



Towards a Sustainable EU: Comparison of 3 Cooperation Types and Their Impact on Governing Effectiveness

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Abstract

The purpose of this study was to build on previous Public Administration research, contributing a better understanding of three cooperation models (PPPs, Co-production and Society-driven cooperation) and their respective perceived governing effectiveness in two different European contexts. Since the topic of Interactive Governance is relatively under-researched, this study was to show how different forms of Interactive Governance work in practice and how they could be used to reach sustainable transition. A final aim of this study was to address Derk Loorbach's call for a framework of effective cooperation models serving as a guide in various societal contexts. The research question guiding the study is: ***What is the influence of cooperation models (PPPs, Co-production and Society-driven cooperation) on the perceived successful effectiveness of steering in the Netherlands and the Czech Republic, in the context of a sustainable transition?***

To come up with answers to the research question, a mix of qualitative methods was used. First, six case studies of Dutch and Czech sustainable projects, where each cooperation model was seen in practice, were analyzed. Then, 18 interviews with Dutch and Czech respondents who worked or are currently working on the sustainable projects identified, were conducted.

The results show that achieving perceived governing effectiveness under PPPs is more straightforward than under the other two cooperation models, which builds on the existing theory that this is the case. However, one of the main contributions of this study is the finding that Co-production and Society-driven cooperation both reach higher governing effectiveness in the Czech cases than in the Dutch. Because of the differing cultural and institutional contexts, the Czech government is advised to consider applying Society-driven cooperation and the Dutch government may apply Co-production, to reach sustainable transition.

This study concludes that PPPs have a direct positive influence on the perceived successful governing effectiveness in both contexts, yet they are not suitable in aiming for a sustainable transition. Second, Co-production has more of a positive influence on the perceived successful governing effectiveness in the Czech case, though having a high potential in the Dutch, in terms of reaching the sustainable transition. Last, Society-driven cooperation also has more of a positive influence on the perceived successful governing effectiveness in the Czech case, though having a rather negative influence on governing effectiveness in the Dutch case, regarding the sustainable transition.

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List of abbreviations

Co-production → CP

Country for the Future → CftF

Democratic dilemma → DD

Dutch Coastline Challenge → DCC

Governing effectiveness → GE

Hedgehog's dilemma → HD

Input legitimacy → IL

Interactive Governance → IG

Kněžice energy cooperative → KEC

New Public Governance → NPG

New Public Management → NPM

Output legitimacy → OL

Public Administration → PA

Public-Private Partnerships → PPPs

Society-driven cooperation → SDC

Warm in de Wijk → WidW

1. Problem statement and research question

In the governmental context, forms of collaboration between the market and the government; for instance Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) and Co-production (CP), are nothing new. At least in the Netherlands, these ways of collaborating have been applied widely, with mixed results. However, in the Public Administration (PA) academic literature, new cooperation forms start to develop. Society-driven cooperation (SDC, also referred to as 'bottom-up initiatives') is a relatively new form of collaboration between the government, market and citizens. While starting to appear quite often in academic literature, this phenomenon has not been applied in practice much, up until now¹. However, taking the numerous potential benefits of SDC into account, not embracing this to manage the sustainable transition would be a missed opportunity. To clarify, a sustainable transition takes the form of generating new green/renewable energy or the development of a long-term strategy/plan, which would benefit future generations.²³

One of the research goals of this thesis is to build on previous PA academic research, contributing a better understanding of all three cooperation forms (PPPs, CP and SDC) and their influence on perceived governing effectiveness (GE) in transitioning to a more sustainable society. This is relevant, since the EU announced its ambition to become climate neutral⁴. The study is to be comparative, since two EU countries - the Netherlands and the Czech Republic, which both have different socio-economic, historical and cultural contexts - are to be analyzed.

While the Netherlands is a Western European country, one of the founders of the EU, and one of the initiators of the European Green Deal⁵, the Czech Republic is a post-communist country, one of the 'late joiners' of the EU⁶ and one of the EU members which is further behind in

¹ Brink and Wamsler, Collaborative Governance for Climate Change Adaptation: Mapping citizen-municipality interactions, 2018, 83

² Asantewaa Owusu and Asumadu-Sarkodie, A review of renewable energy sources, sustainability issues and climate change mitigation, 2016, 2

³ Gielen et al., The role of renewable energy in the global energy transformation, 2019, 39

⁴ European Commission, A European Green Deal, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en

⁵ DutchNews, Europe's Green Deal shows ambition, but the devil is in the details, 2019, <https://www.dutchnews.nl/news/2019/12/europes-green-deal-shows-ambition-but-the-devil-is-in-the-details/>

⁶ The Czech Republic joined the EU in 2004, that is 52 years after the EU predecessor - the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) - was founded.

the transition towards sustainability⁷. Hence, these differences are predicted to have an impact on the preferred choice of a cooperation model and on the GE associated with it. The research goal is to see which of the collaboration forms is used most widely and with what effects in the context of sustainability.

The context set leads to the following research question: ***What is the influence of cooperation models (PPPs, Co-production and Society-driven cooperation) on the perceived successful effectiveness of steering in the Netherlands and the Czech Republic, in the context of a sustainable transition?***⁸

The research question was chosen, since it seems not to have been answered before⁹, which means that this study will be highly original. Next, a lot was written about the GE of PPPs, while far less was written about CP's GE¹⁰ and no results seem to be found on the topic of GE in SDC¹¹. Hence, there is a clear gap in the academic literature to be filled¹²: no article combines the elements of the three cooperation models like this thesis does. This is also where this study aims to contribute academically.

⁷ Kelly, EU's €1 trillion Green Deal accused of recycling money and promises, 2020,

<https://sciencebusiness.net/news/eus-eu1-trillion-green-deal-accused-recycling-money-and-promises>

⁸ Throughout this thesis, “the perceived successful effectiveness of steering” will also be referred to as “successful effectiveness of steering,” “steering effectiveness,” “successful effectiveness of governing” and “governing effectiveness.” Please do keep in mind that although the keyword “perceived” is not often referred to in the text, it still is implied. The research is all about measuring the extent to which public officials perceive to be legitimately and successfully ruling over the private actors/citizens in the cooperation.

⁹ The author has typed the research question into the Erasmus University online Catalogue (<https://eur-on-worldcat-org.eur.idm.oclc.org>), but could not find anything which would resemble the research question (in English).

¹⁰ See Brown et al., 2012, 223-224 and Dezeure and De Rynck, 2012, 249 in Eds. Pestoff et al., New Public Governance, the Third Sector and Co-Production, 2012

¹¹ In the Erasmus University online Catalogue, 380 results show up when typing in “Public Private Partnerships’ steering effectiveness,” plus 189 extra results when typing in “PPPs’ steering effectiveness,” while 265 results show up when typing in “Co-production’ steering effectiveness,” and no results show up when typing in “Society-driven cooperation’ steering effectiveness”.

¹² So far, works were written on PPPs as innovative forms of governance to increase the sustainability in the private sector (see Herrero Amo and De Stefano, 2019); other works are about public management and the importance of government leadership and public engagement for successful policies (see Sun Chan and Fai Philip Siu, 2015) and there also are works on rebuilding trust of the public sector by the private sector (see Virzi et al., 2016 in Garita and Godinez, Business Development Opportunities and Market Entry Challenges in Latin America, 2016). This demonstrates the important gap in academic literature: no paper combines the elements of these three types of works together like this thesis aims to do.

Next, if governments do not partner up with other stakeholders, such as key market players and citizens, they may lose out on capitalizing on the opportunities that these partnerships could bring¹³. A key reason to employ Interactive Governance (IG), which is a form of CP and SDC, is the following. In the context of budget cuts and decentralization, governments have to ask other sectors (market and society) for help in providing needed services (e.g. the provision of night guards in socio-economically disadvantaged areas), which would otherwise cease to exist.

Another reason for studying this topic is that IG and its GE in the context of sustainability is under-researched¹⁴. Academic literature tends to focus either on various cooperation models in the context of a sustainable transition¹⁵, on GE within sustainability¹⁶, or on the sustainable transition alone¹⁷. So far, no academic article has combined these three variables (cooperation models, GE and the sustainability context) together. However, Loorbach actually calls for research which would combine these variables, stating: “It leaves open for further research the fascinating question of how the basic ideas and principles underlying transition management¹⁸ could be translated into specific operational models that would be more in tune...”¹⁹ In addition, Loorbach also calls for an empirical validation of transition management, the outcome being a well-grounded concept and framework which can be used and further developed in a broad societal context and internationally²⁰.

Hence, it is the goal of this research to compare two European governments²¹ in terms of the cooperation models used and their effectiveness in transitioning to a more sustainable society. Additionally, although the results of this research will be limited and non-generalizable (because

¹³ Gray and Stites, *Sustainability Through Partnerships: Capitalizing on Collaboration*, 2013, 62

¹⁴ As the search results in footnote 11 show.

¹⁵ Pita et al., *Participatory issues in fisheries governance in Europe*, 2012, 358-359; Lister, *The Policy Role of Corporate Carbon Management: Co-regulating Ecological Effectiveness*, 2018, 546

¹⁶ Voss et al., *Steering for Sustainable Development: a Typology of Problems and Strategies with respect to Ambivalence, Uncertainty and Distributed Power*, 2007, 208

¹⁷ Horcea-Milcu et al., *Values in transformational sustainability science: four perspectives for change*, 2019, 1435

¹⁸ Transition management is a governance approach aiming to facilitate and accelerate sustainability transitions through IG: a participatory process.

¹⁹ Loorbach, *Transition Management for Sustainable Development: A Prescriptive, Complexity-Based Governance Framework*, 2010, 178

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 179

²¹ **The central and the municipal level of government. In assessing the influence of Society-driven cooperation on governing effectiveness, actors from the municipal (and central) level of government were interviewed; while for the other two models, actors working for the central level of government were interviewed.**

of the lack of space), they may be used to help practitioners, such as civil servants, determine which cooperation model may be the most effective steering manner to tackle the world's struggle to a sustainable transition. In other words, this thesis is to attempt to answer Loorbach's calls for creating a concept/framework of effective cooperation models, which could be used to reach the sustainable transition, serving as a guide in various societal contexts.

To carry out this research, the following steps will be taken. First, in Chapter 2, the cooperation models will be delved into and will be analyzed regarding their impact on GE. Then, Chapter 3 will define all the key concepts, introduce the expectations and methods of measurement. A mix of qualitative methods, i.e. sustainable project case studies and interviews of public officials having experience with the cooperation models, will be the sources to determine the perceived GE in each country. Moreover, Chapter 4 will introduce the chosen sustainability projects in the Netherlands and the Czech Republic, which display the cooperation models in practice. Next, Chapter 5 will illustrate the results of this research (the influence of the cooperation models on the public officials' views on GE), which will thoroughly be analyzed in Chapter 6. Last, Chapter 7 is to summarize the outcomes, recommendations will be given for further research and limitations of the study will be reflected upon.

2. Theoretical framework

In this research, the focus is on three cooperation models, each of which stems from a different body of PA literature. First, PPPs; cooperative arrangements between the public and the private sector, will be explored. Then, CP; a practice of delivering public services where citizens are involved, will be delved into. Last, SDC, where groups of people organize collective goods without any hierarchy or market mechanisms²², will be looked into. Collectively, these models will be theoretically explored regarding their influence on perceived GE, which is what makes this Theoretical framework original.

The successful GE²³ is defined as the **government's ability to impose control**²⁴ over the stakeholders in the given cooperation. Also, GE has to do with **clear rules and roles in place**, where the government should be the central actor defining and shaping the cooperation on the basis of information obtained from the collaboration's context. Additionally, **perceived trust**²⁵ is a pivotal concept in the relation between the government and the private sector/citizens, without which GE would be absent. These are the three measurement criteria of perceived GE which will be focused on²⁶. The more criteria are satisfied, the higher the government's GE. One of the reasons for these criteria²⁷ is that the extent to which the government could govern impactfully or powerfully (synonyms of "effectiveness") depends on the amount of authority experienced over the stakeholders. Although the exercise of authority over the stakeholders involved could be interpreted as a contradiction to collaboration, this research focuses on collaboration experienced by the government; i.e. which of the models is the most suitable for the government to employ in reaching the sustainable transition.

²² Nederhand et al., The governance of self-organization: Which governance strategy do policy officials and citizens prefer? 2018, 237

²³ This is the author's own concept.

²⁴ **For reasons/explanations why 'control' is one of the criteria for governing effectiveness, see section 3.1.1.**

²⁵ **In the thesis, the author will regularly refer to 'perceived trust' by writing 'trust,' however, please keep in mind that since trust as a concept cannot be measured, this is why 'perceived trust' is always inferred.**

²⁶ **The author recognizes that others may claim that there are many other factors omitted in this research, however, due to the lack of space, the author has chosen only three governing effectiveness factors to focus on.**

²⁷ **For other reasons why these criteria were picked, see section 3.1.1.**

2.1 Public-Private Partnerships

PPP is a “cooperation between public [and] private actors [with a durable character] in which they jointly develop products and services (typically infrastructure) and share risks, costs and resources.”²⁸²⁹³⁰ It is a cooperation model which was formally introduced in the (1980s)³¹-1990s³², alongside the New Public Management (NPM) paradigm³³. Because it was introduced in the same timeframe like NPM, it shares some of NPM’s features. For example, PPPs are said to enhance effective public governance, increase service quality and efficiency, and they tend to have the ability to mobilize private sector resources³⁴. Another NPM feature that PPPs share is the use of contracts as a safeguard from opportunistic behavior³⁵.

The fact that the public partner uses contracts to prevent the private partner from suddenly withdrawing their share from the PPP infers a principal-agent relationship between the two. Because it is the government being the key decision maker, instructing the private partner to perform a specific task on its behalf, the government takes the role of the principal and the private partner the role of the agent³⁶. As a result, the tasks in the PPP would be divided as follows: the government would define the project specifications with a demand for output, while the private partner would design, build, finance, maintain and operate the project³⁷. For the PPP to work well, the principal (government) needs to ensure that the contract put up is fully specified and enforceable, that output indicators are measurable and monitorable, that the contract terms are stable over time and that political commitment is high³⁸. In turn, the agent (private partner) needs to abide by the contract, delivering the agreed output in a certain amount of months or years.

²⁸ Hodge et al., Do PPP’s work? What and how have we been learning so far? 2018, 1106

²⁹ Klijn and Teisman, Institutional and Strategic Barriers to Public–Private Partnership: An Analysis of Dutch Cases, 2003, 137

³⁰ Klijn and Koppenjan, Governance Networks in the Public Sector, 2016, 183

³¹ Pratap and Chakrabarti, Public-Private Partnerships in Infrastructure, 2017, 2

³² The official date of the PPP introduction is disputed across academic literature.

³³ Hodge et al., After the Ribbon Cutting: Governing PPPs in the Medium to Long Term 2017, 330

³⁴ Ibid., 330-331

³⁵ Warsen et al., How do professionals perceive the governance of public–private partnerships? Evidence from Canada, the Netherlands and Denmark, 2019, 2

³⁶ Leruth, Public-Private Cooperation in Infrastructure Development: A Principal-Agent Story of Contingent Liabilities, Fiscal Risks, and Other (Un)pleasant Surprises, 2012, 231

³⁷ Ibid., 232.

³⁸ Ibid., 231-232.

2.1.1 PPPs and governing effectiveness

If binding contracts are employed in a PPP, so that the government could hold the private party responsible for its actions, then successful GE could be influenced in a positive way. This is because, since the government values controllability of the cooperative process³⁹, a contract enables the government to retain control and oversight over all performances and outcomes⁴⁰. The contract is a main measure of influencing GE positively, since it conforms to the principles of successful GE. First, it is a symbol of the government's control over the private partner. Second, it stipulates clear rules and roles for both parties involved. Third, the contract could be a form of a trust mechanism, whereby the contract's conditions prevent the actors from practising opportunistic behavior and thereby reinforce the belief in each other's good intentions^{41,42}.

Although PPP contracts delineate governments' clear control over the private partner and rules and roles for both parties are visible; trust, a key mechanism defining successful GE, may not be guaranteed. If, for example, the relationship between the government and the private partner starts off in an uneasy situation, or if the "shadow of hierarchy"⁴³ overarching the PPP is too dominant and threatening⁴⁴, trust may have difficulties unfolding or it may never unfold. Consequently, if trust is absent in the PPP, seizing the advantages of the collaboration may turn out to be impossible⁴⁵.

Although, as mentioned, contracts could aid the formation of trust, this tends to work only partially. For example, if an unanticipated external force (e.g. a financial crisis); which the contract could not have accounted for, turns out to affect the PPP, the actors need to trust each other that their project will be delivered on time, in spite of the external force having a damaging impact.

³⁹ Klijn and Teisman, *Institutional and Strategic Barriers to Public–Private Partnership: An Analysis of Dutch Cases*, 2003, 143

⁴⁰ Pratap and Chakrabarti, *Public-Private Partnerships in Infrastructure*, 2017, 77

⁴¹ See Edelenbos and Eshuis, *The Interplay Between Trust and Control in Governance Processes: A Conceptual and Empirical Investigation*, 2012, for more information on how formal control (contracts) can contribute to increasing trust.

⁴² Klijn and Koppenjan, *Governance Networks in the Public Sector*, 2016, 201-202

⁴³ The shadow of hierarchy may be defined as the government's legislative threat towards private businesses. Legislators can threaten to enact adverse legislation unless the private businesses alter their behaviour to accommodate the government's demands.

⁴⁴ Risse, *GOVERNANCE IN AREAS OF LIMITED STATEHOOD* in Ed. Levi-Faur, *The Oxford Handbook of Governance*, 2012

⁴⁵ Pratap and Chakrabarti, *Public-Private Partnerships in Infrastructure*, 2017, 40

Hence, to achieve GE fully, not only should clear-cut rules for the principal and the agent be in place; the relationship between the government and the private actor should also be seen in terms of stewardship, where actors negotiate and collaborate in a horizontal way⁴⁶. However, it is the government which should remain accountable for the end-results and hence should continue to be the central actor of the project.

In conclusion, according to academic literature, PPPs could influence GE positively, if certain measures are taken. PPPs should capitalize on the characteristics of both NPM and New Public Governance (NPG). NPM features to be applied include the government imposing control on the private partner through a binding contract, where rules and roles for both partners are stipulated (principal-agent roles). On the other hand, to obtain and maintain trust in PPPs, NPG's suggestion to build high-trust (principal-steward) relationships through negotiation and collaboration in a horizontal way, should also be attended to. If these measures are taken, PPPs will influence GE in a positive manner.

2.2 Co-production

Since the early 1980s, when the term 'Co-production' was used for the first time by Elinor Ostrom, an economist at Indiana University⁴⁷, the amount of academic literature on this topic has grown considerably. (Citizen-, client- and consumer-) CP could be defined as the direct involvement of citizens (and clients and consumers) in the design and delivery of public services;

⁴⁶ Warsen et al., How do professionals perceive the governance of public–private partnerships? Evidence from Canada, the Netherlands and Denmark, 2019, 3

⁴⁷ Parks et al., CONSUMERS AS COPRODUCERS OF PUBLIC SERVICES: SOME ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS, 1981

a move away from a top-down view where citizens merely consume services, to a bottom-up view where citizens are enabled to co-produce, alongside the government⁴⁸⁴⁹⁵⁰⁵¹⁵².

While 'PPP' is a concept of the NPM paradigm, 'CP' is an NPG tool⁵³. For example, Van Waarden defines 'governance' as CP of public goods and norms by public and private actors and by multi-level polities⁵⁴. Rhodes, on the other hand, writes about a change from a hierarchic state to governance in and by networks, where the state, civil society and the market interact to (re)allocate resources and coordinate activities⁵⁵. Others also refer to CP in terms of (participatory) governance, where win-win situations could be created for both governments and citizens by ensuring high-quality public service delivery and increasing the allocative efficiency of services⁵⁶.

2.2.1 Co-production and governing effectiveness

Because CP is all about cooperation between the government and citizens, trust-based relationships need to be formed, otherwise it would be difficult to agree on how public services will be delivered. However, the act of CP itself promises the establishment of trust-based relationships between the actors⁵⁷. This merits the collaboration, since partners who trust each other generally achieve more concerning project performance and outcomes than partners who

⁴⁸ De Witte and Geys, Citizen coproduction and efficient public good provision: Theory and evidence from local public libraries, 2012, 593

⁴⁹ Lindquist, Putting Citizens First: Engagement in policy and service delivery for the 21st century, in Ed. Lindquist et al., Putting Citizens First, 2013, 8

⁵⁰ Fotaki, TOWARDS DEVELOPING NEW PARTNERSHIPS IN PUBLIC SERVICES: USERS AS CONSUMERS, CITIZENS AND/OR CO-PRODUCERS IN HEALTH AND SOCIAL CARE IN ENGLAND AND SWEDEN, 2011, 947

⁵¹ Ryan, Co-production: Option or Obligation? 2012, 314

⁵² Lu and Sidortsov, Sorting out a problem: A co-production approach to household waste management in Shanghai, China, 2019, 271

⁵³ Sorrentino et al., Understanding co-production as a new public governance tool, 2018, 277

⁵⁴ Van Waarden, THE GOVERNANCE OF MARKETS: ON GENERATING TRUST IN TRANSACTIONS, in Ed. Levi-Faur, The Oxford Handbook of Governance, 2012

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Bartenberger and Szescilo, THE BENEFITS AND RISKS OF EXPERIMENTAL CO-PRODUCTION: THE CASE OF URBAN REDESIGN IN VIENNA, 2016, 509

⁵⁷ Ibid.

do not trust each other⁵⁸. Also, the presence of trust in CP merits GE, since with trust, governments could govern over the partners easier.

However, CP has a lot more to offer. Through knowledge and information exchange among the partners⁵⁹, CP may contribute to collaborative innovation⁶⁰⁶¹, where various solutions to complex issues may be offered⁶². If diversity is harnessed, this would mean that inclusiveness would be another advantage, along with the sources of throughput legitimacy: voice, due deliberation and transparency⁶³. Consequently, once various actors get involved to co-produce public services, the problem of coordination overload at the center (at the governmental level) may be solved⁶⁴, since the tasks will disperse among the CP members. This may help the government to focus on steering the governance process effectively. Additionally, if CP takes long enough, acceptance and support for governmental policies could be formed, which could ultimately lead to restoring the political identity among the citizens⁶⁵. Once again, if that is achieved, it may be easier for the government to steer the CP successfully, as the participants would, predictably, let the government impose control on them.

On the other hand, there are also some drawbacks to CP. For instance, IG networks, where CP may take place, could be short of input legitimacy (IL), because of lacking clear ex ante authorization⁶⁶ and because mis- or underrepresentation could occur (e.g. only elite members could co-produce)⁶⁷. Next, output legitimacy (OL) could also be a problem in IG networks, since ex post accountability may be hindered due to the 'problem of many hands': it could become hard

⁵⁸ Klijn et al., *Trust in Governance Networks: Its Impacts on Outcomes*, 2010, 210

⁵⁹ Wagenaar, *Governance, Complexity, and Democratic Participation: How Citizens and Public Officials Harness the Complexities of Neighborhood Decline*, 2007, 42

⁶⁰ Sorensen and Torfing, *Metagoverning Collaborative Innovation in Governance Networks*, 2017, 837

⁶¹ Hartley, *Innovation in Governance and Public Services: Past and Present*, 2005, 28

⁶² Wagenaar, *Governance, Complexity, and Democratic Participation: How Citizens and Public Officials Harness the Complexities of Neighborhood Decline*, 2007, 42-43

⁶³ Van Meerkerk et al., *Connective management and governance network performance: the mediating role of throughput legitimacy. Findings from survey research on complex water projects in the Netherlands*, 2015, 751

⁶⁴ Wagenaar, *Governance, Complexity, and Democratic Participation: How Citizens and Public Officials Harness the Complexities of Neighborhood Decline*, 2007, 43

⁶⁵ Edelenbos and Van Meerkerk, *Introduction: three reflecting perspectives on interactive governance*, in Ed. Edelenbos and Van Meerkerk, *Critical Reflections on Interactive Governance*, 2016, 12

⁶⁶ Papadopoulos, *Interactive governance: authorization, representation and accountability*, in Ed. Edelenbos and Van Meerkerk, *Critical Reflections on Interactive Governance*, 2016, 148

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 151

to determine who is responsible for what tasks⁶⁸. This could result in a democratic dilemma (DD): are IG networks a source of potential or a threat to democracy?

If it turns out that the network may threaten democracy (e.g. because of representing the views of radical individuals), the government may then struggle to govern it successfully, since the members may rise up against the government as the dominant actor. Because of the conflict resulting, trust between the members and the government may not evolve, and the government may fear to lose its control over the network. If this happens, the initial idea of successful GE could disappear.

Clearly, CP presents an uneasy relationship with GE, because it could influence GE in both positive and negative ways. For example, CP could influence GE positively, if, under government-induced IG, the government takes the lead in selecting participants of the network, setting the agenda, and promoting dialogue and negotiation. This way, the government would remain in control of the IG network and GE could be achieved.

Moreover, GE could be influenced positively, if clear rules and roles are in place. However, considering that IG networks generally face a challenge in obtaining IL and OL, achieving GE (in terms of rules and roles) could be difficult. This is because in CP, it is often unclear whether and what mandate is ascribed to the network, i.e. who and which virtues give the network a license to rule⁶⁹. Also, even though the network members may claim that they are inclusive, the opposite might be the case, because usually, citizens with a large social network and professional skills participate in CP⁷⁰. In another case, many different people may be members of an IG network, meaning that clear roles may not be in place and hence the 'problem of many hands' (lack of explicit accountability) may be the result.

Last, even though some of CP's benefits involve the establishment of trust-based relationships⁷¹, trust is not guaranteed to evolve at all times. Trust coevolution depends on the

⁶⁸ Ibid., 156

⁶⁹ Ibid., 148

⁷⁰ Voorberg and Bekkers, Interactive governance and the social construction of citizens as co-creators, in Ed. Edelenbos and Van Meerkerk, *Critical Reflections on Interactive Governance*, 2016, 280-281

⁷¹ Bartenberger and Szescilo, *THE BENEFITS AND RISKS OF EXPERIMENTAL CO-PRODUCTION: THE CASE OF URBAN REDESIGN IN VIENNA*, 2016, 509

initial situation⁷² when the participants meet and on whether the CP presents a potential or a threat to democracy. If the members meet in peace (initially but also thereafter) and if the CP is a source of potential to democracy, trust could be fostered and GE could be secured in this regard.

In sum, the influence that CP may have on GE is not as straightforward as that of PPPs. This is because whether the influence would be positive or negative largely depends on many factors.

2.3 Society-driven cooperation

The term 'Self-organization' has its origins in the natural sciences, where order (new structure) was said to emerge out of chaos⁷³ and if certain initial conditions were met, a state of dynamic equilibrium displaying robustness might be reached⁷⁴. SDC, also referred to as self-organization, self-governance, citizen-induced IG, or bottom-up initiatives all refer to one key idea. Namely, the idea that citizens organize themselves in collectives, taking up the responsibility to deliver public services in areas where the government has refrained from due to budget cuts, for example⁷⁵⁷⁶⁷⁷.

Other reasons why citizens cooperate to form bottom-up initiatives is to defend their values, needs and interests⁷⁸⁷⁹⁸⁰. Perhaps they are dissatisfied about the government refraining

⁷² Edelenbos and Eshuis, *The Interplay Between Trust and Control in Governance Processes: A Conceptual and Empirical Investigation*, 2012, 669

⁷³ Edelenbos et al., *The Evolution of Community Self-Organization in Interaction With Government Institutions: Cross-Case Insights From Three Countries*, 2018, 53

⁷⁴ Wagenaar, *Governance, Complexity, and Democratic Participation: How Citizens and Public Officials Harness the Complexities of Neighborhood Decline*, 2007, 24

⁷⁵ Edelenbos et al., *Stakeholder initiatives in flood risk management: exploring the role and impact of bottom-up initiatives in three 'Room for the River' projects in the Netherlands*, 2017, 49-50

⁷⁶ Nederhand et al., *The governance of self-organization: Which governance strategy do policy officials and citizens prefer?* 2018, 237

⁷⁷ De Lancer Julnes and Johnson, *Strengthening Efforts to Engage the Hispanic Community in Citizen-Driven Governance: An Assessment of Efforts in Utah*, 2011, 222

⁷⁸ Edelenbos et al., *Stakeholder initiatives in flood risk management: exploring the role and impact of bottom-up initiatives in three 'Room for the River' projects in the Netherlands*, 2017, 48

⁷⁹ Edelenbos et al., *The Evolution of Community Self-Organization in Interaction With Government Institutions: Cross-Case Insights From Three Countries*, 2018, 53-54

⁸⁰ Beckie and Bacon, *Catalyzing change in local food system governance in Calgary, Alberta*, in Ed. Andree et al., *Civil Society and Social Movements in Food System Governance*, 2019, 83

from funding an elderly care center, or they want to put an end to crime in their neighborhood, or maybe they want to raise awareness about teenage pregnancies in their area. These examples of reasons why citizens self-organize show evidence that the government is unable to provide all necessary public services by itself and that it needs help from the society to ensure service provision.

Self-organization makes the citizens take on a new political identity, such as becoming autonomous, competent, and able to take the responsibility for public service delivery⁸¹. Likewise, the government also takes on a new identity in this cooperation. Some argue that the government's role should be to leave the citizens deliver the public services alone (i.e. to leave them without any hierarchical control imposed).⁸²⁸³⁸⁴ Others, however, claim that a shift from government to governance or from steering to serving is increasingly witnessed⁸⁵⁸⁶⁸⁷. What this means is that the government's role is to be facilitative and enabling⁸⁸⁸⁹, trusting the collectives to deliver the public services without much direct intervention. Sorensen calls such a role a metagoverning role⁹⁰⁹¹.

2.3.1 Society-driven cooperation and governing effectiveness

Considering what influence SDC has on GE, the answer to this is less clear, since to this date, relatively little is known about how collectives emerge and interact with governmental actors

⁸¹ Voorberg and Bekkers, Interactive governance and the social construction of citizens as co-creators, in Ed. Edelenbos and Van Meerkerk, *Critical Reflections on Interactive Governance*, 2016, 278

⁸² WÄLTI et al., How Democratic Is "Governance"? Lessons from Swiss Drug Policy, 2004, 83

⁸³ Klijn and Koppenjan, *Governance Networks in the Public Sector*, 2016, 8

⁸⁴ Warsen et al., How do professionals perceive the governance of public-private partnerships? Evidence from Canada, the Netherlands and Denmark, 2019, 4

⁸⁵ Denhardt and Denhardt, *The New Public Service: Serving Rather than Steering*, 2000, 549

⁸⁶ Borrás, THREE TENSIONS IN THE GOVERNANCE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, in Ed. Levi-Faur, *The Oxford Handbook of Governance*, 2012

⁸⁷ Nederhand et al., Self-organization and the role of government: how and why does self-organization evolves in the shadow of hierarchy? 2014, 6

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Nederhand et al., The governance of self-organization: Which governance strategy do policy officials and citizens prefer? 2018, 237

⁹⁰ See Sorensen, *Metagovernance: The Changing Role of Politicians in Processes of Democratic Governance*, 2006

⁹¹ See Sorensen and Torfing, *Metagoverning Collaborative Innovation in Governance Networks*, 2017

to deliver public services⁹². In the case of GE's first and third criterion⁹³, the hedgehog's dilemma (HD) becomes relevant. The dilemma is about the government having to decide whether to get involved in the collective to offer (e.g. financial) support and shape the conditions for self-organization, or whether to leave the collectives alone, avoiding any harm to, for instance, the trust-based relationship⁹⁴.

To help solve the dilemma and retain at least some control and trust, the government could take the role of a metagovernor. Both hands-off- and hands-on metagovernance techniques should be used to retain control⁹⁵. Hands-off metagovernance refers to the shaping of the context of self-governance (e.g. by passing laws and through budgeting), hence framing the networks⁹⁶. Also, storytelling, or the shaping of images of rational behavior through the constructions of visions for the society, could be another form of hands-off-, i.e. indirect, metagovernance⁹⁷. Hands-on metagovernance could be performed either by facilitation and offering support (in a neutral, non-assertive way), or by the government's direct participation in the network, where it too would negotiate on the solutions to wicked problems⁹⁸. If both metagovernance techniques are employed, the government could experience GE at least to the extent that the citizen-induced IG network would allow it to.

Next, to achieve GE, clear rules and roles should exist and the government should be the central actor shaping those. As discussed, the government could try to influence the bottom-up initiatives through metagoverning, however, the citizens are usually the central actors and they have many motivations to be at the center, hence not easily letting go of their positions. That is one of the factors having a negative influence on GE.

⁹² Edelenbos et al., *The Evolution of Community Self-Organization in Interaction With Government Institutions: Cross-Case Insights From Three Countries*, 2018, 52

⁹³ The government's ability to impose control and trust present.

⁹⁴ Brandsen, *Governments and self-organization: a hedgehog's dilemma*, in Ed. Edelenbos and Van Meerkerk, *Critical Reflections on Interactive Governance*, 2016, 339

⁹⁵ Sorensen and Torfing, *Metagoverning Collaborative Innovation in Governance Networks*, 2017, 830

⁹⁶ Sorensen, *Metagovernance: The Changing Role of Politicians in Processes of Democratic Governance*, 2006, 101

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 102

Also, while bottom-up initiatives tend to enjoy internal legitimacy (i.e. legitimacy in the eyes of the participants), inclusion (rather than efficiency) and flexibility (rather than stability),⁹⁹ clear rules and roles may be absent. This is because if the IG network is legitimate only in the eyes of its own participants and if it adapts to its environment too often, it may lack clear rules, hence making the network difficult to govern. Furthermore, if all eager citizens wanting to join the network are granted entry, clear roles may start to fade, which also does not help to make the network governable. All in all, the second GE criterion seems to be rather impossible to achieve in SDC.

2.4 Conclusion

In conclusion, as demonstrated in Table 1 below, achieving GE under PPPs seems to be rather straightforward because, having been developed alongside the NPM paradigm, PPPs were designed to increase effective public governance. At the same time, governing CP and SDC seems to be rather challenging, if not impossible. This is because the involvement of citizens wanting to dominate or take over the public service delivery could be difficult to moderate, especially if their needs and values are at stake. The question here of course is: does this original theory¹⁰⁰ conform to reality and if so, how and why?

⁹⁹ Provan and Kenis, Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Management, and Effectiveness, 2007, 245

¹⁰⁰ **This theory is original, because as mentioned in Chapter 1, nobody seems to have explored the influence of the cooperation models on governing effectiveness before, probably because the term 'governing effectiveness' is the author's own, multifaceted concept.**

	PPPs	Co-production	Society-driven cooperation
1st GE criterion: Government's ability to impose control	Present , because contracts enable the government to retain oversight	Absent , because IG networks lack IL and OL → DD; Present , if the government takes the lead in selecting participants, setting the agenda and promoting dialogue	Absent , because of the HD, but Present if the government takes the metagovernor's role
2nd GE criterion: Clear rules and roles within the cooperation model	Present , because contracts stipulate rules and roles	Absent , because of lack of IL and OL	Absent , because cooperatives tend to enjoy internal legitimacy, inclusion and flexibility
3rd GE criterion: Perceived trust between the government and the private sector/citizens	Present , since contracts could be a form of trust mechanism, but trust may not be guaranteed ; PPPs should capitalize on NPM and NPG: build principal-steward relationships	Present , because CP promises trust-based relationships, but trust is not guaranteed ; trust coevolution depends on the initial situation and on the DD	Absent , because of the HD, but Present if the government takes the metagovernor's role.

Table 1: Summary: how the three models compare regarding governing effectiveness

3. Operationalization framework

To manage expectations for what is going to follow and to provide a framework for analysis, operationalization needs to happen. This part consists of three subparts, namely (a) operationalization and the definition of terms used, (b) conceptual framework, the formation of expectations, and (c) methodology, where the methodological strategy will be elaborated.

3.1 Operationalization

When reviewing the research question¹⁰¹ once more, independent and dependent variables could be discerned. The independent variables, or the variables which are tested to have an effect on the dependent variable, are the three cooperation models, i.e. PPPs, CP and SDC. The dependent variable, or the variable whose outcome is dependent on the independent variables, is the perceived GE in the given context.

Each cooperation model could have direct positive, direct negative or indirect positive or indirect negative effects on GE in the context explored. However, to complicate matters more, GE is a complex concept itself. This means that while aspects of the cooperation models could have a direct positive impact on GE, there could also be some other aspects in the models which could affect GE negatively. Hence, both the independent and dependent variables are multifaceted, complex concepts which need to be operationalized. Table 2 in the Appendix attempts to demonstrate how this was done.

3.1.1 Definitions

Starting with the dependent variable, there are many reasons for picking three criteria for it. First, when defining the word 'governing' in 'governing effectiveness,' one finds out that it refers

¹⁰¹ "What is the influence of cooperation models (PPPs, Co-production and Society-driven cooperation) on the perceived successful effectiveness of steering in the Netherlands and the Czech Republic, in the context of a sustainable transition?"

to “the exercise of authority,” “the act of government and the design of a hierarchy,” or “to put something under control”¹⁰². Hence, in defining ‘governing effectiveness,’ the government’s ability to rule and impose control to create public value has quickly become one of the GE determinants to look for in the cooperation models. Next, when looking up ‘effectiveness,’ the “performance and impact” was the definition found¹⁰³. Hence, ‘governing effectiveness’ could simply be defined as the government’s rule over the private sector/citizens by the right of authority, which produces expected results.

Another reason for choosing these criteria is that they have been inspired by Klijn and Koppenjan’s instrumental conjecture on the relationship of democratic institutions to governance networks. According to this conjecture, the government may increase its capacity to shape and deliver public policy through the instrumental use of networks¹⁰⁴. Also, this perspective presumes that the government’s interests exist prior to the given collaboration and that the governance network provides a means of reinforcing and realizing these interests. Studies supportive of this view claim that the government is a powerful actor creating and manipulating networks to realize its projects¹⁰⁵. In this sense, to govern the networks successfully, the government needs to create rules and roles for the actors in the network, defining and shaping the collaboration.

Finally, trust as a third GE criterion was introduced, because it is said to be a useful tool when assessing governance network processes¹⁰⁶.

The independent variables and their expected relationships with GE are defined in Table 2 (see Appendix).

3.2 Conceptual framework

¹⁰² Levi-Faur, FROM “BIG GOVERNMENT” TO “BIG GOVERNANCE”?, in Ed. Levi-Faur, The Oxford Handbook of Governance, 2012

¹⁰³ Torfing, GOVERNANCE NETWORKS, in Ed. Levi-Faur, The Oxford Handbook of Governance, 2012

¹⁰⁴ Klijn and Koppenjan, Governance Networks in the Public Sector, 2016, 214

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 289

Now that the key variables were defined, expectations are to be formed. In this section, three expectations will be developed. They will predict the influence of the cooperation models on perceived GE in general (in no particular context).

Based on the Theoretical framework and Operationalization, a conceptual framework model was set up. Figure 1 displays the model. As one could see, the three cooperation models (independent variables) all have determinants which could have an influence on GE, the dependent variable. To read the model correctly, interpret each green line/arrow, to represent 'has positive influence on,' and interpret each red line to represent 'has negative influence on'. Further, the four text boxes in the middle, which begin with "IF" or "BUT," are the conditions under which the predicted influences could hold.




Figure 1: Conceptual framework model

3.2.1 Expectations

First, looking at Figure 1, PPPs are predicted to have a direct positive influence on perceived GE, thanks to binding contracts. This is because contracts designate the government's ability to impose control over the private partner and they stipulate clear rules and roles for both. However, for the PPPs to have a full positive influence on GE, trust between the government and the private partner needs to be present. If trust is absent, GE will not be achieved fully and

eventually, the other two GE criteria could be cancelled out as a result. Hence, the following expectation was formed:

Expectation 1 (E1): PPPs will influence governing effectiveness directly in a positive way through the means of binding contracts, given that trust is present in the relation between the government and the private sector.

Second, CP is predicted to have a more complicated influence on GE. On the one hand, CP promises the establishment of trust-based relationships, which contributes to successful GE. However, this merit could be seized if the collaboration takes long enough. Simply put, citizens and the market need time to build acceptance and support of the government's policies, so that the government could impose control on them, given that they trust the government to do so with good intentions. Also, trust could be fostered if no DD is in the way. In other words, government-induced IG networks need to be a source of potential, rather than a threat to democracy.

On the other hand, based on the selected academic literature¹⁰⁷, CP's challenge in gaining IL and OL is predicted to influence GE in direct negative ways. IL is demonstrated through ex ante authorization and an adequate representation of various members of society, both of what CP seems to have trouble achieving. OL is portrayed through ex post accountability, which could also be hindered through the 'problem of many hands.' Hence, the government may find it difficult to impose control over the network and delineate clear rules and roles, which ultimately results in a negative influence on GE. This results in the following expectation:

Expectation 2 (E2): Co-production will influence governing effectiveness directly in a positive way through trust, if the collaboration process takes long enough and if there is no democratic dilemma in the way. On the other hand, Co-production will also influence governing effectiveness directly in a negative way, because of a lack of input and output legitimacy that could be inherent to Co-production.

Last, SDC is also predicted to influence GE in multiple, conflicting ways. Although the government could impose control over the self-organized network and earn some trust through acting as a metagovernor, the HD could become an obstacle to achieving GE. In other words,

¹⁰⁷ The author acknowledges that there is far more nuance about this in the PA academic literature.

although the government would generally like to define and shape the network, doing so could harm it and the trust-based relationship could be damaged too. Hence, the government should be very careful with imposing too much control over the network; a combination of hands-off and hands-on metagoverning strategies could be used to exercise at least some control and secure trust at the same time.

Despite the fact that GE could be achieved almost fully, if the government would be able to impose some control and secure trust; there tend to be no clear rules and roles in citizen-induced IG networks. This means that GE would still be quite difficult to realize here. Taking these considerations together, the following expectation was made:

Expectation 3 (E3): Society-driven cooperation will influence governing effectiveness directly in a positive way through the government taking the role of a metagovernor of the citizen-induced IG network, but the hedgehog's dilemma needs to be kept in mind when metagoverning. However, Society-driven cooperation will also influence governing effectiveness directly in a negative way, because clear rules and roles are generally absent in collectives.

Finally, taking the context of this research into consideration, the extent to which the governments of the Netherlands and the Czech Republic will capitalize on each of the positive determinants of GE will depend on several factors. That is; whether those experienced with the cooperation models have the willingness, ability and capability to, for example, foster trust in the networks by taking a metagoverning role. However, although the governmental actors could attempt to create rules and order in CP and SDC, it is predicted that the negative determinants/characteristics of each model will eventually take over these attempts and that the original situation will be retreated to.

3.3 Methodology

To come up with some answers to the research question, a mix of qualitative methods will be used. First, six case studies of sustainable projects where each of the three types of cooperation models can be seen in practice, will be introduced and analyzed. Three of the cases

will be Dutch and three cases will be Czech¹⁰⁸, and to make the research up to date, only sustainable projects which were realized in the past 20 years or are currently developed will be explored. The cases were selected based on their relevance to the context of this research, i.e. whether their focus was on the creation of sustainable/renewable energy or on the creation of a long-term strategy/plan, which would benefit future generations. Essentially, they had to illustrate the countries' efforts to achieve a sustainable transition.

The A6 PPP project was chosen as a case, because it portrays the sustainable transition by resulting in the first energy-neutral national road in the Netherlands¹⁰⁹¹¹⁰. Second, the Dutch Coastline Challenge (DCC) CP was set up to call for new technical solutions which could make the Dutch coastlines sustainable in the long-term¹¹¹ by reducing greenhouse gas emissions from coastal maintenance to zero by 2030¹¹². Hence, this case was chosen, because it depicts partners aiming for the sustainable transition. The Dutch SDC case; Warm in de Wijk (WidW) was chosen, because it was founded to realize the local sustainable transition: a CO₂-neutral energy supply by 2030 is one of its visions¹¹³.

Considering the Czech cases, the D4 PPP project was chosen, because it portrays the sustainable transition by the development of a long-term project, which would benefit the future generations of road users. Similarly, The Country for the Future (CftF) CP was chosen, because it shows the sustainable transition by the development of a long-term strategy, taking the future generations into special consideration. Last, the SDC Kněžice energy cooperative (KEC) was chosen, because it illustrates the sustainable transition by setting an example to other municipalities,¹¹⁴ in terms of producing its own energy locally.

¹⁰⁸ See Chapter 1, pages 7-8 for an explanation as to why the author chose such an international comparative case study design.

¹⁰⁹ Rijkswaterstaat, Wat en waarom A6 Almere Havendreef – Almere Buiten-Oost, 2019, <https://bezoekerscentrum.rijkswaterstaat.nl/SchipholAmsterdamAlmere/wat-en-waarom-a6/#.XtY-ZRMzqA>

¹¹⁰ Pianoo, Duurzaam bouwen aan de A6 tussen Almere Havendreef en Almere Buiten-Oost, 2019, <https://www.pianoo.nl/nl/duurzaam-bouwen-aan-de-a6-tussen-almere-havendreef-en-almere-buiten-oost>

¹¹¹ De BouwCampus, Dutch Coastline Challenge: Vraagstukken, <https://debouwcampus.nl/vraagstukken/kustlijnzorg>

¹¹² Rijkswaterstaat, Innovaties Kustlijnzorg, <https://rwsinnoveert.nl/innovaties/watersystemen/@215841/innovaties-kustlijnzorg/>

¹¹³ Warm in de Wijk, De coöperatie in het kort, <https://www.warmindewijk.nl/de-coooperatie/de-coooperatie-in-het-kort>

¹¹⁴ Zachová, Lidé chtějí odebrat energii ze zdrojů, ke kterým mají blízko, shodují se odborníci, 2019, <https://euractiv.cz/section/energetika/news/lide-chteji-odebirat-energii-ze-zdroju-ke-kterym-maji-blizko-shoduji-se-odbornici/>

Next, originally, 16 interviews were to be conducted, but in the end, 19 interviews with Dutch and Czech respondents were done. However, one respondent decided to withdraw from the research, meaning that the data will represent 18 interviews. It was decided to conduct more interviews, because it was suggested that a broader overview about how the cooperation models are perceived to influence GE, is desirable.

Nine interviews were with Dutch interviewees and nine were with Czech respondents, who worked or are currently working on the chosen sustainable projects¹¹⁵, together with the private sector and/or citizens (see the Appendix, Table 3 for more information on why the respondents were chosen). Once the interviews took place, they were transcribed, sent back for a fact-check and review, coded in ATLAS.ti and then the codes were visually portrayed in networks (see the Appendix, Figure 8). The coding process started with importing the transcriptions into ATLAS.ti and highlighting quotations which were regarded as key.¹¹⁶ Then, all quotations were reviewed once more so that codes could be assigned to the quotations which would imply any of the indicators identified.¹¹⁷ Next, the initial 136 codes were downsized to 85 codes, which were connected into 12 networks (see Appendix, Figure 8).

When this was done, analysis took place. Every model was given a color so that the perceptions of every respondent belonging to a particular model group would easily be discernible. Also, a distinction was made between interviewees with original (single) responses and those with multiple answers¹¹⁸. In all cases, the amount of respondents per code was noted to compare the presence of the indicators per model¹¹⁹. In the case of some questions¹²⁰, the identity of the respondents was noted for further analysis, i.e. to see if there are any patterns to

¹¹⁵ See Chapter 4 for an overview of the six chosen case studies.

¹¹⁶ Key quotations were those which would contain a clear answer to the interview questions posed; see the Appendix for the interview questions.

¹¹⁷ See Table 2: Operationalization in the Appendix, for the chosen indicators per variable.

¹¹⁸ Those with original responses were given special recognition in the Findings chapter (Chapter 5).

¹¹⁹ For instance, 5/8 Society-driven cooperation respondents were coded to claim that 'control over the Society-driven cooperation projects tends to exist,' 2 of which had an original response. Hence, the conclusion here is that although the majority of the respondents is aware of control being present in cooperatives, the minority claimed that this actually is the case at all times. Hence, on the whole, cooperatives could be deduced to be rather independent and not very governable in this respect.

¹²⁰ Questions where interviewees from different model groups answered the same way, e.g. saying that different values, needs and sectors the participants represent affect governing effectiveness. In this case, 3/5 PPP respondents answered this way, 3/5 Co-production respondents and 2/3 Dutch Society-driven cooperation interviewees said so.

be found. Based on the data gathered, figures were constructed to see the patterns per cooperation model. Then, the Theoretical framework, expectations made (E1-E3), and the predictions per case were compared to the data found and this was reflected on in the Analysis.

Returning to the interviewees' profiles; eight interviews were with Dutch civil servants from Rijkswaterstaat¹²¹ and one interview was with a member of WidW, an energy cooperative in The Hague. In the case of the Czech respondents; six were civil servants, one was a former civil servant, one a politician (and former minister) and one was the initiator of the KEC. The civil servants worked at the Ministry of the Environment, Ministry of Transportation, Ministry of Industry and Trade, and the State Fund of Transport Infrastructure¹²². The reason for choosing these institutions to do the interviews at, is because the context of this research is the sustainable transition, and these institutions all have a profile which fit the need and want for a sustainable transition.

As to why the Czech respondents were so diverse; this is because it was difficult to find the suitable interviewees and consequently organize interviews with them, since many have not responded or have asked to be contacted after the Czech state of emergency¹²³ comes to an end. This could explain why the amount of interviewees per cooperation model is unequal in the Czech context: two interviews were made for PPP and CP, respectively, while five interviews were made for SDC. In the case of the Dutch interviews, three interviews were made per cooperation model. Keeping this in mind, the Findings should be treated accordingly; no general conclusions can be made.

Next, what is quite striking is that all interviewees were men; the author has no particular explanation for this. Next, the average length of each interview was 45 minutes; the shortest interview being 30 minutes and the longest being 2.5 hours. This is good, since on the whole, the author could deduce a lot of quality data from the semi-structured and in-depth interviews. An adequate idea and understanding of the interviewees' experiences with the cooperation models and their perceptions of the models' impacts on GE was definitely acquired.

¹²¹ Rijkswaterstaat is the executive body of the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management. This is a unique institution; the Czech Republic does not have a comparable one. See <https://www.rijkswaterstaat.nl/> for more information.

¹²² This is a governmental body which provides the finances to all Czech transport infrastructure; it cooperates with the Ministry of Transport. See <https://www.sfdi.cz/en/> for more information.

¹²³ This refers to the Czech state of emergency coming into force on the 12th March 2020 as a result of the Coronavirus outbreak.

A reason for conducting semi-structured interviews was to find possible factors within the cooperation models which may also have an effect on GE, but which were perhaps less obvious to think of. The inclusion of these factors changed the expectations in an interesting way (see the Analysis).

Additionally, since the author did not obtain the signed form about the permission of using the interviewees' quotes and names from everyone, the data will be anonymized.

See the Appendix for an idea of which interview questions were asked. While some questions may seem deterministic (e.g. what the respondents perceive to be the future role of the government), such an approach was taken on purpose. As mentioned in footnote 8, this thesis is attempting to measure "the perceived successful effectiveness of steering:" the extent to which public officials perceive to be legitimately and successfully ruling over the private actors/citizens in the cooperation. This explains the rather deterministic tone of some of the interview questions: the aim was to measure the impact of the models on the perceived GE.

3.3.1 Pros and cons of methods applied

Elaborating on the reasons for the mix of qualitative methods (case studies and interviews), a first reason is that this mix would make the research balanced. On the one hand, by analyzing case studies, the complex context could be distilled into manageable parts by explaining, describing or exploring events¹²⁴. Second, by doing interviews, culturally specific information could be obtained, i.e. the 'human' experience of the cooperation models could be discerned¹²⁵. This is important, as the research is all about identifying the influence of the models on the perceived GE.

Next, another reason for using the qualitative methods, is so that the interviewees could easily refer to one of the chosen case studies¹²⁶. Also, while one often looks for the 'why' behind

¹²⁴ Crowe et al., The case study approach, 2011, 4

¹²⁵ Mack et al., Qualitative Research Methods: A Data Collector's Field Guide, 2005, 1

¹²⁶ The interviewees were asked about the case studies of their own country during the interviews.

statistics, qualitative methods could provide one or more answers to the 'why' question¹²⁷ (including answers to the 'how' and 'what' questions)¹²⁸. Last, qualitative methods were used, since the topic of cooperation and perceived successful GE are variables which cannot be quantified; hence, qualitative methods have to be used here.

However, there are a couple of problems which could be encountered along the research. First, while analyzing the case studies and conducting the interviews, some inherent bias would probably be included and this would likely be reflected in the Findings and the Analysis. In other words, the Findings and the Analysis reflect the author's interpretation of the data collected, which means that no objective facts or conclusions can be deduced. Also, given the lack of space, generalizations cannot be made, because only a few case studies in a particular context and only a few interviews were done. Additionally, the (Dutch and the Czech) context per case is quite different, which could make it difficult to present an effective, balanced comparison. Hence, although the results are to be non-generalizable, further research should be done to test this non-generalizability. Perhaps if more cases and more interviews would be done in the same context, some general conclusions about which cooperation models work best in terms of GE could be made.

¹²⁷ Tiley, Qualitative research: What is it and why should you use it?, 2017, <https://www.onepoll.com/qualitative-research-what-is-it-and-why-should-you-use-it/>

¹²⁸ Crowe et al., The case study approach, 2011, 4

4. Empirical context

Now that the background of this research was set, the empirical context will be portrayed. To do this, six case studies; three Dutch and three Czech; each an example of a different cooperation model, will be introduced. Next, in Findings, the interviews with the public officials will, among other things, show which of the cooperation models is perceived to be the most effective one in governing successfully.

4.1.1 Dutch case nr. 1: PPP: A6: Almere Havendreef - Almere Buiten-Oost

Rijkswaterstaat has widened the A6 highway between Almere Havendreef and Almere Buiten-Oost (Oostvaarders) to four lanes per driving direction¹²⁹. This project is a part of the Schiphol-Amsterdam-Almere (SAA) program, which is designed to improve the traffic flow and accessibility of the northern part of the Randstad¹³⁰¹³¹. Since July 2019, one year earlier than planned, the route is open to traffic¹³².

¹²⁹ Rijkswaterstaat, Wat en waarom A6 Almere Havendreef – Almere Buiten-Oost, 2019, <https://bezoekerscentrum.rijkswaterstaat.nl/SchipholAmsterdamAlmere/wat-en-waarom-a6/#.XtY-ZRMzaqA>

¹³⁰ Randstad is an industrial and metropolitan conurbation in the Netherlands. It consists of four major/largest cities: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht, and the surrounding areas. Randstad extends in a crescent from Utrecht in the east to Dordrecht in the south and to Lelystad in the north.

¹³¹ Rijkswaterstaat, A1/A6/A9/A10: Schiphol-Amsterdam-Almere, 2020, <https://www.rijkswaterstaat.nl/wegen/projectenoverzicht/a9-a10-a1-a6-schiphol-amsterdam-almere/index.aspx>

¹³² Rijkswaterstaat, Wat en waarom A6 Almere Havendreef – Almere Buiten-Oost, 2019, <https://bezoekerscentrum.rijkswaterstaat.nl/SchipholAmsterdamAlmere/wat-en-waarom-a6/#.XtY-ZRMzaqA>



The completed A6 PPP project, Source:

<https://nieuwsbrieven.rijkswaterstaat.nl/actueel/nieuwsbrieven/nieuwsbrieven-archief-nieuwsbrief-rijkswaterstaat-saa-a6-almere-havendreef---almere-buiten-oost/2019/24-juli-2019>

The A6 PPP project portrays the sustainable transition through a solar panel field at the Almere junction, which meets the energy demands of the highway by generating enough energy to keep the lights, signs and traffic lights operating¹³³. What also contributes to sustainability is that 13km of new, largely silent and fully recyclable¹³⁴ asphalt was used to construct the extra lanes¹³⁵. Next, new and adjusted bridges/viaducts were constructed at 13 locations, and new entrances and exits of Almere Haven towards Amsterdam and Lelystad were made¹³⁶. These

¹³³ Pianoo, Duurzaam bouwen aan de A6 tussen Almere Havendreef en Almere Buiten-Oost, 2019, <https://www.pianoo.nl/nl/duurzaam-bouwen-aan-de-a6-tussen-almere-havendreef-en-almere-buiten-oost>

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Rijkswaterstaat, Wat en waarom A6 Almere Havendreef – Almere Buiten-Oost, 2019, <https://bezoekerscentrum.rijkswaterstaat.nl/SchipholAmsterdamAlmere/wat-en-waarom-a6/#.XtY-ZRMzaqA>

¹³⁶ Ibid.

measures are sustainable, since they take the future generation's needs and wants into consideration.

In terms of the partnership, this is a typical PPP, because Rijkswaterstaat was working with a private consortium called Parkway6. Parkway6 consisted of various private parties, e.g. Dura Vermeer¹³⁷, BESIX¹³⁸, John Laing, and others¹³⁹. The consortium operated under a DBFM (Design, Build, Finance, Maintain) contract¹⁴⁰, meaning that the private partners were responsible to deliver the project to their client/contract giver - Rijkswaterstaat. In delivering the project, the consortium prioritized the ideals of circular economy and the transition to sustainability in reusing commodities and materials and deploying sustainable energy¹⁴¹. This is yet another reason why this case study was chosen: it is about a Dutch PPP which worked towards a sustainable transition through their values and deeds.

Predicting the extent to which Rijkswaterstaat perceived this PPP as governable, one may assume that the cooperation process went smoothly. This is because a binding DBFM contract was used, which, according to Figure 1, should lead to GE, if trust is present. Of course it is too soon to assume whether trust was present in the partnership; this is what the interviews with the public officials will reveal. However, because the project was accomplished one year earlier than planned, it could be presumed that GE was achieved.

4.1.2 Dutch case nr. 2: Co-production: Dutch Coastline Challenge

To face the challenges of the coming years through innovation, Rijkswaterstaat decided that it is necessary to create a CP by partnering up with private companies, knowledge institutions, governments and entrepreneurial citizens¹⁴². Because of climate change resulting in rising sea levels, the issue of keeping the Netherlands safe and liveable becomes ever more acute to

¹³⁷ A Dutch construction engineering company

¹³⁸ A Belgian construction company in the Netherlands

¹³⁹ Rijkswaterstaat, Wat en waarom A6 Almere Havendreef – Almere Buiten-Oost, 2019, <https://bezoekerscentrum.rijkswaterstaat.nl/SchipholAmsterdamAlmere/wat-en-waarom-a6/#.XtY-ZRMzaqA>

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Pianoo, Duurzaam bouwen aan de A6 tussen Almere Havendreef en Almere Buiten-Oost, 2019, <https://www.pianoo.nl/nl/duurzaam-bouwen-aan-de-a6-tussen-almere-havendreef-en-almere-buiten-oost>

¹⁴² Rijkswaterstaat, Samen innoveren, <https://rwsinnoveert.nl/samen-innoveren/>

address. To keep the water away from the land, sand from the North Sea is used to protect the coastlines¹⁴³. This sand is collected by dredgers which emit fossil fuels, damaging the environment¹⁴⁴. This is why the DCC was founded in April 2017: to call for new technical solutions which could make the Dutch coastlines sustainable in the long-term¹⁴⁵ by reducing greenhouse gas emissions from coastal maintenance to zero by 2030¹⁴⁶. Hence, this case study was chosen, because it depicts partners aiming for the sustainable transition.



The Dutch coastline, Source: https://rwsinnoveert.nl/publish/pages/166187/ikz_1.jpg

To achieve the goal, a different way of thinking with regards to coastal maintenance was needed. Hence, Rijkswaterstaat conducted a market consultation to prepare for the tender and innovation partnerships with the private sector were made¹⁴⁷. These partnerships are a form of CP, where Rijkswaterstaat takes a leading role. Rijkswaterstaat facilitates the development of the

¹⁴³ De BouwCampus, Dutch Coastline Challenge: Vraagstukken, <https://debouwcampus.nl/vraagstukken/kustlijnzorg>

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Rijkswaterstaat, Innovaties Kustlijnzorg, <https://rwsinnoveert.nl/innovaties/watersystemen/@215841/innovaties-kustlijnzorg/>

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

given innovation by the private party (consortia) and assesses the submitted innovation proposals on criteria such as sustainability and cost effectiveness¹⁴⁸. So far, three innovations ('sand windmills,' Dutch Coastline Development Game and 'De Haakse Seawall') were created and are evaluated¹⁴⁹.

Whether or not this CP is easily governable is difficult to predict, since it has not come to an end yet. However, given that the DCC has been running since 2017 (long enough to develop some trust-based relationships) and that the project initiator is a governmental body, the question of the DD and of lack of IL and OL could be discarded¹⁵⁰. Following Figure 1, Rijkswaterstaat should, in theory, experience GE.

4.1.3 Dutch case nr. 3: Society-driven cooperation: Warm in de Wijk

Founded in 2015, WidW¹⁵¹ is a bottom-up energy cooperative in The Hague, which supplies sustainable and local energy to its members. The bottom-up initiative consists of three board members, seven project group members¹⁵²¹⁵³ and 18 workgroup members.¹⁵⁴¹⁵⁵ It has, in a relatively short amount of time, convinced 300 households to switch from the unsustainable gas¹⁵⁶ to solar,¹⁵⁷ water¹⁵⁸ and geothermal energy¹⁵⁹. Together, the members democratically co-

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ De BouwCampus, Dutch Coastline Challenge: Vraagstukken, <https://debouwcampus.nl/vraagstukken/kustlijnzorg>

¹⁵⁰ Assuming, of course, that the initiator is a democratic government (with democratic values and intentions) steering top-down, thereby eliminating the democratic dilemma.

¹⁵¹ See <https://www.warmindewijk.nl/>

¹⁵² Those starting the initiative up

¹⁵³ Warm in de Wijk, Bestuur en projectgroep, <https://www.warmindewijk.nl/over-ons/bestuur-en-projectgroep>

¹⁵⁴ Informing residents about energy-saving measures

¹⁵⁵ Warm in de Wijk, Werkgroepen, <https://www.warmindewijk.nl/over-ons/werkgroepen>

¹⁵⁶ See <https://www.warmindewijk.nl/>

¹⁵⁷ Warm in de Wijk, Het project Warm in de Wijk, <https://www.warmindewijk.nl/duurzame-warmte-in-de-vruchtenbuurt/het-initiatief-widw>

¹⁵⁸ Warm in de Wijk, Warm in de Wijk | Zet m op 70, <https://www.warmindewijk.nl/duurzame-warmte-in-de-vruchtenbuurt/proefproject-zet-m-op-70>

¹⁵⁹ Warm in de Wijk, Vraag en antwoord, <https://www.warmindewijk.nl/duurzame-warmte-in-de-vruchtenbuurt/vraag-en-antwoord>

decide on the rules and on the course the cooperative is to take¹⁶⁰. The members' commitment, involvement and enthusiasm is key to run this cooperative¹⁶¹.

To realize the local sustainable transition, WidW needs partners. That is why it partnered with the municipality Den Haag, the province Zuid-Holland, Dunea, HAL, Eneco¹⁶² and Stedin¹⁶³¹⁶⁴. Additionally, the bottom-up initiative is listed on the HIER Opgewekt website,¹⁶⁵ which is a knowledge platform for and about local energy cooperatives, connecting cooperatives together and increasing their visibility. They seem to be involved with Rijkswaterstaat in some ways. What Rijkswaterstaat did to get at least some idea about the citizen-induced IG networks, is that she organized the HIER Opgewekt event for local public authorities in 2013¹⁶⁶. During this event, everyone involved in the trend of local energy generation gathered together¹⁶⁷. A special attention was paid to the new and changing role of local governments (metagovernors) in the citizen-induced IG networks¹⁶⁸.

Returning to the question of what influence this SDC may have on GE, it is expected that the influence would be positive. This is because the Dutch government has direct contact with, and hence perhaps some influence over, the energy cooperative, although this remains to be seen from the interviews. In short, there could be a mention of metagovernance over the initiative. However, the prediction made in Figure 1 about no clear rules and roles within the initiatives is disproved, since there seem to be clear rules and roles, if one explores WidW's website.

4.2.1 Czech case nr. 1: PPP: D4: Příbram - Písek

¹⁶⁰ Warm in de Wijk, De coöperatie in het kort, <https://www.warmindewijk.nl/de-coöperatie/de-coöperatie-in-het-kort>

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Green energy suppliers

¹⁶³ Manager of the heat network

¹⁶⁴ Warm in de Wijk, Samenwerkingspartners, <https://www.warmindewijk.nl/over-ons/samenwerkingspartners>

¹⁶⁵ See <https://www.hieropgewekt.nl/>

¹⁶⁶ Klimaatverbond, Lokale energieopwekking centraal tijdens Evenement HIER opgewekt, 2013, <https://www.klimaatverbond.nl/nieuws/lokale-energieopwekking-centraal-tijdens-evenement-hier-opgewekt>

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

In 2016, the Czech Ministry of Transportation officially approved of and started to use the PPP model for highway constructions¹⁶⁹. This is the first project to be financed on the principle of cooperation between the government and the private sector¹⁷⁰. The goal is to complete a 32km-long highway section between Příbram and Písek¹⁷¹. While this section is to be completed based on the DBFMO (Design, Build, Finance, Maintain and Operate) contract, a 20km-long section¹⁷² should be completed under the M&O (Maintain and Operate) contract¹⁷³. Some reasons why the Ministry decided to use the PPP model, include that the construction speed is faster and that the private party is trusted to both deliver and maintain a road of high quality¹⁷⁴. This is exactly why PPP is such a favored way of collaborating.

¹⁶⁹ Ministerstvo dopravy, Vláda odstartovala využití PPP projektů v dopravní výstavbě na úseku D4 mezi Příbramí a Pískem, 2016, <https://www.mdcr.cz/Media/Media-a-tiskove-zpravy/Vlada-odstartovala-vyuziti-PPP-projektu-v-dopravni>

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Skalka – Háje and Mirovice – Krašovice

¹⁷³ See <https://www.pppd4.cz/cs>

¹⁷⁴ Ministerstvo dopravy, Vláda odstartovala využití PPP projektů v dopravní výstavbě na úseku D4 mezi Příbramí a Pískem, 2016, <https://www.mdcr.cz/Media/Media-a-tiskove-zpravy/Vlada-odstartovala-vyuziti-PPP-projektu-v-dopravni>



The D4 highway, Source: <https://www.zpravypribram.cz/ministerstvo-ceka-nabidky-na-dostavbu-dalnice-d4/>

In 2017, the Ministry selected three advisers¹⁷⁵¹⁷⁶ for the construction. They assist in selecting the best private companies which would complete the task. Later that year, a 5km-long section on the D4 was opened for traffic use¹⁷⁷. One of the project's successes concerning sustainability is the formation of a bypass, where drivers no longer need to drive through one of the villages in the area. Hence, the villagers may welcome the reduced traffic noise and additionally, this bypass is also to have positive effects on the environment¹⁷⁸.

¹⁷⁵ White & Case, Česká spořitelna and Obermeyer Helika

¹⁷⁶ Ministerstvo dopravy, Ministerstvo dopravy vybralo poradce pro výstavbu D4 formou PPP projektu, stát ušetří 53 milionů, 2017a, <https://www.mdcr.cz/Media/Media-a-tiskove-zpravy/Ministerstvo-dopravy-vybralo-poradce-pro-vystavbu>

¹⁷⁷ Ministerstvo dopravy, Řidiči mohou nově využít zprovozněný úsek D4 Skalka – křižovatka II/118, 2017b, <https://www.mdcr.cz/Media/Media-a-tiskove-zpravy/Ridici-mohou-jezdit-po-novem-useku-dalnice-D4-mezi>

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

In 2018, the tendering process started and as a result, four private consortia are now in a competitive dialogue for the completion and operation of the highway. The winning consortium is expected to start constructing the highway in 2020¹⁷⁹.

Considering what influence this PPP may have on GE, thus far it is difficult to tell. This is because there are no Czech PPP cases to compare this with. However, what is clear is that the winning consortium is to get a DBFMO and an M&O contract to complete the D4 highway. These contracts are a means through which the Ministry can hold the private sector accountable; a measure of control and thus an indicator of GE. However, full GE can only be secured if trust is present. Considering that the Czech government has some unfortunate experience with PPPs¹⁸⁰ and that both the political and the institutional environment is unstable¹⁸¹, it is expected that the trust levels are to be relatively low, which could harm the cooperation and make the project a difficult one to govern.

4.2.2 Czech case nr. 2: Co-production: Czech Republic: The Country for the Future

In 2019, the Czech Republic introduced a new innovation strategy for 2019-2030¹⁸²¹⁸³. The strategy's key authors are the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister. Together with

¹⁷⁹ Ministerstvo dopravy, Do soutěžního dialogu na dostavbu a provoz dálnice D4 postupují čtyři firmy, 2018, <https://www.mdcr.cz/Media/Media-a-tiskove-zpravy/Do-soutezniho-dialogu-na-dostavbu-a-provoz-dalnice>

¹⁸⁰ One of the first PPP projects in the Czech Republic was meant to be the construction of the D47 motorway to Ostrava. In 2002, the government of the then Prime Minister Miloš Zeman issued an Israeli company Housing & Construction a contract for the construction without a tender taking place. The construction, even with a 30-year guarantee for the maintenance of the road, was to cost around 125 billion CZK. Less than a year later, the new government decided to terminate the contract after having doubts about cost overrun and it was to build the highway from its own resources. Police was involved in the investigation on corruption, but since no one was able to prove corruption, the case was postponed. See <https://ct24.ceskatelevize.cz/ekonomika/2387953-zkratka-ppp-v-cesku-nevesti-nic-dobreho-dostavba-dalnice-d4-za-soukrome-penize-ma>

¹⁸¹ Švec, Zkratka PPP v Česku nemá dobrou pověst. Dostavba dálnice D4 za soukromé peníze to má změnit, 2018, <https://ct24.ceskatelevize.cz/ekonomika/2387953-zkratka-ppp-v-cesku-nevesti-nic-dobreho-dostavba-dalnice-d4-za-soukrome-penize-ma>

¹⁸² See <https://www.countryforfuture.com/>

¹⁸³ Rada pro výzkum, vývoj a inovace et al., Inovační strategie České republiky 2019–2030, 2019, https://www.vlada.cz/assets/urad-vlady/poskytovani-informaci/poskytnute-informace-na-zadost/Priloha_1_Inovacni-strategie.pdf

partners from the private,¹⁸⁴ public¹⁸⁵ and the societal sector,¹⁸⁶ the vision of this CP is to place the Czech Republic among the world's 20 most advanced economies by 2030¹⁸⁷. To fulfill this vision, the two key authors assembled the partners, and the work in progress in science, research and innovation was identified¹⁸⁸. Then, to fill any innovation-related gaps, new innovation plans and activities were developed¹⁸⁹. These were divided into nine strategic pillars¹⁹⁰, which are interrelated and decisive in achieving the ambition of becoming one of Europe's top innovation leaders¹⁹¹. Consequently, a strategic plan was drawn up.

In terms of sustainability, this CP is particularly a strong case. Its main aim could be summarized in three themes: to create, develop and internationalize innovative companies (startups); build an innovative infrastructure with an emphasis on digital services and artificial intelligence; and implement innovations into practice¹⁹². As a result, future generations would benefit from the highly innovative environment.

Finally, predicting how this CP may influence GE, the outlooks are positive. The fact that all the main players in the innovation ecosystem managed to agree on the strategic plan¹⁹³ means that the members can trust each other to work well together. Trust is one of the main determinants to achieve GE. Second, since this CP is government-induced and hence clear rules and roles are present, the network has IL and OL, which is also key for GE. However, it is too soon to make conclusions about GE, since this CP was only initiated in 2019.

¹⁸⁴ e.g. Association of Small and medium-sized enterprises and sole traders

¹⁸⁵ e.g. Ministry of Transportation and the Ministry of the Environment

¹⁸⁶ e.g. scientists and academicians

¹⁸⁷ Czech Republic: The Country for the Future, Naše strategie, 2020, <https://www.countryforfuture.com/strategie/>

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ R&D: Funding and evaluation of Research and Development; Technology: Polytechnic education; Startups: National startup and scale-up environment; Digitalization: Digital government, production and services; Excellence: Innovation and research centers; Investment: Smart investments; Patents: Intellectual property protection; Smart Infrastructure: Mobility and construction environment; Smart People: Smart marketing. See https://www.vlada.cz/assets/urad-vlady/poskytovani-informaci/poskytnute-informace-na-zadost/Priloha_1_Inovacni-strategie.pdf

¹⁹¹ Czech Republic: The Country for the Future, Naše strategie, 2020, <https://www.countryforfuture.com/strategie/>

¹⁹² Ministerstvo průmyslu a obchodu, Nový program na podporu inovací The Country for the Future, 2019, <https://www.mpo.cz/cz/podnikani/podpora-vyzkumu-a-vyvoje/novy-program-na-podporu-inovaci-the-country-for-the-future--246526/>

¹⁹³ Vláda České republiky, Budoucnost České republiky je v inovacích: The Country for The Future, 2019, <https://www.vlada.cz/cz/media-centrum/aktualne/budoucnost-ceske-republiky-je-v-inovacich-the-country-for-the-future-171867/>

4.2.3 Czech case nr. 3: Society-driven cooperation: Self-sufficient village Kněžice

In 2006, an inconspicuous village Kněžice in Central Bohemia became a phenomenon of the Czech energy community¹⁹⁴. Because the inhabitants wanted to return to their self-sufficient past, keep the cashflow within the region, and improve both the environment and the living standards¹⁹⁵, they set up a biogas plant with three reservoirs and two biomass boilers, thereby providing most of the heat for the village¹⁹⁶. KEC gets their heat from agricultural-, food waste, and waste from other materials¹⁹⁷. In short, KEC, the most well-known energy cooperative in the Czech Republic, managed to come up with a way to produce energy sustainably, which many, including the Ministry of Industry and Trade, have recognized and supported.

¹⁹⁴ Votruba, Fenomén: soběstačná obec Kněžice, 2019, <https://archiv.ihned.cz/c1-66688250-fenomen-sobestacna-obec-knezice>

¹⁹⁵ Kazda, Energeticky soběstačná obec Kněžice, 2017, <https://slideslive.com/38904977/energeticky-sobestacna-obec-knezice>

¹⁹⁶ Votruba, Fenomén: soběstačná obec Kněžice, 2019, <https://archiv.ihned.cz/c1-66688250-fenomen-sobestacna-obec-knezice>

¹⁹⁷ Zachová, Lidé chtějí odebírat energii ze zdrojů, ke kterým mají blízko, shodují se odborníci, 2019, <https://euractiv.cz/section/energetika/news/lide-chteji-odebirat-energii-ze-zdroju-ke-kterym-maji-blizko-shoduji-se-odbornici/>



The biogas plant, reservoirs and biomass boilers, Source: <https://www.asb-portal.cz/stavebnictvi/technicka-zarizeni-budov/energie/knezice-energeticky-sobestacna-obec>

In terms of what influence this SDC may have on GE, the answer to this is less obvious. On the one hand, rules, roles, detailed history and a description of the citizen-induced IG network are clearly stated on its website¹⁹⁸. However, there is barely any evidence of the Czech government willing or indeed taking the metagovernor's role. It seems that because of being afraid of the HD's consequences, the government refuses to involve itself more than by merely supplying finances from time to time.

In sum, looking back at the six case studies, it seems that the relation between the three cooperation models and GE is more complex than was anticipated. This is understandable, since both countries have different political, legislative and institutional backgrounds and every case study is unique; some criteria affecting GE positively in one case may not have the same consequences in other cases. The next section will reveal which of the cooperation models is perceived to work best regarding GE in each country.

¹⁹⁸ Obec Kněžice, Energetika Kněžice, <http://www.obec-knezice.cz/index.asp?nav=soubory&m1=6&m2=0&m3=0&id=0>

5. Findings

In this chapter, the results from the interviews will be presented. First, starting with the most important findings; the perceived GE level per cooperation model will be defined, concluding with an answer to the question: ‘which of the three cooperation models is the most effective one concerning steering?’ Next, the answers to this question will be verified by portraying which of the models is the most governable one in practice; were the anticipated results of the projects delivered? Essentially, these findings are key to answering the research question¹⁹⁹; hence presented first.

Then, other factors which may also influence GE will be presented. This is also an important finding, because it shows that there clearly are more factors than the academic literature has mentioned. Further, the CP- and SDC respondents were asked about the presence of legitimacy and DD within the projects. Because these topics²⁰⁰ are not relevant to all three models, this is why the finding was placed close to the end of the chapter. Last, the interviewees were questioned about the future role of the government: should the government become a metagovernor or leave the bottom-up initiatives to fulfill their goals self-sufficiently? Although the answers are interesting, it only concerns SDC; hence placed to the end.

5.1 Governing effectiveness per cooperation model, defined

5.1.1.1 Level of governmental control in Society-driven cooperation

The first question to measure perceived GE was whether the government was able to impose control over the private partner/citizens in the cooperation. In SDC, 5/8 (2 original²⁰¹,

¹⁹⁹ What is the influence of cooperation models (PPPs, Co-production and Society-driven cooperation) on the perceived successful effectiveness of steering in the Netherlands and the Czech Republic, in the context of a sustainable transition?

²⁰⁰ Legitimacy and the democratic dilemma

²⁰¹ ‘Originality’ here means that the respondent has only provided a single response and no multiple responses.

Czech) having experience with this model, responded that the government tends to be in control. Nr. 14 illustrates that sometimes, the government's control could be rather upsetting:

'The Ministry controls the parameters we have, especially since the stiffening of the regulations on the maximum release of emissions, so that's an example of the negative cooperation we sometimes experience.'

Nonetheless, 4 (2 original, Czech) responded that the cooperatives are self-sufficient and hence the government does not have control over them. Finally, all 3 Dutch interviewees said that the cooperation was not about control, but about collective decision-making, though 2/3 have also claimed that control over the cooperatives tends to exist. Nr. 8 shows that the government's control and being able to decide collectively both matter (see Appendix).

In this respect, GE over SDC tends to vary in the Czech context, while in the Dutch, this model tends to be governable. Whereas the Dutch interviewees tended to talk about experiencing control, or, as the cooperative member said; needing the government in some ways to survive, the Czechs were more nuanced. One half said that control was experienced, while the other half claimed that the initiatives are autonomous and hence uncontrollable. A possible explanation for this difference is that the extent of control experienced depends on the role and the ministry the interviewee represented (see Table 3 in Appendix). While it was said that the Ministry of the Environment had control over the cooperatives, the opposite was the case for the Ministry of Industry and Trade. Also, while some interviewees were involved in the project only once through voting for it in a competition or through visiting the site out of interest, others experienced control over it, because hands-on metagovernance through financing was employed. Hence, whether control was experienced depended on the civil servant's role and their institution.

5.1.1.2 Level of governmental control in Co-production

In the case of CP, 3/5 (2 original, Dutch) having experience with this model said that the cooperation was not about control, but about collective decision-making. Nr. 7 sums up the dominant standpoint:

'No, control is not the right word. Everyone's input is respectfully listened to. We're all equals within the collaboration, the hierarchy should not be in place.'

However, 3 (2 original, Czech) said that the government's control was definitely evident. This means that in the Czech case, CP is easier governable than in the Dutch, in this respect. Nonetheless, all Dutch CP respondents agreed that to make projects successful, governmental hierarchy/control should not be in place. Everybody's voice should count equally; the collaboration's structure should be horizontal. It is only then that GE could be achieved. This contrasts with what the Czechs said; according to them, there is a given hierarchical structure in the government which is followed and for a successful project, a leader is needed to rule over the cooperation.

An instinctive explanation for such results is a difference in history and culture. While the Netherlands has a democratic past, the Czech Republic has a communist past. It has not been until 1989, the year of the fall of the Berlin Wall²⁰² and the Velvet Revolution,²⁰³ that Czechoslovakia formed a coalition government and not until 1990 that the first free elections took place. This shows just how young the Czech democracy is and although the Czech interviewees might have been the first ones educated in a democratic system, their parents and teachers grew up in a communist country, meaning that the communist-induced way of thinking endured. Furthermore, the CP initiators both grew up in the communist Czechoslovakia, meaning that the ideal of hierarchy is now reflected in their governing manner. All in all, with regards to CP, whether or not the respondents experienced control depends on the historical and cultural backgrounds they possess.

5.1.1.3 Level of governmental control in PPPs

Concerning PPPs, 3/5 (2 original, Czech and Dutch) having experience with this model answered that control over the private consortium was experienced, and 3 said that it was about

²⁰² Representing the end of Soviet communism in November, 1989.

²⁰³ The **Velvet Revolution** was a non-violent transition of power in Czechoslovakia, occurring from 17 November - 29 December 1989. Popular anti-communist demonstrations against the one-party rule of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia were done by students and older dissidents. The result was the end of 41 years of one-party rule in the country, the dismantling of the command economy and conversion to a parliamentary republic. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Velvet_Revolution or <https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/czechoslovakias-velvet-revolution-1989/>

collective decision-making, though the government had the final say, as one could see in nr. 17's quotation:

'Yeah, I had a feeling like I was in control. You prepare the project together with the contractor, but ultimately, [the government] has to make the final decision; [the government] must retain the governor's role. This is because it has a social (and contractual) responsibility and the private party only has contractual responsibility.'

On the whole, as expected from Chapters 2 and 3, PPP seems to be governable in this respect. This is because, as mentioned in the quote above, the government has a social and contractual responsibility, it has a public image to build; it simply cannot afford the project's failure, because the road users would not be able to get to work, keep the economy going, etc. Because of these severe consequences resulting if the project does not get done on time; the government has to stay in control, it has to have the final say. That explains why all PPP respondents experienced control over the private consortia.

5.1.2.1 Rules and roles in Society-driven cooperation

Second, the next question measuring GE, was whether there were clear rules and roles in the cooperation. Within SDC, 2 Dutch respondents replied that no contracts were needed. However, 2 Czechs said that rules and roles existed, but that they were superfluous. One of them, nr. 3, was definitely a bit sarcastic and critical about the overregulation in the Czech Republic:

'Yes, rules certainly exist; concerning projects co-financed by the EU; the main framework is from Brussels, but here we have to tighten the rules up and complicate them so much that the cooperatives would want to avoid getting involved because of all the complexity.'

Then 3 said that rules and roles existed, 1 Czech (nr. 14) said that since contracts were in place, rules and roles were defined and together with 2 others, he agreed that rules and roles were absolutely necessary (see Appendix). However, 1 of them (Dutch, nr. 8) admitted that while there were clear roles, there were not many fixed, official rules:

'Because the participation in the cooperative is voluntary, we don't have fixed agreements as to how much time you have to invest. People do it in their own time; it takes me at least half a day each week if I do the job a bit seriously...'

Altogether, it seems that rules and roles within SDC tend to be more present in the Czech case, while less so in the Dutch, making the cooperation type easier governable in the Czech Republic. Why that is, could be because of differences in the cooperatives' formality/maturity²⁰⁴. KEC's initiator said that they have to have a formal status and contracts with the neighbors, so that they could supply them with heat and electricity, because this is how the Czech legislation is set up. Although the member of WidW agreed by saying that the cooperative also has an official status because of its activities, he added that they keep discovering which rules could be implemented. This is because the cooperative is full of volunteers and so no fixed agreements are made. In short, KEC is a highly mature energy cooperative, established in 2006, while WidW is relatively less mature, since it has only been running since 2015. WidW's less developed rules could explain why it could be a bit more challenging to govern such 'young' projects effectively.

5.1.2.2 Rules and roles in Co-production

In CP, 3 (majority Czech) responded that rules and roles existed. In contrast, 2 Dutch interviewees stated that no contracts were needed and that while roles existed, there were not many fixed, official rules. Nr. 6 calls this type of cooperation a "pre-contractual cooperation":

'[The Co-production] is completely free; of course you have the parties who participate in the project, but there are no fixed rules. I would call what we have a pre-contractual cooperation with 3 types of parties: the government, knowledge institutions and market parties.'

Once again, in the CP's case, it seems that rules and roles tend to be more present in the Czech context, while they tend to be quite nonexistent in the Dutch, meaning that CP tends to be easier to govern in the Czech case. A reason for this could be a difference in transparency and

²⁰⁴ Although some readers may claim that these two cooperatives are incomparable as a result of the difference in formality/maturity, the scope (supplying about 300 inhabitants with locally produced energy) and aims/objectives (to be one of the front-runners in terms of supplying green energy locally) are the same in both cases, hence they are comparable.

people's character. While in the CftF's case, the need to be transparent about governmental plans is high; the DCC does not want to present itself openly before reaching clear milestones. Hence, the way CftF is organized is much more structured; the rules and roles are easily found online, while the DCC is characterized as voluntary and, to an extent, informal (without many fixed rules). The idea is that the DCC will retain this 'free' status until it grows and starts achieving its vision. However, until then, without clear rules and roles, it could be difficult to govern it effectively.

5.1.2.3 Rules and roles in PPPs

Last, in the case of PPPs, all 5 interviewees claimed that rules and roles existed, because contracts were in place (together with large amounts of public money)²⁰⁵. This is exactly what was predicted in the Theoretical framework. Hence, in this regard, both PPP cases tend to be governable.

5.1.3 Perceived trust in all three cooperation models

The third question measuring GE, was whether the interviewees perceived that there was trust between the government and the private sector/citizens. The results are interesting, because both in SDC and in CP, everybody answered that trust was present and that it was vital for the cooperation to succeed. However, there was 1 Dutch SDC interviewee and 1 Czech CP respondent, who were rather wary about how trust is to develop in the future. Because of the current developments, they said that although some trust basis is present, the situation may change. Nr. 8 shows the case in point (see Appendix).

The same goes for PPP: there was 1 Czech (nr. 12) who said that although trust is present right now, it may not be so in the future, depending on how the project develops:

²⁰⁵ Because the amount of public investments in PPPs is (considerably) higher than in the other two cooperation models, there is a higher need for control, structure (rules and roles) and trust needed, which could also explain why all five interviewees stated that clear rules and roles existed.

'If the politics don't let this project happen, then the trust of the private sector in the government will surely significantly fall. The participants invested a considerable amount of money into the project's realization and hence expect it to be successfully accomplished.'

Then there was 1 Dutch PPP interviewee, who claimed that he is not sure whether there was trust, since he was not a part of the whole project. He added that the controlling aspects are still highly relevant within PPPs, but that trust and the soft skills of management are gaining in importance:

'Collaboration is not just about a contract; collaboration is about whether you can do it together; during some projects, collaboration proved to be very strenuous, also because of the relationships that made it difficult.'

Hence, probably because it sometimes is almost impossible to build trust with a consortium with whom collaboration is difficult, nr. 15 said that trust is not, and should not, always be a determinant of GE:

'In some other projects, trust wasn't all that important because of things that didn't go so well at first.'

That is unexpected, because according to Figure 1, trust should be very important when determining PPP's GE. However, on the whole, since everyone except for one person agreed that trust was present and that it was vital, one could conclude that GE in all three cooperation models and in both contexts was achieved in this respect.

5.2 The most effective cooperation model in terms of steering?

When the interviewees had to decide about which of the models is, according to them, the most effective one concerning steering, 9/18 responded that there is no one best cooperation form and that one's choice for a model depends on the project to be realized (see Figure 2 for a full response overview). Quoting nr. 10:

'All models have a given meaning, it isn't about preferring just one of them...'

This point is also illustrated by the results above; every model enjoys a distinct GE level, because it has a different meaning in different contexts²⁰⁶. For instance, running an energy cooperative would require a different model than when building a recycled bridge. Moreover, a choice for a model depends not only on the types of actors the government would want to include; whether the project has defined principles and goals or whether it needs to be more flexibly organized, are also factors to be considered. The respondents claimed that PPPs are appropriate when the project has defined principles and goals and that they are not sufficient in reaching the sustainable transition, which, by definition, has fluid principles and goals. See Appendix for nr. 12's quote.

The other type of response heard was that the benefits of all three models should be seized, though attention to SDC should be given. Quoting nr. 13:

'I don't think that this question should be approached in terms of which of the models is the best. I think the initiative should ideally arise from the community base, presuming that this community is well educated and aware of its goals and ways to achieve them.'

Another response coded the same way, added that although the sustainable transition could be achieved if the citizens are driven enough to come up with their own initiative, market players (from PPPs) and the government steering top-down (CP's idea) are also very much needed. Only when elements from all three models are combined (though the idea for a pioneering project has to arise from the bottom; the citizens) will the sustainable transition, combined with GE, be reached. In other words, why only have one model, when the government could capitalize on the benefits of all three?²⁰⁷

²⁰⁶ Although PPPs seem to enjoy high perceived governing effectiveness in both cases.

²⁰⁷ To read more about which of the models is the most appropriate/effective one in specific cases, see section 6.4 about the Practical consequences of this research.

Which of the three cooperation models is the most effective one in terms of governing?




Figure 2: 'Which of the cooperation models is the most effective one in terms of governing?'

5.3 Cooperation results achieved?

Another question posed was whether the respondents think that the results of the cooperation²⁰⁸ were successfully achieved. This is to see whether the interviewees perceived the projects to be successful; delivering concrete, expected results, which could help decide which of the models is the most governable one in practice, not only in theory (as described above). Quite unexpectedly, almost everyone claimed that the anticipated results were achieved²⁰⁹. Although, 2 of them (Dutch SDC interviewees), have nuanced this by saying 'I don't think that all results were achieved' and 'some results are yet to be seen,' respectively. To illustrate, see Appendix for nr. 8's quote.

²⁰⁸ By 'results,' the author means 'deliverables,' 'desired products/services' or 'expected output.' Examples of expected results could be a completed highway, a finished project or a cooperative delivering energy to its members.

²⁰⁹ This is convincing evidence, since one could easily tell whether the results were truly achieved by investigating the current status of the given cooperation project.

7/10 who said that the results were achieved were Dutch; 3 worked on the PPP, such as nr. 1:

'Yes, I think the result was certainly achieved; the most important result was of course to create the extra capacity for the road user; we realized this earlier and within the budget. The reason why the private party delivered the project on time, is because their goals overlap with ours.'

That all Dutch PPP respondents agreed on the results achieved is no surprise, since, as described in the case study, the A6 highway was widened one year earlier than planned. That this was done within the allocated budget is another reason why the interviewees rightly believe that the anticipated results were achieved. Other than them, there was also 1 CP- and 3 SDC respondents²¹⁰ claiming that the results were accomplished. The rest (3) were Czech working/having worked on SDC. Nr. 14 reflected on why the results were achieved, with pride:

'Certainly, the results were achieved, because at the beginning, we declared that we would save 9000 tons of CO2 emissions per year and according to the audit calculations, we saved 11,000 tons of CO2 emissions per year, so we exceeded the original parameters set.'

That KEC turned out to be a success is not surprising, because, as mentioned in the case study, they are the most well-known energy cooperative in the Czech Republic and they are setting an example to other municipalities. Moreover, 1 Czech PPP respondent (nr. 18) said that the project's results are yet to be seen:

'We'll see if we'll get the offers from the private parties and what they will be like... Our goal is that the candidates submit all three offers to us, because then we'd be in a better position in the Chamber of Deputies²¹¹. And if the offers are reasonably priced, then approval from the Chamber will be easier to get. But right now, I can't predict how the situation²¹² will influence the financial markets; it's still very turbulent.'

²¹⁰ Though 2/3 had nuanced responses

²¹¹ In the Czech Republic, the PPP projects have to be approved by the Chamber of Deputies before realization could take place; this is given by the law.

²¹² "The situation" refers to the Coronavirus pandemic.

Because the D4 highway project is still ongoing and because it is still in its preliminary phase (they are currently²¹³ waiting for the private consortia's offers), it is too soon to decide whether this project will be successful, because the contract has to be put up and the highway still has to be built. The ongoing Coronavirus pandemic does not help in realizing this project on time and within the budget, though. If its influence on the financial markets is extreme, it could perhaps show that even a governable model like PPP could struggle to reach its results. Finally, the 4 remaining respondents (3 CP, majority Dutch and 1 Czech PPP) were rather positive by claiming that although the results are yet to be seen, the future is bright.

In sum, because not all interviewees answered this question, it is difficult to come up with a clear conclusion as to which of the models is the most governable one²¹⁴. However, considering the Dutch cases, PPP seems to deliver expected results the most, CP may have a bright future, and mixed results are seen in SDC's case. Contrastingly, when compared to the Czech cases, SDC seems to be the only model which has, up until now, delivered expected results. There are a couple of explanations for this. First, KEC is a project which has been effective for the longest,²¹⁵ hence that it delivered results was to be expected. Second, the Czech legislative system's rules imposed on the cooperative could also explain why KEC delivered expected results: perhaps it was forced to do so by the system.

5.4 Other factors potentially having an influence on governing effectiveness

During the interviews, respondents were also asked about any other factors which could influence GE. 21 new factors were assembled. Up to 8 of these have indirectly something to do with trust²¹⁶, 11 have to do with rules and roles²¹⁷ and 11 were associated with the government's control over the private sector/citizens²¹⁸. All in all, the majority of these factors have to do with

²¹³ Written on 29th May 2020

²¹⁴ This is one of the aims of the thesis, see Chapter 1, page 9-10.

²¹⁵ Initiated in 2006, while the D4 PPP project was initiated in 2016 and Country for the Future (Co-production) in 2019.

²¹⁶ E.g. the time and intensity of cooperation; transparency

²¹⁷ E.g. leadership, character and the ability to convince; consistency/management in the partnership

²¹⁸ E.g. passion and personal involvement; political support

personal characteristics; it is the civil servant and their actions influencing GE. See Figure 3 below (and Figure 4 in Appendix²¹⁹) for an overview of the types of answers given.

Which other factors could influence governing effectiveness?




Figure 3: ‘Which other factors could influence governing effectiveness?’

For example, some interviewees said that what definitely has an impact on GE are unforeseen circumstances, or external shocks, such as the Covid-19 pandemic. Such a crisis may naturally cause the given project to lose its dynamism, and hence may severely harm the ability to govern it effectively. Next, since the most popular response was that it is whether the partners have the same vision and willingness to cooperate, determining GE, this means the following. To govern successfully, a clear goal, a clear plan for the project is needed; something that all partners in the collaboration could agree on. Further, participants need to be motivated/willing to work on the project. Only when harmony is created, could the government take control over the project²²⁰ and only then could trust be fostered. To quote nr. 7:

²¹⁹ For information on the “Other” factor category influencing governing effectiveness

²²⁰ **Although this may sound like a hierarchical way of working is implied, it is not intentional. As was discussed before; to achieve perceived governing effectiveness, the government needs to be in control, it needs to maintain its authority (some readers may read “it needs to maintain a hierarchy.”) That is why the government taking control over the project is so important to achieve governing effectiveness.**

'When it comes to collaboration, that aspect of trust is important. Collaboration starts with a piece of content and ambition... you can only work together if you all have that shared ambition.'

Or, as nr. 10 said:

'There is a huge opportunity for innovation; if the Czech Republic determines... that X²²¹ activity is promising for it in the future, then we must all... try to fulfill this strategy. It is all connected to people's pride that we can do something and we need to build on that...'

Another aspect relating to GE is that of different values, needs and sectors the participants represent. For instance, different institutional and legislative setups have other demands (e.g. in the Czech PPP case; the fact that the Czech Republic is outside of the Eurozone and does not have English as a key legislative language, proved to be an obstacle). In consequence, these differences could harm GE by increasing the project's complexity, which could harm GE further. Nevertheless, if the partners come up with mutual agreements to (e.g.) tolerate each other's different values, then GE could be influenced positively. It depends on how these differences are dealt with that determines GE; some see differences as a threat, while others see them as opportunities.

5.5 Legitimacy and the democratic dilemma

During some of the CP and SDC interviews, additional questions about the presence of (input and output) legitimacy and the DD in the projects were posed. Since not all 13 respondents were interviewed about these topics²²², the results which follow are inconclusive and should be treated cautiously (see Figure 5 in Appendix). However, keeping this in mind, when it comes to legitimacy and its perceived presence in both models, surprisingly, IL (ex ante authorization) turned out to be present in both the Czech and the Dutch case. In terms of the other IL type

²²¹ This information is anonymized.

²²² The reason for this is that not all interviews offered the author the chance to pose these questions, because each interview took a slightly different direction. Also, the interviewees had differing levels of expertise to talk about these themes, which is why not everybody was asked about legitimacy and the democratic dilemma.

(representation), this tended to be less perceived in both contexts. Regarding OL (ex post accountability), almost all Dutch interviewees agreed that it was present. Quoting nr. 7:

'That Problem of many hands / Accountability problem might have been there, but due to the focus we have put in with the Coalition table, there is much to oversee.'

This is, at first glance, very unexpected and surprising, since according to Figure 1, CP should be characterized by a lack of both IL and OL, which seems not to be the case here.

However, compared with the perceived presence of legitimacy in SDC²²³, one immediately could see the difference; particularly in the Dutch context. On all fronts, the Dutch perceived legitimacy presence fell (see Figure 5 in Appendix). Although the majority still believed that IL (ex ante authorization) was present, all 3 agreed that mis- or underrepresentation occurred and only 1 believed that OL was present. When it comes to the Czech case, the results are quite striking. 3/5 mentioned legitimacy in their interview, of which the majority felt that clear IL (ex ante authorization) and OL were present. To quote nr. 16:

'I told the Ministry... that these community projects definitely make sense and that we will support them... we set the rules (regulatory framework) and enact what these projects should look like.'

Clearly, setting the regulatory framework for the cooperatives is a form of IL (ex ante authorization), where a mandate is ascribed and a license to rule is given to the IG network. Next, once again, all agreed that cooperatives are characterized by professional citizens, which is the only commonality with their Dutch counterparts. What these results then show is that although CP seems to portray more reasons for perceived GE in both contexts, SDC seems to be more governable in the Czech context.

When discussing the presence of the DD within the projects, the main finding is that the more players are involved, the greater the chance for the dilemma. However, people's values, which may not be in line with the government's values, matter too; if they are undemocratic, the urgency of the dilemma increases. In addition, when it comes to the sustainable transition, there

²²³ Such a comparison was not done in the Theoretical-, nor the Operationalization framework.

are so many aspects to be considered that the DD could also prove to be an obstacle to GE. Or, as nr. 4 put it:

'The democratic dilemma within [the Co-production] is very limited; I think the dilemma increases if you deal with a more complex project; this isn't a huge project in terms of the number of actors... if we look at the topic of sustainability, many aspects are to be seen... it's almost impossible to include them all in the project, meaning that a democratic dilemma can arise... perhaps it's true that the democratic dilemma is more likely within PPPs, because you have private parties which obviously have other interests...'

Nr. 9 agrees by saying:

'I think it will become more difficult to govern if there are many citizens who want to participate and want to do things that the government doesn't do.'

In sum, it seems that at least in the Dutch context,²²⁴ the DD seems to be the greatest in PPPs and in SDC. It seems to be the smallest in CP, because the (democratic) government governs top-down, meaning that there is no space for undemocratic values. However, this result is not backed up enough, so one should be careful with reaching premature conclusions.

5.6 The government as a metagovernor: yes or no?

The last questions concerned metagovernance in SDC and the government's future role²²⁵. The results turned out to be very diverse and interesting; see Figure 6 for an overview. Under the 'Other' category, four different answers were identified (see Appendix).

As one could see from Figure 6 below, the majority claimed that the government should govern top-down, metagovern over the SDC and be supportive by financial means. However, interestingly, there were also some public officials who stated otherwise; that the government is

²²⁴ No Czech interviewees were asked about this.

²²⁵ Should the government be a metagovernor? Or could the sustainable transition be realized without the government?

unwilling/unable to metagovern (because of ill-suited roles), or that it should withdraw its control over the citizens and let them self-organize. The majority stating this was Czech. For instance, nr. 2 claimed that because KEC is very local and small-scale, this is why the government is not willing to metagovern it:

'Kněžice seemed a bit amateurish to me. Of course it's a nice project to have on the local level, but considering our international goals, it's small-scale and so not very relevant. There aren't that many self-sufficient communities, and so we don't have to know about them.'

Nr. 14 added that because the government is unable to metagovern, it should just leave the energy cooperative govern its matters autonomously:

'Ministry officials are people who were taught about laws, but they don't know anything about running an energy cooperative, so it doesn't make sense for them to get involved and they don't even want to get involved. Perhaps they would want to cooperate, but they certainly wouldn't want to learn about running a cooperative...'

Also, 2/3 Dutch SDC respondents agreed that the government should distance itself from the cooperatives. Knowing this, it makes one ask: to what extent is it acceptable/just that the government experiences GE in SDC? Clearly, the results portray the problem of the HD; while the public officials claim that they should take the metagovernor's role, at the same time, they also acknowledge that they should give the cooperatives some space to self-organize. There is no simple way out of this dilemma; it seems to be unavoidable and impeding GE, as expected from Figure 1.

Which role should the government fulfill?




Figure 6: 'Which role should the government fulfill?'²²⁶

5.6.1 Hands-off- vs. Hands-on metagovernance

Considering that the majority would prefer to see the government in the metagovernor's position (Figure 6), e.g. nr. 5:

'I really believe that the government should be the one steering the cooperation and taking the lead, because the sustainable transition is so vast...'

A further search was conducted to see what type of metagovernance was the most popular one. It turns out that there are three metagovernance types openly practiced: Hands-off through voting²²⁷, Hands-off through creating programs²²⁸, and Hands-on through financing²²⁹. Further,

²²⁶ A "mild metagovernor" is the government choosing to be rather indirectly involved in the Society-driven cooperation, e.g. through voting for the best energy cooperative in a competition.

²²⁷ Voting for the best energy cooperative in a competition

²²⁸ Programs for the cooperatives to sign up to

²²⁹ Financing the cooperatives directly

the results show that both Hands-off types are practiced more than Hands-on, because 5/7 SDC interviewees mentioned taking part in this metagovernance. When it comes to Hands-on metagovernance, surprisingly, only the two energy cooperatives (Dutch and Czech) interviewed talked about getting financial support, e.g. nr. 8:

'What we also need the government for is financial support: a major European subsidy was applied for to make energy in the neighborhoods more sustainable and we were one of the districts who applied for this subsidy through the province. As a district alone, we would never be able to apply for the subsidy.'

The civil servants within the SDC have not commented on this. Perhaps it is so that the energy cooperatives only really appreciate getting financial support from the government and perhaps this metagovernance type suffices, in their view?

In conclusion, while the perceived governability of SDC tends to vary in both cases, on the whole, CP tends to enjoy more GE in the Czech case and PPPs tend to reach GE in both cases explored. Next, regarding the most effective cooperation model in terms of steering; the popular answer was that every model is appropriate for a different situation. Then, considering which of the models actually 'works' in practice; in the Dutch context, PPP delivered the expected results, CP seems to have a bright future, and mixed results are seen in SDC. However, in the Czech context, SDC seems to be the only model which has, up until now, delivered expected results.

Moreover, the most popular factor which could impact GE further, turned out to be the presence of a vision and willingness to cooperate. Turning to the topic of perceived legitimacy; on the whole, CP seems to portray more legitimacy in both contexts than SDC, though this model seems to enjoy higher legitimacy in the Czech case. Last, concerning the government's future role, the majority agreed that the government should take the metagovernor's role. While the civil servants mainly talked about using Hands-off metagovernance, both energy cooperatives talked enthusiastically about the government's Hands-on metagovernance. The following chapter will analyze the implications of these results.

6. Analysis

In this chapter, the results obtained will be discussed in relation to the research question,²³⁰ regarding how they answer the expectations made and in terms of how they compare to the academic literature. The data will be interpreted, implications of which will be discussed in detail.

6.1 The research question answered

This research is about identifying the influence of the cooperation models on the perceived GE, i.e. how the civil servants perceive/experience each model's effectiveness with regards to governing. When asking which of the models is perceived to have the highest GE, 'it depends' was the most common answer heard²³¹. However, beyond that, PPP was said to be the most governable form in general, though 43% of those preferring it (see Figure 2) said that PPPs are not suitable for sustainability contexts, because of sustainability's dynamism, which is contrasting to PPPs' preference for a long-term, undisrupted cooperation. Then interestingly, SDC was the next preferred cooperation form, though 29% of those preferring it claimed that the benefits of all models should be seized as well.

In short, the findings show that while **PPPs seem to be the most governable no matter the case, Society-driven cooperation is the model preferred when it comes to governing effectively on the way to a sustainable transition**. When compared to the case studies²³², this is an unexpected finding, because only the Dutch PPP and SDC were expected to achieve GE; in the Czech context, this was much more uncertain. Despite this major finding, the situation seems to be different in practice, particularly when it comes to SDC.

²³⁰ What is the influence of cooperation models (PPPs, Co-production and Society-driven cooperation) on the perceived successful effectiveness of steering in the Netherlands and the Czech Republic, in the context of a sustainable transition?

²³¹ All Co-production respondents said so, together with 3/8 Society-driven cooperation interviewees and 1 Czech PPP respondent.

²³² See Chapter 4

On the one hand, PPPs display general governability in both cases, though up until now, PPPs only delivered expected results in the Dutch context (which is understandable; the first PPP project in the Czech Republic is currently being realized). This means that **PPPs have a general positive influence on perceived governing effectiveness in both contexts**²³³.

Next, CP can achieve more GE in the Czech case, though it seems to have a bright future also in the Netherlands²³⁴. This conforms to the general predictions made for both CP cases (see Empirical context), i.e. that both CPs are likely to have a positive influence on GE. In addition, despite expecting otherwise, CP seems to be characterized both by a (generally high) IL and OL and a small- to nonexistent DD. This is because it is a top-down cooperation where the democratic government sets the stage. Hence, also **Co-production seems to influence governing effectiveness generally positively**²³⁵.

Last, though SDC's governability varies in both contexts, in the Czech case, the model's perceived legitimacy and effectiveness seem to both be high (and low in the Dutch case). Also, many of the Czech respondents agreed that the government should take the metagovernor's role in SDC²³⁶, though the HD was acknowledged too,²³⁷ because many have added that the cooperatives should be given some autonomy to perceive their goals. This means that **Society-driven cooperation seems to affect governing effectiveness positively solely in the Czech context**²³⁸.

6.2 Were the expectations confirmed or disproved?

²³³ **Note: such conclusions are made based on the six sustainable cases studied in the Netherlands and the Czech Republic and based on the 18 interviews with Dutch and Czech respondents. Hence, the conclusions are not undisputable and no generalizations can be and should be made.**

²³⁴ As stated in section 5.3.

²³⁵ See footnote 233.

²³⁶ **Such a conclusion was established based on the respondents answering the questions: "Was there a need to metagovern the Society-driven cooperation? What role was expected of you, as a governmental actor?" by: "the government should take the role of a metagovernor," "it is the role of the government to define its priorities and goals in a top-down manner," or by describing their involvement in specific types of metagovernance.**

²³⁷ Just as was predicted in the Empirical context.

²³⁸ See footnote 233.

See section 3.2.1. Expectations for the predictions made. What follows are no recommendations, but comparisons between the expectations (E1-E3) made and the **perceived governing effectiveness** per model. Hence, it is the author's intention to elaborate on how respondents think about trust, among other factors, because this study is about the respondents' perceptions; not about GE as a static numerical indicator.

6.2.1 PPP: Trust should not be leading

Starting with E1, this expectation could be confirmed with an exception. As one of the PPP interviewees said; sometimes, relationship-building and hence trust-building between the government and the private consortium is not only difficult; it may be impossible. Hence, if this happens, GE should not decline just because trust is difficult to build; controlling mechanisms, e.g. binding contracts, should govern the partnership onwards.

Next, there are a few other factors which may influence perceived GE in PPPs. Some of these factors are: same vision and willingness to cooperate, good personal relations, political commitments of the public sector and political support, and differences in institutional and legislative setups (both Czech PPP interviewees claimed that this could be a serious problem). As a result, the expectation was adapted to the following:

PPP's influence governing effectiveness directly in a positive way through binding contracts, and if trust is present between the government and the private sector, the greater the positive impact on governing effectiveness will be. However, trust should not be a defining factor that governing effectiveness is built upon. Additionally, there are numerous other factors having an influence on PPPs' governing effectiveness. The nr. 1 factor seems to be the presence of a common vision and a willingness to cooperate.

6.2.1.1 Comparison with previous academic research on PPPs

Reviewing the academic literature on PPPs, it turns out that the majority of what was found resonates to what academia states. PPPs share some of NPM's features also in practice, e.g. the

enhancement of effective public governance,²³⁹ because the majority claimed that they enjoyed control over the private partner, meaning that effective governance was reached.

Additionally, as was mentioned, PPPs only work well if the political commitment is high²⁴⁰. Hence, 'political commitment' should have been one of the basis GE determinants.

What is also the case both in theory and practice, is that PPP contracts enable the government to retain control and oversight over all performances and outcomes^{241,242}. These points about PPPs and their governability, which were first raised in the Theoretical framework but were illustrated by the results, build on the previous academic research made.

The only matter where theory and practice disagree is that, according to academia, if trust is absent in PPPs, seizing the partnership's benefits may turn out to be impossible²⁴³. However, according to one of the interviewees, trust should not define the partnership's success. A possible reason why these two statements clash is a cultural difference and a difference in contexts.

While Pratap and Chakrabarti, the authors stating that trust is absolutely vital, are Indian and wrote their book from an Indian context; the interviewee stating otherwise is Dutch, having worked on the PPP in the Netherlands. Following the Hofstede model of 6 dimensions of national culture²⁴⁴; while India has more of a collectivist culture²⁴⁵, the Netherlands has a strong individualist culture²⁴⁶. According to Hofstede, there is a relation between trust and the Individualism dimension²⁴⁷. He states that individualists are free to choose who to partner with

²³⁹ Hodge et al., After the Ribbon Cutting: Governing PPPs in the Medium to Long Term 2017, 330-331

²⁴⁰ Leruth, Public-Private Cooperation in Infrastructure Development: A Principal-Agent Story of Contingent Liabilities, Fiscal Risks, and Other (Un)pleasant Surprises, 2012, 231-232.

²⁴¹ Pratap and Chakrabarti, Public-Private Partnerships in Infrastructure, 2017, 77

²⁴² All 5 interviewees said that rules and roles were enforceable because of the contracts in place.

²⁴³ Pratap and Chakrabarti, Public-Private Partnerships in Infrastructure, 2017, 40

²⁴⁴ Those dimensions are: Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Individualism/Collectivism, Masculinity/Femininity, Long Term/Short Term Orientation, and Indulgence/Restraint. For more information, see Hofstede's own website: <https://geerthofstede.com/culture-geert-hofstede-gert-jan-hofstede/6d-model-of-national-culture/> or <https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=orpc> (pg 11)

²⁴⁵ Scoring 48/100 on the Individualism dimension, see Hofstede Insights, Country Comparison, 2020, <https://www.hofstede-insights.com/country-comparison/india,the-netherlands/>

²⁴⁶ Scoring 80/100 on the same dimension, Ibid. Interestingly, the Czech culture is also individualist, according to Hofstede, scoring 58 on the Individualism dimension (Ibid.).

²⁴⁷ Hofstede, Intrinsic and Enforceable Trust: A Research Agenda, 2006, 20

and withdraw from the partnership if the given situation requires it²⁴⁸. However, collectivists are members of a very long-lived network of interdependent relationships, meaning that members are expected to trust one another²⁴⁹. This cultural difference may explain the clash of the opinions on the importance of trust within PPPs.

6.2.2 Co-production: Quality goes before quantity in this legitimate model

With regards to E2, the expectation has to be rejected, with an exception that trust indeed does play a major role when reaching perceived GE (all CP interviewees agreed on this).

However, collaboration taking long enough was not mentioned as significant in determining a successful project. Perhaps it is so, because the interviewees agreed that quality goes before quantity; it is the cooperation 'journey,' the process, which matters more. This could explain why: the majority agreed that the presence of leadership, a strong character and an ability to encourage cooperation; communication, trust and having access to the same information, are all GE factors. These factors show a need for quality cooperation with quality guidance to reach a common vision; it is not about quantifying concrete results or quantifying CP's length. This is also probably why the majority of the respondents said that although the project results were not yet achieved, they were positive that the results will be achieved²⁵⁰, because of the right partners and the right atmosphere.

Next, when it comes to the presence of the DD in CP; no definite conclusions can be made, because not enough respondents were asked about this. However, the argument made during the interviews is that in (the Dutch) CP, the DD tends to be very limited or nonexistent. This is because generally, it is the (democratic) government steering top-down, making sure that any undemocratic views/values are eliminated²⁵¹. However, what could hamper the GE by exacerbating the DD, are factors such as different values, needs and sectors the participants

²⁴⁸ Ibid.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰ This was also predicted to be the case in the Co-production case studies in the Empirical context.

²⁵¹ Although it sometimes may be argued that this is not the case in practice (that the government steers top-down, thereby eliminating any chances for undemocratic views/values), the author presents one of the respondent's arguments here, which of course should be evaluated critically by the reader.

represent and unforeseen circumstances/crises. This is because the more actors are involved with different, undemocratic values, and the more profound the crisis; the more difficult it could be for the government to keep governing effectively and democratically.

Finally, the last part of the expectation about a lack of legitimacy generally inherent to CP also needs to be rejected for these particular cases, because Figure 5 (in Appendix) clearly reflects that both the Dutch and the Czech CPs generally enjoy both IL (ex ante authorization) and OL (ex post accountability). A simple reason why, is because of being set up by the government and because of having political commitments to abide to. Hence, the expectation was changed to:

Co-production will influence governing effectiveness directly in a positive way through trust, if the collaboration process is led by a strong leader to reach a common vision and if political commitments are obeyed, eliminating the chances for a democratic dilemma. Also, Co-production will influence governing effectiveness in a positive way, because both input and output legitimacy are generally inherent to this model.

6.2.2.1 Comparison with previous academic research on Co-production

In the selected academic literature, CP is defined as the direct involvement of citizens in the design and delivery of public services; a move away from a top-down view to a bottom-up view where citizens are enabled to co-produce²⁵²²⁵³²⁵⁴²⁵⁵²⁵⁶. Relating to the results, this definition has to be nuanced. First, since all Dutch interviewees claimed that the cooperation was not about control, but about collective decision-making, though both CP cases were initiated by the government, the adapted definition is the following: 'A move to a top-down view where the

²⁵² De Witte and Geys, Citizen coproduction and efficient public good provision: Theory and evidence from local public libraries, 2012, 593

²⁵³ Lindquist, Putting Citizens First: Engagement in policy and service delivery for the 21st century, in Ed. Lindquist et al., Putting Citizens First, 2013, 8

²⁵⁴ Fotaki, TOWARDS DEVELOPING NEW PARTNERSHIPS IN PUBLIC SERVICES: USERS AS CONSUMERS, CITIZENS AND/OR CO-PRODUCERS IN HEALTH AND SOCIAL CARE IN ENGLAND AND SWEDEN, 2011, 947

²⁵⁵ Ryan, Co-production: Option or Obligation? 2012, 314

²⁵⁶ Lu and Sidortsov, Sorting out a problem: A co-production approach to household waste management in Shanghai, China, 2019, 271

government sets the conditions for collaboration, with a consent of the partners.²⁵⁷²⁵⁸²⁵⁹ The 'bottom-up view' turned out to be more applicable in SDC.

Moreover, CP promising the establishment of trust-based relationships between the actors involved²⁶⁰ is what turned out to be the case, because all interviewees agreed that trust is present and vital. However, trusting partners generally achieving greater network performance and outcomes²⁶¹ was not demonstrated, since only one interviewee said that the results of the cooperation were achieved. Some reasons why this might be are because both CPs were initiated relatively recently²⁶² and because these interviewees value the partnership's quality over the quantity.

Next, CP contributing to collaborative innovation²⁶³²⁶⁴, where various solutions to deal with complex issues are offered²⁶⁵, was seen in both cases, because the majority claimed that different values, needs and sectors the participants represent have an influence on GE. In other words, the participants coming from various sectors means that their different specializations could contribute to collaborative innovation.

In addition, the problem of coordination overload at the center (at the governmental level) being solved²⁶⁶, was also clearly visible. This is because many mentioned that CP is not about control, but about collective decision-making; meaning that the government does not have to face coordination overload, since decisions are made horizontally, between the partners.

²⁵⁷ Van Meerkerk, Top-down versus bottom-up pathways to collaboration between governments and citizens: reflecting on different participation traps, in Ed. Kekez et al., *Collaboration and Public Service Delivery: Promise and Pitfalls*, 2019, 149

²⁵⁸ Czischke, Collaborative housing and housing providers: towards an analytical framework of multi-stakeholder collaboration in housing co-production, 2018, 58

²⁵⁹ Mitlin and Bartlett, Editorial: Co-production – key ideas, 2018, 358

²⁶⁰ Bartenberger and Szescilo, *THE BENEFITS AND RISKS OF EXPERIMENTAL CO-PRODUCTION: THE CASE OF URBAN REDESIGN IN VIENNA*, 2016, 509

²⁶¹ Klijn et al., *Trust in Governance Networks: Its Impacts on Outcomes*, 2010, 210

²⁶² The Dutch case was established in 2017 and the Czech case in 2019

²⁶³ Sorensen and Torfing, *Metagoverning Collaborative Innovation in Governance Networks*, 2017, 837

²⁶⁴ Hartley, *Innovation in Governance and Public Services: Past and Present*, 2005, 28

²⁶⁵ Wagenaar, *Governance, Complexity, and Democratic Participation: How Citizens and Public Officials Harness the Complexities of Neighborhood Decline*, 2007, 42-43

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 43

However, CP's IG networks lacking clear ex ante authorization²⁶⁷, mis- or underrepresentation occurring²⁶⁸ and ex post accountability being hindered²⁶⁹ were claims which were not portrayed by the results, as shown in Figure 5 (in Appendix). Since perceived legitimacy turned out to be generally higher than in SDC, the statement about a lack of overall legitimacy should rather be applied in the 'least formal' model: SDC. Although, admittedly, perceptions on legitimacy are neither universal nor static, but rather constructed through socio-cultural frames²⁷⁰, hence this view on high legitimacy in CP could still be contested.

6.2.3. Society-driven cooperation: The contextual divide is the greatest here

Finally, considering E3, this expectation cannot be fully accepted nor disproved.

The contextual divide is the greatest here, because while all 9 Dutch respondents (4 original responses) said that the government should definitely take the metagovernor's role, 6 Czechs (2 original) said the same. Nonetheless, only 3 Dutch added that the government should leave some space for the citizens to self-organize, while 6 Czechs (2 original), claimed the same. When investigating further; whether this pattern repeats itself as to which nationality prefers which cooperation model; 5/7 preferring SDC were Czech, while 5/9 preferring a generally more governable model (CP or PPP) were Dutch. This shows that while the Dutch seem to prefer enforcing control through metagovernance, the Czechs seem to let the cooperatives govern themselves autonomously, being aware that too much control could prove damaging to the cooperatives. It is hence in the Czech case that the HD is paid more attention to.

Next, when it comes to the second part of E3, the research showed that generally, rules and roles within the SDC cases are present, since only 2/8 (both Dutch) claimed that no clear rules were in place. Although, since the majority of the Dutch answered this way, perhaps it is so

²⁶⁷ Papadopoulos, Interactive governance: authorization, representation and accountability, in Ed. Edelenbos and Van Meerkerk, *Critical Reflections on Interactive Governance*, 2016, 148

²⁶⁸ Ibid., 151

²⁶⁹ Ibid., 156

²⁷⁰ Alexander et al., Bridging the legitimacy gap—translating theory into practical signposts for legitimate flood risk governance, 2018, 398

that clear rules (and roles) could be absent in the Dutch cooperatives. Once again, the contextual differences are stark here.

Further, a few other determinants of perceived GE were described. 4/7²⁷¹ claimed that the citizens' level of education and motivation to realize the project is an important factor defining GE. Then, 3/4 Czech interviewees stated that the project's complexity and/or the complexity of the administrative system the cooperatives deal with deteriorates GE. This, together with the bureaucratic system with 'too many rules,' as some of the Czechs put it, probably explains why the majority acknowledged that giving the cooperatives some autonomy is essential for them to survive. The 'system of rules' could also explain why clear rules and roles are inherent to the Czech cooperative.

Last, all 3 Dutch interviewees agreed that the length and intensity of cooperation could affect GE positively. Perhaps this is exactly what is needed in the Dutch context, because up until now, the Dutch government (Rijkswaterstaat) came barely into contact with the energy cooperative and if it did, it would usually be just for once. It is from this distance that the Dutch public officials claimed that SDC is usually ineffective and that cooperatives tend to score low on legitimacy. However, in the Czech case, both Hands-on- and Hands-off metagovernance is employed to seize the benefits from the cooperation, which explains why the public officials prefer this model, and why they interpret it as effective (explaining the relatively high OL). Knowing this, the expectation was adapted to:

Society-driven cooperation will influence governing effectiveness directly in a positive way through the government taking the metagovernor's role in the citizen-induced IG network, but the hedgehog's dilemma needs to be kept in mind when metagoverning. In the Czech case, public officials tend to be more aware of the negative consequences if too much metagovernance/control is employed. This model may also influence governing effectiveness directly in a negative way, if clear rules and roles are absent, which tends to be so in the Dutch case. Other significant factors affecting governing effectiveness are mostly context-specific, though 1 general factor is that of an education level and citizens' motivation to realize the project.

²⁷¹ The 8th interviewee (Czech) said that there were no extra factors affecting governing effectiveness, hence he is not counted here.

6.2.3.1 Comparison with previous academic research on Society-driven cooperation

Revisiting academic literature on SDC, that citizens take on a new identity by becoming autonomous, competent, and able to take responsibility for public service delivery²⁷² was visible during the research. This is because the education level (competence) was one of the extra factors determining GE and some respondents said that since the cooperatives are autonomous, there was no control experienced over them. Also, of the 6 respondents interviewed about legitimacy, none mentioned that there would be any form of IL - representation. This means that citizens in SDC indeed tend to be more educated, professional, and able to take responsibility in delivering public services²⁷³²⁷⁴.

Also, the divide between those arguing for metagovernance/control²⁷⁵²⁷⁶²⁷⁷²⁷⁸ and those arguing against it²⁷⁹²⁸⁰²⁸¹ was clear. Generally, the Dutch respondents would be the ones preferring metagovernance and the Czechs would argue against it; they would argue for more autonomy for the citizens.

Regarding the discrepancies between previous research and this research; while Sorensen states that both types of metagovernance should be practiced for optimal project results²⁸², this research shows that one type of Hands-off metagovernance (shaping the context of self-governance) was practiced most widely, together with one Hands-on type (facilitation and

²⁷² Voorberg and Bekkers, Interactive governance and the social construction of citizens as co-creators, in Ed. Edelenbos and Van Meerkerk, *Critical Reflections on Interactive Governance*, 2016, 278

²⁷³ Dekker, *From Pillarized Active Membership to Populist Active Citizenship: The Dutch Do Democracy*, 2019, 76

²⁷⁴ Edelenbos et al., *The challenge of innovating politics in community self-organization: the case of Broekpolder*, 2017, 57

²⁷⁵ Nederhand et al., *Self-organization and the role of government: how and why does self-organization evolves in the shadow of hierarchy?* 2014, 6

²⁷⁶ Nederhand et al., *The governance of self-organization: Which governance strategy do policy officials and citizens prefer?* 2018, 237

²⁷⁷ See Sorensen, *Metagovernance: The Changing Role of Politicians in Processes of Democratic Governance*, 2006

²⁷⁸ See Sorensen and Torfing, *Metagoverning Collaborative Innovation in Governance Networks*, 2017

²⁷⁹ WÄLTI et al., *How Democratic Is "Governance"? Lessons from Swiss Drug Policy*, 2004, 83

²⁸⁰ Klijn and Koppenjan, *Governance Networks in the Public Sector*, 2016, 8

²⁸¹ Warsen et al., *How do professionals perceive the governance of public-private partnerships? Evidence from Canada, the Netherlands and Denmark*, 2019, 4

²⁸² Sorensen and Torfing, *Metagoverning Collaborative Innovation in Governance Networks*, 2017, 830

offering (financial) support). Surprisingly, nobody talked about the other two metagovernance forms²⁸³. This is probably because they are rather more direct; the government taking more of an intrusive role, which, given the HD, would be considered unacceptable (by the government and the citizens) to practice.

Last, that cooperatives tend to enjoy internal legitimacy, inclusion (rather than efficiency) and flexibility (rather than stability),²⁸⁴ turned out to be false in the Czech case. As discussed, KEC enjoys both IL (ex ante authorization) and OL (efficiency); it scores low on inclusion (no IL - representation), and it has clear rules and roles (stability) embedded. Evidently, SDC is not purely an informal collaboration form without any rules and roles²⁸⁵; citizens self-organize to seriously contribute to the sustainable transition. Nonetheless, in the Dutch case, the situation is a lot more different, though inclusion was also an aspect which was not illustrated (Figure 5 in Appendix).

6.3 Academic contributions of this research

Next to building on previous academic research, the results contribute a better understanding of all three models in relation to GE in two different European contexts. Such an understanding could especially be of use to academics, policy makers and others. In the European context, this research is particularly relevant, because of the EU's ambition for Europe becoming the first climate-neutral continent; the models could be adopted to reach such an ambition.

Nonetheless, many academic statements were not illustrated, mainly because of the specific cultural, institutional, legislative, and political backgrounds of the 6 chosen cases. Because only a few cases and a few interviews were analyzed in a specific context, no global, undisputable conclusions can be deduced. Also, the comparison of diverse contexts; the Dutch government having more than 20 years of experience with PPPs²⁸⁶ and the Czech government

²⁸³ Storytelling and the government's direct participation in the cooperatives

²⁸⁴ Provan and Kenis, Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Management, and Effectiveness, 2007, 245

²⁸⁵ Smith, A critical appreciation of the "bottom-up" approach to sustainable water management: embracing complexity rather than desirability, 2008, 355

²⁸⁶ Ministerie van Financiën, Nederland helpt andere landen met kennis over Publieke Private Samenwerking, 2020, <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/publiek-private-samenwerking-pps-bij->

experiencing the governance of PPPs for the first time, has important consequences for the conclusions of this study. Similarly, the uneven proportion of the interviewees who represented SDC also has important consequences for any conclusions made. Anyhow, to give an idea as to what this specific research contributes to academia, a new conceptual framework model was made. See Figure 7 below.




Figure 7: Updated Conceptual framework model

Based on the adapted expectations, the first conceptual framework model (Figure 1) was changed in a peculiar way (see Figure 7). As predicted, the cooperation models have a much more complex influence on perceived GE in practice than in theory. Although some factors remain

unchanged²⁸⁷, the majority show a different relation to GE than originally²⁸⁸. Moreover, four new indicators²⁸⁹ were added. This enrichment of Figure 1 displays how much this research has contributed to academia and although the Analysis shows more factors influencing GE, the ones in Figure 7 are the most significant. Although some of the theories on GE were portrayed, the diversity of factors which civil servants have to deal with whenever governing a particular cooperation is also shown. Such factors cannot be found in academic literature; that is why this empirical research was done.

6.4 Practical consequences of this research

In the beginning, it was stated that the goal is to see which of the collaboration forms is used most widely and with what effects in the sustainability context. It turned out that one should not search for the perfect model, but rather should determine what is to be achieved and then find a model which could reach the goal the best. Or, as nr. 7 put it succinctly:

'Structure; the form, follows the content, and not vice versa.'

Hence, when aiming to reach the sustainable transition (the content), PPPs turn out to be the least popular, while SDC seems to be the most desired model (the form) (see Figure 2). However, regarding how governable this model is, the results show that while it is highly desired and successfully operational in the Czech case, in the Dutch case it is less so. Hence, in the Dutch context, employing CP to successfully reach the sustainable transition could be a practical implication. This is because all 9 Dutch respondents talked about the importance of remaining in charge of the project, which is what CP offers. Also, after the majority (5/9) of the Dutch who

²⁸⁷ Binding contracts, trust in governance networks and the government as a metagovernor still display a direct positive influence on governing effectiveness.

²⁸⁸ For instance, under PPP, the 'IF: trust' determinant is marked by a dotted line instead of a full line, since it turned out that trust should not be a key determinant defining the successful governing effectiveness of PPPs. Next, the presence of input and output legitimacy in Co-production has now a direct positive influence on governing effectiveness. Under Society-driven cooperation, the 'clear rules and roles' factor and the hedgehog's dilemma determinant have been adapted as well, based on contextual differences.

²⁸⁹ New factors include a common vision and a willingness to cooperate and the education level and citizens' motivation. Co-production has new determinants: the presence of strong leadership and the obedience of political commitments.

stated that their preference for a model would depend on the project goal, the next preferred model was CP (3/9), which is yet another reason to consider employing it.

As a result, there is no simple answer to which of the cooperation models is the most effective steering manner to reach the sustainable transition²⁹⁰; the answer is dependent on unique contextual determinants which make one model more governable in one context than in another. Hence, an additional practical implication is that to reach the sustainable transition, every government should determine exactly what it is trying to reach; is it a transition to zero-carbon mobility? A transition to energy self-sufficient cities? Or a transition to zero plastics in the water? When a vision is set, the government could start evaluating which of the models and which partners are needed to fulfill it. There is no such thing as 'one size fits all;' every government should decide for itself which opportunities to seize (legitimacy?) and which risks to take (DD?) in reaching the sustainable vision. If every government follows these steps, a world transition to sustainability may successfully take place.

Another important practical implication is not to shy away from a particular model, just because it is new and under-researched, such as is the case with SDC. Although many civil servants believe that they are incapable of metagoverning because of 'ill-suited roles,' this is just an illusion; they are capable. In the case of governments (e.g. the Czech) which should definitely seize SDC's benefits; special programs, training or events could be organized where SDC's benefits would be presented and where the officials would be trained to metagovern. The same could happen for CP; public officials from the (e.g. Dutch) government could be taught about the benefits and the risks behind this model before employing it and reaping its advantages.

With regard to when PPPs could be used to reach the government's sustainable goals, a practical implication could be that governments which prefer planning long-term goals (e.g. China and Russia) and/or governments not considering trust to be a vital element in GE, would likely find this model beneficial. This is because PPPs turned out to be the most governable model, no matter the case, and they turned out to be highly effective (delivering expected results). Hence, even 'abstract,' long-term goals such as reaching the sustainable transition could potentially be reached using PPPs. However, this needs to be proven in practice. This is why further research on this topic is highly encouraged.

²⁹⁰ Reaching the sustainable transition is not the dependent variable; perceived governing effectiveness is. The sustainable transition is the context of this research.

7. Conclusion

This chapter will succinctly answer the research question: ***What is the influence of cooperation models (PPPs, Co-production and Society-driven cooperation) on the perceived successful effectiveness of steering in the Netherlands and the Czech Republic, in the context of a sustainable transition?***, summarize the overall argument made, show a reflection on the aims, methods and results, highlight any important limitations, give relevant recommendations, and explain the contributions of this thesis.

7.1 Research question answered and summary

As the findings show, each of the cooperation models has a different influence on perceived GE in both contexts, when it comes to the sustainable transition. Unique cultural, institutional, political and legislative determinants make one model seem more governable/desirable to address a specific governmental aim in one context than another. For instance, in CP, whether or not the respondents experienced control/governability depended on their cultural backgrounds. While control over the private sector was experienced in the Czech case, the Dutch respondents claimed that no form of control/hierarchy should be in place for a successful project.

In addition, it is not only the unique context which is affected differently when facing a particular model; the governmental aim is another factor which determines whether one model is more suitable than another one. Hence, if the aim is to reach sustainable transition, the choice of a model would be different than if the aim would be to increase the production efficiency of hard infrastructure (e.g. highways).

The third factor playing a role in the equation is the models' governability, i.e. to what extent can successful GE be reached. Putting this factor into the equation complicates matters even more, because while for instance SDC would be the most desirable model to use when

reaching the sustainable transition²⁹¹, its governability is, in theory, the lowest when compared to the other two models. **Generally**, this research (theoretical framework, findings (case studies and interviews) and analysis) has shown the following:

1. PPPs have a direct positive influence on the perceived successful GE in both contexts. However, they do not seem to be suitable in aiming for a sustainable transition, because they obey binding, inflexible contracts, while a sustainable transition requires partners' flexibility and willingness to change the plans from time to time²⁹²²⁹³. This model is characterized by the highest governability²⁹⁴.

2. CP has more of a positive influence on the perceived successful GE in the Czech case, while having a high potential in the Dutch case, in terms of reaching the sustainable transition²⁹⁵²⁹⁶. This model is characterized by medium governability²⁹⁷.

3. SDC has more of a positive influence on the perceived successful GE in the Czech case, while having a rather negative influence on GE in the Dutch case, regarding the sustainable transition. This model is characterized by (a general) low governability²⁹⁸.

Such answers to the research question were partially expected. This is because according to the Theoretical framework, achieving GE in PPPs is to be more straightforward than in the other two models, which was shown by the results. Nevertheless, because much more research was done about PPPs, one may ask whether this theory is biased. Although this question is outside of the scope of this research, it should be considered.

²⁹¹ **This is because the sustainable transition has fluid principles and goals, just as is the case in some energy cooperatives. What the interviewees also mentioned is Society-driven cooperation's effectiveness in terms of reaching the sustainable transition, because of the values, needs and wants of the citizens involved. In other words, Society-driven cooperation could be deployed when transitioning to a more sustainable society, if the citizens involved truly believe in achieving the sustainable goals. The initiative has to come from the bottom, as citizens generally show resistance when they are told to do something by the government.**

²⁹² Hueskes et al., Governing public-private partnerships for sustainability: An analysis of procurement and governance practices of PPP infrastructure projects, 2017, 23

²⁹³ Zheng et al., Investigating the Sustainability Performance of PPP-Type Infrastructure Projects: A Case of China, 2018, 11

²⁹⁴ See the theoretical framework (2.1) for further elaboration/reasons why.

²⁹⁵ Miller and Wyborn, Co-production in global sustainability: Histories and theories, 2018, 6

²⁹⁶ Malbert et al., Co-producing knowledge in Gothenburg, in Ed. Polk, Co-producing Knowledge for Sustainable Cities: Joining Forces for Change, 2015, 43

²⁹⁷ See the theoretical framework (2.2) for further elaboration/reasons why.

²⁹⁸ See the theoretical framework (2.3) for further elaboration/reasons why.

However, what was unexpected is to see both CP and SDC reach higher perceived GE in the Czech cases than in the Dutch. A possible explanation for this is that the Czech context was characterized by ‘system complexity’ and ‘overregulation,’²⁹⁹ meaning that because rules, roles and legitimacy are inherent to the Czech projects explored, overall GE tends to be high. Hence, in this context, applying SDC to reach the sustainable transition should definitely be considered. Another reason why this model is recommended, is because although the Czech respondents acknowledged that metagovernance is vital, they added that enough autonomy should be granted so that the cooperatives could prosper, showing preparedness to metagovern responsibly. This illustrates how much the differing cultural and institutional backgrounds matter when choosing the optimal cooperation model.

On the other hand, the Dutch respondents were stressing the importance of having a common vision and willingness to cooperate, while at the same time considering the different values, needs and sectors the partners represent³⁰⁰. These factors, combined with having quality communication, trust and access to the same information, were all said to influence perceived GE in significant ways. Because the Dutch raised attention to these influential factors, which have to do with maintaining quality cooperation, this is why CP should be applied here to reach the sustainable transition. CP is also suggested, because the perceived legitimacy level of the CP cases tends to be higher than that of the SDC, and it seems to enjoy little to no DD. Last, because the majority of the Dutch preferred to see the government metagovern, this is why a model where the government steers the cooperation would be optimal.

7.2 Reflections

Reflecting on the aims of this thesis; one of them was to build on previous PA academic research, contributing a better understanding of all three cooperation models and their respective GE in two different European contexts. The author believes that this aim was fulfilled well, since although many academic statements about the models were illustrated by the findings, many more new factors affecting GE were also discovered; some of which were not mentioned in the

²⁹⁹ This could be related to the Czech Republic’s communist past, since under the dictatorial regime, the communists liked keeping everything under control (i.e. through overregulation and excessive legislation).

³⁰⁰ The preference of these factors could be explained by the Dutch democratic past, where the government needs to form a coalition of parties of differing values and needs to form policies.

theory. To illustrate the academic contribution made, an updated conceptual framework model - Figure 7 - was constructed. The findings are valuable for any academic or practitioner exploring the determinants of GE in a PA context.

Additionally, another aim was to see how the under-researched IG; a form of CP and SDC, works in practice and how it can reach sustainable transition. This aim was also met, since four IG case studies from two different contexts were explored and asked about during the interviews. Also in this case, the extra knowledge about how IG is applied builds on previous research and it could be used as evidence that governments should not shy away from the contemporary collaboration phenomena.

Last, the goal of this research was to see which of the models may be the most effective steering manner to reach the sustainable transition, in other words; Loorbach's call to create a framework of effective cooperation models serving as a guide in various societal contexts, was to be addressed. As discussed, there is no simple answer for such a plea; which of the models is the most effective steering manner is dependent on the context, since determinants such as culture, politics, and legislation all have an effect on the models' GE. For example, trust being deemed as relatively unimportant in Dutch PPPs' GE (cultural determinant) and having a different currency than the Euro in Czech PPPs (legislative determinant) both seem to affect PPPs' perceived GE negatively. As mentioned in section 6.4: Practical consequences; every government should decide for itself which benefits of the models to seize and which risks to face.

7.3 Limitations

In this research, a mix of qualitative methods was used (6 case studies and 18 interviews) to arrive at an answer to the research question. Hence, in terms of the breadth of the research, a good, preliminary overview of the cooperation models was outlined. However, a limitation is in the amount of interviewees per model in the Czech context. While there were three interviewees per model in the Dutch context, in the Czech, five were interviewed about SDC and two were interviewed about PPPs and CP, respectively. This misrepresentation could explain why it was concluded that SDC should definitely be implemented in the Czech context. However, the limitation could also be seen as an advantage, since SDC is the newest, and an under-researched

phenomenon, which is why more interviews could also benefit academic research by bringing more insight into this model.

Another possible limitation is that while the institutions and the functions the Czech respondents represented were diverse, in the Dutch context, all respondents (except for the energy cooperative) were civil servants and worked at Rijkswaterstaat. This makes the findings rather biased and non-generalizable. The repeatability of this research is also a factor which would be difficult to fulfill. Nonetheless, a definite strength of this study is its originality and a general diversity of the findings.

Third, a final limitation is this study's short length. The results are a snapshot of the reality out there and so they are not necessarily definite. Hence, although all three models were presented and compared in two different contexts, the contemporary topic of collaboration should be explored further.

7.4 Recommendations

To build on this topic, a few recommendations are given. First, practitioners may consider using these findings to implement either of the models in their own context to reach a given governmental aim, such as the sustainable transition. They could develop policies which institutionalize both IG forms, educate civil servants about these models and teach them to use the models in practice. Once applied, perceived GE should be measured once more to test the generalizability of this study's findings.

A recommendation for academia is that future studies could look into the other GE factors which were voiced during the interviews³⁰¹, to see if they too are relevant in other, perhaps non-European, contexts. This could be done by conducting a single, in-depth case study, interviews in one context, or by conducting a comparative study, but between two non-European governments or between a European and a non-European government. In any case, it would be

³⁰¹ Other factors than the three main determinants of perceived governing effectiveness: government's control, presence of rules and roles and presence of trust.

interesting to find out how different contexts react to the models in reaching the sustainable transition.

Last, future studies could also go deeper into the sustainable transition itself, by taking the broad concept apart and exploring only some parts of it, such as the transition to a no-plastics-in-the-oceans society. In this context, how do the cooperation models influence GE?

In sum, this thesis attempted to fill the gap in PA academic research on IG and its importance in reaching the sustainable transition. Although the findings illustrated the theory that PPPs have a positive influence on perceived GE, they challenged the assumption that CP and SDC would be ungovernable. On the contrary; CP should be applied in the Dutch context and SDC should be applied in the Czech context. If this is not attempted, the numerous benefits behind these contemporary models will be missed and the sustainable transition a goal not accomplished.

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Appendix

Interview questions from section 3.3: Methodology

To give one an idea of which interview questions were asked, see below. Note: this is a translation of the interview questions which were posed in Dutch and in Czech.

- Which of the cooperation models do you have experience with, in the context of sustainability? How long have you worked with the private sector/citizens on the project?
 - Looking back, do you feel that you, as a governmental actor, were in control of the cooperation? Why? (Were binding contracts present?)
 - Were there clear rules and roles to be discerned in the project? How?
 - How important was trust during the collaboration and did you and the private partner/citizens trust each other while working on the project? Why?
 - Do you feel that the expected results of the cooperation were reached?
 - Were there also other factors which have facilitated the governance of the project or made it more difficult?
- Which of the three cooperation models (PPPs, Co-production and Society-driven cooperation) do you perceive to be the most effective and efficient steering manner to achieve the global transition to sustainability?

The following questions were posed to a select amount of respondents (mainly Co-production- and Society-driven cooperation respondents, but also a limited amount of PPP respondents decided to express themselves about the role(s) the government is expected to take):

- Do you perceive that the democratic dilemma was present during the cooperation? How/why?
- Do you feel that it was a challenge obtaining ex ante authorization/representation (input legitimacy)/ex post accountability (output legitimacy) during the cooperation? How/why?
- Was there a need to metagovern the Society-driven cooperation? What role was expected of you, as a governmental actor? If metagovernance did take place, what type of metagovernance was it - hands-off or hands-on?

- Was the hedgehog's dilemma accounted for during the Society-driven cooperation project?

The answers falling under the 'Other' category of which role the government should take, section 5.6: The government as a metagovernor: yes or no?

Under the 'Other' category, four different answers were identified:

1. 'The government is needed by Society-driven cooperation as a boundary spanner'
2. 'Nobody asked us, the governmental actors, to metagovern, so why do so?'
3. 'The sustainable transition could also be realized by the private sector'
4. 'The role of the government might become smaller/zero in some aspects.'

Extra quotes:

Section 5.1.1.1: Level of governmental control in Society-driven cooperation

Nr. 8 shows that both the government's control and being able to decide collectively, matters:

'The government has a crucial role, otherwise these initiatives would not happen. You need the government in the early stages for seed money and moral support. The public official from the municipality sometimes comes here for a residents' evening to tell us what the municipality finds important and then the neighbors can ask the official questions.'

Section 5.1.2.1: Rules and roles in Society-driven cooperation

1 Czech interviewee (nr. 14) said that since contracts are in place, rules and roles are defined and together with 2 others, he agreed that rules and roles are absolutely necessary:

'No, it's not freestyle, of course there are rules; the rules are such that we will supply you with heat and you will pay us an amount of money for it; that is stated in the contract.'

Section 5.1.3: Perceived trust in all three cooperation models

Nr. 8 shows the case in point:

'Yes, we do, by all means, have open communication with each other; we have basic trust in each other, but that doesn't mean that there aren't any tensions every now and then. We're sometimes frustrated about the municipality being quite demanding on us for half a year now.'

Section 5.2: The most effective cooperation model in terms of steering?

As nr. 12 said:

'I don't think PPP models are good when it comes to the sustainable transition. I really don't think so, because I can't say what, with regard to the transition to carbon-free mobility, will apply in the next 3 years, rather than 30 years, which is usually how long a PPP cooperation takes.'

Section 5.3: Cooperation results achieved?

To illustrate one of the nuanced responses, nr. 8 stated:

'Not yet; our expected results are that our district will have a sustainable heat source in 10 years' time. If we're talking about expected results in the long-term, then we'd like to become a sustainable X³⁰² district...'

Extra tables:

Table 2: Operationalization

³⁰² This information is anonymized.

Variable	Definition	Expected relationships	Interview questions asked + Corresponding indicators
<i>Independent.</i> PPP	A long-lasting cooperation between public and private actors where services and products are collectively developed and where resources, risks and costs are shared between the two (or more) parties	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Binding contracts have a direct positive effect on the GE - Presence of perceived trust has a direct positive effect on the dependent variable - Absence of perceived trust has a direct negative effect on the dependent variable 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Were binding contracts present? -> indicator of GE criteria 1+2 - Was perceived trust between the governmental actor and the private party present? -> indicator of GE criterion 3
<i>Independent.</i> Co-production	A move away from a top-down view where citizens mainly consume services, to a bottom-up view where they directly co-produce public services alongside the government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Presence of trust has a direct positive effect on the GE - Lack of IL and OL³⁰³ has a direct negative effect on the dependent variable - Collaboration shorter than one year³⁰⁴ has an indirect negative effect on the dependent variable - Collaboration longer than one year has an indirect positive effect on the dependent variable - DD has an indirect negative effect on the dependent variable³⁰⁵ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Was perceived trust between the governmental actor and the private sector/citizens present? -> indicator of GE criterion 3 - Was there a mention of ex ante authorization, representation and ex post accountability within the CP? -> indicator of GE criteria 1+2 - Did the collaboration last more than one year? -> indicator of GE criterion 3

³⁰³ See section 2.2.1, page 16, for a definition of input and output legitimacy.

³⁰⁴ Looking into academic literature, it is not exactly clear how long collaborative projects should take place to ensure a trust-based relationship. The literature and research online often talk about “years,” so the author came up with an indicator which should illustrate this.

³⁰⁵ **If the Co-production threatens democracy, the government may struggle to govern the network successfully, since the members may rise up against the government as the dominant actor. Because of the conflict resulting, trust between the members and the**

		- No DD has an indirect positive effect on the dependent variable	- Was there a mention of a DD? -> indicator of GE criteria 1+3
Independent: Society-driven cooperation	The idea that citizens self-organize in collectives, where they take the responsibility of delivering key public services which they want and need, in areas where the government has abstained from	- Government taking the role of a metagovernor ³⁰⁶ has a direct positive effect on the GE - The absence of rules and roles ³⁰⁷ has a direct negative effect on the dependent variable - Ignoring the HD has an indirect negative effect on the dependent variable ³⁰⁸ - Taking the HD into consideration has an indirect positive effect on the dependent variable	- Did the government employ hands-on-/hands-off metagovernance during the cooperation? -> indicator of GE criteria 1, 2, 3 - Were rules and roles present? -> indicator of GE criterion 2 - Was the HD addressed during the cooperation with citizens? -> indicator of GE criteria 1+3
Dependent: Governing effectiveness	Successful effectiveness of steering; also referred to as steering effectiveness and successful effectiveness of governing. This refers to the extent that the government perceives itself to be legitimately and	The 3 GE criteria: 1) Government's ability to impose control over the private partner/citizens determines GE	- Did the civil servant perceive that he ('the government') was in control of the collaboration? -> indicator of GE criterion 1

government may not evolve, and the government may fear to lose its control over the network. If this happens, the initial idea of successful steering effectiveness could disappear. This is why the presence of the democratic dilemma has an indirect negative effect on governing effectiveness (it takes some time to make the governance of the network difficult/impossible).

³⁰⁶ The author measured this through checking whether there is presence of hands-on- and hands-off metagovernance (see section 2.3.1 for further clarification).

³⁰⁷ Rules on how the cooperatives are organized and roles of the citizens involved in the Society-driven cooperation networks.

³⁰⁸ **This is so, because if the government governs over the IG network as it wishes, not taking the values of the citizens into consideration, then it may harm the citizens' trust in the government and make them angry, pushing the government out of the IG network as a result (making governing effectiveness impossible to happen henceforth).**

	<p>successfully ruling over the private actor/citizens in the cooperation</p>	<p>2) Clear rules and roles within the cooperation and whether the government is the central actor defining and shaping the cooperation is an indicator of GE</p> <p>3) Presence of perceived trust between the government and the private sector is also a determinant of GE.</p>	<p>- Were there clear rules and roles to be discerned in the project? -> indicator of GE criterion 2</p> <p>- How important was trust and did the civil servant ('the government') and the stakeholders trust each other? -> indicator of GE criterion 3.</p>
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Table 3: Additional information about the interviewees

This table summarizes some basic, additional information about the interviewees of this research. The interviewees were chosen, because they all had something to do with the chosen case studies, in one way or another; whether it was by advising the energy cooperatives in some way (e.g. respondent 5 and 9) or by managing the PPP project (e.g. respondent 1 and 17). This is to give the reader some background information on the profiles of each respondent, whenever reading their quotations. Any information which may generate additional questions is explained in the footnotes. As the reader may notice, some information is more vague/anonymized. This is done at the request of the given respondents.

Number of the respondent	Nationality and case study	Position	Organization
1	Dutch, A6 PPP	Contract manager	Rijkswaterstaat
2	Czech, Kněžice Society-driven cooperation	Head of the Department and Deputy Director	Ministry of the Environment
3	Czech, Kněžice Society-driven cooperation	Manager	Joint-stock company ³⁰⁹
4	Dutch, Kustlijnzorg ³¹⁰ Co-production	Strategic advisor	Rijkswaterstaat
5	Dutch, HIER Opgewekt ³¹¹ Society-driven cooperation	Advisor	Rijkswaterstaat
6	Dutch, DCC Co-production	Project manager	Rijkswaterstaat

³⁰⁹ This respondent used to work at the Ministry of Industry and Trade, before starting a career in the private sector. He was chosen in order to create some diversity in the interview answers (as he could speak both from the perspective of a civil servant and a businessman).

³¹⁰ One of the innovation projects of Rijkswaterstaat, a track of the Dutch Coastline Challenge.

³¹¹ A platform for and about (Dutch) local energy cooperatives which cooperated with Rijkswaterstaat.

7	Dutch, DCC Co-production	Project manager	Rijkswaterstaat
8	Dutch, Warm in de Wijk Society-driven cooperation	Board member	Warm in de Wijk
9	Dutch, HIER Opgewekt Society-driven cooperation	Program advisor	Rijkswaterstaat
10	Czech, Country for the Future Co-production	Director	Ministry of Transportation
11	Czech, Country for the Future Co-production	Deputy	Ministry of the Environment
12	Czech, D4 PPP	Head of Unit	Ministry of Transportation
13	Czech, Kněžice Society-driven cooperation	Chairman	KDU-ČSL ³¹²
14	Czech, Kněžice Society-driven cooperation	Mayor	Kněžice
15	Dutch, A6 PPP	Head of the Department	Rijkswaterstaat
16	Czech, Kněžice Society-driven cooperation	Deputy	Ministry of Industry and Trade
17	Dutch, A6 PPP	Procurement manager	Rijkswaterstaat
18	Czech, D4 PPP	Head of the Department	State Fund of Transport Infrastructure ³¹³

³¹² A Christian-democratic political party in the Czech Republic. This respondent was chosen, because he is a former Minister of Agriculture and so has knowledge of and experience with Society-driven cooperation projects in the field of sustainability.

³¹³ A governmental body which provides the finances to all Czech transport infrastructure; it cooperates with the Ministry of Transport.

Extra figures:

Section 5.4

What is the rest of the factors influencing governing effectiveness?




Figure 4: The answers falling under the 'Other' factor of governing effectiveness

Section 5.5, 6.2.2, 6.2.2.1 and 6.2.3.1

Is legitimacy present in Co-production and Society-driven cooperation?





Figure 5: 'Is legitimacy present in Co-production and Society-driven cooperation?'

Figure 8: Coding: networks made



◊◊ Most effective cooperation model in terms of steering?

◊ PPP is the best/most governable form of cooperation

◊ PPP projects are good when the project in question is about defined principles and goals, so not when it comes to sustainability

◊ The benefits of all three cooperation models should be seized, with a special attention to Society-driven cooperation

◊ Society-driven cooperation is the best form of cooperation

◊ Coproduction the best cooperation model

◊ There is no one best form of cooperation: it all depends on the area/type of project which you want to realize

◊◊ Were the expected results of the cooperation achieved?

◊ I don't think the desired results have been achieved

◊ The results of the project are yet to be seen

◊ The results of the project are yet to be seen, but the future is bright

◊ Results achieved

◊◊ Governing effectiveness factors

◊ Good personal relations between the partners -> governing effectiveness

◊ Communication, trust and the same info reasons for governing effectiveness

◊ Passion + personal involvement of the partners -> governing effectiveness

◊ Differences in institutional/ legislative/ technical/ monetary/ language setups -> governing effectiveness

◊ Leadership, character and the ability to convince -> governing effectiveness

◊ Consistency/ management in the partnership -> governing effectiveness

◊ The public sector has political commitments -> governing effectiveness

◊ Political support -> governing effectiveness

◊ People's education + motivation to realize the project -> governing effectiveness

◊ Projects' complexity/the complexity of administrative systems -> governing effectiveness

◊ Experience and having an overview on the situation -> governing effectiveness

◊ Cohesion within the internal team of the public sector -> governing effectiveness

◊ Different values, needs + sectors the participants come from -> governing effectiveness

◊ Safe working environment -> governing effectiveness

◊ Technology -> governing effectiveness

◊ The length of the cooperation -> governing effectiveness

