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**Trust Is Won Not Given: The Influence of Trust on Public- Public  
Partnerships**

A Case study Analysis of Integrated Area Redevelopment Projects in  
Utrecht

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## Abstract

The issues that public organisations have to deal with are often overlapping with the scope of other public organisations; thus, by working together, they have a chance to create higher social returns. This could happen if they work together through a public-public partnership (P2P) where they decide to share the risks and resources and have the same core objective, namely to create public value. In urban redevelopment projects there is great potential for P2Ps, because there are often multiple public organizations involved. Hence, the different public organisations can act as a principal on a shared project where they share risks and resources.

This thesis examines two cases studies with potential for public-public collaboration, and analyses what the effect of trust is on the collaboration over time. It examines whether higher levels of trust lead to higher collaborative relationships, and whether this has a positive effect of the project performance. The examined case studies are part of the Masterplan of the stationsgebied Utrecht Centraal, the two cases studies being OV-Terminal Utrecht Centraal and the Uithoflijn.

In the case of the OV -Terminal Utrecht it was found that the trust had a positive effect on the partnership over time. The partnership reached higher collaboration levels due to the development of trust over time. Both trust as collaboration impacted the project performance overtime in a positive manner. The project was more time and budget efficient due to the higher trust levels in the partnership.

On the other hand, the Uithoflijn was the less successful partnership it was evident that trust did not develop over time due to the situational factors, behaviour of the partners and, the initial meeting. The lower levels of trust affected the collaboration between the project partners, which had an adversarial outlook. The low levels of trust and collaboration effected the project performance in a negative manner, since the project went over time and budget due to the nonexistence of collaboration between the project partners.

**Key words:** Public-Public Partnerships, Trust, Collaboration, Urban Redevelopment projects, Rounds Model.

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## List of Abbreviations

P2P	Public-Public Partnership
PPP	Public Private Partnership
OVT	OV- Terminal
BRU	Bestuursregio Utrecht
GUO	Gemeenschappelijke uitvoeringsorganisatie
POS	Projectorganisatie stationsgebied
OVTUC	OV-Terminal Utrecht Centraal
SUNIJ	Sneltram Utrecht-Nieuwegein-IJsselstein
NSP's	Nieuwe Sleutelprojecten
SOK	Samenwerkingsovereenkomst
POK	Projectovereenkomst
MIRT	Meerjarenprogramma Infrastructuur, Ruimte en Transport

## 1. Introduction

Cities are getting more complex; they are dynamic and characterised by wicked problems (Portugali, 2016). As a consequence of this complexity, people have differing perceptions of the main problems and strategies needed to solve these. As governments are not in control of all resources, including knowledge, they are dependent on other actors to manage city-related problems (Nielsen & Andersen, 2009). This is also an issue when planning cities and executing redevelopment projects. The environment in which redevelopment finds itself is complex and projects are multi-functional, located in an already existing environment, and characterised by multiple interests. Hence, when targeting city-related problems, there is a need for a multi-layered approach from the different actors involved to ensure effective collaboration on targets and goals.

Public organisations are key players when it comes to planning and executing redevelopment projects, which is any new construction on a site that has pre-existing uses. However, in recent years, they have been expected to create a higher social return in projects that they complete (Obe, 2016). Due to further decentralisation of national government, this task has become increasingly difficult for public organisations as they need to work with smaller budgets while facing increased pressure to improve the quality of their projects (Obe, 2016). For this reason, there is enormous potential for public organisations to work together to tackle the complexity that wicked problems create. Public collaborations can thus benefit urban challenges. Public organisations often have similar organisational scopes, meaning that public collaborations have the potential to bridge the aforementioned issues and create higher social returns.

The public sector often looks to the private sector to work together to allocate resources more efficiently by creating a public-private partnership (PPP). When looking at PPPs in the context of integrated area development projects, the focus is often, from the private perspective, on the value for money. The private perspective mostly drives this. For this reason, there is a continuous discussion on whether PPPs are well-suited to represent public interests and community wellbeing (Obe, 2016). Therefore, the challenge for the public sector is to form partnerships that increase both economic value and community wellbeing. Since PPPs do not always deliver when it comes to creating public value. A different approach could be a public-public partnership (P2P) where there is collaboration between public organisations that decide to share the risks and have the same core objective to create public value (Engen and Schütte, 2019). Redevelopment projects would greatly benefit from a P2P approach if different public organisations took on a project together where they share risks and resources.

The public sector projects have missed the innovation and efficiency that comes from the private sector (Anwandter & Ozuna, 2002). Nevertheless, there is still an opportunity: that of working together in P2Ps. Currently, there is a lack of potential in the public sector due to a lack of innovation and efficiency. Nevertheless, a private sector-like innovation in the public sector is possible by broadening the scope and acknowledging the potential of interconnected opportunities by working together (Obe, 2016). This way of working would protect public interests and at the same time, stimulate innovation and efficiency without a profit margin. However, there would be a need for using similar principles as PPPs, such as sharing of resources, risks and returns, which would make public institutions more innovative and create public value (Greasley et al., 2008).



P2Ps can be seen as a strategic response to resource dependency because they allow individual agencies to combine technical, managerial, and financial resources to reduce risks and transaction costs while entering major projects (Ibid). The creation of a P2P should help create a seamless service provision focused on outcomes, as well as economy and efficiency (Obe, 2016).

The P2P approach requires high levels of trust between the different partners that are collaborating because contracts do not cover all unexpected events and behaviour, which creates uncertainty. Hence, in a partnership, actors need to fully trust one another as this is the foundation of reaching the projects' goals. Complexity will arise because the different partners will find it challenging to go from working alone on a project, to working together with other (unknown) actors. For a P2P approach to work, it will require a co-ordination and clear pre-determined agreements between the project partners (Gerrits, 2012). Other vital barriers in creating a P2P that are important to consider are the perceived challenges to organisational status, concerns about managerial control, political acceptability, and the regulatory differences, capabilities and capacity (Lobina & Hall, 2006). Hence, the effectiveness of a P2P is highly dependent on coordination and trust between the different actors in a partnership (Engen and Schütte, 2019). If these two elements are not present, it will be challenging to work together on shared goals and objectives. The actors that are part of a P2P arrangement are more willing to share risks if they trust the capacities of the other party (Engen and Schütte, 2019).

### 1.1 Problem statement

The effectiveness of P2Ps is not widely discussed in literature. The existing research focusses primarily on water management and health services. Similarly, there has not been any in-depth research on P2P related to urban redevelopment projects (Lobina & Hall, 2006; Hall et al., 2005). For that reason, research on the working and effectiveness of P2Ps in the context of redevelopment projects is proper a contribution to the already existing scientific literature. When looking at scientific research that focusses on the influence of trust on cooperation and the outcome of projects, most of it relates to public-private partnerships (Pennink, 2017).

In literature, it is widely argued that trust is the critical factor that contributes to the effectiveness of partnerships. Moreover, trust links to the different types of collaborative relationships between partners, and the level of trust can influence the type of relationship of collaboration between partners. It takes time to develop trust, and it can also easily be damaged, and it is the result of different factors which can change over time (Barron, West and Hannan, 1994; Lewicki and Bunker, 1995). Therefore, all the decisions and actions of the partners affect trust and the decision-making process over time. Moreover, all parties need to be clear on their expectations, set clear targets and goals to complete tasks, outline the consequences of not meeting expectations, and having procedures in place to evaluate performance (Lewicki & Wiethoff, 2000; Kramer & Lewicki, 2010). The following elements are needed to make sure that the partnership is stable, and meeting set goals and objectives.

Thus, in a situation with identified high levels of trust, leading to high trust partners, these partners have a tendency to collaborate more closely and the nature of the relationship changes (Hattori and Lapidus, 2004). Due to the higher levels of trust, they are creating more intense collaboration which leads to better outcomes. The dynamic, as described above, forms the basis of this thesis. This thesis is interested in researching whether higher levels of trust influence the type of

collaboration. It specifically examines this question in the context of partnerships between public sector bodies in redevelopment projects in Utrecht.

### 1.2 Scientific relevance

The scientific relevance of this paper is linked to the research on P2Ps because it is underdeveloped; the existing research focusses on the specific field of water management. Hence, the research on urban redevelopment projects and their potential for P2Ps can contribute to the field of collaborative governance. Due to the increased complexity in the urban environment, there is potential to research the influence of trust on the outcomes as perceived by the partners that are part of public inter-organisational cooperation. Mostly, looking at the idea that increased trust can positively impact the outcome of urban redevelopment projects because of successful cooperation between the different public actors. This qualitative empirical research looks at the influence of trust on the nature of the relationship (as related to the level of collaboration) and how this influences the quality of the outcomes.

### 1.3 Societal relevance

When it comes to societal relevance, the analysis of the cases studies can contribute to practical examples and lessons for the public sector on what approach to take when collaborating with other public parties. It can hopefully serve as an example for other redevelopment projects with different public stakeholders on what to do and which approach to take. The societal relevance of the research relates to the potential P2P projects when it comes to using public funding to achieve public value and hence, cutting out private parties that are motivated by financial gain. It creates public value by public organisations which means the public is not paying for profit margins of private parties. Public parties need to have faith in each other to achieve collective gains and share in the creation of public value.

Time is essential in trust, as it takes time and effort to build a relationship, but it can also easily be damaged (Barron et al., 1994; Lewicki and Bunker, 1995). Furthermore, considering one's individual belief and behaviour in trust is based on, the words, actions, and decisions of the other partner (Lewicki & Wiethoff, 2000). Trust builds as a result of the interactions between actors, and the corresponding words, actions and decisions amongst them.

### 1.4 Research question and sub-questions

To establish the influence of P2Ps on project outcomes, examining the existing academic literature as well as case studies to discover the influence of trust throughout the partnership and how this affects the outcomes and whether it improves cooperation between the different public parties. Furthermore, linking the different aspects of empirical qualitative research to answer the following research question:

**What is the influence of trust on the decision-making process and the type of collaboration (P2P) between project partners; and how does trust affect the project outcomes as perceived by the actors over time?**

To answer this research question, sub-questions are formulated. These questions are answered in the theoretical framework and the analysis (based on interviews and triangulation of policy documents).

- What is the influence of trust on decision-making processes?
- What is the influence of trust on collaboration?
- What factors build trust, and how do these factors change over the length of the interaction?
- Does collaborative relationship level influence projects outcomes overtime as perceived by the actors?
- What is the influence of the level of trust on the projects outcomes overtime as perceived by the actors?

### 1.5 Roadmap

This thesis is organised as follows. The following section reviews how literature currently looks at the research topic and concludes the literary gap. It also discusses the research question in detail. Section 3 outlines the conceptual model to analyse the research question. Section 4 introduces the methodological context of the paper by going over the case study selection and scope of the analysis. Section 5 and 6 discuss the research findings to the research question. Subsequently, section 7 concludes, gives recommendations and discusses future research.

## 2. Literature Review

The following part examines the core concepts that are relevant to answer the research question. First framing public- public participation/public inter-organisational cooperation to get a clear overview of the concept. The following section examines trust, looking at the importance, types and the development of the concept over time. Thirdly, a discussion of the factors that contribute to the development of trust. Furthermore, a contextualisation of collaboration and its levels. Subsequently, a discussion on how to analyse project performance. Lastly, an examination of decision-making processes, specifically looking at the rounds model and the role it can play when examining trust over time.

### 2.1 Public- public partnerships

P2P is not a new concept. Existing research mainly focuses on water management, but is highly scarce. The definition used in the existing literature on water management describes P2P (PUPs) as "simply a collaboration between two or more public authorities or organisations, based on solidarity, to improve the capacity and effectiveness of one partner in providing public water or sanitation services" (Hall et al., 2009 p. 2). While in another context the definition of P2Ps can be described as "partnerships between public authorities (government) and any part or member of the general public," such as communities, NGOs, and other government actors (Hall et al., 2005, p. 4). For both definitions, it is essential to acknowledge that both public parties are the principal in the relationship.

In comparison to public-private partnerships between public organisations and a private partner are often "motivated by commercial gain" (Lobina & Hall, 2006). At the same time, P2Ps are based on "a peer relationship forged around common values and objectives, which exclude profit-seeking" (Ibid). Public organisations are not in competition with each other, and should not be motivated by financial gain.

#### Benefits of a P2P approach

The P2P approach would mean a switch from a market approach to a more collaborative approach. Public organisations could benefit if they considered where they could match their objectives to the objectives of other public organisations to see whether there is potential to combine efforts (Engen and Schütte, 2019). The different public organisations can achieve their set objectives but at the same time, create maximum shared societal assets through minimal societal costs (Ibid).

However, it is crucial to understand that in PPPs and P2Ps, awareness is needed concerning the risk of the partnerships. Both parties need to allocate risks or share these between different partners in an effective manner, ideally by negotiating the terms of collaborations. Both in PPPs and P2Ps, there is one crucial factor that can form a solid foundation to combat these risks: trust. Trust is a critical factor that can help understanding performance variation among relationships between organisations both in a public and a private context (Vanneste et al., 2014).

#### Link to collaborative governance

Collaborative governance emphasises the importance of trust as well as collaboration. Collaborative governance is known as a mode of governance which brings multiple stakeholders

together in common forums with public agencies to engage in consensus-oriented decision making (Ansell and Gash, 2008, p 543.). Other, authors recognise this definition but do see the need for a broader approach where the focus is also on cross-boundary governance and to go beyond formal state-initiated arrangements (Emerson et al., 2012).

Collaborative governance realises that in partnership, organisations and individuals pursue different and hidden interests (Huxham et al., 2000). They argue that mutual trust is necessary to promote a positive attitude between partners and keep a certain sense of autonomy (Ibid). Furthermore, they recognise that since trust builds on the success of past actions, there is also an indirect hindrance to achieving trusting relationships (Ibid, p 351).

Thus, the definition used to define **P2Ps** throughout this thesis will be:

'A partnership where the different public organisations work together to achieve set objectives related to a project by sharing resources and risks to improve overall project outcomes' (Hall et al., 2009, p 4).

## 2.2 Trust

As mentioned in the previous section, trust is the key factor to facilitate collaboration in any type of partnership. Hence, it is vital to outline the significance of trust, what trust is and which factors contribute to trust.

### Definitions of trust

The concept of trust is not exactly new in the world of research. It has been examined throughout the different social science disciplines ranging from sociology, economics to political science. However, how can trust be defined when it comes back in all these different disciplines? Several definitions of trust cover the spectrum. Giddens (1991) defined trust as, "the vesting of confidence in persons or abstract systems, made based on a 'leap of faith' which brackets ignorance or lack of information" (p 244). In this definition, the focus is on the idea of having confidence in something despite not knowing where it will live up to expectations. A different definition of trust that Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995) adhere: trust as "the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party" (1995, p. 712). In this definition, the focus is more on the aspect of vulnerability to the actions of others, hoping that they will not abuse it in cases where there are no control mechanisms. In both of the definitions there recognise that you are giving away control by trusting someone or something. More recent authors, define trust depending on not knowing your expectations, or based on the expectations you do have (Brown et al., 2019).

Trust is a broad concept. Hence, it is crucial to outline the meaning of 'Trust'.

"Partner A does not expect opportunistic behaviour from Partner B (Despite there being opportunities to do so), even when Partner A cannot sanction Partner B." (Schilke and Lumineau, 2018, Bradach, 1989; Schnackenberg and Tomlinson, 2016).

This means that the self-interest of partner A is of less importance than the relationship between partner A and B. So, everything that goes further than achieving self-interest can be considered trust (Williamson, 1993). In his research, Williamson argues that trust always goes further than economic benefits. Because of this trust, does not fit in a purely economic perspective (1993).

### Types of trust

Nooteboom (2000) differentiated between two versions of trust, trust incompetence and trust in intention. In the first version, trust in competence focusses in the different competencies of a partner, specifically his/her knowledge, cognitive, organisational, and communication skills (Nooteboom, 2002). In the second version, trust in intention focusses on the intention of the partners in the partnership and how they deter from opportunistic opportunities (Ibid).

Other scholars define trust based on characteristics both related to the trustee and the perceptions of the trustor (Ibrahim and Ribbers, 2009). Mishra (1996) argues that essential components of trust are related to the concepts of competence, openness, caring and reliability. This relates to the definition that Perdue (2001) gives since he describes trust as "Trust consists an acceptance of risk and vulnerability deriving from the action of others and an expectation that the other will not exploit this vulnerability" (p 2212). He separates trust into two types, so-called 'competence trust' and 'goodwill trust' (Perdue, 2001; Humphrey, 1998). Whereas, other authors connect trust to social capital because that arises from the incidence of trust in society (Leith, 2013; Putman, 2000; Fukuyama, 1995). In this scenario, trust appears "within a community of regular, honest and cooperative behaviour, based on commonly shared norms on the part of other members of that community" (Fukuyama, 1995, p.26). As seen in the previous section, there are many definitions of types of trust, but competence and intention-based trust are the most significant.

Lastly, there are three types of trust. The first level is calculus-based trust of which the foundation is a mix of consistency and deterrence, behavioural control is central to this form of trust (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996; Pennink, 2017). The second level is knowledge-based trust focusses on the access to information, and not the ability to predict or control behaviour (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996). Lastly, identification-based trust takes it a step further where the actors do not only know and predict the behaviour of the other actors but also shares the same needs, choices and preferences (Ibid).

### Trust in society

Furthermore, it is crucial to outline that trust comes back in different aspects of society. For example, trust influences outcomes in interactions between partners. Trust is recognised as one of the factors that can make cooperative activities happen (Arrow, 1974). Furthermore, it is a crucial element when it comes to positive interpersonal relations in both and public and a private setting (Lewis and Weigert. 1985). Hence, trust is an essential informal governance mechanism in inter-organisational relationships due to interdependence and group dynamics of the different actors (Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005; Robbins, 2016).

Furthermore, trust is part of governance networks, where it helps achieve better-perceived outcomes (Klijn et al., 2010). The need for trust in governance networks stems back from the relationships between public actors and other stakeholders because these connections are

characterised by high levels of interdependency and complex decision-making processes (Ibid). In this article, they conclude that if there are more network management strategies, this results in more trust, which then again facilitates the use of more network management strategies (Ibid). So, in the context of P2Ps to enhance collaboration through trust, it is essential to recognise the interdependencies and group dynamics.

Based on the literature, as discussed in the previous two sections, the definition of **trust** throughout this paper is:

'Trust is the idea or belief in the unknown, and thus the willingness of an actor to be vulnerable to the actions of another party, despite not knowing what the consequences will be, but based on the expectation that the other actor, to be honest, and not take advantage' (Giddens, 1991; Mayer, Davis and Schoorman, 1995; Nooteboom, 2002).

### 2.3 Factors that Built trust

In the previous sections, there is a discussion on the importance of trust and how to define trust. However, it is also essential to consider the factors that contribute to the building of trust. Trust is a representation of confidence in the other party and. Thus, there is a need for considering the different factors that influence this confidence in others (Doney and Cannon, 1997; Yeon et al., 2019).

#### Three approaches to interpreting trust

For this reason, Mayer et al. (1995) argue that there are three approaches to interpreting what trust is and what factors influence trust. Firstly, Mayer et al. (1995) consider individual characteristics, assuming that individuals intend to trust. Secondly, another approach considers the immediate situational factors and argues that trust is a relatively rational decision-making process (Ibid). Lastly, the final approach considers situational factors and organisational and institutional structures that influence trust (Ibid).

#### Relational norms and societal control

Identifying relational norms as expectations about behaviour that are shared by a group of decision-makers influence trust (Aulakh et al., 1996). Furthermore, the relational norms are a continuity of expectations from the different organisations, the flexibility of the partners and transparent information exchange between the actors in the partnership (Ibid). The relational norms can be complemented by monitoring mechanisms to achieve the same objectives, and these link to output, process and social control (Ibid). Hence, the need to consider one's individual belief and behaviour as trust basing it on the words, actions, and decisions of the other partner (Lewicki & Wiethoff, 2000).

#### Performance and previously established contracts

Moreover, when considering the role of trust, in social and economic areas, it is connected to performance due to the dependency of actors on trusting relations (Nugent and Abolafia, 2006). The need for trust comes back in resource exchanges among citizens, public and private organisations. It is, thus a necessary factor for collective coordination or innovation due to the required existence of supportive personal relationships high in trust (Ibid). Consideration of previous behaviour is a central concept related to factors of trust when it comes to trust formation

and maintenance. Actors are not very likely to defect from previously established social contracts due to consideration as a mode of interaction between different actors (Ibid).

#### Time

Trust takes time to develop and can also easily be damaged again which can have consequences for the establishment of a partnership between the different organisations (Barron, West and Hannan, 1994; Lewicki and Bunker, 1995). For a trust relationship to develop, it needs to be dynamic and thus, needs to keep evolving to be successful (Inkpen and Currall, 2004).

This section has tried to outline **the different factors that contribute to the development of trust**. Thus, one of the factors that influence trust is the realisation that trust comes in various forms and takes time to develop (Aulakh et al., 1996; Doney and Cannon, 1997; Yeon et al., 2019). Ultimately, for trust to develop, there will always be other conditions. The decision-making processes during partnerships influence the level of trust at a particular moment in time. These factors can both build trust as break it down again (Barron, West and Hannan, 1994; Lewicki and Bunker, 1995). Considering the conditions needed: the behaviour of the actors, external conditions and whether the partners keep up their end of the bargain.

#### 2.4 Levels of Collaboration

The following section outlines the influence of trust on collaboration. Furthermore, it acknowledges collaboration as a critical component of effective partnerships. Firstly, it is crucial to recognise the concept of collaborative advantage is the idea that that collaborative, inter-agency partnership has potential when try to achieve public policy goals (Huxham, 1996; Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998). These types of partnerships are in the fields of urban regeneration projects, where local authorities are working together with other organisations to promote the economic, social and political revitalisation of communities and areas (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998). Hence, partnerships are an essential component of collaboration since they can assist in the development of institutions (Sockett, 1997).

#### Trust as an organising principle for collaboration

Furthermore, trust, as it is an organising principle, can play a role through the pathways of structuring and mobilising in the organisational properties. In the case of the pathway of structuring, it helps to develop, trust maintains and alter the links between actors in collaboration, both in a formal as an informal manner (McEvily et al., 2003). Secondly, mobilising is the second pathway through which trust affects organising, as it assists in converting resources into finalised activities as performed by interdependent actors (Ibid). It aims to involve and motivate actors to contribute their resources, use them in joint activities, and to direct them toward the achievement of shared organisational goals (McEvily et al., 2003, p 97). However, for trust to be beneficial for collaboration, it is essential to recognise that relationships are rooted in trust and for a relationship of trust to exist there needs to be some sort of predictability of behaviour and agreements on ends (Sockett,1997). Meaning that there is no collaboration without trust.

#### Levels of trust as linked to collaboration

Sockett (1997) describes the different levels of relationships as follows: The first level is service relationships, "where an individual or unit volunteers support for a school-related function" (p 76). The second level is exchange relationships, "where the parties exchange resources for their mutual



benefit" (Ibid, p76). The third level is cooperative relationships, "where the parties plan together and share responsibilities" (Ibid, p 76). The last and final stage is the systemic and transformative relationships "where the parties share responsibility for planning, decision-making, funding, operations, and evaluation of activities, and where each institution is transformed through the relationship" (Ibid, p 76). Thus, depending on the type of partnership, there is a need for a different level of trust; if a partnership becomes complex, so will the conditions in which trust is rooted.

Furthermore, other authors have connected the state of trust to the type of relationship and argued that with higher levels of trust, there is more collaboration which allows for the ability to be innovative in uncertain situations (Hattori and Lapidus, 2004). Hattori and Lapidus have created a framework that connects different states of trust and connects it to types of collaborative relationships, which then links to various factors related to the kind of collaborative relationship (See Table 1). The framework helps connect the various indicators related to the types of collaborative relationships to levels of trust.

<b>Relationship type</b>	<b>State of Trust</b>	<b>Motivating force</b>	<b>Outlook</b>	<b>Behaviour</b>	<b>Potential outcomes</b>
<i>Collaborative</i>	Highly invested	For the good of the whole	Synergy	Responsible	Breakthrough innovation
<i>Cooperative</i>	Transaction oriented	For successful project outcomes	Win-win	Willing	Preconceived success
<i>Competitive</i>	Reluctant or cautious	To look good	Win within rules	Shrewd	Compromise
<i>Adversarial</i>	Distrust	Not to lose	Win at any cost	Cut-throat	Unpredictable

**Table 1:** A matrix of dynamics related to the four types of relationships (Hattori and Lapidus, 2004, p 98).

Both in Sockett (1998) and Hattori and Lapidus (2004), it becomes apparent that not all relationships need a highly invested state of trust. However, more is required as partnerships become more advanced and delicate. Widely recognised by organisations, as they realise that they can gain a collaborative advantage if they work in partnerships across organisational and sectoral boundaries (Vangen and Huxham, 2003). These types of collaborations are challenging to manage and can, therefore, lead to less rewarding results. Furthermore, it is essential to consider that for most organisations; collaboration is a means to fulfil a joint business opportunity. However, in to do this effectively, there is a need for shared resources and knowledge (Lavrac et al., 2007). Hence, to create an advantage, the process of collaborative processes needs to be nurtured, and the factor that plays the most significant role in this process is trust (Vangen and Huxham, 2003; Cahill et al., 2003).

Based on the literature outlined in this section **collaboration** is the result of different actors working together with actors outside of their organisation by contributing their resources, by combining and coordinating the resources for joint activities or projects, to direct them the shared achievement of or organisational goals (Hattori and Lapidus, 2004; Sockett, 1997; McEvily et al., 2003). Meaning there is a shared understanding of the needs and preferences of the different participating organisations (Sockett, 1997; Mackintosh, 1997). Thus, the act of partners working together improves the project outcomes, which links to different types of collaborative relationships (Hattori and Lapidus, 2004).

### 2.5 Quality of project performance

The influence of trust on collaboration has consequences for outcomes of a project. Hence, it is essential to define what the outcomes can be and how to determine a project's quality. The quality of the outcomes directly links to the quality of the collaboration and results. However, it has always been challenging to define the effectiveness of public policy and project. For this reason, public administration scholars have chosen a variable to encompass the effectiveness of public policy, the so-called 'satisfaction' (Teisman, 1992; Verweij, 2015). They have chosen this variable because it is not only about the goals that have been achieved but more so on whether it is up to the satisfaction of the project partners (Teisman, 1992; Verweij, 2015).

Measuring project satisfaction through comparing the response and assessment of the partners when it comes to the quality of the delivered results compared to the expected quality determined beforehand of a product and or achievement (Fornell et al., 1996; Jamali, 2007). Another definition, more focused on satisfaction argues that it comes in three different elements: time, costs and rewards. The three components are the so-called 'iron triangle' (Ibid). However, this can be considered a 'hard' measurement of performance which does not work well with the perception of different actors that can interpret things differently.

Hence, from the literature, it is evident that the project manager can use the elements to estimate whether the project can be deemed successful (Atkinson, 2006). Furthermore, other scholars recognise that complexity arises in networks because partners have different interests and perceptions when it comes to evaluating problems and solutions but are dependent on each other when it comes to accomplishing shared objectives (Koppenjan, 2004).


Based on the literature outlined in this section, defining the **quality of performance** as:

"The response and assessment of the partner when it comes to the quality of the delivered results compared to the expected quality determined beforehand of a product and or achievement" (Verweij, 2015; Atkinson, 2006; Jamali, 2007).

### 2.6 Decision-making processes


The last element of the theoretical framework outlines the need for a mental model to connect the earlier described concepts. This enables to place the interaction of actors in a timeframe. It is essential to state that decision-making in public administration has become more complex (Teisman, 2000). One of the reasons for this complexity is that the interdependencies between actors characterise society due to the division of resources (Edelenbos and Klijn, 2007; Castells, 2000). Thus, to achieve policy outcomes, there is a need for different forms of collaboration

between organisations in networks (Edelenbos and Klijn, 2007; Van Heffen et al., 2000). Hence, the need for mental models to deal with the increased complexity to help analyse the various processes that are taking place. There are several models which can help reflect on decision making in a public governance context, namely the phase, the stream and the rounds model (See figure 1.)



**Figure 1:** An illustration of three possible models for the analysis of decision-making processes Teisman (2000).

The third and last model is the rounds model which was explicitly developed after years of research in urban and infrastructural planning (Teisman, 2000). The rounds model is a conceptual model with an approach to decision making; it assumes that different decision-making rounds take place (Teisman, 2000; Pennink, 2017). In each of the phases, the interaction between the various actors can result in the definition of problems and solutions (See Figure 2) (Teisman, 2000; Pennink, 2017). Each participant can score points in each phase, in terms of a leading definition of the problem and the (preferred) solution (Teisman, 2000; Pennink, 2017). Through this, they define the beginning of the next round. This means that while there is a new round that is able to change the direction of the match, there is a chance of new players appearing, or an opportunity for a change of the rules of the game (Teisman, 2000; Pennink, 2017).



**Figure 2:** The Rounds Model - Strategies undertook during the interaction that results in outcomes, key decision points (D) and the influence this has on trust (T). Adapted by the author from Teisman (2000) and Pennink (2017).

The rounds model is the mental model examines the links between trust (different levels) and different levels of collaborations (types of relationships). This relationship needs evaluation over time, and one of the critical aspects of doing this are the key decision points as used in the rounds mode. When analyzing processes over time, which is the case in this thesis, the rounds model makes the most sense because it allows for an analysis overtime based on interacting decision by the involved actors.

### 3. Conceptual framework


This section explains the operationalisation of the dependent and independent variable; how they relate and which indicators connect to the different concepts.

#### 3.1 Definitions

In the theoretical framework, it has become apparent that trust is one of the essential components that can influence collaboration and thus, facilitate coordination (Deutsch, 1962). P2Ps need a basis of trust to ensure that the different partners are willing to collaborate and coordinate shared efforts and risks in a project. Hence, the three main concepts that compose the conceptual framework are factors that built trust, trust and collaboration. The concepts will be defined for clarification during the rest of the thesis. The definitions can be found in both chapter 2 and the appendix in de code book.

#### 3.2 Conceptual Model

This research studies the interaction process between partners at different moments in time during the decision-making process. By analysing the decision-making process, it may become apparent which interactions build trust and hence improved the relationship between the partners. As the analysis considers both the factors that build trust as well its influence on the establishment of collaboration, this means that trust can be considered both as a dependent variable and an independent variable. The question is which factors build trust, and how trust affects the levels of collaboration. The interplay between the development of trust and the levels of collaboration over time effects project performance (See Figure 3).



**Figure 3:** Conceptual model that considers the factors that built trust and how trust influences collaboration through a partnership between the different organisations.

#### 3.3 Indicators

The key concepts form the basis of the operationalisation and are based upon the theoretical framework. The relations of the concept are visualised through the conceptual model, to measure the concepts empirically, there is a need to establish indicators. The indicators are built in the theoretical framework.

Concept	Definition	Indicators	References
<b>Trust</b>	Trust is idea or belief in the unknown, and thus the willingness of an actor to be vulnerable to the actions of another party, despite not knowing precisely what the consequences will be, but based on the expectation that the other actor will be honest, and not opportunistic when given the chance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Levels of trust over time: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Calculus- based trust</li> <li>o Knowledge-based trust</li> <li>o Identification-based trust</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Dimensions of trust: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Competence and Intention based trust</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Goodwill</li> </ul>	Giddens, 1991; Lewicki and Buncker, 1995; Pennink, 2017; Park and Lee, 2017, Perdue, 2001;
<b>Collaboration levels</b>	Collaboration is the result of different actors working together with actors outside of their organization by contributing their resources, by combining and coordinating the resources for joint activities or projects, to direct them the shared achievement of or organizational goals. Linked to the levels of relational collaboration.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- State of trust: collaborative, cooperative, competitive and adversarial</li> <li>- Motivating force</li> <li>- Outlook</li> <li>- Behaviour</li> <li>- Potential outcomes</li> </ul>	Hattori and Lapidus, 2004; Fukuyama, 1995; Robbins, 2016; McEvily, Perrone, Zaheer, 2003
<b>Factors that built trust</b>	The realization that trust comes in different forms and needs to be developed over time. Thus, for trust to develop there will be factors such as words, actions, decision, the values, objectives and behavior of partners. The following factors can both built trust as break it down again.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Common values and objectives</li> <li>- Behaviour</li> <li>- Previously established contracts</li> <li>- Institutional aspects</li> <li>- Situational factors</li> <li>- Initial meeting</li> </ul>	Leith, 2013; Fukuyama, 1995; Nugent and Abolafia, 2006; Lobina and Hall, 2006
<b>Quality of project performance over time</b>	The response and assessment of the partner when it comes to the quality of the delivered results compared to the expected quality determined beforehand of a product and or achievement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Time</li> <li>- Quality of the product</li> <li>- Costs and rewards</li> </ul>	Verweij, 2015; Atkinson, 2006; Jamali, 2007

**Table 2:** Indicators based on the theory and related to the conceptual model.

## 4. Methodology

This chapter sheds light on how the data for this research is collected and analysed. Furthermore, it gets into the validity and reliability of the methods and collection of data.

### 4.1 Research question

This thesis addresses the following research question: **What is the influence of trust on the decision-making process and the type of collaboration (P2P) between project partners; and how does trust affect the outcomes of the projects as perceived by the actors over time?**

The research question was answered by collecting different insights through qualitative research methods because they are more appropriate when analysing a specific phenomenon in a more in-depth manner (McNabb, 2008; Heale and Twycross, 2018). For this research question, numbers and statistics would not suffice in this specific thesis, the use of qualitative methods links to the complex nature of trust and its influence on collaboration over time into account, explicitly allowing for an analysis of real-life cases.

### 4.2 Case study

This research is a case study analysis. The benefits of using a case study approach is that allows for an in-depth examination of the phenomenon and provides for an integral insight of ongoing processes and how those are related (Verschuren & Doorewaard, 2007). In this case, two projects in Utrecht, OV Terminal Utrecht and the Uithoflijn in Utrecht, are analysed. In the cases selected, there was potential for P2P collaboration between different partners.

The first characteristic of a case study comparison is to focus on a narrow domain, as this allows the focus of the research to compare the different cases and interpret the difference in approach. Secondly, to delve into case studies, there is a need for a more in-depth approach which makes the process more labour intensive compared to when conducting a survey. Case studies benefit from face-to-face conversations, and thirdly, tend to be more selective when it comes to choosing participants and is based on strategic arguments. Lastly, a case study allows for a more holistic approach, which means that there is room to ask open questions and be flexible on the follow-up questions asked. Hence, there is more room to go into more depth during face-to-face interviews and ensures that all aspects of the topic can be covered.

This thesis discusses two case study projects. In both cases, the municipality of Utrecht worked together with other public partners on redevelopment projects. The first project was a collaboration between Prorail and the municipality. For the second project, the municipality worked together with the province of Utrecht. In both case studies, there was potential for collaboration, and they were part of the *Masterplan Stationsgebied*. The first project, called the OV-Terminal Utrecht, focused on the potential for P2P with the aim to diminish risk and increases opportunities potentially. The second project, the Uithoflijn, had the potential for a similar partnership but they choose not the create a joint execution agency.

Both cases share the same context: both principally have the same associated partners, the projects took place around the same time, and physically took place near each other. The context of the cases ensures the ability to isolate the effect of the collaboration on the resulted project quality. The case studies are hierarchically compared. During the interviews, observations and source research, there is a clear distinction between the two different cases. The analysis allows for conclusions that reach a comparison with a higher abstraction level.

There is potential to create a more integral and holistic image of P2Ps due to the limited research. The interviews and the face-to-face approach this thesis deploys allow for more in-depth analysis of the 'new aspects' in the study. However, it is essential to substantiate those claims with literature as outlined in the theoretical framework. One detriment of this method is external validity. There has been a strategic choice of a comparison of two case studies, but this does mean that the results from this research are more difficult to generalise when compared to survey research where more respondents and cases. The results will be validated by generalising the results to theory, so-called analytic generalisation (Yin, 2003). The case studies will be analysed through a top-down deductive approach, by analysing clearly defined concepts taken from the theory, and underlying dimensions in combinations with the indicators to make sense of the interviews (Myers, 2013). The next paragraph goes more into the need for validity and reliability.

#### 4.3 Validity and reliability

The goal of this research is to analyse the influence of trust on the collaboration process between public partners. To ensure valid and reliable execution of this research, there has been chosen for method triangulation, to increase internal validity (Verschuren & Doorewaard, 2007). The used methods of data collection in this research are:

- Semi-structured interviews of the involved project partners to delve into the developments and interactions that occurred during the projects.
- Analysis of primary and secondary sources triangulated to support the observations from the interviews (Bryman, 2016). Examples of these secondary sources are policy documents, private correspondences between the actors and contracts.

The theoretical understandings, developed from chapter 2 and the corresponding definitions of the critical concepts are a point of departure in this research. However, it is crucial to consider that despite clearly defining the applied concepts in the theoretical framework, they can become clouded and blurred during the interviews. To ensure the accuracy of the interview questions and answers, an interview protocol forms a guideline during the interviews (Goede, 1999). The interview protocol allows the interviewer to fall back on the theoretical concepts of the subject matter and the related indicators. The indicators are a point of departure during the coding of the interviews. Besides, the indicators force the interviewer to stay objective during the interview.


It is essential to ensure that the research is generalisable throughout the process (Thiel, 2010). Qualitative research is inherently less repeatable than quantitative research. Hence, there has been extra attention to the potential for repetition with the user data. The respondents have been chosen based on purposive selection. The selection criteria were that over the entire timeline of the project, the different partners of the involved organisations had to be present at critical decision-making points. All the respondents had to be present at the same essential points of the decision to ensure



they all had the same experience throughout the project. The specific timeline allows for a comparison of the different experiences, which increases the reliability of the data of the various interviews because they all have similar experiences and timelines of events. However, their perception and interpretation of the experience might be different (Swanborn, 1981). A limitation of a case study is the repeatability, which has consequences for the reliability because someone else must be able to repeat the study and get similar results. Hence, by recording and transcribing the interviews, there is the ability to repeat the study with the same data, which improves transparency (Yin, 2003).

#### 4.4 Overview of the respondents

For each of the case studies, interviews took place with multiple actors that were involved with the projects above. For each case study, the ambition was to create a balanced overview of the relevant actors from the partnership because it explains the dynamics of the collaboration. Figure 4 gives an overview of the organisational structure for both of the case studies selected.



**Figure 4:** Organization structure of the case studies – Both part of the Masterplan Stationsgebied.

Table 3 gives an overview of the different interviews that took place, outlining the home organization of the respondent, their specific role in the project, and the period that they were involved with the realization of the OV terminal Utrecht Centraal (OVI).

Respondent	Home organization	Role in the project	Sub organizations	Time period
1	Prorail	Project director Prorail	OV-TUC	2005 – 2011
2	Municipality of Utrecht	Director Stationsgebied	POS	2000 – 2017
3	Prorail	Project director Prorail	OV-TUC	2011- 2016
4	Prorail	Rail Systems Engineer	OV-TUC	2011 -2016
5	Prorail	Project controller	OV-TUC	2012- 2018
6	Municipality of Utrecht	Secretary GUO	POS	2006 -2011
7	Municipality of Utrecht	Interface manager	POS	2005- 2017

**Table 3:** Interviewed actors with their specific roles in the project for the case study OV Terminal.

Table 4 gives an overview of the different interviews that took place, outlining the home organization of the respondent, their specific role in the project and, the period that they were involved with the realization of the Uithoflijn.

Respondent	Home organizations	Role in the project	Sub organizations	Time period
1	Province of Utrecht	Project director Uithoflijn	POUHL	2011-2020
2	Municipality of Utrecht	Director projects	POUHL	2014 -2020
3	Municipality of Utrecht	Program manager Stationsgebied	POS	2009- 2019
4	Municipality of Utrecht	Project manager Stationsplein Oost	POS	2011- 2019
5	Municipality of Utrecht	Project manager	POUHL	2011- 2019
6	Municipality of Utrecht	Project analyst	POS	2011 - 2019
7	Municipality of Utrecht	Project manager	POS	2011- 2020

**Table 4:** Interviewed actors with their specific role in the project for the case study Uithoflijn.

The selection of respondents considered a variety of variables. To ensure that the interviews give a balanced overview of each case, at least three interviews took place with each partner participating in the project. Furthermore, in the case of the Uithoflijn, there were a lot of changes in the project team. Hence, interviews took place with people that worked during different phases of the projects to make sure there is a proper overview of the timeline and try to capture the influencing of the changes in the project team.

#### 4.5 Operationalisation of the research

To properly analyse the different cases, it is essential to reflect on the operationalisation of the theory. As a first step, the critical concepts linked to definitions which help to create a framework of theory which forms the basis of the study. The key concepts connect to indicators, which help bind the key concepts. Furthermore, the indicators connect the interviews to theory and reflect on the conceptual model.

The semi-structured interviews took place using the interview guide (see appendix A). The data retrieved from the interviews and primary and secondary sources. After which the interviews were transcribed and put in Atlas.TI as well as primary and secondary sources, which were policy documents, contracts and correspondence. The conceptual model based on key concepts and indicators formed the basis of the analysis of the various sources. The analysis connected the theoretical concepts to real-life phenomena in the case studies. Lastly, a quantitative aspect added to the analysis of the data. The respondents rated the trust in partnership on a scale of 1-10 during the different rounds to support the qualitative data retrieved from the interviews. The combination allowed for an analysis of the complex nature of trust and its influence on collaboration while taking interactions over time into account.

## 5. Research findings OV-Terminal Utrecht Centraal


### 5.1 Case introduction

This chapter focusses on the case of the central station in Utrecht (OVT). In the OVT case, the municipality, through the project organisation stationsgebied (POS), worked together with Prorail to construct the new railway station. The first plans for the redevelopment of the station came about in the early 2000s, where the decision fell that they wanted an integral station meaning that the train, the bus and the tram were all in one place (POS, 2011b). Hence, both parties realised that they needed to work together intensively to execute the project in the most effective and time-efficient manner. For this reason, they set up a shared execution organisation (GUO), which is a form of a P2P (OVT R1; POS, 2007b).

The municipality created alliance with Prorail, where they aimed to share risk and opportunities while working towards shared societal interests (POS, 2007a; POS, 2011b). It is essential to underline that neither the ownership nor the interest of one party determined the course of the project (OVT R1; OVT R4). The different public organisations shared the responsibility for the entire project. The various elements were split based on who could bear the responsibility for that aspect of the project best (POS, 2007d; POS, 2007f). It required continuous monitoring, ensuring that every aspect of the project went according to plan. The Station area is characterised by the fact that the starting conditions are not determined by a single project, but by contiguity of one or more separate projects which requires a different approach to project management (OVT R7).

### Timeline of the project

In figure 4, a short overview is presented of the critical moments for the case study of Utrecht Centraal.



**Figure 5:** Timeline of critical moments for the development of Utrecht Centraal.

## 5.2 The process: Rounds Model

### **Background**

The origins for the redevelopment of station Utrecht Centraal trace back to the early period of the so-called Nieuwe Sleutel Projecten (NSP) which started in 1997 (POS, 2011b). Utrecht Centraal was one of the seven stations in the Netherlands which got a significant overhaul redeveloping the stations and the area's surrounding the station. The central government, the NS and the municipalities were in charge of making agreements about the renovation of the major stations.

### **Round 1 – Initiation phase Masterplan Stationsgebied 2000-2003**

Utrecht Centraal was one of the seven projects as part of significant train station redevelopments on a national level. The national government and the municipality developed a joint new vision for the station, which focused on improving the following elements (POS, 2011b):

- Creating an integrated transfer machine for all forms of public transport under one roof;
- Integral information provision to travellers;
- The same appearance and quality for all types of public transportation.

In 2003 this all changed when the municipality of Utrecht and the National Government started working on realising the project master plan Utrecht, which had the ambition to make the area safer and more liveable (POS, 2011a). Moreover, it had the aim to create a better connection with the old historical part of the city. As a first step, the municipality worked with a group of public and private partners on what the best way would be to redevelop the area while considering risk management and arranging contracts with the private partners that already had stakes in the area (POS, 2007b; POS, 2007d).

The station formed a barrier between the west and the east side and the municipality had the intention that by improving the station area that both sides would be better connected. The decision to focus on connecting the west and the east side of the city is an integral part of the project. The public transport terminal is part of this connection. The placement of access gates made that the OVT would no longer be accessible to passers-by in the future. To keep the station, open for everyone, they added an 'interurban connection' to the design of the OVT (POS, 2011a).

Early on both parties realised that the complexity of the assignment was a significant stake in the promising redevelopment of the station. The first layer of added complication is that the station had to stay open during the redevelopment projects, the transformations had to take place while people were still commuting to and from Utrecht. The other layer that added complexity was that the redevelopment of the entire area took place at the same time, so the changes in the other projects in the stationsgebied had an immediate effect on the developments of the OVT (POS, 2011a).

The different early negotiations between the national government and the municipality form the basis for the later interactions between the various partners—the critical decisions to build the foundation that made the OVT the central project in the stationsgebied. The national government took a step back in the further development of the design and contracting of the entire masterplan.

The change in actors had consequences for the OVT because the municipality now dealt with Prorail (POS, 2011b).

### **Round 2 – Design phase 2004 -2006 + Contract phase 2007-2008**

The change in actors meant that the municipality and Prorail needed to work together to get the project off the ground. Furthermore, they needed to report their actions and decisions together to the national government, as team, not separate entities.

- Change in actors

The decision to go ahead with the project implied that the number of major actors reduced to two: the municipality and Prorail. The other players also played a role, but only interacted with the actors that executed the part of the project connected to their home organisation. Moreover, the national government took a backseat which means that they were no longer directly involved with the decision-making process on the ground and only informed on keys decisions, or financial issues (OVT R5). Furthermore, this means that the national government now only had an oversight role, and the collaborating parties (Municipality and Prorail) agreed among themselves to form a united front for the national government. By making sure that they would agree first, before presenting any changes or decisions to the national government. To ensure there were no unnecessary delays which could happen if every decision needed discussions with the national government present (POS, 2011b; OVT R3).

Due to the change of key actors involved at the Station Area Partners, the process accelerated in the period 2003-2006. The national government took on an oversight role, and Prorail and the municipality took an active part in the shared decision-making process. Both parties focused more on the common interests and objectives and, thus were more willing to cooperate (OVT R2; OVT R4).

- Change in Content

For four years, spending time on ensuring the different elements of the design were approved, and there was an agreement on the contractual obligations between the partners (POS, 2011b).

- An Agreement of Intent (IOK) and an Implementation Agreement (UOK) was drawn up and signed.
- Developing the design for the OVT from preliminary design (VO) to a definite design (DO).
- Signing contracts and agreements with the private actors that were affected by the redevelopments of the station area.
- First talks for the Project agreement (POK) start.

- Interaction

The period 2003-2004, in particular, was characterised by the actors as a period with a lot of pace and dynamism in public cooperation (OVT R6; OVT R5). Under the NSP system, both an Agreement of Intent (IOK) and an Implementation Agreement (UOK) were drawn up and signed. The municipality of Utrecht has taken up its responsibility as an integrated developer of the central area. The fact that the municipal Project Organization Stationsgebied (POS) is more distant from the municipal organisation has played a decisive role in finding solutions. On the side of Prorail,

they had a similar arrangement because they established a project organisation specifically for the OV-Terminal Utrecht Centraal (OVTUC). In essence, it was the two project organisations that created all the plans and worked together on the execution of the project.

### **Round 3 – Execution phase 2009- 2014**

The core task for the execution phase is "integrating the new" into "the existing" (OVT R6; OVT R4). The construction OVT happens while about 200,000 travellers are walking around every day (POS, 2007a). It is not an option for this project to install a construction fence and close off the work area for four years, and this places high demands on the construction phases. During the execution phase, the excellent cooperation on the public transport terminal project between central government, Prorail and the municipality ultimately led to a unique integrated cooperation model based on equivalence (OVT R1; OVT R4).

- Change in Stakes and interaction

The realisation of close collaboration between the two project happened through the GUO; this was possible due to the conclusion of the POK (POS, 2011a). The stakes change when it comes to the final formal responsibility between the actors. The responsibility for the project now rests with the central government and the municipality of Utrecht. Prorail is the implementing organisation on behalf of the central government. The collaboration between Prorail and the municipality bases itself on a "psychological contract", in which the distribution of responsibility is 50% -50% (POS, 2011a; POS, 2007a). In reality, the responsibility and risk distribution per project component is more complicated. For example, some parts fall within the 'risk part of the State', the 'risk part of the municipality' and a 'common risk part'. Both parties decided to share decision-making power (OVT R6; OVT R4).

The decision-making in GUO management can only take place based on unanimity. In the event of setbacks, there is equalisation within the project. Furthermore, for windfalls, a 'wish list' has been drawn up to enable the later addition of extra quality to the scope of the project. The respondents describe this collaborative model based on incentives as a "new" form of collaboration in the world of area development in general and for station projects in particular (OVT R2; OVT R3). Typically, area redevelopment projects have each party focus on their respective parts of a project without coordination on how to merge the different elements of the project, and the coordination usually happens in retrospect which costs more money and time (OVT R1; OVT R4).

- Changes in content

Finalising the physical structure of the station in 2012 was considered to be the responsibility of the State. With the further development of the other parts of the station, the national government contributed to the funding of those parts of the projects (POS, 2011a; OVT R4). Their involvement was less needed in the actual execution phase. The set up of the project structure was to keep the other party in the loop, because of the basis of unanimity. However, they added an addendum to the original project plans, which would allow the municipality to use the money allocated for the entire project to finalise their parts without the direct involvement of Prorail. A unique situation since the projected was funded by the Meerjarenprogramma Infrastructuur, Ruimte en Transport (MIRT) fund, which can only be spent by state organisations like Prorail.

The municipality, therefore, needed to get direct control over the funds, which would mean they would not need to keep asking permission to Prorail if they were allowed to do something. After lengthy discussions, Prorail got a less dominant role in them as their main mandate was near finalised. Thus, the municipality got a lump sum to complete the parts where they did not need the direct involvement of Prorail (POS, 2011a; OVT R4). In reality, it meant that the municipality took over finishing the bicycle parking underneath the station and worked on the squares next to the station and the bus/tram platform. Additionally, the municipality was no longer responsible for the finalisation of the station building. They were allowed to do under the condition that once the project was finalized, the initial 50/50 arrangement was financially upheld

#### **Round 4 – Completion of the project 2015**

Decisions during the project's third round had consequences for the actors involved in completing the project.

- Change in actors, stakes and interaction

In the final phases of the project, nothing significant could disrupt the final stages of the building processes. Throughout the project, the dynamic was that POS and OVTUC would present the plans and results together to the State to inform them about the trajectory. They had a shared mission and sorted out details together, instead of working out the details with the state present (POS, 2007h).

In the final stage, this dynamic changed for several reasons. First, the momentum changed because there was less collaboration between the partners during the final phases of the executions as they were both finishing up their respective parts of the project. Secondly, in the end, the State takes ultimate responsibility for the project since they funded the majority of the project with state funds (POS, 2007f).

The national government took an oversight role in the project through the decision-making process. However, when it came to the financial round off of the entire project, the government was back in charge since they hold the purse strings. As a consequence, it added a new dimension for the collaboration between the different partners because they had to justify the choices and decisions, surround the project, and figure out who took on which costs. The discussions increased between the original partners concerning who had paid for which elements, and how the financial burden for the different parts of the project compared to each other (OVT R2; OVT R7). The financial discussion was only happening now because, during the project, they agreed to split everything 50/50 to save time.

It was affecting the dynamics of the partnership. The basis of equality and unanimity between the partners was challenging to uphold when discussing the financial settlement because the actual financial contributions to the project did not end up upholding the 50/50 split. Both parties did not want to pay for elements that were not part of their respective scope despite, agreeing to these elements during previous rounds (OVT R2; OVT R7).




## 6. Research findings Uithoflijn

### 6.1 Case introduction

This chapter focusses on the case of the Uithoflijn. Through the project organisation stationsgebied (POS), the municipality worked together with the province of Utrecht to construct the part of the new light rail that was located in the stationsgebied. In the early 2000s, the tram line was in the initial plans for the stationsgebied. In the previous scenario, the tram was going to be located on the Jaarbeurszijde (Geelhoed and Kuhlmann, 2014). However, in 2010 it was decided that the light rail would move to the centrumzijde.

This chapter only discusses the route of the Uithoflijn that is located in the stationsgebied; limiting the scope. Due to this decision, the discussed collaboration is between the POS and the Project Organization Uithoflijn (POUHL). The project had two parts, tramrails in the station area (DOV-T) and the tramrails outside of the station area (SABUTO). The project was under pressure due to the different projects going on at the same time in the stations' area (See figure 6). This thesis only considers the development of the Uithoflijn that takes place in the stationsgebied (DOV-T).




**Figure 6:** Tram route Uithoflijn – Connecting the central station with the Uithof campus.

The division between the POUHL, the POS of the municipality Utrecht and the public transport department of the province of Utrecht as follows (POUHL, 2014a; POUHL, 2014c):

- Project organisation POUHL takes care of the preparation and realisation of the tram infrastructure, the acquisition of it tram equipment, integration tests between infrastructure and equipment and coordination of the test company. The province executes the tram infrastructure and tram equipment and the adjacent public space by the municipality.

- The project organisation POS is responsible for the substructure and parts of the superstructure of section D on behalf of the municipality of Utrecht in the station area. Besides, the municipality provides the design and software for the traffic light controls and warning lights.
- The province of Utrecht is responsible for preparing the future management and maintenance of the tram line to be constructed and the maintenance of the tram equipment. The province will train the tram drivers and carry out the final tests under the coordination of the POUHL during the Trial operation. Finally, the province must also ensure the delivery of the tram infrastructure (such as tram protection systems), and the timely adaptation of the SUNIJ (Light Rail Utrecht - Nieuwegein / IJsselstein) line.

## Timeline of the project



**Figure 7:** Timeline of critical moments for the development of the Uithoflijn.

## 6.2 The process: Rounds Model

### Background

The stationsgebied is a complex area in Utrecht, so when it was redeveloped, the expectations were that all different projects and their timelines would be affecting one another (POUHL, 2014a). The Uithoflijn and its complexity were indeed affected by the built of the OVT and vice versa. The Uithoflijn needs to meet a variety of safety, integration, accessibility requirements in this area (Geelhoed and Kuhlmann, 2014). Hence, the project was highly dependent on other projects in the area.

In 2003 the Council of the municipality of Utrecht agreed on the Masterplan Stationsgebied. In these original plans, the end station for the SUNIJ line would move to the westside (Jaarbeurs side) of the station (POUHL, 2014e). They wanted to integrate the tram into the Station area. A tram stop on the west side of the OVT has been part of the OVT from the Sketch design. Later, the municipality and the region (BRU) jointly decided to delay bus line 12 to the Uithof. As a result, a final stop for the tram on the east side of the OVT was still necessary. The well-thought-out distribution of buses and trams over the east and west sides of the OVT had to be changed again (POUHL, 2014b).

The POS expected the new Uithoflijn to stay on the west side of the station and adapted their plans to that (Uithoflijn respondent 7, 2020). These changes had significant consequences for their planning and projects, and ultimately the Uithoflijn moved to the east side (Centrum side) (Uithoflijn respondent 7, 2020).

### **Round 1 - Initiation phase 2003 – 2011**

The collaborative nature of the Uithoflijn project guaranteed the realisation of a properly functioning tram system and functional integration of the line in the city, linked to the SUNIJ line (POUHL, 2014c). Part of the plans is the construction of runways to the bus and tram stops at Utrecht Central station. The station area consists of two pieces for the tramway: the route section D (interconnection) and the route section OVT (See Figure 6).

In 2010 the BRU and the municipality signed their collaboration agreement (SOK). This formed the basis of a structured decision process of the further development of the Uithoflijn. The basis for the decisions were made in 2011. The BRU and the municipality requested a social cost and benefit analysis (MKBA) and a proposed business case to substantiate a subsidy promised by the government in December 2010 (POUHL, 2014a). This led to the final decision to transfer the connection from a bus connection to a light rail connection. In the resolution from the BRU and municipality, there are some reservations regarding the final grant awarded by the Minister of Infrastructure and the Environment. As it lapses with the Minister's promise of 30 May 2011 in the context of the BO MIRT (Administrative Agreement for the Multi-Year Program for Infrastructure, Space and Transport) (POUHL, 2014a).

### **Round 2 2012 – 2014 Greenlight prep phase**

The decisions made in the previous round form the basis for the interactions in the following rounds. The intention was there from both parties to get the project started, but there needed to be more discussion on how the implementation of the light rail will fall within the station area. . This is because for the POS the changed location of the Uithoflijn meant that they had to adapt their pre-existing plans to accommodate for the implementation of the Uithoflijn in the stationsgebied (POUHL, 2014a; Uithoflijn Respondent 3, 2020). The discussion affects the municipality of Utrecht because they need to decide what is part of the scope and what is not.

- **Change in stakes**

On 18 April 2012, the BRU gave the green light to realise a tram line so that the Uithof line would become part of the Utrecht HOV network upon completion. However, despite the green light from the BRU, the realisation of the tram was halted quickly (POUHL, 2014a; Uithoflijn R3). At

the beginning of June 2012, outgoing minister Melanie Schultz van Haegen announced that she did not want to transfer the 110 million euros in government money for the new tram line. The House of Representatives had said that no decisions are made about the widening of the A27 before the elections. According to the Minister, the A27, the Uithoflijn and the Noordelijke Randweg Utrecht (NRU) were part of a package, and the plans could not be viewed separately (POUHL, 2014f). Despite these problems, construction officially started on 21 September 2012.

The municipality and BRU continued with the plans despite this setback. They signed a partnership agreement for the execution of the Uithoflijn. The decisions made during this period form the basis for the preparation phase of the project. In the period 2012-2014, the main focus was on adapting roads to make room for the tram line. This meant the construction of substructure (bridges, foundation, sand body) on a large part of the tram route.

- **Change in content**

In 2013, the Municipality of Utrecht and the BRU adopted the Final Design, which allowed them to start the Uithoflijn tender. In the first quarter of 2014, the main Uithoflijn agreement signed by both parties (POUHL, 2014a). Following the finalisation of the main agreement, six additional implementation agreements were signed for the different parts of the (POUHL, 2014c). In December 2014, definite plans for the Uithoflijn to the execution agreement of the stationsgebied were added. Furthermore, the selection of a contractor for the tram infrastructure and supplier of tram equipment got introduced. Lastly, just before the new year, the Royal BAM group signed on for the infrastructure contracts (POUHL, 2014a).

- **Change in interaction**

As the implementation of the Uithoflijn increased the complexity in the stationsgebied, its entire design had to be adapted to make room for the implementation of the Uithoflijn. The adaptation of the original plans for the stationsgebied was not the only consequence, but it also meant that there were new discussions between the municipality and BRU (POUHL, 2014d; Uithoflijn respondent 4, 2020). The discussions focused on stationsgebied. First, who was in charge of the project and what is the division of risks linked to the project. These discussions harmed the relationship between the actors. In the end, it was decided that for this specific part of the trajectory of the light rail, the municipality would carry 26 % of the risk and the BRU the other 74% (Uithoflijn respondent 1, 2020, Uithoflijn Respondent 4, 2020; POUHL, 2014d).

The interaction focused responsibility for the various parts of the project and resulted in much bickering between the two parties. It was affecting the stakes, content and interaction between the parties in the following round.

### **Round 3 2015 – 2017 Change in responsibility for the project**

- **Change in actors**

In 2015 there is a significant change in the organisation that is in charge of the development of the Uithoflijn. The responsibility for the projects and contract transferred from the BRU to the province. The reason for this is the closing of the BRU. The introduction of the Abolition of Plus Regions Act, the traffic and transport duties of the BRU transferred to the province of Utrecht

per 1 January 2015 (POUHL, 2014a). As a consequence, the project organisation Uithoflijn is now a partnership between the municipality and the province of Utrecht. Both parties work together on the project through their respective project organisations, the POS and the POUHL. This partnership is only for the part of the construction of the light rail that is within the stationsgebied (POUHL, 2014d).

Since 1 January 2015, the province of Utrecht has been responsible for regional tram transport. As a consequence, this means that Regio tram Utrecht, part of the province, is responsible for the management, maintenance and expansion of the entire tram system in and around the city of Utrecht (POUHL, 2014b).

- Change in stakes and content

At the same time, as a significant change in actors, there was also a substantial change in stakes. In 2015, an audit system integration carried out into the realisation of the entire working tram transport system and the management of the Uithoflijn project. The audit produced recommendations for both the project organisation Uithoflijn as the province of Utrecht. The administrative control from the province of the succession of advice from the 2015 system integration audit fell seriously short. The audit was needed because both parties were unable to work out the problems that occurred during the development of the Uithoflijn, and they kept blaming each other, which essentially meant that the project got nowhere because, with each minor issue, discussion followed on who would be solving it and paying for it (Uithoflijn R3; Uithoflijn R5).

- Change in interaction

The transfer of the responsibilities from BRU to the province had an impact on the interaction between the actors. Furthermore, the audit was needed because the parties could not figure out who was responsible for what during the implementation phase (Rekenkamer, 2018). Both kept pointing fingers and were unwilling to pay for anything that they did consider as part of their scope (Rekenkamer, 2018). The audit had as a result that the relationship was brought back to zero. It put a decision in writing regarding who is in charge and paying for which elements (Rekenkamer, 2018).

#### **Round 4 2018 – 2019 Finalisation of the project**

The changes in interactions between the actors as a consequence of the audit changed the relationship between both parties. It had significant consequences for both the stakes and content and the interactions resulting from those changes.

- Change in stakes and content

The planning for the Commissioning of the Uithoflijn has been adjusted twice, in 2014 and the end of 2017 (Gemeente Utrecht, 2019). Since December 2017, in addition to a leading line planning, we also worked with tighter planning for internal use, that is called a control planning (Rekenkamer, 2018).

After the audit, several consequences happened for the project, extra costs and a new timeline. When the audit wrapped up, both parties concluded that they were not able to finish the project

in line with the original timeline (Rekenkamer, 2018). They expected a postponement of the start of the tram line. As a consequence that there would be a more extended operation of line 12, extra construction work, and the longer construction time involved additional costs.

Moreover, there was a need for extra resources for the preparation, management, and operation of the uithoflijn. Also, there was a need for a pilot company and reception organisation and the additional costs for the new construction of the tram depot in Nieuwegein (Rekenkamer, 2018; Gemeente Utrecht, 2019). In total, 84 million euros was needed inside and outside the project to complete the Uithoflijn and put it into operation. The municipality of Utrecht contributed 25 million of these costs. The remaining amount was 59 million euros was for the account of the province of Utrecht (Rekenkamer, 2018). The additional costs not only consisted of delay costs but also from costs that had not previously been estimated or previously allocated to the project budget (Rekenkamer, 2018).

- Change in interaction

The audit acted as a rewind of the interactions between both of the parties. It was now clear who was responsible for which aspects of the implementation of the Uithoflijn in the stationsgebied. Furthermore, who would be paying for what aspects of the project? The interaction was now much more coherent because there was a clear mission on what approach was needed to get the project done, without too many more delays. Both parties had no reason to bicker anymore and now had a shared objective to get the project done as soon as possible (Uithoflijn R3; Uithoflijn R5).

## 7. Analysis of the case study – OV-Terminal

The following sections analyse the interaction between the municipality and Prorail. The section specifically looks at the four fundamental concepts (trust, factors that built trust, collaboration levels, and quality of project performance). The concepts are analysed through the rounds model to see the effect over time.

### 7.1 Trust

#### Growth of trust round 1:

In the first round, Prorail and the municipality worked together when it came to the plans for the OVT. During this phase, the trust in each other was low. Neither party knows what to expect from the opposing party. However, since the project needs to get started, both parties have no other option to at least figure out the trajectory for the project. Hence, the shared decision to seek a more intense collaboration. The realisation of the OVT during the initiation phase contributes significantly to the growth of trust between both parties.

One actor described the situation as:

'Both parties were willing to put their cards on the table without hesitation. The fact that neither party abused the information they gained from being completely honest from the start helped trust grow and the willingness to collaborate on the project together.' (Interview POS, 2020)

#### Trust and collaboration round 1:

Based on the evaluation of the interactions during the rounds, the following indicators (highlighted in blue) link collaboration levels and trust in the partnership. The higher the levels of trust, the higher the type of relationship level.

Relationship type	State of Trust	Motivating force	Outlook	Behaviour	Potential outcomes	Average level of trust in the partnership
<b>Collaborative</b>	Highly invested	For the good of the whole	Synergy	Responsible	Breakthrough innovation	The average score the different respondents give regarding the trust in the partnership in the first round is: <b>6</b> (See chart 1).
<b>Cooperative</b>	Transaction oriented	For successful project outcomes	Win-win	Willing	Preconceived success	
<b>Competitive</b>	Reluctant or cautious	To look good	Win within rules	Shrewd	Compromise	
<b>Adversarial</b>	Distrust	Not to lose	Win at any cost	Cut-throat	Unpredictable	

**Table 5:** Overview of the indicators based on the interactions in round 1 corresponding the relationship levels.

During the first round, both parties are still unsure of the partnership, which is reflective in the caution when it comes to trusting the other party. Still, since the project has a long term perspective, there is motivation to make it successful, which results in willing behaviour from both sides. Since there are no clear shared goals and objectives set, the relationship is based on compromise and win within the rules.

Growth of trust round 2:

During the second round, the level of trust grew even more due to the decision to be equal partners during the design and execution phases of the project (OVT R2; OVT R5). This joint decision between the partners significantly contributed to the development of trust and formed the basis of collaboration between the partners (POS, 2011a; OVT R5). The growth of trust links to the behaviour of the actors and institutional circumstances as related to the respective home organisations. The different actors involved had an open and transparent approach when it came to the goals and objectives of their organisation and actively searched for common ground with the opposing party (OVT R3; OVT R6). Furthermore, the approach during the first and second round build goodwill for the interactions in the later rounds when they actively needed to work together to solve problems.

Trust and collaboration round 2:

The following overview, shows a reflection on the collaboration levels and trust in the partnership.

<b>Relationship type</b>	<b>State of Trust</b>	<b>Motivating force</b>	<b>Outlook</b>	<b>Behaviour</b>	<b>Potential outcomes</b>	<b>Average level of trust in the partnership</b>
<b>Collaborative</b>	Highly invested	For the good of the whole	Synergy	Responsible	Breakthrough innovation	The average score the different respondents give regarding the trust in the partnership in the second round is: <b>8</b> (See chart 1).
<b>Cooperative</b>	Transaction oriented	For successful project outcomes	Win-win	Willing	Preconceived success	
<b>Competitive</b>	Reluctant or cautious	To look good	Win within rules	Shrewd	Compromise	
<b>Adversarial</b>	Distrust	Not to lose	Win at any cost	Cut-throat	Unpredictable	

**Table 6:** Overview of the indicators based on the interactions in round 2 corresponding the relationship levels.



During the second round, the partnership strengthened by considering the long-term perspective and the willingness to support each other. Both parties are highly invested in the project and have high levels of trust in the partnership. The trust levels reflected in the motivating force, behaviour and synergy of both collaborating parties. Hence, as a result, the potential outcomes are a preconceived success.

#### Growth of trust round 3:

Furthermore, the design and contracting phase was the peak of the trust in the partnership between the different partners. The various actors proved to each other that they were trustworthy when it came to their intentions and competences. There were no signs of self-interest, and both parties approached the project as a co-production which built immense goodwill which benefited both parties during the complexities of the execution phases (OVT R2; OVT R5).

In the first half of the third round, the execution of the project was a shared responsibility, the arrangement being that the party with specific strengths would take the lead in the parts of the project where those particular skills were needed. However, the different actors mention that during the second half of the execution, they lost touch with each other, from both sides of the project it was communicated that this affected the trust in the partnership (OVT R4; OVT R6).

For the reason that they did not need each other as much they did during the earlier phases of the project. Respondents mentioned that the settlement of the finances would have been more comfortable if they would have kept more in touch with each other during the final phases of the execution. Nevertheless, they do mention that during the process itself, it made sense to decrease the collaboration since it would take up unnecessary extra time.

One of the respondents reflecting on the events in the second half of the third round:

'It would have been better for the partnership if we would have kept in touch more despite doing our parts of the project. It would have made the financial settlements easier because we have been able to vouch for each other to the national government in the decisions we made while not actively working together'. (Interview OVTUC, 2020)

#### Trust and collaboration round 3:

The following overview shows a reflection on the collaboration levels and trust in the partnership. The third round was the partnership's most successful round. The changes in the roles of the partners were ultimately decided within a high state of trust. Nevertheless, the rest of the indicators shift to a more cooperative relationship, because the change of role in the partnership makes the collaboration less intense.

Relationship type	State of Trust	Motivating force	Outlook	Behaviour	Potential outcomes	Average level of trust in the partnership
<b>Collaborative</b>	Highly invested	For the good of the whole	Synergy	Responsible	Breakthrough innovation	The average score the different respondents give regarding the trust in the partnership in the third round is: <b>7.5</b> (See chart 1).
<b>Cooperative</b>	Transaction oriented	For successful project outcomes	Win-win	Willing	Preconceived success	
<b>Competitive</b>	Reluctant or cautious	To look good	Win within rules	Shrewd	Compromise	
<b>Adversarial</b>	Distrust	Not to lose	Win at any cost	Cut-throat	Unpredictable	

**Table 7:** Overview of the indicators based on the interactions in round 3 corresponding the relationship levels.

Growth of trust round 4:

The final round showed that the levels of trust and collaboration are still high due to the positive outlook on the project. Nevertheless, the difficulty is more related to the role of the State in the settling of the finances. The municipality never really had to deal with the State before since because they dealt exclusively with Prorail. However, when the different project organisations reflect on the project, they have an extremely positive outlook on both the process and the result. The intensity of the collaboration, levels of trust in the earlier phases significantly contributed to the final results of the project, the overall satisfaction. They all agree that the project would not have been as successful if they had not taken the co-production approach based on unanimity and equality.

Trust and collaboration round 4:

The following overview shows a reflection on the collaboration levels and trust in the partnership. Despite the original 50/50 arrangements and contracts between the partners, this was no longer the case in the financial discussions. The financial conclusions took more time than expected because Prorail and the municipality had to justify their past decisions.

It was affected the dynamics of the partnership. The basis of equality and unanimity between the partners was challenging to uphold when discussing the financial settlement because the actual financial contributions to the project did not end up upholding the 50/50 split. Both parties did not want to pay for elements that were not part of their respective scope despite, agreeing to these elements during previous rounds (OVT R2; OVT R7).

Relationship type	State of Trust	Motivating force	Outlook	Behaviour	Potential outcomes	Trust in the partnership
<b>Collaborative</b>	Highly invested	For the good of the whole	Synergy	Responsible	Breakthrough innovation	The average score the different respondents give regarding the trust in the partnership in the fourth round is: <b>7.5</b> (See chart 1).
<b>Cooperative</b>	Transaction oriented	For successful project outcomes	Win-win	Willing	Preconceived success	
<b>Competitive</b>	Reluctant or cautious	To look good	Win within rules	Shrewd	Compromise	
<b>Adversarial</b>	Distrust	Not to lose	Win at any cost	Cut-throat	Unpredictable	


**Table 8:** Overview of the indicators based on the interactions in round 4 corresponding the relationship levels.

In the final round, the partnership develops from a highly invested state of trust to a more transaction-oriented state of trust. The collaboration between the parties is lower because the project was almost done. The national government becomes more dominant, and while not being involved in the partnership as intense as Prorail, and this is reflected in the motivating force as the focus is now successful project outcomes. In this case, both parties win, but there is no shared outlook. But, due to the goodwill that built over the rounds, the behaviour of the actors is still willing.


## 7.2 Development of trust in the partnership over time

To examine if there is the growth of trust in the partnership over time during the different rounds, each respondent reflected on how they rated their trust in the partnership. The respondents were allowed to give a grade ranging from 1-10 for each round that they participated in the project.

Chart 1 shows the trust of the respondents from the POS in the partnership with Prorail. While, chart 2 shows the trust of the respondents from Prorail in the partnership with POS.



**Chart 1:** Trust of the POS in the partnership with Prorail during the different rounds.



**Chart 2:** Trust of Prorail in the partnership with the POS during the different rounds.


Chart 1 and 2 show that the different respondents that participated in the project started with relatively low levels of trust. However, during the different rounds, because of the various interactions, actions, and decisions, trust in the partnership grew and stayed on a high level consistently. Despite the changes in parties (National government for Prorail and back again), both sides stayed committed to the partnership due to the built-up goodwill during the different rounds. The consistent behaviour can be considered one of the situational factors that influenced the consistency in approach in the final round because even though the financial settlements changed the dynamics of the partnership, there was no loss of trust in the partnership.

### 7.3 Factors that built trust

During the rounds, several different factors contributed to the built-up of trust over time. During the first round, the most significant factor that influenced the growth of trust over time is previous behaviour and the initial meeting (OVT R3; OVT R6). The factors formed the basis for all future interactions. Several respondents acknowledged that the willingness to be open and transparent about the intentions from the respective organisations significantly contributed to the approach after the first round (OVT R6; OVT R7). Both parties showed high trust, which reflected in repeat behaviour. Furthermore, neither party felt like self-serving behaviour took place, even in situations where mistakes happened, and the first instinct would be to blame the opposing party. Furthermore, linking this to institutional factors of the organisation. Openness, transparency was upheld by people higher up in the organisation which transcended to the lower levels on either side.

From the second round onwards, the initial meeting has set the standard for the later rounds. It was supported by the consistent behaviour from both parties when it came to the approach to the project. Once, again openness and transparency took centre stage. Furthermore, the willingness to work together as a team and the way that both sides dealt with mistakes contributed significantly to the further development of trust which had a positive influence on the collaboration levels (OVT R1; OVT R3). The institutional factors, in combination with consistent behaviour, formed the basis for the different changes in situational factors. The changes in actors on the side of Prorail could have harmed the trust in the partnership, but due to the built-up goodwill and faith in the partnership agreement, there were no real issues.

Based on the interviews as conducted for the analysis for the station in Utrecht, the following key factors of trust were established.



**Figure 8:** Essential factors of trust based on the conducted interviews

### 7.4 Collaboration levels

As can be seen from chart 1, after the first round, the level of trust in the other partners stays high. The growth of the trust is one of the main factors that the different actors were willing to collaborate quite intensively because they were not afraid that the behaviour and actions would

change from the opposing actors (OVT R5; OVT R4). The first round formed the basis for collaboration; both sides had high levels of trust in each other.

Two of the respondents talked about this one occasion where they had to sort out a contract with an external party that could block the continuation of the execution phase of the OV-Terminal. The meeting lasted longer than expected, and the representative of Prorail needed to leave. His reflection on the situation:

'I was not anxious for leaving despite not being able to represent my party at the negotiations, and I had enough faith in our partnership that I knew that (...) would not abuse the fact that I was not present for the benefit of his organisation.' (Interview OVTUC, 2020)

There is a multitude of these instances where the opposing parties describe either having so much faith in the partnership that they know the other party would not abuse a situation despite having the chance to do so. The other thing that is striking is the approach to collaboration that both parties have is that they mention that they know that they do not always get the best deal possible for their respective home organisations.

However, they do not mind because, in other instances, they are better off (OVT R1; OVT R2). 'Sometimes the decisions and the resulting action that we take through our joint execution agencies are not the best for my home organisation, but I know that at the finish line it will probably be 50/50 for both parties. It saves much time not having to negotiate every little number and action.' (Interview POS, 2020)

Overall it can be argued that both parties are highly invested in the project and realise that they get the best result by taking the approach that gets the best results for both sides. Every little interaction throughout the first three rounds reflects on the synergy between the two organisations and a feeling of responsibility towards each other. The synergy reflected in the outcomes related to the project. This specific project and course of events can be characterised by high levels of trust, which can link to the development of collaborative type of relationship over time.

### 7.5 Quality of project performance

The different respondents all argued that the set up of the project greatly benefited the project outcomes. They were more effective in allocating resources and could tackle problems early on due to the transparency of both parties. Furthermore, the no-nonsense approach of the actors showed that there was not a culture of blaming each other if elements of the projects were not going as planned. The shared approach also meant that if there were win falls in the project, they reinvested them to increase the quality of the project. The different respondents argue that with the time, costs and rewards it created a better-quality product, than they had initially been planned (OVT R1; OVT R7).

One of the actors involved argued: 'The different actors involved all had the intention from the start to be open, honest and transparent. The different parties were aware that due to the complexity of the project, they needed to align their perspectives and goals because otherwise, the project would never get realised.' (Interview OVTUC, 2020).

In one of the interviews , the interviewee described the critical factors for trust and collaboration as: 'The flexible approach allowed both parties to direct their energy to the things that needed attention at that moment in time. The flexibility allowed us to tackle problems fast and efficient but also to focus on joint opportunities to improve the project. Furthermore, the other side also showed a willingness to work together and think beyond conventional solutions' (Interview POS, 2020).

The anecdote above outlines the intention-based trust from both parties. The approach of working between the two parties was the result of high levels of intention and competence-based trust. A respondent describes the intention and competence-based trust as: 'Even if the project was not going as we had expected, it did not create any tensions between us and the opposing side. We knew that we would come to a solution together.' (Interview OVTUC, 2020).

Alternatively, as another respondent put it:

'Not every part of the project always went smooth, but I trusted in the capabilities of my team and the actors of the opposing side. We also, all approached the project in the same manner, and I knew that the opposing party was good for their word.' (Interview OVTUC, 2020).

The state of trust formed the basis of a collaborative approach between the actors. The partners are highly invested in the project and developed synergy between the partners. Both parties acted for the good of the whole and felt responsible for the shared project outcomes.

## 8. Analysis of the case study – Uithoflijn

The following sections analyse the interaction between the POS and the POUHL. The section specifically looks at the four fundamental concepts (trust, factors that built trust, collaboration levels, and quality of project performance). The concepts are analysed through the rounds model to see the effect over time.

### 8.1 Trust

#### Growth of trust round 1:

In the first round, it becomes evident that the project and the project partners get off on the wrong foot. There is confusion about the scope of the Uithoflijn, and the execution of the project. There are several projects in the Station area, which creates interfaces for the Uithoflijn, and this makes collaboration in the area according to an interviewee very complicated.

'All the different projects in the stationsgebied are related because it is such a small area to work on if there are delays on the west side of the area it will most likely affect the projects on the east side as well. Hence, it is needed to keep tight control over the area so that you can control for any unexpected changes.' (Interview POS, 2020)

However, they did not consider this in 2011, when it was decided not to place the Uithoflijn on the west side (Jaarbeurs side), but on the east side (centre side) of the track. The decision affected the contracts for developments in the eastern part of the Station area, which had already closed (Rekenkamer, 2018; Uithoflijn R7). Thus, the choice for the east side required many adjustments and had many contractual and planning technical consequences (Rekenkamer, 2018; Uithoflijn R5).

One of the respondents from the stationsgebied team reflected on the issues surrounding the first round: 'It felt like the people that were in charge of the development of the Uithoflijn from the BRU felt like they should have priority in the stationsgebied. They had no cognition or awareness for the other projects taking place in the same limited space and the complexity of the situation.' (Interview POS, 2020)

The 2011 decision to move the Uithoflijn to the centrumzijde had significant consequences on the projects that had started previously. The renegotiations had as a result the delayed construction of the Uithoflijn. For contracts concluded after the decision on the arrival of the Uithoflijn on the east side of the track, the Uithoflijn is priority number 1 within the Station area (Rekenkamer, 2018; Uithoflijn R4). The construction of the Zuidgebouw halted, for example, give priority to the Uithoflijn.

However, the respondents from the province mentioned: 'I do not understand how after they knew that we were coming and we wanted to start with the first preparations for the Uithoflijn in the stationsgebied, we still got delayed so much by the other projects in the area.' (Interview POUHL, 2020)



Overall it can be argued that the interaction and the resulting decision between the different actors involved did not build trust in the competence and intention of the various parties. The rocky interactions had as a consequence that the partnership was more on a need to know basis than an approach to collaborate actively. The approach to collaboration of the different partners hence kept affecting the trust levels.

Looking back on cooperation between both parties during the project: 'I feel like only certain people kept each other in the loop of what was happening and which actions were need to go further. These people tried to agree on things before the actual meeting to save time and get to decisions sooner. However, on the administrative level, this did not seem possible.' (Interview POS, 2020).

Trust and collaboration round 2:

The following overview shows a reflection on the collaboration levels and trust in the partnership.

Relationship type	State of Trust	Motivating force	Outlook	Behaviour	Potential outcomes	Average level of trust in the partnership
Collaborative	Highly invested	For the good of the whole	Synergy	Responsible	Breakthrough innovation	The average score the different respondents give regarding the trust in the partnership in the first round is: <b>5</b> (See chart 2).
Cooperative	Transaction oriented	For successful project outcomes	Win-win	Willing	Preconceived success	
Competitive	Reluctant or cautious	To look good	Win within rules	Shrewd	Compromise	
Adversarial	Distrust	Not to lose	Win at any cost	Cut-throat	Unpredictable	

**Table 9:** Overview of the indicators based on the interactions in round 1 corresponding the relationship levels.

During the first round, both parties are still unsure of the partnership, and this is reflective in the caution when it comes to trusting the other party. Still, since the project has a long term perspective, there is motivation to succeed which results in willing behaviour from both sides. Since there are no clear shared goals and objectives set, the relationship is based on compromise and win within the rules

Growth of trust round 2:

In the 2nd round, the intention is present to work together, and both parties sign multiple agreements for the different plans related to the Uithoflijn. In the second round, there is potential for the growth of trust: signing contracts and the creation of a management agreement. The intention is present to work the project through a partnership. Nevertheless, the operation of the Uithoflijn starts 1.5 to 2 years later than initially planned (Rekenkamer, 2018; Uithoflijn R3).

Respondent POS on the delays at the start:

'It would have helped if the POUHL would have taken a more open approach to the implementation of the Uithoflijn in the stationsgebied. It felt like they only complained, but did not want to help think of solutions on how actually to implement the project in the stationsgebied.' (Interview POS, 2020)

Trust and collaboration round 2:

The following overview shows a reflection on the collaboration levels and trust in the partnership.

Relationship type	State of Trust	Motivating force	Outlook	Behaviour	Potential outcomes	Average level of trust in the partnership
<b>Collaborative</b>	Highly invested	For the good of the whole	Synergy	Responsible	Breakthrough innovation	The average score the different respondents give regarding the trust in the partnership in the second round is: <b>4.5</b> (See chart 2).
<b>Cooperative</b>	Transaction oriented	For successful project outcomes	Win-win	Willing	Preconceived success	
<b>Competitive</b>	Reluctant or cautious	To look good	Win within rules	Shrewd	Compromise	
<b>Adversarial</b>	Distrust	Not to lose	Win at any cost	Cut-throat	Unpredictable	

**Table 10:** Overview of the indicators based on the interactions in round 2 corresponding the relationship levels.

Thus, during the second round, there was not a lot of faith in the partnership. Both parties are still reluctant because of the interactions and decisions during the first round. Reflecting on the other indicators, both parties try to look good, but their behaviour is shrewd, and they try to win within the rules, which result in potential outcomes that are a compromise.

Growth of trust round 3:

The third round, the audit and the establishment of an Advisory Board, had significant consequences on the partnership. The audit critically assessed the realisation of the project and provided solicited and unsolicited advice (Rekenkamer, 2018; Uithoflijn R1). The idea was that it would resolve any issues during the implementation, which was supposed to help steer the project administratively. The audit from the start created much bickering between the partners because both parties considered the other party to be at fault for the mistakes made during the development during the Uithoflijn (Rekenkamer, 2018; Uithoflijn R5). The trust and collaboration levels can be considered an all-time low during this process because that both parties were frustrated with the project and the partnership.

Reflection on the abolition of the BRU and the transfer of task: 'If the municipality has a critique on our approach to the development of the Uithoflijn, they should have taken over the role from the BRU themselves' (Interview POUHL, 2020).

Trust and collaboration round 3:

The following overview shows, a reflection on the collaboration levels and trust in the partnership.

<b>Relationship type</b>	<b>State of Trust</b>	<b>Motivating force</b>	<b>Outlook</b>	<b>Behaviour</b>	<b>Potential outcomes</b>	<b>Average level of trust in the partnership</b>
<b>Collaborative</b>	Highly invested	For the good of the whole	Synergy	Responsible	Breakthrough innovation	The average score the different respondents give regarding the trust in the partnership in the third round is: <b>4</b> (See chart 2).
<b>Cooperative</b>	Transaction oriented	For successful project outcomes	Win-win	Willing	Preconceived success	
<b>Competitive</b>	Reluctant or cautious	To look good	Win within rules	Shrewd	Compromise	
<b>Adversarial</b>	Distrust	Not to lose	Win at any cost	Cut-throat	Unpredictable	

**Table 11:** Overview of the indicators based on the interactions in round 3 corresponding the relationship levels.

The state of trust stays reluctant and cautious during the third round. The partnership is at an ultimate low, and both parties want to make sure that the project goes their way. Thus, they are playing not to lose and try to win at any costs. The cut-throat behaviour had as a consequence that the tension reaches an ultimate high. Hence, the need for an audit to get both parties back on the same page.

Growth of trust round 4:

However, the interactions during the third round form the basis for the final and fourth round. When the audit was done in 2018 the different issues between the parties were not per se resolved, but it did help create a path forward because it was apparent who was responsible for what and how the project should be finalised (Uithoflijn respondent 2, 2020; Uithoflijn respondent 5, 2020). The audit greatly benefited the collaboration between the two parties, and it had a positive effect on the intention-based trust since it helped create a perspective on how to go forward and finalise the project (Uithoflijn R2; Uithoflijn R5).

The competence-based trust levels remained low from the side of the POS because they believed that the province had no business from the start executing the Uithoflijn. Besides, parties had a more open attitude toward those involved because they want to learn to gain mutual trust from things that are not yet going well (Uithoflijn R3; Uithoflijn R7).

Reflection the audit from an actor from the province:

'After the audit, we knew what needed to be done, and we did not want to get any more negative press for the project. Nevertheless, I still think we were in a disadvantage after the audit.' (Interview POUHL, 2020).

Trust and collaboration round 4:

In the following overview shows a reflection on the collaboration levels and trust in the partnership.


<b>Relationship type</b>	<b>State of Trust</b>	<b>Motivating force</b>	<b>Outlook</b>	<b>Behaviour</b>	<b>Potential outcomes</b>	<b>Average level of trust in the partnership</b>
<b>Collaborative</b>	Highly invested	For the good of the whole	Synergy	Responsible	Breakthrough innovation	The average score the different respondents give regarding the trust in the partnership in the fourth round is: <b>6</b> (See chart 2).
<b>Cooperative</b>	Transaction oriented	For successful project outcomes	Win-win	Willing	Preconceived success	
<b>Competitive</b>	Reluctant or cautious	To look good	Win within rules	Shrewd	Compromise	
<b>Adversarial</b>	Distrust	Not to lose	Win at any cost	Cut-throat	Unpredictable	

**Table 12:** Overview of the indicators based on the interactions in round 4 corresponding to the relationship levels.


In the final round, which takes place after the audit, both parties try to start fresh. However, due to past behaviour, the state of trust remains reluctant and cautious. Nevertheless, because of the audit, both parties now were more cautiousness to work together to get successful project outcomes. Hence, the behaviour that is displayed is more willing, but still, both parties try to win within the rules since there is still no shared outlook despite the need to bring the project to a successful ending.

### 8.2 Development of trust in the partnership over time.

To examine if there is the growth of trust in the partnership over time during the different rounds, each respondent reflected on how they rated their trust in the partnership. The respondents were allowed to give a grade ranging from 1-10 for each round that they participated in the project. Chart 3 shows the trust of the respondents from the POS in the partnership with the POUHL. While, chart 4 shows the trust of the respondents from POUHL in the partnership with POS.



**Chart 3:** Trust of the POS in the partnership with POUHL during the different rounds.



**Chart 4:** Trust of the POUHL in the partnership with POS during the different rounds.

Chart 3 and 4 show that the different respondents that participated in the project started with relatively low levels of trust. However, when comparing the development of these scores to the scores of Utrecht centraal, the trust levels do not grow as much and stay on a lower level for a more extended period. Trust only rises in the 4th round after the interference of the audit. Chart 2 shows that there are changes regarding the actors involved. There were only two actors that experienced the entire project, and the other respondents stayed for shorter amounts of time. People felt less bound to the project due to the issues that came about.

Furthermore, there was also a change in parties responsible for the project. These two elements contribute significantly to the lower scores for trust in the partnership. The many changes in the involved actors and parties make it challenging to build a bond as a partnership. Furthermore, with every shift in actor, a new trust bond has to be developed, which explains the lower trust levels throughout. Moreover, the reluctant and cautious behaviour had as a consequence that there was no synergy, and both sides tried to win within the rules for their benefit (Uithoflijn R3; Uithoflijn R6). The trust in the partnership only started to grow in the final round. The audit caused a reset on the relationship. For both parties, it was evident which steps needed to happen to make sure the project would finish successfully.

### 8.3 Factors that built trust

During the rounds, several different factors contribute to the built-up of trust over time. The actions in the first round, specifically the initial meeting impacted the behaviour of the actors during the following rounds. In the first round, the conduct of both parties is reluctant; this stays the same throughout all the rounds. The reason for the consistent cautious behaviour links to situational factors. The situational factors that had a significant impact on the location of the Uithoflijn, as both parties were in disagreement on the location and how the decisions regarding the final locational (POUHL, 2014a; POUHL, 2014f) Furthermore, the change in location had a significant impact on the other projects in the stationsgebied. The situational factors affected the behaviour of both parties, which continued in the following rounds.

After the first round, the lack of transparency about the location of the Uithoflijn caused distrust and bickering. Hence, the POS did not feel willing to give up any more objectives for the project, while on the other side the POUHL felt like the process was not going fast enough and the project was held up for no reason. The POUHL did not consider the situational effects of the change of location for the other projects coordinated by the POS. The POUHL felt like their project should have preferential treatment over the other projects in the stationsgebied (POUHL, 2014i; POUHL, 2014j). The outlook showed an unwilling approach from both parties, where they both did not get a lot done and spent most time bickering trying to make decisions.

The behaviour that both parties displayed in round two and three worsened the motivating force of the project, the outlook of the participating parties. Since both tried to gain ground for themselves with the established rules, the partnership reached an ultimate low during round three when an audit was needed to reset the relationship. The audit can be considered a situational factor that had the most significant impact on the continuation of the partnership (POUHL, 2014a; POUHL, 2014e). The levels of trust in the partnership remained low during the fourth round, but


both parties had perspective and were more willing to get the project back on the rails. The audit was one of the main factors that pushed the project to completion.

The other factor that significantly impacted the overall collaboration process surrounding the Uithoflijn was the change in parties that were involved (The shift from the BRU to the province). According to the respondents, there was no continuation in actors that involved on both sides of the project (Uithoflijn R2; Uithoflijn R7). Furthermore, another contributing factor was the perception of the capabilities of both parties. When the issues kept piling up, both sides were blaming each other and neither party felt like they met the expectations during the second and third round (Uithoflijn R2; Uithoflijn R5).

Moreover, there were issues with the approach both parties took regarding mistakes and the lack of actual response, which mostly just focused on deferring the blame on the other party. There was no real constructive discussion on how to get issues resolved since they spent most time bickering on who was to blame and who had to pay for the extra costs of the problem. Neither party was capable of acknowledging their own mistakes and solely focusing on getting the job done (Uithoflijn R2; Uithoflijn R1).

Both parties when asked what would have changed the partnership acknowledged that it would have helped if they had been more honest about their expectations, and had a more open response when it came to dealing with mistakes (Uithoflijn R4; Uithoflijn R7).

Based on the interviews as conducted for the analysis for the Uithoflijn, the following keys factors of trust were established.



**Figure 9:** Essential factors of trust based on the conducted interview

#### 8.4 Collaboration levels

As can be seen from chart 2, after the first round, the level of trust in the other partners stays low. The trust remains weak because there is much discord from the start between the project partners. The reasons for this is the change of location and implementation of the project in the

stationsgebied (Uithoflijn R3; Uithoflijn R6). The POS feels like the POUHL does not recognise the complexity of the area. The sudden changes to the original plan have as a consequence that the original design for the stationsgebied needs to be altered (Uithoflijn R1; Uithoflijn R4). The distrust from the start and the unwillingness to get together and work out the issues explain the low levels of trust. There is never really a partnership because both parties do their own thing without communicating on what would be best for the project.

One of the respondents argued that they lost sight of what would be the best thing for the project: 'We were only trying to accomplish our objectives, there was no willingness to consider to another side, and neither side built up goodwill.' (Interview POUHL, 2020)

It is evident that both parties are invested in the project but are unable to find common ground. If they had been able to find opportunities to work together or discussed the issues they had actively, this would have benefited the project as a whole. There is only synergy between the actors in the fourth and final round, due to interference of the audit (Rekenkamer, 2018). In the previous rounds, they both focus too much on their objectives, which means there is no sense of shared responsibility.

#### 8.5 Quality of project performance

The different respondents from both POS and OVTUC argue that the way the project was structured and the interactions between the partners did not contribute positively to the project outcomes. The lack of trust and the unwillingness to work together had as a consequence that the project took more time than expected, costed more money and did not live up to the expectations which were set back in 2011 (Uithoflijn R2; Uithoflijn R5). There was no shared approach to the project, despite the potential for working together more intensely.

Furthermore, the choice of the municipality and the BRU to fulfil the commissioning together appears to have been unsuccessful in practice (Uithoflijn R1; Uithoflijn R3). Cooperation between all involved, including the municipality, the province, the project organisation and main contractor BAM, was difficult. The parties felt little involvement and responsibility for side projects, which were essential for the realisation of a moving tram.

All respondents argue that the finalisation of the audit did turn the project around (Uithoflijn R2; Uithoflijn R5). Both parties had clear guidelines on the expectations for their part, who was supposed to be doing what, and who was paying for which parts of the project. The explicit agreement benefited the intention-based trust since there were now clear expectations that the project would finish and the deadline was in sight. The competence-based trust never really grew due to the feeling of incompetence from both partners working on the Uithoflijn.

'After the audit, there was no reason to bicker because every issue we had before was appointed one of the partners. The only thing that was left to do was ensure that the project would be finalised without increasing the costs.' (Interview POS, 2020)

Low levels of trust of both parties show through in the competence and intention of the other partner. The project lacked a solid basis on which it could fall back. During the 1-3 rounds, both



parties take on an adversarial approach when it comes to their collaborative approach. There is extreme distrust, and neither party wants to lose, which makes the partnership more like a competition. Neither party would award the other party any favours. However, when considering the 4th round, it can be argued that the collaborative approach as related to the trust levels is more competitive. The levels of intention-based trust have increased, but the competence-based trust levels lack behind. Both parties are still cautious of the other party, but there is a realisation that there needs to be a compromise to ensure that the project finishes without going even more over budget and time. The audit allowed both parties to take a more transaction-oriented approach which was the approach that both parties needed to finish the Uithoflijn without fighting more.


## 9. Conclusion and discussion

### 9.1 The results

This chapter analyses data per case study and compares these, guided by the research questions. To answer the research question of this thesis:

**What is the influence of trust on the decision-making process and the type of collaboration between project partners; and how does trust affect the completion of an area development project?**

Was there evidence of trust in the decision making in the two particular cases, and what type of collaboration level exists between the project partners? Furthermore, how does this affect the completion of projects as a whole? See figure 10 for an overview of the relations between the concepts.



**Figure 10:** Conceptual model that considers the factors that built trust and how trust influences collaboration .

When considering the case studies, the rounds model, and the corresponding analysis of the interviews and content, there is evidence that trust influences decision-making processes. If trust is present, it makes the process of interaction between the participating actors smoother—less time is spent on the process of reaching concrete actions and decisions. The extra time spent during the decision-making process due to the lack of trust created negative outcomes which are the result of the interaction between trust and collaboration.

Moreover, another positive aspect for the parties participating in the decision-making process is that if there is continuous trust, it facilitates an equilibrium where both parties give and take, which is a positive outcome of the interaction between trust and collaboration. Both parties need to be open and transparent about their objectives. Both parties need to define their shared objectives because it contributes to the trust in the intentions and competences of the opposing party.

On the other end of the spectrum, if there is no growth of trust, this makes the overall decision-making process more difficult. There is too much focus making sure that decisions and resulting actions do not harm the objectives of their home organisation, which is evident in the case of the Uithoflijn where neither party wants to compromise. Furthermore, the decision-making process lags because of the distrust in the competence of the other party.

The analysis shows that trust influences the decision-making process. Trust also influences collaboration and makes it more effective. However, it does become apparent that there is a possibility of collaboration even if there is no trust. However, it has as a consequence that the

decision-making process and partnership will take more time than it would take if the trust were present.

Influence of trust on collaboration is mostly visible in the factors that built trust because these contribute positively to collaboration as well. Trust enhances communication between parties, which makes both parties more responsible and willing. Looking at the nature of the collaboration, it becomes evident that with a higher the level of collaboration, there are higher levels of trust in the partnership. High levels of trust and collaboration result in a shared approach where both parties win, and there is synergy in their words, actions and decisions. The synergy has a positive effect on project performance, spending no extra time and money. Trust and collaboration are mutually interdependent since a change in trust affect the collaboration and vice versa. However, collaboration comes first and is the starting point for the development of trust.

If there were low levels of trust present, this showed in a self-centred approach, from the actors. This could be seen in the Uithoflijn, where the actors were unable to collaborate and tried to win within the rules for their home organisation.

The factors that would usually build trust are not present because the behaviour of the actors is shrewd. After all, both parties aim to win within the rules. If this is the overall approach, this effectively means that there is no collaboration between the actors.

The key factors that built trust matched nicely with the critical factors found in the interview analysis. In figure 7 and 8 in section 7, it becomes evident that most factors that affect trust are case dependent. In the case studies, it is evident that the behaviour of the actors and the approach in the partnership is essential. Trust develops further depending on the response from the actors when it comes to changes in actions, decisions and unexpected events over time. The reaction to the changes affects the further development of trust.

One of the significant factors that influence trust is the repetition of the behaviour. If an interaction repeatedly happens positively, the interaction becomes more consistent between the actors. The reason for this is that the original personal objectives become shared, and through the partnership, new common values come about. The shared values reflect on the idea that words become actions and decisions. It is not only talk but active participation, if both parties keep up their end of the bargain despite the risks of the unknown, goodwill is built.

So, can trust as connected to the collaboration levels influence the quality of the project outcomes? Based on the case studies, it is evident that there is a link between the combination of trust and collaboration on project outcomes. High levels of trust link to a higher level of collaboration; the project partners argue that this contributes to the project performance over time, with less extra money and time spent. They mention that the project becomes better than expected, they had better time management and they felt like the money their organisation has spent contributed and made a significant impact on the project. In the project with the lower levels of trust and linked collaboration levels, it becomes apparent that the project costs more time and money and that the extra amounts spent did not add any extra value. Throughout the rounds model, the Uithoflijn did not meet expectations.

## 9.2 Answering the research question

Thus, based on the reflection of the analysis in connection with the theory, trust can affect the decision-making process both in a positive and as a negative manner. The interactions form the basis of the factors that built trust. Depending on their nature; this can strengthen or weaken the collaboration. The level of collaboration at the same time affects trust. If the collaboration is successful, trust develops further. While if the collaboration is unsuccessful, it damages the growth of trust. Trust and collaboration are interdependent meaning that changes in intent, stakes and behaviour affect both concepts.

Furthermore, higher levels of trust connect to higher levels of collaboration. In comparison, lower levels of trust in a partnership often result in a partnership where there is cooperation, but not achieving the positive antecedents of a successful collaboration. The analysis also showed that in the case studies the higher levels of trust through collaboration had a positive effect on the eventual project outcomes. The positive effect on the project outcomes relates to the efficiency of the partners in the collaboration, they did more in the allocated amount of time, which meant the satisfaction levels for the project were higher. If there are lower levels of trust, the process would usually take longer, and would be less efficient, which would cost more funds and time without achieving anything extra from the project.

Trust is essential for any form of partnership; it improves the overall decision-making process and can significantly benefit collaboration. If both parties are trusting and content in their partnership, this can significantly benefit the eventual project outcomes.

## 9.3 Recommendations

What should we learn from the cases studies when it comes to P2P in practice? For any form of collaboration, it is interesting to know that a partnership is possible without trust. However, this does not mean that it is beneficial for project performance. In the case, it is evident that if there are high levels of trust, this has a positive influence on the collaboration levels, which can enhance project performance. Nonetheless, this does not mean that every one of the project outcomes is smooth sailing as became apparent in the OVT. In the last round, the interaction between the parties reduced meaning when they needed to be open and transparent the most, and they were not. The lack of transparency affected the timeline of the project, as the financial discussion caused delays. Hence, it is essential to keep communicating even if it feels like extensive communication is no longer needed; otherwise, it can cause hindrance to the partnership and affect the trust and collaboration levels.

Furthermore, it is interesting to know for future projects that collaboration is a factor that helps develop trust initially. If there is no collaboration, trust does not grow. Nevertheless, when intention based trust is present the partnership changes, it affects the collaboration levels and the other way around. Moreover, the factors that affect trust are case dependent due to the difference in approach in the used case studies. It would be interesting to know if common characteristics of factors of trust exist when 100 case studies are analysed.

#### 9.4 Discussion

This section discusses whether the chosen research design and operationalisation of conditions were sufficient to answer the research question.

It would have been better for the reliability and validity of this research if there had been more respondents per cases. The extra interviews could have contributed to the validity of the analysis and increased the overall level of the content. Another option would have been to add a third case study to create a better overview of the influence of trust on interaction by looking at another project in the Stationsgebied. Furthermore, as a result of the limited amount of interviews, the opinion of a couple of respondents reflects the perspective of the successfulness of the entire project. The analysis would have benefited from the inclusion of interviews with minor actors in the process, to verify the experiences of the two major actors and their respective role in the process.

These elements could have added an interesting perspective but would have been too much of a burden in the limited time available. Even though it would have been better to include more respondents in the research, still some interesting findings and differences between the two cases in the Stationsgebied were found, which can form the basis for future research.

A limitation of this thesis links to the time constraints and the influence of COVID-19 on the interview process. Originally it was the idea to do the different interviews in person because talking about trust in a partnership is a delicate subject—the results of the interview expected to be more honest if the interviews took place in person. Live interviews would have allowed for a proper analysis of the physical reaction and facial expressions from the respondent as well. Allowing for a more in-depth interview. Conducting the interviews online has as a consequence that the interviewer has fewer chances to connect with the respondent properly. However, due to COVID-19, it was not deemed a responsible decision to conduct the interviews in person due to the associated health risks. Hence, it made sense to change the interviews from an in-person interview to an online interview.

#### 9.5 Further research

For the field of collaborative governance, it would be interesting to conduct more research on the potential for P2Ps and the role that trust plays in facilitating collaboration between private and community actors. The need for more research on the principal/ principal relation that is present in a P2P, which contrasts to the principal /agent relationship present in a PPP. Furthermore, it would be of significance to contrast P2P with PPP, to see which of the two partnership types is more efficient when it comes to reaching results. Moreover, this would allow for a comparison of the different types of trust relations. The analysis of trust between principals compared to principal agent relationships.

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## Appendix

### a. Interview guide

#### Introductie

- Hartelijk bedankt voor uw tijd;
- Vertrouwelijke omgang met gegevens;
- Akkoord met opnemen;
- Kost ongeveer drie kwartier.

#### Mijzelf

- Rachel Knibbe, 23 jaar oud;
- Masterstudent Urban Governance in Rotterdam;
- Afstudeeropdracht voor AT Osborne;

#### Thesis

- Onderzoek naar invloed van vertrouwen op besluitvorming en samenwerking tussen publieke partijen in gebiedstransformatie projecten.

#### De respondent

- Wat is uw functie binnen uw organisatie?
- Hoe bent u betrokken geweest bij project
  - A: Stationsgebied
  - B: Uithoflijn

### 1. Vragen

#### 1.1 Fase 1: Vertrouwen

1. Hoe zou u vertrouwen definiëren in de context van samenwerken in gebiedstransformaties
2. Heeft u het idee dat vertrouwen invloed heeft op de samenwerking tussen partners?
  - a. Kan u zowel de positieve als de negatieve factoren benoemen?
3. Kan er samenwerking plaats vinden als er geen vertrouwen is tussen de verschillende project partners?
4. Hoe zou u het vertrouwen beoordelen in de verschillende project partners?
5. Kan het gesteld worden dat als er meer vertrouwen is tussen verschillende partners, dit leidt tot intensere samenwerking die zorgt betere project resultaten?
  - a. Samenwerken met publieke partners
6. Hoe zou u de rol van u organisatie definiëren binnen het project, in relatie tot de andere betrokken partijen?
7. Hoe zou u de relatie van samenwerken beschrijven met de andere partijen?
  - a. In de context van
    - i. A: Stationsgebied
    - ii. B: Uithoflijn
8. Op welke manier is de werken tot stand gekomen?
9. Wat kunnen de voordelen/ nadelen van deze manier werken tussen publieke partijen?
  - a. Welke dingen heeft u zelf ervaren in u eigen project?
  - b. Wat zijn de gevolgen geweest van de type benadering in het project

10. Zou u in de toekomst kiezen voor een andere manier van werken met de partners of hetzelfde als in dit project?

### **1.2 Fase 2: Timeline Rounds model**

11. Kunt u mij meer vertellen over hoe u het proces rondom het project heeft ervaren? Zou u mij een tijdlijn van de gebeurtenissen kunnen geven?
  - a. Vanaf het moment dat u zich aansluit bij het project tot het moment van uitvoering.
  - b. Het gaat dan vooral om de kritieke momenten die de samenwerkingen met de andere partijen heeft kunnen beïnvloeden.
12. Welk cijfer voor elke fase voor het contact tussen de partners

### **1.3 Fase 3: Invloed van samenwerken op de uitkomst van het project**

13. Komt de vorm van samenwerking de uiteindelijke uitkomst van het project ten goede?
14. Wat zou u meenemen van dit project naar een volgend project als het gaat om samenwerken, het proces of de opzet.

#### **Stationsgebied laatste vragen:**

15. In het geval van het stationsgebied wat waren de positieve uitkomsten van de samenwerkingsovereenkomst?
16. Wat is de invloed geweest van het besluitvormingsproces op het ontstaan van de samenwerkingsovereenkomst?

#### **Uithoflijn laatste vragen:**

17. In het geval van de uithof lijn waarom is er volgens u niet gekozen voor een innigere samenwerking tijdens de uitvoering van het project.
18. Kan dit herleid worden naar de eerdere interacties tussen de publieke partners tijdens het besluitvorming proces.

## B. Code book

### Dependent variables

Variable	Code	Indicator	Code
<p><b>Trust</b> is idea or belief in the unknown, and thus the willingness of an actor to be vulnerable to the actions of another party, despite not knowing precisely what the consequences will be, but based on the expectation that the other actor will be honest, and not opportunistic when given the chance.</p>	0	<b>Levels of trust over time:</b>	0.1
		Calculus- based trust	0.1.1
		Knowledge-based trust	0.1.2
		Identification-based trust	0.1.3
		<b>Dimensions of Trust:</b>	0.2
		Competence-based trust	0.2.1
		Intention-based trust	0.2.2
		<b>Goodwil</b>	0.3
<p><b>Collaboration</b> is the result of different actors working together with actors outside of their organization by contributing their resources, by combining and coordinating the resources for joint activities or projects, to direct them the shared achievement of or organizational goals. Linked to the levels of relational collaboration as described by Hattori and Lapidus, 2004.</p>	1	<b>State of trust:</b>	1.1
		Collaborative	1.1.1
		Cooperative	1.1.2
		Competitive	1.1.3
		Adversarial	1.1.4
		<b>Motivating force</b>	1.2
		<b>Outlook</b>	1.3
		<b>Behavior</b>	1.4
		<b>Potential outcomes</b>	1.5

### Independent variables

Variable	Code	Indicator	Code
<p><b>Trust</b> is idea or belief in the unknown, and thus the willingness of an actor to be vulnerable to the actions of another party, despite not knowing precisely what the consequences will be, but based on the expectation that the other actor will be honest, and not opportunistic when given the chance.</p> <p><b>Quality of project outcomes</b>, the response and assessment of the partner when it comes to the quality of the delivered results compared to the expected quality determined beforehand of a product and or achievement</p>	2	<b>Levels of trust over time</b>	2.1
		Calculus- based trust	2.1.1
		Knowledge-based trust	2.1.2
		Identification-based trust	2.1.3
		<b>Dimensions of Trust</b>	2.2
		Competence-based trust	2.2.1
		Intention-based trust	2.2.2
		<b>Goodwil</b>	2.3
		Time	3.1
		Quality of the product	3.2
Cost and rewards	3.3		
	3		

### Interfering variables

Variable	Code	Indicator	Code
<p><b>Factors that built trust</b>, the realization that trust comes in different forms and needs to be developed over time. Thus, for trust to develop there will be factors such as words, actions, decision, the values, objectives and behavior of partners. The following factors can both built trust as break it down again.</p>	4	Words, actions and decisions	4.1
		Common values and objectives	4.2
		Behavior	4.3
		Previously established contracts	4.4



## C. Privacy Form

### 1. Toestemmingsformulier – Interview

Onder begeleiding van Carley Pennink (EUR) en Alexander Schütte en Tim van Veelen (AT Osborne) onderzoekt Rachel Knibbe de invloed van vertrouwen op de samenwerkingen tussen publieke organisaties. Met de verzamelde data wordt gekeken of wat de invloed van vertrouwen is op het ontstaan van samenwerkingen en of deze een positieve invloed hebben op de uitvoering van grootschalige gebiedstransformatie projecten. Hierbij wordt gekeken naar de situatie in twee verschillende projecten in Utrecht, namelijk het stationsgebouw Utrecht en de Uithoflijn. Met behulp van uw deelname kan dit onderzoek worden gerealiseerd. Hartelijk dank daarvoor. Het invullen van dit toestemmingsformulier is noodzakelijk voor het interview.

**Mijn naam is\***

### 2. Informatieblad

Op deze pagina kunt u meer informatie vinden over dit onderzoek.

**Waarom dit onderzoek** - Het doel van dit onderzoek is om te verklaren wat de invloed van publiek-publieke-samenwerking is bij het realiseren van investeringsprojecten in het ruimtelijk domein. Het onderzoek richt zich daarbij vooral op het aspect ‘vertrouwen’ tussen partijen. Dit onderzoek wordt uitgevoerd vanuit de Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam.

**Verloop** - U neemt deel aan een onderzoek waarbij we informatie zullen vergaren door u te interviewen en uw antwoorden op te nemen via audio-opname. Er wordt een transcript uitgewerkt van het interview dat geanalyseerd wordt met het programma Atlas.Ti.

**Vertrouwelijkheid** - Wij doen er alles aan uw privacy zo goed mogelijk te beschermen. Naast de student zal alleen de scriptiebegeleider en de tweede lezer van de student toegang krijgen tot alle door u verstrekte gegevens. Er wordt op geen enkele wijze vertrouwelijke informatie of persoonsgegevens van of over u naar buiten gebracht, waardoor iemand u zal kunnen herkennen. In het onderzoek wordt u aangeduid met een verzonden naam (pseudoniem), tenzij u expliciet toestemming verleend om uw naam te gebruiken.

**Vrijwilligheid**- Uw deelname is vrijwillig en het is mogelijk om op ieder moment te stoppen. Tijdens uw deelname aan het onderzoek heeft u het recht om meer informatie over de dataverzameling en analyse te vragen. Daarnaast heeft u het recht om uw toestemming in te trekken en te vragen naar verwijdering van uw data voordat de dataset is geanonimiseerd of het manuscript is ingeleverd om gepubliceerd te worden. U kunt dit bewerkstelligen door contact op te nemen met Rachel Knibbe via [rachel.knibbe@atosborne.nl](mailto:rachel.knibbe@atosborne.nl) of via 06-41878825.

**Dataopslag** - In de scriptie zullen anonieme gegevens of pseudoniemen worden gebruikt, tenzij u expliciet toestemming verleend om uw naam te gebruiken. De audio-opnamen, formulieren en/of andere documenten die in het kader van deze scriptie worden gemaakt of verzameld, worden beveiligd opgeslagen. De onderzoeksgegevens worden bewaard voor een periode van twee jaar. Uiterlijk na het verstrijken van deze termijn zullen de gegevens worden verwijderd of worden geanonimiseerd zodat ze niet meer te herleiden zijn tot een persoon.

**Indienen van een vraag of klacht** - Indien u specifieke vragen heeft over hoe er met uw persoonsgegevens wordt omgegaan, kunt u deze stellen aan Rachel Knibbe via

rachel.knibbe@atosborne.nl of via 06-41878825. U kunt daarnaast een klacht indienen bij de Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens indien u vermoedt dat uw gegevens verkeerd zijn verwerkt.

### 3. Toestemming

Door dit toestemmingsformulier te ondertekenen erken ik het volgende:

1. Ik ben voldoende geïnformeerd over het onderzoek. Ik heb het informatieblad gelezen en heb daarna de mogelijkheid gehad vragen te kunnen stellen. Deze vragen zijn voldoende beantwoord en ik heb voldoende tijd gehad om over mijn deelname te beslissen. - **Yes/No**
2. Ik neem vrijwillig deel aan dit onderzoek. Het is mij duidelijk dat ik deelname aan het onderzoek op elk moment, zonder opgave van reden, kan beëindigen. Ik hoef een vraag niet te beantwoorden als ik dat niet wil. - **Yes/No**
3. Ik geef toestemming om de gegevens die tijdens dit onderzoek over mij worden verzameld te verwerken zoals is uitgelegd in het bijgevoegde informatieblad. - **Yes/No**
4. Ik geef toestemming om tijdens het gesprek geluid- en/of video-opnames te maken en mijn antwoorden uit te werken in een transcript om vervolgens te analyseren voor de doeleinden van dit onderzoek. - **Yes/No**
5. Ik geef toestemming om mijn antwoorden te gebruiken voor quotes in de scriptie van de student. \* - **Yes/No**
6. Ik geef toestemming om de bij mij verzamelde gegevens te bewaren en in gepseudonimiseerde vorm te gebruiken voor al het verdere onderzoek dat er later mee gedaan kan worden. \* - **Yes/No**

### 4. Ondertekening

Als u op de 'verzenden'-knop drukt, ondertekent u dit formulier.