Where do EU peacekeeping missions go?

Master's thesis

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Abstract

Since the late 1990s, the European Union (EU) has evolved on the world stage as a conflict manager. Despite the fact that the EU has already sent numerous civilian and military peacekeeping missions, most scholars have researched the EU as a security actor with case studies on singular peacekeeping missions. This thesis adds to the debate with one of the first quantitative studies in the field of EU peacekeeping missions. It thus addresses a niche in the political science literature. This thesis unpuzzles some of the motivational factors on where the EU sends its peacekeeping missions – and where not. More specifically, it looks whether trade, trade with natural resources, threat of terrorism, colonial ties and a mandate from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) are explanatory factors for to which conflicts the EU sends its peacekeeping missions. These possible explanatory factors were derived deductively from previous literature. This thesis looked at all conflicts from 1998 until 2018 and coded where the EU did intervene and where not. It focuses on conflicts in Europe, Africa and the Middle East, since these are the main regions for EU's foreign policy and of specific interest for its security more particularly. This left a sample of 97 conflicts, out of which for 90 conflicts data are complete. This thesis used an ordinal regression analysis, to represent the ordinal character of no, civilian, small-medium and big EU peacekeeping missions. It also used binary logistic regression analyses as robustness check for the findings of the ordinal logistic regression analysis. The strongest finding is that the EU is much more likely to send a peacekeeping mission, if there is a mandate from the United Nations Security Council. This was highly significant throughout all models. In the binary logistic regression model focussing on military missions, it was also found that threat of terrorism, whether the state in conflict is a democracy and the presence of a peacekeeping operation by another international organization drive the deployment of EU peacekeeping missions. However, strong trade relationships were shown to make the EU less likely to intervene in that model. The findings of this thesis thus suggest that the EU is strongly committed to multilateralism and the UN as central role in international relations. Moreover, it suggests that the EU is less likely to engage in contentious conflicts, in which no legitimization by the broad international community was given.

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List of Abbreviations

CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
COW	Correlates of War
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
ECB	European Central Bank
EDTG	Extended Data on Terrorist Groups
EEAS	European External Action Service
e.g.	*exempli gratia*
ERRC	European Rapid Reaction Corps
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
HR	High Representative
IS	so-called “Islamic State”
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OR	Odds Ratio
PRIO	Peace Research Institute in Oslo
TEU	Treaty of the European Union
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Database Programme
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USA	United States of America
VIF	Value Inflation Factor
WEU	Western European Union

1 Introduction

The European Union (EU) has committed itself to playing a bigger role in global affairs (EUGS, 2016). As stated in its Global Strategy, this is necessary because "[i]nternal and external security are ever more intertwined: our security at home depends on peace beyond our borders." (EUGS, 2016, p. 7) As part of its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the EU has sent over thirty civilian and military missions since 2003. This is more than any other international organization did in the last decade, including the United Nations (UN) (Brosig, 2014). This is a considerable development for an organization, which not even twenty years ago was called "economic giant, political dwarf and military worm" by former Belgian Foreign Minister Mark Eyskens (as cited in Whitney, 1991).

The way towards an integrated security policy of the EU member states was indeed slow. Before the late 1990s, European defence and security was mainly entrusted to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Hyde-Price, 2018, p. 393). However, the failure of the EU to act in war in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, is now commonly understood to have been a main driver of a begin of an European integration in security and defence (Bindi, 2010, p. 31). In the Lisbon Treaty, the EU reaffirmed its commitment as a conflict manager, stating that the Union shall "preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter" (EU, 2007). In its Global Strategy, launched in 2016, the EU again committed itself to deal with threats of "terrorism, hybrid threats, economic volatility, climate change and energy insecurity" (EUGS, 2016, p. 9). Hence, the CSDP missions have numerous objectives and range from conflict prevention, prevention of human trafficking and piracy, peacekeeping, strengthening international security, to supporting the rule of law (EEAS, 2019). CSDP missions rely on the contribution of the EU member states and are either of civilian or military nature. While member states are usually reluctant to give the EU more authority, member states are now increasingly willing to enhance the EU's crisis management capacities (Boin, Ekengren, & Rhinard, 2013, p. 1). And by now, rarely a European Council meeting goes by without the call for more crisis cooperation (Boin et al., 2013, p. 1).

At the same time, there are – unfortunately – more than enough crises and conflicts in which the EU could engage in. Scholars report that there is a peak of active violent conflicts since 2014 (Pettersson, Högbladh, & Öberg, 2019) and fear that the current COVID-19 pandemic will spark further conflicts in Africa due to the pre-crisis fragility of some countries (Basedau & Deitch, 2020). To give some perspective: The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and the Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO) reported fifty-two conflicts for the year 2018 alone (Pettersson et al., 2019). With so many active conflicts, the question arises under which criteria the EU decides to which conflicts it will send peacekeeping missions. Establishing the

explanatory factors which can explain where the EU sends its peacekeeping missions, and where not, is the aim and focus of this thesis. It will focus on the conflicts in Europe, Africa and the Middle East, since these are the main areas of EU foreign policy (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2011, p. 255) and due to their geographic proximity of specific security interest for the EU.

The efficiency of peacekeeping has been extensively debated among scholars and will thus not be addressed in this thesis (see Collier, Hoeffler, & Söderbom, 2008; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Fortna, 2004; Fortna, 2008; Hoeffler, Ijaz, & Billerbeck, 2011). Rather, it is interested in the question whether there are some underlying factors that all or at least most EU peacekeeping missions have in common. This thesis analyses the concrete research question: "*What factors can explain where EU peacekeeping missions are sent to?*"

The skilled reader will realize that this thesis picked an outcome-based question, which focuses on the dependent variable (here: EU peacekeeping missions), rather than on the independent, or explanatory, variables. This was done on purpose, to represent the novelty of researching EU peacekeeping missions. While EU peacekeeping missions are not a novel topic in the political science literature, most scholars used qualitative methods to explain them. This thesis is one of the first quantitative studies on EU peacekeeping missions. When looking at EU peacekeeping missions, it becomes quite obvious why most scholars turned to qualitative methods: With about thirty missions in total, the number of cases is too small for a valid quantitative study. This is why this thesis uses a different approach, and does not only look at conflicts, where the EU intervened, but also where *not*. By doing so, it created a larger *N* (*N* refers to the number of observations), which makes it possible to conduct a quantitative study. It is important to conduct a quantitative study to complement the existing case studies, since there are several advantages of quantitative studies. Exemplarily, by looking at more cases, quantitative studies allow for much more robust causal generalizations than qualitative studies (Mahoney & Goertz, 2006). Similarly, large-*N* studies allow to estimate the empirical validity of theoretical arguments. This is because large-*N* studies allow to "examine whether the pattern of associations between the variables in our set of observations fits with what the theory predicts" (Toshkov, 2016, p. 201). As commonly used to explain probabilities of certain explanatory factors on the dependent variable, this thesis uses a regression analysis for its research. It picked an ordinal logistic regression analysis in particular, to represent the ordinal character of no, civilian, small-medium and big EU peacekeeping missions. By conducting a quantitative study, this study has strong relevance for academia. Using a different method than before, new explanatory factors for EU peacekeeping missions may be found or old explanatory factors confirmed, leading to more robustness of previous studies' findings.

This thesis also has strong societal relevance. As eluded above, there has been a significant escalation in the number of conflicts occurring globally. Most of these conflicts are in Africa and are thus humanitarian crises at the doorstep of the EU. Intervening was shown to extend the duration of ceasefires (Fortna, 2004) as well as the duration of peace, while at the same time making the recurrence of a conflict less likely (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000). Peacekeeping can thus bring peace and stability in and after times of crises and conflicts. Hence, the question whether the EU (or another third actor) intervenes has very real-life consequences over life and death. This makes the stakes of the debate extremely high. Deploying peacekeeping missions cannot only be important for the citizens of the state in conflict, but is also important for EU citizens themselves. For example, terroristic attacks are a recurring threat, which also happen on the ground of EU territory. Thus, EU peacekeeping missions are an important tool for counter-terrorism and saving lives (EUGS, 2016, p. 20). Furthermore, the results of this thesis are relevant for policy advisers and think-tanks, because it sheds light on motivational factors, and can thus also (cautiously) be used to predict where next EU peacekeeping missions are sent to. By finding out where the EU intervenes, one can conclude which partners the EU helps and what kind of security actor the EU is. The identified reasons for interventions can then also be compared to already identified reasons for other international organizations (such as the UN or NATO) and then be used to find out when which organization is most likely to intervene.

The remainder of this thesis is structured in six sections. First, the literature review gives an insight into the scholarly work written on peacekeeping missions. The literature review is divided in two sub-sections: The first sub-section focuses on assumptions and collaboration difficulties in peacekeeping more generally, while the other sub-section will focus solely on the EU as a security actor. Second, the theoretical background focuses on the factors that other scholars have found to have an effect on *where* third actors intervene. Third, the chapter on research design and method introduces the dependent, independent and control variables of this thesis, as well as explaining why the ordinal logistic regression analysis is seen as most appropriate method for the purpose of this research. Fourth, the analysis outlies the outcomes of the ordinal regression analysis, as well as other control measurements. Fifth, the results of the analysis are scrutinized in the discussion section. Finally, the conclusion of this thesis is presented.

2 Literature Review

The following section gives an insight into the scholarly work written on peacekeeping missions. It will start with introducing assumptions and problems of peacekeeping in general, such as collective action and free rider problems. It will then proceed with a brief historical outline of EU security and defence policy and an introduction to the set-up of the institutions relevant for EU foreign policy. Lastly, it will introduce theoretical and empirical aspects on EU peacekeeping missions more specifically.

2.1 Peacekeeping in international relations

The EU only deploys peacekeeping missions since 2003 and scholars thus also only started to assess peacekeeping done by the EU then (Ginsberg & Penksa, 2012, p. 162). Hence, a big bulk of scholarly work on peacekeeping stems from the international relations discipline. Since the international relations literature contains important background information to this thesis, including fundamental questions such as whether peacekeeping is legitimate and how peacekeeping works, this thesis will start with some insights from the international relations discipline before addressing the literature on EU peacekeeping missions more specifically.

2.1.1 Legitimacy of peacekeeping

Before starting to introduce theoretical insights on peacekeeping, a definition of peacekeeping is needed. This thesis refers to the definition from the UN:

> "Peacekeeping is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing cease-fires and the separation of forces after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements – military, police and civilian – working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace." (UN, 2008, p. 18)

Peacekeeping thus helps countries navigate the path from conflict to peace (UN, 2020). However, there is a principle dilemma with peacekeeping because a third actor interferes in the sovereignty of another state. The idea that each state has ultimate sovereignty over its own territory stems from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. In the context of peacekeeping, there is thus an ongoing debate between those who see peacekeeping in Westphalian terms and those who see it in post-Westphalian terms (Bellamy, Williams, & Griffin, 2010, p. 4). Under Westphalian terms, other states should respect each other's sovereignty and should not intervene in their domestic affairs. Hence, it is then also problematic to claim that any action

by a state towards its own citizens is not legitimate (Shue, 2004). This means that peacekeeping should not be done, even when there is domestic human suffering. Peacekeeping may only be legitimate in case a state directly threatens the maintenance of peace and security between states (Bellamy et al., 2010, p. 4). However, in post-Westphalian terms, “states have a responsibility to protect their own population from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and when they manifestly fail to do so international society acquires a duty to protect vulnerable populations.” (Bellamy et al., 2010, p. 4) This ‘responsibility to protect’ is a key assumption for many peacekeeping missions.

To further understand how peacekeeping may or may not be legitimate – depending on the point of view – it is important to know that international relations generally assume an anarchic international system. This is because there is no institution above the state. The UN in this anarchic system is as close to a world government as we can get. Peacekeeping is therefore strongly associated with and governed by the UN (Goulding, 1993, p. 455).

2.1.2 Reasons for peacekeeping

To explain why the UN, as ‘world government’, has such a special role in peacekeeping, the theoretical insights from international relations on how collective security organizations can act as a deterrent are helpful. Collective security organizations are different from alliances because their membership is universal – like in the UN or former League of Nations, which includes every internationally recognized state (Kelsen, 1948). Kupchan & Kupchan (1995, p. 52-53) define collective security as follows:

> “The case for collective security rests on the claim that regulated, institutionalized balancing predicated on the notion of all against one provides more stability than unregulated, self-help balancing predicated on the notion of each for his own. Under collective security, states agree to abide by certain norms and rules to maintain stability and, when necessary, band together to stop aggression.”

Thus, collective security should deter other states or third actors, in theory, from any aggression against another state. This is because the respective state or actor should fear the opposition of the full weight of the international community. Collective security organizations can thus foster peaceful outcomes between adversaries, because outside involvement would change the outcome between groups or states. Namely, collective security organizations can help to balance against aggressors, because, if collective security works, it should confront aggressors with a dominating force, rather than just an equal force (Kupchan & Kupchan, 1995). Additionally, collective security contributes to cooperation between states, rather than competition (Kupchan & Kupchan, 1991). As such, it institutionalizes the notion all against one

in case of an aggression (Kupchan & Kupchan, 1991) and can help to build confidence and trust among its member states (Kupchan & Kupchan, 1995).

Furthermore, collective security can help to resolve commitment problems. In the context of violent conflicts, peacekeeping can be deployed to enforce and secure an agreed ceasefire, or another commitment which may otherwise be not believable (Ruggeri, Gizelis, & Dorussen, 2012). This is important because, once a deal has been bargained, one side may fear that the other side will not abide the deal (Kydd, 2006). This fear stems from the uncertainty about whether one side may exploit any vulnerability of the other side. Here outsiders can help to resolve those commitment problems. Additionally, collective security organizations can play an important role in promoting peace by functioning as neutral observers. As such, they also do act as a threat for or against any side (Kydd, 2006). Additionally, peacekeepers "facilitate cooperation by minimizing the vulnerability of the weaker side and by signalling a willingness to punish whoever defects from previous commitments" (Ruggeri et al., 2012, p. 390).

The literature provides further theoretical reasons for the utility of peacekeeping. It can prevent the recurrence of violent conflicts. Crocker, Hampson, & Aall (2004) argue that the population in conflict areas can become 'psychological committed to the conflict', in which peace operations can then support 'cooling-off" periods' by maintaining a ceasefire (see Greig & Diehl, 2005). Walter (1997) suggests that peace operations in civil wars may reduce the risks associated with demobilization of troops by providing security guarantees. Hultman, Kathman, & Shannon (2014) argue that peace operations, even in-midst of the fighting and not only during ceasefire, increase the costs of military action. Not only are there increased audience cost in the international community, but the capabilities that peace operations provide, means that strategies and capacities are revealed (Hultman et al., 2014).

2.1.3 From collective action to decision-making problems – Generic theories in the context of peacekeeping

The political science literature has various 'generic' theories at disposal that explain how difficulties can occur when cooperating. More specifically, these problems are the collective action problem, the free rider problem and the joint decision-making trap. These problems were also applied by several scholars to explain how cooperation in peacekeeping can be difficult. As they explain important causal mechanisms that are relevant in the context of EU peacekeeping, considering that the EU has an intergovernmental structure and cooperates with other international organizations, they will now be introduced.

Generally, if an aggressor such as an organized civil group or another state, threatens the peace of a state, the responses from the international community against an aggressor can vary from economic sanctions to military intervention. Because of difficulties finding a unified

response to international aggression, the UN has less costly ways than full military interventions. These ways include “mediators to help states identify mutually beneficial bargains and deploying peacekeeping forces – troops from neutral third parties - to help monitor and enforce peace-agreements” (Frieden, Lake, & Schultz, 2016, pp. 207–208). These difficulties to find a unified response can stem from the above-mentioned three known dilemmas that can occur in organizations: the collective action problem, the free rider problem and the joint decision-making trap.

The collective action problem in the context of peacekeeping means that organizations fully depend on member states to contribute to military capabilities and funds. However, member states also have incentives to provide less than other states or even nothing, even if everyone has an interest in preventing or stopping a war (Jones, 2007). This is the so-called free rider problem. Free riding refers literally to fare dodging, since you know that the train will run anyway. Lastly, any system that has two or more actors will encounter difficulties in the decision-making process (Peters, 1997; Scharpf, 1988). The decisions will likely be made on smallest denominator between the actors (Peters, 1997). In the context of security and peacekeeping, it is thus a massive challenge to agree between states what acts can be considered as threats, which states are aggressors and how those threats should be addressed.

Peacekeeping is usually closely associated with the UN, while the principle decision-making body that legitimizes peacekeeping missions is the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Thus, the UNSC has the responsibility of maintaining global peace and security (Bellamy et al., 2010, p. 303). In general, a distinction is made between UN peace operations, UN-authorized operations and non-UN operations (Bellamy et al., 2010, p. 43). UN peace operations are conducted under the banner of the UN itself. With UN-authorized missions, the UN permits other international organizations, regional organizations or states to conduct a peacekeeping mission. Non-UN operations are not legitimized by the UNSC. However, they may “support the organization’s objectives or those of a particular UN mission” (Bellamy et al., 2010, p. 42). This typology will be relevant for assessing the EU’s peacekeeping missions.

2.2 EU Peacekeeping

The following section will first outline briefly how peacekeeping emerged on the agenda of the EU, and how this is set up institutionally. Secondly, it will introduce scholarly work on whether the EU is a legitimate security actor in the world and why the EU is interested in deploying peacekeeping missions. Lastly, theoretical and empirical findings on the various EU peacekeeping missions will be outlined.

2.2.1 The development of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy

Before the late 1990s, European defence and security was mainly entrusted to NATO (Hyde-Price, 2018, p. 393). Even though the Western European Union (WEU) was founded 1954, besides monitoring Germanys rearmament and a mutual defence clause, the WEU was long not that important (Giegerich & Wallace, 2010, p. 433). That changed in the 1990s, where it was determined in the so-called "Petersberg Tasks" that WEU will now be engaged in humanitarian, peacekeeping and peacemaking missions (Giegerich & Wallace, 2010, p. 435). Additionally, the Maastricht Treaty (1992) established a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU. The WEU remained in an ambiguous position, mainly because there was disagreement between member states which role it should have. Member states with a "Europeanist" approach wished to make European security more autonomous, while the "Atlanticists" wished to rely on NATO and hence, the United States of America (USA) (Hyde-Price, 2018, p. 394). The "Europeanists" included France, Belgium, Spain and Italy, while the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Denmark preferred the "Atlanticist" approach (Hyde-Price, 2018, p. 394). The Balkan Wars and ultimately the Kosovo War in 1999 were a catalyst to 'revolutionize' European cooperation in defence (Bindi, 2010, p. 31). This was because it showed the inability of the EU to act in a crisis at its borders (Hyde-Price, 2018, p. 398). The Saint-Malo Summit in 1998 between the United Kingdom (UK) and France paved the way to establish a European military force. In 1999, the European Rapid Reaction Corps (ERRC) were established, and in 2004 the Berlin Plus arrangement enabled the EU to use NATO assets and established EU Battlegroups (Hyde-Price, 2018, pp. 397–399). Under the Treaty of Nice, the EU broadened its foreign and security policy competences and established a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as well as a High Representative (HR). It is argued by many scholars that the launch of EU cooperation in security and defence was triggered as a response to US intervention in Iraq (2003), which was a divisive issue among member states and generated the EU wanting to enhance its own credibility (Palm, 2017, p. 21). Institutionally, a solidarity clause (Art. 222) and a mutual assistance clause (Art. 42.7) were enforced in the Treaty of Lisbon, which meant that the last competences from the WEU were transferred to the EU and, consequently, the WEU was dissolved in June 2011. By some, it was criticised that the solidarity clause and mutual assistance clause make the EU only a reactive actor, instead of a preventive one (Fernández Sola, 2013, p. 85). The Treaty of Lisbon further changed ESDP to a common security and defence policy (CSDP). These various steps paved the way to further institutionalize and strengthen a common foreign policy of the EU. Additionally, a European Defence Fund has the aim to trigger development of military capabilities and enhance industrial cooperation of the European defence industry. Lastly, there is a permanent EU headquarter for non-executive military operations which is located within the European External Action Service (EEAS) in Brussels. In 2013, the EEAS and the

European Commission launched a *Joint Communication to the Parliament and the Council on the EU's Comprehensive Approach to External Conflict and Crises* (Commission/HR, 2013). The comprehensive approach by the EU "covers all stages of the cycle of conflict or other external crises: through early warning and preparedness, conflict prevention, crisis response and management to early recovery, stabilisation and peace-building in order to help countries getting back on track towards sustainable long-term development." (EEAS, 2013) It also sets out the goal of a shared analysis of crises and threats among all EU institutions and member states (EEAS, 2013). Generally, both military and civilian missions by the EU are financed both by EU member states and by EU budget (Chivvis, 2010, p. 5).

2.2.2 Legitimacy and motivations of the EU as a security actor

To explain how the EU can be seen as a legitimate security actor, the above-introduced collective action and free rider problems are important assumptions. Because states have incentives not to finance peacekeeping missions and to benefit from other countries' contributions, the UN often struggles with underfunded and understaffed peacekeeping missions. Thus, when the EU introduced its CSDP in 1999, the UN welcomed those efforts. It was hoped that these "own autonomous and military capacities and ambitions for international peacekeeping (…) could be harnessed for supporting the UN with desperately needed resources and expertise" (Koops & Tardy, 2017, p. 63). And indeed, the relationship between the UN and EU has "developed into one of the most densely institutionalized partnerships between two autonomous organizations" (Koops & Tardy, 2017, p. 63).

With its "An Agenda for Peace" launched in 1992, the UN already previously "recognised the importance of cooperation with regional organisations (such as the EU) for easing the burden of the UN, thus paving the way for their increasing role in crisis management" (Battistelli, 2015, p. 29). For the relationship between the UN and EU in particular, it is also noteworthy that EU-UN joint declarations were signed in 2003 and 2007. The 2003 declaration called for UN-EU Steering Committee twice a year, which once yearly is hosted in Brussels, and once yearly in New York City (Koops & Tardy, 2017, p. 63). The EU also issued a "Plan of Action to Enhance CSDP Support to UN Peacekeeping" in 2012, which set out priorities in UN-EU cooperation in peacekeeping (Koops & Tardy, 2017, p. 63).

International relations theories have had difficulties explaining why the EU integrated further in defence and security policy (Gross, 2009, p. 7). For realists, it is hard to grasp why "sovereign states actors pool their sovereignty and (…) elect to intervene in the internal affairs of neighbouring – or even in some cases quite distant – sovereign countries" (Howorth, 2011, p. 200). Neo-liberalism can explain the EU as a purely civilian actor well, but not so much the EU as a security actor (Howorth, 2011, p. 201). Constructivism assumes a dynamic nature of

ideas and beliefs, and can thus also account for changing ideas of the EU as a security actor (Howorth, 2011, p. 201). Another argument why the EU deploys peacekeeping stems from pluralism. As Attinà (2017) argues, to engage in peacekeeping missions fits to the pluralist image that the EU has anchored in its Treaty of the European Union (TEU) (Attinà, 2017):

> "In the pluralist world, individuals, peoples, and nongovernmental organizations and associations are legitimate primary actors as much as the states. In such a world, communitarian solidarity and the mutual respect of all the subjects must be promoted. States, in particular, are called to respect the communitarian principle of mutual recognition by all the subjects and therefore rigorously adhere and contribute to the development of international law and the principles of the United Nations Charter. In harmony with this pluralist and communitarian view, the European governments see the EU as a legitimate international actor that wants to defend values such as peace and security, sustainable development, free and just trade, elimination of poverty, and the defense of all human rights."

The promotion of democracy will enhance peace and is thus also a crucial interest of the EU, rather than the EU just being value-driven (Hellendorf, 2015, p. 119). There are also other reasons for the EU to engage in peacekeeping. On the one hand, the USA has increasingly stated that Europeans should be responsible for their own security and started to engage increasingly in Asia (Fernández Sola, 2013, p. 75). This is because the EU was and is seen to be free-riding on US-American military capabilities. On the other hand, a motivation for the EU to deploy peacekeeping missions is also "to be [a player] in world affairs and to affect international outcomes in demonstrative ways" (Bobrow & Boyer, 2016, p. 729). Galantino and Freire (2015, p.1) argue that the integration of EU member states in defence was due to the new political context that the end of the Cold War brought. Because most threats after Cold War have an intra-state and transnational dimension: "International terrorism, illicit trafficking, organised crime along with multifaceted challenges to the state's ruling authorities, civil warfare and intra- and inter-state violence are some examples of the multi-dimensional nature to threats of international security and stability." (Galantino & Freire, 2015, p. 1)

When assessing the EU's behaviour and power, there is a broad scholarly discussion what kind of power the EU is and how it uses its power. Smith (2005) comes to the conclusion that the EU is not a pure civilian power, which relies on its soft power, nor a military power, which relies on coercion through its military capabilities. Rather, the EU can be placed in between. Sjursen (2006) argues that through its focus on multilateralism, the EU uses complementary military operations to act 'civilly'. Giegerich (2010, pp. 55–57) argues that the EU has a lot of potential to be engaged in crisis-management tasks. This is because of the "EU's mix of civilian and military instruments and the potential for integrated civilian–military operation", which give

a “comparative advantage of the EU as a security organisation engaged in crisis-management tasks” (Giegerich, 2010, p. 57).

While this section gave an overview of why the EU in general would consider sending peacekeeping missions *in general* and what kind of security actor the EU is, concrete assumptions and previous findings on *where* peacekeeping missions are sent, will be addressed in the *Theoretical Background*. This is an important difference, because if the EU would just send peacekeeping missions to be a player in world affairs, this could be anywhere.

2.2.3 EU peacekeeping missions

In 2003, the EU launched its first military operation. This was historical, since for the first time ‘Europe as whole’ used military power autonomously, and not in cooperation with other international organizations, such as the UN, the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), like previously (Krotz & Wright, 2018, p. 870). Since then, a total of thirteen military operations have been deployed (see *Table 1*). The scope varies widely, from a few thousand troops to only a few hundred (Di Mauro, Krotz, & Wright, 2017). Most EU missions, however, are still of civilian nature (Howorth, 2011, p. 208). Nonetheless, “CSDP military operations, just as civilian missions, are now a regular feature of the EU’s external relations and physical engagement around the world. They have become a new way for the EU to assert itself in the twenty-first century.” (Krotz & Wright, 2018, p. 873)

The EU’s first military operation was launched in 2003 in the Republic of North Macedonia. 313 troops were deployed in ‘Mission Concordia’. Shortly afterwards, in 2003, EU Military Mission ‘Artemis’ to the Democratic Republic of the Congo was launched. This time, the number of troops was much more significant, amounting to 1807. Both aimed at securing territories and protecting populations, thus were ‘classic’ interventions (Krotz & Wright, 2018, p. 886). Other operations with the same aim were the military operation to Congo, called “EUFOR RD CONGO”, launched 2006, as well as EU Military Bridging Mission Chad and Central African Repubic, short “EUFOR Chad/RCA” launched in 2008. Additionally, in 2014, the EU Military Force Central Africa Republic Bangui (“EUFOR RCA Bangui”) was deployed.

The EU also fought against piracy. In Somalia, the EU launched its first mission with naval operation in 2008. EU Naval Force Somalia ‘Atalanta’, abbreviation “EUNAVFOR Somalia” is seen as one of the biggest successes (Krotz & Wright, 2018, p. 881). While in January 2011, 736 hostages and 32 ships were being held by pirates, both numbers dropped to zero by October 2016 (EU NAVFOR, 2020).

Another dimension is military advising and training of troops. This happened in Mali, Somalia, and the Central African Republic. In 2010, the EU launched its military training mission "EUTM Somalia". In 2013, the EU launched its training mission "EUTM Mali" in Mali. In 2015, the EU deployed the EU Military Advisory Mission to Central African Republic ("EUMAM RCA"). The latest training mission was launched in 2016, EU Military Training Mission in the Central Africa Republic ("EUTM RCA"). Lastly, the EU also added missions aiming to prevent terrorism and human trafficking as in its Naval Operation Mediterranean Sophia ("EUNAVFOR MED Sophia"), launched in 2015. Overall, EU military operations are focused on the Western Balkans and Sub-Sahara Africa (Palm, 2017, p. 91).

The EU developed its civilian capabilities, because otherwise the traditionally neutrally EU member states would have not agreed to the military capabilities (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2011, p. 181). The EU's civilian capabilities range from "police, strengthening the rule of law, civil administration and civil protection" (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2011, p. 182). The EU has deployed over 20 civilian missions so far (see *Table 1*).

On the ground, the EU also cooperates with other international organizations. In addition to civilian missions, four of its military missions were directly supporting UN peacekeeping, namely Artemis, EUFOR RD Congo and EUFOR Tchad/RCA (Koops & Tardy, 2017, p. 63). With the Berlin Plus Agreement, the EU can borrow assets from NATO. In fact, the EU's first military mission in Macedonia, while conducted alone by the EU, was carried out from NATO-SHAPE in Mons, Belgium (Norheim-Martinsen, 2011). At the same time, the EU and the African Union have also become close partners in the field of peacekeeping (Vines, 2010) and have conducted six missions in cooperation (Di Mauro et al., 2017).

The EU has been criticised for not going to the most dangerous conflict zones nor at the peak of the conflicts (Krotz & Wright, 2018, p. 885). Generally, "Europeans are much more likely to engage abroad through the CSDP when they believe that available capabilities match the requirements of the self-defined task." (Krotz & Wright, 2018, pp. 884–885) When assessing the justification of EU military missions, Palm (2017, p. 62) uses the concepts of utility-based or value-based justification, leaning on Lerch & Schwellnus' work (2006) on EU human rights. She argues that EU military operations in the beginning were value-based, while from 2008 onward they also become utility-based (Palm, 2017, pp. 95–108). However, most missions are value-based with primarily humanitarian concerns, with the exceptions being EUNAVFOR Atalanta, EUTM Mali and EUNAVFOR Sophia (Palm, 2017, pp. 106–107). Generally, there are many case studies on singular EU peacekeeping missions (e.g. Dobbins, 2008; Faleg, 2017; Poopuu, 2020), whereas quantitative work is still limited.

In the preparations and decision-making of EU peacekeeping, multiple scholars point towards the importance of the member states regarding the decision about whether an EU

peacekeeping mission will be deployed. Gross (2009) argues that EU member states negotiate about their possibly conflicting commitments on domestic level, transatlantic relations and European interests. An example of conflicting commitments on transnational level would be the USA's expectation of the EU to intervene in the Balkans, which was assumed to be Europe's area of responsibility (Freire et al., 2010, p. 11). Henke (2019) further finds that Germany, France, the UK and Italy are pivotal players in the decision-making of European defence issues. Another constraint can also be if and how much the member states are willing to contribute to missions, due to collective action constraints also in the realm of EU foreign relations (Furness & Gänzle, 2017). *Table 1* underneath lists all civilian and military EU peacekeeping missions to which all EU member states could agree on, including how big the troops sent were.

Table 1: Overview of all civilian and military EU peacekeeping missions until 2018 (own depiction from data set by Di Mauro et al., 2017)

Mission Name	Starting Year	Extension (if still active)/ End	Ended mission (dummy)	Type	Absolute Recorded Maximum Personnel/troops
Aceh Mission (AMM)	2005	2006	YES	CIVILIAN	220
EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine)	2014	2017	NO	CIVILIAN	54
EU Aviation Security South Sudan (EUAVSEC South Sudan)	2012	2014	YES	CIVILIAN	44
EU Border Assistance Mission Libya (EUBAM Libya)	2013	2017	NO	CIVILIAN	100
EU Border Assistance Mission Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM Moldova - Ukraine)	2005	2017	NO	CIVILIAN	120
EU Border Assistance Mission Rafah (EUBAM RAFAH)	2005	2018	NO	CIVILIAN	71
EU Capacity Building Sahel Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali)	2014	2019	NO	CIVILIAN	31
EU Capacity Building Sahel Niger (EUCAP Niger)	2012	2018	NO	CIVILIAN	41
EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission Iraq (EUJUST LEX-Iraq)	2005	2013	YES	CIVILIAN	60
EU Military Advisory Mission, Central African Republic (EUMAM RCA)	2015	2016	YES	MILITARY	70
EU Military Bridging Mission (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA)	2008	2009	YES	MILITARY	3300
EU Military Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR ALTHEA/ BiH)	2004	2017	NO	MILITARY	7000

EU Military Force in Congo (EUFOR RD Congo)	2006	2006	YES	MILITARY	2259
EU Military Force RCA (EUFOR RCA)	2014	2015	YES	MILITARY	700
EU Military Mission, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (ARTEMIS)	2003	2003	YES	MILITARY	1807
EU Military Mission, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (CONCORDIA/ FYROM)	2003	2003	YES	MILITARY	400
EU Military Training Mission, Central Africa Republic (EUTM RCA)	2016	2018	NO	MILITARY	170
EU Monitoring Mission Georgia (EUMM Georgia)	2008	2018	NO	CIVILIAN	340
EU Naval Force Somalia ATALANTA (EU- NAVFOR Somalia)	2008	2018	NO	MILITARY	1943
EU Naval Operation Mediterranean (SOPHIA)	2015	2018	NO	MILITARY	1666
EU Police Advisory Team Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPAT)	2005	2006	YES	CIVILIAN	30
EU Police Mission AFGHANISTAN (EUPOL)	2007	2016	YES	CIVILIAN	320
EU Police Mission Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM BiH)	2003	2012	YES	CIVILIAN	500
EU Police Mission Congo (EUPOL RD CONGO)	2007	2014	YES	CIVILIAN	60
EU Police Mission Former Republic of Yugoslavia PROXIMA (Proxima/ FYROM) 1 AND 2	2003	2005	YES	CIVILIAN	200
EU Police Mission Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo (EUPOL Kinshasa)	2005	2007	YES	CIVILIAN	27
EU Police Mission in Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS/ Palestinian Territories)	2005	2018	NO	CIVILIAN	58
EU Regional Maritime Capacity Building for the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean (EUCAP Nestor)	2012	2018	NO	CIVILIAN	167
EU Rule of Law Mission Georgia (EUJUST THEMIS)	2004	2005	YES	CIVILIAN	10
EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX KOSOVO)	2008	2018	NO	CIVILIAN	1650
EU Security Sector Reform Mission in Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC RD Congo)	2005	2016	YES	CIVILIAN	50
EU Security Sector Reform Mission in Guinea-Bissau (EU-SSR)	2008	2010	YES	CIVILIAN	18
EU Somalia Training Mission (EUTM Somalia)	2010	2018	NO	MILITARY	125
EU Support to AMIS (Darfur)	2005	2007	YES	CIVILIAN-MILITARY	50
EU Training Mission Mali (EUTM Mali)	2013	2018	NO	MILITARY	570

2.2.4 When does the EU not intervene?

Another interesting aspect to look at is, when the EU actually did not intervene. One example is the Lebanon civil war, where the EU was asked to assist by the UN (Gross, 2009, pp. 51–55). However, member states were deeply divided over the appropriate response to the civil war. Additionally, while France supported the idea to enhance the EU's position as a whole to take responsibility, the UK and Germany preferred national contributions to the UN mission (Gross, 2009, pp. 51–55). The EU similarly did not intervene in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2008, despite UN request for EU assistance (Krotz & Wright, 2018, p. 883). Belgium favoured an intervention in DRC, which can be explained by its colonial ties with Congo (Marchi Balossi-Restelli, 2011, p. 168). These cases show that, while in rhetoric the EU puts strong emphasis on a mandate from the UN Security Council to intervene, it still does not automatically mean that the EU will intervene if the UN asks the EU for assistance (Marchi Balossi-Restelli, 2011). A more recent and controversial example of non-intervention by the EU was the case of Libya in 2011. According to Erlanger & Dempsey (2011) this was due to Germany's hesitance. Already these three examples show, how relevant it is to understand when the EU did not intervene

3 Theoretical Background

As introduced in the *literature review*, peacekeeping operations generally are connected to and legitimized by the UN (Goulding, 1993, p. 455). Thus, the NATO-led humanitarian intervention in Kosovo without a UN mandate spurred a great discussion of who should and can intervene in conflicts (Welsh, 2004, p. 6). On the contrary, the genocide in Rwanda and the non-acting of third actors is still seen as one of the biggest failures of the UN (Bellamy et al., 2010, p. 3). To understand *where* third actors actually intervene, political scientists have conducted numerous empirical studies to explore factors which can explain the intervention and reveal patterns. Generally, international actors have security and humanitarian reasons to intervene in a conflict (Hoeffler, 2014). Most of the quantitative work on peacekeeping is done on UN peacekeeping. By contrast, most of the work on EU peacekeeping mission consists of case studies. Thus, the *theoretical background* of this thesis will introduce explanatory factors on where peacekeeping missions are sent to, not only coming from qualitative work on the EU, but also from other quantitative work on peacekeeping more generally. Out of these previous empirical findings, hypotheses will be derived. This thesis makes two significant contributes. Firstly, it assesses whether factors found in qualitative work on EU peacekeeping missions can be confirmed by quantitative studies. Secondly, it examines whether motivating factors on

where other third actor peacekeeping missions are sent- such as the UN - can be applied to the EU.

Several scholars found that economic concerns are a key driver for military engagement in another country. High levels of bilateral trade give the USA an incentive to intervene since the conflict could disrupt trade relations (Fordham, 2008). With more investment sites abroad and important trading partners overseas, there was an increasing demand to protect bilateral trade partners of the USA (Fordham, 2008). Thus, through conflicts, trade is not only disrupted between the state in conflict and its adversaries, but also with other third actors (Aydin, 2008). Aydin (2008) finds that third parties are more likely to intervene if they have strong bilateral trade relations with one of the conflicting parties. This is because disrupted trade could also lead to further negative externalities, such as affecting the performance of national economies and ultimately leading to little investor trust (Aydin, 2008). If trade routes or infrastructure are destroyed, this also has an impact for third parties that trade with the state in conflict. Therefore, it can be expected that trade relationships affect the decision of a third party to intervene. However, Aydin (2008) also finds that third actors refrain from intervening if they have trade relations with both sides of the conflict. In a comparative study between UN and non-UN peacekeeping, Gaibulloev, Sandler, & Shimizu (2009) find that contributions to non-UN peacekeeping are motivated by trade interests and foreign direct investment (FDI) concerns. However, Yoon (1997) finds that economic interests do not mean that the US will more likely intervene. Instead, "U.S. intervention occurs regardless of the variation in the amount of U.S. imports, exports, and foreign investment." (Yoon, 1997, p. 594) In the context of the EU, it was argued that especially Operation Atalanta, which aimed to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia, was primarily deployed due to economic interests (Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Winn & Lewis, 2017). As Norheim-Martinsen, (2011, pp. 25–26) argues:

> "It is even harder for the EU to escape the point that Operation Atalanta restricts itself to treating only those symptoms of a web of interrelated problems in Somalia which threaten European economic interests, while the factors causing the symptoms are left largely untreated. To many, Operation Atalanta signalled a shift in EU policy away from operations that could at least be portrayed as being driven by humanitarian concerns rather than or in addition to self-interest."

Out of these empirical findings it can hypothesized that the EU, similarly, has an interest in resolving a conflict occurring in an important trade partner. This leads to the first hypothesis of this thesis:

H1: *The greater the level of trade between the EU and the state in conflict, the more likely the EU will intervene in that state.*

Scholars have also assessed whether the presence of valuable natural resources, such as oil, will influence whether third actors will intervene. There is mixed empirical evidence. Bove, Gleditsch, & Sekeris (2016) find positive associations between an intervention of a third party and oil reserves. Here, it was found to play a role whether the country at war has large oil reserves, but also if the third actor (and potential intervener) has a high demand for oil. Lastly, the association is also strong if the level of bilateral oil exports from the state in conflict to the potential intervener is high (Bove et al., 2016). Colgan (2013) concludes that one of the reasons, why the USA intervened in Iraq in 1991 and 2003, was due to the large oil reserves in Iraq. However, when assessing whether trade of primary commodities in general influences whether the UN intervenes, Gilligan & Stedman (2003) find that primary commodities do not impact the decision of the UN. In the context of the EU, Winn & Lewis (2017) argue that Operation Atalanta was not only deployed due to economic interests more broadly, but also because the Gulf of Aden facilitates the trade of about seven per cent of the world's oil supply. Also Krotz and Wright find that access to natural resources can play a role in the decision about whether the EU will intervene (Krotz & Wright, 2018, pp. 884–885). When applying these findings to the context of the EU, this should mean that the EU has an interest in intervening if it imports oil from the state in conflict. This leads to the second hypothesis of this thesis[1]:

H2: *The higher the level of oil and petroleum trade between the EU and the state in conflict, the more likely the EU will intervene in that state.*

Additionally, security concerns coming from terrorist attacks can be a reason for intervention, and especially since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, this is an often-mentioned reason for Western military intervention (Azam & Thelen, 2010). However, there is mixed evidence whether terrorist threats actually lead to military interventions. Auerswald & Saideman find in a study on NATO's mission in Afghanistan that "a country's experience with terrorism is not at all correlated with its behavior in Afghanistan" (2014, p. 16). By contrast, when looking at NATO burden sharing, Sandler & Shimizu (2014, p. 57) find that "terrorism motivates the most-at-risk allies to spend more on defense". In the context of the EU, Koenig (2014, p. 7) finds that the operations in Somalia and Sahel were motivated by tackling threats of terrorism. However, there are also arguments that "the civilian and military components of the CSDP remain marginal to the EU's global counter-terrorism policy." (Bossong, 2013, p. 23). To test the explanatory power of the threat of terrorism on EU peacekeeping, the third hypothesis reads:

H3: *The higher the threat of terrorists in the state in conflict, the more likely the EU will intervene in that state.*

[1] Due to data availability, H2 focusses on oil and petroleum as natural resources (see section 4.2.2.2).

There is also evidence that colonial ties motivate intervention, which Perkins & Neumayer (2008) refer to as relational proximity. Perkins & Neumayer (2008) state that the colonial ties may motivate a third-party intervention in three ways. First, due to social, economic and political legacies, and the associated partnerships that come with it, such as foreign investments, the former colonizing power has an interest in the ex-colony flourishing. Second, due to "a combination of familiarity, trust and long-established partnerships", ex-colonies may also perceive the former colonial power as "more legitimate peacekeepers" (Perkins & Neumayer, 2008, p. 902). And lastly, there may also be normative motivations to intervene in times of instability and conflict in the former colony, coming from international and domestic pressure. Similarly, within the EU context, Krotz & Wright (2018 , p. 882) state that European Military Force Chad was only deployed after France pushed for the intervention and ultimately increased its contribution to 65 per cent of EU troops. In the EU mission in Congo, similarly, Belgium was in favour of the intervention, which can be explained by its colonial ties with Congo (Marchi Balossi-Restelli, 2011, p. 168). These findings suggest that the EU should be more likely to intervene, if the country in conflict is a former colony of one of the EU member states. This leads to the fourth hypothesis:

H4: *If there are colonial ties between an EU member state and the state in conflict, the EU will be more likely to intervene.*

As already discussed in the literature review, the EU often emphasizes its commitment to the UN charter as a framework for operating within international relations (Solana, 2009, p. 9). Also in the Lisbon Treaty, the EU reaffirmed its commitment as a conflict manager, stating that the Union shall "preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter" (EU, 2007). And when justifying missions, the EU often refers to resolutions from the UNSC (Marchi Balossi-Restelli, 2011). This should mean that the EU is also more likely to deploy its peacekeeping missions with a mandate from the UNSC. To test whether the EU accounts for an UNSC decision, the last hypothesis reads:

H5: *If there is a mandate from the United Nations Security Council to intervene in a state in conflict, the EU will be more likely to intervene.*

The author of this thesis purposely chose to frame the hypotheses as probabilistic (as opposed to deterministic nature), to emphasize that the relationships predicted above are to be understood as probabilities and tendencies as opposed to so-called laws. Law-like relationships are very uncommon in empirical social science research. The hypotheses are all to be understood under the assumption *ceteris paribus* – everything else being equal. After having presented the hypotheses of this work, the following chapter will analyse the data

situation and introduce the dependent, independent and control variables used to test for these hypotheses.

4 Research Design and Methods

The following chapter will explain how cases were selected and how variables were operationalised. Lastly, it will explain why the ordinary logistic regression analysis was seen as the most appropriate method.

4.1 Case selection

To analyse the research question *"What factors can explain where EU peacekeeping missions are sent to?*", the *sample* of this study consists of all armed conflicts where at least one party is the government. Hence, it includes interstate wars and civil wars. This thesis uses the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Database, version 19.1 (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, & Strand, 2002), which includes all conflicts from 1946 to 2018 with at least one state as an actor in the conflict. Out of all conflicts, the *sample* selected for this thesis consists of all conflicts from 1998 until 2018.[2] The start date of the analysis is 1998, because the EU only had civilian and military peacekeeping on its agenda since the Saint-Malo Summit in that year (Fernández Sola, 2013, p. 73). The end date is 2018, because the dataset only includes conflicts until then. As a next step, the *sample* was reduced to conflicts in Europe, Africa and the Middle East (regions as defined by UCDP/PRIO). This was done because the EU cannot be expected to intervene in conflicts beyond these continents/areas. This is because geographically close countries are more likely to be affected by possibly negative externalities of the conflict, such as refugee flows and disruptions of supply (Gaibulloev, George, Sandler, & Shimizu, 2015). These are also the main areas of EU's foreign policy more generally (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2011, p. 255). To limit the potential regions of interventions to Europe, Africa and the Middle East is an important assumption for the internal validity. Otherwise, the number of conflicts, in which the EU *could* have intervened, is larger, which in return would make it look like the EU is less likely to intervene in the conflict. If one conflict, after a ceasefire, continued for the same reason it started, the UCDP/PRIO data set coded it as the same conflict. Since for some conflicts there are several years between the conflict's ceasefire and the conflict then starting again, it was decided to code every conflict with more than five years of ceasefire as a new conflict. This was done because it is assumed that with many years between, the dynamics of the conflict changed. In the sample used for the thesis,

[2] Hence, the UK is included in the analysis.

this affects fifteen conflicts. These fifteen conflicts were then clustered according to their standard errors, to relax the assumption of regression models that all observations are independent – since those conflicts are not completely independent (see section 4.3. for more information). Finally, all conflicts shorter than two months were deleted from the *sample* (in total five). This leads to a sample consisting of 97 cases (see *Appendix*).

4.2 Operationalisation and measurement of the variables

4.2.1 Dependent variable

The dependent variable (Y), thus the variable whose outcome will be explained in this thesis is "EU peacekeeping missions". To see to which conflicts the EU has sent its peacekeeping missions, and to which it has not, the information on EU peacekeeping missions was derived from the database "EU's Global Engagement: A Database of CSDP Military Missions and Civilian Missions Worldwide" (Di Mauro et al., 2017). For this thesis, EU peacekeeping missions were coded according to ordinal, thus ranked, manner. It has the value 0 if there is no intervention, the value 1 if there is a civilian mission, value 2 if there is a small to medium military mission and value 3 if there is a large military intervention. Small to medium are all interventions with less than 1000 troops. Every intervention with more than 1000 troops sent is categorized as large. This categorization is also in line with Krotz & Wright's (2018, p. 893) categorization of the size of EU peacekeeping missions. In the EU peacekeeping missions, the size from small to medium missions varies from 49 to 531 troops, whereas the large missions range from 1451 to 3250 troops (Di Mauro et al., 2017). Also because of this huge gap between mission sizes, it was decided to have the threshold between small- medium and large missions at 1000 troops. Finally, it was decided to code EU missions along an ordinal scale, rather than coding it as a dummy (= binary (yes/no)) variable, out of the following reason: critics may say that small interventions do not count "as much" as large-scale interventions. Therefore, representing EU missions on an ordinal scale is the most appropriate way to measure the dependent variable.[3]

[3] If the EU had civilian AND military missions in the same country, e.g. Democratic Republic of the Congo, the military mission was chosen.

Table 2: Frequency table of the dependent variable EU peacekeeping missions

EU Peacekeeping	Frequency	Percent
No intervention (=0)	67	69.07
Civilian mission (=1)	17	17.53
Small-medium military mission (=2)	7	7.22
Large military mission (=3)	6	6.19
Total	**97**	**100**

4.2.2 Independent variables

Independent variables (X) are factors that may explain a certain outcome. The aim of this thesis is to analyse what factors can explain where EU peacekeeping missions are sent to, and where they are not. In the *theoretical background*, factors that are commonly used to explain where peacekeeping missions are sent to were already introduced. The following section will explain how these variables will be operationalised in the context of the EU, in order to ensure that they are reliably and validly measured.

4.2.2.1 Level of trade

To test H1, which predicts a higher probability of EU intervention the higher the trade is, the total trade, meaning the sum of import and export between the EU and the partner country, is being looked at. Since both import and export are important for countries' economies, it was decided to look at the sum of both. Data were retrieved from the two data sets Eurostat and Correlates of War (COW), since not one data set provides data for the whole temporal unit of this analysis. Data from 2002 until 2018, were taken from Eurostat, which provides the data of all trade between EU and other countries from 2002 until 2018 (they call the variable *ext_lt_maineu*). In this variable, Eurostat, like done here in the analysis, treats the EU as a unitary actor, meaning it does not break the data on trade down for each member state and the state in conflict. For the years 1998 until 2001, the data were taken from the COW Trade Data Set, Version 4.0 (Barbieri & Keshk, 2009). Here the data were on a dyadic level and had been added for all EU member states, that were already EU member states before 2002. Since those member states, that were not members before 2002, did not influence the decision to intervene before becoming members, their trade data were not taken into consideration for early conflicts. This is also in line with Eurostat's operationalization, which added the new member states respectively after their entry into the EU. The COW data were converted from US Dollar into Euro using the European Central Bank (ECB) exchange rates from the year preceding the conflict (ECB, 2019). Exchange rates prior 1999 were not available, since the

Euro was only introduced as a currency in 1999 (European Council, 2018). Hence, for years 1998, 1999 and 2000 the exchange rate of 1999 was chosen. The final unit of trade flow is hence in millions of Euros. Even though it is more common to measure trade as percentage of total trade, this could not be done here, because the COW data were only available in millions.

For assessing the level of trade between the EU and the state in conflict, the level of trade at the beginning of the conflict was chosen. This was done to have only one temporal unit, since this analysis is not answering the question *when* the EU intervenes and the temporal dimension is therefore of no importance for the analysis. Additionally, another variable was created with the level of trade in the year before the conflict, to control for the effect of the crisis on the economy as a robustness check. For intra-state conflicts, the value of imports and exports of both countries were added. This was done in line with the rational-choice reasoning behind the hypothesis; namely, that a third-actor is more likely to intervene if it has close trade relationships with a state in conflict. Hence, if two states are in conflict, the sum of both countries' trade could be a potential loss of trade during the conflict.

Since the variable measuring trade was skewed, thus not normally distributed, (as further discussed under section *4.3 Methods*), the natural logarithm with the basis of 10 was taken for this variable and all further calculations with this variable were done on the base of the logarithm. There are two missing observations in the trade variable, which can both be explained with the fact that the respective conflicts were conflicts for independence (Kosovo and South Sudan). Hence, the countries only gained independence after the conflict and there is no trade data from before.

4.2.2.2 Level of trade with oil and petroleum [4]

To test H2, which predicts a higher probability of EU intervention the higher the trade of oil and petroleum is, the import level of oil and petroleum (measured in thousand tons) of the state in conflict to the EU will be looked at. Since the EU does not have oil and petroleum rich countries as members, export levels are left out in the analysis. Data are derived from the Eurostat data set, which has the values of "imports of oil and petroleum products by partner country" (they call the variable *nrg_ti_oil*) for the time 1990 until 2018. Whenever a country is not listed, it was assigned the value 0, assuming that there is no imported oil or petroleum from that country. Since not every country has valuable natural resources to export, this is a valid assumption. For assessing the imports level of oil and petroleum, the values of the year from the start of the conflict was chosen. Also here, another variable was created with the import level of oil and petroleum in the year before the conflict, to control for the effect of the crisis on the trade as a robustness check. For inter-state conflicts, the tons of imported oil and petroleum of both

[4] While there are also other valuable natural raw resources, due to data availability only oil and petroleum are being looked at.

countries were added. This was done in line with the rational-choice reasoning of H2, stating that a third-actor is more likely to intervene if it has close trade relationships with a state in conflict because of potential losses in trade. Hence, if two states are in conflict, the sum of both countries' exports of oil and petroleum could be a potential loss during the conflict. Lastly, this variable was measured in tons as opposed to million Euros or percentage of total imports of oil/petroleum, because data were only available in thousand tons. Lastly, since the variable measuring "trade with oil and petroleum" was skewed (as further discussed under section *4.3 Methods*), the natural logarithm with the basis of 10 was taken for this variable and all further calculations with this variable were done on the base of the logarithm.

4.2.2.3 Threat of terrorism

To test H3, which predicts a higher probability of EU intervention the higher the threat of terrorism is, the variable will be measured as follows: The Extended Data on Terrorist Groups (EDTG) data set included the size of terror groups at their peaks in the variable "lsize" (Hou, Gaibulloev, & Sandler, 2020). The EDTG has data on terrorist groups from 1970 until 2016, with data from 1998 onwards being used in the analysis. This variable will be used in the analysis to measure the threat of terrorism. For the missing years 2017 and 2018, the data from 2016 were taken. Although not ideal, it was decided to do this because the data refers to the peak of the size of the terror group – and is hence stable over the years. Thus, the only possible distortion may come if a terror group did not exist anymore in 2017 and 2018. However, it is seen as likely that the terror group existed throughout the whole conflict. Hou et al. (2020, Codebook) defined the strength of a terrorist groups as follows:

Suppose the number of terrorists in a group is *n*.

size	= 1	if $0 < n \leq 9$
	= 10	if $10 \leq n \leq 99$
	= 100	if $100 \leq n \leq 999$
	= 1000	if $1000 \leq n \leq 9999$
	= 10000	if $n > 9999$
	= blank	if n is unknown

For this analysis, the peak size of all terrorist groups active in the time of the conflict was added. Since they were thirteen missing values using only the EDTG data set, this thesis looked for additional sources on the peak size of terrorist groups. It found data in country reports and newspaper articles for eight conflicts (see *Appendix*), which made it possible to reduce the missing values to from thirteen to five. Since the variable measuring "threat of terrorism" was skewed (as further discussed under section *4.3 Methods*), again as for *trade* and *trade with oil and petroleum*, the natural logarithm with the basis of 10 was taken for this variable and all further calculations with this variable were done on the base of the logarithm.

4.2.2.4 Colonial Ties

To test H4, which predicts a higher probability of EU intervention when colonial ties exist, a dummy variable with the value 0, if there are no colonial ties, and value 1, if there are colonial ties, was created. The information was coded manually from the website of Encyclopaedia Britannica for World History (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2020).

4.2.2.5 UN mandate

To measure whether a mandate of the UNSC has been given to intervene in a specific conflict, a dummy variable was created. If there is a UN mandate, the dummy variable has the value 1, and if there is no UN mandate, then the variable gets the value 0. Since this thesis also considers EU civilian missions, UN mandates for civilian missions were also coded with 1. The data for this variable were derived from the Resolutions published on the UN Security Council website and added manually to the data set (UNSC, 2020).

4.2.3 Control variables

Control variables are necessary to include in observational studies, because you need to rule out that your outcome *Y* was caused by another confounding variable *Z* (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2013, p. 81; more on that, see below in “Methodological Proceeding”).

4.2.3.1 Democracy

Gilligan & Stedman (2003, p. 42) found that the UN is more likely to intervene if the state in conflict is a democracy. Therefore, democracy will be a control variable, coded as a dummy, having the values 0 if the state in conflict is not a democracy, and having the value 1 if it is a democracy. The data is derived from the *Polity VI* Project (Marshall, Jaggers, & Gurr, 2017), which categorizes countries as *Full Democracy, Democracy, Open Anocracy, Closed Anocracy, Autocracy* or *Failed*. Here, if a country was coded by Polity IV Project as Full Democracy or Democracy, it gets the value 1, and all other categories get the value 0. In intra-state conflicts, if one state is a democracy and the other state is not, it was coded as 1.

4.2.3.2 Casualties in conflict

Additionally, this thesis will control for whether EU intervention is more likely when greater numbers of deadly causalities exist. The control variable was also used in Gilligan & Stedman's analysis (2003) on where UN peacekeeping missions are sent to. Information on the variable is retrieved from the UCDP/PRIO Dataset on battle-related deaths (Pettersson et al., 2019). The variable looked at is “bd_best”, which refers to the best estimated number of battle-related deaths. The reference year for the battle-related casualties is the year of the intervention. For the conflicts with no intervention, the reference year is the first year of the conflict. Additionally, a variable with all casualties of the respective conflict was created, because it represents the

intensity of the conflict best. Since the variable measuring “casualties in conflict” was skewed (as further discussed under section *4.3 Methods*), also here the natural logarithm with the basis of 10 was taken for this variable and all further calculations with this variable were done on the base of the logarithm.

4.2.3.3 Peacekeeping mission by another international organization

If there was another ongoing peacekeeping mission by another international organization in a conflict, then this is controlled for with two dummy variables. One dummy variable regards a UN peacekeeping mission, and the second regards peacekeeping mission from another International Organization (African Union, ECOWAS, NATO were the ones found to also intervene). This was done to control for the possibility, that the EU may feel less obliged to intervene, if another actor is already attempting to solve the conflict. The data on peacekeeping missions were taken from Bara & Hultman (2020) and the IPI Peacekeeping Dataset, which contains all peacekeeping missions from 1990 until 2018. For these control variables, only military peacekeeping missions by other actors, not civilian missions, were considered.

Table 3: Summary table dependent, independent and control variables of this thesis

Dependent variable	EU peacekeeping operations
Independent variables	Trade (H1) Trade with oil and petroleum (H2) Threat of terrorism (H3) Colonial ties (H4) UN Mandate (H5)
Control variables	Democracy Casualties in conflict Peacekeeping by another international organization

4.3 Methods

In every empirical study, the researcher has the choice between qualitative, quantitative or mixed methods. The literature review exposed that qualitative studies, thus both theoretical explanations for EU peacekeeping missions and also multiple case studies on singular EU peacekeeping missions, have been conducted by multiple scholars. The same cannot be said about quantitative research on EU Peacekeeping missions, where literature is still limited. Most quantitative scholarly work on interventions focuses on analyses of UN peacekeeping missions. The reason of this is simple – UN missions are more numerous than EU

peacekeeping missions and are at first sight more feasible for quantitative studies. With about thirty peacekeeping missions (see *Table 1*), EU interventions are low in number. This is why this thesis uses a different approach, and creates a larger sample by also analyzing where the EU did *not* intervene. This way, an important research gap, namely a quantitative study on EU peacekeeping missions, will be closed. By conducting an analysis with another method, new explanatory factors for EU peacekeeping missions may be found or old explanatory factors confirmed, leading to more robust explanations of previous studies' findings. In the remainder of this chapter, several quantitative designs will be discussed and finally explained, why for the purpose of this thesis the cross-sectional design, using an ordered logistic regression analysis, is the most appropriate.

Quantitative designs conduct large-*N* research and are usually of observational or experimental nature. The later means that "*the researcher both controls and randomly assigns values of the independent variable to the participants*" (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2013, p. 69). Since this is often difficult to achieve in political science (see Ibid.), most scholars in political science conduct observational studies instead. Because of its greater feasibility, this thesis will only consider and discuss observational designs. Here researchers observe reality without random assignment to treatment groups (Bryman, 2016, p. 52). "The core idea of large-N observational research is that even if the outcome of any *individual* case may not be fully determined, the *distribution* of outcomes should still conform with certain patterns if our theory has any bearing in reality." (Toshkov, 2016, p. 202) Popular observational designs are the time-series design and the cross-sectional design.

The time-series design focuses on a single spatial unit over multiple time points (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2013, p. 79). In contrast, the cross-sectional design focuses on a single time unit with variation between individual spatial units. Thus, it explains the variation in the dependent variable across the spatial units (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2013, p. 81). Since EU peacekeeping missions have been part of the EU agenda since 1998, several time points are in the data set. However, there are also several spatial units: several peacekeeping missions, but also several independent variables. Usually the research would choose a research design that combines the time-series design and the cross-sectional design: the panel-data design. But since the temporal unit is not focus of this study, hence it is not being looked at *when* the EU intervenes, this thesis uses a cross-sectional design. This thesis will use the first year of intervention – or if there is no intervention, the first year of conflict – as single temporal unit. To conduct the cross-sectional design effectively, internal validity needs to be ensured by thinking of the four hurdles discussed by Kellstedt & Whitten (2013, pp. 67–84). First, is there a credible causal mechanism connecting X and Y? Second, can we rule out that Y could cause X? Third, do X and Y co-vary? And fourth, did we control for a confounding variable (Z)? The fourth hurdle is the most difficult in observational design because it is hard to control that Y is not caused by

another factor Z (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2013, p. 81). To address the fourth hurdle effectively, control variables need to be used. In this thesis, the control variables are *democracy*, number of *deadly casualties* in conflict and *peacekeeping mission by another international organization*. However, since you can never be sure that you have controlled for all possible factors Z, this thesis can be seen as a preliminary study. This thesis hopes with its quantitative study to add new explanations and motivations for EU peacekeeping missions and which may be an important stepping stone for future research. As Putnam (2003, p. 252) said: "Better an approximate answer to an important question than an exact answer to a trivial question." External validity of observational studies is generally high (Carlson & Morrison, 2009). To ensure reliability, it is crucial that every step of the measurement is done transparently for other researchers to follow (Kellstedt & Whitten, 2013, p. 92). Hence, in this thesis, every step of the operationalization and measurement was carefully explained in this chapter. To further ensure reliability, the STATA Do File and data set are in the *Appendix*.

Specifically, this thesis will use an ordered logistic regression. Regression analysis is used to describe and/or predict what kind of influence the independent variable(s) have on the dependent variable (Kronthaler, 2014, p. 210). If there is a set of independent variables, it is called multiple (as opposed to simple) regression. When deciding which regression model fits the analysis, the researcher has to look at the types of data s/he uses in the analysis. Since in this analysis, the dependent variable is ordinary, thus ranked, an *ordered* logistic regression is most suitable.

The ordered logistic regression was also used by Gilligan & Stedman (2003) to address the question where UN peacekeeping missions are sent to.[5] When conducting the ordered logistic model, the researcher needs to be aware that the model has an underlying "proportional odds assumption". This means that the model assumes the same difference between all the "ranks" of the ordinary data (Windzio, 2013, p. 212). Therefore, it is common to conduct a *Brand test*, which checks whether the proportional odds assumption can be confirmed for the respective data set (Windzio, 2013, p. 213). Otherwise, the results of the analysis can be distorted. If the distance is the same, the ordered logistic regression model can be applied. If the *Brand test* finds that the distance is not the same, the researcher can use the multinominal logistic regression. Here for every category of the dependent variable, an individual coefficient vector is estimated (Windzio, 2013, pp. 212–213). This is in contrast to the ordered logistic regression, where every category of the dependent variable has the same coefficient vector, hence is in one model (since it is assumed that the distance between the ranks is the same). However,

[5] They use survival techniques as a primary research design, since they also want to know how long it takes the UN to intervene. However, as robustness checks, they also include the ordered logistic regression.

since the multinominal logistic regression assumes nominal data, the added value of a model that can host the ranking order for ordinary data may get lost.

Although commonly recommended, in this thesis the *Brand test*, to check for the proportional-odds assumption of ordinary data, could not be conducted. This is because STATA has difficulties computing the *Brand test* with data sets under 200 observations (Statalist, 2017). Usually, as described above, it is recommended to do the multinominal logistic regression, if the proportional odds assumption is violated. This thesis first planned to do a multinominal regression analysis, as a precautious step, in case the proportional odds assumption is violated and to be able to compare the results from the ordered and the multinominal logistic regression. However, due to the low number of observations, STATA discouraged to do the multinominal logistic regression (the warning displayed said “Note: 6 observations completely determined. Standard errors questionable. Convergence not achieved”). Hence, the multinominal logistic regression was not done as a robustness check, but rather binary logistic regression models.

In total three binary logistic regression models were calculated as a robustness check for the results of the ordinary logistic regression: First, a binary logistic regression, where it was looked *whether* the EU intervened, was done. Here, the dependent variable *EU peacekeeping missions* was operationalized as a binary variable, having the value 0 for no peacekeeping mission and the value 1 for a military *or* civilian peacekeeping mission. To additionally being able to further check for whether there are differences in when civilian and military EU peacekeeping missions are deployed, two further binary regression models as a robustness check have been calculated. Here firstly, a binary variable for measuring whether a military mission was sent from the EU to a conflict was created. It takes the value 0 for *no* military mission – the 0 includes both, no mission as well as civilian missions - and the value 1 *if* there was a military mission. To measure whether a military mission was conducted, categories 2 and 3 of the ordinary *EU peacekeeping mission* variable were merged, which referred to the categories *small to medium* military mission and *large* military mission respectively. Due to the low number of observations in each of those two categories, merging them in the binary model made more sense. Secondly, a binary variable measuring whether a civilian mission was sent from the EU to a conflict was created. It takes the value 0 if there was *no* civilian mission – hence no or an EU military mission - sent to a conflict, and the value 1 *if* the EU sent a civilian mission to a conflict. It has hence the value 1, when the ordered dependent variable *EU peacekeeping missions* also had the value 1 for civilian missions. All models were tested in three different logistic regressions.

In preparation for the regression analyses, the following steps have been conducted: since none of those variables (excluding dummy and ordinary variables), are normally distributed according to the Shapiro-Wilk-test, common logarithms with the basis of 10 were calculated.

As robustness test, variables were usually measured in different ways. The *trade* and *trade with oil and petroleum* variables were both measured preceding the conflict and after the conflict, to control for possible effects of the conflict on the trade relationship between the state in conflict and the EU. Additionally, deadly *casualties* were both measured in the year of the intervention and by looking at the total number of deadly casualties in the conflict, to get a sense for the overall intensity of the conflict. For the calculations of this thesis, the version STATA IC 15 from the statistics software STATA is used.

Additionally, there are fifteen conflicts, which had ceasefires of five years or longer and were thus coded as different conflicts (see section *4.1. Case selection*). The option vce(cluster *clustervar*) in STATA allows for a correction of the standard error, since it is assumed (and required) by default that all observations are completely independent (StataCorp, 2013). However, complete independence cannot be assumed for those fifteen conflicts, which is why a relaxation of the requirement of completely independent variables was needed. Thus, in this analysis, the standard errors have been clustered according to the conflict (variable "*conflict ID*" from the UCDP/PRIO data set.).

5 Analysis

The analysis is split into three parts, to check for the robustness of the results. Firstly, data of the first year of intervention, and – if there was no intervention – data of the first year of conflict, were used for the ordered logistic regression. Secondly, data of the year prior to the intervention, or if there was no intervention the data of the year preceding the conflict, were taken for a second model of ordered logistic regression. As discussed in the *Methods and Research Design* chapter, this was done because variables like *trade* and *trade with oil/petroleum* may be affected from a conflict by possibly leading to less trade in the year of conflict. Both models were calculated after excluding all missing observations (threat terrorism has five missing values and trade two, leaving $n = 90$). Thirdly, binary logistic regression models were calculated, to check for the robustness of the results from the ordered logistic regression. Preceding the analysis, a test for collinearity was conducted and descriptive statistics calculated.

5.1 Descriptive statistics

In order to get a better sense for the data, first descriptive statistics have been calculated. *Table 4* refers to the data before the logarithms were taken. The frequency of the dummy variables can be found in *Figures 1-4*.

Table 4: Descriptive statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Deviation	Min	Max
Trade first year of conflict	90	16584.68	39693.56	32.20362	236929.9
Trade first year of conflict	90	17587.76	42814.83	38.98567	285445.7
Oil trade first year of conflict	90	11017.16	37323.93	0	235054.7
Oil trade first year of conflict	90	11534.61	37045.54	0	238046.1
Casualties first year of conflict	90	486.0556	903.6686	25	5769
Total casualties in conflict	90	10828.77	30323.59	26	242041

The figures 1-4 below depict the frequency of the dummy variables of this thesis.



Figure 1: Dummy variable colonial tie



Figure 2: Dummy variable UN mandate



Figure 3: Dummy variable democracy



Figure 4: Dummy variable peacekeeping by another international organization

5.2 Check for collinearity

Prior the analysis, a collinearity test using the *collin* command in STATA has been conducted and all values for the *value inflation factor* (vif) are under the critical value of 10 (*see Table 5*). However, the Eigenvalue of the control variable *UN Peacekeeping mission* was close to 0, which can hint towards a collinearity, here with the independent variable *UN mandate (*see *Table 6)*. Since the various models did have different results if *UN Peacekeeping mission* was in the model, the dummy variable *UN Peacekeeping mission* was ultimately left out due to concerns of collinearity. This means that conflicts, in which the UN intervenes, are still included in the sample, but only the dummy variable, measuring whether an UN peacekeeping mission was deployed in the conflict, was left out.

Table 5: Collinearity Diagnostics

Variable	VIF	SQRT VIF	Tolerance	R-Squared
Trade first year of conflict	2.94	1.72	0.3397	0.6603
Oil trade first year of conflict	3.00	1.73	0.3330	0.6670
Colonial tie	1.31	1.14	0.7656	0.2344
UN mandate	4.83	2.20	0.2069	0.7931
Democracy	1.13	1.06	0.8858	0.1142
Casualties first year of conflict	1.10	1.05	0.9103	0.0897
Other peacekeeping mission	1.58	1.26	0.6323	0.3677
UN peacekeeping mission	4.24	2.06	0.2361	0.7639
Mean VIF	2.52			

Table 6: Eigenvalue and Condition Index

	Eigenval	Index
1	5.5961	1.0000
2	1.4447	1.9681
3	0.8296	2.5972
4	0.5376	3.2263
5	0.3317	4.1075
6	0.1161	6.9441
7	0.0744	8.6751
8	0.0602	9.6422
9	0.0097	24.0203

Condition Number 24.0203

Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from scaled raw sscp (w/ intercept)

Det(correlation matrix) 0.0372

5.3 Ordered logistic regression

The analysis will first describe the results of the ordered logistic regression outputs, where the control variables have not yet been added (Model (1) and (2) in *Table 7*). Afterwards, it will describe the results of the ordered logistic regression outputs referring to the first year of intervention (Model (3) and (5) in *Table 7*). Lastly, this analysis will describe the results of the ordered logistic regression outputs referring to the year before intervention (Model (4) and (6) in *Table 7*). The tables display odds ratios (hereafter OR) and the robust standard error, where the later are in brackets. To interpret odds ratios, you need to be aware that they are multiplicative. Hence, positive effects are larger than one and negative effects are between zero and one (Long & Freese, 2006, p. 179). Due to the multiplication, this also means – against first intuition – "that a positive factor change of 2 has the same magnitude as a negative factor change of 0.5" (Long & Freese, 2006, p. 179).

Looking at those results, where the control variables measuring *democracies*, *casualties* and the *presence of another peacekeeping mission* have *not* been added yet, it can be seen that the only the variable *UN mandate* is significant. The variable *UN mandate* was highly significant with a 99% confidence interval [OR: 18.013 in model (1) and OR: 18.492 in model (2)]. Hence, EU peacekeeping missions are much more likely with a mandate from the UNSC [see *Table 7, models (1) and (2)*]. This is in line with H5, which predicted that the EU will more likely intervene if it has a mandate from the UNSC.

Looking at the analysis, where the control variables have been added, and using the data referring to the first year of conflict [see *Table 7, models (3) and (5)*], the results are fairly similar. Model (3) refers to the model, in which the control variable *deadly casualties* was measured referring to casualties in the first year of intervention/conflict. Model (5) refers to the model in which the variable *deadly casualties* was measured in the *total* casualties of a conflict. Again, *UN mandate* shows highly significant results with a 99% confidence interval and ORs of 17.710 [model (3)] and 20.067 [model (5)]. Predicting the model with data from the year preceding the intervention (and if there was no intervention the year preceding the conflict), again shows similar results, with only *UN mandate* being significant (see models (4) and (6)) in Table 7). Here model (4), which measures casualties in the first year of conflict, whereas model (6) measures total casualties.

The non-significant results have to be interpreted with caution. Non-significance means that you cannot - with confidence - apply the results to the complete sample and that you fail to reject the null hypothesis. However, interestingly, at a previous calculation when the missing data of the EDTG data set on *threat terrorism* have not been found yet, the variables *trade* and *threat terrorism* were significant throughout almost all models (see *Appendix*)[6]. Hence, this suggests that, next to *UN mandate*, there might also be a relationship between EU peacekeeping missions and *trade* as well as *threat terrorism*, even though the results are not statistically significant and the data are inconclusive. In the models using *only* EDTG data on terrorism, trade was negatively associated with EU peacekeeping missions and threat terrorism was positively associated (see *Appendix*). Hence, the more trade happens between the EU and a country in conflict, the *less* likely the EU sends a civilian or military mission. This is the opposite of what was predicted in H1. Moreover, the bigger the size of terrorist groups in the country in conflict, the more likely it is that the conflict will be addressed with a higher category of EU peacekeeping mission. This is in line with H3.
Again, it is important to note that the significance only occurred *prior* to adding the missing data of the variable *threat terrorism*. Possible reasons on why the significance levels have changed will be examined in the discussion.

[6] The previous calculations can be found in the Appendix, pp. 73-74. New calculations have been made because missing data proved to be too many. The previous calculations are based on a more homogenous data set, where the values on the threat terrorism variable are only obtained from the EDTG data set. The new calculations are based on the most complete data set, that has thus more explanatory power. However, since the heterogeneity can affect the results, for the sake of completeness and transparency, both calculations are compared in this thesis.

Table 7: Determinants for EU peacekeeping missions using ordered logistic regression

	Baseline model (1) – First year of conflict	Baseline model (2) – Year prior conflict	Baseline model (1) + controls – First year of conflict	Baseline model (2) + controls – Year prior conflict	Baseline model (1) + controls – First year of conflict	Baseline model (2) + controls – Year prior conflict
VARIABLES	**(1)**	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**	**(5)**	**(6)**
Trade first year of conflict	0.591		0.524		0.470	
	(0.230)		(0.294)		(0.264)	
Trade before year of conflict		0.639		0.588		0.505
		(0.337)		(0.347)		(0.292)
Oil trade first year of conflict	1.053		1.112		1.197	
	(0.191)		(0.242)		(0.253)	
Oil trade year before conflict		1.081		1.123		1.218
		(0.221)		(0.260)		(0.277)
Threat terrorism	1.095	1.068	1.103	1.074	1.153	1.130
	(0.288)	(0.288)	(0.284)	(0.281)	(0.307)	(0.399)
Colonial tie	0.436	0.487	0.486	0.554	0.486	0.540
	(0.320)	(0.351)	(0.340)	(0.445)	(0.353)	(0.399)
UN mandate	**18.031*** **	**18.492*** **	**17.710*** **	**17.296*** **	**20.067*** **	**19.056*** **
	(11.505)	(12.288)	(12.784)	(12.795)	(13.539)	(13.820)
Democracy			1.783	1.717	1.711	1.641
			(1.052)	(0.967)	(0.998)	(0.909)
Casualties first year of conflict			0.953	0.927		
			(0.527)	(0.496)		
Total casualties					0.709	0.683
					(0.223)	(0.207)
Other peacekeeping mission			1.011	1.107	0.998	1.102
			(0.725)	(0.794)	(0.967)	(0.784)
/cut1	0.141	0.485	-0.061	0.331	-1.119	-0.931
	(1.564)	(1.571)	(1.687)	(1.773)	(1.646)	(1.682)
/cut2	1.590	1.920	1.422	1.802	0.427	0.607
	(1.542)	(1.558)	(1.700)	(1.795)	(1.601)	(1.650)
/cut3	2.629	2.947	2.472	2.838	1.483	1.654
	(1.497)	(1.545)	(1.733)	(1.842)	(1.569)	(1.645)
Observations	90	90	90	90	90	90

Displaying odds ratios, robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

5.4 Binary logistic regression

As a robustness check for the results of the ordered logistic regression, a simple *logistic regression* was done. The logistic regression assumes a binary dependent variable. For the logistic regression analysis calculated for this thesis, the dependent variable *EU peacekeeping mission* was hence operationalized as a binary variable. In total, three binary versions of the *EU peacekeeping mission* variable have been created: Firstly, a binary variable measuring whether the EU sent a mission, either military or civilian, was created. As a robustness check that can reflect on the different characters of civilian and military missions, also two binary variables measuring whether a military or civilian mission was sent, were created. The models will be tested in three different logistic regressions respectively. The interpretation is again based on odds ratios.

Table 8 presents the results of the logistic regression using *EU peacekeeping mission* as binary dependent variable. Models (1) and (2) were calculated *without* control variables, and models (3) and (4) were calculated *with* control variables. Models (1) and (3) refer again to calculations, in which the first year of intervention/conflict has been used for the measurement of variables. Models (2) and (4) refer to those models, in which the year *prior* the intervention/conflict has been used for the measurement of the variables. The results are mainly in line with the results of the ordered logistic regression analysis. Throughout all models, UN *mandate* is significant and highly positively associated with EU military peacekeeping missions. Hence, if there is a mandate from the UNSC to intervene in a conflict, the EU is much more likely to intervene.

Table 8: Determinants for EU military or civilian peacekeeping missions using logistic regression

	Baseline model (1)	Baseline model (2)	Baseline model (1) + controls – First year of conflict	Baseline model (2) + controls – Year prior conflict
VARIABLES	**(1)**	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**
Trade first year of conflict	0.868		0.691	
	(0.424)		(0.435)	
Trade before year of conflict		0.913		0.766
		(0.448)		(0.461)
Oil trade first year of conflict	1.015		1.120	
	(0.214)		(0.294)	
Oil trade year before conflict		1.032		1.123
		(0.309)		(0.261)
Threat terrorism	1.080	1.063	1.060	1.035
	(0.307)	(0.309)	(0.294)	(0.291)
Colonial tie	0.391	0.414	0.374	0.407
	(0.322)	(0.334)	(0.318)	(0.346)
UN mandate	**19.515*** **	**20.440*** **	**21.655*** **	**21.299*** **
	(15.898)	(17.282)	15.984	16.247
Democracy			2.849	2.765
			(2.048)	(1.885)
Casualties first year of conflict			1.007	0.988
			(0.530)	(0.504)
Other peacekeeping mission			1.039	1.148
			(0.720)	(0.776)
Constant	0.240	0.201	0.383	0.266
	(0.378)	(0.307)	(0.729)	(0.504)
Observations	90	90	90	90

Displaying odds ratios, robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 9 presents the results of the logistic regression focussing on *EU military peacekeeping missions*. The independent variable *UN Mandate* had to be excluded in all models, because it predicted the models perfectly. The results show a difference in the significance in comparison to *Table 7* or *8*. Throughout all models, trade is significantly negatively associated with EU military peacekeeping missions. Hence, the *more* trade flows between the EU and the country in conflict, the *less* likely it is that the EU will intervene with a military peacekeeping mission. Additionally, the threat of terrorism is significantly positively associated with EU peacekeeping missions. Thus, the greater the threat of terrorism, the more likely it is that the EU will intervene militarily. In model (4), which measured variables preceding the year of intervention/conflict, also the control variables measuring *democracy* and *casualties* are significant (although only at a 90% confidence interval). This suggests that if a country in conflict is a democracy, it is more likely that the EU will intervene with a military peacekeeping mission. However, the *more* deadly casualties were caused in the conflict, the *less* likely it is that the EU will intervene militarily. Additionally, models (3) and (4) show positive associations between another

peacekeeping operation and EU military missions. Since it is only significant with 90% confidence interval, conclusions can only be made with caution. The positive association hints towards that the EU is more likely to send a military mission if another international organization also sends a peacekeeping operation.

Table 9: Determinants for military EU peacekeeping missions using logistic regression

	Baseline model (1)	Baseline model (2)	Baseline model (1) + controls – First year of conflict	Baseline model (2) + controls – Year prior conflict
VARIABLES	**(1)**	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**
Trade first year of conflict	**0.172****		**0.217****	
	(0.108)		(0.158)	
Trade before year of conflict		**0.170****		**0.173****
		(0.107)		(0.149)
Oil trade first year of conflict	0.996		0.957	
	(0.333)		(0.378)	
Oil trade year before conflict		1.002		1.131
		(0.283)		(0.341)
Threat terrorism	**1.578***	**1.634****	1.582	1.705
	(0.387)	(0.399)	(0.456)	(0.603)
Colonial tie	1.135	1.360	2.384	3.119
	(1.928)	(1.628)	(2.731)	(3.966)
Democracy			2.140	**2.062***
			(1.749)	(1.691)
Casualties first year of conflict			0.366	**0.333***
			(0.261)	(0.219)
Other peacekeeping mission			**6.271***	**5.781***
			(6.838)	(5.744)
Constant	10.059	8.095	8.644	12.004
	(17.772)	(14.790)	(19.594)	(27.364)
Observations	90	90	90	90

Displaying odds ratios, robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: The variable UN Mandate had to be dropped, because it predicted the model perfectly.

Table 10 presents the results of the logistic regression using *EU civilian peacekeeping missions* as binary dependent variable. The independent variable *UN Mandate* could be left in the model, because – as opposed to the model measuring the probabilities of EU military peacekeeping missions – it did *not* predict the model perfectly. Looking at *Table 10,* UN mandate is again the only highly positively and significantly associated variable with EU civilian missions. Thus, if there is a mandate from the UNSC to intervene in a conflict, the EU is much more likely to send a civilian mission to that conflict. Additionally, it can be seen that *trade* is surprisingly positively associated with EU civilian missions.

Table 10: Determinants for civilian EU missions using logistic regression

	Baseline model (1)	Baseline model (2)	Baseline model (1) + controls – First year of conflict	Baseline model (2) + controls – Year prior conflict
VARIABLES	**(1)**	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**
Trade first year of conflict	2.084		1.676	
	(0.943)		(0.971)	
Trade before year of conflict		1.920		1.611
		(0.844)		(0.919)
Oil trade first year of conflict	0.930		0.959	
	(0.208)		(0.239)	
Oil trade year before conflict		0.974		0.999
		(0.195)		(0.223)
Threat terrorism	1.007	1.013	0.995	0.992
	(0.261)	(0.260)	(0.232)	(0.234)
Colonial tie	0.605	0.569	0.470	0.457
	(0.420)	(0.381)	(0.364)	(0.341)
UN mandate	**7.112***	**7.665****	**8.265****	**9.216****
	(7.163)	(7.590)	(8.859)	(9.60)
Democracy			1.783	1.848
			(1.413)	(1.472)
Casualties first year of conflict			1.721	1.721
			(0.781)	(0.737)
Other peacekeeping mission			0.580	0.557
			(0.493)	(0.472)
Constant	**0.009*****	**0.011****	**0.006****	**0.007****
	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Observations	90	90	90	90

Displaying odds ratios, robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

6 Discussion of findings

The empirical analysis aimed to find out what factors can explain where EU peacekeeping missions are sent. Furthermore, it aimed to test several hypotheses, which listed which factors are expected to have an impact on the decision whether an EU peacekeeping mission is sent to a conflict. These factors were namely trade (H1), trade with oil and petroleum (H2), threat of terrorism (H3), colonial ties (H4) and the presence of a mandate from the UN Security Council (H5). Additionally, it tested for the control variables democracy, casualties in a conflict, and the presence of a peacekeeping mission by another international organization.

H1, which predicted that the EU will more likely send a peacekeeping mission if there is a high level of trade, *cannot* be confirmed. Trade, throughout most models, was not significant and thus, no concrete conclusions can be made based on the results. However, in the control models conducting binary regression analyses, EU military missions were significantly

negatively associated with trade (*Table 9*). As mentioned earlier, in an earlier version of this analysis where still less data was available, trade was significantly negatively associated with EU peacekeeping missions throughout all models (see *Appendix*), although there the significance was mainly only with a 90 per cent confidence interval. Hence, there are hints towards a negative relationship, even though the data currently available are inconclusive. As the robustness check focussing on civilian missions revealed that trade was positively associated (*Table 9*), it reconfirms that no clear conclusions can be made.

That this thesis could not find strong significant results may be due to several reasons. First of all, it works with a small sample size. This in general decreases the statistical power. It also showed that small changes in the sample can change the significance of the results. Hence, when eight observations to the *threat terrorism* variable were added, which increased the numbers of observations from 82 to 90, trade was in most models not significant anymore. Since the significance beforehand was weak and only with a 90 per cent confidence interval (see *Appendix*), it is less surprising that the p value could quickly go above ten once more observations were included. The theoretical background similarly exposed that the empirical evidence for trade as a motivational factor is mixed. Whereas Aydin (2008) and Gaibulloev et al. (2009) found that strong trade relationships do motivate third actors to intervene, Yoon (1997) found that it does not play a role. Additionally, trade was also found to have been a motivator for single EU missions, such as Atalanta in Somalia (Winn & Lewis, 2017). The non-significant and weak negative findings of this thesis suggest that the effect of trade on peacekeeping is indeed not straightforward. The negative results may hint towards that there must be more than just rational-choice assumptions like “loss of trade”, which motivate the EU to intervene, although it has to be emphasized again that due to the non-significance, no clear conclusions can be made. One strong theoretical argument for finding statistically weak connections is that this thesis did not assess the role of the big EU member states in the decision to intervene. Numerous authors have pointed to the crucial role that member states have in the decision whether the EU will intervene (e.g. Henke, 2019; Norheim-Martinsen, 2011; Olsen, 2009; Styan, 2012). Especially France, Germany, the UK and Italy are usually regarded as pivotal players in the decision-making of defence and security policies of the EU. Hence, it is imaginable that the results would have been more conclusive when operationalizing the *trade* variable with respect to the pivotal EU member states. The mechanism here would be that if a pivotal player has a strong trade relationship with a country in conflict, it would lobby in Brussels for an EU peacekeeping operation. It should be mentioned that the author first aimed to include trade relationships between the pivotal players and the state in conflict. However, ultimately the bilateral relationships could not be considered due to

data unavailability.[7] Reasons for the negative association may be that a higher level of trade may be associated also with wealthier states, which have enough resources of their own to defend themselves in a conflict. Additionally, the negative relationship may also be explained with the fact that the EU does not want to interfere with the internal matters of another state. That only a significant connection could be found for EU military missions, which may be more intrusive to a state, could further underline that.

H2, which predicted that the EU will be more likely to send EU peacekeeping missions if there is a high level of trade with oil and petroleum with the state in conflict, can also *not* be confirmed. The relationship throughout the models was weak and fluctuated between positive and negative effects. One possible reason for inconsistent results may be that fifty per cent of the observations have the value 0, because the EU trades oil and petroleum only with a limited number of countries. The reason for this is simple: Since oil and petroleum are valuable natural resources, which not every country possesses, it is natural that the number of possible trade partners is limited. However, the presence of many zeros in the observations may be the reason why the variable trade with oil and petroleum has weak and inconsistent results. That being said, the logarithm with the basis of 10 was taken of this variable because - as explained - this variable is skewed. Collinearity as a reason for weak relationship is unlikely, due to the results of the collinearity test (see section 5.2.). Additionally, the results might be different when including other commodities than oil and petroleum, which in this thesis could not be done due to data availability. Generally, the small sample used may have also complicated the calculations and analysis. Lastly, it cannot be excluded that the results would have been different if this thesis would have included the role of pivotal players in the model.

H3, which predicts that the higher the threats of terrorists, the more likely it is that the EU will intervene, was only partially confirmed. The factor had a significant positive relationship only in the binary logistic regression model which focussed on EU military missions (*Table 9*). This is in slight contrast to what other authors have found, who said that “the civilian and military components of the CSDP remain marginal to the EU’s global counter-terrorism policy.” (Bossong, 2013, p. 23) The results of this thesis suggest that the relationship between threat of terrorism and EU peacekeeping missions is weak for EU civilian missions, but significant for EU military missions. Other authors have found terrorism to be a driver for peacekeeping (Azam & Thelen, 2010; Sandler & Shimizu, 2014). This suggests, that the role the threat of terrorism will play regarding the decision on EU intervention, is not straightforward.

[7] Eurostat only had EU-partner data available and the even though the Correlates of War trade dataset has bilateral data, the data is only provided until 2014.

Again, in an earlier version of this analysis where they were more missing values in the variable *threat terrorism*, the variable *threat terrorism* was significantly positively associated with EU peacekeeping operations in most models. Here it is likely that the newly added observations have altered the results. For Ukraine, for example, data was missing in the EDTG data set for the alleged terror group “Donetsk People’s Republic”. When looking for missing data, it was then seen that Donetsk People’s Republic is not a terror group recognized by the EU (Mogherini, 2016). Hence, it was decided to include the value 0 for *threat terrorism* for the three conflicts in Ukraine. However, since the EU deployed its civilian mission EUAM Ukraine to Ukraine, this change in observations with the value 0 in Ukraine for *threat terrorism* is likely to have impacted the results from a significant to non-significant result.

Since there was a positive relationship in the binary model focussing on EU military missions and in previous models, this can hint towards a relationship between threat terrorism and EU peacekeeping operations, even if you cannot apply the results to the complete sample and you fail to reject the null hypothesis. In addition to the inconclusive results, the results also do not answer what exactly the concerns of the EU are with regard to terrorism. Are they concerned about the local population in the conflict? Are they concerned about terror attacks on EU territory? Do they want to stop refugees fleeing from terror by fighting the terror groups? Or do they want to promote institutional reforms in authoritarian and fragile states (Bossong, 2013, p. 22)? All of these reasons are plausible, but it is difficult to establish whether all, several or only one of those factors are concrete drivers of EU peacekeeping missions. To find an exact answer is even more complicated due to the fact that terrorist groups themselves aim for multiple outcomes: “Terrorists often use violence to signal their strength and resolve in an effort to produce concessions from their enemy and obedience and support from their followers.” (Kydd & Walter, 2006, p. 78) Here future research should involve case studies that are better to research specific causal mechanisms, because this could not be done within the frame of the current thesis. These multiple ways in which terrorism can play a role should also be kept in mind when operationalizing the threat terrorism variable in future research.

H4, which predicted that the EU will be more likely to intervene if an EU member state and the state in conflict have colonial ties, *cannot* be confirmed. The relationship was weak throughout the models. However, the binary regression models revealed positive relationships with military missions, but negative effects with civilian missions. Since the relationships were not significant, the results have to be interpreted with caution. It is also plausible that due to the low number of cases, but also the low number of military missions specifically, caused problems for analysing the effect separately.

The reason the result was weak may be explained due to bilateral relationships. Some African states are opposed to interventions due to neo-colonial concerns (Gegout, 2017). Additionally,

specifically authoritarian African states drive a non-intervention policy because they are opposed to the requirements Europe usually forces on the rule of law and human rights (Fernández Sola, 2013, p. 76). However, due to "a combination of familiarity, trust and long-established partnerships", other ex-colonies may also perceive the former colonial power as "more legitimate peacekeepers" (Perkins & Neumayer, 2008, p. 902). Thus, colonial ties – depending on the specific relationship between the former colony and the EU member state – may still play a role in the decision. However, the weak relationship suggests that this varies across cases, and that it can certainly not be applied as an explanatory factor for all EU peacekeeping missions.

H5, which predicted that the EU will be more likely to intervene if there is a mandate from the UNSC, *was* confirmed. This was by far the strongest finding of this analysis, with highly significant results throughout the models. The presence of an UN mandate from the UNSC also predicted the binary model focusing on military missions (see *Table 9*) perfectly, and hence seems to be even more applicable for military missions. A mandate from the UNSC is still often seen as the only true legitimation to intervene in another country. This explains why the EU is so eager to particularly act with a UNSC mandate. As discussed in the literature review, this is important since it is generally claimed that each country has ultimate sovereignty over its own territory. Another reason may be that a peacekeeping operation with a UNSC mandate gets a higher public approval rate by EU citizens. Public opinion was found to be generally high for a common foreign policy of the EU, and "between 2003 and 2006, the majority of respondents believed that the European Union plays a positive role regarding peace in the world" (Galantino, 2015, p. 52). The results of this thesis show that the EU's commitment to the UN charter as a framework for operating within international relations (Solana, 2009, p. 9), is not only rhetoric. This is even more important in a time where the multilateral system becomes more and more contested:

> "Some states tend to act within international institutions for pragmatic reasons; others act unilaterally or block multilateral *fora* if it is suitable for their national interests. Pragmatic and realistic approaches substitute the normative approach based on values, as even these values are contested – and hence the kind of moral superiority of states bearing them." (Fernández Sola, 2013, p. 87, emphasis in original)

However, it should be noted that the EU will still not intervene in every country where there is a UNSC mandate. As discussed in the literature review, there are also examples, such as the civil war in Lebanon, where the UN asked the EU to intervene, but the EU did not intervene. Here preferences or concerns of EU member states can play a role in the decision (e.g. Gross, 2009, pp. 51–55). The importance of a UN mandate emphasizes the EU's commitment to its

own norms and to those of international cooperation (Manners, 2002). Since the dummy variable, measuring whether there was a UN peacekeeping mission already deployed to a conflict, was excluded due to multicollinearity concerns, the effect of UN peacekeeping missions itself cannot be assessed.

The relationship between the control variables and EU peacekeeping operations was weak throughout all models. Only in the binary model focussing on EU military missions, democracy, casualties and other peacekeeping operation were significant. However, since the significance is only with a 90 per cent confidence interval, this does not allow for conclusions. The discussion hereafter is only meant to discuss tendencies, that *cannot* be applied to the whole sample based on the weak statistical connections. That democracy was positively associated may be explained by the fact that the EU often refers to the importance of the rule of law and human right in its foreign policy. Hence, it makes sense that the EU will feel more obliged to intervene if one state is threatened by another actor, particularly if it is a non-democratic actor. Many of the conflicts are indeed spurred by terroristic groups such as the so-called Islamic State (IS). The results suggest that this relationship is stronger particularly for military missions. The control variable measuring the deadly casualties in conflict was negatively associated with EU peacekeeping missions throughout the models. Thus, the more deadly casualties, the less likely the EU is to intervene. Again, this is to be interpreted with extreme caution due to the mostly non-significant effects. This negative effect, however, is in line with what critics say about EU missions: that the interventions are unambitious and that the EU generally also does not intervene at the height of the conflict (Krotz & Wright, 2018, p. 885). Lastly, the control variable measuring whether the presence of another peacekeeping mission influences whether the EU will intervene, has weak relationships with the dependent variable throughout the models. However, the binary logistic regression analyses exposed that there was a highly positive association in the model focusing on military missions. When looking at the EU peacekeeping missions, it is true that the EU often cooperates with other international organizations, or deploys a bridging mission until a UN peacekeeping mission starts (this was exemplarily the case in the EUFOR Chad mission as discussed by Styan (2012)).

The results show how important it is for the EU to be seen as a *legitimate* security actor, which acts particularly upon legitimization of the international community. Rather, the missions are driven by less contentious issues. This is all underlined by the presence of UNSC mandates for their peacekeeping missions, and that – in the case of military EU peacekeeping missions - the country in conflict should be devoted to democratic values which is threatened by a third-actor, and that from the state in conflict should come a considerable threat of terrorism. The significant negative association between the EU military missions and level of trade is difficult to tier to a specific reason, since it goes against commonly used rational-choice assumptions

of political science. Plausible reasons discussed are that the state in conflict has enough resources of its own, and/or that the state in conflict was not interested in receiving help from the EU. This would be in line with the above-mentioned finding that the EU is more likely to intervene in non-contentious conflicts. However, also here it should be emphasized again that only the presence of a UNSC mandate was significant throughout all models, and is thus the only result conclusions can be based on.
However, the results of this thesis do not necessarily mean that the EU will *only* intervene if it is seen as legitimate. Other factors, such as that the EU sends missions to assert its importance in the world, or also for more selfish reasons such as limiting refugee flows to Europe, are still plausible additional explanatory factors. These fine nuances and insights into the motivations in specific cases can much better be researched with pointed qualitative case studies and careful theoretical explanations through congruence analyses.

However, the results do show, that when looking at all EU peacekeeping missions quantitatively, the EU is a cautious security player, that does not want to risk being seen as an illegitimate actor. They also show that, despite possible different priorities and attitudes of EU member states, sending EU peacekeeping operations with a UNSC mandate is an explanatory factor that *all* EU member states could agree on – with significance throughout all models.

7 Conclusions

The purpose of this thesis was to find explanatory factors for the question, in which conflicts the EU intervenes, and in which not. It was hypothesized, that the factors trade, trade with oil and petroleum, threat of terrorism, colonial ties and the presence of a mandate from the UNSC may be explanatory factors for where the EU sends its peacekeeping mission. Additionally, the effects of control variables democracy, casualties in a conflict, and the presence of another peacekeeping mission were measured. The hypotheses were tested with several ordinal regression analyses, and binary logistic regression analyses as a robustness check.

The results show that a mandate from the UN Security Council is a strong explanatory factor that the EU will send a peacekeeping mission. This is by far the strongest finding of this thesis. The other variables showed weak statistical connections. The variables trade, threat of terrorism, democracy and peacekeeping by another international organization were only significant when looking at EU military missions particularly. Hence, cautiously, it can be said that the EU is more likely to send a military EU peacekeeping mission to a conflict, if terror groups located in the country of conflict are strong. Furthermore, the EU will be more likely to intervene militarily if the country in conflict is a democracy and in support of peacekeeping

operations by another international organization. However, the EU is less likely to intervene militarily, if its level of trade with the country in conflict is high.

The results have to be interpreted with caution. While this thesis places strong emphasis in creating reliable and valid results, the study is not without limitations. Reliability of this thesis is considered high, as every step of the research and operationalization of the variable was carefully described and the dataset as well as the STATA Do File is made available in the *Appendix*. The external validity of quantitative studies is generally high, although results of this analysis may deviate due to the small *N* of 90 cases with complete data in total. The weakest point of this thesis is its internal validity. Since data had to be merged from multiple data sets, the final data set is relatively heterogenous. This is especially valid for the trade and threat terrorism variables, where due to limited data availability the data for this variable comes from different sources. The variables trade, threat of terrorism, democracy and peacekeeping operation were only significant when looking at military missions in particular. Additionally, the results of variables measuring the influence of trade with oil and petroleum, colonial ties and number of deadly casualties were weak and partially fluctuating throughout the models. This hints towards limited internal validity. Nonetheless, the added value of this thesis is still high, as it showed that quantitative analysis is possible, also in the field of EU peacekeeping missions. As such, it is an important starting point for further quantitative analyses, which could check for the robustness of this thesis' findings.

Another limitation of this thesis is that it has taken the EU as a unitary actor and does not consider the role of the individual member states in the decision as to whether the EU will intervene. This would have to be part of a much more extensive analysis than was possible within the limited time frame of a master thesis. Other scholars have found that the big member states (Germany, UK, France and Italy) are pivotal players in the decision-making (e.g. Henke, 2019). Similarly, authors pointed out that particularly France is using the EU as a security actor for its own national interests (Olsen, 2009; Styan, 2012). Hence, this thesis can only depict part of the story. However, the limitation is not as severe considering that this thesis is focused on the outcome – that is, where do EU peacekeeping missions take place. After all, the missions are the outcome of a decision that *all* EU member states could ultimately agree on. However, here a different operationalization of the EU with regards to its pivotal actors, should be done in future research to compare the results with this thesis. Additionally, this thesis does not analyse the efficiency of the EU's peacekeeping missions. Are the interventions successful, does the EU keep the peace? Although case studies on the efficiency of EU peacekeeping missions have been conducted, quantitative work is still lacking. To answer those questions was beyond the scope of this thesis, but these questions should certainly be investigated in

future research. Another interesting question for future research would be *when* the EU intervenes, thus how long a conflict already lasted until the EU started to intervene. Additionally, the discussion showed that it is difficult to explain concrete causal mechanisms of how threat of terrorism influences the decision where the EU sends its peacekeeping missions. Hence, future research should conduct case studies to break down causal mechanisms of terrorism as a driver for EU peacekeeping missions.

The EU, which has long used economic means, such as sanctions, as foreign policy tools, is now also increasingly committed to diplomatic and military means in conflict prevention and solution (Gegout, 2017, p. 254). Thus, the EU is moving away from solely soft power approaches, and is using more civilian and military missions. In comparison by the sheer number, the EU rather sends civilian missions than military missions.

The results of this thesis show how important it is for the EU to be seen as a *legitimate* security actor, which promotes and stands behind the rule of law. This is underlined by the presence of UNSC mandates for their peacekeeping missions, which also shows that the EU is devoted to multilateralism. When wanting to predict whether the EU will intervene in a conflict, this factor should thus be considered by policy-makers and think tanks. It shows, that when all EU member states agree on where to send EU peacekeeping missions, they can agree on the greatest common denominator which in this case are less contentious missions that were legitimized by the international community. This is an important finding against the background of the growing number of conflicts likely to increase due to the effects of the current COVID-19 pandemic (Basedau & Deitch, 2020). Thus, EU peacekeeping missions are likely to be in higher demand. They are also likely to gain momentum at a time when the USA is increasingly shifting its security interests to Asia, rather than Europe and Africa (Major, 2018). At the same time, with the UK leaving the EU, the EU will lose about 20 per cent of its current capabilities (Giegerich & Mölling, 2018). With the UK leaving, the EU will also lose an important military actor, and France will be the only nuclear power left in the EU. If the EU wants to stay as its current level of ambition as a crisis manager, it will be crucial that the EU will continue to cooperate with other international organizations in peacekeeping or increase its own spending in defence capabilities.

8 Reference List

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9 Appendix

Script of STATA Do File

/* Master's Thesis Lena Wiehe Do File */

```
set more off

cd "C:\Users\lenaf\Desktop\Lenas Sachen\Lena\Lena Uni\IMP Master\Master Thesis\EU Peacekeeping Missions\Data\Final Data for Thesis"

use "Wiehe_Data Set MT_missing values.dta", clear
```

/* Descriptive statistics */

```
drop if threat_terrorism==9 //delete missing values to not deter summary statistics

drop if Trade_mio==0

summarize Trade_mio Trade_mio_yrbefore tradeoil_yrbefore tradeoil_1styrconflict threat_terrorism firstyr_deaths total_deaths


tab colonialtie, m //dummy and ordinary variables

tab UN_Mandate, m

tab Democracy, m

tab otherPKO, m

tab EU_PKO, m
```

/* Testing if variables are normally distributed */

```
swilk Trade_mio Trade_mio_yrbefore tradeoil_yrbefore tradeoil_1styrconflict threat_terrorism firstyr_deaths total_deaths
```

/* Variables are not normally distributed, hence now a log on the basis of 10 will be generated */

```
gen log_trade_mio=log10(Trade_mio)

gen log_trade_mio_yrbefore=log10(Trade_mio_yrbefore)

gen log_tradeoil_yrbefore=log10(tradeoil_yrbefore)

replace log_tradeoil_yrbefore=0 if log_tradeoil_yrbefore==. //EU does not do oil trade with every country, so here the value 0 makes sense

gen log_tradeoil_1styrconflict=log10(tradeoil_1styrconflict)

replace log_tradeoil_1styrconflict=0 if log_tradeoil_1styrconflict==. //EU does not do oil trade with every country, so here the value 0 makes sense
```

```
gen log_firstyr_deaths=log10(firstyr_deaths) //no missing values

gen log_total_deaths=log10(total_deaths) //no missing values

gen log_threat_terrorism=log10(threat_terrorism)

replace log_threat_terrorism=0 if log_threat_terrorism==.

mvdecode log_threat_terrorism, mv(.9542425) //I coded missing values with 9 in Excel; .9542425 is log10 of 9; mvdecode codes the variable to missing for STATA


save "C:\Users\lenaf\Desktop\Lenas Sachen\Lena\Lena Uni\IMP Master\Master Thesis\EU Peacekeeping Missions\Data\Final Data for Thesis\Wiehe_Data Set_Master Thesis.dta", replace


/* Calculating the ordinary logistic regression */

set more off

cd "C:\Users\lenaf\Desktop\Lenas Sachen\Lena\Lena Uni\IMP Master\Master Thesis\EU Peacekeeping Missions\Data\Final Data for Thesis"

use "Wiehe_Data Set_Master Thesis.dta", clear

findit collin //install package to check for collinearity

collin log_trade_mio log_tradeoil_1styrconflict colonialtie UN_Mandate ///

Democracy log_firstyr_deaths otherPKO UN_PKO


/*VIF values are fine, but Eigenvalue of UN_PKO problematic (probably due

to collinearity with UN_Mandate) */


/* Model first year of conflict */

ologit EU_PKO log_trade_mio log_tradeoil_1styrconflict log_threat_terrorism ///

colonialtie UN_Mandate Democracy log_firstyr_deaths otherPKO UN_PKO, ///

vce(cluster conflict_id) or


ologit EU_PKO log_trade_mio log_tradeoil_1styrconflict log_threat_terrorism ///

colonialtie UN_Mandate Democracy log_firstyr_deaths otherPKO, ///

vce(cluster conflict_id) or //model without UN_PKO


estimates store m1, title(Model 1_with missing values without UN_PKO OR)

estimates save "Model 1_with missing values without UN_PKO OR"

outreg2 using "Model 1_with missing values without UN_PKO OR", replace

outreg2 using "Model 1_with missing values without UN_PKO OR", see word
```

```
ologit EU_PKO log_trade_mio log_tradeoil_1styrconflict log_threat_terrorism ///
colonialtie UN_Mandate, vce(cluster conflict_id) or //model without control variables

estimates store m1, title(Model 1_with missing values without controlvar OR)
estimates save "Model 1_with missing values without controlvar OR"
outreg2 using "Model 1_with missing values without controlvar OR", replace
outreg2 using "Model 1_with missing values without controlvar OR", see word

ologit EU_PKO log_trade_mio_yrbefore log_threat_terrorism colonialtie UN_Mandate, ///
vce(cluster conflict_id)

/* Model year before conflict */
ologit EU_PKO log_trade_mio_yrbefore log_tradeoil_yrbefore log_threat_terrorism ///
colonialtie UN_Mandate Democracy log_firstyr_deaths otherPKO, ///
vce(cluster conflict_id) or

estimates store m2, title(Model 2_with missing values_year before conflict without UN_PKO OR)
estimates save "Model 2_with missing values_year before conflict without UN_PKO OR"
outreg2 using "Model 2_with missing values_year before conflict without UN_PKO OR", replace
outreg2 using "Model 2_with missing values_year before conflict without UN_PKO OR", see word

ologit EU_PKO log_trade_mio_yrbefore log_tradeoil_yrbefore log_threat_terrorism ///
colonialtie UN_Mandate, vce(cluster conflict_id) or

estimates store m2, title(Model 2_with missing values without controlvar OR)
estimates save "Model 2_with missing values without controlvar OR"
outreg2 using "Model 2_with missing values without controlvar OR", replace
outreg2 using "Model 2_with missing values without controlvar OR", see word

/* Model first year of conflict with total deaths */
ologit EU_PKO log_trade_mio log_tradeoil_1styrconflict log_threat_terrorism ///
colonialtie UN_Mandate Democracy log_total_deaths otherPKO, ///
vce(cluster conflict_id) or //does not make a difference if I put "i" in front of dummy variables

estimates store m3, title(Model 3_with missing values_total deaths without UN_PKO OR)
```

estimates save "Model 3_with missing values_total deaths without UN_PKO OR"

outreg2 using "Model 3_with missing values_total deaths without UN_PKO OR", replace

outreg2 using "Model 3_with missing values_total deaths without UN_PKO OR", see word

/* Model year before conflict with total deaths*/

ologit EU_PKO log_trade_mio_yrbefore log_tradeoil_yrbefore ///

log_threat_terrorism colonialtie UN_Mandate Democracy log_total_deaths ///

otherPKO, vce(cluster conflict_id) or

estimates store m4, title(Model 4_with missing values_total deaths year before without UN_PKO OR) //estout for significant stars

estimates save "Model 4_with missing values_total deaths year before without UN_PKO OR"

outreg2 using "Model 4_with missing values_total deaths year before without UN_PKO OR", replace

outreg2 using "Model 4_with missing values_total deaths year before without UN_PKO OR", see word

/* Multinominal logistic regression, first year of conflict/intervention */

mlogit EU_PKO log_trade_mio log_tradeoil_1styrconflict log_threat_terrorism ///

colonialtie UN_Mandate Democracy log_firstyr_deaths otherPKO, ///

vce(cluster conflict_id) iter(20) //model without UN_PKO, STATA gave warning that multinominal logistic regression: “Note: 6 observations completely determined. Standard errors questionable. Convergence not achieved”

estimates store m5, title(MLR with missing values without UN_PKO)

estimates save "MLR with missing values without UN_PKO"

outreg2 using "MLR with missing values without UN_PKO", replace

outreg2 using "MLR with missing values without UN_PKO", see word

/* Binary logistic regression */

gen EUPKO_binary=.

replace EUPKO_binary=0 if EU_PKO==0

replace EUPKO_binary=1 if EU_PKO>=1

tab EUPKO_binary, m

label variable EUPKO_binary "EU Peacekeeping Operation, 0= no, 1= civilian or military"

```
gen EUPKO_civilian=.
replace EUPKO_civilian=0 if EU_PKO==0
replace EUPKO_civilian=0 if EU_PKO==2
replace EUPKO_civilian=0 if EU_PKO==3
replace EUPKO_civilian=1 if EU_PKO==1
tab EUPKO_civilian, m
label variable EUPKO_civilian "Dummy EU Peacekeeping Operation, 0= no, 1= civilian"

gen EUPKO_military=.
replace EUPKO_military=0 if EU_PKO==0
replace EUPKO_military=0 if EU_PKO==1
replace EUPKO_military=1 if EU_PKO==2
replace EUPKO_military=1 if EU_PKO==3
tab EUPKO_military, m
label variable EUPKO_military "Dummy EU Peacekeeping Operation, 0= no, 1= military"
save "C:\Users\lenaf\Desktop\Lenas Sachen\Lena\Lena Uni\IMP Master\Master Thesis\EU Peacekeeping Missions\Data\Final Data for Thesis\Wiehe_Data Set_Master Thesis.dta", replace

/*Binary Model civilian OR military mission */

/* Binary Model first year of conflict */
logit EUPKO_binary log_trade_mio log_tradeoil_1styrconflict log_threat_terrorism ///
colonialtie UN_Mandate, ///
vce(cluster conflict_id) or
estimates store m1, title(Model 1_binary first year OR) //estout for significant stars
estimates save "Model 1_binary first year OR"
outreg2 using "Model 1_binary first year OR", replace
outreg2 using "Model 1_binary first year OR", see word

/* Binary Model year before conflict */
logit EUPKO_binary log_trade_mio_yrbefore log_tradeoil_yrbefore log_threat_terrorism ///
colonialtie UN_Mandate, ///
vce(cluster conflict_id) or

estimates store m2, title(Model 2_binary year before) //estout for significant stars
```

```
estimates save "Model 2_binary year before OR"
outreg2 using "Model 2_binary year before OR", replace
outreg2 using "Model 2_binary year before OR", see word

/* Binary Model first year of conflict with control variables */
logit EUPKO_binary log_trade_mio log_tradeoil_1styrconflict log_threat_terrorism ///
colonialtie UN_Mandate Democracy log_firstyr_deaths otherPKO, ///
vce(cluster conflict_id) or

estimates store m1, title(Model 1_binary civilian first year with controlvar OR) //estout for significant stars
estimates save "Model 1_binary first year with controlvar OR"
outreg2 using "Model 1_binary first year with controlvar OR", replace
outreg2 using "Model 1_binary first year with controlvar OR", see word

/* Binary Model year before conflict */
logit EUPKO_binary log_trade_mio_yrbefore log_tradeoil_yrbefore log_threat_terrorism ///
colonialtie UN_Mandate Democracy log_firstyr_deaths otherPKO, ///
vce(cluster conflict_id) or

estimates store m2, title(Model 2_binary first year with controlvar OR) //estout for significant stars
estimates save "Model 2_binary year before with controlvar OR"
outreg2 using "Model 2_binary year before with controlvar OR", replace
outreg2 using "Model 2_binary year before with controlvar OR", see word

/* Binary Model CIVILIAN first year of conflict */
logit EUPKO_civilian log_trade_mio log_tradeoil_1styrconflict log_threat_terrorism ///
colonialtie UN_Mandate, ///
vce(cluster conflict_id) or

estimates store m1, title(Model 1_binary civilian first year OR) //estout for significant stars
estimates save "Model 1_binary civilian first year OR"
outreg2 using "Model 1_binary civilian first year OR", replace
outreg2 using "Model 1_binary civilian first year OR", see word
```

/* Binary Model CIVILIAN year before conflict */

```
logit EUPKO_civilian log_trade_mio_yrbefore log_tradeoil_yrbefore log_threat_terrorism ///
colonialtie UN_Mandate, ///
vce(cluster conflict_id) or

estimates store m2, title(Model 2_binary civilian year before) //estout for significant stars
estimates save "Model 2_binary civilian year before OR"
outreg2 using "Model 2_binary civilian year before OR", replace
outreg2 using "Model 2_binary civilian year before OR", see word
```

/* Binary Model MILITARY first year of conflict */

```
logit EUPKO_military log_trade_mio log_tradeoil_1styrconflict log_threat_terrorism ///
colonialtie, ///
vce(cluster conflict_id) or //UN Mandate predicts failure perfectly and was leftout of analysis

estimates store m3, title(Model 3_binary military first year OR) //estout for significant stars
estimates save "Model 3_binary military first year OR"
outreg2 using "Model 3_binary military first year OR", replace
outreg2 using "Model 3_binary military first year OR", see word
```

/* Binary Model MILITARY year before conflict */

```
logit EUPKO_military log_trade_mio_yrbefore log_tradeoil_yrbefore log_threat_terrorism ///
colonialtie, ///
vce(cluster conflict_id) or

estimates store m4, title(Model 4_binary military year before OR) //estout for significant stars
estimates save "Model 4_binary military year before OR"
outreg2 using "Model 4_binary military year before OR", replace
outreg2 using "Model 4_binary military year before OR", see word
```

/*Binary models with control variables */

/* Binary Model CIVILIAN first year of conflict */

```
logit EUPKO_civilian log_trade_mio log_tradeoil_1styrconflict log_threat_terrorism ///
colonialtie UN_Mandate Democracy log_firstyr_deaths otherPKO, ///
```

vce(cluster conflict_id) or

estimates store m1, title(Model 1_binary civilian first year with controlvar OR) //estout for significant stars

estimates save "Model 1_binary civilian first year with controlvar OR"

outreg2 using "Model 1_binary civilian first year with controlvar OR", replace

outreg2 using "Model 1_binary civilian first year with controlvar OR", see word

/* Binary Model CIVILIAN year before conflict */

logit EUPKO_civilian log_trade_mio_yrbefore log_tradeoil_yrbefore log_threat_terrorism ///

colonialtie UN_Mandate Democracy log_firstyr_deaths otherPKO, ///

vce(cluster conflict_id) or

estimates store m2, title(Model 2_binary civilian first year with controlvar OR) //estout for significant stars

estimates save "Model 2_binary civilian year before with controlvar OR"

outreg2 using "Model 2_binary civilian year before with controlvar OR", replace

outreg2 using "Model 2_binary civilian year before with controlvar OR", see word

/* Binary Model MILITARY first year of conflict */

logit EUPKO_military log_trade_mio log_tradeoil_1styrconflict log_threat_terrorism ///

colonialtie Democracy log_firstyr_deaths otherPKO, ///

vce(cluster conflict_id) or //UN Mandate predicts failure perfectly and was leftout of analysis

estimates store m3, title(Model 3_binary military first year with controlvar OR) //estout for significant stars

estimates save "Model 3_binary military first year with controlvar OR"

outreg2 using "Model 3_binary military first year with controlvar OR", replace

outreg2 using "Model 3_binary military first year with controlvar OR", see word

/* Binary Model MILITARY year before conflict */

logit EUPKO_military log_trade_mio_yrbefore log_tradeoil_yrbefore log_threat_terrorism ///

colonialtie Democracy log_firstyr_deaths otherPKO, ///

vce(cluster conflict_id) or

estimates store m4, title(Model 4_binary military year before with controlvar OR) //estout for significant stars

```
estimates save "Model 4_binary military year before with controlvar OR"
outreg2 using "Model 4_binary military year before with controlvar OR", replace
outreg2 using "Model 4_binary military year before with controlvar OR", see word
```

Sources of EDTG missing data of the threat terrorism variable

Terror group (missing data in EDTG)	Country	Year needed for analysis	Size terror group	Size changed to EDTG operationalization	Source
National Liberation Front (FNL)	Burundi	2014			Nothing found
Africa Marine Commando (AMC)	Cameroon	2015			Nothing found
Africa Marine Commando (AMC)	Cameroon	2017			Nothing found
Africa Marine Commando (AMC)	Cameroon	2015			Nothing found
Democratic Front of the Central African People (FDPC); Popular Front for Recovery (FPR);	Central African Republic	**2008 (EU PKO)**	FDPC: 20 (2008) FPR: 3000 (probably overestimate) (2012)	1000	https://ipisresearch.be/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/IPIS-CAR-Conflict-Mapping-November-2014.pdf (p. 83-85)
Anti-Balaka; Democratic Front of the Central African People (FDPC); Popular Front for Recovery (FPR); Return, Reclamation, Rehabilitation (3R); Union for Peace in Central Africa	Central African Republic	**2016 (EU PKO)**	FDPC: 250 (2010) FPR: 3000 (probably overestimate) (2012)	1000	https://ipisresearch.be/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/IPIS-CAR-Conflict-Mapping-November-2014.pdf (p. 83-85)
Janjaweed	Chad	2015			Nothing found
Mombasa Republican Council (MRC)	Kenya	2015	Less than 500.000	10000	https://issafrica.org/amp/iss-today/kenyas-mombasa-republican-council-liberators-or-nascent-radical-fanatics
Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance	Senegal	2000	2000	1000	http://www.adh-geneve.ch/RULAC/pdf_state/Martin-Evans.pdf (p.6)
Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance	Senegal	2011	2000	1000	http://www.adh-geneve.ch/RULAC/pdf_state/Martin-Evans.pdf (p. 6)
Jund al-Khilafa; Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade	Tunisia	2016	Jund al-Khilafa: 30 Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade: 200-300 (however, in Tunisia and Algeria, therefore it will be divided by 2)	100	https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/24/world/africa/algerian-army-kills-militant-leader-linked-to-beheading-of-french-hostage.html?_r=0 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/mepo.12403
Donetsk People's Republic	Ukraine	**2014 (EU PKO)**	Donestsk People's Republic: 0	0	Donetsk People's Republic NOT a terror organization for EU https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-8-2015-013580-ASW_EN.html
Donetsk People's Republic	Ukraine	**2014 (EU PKO)**	Donestsk People's Republic: 0	0	Donetsk People's Republic NOT a terror organization for EU https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-8-2015-013580-ASW_EN.html

Since the data set did not fit on one page, it was split into Part I and Part II. The data for the variables measuring trade, trade with oil/petroleum, threat terrorism and casualties are the values ***prior*** taking the logarithm with the basis of 10. How the logarithms were calculated can be assessed above in the STATA Do File.

Data Set Part I

Location of conflict	Conflict ID (UCDP)	Side_a	Side_b	Year (from - to)	Start date conflict	End date conflict	Region (UCDP)	Dummy UN Peacekeeping Mission	UN year of intervention	EU Peacekeeping	Name EU Peacekeeping mission
Algeria (1)	13721	Government of Algeria	IS	2014-2015	10.10.2014	20.05.2015	4	0		0	
Algeria (2)	386	Government of Algeria	AQIM, MUJAO	1998-2018	27.08.1985		4	0		0	
Angola (3)	327	Government of Angola	UNITA	1998-2002	11.11.1975	01.04.2002	4	1	1996, first intervention 1985	0	
Angola (4)	387	Government of Angola	FLEC-FAC, FLEC-R	2002; 2004; 2007; 2009	03.06.1991	31.12.2017	4	0		0	
Angola (5)	387	Government of Angola	FLEC-FAC, FLEC-R	2017	03.06.1991	31.12.2017	4	0		0	
Azerbaijan (6)	388	Government of Azerbaijan	Republic of Artsakh	(1991-) 1998	29.12.1991	31.12.1998	1	0		0	
Azerbaijan (7)	388	Government of Azerbaijan	Republic of Artsakh	2005; 2008;	29.12.1991	14.12.2017	1	0		0	
Burkina Faso (8)	360	Government of Burkina Faso	JNIM	2018	15.10.1987		4	0		0	
Burundi (9)	287	Government of Burundi	CNDD-FDD , Palipehutu-FNL, RED-TABARA, FPB, Military faction	1998-2006; 2008	18.10.1965		4	1	2004	0	
Burundi (10)	287	Government of Burundi	CNDD-FDD , Palipehutu-FNL, RED-TABARA, FPB, Military faction	2014-2015	18.10.1965		4	0		0	
Cameroon (11)	13638	Government of Cameroon	IS	2015-2016	19.03.2015	06.10.2016	4	0		0	
Cameroon (12)	14129	Government of Cameroon	Ambazonia insurgents	2017-2018	16.09.2017		4	0		0	

Location of conflict	Conflict ID (UCDP)	Side_a	Side_b	Year (from - to)	Start date conflict	End date conflict	Region (UCDP)	Dummy UN Peacekeeping Mission	UN year of intervention	EU Peacekeeping	Name EU Peacekeeping mission
Cameroon (13)	353	Government of Cameroon	Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad	2015-2017	31.01.1960	03.12.2017	4	0		0	
Central African Republic (14)	416	Government of Central African Republic	UPC (Ali Darass Fulani supporters) Seleka, CPJP, anti-Balaka, Forces of Francois Bozize, Forces of Andrè Kolingba	2001-2002; 2006; 2009-2013	27.05.2001		4	1	2000 first intervention: 1996	3	EUFOR TCHAD/RCA (2008-2009) EUMAM RCA (2015-2016)
Central African Republic (15)	416	Government of Central African Republic	UPC (Ali Darass Fulani supporters) Seleka, CPJP, anti-Balaka, Forces of Francois Bozize, Forces of Andrè Kolingba	2018	27.05.2001		4	1	2018 first intervention: 2014	2	EUTM RCA
Chad (16)	13640	Government of Chad	IS	2015; 2017-2018	27.05.2015		4	0		0	
Chad (17)	288	Government of Chad	MDJT, FUCD, RAFD, UFDD, AN, UFR, FPRN, CCMSR	1998-2010	31.07.1966		4	1	2007	3	EUFOR TCHAD/RCA
Chad (18)	288	Government of Chad	MDJT, FUCD, RAFD, UFDD, AN, UFR, FPRN, CCMSR	2018	31.07.1966		4	0		0	
Congo (19)	408	Government of Congo	Cocoyes, Ninjas, Ntsiloulous	1998-1999; 2002	03.11.1993	31.12.1999	4	0		0	
Congo (20)	408	Government of Congo	Ntsiloulous	2016	03.11.1993	10.12.2016	4	0		0	
Djibouti (21)	379	Government of Djibouti	FRUD-C	1999	12.11.1991	31.08.1999	4	0		0	
DR Congo (Zaire) (22)	265	Government of DR Congo (Zaire)	Kata Katanga	2013-2014	27.10.1961	05.11.2014	4	1	1999	1	EUPOL RD Congo
DR Congo (Zaire) (23)	283	Government of DR Congo (Zaire)	MLC, RCD, CNDP, CNPSC, M23, Kamuina Nsapu	1998-2001	03.01.1964		4	1	1999	3	EUFOR Artemis
DR Congo (Zaire) (24)	283	Government of DR Congo (Zaire)	MLC, RCD, CNDP, CNPSC, M23, Kamuina Nsapu	2006-2008; 2011-2014; 2016-2018	03.01.1964		4	1	1999	3	EUFOR RD Congo (EUPOL RD Congo (civ), 2005)
DR Congo (Zaire) (25)	429	Government of DR Congo (Zaire)	BDK	2007-2008	02.07.1998	31.08.2017	4	1	1999	1	EUPOL RD Congo
DR Congo (Zaire) (26)	429	Government of DR Congo (Zaire)	BDK	2017	02.07.1998	31.08.2017	4	1	1999	1	EUSEC RD Congo
Egypt (27)	13648	Government of Egypt	IS	2015-2018	16.11.2014		2	0		0	
Egypt (28)	391	Government of Egypt	al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya	1998	08.10.1981	02.11.1998	2	0		0	

Location of conflict	Conflict ID (UCDP)	Side_a	Side_b	Year (from - to)	Start date conflict	End date conflict	Region (UCDP)	Dummy UN Peacekeeping Mission	UN year of intervention	EU Peacekeeping	Name EU Peacekeeping mission
Egypt (29)	391	Government of Egypt	Harakit Sawa'id Misr, Jama'at Ansar al-Islam, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis	2014; 2017-2018	08.10.1981		2	0		0	
Eritrea (30)	326	Government of Eritrea	EIJM - AS	1999; 2003	16.12.1993	29.11.1999	4	0		0	
Eritrea, Ethiopia (31)	409	Government of Eritrea	Government of Ethiopia	1998-2000	06.05.1998	13.06.2016	4	1		0	
Eritrea, Ethiopia (32)	409	Government of Eritrea	Government of Ethiopia	2016	06.05.1998	13.06.2016	4	0		0	
Ethiopia (33)	329	Government of Ethiopia	ONLF	1998-2016	11.01.1964	31.12.2016	4	0		0	
Ethiopia (34)	413	Government of Ethiopia	OLF	1998-2013; 2015-2016	31.08.1974	31.12.2016	4	0		0	
Georgia (35)	393	Government of Georgia	Republic of South Ossetia	2004; 2008	12.05.1992	09.11.2008	1	1	1993	1	EUMM Georgia 2008; EUJUST Georgia 2004
Guinea (36)	307	Government of Guinea	RFDG	2000-2001	01.09.2000		4	0		0	
Guinea-Bissau (37)	410	Government of Guinea-Bissau	Military Junta for the Consolidation of Democracy, Peace and Justice	1998-1999	07.06.1998	07.05.1999	4	0		0	
Iran (38)	14268	Government of Iran	IS	2017	15.08.2016	11.06.2017	2	0		0	
Iran (39)	205	Government of Iran	KDPI	2016; 2018	31.05.1946	20.12.2016	2	0		0	
Iran (40)	338	Government of Iran	MEK, PJAK, Jondullah	1999-2001; 2005-2011	13.08.1972		2	0		0	
Iran (41)	338	Government of Iran	MEK, PJAK, Jondullah	2018	13.08.1972		2	0		0	
Iran, Israel (42)	14609	Government of Iran	Government of Israel	2018	10.02.2018		2	0		0	
Iraq (43)	259	Government of Iraq	al-Mahdi Army, Ansar al-Islam, IS, RJF	2004-2018	14.07.1958		2	0		1	EUJUST LEX Iraq 2005, EUAM Iraq 2017
Israel (44)	234	Government of Israel	Fatah, PNA, PFLP, PIJ, PNA, AMB, PRC, Hamas	2000-2012; 2014; 2018	15.05.1948		2	1	1948	1	EUBAM Rafah
Israel (45)	426	Government of Israel	Hezbollah	1998-1999	30.09.1986	23.08.2006	2	1	1978	0	

Location of conflict	Conflict ID (UCDP)	Side_a	Side_b	Year (from - to)	Start date conflict	End date conflict	Region (UCDP)	Dummy UN Peacekeeping Mission	UN year of intervention	EU Peacekeeping	Name EU Peacekeeping mission
Israel (46)	426	Government of Israel	Hezbollah	2006	30.09.1986	23.08.2006	2	1	1978	1	EUBAM Rafah
Ivory Coast (47)	419	Government of Ivory Coast	FDSI-CI, FRCI	2002-2004	19.09.2002	27.04.2011	4	1	2004	0	
Ivory Coast (48)	419	Government of Ivory Coast	FDSI-CI, FRCI	2011	19.09.2002	27.04.2011	4	1	2004	0	
Jordan (49)	13886	Government of Jordan	IS	2016	02.03.2016	29.12.2016	2	0		0	
Kenya (50)	13646	Government of Kenya	Al-Shabaab	2015-2018	13.03.2015		4	0		0	
Lebanon (51)	13675	Government of Lebanon	IS	2014-2015; 2017	25.06.2014	27.08.2017	2	1	1978	0	
Liberia (52)	341	Government of Liberia	LURD, MODEL	2000-2003	12.04.1980	21.11.2003	4	1	2003	0	
Libya (53)	11346	Government of Libya	Forces of Khalifa al-Ghawil, Forces of the House of Representatives, PFLL, ASL, NTC, Forces of Muammar Gaddafi	2011; 2013 - 2015; 2017	28.02.2011	12.11.2017	4	0		1	EUBAM Libya
Libya (54)	13694	Government of Libya	IS	2015-2018	14.03.2015		4	0		3	EUNAVFOR Sophia
Macedonia, FYR (55)	417	Government of Macedonia, FYR	UCK	2001	11.01.2000	17.08.2001	1	0		2	EUMM Concordia
Mali (56)	11347	Government of Mali	JNIM, AQIM; Ansar Dine, MUJAO, Military faction (Red Berets), Signed-in-Blood Battalion	2009; 2012 - 2018	14.06.2009		4	1	2013	2	EUTM Mali
Mali (57)	13611	Government of Mali	FLM	2015	05.01.2015	28.10.2015	4	1	2013	2	EUTM Mali
Mali (58)	14113	Government of Mali	IS	2017-2018	04.02.2017		4	1	2013	2	EUTM Mali
Mali (59)	372	Government of Mali	CMA , ATNMC	2007-2009; 2012; 2014-2015	28.06.1990	18.05.2015	4	1	2013	2	EUTM Mali
Mauritania (60)	442	Government of Mauritania	AQIM	2010-2011	15.09.2008	20.10.2011	4	0		0	
Mozambique (61)	332	Government of Mozambique	Ansar al-Sunnah	2013; 2016; 2018	31.12.1977		4	0		0	
Niger (62)	13639	Government of Niger	IS	2015-2018	26.03.2015		4	0		1	EUCAP Niger
Niger (63)	430	Government of Niger	MNJ	2007-2008	25.10.1991	16.11.2008	4	0		1	EUCAP Niger
Nigeria (64)	13641	Government of Nigeria	IS	2015-2018	15.03.2015		4	0		0	

Location of conflict	Conflict ID (UCDP)	Side_a	Side_b	Year (from - to)	Start date conflict	End date conflict	Region (UCDP)	Dummy UN Peacekeeping Mission	UN year of intervention	EU Peacekeeping	Name EU Peacekeeping mission
Nigeria (65)	297	Government of Nigeria	Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad	2009; 2011-2018	15.01.1966	30.07.2009	4	0		0	
Nigeria (66)	424	Government of Nigeria	Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa	2004	28.12.2003	08.10.2004	4	0		0	
Nigeria (67)	425	Government of Nigeria	NDPVF	2004	04.06.2004	20.09.2004	4	0		0	
Russia (Soviet Union) (68)	13588	Government of Russia (Soviet Union)	IS	2015-2018	21.03.2015		1	0		0	
Russia (Soviet Union) (69)	401	Government of Russia (Soviet Union)	Chechen Republic of Ichkeria	1999-2007	27.05.1994	06.10.2007	1	0		0	
Russia (Soviet Union) (70)	432	Government of Russia (Soviet Union)	Forces of the Caucasus Emirate	2007-2015	07.10.2007	21.10.2015	1	0		0	
Rwanda (71)	374	Government of Rwanda	FDLR (1999-2000 ALiR)	1998-2002	01.10.1990		4	1		0	
Rwanda (72)	374	Government of Rwanda	FDLR (1999-2000 ALiR)	2009-2012; 2016; 2018	01.10.1990		4	0		0	
Senegal (73)	375	Government of Senegal	MFDC	2000-2001; 2003	31.12.1988	30.12.2011	4	0		0	
Senegal (74)	375	Government of Senegal	MFDC	2011	31.12.1988	30.12.2011	4	0		0	
Serbia (Yugoslavia) (75)	412	Government of Serbia (Yugoslavia)	UCK	1998-1999	22.04.1996	21.11.1999	1	1	1999	0	EULEX Kosovo
Sierra Leone (76)	382	Government of Sierra Leone	RUF	1998-2001	23.03.1991	20.12.2001	4	1	1998	0	
Somalia (77)	14074	Government of Somalia	Republic of Somaliland	2018	08.01.2018		4	0		2	EUTM Somalia
Somalia (78)	337	Government of Somalia	Al-Shabaab	2001-2002; 2006-2018	18.01.1982		4	1		3	NAVFOR Somalia
South Sudan (79)	11345	Government of South Sudan	SPLM/A In Opposition, SSLM/A, SSDM/A	2011-2018	20.08.2011		4	1	2011	1	EUAVSEC South Sudan
South Sudan, Sudan (80)	11348	Government of South Sudan	Government of Sudan	2012	27.03.2012	26.12.2012	4	1	2012	1	EUAVSEC South Sudan
Sudan (81)	11344	Government of Sudan	Republic of South Sudan	2011	01.05.2011	15.06.2011	4	1	2011	1	EUAVSEC South Sudan
Sudan (82)	309	Government of Sudan	NDA, SPLM/A, SLM/A, JEM, NRF, SRF, SSD, Darfur Joint Resistance Forces, SARC	1998-2018	22.07.1971		4	1	2004	1	EU Support to AMIS

Location of conflict	Conflict ID (UCDP)	Side_a	Side_b	Year (from - to)	Start date conflict	End date conflict	Region (UCDP)	Dummy UN Peacekeeping Mission	UN year of intervention	EU Peacekeeping	Name EU Peacekeeping mission
Syria (83)	13042	Government of Syria	PYD	2012-2013; 2015	10.09.2011	25.07.2015	2	1	2012	0	
Syria (84)	13604	Government of Syria	IS	2013-2018	14.05.2013		2	1	2012	0	
Syria (85)	13809	Government of Syria	SDF	2016; 2018	06.12.2015		2	0		0	
Syria (86)	299	Government of Syria	Syrian insurgents	2011-2018	23.02.1966		2	1	2012	0	
Tunisia (87)	14333	Government of Tunisia	IS	2016	18.03.2015	09.11.2016	4	0		0	
Turkey (88)	13902	Government of Turkey	IS	2015-2017	23.07.2015	06.09.2017	2	0		0	
Turkey (89)	354	Government of Turkey	PKK	1998-2013; 2015-2018	01.05.1983		2	0		0	
Turkey (90)	383	Government of Turkey	MKP	2005	31.12.1987	17.10.2005	2	0		0	
Turkey (91)	383	Government of Turkey	TAK, YSK	2016	31.12.1987	17.10.2005	2	0		0	
Uganda (92)	314	Government of Uganda	ADF, LRA	1998-2011; 2013-2018	25.01.1971		4	0		0	
Ukraine (93)	13246	Government of Ukraine	DPR	2014	12.04.2014	16.09.2014	1	0		1	EUAM Ukraine
Ukraine (94)	13247	Government of Ukraine	LPR	2014	04.05.2014	26.08.2014	1	0		1	EUAM Ukraine
Ukraine (95)	13306	Government of Ukraine	DPR, LPR, United Armed Forces of Novorossiya	2014-2018	17.09.2014		1	0		1	EUAM Ukraine
Yemen (North Yemen) (96)	13645	Government of Yemen (North Yemen)	IS	2015	20.03.2015	06.10.2015	2	0		0	
Yemen (North Yemen) (97)	230	Government of Yemen (North Yemen)	AQAP, Ansarallah, AQAP, Forces of Hadi	2009-2018	15.03.1948		2	0		0	

Data Set Part II

Location	EU year of intervention	Dummy other PKO	Dummy colonial tie	Trade first year of conflict	Trade before year of conflict	Oil trade first year of conflict	Oil trade year before conflict	Dummy Democracy	Dummy UN Mandate	Threat terrorism	Casual-ties first year of conflict	Total casualties
Algeria (1)		0	1	52899,2	54306,3	28025,304	29779,543	0	0	145	26	26
Algeria (2)		0	1	12104,1072	13487,646	26148,046	26343,03	0	0	4078,33	3029	18857
Angola (3)		1	1	1692,10628	1897,00536	2108	2136	0	1	1100	1041	30227
Angola (4)		1	1	3673,9	3.407,82	6656	7252	0	0	1100	30	408
Angola (5)		0	1	6194,1	7582,5	13660,373	6349,069	0	0	100	25	408
Azerbaijan (6)		0	0	247,453488	167,176492	40	44	0	0	0	34	5318
Azerbaijan (7)		0	0	4003,2	2537,8	5307	7538,723	0	0	20	36	5318
Burkina Faso (8)		0	1	932,9	917,1	0	0	1	0	0	43	43
Burundi (9)		1	1	107,635359	111,085943	0	0	0	1	1000	273	8771
Burundi (10)		0	1	130,2	115,9	0	0	1	1	.9	49	8771
Cameroon (11)		0	1	3380,7	3780,6	1811	2010	0	0	.9	283	472
Cameroon (12)		0	1	3391,1	3335,1	2158	3125,063	0	0	.9	35	790
Cameroon (13)		0	1	3380,7	3780,6	1811	2010	0	0	.9	712	807
Central African Republic (14)	2008	1	1	229,1893406	255,409424	0	0	0	1	1000	28	974
Central African Republic (15)	2016	0	1	112,3	107,2	0	0	1	1	1000	47	974
Chad (16)		0	1	413,6	445,5	0	0	0	0	.9	272	437
Chad (17)	2008	0	1	176,8002	161,728353	0	0	0	1	250	34	7606
Chad (18)		0	1	593,2	369,6	0	0	0	0	0	42	7606
Congo (19)		0	1	1088,08329	1220,2655	1889	1247	0	0	0	3272	14227
Congo (20)		0	1	2321,1	3554,6	3480	1816	0	0	0	51	14227
Djibouti (21)		0	1	237,024003	188,323979	0	0	0	0	0	25	285
DR Congo (Zaire) (22)	2005	0	1	2181,7	1738	12	0	0	1	5343,33	94	153
DR Congo (Zaire) (23)	2003	0	1	1098,03375	1110,11897	294	11	0	1	16333,33	451	21322

Location	EU year of intervention	Dummy other PKO	Dummy colonial tie	Trade first year of conflict	Trade before year of conflict	Oil trade first year of conflict	Oil trade year before conflict	Dummy Democracy	Dummy UN Mandate	Threat terrorism	Casual-ties first year of conflict	Total casualties
DR Congo (Zaire) (24)	2006	0	1	1206	1209,1	48	0	0	1	4293,33	182	21322
DR Congo (Zaire) (25)	2005	0	1	1289	1206	0	0	0	1	3893,33	116	452
DR Congo (Zaire) (26)	2005	0	1	2159,3	1842,4	12	20	0	1	4343,33	86	452
Egypt (27)		0	1	27678,9	25474,2	7142,987	8795,443	0	0	1026,67	767	2192
Egypt (28)		0	1	8012,39283	7724,46138	5126,152	5999,71	0	0	60	27	932
Egypt (29)		0	1	25474,2	22868,1	6299,893	7142,987	0	0	2026,67	184	932
Eritrea (30)		0	1	100,955371	139,868768	0	0	0	0	0	25	113
Eritrea, Ethiopia (31)		0	1	1399,67273	883,600127	0	0	0	1	1550	1000	98217
Eritrea, Ethiopia (32)		0	1	2733,2	2646,6	0	0	0	0	1550	25	98217
Ethiopia (33)		0	0	699,836368	707,371915	0	0	0	0	1550	25	1533
Ethiopia (34)		0	0	699,836368	707,371915	0	0	0	0	1550	25	2145
Georgia (35)	2004	1	0	925,7	707,6	1036,038	679	1	1	20	27	782
Guinea (36)		0	1	637,110497	629,078694	0	0	0	0	0	217	649
Guinea-Bissau (37)		1	1	53,7396031	45,3310395	0	0	0	1	0	505	704
Iran (38)		0	0	20955,8	13747,5	14975,116	28517,738	0	0	100	27	27
Iran (39)		0	0	13747,5	7724,1	0	14975,116	0	0	100	30	242
Iran (40)		0	0	9451,75446	10031,2833	46729,218	42248,248	0	0	162,86	28	1086
Iran (41)		0	0	18357,3	20955,8	28517,738	19978,008	0	0	100	27	1086
Iran, Israel (42)		0	1	52632,4	53270,9	29697,605	22025,052	1	0	15821,67	103	103
Iraq (43)	2005	1	1	3956,5	2512,7	8483	13029	0	1	18126,67	2608	61672
Israel (44)	2005	0	1	23277,0952	21397,0715	64	0	1	1	15776,67	120	5902
Israel (45)		0	1	20046,9172	20710,8034	0	0	1	1	11221,67	54	1534
Israel (46)	2005	0	1	23813,4	23258,2	215	208	1	1	11221,67	825	1534
Ivory Coast (47)		1	1	3928,6	3363,11395	0	0	0	1	0	543	908
Ivory Coast (48)		0	1	4640	4962,2	0	0	0	1	0	179	908

Location	EU year of intervention	Dummy other PKO	Dummy colonial tie	Trade first year of conflict	Trade before year of conflict	Oil trade first year of conflict	Oil trade year before conflict	Dummy Democracy	Dummy UN Mandate	Threat terrorism	Casual-ties first year of conflict	Total casualties
Jordan (49)		0	1	4393,7	4369,6	0	0	0	0	516,67	34	34
Kenya (50)		0	1	3544,6	2987,6	0	0	1	0	10000	42	245
Lebanon (51)		0	1	6877,7	7029,6	0	0	1	1	1131,67	126	272
Liberia (52)		1	0	2373,78457	1181,39803	0	0	0	1	5000	57	3051
Libya (53)	2013	1	1	12565,9	36363,3	59555,563	16195,283	0	1	2100	31	4531
Libya (54)	2015	0	1	11691,2	17789,3	17764,962	13683,081	0	1	2100	118	1936
Macedonia, FYR (55)	2003	1	0	1265,94471	1097,04122	0	0	1	1	0	72	72
Mali (56)	2013	1	1	528,2	519,5	0	0	1	1	1225	839	1232
Mali (57)	2013	1	1	1000,9	890,3	0	0	0	1	1225	44	44
Mali (58)	2013	1	1	1142,9	1154,7	0	0	0	1	1225	47	172
Mali (59)	2013	1	1	526,4	558,1	0	0	0	1	1225	131	778
Mauritania (60)		0	1	1355,2	982,1	0	0	0	0	25	29	55
Mozambique (61)		0	1	2167,5	1965,5	0	0	0	0	0	27	4466
Niger (62)	2012	0	1	878,5	840,8	0	0	1	0	1025	171	728
Niger (63)	2012	0	1	445,4	341,9	0	0	1	0	1000	47	259
Nigeria (64)		0	1	29301,7	39664,6	45586,263	44606,291	1	0	13100	1919	5858
Nigeria (65)		0	1	19671,4	26670,5	23211,411	24084,741	0	0	1000	405	12211
Nigeria (66)		0	1	10544,5	11299,3	23413	15284,036	0	0	1100	61	61
Nigeria (67)		0	1	10544,5	11299,3	23413	15284,036	0	0	1100	67	67
Russia (Soviet Union) (68)		0	0	210228	285445,7	224943,117	229373,543	0	0	220	55	205
Russia (Soviet Union) (69)		0	0	31573,6083	33207,3757	114411,75	133138,387	0	0	1896,67	5769	18164
Russia (Soviet Union) (70)		0	0	236929,9	216000,1	238046,142	235054,738	0	0	220	30	2947
Rwanda (71)		0	1	132,8582924	161,9876046	0	0	0	1	0	1096	9560
Rwanda (72)		0	1	208,7	205	0	0	0	0	0	1824	9560
Senegal (73)		0	1	1105,09385	1274,22536	0	0	1	0	1000	47	1373
Senegal (74)		0	1	3153,5	2461,9	0	0	1	0	1000	25	1373

Location	EU year of intervention	Dummy other PKO	Dummy colonial tie	Trade first year of conflict	Trade before year of conflict	Oil trade first year of conflict	Oil trade year before conflict	Dummy Democracy	Dummy UN Mandate	Threat terrorism	Casual-ties first year of conflict	Total casualties
Serbia (Yugoslavia) (75)		1	0	0	0	51	139	1	1	1666,67	1235	2639
Sierra Leone (76)		1	1	190,523053	273,719704	0	0	0	1	5000	2097	11473
Somalia (77)	2010	1	1	163,3	177,3	0	0	0	1	2650	121	121
Somalia (78)	2008	1	1	32,203621	38,9856664	0	0	0	1	3850	1491	34216
South Sudan (79)	2012	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	10000	137	5194
South Sudan, Sudan (80)	2012	0	1	1076,3	1555,4	0	0	0	1	12333,33	367	367
Sudan (81)	2012	0	1	1555,4	1162,3	0	0	0	1	12333,33	145	145
Sudan (82)	2005	1	1	752,269301	588,500355	0	0	0	1	12433,33	161	49322
Syria (83)		0	1	1457,7	6254,8	5163,029	0	0	1	57408,33	25	124
Syria (84)		0	1	888,3	1457,7	0	0	0	1	57408,33	545	41467
Syria (85)		0	1	502,1	7330,7	0	0	0	0	57408,33	158	188
Syria (86)		0	1	6254,8	592	7804,638	5163,029	0	1	57408,33	1141	242041
Tunisia (87)		0	1	19859	20264,9	1709,227	1705,871	1	0	9	72	72
Turkey (88)		0	0	140601,1	129165,1	1069,224	1673,485	0	0	2350	26	1842
Turkey (89)		0	0	37223,4712	36009,1291	1076,482	589,244	1	0	2450	1952	30118
Turkey (90)		0	0	80850,1	73047,9	1710,746	1740,036	1	0	2350	29	564
Turkey (91)		0	0	144509,6	140601,1	1673,485	1657,645	0	0	2350	400	564
Uganda (92)		1	1	520,77081	684,808964	0	0	0	0	6383,33	935	13658
Ukraine (93)	2014	0	0	30816,7	37864,4	3835,344	2058,707	0	0	0	2021	2021
Ukraine (94)	2014	0	0	30816,7	37864,4	3835,344	2058,707	0	0	0	712	712
Ukraine (95)	2014	0	0	30816,7	37864,4	3835,344	2058,707	0	0	0	1558	3767
Yemen (North Yemen) (96)		0	1	772,2	1488,3	47	0	0	0	100	246	246
Yemen (North Yemen) (97)		0	1	1041,1	1007,3	43	0	0	0	100	94	21913

Previous findings with n=82 - Determinants for EU peacekeeping missions using ordered logistic regression

	Baseline model (1) – First year of conflict	Baseline model (2) – Year prior conflict	Baseline model (1) + controls – First year of conflict	Baseline model (2) + controls – Year prior conflict	Baseline model (1) + controls – First year of conflict	Baseline model (2) + controls – Year prior conflict
VARIABLES	**(1)**	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**	**(5)**	**(6)**
Trade first year of conflict	**0.444***		**0.200***		**0.224****	
	(0.211)		(0.177)		(0.148)	
Trade before year of conflict		0.472		0.280		**0.266***
		(0.261)		(0.252)		(0.201)
Oil trade first year of conflict	1.0513		1.363		1.367	
	(0.214)		(0.443)		(0.343)	
Oil trade year before conflict		1.069		1.224		1.305
		(0.255)		(0.438)		(0.406)
Threat terrorism	**1.593***	**1.570***	**1.884****	**1.780****	**1.943****	**1.904****
	(0.413)	(0.428)	(0.518)	(0.491)	(0.501)	(0.535)
Colonial tie	0.559	0.635	1.0877	1.285	0.689	0.822
	(0.565)	(0.637)	(1.576)	(1.950)	(0.730)	(0.935)
UN mandate	**16.313*****	**15.255*****	**21.792*****	**15.718*****	**21.545*****	**16.038*****
	(12.889)	(12.358)	(22.862)	(14.736)	(17.321)	(13.291)
Democracy			**5.116***	**4.052***	**4.063****	**3.345***
			(4.291)	(3.007)	(2.716)	(2.199)
Casualties first year of conflict			0.429	0.453		
			(0.367)	(0.358)		
Total casualties					0.583	**0.5551***
					(0.213)	(0.192)
Other peacekeeping mission			0.899	1.218	0.963	1.228
			(0.807)	(1.101)	(0.917)	(1.222)
/cut1	0.647	0.894	-1.888	-0.975	-1.698	-1.401
	(1.580)	(1.648)	(2.572)	(2.468)	(1.901)	(2.062)
/cut2	2.129	2.366	-0.282	0.619	-0.0481	0.252
	(1.542)	(1.602)	(2.558)	(2.475)	(1.909)	(2.082)
/cut3	3.179**	3.404**	0.797	1.678	1.022	1.312
	(1.488)	(1.584)	(2.645)	(2.586)	(2.007)	(2.201)
Observations	82	82	82	82	82	82

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Previous findings with n=82 - Determinants for military EU peacekeeping missions using logistic regression

	Baseline model (1)	Baseline model (2)	Baseline model (1) + controls – First year of conflict	Baseline model (2) + controls – Year prior conflict
VARIABLES	**(1)**	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**
Trade first year of conflict	**0.331****		**0.211***	
	(0.170)		(0.182)	
Trade before year of conflict		**0.277****		**0.121****
		(0.145)		(0.126)
Oil trade first year of conflict	0.838		1.045	
	(0.259)		(0.366)	
Oil trade year before conflict		0.882		1.225
		(0.232)		(0.302)
Threat terrorism	**1.635***	**1.777****	**1.866*****	**2.203****
	(0.419)	(0.475)	(0.445)	(0.789)
Colonial tie	1.483	1.810	2.625	3.162
	(1.928)	(2.309)	(2.565)	(3.149)
Democracy			7.485	**11.852***
			(9.186)	(16.310)
Casualties first year of conflict			0.295	**0.225***
			(0.261)	(0.181)
Other peacekeeping mission			6.155	5.384
			(6.888)	(5.941)
Constant	1.525	1.787	9.952	44.252
	(2.871)	(3.502)	(32.173)	(148.323)
Observations	68	68	68	68

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Previous findings with n=82 - Determinants for civilian EU missions using logistic regression

	Baseline model (1)	Baseline model (2)	Baseline model (1) + controls – First year of conflict	Baseline model (2) + controls – Year prior conflict
VARIABLES	**(1)**	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**
Trade first year of conflict	0.891		0.319	
	(0.461)		(0.319)	
Trade before year of conflict		0.889		0.481
		(0.521)		(0.440)
Oil trade first year of conflict	1.004		1.353	
	(0.252)		(0.474)	
Oil trade year before conflict		0.988		1.120
		(0.243)		(0.352)
Threat terrorism	**1.849****	**1.861****	**2.287*****	**2.164*****
	(0.491)	(0.530)	(0.699)	(0.634)
Colonial tie	0.786	0.795	0.777	0.936
	(0.867)	(0.886)	(0.964)	(1.241)
UN mandate	**7.804***	**7.480***	**10.326****	**7.004****
	(8.682)	(8.439)	(10.435)	(6.144)
Democracy			**7.373****	**5.950***
			(7.465)	(5.725)
Casualties first year of conflict			0.605	0.648
			(0.520)	(0.522)
Other peacekeeping mission			0.755	1.117
			(0.848)	(1.219)
Constant	0.024*	0.248	0.442	0.152
	(0.053)	(0.0581)	(1.345)	(0.418)
Observations	71	71	71	71

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1