

Temporary EU labor migrants and housing policy challenges:
*Policy differences between municipalities in Zuid-Holland and
the role of private actors*



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Abstract

This research examines the policy differences on housing of labor migrants between the municipality of Vlaardingen and Lansingerland. Both municipalities have their own contextual differences and involved actors that shaped the policy outlines. The role of private and public actors regarding these policies is examined by applying a policy network analysis. For both cases, the network has been indicated in order to illustrate its structure, the relevant resources, and the power distribution. Consequently, this research provides insight into two opposite local policy networks and reveals the roles that public and private actors have concerning policy on housing of labor migrants. It illustrates that migration management by municipalities is increasingly done by privatization of public interests and responsibilities. As a result, monopolization of private actors occurs due to their privileged position, which may lead to problem displacement to other municipalities.

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1. Introduction

Many municipalities in the Netherlands are dealing with signs of nuisance from labor migrants. Noise disturbance, dirt, and odor nuisance are mostly experienced and caused due to overcrowded houses and bad living conditions (BN De Stem, 2018). Municipalities have difficulties challenging these issues and some municipalities even tried to introduce quotas for labor migrants (Omroep Gelderland, 2020). However, this is legally not possible, because many labor migrants are European citizens. As a result, labor migrants are able to travel freely and many migrants do not register, which makes it hard for governments to deal with the issue (de Zwaan, 2018). Additionally, these labor migrants move very easily, which causes many local governments to deal with it differently (Engbersen, 2018).

Most temporary labor migrants in the Netherlands come from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The largest share are Polish immigrants, who live in the municipalities with intensive agriculture, horticulture, or process industries such as meat processing and slaughterhouses. These sectors are mostly located within the provinces of Zuid-Holland, Gelderland, Flevoland, and Brabant (CBS, 2019). Most of them who work in horticulture, work in the province of Zuid-Holland since this is where 49 percent of this sector is located (Rijksoverheid, 2019). In the Province of Zuid-Holland, labor migrants sometimes live in bad conditions due to absent or unclear policy (AD, 2019). In 2015, there were around 132.000 labor migrants in Zuid-Holland. Most of them were accommodated in regular independent houses (Tympan Instituut, 2017) and because the gross share of these labor migrants are from Poland, media refer to this nationality when reporting about nuisance of 'Polish houses' or 'Polish hotels'.

On a national level, there was a declaration settled for accommodating EU-labor migrants, which has led to the Stichting Normering Flexwonen (SNF). The SNF developed a certificate which includes the norms of quality of accommodating labor migrants and is meant for all industries that provide housing for EU labor migrants (Flexwonen, 2020). In order to check if companies meet the requirements, the SNF keeps track of registered companies and works together with different inspection services. The inspection service of the Ministry of Social Affairs is one of those services, who detects a lot of cases where labor migrants live in bad conditions (BZK, 2019). These bad living conditions again came to light during the corona-crisis, when many labor migrants became infected because they live with too many people close together (NOS, 2020).

Actors who are mostly involved in the housing of labor migrants in the Netherlands are employers, housing corporations, commercial housing companies and recruitment agencies (Platform31, 2015). Approximately half of all labor migrants find work through recruitment agencies, whom are in many cases also responsible for accommodation (ABU, 2018). These private actors hold different interests regarding municipality's policy. Contrariwise, municipalities need private actors in order to steer and control labor migration. This requires policymaking through collaboration between public and private actors, which happens in different network compositions which will be analyzed during this research.

Zuid-Holland is chosen because this is one of the areas in the Netherlands where most labor migrants live, both in urban and suburban areas. Furthermore, Zuid-Holland has one of the most municipalities and most houses of all provinces in the Netherlands (Kadaster, 2020). This makes it more likely for a so-called waterbed-effect to occur. This means that when measurements are taken in one municipality, labor migrants are being housed elsewhere, and nuisance could start to occur in a neighboring municipality. Most municipalities that formulated policy for housing of labor migrants understand the importance of the SNF certificate, but still have variations in the regulations that they apply.

Vlaardingen and Lansingerland are two municipalities in Zuid-Holland that are contrasting cases in the number of SNF registered companies located within their borders and the number of registered labor migrants. Therefore, these cases will be compared during this research. The goal of this research is to describe the policy differences between two contrasting cases and to see what role private actors play in different policy networks. In order to accomplish this goal, the following research has been formulated: *To what extent do the municipalities of Vlaardingen and Lansingerland differently manage the housing of CEE labor migrants and what is the role of private actors?*

1.2 Academic and societal relevance

Commercial actors are increasingly used for migration management purposes (Sørensen 2012), which is also done regarding housing of labor migrants, since it is not always clear where labor migrants live (NOS, 2020). Migration control is more frequently being outsourced to private actors, which goes together with the embracement of neoliberal ideology in many western countries. However, outsourcing can cause a lock-in effect, that makes the reversibility of policies very difficult (Menz, 2011). Since private actors are strongly involved in the housing

of labor migrants it is important to explore this role. Policy network theory and the concept of governance will be used in order to provide insights in the policy networks. Even though social network analysis is seen as ‘the missing link’ in analyzing migration networks (Bilecen, Gamper & Lubbers, 2018), policy network analysis is hardly applied for indicating the network concerning migration issues. Additionally, local governance is seen as increasingly important in the context of the ‘local turn’ in migration policy studies (Zapata-Barrero, Caponio & Scholten, 2017), which makes analyzing local governance even more interesting. This research will describe the policy differences between two municipalities and analyze the actors involved in the policy network. This way, policy differences can be indicated and new insights into the role of private actors in the field of migration policy studies can be provided.

Recently, the underlying problems concerning work and living conditions of labor migrants became apparent when Dutch society had to deal with COVID-19 and transform into a ‘1,5-metersociety’. Although the problems have been known for years, abuses regarding housing of labor migrants keep occurring. Therefore, former political leader Emiel Roemer is currently working as mayor of Heerlen and head of ‘chasing team protection labor migrants’, to reform the protection of labor migrants. He visits municipalities and provinces in order to get informed and to change the bad living conditions (Clercq, 2020). This illustrates that problems regarding housing of labor migrants are issues of concern for many communities in the Netherlands. Moreover, less is known about how to challenge these problems, since there is a relation with the private sector as mentioned before. This research contributes by understanding policies in a very specific policy domain so they can be improved, and other local governments can learn from the findings, which can prevent them from pitfalls.

The structure of this thesis includes the following. The theoretical framework will introduce some earlier collected findings and theories relevant to the topic and which are applicable to this research. This will be followed by the research design and the method chapters, which will explain the way this research has been conducted. The context chapter will provide some additional information, the findings will be described and analyzed in order to formulate an answer to the research question and expectations in the conclusion. Lastly a reflection on this research will be given in the discussion.

2. Theoretical framework

The theoretical framework contains two sections. Section 2.1 and 2.2 will elaborate on the characteristics of the migration patterns of CEE migrants. These characteristics have consequences for the ‘visibility’ of the migrants and thus for governing. Because of that, section 2.3 emphasizes modern times of governing in order to understand the interaction between public and private actors. This results in the explanation of the policy network analysis in section 2.4 that will form the base for this research. Throughout the theoretical framework three expectations are formulated that result from the relevant theories.

2.1 Motivations

Although motivations for migration are hard to define and measure, most migrants from CEE countries who migrated to the Netherlands were motivated because of work. This is differently from the majority of migrants in the Netherlands, for whom family matters are the most important factor (van Ostaijen et al. 2014). Work becoming a more dominant motivation factor also has a relation with changes in Europe, concerning EU enlargement. This provided people whose country became part of the EU, with the possibility to move freely throughout Europe. This also changed the character of the migration flows. The traditional forms such as seasonal and circular movement have changed into different forms. Intra-European movement can be categorized according to four categories: bi-national, which means that people have a strong attachment with home and destination country. Circular, with regards to people who move back and forward such as seasonal workers. Footloose, which entails migrants who explore different countries in Europe but might experience difficulties accessing the labor market and lose ties with the home country. And settlement, those are people who have a weak attachment with the home country and settle in the destination country (Engbersen et al. 2013).

2.2 Liquidity and flexibility

The change in EU people’s mobility came mostly through EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007. However, some EU member states such as the Netherlands first asked for transitional arrangements according to the intra-EU movement of workers, such as a work permit for the first two years. However, these restrictions were lifted in 2011 and 2013 (Sert, 2018). This increased freedom of movement caused an East-West migration system in Europe and is characterized by temporality, flexibility, and unpredictability. Engbersen (2018) therefore refers to this as liquid migration, which means that many intra-European migrants do only partly

integrate into the destination countries. They move back and forth between countries, move to multiple locations and this movement is characterized by a temporal nature of residence. Consequently, destination locations have difficulties responding to this temporary, unpredictable, and less visible form of migration (Engbersen, 2018).

The increasing work-motivated migration and the temporary character of it is in line with the increasing demand for temporary and flexible employees. Most employers want flexible workers in order to reduce the costs (Houseman, 2001). But the flexibility of workers has also been encouraged by labor market policy reforms that make flexibility on the labor market possible. These reforms did already start in the Netherlands during the 1980s (Wilthagen, 1998). The temporal character of these migrants results in the fact that most of them are finding employment through recruitment agencies (SEO, 2018). Regarding the position of recruitment agencies in the policy network this results in the following expectation.

Expectation 1: In a municipality where many companies are located that employ labor migrants, recruitment agencies have a stronger position since they are in control of this ‘resource’.

Because most migrants do not speak the Dutch language, or don’t have enough knowledge about regulations they become more vulnerable (Yao & van Ours, 2015). Additionally, migrants are more likely to take the less desirable jobs, because they do not have many other options than accepting poor terms and face exploitation due to forced flexibility (Ollus, 2016). Additionally, recruitment agencies also select ‘the best’ labor migrants. The agencies select for skills but also for ‘motivated’ workers and who fit the employers’ national and racialized stereotypes (Findlay et al. 2013).

In the Netherlands, the discourse on Polish migrants (the largest CEE migrant group) is predominantly negative, with references towards criminal connotations and stereotyping the group (Vink & Pratsinakis, 2014). The highest concentration of Polish migrants has developed in urban areas, which also lead to concerns about the quality of the neighborhood, housing conditions, illegality, and nuisance. Municipalities have become responsible for monitoring housing of foreign workers and are trying to find practical solutions (Engbersen, Snel & de Boom, 2010). However, municipalities deal with migration from CEE countries very differently because of the flexible migration character. Migration of CEE migrants sometimes seems

invisible, due to free movement of EU citizens and a lack of person registration, which requires a less conventional type of governing.

2.3 Governing in present times

In European countries migration politics have been normalized and most of all, have been focused on the economic function (Freeman, 1995). In the UK and Spain from late 1990s to the late 2000s, policies have moved to expansive market-based migration policies, resting on ideas about i.e. flexibility, GDP, and job creation (Balch, 2013). This is also the case for the Netherlands which has led to an increasing privatization of the control of labor migration. Employers have gotten an increasing responsibility for controlling migration, which is based on trust once a non-state actor is approved by the state. As a result, private parties have become part of safeguarding public interest (de Lange, 2011). In the policy area of spatial planning the lines between public and private have become increasingly blurred when it comes to policy making and implementation. Private actors have shown a growing interest in land development and have influenced authorities to change their land development- and land-use policy (Louw, van der Krabben & Priemus, 2003). Mutual interests of public and private actors regarding housing of labor migrants is characteristic for network governance. This is because actors cannot achieve their objective without the resources possessed by other actors. Therefore, actors position themselves strategically in the policy process, which mostly results in public-private partnerships, such as in large urban development projects (Klijn & Teisman, 2003).

Since migration from CEE countries is mostly work-motivated, governing this type of migration is very much related to private actors. Nowadays the conceptualization of 'government' as a major actor in public policy who is able to influence the economy and society has lost importance. A more present concept is that of 'governance', stressing the importance of networks, partnerships and markets and is related to the concept of new public management (Peters & Pierre, 1998). Rhodes (1997) argues that 'governing without government' is becoming dominant in advanced industrial democracies. Rhodes observed that there no longer is a mono-centric or unitary government, but there are many centers that link different levels of government. He speaks of a 'differentiated polity' that is characterized by functional and institutional specialization and fragmentation of policies and politics. In this pluralistic system, organizations depend on each other for resources. These power-dependent policy networks define the 'political marketplace'. These networks, therefore, limit participation in the policy process, define the roles of actors, decide which issues will be included and excluded, shape

behavior of actors, privilege certain interests and substitute private government for public accountability. This changed the meaning of government to a new process of governing is therefore called governance (Rhodes, 1997).

Governance entails that societal actors have become influential over policy and administration and that governments have lost power over their steering capacity, as they used to do in the past. Therefore, they are referred to as becoming 'hollow' (Peters & Pierre, 1998). The hollow state can be understood as a metaphor for the reliance of the public sector on contracting with non-profit agencies and for-profit firms, for providing taxpayer-funded goods and services. A government thus as a matter of public policy has contracted out its production capability to third parties, in order to jointly deliver public services. Especially on the local level the governing of the hollow state can seem a bit fuzzy, which can influence the legitimacy of the state (Milward & Provan, 2000). As mentioned before, the concept of networks is very important within the concept of governance. Policies result from bargaining between network members and as a result, power becomes diffused. The rationale behind this is that of the exchange theory which states that 'an organization has power, relative to an element of its task environment, to the extent that the organization has the capacity to satisfy needs of that element and to the extent that the organization monopolizes that capacity' (Thompson 1967, in Rhodes, 2007).

Within a policy network, actors can act within certain rules. These rules are procedures that are created by the interaction between actors and regulate the games within the network. The rules are not static and not always clear about how they should be interpreted. The game that is played within these rules is done by players (actors) who want to achieve a certain objective. To achieve this objective, players can apply strategies, which are a cohesive series of actions whereby ambitions are linked to the assessment of the desires and ambitions of other actors. Policy is a result of interactions between actors in games (Klijn, Koppenjan & Termeer, 1995). Two types of network management can be applied: process management by guiding and steering the interactions, and strategies of institutional design in order to change characteristics of the network. The latter can be done through strategies aimed at changing the networks composition, network-outcomes, and network-interactions. This research will mostly be concerned with process strategies since the way actors try to guide the interaction and try to activate other actors and their resources is relevant for this research (Klijn, 2005). In conclusion, resources are important for becoming part of a policy network and public actors try to manage migration through their interaction with private actors, this results in the following expectation.

Expectation 2: Private actors are part of the policy network due to the possession of certain resources and are managed by the municipality to control housing of labor migration.

2.4 Power diffusion and the policy network

Rhodes (2007) elaborates on the diffused powers, by emphasizing that organizations are dependent on other organizations for resources, which they need to exchange in order to achieve their goals. Even though decision-making for each organization is constrained by the other, the dominant coalition and the appreciative system of this coalition influences if relationships are seen as a problem and which resources will be sought. Furthermore, the dominant coalition uses strategies within the rules of the game to regulate the process of exchange. The discretion that a coalition has is a product of the goals and relative power potential of interacting organizations. The relative power in this turn is a product of the resources of each organization, the rules of the game and the process of exchange between organizations. This means steering of networks is determined by hands-off management which is characterized by diplomacy or management by negotiation. As mentioned before, this can seem fuzzy for local networks because it depends on the network being centrally or decentrally organized. When a local organization is centrally directed, the horizontal relationships in this network are transformed into vertical relationships which can influence their autonomy, distinctiveness, and effectiveness through involvement of multiple individuals with conflicting beliefs. Secondly, a network can be decentralized which sees network governance as bottom-up. This implies that many semi-autonomous powers check one another, rather than a few autonomous branches (Rhodes, 2007).

According to New Public Management, governance should be arranged by contracts and other market-like tools. In a hollow state there is not a hard separation between formation and implementation and between the variety of decisions made by many actors. Contracting, therefore, could be a way to oversee the complexity of decisions and monitor them. In most cases, public actors want to shift as many risks to the private actors, but at the same time do public actors want a firm grip on the content and the implementation process. The decision-making process within a hollow state is different from the classic form in which politicians set the goals. The complexity of the hollow state is characterized by a form of management in which formation and implementation influence each other and decisions are made in different areas of the network (Klijn, 2002).

The concept of the hollow state is a good concept in order to understand and illustrate the policy environment in which this issue is governed. However, this research will be focused on the structure of the network and the interactions within it which influence the final policy outcome. Although some, such as Dowding (1995), argue that network properties are not able to explain the policy process, but rather properties of the members of that network can be used as an explanation. Marsh and Smith (2000) argue that the institutionalization of beliefs, values, cultures, and particular forms of behavior are involved in networks. Therefore, networks result from repeated behavior and they define the roles and responses. As a result, they are not neutral, but they reflect power distributions and conflicts and shape political outcomes. In order to understand policy networks, Marsh and Smith (2000) defined three relationships. These relationships include the structure of the network and the agents within them; the network and the context it operates in; and the network and the policy outcome (Marsh & Smith, 2000).

To analyze the network related to temporary labor migrant housing policy, a policy network analysis (PNA) will be applied. The PNA emphasizes that actors within a policy network need to exchange resources in order to reach a goal. The power-dependent relationships decide which actors are in the core, which are in the periphery of the policy network, or which are completely excluded. Two opposite types of policy networks are the policy community and the issue network (Fawcett & Daugbjerg, 2012). These networks can be identified by the network structure (membership and integration), resources, and power (Fawcett & Daugbjerg, 2012; Rhodes & Marsh, 1992).

2.4.1 Network Structure

The structure of the network is defined by membership and integration (Fawcett & Daugbjerg, 2012). The first factor, membership, is defined by the number of participants (density) and the type of interests. If the numbers of membership are very limited this fits more into the policy community, if the numbers are very large this fits into an issue network. A policy community is either dominated by the government or serves the interests of all the members. It is characterized by stability, highly restricted membership, vertical interdependence and limited horizontal articulation. An issue network is unstable, has a large number of members, which have limited vertical interdependence (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992).

The density of a network is important for performing a governance role. In a dense network all actors are connected to each other. They might be connected because they have a direct linkage or through a third party. The density of a network decides if there are gaps in the network which

might result in a lack of communication, information sharing and negotiation (Parker, 2007). However, for all members of a network to sustain a relationship with all others within the network is highly unlikely or even impossible. Keeping ties with others involves costs, therefore actors need to be selective when they decide to invest in a relationship. Furthermore, do not all ties have the same strength or value, and not all actors have the same status, resources, or authority (Christopoulos, 2008).

The second factor, integration, concerns the frequency of interaction, continuity, and the consensus of it (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992). Adam and Kriesi (in Sabatier, 2007) further developed this concept into types of interactions: interactions of conflict, bargaining or cooperation. Cooperation happens when some actor 'closely collaborated' with another actor over the past five years, it is conflicting when 'some major disagreements' with other actors happened over the past five years or targeting/bargaining when an actor 'tried to influence' another actor over the past five years (Kriesi, Adam & Jochum, 2006). 'Social network theories assume that the primary unit of analysis is a social relation connecting the members of a social system'. The patterns or the presence or absence of ties within a network decide its social structure. However, in turn the structure of the network influences the perceptions, actions and attitudes of the actors. Interorganizational ties (interactions) are important in explaining the social structure of a policy domain. Resource exchanges are the interactions of these organizations and in a policy network this is mostly voluntary. However, governmental legislation or administrative regulations can cause asymmetrical power relations which rest on coercive force (Knoke, 2011).

2.4.2 Resources

The resources are categorized by the distribution of it within the network and within the organizations. The exchange of resources defines the mutual relationships. When only some actors have resources or all actors have resources, they decide how hierarchical, equal, or unequal resources are distributed through the network (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992). In order to define resources, definitions could be borrowed from the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). Network participants can use resources in order to allocate their interests. The ACF distinguishes certain resources that can be used by coalitions to influence public policy. Since the ACF and governance theory is very related and can be combined (Koebele, 2019). The following resource distinctions from the ACF will be used: formal legal authority to make policy decisions, public opinion, information, mobilizable troops, financial resources, and skillful leadership. Formal legal authority can be understood as people such as officials or

legislators but can also be seen as the access to people who are in these authoritative positions. Public opinion can be understood as support from the public that could influence the decisions of officials. Information mostly concerns studies that can be used in discussion, to bolster arguments and win political battles. Mobilizing troops is mostly done by actors that do not possess a lot of financial resources but is used to move people with shared beliefs in political activities. Financial resources can be understood as the ability to purchase other resources, such as financing research or supporting public campaigns. Skillful leadership is needed to create an attractive vision and attract and strategically use resources (Sabatier & Weible, 2007).

2.4.3 Power distribution

Power is defined by the distribution of influence between members (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992). The distribution of power can be specified by the concentration of power and the fragmentation of power. Adam and Kriesi (in Sabatier, 2007) explain that this distribution of power is all concerned with the fact if the power is concentrated in the hands of one actor or a coalition of actors, or if the power is shared equally between actors or coalitions of actors. This can be measured due to reputational measurements, based on perceived influence (Kriesi, Adam & Jochum, 2006). Together with a type of interaction this can lead to different power distributions and potential policy changes. The different combinations are illustrated in table 1.

Table 1: *Distribution of power and policy change*

Distribution of power	Type of Interaction		
	Conflict	Bargaining	Cooperation
Concentration	Dominance: Moderate potential for rapid (serial) shift	Asymmetric bargaining: Low to moderate potential for incremental change	Hierarchical cooperation: Low potential for change—maintenance of status quo
Fragmentation	Competition: High potential for rapid (serial) shift	Symmetric bargaining: Moderate to high potential for incremental change	Horizontal cooperation: Low to moderate potential for change—maintenance of status quo

(Adam & Kriesi, 2007, in Sabatier, 2007)

The policy network analysis could be used to identify the actors involved regarding the housing of labor migrants and to see how the network is structured. The network's structure, which resources are used by the involved actors, the interactions and power concentration or fragmentation are important for the policy outcome. Policy differences could possibly be linked to the role of the involved actors and the network's structure, that follow from the network analysis. In conclusion, resources are important to become part of a policy network, but the network's structure, which is determined by membership and interaction is important for the role and the power distribution of the private actor in it. As a result, the final expectation is formulated.

Expectation 3: If only a few private actors are active in an area, the power distribution will be concentrated, together with a conflicting interaction this could lead to a dominant role of the private actors, which could lead to a policy in their favor.

3. Research design

In this chapter, the research design will be explained according to the research question, operationalization of the research and the method section. The method section includes explanations about the way cases will be selected and data will be collected and analyzed. The reliability and validity of the research will also be discussed, together with some ethical considerations.

The goal of this research is to provide better insights in the different ways' municipalities manage the housing of labor migrants. This is done by a qualitative approach, with document analysis and interviews as primary research tools. To fully understand the policy network and the role of private actors, an analysis and comparison of the housing policies of Vlaardingen and Lansingerland have been chosen in order to apply an in-depth analysis.

3.1 Research question & sub-questions

To better understand policies on housing of CEE labor migrants in the municipalities of Vlaardingen and Lansingerland, the following question has been formulated:

To what extent do the municipalities of Vlaardingen and Lansingerland differently manage the housing of CEE labor migrants and what is the role of private actors?

To further explore the main research question some sub-questions have been formulated.

- *What kind of measurements are taken by the municipalities of Vlaardingen and Lansingerland regarding CEE labor migrant housing?*
- *Which private actors are involved and what is their position in the policy network of Vlaardingen and Lansingerland?*
- *How do we need to understand the role of private actors regarding the housing policies of CEE labor migrants in case of Vlaardingen and Lansingerland?*

3.2 Methods

3.2.1 Case selection

Since this research has investigated the differences between policies regarding housing of labor migrants, some parameters have been set. The first one is the number of CEE labor migrants that live in the municipality. The number of labor migrants per municipality is collected based on the registration of people in the Netherlands and divided according to nationality by Tympaan Instituut (2017). These numbers do not give an exact picture of the number of CEE labor migrants, but they provide an indication of the density per municipality. Secondly the amount of SNF registered companies have been collected through the registers of the SNF (SNF, 2020) and selected according to municipality. This gives an indication of the number of companies that are located within a municipality which are associated with housing of labor migrants. Thirdly, the municipality's need to have a policy on housing of labor migrants or a temporary housing policy and the SNF certificate needs to be present in the policy. Consequently, Vlaardingen and Lansingerland could be selected out of a group of municipalities that met these conditions.

Selection of case studies

Vlaardingen hosts little SNF registered companies compared to the number of migrants that live there, whereas Lansingerland holds a high number of SNF registrations but has relatively low numbers of registered CEE migrants. When checked for the total amount of labor migrants (so not only CEE labor migrants), Vlaardingen and Lansingerland are almost identical with respectively 1.890 and 1.880 labor migrants (Tympaan, 2017). The difference in CEE registrations can be caused by different registration methods and efforts. Furthermore, the SNF registration only indicates the main location of the company, which means that in reality companies can have multiple facilities in other municipalities. In the case of Vlaardingen, the number of CEE migrants is high but the SNF registrations are low which is the opposite of Lansingerland, see figure 1.




Figure 1: SNF registrations and number of migrants
(Source: SNF, 2020 & Tympaan, 2017)

Since Lansingerland and Vlaardingen are different regarding numbers of CEE labor migrants and SNF registrations, these two municipalities are selected as case studies for comparison. Additionally, Lansingerland and Vlaardingen are mid-large municipalities with correspondingly 62.396 and 73.445 inhabitants (CBS, 2020). Lansingerland developed a policy on housing of labor migrants in 2019 and invited several private parties to share their experiences. Vlaardingen already formulated a policy on CEE migrants in 2010 and established a covenant in 2016, with several private parties. Both municipalities incorporated the SNF norms in their policies but had a different approach in formulating their policy. Additionally, Lansingerland and Vlaardingen established their policies independently, differently from municipalities such as in the region Holland Rijnland which established a covenant together.

3.2.2 Data collection

The data collection exists out of two phases. The first one concerns the collection of data from policies regarding housing of labor migrants, the second phase includes data collection through conducting interviews. The documents relevant for the first collection phase, which contains policy data, have been collected through the municipality network system of the province of Zuid-Holland. This was made possible because of the researcher's participation in a research internship position within a taskforce focused on housing of labor migrants within the province. This way, the civil servants responsible for policy on housing of labor migrants were directly targeted and the relevant documents were provided by them. These were policy documents that include all rules and decisions that the municipalities formulated regarding housing of labor migrants. In the case of Vlaardingen an additional covenant was provided which included rules on housing of labor migrants with involved stakeholders.

Because this research provides insights in the policy network regarding housing of labor migrants in the municipalities of Vlaardingen and Lansingerland, interviews have been conducted with involved public and private actors. Public actors are actors part of the government and private actors are commercial companies. Vlaardingen signed a covenant with multiple partners, which gave a clear insight in the involved actors. Through direct contact with a civil servant, contacts with involved actors were relatively easy found. In the case of Lansingerland the involved actors were less clear because of the absence of specific documents like agreements. However, the municipality was advised on an information event, at which several private actors had participated. By approaching these actors directly and applying a continuous snowball technique, relevant actors were interviewed. In total 10 respondents participated in this research. Two municipal associated actors for both municipalities were interviewed, two private actors who were active in both municipalities, one specific private actor in Vlaardingen and three specific private actors involved in Lansingerland have been interviewed. The respondents of private actors are company owners ranging from commercial housing companies, recruitment agencies and horticulturists and are schematically displayed in figure 2. Because of the local character and ‘small world’ of these policy networks, anonymization of respondents is highly important and involved actors have been categorized according to ‘type’. The public actors are categorized according to their affiliation with policy or politics and the private actors have been categorized according to their main business core.

Vlaardingen	Lansingerland
<p>Public actors</p> <div data-bbox="197 1424 716 1543" style="background-color: #4a7ebb; color: white; padding: 5px;"> 1. Policy actor (policy-V) 2. Political actor (political-V) </div>	<p>Public actors</p> <div data-bbox="788 1424 1307 1543" style="background-color: #4a7ebb; color: white; padding: 5px;"> 3. Policy actor (policy-L) 4. Political actor (political-L) </div>
<p>Private actors</p> <div data-bbox="197 1648 716 1904" style="background-color: #4a7ebb; color: white; padding: 5px;"> 5. Recruitment agency (recruit-V) </div>	<p>Private actors</p> <div data-bbox="788 1648 1307 1904" style="background-color: #4a7ebb; color: white; padding: 5px;"> 8. Horticulturist (hort-L) 9. Housing company (housing-L) 10. Recruitment agency (recruit-L) </div>

Figure 2: Division of respondents

The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured form, with guidance of the concepts that followed out of the theoretical analysis. The semi-structured approach has also been applied in order to give space for new interpretations since the issue is of a complex nature. New important actors and unexpected case specific issues could come to the table during the interviews. The interviews have been conducted through video calling which made it possible to record the conversations. However, there was one exception where an interview was done through phone calling, which did not allow for audio-recording. Therefore, this interview will be treated as an explorative interview.

Due to the current Corona-Crisis, the data collection phase was done differently from normal conditions. Interviews have been done through video-calling which had an influence on the results because no full body-language could be applied and because of the dependence on technical possibilities. Sometimes internet-connection related problems occurred, which have influenced the quality of the audio recording, but also due to video malfunction it wasn't always continuously possible to see the respondent's visual appearances. Additionally, not all companies were willing to participate. One's priority was not always concerned with participating in a research, especially because companies associated with labor migrants have to deal with a decrease of demand for labor force in certain sectors and because most houses are too overcrowded and do not comply to the corona-measurements of the RIVM (NOS, 2020).

3.2.3 Data analysis

The policy documents of Vlaardingen and Lansingerland have been submitted to an in-depth content analysis. By open coding in Atlas.ti, essential parts of the documents have been identified. This form of close reading provides the possibility to identify specific parts of their policy and categorize them, so they could be compared with each other, in order to see if they deviate. The deviances could be an indication for any prevailing interests or power relations that follow from the policy network analysis.

Accordingly, in order to explain the policy differences between the two municipalities, a policy network analysis has been applied to both cases, to identify the context, the network's structure, and the actor's positions. This analysis is done through coding of the interviews with help of Atlas.ti. The categories that followed from the literature on policy network analysis and governance have been used to categorize the answers and identify them according to the theories.

Because multiple respondents indicated that the topic of this research is highly politically sensitive, anonymization of the data was essential. Respondents have agreed to the fact that the researcher will prevent including personal or any traceable information in the results of this research. Furthermore, the data is saved at a safe offline place, in order to guard the privacy and interests of the respondents.

3.3 Operationalization

In order to answer the research question, important parts of the relevant theories have been operationalized. The relevant concepts that follow out of the theories are defined in the table below:

Table 2: *Operationalization table*

Network identification variables	Sub-variables	Indicators	Characteristics	Questions
Network structure	Membership	Density	Direct relationship between actors, via third party or gaps between actors	How many actors are involved in the realization of housing and who work together?
		Type of interests/ goal	Which type of housing is of interest for the involved parties	What is the most important objective with regards to realizing housing? Which type? Where? Small/ large scale Short-stay / Mid-stay / Long-stay housing Location: neighborhoods, rural area, business area, own property
	Interaction	Cooperation	Closely co-operated with actor over the past five years	Which actor(s) did you collaborate with over the last five years? How would you describe this collaboration?
		Conflict	Major disagreements with this actor over the past five years	With which actor(s) did you have a major disagreement over the past five years? How would you describe this?
		Bargaining	Tried to influence actor over the past five years	Which actor(s) did you try to influence over the past five years and how did you do that?
		Interaction guiding	Position of actor in interaction for example mediating or brokering	How would you describe your position in guiding interactions between actors?
		Activation of actors and resources	How the actor tried to activate others and their resources for example through selective activation or coalition building	How did you try to activate actors and their resources?
Resources	Distribution within the network	Mobilizing troops	Ability to move people with shared interest to realize housing	Do you actively reach out to people in order to start a (community) movement regarding housing of labor migrants?

		Public opinion	Ability to communicate and gain public support for housing	Do you have contacts with the press, and do you use them if you want to gain attention regarding housing of labor migrants?
	Distribution within the organization	Formal legal authority	Own position or access to someone with formal authority to realize housing	Do you have access, or do you know someone who has legal authority in order to realize housing?
		Information	Ability to strategically use information in order to realize housing	Do you gather information regarding housing of labor migrants, and do you use this to realize it?
		Financial resources	Ability to use financial resources to realize housing	Do you have access to sufficient financial resources to realize housing or do you know someone who has it?
		Skillful leadership	Efficiently use resources and attract new resources to realize housing	Does leadership provide you a position in the policy network?
Distribution of power	Concentration	One actor or coalition has the most power	Perceived influence of different actors	Name all influential actors over the past 5 years? Name three most influential organizations? Which organization or coalition is most influential?
	Fragmentation	Power is shared between actors and coalitions		

3.4 Reliability and validity

Reliability

This research is based on qualitative methods which have a certain degree of reliability and validity. Reliability comes forward from the extent that a research can be replicated. However, with qualitative research, the data retrieved from the interviews is highly context specific. Therefore, the quality of qualitative research can hardly be judged by its repeatability, but rather by its 'trustworthiness' (Golafshani, 2003). The trustworthiness of a research can be influenced by the researcher himself, the methods, and the contextual situation (Baarda et al, 2013). For example, when the researcher had a bad day this influences the interview and due to the previous mentioned corona conditions, this as well influences the outcome. The trustworthiness can be checked by following the methodological steps. The interviews (except for one) that are conducted for this research are audio-recorded. Furthermore, the audio recordings are transcribed and analyzed through the coding program Atlas.ti. This way the results of this research can be traced back to the source. Secondly, the usage of concepts derived from theories have been used during the interviews, which was important to secure the relevance of the questions that were asked to the respondents. However, a narrow focus of two municipalities have been chosen. This allows for details, but the two local situations also can be defined as 'a small world' therefore, results can be influenced by other factors.

Validity

Since this research is highly politically sensitive as mentioned by respondents, it is arguable that power-related questions or other topics that could possibly reveal a companies' strategy were not answered in full honesty. Socially desirable answers influence the validity of the data (Baarda et al, 2013). Validity concerns the extent that the data matches reality and thus the quality of the data. By assuring the respondents of the anonymization of the data, an attempt was done to increase the degree of honesty of the answers that were given. This way, this research was conducted in a most valid way possible. Additionally, the research is conducted by using a combination of document analysis and interviews. Such a triangulation of methods can improve the validity of the results. Furthermore, it is important to be aware of prejudices, assumptions, overdocumentation, fast judgement and ask for advice and feedback from colleagues (Baarda et al, 2013). By writing down expectations, the researcher has tried to indicate and create awareness of its assumptions. Secondly, documentation is done by previous mentioned methods but also by utilizing a personal logbook to keep track of new insights.

Finally, colleague researchers have been giving their advice on developments, which was very useful for prevention of becoming too subjective and developing a tunnel-vision.

3.5 Ethical considerations

Since this research provides insights in the policy network regarding housing of labor migrants, power struggles and policy influences of private actors will be exposed. Therefore, substantive, and sensitive information is needed. Especially for private companies this can be difficult to grant, since this might influence their image and strategies. Therefore, the data used in this research is anonymized. The goal of this research is to explore the differences of policy on housing of labor migrants and how public-private policy cooperation is developing. By comparing two different municipalities, policy and network differences have been illustrated. However, caution should be taken when nominating these two cases as typical or ideal models. Developments in this policy field are in full motion, with many varieties between municipalities. Nevertheless, the outcomes of this research could be used as explanatory and inspirational for yet to be developed policies and studies. Afterall, more knowledge is needed regarding the role of private actors in migration policy research since a knowledge gap is still existent in both scientific and societal dimensions.

4. Context

In 2016 there were 371.000 Central-European and Eastern-European (CEE) labor migrants in the Netherlands. They come mostly from Poland, Czech, Slovakia, Hungary, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria. 49% of them worked as temporary workers. In total, these labor migrants fulfill 514.000 jobs which accounts for 4,7% of total jobs in the Netherlands and 11 billion of the National income (ABU, 2018). Most of these labor migrants find jobs through recruitment agencies, mostly in the agriculture sector, the temporary employment sector, and business services. They also find jobs in the shipping sector, logistics, machine building, food production, cleaning industry and metal industry. Only 37% of the CEE labor migrants who work in the Netherlands are also registered. Most jobs where labor migrants work, are regionally located in the south and west of the Netherlands (SEO, 2018). Local governments of these areas mostly have to deal with the housing of labor migrants as well. In this chapter relevant contextual information will be provided in order to better understand the different issues and public/private actors that are involved regarding housing policy of CEE labor migrants.

4.1 Housing of labor migrants and the position of private actors

In principle the migrant worker is responsible for his or her housing. Due to the length of stay and limited resources, social-housing or owner-occupied housing is not possible for CEE labor migrants. In the Netherlands migrants and non-migrants need to subscribe to a waiting list if they want to apply for social housing, which can take a long time. The alternatives are flats, which are sometimes offered with inflated rents and informal contracts. Labor migrants are therefore dependent on the private part of the housing market and vulnerable due to a lack of knowledge about legislation and regulations and a lack of alternatives. As a result, migrants mostly end up sharing an apartment because it is too expensive to afford it themselves. However, when labor migrants are recruited, housing is facilitated by private actors based on clustered contractual relationships, which includes facilities which are easily available, temporary, and strictly managed. Because these facilities are strictly regulated, nuisances, domestic-violence and over-occupation are less likely to occur. In unregulated facilities, when the migrant's autonomy is higher, nuisances, domestic-violence and over-occupation is more likely to occur (Reeger & Enengel, 2015).

Most labor migrants find work through recruitment agencies or get recruited directly by an agrarian company. In these cases, housing needs to be offered under the collective labor

agreement (CAO) of the agrarian sector and the recruitment sector. Companies within these CAO's need to provide good housing for temporary labor migrants which they recruit (SER, 2014). They can organize this themselves or outsource this to commercial housing companies (Platform31, 2015).

To illustrate what kind of regulations are applied, the CAO for the recruitment sector is further elaborated upon in this section. According to this CAO the employee (migrant) is not obliged to make use of the offered housing facility, and it also is not a requirement for employment. The recruitment agency needs to have a register with an overview of all the facilities with the number of occupants and the following facility types are allowed:

- Regular residence house
- Hotel/Pension
- Living units in a building complex
- Chalets/living units
- Facilities on a recreational area
- Or other forms that are allocated as such by SNF

Regular houses and living units in a building complex need to have a minimum of 12 square meters of utility surface. For hotels/pensions, chalets/living units, and facilities on recreational areas the living surface needs to be a minimum of 10 square meters. Other points of importance are safety, hygiene and the presence of sanitation, fridges, and cooking facilities. These CAO norms are operative when the recruitment agency withholds a percentage of the migrant's income, this can be a maximum of 25 percent of the gross minimum wage (BZK,2019). Furthermore, the recruitment agency needs to inform the employee about registering in the persons register of the municipality. When the working period ends, the recruitment agency needs to offer the employee a reasonable amount of time to leave the facility (ABU, 2020).

Most labor migrants are satisfied with their living conditions, mostly due to the temporary character of their housing, but also due to a dual frame of reference, concerning the difference in norms of qualities in the home country and in the Netherlands. However, labor migrants also would like to pay less and would like to have more living space and room for privacy. These attitudes are also influenced by the connectedness with the home country and the Netherlands (Engbersen et al. 2011). Temporality is therefore considered to influence the demand for housing, increasingly in the short and mid-stay facilities. It is argued that migrants who stay for a short period of time demand less from their living facilities than migrants who will stay for a

longer period of time and thus require other forms of housing. Migrants who want to stay permanently have the same available options as everyone else in the Netherlands (Platform31, 2015). It is assumed that migrants who stay shorter than 6 months would be suitably accommodated in living units at an agrarian company, in a lodging building or a hotel/pension. Migrants who stay longer than 6 months would best be accommodated in chalets or mobile homes, demolition homes, or regular houses (BZK, 2010).

However, private parties also look at the costs and profits. When housing is becoming too expensive because it needs to meet quality standards, the private actors are willing to move their housing capacity to another municipality with less strict rules, since it is more profitable to travel longer between the living area and working location, than providing expensive housing (VNG, 2013).

4.2 The role of the municipality

The municipality's responsibility is to make a policy framework for housing facility rules. In order to formulate a policy framework, municipalities can inform labor migrants and employers to get an indication of the demand for types of housing. Additionally, interest groups such as Pools Overlegplatform in Nederland (PLON) could be asked for advice (VNG, 2013). The municipality decides what is allowed and sets rules in a land use plan (bestemmingsplan) and the general local regulation (algemeen plaatselijke verordening). Rules can include the obligation of a night register, a maximum number of rooms that may be rented, distance between houses or a maximum number of households. The municipality has the power to decide whether a building permit may be granted, but it also has a responsibility to communicate with entrepreneurs and the surrounding inhabitants and align policy with law enforcement (VROM & SZW).

In general, two area distinctions are made regarding the location of housing: the village (kern) and the rural area (buitengebied). Municipalities try to identify the demand for housing from employers and have to decide which type of facilities they want to allow. They mostly make a distinction between large scale and small-scale facilities. (VROM et al. 2008). In case of a demand for facilities in a rural area (buitengebied), such as housing on camp sites, recreational facilities, or other non-urban areas, municipalities need to take into account the policy of the province. The transformation of existing buildings like office buildings or a former nursing home located in a rural area, could be interesting locations to use for lodges. However, strict safety measures can limit the options and regulations need to align with the policy of the province (BZK, 2010). Municipalities are responsible for enforcement of the regulations

supported by several organizations. The municipality checks the housing for abuses in several phases and has coercive power which the executive parties have to comply with (Expertisecentrum Flexwonen, 2020).

4.3 The SNF certificate

The SNF uses the same facility types as mentioned in the recruitment CAO, however it has stricter and more detailed requirements for the facilities. Such as 3,5 square meters for sleeping area, presence of a chair and closet or microwave (SNF, 2019).

When companies are registered in the SNF register, they become eligible for the ‘bed-voor-bed’ regulation. The goal of this regulation is to reduce undesirable housing situations and to prevent unlawful housing or tolerance situations which make the collaboration between municipality and employers less transparent. The regulation makes it possible for employers to discuss possible locations with the municipality. Every bed that disappears needs to be replaced with a new bed. In order to get to use this regulation, recruitment agencies also need to have the ‘Stichting Normering Arbeid’ certificate (SNF, 2020). Employers and municipalities share a collective intention based on transparency and certainty. The employer provides insight in all the locations and will try to suit it to the law and regulations and the municipality has to be transparent in providing information for the employer about existing or possible locations regarding housing (VNG, 2012).

5. Results

In this chapter the findings from the policy analysis and the interviews are presented. First a case description is formulated in order to better understand the contextual differences. Next the policy analysis illustrates the most important measurements that are taken by the municipality. Some explanatory information from the interviews has been added here, but since the findings from the policy analysis could not fit into the same indicator divisions, they have been separated. However, some elements of the policy will return, e.g. under interests. The findings that result from the interviews have been categorized by the indicators resulting from the theories. Moreover, the findings are sorted by municipality and public/private actors, in order to compare the two cases. The network structure is determined by membership and interaction. Furthermore, resources are divided according to distribution within the network and within the organization. Finally, the power distribution is determined by concentration and fragmentation of power.

5.1 Case description

Vlaardingen and Lansingerland have different contextual situations. As described by the owner of a recruitment agency who is active in both municipalities, Lansingerland is a municipality with a high demand for labor migrants. This is due to the flower auction and companies that affiliate with this kind of business such as greenhouse horticulture companies. *‘those companies need labor migrants, but due to a season-effect or because they do not have the capacity to organize it themselves, they hire a recruitment agency’* (recruit-V&L). Secondly, the average value of the buildings (woz-waarde) in Lansingerland is much higher than in Vlaardingen, which makes it more interesting to house people in Vlaardingen. Consequently, the owner of the recruitment agency emphasizes that Vlaardingen only experiences the ‘down sides’ of labor migrants, since the image of labor migrants is not very good.

‘when these people are done working, they go home, open a beer, and then they are causing the nuisance, ... this is the image people have’ (recruit-V&L). As a consequence the policy regarding housing of labor migrants in Vlaardingen is of a different nature than in Lansingerland.

5.2 Core policy elements

Vlaardingen

Vlaardingen was one of the first municipalities to pay special attention to housing of labor migrants, starting in 2010. In this policy, general rules were formulated such as the maximum week-rent of 65 euro's, a maximum amount of 4 people per house and since Vlaardingen has mostly social housing, housing corporations got an important role and responsibility regarding allocating houses. Secondly, a clear emphasis on the integration of CEE labor migrants was part of the policy (Vlaardingen, 2009). According to the political actor of the municipality of Vlaardingen, the housing of labor migrants became problematic during the financial crisis. *“at a certain point during the economic crisis, you saw that houses were hardly sold and recruitment agencies and pawnbrokers started buying cheap houses”* (political-V). These houses (in living areas) were used for the housing of labor migrants. However, because this caused nuisances such as screaming, drug and alcohol abuse and other forms of exploitation, the municipality wanted to act. *“something that also happens is that they [labor migrants] rent a bed for eight hours, that means that the same bed is rented three times within 24 hours”* (political-V). As a result, a covenant was established. The covenant emphasizes the importance of integration of labor migrants in society. Dutch language lessons need to be provided and support in finding permanent housing are responsibilities for the private actors. Therefore, participating actors are only allowed to provide housing for labor migrants that will stay for a minimum of 4 months. Increasing person registration is important to create safe housing and minimize damage to the surroundings. The involved private parties need to be SNF registered and have other authorized certificates. The covenant obliges the municipality to facilitate 300 housingplaces and has a special focus on the allocation of demolition homes. The covenant safeguards a maximum number of people per house. This means that for a one-family home, a max of 4 people is allowed without children. The recruitment agencies and housing companies have a lot of responsibilities regarding intensive surveillance, administration, furniture and norms of SNF. Furthermore, it is not possible for other parties to join the covenant unless all participating parties agree or can show that the entrance of a new covenant partner will affect their interests (Gemeente Vlaardingen et al. 2016).

Lansingerland

The situation in Lansingerland differs from Vlaardingen. The need for housing for labor migrants was not so urgent until very recently. Due to the demand of companies and

infrastructural problems caused by the movement of labor migrants between the large cities as The Hague and Rotterdam or Vlaardingen, are mentioned by three actors (public and private) as motivations for developing policy. The municipality organized an informative event (beeldvormingsavond) and invited six private actors, ranging from recruitment agencies to horticulturists, in order to be informed on the issue. *‘it was a meeting which everyone looked positively back on because all the issues were discussed. Everyone was able to speak such as counsellors, that could ask questions to for example recruitment agencies’* (political-L). The policy that was developed emphasizes that the municipality keeps in control in judging every initiative regarding housing of labor migrants. The municipality judges the facility based on several rules such as parking norms, the owner needs to have the SNF certificate, agreements about management and maintenance by the owner, there needs to be a communication protocol and complaints need to be registered. Enforcement does the municipality through a so called ‘piepsysteem’, which is based on notifications of violations of the land use plan or other complaints. Owners that violate the rules and thus cause many notifications through the ‘piepsysteem’ can get a fine or the location will be evicted. Room-by-room rental in living neighborhoods is not allowed and it is not allowed to accommodate more than 4 persons per house. The municipality holds a maximum number of houses and distance between the different houses that can be used for room rental. In the rural area (buitengebied) it is not allowed to have more than 6 people in a house. The establishment of permanent new or re-structured buildings requires the belief that it will stay within the far future and increasing registration of labor migrants needs to be done as in Westland. Finally, regarding communication, citizen participation is needed in order to discuss issues like parking or noise disturbance. The most remarkable feature of Lansingerland’s policy is that it is allowed to build housing on the property of a horticulturist’s property. The policy document includes an indication of a ‘good business case’ between 30 and 250 housing places. Currently a developing framework (ontwikkelingskader) is being established by a working group initiated by the policy makers, including two recruitment agencies and two horticulturists, in order to create a framework with all additional rules for approving a project at the horticulturists property (Gemeente Lansingerland, 2019).

5.3 Membership

5.3.1 Density

Public actors Vlaardingen:

Public actors in Vlaardingen do not exactly know how many companies want to or already participate in housing of labor migrants in their municipality. This is mostly due to bad registration of people. Vlaardingen tries to get a grip on the number of companies by using the covenant as a way to create a group of ‘good guys’ as described by a policy actor. The covenant establishment in 2016 was in the first place initiated to challenge the situation in a large flat, after the mayor had intervened. The municipality of Vlaardingen established the covenant with several housing corporations, recruitment agencies and housing companies. Moreover, he describes that the municipality wants to act facilitating and that it is also hard to select the right companies.

‘‘sometimes there are business constructions from here to Tokyo (as if there is no end to it). You got to have time and possibility to check all of them’’ (policy-V). Through the years, two covenantpartners dropped out of the covenant, which left three commercial partners in total. After at least five years, the municipality has agreed on 3 locations where the partners can realize their housing.

Public actors Lansingerland:

Public actors in Lansingerland do not exactly know how many companies want to, or already participate in housing of labor migrants in their municipality. However, a policy actor emphasizes that this is not important to know, since the municipality facilitates, and private actors need to come to them. Nevertheless, the municipality tries to select reliable private actors. This is done by organizing an informative event, where housing companies, recruitment agencies and horticulturists could share their opinion. The political actor in Lansingerland also emphasizes the importance of large companies like Zalando, that are located in the municipality and also have a demand for labor migrants. However, these companies were not represented at the informative event. Additionally, he admits that the selection of presented private actors was slightly subjective, but overall large companies with ‘well known’ names. Remarkable is that companies that were found in the SNF register did not participate in the informative event nor were mentioned during the interviews.

Private actors Vlaardingen:

The housing company that has been active in the two municipalities emphasizes that there are more private parties active in Vlaardingen than in Lansingerland, due to more available options regarding housing in Vlaardingen. However, the recruitment agency that is active in both municipalities argues that there are only a few recruitment agencies politically active, mostly due to the political sensitivity of the topic. *“look if you raise your head above ground level, mostly it is chopped off and that is why we mostly catch a lot of wind. If you google us you can see quite a lot political oriented articles which are no happy messages”* (recruit-V&L). The two recruitment agencies who are part of the covenant had a share of 130 apartments in a flat building, which is good for the housing of 260 labor migrants. This was partly the reason why they could join the covenant and remain their housing capacity. According to one of the recruitment agencies, these apartments have been in ownership for over 6 years. The intended group forming by the municipality of ‘good’ and ‘reliable’ private actors, is however not reserved for every company as described by the recruitment agency who is active in both municipalities. He explains that due to the political sensitivity of the issue actors need the resources in order to stand one’s ground in this political field.

Private actors Lansingerland:

Lansingerland has a different economic situation than Vlaardingen, with a large share of horticulturists. According to the horticulturist, this includes more than 300 horticulturist companies, which is good for 1900 hectares. Additionally, recruitment agencies are active in Lansingerland, to provide labor force for the horticulturists. Logically, these private parties were invited to speak at the informative event and two horticulturists, and two recruitment agencies are working on the developing framework. All the housing and recruitment actors were not largely active in Lansingerland yet.

5.3.2 Interests

Public actors Vlaardingen:

The political and policy actors in Vlaardingen emphasize that they want to reduce nuisance as much as possible. They want to regulate the housing of labor migrants and create transparency by using a covenant and work together with benevolent parties. As described by a policy actor, the municipality was in the midst of an urban renewal and locations, mostly property of housing corporations, were being restructured. *“houses become available, which are complexes of the*

corporations that are nominated for demolition. That is great because this always takes two or three years, the regular residents go somewhere else, we put labor migrants in there, that was a profit situation for everyone'' (policy-V). The number of 300 houses that should be facilitated, was a political decision, without much substantiation according to the policy actor. The emphasis on integration on the contrary was a deliberately chosen topic. Both the policy as the political actors emphasize the importance of the availability of language support. The political actor describes that language is important to establish understanding between labor migrants and Dutch people, something that is normalized for other newcomers. *''this is not different from our approach towards other groups of newcomers in the Netherlands. So we wanted the covenantpartners to provide Dutch language lessons''* (political-V). Additionally, the municipality wants to increase personal registration. This is done by applying a tourist tax for 'empty houses', but also by additional agreements with the covenant partners. *''the price that they [partners] pay for that is that we have agreed that the houses they possess in residential areas, that they will let a family live there or otherwise the houses need to go back to the market''* (political-V).

According to the policy actor, new locations for housing for the covenant partners have been allocated at the edge of the city center, but it took a long time to decide where they should be located, since this was never included in the covenant. *''we spent 6/7 years to let the council decide where the locations should come, because you get residential uproar, not in my backyard''* (policy-V). This way, space is created for housing of labor migrants and by allowing only a family or a maximum of 2 people at one location (except for the covenantpartners), with a maximum value (woz-waarde) of 200.000 euros. The municipality tries to force owners of houses to give them back to the market. Additionally, the political actor foresees other side effects of forced registration such as better garbage collection. *''garbage collection is calculated according to the number of residents per area. When there are 300 houses registered as empty, but every house contains four people, then this is no longer correct''* (political-V).

Public actors Lansingerland:

According to a policy actor in Lansingerland, the companies that are active within the horticulture industry are one of the best in the world, so that requires good people. Together with increasing demands from labor migrants, good housing is needed. The political actor/co-initiator for policy on housing of labor migrants describes that he was notified about the issue by an entrepreneur on a New Year's Eve drink in 2018, he saw the importance of housing of

labor migrants for the economy of Lansingerland. *‘as a company nowadays you need to provide good housing for labor migrants, otherwise they say we know another place to go’* (political-L).

Additionally, he emphasizes the importance of infrastructural obstruction due to traffic jams. He describes that first the housing of labor migrants for horticulture had priority and because this could be realized in the rural areas (buitengebied), this was less politically sensitive and thus easier to agree on. The municipality does not set a goal of a certain number of housing units such as Vlaardingen, however, the policy allows for a minimum of 30 and a maximum of 250 housing units. Contrary, the political actor mentions that large facilities should not be the aim of the policy. *‘it was not the intention to realize locations with hundreds of people. The idea was that if you are a horticulturist and you have a spare piece of property that you can create housing which is not of large scale. It was not the intention to realize a place or multiple places for hundreds’* (political-L).

Private actors Vlaardingen:

All the recruitment agencies have a clear preference for large scale housing. One recruitment agency which is only active in Vlaardingen explains that large facilities are technically and logistically better organizable. Because a large-scale facility is more viable, it is possible to have a concierge in the building that manages things like incoming mail, opening the door or cleaning. *‘ofcourse we want to build large projects in which you can house minimal 150 or 200 people. That is well manageable and is good for the community, because it is not spread all over the city so nuisance can be prevented’* (recruit-V). Another recruitment agency that is active within both municipalities, nuances this image by explaining that large scale is mostly preferable for labor migrants that stay for a short period and that people who stay longer or permanently need fully-fledged houses. *‘at onese we want large scale housing for people who stay for a relatively short period, because then you have a protected environment. At the other side we want regular living houses for the people that stay for a longer period of time’* (recruit-V&L).

Private actors Lansingerland:

The two housing companies do not have a strong preference for large scale housing. They also prefer small housing, which can be in multiple locations, this is also better manageable. One of the two housing companies that is active in Lansingerland, gives special preferences for a

minimum of 30 people and a maximum of 70 or 80 people at one location. *‘‘I believe in buildings that allow between 30 and 70-80 people. 30 because you want to keep it profitable and 70-80 so it stays overseeable’’* (housing-L). However, the owner of the housing company that was active within both municipalities emphasizes that small facilities also have less political resistance than large facilities. Furthermore does he explain that additional factors also play a role in deciding which facility is interesting. *‘‘the location, accessibility to shops or other accommodations. Occasions that promote convenience’’* (housing-V&L) For this housing actor a condition is that the land needs to be included, if the price for the land is too expensive, the opportunity is not interesting anymore.

The horticulturalist explains that he wants good housing close to its company. He emphasizes that currently people are driving from cities where they live in bad conditions, to the companies where they work, which is ridiculous and also burdensome for the Dutch citizens who experience housing shortages. He agrees with the recruitment agency that large scale facilities are preferred. But some additional facilities are needed to improve the quality of the living conditions for recreational purposes. *‘‘enough qualitative facilities that facilitate a place where they can live well and also has recreational possibilities, at a short distance from the residential areas so they can do their shoppings ... that is very good possible because the greenhouse areas are very close to the residential areas’’* (hort-L). A recruitment agency explains that additional facilities are needed and that they would like to do more than the SNF norms prescribe, but in order to realize this, the project needs to be large enough and last enough time to be profitable. *‘‘ minimal 100 men and minimal 15 years is what you need, otherwise you cannot do the math’’* (recruit-L).

The owner of a housing company active in Lansingerland also reflects on the current corona-crisis and explains that housing at the property of a horticulture company would be ideal for quarantaining. Furthermore, does he argue that large scale facilities cause problems regarding the spreading of the corona-virus and the impossibility to quarantine the full facility.

5.4 Interaction

5.4.1 Interaction guiding

Vlaardingen:

Interaction guiding is an indicator that is only relevant for public actors, since this is seen as a tool that public actors can apply in the context of governance. In Vlaardingen interaction developed out of an existing situation. But here, guiding interaction is mostly used as a tool to justify the municipality's approach and collaboration with the private parties. A political actor from the municipality once went to a facility of a recruitment agency for surveillance. By making pictures of the housing and sharing this with other political actors, the actor was able to convince others that the partners are doing well. Additionally, the political actor asked the covenant-partners to give a presentation to other political actors in order to show what requirements they committed to and to show that they are good willing. *'what does it mean to meet up to the SNF norms ... which rentalprices do people need to think of, which houses do you rent for which price, does the council know that you present your payroll administration to the tax authorities and what the consequences of that are and that you register the people who live in the houses''* (political-V).

Lansingerland:

In Lansingerland interaction guiding by the municipality is rather clear. By organizing an information event and channeling input from four actors in a working group, the municipality guides and decides which companies have a say. The municipality did not decide to only select private actors that are active within the municipality but searched for actors that could provide knowledge and advice to the municipality.

5.4.2 Cooperation

Public actors Vlaardingen:

The policy actor of the municipality explains that the collaboration developed smoothly. This is because everyone understood that the covenant is relevant for every single actor. *'I think its an excellent collaboration, that is why the covenant exists and we are busy establishing a new version, because everyone sees the importance and the profits''* (policy-V).

Public actors Lansingerland:

The political actor of the municipality explains that he has close contact with some entrepreneurs, such as with one of the housing companies. He discusses the topic with them. However, the input from private actors was collected during an informative meeting, which was experienced as constructive and positive. *“that informative event was received very enthusiastically and positive and then you have all the parties at one table ... the conversation that came forward concluded that everyone said we need to realize housing for labor migrants”* (political-L)

Private actors Vlaardingen:

All three private parties that are participating in the covenant in Vlaardingen emphasize that they joined the covenant in order to cooperate with the municipality. The housing company explains that the covenant was established because of mutual profits. *“this really went in coordination with each other, which was profitable for everyone. ... It is in everyone’s interests”* (housing-V&L). He emphasizes that the covenant is created by the municipality, but that the private partners have been giving their input. The reason for being part of the covenant also depends on the attitude of a company, how driven it is and if it is prepared to ‘draw a line’ for itself.

Private actors Lansingerland:

The recruitment agency that is active in both municipalities explains that he experiences a ‘mega-cooperative’ cooperation with both municipalities. The same goes for the horticulturist and recruitment agency in Lansingerland, who explain that everyone agreed that it is good for the local economy to house labor migrants within the municipality and that you cannot leave it to the large cities. The horticulturist explains that it is very logical that the municipality cooperates with companies in the horticulture sector, since this covers a large share of the economy. *“in Lansingerland you see that two thirds of the economy is horticultural related, so it is very logical that the municipality and that sector consult each other about all kinds of issues. This includes energy, water and labor, those are the logically interfaces”* (hort-L). These topics are discussed in gatherings organized by the municipality.

5.4.3 Conflict

Public actors Vlaardingen:

Although most actors experience cooperation in both municipalities, there are also some forms of conflict. In Vlaardingen, the covenant used to include two more private partners. These two dropped out because they did not comply with the agreements. The policy actor describes this as ‘starting problems’. *‘that one dropped-out, that was a partner that did not greatly kept appointment, so we intervened and he was evicted, that kind of things happen’* (policy-V).

Public actors Lansingerland:

Interaction with involved actors is overall not seen as conflicting. However, the political actor emphasizes that the process is very slow. This is due to the ‘the fourth power’, which are the civil servants that have to make the policy. Additionally, internal political struggles slow down the policy making. *‘honestly, my own party has something against the concept of flexhouses’* (political-L).

Private actors Vlaardingen:

The housing company who is part of the covenant describes that the parties that dropped out had enough housing in other areas, and because they did not show up at meetings and were not active enough towards the municipality they lost their position in the covenant. *‘they had enough housing at another place, so they were okay with it. Therefore, they paid less attention for appointments, meetings, they did not apply acquisition and thus they were not in the spotlight which means that you do not have a say when things are to be allocated’* (housing-V&L).

A recruitment agency in Vlaardingen explains that establishing a large scale project despite the covenant, was still a hard job due to public opposition and too little perseverance from the municipality.

‘I have been busy with [location] for four years to get it off the ground, a lot of resistance from the public opinion, mostly from the neighbours. The municipality did not have enough power to get it through, which has cost a lot of money and eventually nobody has anything. And we were forced to use houses that are designated for the citizens of Vlaardingen’ (recruit-V).

Private actors Lansingerland:

The housing company that has been active in both municipalities experience resistance from local politics. He describes that during two or three meetings with the municipality, it became clear that the municipality and its politics were against their plans. Therefore, it becomes a commercial decision to invest more time and energy or to move to another municipality where projects are easier realized. *‘Eventually the length of time that it takes is also discouraging to invest more energy. Because there are more cases that ask your full attention and if you feel that the feasibility is limited, then you move your focus to a different location in a municipality where the feasibility is higher’* (housing-V&L). Another housing company that is active in Lansingerland emphasizes that he experiences a conflict with the policy makers. According to him the development of the policy is taking too long and the policy makers have too much to say about it. The policy maker is good at guiding communication according to the housing company, which comes to expression in conversations that the two actors have on the issue. Both housing companies indicate that due to the tiresome and slow process, they are not interested in Lansingerland anymore.

5.4.4 Bargaining

Public actors Vlaardingen & Lansingerland:

The public actors do not see bargaining as a way that the covenant was established. The municipality sets rules and the partners have to oblige to them. Only on the number of housing units in Vlaardingen the policy actor admits that the private actors wanted more but that it eventually was a political decision.

Private actors Vlaardingen:

According to the housing company that is active in both municipalities, the covenant in Vlaardingen is a compromise and was established because they provided transparency and clear communication towards the municipality in order to show that they meet the requirements. *‘when you are in the covenant, you need to commit yourself to the rules and frequently join meetings and discuss the current situation and the adjustments that according to the covenant take place’* (housing-V&L). The housing company explains that this good behaviour eventually led to the fact that they were more likely to get into business and got the requested housing. The recruitment agency in Vlaardingen explains that they used private housing as an alternative, but also as a sort of pressing tool for realizing projects since the municipality wants to prevent labor

migrants from being housed in private homes. *“That is no secret, but it is a big stick so that the projects will come off the ground. On the other hand, we also do not want separated houses divided over the city, that is technically not convenient”* (recruit-V).

Private actors Lansingerland:

The housing company that has been active in both municipalities explains the difference between the two municipalities. In Vlaardingen locations were allocated, through the covenant. However, in Lansingerland it is important to provide yourself a position, in order to get something done. This is done by *“lobbying, lobbying, lobbying”* (housing-V&L). However, because in Lansingerland the horticulture sector is large they also have the best lobbying position.

“Lansingerland has a large greenhouse area, so the interests of those entrepreneurs is very high for the economy of Lansingerland. So you see that politics say, let the horticulturists manage it themselves.” (housing-V&L). The horticulturist confirms that they have tried to convince politicians by providing a good and honest message at the informative event.

5.5 Resources within the network

5.5.1 Mobilizing troops

Public actors Vlaardingen:

Public actors in Vlaardingen did not mention the importance of mobilizing troops.

Public actors Lansingerland:

In Lansingerland the political actor explains that it is important to mobilize people and form coalitions. However, this is not always an easy task, especially when there is also disagreement on the issue within its own party.

Private actors Vlaardingen:

The private parties in Vlaardingen do not see the importance of mobilizing troops with regards to the covenant. However, a recruitment agency argues that the frequent shifting of political actors in Vlaardingen makes it hard to realize housing and slows down the process, since they have different beliefs.

Private actors Lansingerland:

Private actors in Lansingerland do not mention the importance of mobilizing troops explicitly. However, because one of the recruitment agencies is active in both municipalities, a political actor from Vlaardingen will ‘have a talk’ with a colleague in Lansingerland. Also, a housing company in Lansingerland was able to convince political actors with shared beliefs to put the issue on the political agenda.

5.5.2 Public opinion

Public actors Vlaardingen:

The policy actor of Vlaardingen explains that the covenant partners are subject to a lot of exposure because they are easily found and therefore blamed. Which is used by political parties that do not like the plans. *‘because these [partners] actors are easily found and we know a lot about them, some local political parties that do not like everything, zoom in at the covenant partners and say that they are a mess. This costs a lot of time, but they never could prove that something was wrong. As a result, the actors that are not part of the covenant and are not bonafide can do what they want’* (policy-V).

Public actors Lansingerland:

The political actor emphasizes that the political struggles within its own party prevent him from reaching out to the media. The policy actor explains that the media is only approached once everything is decided and the plans are fully prepared.

Private actors Vlaardingen:

The housing company that has been active in both municipalities clearly emphasize rather not be involved in public opinion. He explains that the media mostly sheds a bad light on the issue. *‘I experience that the topic is frequently negatively highlighted, because it is very difficult to bottom-up what is really the case. Statements are very suggestive, instead of investigating the deeper layers’* (housing-V&L). The recruitment agency that is active in both municipalities, tells that when there was a bad article published about them, they responded by publishing an open letter to the municipality council.

Private actors Lansingerland:

The usage of the media in Lansingerland is not for every actor as conventional as others. Some such as the horticulturist do not discuss the topic with the media. Others, such as a recruitment

agency in Lansingerland, participated in different media regarding a other municipality, which was one of the reasons why he was invited to the informative event. The owner of a housing company who is active in Lansingerland explains that he has been participating in multiple newspapers and media shows. By participating in the media he tries to establish a certain mind setting. By emphasizing the importance of labor migrants he echo's another sound. *'I want to echo a different sound than people who only have objections and say that they are perverts, rapists or alcoholics. No they are people ... So instead of showing what it costs us, such as done mostly in the media, I can also show you that it brings us a lot and how it profits us. They are 400.000 consumers that buy their food in the Netherlands, they are 400.000 people who do the jobs that we don't want to do''* (housing-L).

5.6 Resources within the organization

5.6.1 Formal legal authority

Public actors Vlaardingen & Lansingerland:

The public actors in Vlaardingen and Lansingerland do not indicate that they have used special legal authority other than their own for developing the policy.

Private actors Vlaardingen:

The recruitment agency that is active in both municipalities mentions that he once invited all the chairmen of the council of Vlaardingen at his office. He argues that he is capable to act within the political field or media, because he has the resources for it, such as an inhouse lawyer.

Private actors Lansingerland:

All private parties in Lansingerland have in some way contact with persons with formal authority. All are in contact with the counselor for housing. The recruitment agency has a family contact within the municipality and due to other local activities had previously been in contact with the counselor. Others have contacts with politicians, such as the owner of a housing company, who describes his contact almost as friends with whom he not only discusses the housing of labor migrants alone, but also other topics. This contact also was the start of the political agenda for housing of labor migrants. Additionally, he is a member of the entrepreneurs association VNO-NCW. These contacts make it possible to get access to the municipality, such as performing at an informative event.

5.6.2 Information

Public actors Vlaardingen:

The policy actor in Vlaardingen explains that studies are relevant to indicate how many labor migrants live in the municipality. However, they only give a global figure which is of no use. *‘we are doing this already for ten years, but you will never get good statistics ... a general picture emerges, I can't do anything with it’* (policy-V).

Public actors Lansingerland:

The political actor in Lansingerland argues that studies are referred to during policy making and during presentations. However, in the policy document information from studies is less dominantly present.

Private actors Vlaardingen:

Two out of three private actors believe that studies can be useful to understand the problem. However, the recruitment agency that is active in both municipalities emphasizes that politics in Vlaardingen do not have interests in research.

Private actors Lansingerland:

The housing company in Lansingerland, uses studies to include an objective factor. The horticulturists unite themselves and have specialists on labor, which can provide them with data. Interestingly, the housing company that was active within the two municipalities possess a share in knowledge center Platform 31, that advises the government on various issues. The housing company shares experiences that they have from the market and has become a partner for informing the government. *‘we possess shares in Platform 31 ... we are a stakeholder. Many sessions are organized so governmental departments can be informed, municipalities are informed. At a certain moment we became a partner in order to provide information from the market’* (housing-V&L).

5.6.3 Financial resources

Public actors Vlaardingen & Lansingerland:

The public actors explain that financial resources are not relevant since the municipality only has a facilitating role and the private actors have to realize it.

Private actors Vlaardingen:

Two private actors indicate that financial resources are important for their position in the policy network. Those two actors are the recruitment agency and housing company who are/were

active within the two municipalities. They both emphasize that financial power is important in order to be an interesting partner for a municipality. The recruitment agency explains that because the projects are mostly for a long period of time, this requires enough financial resources, which means that the municipality will rather choose a party that has enough financial resources which will bring the project to a success. *‘everything is quite complex and long term projects so you are looking for someone with enough grip, that has a long haul and has enough financial support to carry out a project. The municipality will not work together with the local guy in the neighbourhood, because the chances for success are much lower’*(recruit-V&L).

Private actors Lansingerland:

The private actors that are active within Lansingerland do not think that their financial situation influences their involvement. The recruitment agency explains that he was never asked to provide insights in its financial situation in order to prove if he is a reliable partner. *‘No, I never experienced that this [financial situation] was the reason why I had access to the discussion table. When I wanted to realize a 10 million plan, never a municipality asked me, can you afford that?’* (recruit-L). The horticulturist emphasizes that it is not easy for middle/small businesses to financially organize this alone. Therefore, he argues that a collective approach is needed.

5.6.4 Skillful leadership

Public actors Vlaardingen & Lansingerland:

The public actors did not give an indication about leadership.

Private actors Vlaardingen & Lansingerland:

Only one private actor argues that they are showing leadership. This is the housing company that was active in both municipalities. He argues that they are ahead of others and that they want to be the best. *‘we are at the forefront of this. We do our best in order to be part of the leading parties. Especially in developing different types of housing’* (housing-V&L).

As a result he argues that they are capable of steering in this sector. A skillful position also means that you are invited to advise the municipality argues a housing company in Lansingerland.

5.7 Power distribution

5.7.1 Power concentration

Public actors Vlaardingen:

The public actors explain that the municipality has a strong position. The political actor in Vlaardingen emphasizes the monopoly position of the municipality by explaining that they can decide which agreements they allow or not. *“if we decide tomorrow to not cooperate anymore, you can decide to retract certain decisions of the council”* (political-V).

Public actors Lansingerland:

The policy actor in Lansingerland emphasizes that the municipality keeps in control of the projects that will be realized. The political actor emphasizes that much power is concentrated at the policy actors. *“it goes slow, and although a councilor says we will do it, but the public servants need to develop it”* (political-L).

Private actors Vlaardingen:

Also the private actors explain that the municipality finally decides what is in the covenant like the number of houses, since the private parties would have liked much more. In Vlaardingen basically three private parties have most influence since they are the only private partners in the covenant. However, between the private parties no one claimed that more power was concentrated with one party.

Private actors Lansingerland:

From the private actors that spoke at the informative event, two actors participate in the workgroup for the developing framework, which includes a total of four actors: two recruitment agencies and two horticulturists. Additionally the policy focus on horticulturists is an indication for a power concentration at their side, which is acknowledged by the housing company that was active in both municipalities. The horticulturist emphasizes that recruitment agencies are also important since they provide labor to the companies. Furthermore, a housing company argues that the policy makers have much power since they make the policy and decide who gets into the workgroup. He echoes ‘another sound’, which is not appreciated by the policy makers, and as a result he will not get things done anymore. *“civil servants have relatively much power, although they are not democratically chosen. On the other side I also understand that they always have to deal with a new board that wants something different”* (housing-L).

One recruitment agency has an influential position in both municipalities. He justifies this by arguing that they are doing this for the sector. Many recruitment agencies do not always have

everything well-organized and therefore are afraid to stand up, but recruitment agencies cannot 'keep taking the blows'. *'that is why it is important and we come to the fore, actually for the whole sector and at the other side the sector needs to develop and become fully compliant'* (Recruit-V&L).

5.7.2 Power fragmentation

Public actors Vlaardingen:

In Vlaardingen only three private actors are involved in the covenant. Between the involved private partners there is a slight power fragmentation. The policy actor argues that one recruitment agency is a little more dominant than the others, because he wants the most housing.

Private actors Vlaardingen & Lansingerland:

The housing company explains that the housing corporations (who are part of the covenant) had a slightly dominant and more influencing role since they could decide who gets the housing in Vlaardingen. Other than that, the involved private actors do not indicate a clear power imbalance among the private actors. In Lansingerland, there is a power fragmentation within the working group that was formed. The horticulturist and recruitment agency that are part of the working group and do not indicate a power difference between the involved parties.

Table 3: *Summary important findings in Vlaardingen and Lansingerland*

Network identification variables	Sub-variables	Indicators	Findings Vlaardingen	Findings Lansingerland
Network structure	Membership	Density	Three private actors are involved. Only a few private actors dare to be politically active due to political sensitivity.	Six private actors joined the informative event. Four actors are developing a framework of whom are recruitment agencies and horticulturists.
		Type of interests/ goal	The municipality wants to give back the houses to the market. The 300 facilitated houses are a political decision. Recruitment agencies prefer large scale, housing company also prefers small scale.	Demand for good labor migrants and infrastructural problems. No goal of housing units is set. Recruitment agencies and horticulturists prefer large scale and housing companies small scale. Public actor does not prefer large scale.
	Interaction	Cooperation	All actors experience cooperation since everyone understands the added value of a covenant.	Actors that are currently still involved experience interaction as cooperative. Also, the informative event was experienced as constructive.
		Conflict	Two former covenant partners dropped out because they did not honor commitments. Realizing new housing takes a long time.	Interaction guided by policy makers is causing conflict. Time consuming process is causing losing interests.
		Bargaining	Providing transparency and showing good behavior. Existing houses are used as a big stick.	Private actors try to convince public actors of their interest. This is more needed in Lansingerland, since in Vlaardingen locations are allocated.
		Interaction guiding	By applying surveillance, the municipality checks private actors' behavior and uses it for further political decisions.	Interaction is guided by organizing an informative event and channeling four private actors into a working-group.
		Activation of actors and resources	Not relevant	Not relevant

Resources	Distribution within the network	Mobilizing troops	Less relevant due to frequent change of political actors.	Mobilizing troops was less relevant. Only within politics by forming coalitions.
		Public opinion	Private actors are mostly negatively exposed in the media since they are easily found. One actor used it as a tool to strike back.	The media is approached by one private actor who uses it as a tool for mind setting.
	Distribution within the organization	Formal legal authority	All private actors are in contact with public formal actors, one emphasizes to have a team with for example an inhouse lawyer.	All private actors are in contact with public formal actors. One in specific with politicians which was a kickstart for agenda setting and provided him access to the informative event.
		Information	Information resources are not relevant due to political disinterest.	Information resources were used for establishing policy. One private actor has a share in a research center.
		Financial resources	Financial resources are important since the municipality wants to know if the private actor is capable to support the projects.	Financial resources are not seen as crucial.
		Skillful leadership	Not relevant	Skillful leadership is seen as a reason why private parties are provided access to share their interests.
Power distribution	Concentration	One actor or coalition has the most power	Since the private actors are with three, there is a concentration of power with them.	Recruitment agencies and horticulturists possess a power concentration. Additionally, policy makers are powerful since they are able to guide the interaction.
	Fragmentation	Power is shared between actors and coalitions	However, between the actors there is a fragmentation of power.	

6. Analysis

In this chapter, the results will be connected to the theories, in order to understand the policy outcomes and the differences between the municipalities. Additionally, this chapter will provide an answer to the sub-questions.

The first sub question is: *what kind of measurements are taken by the municipalities of Vlaardingen and Lansingerland regarding CEE labor migrant housing?*

The main policy differences between Vlaardingen and Lansingerland are that Vlaardingen committed itself to a number of 300 housing units for labor migrants and emphasizes great importance on integration. Private parties have to provide language lessons and have great responsibilities regarding person registration, SNF norms and other administrative obligations. Mostly demolishing homes are targeted that are possessed by housing corporations and a maximum rent and number of people is allowed. In Lansingerland broad guidelines are set, however, room rental for labor migrants in neighborhood areas is not allowed. The focus is mostly on providing housing for labor migrants based on the demand from local companies. As a result, it is allowed to realize housing at the property of horticulturists and no maximum number of persons or units is given. In order to understand these differences, the network should be indicated, so an answer on the second sub-question can be formulated: *Which private actors are involved and what is their position in the policy network of Vlaardingen and Lansingerland?*

6.1 Network structure

In order to understand the network structure, membership, and interaction of the actors within the network are important. Membership consists of density and interests. In both municipalities, the number of involved actors is not very large. This is mostly because municipalities want to work together with 'reliable' actors who share the same belief. To reduce the risk that horizontal relationships, that turn into vertical relationships, damage the authority of public actors (Rhodes, 2007). Additionally, because all actors are connected by a third party, the networks are very dense. In Vlaardingen only three private actors are part of the covenant and in Lansingerland six actors informed the municipality and four actors help establishing a developing framework. However, the selection of the four actors in Lansingerland creates a gap in the network, since not everyone who participated in the first informative event, is involved in the working-group. There are differences in interests. The recruitment agencies prefer large scale housing, whereas housing companies are also satisfied with smaller facilities.

Additionally, the horticulturist joins the recruitment agency's preference. Contrastingly, public actors predominantly indicate not to prefer large scale housing.

The small number of actors in Vlaardingen is an indication for a policy community. Additionally, all the involved parties agree that the covenant serves everyone's interests and the network's composition has been relatively stable despite two dropouts. By canalizing actors into a small working-group in Lansingerland a policy community is established as well. This canalizing clearly illustrates the interaction guiding applied by public actors. At the same time, does this change of density have an effect on the interaction. Since the density of actors in Vlaardingen is very low, a 'smooth cooperation' is experienced. In Lansingerland due to canalizing actors and communication, a different density of actors was created, and the network structure changed. Which is a clear example of process management (Klijn, 2005). However, this led to a conflict with an actor that wasn't involved (but who was partly responsible for agenda setting of the issue). Additionally, since in Lansingerland the policy process is experienced as slow and time consuming this is also seen as conflicting, which leads to private actors losing their interest, since investing in a network involves costs and actors need to be selective. This confirms the findings of Christopoulos (2008).

In conclusion this could mean that the smaller the group of actors, the involved actors experience more cooperation. Presumably, this is also due to the higher probability that their interests will be allocated. Additionally, the network's structure is also not completely inseparable from its context. In Vlaardingen, the covenant mostly erupted out of the need of dealing with nuisance. As a result, the involved private actors were already active within the municipality and thus were included in the policy network. In contrast, in Lansingerland due to high housing prices, less private actors are active. But due to the demand of its entrepreneurs (predominantly horticulturists) and infrastructural issues, it decided to establish a policy, which causes a different actor selection. Actors are involved based on their experience regarding housing of labor migrants, because they are one of the larger companies or because of their activity towards the municipality. With other words, they are involved because of their resources and activities.

A policy network's composition is also decided by the resources that actors possess, which determines the influence they potentially have. So, to answer the third sub-question: *how do we need to understand the influence of private actors in the housing policies of temporary CEE migrants in case of Vlaardingen and Lansingerland?* The resource allocation and power distribution need to be analyzed.

6.2 Resources

Mobilizing troops and public opinion are considered to be resources that are distributed within the network. Most private actors argue that policy decisions are made by the game of politics. As a result, they all have contacts with political or policy actors from the municipalities. Some have contacts with both types of public actors and seek for public actors that share the same beliefs. One actor that invests thoroughly in networking also indicates that financial resources are not his strongest asset, which complies with the findings of Sabatier & Weible (2007). However, it is hard to mobilize troops in different political circumstances. In Vlaardingen due to change of political actors, this is not seen as a crucial asset. Public opinion is mostly avoided because of the negative connotation and sensitivity that the issue induces. However, an actor in Lansingerland and an actor in Vlaardingen have used the media. The former in order to establish mind setting and the latter as a tool to straighten up a bad image about the company that appeared in the media. However, the mind setting might have contributed to agenda setting, it did not result in a durable core position in the policy network in Lansingerland. Additionally, the recruitment agency in Vlaardingen was able to retain its reliable image and position towards the municipality, by applying a media offensive.

The resources that are distributed within the organization are formal legal authority, information, financial resources, and skill full leadership. All actors share access to someone with formal legal authority, this shared resource is a reason why they are part of the policy network. However, it does not create hierarchy. Additionally, financial resources are not considered as a hugely determining factor. However, the belief that actors are able to carry the initiatives financially is important for participating. Therefore, formal legal authority and financial resources are not seen as largely distinctive resources for the two policy networks.

Information sources are more of relevance in Lansingerland than in Vlaardingen, since politics in Vlaardingen are considered to be not interested in studies, but in Lansingerland they are. In Lansingerland actors are invited to speak and share their expertise, which makes information a resource in order to be involved in the policy network. One actor contributes actively to the creation of information by participating in a research platform, this might also be the reason why he was invited to Lansingerland. Additionally, this actor argues that they have a leading role in the sector which endorses leadership. However, the same actor wasn't included in the working-group and lost its interest. A recruitment agency that is included in the working-group argues that they stand up for the sector, which also tends to a form of leadership. However, again the context is important, since due to the economic situation in Lansingerland

horticulturists and recruitment agencies have a preferable position. This illustrates that leadership is important to be able to be involved but is no guarantee to stay in the network or realize housing due to contextual preferences.

6.3 Power distribution

Although all involved actors in both municipalities are ‘privileged’ to give their input for policy on housing of labor migrants, there is a difference in power distribution within the policy networks between Vlaardingen and Lansingerland. In Vlaardingen, the involved actors did not indicate a major power difference between the private actors. Secondly, the private actors indicate that the municipality has a formal decisive position, for example with regards to the political settling of the number of housing units. However, since the recruitment agencies already had housing in the municipality, they also possessed a strong position. The private actors allowed for transparency in their administration and showed ‘good behavior’, which provided them with an even stronger position. Therefore, the power distribution in Vlaardingen could rather be seen as fragmented. Together with prevailing cooperative interaction this leads to a horizontal form of cooperation with less potential for change. Which is an explanation for the long period of time that was needed for deciding on new locations for housing.

In Lansingerland there is a clear concentration of power with the recruitment agencies and horticulturists concerning the private actors. However, a clear guiding role and strong position from the policy makers is prevailing. Two recruitment agencies and two horticulturists are invited to give their input in a working-group and their dominant role can be seen as the reason for the common threat in the policy which mostly serves the interests of the horticulturists, since it is possible to realize housing at their property. The interaction between these actors is explained as cooperative, with a strong position for the policy actors and therefore can be understood as hierarchical cooperation, which as well can be understood as a basis for less change. The dominant power position of the policy actors conflicted with other private actors. This can be understood as a dominant and asymmetric power distribution, which led to a change in the policy network structure and the drop out of certain (housing) actors.

7. Conclusion

In conclusion, the cases of Vlaardingen and Lansingerland illustrate two contrasting contextual situations but have a shared intention of controlling the housing of labor migrants. This research started with the question: *To what extent do the municipalities of Vlaardingen and Lansingerland differently manage the housing of CEE labor migrants and what is the role of private actors?* This chapter will formulate an answer to the question and will discuss the expectations that followed from the theories.

Differences between Vlaardingen and Lansingerland

The municipalities have different approaches regarding policy on housing of labor migrants and have different policy network compositions. Vlaardingen was one of the first municipalities in the Netherlands which had a policy focused on housing of labor migrants. It started with restricting the maximum rent per week and limiting the maximum number of residents to four persons per house. However, due to bad living conditions and escalating situations, a covenant was established in 2016. This way the municipality wanted to improve their grip on the situation and work together with the private actors which had a great share of housing for labor migrants. The municipality tried to create transparency in the administration of the private actors and since labor migrants mostly live in Vlaardingen, the importance of integration was emphasized. In reward, the municipality committed itself to facilitate 300 housing units for labor migrants.

Whereas the majority of labor migrants live in Vlaardingen, they mostly work in Lansingerland. This is mainly because the average housing prices are much higher in Lansingerland and since the demand for labor migrants in Lansingerland is much higher than in Vlaardingen. Under pressure of its entrepreneurs and due to infrastructural problems, the municipality of Lansingerland has decided to develop policy on housing of labor migrants. The municipality firstly informed itself and since a large share of its economy exists out of horticulturists (who are dependent on recruitment agencies for labor), it is made possible to realize housing at the property of the horticulturists. The rules that apply for this type of housing will be location specific and are still in development.

The major differences between the two municipalities are the prepossessed number of housing units and the emphasis on integration in Vlaardingen and the location specific focus in Lansingerland. This is because policy in Vlaardingen is mostly focused on challenging nuisance whereas policy in Lansingerland mostly serves economic purposes. This illustrates that

managing housing of labor migrants is done with different policies due to context specific situations.

The importance of resources

As Engbersen (2018) explained, EU labor migration is very flexible, and people move from place to place. They are moving to places where work is available and are mostly finding this through recruitment agencies. This resulted in the first expectation that recruitment agencies have a strong position in the municipality where companies are located that employ labor migrants. This expectation seems to be confirmed for the situation in Lansingerland, where horticulturists and recruitment agencies have dominant roles. However, the presence of labor demanding companies does not have to be a condition for an influential positions of recruitment agencies in the policy networks. Two out of three private actors in the covenant of Vlaardingen are recruitment agencies but they do not provide labor to companies in Vlaardingen. This shows that the issue of housing of labor migrants goes beyond municipal borders and its local corporate interests.

The public-private mechanisms that are illustrated in this research are exemplary for the privatization of control of migration as described by de Lange (2011). Public and private actors need each other because they possess resources which they need to achieve their objectives. This leads to public-private partnerships (Klijn & Teisman, 2003). As a result, the second expectation is that private actors are part of the policy network due to the possession of certain resources and are managed by the municipality to control housing of labor migration. Access to someone with formal authority is for private actors in both municipalities important to be involved in the policy network in the first place. Vlaardingen was to a greater extent forced to establish a covenant due to experienced nuisance. The private parties that were in possession of housing therefore could claim their position in the covenant. Consequently, in Vlaardingen, possession of other resources was less important and contextual variables have resulted in public-private collaboration. Which matches the findings of Marsh and Smith (2000), that the context of the policy network is very important for the composition of the network. In Lansingerland, public actors have invited private actors to inform the municipality. Information as a resource was therefore crucial in this municipality in order to be involved. However, the focus and development of the policy is mostly influenced by the presence of horticulturists and their dependence on recruitment agencies, which illustrates that the contextual situation is important in this case as well. Additionally, resources such as public opinion, media and skillful

leadership were especially important for housing companies in order to be involved in the policy network. However, these resources were not sufficient to be involved in the implementation. This exposes that resource exchange does not solely explain the policy network structure, but contextual factors play an important role as well.

Policy network dynamics, power relations and steering

The public-private partnership in the form of a covenant in Vlaardingen clearly illustrates the attempt of public actors to claim back their steering capacity, which is exemplary for a hollow state (Peters & Pierre, 1998). The covenant involves increasing responsibilities for private actors to safeguard public interests. The obligation of private actors to provide language lessons to labor migrants in order to improve integration is a clear example of private actors taking over a responsibility that normally would be a concern for public actors. In return for serving public interests, the private actors received 300 housing units and public and private actors meet each other in their mutual interests. In Lansingerland private actors are managed differently. Interaction is guided, information is obtained, and certain actors are selected to further develop the policy. This illustrates that private actors are more strongly managed through a form of process management which is determinative for the outline of the policy network and the policy itself. However, both cases are exemplary for attempts to steer the network, which is characterized by management of negotiation (Rhodes, 2007).

The final expectation is based on the rationale, that if only a few private actors are active in an area, the power distribution will be concentrated, together with a conflicting interaction this leads to a dominant role of the private actors, which could lead to a policy in their favor.

In Vlaardingen the private actors showed willingness to give transparency and won the trust of public actors which provided them with an influential position. Consequently, power is less hierarchical, and the private actors have provided themselves a privileged position. Moreover, since the interaction was not conflicting but cooperative all parties were satisfied with the 'rich' content of the policy. Both private as public actors have promised each other substantive agreements, which is a result of the strong position of the private actors and the cooperative interaction.

In Lansingerland the interactions are strongly guided by public actors. This illustrates an influential position of public actors, which leads to a conflict between the interests of some private actors above others. Conflicting interaction and beliefs changed the network's structure

in this case (Knoke, 2011). As a result, the recruitment agencies and horticulturists have a more influencing role since the policy is mostly focused on providing housing for horticulturists and they are acting within a workgroup in order to develop requirements for housing at the property of the horticulturists.

Both cases illustrate that private actors that are active within a municipality and have a proactive attitude towards the municipality are most likely to influence the policy content, under the condition that they share the same beliefs as the public actors. The involvement of other actors and a conflict with these stakeholders can lead to a predominant policy focus and exclusion/dropout from actors of the policy network. How the interests of different actors exactly have been allocated and which strategies have been used, unfortunately cannot be explained by this research.

Monopolizing for control

The findings that follow from the cases of Vlaardingen and Lansingerland illustrate that municipalities have a need for steering housing of labor migrants, which is forcing public and private actors to collaborate with each other. Because of the political sensitivity of the topic, public actors search for actors that are reliable and have 'things in order'. This way they try to create a group of 'good guys', who have an advantage in respect of the others, the 'bad guys'. This attempt for control influences the structure of the policy network and increases the influence of 'established' and 'large' private actors. This provides these companies with a stronger position in the market which results in other 'bad' and smaller companies to move to a different municipality. This water-bed effect is also seen among the well-established companies, when due to time consuming processes, commercial choices must be made, and a municipality might be left aside by certain private actors. As a result, this research provides an insight in the commercial side of migration control. Municipalities try to select private actors and search for ways to create transparency. At the same time, private actors have to act in a politically sensitive field in order to allocate their interests. Reasonably, this would result in tribulation of wrongdoing private actors and the market would mostly include good willing private actors. However, these notions are not very objective and wherever 'monopolizing' the market for housing of labor migrants can be considered a best practice and increases the living conditions of labor migrants, is interesting for a further debate. Especially by bearing in mind that the companies now considered to be reliable and transparent in one municipality might not in a different municipality. Therefore, a regional approach is needed in which local and regional

and public and private interests will be balanced, responsibility will be shared and hopefully living conditions for labor migrants can be secured.

8. Discussion

The findings presented in this study have been conducted under extraordinary conditions. Due to the corona-crisis, interviews had to be done through video calling which led to differences in data quality. Nevertheless, the corona-crisis reveals again that labor migrants are crucial for the Dutch economy and that bad housing conditions are still frequently occurring. That makes this research highly relevant and information about the role of private actors, with regards to this issue, more preferable. It is worth mentioning that the findings that result from this research, reflect on very local situations. The respondents that participated in this research have shared their personal perspective and experiences and thus the results are highly context dependent.

The examined cases illustrate that the policy network concerning housing of labor migrants is characterized by a few different actors. They are involved in the network since they rely on the exchange of their resources. However, which resources and interests are prevailing also depends on the context. This is an important take-away for generalizing this analysis to different situations. The analyses illustrate the entanglement of two contextual different situations, which emphasizes the complexity of the issue. Above all, housing of labor migrants is an issue that is governed on multiple levels and crosses municipal borders.

This research confirms the trend towards privatization of control of migration. The control over the whereabouts of labor migrants isn't completely in the hands of the government. Public-private interactions are part of the governance of housing of labor migrants and result in policies with different accents. Understanding these mechanisms is crucial for reflecting and improving policies. However, unfortunately this research was not capable of explaining the processes that result from strategies which were used for establishing the different policies. The notion of 'reliable' private actors is constructed by public actors based on shared beliefs, however, the question of how these beliefs arise and mutual influencing is achieved is interesting for additional research. Consequently, this research does not have a very strong explanatory function concerning the policy differences, but rather a descriptive one which is also inherent to network analyses (Dowding, 1995). Other types of theories and methods could possibly lead to different results. Nevertheless, this research creates a basis for understanding governance and

policymaking regarding housing of labor migrants by describing the policy differences and indicating the roles of private and public actors in the different policy networks.

Increasing local public-private partnerships regarding housing of labor migrants can be expected in the future. Additionally, public-private partnerships also transfer responsibilities for public interests to private actors. Increasing privatization and a struggle between beliefs can endanger the allocation of public interests and the autonomy of public actors. Therefore, balance should be found between interests of different types of private actors in coordination with regional public interests. By increasing transparency, surveillance and shared responsibility, policies can be improved and abuses regarding housing of labor migrants will hopefully be prevented.

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