European Integration Cleavage in the 8th and 9th European Parliament

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Thijs Stegeman
430781
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Erasmus University Rotterdam
Dr. Asya Zhelyazkova
Prof. Dr. Markus Haverland
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ERASMUS UNIVERSITEIT ROTTERDAM

Summary

As a result of the financial crisis of ‘08- ‘09 and the Euro crisis of ’13-’15, Euroscepticism has become more mainstream and gotten a more prominent place in political debates and elections. This development was particularly visible at the European Parliament (EP) elections of 2014, where anti-European parties significantly increased their share of parliamentary seats. According to Hix, Noury and Roland, this shift has caused a surge in the importance of the pro/anti-European integration division compared to the traditional left-right division, measured in voting behaviour. The 2019 EP elections were not preceded by a similar crisis, but still resulted in an increased share of seats for anti-European Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). Therefore, this thesis will focus on the composition of political cleavages in the complete eighth and the newly elected ninth term of the EP.

The term political cleavage was first introduced by Lipset and Rokkan to describe divisions in society which were mirrored in politics. These divisions were usually competing world views which encompassed a varying range of issues, i.e. liberal market views opposed to government intervention. Traditionally, the left-right cleavage has been the most important, while in the 70’s and 90’s cultural values of universal values opposed to local, cultural values gained in importance. Some authors argue that the cleavage of European integration falls along the same division as the cultural cleavage, while others treat it as a new emerging cleavage, quickly gaining in importance.

To analyse the development of the different cleavages, a multidimensional scaling analysis of roll-call data between 2014 and 2019 was done. Roll-call data are the publicly recorded votes of individual MEPs. Using these votes and multidimensional scaling, the ideological distances between MEPs were calculated and plotted in a 2-dimensional graph. To interpret the coordinates of the MEPs in this graph an OLS regression was performed.

The results from this regression showed that in the period from 2014 until the first half of 2019, the eighth term of the EP, a combination of the measurement for European integration and GAL/TAN was the best predictor for the first dimension, while the general left-right and economic left-right measures were most important on the second dimension. During the ninth term, the cleavages shifted and neither cleavage is clearly dominant , although EU integration seems to have a slight upper hand. It can be concluded that since the 2014 election, the EU integration cleavage has lost in dominance, but also that this cleavage has submerged with the cultural cleavage.

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Introduction

As the results of the 2019 European Parliament elections were coming in, it had become clear that for the first time in the 40 years it has existed, the European Parliament would not be dominated by a majority of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) and the European People's Party (EPP) (Erlanger & Specia, 2019). Ever since the European Parliament was found in its current form in 1979, the centre-left S&D and the centre-right EPP together held a majority of the 751 seats in the world's largest democratic body (Erlanger & Specia, 2019; Anderson, 2019). This loss had been in the making for quite some time. The European political landscape has changed a lot in the past decade, partly due to the financial crisis of 2008-2009 and the Euro crisis in 2013-2015 (Hix et al., 2018b). The European handling of these crises has cast doubts on the European project and helped populist parties become an increasingly dominant voice in national politics, even gaining a governing majority in several larger European Union (EU) Member States (Erlanger & Specia, 2019; Hix et al., 2018b). Their increased influence already showed in the 2014 election results, where anti-European parties managed to get 20 percent of the seats. This number increased to 25 percent after the most recent elections, a smaller percentage than some people predicted or hoped for, but a clear sign that voters are no longer taking the European project for granted (Erlanger & Specia, 2019; Anderson, 2019).

Political cleavages

As the crises of 2008-2009 and 2013-2015 ignited the doubt about the EU, populist parties capitalized on this momentum and gave a voice to people that previously felt like they were not being heard by opposing the EU (Mair, 2007; Luyendijk, 2017). There is a large body of research on the motivations of these people and how to best describe this new political phenomenon (Bornschier, 2010; Hooghe & Marks, 2018). For many researchers, cleavage theory offers the best tools for understanding these changes. Cleavage theory describes the political landscape as one or a combination of cleavages. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) define cleavages as divides of ideological ideas on a set of related issues that separate social groups (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Kriesi et al., 1992). Traditionally, the left-right cleavage has been dominant in both national and European politics. The left-right cleavage captures the political divide between parties, calling for a more open economy and those calling for more government intervention and regulation (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Bornschier, 2010; Hooghe & Marks, 2018). This cleavage captures a long list of issues ranging from a minimum wage and mandatory health insurance to regulation on large tech companies. These issues differ in content,

but voting behaviour will fall along broadly similar lines Hooghe & Marks, 2018). Cleavages are not absolute, national parties are not necessarily either entirely in favour or strongly against, it can be seen as a scale where parties can also score somewhere in the middle (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). Similarly, the cleavage dividing political parties in favour of the European Union and those opposing it captures a broader array of issues, including how people perceive globalization in general (Mader et al., 2019).

Researchers like Hix, Noury, and Roland (2005; 2006; 2007; 2018b) and Hix and Noury (2009) analysed voting behaviour in the European Parliament over time using both the European integration cleavage and the left-right cleavage. They found that after the first electoral success of anti-European parties in 2014, the pro/anti-EU cleavage became the primary cleavage in European Parliament politics and the best predictor for voting behaviour (Hix et al., 2018b). Later in the 5-year term, the cleavages became more balanced, but the European integration cleavage remained a vital aspect throughout (Hix et al., 2018b), although at the time no complete data of the eighth term was available. Their results were surprising as all previous research showed a dominance of the left-right cleavage (Hix et al., 2005; 2006; 2007; 2018b; Hix & Noury, 2009). With a comparable situation after the 2019 European Parliament election, it begs the question of whether this will again result in a similar dominance of politics based on the EU integration cleavage. To find an answer, the following research question was formulated; *Which cleavage, left/right, or pro/anti-European integration can be best used to predict individual voting behaviour in the ninth European Parliament?* To answer this question, roll-call data from the European Parliament between 2014 to 2020 will be analysed.

Scientific relevance

Regarding the scientific relevance of the thesis, it adds to the existing literature by applying a known method for analysis to a new timeframe. Previous studies have focused on previous terms of the EP (Hix, 2002; Hix et al., 2005; 2006; 2007; Hix & Noury, 2009) or an incomplete period of the eighth term (Hix et al., 2018b). At this point, there is also no published analysis on the first year of the ninth EP. This thesis analyzes roll-call votes of the entire period of the eighth term (2014-2019) and the first half-year of the ninth term (June 2019 – January 2020). Considering the previous study showed a surge of the importance of the European integration cleavage after a, for anti-European parties, successful election (Hix et al., 2018b), the second

period in this analysis is especially relevant as it also follows an election in which the share of seats belonging to anti-European parties increased.

Social relevance

The way voting behaviour is structured in the EP has implications for the outcome of their voting rounds. Over the last decades, the EP has accrued more competences, among which the right to censure the European Commission and to amend and approve close to all EU legislation. In the ordinary decision-making procedure, the EP is also the co-legislator (Hix & Hoyland, 2011). These competencies have made the EP, along with the Commission and Council of the EU, the most important EU institution (Hix et al., 2006; McElroy & Benoit, 2007). Besides, the EP is the only international body that is directly elected and represents the entire European electorate (European Parliament, z.d.). Therefore, it is essential to understand the cleavages at play as it could help overcome differences and make better compromises.

Reading guide

This thesis is structured in five main sections. The topic and the research question were introduced in the previous chapter, as well as the scientific and social relevance. In the next two chapters, the existing literature concerning cleavage theory and current cleavages in place are discussed, leading to a theoretical framework for the thesis and the research hypotheses. In the third section, the research design and the variables and measurements used are discussed, as well as their shortcomings. In the fourth section, the results of the analysis are reported and interpreted. Finally, in the discussion and conclusion chapter, these results are discussed and conclusions are drawn based on the observations made.

Literature Review

This master thesis focusses on the potential political shift away from the traditional left-right cleavage and towards the pro-anti-European integration cleavage in the ninth European Parliament (EP). In the following chapter, the literature on cleavage theory, the differing cleavages observed in the literature, and voting procedures in the European Parliament, in general, will be elaborated.

Cleavage theory

The idea that political parties are formed and positioned along structural cleavages comes from Lipset and Rokkan (1967). They describe cleavages as social divides in society, with opposing worldviews on either side. These cleavages are not absolute, meaning that someone is not necessarily entirely in favour or against an issue, but can agree with a particular side to a certain degree. Therefore, it can be interpreted as a scale. They argue that social revolutions can cause sociological cleavages to shift and create new social, closed groups. In these groups, members of a group only interact with other members from their group, which share a similar worldview. An example of this phenomenon is the pillarization in the Netherlands during the first half of the 20th century (Bartolini & Mair, 1990). During this period, reformists, Catholics, liberals, and social democrats each had their separate political parties, schools, newspapers, and even football clubs (Koops, 2018). Due to these separated instances, members from different groups barely interacted with each other. This process of creating different closed social groups constantly repeats itself along different revolutions. The industrial revolution caused the urban-rural cleavage and, later, the employer-employee cleavage, which was mainly important in Europe during the 18th and 19th centuries (Hooghe & Marks, 2017). The repeated conflict between both sides of these cleavages strengthened both their collective identities, which went further than mere occupation or religion and was mirrored in their political preferences and parties (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Bartolini & Mair, 1990; Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak & Giugni, 1992). Cleavages work as a ‘prism’ through which current and emerging issues are perceived and framed (Marks & Wilson, 2000; Marks, Wilson & Ray, 2002).

Kriesi et al. (1992) disagree that sociological cleavages are necessarily mirrored in political preferences. They argue that political cleavages are based on cultural and structural cleavages. However, these social distinctions only result in "political cleavages if they are organized as such" (Kriesi et al., 1992, p. 3). Because of the closed-loop feedback in socially closed groups, it is highly unlikely for political representatives and parties to change their

position on issues (Hooghe & Marks, 2017). Lipset and Rokkan (1967) call the immobility of political parties on the scale of a cleavage the “freezing hypothesis”.

Lipset and Rokkan (1967) argued that in the post-world war two period, where nationalism was no longer a major political ideology, the only major cleavage would run along the lines of domestic politics on 'who gets what'. Taxes, the welfare state, and economic issues could be compromised on a single left-right cleavage (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). However, the political landscape has changed since the 1960s (Kriesi et al., 1992). Hooghe and Marks (2017) describe two significant changes in cleavage theory. First, instead of political parties forming along the lines of an emerging cleavage, in contemporary politics, cleavages emerge in a landscape where a system of competitive party politics is already in place. Multiple articles have proven that the existing parties are indeed 'frozen' and rarely change their position, and they do not adjust to emerging new cleavages (Bakker et al., 2015; Rohrschneider & Whitefield, 2016). However, instead of the existing parties moving to fill the possible void created by a new political cleavage, new political parties can be founded as a response to the new cleavage, leading to more dynamism in the party system. Second, based on the political structures of their time, Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) idea of cleavage theory assumed one primary cleavage to divide society. Emerging cleavages can either replace the old one, as happened with the rural-urban cleavage, which was replaced by the employer-employee cleavage, or fall along the same lines. Later authors (Hooghe & Marks, 2017; Kriesi et al. 1992) argue that multiple cleavages can coexist and are interested in the interaction between cleavages. Kriesi et al. (1992) go deeper and argue that the possibility for emerging political cleavages is a zero-sum game. Meaning that the politicization process of one cleavage takes resources and time away from another cleavage, as the resources can only be spent once. Therefore, a cleavage cannot emerge if the current primary political cleavage takes up all time and resources.

Not all authors agree with the zero-sum line of reasoning. Brand (in Kriesi et al., 1992) argues that, under certain conditions, the existing cleavage could actually strengthen the politicization of a social cleavage. Whether a cleavage leaves space for new political cleavages to politicize depends on two features, the degree of closure and its salience. The degree of closure relates to the ability of mobility between social groups. The possibilities for social mobility depend on the distinctiveness of the group. Social groups can have their educational institutions, religion, customs, and urban and unique settings. These factors influence individuals' ability to move between social groups (Kriesi et al., 1992; Bartolini & Mair, 1990).

Kriesi et al. (1992) describe the salience of a cleavage as the degree to which it has been institutionalized. A cleavage is seen as institutionalized when the social groups are integrated in the political networks and no longer make use of 'unconventional' methods, such as illegal protests, to frame their perspective. Instead, the issues are being discussed and absorbed in the legislature through the parliamentary and administrative arenas. If a group has a high degree of closure and is institutionalized, it leaves next to no potential for other cleavages to politicize. Only when the degree of closure decreases, its members "may become available for the mobilization of new social movements" (Kriesi et al., 1992, p. 8). In a reversed situation, one with high closure but no institutionalization, the members of the group focus their resources on the mobilization of their cleavage and are not available for competing cleavages. In a situation where no institutionalization is yet reached and there is a low degree of closure, groups will compete for attention and resources to promote their perspective. In this situation, the weakened traditional cleavage may try to include the new issues into their own political divisions (Kriesi et al., 1992; Bartolini & Mair, 1990). An example of such a situation is the Black Lives Matter movement. There is a low degree of closure because everyone can join the movement and it does not belong to one demographical group. There is no institutionalization as the ideals or leadership of the movement have not yet been integrated into the political network, meaning there is no political party that represents the specific group. The issue of racism is still politically very salient. However, the existing political parties are choosing different sides of these issues and dividing the issue along existing political divisions (Casalicchio, 2020).

Left-right and alternative dimensions

As described before, in the period after the Second World War, domestic politics were 'frozen' by party positions on economic issues of 'who gets what' (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). Bornschier (2010) describes two main cultural evolutions between 1970 and 2000, which, he argues, have 'unfrozen' the political landscape and resulted in a second, non-economic cleavage (Also, Marks & Wilson, 2000; Hooghe & Marks, 2018). He identifies the new dimension as cultural libertarian and universalistic – traditionalist, communitarian values. This second cleavage politicized in two phases. In the '70s, issues such as gay rights, abortion, and minority rights appeared on the political agenda. This development was called 'The New Left' by Kitschelt (1994) and fell on the cultural libertarian side (Bornschier, 2010). The response to the New Left came in the '90s and initially mainly focussed on the issues of immigration and 'cultural differentialism' (Bornschier, 2010; Betz & Johnson, 2004). According to Bornschier (2010), the

discussion mainly stems from opposing views on the role of the community where universal values on the rights of individuals clash with traditional, cultural values, and shared social practices. The rise of these opposing views is called the 'New Right' or 'The Populist Right-wing' (Kriesi, 2010).

Kriesi (2010), Bornschier (2010), and Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson (2002) describe the emergence of the 'New Right' and the 'New Left' as a cleavage which cuts through the traditional left-right divide. However, this is contested. Both Inglehard and Baker (2000) and Flanagan and Lee (2003) use the World Value Surveys to argue that the development of new values is not a new political cleavage, but a result of economic development/decline and the differences in values can be explained through historical path-dependence. This means that they argue how the traditional left-right cleavage has adopted the issues of the emerging cultural cleavage, and how countries respond to these new values depends on their historical values and the state of their economy. Inglehard and Baker (2000) empirically show that economic development generally leads to a more favourable environment for liberal and universal values, while economic downturn results in the opposite. The impact of these trends differs per country and religion, but the general trend remains the same. Flanagan and Lee (2003) continue and argue that support for either side of the left-right cleavage follows the same tides of economic up- and downturn and therefore, can be said to run along the same lines. Both Inglehard and Baker (2000) and Flanagan and Lee (2003) introduce a new name for their combination of cultural and left-right cleavage, to indicate the issues it includes have changed. However, it can be argued against these two articles that they use data from the '90s, which does not show the later rise of the 'New Right'. Both authors argue that the 'New Left' has been better at mobilizing than the 'New Right', which was mobilized later (Kriesi, 2010; Inglehard & Baker, 2000; Flanagan and Lee; 2003). Bornschier, Hooghe et al., Inglehard, and Baker and Flanagan and Lee all use different names for the cleavage they describe in their respective articles, but all use the same cultural proponents and developments from between the '70s and '90s as the basis for their cleavages.

Cleavages in international politics

Political cleavages along economic and/or cultural dimensions are not exclusive to national politics (Attina, 1990; Hooghe, Marks & Wilson, 2002; Hix, Noury & Roland, 2005; 2006; 2007; Hix & Noury, 2009). After its first direct elections in 1979, party politics in the European Parliament (EP) have evolved to show similar distinctions as their national equivalents (Hix et

al., 2005; 2006; 2007; Hix & Noury, 2009). In contrast to cleavages in national parties, these political cleavages are not the direct result of social cleavages and closed groups, but a consequence of spill-over from the cleavages in national politics. These have created competing ideologies which are copied in the political families of the EP (Grande & Kriesi, 2012; Hooghe & Marks, 2018).

In 1979, the EP was mainly a consulting body for other European Union (EU) institutions, but in the decades after it has accrued more competencies on issues which were previously mainly national responsibilities, i.e. market and environmental regulation, social policies and internal affairs. As these competencies were transferred to the EU level, the traditional left-right cleavage of 'who gets what' politics was expected to emerge in EU level politics as well (Hix et al., 2006; McElroy & Benoit, 2007). Noury (2002) and Kreppel and Tsebelis (1999) studied this cleavage using the roll-call votes, these are the publicly recorded votes by individual MEPs, and empirically show that during the 3rd (1989-1994) and 4th (1994-1999) legislative periods of the EP, the left-right cleavage was dominant to explain voting behaviour and coalition building. A later analysis of roll-call votes by Hix et al. (2006) into the entire history of the EP, supports the conclusion of Noury (2002), Kreppel and Tsebelis (1999) that the left-right cleavage is still dominant in the 5th term (1999-2004). As well as after the enlargement of 2004 in the 6th (2004-2009) legislative period (Hix & Noury, 2009; Hix, Noury & Roland, 2018b). However, Hix et al. (2006) also show an emerging second cleavage which they interpret as government vs. opposition and in later periods as a pro- and anti-European Integration dimension, which is positioned orthogonal to the traditional cleavage. This new cleavage divides parties in favour of further EU integration and those in favour of more independence for individual Member States. Hix et al. (2006) argue that this dimension is becoming increasingly important in EP voting behaviour.

Evolution of the European integration cleavage

Hix et al. (2006) were not the first to see a relation between being in favour of the EU and being either in government or opposition, as this was one of the first interpretations of this cleavage. Therefore, the early literature of the European integration cleavage will be discussed before moving on to modern interpretations. Four years before Hix et al. (2006), saw the relation, Hooghe et al. (2002) presented a similar model, based on data from European national parliaments. The roll-call data, which are publicly recorded data on the individual votes of parliamentarians, in the article of Hooghe et al. (2002) suggests that criticism on the European

project is limited to extreme parties on both the right and the left. Hooghe et al. (2002) argue that this is a result of these extreme parties being excluded from national Government positions. Governing coalitions mainly consist of centre-left and centre-right parties, which, being in government, have had the chance to influence the shaping of the EU. Therefore, support for the EU along the lines of the left-right dimension shows as an inverted U-Curve, see *Figure 1*. Support is the highest among centre parties, which were in government, and declining towards both the extreme left and right (Hooghe et al., 2002). Far left-wing political parties oppose the EU because of how its open market disproportionally benefits large companies, making it harder for small companies to compete. Far right-wing parties criticise the EU because they say it weakens the national autonomy and threatens local cultural values (Hooghe et al., 2002). In their analysis, Hooghe et al. (2002) interpreted roll-call data from European national governments. In a different context, Diaconis (2008) found a similar pattern in US politics, naming it the 'horseshoe' model. Kriesi (2007) describes political Euroscepticism as "essentially dominated by opposition politics" (Kriesi, 2007, 83). However, after the crises of 2008-2009 and 2013-2015, the debate on European Integration was no longer exclusive to opposition parties. Its criticism is being picked up by mainstream parties, and the critical opposition parties are becoming more influential (Hix, Noury & Roland, 2018b; Hooghe & Marks, 2018).

Figure 1

The inverted U-curve showing support for the EU compared to the left-right dimension



Figure 1: The inverted U-curve (Hooghe et al., 2002)

Hix, Noury and Roland (2005; 2006; 2007; 2018b), Hix & Noury (2009) and Kriesi (2007; 2010; Kriesi et al., 2006) have written the main body of recent literature on the pro/anti-European Integration cleavage, but they are not the only authors to recognize or debate this shift. Other early authors such as Marks, Wilson, and Ray (2002) and Aspinwall (2002) find

that the ideological position of MEPs has a significant relation with European integration preferences, regardless of nationality. Other researchers argue there is already a second dimension along the lines of the "powers and scope of EU institutions" (McElroy & Benoit, 2007, 5), or more or less European regulation (Kreppel and Tsebelis, 1999). Marks and Wilson (2000) argue that the European integration cleavage will be assimilated by the existing cleavages, namely the traditional left-right cleavage and the cultural cleavage.

Interpretation of the EU integration cleavage

More recently, Kriesi et al. (2006), Grande and Kriesi (2012), and Teney, Lacewell, and De Wilde (2014) have taken a broader look at the shift and make a distinction between 'winners' and 'losers' of globalization, which they relate to the way these people perceive European integration and interpret the dimension as communitarian vs. cosmopolitan. The 'winners' are people who economically benefit from the integrated European market and free movement of people, usually because their job or company operates in this international sphere. They perceive the EU positively because of the global "*principle of rule and law*" and universality; in other words, they support universal values over local, traditional values. The 'losers' of globalization do not benefit from the more integrated worldwide market, either because it threatens their cultural identity or their job perspectives. These people perceive the EU negatively because of the negative influence over the "*constitutive community*" or its focus on free-market mechanisms (Teney et al., 2014, 591). These authors argue that the pro/anti-EU sentiment has moved beyond merely whether their national party was in government and had the chance to influence its politics. Kriesi et al. (2006) and Grande and Kriesi (2012) use the idea of 'winners' and 'losers' of globalisation as the starting point of their emerging cleavage, called demarcation vs. integration. Grande and Kriesi (2012) and Teney et al. (2014) agree that these dimensions have taken over or integrated with the cultural cleavage to become the second most important political dimension. This is in line with Hooghe and Marks (2008; 2018), who also recognize the emerging 'transnational' cleavage in the EP and argue it is part of their GAL/TAN dimension (Hooghe et al. 2002), with the green, alternative, liberal parties showing more support for the EU and the traditional, authoritarian, national parties promoting sovereignty. Over time, the idea that the cleavage is based on 'winners' and 'losers' of globalization and European integration has become important and is becoming a significant predictor for parliamentary voting behaviour. Although, there is no unanimity on whether this new cleavage is submerged by the cultural cleavage or is emerging as a separate cleavage.

On the exact meaning of the cleavage, Treib (2020) makes a clear distinction. He has argued that the cleavage of globalization has to be interpreted as a separate cleavage as the pro/anti-European integration cleavage because it does not fall along the same lines. He reasons that the social groups on both sides of these cleavages are not the same because the globalization cleavage separates those who profit from the ever more integrated international market from those who do not, while the pro/anti-European integration cleavage is not merely a separation of winners and losers of the integrated European market. Treib (2020) reasons that the EU is a unique institution whose criticism is not solely based on economic consequences, but also the principle of sovereignty. Because people who might profit from the integrated market can still oppose the EU based on this principle, the groups do not necessarily overlap. Despite this, many authors do use these two cleavages as interchangeable (Grande & Kriesi, 2012; Teney et al., 2014; Hooghe & Wilson, 2018; Hix et al., 2018b). One clear argument in favour of using the two cleavages as interchangeable comes from Mader et al. (2019). Their empirical research proves that German voters do not distinguish between globalisation issues or European integration. According to Mader et al. (2019), globalisation has a 'symbolic' value, which ties together several related issues, namely European integration, economic openness, and immigration. Therefore, as voters perceive these issues similarly, it can be concluded that there is no significant difference between the social groups in favour or opposing globalization and those in favour or opposing European integration and the two issues fall along the same lines of one cleavage. Hix et al. (2006; 2007; 2018b) use one cleavage in their research, it divides social groups on both European integration and globalization. As European integration is an exclusively European subject, this cleavage only applies to the population of EU Member States. In this thesis, only the political positions of populations and political parties of EU Member States are used. Therefore, the same definition of the pro/anti-European integration cleavage as Hix et al. (2018b) will be used, thus including globalization.

Dominance of the EU integration cleavage

On the dominance of the new cleavage, Wheatly (2016) builds on the communitarian vs. cosmopolitan literature and finds the dimension to be the second most important cleavage in UK politics, after the left-right dimension. Hurrelmann, Kerr, Gora, and Eibl (2019) analysed the issue framing in the national parliaments of Germany, Austria, Spain, and Ireland. They found that voting behaviour might shift towards a European Integration cleavage, the economic left-right cleavage is still 'highly influential' in debates and framing, just like in the UK. As EP

elections regularly include issues of national politics (Grande & Kriesi, 2012; Treib, 2014; 2020) these developments are relevant for their outcome.

Hix, Noury, and Roland (2018b) continue this debate on the dominance of the cleavage but focus on its role in the EP. They label the cleavage pro/anti-European Integration, but their dimension consists of the same characteristics as dimensions along the lines of winners and losers of globalization. The cleavage captures the divide on immigration, sexuality, gender equality, environmental protection, and globalization. Hix et al. (2018b) argue that the global recession of 2008 and the European migration crisis of 2015-2016 have helped to politicize the European Integration cleavage in the EP and mobilized parties along those lines (Also; Hurrelmann et al., 2019). This process resulted in a political shift away from the traditional left-right cleavage and towards the pro/anti-European Integration cleavage, making the latter the dominant cleavage in the EP. Hix et al. (2018b) used roll-call votes and data sets on national party positions to analyse the shift during the 6th, 7th (2009-2014), and part of the 8th (2014-2019) European Parliament. They found the left-right dimension to still be dominant during the 6th and 7th Parliament but was overtaken by the pro/anti-European Integration cleavage during the 8th Parliament, although this is based on incomplete data. They are the first authors to draw this conclusion. However, which cleavage is dominant is still dependent on the issue discussed. Concerning employment, the environment, gender, the internal market and consumer protection, and industry, research and energy, debates, and voting behaviour are split mainly along the left-right dimension. Concerning EU budget, economic and monetary affairs, foreign affairs, and international trade, the pro/anti-European Integration cleavage is dominant (Hix, Noury & Roland, 2018a).

Theoretical Framework

In the following chapter, the theoretical framework of the thesis will be further elaborated, building on the literature discussed in the literature review. The main focus will be on the pro/anti-European integration cleavage; it will first discuss what this cleavage exactly includes and excludes, focusing on the debate on whether the globalisation cleavage runs along the same lines or not. Afterward, the differences between the EU integration cleavage and the cultural cleavage will be further explained. Finally, the chapter will focus on the underlying mechanisms which have been the leading cause of the shift away from the left/right cleavage and to the pro/anti-European integration cleavage, first in a worldwide national politics perspective, then specifically in the European Parliament (EP).

The pro/anti-European integration cleavage

The previous chapter discussed Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) cleavage theory, which describes cleavages as a result of social tensions, with groups forming on both sides of the cleavage. These tensions are then mirrored on the political field as well, with parties taking a position on either side of the cleavage line. The pro/anti-European integration shows the divide between those in favour of further European integration, and those opposing the European integration, and often opposing the EU completely (Hix et al., 2005; 2006; 2007; 2018b). Since 2000, the pro/anti-European integration cleavage has become institutionalized (Hix et al., 2006; 2007, Hix & Noury, 2009; Hooghe & Marks, 2018), meaning that political parties have been able to mobilize and debate on these topics using the traditional political methods (Kriesi et al., 1992).

As cleavages become increasingly institutionalized, they tend to pull other emerging cleavages into their cleavage, dividing social groups along the same lines (Kriesi et al., 1992). Therefore, the pro/anti-European cleavage does not only capture the divide between those in favour of European integration and those opposing it, but also those in favour of more open immigration, more equal rights for women and members of the LGBT community, environmental protection and more globalization and those opposing (Hix et al., 2018b). For some of these topics, it is logical that they fall among the same lines. Open immigration is one of the cornerstones of the European Project, and environmental protection or global warming cannot be effectively regulated and solved on a national level. Equal rights for men, women, and members of the LGBT community were part of the cultural cleavage and will be discussed in that section. As shown by the Treib/Mader et al. discussion, whether globalization cleavage falls along the same lines as the pro/anti-European integration is still being discussed but this

thesis follows the line of Hix and al., (2018b) and uses a cleavage combining the issues of globalization and EU integration.

Differences between the EU integration cleavage and the cultural cleavage

With the rise of the New Left and the New Right in the seventies and the nineties, the cultural cleavage was for years the second-most important cleavage in national and international politics (Bornschier, 2010; Kriesi, 2010). There is still discussion about what the cultural cleavage shows precisely, but the common denominator all authors use is a clash between universal values of individual freedom and equality, i.e., gender equality, minority rights, LGBT rights, abortion and immigration, and more traditional, cultural values and social practices, such as religion and shared cultural practices (Kitschelt, 1994; Marks & Wilson, 2000; Flanagan & Lee, 2003; Betz & Johnson, 2004; Bornschier, 2010). Several of these issues also correlate with issues captured by the pro/anti-European integration cleavage.

Kriesi et al. (1992) describe how cleavages can begin to include salient issues of other cleavages to ensure the survival of their own dominant position. It can be argued that this is what happened as the pro/anti-European integration cleavage gained in importance. During this process, some issues of the cultural cleavage realigned with the cleavage of European integration. For issues as immigration and environmental protection, this is a logical development, as there was already a consensus that these issues must be addressed at a supranational level (Marks & Wilson, 2000). The same goes for gender and LGBT rights, as EU level politics are to a lesser extent, influenced by local cultural values and religions and show more affinity with universal rights that fit these issues. This is in contrast with an issue as abortion, which was a divisive issue on the cultural cleavage, but is not mentioned in literature on the pro/anti-integration cleavage (Marks & Wilson, 2000; Hooghe et al., 2018). One explanation for this observation is that abortion is a matter of national legislatures, as most health issues are not an EU competence. In conclusion it can be argued that several of the main issues previously related to the cultural cleavage have become subsumed by the EU integration cleavage as the latter increased in salience.

Although some authors have argued that the European integration cleavage and the cultural cleavage have merged (Marks & Wilson, 2000), others see the European integration cleavage as the next big cleavage which is surpassing the cultural cleavage in dominance (Mair, 2007). Mair (2007) metaphorically describes the EU integration cleavage as a European giant, giant, which is *"not only sleeping, but has been deliberately sedated"* (Mair, 2007: 12). He

argues that the topic of European integration was 'sleeping', was a result of deliberate action by governments to not mobilize on this issue. Most governments had taken part in shaping the European project and were, therefore, in consensus on its approval. As a result, criticism of the EU was for a long time exclusive to opposition parties (Hooghe et al., 2002; Kriesi, 2007). However, as time passed, the governments which helped shaped the EU were unseated, and with the financial crises of 2008 and the Euro crisis in 2013, criticism on the EU increased. As a result, the European giant is no longer sedated and has become one of the main cleavages in contemporary politics (Mair, 2007; Hix et al., 2018b). Following Kriesi et al.'s (1992) interpretation of cleavage theory, the interplay between cleavages can be seen as a zero-sum game. The more resources a political party uses to establish its position on one cleavage, the fewer resources are available for political parties to establish its position on other cleavages, resulting in the dominance of one or two cleavages in the political debate. This means that as more parties, both in government and in opposition, spent resources to mobilize and establish their positions on the pro/anti-European integration cleavage, the cleavages either merged or the cultural cleavage became less salient. These developments are extra relevant because the pro/anti-European integration cleavage is poised to become more dominant than the left/right cleavage as well, at least in international politics (Hix et al., 2018a; 2018b).

Mechanisms behind the shift

Using statistical analysis, Hix, Noury, and Roland (2018b) have shown that during the eighth legislative period of the European Parliament (EP), the pro/anti-European integration cleavage was the main predictor of individual MEP's voting behaviour and thus the dominant cleavage. When looking at the yearly data of the eight EP, it showed that immediately after its election in 2014, the pro/anti-European integration cleavage overtook the left/right cleavage. Hix et al. (2018b) attribute this development to the substantial increase in representation of 'populist anti-European parties' and not as a direct result of the global recession of 2008 or the European migration crisis of 2015-2016. However, these events might have had an indirect effect on the shift, as they helped the populist parties establish their electoral success and influence the EU agenda (Hix et al., 2018b). The analysis of Hix et al., (2018b) also shows how the left/right dimension regained momentum in 2017, while both cleavages show a very comparable amount of dominance in 2016 and 2018. As their data is limited to a year before the end of the eight EP's period, it is not conclusive that the dominance of the pro/anti-European cleavage was a temporary response to the election of anti-European parties in the EP. This thesis aims to give

a more conclusive answer by applying the following two hypotheses to a complete dataset of the eight EP. The second hypothesis is necessary because the absence of dominance of the left-right cleavage does not automatically imply the dominance of the EU cleavage, the possibility neither cleavage is clearly dominant exists.

H1: The pro/anti-European integration cleavage is more dominant than the left-right cleavage in the eighth European Parliament voting behaviour.

H2: The left-right cleavage is more dominant than the pro/anti-European integration cleavage in the eighth European Parliament voting behaviour.

In the 2019 election of the ninth European Parliament, both the populist, anti-European parties, and the Green family achieved a significant increase in seats, while the so far dominant, mainstream political families saw a decrease and even lost their majority (Treib, 2020). With preliminary roll-call data available of the ninth and newest EP, this thesis also seeks to determine whether these electoral results show another 'shock' effect on the voting behaviour of individual MEPs regarding a shift from the left/right cleavage towards the pro/anti-European integration cleavage.

H3: The pro/anti-European integration cleavage is more dominant than the left-right cleavage in the ninth European Parliament voting behaviour.

H4: The left-right cleavage is more dominant than the pro/anti-European integration cleavage in the ninth European Parliament voting behaviour.

Research design and methodology

In the following section, the voting procedures in the EP, the data gathering, the dependent and independent variables and the research design will be discussed. The basis of the research design is derivative of the Hix et al. (2018b) article. Therefore, the principal analysis was done by using multidimensional scaling (MDS) to retrieve the main dimensions at play and an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to find the meaning of these dimensions. As a robustness check, a logistic regression was done on the coordinates retrieved through the MDS analysis. These methods will be discussed in detail during this chapter.

Voting in the European Parliament

To understand the political cleavages observed in the European Parliament, it is vital to understand their procedures. Therefore, before discussing the research design of the thesis, the voting procedures of the EP are explained. At first, the EP started with 'only' 410 members and was mainly a consultative body to the European Commission and the European Council. As the European Union expanded, the EP grew to 751 MEPs before Brexit and 705 after. Not every Member state is equally represented in the EP. The number of MEPs each Member State can elect to the EP depends on their number of constituents, with a minimum number for the smallest Member States (European Parliament, z.d.). At the time of its first direct election in 1979, the EP was mainly a consulting body for the European Commission and European Council. Since then, the EP has accumulated more responsibilities and powers. Under the most recent treaty, the Lisbon treaty, the EP has acquired the competencies to control the EU budget, approve and censure the European Commission (EC) and approve and amend EU legislation on many issues. With these competencies, the EP has become one of the most influential institutions of the EU (Hix et al., 2006; McElroy & Benoit, 2007). The EP is directly elected by EU citizens, a feature which alone sets it apart from all other international institutions, and directly represents the EU population.

The 705 MEPs in the EP do not work completely independent of each other. Just like in national parliaments, there are political parties to which they can belong. These European political parties are usually referred to as political groups or political families and combine national parties from different Member States who share a similar ideology (Attina, 1990; Hix, 2002; McElroy & Benoit, 2007). During the ninth term of the EP, there are in total seven European political groups. The largest are the Socialists and Democrats (S&D), generally considered to be a centre-left party in favour of a ‘fairer society’ (S&D, z.d.). Second are the

European People's Party (EPP), consisting of mainly centre-right Christian democratic parties (EPP, z.d.). The third biggest family is the Renew Europe Group (REG), formerly known as the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE). They consist of moderate parties in favour of free-market mechanisms and 'changing Europe for the better' (REG, z.d.). There are two more 'right-wing' families. The European Conservatives and Reformist Group (ECR) fight for a more 'realistic' Europe (ECR, z.d.) and the Identity and Democracy Group (IDG) fight against a more and more 'federal' Europe and also want to bring more responsibilities back to its Member States. Similarly, there are two left-wing families, consisting of the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA), that wants to fight for a more 'socially, economically and environmentally resilient future' (Greens/EFA, z.d.), and the Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL), that wants a Europe that promotes equal educational opportunities, social solidarity and sustainable development instead of policy based on 'radical market-oriented logic' (GUE/NGL, z.d.). Several MEPs and national parties choose not to affiliate themselves with any political family. These can still hold a seat in the EP and are called non-attached members or non-inscrits. The number of MEPs affiliated with each political family after the 2019 election is shown in *Figure 2*. Voting happens in large lines along these political family lines, but MEPs are free to vote independent from their group (European Parliament, z.d.).

Figure 2

Distribution of MEPs among European Political groups after the 2019 election



Figure 2: Distribution of MEPs among European Political Groups after the 2019 election (European Parliament, z.d.)

Voting in the EP takes place during its plenary sessions. The EP gathers twelve times a year in Strasbourg for these plenary sessions, and these sessions take four days each. Also, the MEPs

generally hold four part-sessions a year in Brussels. During these plenaries and part-sessions, the MEPs debate and vote on written declarations, legislative reports, amendments, and non-legislative reports (European Parliament, z.d.). Every day the EP is in session, it votes on hundreds of amendments and issues. Specialized committees usually prepare these amendments and rapports. For each policy field, there is a committee consisting of 25 to 81 MEPs from a combination of political families. Each committee has a chair, a bureau, and a secretariat, which are voted in by a majority in the EP. These committees can initiate legislative proposals and prepare a rapport on an issue to inform the EP before voting (European Parliament, z.d.).

In general, most of the votes in the EP are done by a show of hands. If a show of hands does not give a clear indication of a majority, an electronic system is used. MEPs can press a button to either vote in favour, against, or abstain. For most of these voting rounds, only the outcome is registered, and not the individual votes. Only when using a roll-call vote, each individual vote is publicly recorded. A roll-call vote is held when it is requested by a European political group or at least 38 MEPs and is also done by electronic voting (European Parliament, z.d.).

Because roll-call votes are publicly recorded, they are the primary source of information for researchers looking into individual voting behaviour, party cohesion, and issue positioning (Yohe, 1968; Carrubba, Gabel, Murrah, Clough, Montgomery, & Schambach, 2006). However, some authors argue that roll-call votes alone are not a reliable source to study these issues (Carrubba et al., 2006; Carrubba, Gabel & Hug, 2008). Carrubba et al. (2006; 2008) argue that due to the public nature of roll-call votes, they do not necessarily reflect the actual dimensions at play. This is especially relevant when the party leaders have means to promote or punish their members when a member does not follow the party ideology (Carrubba et al., 2008). In the EP, this seems to be the case, as MEPs are dependent on their national party on how high and if a representative is positioned on the ballot for the next elections (European Parliament, z.d.). However, roll-call votes are the only source for individual voting behaviour in the EP and thus used in this thesis.

Data gathering

To perform the MDS analysis and OLS regression data is gathered on the roll-call votes of the MEPs, the European political family of MEPs, the region of their home country, whether the MEP's national party is in government or opposition and the national party positions on the

left-right cleavage and the EU integration cleavage. The roll-call votes are used to calculate the ideal point of each MEP using the MDS analysis, creating the independent analysis for the regression. In the OLS regression, the MEPs' national party positions on the left-right and EU cleavage are the independent variables and the European political family of MEPs, the region of their home country, and whether the MEP's national party is in government or in opposition as control variables. The data for the analysis is gathered from four different sources VoteWatch (VoteWatch, z.d.), ParlGov (Döring and Manow, 2019; ParlGov, z.d.), European Parliament documents (European Parliament, z.d.; VoteWatch, z.d.), and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) (Polk et al., 2014). These four sources will be individually discussed.

First, VoteWatch is an organization that records voting data from the European Parliament and the European Council so that it can be used for scientific research (VoteWatch, z.d.). VoteWatch stores data of all roll-call votes cast by the EP. As discussed before, roll-call votes are voting rounds where the individual votes of each MEP is recorded (Carrubba et al., 2006; Hix et al., 2018b). Therefore, these votes are the primary source for researchers interested in voting behaviour in the EP. The purpose of the thesis is to research the shift in cleavages during the eighth and the first period of the ninth EP, only the roll-call votes during the eight (2014-2019) and ninth (2019-2024) elected European Parliament are used. The number of roll-call voting rounds during these terms and their distribution among different policy fields can be found in *Table 1*. From the ninth EP, data until the 29th of January 2020 is used. This distinction is a result of the change in the number of MEPs due to the United Kingdom leaving the European Union. After this data, there is limited data available, and therefore no reliable analysis can be made of that period.

Table 1

Number of voting rounds by initiating committee

European Parliament Committee	EP 8 (June 2014)	EP 9 (June 2019)	EP 9 after Brexit (January 29, 2020)
	Voting rounds (%)	Voting rounds (%)	Voting rounds (%)
Agriculture and Rural Development	35 (1.5 %)	2 (1.5 %)	0 (0 %)
Budget	234 (10.1 %)	16 (11.7 %)	6 (20.1 %)
Budgetary Control	241 (10.4 %)	2 (1.4 %)	0 (0 %)
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs	238 (10.2 %)	20 (14.6 %)	2 (6.9 %)
Constitutional Affairs	57 (2.5 %)	5 (3.6 %)	0 (0 %)
Culture and Education	35 (1.5 %)	4 (2.9 %)	0 (0 %)
Development	41 (1.8 %)	2 (1.5 %)	0 (0 %)
Economic and Monetary Affairs	164 (7.1 %)	9 (6.6 %)	2 (6.9 %)
Employment and Social Affairs	71 (3.1 %)	2 (1.5 %)	1 (3.4 %)
Environment, Public Health and Food Safety	173 (7.4 %)	21 (15.3 %)	4 (13.8 %)
Fisheries	71 (3.1 %)	2 (1.5 %)	1 (3.4 %)
Foreign affairs and security policy	316 (13.6 %)	31 (22.6 %)	1 (3.4 %)
Women's Rights and Gender Equality	39 (1.7 %)	5 (3.6 %)	2 (6.9 %)
Industry, Research and Energy	106 (4.6 %)	3 (2.2 %)	0 (0 %)
Internal Market and Consumer Protection	60 (2.6 %)	0 (0 %)	1 (3.4 %)
Internal regulations of the EP	39 (1.7 %)	1 (0.7 %)	0 (0 %)
International Trade	119 (5.1 %)	6 (4.4 %)	5 (17.2 %)
Legal Affairs	137 (5.9 %)	1 (0.7 %)	0 (0 %)
Petitions	14 (0.6 %)	1 (0.7 %)	0 (0 %)
Regional Development	44 (1.9 %)	1 (0.7 %)	3 (10.3 %)
Transport and Tourism	89 (3.8 %)	3 (2.2 %)	1 (3.4 %)
Total	2323 (100%)	137 (100%)	29 (100%)

Table 1: Number of voting rounds per initiating European Parliament committee (up-to date till May 1st, 2020)

Second, to retrieve data on the independent variables, the ideological position of national political parties along the left-right and pro/anti-European dimensions, the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) is used. The CHES is a combination of survey results among experts, scaling national parties on a number of different issues. The survey quantifies these ideological positions using Likert scales, where the expert respondents estimate the position of different national parties ranging, for example, from "Strongly opposed" to "Strongly in favour" (Polk et al., 2017). An example of the survey on Belgian political parties is attached in the appendix. The survey is held roughly every four years, with the last complete available round being from 2014. The ideological position data from the 2014 round were used in this analysis. These data points are still valid as political parties rarely significantly move their ideological position over time (Hooghe & Marks, 2018). Data from the 2017 round is used to account for a small number of political parties founded after 2014. An overview of all political parties and their information is shown in *Table 13* in the appendix.

Third, based on the roll-call votes, a list of all active MEPs was composed for the eighth and ninth term of the EP. It contains the names of all MEPs who had cast a vote during either the eighth or ninth term. Using EP documents the control variables, the nationality, and European political group as well as the national political party of each individual MEP, were added. The number of MEPs affiliated with each European political group is shown in *Table 2,* as per the election results of 2014 and 2019.

The last control variable, whether the national party of the MEP was in opposition or in government is based on data from ParlGov (Döring and Manow, 2019). ParlGov combines election data of 37 OECD countries and the resulting coalitions (ParlGov, z.d.). The data shows opposition/government data for any given year between 2014 and 2020. These data are shown in *Table 14* in the appendix.

Table 2

European Parliament election results and redistribution after Brexit

European political group (EP Group abbreviation)	EP 8 (June 2014)	EP 9 (June 2019)	EP 9 after Brexit (January 29, 2020)
	MEPs (%)	MEPs (%)	MEPs (%)
European People's party (EPP)	221 (29,43%)	182 (24,23%)	187 (26,52%)
Socialists & Democrats (S&D	191 (25,43%)	154 (20,51%)	148 (20,99%)
European conservatives and Reformists (ECR)	70 (9,32%)	62 (8,26%)	59 (8,37%)
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) / Renew Europe Group (REG)	67 (8,92%)	108 (14,38%)	97 (13,76%)
European United Left / Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL)	52 (6,92%)	41 (5,46%)	40 (5,67%)
The Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA)	50 (6,66%)	74 (9,85%)	67 (9,50%)
Europe of freedom and direct democracy (EFDD) / Identity and Democracy (ID)	48 (6,39%)	73 (9,72%)	76 (10,78%)
Non-attached (NI)	52 (6,92%)	57 (7,59%)	31 (4,40%)
Total MEPs	751 (100%)	751 (100%)	705 (100%)

Table 2: MEPs per European political group, 2014-2020

Dependent variable

The dependent variable in the analysis is the roll-call votes cast by MEPs during both the eighth and ninth term of the EP. The roll-call votes are gathered from VoteWatch and represent the complete selection of roll-call votes available for this period. During the eighth term of the EP, 855 MEPs cast a vote over in total 2323 roll-call voting rounds, with on average 601 MEPs

voting in favour or against during each round. Due to illnesses and turnover, the number of MEPs is higher than the normal 751 that can take place in the EP at a time. During the first half-year of the ninth term, 757 MEPs voted over a total of 137 roll-call voting rounds, where on average per round 567 MEPs casted their vote in favour or against the proposal. Due to varying circumstances, not every MEP was equally active in their voting behaviour. To adjust for MEPs who only participated in a small number of voting rounds, a selection was made of MEPs who participated in at least 10 percent of the total number of votes. By excluding those who voted in less than 10 percent of the roll-call votes, a more reliable calculation of estimated ideal positions could be made. The outcome of the MDS analysis, the coordinates of every single MEP in a 2-dimensional space, is the dependent variable in the OLS regression. As the CHES database did not contain data on every national party, MEPs belonging to those national parties or independent MEPs were excluded from the OLS regression. As a result, 773 of the 855 MEPs of the eighth elected EP and 651 of the 755 MEPs from the ninth elected EP are used in the OLS regression.

Independent variables

The main independent variables are the MEP positions on the left-right and European integration dimension. These positions are derived from the position of their national party, as found by the Chapel Hill Expert Survey. During the eighth term of the EP, 171 national political parties were represented. With the ninth elected EP, 205 parties had MEPs elected to the EP. This number dropped to 200 after Brexit. Due to the overlap between these numbers, the total number of national political parties in the dataset is 240. A number of these are dropped during the analysis due to a lack of data on their ideological position. These data are shown in *Table 13* of the appendix.

The CHES uses three different measures for the left-right dimension; left-right general, economic left-right, and the GAL/TAN dimension (Polk et al., 2017). The general left-right measure is operationalized by the CHES as *"position of the party in 2014 in terms of its overall ideological stance"* which the respondents had to score on a Likert-scale ranging from 0 "Extreme left" to 10 "Extreme right" (Polk et al., 2017). The second left-right measurement, economic-left right, was operationalized by the CHES using the same Likert scale on *"Position of the party in 2014 in terms of its ideological stance on economic issues. Parties can be classified in terms of their stance on economic issues. Parties on the economic left want government to play an active role in the economy. Parties on the economic right emphasize a*

reduced economic role for government: privatization, lower taxes, less regulation, less government spending, and a leaner welfare state" (Polk et al., 2017). The third and final measurement for the left-right dimension is based on Hooghe and Marks (2002) GAL/TAN dimension. The scale used ranges from 0 "Libertarian/Postmaterialist" to 10, "Traditional/Authoritarian". The CHES used the following statement; *"position of the party in 2014 in terms of their views on democratic freedoms and rights. "Libertarian" or "postmaterialist" parties favour expanded personal freedoms, for example, access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or greater democratic participation. "Traditional" or "authoritarian" parties often reject these ideas; they value order, tradition, and stability, and believe that the government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues"* (Polk et al., 2017). Hix et al. (2018b) describe this measurement as a measurement for the "'*social' left-right"* (Hix et al., 2018b, 12) while other authors describe GAL/TAN as a cultural cleavage. One measurement for the European integration dimension was used. It was conceptualized using a Likert scale on the following statement "*overall orientation of the party leadership towards European integration in 2014*". The respondents could answer on a scale ranging from 1 "Strongly opposed" to 7 "strongly in favour" (Polk et al., 2017). Because the EU integration measurement was scaled differently than the left-right measurements, the 1 to 7 scale was transformed to a 1 to 10 scale. By rescaling the measurement, it becomes possible to compare the coefficients of the regression which benefits their ability to be interpreted.

In addition to the measurements for the left-right and EU integration dimension, three control variables were used in the analysis. The control variables are the European political group the MEP affiliates with, the European region of the MEPs home country and whether the national party the MEP affiliates with was in the national government or in opposition. To perform the analysis, these control variables were transformed into dummy variables. Each political group was coded with a number from 0 to 10 and were treated as nominal data within both the OLS regression and the logistical regression robustness check. The European region control variable was added to control for the strategic voting behaviour of Member States belonging to a particular region. Similar to the European political group, the European regions were given a number from 1 to 4, as seen in *Table 3,* and used as a dummy variable in the analysis and used as nominal data. The distinction between countries and regions was based on Hix et al. (2018b; 2006; 2007). Data on governing and opposition parties were retrieved from ParlGov (z.d.) and coded as "1" for in government and as "0" when the political party was in opposition. Each national party was coded each year, changing when elections resulted in a new

coalition, or a new coalition was formed. When changes appeared in the middle of the year, the code was based on the most substantial passed or remaining timeframe for that calendar year. An overview of this data is given in *Table 14*, in the appendix. The dependent and independent variables are used to perform the MDS analysis and OLS regression.

Table 3

European Member States divided by European region

European region	Country
Northern Member States	Austria
	Belgium
	Denmark
	Finland
	Germany
	Ireland
	Luxembourg
	Netherlands
	Sweden
Southern Member States	Croatia
	Cyprus
	France
	Greece
	Italy
	Malta
	Portugal
	Spain
Eastern Member States	Bulgaria
	Czech Republic
	Estonia
	Hungary
	Latvia
	Lithuania
	Poland
	Romania
	Slovakia
	Slovenia
United Kingdom	United Kingdom

Table 3: European countries by region

Multidimensional scaling

To find the main dimensions in the European Parliament, multidimensional scaling (MDS) was used. MDS is a technique used to visualize multidimensional data, reducing it to a two- or three-dimensional space. Classic MDS can be used in many fields, including analysing political dimensions (Diaconis, Goel & Holmes, 2008). With MDS, the ideal position of a MEP is estimated based on its relative distance to other MEPs. The results of the MDS analysis are the

coordinates of each MEP's estimated ideal point in a 2-dimensional space. Plotted in a graph, this output indicates how MEPs and political families relate to one another and, more importantly, along which lines they differ. Therefore, the plotted results say something about MEP voting behaviour and potential cleavages. Another important aspect of MDS is that they plot the dimension, which explains the most substantial portion of differences between MEPs on the first dimension, the dimension which offers the second largest percentage of differences and so forth (Diaconis et al., 2008). As these dimensions explain differences in voting behaviour, they can be caused by political cleavages. Therefore, MDS analysis is particularly useful when researching the dominance of one cleavage over another.

There are multiple types of MDS analysis. For this thesis, Togerson's (1952) classical metric MDS is used. This specific method was best suitable, given the methods suggested by Hix et al. (2018b). Metric MDS methods usually require rational or interval data as input, while the distance matrix based on roll-call votes would be categorized as ordinal. However, in practice, Togerson's classic method is most often used when working with ordinal datasets (Kruskal & Wish, 1978), making it perfectly suitable for the analysis done in this thesis.

To do an MDS analysis, a matrix needs to be created showing the ideological distance from each individual MEP to each individual MEP (Hix et al., 2018b; Diaconis et al., 2008). To create this matrix for the eighth term, the 2323 roll-call voting rounds were used. During these 2323 voting rounds a total of 1.37 million votes were casted in favour or against the proposal. As there were 855 MEPs active during EP 8 and 757 during the relevant period of EP9, this resulted in two matrices of 855 by 855 for EP 8 and 757 by 757 for EP 9. The matrix for the ninth term, the total of 137 roll-call voting rounds are included, containing 78 thousand individual votes in favour or against. The relative distances between MEP's were calculated using the following formula. Resulting in d_{ij}, the distance of MEP *i* to MEP *j*, based on *Cij,* the number of roll-call votes in the analysis and v_i, the vote of MEP *i*, coded as 1 (in favour), -1 (against), or 0 (any kind of not-voting) (Diaconis et al., 2008; Hix et al., 2018b). d_{ij} roughly shows the percentage of votes where MEP *i* and MEP *j* disagreed and gave a reliable estimation of the ideological distance between the two MEP's (Diaconis et al., 2008).

$$d_{ij} = \frac{1}{C_{ij}} \sum_{k=1}^{n} |v_i - v_j|$$

The matrices of distances could be used for the MDS analysis, but the literature offers two more steps to make the data better represent the differences (Hix et al., 2018b). Without

these steps, the results did not differ significantly. First, the distances are transformed in dissimilarities by applying $p_{ij} = 1 - exp(-dij)$. Applying this formula makes the results less sensitive to substantial differences, as between different European political groups (Diaconis et al., 2008; Hix et al., 2018b). In addition, the resulting matrix is double centred. To double centre the matrix, for each dissimilarity, the row average, and the column average was subtracted, and the matrix mean divided by -2 was added (Hix et al., 2018b). As each point of the matrix captures the distance from one MEP to another, the row mean equals to the mean of all distances of one MEP to all other MEPs. The same can be said of the column mean. Therefore, by applying this step, the results were controlled for the average distances from MEP *i* and MEP *j*.

When applying MDS to the resulting matrix, it shows the estimated ideal point of each MEP in a two-dimensional space. The coordinates of each MEP in the two-dimensional space are calculated based on the dissimilarities from each MEP to his/her fellow MEPs, as calculated in the matrix. The distance between MEPs in the plotted graphs represents these dissimilarities (Diaconis et al., 2008). These dimensions are solely based on the dissimilarities between MEPs and can, therefore, not necessarily be interpreted as the left/right or European integration cleavage. Also, MDS reduces the data to only two dimensions, while more could exist and be influential. Using a Mardia fit analysis on the resulting eigenvalues of the MDS analysis, it can be said that for EP 8 and EP 9, 96 and 99 percent of the differences respectively, can be explained by the first two dimensions.

OLS Regression

As mentioned before, the dimensions do not mean anything by themselves, but they can be interpreted using an OLS regression. Hix et al. (2018b) estimated the following linear regression:

$$y_{ikt} = \alpha + \beta_1 LR_{kt} + \beta_2 EU_{kt} + X'_{ikt}\gamma + \epsilon_{ikt}$$

In this formula, y_{ikt}, is the estimated ideal point of MEP *i*, of party *k*, at time *t*, or in other words, the coordinates of MEP *i*, on one of the two dimensions as estimated by MDS. The time refers to the eighth or ninth elected EP. *LR* is the score of the national political party on the left-right dimension. EU is the score of the national party on the pro/anti-European integration dimension. Both scores are based on the 2014 CHES (Polk et al., 2017). The *X* combines a set of control variables, the European political group which the MEP belongs to, the region of the country the

MEP is from, and whether the national party the MEP affiliates with was in a governing coalition or in opposition. α, β_1 and β_2 are the to be estimated parameters of the formula. ϵ is the error term (Hix et al., 2018b). To perform an internally valid regression, the data must meet several assumptions. These assumptions are linearity, sample variation (multicollinearity), homoscedasticity, normality and (Wooldridge, 2013).

First, the linearity assumption states that the relation between the dependent and independent variables must be linear. To test the linearity assumption, the error terms of the regression need to follow a linear pattern. Therefore, a visual representation of the error terms was created. The representation showed that the error terms of the regression follow a linear pattern and thus the linearity assumption is met.

Second, the multi-collinearity assumption relates to the correlation between the independent variables. If there is a high correlation between any two independent variables, it can invalidate the results of the regression because it cannot be proven which independent variable causes the variance in the dependent variable. To check the multi-collinearity assumption, a correlation analysis was run on the independent and control variables. The results of this analysis are shown in *Table 4*. When a correlation is 1, there is a perfect positive correlation, meaning that when variable A increases with X, variable equally B increases by X. When the correlation is -1, there is a perfect negative correlation, meaning that when one variable A increases with X, variable B will decrease by X. The closer the correlation is to 0, the less variables A and B move in sync (Woolridge, 2013). A correlation is considered to be distorting the results when it is above 0.7. Between the independent variables of this thesis, only the correlations between the left-right general measurement and the left-right economic and GALTAN measurements are above the 0.7 threshold. However, as these measurements for the left-right cleavage are not used in a single regression, it does not disturb the results and thus does not threaten the internal validity. It must be noted that there is a correlation of 0.53 between the position of a national party towards European integration and the GALTAN measurement. However, this correlation is not considered strong enough to distort the results. Between the remaining variables, there were no notable correlations. All the correlations are highly significant, apart from the correlation between the economic left-right measurement and the dummy variables for the European political family and for the opposition/government. This does not pose a problem when performing the analysis (Woolridge, 2013). Therefore, the multicollinearity assumption is met.

Table 4

Correlation between independent variables

Independent variable	EU position	LR gen	LR econ	GALTAN	European region	Political family	GOVT
EU position	1						
LR gen	-0.3912***	1					
LR econ	-0.0313***	0.7632***	1				
GALTAN	-0.5288***	0.7903***	0.4496***	1			
European region	0.1876***	0.2121***	0.2015***	0.2357***	1		
Political family	-0.5076***	0.3459***	0.0503	0.4005***	-0.0994***	1	
GOVT	0.3507***	-0.1181***	0.0539	-0.1356***	0.1127***	0.3425***	1

Table 4: Correlation between independent variables, based on EP8 data (P<0.10 ** P<0.05 *** P<0.01)*

The third assumption relates to the homoscedasticity of the sample. To do a linear regression, there should be a constant variance in the error terms. The error term captures the random disturbance when a value differs from the value predicted by the regression. A regression is considered homoscedastic when the error term is relatively constant for all values of the linear outcome. In other words, there should not be any patterns within the dataset (Wooldridge, 2013). Based on the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity, the hypothesis of constant variance in the error terms was rejected. Meaning the data is not homoscedastic and there are discernible patters (Woolridge, 2013). The patterns are a result of MEPs affiliated with the same national party. The position of each MEP on the left-right and EU integration dimension is based on the CHES score of the national party, thus MEPs affiliated with the same national party have identical scores. To adjust for the dependence in the observations, the regression is clustered on national parties, meaning MEPs belonging to the same national party are treated as a group (Fitzmaurice, z.d.). By clustering the MEPs from the same national party, it corrects the standard errors and bias in the dependency of the observations while maintaining the individual MEPs as the unit of analysis. With this adjustment, there are no patterns in the data, and the homoscedasticity assumption is also met.

The final assumption is the normality assumption. To be able to do a linear regression, the used variables must be normally distributed. A skewness/Kurtosis test for normality rejected the hypothesis that the data was distributed normally (Woolridge, 2013). A visual representation of the data shows that the data were grouped together at different points. Because the linear regression cannot meet all the assumptions, a logistic regression is added to analysis as a

compensation. The logistic regression functions as a robustness check for the results of the linear regression. This regression will be further elaborated in the next section.

Logistic regression

To compensate for the normality assumption in the OLS regression, a separate regression was done. The results from the OLS regression are compared to the results of a logistic regression. A logistic regression analyses the probability of a binary outcome given a set of predicting factors (Woolridge, 2013). In this thesis, the coordinates of the dimensions resulting from the MDS analysis are brought back to a set of binary variables to be able to be used as the dependent variable. This is done by setting a halfway line on the dimension and coding all coordinates above this line as a '1' and all coordinates below the line as '0'. The halfway line was set based on the grouped distribution of standard errors function. The distribution of standard errors was uncovered by creating a histogram of these results, as shown in *Figure 3*. The line was set between groupings were there was the best equal distribution of results on either side of the line. For the results on the eighth term of the EP, this was at '0'. This means all positive coordinates were coded as '1' and all negative coordinates on both dimensions as '0'. For the ninth term, the line was set on '-0,1', with all coordinates above this number coded as '1' and all coordinates below as '0'. This transformation was done on the coordinates of both dimensions, and on both dimensions, a separate logistic regression was run with the same independent variables as with the OLS regression. The results of this analysis will be discussed in the results section. It can be expected that by performing this transformation, much information is lost, making the analysis less precise. However, as it is a robustness check, this method does fit its purpose.

Figure 3

Histogram visualization of the standard errors of the OLS regression



EP8 EP9

Figure 3: Histogram representation of standard error of the regression on EP8 and EP9

For the logistic regression, the following formula is estimated. The independent variables are similar to those of the OLS regression. However, the outcome is the probability, *P*, of a MEP to be either above or below the line of the dimension.

$$P_{ikt} = \alpha + \beta_1 LR_{kt} + \beta_2 EU_{kt} + X'_{ikt}\gamma + \epsilon_{ikt}$$

Similar to the linear regression, to perform a logistic regression, a set of assumptions must be met to determine its internal validity. These assumptions are to have a binary dependent variable, the observations have to be independent of each other, there can be no multicollinearity between the independent variables, there has to be linearity in the independent variables and the log odds, and there has to be a large-n sample (Woolridge, 2013). As the assumptions of multicollinearity and linearity are the same with the OLS regression, therefore they will not be discussed again here. The assumption of the binary independent variable is met by transforming the coordinates to binary results. The assumption of independent observations is also met. This means the dependent variable cannot be based on matched or repeated measurements (Woolridge, 2013). The assumption is met as the dependent variable is based on the ideological dissimilarities between MEPs. The large-n assumption relates to there being enough observations in the analysis to get reliable results. According to Woolridge (2013), a general rule to determine whether the large-n assumption is met is by looking at the number of independent variables and the frequency of the least frequent outcome. For each independent variable, there should be at least ten cases of the least frequent outcome (Woolridge, 2013). In the binary coding, the least frequent outcome is 0.374 percent of the total results. With five

independent variables, the sample should consist of at least 134 observations (10*5/0.374). With at least 651 MEPs being considered when doing the regression, it can be concluded that the large-n assumption is also met. Further validity and reliability assurances are discussed in the next section.

Reliability and validity

For any research design, it is essential to make sure it is considered both reliable and internally and externally valid. The reliability of the research relates to the ability of the research to be repeated while the internal validity checks whether the concepts are measuring the correct phenomenon. Finally, external validity is about the generalizability of the conclusions (Shuttleworth, 2008).

Part of the internal validity has already been discussed in the previous sections, namely the assumptions which need to be met to perform a valid regression. As these assumptions have already been discussed in detail, they will not be further discussed here. However, there is more to the internal validity of the research. To ensure the analysis is valid, there has to be covariation between the dependent and independent variables. This means that there has to be a correlation between the dependent and independent variables (Woolridge, 2013). In this case, the dependent variables are the coordinates on the dimensions as plotted by MDS, while the independent variables are the measurements for the EU position and the left-right cleavage. These correlations are shown in *Table 5*. As the regression takes several control variables into account, the correlations can give a skewed image (Woolridge, 2013). Apart from the correlations between EP8's first dimension and left-right general or left-right economic, EP8's second dimension, and the EU position and EP9's second dimension and the EU position, there is at least a weak correlation between the independent and dependent variables. This does not pose significant problems, as there are more independent variables to control for these relations. In addition, all the correlations are highly significant. The control variables are needed to exclude alternative explanations of the results. The control variables in this thesis are based on previous work (Hix, 2002; Hix et al., 2005; 2006; 2007; 2009; 2018b) and can increase the internal validity of the research.

Table 5

Correlations between dependent variable and independent variables

	Dimension 1 EP8	Dimension 2 EP8	Dimension 1 EP9	Dimension 2 EP9
EU position	-0.7524***	0.1397***	-0.6903***	-0.2786***
LR general	0.2653***	-0.7365***	0.6321***	-0.4425***
LR economic	-0.0454***	-0.6586***	0.3570***	-0.5684***
GALTAN	0.3342***	-0.6667***	0.7057***	-0.3250***

Table 5: Correlation between dependent variable and independent variables (P<0.10 ** P<0.05 *** P<0.01)*

Besides the internal validity, the external validity of the research has to be considered. The external validity indicates whether the findings can be generalized to the entire research population (Cuncic, 2020; Woolridge, 2013). As discussed, MEPs who either did not participate in voting often enough to get a reliable idea of their preferences or for whom there was no information on their national party's position, are excluded from the analysis. MEPs not belonging to a national party were also excluded. This results in a slight bias towards larger political parties. In addition, roll-call votes account for only 2323 of a total of around 16000 votes taken by the European Parliament during the eighth term and 137 during the ninth term (European Parliament, z.d.). As the outcomes of non-roll-call votes are not recorded individually, it is impossible to analyse these. This is one of the limitations of the research. In addition, the analysis is limited to a certain period of voting in the EP and cannot be generalized to other periods or any national parliaments. In addition, the research's reliability is assured because the analysis takes the entire dataset of roll-call votes into account. This means that future research on the same period will produce the same results.

Results

In the results section of the thesis, the results of the multidimensional scaling (MDS) analysis and the ordinary least squares (OLS) and logistic regression will be discussed in order to answer the hypotheses. First, the results of the MDS analysis will be presented and discussed, as well as a review of the goodness-of-fit statistics of this analysis. Second, the results from the OLS regression will be used to answer the hypotheses. The section will end with a broader look at the implications of the results.

Multidimensional results

The results of the MDS analyses on roll-call data from the eighth and ninth term of the EP are illustrated in *Figure 4* and *Figure 5*. These two figures show the estimated ideal points of individual MEPs along the two main dimensions, represented by the X and Y-axis. MDS analysis produces dimensions based on the percentage of differences they explain, as the total number of dimensions has been brought back to two for the analysis. Therefore, no concrete meaning can be given to these dimensions by just the MDS analysis. The only thing which can be concluded from the MDS analysis by itself is that, out of all dimensions found, the two dimensions shown explain most of the differences between MEPs (Diaconis et al., 2008). However, cautionary observations can be made from these results before moving on to the OLS regression (Hix et al., 2018b).

When taking a look at *Figure 4*, which depicts the dimensions during the eighth term of the EP, one can see a distinction between the three largest families on the left-hand side, the EPP, S&D and ALDE, and the anti-European family, EFDD and the extreme right family, ENF (Hix et al., 2018b), on the opposite side on the X-axis. The EPP and S&D together held a majority during the eighth elected EP and were strongest represented in the European Commission. In fact, the only other political family represented in the European Commission, was ALDE (European Commission, z.d.). As both the European Commission and the European Parliament are generally considered to be pro-integrationist (Hooghe & Marks, 2018; Bornschier, 2010), the distinction with the EPP, S&D, and ALDE on the left-hand side and the Anti-European considered family EFDD (Hix et al., 2018b) on the right-hand side, hints at a pro-anti-European cleavage.

A similar distinction can be made between the politically left-leaning families, the Greens/EFA and GUE/NGL, and the right-leaning, conservative family ECR. The former are

plotted on the top-side and the latter on the opposing bottom-side, meaning the dimension along the Y-axis could align with the left-right cleavage. Another observation can be made relating to party cohesion. The more MEPs from the same political family are closely positioned around each other, the higher the cohesion on the political family level. The EPP, S&D, and ALDE all seem to have relatively high cohesion, especially when compared with the remaining political families, which all seem to be more spread out. An explanation for this observation can be found in previous literature (Hix, 2002; Carrubba et al., 2006; 2008). Hix (2002) argues that party discipline in the largest parties is higher because they have more abilities to punish and reward their MEPs. Up until the eighth elected EP, the EPP and S&D together always held a majority of MEPs in the EP and therefore were able to control the appointments for committee chairs and other key positions within the EP. It is logical to assume that the families would appoint MEPs who follow the 'party line' for these positions (Hix, 2002). This explanation is also in line with findings from Carrubba et al. (2006; 2008) on this subject.

The inverted U-shape/horseshoe model, *Figure 1*, from the literature can be recognized in the results of the MDS analysis, *Figure 4* and *Figure 5*. However, as it seems, the EU integration dimension is now on its side, with the horizontal instead of the vertical axis representing the EU integration dimension. Therefore, it has taken the shape of a C instead of an inverted U. In addition, since the model was introduced in 2002, anti-European parties, EFDD and ENF, have been on the rise, which explains the grouping of MEPs in a section of the model where previously no parties were observed, in the 'mouth of the C/U'. One note can be made on the ENF, this family is categorized as 'extreme right' (Hix et al., 2018b). However, in *Figure 4*, it is plotted more centrally on the dimensions supposedly related to the left/right dimensions than other families seen as right-wing, such as the EPP and ECR.

When comparing these results to previous studies on political dimensions in the EP, the results seem very comparable. The political families are positioned relative to each other in the same fashion and the cohesion differences are comparable as well. As can be observed in *Figure 4*, the EFDD family is grouped in two different places, one around the ENF family and a smaller number of MEPs nearer to the left-leaning families. The same observation was made by Hix et al. (2018) in their analysis of the eighth elected EP.

Based on the results shown in *Figure 4*, one could argue that the first dimension relates to the representation of the political family in important EP committees' positions, i.e. chair. As MEPs vote on candidates for these positions (European parliament, z.d.), the larger families are

better represented and can exclude other families from these positions (Treib, 2014; Servant & Panning, 2019). These committees influence the draft legislation put before the EP. Therefore, it is logical that the political families who have had more influence in shaping these drafts are more likely to vote in favour of their drafts. This could explain the clear distinction between the three largest families, S&D, EPP and ALDE, on the left, and the families which are mostly excluded from important committee positions, EFDD and ENP (Treib, 2014; Servant & Panning, 2019), on the right. However, this pattern did not show in previous studies where the same MDS analysis was used. In the analysis of previous terms, the pattern showed the left-right divide on the first dimension while the S&D and the EPP still dominated the vital committee positions (Hix, 2002; Hix et al., 2005; 2006; 2007; 2018b; Hix & Noury, 2009). Therefore, it can be concluded that the current composition is not caused by this bias in committee representation.

Figure 4

MDS plotted map of MEPs estimated ideal points based on roll-call votes during EP8



Figure 4: MDS estimated ideal points based on roll-call votes, plotted on the two main dimensions, EP8, 2014-2019

Compared to *Figure 4*, *Figure 5* gives a less clear view of the meaning of the two dimensions. The political families are also less clustered together. This is most likely a result of the smaller number of voting rounds available for this period, compared to for EP8. Therefore, less exact estimated ideal positions can be given. When interpreting the figure, the political families still relate to each other in the same fashion as during the eighth term. However, there is still a

definite composition of the political families in how they relate to each other. The composition mainly seems to be rotated anti-clockwise. Also, there is no longer a seemingly clear correlation between the dimensions/axes and the known cleavages. For example, the MEPs associated with the EPP now appear at the centre-bottom of the figure instead of the left-bottom side, and the greens have shifted from the centre-upside, to the left-upside. As it is highly unlikely for national parties to shift their ideological positions (Hooghe & Marks, 2002), it is more likely that this shift of the political families on the dimensions which offer the best explanation for differences, indicates a change in the importance of the political cleavages (Hix et al., 2018b). Based on the lack of a clear visible correlation between the axes and the known cleavages and the rotated composition of the figure, the primary dimension is most likely a combination of different cleavages. In addition, the anti-European EFDD is no longer positioned directly opposed to the three largest families. To get a more robust meaning of the found dimensions, an OLS regression was done, whose results will be discussed later

Figure 5

MDS plotted map of MEPs estimated ideal points based on roll-call votes during EP9



Figure 5: MDS estimated ideal points based on roll-call votes, plotted on the two main dimensions, EP9, June 2019 – January 2020

Goodness-of-fit statistics

Before discussing the results of the OLS regression, the usefulness of the found dimensions should be discussed. With MDS, distances between objects that generally appear in a larger number of dimensions are scaled in a small number of dimensions. Because of this process, not all distances or dissimilarities between objects can be maintained (Diaconis et al., 2008; Mardia,

Kent, & Bibby, 1979). There are different measurements that allow the percentage of dissimilarities within the number of dimensions to be calculated. One of these is the Mardia fit measure. The Mardia fit measure captures the percentage of total distance in differences captures per dimension, calculated by using the eigenvalues (Mardia et al., 1979). The Mardia fit measure consists of two different measures which are complimentary to each other. The main difference between the two stems from the different calculations. The results of the Mardia fit measure can be found in *Table 6*. The following formulas are used to calculate the measures, where p represents the number of dimensions and λ represents the eigenvalues (Mardia et al., 1979).

$$\text{Mardia}_1 = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{p} |\lambda_i|}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} |\lambda_i|} \qquad \text{Mardia}_2 = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{p} \lambda_i^2}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \lambda_i^2}$$

According to Mardia 1, the two dimensions retained for the analysis combined explain 84.37 percent of the differences for the eighth term and 80.54 for the ninth term. Mardia 2 shows the percentage when the eigenvalues are squared, resulting in a measurement which shows that 99.50 percent of for EP8 99.02 percent for EP9 explained using the two retained dimensions. The remaining 15.63 and 19.46 percent of the differences, according to Mardia 1, can only be explained by including a higher number of dimensions. However, as the first two dimensions explain the most substantial portion of the distances, these are the most interesting for the analysis. According to Everitt and Hothorn (2011), a score of 80 percent or higher on the Mardia 1 measurement can be considered 'good'. For the analysis of both the eighth and the ninth term, both Mardia measures score above 80 percent and can, therefore, be considered 'good'.

Table 6

Goodness-of-fit statistics

			Mardia 1 (eigenvalue)		Mardia 2 (eigenvalue^2)	
	Dimension	Eigenvalue	Percent	Cumulative percent	Percent	Cumulative percent
8th European Parliament	1	10700.987	68.82	68.82	94.67	94.67
	2	2417.6102	15.55	84.37	4.83	99.50
9th European Parliament	1	6767.2452	48.67	48.67	69.31	69.31
	2	4430.0729	31.86	80.54	29.70	99.02

Table 6: Results of the Mardia fit measure on the MDS of the eighth and ninth EP

A second observation can be made based on these statistics. During the eighth elected EP, the second dimension 'only' explains 15.55 percent of the variance according to Mardia 1, while in

EP9, this number increases to 31.86 percent. According to Mardia 2, the second dimension explains 4.83 percent of the differences during the eighth term and 29.70 percent of the differences during the ninth term. These numbers are difficult to interpret by themselves, but they give a clear indication that the second dimension's importance has increased during the first year of the ninth term compared to the eighth term. In both analyses, it takes only two dimensions to explain more than 99 percent of the differences according to Mardia 2, which is an indication that these dimensions give a very good fit (Stata, z.d.).

OLS results

As the MDS analysis by itself only gives interpretative evidence, OLS regression is used to provide more conclusive answers and describe meaning to the dimensions found. The dependent variable of the OLS regression are coordinates retrieved by the MDS analysis. A separate regression is run on the coordinates of first dimension and the second dimension. The regression is controlled for the European political group (EPG), European region, and whether the national party was in a governing coalition or in opposition (GOVT) and clustered by national parties to compensate for the otherwise lack of independence in the observations.

The results of the regression on the coordinates of the first dimension are shown in *Table 7*, and the results of the regression on the coordinates of the second dimension are shown in *Table 8*. *Table 7* shows the results of the regression with the coordinates of the X-axis as the dependent variable, while *Table 8* shows the results with the coordinates of the Y-axis as the dependent variable. The results explaining the second dimension are the clearest and are, therefore, discussed first. During neither the eight parliament nor the ninth parliament, the ideological position of MEPs towards European integration offers any significant explanation for how they score on the second dimension. In contrast, during the eighth term, all three measures for the left-right dimension are significant at the $p<0.05$ level. The coefficients of the left-right measurements do not differ much among each other, the lowest being 0.0158 and the highest being 0.0171. This means that with each point on the left-right scales, the estimated ideal point moves by between 0.0158 and 0.0171 points up or down. It must be noted that the EU integration coefficients are negative. However, coefficients are an indicator of the impact of their measurement on the dependent variable, the coordinates of the estimated ideal positions. To interpret the impact of a measurement, it can be disregarded whether the coordinates moves up or down as its main focus is the amount with which they move up or down. Therefore, it can be ignored whether the coefficient is positive or negative (Woolridge, 2013). Based on the

results, it can be concluded that during the eighth term of the EP, the second dimension can be explained through the left-right cleavage. During the ninth term, the general left-right measurement and the GAL/TAN measurement no longer offer any significant explanation. However, the economic left-right measurement still does and at the P<0.01 level. The coefficient of the economic left-right measurement is with 0.0178 also clearly higher compared to those of the other left-right measurements, 0.0027 and 0.0055. This indicates that during the ninth term, the second dimension still captures the difference in how active of a role MEPs want the state to play in the economy.

The first dimension is harder to interpret, as both the EU position and various left-right measurements offer significant results. Although some are only significant at the P<0.10 level. When comparing the results of the general left-right measurement and the EU position on the first dimension during the eighth term, these offer the same lightly significant results. However, the general left-right measurement has a coefficient of 0.0269 compared to 0.0114 of the EU integration measurement. This means the effect of the left-right general on the coordinates on the first dimension is twice as big as the effect of the EU integration measurement. When using the GAL/TAN dimension in the regression, it is slightly significant and the EU position is no longer significant, meaning it is subdued by the GAL/TAN measurement. On the contrary, when comparing the economic left-right measurement and the EU integration measurement, the first offers no significant results with the EU integration measurement is significant at the P<0.05 level with a coefficient of 0.0157. It can be concluded that during the eighth term, the economic left-right dimension offers no explanation for the first dimension, while the GAL/TAN offers more significant results for this dimension, and the left-right general and EU positions are comparably slightly significant, but the general left-right has a stronger effect.

During the ninth term, the general left-right measurement offers no significant results for the first dimension, and the economic left-right measurement only at the P<0.10 level. When analysed together with either of these measurements, the EU integration measurement is significant at the P<0.01 level and has a coefficient of 0.0157 and 0.0174, compared to 0.0097 of the economic left-right. The results change when regressing the GAL/TAN measurement and the EU integration measurement together. In this case, the GAL/TAN left-right measurement is significant at the P<0.05 level and has a coefficient of 0.0138 while the EU integration measurement only at the P<0.10 level and the coefficient is slightly smaller, 0.0111. Besides the results using the GAL/TAN measurement, the OLS results give a much clearer

overview of the meaning of the dimensions during the ninth term than the solely interpretative evidence from the MDS analysis.

Another observation that can be made from the results in *Table 7* and *Table 8* is that the grouping of Southern European MEPs shows significant differences compared to the group of Northern MS. This difference shows mainly on the first dimension and on the second dimension only during the ninth term. This observation is comparable to a similar cleavage between Northern and Southern MS in the European Council (VoteWatch, 2020). Based on the coefficients, the nationality of Southern MS has a quite strong effect on the estimated ideal points. The coefficients of Southern MS range between 0.0452 till 0.0630. These coefficients are a lot higher than those of the ideological measurements. Besides the Southern MS, the Eastern MS also offer significant results, albeit only on the first dimension during the eighth term. The significance is also lower and the coefficients smaller, the highest being 0.0425 and lowest 0.0290. The effect of the nationality of UK MEPs on their voting behaviour has significant effects at the $P<0.05$ level when regressing the second dimension while with the first dimension it is only at $P<0.10$. However, it is interesting that on the first dimension the coefficients of UK MEPs range from 0.0180 when using GAL/TAN to 0.0995 when using the general left-right. On the second dimension, the coefficients are more stable, ranging from 0.0540 for the economic left-right till 0.0785 on the GAL/TAN. These findings are interesting because it means representatives from the UK are more coherent in opposing Northern MS on issues relating to the left-right dimension but are more divided on issues relating to European integration. These results are in line with their national division on the role of the EU over the last ten years. This division is best shown in the results of the Brexit referendum, where 51.9 percent of the electorate voted in favour of leaving the EU and 48.1 percent voted to remain. Besides the small margin, there were also apparent regional differences (BBC, z.d.).

More observations can be made when looking at the European political families. As was expected, these families offer highly significant results when predicting estimated ideal points as well as very high coefficients compared to the other variables. The only exceptions are the EFDD/IDG and the NI during the ninth term. The EFDD, later renamed the Identity and Democracy Group (IDG), is seen as anti-European political parties (Hix et al., 2018b). Therefore, it is logical that on the first dimension, linked to European integration, this family does offer significant results. They seem more divided on the second dimension, with only significant results on the GAL/TAN measurement during the eighth term and on the economic

left-right measurement during the ninth term. The non-inscrits (NI) are MEPs belonging to no European political families. Therefore less cohesion is to be expected. However, their grouping still offers significant results on both dimensions in the eighth term and on the second dimension during the ninth. This suggests that the MEPs and national parties who do not belong to an EPG still share a common ideology. This can also be seen in the MDS results in *Figure 4* and *Figure 5*, where a large percentage of the NI MEPs group together. The lack of significant results on the first dimension during the ninth term might be related to the pending Brexit. With Brexit happening in the near future, some UK national political parties choose not to affiliate themselves again with a political family (European Parliament, z.d.), creating more diversity in this grouping. This can also be seen in *Table 2*, showing the number of MEPs affiliated with each European political group. After Brexit, the number of MEPs not affiliated with a political family dropped from 57 to 31, a more significant drop than any other family, especially given the already relatively small size of the NI group. In addition, the R-squares of both regressions is relatively high, with around 0.92 for the eight term and around 0.84 for the ninth. These results are in line with earlier findings by Hix et al., (2018b).

Table 7

Results of the OLS regression on the first dimension using control variables

	EP 8 Dimension 1			EP 9 Dimension 1		
Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
LR general	0.0269*			0.0084		
	(0.0138)			(0.0073)		
LR econ		0.0145			0.0097*	
		(0.0101)			(0.0049)	
GALTAN			0.02116*			0.0138**
			(0.0125)			(0.0065)
EU	-0.0114*	-0.0157**	-0.0051	-0.0157***	-0.0174***	-0.0111*
	(0.0061)	(0.0065)	(0.0078)	(0.0084)	(0.0059)	(0.0065)
GOVT	0.0191	0.0095	0.0180	0.0079	0.0079	0.0070
	(0.0159)	(0.0160)	(0.0162)	(0.0091)	(0.0091)	(0.0091)
Northern MS						
Eastern MS	-0.0388**	-0.0290*	-0.0425**	0.0089	0.0132	-0.0056
	(0.0168)	(0.0171)	(0.0192)	(0.0202)	(0.0209)	(0.0206)
Southern MS	-0.0574**	-0.0627**	-0.0442**	-0.0503***	-0.0487***	-0.0452***
	(0.0247)	(0.0286)	(0.0217)	(0.0167)	(0.0158)	(0.0167)
UK	0.0995*	0.0905	0.0180*	0.0061	0.0030	0.0109
	(0.0547)	(0.0559)	(0.0559)	(0.0371)	(0.0354)	(0.0381)
ALDE/REG	-0.0261	-0.0068	0.0272	0.1119***	0.1137***	0.1229***
	(0.0336)	(0.0314)	(0.0187)	(0.0333)	(0.0273)	(0.0295)
ECR	0.6948***	0.7373***	0.7389***	0.5088***	0.5230***	0.5045***
	(0.0613)	(0.0536)	(0.0452)	(0.0465)	(0.0371)	(0.0398)
EFDD	0.8931***	0.9205***	0.9573***			
	(0.1601)	(0.1690)	(0.1388)			
IDG				0.7085***	0.7132***	0.7083***
				(0.0530)	(0.0439)	(0.0402)
EPP	-0.0869**	-0.0541**	-0.0624**	0.2743***	0.2729***	0.2645***
	(0.0363)	(0.0263)	(0.0299)	(0.02995)	(0.0252)	(0.0239)
Greens/EFA	0.4719***	0.4546***	0.4862***	0.0592***	0.06267***	0.07588***
	(0.0261)	(0.0235)	(0.0332)	(0.0213)	(0.0211)	(0.0238)
GUE/NGL	0.9403***	0.9036***	0.9128***	0.2924***	0.2940***	0.3011***
	(0.0560)	(0.0487)	(0.0527)	(0.0367)	(0.0361)	(0.0390)
ENF	1.1064***	1.1869***	1.182***			
	(0.0841)	(0.0755)	(0.0661)			
NI	0.8604***	0.9370***	0.9097***	0.2225	0.2274	0.2489*
	(0.1263)	(0.1224)	(0.1191)	(0.1476)	(0.1481)	(0.1289)
Constant	-0.3340***	-0.2428***	-0.367***	-0.1795***	-0.1725***	-0.2385***
	(0.0862)	(0.0755)	(0.0661)	(0.0595)	(0.0566)	(0.0746)
Observations	773	773	773	651	651	651
R-squared	0.9276	0.9253	0.9273	0.8434	0.8444	0.8464

Table 7: Interpreting the coordinates of the first dimension using OLS regression, coefficient (std. error) (P<0.10 ** P<0.05 *** P<0.01)*

Table 8

Results of the OLS regression on the second dimension using control variables

	EP 8 Dimension 2			EP 9 Dimension 2		
Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
LR general	-0.0171**			-0.0027		
	(0.0079)			(0.0067)		
LR econ		-0.0158***			-0.0178***	
		(0.0054)			(0.0050)	
GALTAN			-0.0166**			0.0055
			(0.0068)			(0.0037)
EU	-0.0010	0.0027	-0.0062	-0.0052	-0.0003	-0.0004
	(0.0032)	(0.0030)	(0.0042)	(0.0049)	(0.0055)	(0.0068)
GOVT	-0.0161	-0.0092	-0.0164	-0.0051	-0.0042	-0.0062
	(0.0128)	(0.0119	(0.0132)	(0.0072)	(0.0075)	(0.0074)
Northern MS						
Eastern MS	-0.0205	-0.0275*	-0.0164	0.0294	0.0246	-0.0255
	(0.0149)	(0.0154)	(0.0152)	(0.0193)	(0.0230)	(0.0243)
Southern MS	0.0156	0.0232	0.0058	0.0624***	0.0630***	0.0614***
	(0.0165)	(0.0172)	(0.0153)	(0.0193)	(0.0176)	(0.0187)
UK	-0.0735**	-0.0540*	-0.0785**	0.0361**	0.0389**	0.0403**
	(0.0338)	(0.0298)	(0.0334)	(0.0178)	(0.0174)	(0.0187)
ALDE & REG	-0.2000***	-0.1932***	-0.2328***	-0.2209***	-0.1996***	-0.237***
	(0.0238)	(0.0204)	(0.0202)	(0.0302)	(0.0244)	(0.0278)
ECR	-0.4250***	-0.4375***	-0.4486***	-0.3542***	-0.1833***	-0.2181***
	(0.0345)	(0.0299)	(0.0256)	(0.0281)	(0.0344)	(0.0360)
EFDD	-0.1040	-0.1043	-0.1449**			
	(0.0931)	(0.0907)	(0.0730)			
IDG				0.0952	0.1340***	0.0557
				(0.0584)	(0.0445)	(0.0477)
EPP	-0.3811***	-0.3830***	-0.3893***	-0.3542***	-0.3215***	-0.3830***
	(0.0258)	(0.0212)	(0.0211)	(0.0281)	(0.0272)	(0.0264)
Greens/EFA	0.2443***	0.2509***	0.2291***	0.2455***	0.2320***	0.2580***
	(0.0195)	(0.0169)	(0.0235)	(0.0192)	(0.0193)	(0.0183)
GUE/NGL	0.1257***	0.1383***	0.1384***	0.2797***	0.2559***	0.3004***
	(0.0324)	(0.0272)	(0.0298)	(0.0295)	(0.0296)	(0.0305)
ENF	-0.2238***	-0.2530***	-0.2643***			
	(0.0389)	(0.0256)	(0.0249)			
NI	-0.2123***	-0.2530***	-0.2370***	0.1044**	0.1047***	0.1070**
	(0.0512)	(0.0444)	(0.0444)	(0.0476)	(0.0378)	(0.0476)
Constant	0.2809***	0.2366***	0.3253***	0.0918*	0.1206**	0.0340
	(0.0482)	(0.0297)	(0.0608)	(0.0551)	(0.0496)	(0.0614)
Observations	773	773	773	651	651	651
R-squared	0.9227	0.9246	0.9252	0.8548	0.8641	0.8551

Table 8: Interpreting the coordinates of the second dimension using OLS regression, coefficient (std. error) (P<0.10 ** P<0.05 *** P<0.01)*

A second set of OLS regressions was done without the control variable of the European political group (EPG). The EPGs all have their own fixed ideological position and therefore could cloud the results. The results from this regression are shown in *Table 9* and *Table 10* in the appendix. On the results of the eighth term, it stands out that none of the left-right measurements have significant results on the first dimension, while when using the control variables, the GAL/TAN measurement had significant results. On the second dimension, the EU integration measure scores highly significant when regressed with either the economic left-right or the GAL/TAN measurement. However, the coefficients of the EU position are much smaller than those of their left-right measurements, 0.0194 and 0.0213 compared to 0.0769 and 0.0822. Therefore, these results support the conclusion that during the eighth term the first dimension is explained by the EU integration cleavage and the second dimension by the left-right cleavage.

The results for the ninth term show the same shifted composition on the dimensions as *Figure 5* from the MDS analysis. All measurements are significantly at the $P<0.01$ level on both the first and second dimension. The coefficients of the measurements are to a large extent comparable and support this conclusion. Therefore, it can be said that the dimensions produced by MDS show a combination of both cleavages. The only considerable difference between two coefficients in the same regression is seen between the economic left-right measurement and the EU integration measurement. On the first dimension both are significant, but the EU integration measurement has a relatively large coefficient while the economic left-right measurement has a relatively low coefficient, 0.0749 and 0.0461. The opposite is the case for the second dimension, 0.0221 for EU integration and 0.0665 for the economic left-right.

Robustness check

When comparing the results from the OLS regressions to those of the robustness check, they offer the same general impression. The results from the logistic regression can be found in *Table 11* and *Table 12* in the appendix. As discussed before, by transforming the coordinates, a lot of information is lost. Still, some conclusions can be made. On the first dimension during the eighth term, the EU integration measurement scores significant on all three regressions. Similar to the OLS regression with EPG control, GAL/TAN also scores significant on the first dimension. On the second dimension, only measurements for the left-right cleavage have significant results. This is in line with the results of both OLS regressions.

The results for the ninth term are more in line with those of the OLS regression without EPG control. The measurements of both the left-right cleavage and the EU integration cleavage

score significantly on the first dimension. The coefficients for the EU integration measurement are slightly higher than those of the general left-right and economic left-right measurements. For the GAL/TAN measurement and the EU integration position, the coefficients are practically equal. In general, these results add evidence to the conclusion that the cleavages have shifted on the dimensions. On the second dimension, only the economic left-right measurement has significant results. This is in line with the observations made based on the coefficients of the OLS regression without EPG control and the OLS regression with EPG control.

Concluding remarks

Given the combined evidence of the MDS analysis, the resulting OLS regressions and the logistic regression, it can be concluded that the EU integration cleavage has been dominant throughout the eighth term of the EP while during the first year of the ninth term the cleavages have started to shift compared to the main dimensions. Therefore, H1 '*The pro/anti-European integration cleavage is more dominant than the left-right cleavage in the eighth European Parliament voting behaviour'* can be accepted and H2 '*The left-right cleavage is more dominant than the pro/anti-European integration cleavage in the eighth European Parliament voting behaviour'* is rejected. However, it must be noted that the effect of the EU integration measurement decreases when controlling for GAL/TAN. This indicates that the EU integration cleavage is subsumed under this dimension.

Based on the results of the different regressions, there is no clear indication of a dominant cleavage during the ninth term of the EP. Both the measurements of the left-right cleavage and the EU integration had highly significant effects on the estimated positions and also in the coefficients no clear difference between the cleavages could be perceived. Therefore it cannot be concluded on cleavage is more dominant than the other and neither H3 '*The pro/anti-European integration cleavage is more dominant than the left-right cleavage in the ninth European Parliament voting behaviour'* nor H4 '*The left-right cleavage is more dominant than the pro/anti-European integration cleavage in the ninth European Parliament voting behaviour'* can be accepted and thus both are rejected. Neither hypothesis is accepted, but it can be concluded that during the first half year of the ninth term both cleavages were perceptibly equally important. One note must be made regarding these conclusions. Given the results for the ninth term, the effect of the EU integration measurement was stronger on the first dimension than the economic left-right measurement, while the opposite was true for the second dimension. Therefore, the economic left-right was the least important measurement during the ninth term.

Discussion & Conclusion

In the final chapter, the implications of the results will be discussed to answer the research question, 'Which cleavage, left/right or pro/anti-European integration can be best used to predict individual voting behaviour in the ninth European parliament?'. Given the results, it is clear that there is no simple answer to this question. However, the results allow for a number of observations which will be discussed, mainly the importance of the GAL/TAN measurement during both terms and the cleavage shift during the ninth. Finally, the chapter will end with a conclusion and a discussion of the limitations of the research.

GAL/TAN vs. EU integration

The results have shown a difference in explanatory power between the CHES' measurement for the GAL/TAN measurement and the other two measurements for the left-right dimension. When looking at the OLS regression, the GAL/TAN measurement was a better predictor for the first dimension than the EU integration measurement in both the eighth and the ninth term. In the logistic regression GAL/TAN also showed significant results. In the literature review and the theoretical framework chapters, the difference between the GAL/TAN cleavage from Hooghe et al. (2002) and the traditional left-right as described by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) has been discussed, showing that GAL/TAN also takes cultural values into account. For this reason, Hix et al., (2018b) have used the GAL/TAN as a measurement for the *"'social' left-right"* (Hix et al., 2018b, 12). However, Hooghe et al. (2002) introduced the GAL/TAN cleavage as separate from the left-right cleavage and as "*the most general and powerful predictor of party positioning on the issues that arise from European integration*" (Hooghe et al., 2002, 966). Therefore, it is logical that it is a strong predictor for a dimension closely related to the European integration cleavage.

Still, it cannot be said that the GAL/TAN measurement and the EU integration cleavage are the same. There is only a moderate correlation between the two measurements, see *Table 4.* The GAL/TAN cleavage intends to capture the political positions on issues arising from European integration while the EU integration cleavage also captures the institutional issues surrounding European integration. For example, the increasing competences of the EU on different fields, at the expense of national governments (Hix et al., 2018b; Treib, 2020). The moderate negative correlation between the two measurements also shows that national parties which score higher on the European integration measurement, and thus are more in favour of further integration, score lower on the GAL/TAN measurement, and thus lean towards more

libertarian or postmaterialist values. Nonetheless, the GAL/TAN measurement has proven to be a better predictor for estimated positions on the first dimension than the measurement of European integration. This means that the first dimension does not relate to European integration by itself, but to the issues of the Green, Alternative, Libertarian/Traditional, Authoritarian, Nationalistic (GAL/TAN) cleavage, and has been misinterpreted by Hix et al., (2018b). Hix et al. (2018b) argued that the EU integration cleavage was the most important predictor for voting behaviour during the eighth EP, while the results of this thesis support GAL/TAN cleavage as the strongest predicting factor.

These findings can be linked back to the literature discussion on whether the European integration cleavage and the cultural cleavage are separate or have merged. Based on the results from the analysis, the first cleavage in the EP can be best explained through a combination of the GAL/TAN measurement and the EU integration cleavage. Therefore, it can be argued that the European crises and Euroscepticism did not lead to a new cleavage as Mair (2007) and Hix et al. (2018a; 2018b) predicted, but the issues of EU integration have become embedded in the pre-existing cultural cleavage, as discussed by Marks and Wilson (2000) and Kriesi et al. (2006). The combination of this new cultural cleavage and the left-right cleavage also argue in favour of Kriesi's (1992) two-dimensional structure of politics.

Shifting cleavages

While during the eighth term, there was a clearly discernible connection between the two main dimensions found by the MDS analysis and the political cleavages from the literature, this connection is barely to be found during the ninth term. In *Figure 5*, depicting the results of the MDS analysis of the ninth term, it is clear that the composition of political families has rotated. The results of the OLS regression support this conclusion without EPG control (*Table 9* and *Table 10*) and the logistic regression (*Table 11* and *Table 12*). The regressions results still show a slight dominance of the EU integration/GAL/TAN cleavage on the first dimension and economic left-right on the second dimensions (*Table 7* and *Table 8*).

At the beginning of the thesis, the expectation was formulated that the European integration cleavage would increase in importance as a result of the success of anti-EU parties in the 2019 European Parliament elections. At least for the researched period, it can be concluded that this has not been the case. Compared to the eighth term, the European integration and the GAL/TAN cleavage have lost in dominance. This conclusion is supported by the

significant OLS and logistic regression results of both cleavages on the first dimension and the rotated composition of the MDS results. Hix et al. (2018b) have shown that during the eighth term, the relative dominance of the European integration cleavage was diminishing compared to the left-right cleavage. Based on the data from the first half-year of the ninth EP, it can be said that this trend has continued. Hix et al. (2018b) put forward the idea that the financial crisis of 2008-2009 and the Euro crisis of 2013-2015 had increased the public debate on European integration and, therefore, the importance of the cleavage. With this in mind, it can be argued that as time passed, the political effects of these crises have decreased. Nonetheless, even with the importance of the cleavages shifting, it can be concluded from the regression results that during the ninth EP the European integration and GAL/TAN cleavage is slightly more important than the economic left-right division.

The importance of the GAL/TAN cleavage over the EU integration cleavage and the comeback of the left-right cleavage have certain implications for politics in the EP. Over the last decades, the EP has accumulated more competences which have increased its influence over EU regulation and its impact on the population. Based on the results, the difference between political parties affiliating with traditional, local cultures and those affiliating with universal cultures is very influential and not just those with diverging ideas on European integration. Therefore, efforts must be made to reconcile the seemingly opposing values to improve effective politics in the EP.

Limitations and recommendations for future research

As is the case with any research design, there are limitations that have to be addressed. In this thesis, there are two limitations which have had their influence on the results, the fact only roll-call votes have been used and that for the ninth term of the EP, a relatively small number of roll-call votes was available. The use of roll-call votes has had an impact on the results because these only represent a part of the votes and, as Carrubba et al. (2006; 2008) have described, can give an unrepresentative view of voting behaviour during non-roll-call votes. The public nature of roll-call votes compared to other voting methods enables party leadership to enforce the party line through promotions and punishments and, therefore, influence individual behaviour (Carrubba et al., 2006; 2008). However, the only possibility to go past this limitation is for the European Parliament to make use of roll-call votes in a larger percentage of their voting rounds.

The second limitation is the small number of voting rounds available for the ninth term of the EP. As at the time of the research, the ninth EP has been in office for less than a year, and limited information is still available. Due to the smaller number of voting rounds held, the estimated ideal positions of the MEPs are less exact and more sensitive to outlying results. This limitation directly translates to the need for future research. It is essential to repeat this analysis when more voting rounds have been held to check whether the observed trend is valid.

The second recommendation for future research relates to the use of the European integration and the GAL/TAN cleavage. Based on the results, it can be said that the GAL/TAN cleavages relate more to the first dimension than the EU integration cleavage. However, questions remain. The GAL/TAN cleavage was introduced as a cleavage based on issues arising from European integration, but the measurement correlates more with the general left-right and economic left-right measurements than with the European integration measurement. In addition, more research should be done on whether the GAL/TAN was also a better predictor than EU integration in previous terms of the EP.

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Appendix

A: Table 9

Results of the OLS regression on the first dimension without EPG control variable

	EP 8 Dimension 1			EP 9 Dimension 1		
Ind. variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
LR general	-0.0056			-0.0541***		
	(0.0140)			(0.0070)		
LR econ		-0.0171			0.0461***	
		(0.0165)			(0.0088)	
GALTAN			-0.0156			0.0523***
			(0.0153)			(0.0083)
EU	-0.1256***	-0.1242***	-0.1321***	0.0593***	-0.0749***	-0.0489***
	(0.0144)	(0.0167)	(0.0165)	(0.0079)	(0.0081)	(0.0086)
GOVT	-0.1384**	-0.1320**	-0.1357**	-0.0038	-0.0010	0.0009
	(0.0616)	(0.0631)	(0.0604)	(0.0128)	(0.0128)	(0.0132)
Northern MS						
Eastern MS	-0.1065*	-0.1031	-0.0905	-0.0040	0.0351	-0.0161
	(0.0636)	(0.0678)	(0.0642)	(0.0340)	(0.0454)	(0.0397)
Southern MS	-0.1472**	-0.1385**	-0.1501**	0.0876**	-0.0815**	-0.0622*
	(0.0636)	(0.0592)	(0.0632)	(0.0346)	(0.0375)	(0.0350)
UK	0.1010	0.1298	0.1010	-0.0333	-0.0518	-0.0077
	(0.1529)	(0.1740)	(0.1527)	(0.0646)	(0.0643)	(0.0830)
Constant	1.0302***	1.0649***	1.1223***	0.1395	0.3102***	0.0895
	(0.1168)	(0.1195)	(0.1582)	(0.0878)	(0.0852)	(0.0992)
Observations	773	773	773	651	651	651
R-squared	0.6089	0.6137	0.6260	0.6643	0.6195	0.6453

Table 9: Interpreting coordinates of the first dimension using OLS regression without EPG control, coefficient (std. error) (P<0.10 ** P<0.05 *** P<0.01)*

B: Table 10

Results of the OLS regression on the second dimension without EPG control variable

	EP 8 Dimension 2			EP 9 Dimension 2		
Ind. variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
LR general	-0.0858*** (0.0068)			-0.0642*** (-0.0090)		
LR econ		-0.0769*** (0.0074)			-0.0665*** (0.0102)	
GALTAN			-0.0822*** (0.0064)			-0.0602*** (0.0098)
EU	-0.0087 (0.0058)	0.0194*** (0.0058)	-0.0213*** (0.0065)	-0.0404*** (0.0075)	-0.0221*** (0.0080)	-0.0518*** (0.0089)
GOVT	-0.0843** (0.0352)	-0.0607 (0.0377)	-0.0752* (0.0426)	-0.0005 (0.0117)	-0.0015 (0.0116)	-0.0063 (0.0129)
Northern MS						
Eastern MS	-0.0799* (0.0437)	-0.1298** (0.0615)	-0.0585 (0.0529)	-0.0470 (0.0524)	-0.0905 (0.0608)	-0.0348 (0.0542)
Southern MS	0.0162 (0.0382)	0.0448 (0.0424)	-0.0089 (0.0406)	0.0823 (0.0507)	0.0756 (0.0485)	0.0528 (0.0485)
UK	-0.0327 (0.0741)	0.0640 (0.0622)	-0.0634 (0.0946)	0.0488 (0.0605)	0.0646 (0.0613)	0.0209 (0.0812)
Constant	0.5915*** (0.0593)	0.2908*** (0.0695)	0.6362*** (0.0703)	0.6140*** (0.0777)	0.4696*** (0.0775)	0.6576*** (0.1041)
Observations	773	773	773	651	651	651
R-squared	0.6166	0.5406	0.5363	0.4618	0.4780	0.4104

Table 10: Interpreting the coordinates of the second dimension using OLS regression without EPG control, coefficient (std. error) (P<0.10 ** P<0.05 *** P<0.01)*

C: Table 11

Results of the logistic regression on the first dimension

	EP 8 Dimension 1			EP 9 Dimension 1		
Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
LR general	-0.0920			0.4009**		
	(0.2277)			(0.1953)		
LR econ		-0.0566			0.4190***	
		(0.2002)			(0.1458)	
GALTAN			-0.4729**			0.2878**
			(0.1859)			(0.1234)
EU	-0.4054**	0.3600***	-0.6770***	-0.5052**	-0.5486**	-0.3259**
	(0.1958)	(0.1378)	(0.1594)	(0.2377)	(0.2214)	(0.1845)
GOVT	0.4220	0.4593	0.4091	0.5854**	0.5924**	0.5910**
	(1.0874)	(1.0552)	(1.1075)	(0.2942)	(0.3005)	(0.2930)
Northern MS						
Eastern MS	-0.3393	-0.4069	-0.2750	0.5050	0.4972	0.3274
	(1.0737)	(1.2185)	(0.7201)	(0.4946)	(0.4793)	(0.5464)
Southern MS	-1.7977	-1.6415	2.8602***	-0.6919	-0.4714	-0.7262
	(1.3154)	(1.1344)	(1.0920)	(0.4960)	(0.4910)	(0.5376)
UK	0.9659	1.0550	0.7201	0.2468	0.2713	0.1087
	(0.8703)	(0.9024)	(0.9392)	(0.6021)	(0.5683)	(0.5769)
ALDE/REG	-5.9649***	-5.8203***	-6.9822***	1.3551**	1.3689**	2.1240***
	(1.4581)	(1.4177)	(1.2242)	(0.6507)	(0.5992)	(1.6218)
ECR	0.9187	1.0239	0.7752	0	0	0
	(1.5768)	(1.5674)	(1.4247)			
EFDD	0.1238	0.3270	-0.7627			
	(1.9999)	(1.8877)	(1.7505)			
IDG				0	0	0
EPP	-6.6937***	-6.5980***	-6.8927***	3.9981***	4.0453***	4.3893***
	(1.3588)	(1.5085)	(1.2084)	(0.7168)	(0.6522)	(0.5847)
Greens/EFA	0	0	0	0.1613	0.2440	0.2865
				(0.6864)	(0.6862)	(0.73050
GUE/NGL	0	0	0	5.2940***	5.3070***	5.4808***
				(1.2464)	(1.1962)	(0.2930)
ENF	0	0	0			
NI	0	0	0	-0.4949	-0.1951	1.0302
				(2.2769)	(1.9938)	(1.622)
Constant	6.2828*	5.5526**	11.1.1075***	-0.2101	-0.0338	-1.2581
	(3.6007)	(2.3197)	(1.8831)	(1.8509)	(1.7592)	(1.8386)
Observations	423	423	423	524	524	524
Pseudo R^2	0.8681	0.8680	0.8743	0.5534	0.5596	0.5517

Table 11: Interpreting the transformed coordinates of the first dimension using logistic regression, odds ratio (Robust std. error) (P<0.10 ** P<0.05 *** P<0.01)*

D: Table 12

Results of the logistic regression on the second dimension

	EP 8 Dimension 2			EP 9 Dimension 2		
Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)
LR general	-0.4358*			-0.0825		
	(0.2429)			(0.1769)		
LR econ		-0.3324*			-0.2144*	
		(0.1895)			(0.1223)	
GALTAN			-0.3002 **			0.1893
			(0.1462)			(0.1336)
EU	-0.0768	0.0364	-0.0976	-0.0082	-0.02882	0.0498
	(0.1717)	(0.1512)	(0.1725)	(0.1364)	(0.1233)	(0.1349)
GOVT	-0.0419	0.1326	0.0033	-0.0121	-0.0063	-0.0182
	(0.7417)	(0.7160)	(0.6887)	(0.2623)	(0.2720)	(0.2629)
Northern MS						
Eastern MS	0.8268	0.5715	1.0782	0.1863	-0.1145	0.1283
	(0.8407)	(0.8135)	(0.8074)	(0.6000)	(0.5966)	(0.6146)
Southern MS	1.6700*	1.7041*	1.9324*	1.4442***	1.2568**	1.3057**
	(0.9695)	(0.9785)	(0.9927)	(0.5499)	(0.5240)	(0.5356)
UK	-1.5420	-1.4323	-1.4215	0.5085	0.4741	0.8577
	(1.7557)	(1.8805)	(1.7918)	(0.5315)	(0.5618)	(0.5522)
ALDE & REG	0.3444	1.2985	0.2129	-4.5473***	-4.4102***	-4.8476***
	(1.3863)	(1.3777)	(1.4454)	(0.8977)	(0.8266)	(0.7724)
ECR	-2.4753	-2.1304	-2.3123	-4.2236***	-4.4227***	-4.9858***
	(1.9179)	(1.9683)	(1.8501)	(1.1790)	(1.0376)	(1.0720)
EFDD	0.9926	2.0392	0.9701			
	(1.7200)	(1.4880)	(1.4773)			
IDG				0	0	0
EPP	-3.1957**	-2.4082*	-3.0577**	-6.4229***	-6.1504***	-7.1141***
	(1.4308)	(1.4328)	(1.4172)	(0.9138)	(0.8371)	(0.8075)
Greens/EFA	0	0	0	0	0	0
GUE/NGL	0	0	0	0	0	0
ENF	0	0	0			
NI	0	0	0	0	0	0
Constant	1.3550	-1.0841	0.1384	4.1673***	5.0749***	2.6718*
	(3.0728)	(1.9752)	(2.3865)	(1.4299)	(1.4035)	(1.4749)
Observations	423	423	423	453	453	452
Pseudo R^2	0.4733	0.4611	0.4642	0.5234	0.5309	0.5277

Table 12: Interpreting the transformed coordinates of the second dimension using logistic regression, odds ratio (Robust std. error) (P<0.10 ** P<0.05 *** P<0.01)*

E: Table 13

Ideological positions of national parties based on CHES

National Party	Country	eu_position	lrgen	lrecon	galtan
50 PLUS	Netherlands	4,800	5,250	3,667	4,333
Agir - La Droite constructive	France	7,000	7,000	4,250	5,000
Alliance Écologiste Indépendante	France	6,214	3,083	3,250	1,417
Alliance Party of Northern Ireland	United Kingdom				
Alternative für Deutschland	Germany	1,615	8,923	8,333	8,692
ANO 2011	Czech Republic	5,200	5,786	6,357	4,455
Anorthotikó Kómma Ergazómenou Laoú	Cyprus	4,500	2,000	2,000	3,250
Arbetarepartiet- Socialdemokraterna	Sweden	5,273	3,762	3,429	3,619
Attīstībai/Par!	Latvia				
Azione	Italy	3,143	1,286	0,714	0,286
Bloco de Esquerda	Portugal	3,125	1,333	0,667	0,667
Bulgaria Without Censorship/Reload Bulgaria	Bulgaria				
Bulgarian Socialist Party	Bulgaria	5,294	3,688	3,471	5,938
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	Germany	6,500	3,000	2,800	1,700
Catalunya en Comú	Spain	6,375	6,000	6,375	5,250
Centerpartiet	Sweden	5,409	7,238	7,667	3,048
Centre Démocrate Humaniste	Belgium	6,400	4,400	4,200	5,000
Centro Democrático e Social – Partido Popular	Spain	2,500	7,750	8,500	7,500
Česká strana sociálně demokratická	Czech Republic	6,067	3,143	2,714	4,429
Christen Democratisch Appèl	Netherlands	5,545	6,778	6,556	6,444
Christen-Democratisch & Vlaams	Belgium	6,600	5,400	5,600	5,600
ChristenUnie	Netherlands	3,444	5,444	4,111	7,667
Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands	Germany	6,385	5,923	5,917	6,000
Christlich Soziale Partei	Belgium	6,400	4,400	4,200	5,000
Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern e.V.	Germany	4,846	7,231	6,083	7,923
Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria	Bulgaria	6,765	6,500	7,000	5,118
Ciudadanos – Partido de la Ciudadanía	Spain	6,667	5,556	6,500	3,222
Coalition for Europe	Spain				
Coalition of the Radical Left	Greece	3,444	2,000	1,444	2,111
Communist Party of Greece	Greece	1,111	0,667	0,111	5,778
Conservatives	United Kingdom	3,143	7,000	7,857	6,143
Dansk Folkeparti	Denmark	1,909	6,900	4,500	8,400
Darbo partija	Lithuania	5,133	4,400	4,692	5,857
Déi Gréng - Les Verts	Luxembourg	6,333	3,000	4,000	0,500
Delegación Ciudadanos Europeos	Spain				
Democraten 66	Netherlands	6,818	5,556	6,556	1,000
Democratic Party	Cyprus	5,500	6,000	6,250	6,250

Democratic Rally	Cyprus	6,750	7,500	8,500	6,000
Democratic Unionist Party	United Kingdom	2,583	9,000	8,000	9,000
Democrats for Strong Bulgaria	Bulgaria	6,588	7,563	8,000	4,118
Demokratikus Koalíció	Hungary	6,714	3,357	4,857	2,571
Det Konservative Folkeparti	Denmark	5,500	7,000	7,600	7,200
Det Radikale Venstre	Denmark	7,000	5,700	6,500	1,900
Die Grünen - Die Grüne Alternative	Austria	6,500	3,000	2,800	1,700
DIE LINKE.	Germany	3,000	1,231	1,250	4,923
Die PARTEI	Germany				
Écologistes Confédérés pour l'organisation de luttes originales	Belgium	6,250	2,200	2,200	1,200
Eesti Keskerakond	Estonia	5,000	4,250	3,875	6,625
Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond	Estonia	2,867	5,000	8,000	9,000
Eesti Reformierakond	Estonia	6,875	7,250	8,250	3,125
Együtt – A Korszakváltók Pártja	Hungary	6,643	3,643	4,857	2,357
EH BILDU	Spain	6,375	4,333	4,125	4,500
Elliniki Lusi-Greek Solution	Greece	1,818	1,200	1,000	2,100
Enhedslisten	Denmark	1,818	1,200	1,000	2,100
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya	Spain	5,556	3,667	3,625	2,111
Europe Écologie	France	6,214	3,083	3,250	1,417
Familien-Partei Deutschlands	Germany				
Feministiskt initiati	Sweden	3,158	1,810	1,714	0,810
Fianna Fáil Party	Ireland	5,556	5,875	5,750	7,250
Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség / Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt	Hungary	2,714	7,929	3,692	8,643
Fine Gael Party	Ireland	6,444	6,625	7,125	6,375
Folkebevægelsen mod EU	Denmark	1,091	2,000	1,333	2,750
Forum voor Democratie	Netherlands	1,133	9,000	7,143	9,000
Forza Italia	Italy	3,429	6,714	7,000	7,286
Fratelli d'Italia	Italy	2,167	7,857	5,571	9,286
Freie Demokratische Partei	Germany	5,692	6,538	8,000	3,385
Freie Wähler	Germany				
Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs	Austria	1,900	8,700	5,500	8,800
Front de Gauche	France	2,643	1,750	1,167	3,909
Front National	France	1,214	9,636	5,909	8,917
Gauche républicaine et socialiste	France				
GO Realisme & Daadkracht	Netherlands	1,133	9,000	7,143	9,000
Gods kalpot Rīgai	Latvia	4,200	4,000	3,556	7,000
Green Party	United Kingdom	5,167	1,857	2,000	1,000
Groen	Belgium	6,200	2,200	2,000	1,200
GroenLinks	Netherlands	6,545	2,333	2,667	1,000
Hrvatska demokratska zajednica	Croatia	6,222	7,333	5,333	8,250
Hrvatska konzervativna stranka	Croatia				
Independents for change	Ireland				
Isamaa	Estonia				
Istarski demokratski sabor	Croatia	6,778	3,333	5,333	1,875

Italia Viva	Italy	6,571	3,571	4,571	2,429
Izquierda Unida	Spain	4,600	2,000	1,778	1,400
Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom	Hungary	1,214	9,714	4,000	9,500
Junts per Catalunya - Lliures per Europa	Spain	5,643	5,000	5,000	5,000
Kansallinen Kokoomus	Finland	6,600	7,667	8,222	4,750
Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt	Hungary	2,714	7,929	3,692	8,643
Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy	Czech Republic	2,733	1,071	1,000	6,571
Kongres Nowej Prawicy	Poland	1,059	9,529	9,588	8,824
Kotleba – Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko	Slovakia	2,286	8,357	4,769	9,357
Křesťanská a demokratická unie – Československá strana lidová	Czech Republic	6,500	5,929	5,571	7,643
Kresťanskodemokratické hnutie	Slovakia	5,000	6,929	6,000	8,929
Kristdemokraterna	Sweden	3,900	6,222	5,444	9,000
La France Insoumise	France	2,083	1,700	1,111	2,400
La République en marche	France	7,000	7,000	4,250	5,000
Labour Party	United Kingdom	5,889	4,125	4,125	3,750
L'Altra Europa	Italy				
Latvijas Krievu savienība	Latvia	2,889	3,250	2,857	8,286
Lega	Italy	1,143	8,857	7,286	9,143
Les centristes	France	6,182	6,273	6,889	6,222
Les Républicains	France	5,429	7,667	7,333	7,167
Liberalerna	Sweden				
Liberals	United Kingdom	6,714	4,857	5,143	2,429
Lietuvos lenkų rinkimų akcija	Lithuania	4,214	5,462	3,583	8,857
Lietuvos Respublikos liberalų sąjūdis	Lithuania	6,533	7,333	8,615	2,429
Lietuvos socialdemokratų partija	Lithuania	6,600	3,200	3,308	4,286
Lietuvos valstiečių ir žaliųjų sąjunga	Lithuania	4,692	3,867	3,417	6,167
Lista Marjana Šarca	Slovenia				
Liste Renaissance	France	7,000	7,000	4,250	5,000
Los Pueblos Deciden	Spain				
L'union pour les Outremer	France				
Magyar Szocialista Párt	Hungary	6,071	3,429	4,071	4,071
Magyarország Zöld Pártja	Hungary	5,286	4,286	3,615	2,929
Miljöpartiet de gröna	Sweden	4,409	3,286	3,524	1,619
Moderaterna	Sweden	6,364	7,429	7,667	4,667
Momentum	Hungary				
Most–Híd	Slovakia	6,429	6,214	6,357	5,786
Mouvement Démocrate	France	7,000	7,000	4,250	5,000
Mouvement Radical Social-Libéral	France	7,000	7,000	4,250	5,000
Mouvement Réformateur	Belgium	6,400	7,000	7,600	3,000
Movement for Rights and Freedoms	Bulgaria	6,000	4,688	4,353	6,588
Movement for Social Democracy EDEK	Cyprus	5,750	4,750	4,500	4,500
Movimento 5 Stelle	Italy	1,429	4,667	3,429	2,571
Movimento Partido da Terra	Portugal	3,400	6,750	7,000	6,333

Nacionālā apvienība / Tēvzemei un Brīvībai / LNNK	Latvia	5,700	8,300	5,889	8,111
Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands	Germany	1,667	10,000	5,333	9,818
Nea Demokratia	Greece	6,556	7,222	7,111	7,000
NEOS – Das Neue Österreich	Austria	6,300	6,000	7,600	2,900
Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie	Belgium	5,000	7,800	8,200	6,200
Nouvelle Donne	France	6,000	2,600	2,400	3,400
Nova Slovenija – Krščanski demokrati	Slovenia	6,462	7,846	8,077	8,308
Nuovo Centrodestra	Italy	5,714	6,143	6,000	8,000
Občanská demokratická strana	Czech Republic	2,867	8,000	8,143	6,000
Obcianska konzervatívna strana	Slovakia	2,857	7,286	8,571	2,786
Obyčajní ľudia a nezávislé osobnosti	Slovakia	3,000	6,500	6,545	8,083
Ökologisch-Demokratische Partei	Germany				
Open Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten	Belgium	6,600	7,000	7,800	2,400
Österreichische Volkspartei	Austria	6,700	6,100	6,400	7,200
Panellinio Sosialistikó Kínima	Greece	6,556	4,778	5,444	4,000
Partei Mensch Umwelt Tierschutz	Germany	4,000	4,667	2,000	4,000
Parti chrétien social luxembourgeois	Luxembourg	7,000	6,500	4,500	6,000
Parti démocratique	Luxembourg	5,133	4,400	4,692	5,857
Parti du Travail de Belgique	Belgium	3,400	0,400	0,200	2,800
Parti ouvrier socialiste luxembourgeois	Luxembourg	6,333	4,000	4,500	1,000
Parti socialiste (bel)	Belgium	6,000	2,600	2,400	3,400
Parti socialiste (fra)	France	5,786	3,833	3,833	3,364
Partido Comunista Português	Portugal	1,875	0,500	0,333	4,167
Partido Nacionalista Vasco	Spain	6,444	6,300	6,333	6,400
Partido Popular	Spain	2,500	7,750	8,500	7,500
Partido Social Democrata	Portugal	6,875	6,667	7,833	5,667
Partido Socialista	Portugal	6,000	2,600	2,400	3,400
Partido Socialista Obrero Español	Spain	6,700	3,800	4,111	2,200
Partidul Democrat-Liberal	Romania	6,647	6,647	7,176	5,588
Partidul Libertate, Unitate și Solidaritate	Romania				
Partidul Mișcarea Populară	Romania	6,500	6,471	7,059	5,059
Partidul Naţional Liberal	Romania	6,529	6,647	6,647	5,353
Partidul Social Democrat	Romania	6,875	6,667	7,833	5,667
Partij van de Arbeid	Netherlands	3,400	0,400	0,200	2,800
Partij voor de Dieren	Netherlands	3,714	2,889	2,429	2,333
Partij Voor de Vrijheid	Netherlands	1,091	9,250	4,556	7,778
Partija "VIENOTĪBA"	Latvia	5,818	7,000	7,300	5,700
Partija tvarka ir teisingumas	Lithuania	3,200	6,615	4,385	8,286
Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya	Spain	6,700	3,800	4,111	2,200
Partit Laburista	Malta	5,600	5,000	5,250	2,250
Partit Nazzjonalista	Malta	7,000	6,500	6,250	4,750
Partito Democratico	Italy	6,571	3,571	4,571	2,429
Perussuomalaiset	Finland	6,000	2,600	2,400	3,400
Pessoas-Animais-Natureza	Portugal	4,600	3,667	3,000	5,000
Piratenpartei Deutschland	Germany	4,714	3,250	3,250	1,909

PIRÁTI	Czech Republic				
Place publique	France	6,000	2,600	2,400	3,400
Plaid Cymru	United Kingdom	6,000	3,250	3,250	4,333
Platforma Obywatelska	Poland	6,529	5,706	6,294	4,588
PODEMOS	Spain	4,444	1,667	1,250	1,750
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe	Poland	5,471	5,294	3,471	6,941
Popular Association – Golden Dawn	Greece	1,111	9,889	2,875	10,000
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość	Poland	3,824	7,941	3,059	8,471
PRIMAVERA EUROPEA	Spain				
PRO Romania	Romania				
Progresívne Slovensko	Slovakia	6,077	3,385	4,154	3,462
Rassemblement national	France	1,214	9,636	5,909	8,917
Régions et Peuples Solidaires	France	6,214	3,083	3,250	1,417
Saskaņas	Latvia	4,200	4,000	3,556	7,000
Scottish National Party	United Kingdom	6,286	3,000	3,333	4,600
Sinn Fein (uk)	United Kingdom	4,636	2,900	2,300	3,100
Sinn Féin (ire)	Ireland	4,636	2,900	2,300	3,100
Sloboda a Solidarita	Slovakia	2,857	7,286	8,571	2,786
Slovenská demokratická a kresťanská únia – Demokratická strana	Slovakia				
Slovenska demokratska stranka	Slovenia	6,647	7,133	7,688	3,500
Slovenska ljudska stranka	Slovenia	6,077	6,462	6,308	7,077
SMER-Sociálna demokracia	Slovakia	6,143	3,692	2,571	6,929
Socialdemokratiet	Denmark	6,000	4,400	3,900	5,200
Socialistische Partij	Netherlands	2,100	1,000	1,000	4,111
Socialistische Partij.Anders	Belgium	6,000	3,000	2,800	2,600
Socialistisk Folkeparti	Denmark	4,636	2,900	2,300	3,100
Socialni demokrati	Slovenia	6,000	4,400	3,900	5,200
Socijaldemokratska partija Hrvatske	Croatia	5,600	4,000	3,444	3,222
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej	Poland	6,588	2,765	3,118	2,765
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej - Unia Pracy	Poland	6,588	2,765	3,118	2,765
Solidarna Polska Zbigniewa Ziobro	Poland	2,222	0,875	0,500	1,857
Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond	Estonia	6,875	4,875	4,750	2,500
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands	Germany	6,385	3,769	3,500	4,154
Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs	Austria	6,000	3,900	2,800	4,000
SPOLU – občianska demokracia	Slovakia				
Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij	Netherlands	2,556	8,111	6,889	9,444
Starostové a nezávisli	Czech Republic	6,667	7,214	7,857	5,500
Strana maďarskej komunity	Slovakia	6,143	6,769	5,714	7,500
Südtiroler Volkspartei	Italy	5,667	5,000	5,400	7,250
Suomen Keskusta	Finland	4,500	5,556	5,444	7,000
Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue – Finlands Socialdemokratiska Parti	Finland	5,600	4,000	3,444	3,222
Svenska folkpartiet	Finland	6,400	7,444	7,333	2,111

Sverigedemokraterna	Sweden	6,000	4,400	3,900	5,200
Svoboda a přímá demokracie	Czech Republic	6,647	7,133	7,688	3,500
SYRIZA	Greece	3,444	2,000	1,444	2,111
Tėvynės sąjunga – Lietuvos krikščionys demokratai	Lithuania	6,533	7,643	6,538	7,286
The Brexit Party	United Kingdom				
To Potami	Greece	6,000	4,889	5,667	2,111
TOP 09 a Starostové	Czech Republic	6,667	7,214	7,857	5,500
UK Independence Party	United Kingdom	1,143	9,143	8,571	9,286
Ulster Unionist Party	United Kingdom				
Union des démocrates et indépendants	France	6,615	5,909	6,455	5,364
Union of Democratic Forces	Bulgaria	6,647	7,133	7,688	3,500
Union pour un mouvement populaire	France	5,429	7,667	7,333	7,167
Unión Progreso y Democracia	Spain	6,667	5,667	6,000	3,111
Uniunea Democrată Maghiară din România	Romania	6,294	6,118	6,125	5,688
Uniunea Salvați România	Romania				
USR-PLUS	Romania				
Vänsterpartiet	Sweden	5,818	7,000	7,300	5,700
Vasemmistoliitto	Finland	4,300	1,889	1,667	1,889
Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti	Denmark	5,818	7,000	7,300	5,700
Verjamem	Slovenia				
Vihreä liitto	Finland	5,900	4,444	4,444	0,778
Vlaams Belang	Belgium	2,600	9,200	5,500	9,000
VMRO	Bulgaria	3,313	6,077	3,733	8,625
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie	Netherlands	5,182	7,889	8,333	5,125
Volt	Germany				
VOX	Spain				
Wiosna	Poland	6,588	2,765	3,118	2,765
Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība	Latvia	5,000	5,900	5,667	7,222
Živi Zid	Croatia				
Independent					

Table 13: Ideological positions of National political parties based on CHES

F: Table 14

National parties in government or in opposition between 2014 and 2020

National Party	Country	ParlGov 2014	ParlGov 2015	ParlGov 2016	ParlGov 2017	ParlGov 2018	ParlGov 2019	ParlGov 2020
50 PLUS	Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Agir - La Droite constructive	France	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
Alliance Écologiste Indépendante	France	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alliance Party of Northern Ireland	United Kingdom	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alternative für Deutschland	Germany	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ANO 2011	Czech Republic	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Anorthotikó Kómma Ergazómenou Laoú	Cyprus	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Arbetarepartiet-Socialdemokraterna	Sweden	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Attīstībai/Par!	Latvia	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Azione	Italy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bloco de Esquerda	Portugal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bulgaria Without Censorship/Reload Bulgaria	Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bulgarian Socialist Party	Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	Germany	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Catalunya en Comú	Spain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Centerpartiet	Sweden	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Centre Démocrate Humaniste	Belgium	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Centro Democrático e Social – Partido Popular	Spain	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Česká strana sociálně demokratická	Czech Republic	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Christen Democratisch Appèl	Netherlands	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
Christen-Democratisch & Vlaams	Belgium	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
ChristenUnie	Netherlands	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands	Germany	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Christlich Soziale Partei	Belgium	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern e.V.	Germany	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria	Bulgaria	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

Ciudadanos – Partido de la Ciudadanía	Spain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Coalition for Europe	Spain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Coalition of the Radical Left	Greece	0	0	1	1	1	0	0
Communist Party of Greece	Greece	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Conservatives	United Kingdom	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Dansk Folkeparti	Denmark	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Darbo partija	Lithuania	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Déi Gréng - Les Verts	Luxembourg	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Delegación Ciudadanos Europeos	Spain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Democraten 66	Netherlands	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
Democratic Party	Cyprus	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Democratic Rally	Cyprus	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Democratic Unionist Party	United Kingdom	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Democrats for Strong Bulgaria	Bulgaria	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Demokratikus Koalíció	Hungary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Det Konservative Folkeparti	Denmark	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
Det Radikale Venstre	Denmark	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Die Grünen - Die Grüne Alternative	Austria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DIE LINKE.	Germany	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Die PARTEI	Germany	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Écologistes Confédérés pour l'organisation de luttes originales	Belgium	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eesti Keskerakond	Estonia	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond	Estonia	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Eesti Reformierakond	Estonia	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Együtt – A Korszakváltók Pártja	Hungary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EH BILDU	Spain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Elliniki Lusi-Greek Solution	Greece	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enhedslisten	Denmark	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya	Spain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Europe Écologie	France	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Familien-Partei Deutschlands	Germany	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Feministiskt initiati	Sweden	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fianna Fáil Party	Ireland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség / Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt	Hungary	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Fine Gael Party	Ireland	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Folkebevægelsen mod EU	Denmark	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Forum voor Democratie	Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Forza Italia	Italy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fratelli d'Italia	Italy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Freie Demokratische Partei	Germany	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Freie Wähler	Germany	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs	Austria	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Front de Gauche	France	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Front National	France	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gauche républicaine et socialiste	France	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
GO Realisme & Daadkracht	Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gods kalpot Rīgai	Latvia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Green Party	United Kingdom	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Groen	Belgium	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
GroenLinks	Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hrvatska demokratska zajednica	Croatia	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
Hrvatska konzervativna stranka	Croatia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Independents for change	Ireland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Isamaa	Estonia	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Istarski demokratski sabor	Croatia	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Italia Viva	Italy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Izquierda Unida	Spain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom	Hungary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Junts per Catalunya - Lliures per Europa	Spain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kansallinen Kokoomus	Finland	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt	Hungary	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy	Czech Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kongres Nowej Prawicy	Poland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kotleba – Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko	Slovakia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Křesťanská a demokratická unie – Československá strana lidová	Czech Republic	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Kresťanskodemokratické hnutie	Slovakia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kristdemokraterna	Sweden	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
La France Insoumise	France	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
La République en marche	France	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
Labour Party	United Kingdom	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
L'Altra Europa	Italy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Latvijas Krievu savienība	Latvia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lega	Italy	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Les centristes	France	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Les Républicains	France	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Liberalerna	Sweden	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Liberals	United Kingdom	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lietuvos lenkų rinkimų akcija	Lithuania	1	1	0	0	0	1	1
Lietuvos Respublikos liberalų sąjūdis	Lithuania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lietuvos socialdemokratų partija	Lithuania	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Lietuvos valstiečių ir žaliųjų sąjunga	Lithuania	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
Lista Marjana Šarca	Slovenia	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Liste Renaissance	France	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
Los Pueblos Deciden	Spain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
L'union pour les Outremer	France	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Magyar Szocialista Párt	Hungary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Magyarország Zöld Pártja	Hungary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Miljöpartiet de gröna	Sweden	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Moderaterna	Sweden	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Momentum	Hungary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Most–Híd	Slovakia	0	0	1	1	1	1	0
Mouvement Démocrate	France	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
Mouvement Radical Social-Libéral	France	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
Mouvement Réformateur	Belgium	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
Movement for Rights and Freedoms	Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Movement for Social Democracy EDEK	Cyprus	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Movimento 5 Stelle	Italy	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Movimento Partido da Terra	Portugal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nacionālā apvienība / Tēvzemei un Brīvībai / LNNK	Latvia	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands	Germany	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nea Demokratia	Greece	1	1	0	0	0	1	1
NEOS – Das Neue Österreich	Austria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie	Belgium	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
Nouvelle Donne	France	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Nova Slovenija – Krščanski demokrati	Slovenia	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Nuovo Centrodestra	Italy	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Občanská demokratická strana	Czech Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Obcianska konzervatívna strana	Slovakia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Obyčajní ľudia a nezávislé osobnosti	Slovakia	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Ökologisch-Demokratische Partei	Germany	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Open Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten	Belgium	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Österreichische Volkspartei	Austria	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Panellinio Sosialistikó Kínima	Greece	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Partei Mensch Umwelt Tierschutz	Germany	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Parti chrétien social luxembourgeois	Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Parti démocratique	Luxembourg	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Parti du Travail de Belgique	Belgium	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Parti ouvrier socialiste luxembourgeois	Luxembourg	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Parti socialiste (bel)	Belgium	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Parti socialiste (fra)	France	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Partido Comunista Português	Portugal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Partido Nacionalista Vasco	Spain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Partido Popular	Spain	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Partido Social Democrata	Portugal	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Partido Socialista	Portugal	0	1	1	1	1	1	1

Partido Socialista Obrero Español	Spain	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Partidul Democrat-Liberal	Romania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Partidul Libertate, Unitate și Solidaritate	Romania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Partidul Mișcarea Populară	Romania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Partidul Naţional Liberal	Romania	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Partidul Social Democrat	Romania	1	1	0	1	1	1	0
Partij van de Arbeid	Netherlands	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Partij voor de Dieren	Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Partij Voor de Vrijheid	Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Partija "VIENOTĪBA"	Latvia	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Partija tvarka ir teisingumas	Lithuania	1	1	0	0	0	1	1
Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya	Spain	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Partit Laburista	Malta	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Partit Nazzjonalista	Malta	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Partito Democratico	Italy	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
Perussuomalaiset	Finland	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
Pessoas-Animais-Natureza	Portugal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Piratenpartei Deutschland	Germany	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PIRÁTI	Czech Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Place publique	France	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Plaid Cymru	United Kingdom	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Platforma Obywatelska	Poland	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
PODEMOS	Spain	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe	Poland	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Popular Association – Golden Dawn	Greece	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość	Poland	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
PRIMAVERA EUROPEA	Spain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PRO Romania	Romania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Progresívne Slovensko	Slovakia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rassemblement national	France	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Régions et Peuples Solidaires	France	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Saskaņas	Latvia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scottish National Party	United Kingdom	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Sinn Fein (uk)	United Kingdom	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sinn Féin (ire)	Ireland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sloboda a Solidarita	Slovakia	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Slovenská demokratická a kresťanská únia – Demokratická strana	Slovakia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Slovenska demokratska stranka	Slovenia	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Slovenska ljudska stranka	Slovenia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SMER-Sociálna demokracia	Slovakia	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
Socialdemokratiet	Denmark	1	0	0	0	0	1	1
Socialistische Partij	Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Socialistische Partij.Anders	Belgium	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Socialistisk Folkeparti	Denmark	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Socialni demokrati	Slovenia	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
Socijaldemokratska partija Hrvatske	Croatia	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej	Poland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej - Unia Pracy	Poland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Solidarna Polska Zbigniewa Ziobro	Poland	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond	Estonia	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands	Germany	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs	Austria	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
SPOLU – občianska demokracia	Slovakia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij	Netherlands	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Starostové a nezávisli	Czech Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Strana maďarskej komunity	Slovakia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Südtiroler Volkspartei	Italy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Suomen Keskusta	Finland	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue – Finlands Socialdemokratiska Parti	Finland	1	0	0	0	0	1	1
Svenska folkpartiet	Finland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sverigedemokraterna	Sweden	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Svoboda a přímá demokracie	Czech Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SYRIZA	Greece	0	0	1	1	1	0	0
Tėvynės sąjunga – Lietuvos krikščionys demokratai	Lithuania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The Brexit Party	United Kingdom	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
To Potami	Greece	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOP 09 a Starostové	Czech Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UK Independence Party	United Kingdom	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ulster Unionist Party	United Kingdom	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Union des démocrates et indépendants	France	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Union of Democratic Forces	Bulgaria	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Union pour un mouvement populaire	France	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
Unión Progreso y Democracia	Spain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Uniunea Democrată Maghiară din România	Romania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Uniunea Salvați România	Romania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USR-PLUS	Romania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vänsterpartiet	Sweden	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vasemmistoliitto	Finland	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti	Denmark	0	1	1	1	1	0	0
Verjamem	Slovenia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vihreä liitto	Finland	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Vlaams Belang	Belgium	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
VMRO	Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie	Netherlands	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Volt	Germany	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
VOX	Spain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Wiosna	Poland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība	Latvia	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
Živi Zid	Croatia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Independent		0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Table 14: National parties in government or in opposition between 2014 and 2020

G: Example of CHES survey

Welcome and Instructions

Welcome!

Dear colleague,

We are extremely grateful for your participation in the Chapel Hill survey on political parties.

Thank you in advance for sharing your expertise with us!

We would like you to reflect on the position of the **leadership of national parties in Belgium** in the course of **2014**. The leadership of a political party consists of the party's chair, the party presidium, and the parliamentary party (as distinct from the party base or local and regional party officials).

Below you will find the abbreviations and full names of national parties, in the country language and in English.

Abbreviation	Full Name	English Translation
PS	Parti Socialiste	Socialist Party
SPA	Socialistische Partij Anders	Socialist Party Different
ECOLO	Ecolo	Ecolo
Groen	Groen	Green
MR	Mouvement Réformateur	Reformist Movement
VLD	Open Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten	Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats
cdH	Centre Démocrate Humaniste	Humanist Democratic Centre
CD&V	Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams	Christian Democratic and Flemish
N-VA	Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie	New Flemish Alliance
FDF	Fédéralistes Démocrates Francophones	Francophone Democratic Federalists
VB	Vlaams Belang	Flemish Interest
PVDA	Partij van de Arbeid van België	Workers' Party of Belgium
PP	Parti populaire	People's Party

General Questions on European Integration

	1: Strongly opposed	Opposed	Somewhat opposed	Neutral	Somewhat in favor	In favor	7: Strongly in favor	Don't know

PS	
SPA	
ECOLO	
Groen	
MR	
VLD	
cdH	
CD&V	
N-VA	
FDF	
VB	
PVDA	
PP	

How would you describe the general position on European integration that the party leadership took over the course of 2014?

	0: No importance	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10: Great Importance
PS											
SPA											
ECOLO											
Groen											
MR											
VLD											
cdH											
CD&V											
N-VA											
FDF											
VB											
PVDA											
PP											

Next, we would like you to think about the salience of European integration for a party. Over the course of 2014, how important was the EU to the parties in their public stance?

What about conflict or dissent within parties over European integration over the course of 2014?



Finally, we would like you to evaluate parties on whether they consider EU membership beneficial. "Taking everything in consideration, does the party leadership think that its country has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?"

Specific Policy Questions

What **position** did the **party leadership** take over the course of **2014** on the following policies?

First, take the position of the party leadership in 2014 on the powers of the European Parliament (EP).

	1:Strongly opposes	Opposes	Somewhat opposes	Neutral	Somewhat favors	Favors	7:Strongly favors	Don't know
PS								
SPA								
ECOLO								
Groen								
MR								
VLD								
cdH								
CD&V								
N-VA								
FDF								
VB								
PVDA								
PP								

	1:Strongly opposes	Opposes	Somewhat opposes	Neutral	Somewhat favors	Favors	7:Strongly favors	Don't know
PS								
SPA								
ECOLO								
Groen								
MR								
VLD								
cdH								
CD&V N-VA								
FDF								
VB								
PVDA								
PP								

The internal market (i.e. free movement of goods, services, capital and labor).

EU cohesion or regional policy (e.g. the structural funds).

	1:Strongly opposes	Opposes	Somewhat opposes	Neutral	Somewhat favors	Favors	7:Strongly favors	Don't know
PS								
SPA								
ECOLO								
Groen								
MR								
VLD								
cdH								
CD&V								
N-VA								
FDF								
VB								
PVDA								
PP								

	1:Strongly opposes	Opposes	Somewhat opposes	Neutral	Somewhat favors	Favors	7:Strongly favors	Don't know
PS								
SPA								
ECOLO								
Groen								
MR								
VLD								
cdH								
CD&V								
N-VA								
FDF								
VB								
PVDA								
PP								

EU foreign and security policy.

EU enlargement to Turkey.

	1:Strongly opposes	Opposes	Somewhat opposes	Neutral	Somewhat favors	Favors	7:Strongly favors	Don't know
PS								
SPA								
ECOLO								
Groen								
MR								
VLD								
cdH								
CD&V								
N-VA								
FDF								
VB								
PVDA								
PP								

	1:Strongly opposes	Opposes	Somewhat opposes	Neutral	Somewhat favors	Favors	7:Strongly favors	Don't know
PS								
SPA								
ECOLO								
Groen								
MR								
VLD								
cdH								
CD&V								
N-VA								
FDF								
VB								
PVDA								
PP								

EU
authority over member states' economic and budgetary policies.

Ideological Questions

We now turn to a few questions on the **ideological positions** of political parties in Belgium in **2014**.

Please tick the box that best describes each party's overall ideology on a scale ranging from 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right).

	0:Extreme left	1	2	3	4	5:Center	6	7	8	9	10:Extreme right	Don't know
PS												
SPA												
ECOLO												
Groen												
MR												
VLD												
cdH												
CD&V												
N-VA												
FDF												
VB												
PVDA												
PP												

	0:Extreme left	1	2	3	4	5:Center	6	7	8	9	10:Extreme right	Don't know
PS												
SPA												
ECOLO												
Groen												
MR												
VLD												
cdH												
CD&V												
N-VA												
FDF												
VB												
PVDA												
PP												

Parties
can be classified in terms of their stance on economic issues. Parties on the economic left want government to play an active role in the economy. Parties on the economic right emphasize a reduced economic role for government: privatization, lower taxes, less regulation, less government spending, and a leaner welfare state.

Next, we would like you to think about the salience of economic issues for a party. Over the course of 2014, how important were economic issues to the parties in their public stance?



Parties can be classified in terms of their views on democratic freedoms and rights. "Libertarian" or "postmaterialist" parties favor expanded personal freedoms, for example, access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or greater democratic participation. "Traditional" or "authoritarian" parties often reject these ideas; they value order, tradition, and stability, and believe that the government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues.



Over the course of 2014, how important were libertarian/traditional issues to the parties in their public stance?

	0:No importance	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10: Great Importance
PS											
SPA											
ECOLO											
Groen											
MR											
VLD											
cdH											
CD&V											
N-VA											
FDF											
VB											
PVDA											
PP											

Policy dimensions

Next, we would like you to consider where political parties stood on the following **policy dimensions** in Belgium in **2014**.

	0:Fully in favour of raising taxes to increase public services	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10:Fully in favour of cutting public services to cut taxes.	Don't know

Position on improving public services vs. reducing taxes.

Position on deregulation.

Position on redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor.



Position on state intervention in the economy.

Position on civil liberties vs. law and order.

	0:Strongly promotes civil liberties	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10:Strongly supports tough measures to fight crime	Don't know
PS												
SPA												
ECOLO												
Groen												
MR												
VLD												
cdH												
CD&V N-VA												
FDF												
VB												
PVDA												
PP												

	0:Strongly supports liberal policies	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10:Strongly opposes liberal policies	Don't know
PS												
SPA												
ECOLO												
Groen												
MR												
VLD												
cdH												
CD&V												
N-VA												
FDF												
VB												
PVDA												
PP												

Position on social lifestyle (e.g. homosexuality).

Position on role of religious principles in politics.

	0:Strongly opposes religious principles in politics	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10:Strongly supports religious principles in politics	Don't know
PS												
SPA												
ECOLO												
Groen												
MR												
VLD												
cdH												
CD&V												
N-VA												
FDF												
VB												
PVDA												
PP												

	0:Fully opposed to a restrictive policy on immigration	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10:Fully in favour of a restrictive policy on immigration.	Don't know
PS												
SPA												
ECOLO												
Groen												
MR												
VLD												
cdH												
CD&V												
N-VA												
FDF												
VB												
PVDA												
PP												

Position on immigration policy.

Position on integration of immigrants and asylum seekers (multiculturalism vs. assimilation).

	0:Strongly favors multiculturalism	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10:Strongly favors assimilation	Don't know
PS												
SPA												
ECOLO												
Groen												
MR												
VLD												
cdH												
CD&V												
N-VA												
FDF												
VB												
PVDA												
PP												

Position on urban vs. rural interests.

	0:Strongly supports urban interests	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10:Strongly supports rural interests	Don't know
PS												
SPA												
ECOLO												
Groen												
MR												
VLD												
cdH												
CD&V N-VA												
FDF												
VB												
PVDA												
PP												

Position towards the environment.

	0:Strongly supports environmental protection even at the cost of economic growth	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10:Strongly supports economic growth even at the cost of environmental protection	Don't know
PS												
SPA												
ECOLO												
Groen												
MR												
VLD												
cdH												
CD&V												
N-VA												
FDF												
VB												
PVDA												
PP												

	0:Strongly favors political decentralization	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10:Strongly opposes political decentralization	Don't know
PS												
SPA												
ECOLO												
Groen												
MR												
VLD												
cdH												
CD&V N-VA FDF												
VB												
PVDA												
PP												

Position on political decentralization to regions/localities.

Position towards international security and peacekeeping missions.





Position towards ethnic minorities.

Position towards nationalism

	0:Strongly promotes cosmopolitan rather than nationalist conceptions of society	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10:Strongly promotes nationalist rather than cosmopolitan conceptions of society	Don't know
PS												
SPA												
ECOLO												
Groen												
MR												
VLD												
cdH												
CD&V												
N-VA												
FDF												
VB												
PVDA												
PP												

Next,
we'd like you to consider the salience of the following issues for each party over the course of 2014.

	0:Not important at all	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10:Extremely important	Don't Know
PS												
SPA												
ECOLO												
Groen												
MR												
VLD												
cdH												
CD&V												
N-VA												
FDF												
VB												
PVDA												
PP												

	First Most Important	Second Most Imporant	Third Most Important
PS			
SPA			
ECOLO			
Groen			
MR			
VLD			
cdH			
CD&V			
N-VA			
FDF			
VB			
PVDA PP			

Salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric.

Salience of

	0:Not important at all	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10:Extremely important	Don't Know
PS												
SPA												
ECOLO												
Groen												
MR												
VLD												
cdH												
CD&V N-VA												
FDF												
VB												
PVDA PP												

reducing political corruption.

For each party, could you please indicate which were the first, second, and third most important issues over the course of the past year.

Block 8

Finally, we are going to present you with descriptions of 3 hypothetical parties and their views towards economic, libertarian/traditional, and EU issues. We would like you to place these hypothetical parties on the following dimensions.

Vignettes

First, we would like you to place hypothetical Parties A, B, and C on the EU dimension

Party A conceives the European Union as an intergovernmental organization in which member states, not the European Commission or the European Parliament, should be the dominant players. It rejects exiting the EU, but it wishes to reclaim state sovereignty from the EU. *On a 1-7 point scale with 1 being extreme anti-EU and 7 being extreme pro-EU where would you place this party?*

	1:Anti-EU	2	3	4:Center	5	6	7:Pro-EU	Don't know
Party A	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Party B conceives the European Union as a supranational organization that provides Europeans with citizenship and a range of public goods. This party believes the European Commission should become the government of the European Union. *On a 1-7 point scale with 1 being extreme anti-EU and 7 being extreme pro-EU where would you place this party?*

	1:Anti-EU	2	3	4:Center	5	6	7:Pro-EU	Don't know
Party B	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Party C believes that both member states and European institutions should play a vital role in EU policy making. The party is willing to pool national sovereignty in the EU if this is efficient and feasible. European policy should be guided by subsidiarity, the principle that what can be better done at the national/subnational level should not be centralized. *On a 1-7 point scale with 1 being extreme anti-EU and 7 being extreme pro-EU where would you place this party?*

	1:Anti-EU	2	3	4:Center	5	6	7:Pro-EU	Don't know
Party C	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Next, we would like you to place the hypothetical parties on the economic dimension.

Party A advocates a social market economy with an emphasis on social justice, solidarity, and support for a welfare state. However, this party opposes state ownership, defends private property, and resists excessive intervention of the state in the economy. It believes there is a sharp trade-off between welfare spending and economic competitiveness. *On a 0-10 point scale with 0 being extreme left and 10 being extreme right where would you place this party?*

	0:Left	1	2	3	4	5:Center	6	7	8	9	10:Right	Don't know
Party A	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Party B views the equalization of life chances for all citizens as an important goal of government. It favors active government in regulating domestic and international markets, and supports steeply progressive taxes to fund redistributive social programs. *On a 0-10 point scale with 0 being extreme left and 10 being extreme right where would you place this party?*





Party C
believes in small government. It favors minimal regulation of domestic and international markets, supports the privatization of many government operations, and opposes high taxes to fund redistributive social programs. *On a 0-10 point scale with 0 being extreme left and 10 being extreme right where would you place this party?*

Finally, we'd like you to place these 3 hypothetical parties on the libertarian/traditional dimension.

Party A frames its policies around principles of social justice, grassroots democracy, and multiculturalism. The party favors same-sex marriage, active euthanasia, and access to safe abortion. *On a 0-10 point scale with 0 being extreme* "Libertarian/postmaterialist"*and 10 being extreme* "Traditional/authoritarian" *where would you place this party?*



Party B
favors non-discrimination legislation covering gender, race and sexual orientation, but opposes minority quotas. The party sees itself as a pragmatic party that is willing to compromise if this is necessary to achieve its broad goals. *On a 0-10 point scale with 0 being extreme*
"Libertarian/postmaterialist"*and 10 being extreme* "Traditional/authoritarian" *where would you place this party?*



Party C emphasizes traditional family values, law and order, and the nation. It opposes the legalization of same-sex marriage and the right to die. It believes that the government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues. *On a 0-10 point scale with 0 being extreme* “Libertarian/postmaterialist”*and 10 being extreme* "Traditional/authoritarian” *where would you place this party?*

	0:Libertarian/ Postmaterialist	1	2	3	4	5:Center	6	7	8	9	10:Traditional/ Authoritarian	Don't know
Party C												

Expert demographics

What is your gender?

- Male
- Female

In which country do you reside?

And for how long have you resided there?

If you hold a doctoral degree, in which country did you receive it?

In political matters people talk of the economic "left" and the "right". What is your position? Please indicate your views using any number on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "left" and 10 means "right". Which number best describes you?

0:Left	1	2	3	4	5:Center	6	7	8	9	10:Right

In political matters people talk of the libertarian/tradition dimension. What is your position?
Please indicate your views using any number on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "libertarian/postmaterialist" and 10 means "traditional/authoritarian". Which number best describes you?

0:Libertarian/ Postmaterialist	1	2	3	4	5:Center	6	7	8	9	10:Traditional/ Authoritarian

H: Revision report

Dear professor Zhelyazkova and Haverland,

Per recommendation of professor Zhelyazkova I added in this report to explain some of the choices and revisions I have made based on both your comments.

In the introduction I've altered the social and scientific relevance to better represent the novelty of the data used for this thesis and to bring more focus on the co-legislator role of the EP. The Treib discussion on the globalisation and EU integration cleavage was taken out of the theoretical framework and expanded in the literature review. The discussion did not add to the hypotheses and could therefore be missed in the framework. I choose not to change the hypotheses because I do feel like all four add something. When one cleavage is not dominant and the hypothesis is rejected, it does not automatically mean the other cleavage is dominant, nor that any of the both is dominant.

The cleavages in the EP can indeed be different from the ones in national politics. But, as the parties are aligned on different ideologies on the issues and the families in the EP are aligned on the same ideologies, cleavages play in the EP as well. It is not the same as Rokkan & Lipset outline, but their book is from 1967 and cleavage theory has been updated since, among others by Kriesi. These updates have been described in the review as well.

Based on the comments I have moved the section on voting procedures to the Research design section as it would fit better there. In the Research Design, I elaborated on the clustering of MEPs belonging to the same national party, to make it more clear that the individual MEPs are still the unit of analysis. The method of clustering is the same as used by Hix, Noury, and Roland in their article. The high R-squares of the OLS regression are also similar in their article. For my thesis I also copied the steps to finetune the data, these are explained in the text and made clear that these are copied from their article. These steps are not to get nice results. In addition, I added the quote "'social' left-right" from the Hix article to show they used the GAL/TAN measurement for left-right cleavage. I also explained other authors do not see it this way.

As discussed with professor Zhelyazkova, I used the Mardia fit measure as this was given by Stata. However, there was little literature to find on the different interpretations of the two different measures, apart from its calculation. Therefore, in my thesis I have used them complimentary to each other without going too much in depth on the differences between Mardia 1 and Mardia 2.

In the results section the results of the robustness check, the logistic regression, are discussed and to what extent they back up the results from the OLS regression. In addition, the coefficients were more elaborately discussed.In the discussion I added a paragraph to discuss the implications of the findings, hopefully making it less technical.

I hope I was able to clarify some of the choices I have made when implementing your feedback.

With kind regards,

Thijs Stegeman