The Identity of the European Union as an International Security Actor

A Theoretical Analysis of the European Union’s Security Sector Reform Missions

McLean et al. (2019)

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Summary

This thesis looks at Security Sector Reform (SSR) missions of the European Union (EU). These missions are focused on reforming the security sector in states that are not capable of providing security to its citizens. This thesis found that there is a lack of academic literature that is linking the identity of the EU to specific SSR missions. Besides, this thesis also found that the academic literature on SSR missions lacks theoretical explanations. This thesis fills these gaps, as it is analysing the SSR missions of the EU to find out what kind of international security actor the EU is in these missions. This analysis is done by looking at three different types of powers, namely Normative Power, Realist Power and Liberal Power. The identity of the EU within the SSR missions can be revealed by looking at which kind of power the EU applies during its SSR missions. This thesis used a combination of congruence analysis and causal-process tracing to analyse documents of specific SSR missions. A coding framework that was connected to the different types of powers, was used to find out which power was dominant. This thesis found that the EU applies Normative Power the most frequently during the analysed SSR missions. It can therefore be argued that the EU is a normative international security actor in its SSR missions.
Acknowledgement

Writing this thesis was an interesting and a great learning experience. I have learned more about the EU and its missions. I started with limited knowledge about the EU and its missions and its structure. Now, especially thanks to this thesis, I can say that I understand how the EU operates. During the writing process, I also learned to ask for advice when I experienced some struggles.

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Abbreviations

AMISOM: African Union Mission in Somalia
AU: African Union
BiH: Bosnia and Herzegovina
CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy
COPPS: EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support
CSDP: Common Security and Defence Policy
DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo
EEAS: European External Action Service
ESDP: European Security and Defence Policy
EU: European Union
EUAM: European Union Advisory Mission
EUCAP: European Union Capacity Building Mission in Mali
EULEX: European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
EUMAM: European Union Military Advisory Mission
EUPM: European Union Police Mission
EUPOL: European Union Police Mission
EUSEC: European Security Mission
EUTM: European Union Training Mission
FACA: Central African Armed Forces
ISAF: International Security Assistance Force
LPE: Liberal Power Europe
MONUC: United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>NPE</td>
<td>Normative Power Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNC</td>
<td>Congolese National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCA</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RD</td>
<td>Democratic Republic</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
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<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>UN Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>WOS</td>
<td>Whole-Of-Society</td>
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1. Introduction

1.1 The Security Sector Reform

Today there is greater recognition in the international community and within the EU that security sector reform, or *security system reform* as it is also referred to, reflecting the multi-sector nature of the security system, is an important part of conflict prevention, peace building and democratisation and contributes to sustainable development (Commission of the European Communities, 2006, 3).

Security Sector Reform (SSR) missions are mainly undertaken in post-conflict situations (Dursun-Ozkanca & Vandemoortele, 2012; Council of the European Union, 2005c). They are also undertaken in situations that are considered to be more stable, but that do need improvements to the institutions that address the security of the citizens of the respective state (Commission of the European Communities, 2006; Council of the European Union, 2005c). In these kinds of situations, the security institutions are mostly not capable of ensuring security, and are therefore considered to be weak. These kinds of institutions are most of the times connected to failed states (Skeppström et al., 2015). The SSR missions are focused on reforming the incapable security sector of these kinds of states (Dursun-Ozkanca & Vandemoortele, 2012). The security sector is described by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as follows: “all state institutions and other entities with a role in ensuring the security of the state and its people” (Commission of the European Communities, 2006, 5). This reform is thus done by improving the weak security institutions and entities within the respective states. Because of this, the missions contribute to the reconstruction of post-conflict states (Skeppström et al., 2015; Dursun-Ozkanca & Vandemoortele, 2012).

The European Union (EU) is one of the various organisations that executes these SSR missions (Dursun-Ozkanca & Crossley-Frollick, 2012). These missions are part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (Commission of the European Communities, 2006). Nowadays the ESDP is called the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (European Commission, 2016a). The Commission of the European Communities (2006) argues in its policy framework that the EU’s SSR is focused on reforming the governance of states and at the same time on improving the security for individuals of states. The Commission calls this a holistic approach. Furthermore, there are
certain standards that are important in the EU’s SSR framework. Norms and values, such as democracy and human rights, but also the rule of law, are emphasised. Besides these norms and values, local ownership is also an important point in the framework. Moreover, the framework needs to be in line with the external action of the EU (Council of the European Union, 2005c).

Even though the EU provides a description of how it conceptualises its SSR, and what the SSR framework consists of in its documents, it does not directly provide information about the development of its identity, or about what sort of actor the EU is in the security sector. This thesis aims to gather information about what kind of international security actor the EU is. More specifically, this thesis wants to find out what kind of actor it is during its specific SSR missions. The research question that is central in this thesis is therefore as follows:

‘What kind of international security actor is the European Union in its Security Sector Reform missions?’

1.2 Theoretical and societal relevance

1.2.1 Theoretical relevance

To find out what kind of international security actor the EU is in its SSR missions, this thesis needs to look at three different theories. These theories are realism, liberalism and Normative Power Europe (NPE). From the theories realism and liberalism, this thesis specifically looks at Realist Power and Liberal Power. This thesis therefore elaborates further on already existing dominant theories. More specifically, it contributes to the academic debate on what kind of power is the most applicable to the EU. Furthermore, it contributes to the theoretical literature on the missions of the EU, and more specifically, on the SSR missions of the EU. Because of these contributions to theoretical literature, this thesis is theoretically relevant.

1.2.2 Societal relevance

This thesis provides deeper knowledge about the reasons behind the EU’s SSR missions, and about how the missions are undertaken. Besides, by analysing the specific SSR missions, the knowledge on the identity of the EU will be increased. The EU itself can learn from this,
the Member States can learn from this as well, as it makes the EU and its policies more transparent. Because of this, this thesis is societally relevant.

1.3 Methods

This thesis analyses data by using the congruence analysis and causal-process tracing. The congruence analysis is appropriate in this thesis, as it compares theories, and looks at which theory is the most applicable to the EU’s SSR missions. This research design helps to find out which type of Power, Normative Power, Realist Power and Liberal Power has the most congruence with the SSR missions. To gain more in-depth knowledge about what kind of international security actor the EU is in its SSR missions, the congruence analysis is combined with the research design, causal-process tracing. This research design is appropriate for the data analysis in this thesis, as it uncovers the underlying factors of the international security identity of the EU. Moreover, it uncovers the development of the identity of the EU in its SSR missions.

1.4 Results

This thesis found that the main expectations ‘The EU applies Realist Power in its SSR missions’ and ‘The EU applies Liberal Power in its SSR missions’ are confirmed in all the missions. The main expectation ‘The EU applies Normative Power in its SSR missions’ is confirmed in all the missions, except for one. Despite this, this thesis found that the number of Normative Power codes was dominant among the SSR missions. The second-highest number was the number of Liberal Power codes, and after this the number of Realist Power codes. Because of these results, it can be argued that the EU mainly applies Normative Power in its SSR missions. The EU can therefore be considered a Normative international security actor in its SSR missions.

1.5 Structure

In the subsequent chapters, this thesis will elaborate on the literature review. This chapter presents information about earlier research on the EU as an international security actor. Then it
presents information on the SSR of the EU, but also of the United Nations (UN) and other international organisations. The literature review is followed by a chapter on the theoretical framework. This chapter presents information about theories on the three types of power, Normative Power, Realist Power and Liberal Power. The theoretical framework is followed by a chapter that elaborates on the research designs and methods that are used in this thesis. It also elaborates on the operationalisation of the research project that is carried out, and on the validity and reliability. This chapter is followed by a chapter with the data analysis. It presents the data that is gathered. First, it presents the data that is connected to Normative Power. Then, the data that is connected to Realist Power. Subsequently, the data that is connected to Liberal Power. After this, it compares the data of the three types of power. The data analysis is followed by a chapter that discusses the findings of this thesis. It combines findings from earlier research to the findings that are mentioned in the chapter on the data analysis. Finally, the discussion of findings is followed by a conclusion.
2. Literature review

This chapter first presents an analysis of the academic literature on the role of the EU in the global security sector and the identity of the EU as an international security actor. Then it discusses the views in the academic literature on the EU’s SSR missions. Next, it looks at the academic literature on the UN’s SSR missions. After this, it presents literature that connects SSR missions of various multilateral organisations.

2.1 The European Union as an international security actor

The EU is increasingly becoming an important actor in the global security sector. It desires to provide security on a global level (Kirchner, 2005; Renard, 2014; Rieker, 2009). Because of this desire, it is important to examine the EU as an international security actor. This section therefore analyses how academic literature analyses the role of the EU in the global security sector. Then it analyses the academic literature on the identity of the EU as an international security actor.

2.1.1 The role of the European Union in the global security sector

There is a lot of academic literature on the role of the EU in the global security sector (Kirchner, 2005; Larsen, 2002; Renard, 2014; Rieker, 2009). Some of this academic literature analyses the capability of the EU to be an international security actor. These analyses can, for instance, be done by evaluating the ESDP and the CFSP. Rieker argues that capabilities can be divided into four components: “rights and authorities, resources, competencies and organizational skills” (Rieker, 2009, 704). Rieker found that the EU is not competent enough in the second and fourth components, resources and organisational skills. Because of this lack of competency, the capability of the EU decreases. Despite this decrease, the EU can still be considered an international security actor (Rieker, 2009).

The capability of the EU can also be analysed by examining the approach of the EU to security challenges. Both Renard (2014) and Kirchner (2005) look at various functions within the security sector for this kind of analysis. These analyses provide information about how, and whether the EU fulfils the functions. By focusing on the fulfilment of functions during security challenges, both Renard (2014) and Kirchner (2005) focus on the practice, rather than on the
theory of the EU’s security activities. This focus provides information about the relevance and the capability of the EU, with regard to providing global security (Kirchner, 2005; Rieker, 2009).

Kirchner (2005) evaluates various multilateral organisations, such as the EU, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), instead of only the EU. Based on this analysis, Kirchner argues that the EU is becoming capable of being an international security actor. However, the EU is not capable of being the only security actor (Kirchner, 2005). Renard (2014) uses a different way to analyse the fulfilment of the functions, as Renard compares the fulfilment of the functions on the regional level to the fulfilment on the global level. Renard argues that the EU desires to become an international security actor. However, it is still at the beginning of this process, as the functions are mainly executed on the regional level, rather than the global level.

Larsen (2002) also analyses whether the EU’s role in security is more on a global level or on a regional level. However, Larsen provides criticism on the use of capabilities to analyse the role of the EU. It can be argued that this way of analysing neglects the underlying dynamics of the role of the EU as an international security actor (Larsen, 2002). According to Larsen (2002), a better way to analyse the role of the EU is to look at how the EU presents itself on the global level. After analysing how the EU presents itself, Larsen argues that the role of the EU is on a regional, rather than global level. At the same time, Larsen argues that in the future, this role might turn into a global one.

2.1.2 The identity of the European Union as an international security actor

As mentioned above, there is a large amount of academic literature on the role of the EU in the global security sector. This literature, however, does not discuss the identity of the EU in the global security sector. This section will look at the academic literature that does look at the identity of the EU as an international security actor. This identity is important, because it influences the EU’s position and connections within the world. Manners and Whitman (2003) analyse the identity of the EU by looking at its construction and representation. They examine three views that look at the hybrid structure of the EU. These three views are “network polity, meta-regionalism, and boundedness” (Manners & Whitman, 2003, 384). Besides, they look at what kind of role the EU has, a civilian role, a normative role or a military role. These factors are further analysed by examining explanations that are provided by political theories as well as social theories. Manners and Whitman (2003) find that the international identity of the EU
Palm and Crum (2019) use a different way when focusing on the identity of the EU in the global security sector. They argue that there is a lack of literature that connects missions of the EU to “the evolution of the EU’s identity as an international security actor” (Palm & Crum, 2019, 514). McDonagh (2015) also emphasises the importance of an analysis of the missions when looking at the identity of the EU within the security sector. McDonagh argues that these missions expose the underlying interests and narratives of the EU. These interests and narratives construct the identity of the EU. So, in order to comprehend the identity of the EU as an international security actor, the missions of the EU need to be examined (McDonagh, 2015). Palm and Crum (2019), as well as McDonagh (2015), focus on the military side of the EU’s missions, as they both specifically focus on military missions.

McDonagh (2015, 633) focuses on three narratives underlying military missions. The first narrative is “Europe as Zone of Peace”, which focuses specifically on regionalism and establishing peace within the European region. The second narrative is “Europe as Risk Manager”, and emphasises countering a variety of threats that come from outside Europe. The third narrative “Military Power Europe” focuses on protecting the EU. This protection is not only focused on the security of the EU, but also on the interests of the EU (McDonagh, 2015, 633). McDonagh (2015) found that especially the ‘Europe as Zone of Peace’ and ‘Military Power Europe’ are not incorporated in the analysed missions. Besides, the identity of the EU as an international security actor is still being developed.

Palm and Crum, on the other hand, focus on four different explanations of the development of the international security identity of the EU. These explanations are analysed by looking at the concepts, justification and embeddedness. These four explanations are as follows: “pacifist and interventionist Normative Power, Realist Power and Liberal Power” (Palm & Crum, 2019, 516).

The first two explanations are part of the concept of Manners (2002), NPE. NPE focuses on “the power of ideas rather than that of material capabilities” (Palm & Crum, 2019, 516). The pacifist Normative Power criticises the EU’s emphasis on militarisation, as it decreases its Normative Power. The interventionist Normative Power, on the contrary, argues that militarisation improves the Normative Power of the EU (Palm & Crum, 2019). The third explanation, Realist Power, criticises NPE views. The Realist Power approach argues that the militarisation was used by the EU to improve its role in the world (Palm & Crum, 2019). The fourth explanation, Liberal Power, is connected to the term Liberal Power Europe (LPE). LPE consists of several characteristics, under which pacifistic and open, that make its identity a ‘difference engine’.
emphasises economic factors in the EU’s consideration of the use of militarisation (Palm & Crum, 2019). After analysing these four explanations, Palm and Crum (2019), find that, on the one hand, the first military missions of the EU can be connected to the second explanation, the interventionist Normative Power. The later missions, on the other hand, can be connected to the fourth explanation, the Liberal Power.

Thus, there is a small amount of literature that looks at the EU’s missions to analyse the identity of the EU within the global security sector. This thesis contributes to this literature by focusing on the EU’s missions, as this is an important part of analysing the EU’s identity. Through looking at NPE, Realist Power and Liberal Power, the development of the EU’s identity can be identified. This thesis therefore uses these three theories, rather than the narratives of McDonagh (2015). However, this thesis also contrasts with Palm and Crum (2019). Whereas Palm and Crum focus specifically on the EU’s military missions, this thesis focuses specifically on the SSR missions, to analyse the EU’s identity as an international security actor. This should be researched as there is no academic literature on this specific connection. Besides this difference, Palm and Crum (2019) focus solely on the military side of the missions. In contrast to Palm and Crum, this thesis does not analyse only the military side of the SSR missions. The SSR missions can be military, civilian, or even a combination of both (Council of the European Union, 2005c). The EU thus uses a holistic approach in its SSR missions, “which goes beyond purely military or police aspects”. This approach does incorporate the emphasis on the provision of security (Müller and Zahda, 2018, 121). It is interesting to analyse the so-called holistic approach of the SSR missions, and not solely the military side of the SSR missions.

2.2 The Security Sector Reform

In order to research the identity of the EU as an international actor, this thesis analyses the EU’s SSR missions. The SSR missions have been executed by various multilateral organisations, such as the UN, the EU, and the OSCE. The EU is one of the multilateral organisations that has executed many missions (Dursun-Ozkanca & Crossley-Frolick, 2012). This section analyses the literature on the EU’s SSR missions. Then, it analyses the literature on the UN’s SSR missions. After this, it analyses the literature that connects various SSR missions of different multilateral organisations.
2.2.1 The European Union’s Security Sector Reform

Because of the frequency of the EU’s SSR missions, the SSR missions are an important part of the EU (Dursun-Ozkanca & Crossley-Frollick, 2012), and more specifically, within the CSDP. It is even more important, because the “SSR reveals several interlocking agendas: conflict prevention, crisis management, good governance and enlargement” (Dursun-Ozkanca & Crossley-Frollick, 2012, 238). Researching the EU’s SSR missions would thus provide more information about the agendas of the EU, and researching the missions is therefore relevant.

There is a lot of academic literature on the EU’s SSR activities (Dursun-Ozkanca & Vandemoortele, 2012; Faleg, 2012; Jayasundara-Smits, 2018; Juncos, 2018; Müller & Zahda, 2018; Skeppström et al., 2015). Some of this literature consists of analyses of the EU’s SSR policy. This kind of literature mainly evaluates the successes and failures of the EU’s SSR missions. Skeppström et al. (2015), for instance, analyse the positive and negative effects of the European Union Training Missions (EUTM) that took place in Somalia and Mali. This article concludes that on short-term EUTM could become a success. However, on the longer-term, the mission might show some negative effects. After this conclusion, Skeppström et al. (2015) present advice to the EU to improve its SSR missions.

Another approach of evaluating the EU’s SSR missions is by looking at the way the missions are perceived by the locals. This kind of literature provides a bottom-up perspective, rather than a top-down perspective (Müller & Zahda, 2018). Müller and Zahda (2018) research the EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS), to analyse the attitudes of locals towards the SSR missions. They argue that the locals in Palestine mainly criticise the EU’s SSR missions, because of discrepancies between the EU’s liberal terms in the policies and the failure of implementing these terms during the actual mission. Juncos (2018) also looks at the perceptions of the locals. More specifically, Juncos analyses local resistance towards the EU’s SSR mission in Bosnia. This analysis is done by applying a Foucauldian approach. This approach enables Juncos (2018) to examine the interaction between local stakeholders and international organisations, and the power relations that this interaction entails. Juncos (2018, 112) mainly found the following forms of resistance: “upholding European standards, using the local ownership trap, simulating reforms, and lowering the bar”. Besides, Juncos found that the resistance was controversial, as it not only decreased, but also increased the power of the EU.

Jayasundara-Smits (2018) also focuses on the local aspect. In contrast to Juncos (2018) and Müller & Zahda (2018), Jayasundara-Smits looks more at the context rather than the local
stakeholders. She analyses the context-related challenges to the European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM) Ukraine. This analysis is based on a Whole-Of-Society (WOS) approach, in which the context is emphasised as an element for the success of SSR missions (Jayasundara-Smits, 2018). Jayasundara-Smits (2018) found that especially the security and the politics are context-related challenges for the mission. Another challenge for the mission was the connection with Russia.

A different way of analysing the SSR missions is by providing theoretical explanations of the SSR missions. The amount of academic literature that provides theoretical explanations of the SSR missions is however small (Dursun-Ozkanca & Vandemoortele, 2012). Faleg (2012) is an example of literature that provides such a kind of explanation. Faleg (2012) analyses the EU’s SSR missions by focusing on the epistemic learning approach. With this approach, Faleg explains the evolution of the SSR policy of the EU. Faleg (2012, 179) argues that “knowledge and ideas shaping interests” enable the SSR policy to develop.

Other academic literature that provides theoretical explanations connects the EU’s SSR missions to liberal theories. Müller and Zahda (2018) argue that EUPOL COPPS is strongly connected to liberal norms. These liberal norms are not specifically linked to this mission, but rather to the EU in general. Müller and Zahda (2018) therefore connect the peacebuilding missions of the EU to NPE, the aforementioned concept of Manners. NPE puts an emphasis on “liberal norms - such as liberty, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law” (Müller & Zahda, 2018, 121). Müller and Zahda (2018) argue that the policies of the EU, with regard to its missions, are based on NPE, as it could stimulate acceptance of the missions. These policies are however criticised because they are considered to be too western, and because of discrepancies between different policies. Juncos (2018) complements Müller and Zahda (2018), as Juncos argues that the EU uses governmentality, a liberal approach, in its SSR missions to justify these missions. The liberal governmentality approach of the EU’s SSR is based on the idea that state institutions can be improved by implementing liberal norms. The SSR mission in Bosnia is also based on this idea, according to Juncos (2018).

Thus, within the academic literature, there is often a strong focus on a specific SSR mission, which means that there is a lack of literature that compares different missions. Besides, only a small amount of literature provides theoretical explanations for the SSR missions. A part of this literature focuses on NPE and liberal approaches. These approaches are also connected to the four abovementioned explanations of the identity as an international security actor that Palm and Crum (2019) describe. There is thus a connection between the EU’s SSR missions and the theories that provide explanations for the identity of the EU in the global security sector.
2.2.2 The United Nations’ Security Sector Reform

As mentioned before, there are multiple multilateral organisations that execute SSR missions. The UN is considered to be an important actor within this field, as it has experience in improving the security in unstable countries. Besides experience, the UN is also considered to be legitimate, which increases its importance (Hänggi & Scherrer, 2008). Researching the UN’s SSR missions is therefore relevant.

The academic literature on the UN’s SSR missions consists, just like the literature on the EU, mostly of analyses that evaluate the SSR missions. These analyses mostly focus on one specific SSR mission. Mobekk (2009) is one such author, as she analyses a UN mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, called MONUC. Mobekk (2009) argues that the mission had achieved some successes, but that the implementation of the SSR policy was not executed successfully. Hood (2006) is another author that provides an analysis of a UN’s SSR mission, as Hood researches the mission in East Timor, called UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). Hood (2006) presents successes in this mission, but provides criticism at the same time. Mendelson-Forman (2006) also provides criticism on an SSR mission of the UN in Haiti. Hänggi and Scherrer (2008) on the contrary, do not focus on a specific SSR mission. Instead, they analyse the successes and failures of the approach of the UN in its SSR missions. Hänggi and Scherrer (2008, 498) argue that the UN does not “possess an integrated SSR approach”. All this literature, that consists of analyses, conclude with a piece of advice for improving the UN’s SSR missions (Mobekk, 2009; Hood, 2006; Mendelson-Forman, 2006; Hänggi & Scherrer, 2008).

Another similarity between the literature on the UN’s SSR missions and the literature on the EU’s SSR missions is the focus on the local aspect of the SSR missions. Podder (2013) looks at the “interplay between international approaches and local realities”. Podder analyses this by looking at a UN’s SSR mission in Liberia (UNMIL). It is argued that the local aspect within this interplay is neglected by the UN during this SSR mission (Podder, 2013). Newby (2017) complements Podder (2013) since she looks at a UN mission in Lebanon, namely the UN Interim Force (UNIFIL). More specifically, Newby (2017) researches how an SSR mission can improve the legitimacy of institutions on a local level.

Thus, just like the analysis of the academic literature on the SSR missions of the EU, the analysis of the literature on the ones of the UN also shows a gap in the literature that provides theoretical explanations for the missions. It also shows a gap in the literature that provides comparisons of multiple SSR missions.
2.2.3 Security Sector Reform missions of different organisations

As mentioned above, there is much academic literature on the SSR missions of the EU and the UN. There is, however, not so much written on the collaboration of various multilateral organisations on the SSR, even though this collaboration is becoming more and more common (Dursun-Ozkanca & Crossley-Frolick, 2012). Dursun-Ozkanca and Crossley-Frolick (2012) do research the collaboration of multiple multilateral organisations, such as the EU and the UN, on a specific location, namely Kosovo. More specifically, they research the labour division with regard to SSR missions in Kosovo. Dursun-Ozkanca and Crossley-Frolick (2012) criticise the coordination between the various organisations. Schroeder et al. (2014) also do not look at one specific organisation that executes SSR missions. Instead, they look at different cases, Palestine, Liberia, and Timor-Leste, and how different external actors have affected the local security sectors in these places. By looking at this, Schroeder et al. (2014) analyse the discourses of security governance that these various external actors use. Schroeder et al. (2014) found that the standards of these discourses, used by the various organisations, were not or only partly accepted by the locals.

2.3 Conclusion

To conclude, an analysis of the academic literature on the EU as an international security actor shows that there is not much academic literature that connects the identity of the EU in the global security sector to specific missions of the EU. With regard to the academic literature on the SSR missions of both the EU and the UN, there is a gap in the literature that provides theoretical explanations for the SSR missions. It also shows that there is a gap in the literature that analyses and compares various SSR missions. Furthermore, there is a lack of literature that compares different organisations.

This thesis connects different SSR missions to theories about the identity of the EU as an international security actor. Even though there is a lack of literature on the collaboration between various organisations on SSR missions, this thesis will be too short to also analyse this collaboration. Thus, this thesis can fill in these other specific gaps in the academic literature on both the SSR missions and the identity of the EU as an international actor, and is therefore considered to be innovative.
3. Theoretical framework

This chapter presents the significant theories in this thesis. It elaborates on the explanations of the international security identity of Palm and Crum (2019), Normative Power, Realist Power, and Liberal Power. Whereas Palm and Crum (2019) divide Normative Power into pacifist Normative Power and interventionist Normative Power, this thesis does not make this distinction. Palm and Crum argue that these forms of power provide explanations for the development of the international security identity of the EU. Because of this, these explanations divide the theoretical debate on what kind of international actor the EU is (Palm & Crum, 2019; Smith, 2011). Analysing these three forms of power will thus provide an answer to the research question of this thesis. These three forms of power form therefore the theoretical framework.

The three main expectations in this thesis are based on these explanations, and they are as follows: The EU applies Normative Power in its SSR missions, the EU applies Realist Power in its SSR missions, and the EU applies Liberal Power in its SSR missions. Smith (2011) argues, however, that academic literature on how the EU applies these kinds of power is ambiguous. This thesis contributes to this academic debate, by focusing on various underlying expectations. These underlying expectations analyse the legitimisation that the EU uses in its SSR missions, thus providing information on the ‘why’ behind the SSR missions. They also analyse how the EU carries out the missions, thus providing information on the ‘how’ of the SSR missions. The underlying expectations linked to each of these expectations are derived from the theories presented in this chapter, and will be presented throughout this chapter. This chapter is structured in the following way: First, it presents the NPE explanation, including the pacifist Normative Power and the interventionist Normative Power. Then, it presents the Realist Power explanation. After this, it presents the Liberal Power explanation.

3.1 Normative Power

Manners (2002, 238) argues that “the power of ideas and norms rather than the power of empirical force”, should be analysed to comprehend the position of the EU in the global security sector. This approach is the basis of the concept NPE, as the Normative Power of the EU is focused on ideas instead of on material instruments (Whitman, 2013). As mentioned in the literature review, the international security identity, as well as the EU’s SSR missions, can be connected to NPE.
Manners (2002, 240) provides three reasons that cause the EU to be normative, namely the “historical context, hybrid polity and political-legal constitution” of the EU. First, the establishment of the EU took place in a situation in which the Member States wanted to work together to ensure peace after various wars occurred. Second, the EU’s governance structure is hybrid. It consists of different states, with different principles. Because of this construction, all the Member States of the EU need to agree on the principles that are being used by the EU. Third, the political-legal constitution is strongly based on the norms of the EU. The EU’s international identity is influenced by its norms, such as democracy and human rights, as these have been important to the EU throughout the years. These norms play therefore a significant role in the EU’s foreign policies. These kinds of factors make the EU different from other international organisations. It can be argued that this dissimilarity causes the EU to be normative (Manners, 2002).

Manners (2002, 240) provides a description of three forms of power: civilian power, which means the “ability to use civilian instruments”, military power the “ability to use military instruments”, and Normative Power the “ability to shape conceptions of ‘normal’”. NPE looks at the latter form of power, rather than the first two forms of power, and connects this to the EU (Manners, 2002). NPE is thus not connected to military means, nor is it connected to economic means. Instead, NPE is focused on means in terms of norms, which replace the effect of the military and economic means (Diez, 2005). NPE is about “promoting norms and values” around the world (Sjursen, 2006, 241). Furthermore, Diez (2005) argues that NPE also forms the basis of the identity of the EU, as it contributes to the EU’s perception of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’.

Palm and Crum (2019) divide the NPE concept into two other concepts, pacifist Normative Power and interventionist Normative Power. Both of these concepts focus on militarisation. According to Manners (2006) and Diez (2005), militarisation has become a priority in the EU’s policies, rather than civilian means. This is especially seen in the ESDP and the CFSP operations. “This prioritization includes the emphasis given to identifying and achieving military capabilities ahead of civilian capabilities” (Manners, 2006, 189).

The pacifist Normative Power concept argues that the EU’s focus on militarisation decreases its Normative Power (Palm & Crum, 2019). The EU focuses more and more on the “short-term problem-solving” rather than on the “long-term structural solutions” or a balance of both, due to the emphasis on militarisation (Manners, 2006, 194). Normative Power entails that the EU should combine both short-term and long-term practices, and as this combination diminishes, the Normative Power of the EU also diminishes (Manners, 2006). Besides, it can be argued that the militarisation of the EU could transform the EU into a sort of dominant state.
Palm and Crum (2019) argue that, in contrast to the pacifist Normative Power concept, the interventionist Normative Power concept has a more positive stance towards the militarisation of EU, as it would improve the Normative Power of the EU. Militarisation would thus not decrease the Normative Power of the EU (Manners, 2006). Militarisation can even stimulate the advancement of the important norms of the EU mentioned above (Stavridis, 2001). Even though this division is important, and provides information on the use of military force, this thesis focuses not solely on the use of military force, as mentioned before. Because of this focus, this thesis rather looks at the following factors of Sjursen (2006).

Sjursen (2006) argues that the EU’s policies that consist of ‘real’ Normative Power need to be set apart from normative arguments based on one’s own interests. This division can be made by looking at the provided justification of the norms used in the EU’s policies. Providing such a justification discloses the possibility that the policy is based on one’s own interest. Moreover, the justification of norms used in the policy, needs to be accepted by the people involved in the policy. Besides justification, the application is also important. The norms in the policy need to be applicable to a specific context. Another way of making the division is by looking at law and rules underlying the EU’s policies, which is important, because “to ‘act in a normative way’ would then be to act in accordance with legal principles” (Sjursen, 2006, 245). It needs to be analysed how, for instance, the EU incorporates human rights into its framework. If the EU provides a justification, ensures applicability to the context, and acts in line with the law and rules, the legitimacy of the promotion of the norms increases (Sjursen, 2006).

If this theory is right, the data will show that the EU’s SSR missions are based on the promotion of the EU’s norms and values. Underlying this expectation, the data will show that the EU provides a justification of the specific norms during its SSR missions. These two expectations focus on the legitimisation of the missions. Besides these expectations, the data will also show that the norms in the EU’s SSR missions are adapted to ensure applicability to the context, and that the EU’s SSR missions are in line with legal principles. These two expectations focus on how the EU carries out the missions.
3.2 Realist Power

The concept Realist Power opposes the NPE concept (Palm & Crum, 2019), as realists point out the importance of military means, because “the key to survival in war is military power” (Posen, 2006, 153). Realists emphasise states rather than international organisations, such as the EU. However, it can be argued that the EU behaves like a state, and could therefore be considered to be important for realists (Palm & Crum, 2019). Realists claim that the international system is structured in an anarchic manner. In this anarchy, competition and clashes of interests are natural (Hyde-Price, 2008). Moreover, realists claim that survival in this anarchic international system means that states can only rely on their own, and not on other states (Posen, 2006).

The EU is also located within this anarchic international system. This means that, even though the EU argues that its decisions are in the interest of the world (Hyde-Price, 2008), the choices of the EU are motivated by its own interests (Palm & Crum, 2019; Hyde-Price, 2008). Besides, the decisions of the EU are “heavily constrained by the structural dynamics of a competitive, self-help system” (Hyde-Price, 2008, 37). Some of these decisions can be seen as normative. However, as mentioned above, these decisions do not imply Normative Power, as they are based on the EU’s own interests (Sjursen, 2006). An example is that the EU is interested in an international milieu in which its security and wealth can be ensured (Hyde-Price, 2008). Because of this, the choices made by the EU are based on strategies, which is in contrast to what NPE argues (Sjursen, 2006).

Another realist explanation for the role of the EU in the global security sector is based on the perception of a threat. This perception of a threat is strongly connected to the amount of power a state or a state-like organisation has. The amount of power one has is always being compared to the amount of power the other has (Pohl, 2013; Posen, 2006). This means that the anarchic international system causes states to always strive to have more power than the other. The perceived threat is often linked to unipolarity, which means that there is a single state with a lot of power. Such a state is often perceived as a threat. The US can be considered such a state, as it is extremely powerful because of its capacities with regard to military, technology and economy (Pohl, 2013; Posen, 2006). According to realists, states, or state-like powers, try to cope with this unipolarity (Pohl, 2013). There are certain methods that these powers can use to cope with this threat.

States counter this threat through balancing it (Cladi & Locatelli, 2012). Balancing would cause a “shift in the balance of power” (Pohl, 2013, 309). As the US has a lot of power,
the EU would thus try to balance the US, so that it can be more independent from the domination of the US. The EU can do this, by focusing specifically on expanding its autonomy within the security sector, through its CSDP (Cladi & Locatelli, 2012; Krotz, 2009; Posen, 2006). Next to expanding its autonomy, the EU could also focus on developing its own capacities, especially military capacities, in the global security sector (Posen, 2006). Furthermore, the EU could also balance the US by inhibiting the power of the US (Pohl, 2013). This can be done by executing missions that go against the preferences of the US (Pohl, 2013; Posen, 2006). Another way of balancing is by working together with a different state, and to form an alliance against the threat (Posen, 2006).

A different way to ‘fight’ the threat is bandwagoning, which means that a state would try to cooperate with the threat, rather than balance it. In the case of the EU, this means that the EU would cooperate with the US (Cladi & Locatelli, 2012), through, for instance, NATO (Posen, 2006). Bandwagoning can be used by states to gain more power themselves, and to have more security (Cladi & Locatelli, 2012; Posen, 2006). Bandwagoning is therefore an attractive tactic, especially for smaller powers (Cladi & Locatelli, 2012; Posen, 2006). Even though the military capabilities of the EU should not be underestimated, the balance of power between the EU and the US is asymmetrical, in which the US is more powerful (Cladi & Locatelli, 2012; Posen, 2006). It is therefore argued that bandwagoning is more appropriate due to this power asymmetry (Cladi & Locatelli, 2012). On the other hand, bandwagoning could have as a consequence that the interests of the EU become conditioned by the US, which could mean that the EU has to adhere to the interests of the US, rather than its own (Cladi & Locatelli, 2012).

If this theory is right, the data will show that the EU’s SSR missions are based on the EU’s strategic interests. Besides, the data will show that the missions respond to unipolarity in the world by either balancing or bandwagoning. The first expectation focuses on the legitimisation, while the latter two focus on how the EU carries out the missions.

### 3.3 Liberal Power

Palm and Crum (2019) describe the Liberal Power concept as Liberal Power Europe (LPE). LPE criticises the Realist Power concept, arguing that the Realist perspective is not applicable to the EU (Palm & Crum, 2019). More specifically, the two aforementioned realist methods, balancing and bandwagoning are not applicable to CSDP operations (Hyde-Price, 2013). It is
also argued by liberals that these two methods will not happen, because the states with a lot of power are mostly liberal states, and thus have the same liberal norms in common with the EU. These states are therefore not seen as threats (Posen, 2006). Wagner (2017) argues that LPE has one significant similarity with NPE. Both forms of power emphasise the importance of human rights and democratic norms within the EU. They both argue that these norms strongly influence the decisions of the EU within the security sector.

A dissimilarity between LPE and NPE is that LPE argues that the power of the EU consists of both means and ideas, while NPE argues that it consists only of ideas. LPE does argue that it varies how much influence each of these has on the EU’s power (Wagner, 2017). LPE also criticises NPE. NPE for instance only looks at the driving force of these norms. LPE, on the contrary, does not only look at the driving force behind the EU’s missions, but also at the constraints that the EU experiences during its missions. Besides, the political side of the aforementioned norms is ignored by NPE. LPE does pay attention to this political side. It describes the EU’s policies as political, rather than normative. According to liberalists, the EU makes decisions in its foreign policy, and in its use of norms, and “each of these decisions is highly political in the sense that abstract norms and values have to be applied to specific cases and balanced against possibly conflicting norms and values” (Wagner, 2017, 1406).

Liberalists argue that the choices made in the CSDP policies are influenced by the Member States, and its preferences. It can even be argued that the interests of the Member States are central in the CSDP policies (Pohl, 2013). Because the EU’s actions in the security sector can be described as high politics, the Member States have even more influence on the EU’s actions (Krotz, 2009). The Member States are in turn influenced by the opinions and expectations of its citizens. Liberalists argue that Member States shape their foreign policies based on the “expected domestic political consequences” (Pohl, 2013, 319). Pohl (2013) argues that this argument can also be seen in the CSDP missions. However, not only citizens, but also interest groups play an important role in shaping the Member States’ and the EU’s policies. It differs per case whether citizens or interest groups play a more significant role (Wagner, 2017).

Furthermore, liberalists emphasise the security of individuals. The use of military means is therefore focused on providing this security. This emphasis is strongly linked to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and liberal peacebuilding. Liberalists argue that the EU would establish peace by implementing democratic norms. These democratic norms make the government responsible for providing security for individuals (Wagner, 2017). Besides, according to liberalists, the EU is avoiding risks and victims in its missions. This avoidance strategy is mostly focused on its own troops, which means that the EU encourages local troops,
rather than its own, to tackle the conflict, so that its own citizens are still safe. This strategy thus contrasts with the principle to ensure the security of individuals. Another avoidance strategy is using specialised technology, such as drones. LPE thus pays attention to contrasting principles, and constraints of the EU (Wagner, 2017). Wagner (2017) argues that the avoidance method can be analysed by looking at how many victims there are in the local troops and in the EU troops. Besides, it can be analysed by looking at the relations between the EU and private contractors in the security sector. According to Wagner (2017), the EU has implemented this avoidance method during certain missions within CSDP, such as various SSR missions, and it can therefore be argued that the EU applies Liberal Power.

If this theory is right, the data will show that first, the EU’s SSR missions are influenced by the Member States, which are in turn influenced by domestic interests. Secondly, the data will show that the EU’s SSR missions are based on the ambition to provide security for individuals. These two expectations provide information on the legitimisation of the missions. Thirdly, the data will show that the EU’s SSR missions apply an avoidance method. This expectation provides information on how the EU carries out the missions.
4. Research design and methods

This chapter will present the methodology of this thesis. It will first elaborate on the research designs used in this thesis. Then on the operationalisation of this research design. Finally, it will discuss how the validity and reliability of the methodology will be ensured.

4.1 Research design

There are various research designs that can be used for data analysis. This thesis will use the combination of two qualitative research designs for its data analysis, congruence analysis and causal-process tracing. This section will elaborate on the incorporation of congruence analysis and then causal-process tracing in this thesis.

4.1.1 Congruence analysis

The research design congruence analysis is focused on theories (Blatter & Haverland, 2012). This thesis is also focused on three different kinds of theories, Normative Power, Realist Power and Liberal Power, which are selected based on literature, and further elaborated on in Chapter three. By using the congruence analysis as a research design, this thesis fills in the gap of theories on SSR missions. It provides theoretical explanations to the EU’s SSR missions. These explanations, in turn, provide explanations for the EU’s identity as an international security actor. Moreover, this thesis focuses on important theories, normative, realist and liberal theories. Besides, as mentioned in Chapter one, the research question is as follows: ‘What kind of international security actor is the European Union in its Security Sector Reform missions?’ This research question is thus not focused on a specific result or an effect. It rather uses the three theories to analyse the identity of the EU as an international security actor in its SSR missions. Because of this focus on theories, using congruence analysis as a research design is appropriate.

The important characteristics of these theories are already analysed, and formulated as expectations in Chapter three. In this chapter, these expectations will be further operationalised in more concrete and specific terms. Blatter and Haverland (2012) argue that this contributes to finding solid evidence. In Chapter five, the expectations, with the specific codes, are connected to the empirical information. The congruence between the theory and the observations will be
analysed per theory. Then this congruence will be compared to the other theories. The theory with the most congruence provides the best explanation for the EU’s identity. When a specific theory does not indicate congruence, that theory does not apply to the EU’s identity. Blatter and Haverland (2012) argue that the evidence is the most valuable when either NPE, Liberal Power or Realist Power shows congruence, while the other two do not.

To dive deeper into the underlying factors of the EU’s identity as an international security actor, the congruence analysis will be combined with another research design, namely causal-process tracing.

4.1.2 Causal-process tracing

Blatter and Haverland (2012) argue that causal-process tracing can be used in addition to the congruence analysis to discover if there is congruence between the three theories and the empirical data. Because of this argument, this thesis analyses the SSR missions by using causal-process tracing. The research design causal-process tracing is focused on “the many and complex causes of a specific outcome” (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, 80). More specifically, the goal of using causal-process tracing as a research design in this thesis is to find out more about the underlying factors that cause the EU to be a specific international security actor, and whether the identity of the EU has changed throughout the missions.

This thesis analyses all the three following types of data of causal-process tracing, ‘smoking guns’, ‘confessions’, and ‘comprehensive storylines’ in its data analysis. The empirical observations in this thesis are thus collected through these three types of data, and will be presented in Chapter five. First, this thesis looks at the type of data ‘smoking gun’ to gather empirical observations. Blatter and Haverland (2012) argue that to increase the value of the evidence, various observations in one specific SSR mission need to be made. This thesis analyses a specific mission, while making various observations. These various observations provide information on whether the EU is a normative, realist or liberal actor in a specific mission.

There is one downside to this type of data, as it does not always expose the real interests of the EU during its SSR missions (Blatter & Haverland, 2012). In order to solve this problem, the type of data ‘smoking guns’ is complemented by the type of data ‘confessions’, which means that this thesis specifically analyses the EU’s documents by looking at the explicit comments that the EU makes about its interests and motivations in its SSR missions. Adding
the ‘confessions’ to the ‘smoking guns’ provides information about why the EU can be considered a specific actor. It makes the observations more in-depth.

After these types of data, this thesis will also look at the ‘comprehensive storyline’ type of data. This means that after analysing a specific mission, this thesis compares all the different missions. It looks whether these missions are similar or have changed over time, and in what ways they are similar or dissimilar. By doing this analysis, specific ‘turning points’ can be recognised (Blatter & Haverland, 2012), which provides information about the development of the identity of the EU over time.

Through these three types of data, and the analysis of the three theories, which all focus on analysing SSR missions, the kind of power the EU uses during specific SSR missions will be uncovered. According to the theory mentioned in Chapters two and three, the EU’s identity as an international security actor will in turn also be uncovered.

4.2 Operationalisation

In this section, the operationalisation of the aforementioned expectations of this thesis will be elaborated on. First, this section presents the coding framework that is used in the data analysis. Then, it discusses the selection of the cases. After this, it discusses the documents that are used for the data analysis.

4.2.1 Coding framework

In the data analysis, the empirical data will be gathered through three coding frameworks. Each of the documents will be analysed through the coding frameworks, consisting of main codes and sub-codes. The sub-codes will be the concrete measurements of the main codes. Together they form the basis of the main code. The documents will be coded on a paragraph level. The codes in these coding frameworks will be connected to the underlying expectations. These underlying expectations are namely the fundamental components of the main expectations. Analysing the codes of the underlying expectations therefore provides information about the main expectations. The expectations will thus be measured through these codes.

The codes will be aggregated on the level of the mission. Because of this aggregation, the measurements will provide information about the focus of the missions, as it shows whether
the codes of Normative Power, Realist Power or Liberal Power are the most frequent within a specific mission. Because of this, it will become clear when the EU applies Normative Power, Realist Power or Liberal Power during specific SSR missions.

The first main expectation is: ‘The EU applies Normative Power in its SSR missions’. The main codes, the sub-codes and examples of the first main expectation can be viewed in Table 1. The first of the underlying expectations is: ‘The EU’s SSR missions are based on the promotion of the EU’s norms and values’. To measure this expectation, documents will specifically be analysed through terms like fostering, promoting, spreading, strengthening combined with terms like democracy, human rights, rule of law.

The second underlying expectation is: ‘The EU provides a justification of the specific norms in its SSR missions’. To measure this expectation, the documents will be analysed by focusing on explanations that are provided by the EU for its use of norms and values in its SSR missions. This explanation should involve an improvement in the local situation and/or standards as a result of the implementation of norms and values. The third underlying expectation is: ‘The norms in the EU’s SSR missions are adapted to ensure applicability to the context’. This expectation will be measured through looking at how the EU mentions the local aspect and context in its documents. The fourth underlying hypothesis is: ‘The EU’s SSR missions are in line with legal principles’. This expectation will be analysed by looking at the principles and rules on which the EU’s SSR framework and missions are based, and how these are described in the documents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1 Main codes</th>
<th>Sub-codes</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Promotion of norms and values</td>
<td>Fostering democracy</td>
<td>“Fostering democracy” (Council of the European Union, 2005c, 4).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implementing EU standards</td>
<td>“Adhering to internationally recognised standards and European best practices” (Council of the European Union, 2008b, 93).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stimulating human rights</td>
<td>“EUAM RCA shall promote the implementation of international humanitarian law and human rights” (Council of the European Union, 2019c, 142).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Promotion of norms and values</td>
<td>Strengthening the rule of law</td>
<td>“EU activities could support SSR by contributing to strengthen or reorganize justice and other rule of law structures” (Council of the European Union, 2005c, 15).</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.2 Justification of norms</td>
<td>Commitment to the norms encourages stability in the region</td>
<td>“A continued commitment of EU political effort and resources will help to embed stability in the region” (Council of the European Union, 2005a, 20).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implementing EU standards strengthens stability in the region</td>
<td>“Strengthening stability in the region in line with its European perspective” (Council of the European Union, 2008b, 92).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthening norms raises standards</td>
<td>“In accordance with best European and international practice, and thereby raising current BiH police standards” (Council of the European Union, 2002, 5).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Applicability to the context</td>
<td>Adaptation to the situation</td>
<td>“Adapted to the specific country situation” (Council of the European Union, 2005c, 4 &amp; 11).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Focus on national plans and policies</td>
<td>“Contribute to the implementation of the Iraqi National Security Strategy” (Council of the European Union, 2017c, 12).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local ownership</td>
<td>“SSR has to be locally owned” (Council of the European Union, 2005c, 5).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The interest of the local people</td>
<td>“The Republic of Mali sent a letter inviting the Union to deploy a Union civilian mission to support the Malian security forces” (Council of the European Union, 2014a, 21).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Legal principles</td>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>“Taking into account human rights” (Council of the European Union, 2015b, 14).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.4 Legal principles

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>International principles</th>
<th>“Acting according to international standards and respecting human rights” (Council of the European Union, 2005c, 4).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislation and regulations</td>
<td>“Act in a professional manner and in accordance with relevant legislation and regulations” (Council of the European Union, 2002, 5).</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Rule of law</td>
<td>“Working as an integral part of the broader rule of law approach” (Council of the European Union, 2002, 5).</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Table 1. Coding framework of the first main expectation.*

The second main expectation is: ‘The EU applies Realist Power in its SSR missions’. The main codes, the sub-codes and examples of this expectation are presented in Table 2. The first underlying expectation is: ‘The EU’s SSR missions are based on the EU’s strategic interests’. To measure this expectation, the documents are analysed by looking at whether the EU is focused on its interests during its SSR missions. The second and third underlying expectations, ‘The EU’s SSR missions are balancing tactics’ and ‘The EU’s SSR missions are bandwagoning tactics’, are examples of responses to unipolarity. The second expectation will be measured by analysing if the EU expresses in its documents that it has autonomous capabilities in its SSR missions, and/or that it wants to increase its autonomous capabilities due to the SSR missions, and capabilities in general. Besides, it will be analysed if the EU mentions that there is a focus on its military capacity, and an increase of this military capacity. The third expectation will be measured by looking at the documents if the EU mentions cooperation or coordination with a powerful state or organisation.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>2 Main codes</th>
<th>Sub-codes</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Strategic</td>
<td>Creating a favourable milieu</td>
<td>“Ensure that cases of war crimes, terrorism, organised crime, corruption, inter-ethnic crimes, financial/economic crimes and other serious crimes are properly investigated, prosecuted, adjudicated and enforced” (Council of the European Union, 2008b, 93).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interests</td>
<td>Strategic objectives</td>
<td>“SSR plays an important role in serving the EU’s strategic objectives” (Council of the European Union, 2005c, 5).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Balancing</td>
<td>Autonomous capabilities</td>
<td>“Without prejudice to the decision-making autonomy of the Union and its single institutional framework” (Council of the European Union, 2019c, 144).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tactic</td>
<td>Increasing capabilities</td>
<td>“As we increase capabilities in different areas, we should think in terms of a wider spectrum of missions. This might include … security sector reform” (Council of the European Union, 2005c, 5).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military capacity</td>
<td>“The EU is uniquely placed to bring together a wide range of civilian and/or military activities needed in the framework of SSR” (Council of the European Union, 2005c, 10).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Bandwagoning</td>
<td>Coordination with NATO</td>
<td>“Establish and maintain an effective link with key international actors operating in the civilian Security Sector Reform, notably … NATO” (Council of the European Union, 2018c, 32).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tactic</td>
<td>Coordination with the US</td>
<td>“It would be conducted in close coordination with partners, including … the United States of America” (Council of the European Union, 2010a, 17).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 2. Coding framework of the second main expectation.*
The third main expectation is: ‘The EU applies Liberal Power in its SSR missions’. The main codes, the sub-codes and examples of this expectation are presented in Table 3. The first underlying expectation is: ‘The EU’s SSR missions are influenced by the Member States, which are in turn influenced by domestic interests’. This expectation can be measured by looking at the term ‘Member States’ in the documents, and in what way this is mentioned. It will be analysed whether the Member States have influenced the SSR missions, and whether the missions are based on the interests of the Member States. Besides, this expectation will also be analysed by looking at the influence of domestic interests. This domestic interests entails the interests of the EU’s citizens and interest groups.

The second underlying expectation is: ‘The EU’s SSR missions are based on the ambition to provide security for individuals’. This expectation is measured by analysing the documents for terms like safety, security and well-being combined with terms like citizens, individuals, or the people. The third underlying expectation is: ‘The EU’s SSR missions apply an avoidance method’. This expectation can be measured by looking at whether the EU delegates responsibilities to the local troops in the documents, and by looking at terms like specialised technology. Besides this way of measuring, this expectation can also be measured by looking at whether the EU states that it is responsible or not.
3 Main codes | Sub-codes | Examples
---|---|---
**3.1 Influence of the Member States** | Coordination with Member States | “Close co-ordination between the Council, Member States and the Commission” (Council of the European Union, 2005c, 12).

**3.2 Providing security for individuals** | Protection of civilians | “The ultimate goal which is to reach a situation where the security system is organised in a way which ensures … the protection of individuals” (Council of the European Union, 2005c, 10).

| Serving the citizens | “As a functioning government serving all Somali citizens” (Council of the European Union, 2011a, 37).

**3.3 Avoidance method** | The EU cannot be held liable | “Under no circumstances may the contributing States hold the Union or the HR liable for acts or omissions by EUAM Ukraine in the use of the funds provided by those States” (Council of the European Union, 2014c, 46).

| The mission shall not be involved in combat operations | “EUTM Mali shall not be involved in combat operations” (Council of the European Union, 2020a, 2).

*Table 3. Coding framework of the third main expectation.*

### 4.2.2 Selection of the cases

For the data analysis, the cases that are selected are all the SSR missions of the EU, mentioned in Table 4. Some of these cases literally mention ‘SSR’ in its documents, so these are SSR missions. The other cases are mentioned in the ‘Joint Staff Working Document’ that is focused on analysing the SSR framework and missions of the EU (European Commission, 2016b). All the cases are somewhat similar, as they are executed by the same actor, and are all focused on the same goal, the reform of the security sector in various states.

As argued by Palm and Crum (2019) in Chapter two, analysing specific missions of the
EU will provide information about the EU’s international security identity. These SSR missions are especially interesting, as they focus on the security sector. Because of this focus, it could uncover the identity of the EU within the international security sector even more.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>SSR missions</strong></th>
<th><strong>Date of establishment</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUPM BiH (Bosnia and Herzegovina)</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSEC RD Congo</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOLE Afghanistan</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOLE RD Congo</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU SSR Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>EULEX Kosovo</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM Somalia</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM Mali</td>
<td>2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUAM Ukraine</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCAP Sahel Mali</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMAM RCA (Central African Republic)</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM RCA</td>
<td>2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUAM Iraq</td>
<td>2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUAM RCA</td>
<td>2019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 4. The EU’s SSR missions (See Appendix A).*

### 4.2.3 Documents

The documents that are analysed are mainly legislative documents on the SSR missions of the EU. These documents consist of Council Decisions, Council Conclusions, Council Joint Actions, and Commission Decisions. The documents that are used to analyse specific SSR missions are the Council Joint Actions and Council Decisions. Each mission before 2009 will be analysed by the Council Joint actions, whereas each mission after 2009 will be analysed by the Council Decisions. The Council Decisions namely replaced the Council Joint Actions, when the Treaty of Lisbon was established in 2009 (EU Monitor, n.d.).

In these documents, the Council of the EU writes about establishing or amending a specific SSR mission. The documents that are analysed are thus about the plans of the EU with regard to its SSR missions. This thesis therefore analyses the carrying out of the SSR missions.
based on the plans, rather than the execution of the missions. Most of the Council Joint Actions and Council Decisions have extended and amended versions. Especially the older missions have been amended multiple times, and have therefore various versions. These amended versions will also be analysed. Within these documents on the specific SSR missions, the mandates will receive the most attention during the data analysis. These mandates are specifically interesting to analyse, as these provide information about the objectives of the missions.

4.3 Validity and reliability

The internal and external validity of this thesis need to be ensured. Concerning the internal validity, this will be ensured by using the causal-process tracing as an addition to the congruence analysis. This is the case because the causal-process tracing research design specifically looks at whether there is a real connection between the independent variable and the dependent variable (Blatter & Haverland, 2012). In this thesis, this means the connection between the international identity of the EU and the EU’s SSR missions. Furthermore, the expectations of one theory are distinct from the expectations of the other theories. These factors cause the internal validity to increase.

Concerning the external validity of this thesis, the findings of this thesis are hard to generalise. Analysing the EU’s SSR missions, and comparing these missions, provide information on the development of the international identity of the EU in the security sector. This information is thus completely focused on the EU’s identity, which makes it hard to generalise the findings to other organisations. With regard to theoretical generalisation, this thesis does not look at so-called ‘crucial cases’. The SSR missions are not selected based on ‘most-likely’ and ‘least-likely’ cases (Blatter & Haverland, 2012). Because of this, this thesis especially focuses on the internal validity.

The reliability of this thesis will be increased because of the connection between the coding frameworks of Tables 1, 2 and 3, and specific documents of the EU. This means that the codes will be applied to each document. Blatter and Haverland (2012) argue that in order to increase the validity, as well as the reliability, of a congruence analysis, the expectations of the thesis need to be presented first, rather than the empirical data. This is also done in this thesis, as the expectations are already presented in Chapter three.
5. Data analysis

This chapter will focus on the data analysis that will lead to the answer to the research question of this thesis, ‘What kind of international security actor is the European Union in its Security Sector Reform missions?’ This research question will be researched by using both a congruence analysis and a causal-process tracing as research designs. In this chapter, each mission will be analysed. These analyses will be done by looking at documents that are connected to specific missions, while using the coding frameworks mentioned in Chapter four. The coding process will be executed in ATLAS.ti. The number of codes that apply to these documents will provide information about the main expectations and underlying expectations. Thus, the results from these analyses will provide information about the kind of power that is used during each mission.

This chapter will first present the data analysis on Normative Power. Then, on Realist Power and after this on Liberal Power. The types of data that are presented in these sections are both ‘smoking guns’ and ‘confessions’. Finally, the last section will combine all this information, and presents information on which main expectation is the most applicable to the EU in general. The type of data that is presented in this section is the ‘comprehensive storylines’.

5.1 Normative Power

The first main expectation is: ‘The EU applies Normative Power in its SSR missions’, and the total number of codes connected to this expectation can be seen in Figure 1. This main expectation is researched by focusing on the connected underlying expectations. The first underlying expectation is: ‘The EU’s SSR missions are based on the promotion of the EU’s norms and values’. The main code related to this expectation is ‘Promotion of norms and values’. The first sub-code is ‘Fostering democracy’. The second sub-code is ‘Implementing EU standards’. The third sub-code is ‘Stimulating human rights’. The fourth sub-code is ‘Strengthening the rule of law’, which is the most prevalent. The first sub-code is, for instance, described by EUTM RCA, as it states that the mission is “working towards the goal of modernised, effective and democratically accountable Central African Armed Forces (FACA)” (Council of the European Union, 2016b, 22). The second sub-code is described by EUPM BiH, as it mentions that the mission’s objective is “to establish sustainable policing arrangements
under BiH ownership in accordance with best European and international practice” (Council of the European Union, 2002, 5). This quote indicates that the EU standards are implemented in the reformed policing arrangements in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The third sub-code appears in, for instance, EUPOL RD Congo. In its mission statement, the Council of the European Union (2009c, 46) describes that the mission shall “contribute to the police as well as to the gender, human rights and children and armed conflict aspects of the peace process in the Eastern DRC and especially to its linkage to the reform process of the PNC”. With regard to the fourth sub-code, EULEX Kosovo especially is focused on strengthening the rule of law in Kosovo. This becomes already clear from the name, but it also is the main focus of the tasks of the mission. One of such tasks is for instance to “monitor, mentor and advise the competent Kosovo institutions on all areas related to the wider rule of law” (Council of the European Union, 2008b, 93). In another example, EUSEC RD Congo describes in its documents the first, third and fourth sub-codes in one paragraph:

The mission must provide the Congolese authorities responsible for security with advice and assistance, while taking care to promote policies compatible with human rights and international humanitarian law, democratic standards and the principles of good governance, transparency and respect for the rule of law (Council of the European Union, 2005a, 21).

The quotes connected to this first underlying expectation all show that the EU is promoting its norms and values, such as human rights, rule of law and democracy, but also EU standards in general. As becomes clear from the quotes, the EU promotes these norms, values and standards through reforming the local arrangements or by promoting policies that incorporate these norms, values and standards.

The second underlying expectation is: ‘The EU provides a justification of the specific norms in its SSR missions’. The main code related to this expectation is ‘Justification of norms’, and the sub-codes are ‘Commitment to the norms encourages stability in the region’, ‘Implementing EU standards strengthens stability in the region’, and ‘Strengthening norms raises standards’. All these three sub-codes do not appear often in the documents. Together they appear in only four missions. The first sub-code appears in EUAM Iraq, as it states that the EU “underscored the importance of security and the rule of law for stability in Iraq” (Council of the European Union, 2017c, 12). The other mission in which this sub-code appears is EUSEC RD Congo:

The current security situation in the DRC may deteriorate, with potentially serious repercussions for the process of strengthening democracy, the rule of law and
international and regional security. A continued commitment of EU political effort and resources will help to embed stability in the region (Council of the European Union, 2005a, 20).

The second sub-code appears in EULEX Kosovo, as it states that EU will “strengthening stability in the region in line with its European perspective” (Council of the European Union, 2008b, 92). The third sub-code appears in EUPM BiH, as it states that “to establish sustainable policing arrangements under BiH ownership in accordance with best European and international practice, and thereby raising current BiH police standards” (Council of the European Union, 2002, 5). The quotes show that when the EU provides a justification for the focus on the EU norms, it argues that this focus can raise specific standards and that it can make a region more stable.

The third underlying expectation is: ‘The norms in the EU’s SSR missions are adapted to ensure applicability to the context’. The main code related to this expectation is ‘Applicability to the context’. The first sub-code is ‘Adaptation to the situation’, and only appears in EUPM BiH, as the EU states that the mission will “be based on a transparent structure that takes into consideration the multiple ethnic composition of the society and that can deal satisfactorily with gender related issues” (Council of the European Union, 2002, 5). This shows that in EUPM BiH, the EU adapts the mission to the ethnic situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The second sub-code is ‘Focus on national plans and policies’, and appears in half of the missions. This is, for instance, the case in EU SSR Guinea-Bissau, as the EU states that in the mission statement that “EU SSR GUINEA-BISSAU shall provide local authorities with advice and assistance on SSR in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, in order to contribute to creating the conditions for implementation of the National SSR Strategy” (Council of the European Union, 2008a, 12). This quote shows that the SSR mission, EU SSR Guinea-Bissau contributes to the implementation of the national plan.

The third sub-code is ‘Local ownership’, and appears in a few missions, under which EUPOL Afghanistan. The EU describes that the mission has the following objective: “EUPOL AFGHANISTAN shall significantly contribute to the establishment under Afghan ownership of sustainable and effective civilian policing arrangements” (Council of the European Union, 2007a, 34). The fourth sub-code is ‘The interest of the local people’, and appears in almost all the missions. This sub-code indicates that the local authorities invite the EU to their country for advice and support. This happened for instance in EUAM RCA:

The President of the Central African Republic, in a letter to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, requested the deployment of a
civilian Mission in the Central African Republic to support progress in the ongoing Security Sector Reform (Council of the European Union, 2019c, 141).

The quotes connected to this expectation show that the EU is focused on the applicability of the SSR missions to the local situation. The EU is not only focused on the local situation and plans and policies, but it also ensures that the locals are participating in the process. Moreover, the EU demonstrates that the SSR missions are based on the interest of the local authorities.

The fourth underlying expectation is: ‘The EU’s SSR missions are in line with legal principles’. The main code connected to this expectation is ‘Legal principles’. The first sub-code is ‘Human rights’ and the second sub-code ‘International principles’. Only a few documents describe that the mission should incorporate human rights and/or international principles in its tasks. EULEX Kosovo and EUAM Iraq are missions that do state these incorporations in their tasks. The two sub-codes both appear in the same paragraph in both missions. EULEX Kosovo states that the mission shall “ensure that all its activities respect international standards concerning human rights and gender mainstreaming” (Council of the European Union, 2008b, 93). EUAM Iraq describes that one of its tasks is that “EUAM Iraq shall ensure that human rights and gender perspectives are incorporated into its tasks, and that policies and plans developed with its support comply with international standards and obligations on human rights and on gender” (Council of the European Union, 2017c, 13).

The third sub-code ‘Legislation and regulations’ only appears in EUPM BiH, as it states the mission will “act in a professional manner and in accordance with relevant legislation and regulations” (Council of the European Union, 2002, 5). The fourth sub-code, ‘Rule of law’, appears the most often in the documents. For instance, in EUPOL Afghanistan, the Council of the European Union (2010b, 5) describes that the structure of the mission consists of “a Rule of Law component”. EUPM BiH is another mission that describes in its mission statement that the mission is based on the rule of law. This can be seen in the following quote: “The EUPM, under the guidance and coordination of the EUSR and as part of the broader rule of law approach in BiH and in the region” (Council of the European Union, 2005b, 55). EUPM BiH is thus based on the general legal principles of the rule of law in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

These quotes show that the legal principles underlying the SSR missions are based on human rights, international principles, legislation and regulations, and the rule of law. These principles determine how the tasks of the missions should look like, how the EU should act during its missions, and how the missions should be structured.

Figure 1 shows the number of codes per underlying expectation. From this figure, and the text above, it can be concluded that the first underlying expectation is confirmed in almost
all the missions, and in half of the missions it is the most prevalent of all the expectations. The second underlying expectation is less prevalent. It is only confirmed in four missions, and within these missions, the number of codes is low. The third underlying expectation is confirmed in almost all the missions, except for one. The numbers of codes are also relatively high and, in some missions, the third expectation is even the most prevalent one. The fourth underlying expectation is confirmed in six of the missions. This expectation is never the most prevalent one.

![Figure 1. Number of codes per Normative Power expectation.](image)

### 5.2 Realist Power

The second main expectation is ‘The EU applies Realist Power in its SSR missions’, and the total number of codes connected to this expectation can be seen in Figure 2. This main expectation is researched by looking at the connected underlying expectations. The first underlying expectation is: ‘The EU’s SSR missions are based on the EU’s strategic interests’. The main code connected to this expectation is ‘Strategic interests’. The first sub-code is ‘Creating a favourable milieu’. One of the missions this sub-code appears in is EUAM Iraq, as one of the documents state that “EUAM Iraq shall ensure that that actions to combat organised
crime include the fight against illegal migration, trafficking in weapons and drugs, cybercrime and illicit trafficking and destruction of cultural goods” (Council of the European Union, 2017c, 13). This quote indicates that, by combating organised crime, the milieu of Iraq will be improved, which is favourable for the EU. The second sub-code, strongly linked to the first sub-code, is ‘Strategic objectives’. This sub-code is only mentioned in a few missions, under which EUPM BiH. In one of the documents of EUPM BiH, the EU explains that the mission “should contribute to the overall peace implementation in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as to the achievements of the Union's overall policy in the region, notably the Stabilisation and Association Process” (Council of the European Union, 2002, 1). This quote indicates that the SSR mission contributes to the strategic objectives of its overall policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The quotes connected to this expectation show that the EU uses its SSR missions for its strategic interests.

The second underlying expectation is: ‘The EU’s SSR missions are balancing tactics’. The main code connected to this expectation is ‘Balancing tactic’, and the sub-codes are ‘Autonomous capabilities’, ‘Increasing capabilities’ and ‘Military capacity’. The first one appears in all the missions, whereas the latter two are only mentioned in one mission each, namely EUCAP Sahel Mali (Council of the European Union, 2019a; Council of the European Union, 2019b), and EUTM Mali (Council of the European Union, 2020a, 2). The first sub-code is always described by almost the same sentence, in which the autonomous capabilities with regard to the decision-making is emphasised. This sentence is for instance mentioned by EUPOL Afghanistan as follows: “without prejudice to the EU’s decision-making autonomy and its single institutional framework” (Council of the European Union, 2007a, 37). Besides the decision-making autonomy, there are no other autonomous capabilities described. EUCAP Sahel Mali describes the second sub-code in the following text:

In its conclusions on Sahel/Mali, the Council underlined the importance of the regionalisation of CSDP in the Sahel with the aim of strengthening, as appropriate, the civilian and military support to cross-border cooperation, the regional cooperation structures - in particular those of the G5 Sahel. (Council of the European Union, 2019a, 29).

With this, EUCAP Sahel Mali indicates that it wants to increase its capabilities with regard to the support it provides. The sub-code ‘military capacity’ is mentioned in EUTM Mali, as it states that the mission is conducted “to provide military assistance to the G5 Sahel Joint Force as well as national armed forces in the G5 Sahel countries” (Council of the European Union, 2020a, 2). The first quote indicates that the EU wants to emphasise its autonomous
decision-making capabilities. The second quote shows that the EU wants to improve its capabilities in another region. The third quote shows that the EU has the military capacity in its mission. These quotes are examples of the balancing tactic.

The third underlying expectation is: ‘The EU’s SSR missions are bandwagoning tactics’. The main code connected to this expectation is ‘Bandwagoning tactic’. The first sub-code is ‘Coordination with NATO’. The second sub-code is ‘Coordination with the US’. The first one is more prevalent in the documents than the latter ones. The first sub-code appears in, for instance, EUPOL Afghanistan. EUPOL Afghanistan states that there is “continued cooperation with key partners, including with the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the NATO Training Mission” in the mission (Council of the European Union, 2013b, 44), and that “the HR shall be authorised to release to NATO/ISAF EU classified information and documents generated for the purposes of the Mission” (Council of the European Union, 2013b, 45). This last sentence appears in more missions. The second sub-code appears in, for instance, EUTM Somalia. EUTM Somalia states that “the EU military mission shall operate in close cooperation and coordination with other actors in the international community, in particular, the United Nations, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and the United States of America” (Council of the European Union, 2010a, 17). These quotes show that the EU works together with, rather than going against NATO and the US, in its SSR missions. These quotes are examples of the bandwagoning tactic. The quotes from both the second and the third underlying expectations are examples of EU’s response to unipolarity.

Figure 2 presents information on the number of codes per underlying expectation. Based on this figure, and the text above, it can be concluded that the first expectation is confirmed in only five of the missions. The number of codes is relatively high when it does appear in a mission. The second underlying expectation is confirmed in all the missions. The number of codes is, however, relatively low. The third underlying expectation is confirmed in almost half of the missions. Besides, it has a relatively high number of codes.
5.3 Liberal Power

The third main expectation is ‘The EU applies Liberal Power in its SSR missions’, and the total number of codes connected to this main expectation can be viewed in Figure 3. The main expectation is researched by looking at the connected underlying expectations. The first underlying expectation is: ‘The EU’s SSR missions are influenced by the Member States, which are in turn influenced by domestic interests’. The codes related to this expectation are the main code ‘Influence of the Member States’, and the sub-code ‘Coordination with the Member States’. This sub-code appears in the documents of all the missions. Most of the times, it appears when the staff of the mission is described. This is, for instance, the case in EULEX Kosovo, as the document states that “EULEX KOSOVO shall consist primarily of staff seconded by Member States or EU institutions. Each Member State or EU institution shall bear the costs related to any of the staff seconded by it” (Council of the European Union, 2008b, 95). The Member States thus do influence the staff that is employed during most of the SSR missions, and are responsible for the costs related to the staff. The sub-code also appears in several documents with regard to the description of the so-called ‘Project Cell’. For instance, in EUSEC RD Congo, it is stated that
EUSEC RD Congo shall have a Project Cell for identifying and implementing projects. EUSEC RD Congo shall, as appropriate, facilitate and provide advice on projects implemented by Member States and third States under their responsibility in areas related to EUSEC RD Congo and in support of its objectives. (Council of the European Union, 2014e, 25).

The projects of the Member States can thus be incorporated in various SSR missions. Besides projects, several missions mention that they can make arrangements with the Member States. EUAM Iraq, for instance, describes: “subject to the Commission's approval, EUAM Iraq may conclude technical arrangements with Member States … regarding the provision of equipment, services and premises to EUAM Iraq” (Council of the European Union, 2017c, 17).

The majority of the documents consists of these kinds of examples. Most of these documents of the missions, however, do not describe that the missions are based on the interests of the Member States. The documents on EUAM Iraq and EUPM BiH, on the other hand, do emphasise the interest of the Member States within this area. EUAM Iraq for instance mentions that one of the mission’s objective is “to assist the Union Delegation to Iraq in the coordination of Union and Member States support in the field of Security Sector Reform in Iraq” (Council of the European Union, 2017c, 13). EUPM BiH mentions that a key task of the mission is to “contribute to the coordination of Union and Member States’ efforts in the field of the rule of law” (Council of the European Union, 2011c, 52). Even though the documents on the analysed SSR missions mention the Member States numerous times, they do not mention any influence of the EU’s citizens and interest groups. This analysis thus show that the SSR missions are influenced by the Member States, but not explicitly by domestic interests.

The second underlying expectation is: ‘The EU’s SSR missions are based on the ambition to provide security for individuals’. The main code related to this expectation is ‘Providing security for individuals’. The first sub-code related to this expectation is ‘Protection of civilians’, and appears in a few missions, under which EUAM RCA, as it states “EUAM RCA shall promote the implementation of international humanitarian law and human rights, as well as the protection of civilians” (Council of the European Union, 2019c, 142). The second sub-code ‘Serving the citizens’ only appears in EUTM Somalia, as it mentions that “in order to contribute to strengthening the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) as a functioning government serving the Somali citizens” (Council of the European Union, 2010a, 17). These quotes show that the EU wants to reform the local policies and authorities, so that security for individuals can be provided.

The third underlying expectation is: ‘The EU’s SSR missions apply an avoidance
method’. The main code and sub-codes related to this expectation are ‘Avoidance method’, ‘The EU cannot be held liable’, and ‘The mission shall not be involved in combat operations’. The sub-code ‘The EU cannot be held liable’ appears in most of the missions, such as EUCAP Sahel Mali, as it states that “Under no circumstances may the contributing Member States hold the Union or the HR liable for acts or omissions by the Head of Mission in the use of the funds provided by those States” (Council of the European Union, 2014a, 25). The second sub-code only appears in the documents on EUTM Mali, as the Council of the European Union (2013a, 20) literally mention the sub-code: “EUTM Mali shall not be involved in combat operations”. These quotes show that the EU avoids the liability for certain acts, and that the EU avoids being active in combat operations.

Figure 3 presents information on the number of codes per underlying expectation. The first expectation is confirmed in all missions. The number of codes is also the highest in almost all the missions, except for two. The second underlying expectation is confirmed in the lowest number of missions, namely five. The third underlying expectation is confirmed in almost all the missions. The number of codes connected to this expectation is however low.

![Figure 3. Number of codes per Liberal Power expectation.](image)
5.4 The three forms of power

Figure 4 compares the number of codes per power per mission, so that it becomes clear which power is used the most frequently during a specific mission. This provides information on which main expectation, ‘the EU applies Normative Power in its SSR missions’, ‘the EU applies Realist Power in its SSR missions’ or ‘the EU applies Liberal Power in its SSR missions’, can be confirmed. From Figure 4, it becomes clear that Realist Power and Liberal Power appear in all the missions. Normative Power, on the other hand, is not applied in EUMAM RCA (Council of the European Union, 2015a). Besides, it differs per mission which power is applied the most. First, the number of Normative Power codes is the highest in eight missions. In one mission, EUTM RCA, the number of Normative Power codes is similar to the number of Liberal Power codes. Secondly, the number of Realist Power codes is in none of the missions the highest. Thirdly, the number of Liberal Power codes is the highest in five of the missions.

![Figure 4. Comparison of the number of codes per the three forms of power and per mission.](image-url)
6. Discussion of findings

This chapter will discuss the findings that are presented in Chapter five. It will compare these findings of this thesis to the findings from earlier research, which are mentioned in Chapter two and three. This chapter will first present the discussion on Normative Power, then Realist Power, and hereafter Liberal Power. Finally, it presents a discussion on what kind of international security actor the EU is in its SSR missions.

6.1 Normative Power

This thesis found that in many of the SSR missions, the main expectation ‘The EU applies Normative Power in its SSR missions’ was confirmed. EUMAM RCA was, however, the exception, as this mission did not show any of the Normative Power codes. Despite this, the number of Normative Power codes was higher than the number of the Realist Power codes and the number of Liberal Power codes. Two of the underlying expectations were also confirmed in almost all of the analysed SSR missions, namely ‘The EU’s SSR missions are based on the promotion of the EU’s norms and values’ and ‘The norms in the EU’s SSR missions are adapted to ensure applicability to the context’. Another underlying expectation ‘The EU’s SSR missions are in line with legal principles’ was confirmed in almost half of the missions.

The underlying expectation, ‘The EU provides a justification of the specific norms in its SSR missions’ was, however, only confirmed in a small number of missions, namely in EUPM BiH, EUSEC RD Congo, EULEX Kosovo and EUAM Iraq. Because of this low number of confirmed cases concerning this expectation on justification, only the four aforementioned missions confirmed all the expectations. The justification that this thesis found for EUPM BiH is similar to what Juncos (2018) found. Juncos found that the EU is implementing both European and specific international standards in other states. Such standards can, for instance, be liberal norms. This implementation would then lead to the improvement of the capability of state institutions. Both this thesis and Juncos (2018) found that the EU provides such a justification in the SSR mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The findings of this thesis thus show that the EU provides such a justification in only four SSR missions. This is contrasting to the results of Palm and Crum (2019), which are centred around justifications provided by the EU in the military missions. They found that the earlier missions, the ones between 2003 and 2007, provide a normative justification. It can be
argued that Palm and Crum found justifications in so many missions, whereas this thesis found it in so few missions, is because Palm and Crum focus on a different type of missions. Another explanation for this difference in results is that they might have been only selecting cases that provide justifications, as justifications played such an important role in their research project. Their theoretical framework was namely based on justifications. Even though it might have not been intentional, it is possible that because of this their case-selection was biased.

Sjursen (2006) argues that it needs to be analysed whether the EU is applying Normative Power in its missions, or that it is using normative arguments for its own gain. This can be done, according to Sjursen, by looking at the justification of the norms that are provided by the EU. This thesis found that the EU does not only barely provide a justification for the norms, it also does not provide information about acceptance of the justification by the people involved in the EU’s policy in the missions that do consist of a justification. Because of this lack of justification in the majority of the SSR missions, it cannot be ruled out that the promotion of the norms and values are meant to serve the EU’s own interest.

These findings are similar to what earlier research found (Müller & Zahda, 2018). Müller and Zahda argue that the operations of the EU are considered normative. However, the same operations are serving the interests of the EU. This contradiction can especially be seen in “the tensions between the EU’s democracy promotion agenda and stability objectives in its neighbourhood” (Müller & Zahda, 2018, 122). These kinds of stability objectives are in this thesis also considered as an interest of the EU, as the EU is interested in a milieu in which the security and wealth of the EU can be ensured (Hyde-Price, 2008). Palm and Crum (2019) strengthen this argument, but then specifically with regard to the EU’s military operations. They found that the EU is increasingly focusing on its interests in its foreign operations, and that “in the course of its military operations the EU has come to be increasingly removed from any pretension to be a Normative Power” (Palm & Crum, 2019, 528).

If Sjursen’s theory (2006) is applied, these findings thus indicate that there is a possibility that the EU is actually applying Realist Power, rather than truly Normative Power. The Normative Power of the EU is therefore decreased in the SSR missions. However, this thesis also found that the number of Normative Power codes was the highest in the SSR missions.
6.2 Realist Power

In this thesis, the main expectation ‘The EU applies Realist Power in its SSR missions’ is confirmed in all the analysed SSR missions. The underlying expectations ‘The EU’s SSR missions are based on the EU’s strategic interests’ and ‘The EU’s SSR missions are bandwagoning tactics’ are confirmed in nearly half of the missions. The underlying expectation ‘The EU’s SSR missions are balancing tactics’, on the contrary, was confirmed in all the missions. The findings on the underlying expectation on the EU’s strategic interests confirm the aforementioned possibility that the EU actually applies Realist Power, while using normative norms, in the SSR missions EUPM BiH, EUPOL Afghanistan, EULEX Kosovo, EUTM Mali, EUCAP Sahel Mali, and EUAM Iraq. This is similar to what Hyde-Price (2008) and Palm and Crum (2019) argue. These authors also argue that this is the case because the EU finds itself in an anarchic international system. Besides following its own strategic interests, Posen (2006) argues that another factor of this anarchic system is that the states can only rely on their own, and not on others. The findings of this thesis partly agree with this statement. On the one hand, the findings show that there is cooperation with local authorities, as well as international organisations, such as NATO, but also with other states, such as the US. On the other hand, this cooperation is mostly based on the coordination between the activities of the various actors that are present in the area. The EU does not mention that the EU relies on these actors during its SSR missions. The EU therefore does not completely rely on the other actors.

With regard to the expectation of the balancing tactic, the findings are dissimilar to what Diez (2005) and Manners (2006) found. These authors argue that many of the EU’s CSDP and CFSP missions are increasingly becoming militarised. Because of this militarisation, military capabilities are emphasised in the missions. This thesis, on the contrary, found that military capabilities, which are considered to be a balancing tactic, are barely mentioned in the analysed SSR missions. This means that militarisation is not happening in the SSR missions.

Concerning the findings on the EU’s use of balancing and bandwagoning tactics as responses to unipolarity, this thesis found that the EU prefers balancing over bandwagoning in its SSR missions, because of the lower number of bandwagoning codes. However, the balancing tactic only appears this often because of the EU’s emphasis on its autonomous decision-making capability in the missions. The numbers of the other sub-codes, on the other hand, are very low. Besides, this thesis found that the EU does not want to expand its (military) capabilities in its SSR missions. As Cladi and Locatelli (2012), Krotz (2009), and Posen (2006) argue that the focus on expanding such capabilities is an important indication of a balancing tactic, it can be
argued that the EU actually does not apply the balancing tactic in its SSR missions. This argumentation is in line with the findings of Cladi and Locatelli (2012). These authors argue that the balancing tactic is not the appropriate tactic for the EU due to the power asymmetry between the EU and the US. Based on the findings of this thesis, it can also be argued that the EU is actually applying the balancing tactic in its SSR missions, but that it is weakly applying this tactic. This argumentation is in line with the findings of Posen (2006). Posen (2006, 186) namely found out that “ESDP is a form of balancing behaviour, albeit still in a weak form”.

Moreover, Pohl (2013) and Posen (2006) argue that according to realism, states react based on a perceived threat, namely unipolarity. The balancing and bandwagoning tactics are ways to cope with this threat. It can be argued that the EU does not really apply the balancing tactic, as the EU is not focused on expanding its capabilities. It can also be argued that the EU is applying the balancing tactic only in a weak form. Moreover, the bandwagoning tactic is not even confirmed in half of the missions. This is similar to the argument of Hyde-Price (2013), who argues that the EU’s operations in the security sector cannot be analysed using the terminology ‘balancing tactic’ and ‘bandwagoning tactic’. The findings would therefore suggest that the EU does not really focus on coping with unipolarity in its SSR missions. This is in line with the liberalist view, which is mentioned in the discussion on liberalism in Posen’s article (2006).

6.3 Liberal Power

This thesis found that the main expectation ‘The EU applies Liberal Power in its SSR missions’ is confirmed in all the analysed SSR missions. The underlying expectations are confirmed in many of the missions. The underlying expectation ‘The EU’s SSR missions are influenced by the Member States, which are in turn influenced by domestic interests’ is confirmed in all the missions. This expectation is confirmed in the SSR missions because of the influence of the Member States, and in some because of the interest of the Member States. This thesis found that the EU, however, does not pay attention to the citizens of the Member States in its SSR missions. This is dissimilar to the findings of Pohl (2013) who argues that choices made by the EU with regard to CSDP missions are based on the Member States, which are influenced by their citizens, and their expectations. According to Pohl, there would thus be an indirect influence of the EU’s citizens on the missions. Besides citizens, interest groups are neither mentioned in the analysed EU’s SSR missions. This is in contrast to what Wagner (2017)
argues, as he argues that the Member States’ and the EU’s decisions are influenced by these interest groups. The findings of Hyde-Price (2013) on the other hand are similar to the findings of this thesis. Hyde-Price found that the EU’s operations in the security sector are not simply based on the desires of the societies of each Member State.

The expectation ‘The EU’s SSR missions apply an avoidance method’ is confirmed in almost all the missions, as the EU states that it cannot be held liable for failures. The EU, however, does not prefer employing local troops. The Council of the European Union (2008a, 13) even states in its SSR mission EU SSR Guinea-Bissau that “local staff shall be recruited on a contractual basis by the Mission if the functions required are not provided by Member States.” This indicates that the EU is first employing the troops itself, and when there are still functions to fill, it employs local troops. Besides local troops, the EU also does not state in its SSR missions that it is collaborating with private contractors. Furthermore, the EU does not mention that it uses specialised technology during its SSR missions. These findings are dissimilar to the argument of Wagner (2017), as he argues that these factors can actually be found in the EU’s SSR missions.

The underlying expectation ‘The EU’s SSR missions are based on the ambition to provide security for individuals’ is confirmed in almost half of the missions. Müller and Zahda (2018) argue that this expectation of Liberal Power is an important part of the aforementioned holistic approach of the EU’s SSR policy. Because of this, they argue that the EU is “formally committed to the security of the state and its people” (Müller and Zahda, 2018, 122). Wagner (2017) also argues that the well-being and security of individuals are emphasised by the EU. According to these authors, the number of confirmed SSR missions should therefore be higher.

6.4 The kind of international security actor

This thesis found that in the earlier SSR missions, the EU applied Normative Power the most frequently. In the later missions, from EUTM Mali onwards, this changed, as the EU started to apply more Liberal Power. Because of this, Liberal Power was the second most frequently applied. However, the results after EUTM Mali are still mixed. In one mission the EU still applied Normative Power the most, and in another mission, the EU equally applied Liberal Power and Normative Power. With regard to Realist Power, this form of power was never dominant during the SSR missions. More specifically, it was applied the least often. The findings that the EU applied the Normative Power the most often is in line with the arguments
of Müller and Zahda (2018), who argue that the framework of the EU is mostly normative.

As mentioned before, Palm and Crum (2019) also analyse the identity of the EU by looking at the kind of power that the EU uses. As mentioned before, a difference between this thesis and their research project is that they analyse military missions instead of SSR missions to find out the kind of power that is applied. They found in their research project that in the earlier military missions the EU applied mostly Normative Power, or more specifically, what they call Interventionist NPE. Over time, the kind of power that the EU applies has changed, Palm and Crum argue. The EU has applied more and more Liberal Power. As a result of these findings, Palm and Crum (2019, 528) describe “the EU’s international security identity as a Liberal Power”. This is similar to the findings of this thesis on SSR missions, as the EU started to apply more Liberal Power in the later SSR missions. This thesis, however, also found that Normative Power was in two of the missions still applied the most, or equally applied. This means that the EU also in the later SSR missions often applied Normative Power. Because of this, it cannot be said that the EU is a truly Liberal Power, which is a different conclusion than the conclusion of Palm and Crum.

These different conclusions of Palm and Crum (2019) and this thesis might be partly explained by the different descriptions of Liberal Power and Realist Power. Whereas Palm and Crum considered counter-terrorism and the struggle against illegal border crossing to be part of Liberal Power, this thesis considered it to be part of Realist Power. This is the case because Palm and Crum see it as a focus on improving the economic situation, which they see as a component of Liberal Power. This thesis considers it as part of creating a favourable milieu, which is a component of Realist Power. If this thesis used the same description of Liberal Power as Palm and Crum, Liberal Power would have been found more frequently, and Realist Power even less frequently. Another explanation for the difference between the conclusions might be that the EU is a different kind of actor in its military missions than it is in its SSR missions, and that the EU applies Liberal Power more often in its military missions than in its SSR missions.

Krotz (2009), in contrast to Palm and Crum (2019), does not want to describe the kind of actor the EU is within the security sector. Krotz argues that the EU’s policies consist of various components that are connected to different kinds of theories. Krotz, for instance, argues that the EU wants to increase its autonomous capabilities in the security sector, which would make the EU a realist actor. On the other hand, the EU’s policies also consist of components that would make the EU a constructivist actor or a liberalist actor. As a result of this, Krotz argues that there is no theory more prominent than another. After analysing the three theories, this thesis can update the findings, as there is actually a theory more dominant. Even though
Sjursen (2006) would argue that the lack of justification decreases the Normative Power, it is the most frequently used power. It can therefore be argued that the EU applies Normative Power in its SSR missions.
7. Conclusion

7.1 Summary

The literature review in this thesis found that there is a theoretical gap in the academic literature on what kind of international actor the EU is in the security sector, especially when connected to specific missions. It also found that there is a theoretical gap in the academic literature that analyses the SSR missions of the EU. This thesis aimed to fill these gaps, as it connected the identity of the EU to specific SSR missions while analysing theories. Because of this aim, this thesis aimed to find the answer to the following research question ‘What kind of international security actor is the European Union in its Security Sector Reform missions?’. This thesis answered this question by looking at what kind of power the EU applies during its SSR missions, because analysing the kind of power provides information on the development of the identity of the EU as an international security actor. This thesis was therefore centred around the following three main expectations: ‘The EU applies Normative Power in its SSR mission’, ‘The EU applies Realist Power in its SSR missions’, and ‘The EU applies Liberal Power in its SSR missions’.

This thesis thus answered the research question by looking at three different types of power, namely Normative Power, Realist Power, and Liberal Power. The theoretical framework therefore focused on providing theories on these three types of power. Through these theories, the underlying expectations were established. The data analysis was done by using the two research designs congruence analysis and causal-process tracing. The research project is operationalised by looking at the Council Joint Actions and the Council Decisions of specific SSR missions. These documents were analysed by using a coding framework, that was connected to each of the powers. The number of codes that are connected to a type of power indicated how many times the EU applies a certain power. This in turn, indicated what kind of power the EU is.

This thesis found that three of the underlying expectations of Normative Power, ‘The EU’s SSR missions are based on the promotion of the EU’s norms and values’, ‘The norms in the EU’s SSR missions are adapted to ensure applicability to the context’, and ‘The EU’s SSR missions are in line with legal principles’ were confirmed in many of the missions. The underlying expectation, ‘The EU provides a justification of the specific norms in its SSR missions’ was however only confirmed in four of the missions. It can thus be argued that the
EU does incorporate the Normative emphasis on norms and values, and on the applicability to the context in its SSR missions. On the other hand, it does not provide a justification for these kinds of norms and values. Nevertheless, because of the high number of Normative Power codes found in the missions, the EU can be considered a Normative Power actor.

The underlying expectation of Realist Power ‘The EU’s SSR missions are based on the EU’s strategic interests’ was confirmed in almost half of the missions. Just like the underlying expectation ‘The EU’s SSR missions are bandwagoning tactics’. The underlying expectation ‘The EU’s SSR missions are balancing tactics’, on the other hand, was confirmed in all the missions. Despite this confirmation, it cannot be argued that the EU is using balancing and bandwagoning tactics as a response to unipolarity, as the number of codes of the bandwagoning tactic is low, and the balancing tactic is not really applied, or only applied weakly. It can be argued that some of the SSR missions are based on the EU’s strategic interests, but not the SSR missions in general. Because of these arguments, and the low number of Realist Power codes, the EU cannot be considered a Realist Power actor.

The underlying expectation of Liberal Power ‘The EU’s SSR missions are influenced by the Member States, which are in turn influenced by domestic interests’ is confirmed in all the missions. However, the missions are only influenced through cooperation with the Member States, and a little through the interest of the Member States, but not through the interests of the citizens and interest groups. The underlying expectation ‘The EU’s SSR missions apply an avoidance method’ is also confirmed in all the missions. This avoidance method is only applied because of the statement of the EU that it cannot be held liable during the missions. The underlying expectation ‘The EU’s SSR missions are based on the ambition to provide security for individuals’ is confirmed in almost half of the missions. The EU does apply Liberal Power increasingly in the later missions. Despite this increase, because of the small results for the influence of domestic interest and the avoidance method, and the low amount of codes for the latter expectation, the EU cannot be considered a Liberal Power actor.

To conclude, even though the number of Liberal Power codes increased in the later missions, the total number of Normative Power codes was the highest. This means that Normative Power was found the most frequently in the analysed SSR missions. To answer the research question, the EU is a Normative international security actor in its SSR missions.
7.2 Limitations and recommendations for future research

This thesis provides information about not only the EU’s SSR missions, but also about the identity of the EU in the global security sector. Because of this information, this thesis contributes to the improvement of the transparency of the EU. Despite this contribution, this thesis does have some limitations. First, this thesis used codes to analyse the SSR missions. Even though the codes were used thoroughly in the data analysis, subjectivity might have played a role in it. Because of this subjectivity, it is possible that a different researcher can find different results for the same SSR missions. Another limitation of this thesis is that the number of documents differs per mission. Especially the first missions consist of more documents, compared to the newer ones. This is the case because the older missions have been amended multiple times. As a result, the number of codes is lower in the newer missions, which could affect the comparison of the missions.

Furthermore, although this thesis contributes to filling the abovementioned theoretical gaps, there are still gaps with regard to the academic literature on the SSR missions and the kind of international security actor. As mentioned in Chapter two, there is a lack of literature that analyses the collaboration between various organisations during SSR missions. This thesis also found that there is a strong collaboration between for instance the EU and NATO, and between the EU and the African Union (AU). It is therefore interesting to research this to provide even more in-depth knowledge on SSR missions in general, or on the role of the EU within the international SSR sector. Besides this recommendation, another recommendation for future research is to analyse the EU documents that are about its conceptualisations and frameworks with regard to its SSR missions. This is interesting as these documents are not linked to a specific mission. This would provide more information on what kind of international security actor the EU is in its SSR missions in general.
References


Appendix A: List of documents per mission

**EUPM BiH**


**EUSEC RD Congo**


EUPOL Afghanistan


EUPOL RD Congo


EU SSR Guinea-Bissau


EULEX Kosovo


**EUTM Somalia**


**EUTM Mali**


**EUAM Ukraine**


**EUCAP Sahel Mali**


**EUMAM RCA**


**EUTM RCA**


**EUAM Iraq**


EUAM RCA