

INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL STUDIES
The Hague, The Netherlands

R E S E A R C H P A P E R

presented by

Alexander von Hildebrand

Agricultural and Rural Development Programme 1989/1990

THE RONDAS CAMPESINAS OF CAJAMARCA, PERU :

A PARTICIPATORY PEASANT MOVEMENT

**In partial fulfilment of the
requirements for obtaining
the degree of
Master of Arts in Development Studies**

This document represents part of the author's study programme while at the Institute of Social Studies; the views stated therein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Institute.

Research papers and theses are not made available for outside circulation by the Institute.

A mi querida hija Catalina,
mi querido hijo Jan,
y mi querida esposa Angela,
que con carino y con mucha paciencia
me han acompañado en este esfuerzo.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
INTRODUCTION	1
The situation of the country	3
The Rondas Campesinas, a peasants's response: "one more"?	3
Objectives and organisation of the Research Paper	3
Limitations of the study	4
CHAPTER I : ANALYTICAL APPROACH	
1.1. Definitions	5
1.2. Models of peasant mobilisation	5
CHAPTER II : THE FORMATION OF THE RONDAS CAMPESINAS	
2.1. Cuyumalca: the official creation of the Rondas Campesinas	10
2.2. The Department of Cajamarca and its regions : the geographical setting	12
2.3. Historical development of the agricultural production systems	13
2.3.1. Early land use systems	13
2.3.2. The hacienda and the plantation systems	13
2.3.3. The peasant communities	15
2.4. Rural protest movements in Cajamarca	15
2.5. The social relations of production at the turn of the century	16
2.6. The surge of banditry	17
2.7. Labour migration and rural unionism	19
2.8. Impact of the Land Reform of 1969	21
2.9. Allies and opponents	23
2.9.1. The role of the local state representatives	23
2.9.2. The role of the Church	23
2.9.3. The role of political parties	24
CHAPTER III : THE INTERNAL EVOLUTION OF THE RONDAS CAMPESINAS.	
3.1. "Small Thieves" and "Big Thieves"	26
3.2. Organisational structure of the Rondas	27
3.2.1. The horizontal system	27
3.2.2. The vertical model of organisation	28
3.3. Self-defense and Peasant Justice	30
3.4. Sanctions	30
3.5. Relations to the state	31
3.5.1. Cooperation between the Rondas and the state	32
3.5.2. Conflict relations with the state	32
3.6. Community development : a space for the Rondas	33
3.7. Participation of women in the Rondas	35

CHAPTER IV : THE EXPANSION OF THE RONDAS CAMPESINAS.	
4.1. The expansion mechanisms	38
4.2. Numerical and geographical importance of the Rondas	38
4.3. Variants of the Rondas	41
4.3.1. The Urban Rondas	41
4.3.2. The Paramilitary Rondas	41
CHAPTER V : THE RONDAS CAMPESINAS : A UNIT FOR PARTICIPATORY AUTONOMOUS DEVELOPMENT ?	
5.1 The concept of participation	42
5.2. Limitations of the Rondas	43
5.2.1. Social differentiation patterns	43
5.2.2. Other drawbacks	46
CHAPTER VI : CONCLUSIONS	48
BIBLIOGRAPHY	53
APPENDIXES	57

INTRODUCTION

The situation of the country

It is within a framework of a deep economic, social and political crisis, which is severely affecting the poorest social classes in the country, that Peru is entering this last decade of the XXth century.

An external debt that amounts 20 thousand million dollars (the equivalent of 30 minimum wages per capita), a soaring inflation rate -it reached 2,775% for 1989 (Andean Group Report, 1990:4) -, negative national saving rates for the last twenty years, except for 1979 and 1985, and diminishing investments (the rate of investments dropped from 21% of GDP in 1953 to 5,7% of GDP by 1985 (Senado de la Republica,1989:182) are the current indicators of a deep economic recession. Generalised pauperization is the common result of the crisis. Only 20% of the Peruvians can consider themselves to be well nourished by WHO standards (Benites,1990:2), the monthly minimum wage has sunk from 70 US \$ in 1975 to 30 US \$ in 1990; to have an employment as such is already a privilege . More than 83% (83,4%) of the population have to share less than half (47,3%) of the total income, while a privileged minority (6%) retain near to a third (32%) of it (Senado de la Republica,1989:173). The pronounced unequal distribution of the country's resources is found in every economic sector of the Peruvian society (Chavez,1982; Guzman and Vargas,1981).

The social impact of the generalised state of crisis is much felt in the rural areas, and in those of the Andean regions particularly. Urban biased agricultural policies, i.e. unequal exchange mechanisms and negative terms of trade settle the agricultural producer's incomes; peasants households in the Andean regions are at the bottom of the national income scale. The absence of basic health care (¹) and educational services (²) in rural areas contribute to continuous reductions in the living standards of the peasant households (see Appendix No.1).

To the economic crisis and its social implications, must be added the existence of a political crisis. Although political turmoil is not new for Peru -in June 1990, for the first time in 78 years, Peru had a third president elected consecutively -, it lives levels of unseen violence. As violence threatens to spread to all the regions of the country, a special commission created by Parliament to investigate alternatives for pacification, presented a special report (Violencia y Pacificacion, Senado de la Republica,1989) pointing out the structural character of the violence in rural and urban areas.

¹ In 1988 "65,5% Of the 60,335 registered baby deaths (under 1 year of age), were the result not of complicated pathologies but of respiratory infections, diarrheas, immune-preventible sicknesses and of malnutrition" (UNICEF statement quoted in Senado de la Republica,1989:187).

²) The wage policies in the educational sector are a tremendous disincentive for rural teachers, who have to put up with additional drawbacks (i.e.long distances, difficult transport, lack of a minimal infrastructure). In 1987, less than 6% of the government's budget was assigned to the Ministry of Education, while more than 26% of it went to the Ministry of War (Senado de la Republica,1989:180).

In addition to the structural inequalities, a highly inefficient and centralised administration - a legacy of the colonial times - renders the country ungovernable.

Until 1969, at the national level, the economic and political power had traditionally been centred in the capital Lima, and there, in the grip of a relatively small privileged class, most of its members being descendants of Spanish "Conquistadores".

In the rural areas and until the Land Reform of 1969, it was the landed elite that ruled. "Gamonales", feudal-like landlords of the Andean regions controlled the Highlands, while the "hacendados", capitalist plantation owners domineered most of the irrigated land along the country's coastline.

Yet, also after the structural changes of 1969, the local ethnic groups who had been continuously exploited and marginalised from any kind of participation in political decision-making, have remained mere objects in the country's development. The marginalisation of the largest part of the Peruvian society has driven the country into an inhuman state of political violence and increasingly so in the past ten years.

Since 1980, the war between the repressive apparatus of the State (police, military and paramilitary units) and the radical guerrilla groups ("Shining Path" -SL-, and the "Revolutionary Movement Tupac Amaru" -MRTA-) allied to the drug trafficking maffias, has claimed an economic loss of over 10 thousand million dollars -more than half of the country's foreign debt-. The undeclared war accounts a toll of 15,811 killings (Andean Group Report,1990:4), mainly peasants (see also Senado de la Republica,1989: 375 and 378).

The rural households, especially in the central Andean regions, are caught in the crossfire between the oppressive imposition of SL's Pol-Pot-like ideology (³) and the military repression (⁴).

Thus, large numbers of peasants have been forced to flee their homes (many migrating to the eastern piedmont regions, where cultivation of coca shrubs offer an alternative for survival); also state officials have had to withdraw, "abandoning" regions where the state's presence was already minimal.

³ SL's "actions" are not only limited to sabotages against military targets, their attacks are characterised by destruction of all state related infrastructures, such as: roads, bridges, medical posts, schools, agricultural stations, development project offices, etc.. Their raids on villages generally end with the assassination (under the most cruel circumstances - p.e. by smashing the head with a hammer -) of previously "condemned" "people's enemies", and the compulsory recruitment of all local youngsters. (Source: Personal information, on the case of the killing of two colleagues from an NGO, in 1988).

⁴ Extra judicial executions , officially called "excesos" (excesses), have been frequent. In 1986, more than 300 mutinying prisoners accused of terrorism, were "executed" (shot in the neck) after they had surrendered. Arbitrary violations of Human Rights are commonplace: In the Andean community of Socco, Ayacucho, the entire population but an old woman, was exterminated by "angry" soldiers. Some of the assassins were sent to court for trial.(Sources:local newspapers at the time of the crimes).

The Rondas Campesinas, a peasants's response: "one more"?

Confronted with "...a state that is unable to express (a national) project and that in itself is antidemocratic, as historical practice evidences, despite all constitutional references" (Senado de la Republica, 1989:219, my translation), popular movements of the indigenous people in Peru have claimed a major participation in the control of power. Rebellions, upheavals, plots and other forms of protest since -and even before- the Spanish Invasion, have been organised. Still most of them have not been successful due basically to the inability to create the necessary alliances, and the lack of a class consciousness among the rebelled (Chavez, 1982:54-61).

Fifteen years ago, a "new" peasant organisation emerged in the Northern Andes of the country: the Rondas Campesinas of Cajamarca -"Peasant Rangers" or "Rural Guards"- (hereafter "Rondas"). The original objective of this self-defense organism was to control cattle thefts in the central region of the Department of Cajamarca. Nowadays, cattle raiders and other criminals have been neutralised to a great extent. The Rondas are very active and have continued to grow.

They have assumed additional functions in the social, economic and political spheres of their communities, normally commandeered by state institutions. This process came about partly due to the vacuums created by the non-presence of the state, and partly as a result of the state's inefficiency and corruption. A peculiar system of "Peasant Justice" has been developed and put into practice by the Rondas (Estela, 1987:52-53).

Under the lead of the Rondas, paths, roads and marketplaces are being controlled, also communal development actions are being undertaken. An awareness for the need of more grassroots participation in the development process of the region is experienced (Revilla, 1988:6; ILLA, 1989:32-3).

The Rondas, whose main characteristic is grassroots-democracy, now represent the interests of the peasants in those regions where the "Ronda phenomenon" has spread to and are thus becoming a movement of rising importance for the country's peasantry (Gonzales and Chavez, 1990; CIPCA, 1988:12).

Fourteen years after the official creation of the Rondas, this organisation has fought its way through and has gained important spaces of participation, in the cultural, economical, social and political spheres. Also, its role as adequate "manager" of the local natural resources is becoming of increasing environmental relevance ("El Ronderito", 1989). Women too, have fought for and won important elbowroom within the Rondas, and through them, in the rural communities (Gonzales and Chavez, 1990).

It is therefore important to analyze the role that the Rondas Campesinas - whose unique authority is based on democratic principles - play as a grassroots organisation in the development of the region.

Objectives and organisation of the Research Paper

The hypothesis in this research paper is that the Rondas, are a peasant organisation that developed from a self-defence organisation into a unit that enhances a grassroots-oriented participatory development.

The present research paper has been divided in six sections.

After this introduction, a first chapter delivers the conceptual framework within which the Rondas will be analyzed.

Chapter two tries to answer the important question : How and why did the Rondas emerge in the central region of Cajamarca in 1977? Which were the peculiar historical, cultural socio-economic and political factors that lead to the formation of the Rondas? These points shall be treated after a brief geographical description of the Department of Cajamarca and its regions.

Next, the characteristics of the Rondas and the roles they have assumed in the economical, social, political and cultural life of the "Ronderos" (Ronda members) are discussed in chapter three. It will look at the internal evolution of the Rondas, from a self-defense to a community development organisation.

A fourth chapter gives insights into the processes which made the Rondas spread so fast from the village level to the district, provincial, departmental and even national levels.

Chapter five discusses the potentialities and the drawbacks of the Rondas, helping to answer the question: Are the Rondas Campesinas potential agents for a participatory development?

The last section of the paper, chapter six, sums up the conclusions found during the exercise.

Limitations of the study

This Research Paper will be mainly based on the analysis of secondary data. The main sources of references are limited to the scarce bibliography on the "Rondas Campesinas" phenomenon. These are mainly (partly unpublished) mimeos, articles in newspapers and specialised journals and reports of development agencies working in the region of Cajamarca. Beyond the resources mentioned, I shall bring in my own practical field experience in Cajamarca and rural Peru where I worked as a development agent for nearly seven years from 1983 to 1989.

CHAPTER I : ANALYTICAL APPROACH

The surge of peasant movements, especially in Latin America, has challenged many social scientists in search for explanatory factors concerning the development of the former. Most authors, aware or not of the "risk of oversimplification and misinterpretation, when offering generalisations based on classifications and a large number of case studies" (Singelmann, 1987:5), have developed general models of peasant mobilisation. Abstract generalizability considers the uniqueness of possibly unrepeatable historical conditions and patterns (op.cit.:4-5).

For the purpose of this paper, some of the models shall be presented and discussed in view of their relevance to the Rondas. Yet before, some general definitions are given.

Definitions

In the present paper the term "peasant" is understood as defined by Wolf (1966):

"rural cultivators whose surpluses are transferred to a dominant group of rulers that uses the surpluses both to underwrite its own standard of living and to distribute the remainder to groups in society that do not farm but must be fed for their specific goods and services in turn".

Yet, in accordance with Singelmann (1987), Adams' interpretation completes the concept by relating it to the Latin American "campesino". Thus peasants are (also):

"Almost all poor rural dwellers; it includes peasants who own their land and rural laborers who may never have imagined owning land. The "campesino"..may be found in the growing group of peasants who spend part of their time in wage labor or among laborers who keep a small plot under cultivation" (Adams, quoted in Singelmann,1987:15).

"Peasant movement" is understood as "any collective reaction (of peasants) to their low status" through which they "attempt to improve their lot (i.e. individual and common welfare) through the organisation of formally structured interests groups" (Landsberger and Hewitt,1970:56).

Models of peasant mobilization

Scholars' explanatory approaches can be divided into two major categories: a group emphasizes the importance of internal factors (i.e internal to the peasant community), the other insists on the relevance of external factors leading towards peasant mobilisation.

Singelmann (1981) regards historical conditions as crucial in the process to the formation of peasant movements. For him, these "can be seen as extremely unequal exchanges that tend to be maintained by coercion (or threats of coercion) and by peasants' dependence on the landowner for their means of subsistence" (op.cit.:10).

Thus the possibility of developing "potential class solidarity among peasants" (ibid) was at stake as long as the peasants had to prioritize the vertical links towards the landlord in order to assure their livelihood.

For this author, the surge of peasant movements is related to the following transformations in the "exchange-theory of traditional patron-campesinos relations" (op.cit.:12):

- "a. The rewards from vertical solidarities decreased relative to the rewards of horizontal solidarities for the peasants,
- b. the dependence of the peasants on their landholder decreased and/or,
- c. alternative vertical solidarities emerged that were compatible with horizontal solidarities for the peasants."

In a more accurate way, Singelmann lists the conditions that favour such transformations. The following can be considered to be of an "internal" nature:

"Availability of successful models for conduct, and raised expectations;" "increases in the cognitive capacity on the part of the campesino in general and of leaders in particular, due to exposure to new reference sources (..labour syndicates, schooling, migrations)";

The next are related to "external" events :

"A breakdown of the traditional isolation of the hacienda domain"; "..a deterioration in the campesino's socio-economic position due to economic depression,..and the mobility..of the patrÃnes to continue supplying paternalistic services to the campesinos"; "macrostructural transformations in the larger society that detrimentally affect the power..of the landed lite"; "an ascension to power of a governmental that is needed to grant concessions to organised campesinos";(op.cit.:205).

La Mond (1970) relates the origin of peasant movements to what he calls "structural discrepancies in the social system" (op.cit.223), and points out three situations which lead to such contradictions in an abstract way:

- "(a) Capacity to process information increases, but relative opportunity to exercise and utilize it do not,
- (b) capacity and relative opportunity both increase, but capacity does so more rapidly than opportunity,
- (c) capacity increases while at the same time relative opportunity decreases" (op.cit.223).

Among the more important factors leading to structural change, La Mond mentions: the availability of qualified leadership, inducement of formal education and travel experience. the side-effects of the emergence of a modernizing lite and ideologies that weaken the ruling class.

For Galjart (1976:25) it is also coercion (⁵) and patronage (⁶) which are the most

⁵ "Coercion shows itself in: low wages, long hours of work, oral contracts for short periods, payments in coupons which can only be exchanged for goods.., in the obligation to provide extra services which are often not paid for, in the obligation to sell the produce through the owner, in dishonest practices with weights and measures, in the control exercised over the social contacts of peasants living on the property, and in reprisals taken against those who were in any way rebellious." (Galjart,1976:26)

common mechanisms used to preserve the status quo of oppression i.e. they represent the major obstacles for peasant mobilization.

The conditions which Galjart attributes to the weakening of the power structure and favour peasant movements can also be divided into "internal" and "external" factors:

A. Internal conditions:

- the awareness of a common goal
- horizontal solidarities developing at the local level,
- a better access to educational facilities,
- the existence of labour scarcity and/or rural migration,
- the presence, among the peasants, of individuals with experience in unions (urban, mines).

B. External conditions

- a particular event that increases the peasants' frustration,
- a "threat from outside, from a traditionally negative reference group"(op.cit.:38),
- the aptitude of the organisation to find and join external (i.e. urban) alliances,
- the emergence of new interest groups, p.e. a national industrial bourgeoisie,
- the emergence of pro-peasant ideologies creating divisions within the ruling lite,
- the kind of demands made by the peasant organisation "amount merely to the application, of an already existing law" (thus reducing the risk of being repressed),
- and the position the state assumes vis a vis peasant mobilisation (repression or neutrality) (op.cit.:32).

Wolf (1969) considers external factors as being decisive for the genesis of peasant movements. Indeed, he points out that: "Poor peasants and landless labourers..are unlikely to pursue the cause of rebellion unless they are able to rely on some external power to challenge the power which constrains them" (op.cit:289).

Further, in his opinion not all peasants will be prepared to join a protest movement from the beginning on. He writes: "It is the middle peasantry with secure access to land and the poor but "free" peasants ("located in a peripheral area outside the domains of landlord control") who constitute the pivotal groupings for peasant uprisings" (op.cit:290-1.). Galjart also departs from the assumption that peasants mobilise primarily for individual reasons and in the prospect of local objectives.

After studying five case studies of peasant actions (⁶), Pearse (1975) concludes that the following elements played a major role in the formation of "associations explicitly serving the interests of peasants across an extensive agricultural region" (op.cit.:163):

- "the decay of the estate as an economic unit and as a system of social control,
- the push towards a market economy,

⁶ "Patronage is an institutionalised relationship based upon an agreement, usually informal, between two patrons (or parties) who differ in the degree to which they can influence the allocation of goods and services. The agreement implies that the one with the most influence, the patron, will use it in favour of the other party, the client, who will perform various services in return." (Galjart,1976:26)

⁷ The Bolivian peasant revolt of 1899, the upheaval of Tocroyoc/Peru in 1921, the armed revolt of La Convencion/Peru in 1960, the peasant leagues in the Northeast of Brasil in 1960 and the peasant federations in Venezuela in the late 40's.

- the role of urban allies opposed to the established proprietary interest",
- and the absence of state presence.

Although Landsberger (1969) also considers that communal experience in co-operation among peasants facilitates the establishment of a movement, he also mentions that it can hinder the movement's development beyond the community level (op.cit.:49-50). He agrees on the need for leadership, whereby he considers that the leader can be as well internal as external to the peasant group. Alike Wolf and Galjart, Landsberger expresses the importance of "the individual self-interest" in the surge of movements, but he goes further, and says that individualism "is the source of energy of both working class and peasant movements" (op.cit.:51).

The exposure to modernizing experiences (i.e. a push towards market economy) would also, for Landsberger (1974) reinforce the genesis of a peasant movement. But his arguments differ from the ones of his colleagues reviewed here.

Albeit Landsberger does agree on the positive effects of education, migration, travel and media towards the "awakening of consciousness and militancy" (op.cit:52), he emphasizes that the modernisation process "would have the effect of overcoming the negative personality characteristics of the peasants" (ibid). Herby he alludes to the idiosyncrasy attributed to "backward societies" by the followers of the Modernisation Theory (⁸).

Thus for Landsberger, and this is evidenced in other writings (see the doubts expressed concerning "altruistic leadership" in: Landsberger and Hewitt,1970), external factors are crucial in "bringing" development into the peasant community.

Paige (1975:42) makes a rejoinder to those authors who emphasize the importance of the external influence on the making of peasant action: "Peasant rebellions in commercial hacienda systems depend on the weakening of the repressive power of the landed aristocracy, the introduction of organisational strength from outside the peasant community or both". Further, he differs from the above mentioned authors in the evaluation of the impact migration may have in creating stronger horizontal solidarity among peasants. "The migratory pattern also tends to undermine any possible pressure for group solidarity based on work group interdependence. The constant turn-over inherent in the migratory system weakens the worker community" (op.cit.:68)

It can be noted that the models presented have various common points. The peasant's acquaintance and increase of familiarity with alternatives for development, the opposition towards change by the ones in power, the weakening of the ruling elite and the emergence of a modernizing elite are considered to be significant factors.

⁸ One of the main thesis of Modernisation Theory affirms the traditional-modern dichotomy that makes societies in the underdeveloped world appear as fundamentally of dual nature. Among its followers are Foster, Lewis, Lipton, Mc Clelland, Rogers ("The sub-culture of peasantry",1969), Rostow ("Stages of Economic Growth:An Anti-Communist Manifesto"1960) Schultz, Smelser, Parsons and Hoselitz. In their opinion, "backward", "traditional", and "primitive" cultures were serious blockages to development and modernisation. The "archaic" society preserves its static characteristics due to a "lack of cultural ability", "social pressure of kin relationship" and a "fatalistic approach to the world" (Webster,1984:50). Underdevelopment is a result of traditionalism, antithetical with the modern world because the individual cannot develop economic rationality. "Traditional societies "needed changes in values, in behaviour patterns, in social structure..into achievement-orientation"(Dunham,1989:4).

The following chart summarises the conditions which, according to the authors reviewed here, lead to the formation of peasant movements.

Chart : Conditions leading to the formation and consolidation of peasant movements.

Characteristics	Conditions
leading to the emergence of peasant movements	

INTERNAL TO THE COMMUNITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Availability of successful models of organisation; . Availability of strong leadership; . Awareness of a common goal; . Opportunities to have access to new reference sources like formal education, travel, migration, experiences in union work; . Increase in the capacity to process the new information; . Development of horizontal solidarities; . Strong individual interests e.g. existence of middle peasants and/or "free" peasants.
--------------------------------------	---

EXTERNAL TO THE COMMUNITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Different mechanisms challenge and weaken the existing social relations of production based upon coercion and patronage; . Emergence of a modernizing elite and new interests groups that challenge the power of the ruling elite . Development of alliances with non-rural (urban) groups; . Position the state will assume in relation to the movement and its demands.
--------------------------------------	--

Sources: Singelmann,1981; La Mond,1970; Galjart,1976; Wolf,1969; Pearse,1975; Landsberger,1970; Landsberger and Hewitt,1970 and Paige,1975.

The models presented and their elements will be taken into account during the following exercise. The conclusions of this paper will refer to them and signal their validity for the analysis of the Rondas Campesinas of Cajamarca.

CHAPTER II : THE FORMATION OF THE RONDAS CAMPESINAS

2.1. Cuyumalca: the official creation of the Rondas Campesinas

The social impact of the country's economic crisis in the last four decades has brought a sequence of violence to the rural areas, also to the central region of Cajamarca. Government decisions have in a biased way favoured the urban centres. As from the 50's the liberation of food imports from taxation and government price control (in order to provide the metropolitan masses with cheap foodstuffs and the agro industry with low cost inputs, see: Lajo,1986), enhanced a major economic problem for the country's peasantry. Agricultural producers were increasingly unable to cover their production costs with the prices received for their products.

In the following years, the participation of the agricultural sector in the national GDP diminished sharply. Especially after Velasco's fall in 1975, the export-oriented (IMF and World Bank dictated) liberal politics followed by Morales Bermudez (1975-80) and Belaunde Terry (1980-85), eroded further the economic importance of subsistence farming (Lopez,1989:207; Slater,1985:155).

It is within this context, and in the aftermath of a 3-year drought period, that delinquency augmented sharply in the central region of Cajamarca. In a situation where, as described by Benites (1990:3, my translation), the "law of the jungle, corruption, bribery and manslaughter became the predominant behavioural patterns", a main crime soared: theft and primarily, cattle stealing (⁹) (Lumba,1989:22; Lopez,1989:207; see also Orlove,1973).

The loss of a cow, a bullock or a mule, often meant a major economical disaster for the average peasant household, namely "Under these circumstances (of a generalised economical crisis) cattle raising became crucial. The increasing importance of using cattle as a way of saving and as a source for cash, meant that cattle looting had a particularly adverse impact on the economy of the peasant who was intimately but inadequately related to the market" (Gitlitz and Rojas,1985:120, my translation; ILLA,1987:17).

Irigoyen (1987:20) distinguishes two kinds of thieves: the professional gangster who acted through an organised network of informants from inside and outside the peasant communities, and delivered the stolen animals directly to the Coast. Most of the gang chiefs were well-known, yet they remained "untouchable" for the people's fear of "vendetta-like" revenge acts. Whereas the professional criminals sometimes acted accordingly with official authorities (see also Gitlitz and Rojas,1985:121), the other kind of thief, an occasional robber, "worked" independently and normally within his immediate neighbourhood. Both types increased their activities as from the mid-70's (¹⁰).

⁹ "Abigeato" or cattle raiding was already a major activity at the turn of the century, as the market for meat expanded. Its intensity did not diminish, on the contrary as from the mid-sixties the frequency of thefts organised by professional gangs of two to twenty members, augmented. They no longer stole solely animals, but households items, tools, money, etc. now made part of their booty (Estela,1987:28).

¹⁰ Data on the number of stolen animals is difficult to get. Yet the following numbers give a general idea on the severity of the "abigeato": in 1983, a group of peasants of the province of Sapiyllca, Department of Piura (see map No.1) reported that they had 1331 animals stolen since 1976; 428 cattle, 58 horses, 326 sheep, 147 pigs had been stolen from 180 families, and represented near to 20% of what the district generally delivers to the provincial market ("EL TIEMPO",18.12.1983,Piura in: CIPCA,1988:21).

After the school of the hamlet Cuyumalca in the district of Chota/Cajamarca had once again been sacked by burglars, the vice-governor (⁵) of the locality called for a general assembly of the community to discuss the situation. The result of the meeting was an agreement that would have a major impact in the region. On that 29th of December of 1976, the first Rondas Campesinas were created. The neighbours of Cuyumalca organised night patrolling brigades "in order to defend the interest of the school and of the community" as stated in the original Act, for which they mentioned the need to "request the necessary licenses to buy arms" from the province's highest authority (Gitlitz and Rojas,1985:124, my translation). Not only did the sub-prefect agree with the patrols getting armed, he also recommended that "the main function of the brigade's chief was to organise the groups of Ronda by sectors, in order to act against thieves during nighttime, to capture them and to put them at the disposition of the authorities of the province" (op.cit:124, my translation). The Rondas were to complement the police's tasks.

Historical evidence shows that local peasants had started various attempts to organise themselves against crime. Influenced by the model of the "Rondas de Hacienda" (see section 2.6) east two types of Rondas-like organisations had surfaced at irregular intervals: the "Rondas Nocturnas" and the "Guardias Rurales".

The former consisted of "groups of peasants generally linked by kinship relations who organised themselves in night guards to protect their properties, in the districts of Lajas and Chota" (Revilla,1988:3, my translation; also Gonzales and Chavez,1990;86-7). The "Guardias Rurales" responded less to the direct interests of the peasants involved, as they consisted of throngs organised in an ad-hoc manner by the local authority to combat cattle raids whenever these became too frequent (ILLA,1987:14).

Although both types of organisation did mark a step towards self-defense, they remained of an ephemeral nature and none of them survived. In opposition to these attempts the Rondas Campesinas spread throughout the province in a matter of months, and by 1980 they were found in most of the neighbouring provinces. In the late 80's, the Rondas spread not only to most of the districts of Cajamarca, but also to many districts of the Departments of Piura, Tumbes, Lambayeque, La Libertad, Ancash, Amazonas and San Martin, also as Urban Rondas in many shanty towns of the big cities (see section 4.2.,Table No.1).

In order to understand the Ronda phenomenon, the next pages will reflect on the historical background of this organisation analyzing the factors that lead to its formation. First, a short description of the central region of the Department of Cajamarca follows.

⁵ The executive power in Peru has the following hierarchy:

Level	Official representative
Nation	President
Department	Prefect
Province	Sub-prefect
District	Governor
Hamlet	Vice-governor

2.2. The Department of Cajamarca and its regions : the geographical setting

The Department (⁶) of Cajamarca (see map No.1 and No.2) is situated in the northern Highlands (⁷) of Peru. It is linked to the Coast (⁸) by three main routes which divide the Department into three regional spaces. (see map No.2)

The northern region (⁹) consists of two provinces: Jaen and San Ignacio. After the successful eradication of malaria in the area (1940), the region was colonised mainly by proletarians who became jobless in the wake of the mechanisation process that occurred in the sugar plantations of the Coast. The main products of the region, coffee and rice produced in the predominantly small and medium farms, are exported to the coastal markets by the paved and strategically important route that links the northern Coast with the Amazon Basin.

The central region of the Department of Cajamarca, of principal interest for the present paper, has an unpaved road infrastructure which links its four provinces: Cutervo, Santa Cruz, Hualgayoc and Chota. The city of Chota is the main commercial centre of the region, which also includes the northern part of the province of Celendin within its economic activity. It is connected to the coastal city of Chiclayo, by an unpaved road, terminated by 1950.

An important interregional track, built to facilitate the extraction of minerals in Hualgayoc (the biggest mining centre in Peru during Colonial rule), links the central region to the southern region. The capital of the Department, Cajamarca City (aprox.100,000 inhabitants), articulates the rural economies of the southern and eastern provinces (including the southern part of Celendin), as it provides the gateway to the Coast. The two western provinces are more immediately linked to the Coast through the vital Cajamarca-Pacasmayo paved road.

⁶ Peru is divided into 25 Departments, each one composed of several provinces. The provinces consist of grouped districts which again are divided into villages or hamlets (dispersed dwellings).

⁷ The "Highlands" (Sierra) are formed by the Andean ranges with peaks up to 4300 m. These are divided by narrow and fertile valleys. The dry climate of the Coast limits the agricultural use of the western slopes, while the less abrupt eastern slopes present more favourable conditions as they incorporate themselves into the humid tropical forest of the Amazon Basin. Potatoes, maize and other staple food such as Andean tubercles and grains are the main crops. the highlands account for 62% of the total arable land of the country, yet its share in the sector's total output is only of 40% (ONERN,1986:57)


⁸ The "Coast"(Costa) is a narrow desert strip that runs along the Pacific littoral, in average 70 to 120 km wide. Rivers enable a limited but very productive agricultural activity of an oasis-type. The "Coast" represents 22 percent of the total arable land and generates more than 40% of the country's total agricultural output (Martinez,1982: 35). The main crops are sugar cane, cotton, rice, maize and vegetables.

⁹ Region, here, is understood as a geographical space whose boundaries do not primarily respond to administrative and political criteria, but are a result of the dynamics of the social relations that have developed inside this space, according to common cultural, historical and economical backgrounds. It reflects the notion of a spatial unity created BY and not FOR the people of the area.



MRP N:1

CAJAMARCA AND ITS PROVINCES
(Scale 1:1'500,000)



LEGEND

—	Departamental and provincial Boundaries
----	Road
xxxx	Regional Boundaries
•	Provincial Capital
▲	Dptal Capital

LA

LIBERTAD

79°

MAP N°2

The historical evolution of the three regions has been, although closely related, of a different kind. This regional differentiation has generally been overlooked by most of the authors who analyzed local processes in Cajamarca, before 1985.

Both the central and the southern regions endured the impact of the first strong capitalist penetration at the turn of the century. While a 'junkering' process followed in south, stabilising the hacienda economies, this was not the case in the centre. Here the landowners preferred to increase the differential rent by selling parts of their lands.

In 1940, the installation of a subsidiary of the TNC "Nestle" in the valley of Cajamarca, definitely settled the agrarian structure in the southern region (Taylor,1980). This second penetration of capitalism had little effect in the other regions of the Department.

2.3. Historical development of the agricultural production systems

Prior to the Spanish Invasion, local societies had achieved bewilderingly refined and ecologically adapted agricultural production systems. "When the Spaniards arrived in Peru they found a society with highly sophisticated economic and social organizations...Among other things, the (prevailing) system virtually did away with poverty and idleness, and seemed to have worked with great efficiency" (Flores-Saenz,1977:28-29, my translation).

2.3.1. Early land use systems

The basic unit of the Cuisango society (? - 1470 a.D), which occupied most of the territory of today's Cajamarca, was the nuclear family and not the extended family as it was the case in the "ayllu" of the Inca society (Eich,1983).

The "curaca's" (local spiritual and political leader) land was worked on the basis of compulsory labour contributions from each nuclear family. Although pasture land was of common property, every household had access to a private plot: the characteristics of the land use system previous to the arrival of the Spaniards was based on individual private property (see Garcia and Ruiz,1989:14; also de Wit,1989:6).

2.3.2. The hacienda and the plantation systems

The Spanish Conquest ruptured the Inca system and turned the country's self-sufficient economy into an export-oriented enterprise. With the decline of the mining "industry", during the eighteenth century new agrarian systems were developed: the hacienda and the plantation systems.

The haciendas were formed mainly in the Highlands, where the majority of the Indian population lived. They were based on the land grants (mercedes) and peasant allotments (encomiendas) that had been distributed by the Spanish Crown (see Stavenhagen,1981:4). The consolidation of the haciendas was the result of the decline in mining and of the increase of domestic demand for food. The hacienda production system was based on forced labour regimes. Whether in livestock estates or on mixed crop/livestock estates, land labourers were exploited having to pay tribute in kind and/or in labour (Kay,1983).

The hacienda system prevailed over decades, until the land reform of 1969, mainly because it was self-sufficient and hardly linked to the national economy (Flores-Saenz,1977:35). Yet, in some regions, mainly those near urban centres, the growing demand for foodstuffs and raw materials induced a process of intensification of the land use, forcing the landowners or "gamonales" to substitute labour by capital.

The **plantation** system developed from the hacienda model into more capital-intensive and export-oriented (sugar and cotton) enterprises, retaining initially similar exploitative labour regimes. Important shares of the high profits obtained from the "guano boom" between 1840 and 1880 were invested privately in the capitalization of large sugar cane and cotton estates (¹⁰), mainly along the Coast (¹¹) (Gonzales,1989:389).

The catastrophic effects of the Chilean War (lost by Peru after five years of battles, in 1884), caused a serious succession of bankruptcies among the plantation owners. Many had to sell and a "great many of Peru's sugar estates passed into the hands of foreign corporations - British, German, Italian, American, etc...- possessing enough capital to rebuild and operate the estates along more modern lines." (Levin in Flores-Saenz,1977:47,my translation).

The sugar plantations in the northern Coast of Peru "were integrated into the international capitalist system before the turn of the century" (Slater,1989:119). Subsequent price crisis in the world market eliminated the less capitalised and only a few agro-industrial complexes with economies of scale were able to "survive", metabolizing the smaller plantations (see Appendix No.3). By 1930, the process of land concentration had stabilised, leaving the country's richest lands in the hands of a few landlords.

For instance, Gildemeister, one of them, concentrated a total of 1,250,000 acres, including Highland estates as "labour reserves" (Scott,1976:334). Their industrial sugar estate was the largest in Peru, and reputedly in the world (op.cit.:325).

The plantation owners or "**hacendados**", were organised in the powerful National Agrarian Society (SNA) and had strong influence at the national level (¹²).

The "**gamonales**" although they "had unlimited powers because they either dominated local state organisations or were related to civil employees who act leniently towards them" (Mac Donald,1976:62; also ¹³), they were politically weaker.

¹⁰ "as a response to certain favourable external factors such as the fall of cotton production during the American Civil war and the relatively high world prices for sugar" (Slater,1989:63)

¹¹ "...a good proportion of the guano-derived capital falling under the control of commercial land-holding interests was utilized in developing an agricultural export sector oriented around cotton and sugar cane production" (Slater,1989:83)

¹² Due to the fact -among other reasons- that "By the middle of 1960, approximately 75% of Peruvian agricultural exports were produced in the coastal zones, sugar cane and cotton being the most important in terms of area covered and value of production" (Slater,1989:125), the SNA was represented in the "principle agencies through which agricultural policy was made...such as customs and tariffs, money and banking, foreign exchange and trade, agricultural credit, supply of fertilisers, etc."(Flores-Saenz,1977:161).

¹³ The (gamonal) was its absolute master, euphemized in the term **patron**. The (gamonal's) house was a magnificent dwelling, the residence of his large family of relatives and the scene of banquets and elaborate receptions. To the **peones** of the hacienda, the **patron** was the apotheosis of authority, immediate in a way that the viceroy and king never were. His ostentatious possessions -his horses and carriages, his elaborate attire, his silver and finery- were visible symbols of wealth. Disobedience to his will brought severe and exemplary punishment." (Gibson quoted in Flores-Saenz,1977:35).

They did not conform a unique front with the "hacendados" due to the rentist characteristic of their economies which didn't meet the policies of the SNA.

Until 1968, the development of Peruvian agriculture had been characterised by the discrepancy between a dynamic and highly capitalised export-oriented plantation sector, and a traditional rentist hacienda system, whereby both systems were closely interlocked.

2.3.3. The peasant communities

The fundamental organisation of the Inca society was based on the peasant communities. Some managed to survive the impact of colonisation, their total number having being decimated to one tenth of the former, due to the murderous working conditions in the Spanish mines and to the plagues (mainly small-pox) introduced by the European Conquerors.

Most of their lands had been distributed among the new landlords, however, the essence of the community, based on collectivist principles and self-sufficiency, prevailed until the twentieth century: "they constitute groups of territorial control, of democratic organization and guarantee the preservation of ethnical and cultural values" (Wiener,1987:52,my translation). By 1960, still more than 50% of the rural population in Peru belonged to such a community, numbering a total of approximately 5000 (Wiener,1987:38).

In Cajamarca however, peasant communities did and do not play an important role. In all of the Department there are only 77 Peasant Communities . In the central region of Cajamarca only twenty two Peasant Communities exist with few members and little control over land; also most of them are of recent formation (after the land reform of 1969) (IINCAP,1990:9).

2.4. Rural protest movements in Cajamarca

The capture of the Inca Atahualpa in 1533 which determined the annihilation of the Inca Empire was not as universally believed, the exploit of Francisco Pizarro's horde. It was the achievement of the local Indians, the Caxamarcas, who considered the Spaniards as their allies (Gaytan,1986:195). Indeed, the indigenous ethnics were at war with the Incaic invaders since 1470. As a result much of the locals had been deported (¹⁴).

Indian resistance continued during the Spanish Rule (1532-1821), but it was of only of local relevance and the rebellions remained isolated: an indigenous movement as such was unable to take root (Silva Santisteban,1986:23).

Indigenous upheavals did occur, e.g. Gaytan (1986) mentions fifteen of them that were officially recorded during the 18th century. Most were expressions of resistance against land expropriations, excessive taxation and inhuman working conditions, especially in the wool workshops (obrajes). Yet only a few were of a violent nature and peasant resistance in Cajamarca against the Colonial Rule was of a passive nature and many of the disputes took place in the courts (op.cit.:198).

¹⁴ "Mitmaes" or "mitimayas" were a system of forced resettlements of ethnic groups from one region to another. The Incas (and maybe others before), moved undesired communities in order to get rid of resistance strongholds, and also sent into the newly conquered regions, allied ethnical groups to "educate" the new vassals (see Gaytan,1989:195)

The most important Indian rebellion, the one of Tupac Amaru in 1780 (¹⁵) had a relatively weak impact in the Northern Highlands. Indeed, "the Incaic feeling, the Andean utopia, had no importance within the indigenous population during the Colonial Period—except in the communities of mitimaes" (Gaytan,1986:194, my translation)

The acculturation process in the region was strong. By 1790 the Department had more Spanish inhabitants than Indians, this fact is mainly due to the decimation caused by European diseases (small-pox, influenza); the local languages *culli* and *quechua* were replaced by Spanish. Today, less than 1% of the Cajamarquinos speak the original languages.

The Church combated the local symbolic universe and cosmology, either by "christianizing" it (e.g. converting local deities into saints) or simply through blunt repression (Gaytan,1986:195; Silva Santisteban,1986:25).

Ethnicity or "indianness", thus, does not embody or "denote a significant cultural common ground" (Pearse,1975:59) in Cajamarca, and as such did and does not represent a factor of unity among the oppressed as it is the case in the Peasant Communities in the South of the country).

At the turn of the century, the land usurpations which followed the re-structure of the agricultural sector and the dislocative impact of capitalist penetration (subsequently proletarianising the peasantry), enhanced protest actions. Some were local, yet most occurred in the plantations along the Northern Coast. It is not until the 30's—in the aftermath of the Wall Street collapse of 1929, and the end of an 11 year dictatorship— that under the influence of intellectuals and political parties, that local rural protest takes a more organised form with the creation of the first national peasant federation (Federacion Nacional de Yanaconas y Campesinos del Peru).

2.5. The social relations of production at the turn of the century

The new agricultural structure that emerged after the economic collapse that followed the War (1879–1884), was characterised by a substantial investment of foreign capital along the Coast, mainly in the amplification of sugar estates.

The strong increase in labour demand could no longer be matched by the indenture of Chinese coolies (¹⁶), and had thus to be supplied by Highland peasants.

¹⁵ Jose Gabriel Condorcaqui, a descendant of Tupac Amaru I, together with his wife Micaela Bastidas started what turned out to be the major indigenous revolution. It preceded the country's Independence War by forty years. The rebel army gathered more than 60,000 armed men and women of different origins—Indians, rich and poor "criollos" (Peru-born Spaniards), "mestizos" (of mixed European and Indian descent), runaway (African) slaves, priests—Their radical project was much wider than just achieving a reduction of the burden imposed by the Spanish Crown. Tupac Amaru II and Micaela Bastidas believed in an independent Indian nation and questioned the Spanish presence as such (Chavez,1982:58). The movement was defeated by the Spanish with the help of Indian allies in 1782. But the criollos and the mestizos learned their lesson: realising the potentiality of the Indians, they made sure not to let any of their leaders conduct further protest movements, and were careful to keep them away from participating in post-Independence governments (ibid).

¹⁶ After slavery was abolished in 1858, Chinese labour was imported to Peru. The "coolies" worked on the basis of 10 to 15 year indenture contracts (Gonzales,1989).

Active banditry spread to all the districts of Cajamarca, where it reigned for 30 years (Burga,1976:201).

The "weakness of the state, its lack of monopoly over the use of violence, and the ability of bandit gangs to outgun the police" (Taylor,1980:3), allowed the upsurge of armed gangs. In fact, the circumstances that reigned in this region were similar to those which allowed the appearance of the "cangaceiros" in the "sertao" regions in Northeastern Brasil, and alike the "bandoleros" in the Venezuelan and Colombian Llanos where "outcast frontiersmen, subsisting on the fringes of "civilisation", well beyond the reach of central government authority" (Slatta,1987:192) turned to banditry.

The armed gangs by no means represented the interests of socially weaker groups as they were "linked to vertical power structures controlled by local magnates" (Taylor,1980:3). Banditry here, "did not engage in the "Robin Hood" -style redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor" (Slatta,1987:198). It consisted of organised "antisocial bandits, not noble robbers"(Taylor,1980:6), who far from being class enemies of the elite, worked with and for the rural oligarchy and even with governmental officials,"..because their survival depended on the establishment of links with local patronage structures, organised in factions" (Taylor,1988:111). As a result of the type of survival strategies that had developed in that region, most peasants "invariably became involved in clan imbroglios" (Taylor,1980:7).

Similar to the "bandoleros" of Colombia, the brigands depended on their financial and political sponsors or "godfathers" (Slatta,1987:192). If deprived of that "godfather" protection, the gangs were eradicated.

Hobsbawm's "social bandits" are not found within this context (¹⁷).

It is during this period that the first "Rondas" appeared: the so-called "Rondas de hacienda". These consisted of hired armed gangs, comprising avowed tenants, whose duty was to protect the properties of "their" hacendados (see Taylor,1973:38,60,note 45; CIPCA,1988:20). They not only patrolled along the boundaries of the haciendas, but also enforced justice arbitrarily (¹⁸). The scope of action was broader :the gamonales did not hesitate in "hiring bandits to eradicate political opponents intent on their overthrow" (Taylor, 1980:8).

The experience of banditry in the region played an important role for the later formation of Rondas Campesinas: the drilling in the use of weapons, the training of strategic guerrilla-like tactics, and the organization of an efficient intelligence system.

¹⁷ For Hobsbawm, peasant outlaws were social bandits "whom the lord and the state regard as criminals, but who remain within the peasant society, and are considered by their people as hero, as champions, avengers, fighters for justice, perhaps even leaders for liberation, and in any case men to be admired, helped and supported. This relationship between peasant communities and the rebel, outlaw and robber is what gives the phenomenon of social banditry its political and social significance" (Quoted in Slatta,1987:2)

¹⁸ In 1933, a manager of the Gildemeister's gigantic desmaine Casa Grande was sentenced to 8 years of prison for ordering "his" rondas to cut off the ears of any person seen walking around the estates boundaries during night time. He rewarded each pair of ears delivered to him and kept them in a formolic solution as "souvenirs".(see Taylor 1983:62,note57; this anecdote was confirmed to me by a former hacienda peon of the district of Jesus, where I worked).

But "bandolerismo" did not induce a process of social awareness and sensitivity, on the contrary, it "created important obstacles to the development of class based peasant movements" (Taylor,1980:3). Banditry came to a stop in the early 30's as the central government eventually assumed "the functions of social control formerly exercised by "caudillos" (Taylor,1988:111).

2.7. Labour migration and rural unionism

A decisive element for the formation of the Rondas in 1976, was the experience many of the later Ronderos went through as seasonal migrants to the Coast. The process of migration to the Coast plantations was already important in the second half of the XIXth century and apparently responded to demographic pressure due to forced evictions from the haciendas (see Taylor,1988:585, and 577-578).

After the Chilean War the local labour shortage in the coastal plantations was supplied by Highland peasants who were generally recruited through a middlemen and often in a coercive way (Scott,1976:323-4) (¹⁹). The contracting of migrant land labourers became of vital importance for the expansion of the sugar cane estates as from 1885, and remained of high relevance until the late 30's. The central region of Cajamarca became the hinterland of the sugar plantations "Tuman", "Cayalti", "Pucala", "Patapo", and "Pomalca" (Scott,1976).

During the first decades of the century, the expanding industrialisation and urbanisation prompted the widening of urban markets for consumption goods. The increasing domestic demand for food and goods monetised the economy further, integrating hereby the regional economies into the national markets. It was necessary to keep the urban wages low. The earnings of the exported sugar cane were badly needed by the state for purchasing the capital goods for the industrial sector. This process compelled pressure on the landlords towards diversification in their production pattern, whereas the capitalist farmers (mainly on the Coast) were strengthened.

With the introduction of mechanised forms of production from the 20's on (Flores-Saenz,1977), the relations of production in the plantations changed demanding more seasonal labourers, while the number of jobs for permanent workers decreased.

The competition for man-power between the plantations and the Highland haciendas, a result of the shift in demand for more seasonal labour, was short-termed and soon countered by the expulsion of tenants and sharecroppers in the latter.

The proletarianised labourers of the plantations were better organised since their class consciousness had developed further as than was the case in the Highland haciendas, where the tenants and sharecroppers still worked under pre-capitalistic relations of production.

¹⁹ The most common form of hiring labour was through the 'enganche' (literally 'hook') system, whereby plantation contractors recruited unskilled labourers in the Highlands by advancing a certain amount of money. Once accepted by the plantation (names had to be checked against a black list of "undesired" elements), the loan was discounted from the weekly salaries. The "enganchado" could not leave the hacienda before all debts were cancelled, under the threat of being hunted down. (Scott,1976:326-27).

During this period of adjustment (which also meant the further incorporation of local economies into the capitalist system) the plantation workers of the plantations began to organise against the inhuman working conditions. In the early 30's the first rural unions appeared, mainly under the flag of the APRA party.

As a consequence of the crisis of world capitalism in 1929, the period between 1930 and 1933 -a sort of "political intermezzo"- witnessed a series of "openings for middle class regionalist movements" in Peru (Slater,1989:87) : the efforts to create a national organisation of peasants finally succeeded. The legal recognition of the National Federation (Federacion Nacional de Yanacunas y Campesinos del Peru) was a result of an APRA launched insurrection in Trujillo in 1932 (which for Quijano "represented the first organised attempt by Peruvian workers to struggle for power" (quoted in Slater,1989:87). The Peruvian Peasant Confederation (CCP) was officially recognised in 1947. Albeit, these attempts were again capsized in 1948 and repressed by a military regime, until 1956.

In the late 40's and during the 50's, the work opportunities in the Coast plantations drastically diminished for the central Cajamarquino migrant. This was not only the result of the increasing mechanisation (²⁰), but also, most of the labour needed in the sugar complexes was supplied by locals (for instance, the district of Chiclayo more than doubled its population between 1940 and 1961, Scott,1976:337). The Coast was thus no longer an "escape"for him/her (Lopez,1981:205), (²¹).

In the Highlands, the raising pressure on the land accentuated the process of fragmentation and challenged seriously the existing land tenure system. The gamonales, also facing an economic urgency to cope with the rapidly changing conditions in the market, accelerated the sale of parts of their estates (ibid). By 1960, only few large haciendas had not gone through a process of division (Irigoyen,1987:19).

In this sense, in the late sixties, landlessness or near-to-landlessness and unemployment were inducing out-migration to the urban centres, while expanding poverty was the prevailing condition of the rural majorities.

The union experience, which not only meant the organisation and coordination of strikes, but also acquirement of bargaining skills vis a vis the authorities, constituted a major legacy for the many Chotano migrants who eventually returned to their places of origin.

²⁰ The choice of technology applied in sugar cane had become concentrated in the transformation process due to the higher value added involved. Machinery had been introduced to improve transportation from the fields to the sugar factories, cutters were no longer paid by volume but by weight; surely this meant an increase in the exploitation of labour. "Employment in the sugar industry fell by approximately half..from 46,197 jobs in 1940 to around 24,000 in 1969. This was a direct result of labour displacing technical change." (Scott,1976:321).

²¹ Migration shifted as from the 40's on towards the small and medium sized coffee and rice plantations in the northern provinces of Jaen and San Ignacio (Irigoyen,1987:19). Until today, more than 50% of the Chotanos migrate temporarily to that region (IINCAP,1988:19). However, in recent years the piedmont areas of Pucallpa and Nueva Cajamarca in the Department of Amazonas, where the main product is coca leaves, have attracted these migrants.

This background adeptly skilled them and explicitly developed their preparedness to organise themselves. Gonzales and Chavez (1990) refer to a similar process which took place in the central Highlands of Peru where the American Copper Corporation "owned" large communal lands, and where "the union experience of the peasants who worked in the mines became of primary importance in the process of regaining access to land" (op.cit:43,my translation).

The process of massive expulsions and of increasing proletarianization also prompted the "eruption of various peasant struggles which, in the early sixties, coalesced with the emergence of rural guerrilla movements" (Slater,1989:121). Such a peasant revolt was the one occurred in the Convencion valley in 1952 (²²). Flores-Saenz (1977) mentions 620 strikes in the sugar estates between 1957 and 1968 (op.cit.:129).

2.8. Impact of the Land Reform of 1969

The need for a radical land reform not only responded to internal pressures, external factors also influenced the need for changes. The relative success of the Cuban Revolution, and the peasant revolts in Bolivia, had prompted the US to launch a reformist campaign, sealed at the international economic conference in Punta del Este in 1961.

The reasons for the military take-over and the implementation of a radical land reform in 1969, were related to the increasing peasant protest movements which were getting beyond control, and the pursuit of a "modernised" Peru. The ideology of modernisation, widespread in Latin America since the end of WW II, and more intensively in the sixties, had strongly influenced the Peruvian generals, most of them trained in the US. Although their political affinity placed them in the leftist field, the Junta's main objective was to develop the country into a modern capitalist society and "incorporate the peasantry into the market economy (creating) a large internal consumer market and a provider of capital funds for the industrialisation of the country" (Petras,1971:265).

²² The armed struggle of La Convencion (1952-1965) was "One of the most important agrarian mobilisations to have occurred in Latin America" (Brass,1989:174), turned out to favour small capitalist farmers. The upheaval was centred the Convencion Valley in the piedmont area of the southern Department of Cusco. Local landlords rented out virgin and hilly land to tenants, who paid the usufruct of the plots with labour service (150 to 200 days per year) on the landlord's sugar cane, cacao and tea plantations. The positive development of coffee prices largely benefited the tenants who had planted coffee trees. The landlords' attempts to integrate those coffee plots into the large plantations, mainly through expellment, enhanced the creation of the first peasant unions in the valley. The meanwhile capitalised tenants undermined the landlords' attempt at expulsion through an increase in labour rent obligations, by contracting sub-tenants "who henceforth discharged (them of) the labour service contributions owed..to the landlord" (Brass,1989:175). The battle for property titles was too hot an issue for the communist peasant union of Cusco FTC, let alone the APRA party, causing many tenants and sub-tenants to join the Trotskyist Revolutionary Left Front (FIR), led by Hugo Blanco (see Brass,1989:174). This armed movement was suffocated by a "carrot and stick"- policy: limited distribution of land rights and extensive counter-insurgency actions."FIR's extra-legal challenge to the power of the landlord class"(Brass,1989:175), finally benefited the richer, when in 1962 the government of Belaunde began to distribute property titles: "The government promised legal titles to these small parcels on the basis that the campesinos pay the government the value of the lands, and then the government would in turn, reimburse the former owner, the hacendados" (Craig,1969:276). Yet the large majority of sub-tenants remained landless.

The expropriation of the most profitable and capital-intensive agricultural enterprises, showed the government's "determination and ability to liquidate the rural oligarchy" (Kay,1983:207). The economical basis of the agro-exporting oligarchy and centres of power of foreign capital were destroyed (²³).

Among the policies directed towards the re-organisation of the peasantry, was the creation of a National Agrarian Confederation -the CNA-, a state directed organisation. All other peasant organisations (about 1500 in 1969) (Kay,1983:211) also the powerful SNA, were outlawed. SINAMOS, a national programme based on the principles of Community Development came to replace the liberal "Cooperacion Popular" of the former regime, with the purpose of diffusing the populist ideology of the military government to the rural areas.

In the central region of Cajamarca, the impact of the Land Reform was not so much related to the redistribution of land. Big latifundia in this region were scarce; the "subdivision of haciendas and their sale in small parcels..(increased)..especially in the 60's as fears grew among landowners of the imminence of a land reform programme which would expropriate their property" (Scott,1976:328).

The peasant mobilisations in the region during the Velasco regime were basically resistance actions against forced collectivisation and in favour of individual tenancy (de Wit,1989:11; Gitlitz and Rojas,1985:135 also ²⁴).Peasants also opposed the cooptative imposition of the state directed CNA as an "all peasant organisation". The issues raised were thus less of land claiming nature than they were in other parts of the country. It is important to remark that of the 25 existing Peasant Communities, many were formed during the period of the Land Reform (IINCAP,1989:12).

The influence of Velasco's Land Reform in the region of Chota had thus two major effects. More than anything else it contributed to the formation of the Rondas by proving the frailty of the gamonalist system: it was eliminated. This meant the removal of the most relevant obstacle that had constantly thwarted the formation of a propitious peasant organisation.

²³ By 1980, near to 10 million hectares had been allocated to 411,000 rural households.

Table: Land distributed and benefited households, land reform 1969/Peru.

Type of beneficiaries	Distributed land		Benefited households	
	Hectares	%	Number	%
Cooperatives	4,916,672	50,4	160,090	40,1
Peasant groups	2,634,712	27,0	55,992	14,6
Native communities	287,227	2,9	11,684	2,9
Peasant communities	913,229	9,4	126,951	31,8
Individual peasants	770,430	7,9	43,352	10,3
Others	34,024	2,4	1,507	0,4
TOTALS	9,756,314	100,	411,069	100,0

Source: Martinez and Tealdo,1982:20 and 28.

²⁴ Land collectivisation in the Department of Cajamarca turned out to be a disastrous experience. A mixture of individualism, lack of managerial skills and adverse economical and political conditions caused the long-term failure of the imposed model. By the end of 1988, most (70%) of the cooperatives and some the Peasant Communities created in Cajamarca had been dissolved (de Wit,1989:19).

The second major benefit of Velasco's Land Reform was the fact that the "military needed to legitimize its project and in doing so, it officially fostered the validation of an indigenous culture, and tolerated at least a certain amount of political space within which both urban and rural popular organizations could establish their presence and pursue their specific objectives" (Slater,1989:202). That realm turned to advantage the creation of the Rondas Campesinas by strengthening organisational levels and enhancing a process of awareness among the peasants towards self-reliance.

2.9. Allies and opponents

2.9.1. The role of the local state representatives

The state also contributed to the formation of the Rondas Campesinas, mainly due to the fact that it had been traditionally absent as an agent of development and that nearly all state support for the peripheral region invariably favoured only a small group of people. The central government's attitude towards the "backward" regions changed dramatically in the 70's, with the military reformist regime of Velasco.

Important efforts were made to improve educational levels in rural areas and to articulate further local economies with the market, did have positive results for the formation of the Rondas. Indeed, the faculty of reading and writing and the use of communication networks (roads, radio, newspapers,etc.) favoured the genesis of the Rondas Campesinas.

Despite the state's changes in attitude towards peasants, it did little in modifying the local authority's class biased relations to the peasantry. The local power, represented through the local officialdom, played an unintentional but major role in enhancing the surge of the Rondas Campesinas. Indeed, traditionally government officials represented the interests of the local gamonales, while they confronted the peasants with aversion. The institutionalised corruption and inefficiency of the police (²⁵), the military, the politicians and the judges (²⁶), intensified the current brutality of repressive actions taken against the peasants (ILLA,1988:12-13). So that the outcome of the local authorities's convention embodied a latent catalyst for peasant opposition (Irigoyen,1987:22).

2.9.2. The role of the Church

From early colonial times the Catholic Church in Peru used religion as an instrument to destroy and dominate the indigenous cultures and people.

²⁵ The following reports picture the existing relations between raider gangs and the official authorities."I remember when we took a well known rustler to the police station. We had everything with us: the witnesses, signed and certified declarations. When we got to the police station, the chief assured us he'd jail him. But on our way home, we saw the thief jumping onto another truck". (Peasant testimony, cited in C.C.R.C. T.VI,1986:8, my translation)."Although many cattle thieves were known by name, they enjoyed impunity, mainly because of the terror they would use during their actions and also to the complicity of the officialdom upon which they could rely " (Gitlitz and Rojas,1985:122, my translation)

²⁶ "The authorities did nothing to stop the delinquency. The attorneys and the judges knew little about our problems, and rarely would they act against a cattle-thief if we didn't pay beforehand. If it came to a trial, the one who had the better friends and had paid the higher bribe, would win. The police didn't know what was going on in the rural areas, nor did they have enough personnel. Besides, many of them would help a thief for little money." (Peasant testimony, cited in C.C.R.C. T.VI,1986:7, my translation).

Despite the fact that several Churchmen did undertake individual solidarity actions with the poor, these did not receive institutional backing nor did they provoke a change of attitude. For the peasantry of Cajamarca, it was only in the 1960's that "For the first time, pastoral work was more oriented towards the countryside than towards the capital of the province" (Gitlitz and Rojas, 1985:123, my translation).

Within the context of Medellin 1968 and the spirit of the theology of liberation, a group of Catholic catechists, members of Cajamarca's episcopal Department of Social Action (backed by the progressive bishop of Cajamarca Dammert Bellido), initiated the formation of peasant leaders in rural areas of Hualgayoc province in the late 60's (Estela, 1988:5).

The readings of the Bible and the catechisation imparted, and raised moral values and principles as well as a sense of social justice, which later clearly influenced the moral basis of the Rondas. The regular gatherings provided space for communication, experiences could be interchanged and actions of all kinds be organised, under the "protection" of the Church.

Thus the formation of the Rondas Campesinas was facilitated by the action and the influence of the Church, and the institution officially accepts being involved in the creation of the peasant movement (ibid; Dammert, 1988).

A similar importance of the (Protestant) Church in developing the organisation of peasants is reported by Craig (1969:286) for the case of the formation of unions in the Convencion valley and by Gitlitz and Rojas (1985:131) when mentioning the creation of the first Rondas in Cutervo (²⁷).

2.9.3. Role of political parties

The emergence of political parties in the Chota region happened late. The non-existence of political parties, i.e structurally organised groups with a clearly defined ideology and a articulated programme, was mainly due to the fact that in this frontier region "...political competition revolved around men instead of ideas" (Taylor, 1980:13).

In as much as banditry contributed to the formation of the Rondas, by drilling the peasants in handling firearms and training guerrilla tactics, the APRA party, that emerged in the region in the late 20's (Taylor, 1988:113) encouraged and reinforced the organisability of the local peasantry.

The political significance of leftist parties in the region became relevant in the late 60's. The communist peasant union, the Confederacion Campesina del Peru -CCP- and its filial Federacion de Campesinos de Cajamarca -FEDECC-, played a major part in substantiating and reinforcing the organisational capacity of peasant groups. Through the constitution of local committees, opposition movements were organised against the corporative undertakings of the Velasco regime. Due to their fundamental and radical opposition to the central government, the discourses of the extreme left parties became more attractive than the positions expressed by the more moderate APRA (Burga, 1988:912; FEDECC, 1972).

²⁷ Craig reports that "An unexpected finding about the union leaders was that a surprisingly large minority of the early officials were known to be 'evangelicos' (Protestant fundamentalists)". Similarly, Gitlitz and Rojas remark that in the formation of the Rondas of Succha/Cutervo in 1979, that "many of the initial activists were members of various protestant sects".

Although the parenthood of the Rondas Campesinas of central Cajamarca, is still a matter of hot debates between the APRA and the Left (as well as among the latter's factions), it was maoist UNIR's (National Leftist Revolutionary Unity) political and organisational advisory function that had more influence on the Rondas. The chief role was played by a young activist, Daniel Idrogo -a student of peasant origin - who later became and still is a recognised leader of the Rondas. He was elected deputy for UNIR in 1985 and performed a decisive role in defending the interests of the movement at the national level.

APRA's attempts to win over the loyalty of the peasants succeeded to some extent in 1981 with the formation of the parallel "Rondas Pacificas" (Irigoyen,1987:23). Their founder, former governor and mayor of the district of Chota still holds the chair of "President". These Rondas follow the formal spirit of 1976 as they maintain that "they should be legalised and recognised officially as para-police forces, subordinated and under the command of the local authorities" (Gitlitz and Rojas,1985:134, my translation).

The impact of political parties in the formation of the Rondas is evident. Yet it appears that it was more the organisational advice (infrastructural help, etc.) the parties provided which was of relevance, while the accompanying "ideological packages" had little impact on the campesinos/as (see Appendix No.3).

Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that manipulative intentions still are very present among the political parties that "advise" the Rondas (¹), and fierce competition exist for getting hold of important organisational posts (see Burga,1988; also ²).

Craig's statement on the importance of political parties on the unions of La Convencion can be applied to the Rondas as well:

"Despite the outside advisory roles of the lawyers and the various FTC representatives to the valley, the major part of the organisation and development (of the movement).. was primarily an autonomous development within the valley and constituted an unusual Latin American phenomenon of a rural labor union organising itself from the bottom up rather than being organised and directed from outside" (Craig,1969:287)

Among the institutions that influenced the formation of the Rondas two more should be mentioned. The University of Cajamarca, created in the late 60's as a result of political pressure of Apra and the Left, enhanced the development of regional movements (Burga,1988:91). The Teacher's Union (SUTEP), which allied with UNIR also promoted the creation of the Rondas (Lopez,1989:208).

¹ "...the characteristics of these political parties is definitely that they are of an urban kind with regard to their composition, their militancy and leadership, as well as the orientation of their ideologies. This is why the peasantry never constituted neither an objective nor a main field of work within the development strategies of these parties." (Gonzales and Chavez,1990:64, my translation).

² "Leftist militants " have partly substituted the authentic peasants in the conductive tasks in the different federations..they have also transferred the political divisionism which affects the Peruvian Left.. and created groups which do not contribute to the strengthening and unity of the Rondas" (Gonzales and Chavez,1990:131, my translation).

CHAPTER III : THE INTERNAL EVOLUTION OF THE RONDAS CAMPESINAS.

3.1. "Small Thieves" and "Big Thieves"

When raiders were caught, they were interrogated before being handed over to the police (³⁰). On the basis of the information obtained and the results of its verification, a light was thrown on how cattle stealing was organised in the region. When a raid took place, the prowlers would count on the support of an "internal" informant, and acted in coordination with "external" agents, the latter usually being the bosses of the gang. The strategy of cattle raiding was not new to the members of the Rondas, yet the relevance of the "outside" connections became more apparent to them.

The initially subordinated relation of the Rondas towards the local authority, (as specified in the Constitutional Act of Cuyumalca), gradually became replaced by distrust, which enforced the Ronderos's keenly felt need for self-defense. It would be difficult to locate the exact moment when the Rondas decided to assume the responsibility not only of patrolling, capturing and cross-questioning the suspects, but also for further investigating the crimes and its possible addenda. The need of developing an adequate system for crime prevention became evident.

This awareness was strengthened every time a robber, who had been handed over to the guards, was set free a few hours later due to his "good" relations with the police chief and/or the local judge (ILLA,1987:12-13).

This process meant that the Rondas, on the basis of their experience as rural vigils, began to exercise justice according to the criteria of their community. And it also meant that the Rondas gradually became an independent organisation. The link with officialdom was nevertheless carefully maintained: for instance whenever "gobernadores" (official representatives of the state at the hamlet level) were replaced by elected leaders that responded to the interests of the people, the Rondas would insist on their official accreditation (Irigoyen,1987; Gonzales and Chavez,1990).

The Rondas entered a process of democratisation, and as such began to combat the most corrupt elements of officialdom, namely those "who stole with the law in their hands or the "Big Thieves" as they call them (Irigoyen,1987:25).

The first important actions of the Rondas against these kind of thieves was the forced expulsion of Chota's judge Manuel Carhuay nicknamed "cuanto hay?" (how much do I get?) in 1978. This experience was to give impulse to the Rondas's search for a genuine "Peasant Justice" (see Benites,1990:4). A similar impact was achieved when, in 1979, the Rondas organised a massive demonstration against the increases in the cost of living and the practice of hoarding with impunity (Vargas,1979:2).

³⁰ Not all Rondas acted accordingly. At the end of 1977, a Ronda that had captured a well known gang (a whole 5 member family) in flagrante delicto, proceeded to call a general assembly. The more than 2000 (sic) peasants that attended the gathering decided to kill the gang. Their bodies were cut to pieces and buried so as not to be found by the police.(Gitlitz and Rojas,1985:130). Such cases are referred to as initial mistakes by the presentday Rondas. With a safe margin of certainty, it can be said that these kind of procedures ended in the region by 1978, as none have been reported since (op.cit.:132).

In March of 1980, the Rondas Campesinas of La Succha and two neighbouring hamlets, had delivered a thief gang, together with the required evidence (stolen animals), to the local police station (Investigation Police of Peru -PIP) of the town of Cutervo. When the Ronderos detected the gangsters having a meal together with the police chief and other policemen (PIPs), a fight broke out and a peasant was badly shot. Next day, more than 2,000 (sic) peasants descended to the town and protested in front of the police offices. As a result of the ensuing confrontation, the PIPs had to flee the place and the police station was burnt down. Cutervo has no PIP station since (See Gitlitz and Rojas,1985:132 and 137,note 20).

Another major action in 1980 was organised by the Rondas of Bambamarca: a protest march against the indiscriminate pollution of the Chonta river by the washout of the Hualgayoc mines. In that occasion urban and rural dwellers concerned by the contaminating effects joined the peaceful demonstration (see Gitlitz and Rojas,1985:133). Irigoyen (1987:25) reports of further Rondas actions which forced the removal of the city mayors of Chota and of Bambamarca.

These actions were signals of an evolving awareness inside the organisation.

As such, two main outcomes may be noted here as of high significance for the Rondas' internal development: on the one side, the Ronda became more inward-oriented i.e. it could no longer count on the assistance of the police and the judicial system in solving problems within the community. Increasingly the Rondas became an instance of justice solving all kinds of quarrels. Disputes over land boundaries, access to irrigation water, even matrimonial disputes were brought before the Rondas (see Gitlitz and Rojas,1985:131). Evidently, the original scope for which the Rondas were created was overridden.

At the same time, the relation of the community towards officialdom, in essence chiefly negative but of a blurred nature, started to become more differentiated. Now the Ronderos not only fought against the "Small Thieves", the "Big Thieves" also had to be eradicated.

Originally concerned with self-defense, the Rondas perceptibly were becoming instances of self-development.

3.2. Organisational structure of the Rondas

The organisational structure of the Rondas can be divided into two systems: the participatory or "horizontal" system and the imposed or "vertical" system.

3.2.1. The horizontal system

The basic structure of the Rondas organisation is rooted on territorial features:its basic instance is the hamlet. The hamlet is divided into several sectors, which are the minimal unit in the organisational scale.

Every Sectoral Committee organises an appropriate number of Ronda Groups, consisting each of 5 to 15 members. Each Ronda Group has a leader, an elected Ronda Chief, and has to patrol alternately once to twice a week. All men of the sector, from 17 to 60 years of age, have to enrol in a Ronda Group and participate in the night guard duties from 8 p.m to 5 a.m.. In case of non-appearance, fines in cash have to be paid to the delegate of the Sectoral Committee (Irigoyen,1987:27). Widows, the elderly and the handicapped are exempted from Ronda duties.

Women are free to enlist and join the night patrols, but they rarely do so (CIPCA,1988:10). Moreover women are organised in **Women's Committees** at the sector level (see section 3.7.).

The **Hamlet Ronda** is coordinated by a publicly elected **Directory** with up to 11 appointees (³¹). Its main function is to coordinate with the different sectors, chair the monthly meetings of the **General Assembly** - the highest organisational level in the hamlet -, and implement the agreements taken. All adults living in the hamlet, men and women over 18, are members of the **General Assembly** and have equal voting right; attendance at the gatherings is compulsory. All the important decisions concerning the hamlet are taken by the **General Assembly** in a democratic manner.

3.2.2. The vertical model of organisation

At higher levels the **Hamlet Rondas** are represented only through elected delegates within a system of federations. That is, at the district, departmental and national levels in the corresponding federations. The federations fulfil similar functions as the **Directories** at the hamlet level does (see Appendix No.2). Above the hamlet level, the direct control of the base over its organisation is no longer as present, which imperils the guarantee that the interests of the base are adequately represented. In fact, this vertical structure reflects the influence of political parties currently engaged in advising the **Rondas**. This model responds to a centralist ideology, more appropriate to urban realities (Gonzales and Chavez,1990:62).


Democratic participation is the most salient characteristic of this peasant organisation. This trait is evident at the "lower" levels up to the **Hamlet Ronda**. And although the **Rondas Campesinas** try to act directly for the interests of the peasantry they have not been able, yet, to break with the custom of being "represented" through others, mainly "white collars", and/or spokesmen and -women of different gremial organisations.

Further, the definition of the vertical organisational structure responds to inadequate administrative criteria: district, province and departmental divisions are artificial boundaries. The peasants have organised their regional spaces "on the basis of the established social relations , the "limits" of the region (being) determined by the reach of the production and circulation spheres" (de Wit,1989c:12, my translation). These facts have not been not taken into account, despite several official attempts to "regionalise" the country (³²).

³¹ The **Directory** consists of: **President, vice-President, Secretary of Organisation, Secretary of Self-Defense and Discipline, Sub-Secretary of Self-Defense and Discipline, Secretary of Peasant Justice, Sub-Secretary of Peasant Justice, Secretary of Economy, Secretary of Press, Secretary of Sports, Secretary of Agriculture.** All **Ronda Group** leaders also belong to the **Hamlet's Directory** (see Appendix No.2)

³² "It is clear from the nature and direction of regionalisation, as envisaged in the Constitution of 1979, that administrative deconcentration, rather than political decentralisation, linked to regional democratic control, was the funding objective" (Slater,1989:197).

The following scheme summarises the organisational structure of the Rondas Campesinas:



Notes: The triangular form should show that although several "back-up" instances have been built-in at different levels, the "information-processing network" remains "short-circuited". The open ends of the base show that the Rondas are un-linked and atomized (see La Mond Tullis, 1970:42-43). In opposition to that, the circle represents grassroots participation at all decision-making levels and a functioning communication system within the hamlet.

3.3. Self-defense and "Peasant Justice"

The armed (³³) night patrols police the neighbourhoods of their sector, eventually forcing any passerby or vehicle to stop, present a proof of identity and explain the reason for "meandering" at such late hours. In the case of irregularities, the person is detained until dawn and if necessary turned over to the next police station (Irigoyen,1988:45).

As soon as a Ronda Group is informed of the occurrence of a crime, it organises search patrols coordinating with the neighbouring hamlets (depending on the gravity of the case one to three fireworks are shot off, and the people immediately gather). The investigation of the case is undertaken and proofs are gathered, suspects detained. The Hamlet Ronda Directory calls for a general assembly of the hamlet concerned, and organises a trial with the help of the members of an ad-hoc elected "Commission of Peasant Justice".

The suspect has a genuine right to defend him- or herself or through others (often relatives), and the procedure is documented by the secretary. Once the suspect is sentenced, the sanction is applied immediately. But the convict has the right to appeal. Sometimes, due to a lack of proof, the suspect is released (op.cit.:36).

"Peasant Justice" includes many aspects of the official law system in Peru (³⁴) Yet, it also recreates traditional forms of law use, and incorporates constructive experiences. It would be wrong to describe the justice the Rondas administer as only based upon traditional "principles and experiences which they learned from the elder" as Garcia (1988:4) suggests. The substantial difference between this form of justice and the official juridical system relies on the dynamism of its management rather than in its essence.

3.4. Sanctions

The understanding of law within the Rondas is intrinsically related to the idea of rehabilitation (Irigoyen,1988:46-49). The need for sanction derives from the real danger a cattle thief represents for the survival of a household, and the threat the existence of armed gangs signify for the hamlet. But more important than the action of sanctioning is the act of repentance. In a case reported by Irigoyen (1988:47) a person that had stolen a few garlincs bulbs from his neighbour, was sanctioned more roughly than had been the case of a reincident cattle thief. This was because the he would not "regret" what he'd done and didn't promise not to do it again. Such an attitude towards justice, where public repentance functions as an effective mechanism in preventing crime, is based in the reciprocal character of the society.

³³ "Most Ronderos only have machetes (bush knives), knives, or wooden clubs. Nearly every Ronda Group has some sort of rifle, shotgun or pistol. Most firearms are old, many are out of order and other ones are home-made." (Gitlitz and Rojas,1985:129, my translation).

³⁴ Notwithstanding the fact that the official law system in Peru is a result of imported values and doctrines, imposed on a completely different environment with other historical and social contexts. "...thus in a highly stratified society, the right to equality was interpreted as equality within each social stratum, the right to property proclaimed by the French Revolution aimed to mobilise the feudal property, ministered to defend the interests of the big landowners; in the agricultural context, a single monopolistic juridical system was imposed" (Irigoyen,1987:17, my translation).

"Moral" sanctions would be senseless in an individualised vicinity where this kind of social control does not work (³⁵).

Minor offences are punished with warnings. These are emitted in written form, with the signature of the commission's members and of the convict him/herself, whereby he/she promises to "behave" correctly in future (Irigoyen, 1988:35-36).

More serious violations face harder sanctions such as physical punishment (beating with a whip), forced night guarding (every night, during a specific period of time), obligatory communal work (repairing a school wall, clearing a path, or working on the injured person's field (*ibid*). Boycott and expulsion from the hamlet are the hardest sanctions applied (³⁶).

The sentenced might be given some responsibility within the Ronda organisation, although initially under close supervision. As a matter of fact, many ex-thieves became good Ronderos, even outstanding Ronda leaders (*op.cit.*:47). In opposition to this, "in the formal system of the country, a convict is officially considered re-socialised 5 years after released. What really happens is another matter" (*op.cit.*:46, my translation).

The Women's Committees are in charge of the discipline during the trial. Often it is the women who carry out the sanction. Irigoyen (1988) explains this as an educational and also protective measure. Men beaten by women publicly are an affront to manliness and thus function effectively as dissuasive, also men beaten by women would restrain to impeach the act to the police for they would feel ashamed.

3.5. Relations to the state

The reaction of the state to the formation of the Rondas was at first of a benevolent nature but soon changed into a repressive one.

As mentioned earlier, the creation of the Rondas in Cuyumalca was positively encouraged by the governor and the sub-prefect who saw in this organisation an armed "para-police" force. When the organisation developed its own dynamics, its legal status was increasingly questioned.

Two basic attitudes express the State-Rondas relations : cooperation and conflict.

3.5.1. Cooperation between Rondas and the state

³⁵ Self-criticism seems to have been a tradition among the pre-Hispanic inhabitants of the region under study. Pizarro's brother reported in 1571 a tradition of the Cuismano : "A shocking (sic) fact was that these Indians practised confession..and they would do so by telling their "ochas", that in their language means faults, and would confess if they had stolen something or put up a fight, if they had served their superiors correctly, if they hadn't venerated the Devil (sic) and other devils.." Cited in Silva Santisteban, 1986:27, my translation).

³⁶ In 1984, I witnessed a case where a former Ronda leader in the hamlet of Iraca Grande, did not accept the verdict of the Tribunal concerning a definition of boundaries with a neighbour. When a delegation came to his house, in order to force him to recognize the new limits of his plot, he fired at them. After a short siege, he gave up, but next day denounced the members of the delegation to the police of Chota (city). By doing so, the man broke one of the most important "Commandments of the Rontero"(see appendix No.3). His "betrayel" was considered of the worst kind mainly because the accused was a former leader. He was boycotted. This meant that nobody spoke to him, nor to the members of his household. After four months of isolation, he took his family to the Coast, and is said to have bought a small plot there.

The initial purpose of forming night guarding groups as a helping arm of the police, still forms the grounds for the cooperative attitude of some Rondas vis a vis officialdom. This happens in remote areas, where police presence is quasi unknown. Still, even this cooperation has evolved and the Ronderos no longer let themselves be treated as unpaid rural guards.

When a suspect is handed over, or the police requires the help of a Ronda in the search for a runaway, the Rondas treat the case internally and hand over the person only when his/her culpability has actually been established. This is the case in the hamlets organised as "Rondas Pacificas", where, in opposition to the independent Rondas, its members patrol unarmed and "Peasant Justice" is not practised (Irigoyen, 1988:23).

3.5.2. Conflict relations with the state

The above mentioned situation of cooperation remains the exception. The state officials have reacted to the formation of the Rondas mainly with an increase in repressive actions. Among them is the intent of splitting the organisation by forming a parallel institution, the use of different means of co-optation, the use of blunt violence and the creation of legal obstacles.

The "Rondas Pacificas" received complete support from officialdom, especially after APRA won the 1985' general elections. Notwithstanding that the President of the Rondas Pacificas - a wealthy trader of Chota who has occupied important public posts - is facing trial on an accusation on bribery and misuse of governmental funds (Garcia, 1988:10, n.3). This parallel institution has undoubtedly weakened the peasant movement in the region.

Local government attempts to co-optate the movement are commonplace. For instance, it is common use that officials pay a visit to the hamlets one or two days before the Rondas organise a major meeting, and distribute checks to "their" Rondas; Garcia (1988:2) reports that in 1987, 30 public fund checks of 100,000 Intis each were used for this purposes (see also Burga, 1988:95; "El Rondero" No.8-9, 1988:19).

However, the most common reaction of the state to the Ronda phenomenon has been blunt repression.

Many times, when a suspect was handed over to the police, instead of putting the individual behind bars, the entire Ronda Commission would be imprisoned. The harassment against the Ronda leaders has become routine. This abusive behaviour sometimes triggered violent reactions and ended in a jacquerie type of protests (CIPCA, 1988:29-38).

Under the Belaunde regime (1980-1985) the local police detachment of ten regular men in the city of Chota, was augmented by a whole command. Such "privileges" are normally reserved to the capitals of the 25 Departments of Peru (Revilla, 1988:32).

Albeit, clashes with Ronderos, quite common in the early days, have diminished but they are not less violent. The shooting of 8 Ronderos during a row about land rights in the hacienda Santa Clara in 1988, and the killing of 12 other peasants in Paredones and Monte Carlo in the Department of Piura, evidence the state's recalcitrant attitude. (CIPCA, 1988:32)

Further undertakings against the Rondas involve a "legal battle". After years of struggle, the Rondas were officially recognised by the state in 1986.

The legal article (for translation see ³⁷) appears to be a hybrid between the two motions presented to Parliament by the APRA and by UNIR (CIPCA,1988:59). Therefore, the Rondas are accepted to be "pacifist, democratic and autonomous" and to take part in the solution of "whatever crime" that occurs in their area. But at the same time the Rondas are supposed to be "duly registered by the local authority", with whom they are due to "cooperate". Also the fact that the Rondas have their own and unique charter is denied by the Reglament: "Their statutes and rules are to be directed by the norms of the Comunidades Campesinas established by the Constitution and the Civil Act". Although the Ronderos consider this Reglament as a provocation (e.g. it only considers men to be Ronda members) and the need for an adequate accreditation is pending, the Rondas Campesinas do have a legal basis (Estela,1987:57-66, see also Dammert,1988).

Another "classical" harassment is to declare the Rondas guilty of kidnapping and of violating human rights. Yet, the detention of suspects and/or the search of private grounds respond to logic in a region where endemic banditry has to be combated, and such acts cannot be considered of an arbitrary nature. Nevertheless, these charges do create problems for the Rondas, especially in today's political context where kidnapping is brought into relation with terrorist activities (Estela,1987).

It remains questionable whether the different attempts at manipulation can ever succeed in destroying the Ronda movement. On the contrary, these expressions of the impositive nature of the state are apparently contributing to develop more horizontal solidarities among the "Ronderos" and "Ronderas".

3.6. Community development: a space for the Rondas

As the awareness of the need for an appropriate justice developed, "Ronderos" and "Ronderas" also perceived the necessity of engaging in other activities beneficial to the community. Indeed, the fact of protecting the communal assets also involved the idea of gaining control over their use in order to prevent deterioration. As the Rondas became more inward-oriented, the adequate use of communal resources became an obvious mechanism to reduce the generalised pauperization caused by the country's major economic crisis.

The consciousness of the development potential of the Rondas was not immediate. The first indications came from the positive socio-economic effects of the control over robbery and night-guarding activity.

Cattle were now able to sleep outside during the night and no longer did they share the household's dwelling, until then maintained under extreme unhygienic conditions. Eventual costs for the building of robber-proof sheds could now be saved. Animal manure, a basic input at the smallholder's level, was now naturally spread, fertilising the pastures.

³⁷ The Rondas Campesinas are legally recognised as "pacific, democratic and autonomous, whose members are duly registered with the corresponding political authority as organisations at the service of the community and who contribute to the development of social peace, without partidarian aims. Further their objectives are to defend their lands, guard their cattle and other goods, cooperating with the authorities in the elimination of whatever crime. Their statutes and rules are to be directed by the norms of the Comunidades Campesinas established by the Constitution and the Civil Act". (Estela,1987:66, my translation)

The Ronda Groups guaranteed that valuable tools such as ploughs, iron bars, shovels etc., now left outside the house during night time did not disappear. The same applied to the maize shafts and other crops left under the house's roof to dry (Benites,1990).

A major achievement of the Rondas has been the restoration of security and confidence within and between the hamlets. As a peasant testimony reports: "Its' a new world here. We can raise our cattle again thanks to our efforts" (CCRCTVI,1986:14). Within this optimistic context the determination of the "Ronderos" and "Ronderas" to do something for their hamlet became rewarding.

Communal development activities as a sign of a process from "below" have been organised by different Rondas, as from the mid-eighties. The accomplishment of these tasks are organised by the Hamlet Rondas Directories, in accordance with the decisions taken by the General Assembly. The work is done with the compulsory contribution of all community members. Resourceful use is made of locally available materials, e.g. mud and stones for construction. The costs for external inputs such as cement, iron, zinc roofs, etc. are either covered by the Rondas' own funds (collected from fines and fees for justice services) or are co-financed in coordination with local development agencies, i.e. the state and/or NGO's. (IINCAP,1988).

Some Rondas have formed special committees who become acquainted with technical issues concerning specific development projects conceived by the Rondas. One example is the squad of qualified para-medical development agents of Iraca Grande. The training is organised by a local NGO and some state agents, and the community maintains the "semi-professionals" when in service with food and sleep (ibid).

The communal development actions organised by Rondas include the following:

- The construction and improvement of school infrastructures and facilities,
- the building of Primary Health Centres or more modest medical stores,
- the canalization of drinking water supplies,
- the erection of communal houses,
- the repair and construction of pathways, roads and bridges,
- the performance of soil conservation practices such as the re-construction of ancient terraces and other erosion controlling measures such as reforestation schemes,
- the execution of small irrigation schemes,
- the recovery of traditional ecologically adapted land use systems (³⁸)
- the realisation of cultural events,
- and the supervision of market places and the control of prices.

(Sources: Revilla,1988:6; "El Rondero", Nos.1,2,4-5,8-9,10; Gonzales and Chavez,1990:97,118; ILLA,1987:32-33; Burga,1988:94); Lopez,1988:210; Estela,1987:28; Irigoyen,1987:24; PRATEC,1988).

³⁸ Traditional andean production systems provide a balanced yield while guaranteeing the maintenance of the soil's fertility. They consist roughly of crop rotation, mixed cropping, use of organic fertilisers and natural crop protection methods. The Ronderos and Ronderas have adopted a mixed system, where ecological agriculture and conventional practices are combined oriented towards the maximum use of local resources, at the same time preventing their long-term deterioration (PRATEC,1988).

The Rondas Campesinas have also re-created cultural spaces. It is mainly in relation to local events, such as "Ronda anniversaries", that cultural programmes are organised. They consist of the public performance of popular songs, dances, theatre and poetry. Historical anecdotes, Ronda episodes and other events related to the life of the hamlet are thus saved into the collective memory of the communities (Estela,1987:28).

The general assemblies, where common matters are discussed on a regular basis, and the patrolling activity in small groups have created instances of information exchange, reflection and discussion, furthering thus cultural development.

The Rondas' increasing importance in the production process and the role they play in securing popular culture have reassured the peasants' identity, and as such has reinforce their claim-making potential.

3.7. Participation of women in the Rondas

The subordination of women to men has been a feature in the rural society of Peru, especially since the Spaniards arrived, until today (³⁹). Changes in the sexual division of labour came about in a drastic way with the strong out-migration of men to the mines. Women had to take over all the production operations as well as having the responsibility for the reproduction of the household's economy.

In such regions where the peasant population was displaced and relegated to marginal lands, ecological deterioration, determined by the loss of control over natural resources, occurred increasingly. The subsequent deforestation due to land shortage, over-use of the soil and overgrazing, meant longer walks in the search for firewood and grazing spots for the animals, chores for which women and girls were responsible.

Along with the process of proletarianisation, women that were forced to sell their labour force, in general became lower wages than men. Discrimination occurred not only at the level of labour relations but also within the peasant organisations, at the representational level:" The women were paid less than male workers and this (fact) was ignored by the unions" (Flores-Saenz,1977:142).

Women's participation in agriculture is commonly underestimated. Rogers (1989) mentions the findings of Deere (in a study carried out in Cajamarca) and points out that a detailed investigation revealed that 86% of all rural women actively participated in agricultural production (Rogers,1980:165).

Indeed, "women play a primary role in decision-making on economical matters within the household, and, far from being marginalised from productive activities, they have a

³⁹ A peasant's testimony, recorded by Gonzales and Chavez (1990:148, my translation) helps to evaluate women's discrimination in the rural areas of Cajamarca: "...we get up early in the morning and get the food ready, we milk the cow and feed the chicken, later we serve the food to the husband so he can go to work. Then we go, together with my small children to look for firewood, as it is rare around here we have to walk quite a lot to find only little. Home again, we take the animals to graze or wash the laundry or look after the garden. When my husband returns in the afternoon, tired, he tells me that I am a lazy woman, that I do nothing and that I pass my time spinning wool".

determinating role in the agricultural production" (Gonzales and Chavez,1990:137, my translation, see also ⁴⁰).

The incorporation of women in processes of social transformation has remained ineffectual. The radical Land Reform of 1969 did little to change traditional patterns of women's discrimination, which are still very actual. "Of fifteen agrarian reform production cooperatives in the province (of Cajamarca), only five had female members, and overall, women constituted only 2 percent of the total cooperative membership." "...the only women who became cooperative members were widows or single mothers with children under eighteen years of age" (Deere,1984:179).

Female peasant-oriented organisations which are generally of an impositive nature have been promoted by governmental and non-governmental institutions in the region. "Mother Clubs" are very common: they consist of groups where women have to take part in training courses on knitting, sowing, etc. and receive (generally EC-donated) food rations in return. As Gonzales and Chavez (1990:154) correctly point out, these approaches reveal an attitude towards women which is essentially urban (woman = "housewife") and discriminating for it concentrates on the family welfare (e.g. family nutrition), but does not take into account the needs and wishes of peasant women.

In opposition to the cases mentioned above, within the Rondas the women have fought their way through. The Women's Committees allow women to secure important spaces of participation.

A major role women play is the one of keeping discipline. This function evolved from the insistence women put to the front in sending their husbands out to guard whenever it was their turn. Indeed, as animal husbandry falls into the responsibility of women (according to the prevailing sexual division of labour in the region) cattle thefts concerned women seriously; also women were often left alone, and thus more exposed to criminals.

Keeping discipline involves controlling male participation in night guarding, keeping order during the assemblies, participation in "Peasant Justice Commissions" as well as executing some of the sanctions, like public punishments ⁴¹).

Women also organise cultural events (see section 3.6), where they take part not only by supplying the food and home-made beer (chicha), but also with songs, dances and theatre

⁴⁰ For Gonzales and Chavez (1990:138) a correct analysis of the sexual division of labour in the process of agricultural production has to take into account the following aspects: Who produces the means of production? Who provides services associated to the production activities? Who transforms and processes agricultural products? Who transports, stores and commercialises the crops and other farm produces?

⁴¹ With the increasing participation of women in "Peasant Justice Commissions", the nature of the sanctions changed. The conventional physical punishment became more rare and was replaced by educational punishments such as communal-oriented forced work (Gonzales and Chavez,1990:159)

performances (Estela,1987:28).

Through these spaces women are able not only to participate in the decision-making processes concerning communal matters, but can also make public household problems such as violence and male abandonment ("El Rondero" No.10,1989:21), until then, kept under the husband's dominion. Male domination patterns are far from being removed, yet the Women's Committees have taken important steps towards emancipation by creating gender awareness among the Ronda members, women and men.

CHAPTER IV : THE EXPANSION OF THE RONDAS CAMPESINAS

4.1. Numerical and geographical importance of the Rondas

The Rondas extended rapidly not only to the neighbouring hamlets of Cuyumalca, but also to further districts, provinces and other Departments.

By the end of 1977 nearly the whole valley of the Chota river, including some 70 hamlets, was organised in Rondas (Gitlitz and Rojas,1985:116). In 1978 the Rondas had covered the province of Chota (Benites,1990:4).

The movement spread to all the province of Hualgayoc and to the southern parts of Cutervo by 1980. Five years later, the Rondas were found in all the central region of Cajamarca, parts of Jaen and of San Ignacio and in most southern provinces of the Department (Gitlitz and Rojas,1985:126 and 141).

In 1988, more than 10 national Departments, among them Tumbes, Piura, Lambayeque, La Libertad, Ancash, Huanuco, Lima, Amazonas and San Martin, were represented at the II Rondas' Congress through Ronda delegates (Gonzales and Chavez,1990:84), at a point where in the Department of Cajamarca there were "more than 1000 Hamlet Rondas" (Burga,1988:93). Table No.1 gives a general overview on the chronological expansion of the Ronda movement.

4.2. The expansion mechanisms

The evident effectiveness and the consequences of their internal evolution, became the warrant for a rapid expansion of the movement. The "Ronderos" and "Ronderas" themselves have been its most salient promoters. Ronda meetings, visits of Ronda delegations to non-Ronda areas, radio programmes and newspapers (⁴²), decidedly contributed to its rapid expansion.

The influence of political parties and of the Church have also remained of vital importance for the expansion of the Rondas. Despite the fact that the Ronderos say that "Nobody came to tell us how to form the Rondas. We did it all ourselves. And now we do not want the politicians to mingle. The Ronda has to remain a unique front."(CCRTVI,1986:13;my translation). Albeit, decisive regional, interregional and national meetings of the Rondas have been organised by political parties and/or sponsored by the Church (see reports of Ronda congresses in bibliography list).

Thus, the Rondas' geographical expansion was and is supported by four main factors: Their own members, the media, external institutions and regional Ronda meetings. The latter are of different nature: meetings may be aimed at coordinating activities, at improving the effectiveness of the Rondas and the conducting capacity of their leaders and at increase agro-technical skills through training courses, some in co-operation with local state and/or NGO's.

Table No.2 gives a general overview on the type of Ronda meetings.

⁴² As an example, the local newspaper of Piura, "El Correo" reported in September of 1985 that thanks to the action of the Rondas "cattle thieving has been reduced to zero" in Sapillica, where two years before it was thriving."(CIPCA,1988:22, my translation).

Table No.1 : Chronological and geographical expansion of the Rondas (1976-1988), partial data

<u>Year</u>	<u>Existence of Rondas</u>	<u>References</u>
1976	Formation of the first Ronda Campesina in Cuyumalca.	See Section 2.1./RP
1977	70 Hamlet Rondas along the Chonta River.	Gitlitz et al.,1985:116
1979 and 1980	Rondas in all districts of the province of Chota, in Cutervo and Succha, province of Cutervo and some in districts of the province Hualgayoc.	Op.cit:126
1982	First Rondas in the province of Jaen.	Lumba,1989:56
1983	First Rondas in the Department of Piura.	CIPCA,1988:22
1985	Rondas in all districts of central Cajamarca, most of the districts in the northern region, mainly along the Maranon River (see map). First Urban Rondas in the province of Jaen.	Gitlitz et al.,1985:196 Lumba,1989:56
1987	Rondas in most districts in the provinces of: Hualgayoc,Santa Cruz, Celendin, Cajamarca,San Marcos, Contumaza, San Pablo, San Miguel and Cajabamba. Rondas in the Departments: Amazonas, San Martin, La Libertad, Lambayeque,Ancash and Huanuco. 10 Urban Rondas in the province of Jaen.	ILLA,1987:19 Estela,1987:19 Lumba,1989;57
1988	More than 1000 Rondas in the Department of Cajamarca. More than 10 departments were represented through Ronda delegates at the II Ronda Congress 726 Rondas (approx.50,000 peasants),Dept. of Piura	Burga,1989:93 CIPCA,1988:27

Table No.2 : Type of Ronda meetings (1987-1988) , a selection.

<u>D A T E</u>	<u>P L A C E</u>	<u>E V E N T</u>	<u>P A R T I C I P A N T S</u>
June 24th	Nationwide	National Day of the Peasant	All peasant organisations
Once a year	Local	Ronda Anniversary	All Hamlet Rondas
Monthly	Local	General assembly	Every Hamlet Ronda
27.-29./09 1985	Chota	First Departmental Congress of Rondas Campesinas	Representatives of Hamlet Rondas and delegates of the province of Jaen
09.-11./11 1985	Piura	First Departmental Convention of Rondas Campesinas	More than 500 peasants from Piura and Tumbes
07./02 1986	Sullana /Piura	Formation of Ronda	50 peasants
21.-22./02	Jaen	I Zonal Meeting of Rondas	Hamlet Rondas of district
13.-15./03 1987	Puruay/ Cajamarca	First Congress of the Provincial Federation of Rondas	District Federations and Hamlet Rondas' delegates
27.-29./03 1987	Lima	First National Meeting of Rondas	Delegates from several Departments
23.-25./09 1987	Sorochocho/ /Cajamarca	I Training Course on Peasant Justice	Rondas delegates
16.-17./87	Chota	II Departmental Meeting of Rondas	Ronda delegates
26.28./05 1988	Cajamarca	II Departmental Congress of Rondas	860 delegates from 10 Departments
01./06 1988	Piura	Third Departmental Convention of Rondas Campesinas	More than 400 delegates of 136 Sectoral Committees representing 10,284 peasants
18.-20./07 1988	Sorochocho /Cajamarca	Meeting on Rural Development	Representatives of the districtal federation and local teachers
19.-20./08 1988	Tual /Cajamarca	II Training Course on Organisation	70 delegates of Sectoral Committees
November 1988	Cajamarca	I Training Course on Seeds Technology in the Andes	Representatives of the departmental federation and delegates of the
	district of Sorochocho, the		Ministry of Agriculture, and local NGO's
20.21./01 1989	Curgos/ La Libertad	First Districtal Meeting	Rondas of the district and Districtal Federation
23./02 1989	Encanada/ Cajamarca	Creation of a District Federation	Representatives of Departmental Federation and 26 Sectoral Committee

Sources: "El Ronderito", all numbers; CCRCTVI, 1986; Burga, 1988; CIPCA, 1988; Gonzales and Chavez, 1990:84.

4.3. Variants of the Rondas

Replications of the Cuyumalca model have been experimented throughout the country. Rondas have also appeared in urban zones, namely as self-defense organisations in shanty towns. Another variant of the Rondas are the para-military Rondas, created under Belaunde (1983) and strongly enhanced by the government of Garcia (1985-90) in zones where terrorist activities are strongest.

4.3.1. Urban Rondas

As a result of the massive rural-urban migration of the last 40 years, the country has been transformed. Indeed, in 1950, the percentage of rural population was of 70%, today it is reduced to near 30%, while masses of people have accrued the shanty suburbs of the metropolises. The Urban Rondas became a logic response to the local authorities's incapacity (sometimes due to indifference or complicity) to cope with the levels of delinquency and violence typical for such quarters (Lumba,1989:56).

4.3.2. The Paramilitary Rondas

Due to the effectiveness of the Rondas in Cajamarca as a barrier to the penetration of terrorist groups like Sendero Luminoso and the Tupac Amaru Movement (CIPCA,1988:11; also see ⁴³), the model has been copied by the military and instaurated as a counter-insurgency strategy. The Rondas Campesinas in the military occupied zones ("emergency zones") are a mixed model: Vietnam and Central American practices ("model villages") fused with local experiences (Gonzalez,1988). They are awkwardly weaponed and untrained peasant groups who are supposed to repel terrorist attacks in remote areas, in coordination with the military. The so-called Civil Defense Committees are the backbone of that organisation.

These Rondas "only act against those "terrorists" who have been identified as such by the military; generally these are teachers, peasant leaders and local leftist authorities" (Kirk in CIPCA,1988:28, my translation). So far, the result of this strategy has caused these groups to become an easy target and that more peasants have been killed (ibid).

⁴³ "A group of people came here, saying they were senderistas and they invited us to join files with them. We told them to leave, if not we'd kill them. They answered we were working together with the repression, with the police. We denied ti, saying that we peasants didn't want them, we didn't ask them to come, we are able to defend ourselves by making justice on behalf of the majorities. They left and we haven't seen them since."(A Rondero's testimony quoted in Gonzales,1987:74; see also CIPCA,1988: 9 and 11))

CHAPTER V : THE RONDAS CAMPESINAS : A UNIT FOR PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT ?

This chapter will analyze the potentialities and the weaknesses of this peasant movement and thereby try to answer an important question raised by this research paper: how stable are the Rondas as agents fomenting a participatory development?

5.1 The concept of participation

Participation is being used very broadly, especially in the last decade it has become a "bandwagon". Participation can be understood as passive observation and can also be synonymous of autonomy. Zutter (1985:42) classifies participation in relation to the involvement of two or more actors in the process of decision-making. His scale has the following levels:

Low level	L1) Right to access to information
	L2) Right to give opinions
	L3) Right to make proposals
Participation	L4) Right to co-manage and take part in the decision -making process through delegates
High level	L5) Right to autonomous decision-making

In most "participatory" development programmes and projects in rural areas of Peru, the real participation of the "target group" populations ends at level two, some reach level three, rarely level four. This is due to the fact that most projects are conventionally designed for the poor, near to none are designed by the poor. (personal field observation).

A participatory development should guarantee the take part of the "beneficiaries" at all decision-making, i.e. active participation in :

- the formulation of developmental policies,
- the determination of objectives and strategies
- the elaboration of plans, programmes and projects,
- the attribution of funds and administration of the operations and in,
- the evaluation and control of the results obtained.

Indeed, taking into account that development should be oriented towards self-reliance, it is the nature and quality of participation, as gauged by the criteria mentioned above, which largely determine the success or failure of a specific development programme.

"Where the populace has a voice in defining, or diagnosing its problems -where it enters into a sequence of development decisions and actions early- there development has a solid chance of centring on basic human needs, of attending centrally job-creation, of offering opportunities for the consolidation of local and regional autonomy, of promoting patterns of interdependence of a horizontal type, and of respecting cultural integrity and diversity " Goulet, 1986:33)

From this short conceptual treaty it appears that the Rondas, - an instance where the people themselves are the major problem-solvers -, considering their participative characteristics, have succeeded in becoming a peasant movement that enhances a grassroots-oriented and participative development.

Despite the movement's strong potential in enhancing a "bottom-up" self-

development, it nevertheless reveals certain drawbacks, which, if not taken into account by the Ronderos and Ronderas, might jeopardize the Rondas' further evolution.

5.2. The limitations of the Rondas

Among the handicaps the Rondas face, two can be considered of major importance: the organisational structure and social differentiation. The problems related to the vertical organisational structure - that does not articulate the Rondas' best "atout," namely their basis-democracy -, have already been discussed in section 3.2.2.. The existence of social differentiation as such, but the lack of awareness of its implications, that pose a major hindrance for the Rondas future.

Further, internal frictions which lead to different kind of problems are also present within the movement.

5.2.1. Social differentiation patterns

The Rondas claim to be "an organisation of a broad and unique front", "the minorities must compulsory obey majority decisions"(Rules and statutes of the Rondas Campesinas, see appendix No.2). Parallel to it, the individual's rights are clearly protected: "nobody is to be persecuted, marginalised or reproved for their political, religious, racial or cultural creeds" (op.cit). Further, the Rondas claim that " The Rondas Campesinas condense the interests of all the sectors of the members, who are proportionately represented in the leading organs" (op.cit.).

The idealism expressed by the Rondas when viewing the rural masses as monolithic (see Appendix No.2), is restated in the utopia of the peasant- worker alliance. A unique all-peasant union, "in brotherly union with the proletarian of the city", will ponder the organisation of regional governments (ibid).

But, the worker-peasant alliance is likely to remain an ideal. Indeed, through history peasant and/or worker movements have only joined efforts late, and only in the battle field.

"(During) the Mexican peasant revolution..there was hardly an urban working class to speak of. The Bolivian revolution, while greatly beneficial to the peasants, was mainly the work of the tin miners and an intellectual elite. The Cuban revolutionaries finally achieved the support of the organised urban working class only..when Batista's fall was assured" (4 op.cit.:19).

The interests of urban workers are often opposed to the one's of the rural dwellers and vice-versa be it because of a possible competition for public investments, or due to the fact that low market prices for agricultural products, a truculent issue, often subvention higher industrial wages.

From the above mentioned, it appears that the Rondas do not explicitly recognise the existence of different social classes amidst their organisation. But there is evidence that in the central region of Cajamarca, as in other rural areas in Peru, there are differentiation patterns related to the possibilities of access to means of production.

For this purpose, the data collected by Gitlitz and Rojas (1985:138) on land tenure and

number of livestock per holding in three "Ronda-provinces": Chota, Cutervo and Hualgayoc, is shown in Tables No.3 and No.4


The data shown evidences a strong fragmentation of the land, with a concentration of small holdings on less than 50% of the area and the existence of few farms with access to large quantities of land, considering all regional variances.

The distribution of land designs the production systems, i.e. in a livestock raising area, determines the number of animals per holding.


Table No.4 evidences that the larger holdings have, in average, 7,5'times more animals than the small holdings. The latter represent over 60% of all holdings. Thus, the owners of important animal herds (15 animals and more) benefit more from the patrolling Rondas, than do the large majority of Ronderos, who probably only possess 2 or less cows individually.

**Table No.3 : Social differentiation patterns : Land tenure
in three "Ronda" Provinces: Chota, Cutervo, Hualgayoc.**


Province of Chota : Land tenure, 1972.



Province of Cutervo: Land tenure, 1972.




Province of Hualgayoc: Land tenure, 1972.



Source: Gitlitz and Rojas, 1985:138.

Table No.4 : Social differentiation patterns : Average number of livestock in landholdings of different sizes, in three "Ronda"- provinces: Chota, Cutervo and Hualgayoc. (1972)



Source: Gitlitz and Rojas, 1985:138

Another example of an on-going differentiation process which can originate strong cleavages amidst the Rondas, is the existence of some cocaine laboratories in rural areas of the region, owned by former peasants who now are wealthy traders (personal information).

5.2.2. Other drawbacks

Internal frictions within the Rondas generate problems for the organisation. One of the problems encountered is absenteeism.

The fact that some households do not join the organisation has two possible explanations

- the fear of being persecuted by the law (i.a. as "kidnapper") and,
- the fact that some Rondas feel practically "jobless".

The former concerns a minority of peasant households who may be particularly exposed i.e dependent on state support for any reason. Nevertheless the ambiguous nature of the Rondas' legal status speaks for this current, to the advantage of the "Rondas Pacificas".

The latter case refers to a common situation found in those hamlets where the Rondas have not unfolded all their potential for community development, remaining basically at the "night-patrolling stage". When, in addition, the hamlet is surrounded by other Rondas, that Ronda Group hardly faces delinquency and the predisposition to continue guarding diminishes.

Consequently, some Rondas have entered a phase of dissolution. Reutlinger (1988) mentions the case of a Ronda that had reduced the number of general assembly meetings to three per year and where the reigning disorientation was allowing internal frictions to take over.

Some cases of corruption have also been reported. Also some Ronda leaders have been accused of abusing their power. Yet, most of the accusations remain very general and "nobody ever described a particular and specific case where such abuses occurred..we conclude that the cases must have been exceptions" (Gitlitz and Rojas,1985:132, my translation). Some of these problems can also be related to the activities of political parties or of religious sects in the region. Among the latter, some categorically forbid their followers to take part in any kind of organisation (Revilla,1988:7).

It is difficult to state whether the problems related to internal frictions are indicators of existing class conflicts, yet the Rondas do provide the necessary spaces for discussion and most Ronda leaders are aware of the existence of such difficulties.

The lack of an explicit awareness of class differentiation, besides the obstacles that the vertical organisation poses, constitutes an important limitation for the movement. The Rondas are still strongly united by "the threats from outside", a fact that postpones the necessity of discussing internal matters such as social differentiation and the consequences it can have in weakening the movement. Class conflicts are present, yet the Rondas do not seem to be prepared to face them.

Similar tactical errors have jeopardized other peasant movements before; such is the case of the peasant revolt of La Convencion (see footnote 22) and of the revolutionary movement of Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bastidas (see footnote 15).

CHAPTER VI : CONCLUSIONS

The formation of the Rondas Campesinas

The formation of the Rondas Campesinas in Cuyumalca, in December of 1976, and their later consolidation as a regional and interregional peasant movement, responded to a combination of historical, economic, social and cultural factors. These are summarised below, whereby they have been divided according to their internal or external nature.

A. Internal factors (i.e internal to the peasant community)

1. The legacy of an individualised society where private property was the standard, played an important role in the history of the central region of Cajamarca, where communal-based organisations such as the Peasant Communities hardly emerged. The overwhelming presence of freeholders, who were articulated to the production mode of the hacienda but did not depend solely on it, as a matter of fact, express the strong individuality of the central Cajamarquinos.

Indeed, the first Rondas establish themselves with the prime objective of safeguarding private property. Here, Wolf's point on the significance of the "free" peasants in forging peasant organisations is fully justified. Also Galjart's argument on the relevance of individualism and Landsberger's reference to individual self-interest being the motor of peasant movements, concur with the facts.

Nevertheless, the safeguarding of the community's possessions, as in the case of the school's paraphernalia in Cuyumalca, was also a crucial factor enhancing the surge of the Rondas. Indeed, parallel to the manifestation of individualism, communal interests also played an important role in convincing the peasants to guard all night long. This mixture of apparently contradictory principles, individualism and collectivism, was present at the formation of the Rondas.

2. Another important factor, which is related to the former, was the practical lack of a peasant organisation to represent the interests of the peasantry. The different attempts to organise "rondas" in the past, be it "Rondas de hacienda", "Rondas Nocturnas" or the police-sponsored "Guardias Rurales", had not been successful. However, these experiences did familiarized the local peasants with the effectiveness of such an association. Similarly, the decades of banditry and rural violence in the region, forced nearly everyone not only to learn how to handle arms, but also to develop skills for the formation of intelligence networks. These experiences also became vital for the effectiveness of the Rondas.

It should be noted that banditry did not enhance societal change, on the contrary, it strengthened existing vertical patron-client links.

As pointed out by Singelmann, the availability of successful models of organisation, played an important role towards the genesis of the Rondas. Landsberger's fears on the hindrances that communal experiences may have on a movement's development beyond the community level do not apply for the case of the Rondas.

3. Another significant determinant was the fact that the local peasants had access, although under difficult conditions, to new sources of reference, such as formal education, newspapers and other media.

The experiences made during longer journeys to the Coast –droving cattle or selling household products–, and especially during migration periods, became valuable inputs that rose the abstractive capacity of the central Cajamarquino. This opening of "new horizons", turned out to be a comparative advantage for the region's peasantry.

4. The union experiences of many seasonal migrants enforced their consciousness for the need of representativeness, and sharpened their political competence for the origination of a self-defense organisation. The exposure to this experience, but also the increased capacity to process the new information, and adapt the "know-how" to the local need for better organisational levels, were basic elements that enhanced the rise of the Rondas.

Galjart would call this process 're-socializing'(1976:36). La Mond's first "situation" can be recalled:

- a "structural discrepancy", which can be at the origin of a peasant movement, is caused by a process where "the capacity to process information increases, but the relative opportunity to exercise and utilize do not". This contradiction lead to the surge of the Rondas. Paige's negative assessment of the potential migration experience, namely as a process that "undermines any possible pressure for group solidarity", does not apply here.

Most "internal" factors mentioned by the authors who's study delivered the analytical approach for the present paper also apply for the case of the Rondas. Especially the "awareness of a common goal" appertain to the Rondas reality. The most salient (and maybe only) common goal that fostered the Rondas was an evident one: the need to combat the prevailing state of violence and the on-going cattle raiding. The "frontier" conditions in this faraway region created an "ambiente" of adventure and lawlessness with a tendency to rebel against the central authorities. The continuous state of violence and insecurity that reigned, linked to the abuses and lack of protection on the part of the state officials, impelled the peasants to "take over" and find a way of resolving their problems by themselves.

B. External factors

1. A first and decisive factor that contributed to the generation of the Rondas, was indeed the disappearance of the gamonales and the hacienda system in 1969. Although many of the other factors that lead to the formation of the Rondas, were present before 1969, it is only after this macro-structural change that the Rondas emerged.

All authors reassessed agree in emphasizing the crucial role of a "modernizing elite", or new interests groups, in challenging the existing social order. In the case of Peru this new elite disappeared the former system .

2. Coercion and patronage characterised the social relations of production in the region until 1969, but mainly only for those peasants engaged in direct relations with the gamonales. Yet despite the fact that most peasants were "free" – more than 75% of them were freeholders at the turn of the century –, the development of horizontal solidarities, at conflict with the reigning clientelism, did not succeed. Singelmann and Galjart appear to be correct in seeing coercion and patronage as the major obstacles for the formation of peasant movements, even when not all the peasantry is affected by them.

3. The central Cajamarquino peasants have been strongly, although inadequately articulated to the market economy, for several decades. This was a fact that helped the formation process of the Rondas. The relatively easy access to cash money due to the existence of a domestic market in the region and outside of it, the germane geographical mobility or "tactical mobility" and a relative independence from coercive labour relations, allowed the formation of an individualised capitalization process. This factor backs the motivation for participating in an organisation oriented towards the safeguarding of private property.

However, the "push towards a market economy", which in other words implies the abandonment of subsistence agriculture, did not have the immediate impact that Pearse and Landsberger attribute to it.

4. A very significant factor for the surge of the Rondas, was thus not the integration into the market economy itself, but the impact that the government's return to liberal and IMF-shaped policies, had on the peasant's economy. Indeed it is amidst the generalised crisis that followed Velasco's period, that the Rondas were formed. In Galjart's words this was the "particular event that increased the peasant's frustration".

5. The state also played a major role allowing the surge of the Rondas. The traditional absence of the state as a development agent and its presence as a repressive force, created the perception among the peasantry of a "traditionally negative reference group" (Galjart), and thus furthered the development of horizontal solidarities. Further, the state permitted the peasants to take over spaces normally commandeered by it, for instance by conceding to give up its monopoly on the legitimised use of violence - see Cuyumalca-. And under Velasco, the state had to tolerate the formation of peasant movements in its populist need for legitimation.

Another "threat from the outside" has been the presence of terrorist groups along the boundaries, but also inside the territories "controlled" by Rondas; Sendero Luminoso and Tupac Amaru integrants have successfully being repelled by them (CIPCA,1988:11; Burga,1988:96; Estela,1987:43). This "outside threat" also furthered the movement's cohesion.

6. One more factor played a decisive role: the alliances the peasantry was able to develop. These consisted of links to other peasant organisation (i.a. FEDECC) and to urban circles. Among them was the relation to the Church (Catholic and Protestant), to (two major) political parties and in a minor degree, to local unions. These alliances empowered the peasants to perceive the importance of being organised and helped improve the quality of the Rondas' leaders, but at the same time exposed the organisation to manipulative strives. Again, most authors agree on the important role such alliances play in "opposing the established interests" (Pearse).

A final revision of the elements presented in the analytical approach of this paper, gives right to most authors in their evaluation on the emergence of peasant movements. However, most of them (especially Landsberger, Wolf, Pearse and Paige) emphasize the role "external" factors play. This fact reveals an inherent lack of confidence in the internal forces of peasant movements.

This current of thought, typical for the followers of the Modernisation theory, as can be seen is still widespread among social scientists. The Rondas Campesinas are a proof of the viability of a genuine development from "inside" and from "below". The study of this movement should help those, who still stubbornly believe that development has to be brought to the peasants from "outside" and from "above", to change their views.

The evolution of the Rondas

The Rondas Campesinas not only emerged in response to a specific problem, namely the increasing violence in the rural areas of the provinces in central Cajamarca, but also as a reaction to major social dislocations, set in motion by a radical societal change.

They have evidently surpassed their original scope as self-defense organisation, and in a matter of less than 15 years, they have spread to the rural and/or urban areas of more than ten of the country's departments.

Two major factors have enabled their vertiginous expansion: the practice of basis-democracy (one voice, one vote) and of "Peasant Justice".

The organisational structure of the movement is of a horizontal kind and allows the participation of every member of the hamlet into the decision-making processes. Beyond the hamlet level, the organisational structure becomes vertical and bureaucratic. It is no longer adapted to reality and is, thus, less democratic.

Peasant Justice is equitable, efficient, cheap and above all respected by all Ronda members. Peasant Justice as practised by the Rondas, does not oppose the official judiciary system, it does set, however, the interests of the ensemble before the interests of the individual. It's basic strength relies in the effective implementation.

The participation of women in the Rondas is of a higher relevance than in other peasant organisations in the region. Although female discrimination is still far from being banned, through the Women's Committees, the women can provide a new vision of themselves, understand the causes of their low status and generate more awareness for gender issues.

The success of the Rondas has made it a "model". The state-implemented anti-terrorist "rondas campesinas", are a proof of the fact that this movement cannot be "transported" to an environment with unlike historical, economic, social and cultural values.

Perspectives

The relations of the Rondas with the state are fundamentally antagonistic. The Rondas promote a grassroots-oriented and self-reliant development, and the kind of participation they are claiming for, is inevitably linked to the question of power structures.

The Rondas, thus are challenging the existing order. The relative absence of major conflicts with the state, the local elites, and other interest groups in the region can only be understood within the political context of Peru.

Indeed, for officialdom, the Rondas provide a guarantee against the advancement of terrorism, they maintain the "earth alive" (i.e. keep the peasants on their lands), they contribute to the reduction of rural-urban migration, and they also sandbag the frontiers against the bellicose neighbour, Ecuador.

For the local elites, similar criteria apply, but also for many of them, the Rondas also (still) provide shelter for cocaine-related activities.

The subversive groups do not dare challenge the authority of the Rondas, yet they are aware of the Ronderos' latent hostility against the establishment, which converts them into potential allies, moreover if these are, and they are, armed.

The Rondas have a clear potential to continue enhancing a grassroots-based participatory development in the central region of Cajamarca as well as in other rural areas in the country. However, the feeble organisational structure beyond the hamlet level and the lack of awareness on the existence and implications of social differentiation amidst the Rondas, are serious drawbacks of the movement which might jeopardize the developmental task of the Rondas.

The Rondas' role, as an agent (maybe the agent) of an autonomous regional development in Cajamarca, should be matter of further study.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- ANDEAN GROUP REPORT (1990): Latin American Regional Reports, Issue of 10.10.1990 :4-5, London: Latin American Newsletter.
- AZNARAN, Guillermo (1988): Economia Regional y Descentralizacion Financiera Lima: Concejo Nacional de Ciencias y Tecnologia -CONCYTEC-.
- BENITES ROQUE, Julio (1990): "Las Rondas Campesinas: Un Proyecto de Desarrollo. Democracia, Justicia y Paz Social en el Peru"; Paper presented at the ISS (22.02.1990).
- BRASS, Tom (1989): "Trotskyism, Hugo Blanco and the Ideology of a Peasant Movement". Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol.16, No.2, pp. 173-197, London: F.Cass.
- BURGA, Manuel (1976): De la Encomienda a al Hacienda Capitalista: el Valle de Jetquetepeque del Siglo XVI al XX, Lima : Instituto de Estudios Peruanos
- BURGA, Eduardo (1988): Cajamarca y las Rondas Campesinas : "II Congreso Departamental" In: Socialismo y Participacion, No. 42, pp. 19 - 97. Lima: Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Participacion -CEDEP-.
- CASTILLO, Carmen (1988): "Balance de Investigaciones realizadas como Practicas Profesionales de Tesis", Paper presented at the II Seminario-Taller UNC-PUC in Cajamarca (21.-25./07,1988).
- CHAVEZ ACHONG, Julio (1982): Introduccion al Problema Agrario del Peru, Lima: Talleres TAREA, Centro IDEAS.
- CCRCTVI- COMITE CENTRAL DE RONDAS CAMPESINAS - TUNEL VI - (1986): Rondas Campesinas : Paimos-Piura, Lima: CIPCA, TAREA.
- CRAIG, W.W. (1969): "Peru: The Peasant's Movement of La Convencion", in Latin American Peasant Movements, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
- DAMMERT BELLIDO, Jose (1988): "La Iglesia y las Rondas" QUE HACER No. 52.p.9., Lima: Centro de Promocion para el Desarrollo -DESCO-.
- DEERE, Carmen D.; LEON, Margarita (1987): "Conclusions", Rural Women and State Policy: a Feminist Perspective on Latin American Agriculture, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- DEERE, Carmen (1987): "The Latin American Agrarian Reform", Rural Women and State Policy: a Feminist Perspective on Latin American Agriculture, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- DE WIT, Anton (1989a), "Reforma Agraria en Cajamarca y lo que no se estudio" Mimeo, unpublished.
- DE WIT, Anton; Grande, Arturo (1989b): "Desarrollo Rural y Dinamica Agraria en Cajamarca", mimeo, unpublished.
- DE WIT, Anton; Grande, Arturo (1989c): "Economia Campesina, Historia Ruarl y Caracteristica Productivas: Los Espacios Cajamarquinos", mimeo, unpublished.
- DUNHAM, David (1989): Modernisation Theory, mimeo, The Hague: ISS.
- EICH, Dieter (1983): Ayllu und Staat der Inka, Frankfurt: Vervuert Verlag.
- "El Ronderito" Nos. 1,2 (1986), 4-5 (1987), 8-9 (1988), and 10 (1989), Cajamarca: FEDERACION PROVINCIAL de RONDAS CAMPESINAS de CAJAMARCA.
- ESTELA DIAZ, Rolando (1987): "Reconozcase a las Rondas Campesinas" : Experiencias de Rondas en Cajamarca, Lima: Servicio de Educacion Rural -SER-.
- FED 1-FEDERACION de RONDAS CAMPESINAS de CHOTA, CUTERVO, SAN MIGUEL, HUALGAYOC, CELENDIN (1985): ICongreso Departamental Rondas Campesinas Cajamarca.

- FED 2-FEDERACION de RONDAS CAMPESINAS de CHOTA, CAJAMARCA, LA LIBERTAD, HUARAL, PALLASCA, HUANUCO (1987): I Encuentro Nacional de Rondas Campesinas: Linea Programatica y Organisativa de Autodefensa de Masas, Lima.
- FED 3-FEDERACION de RONDAS CAMPESINAS de CAJAMARCA; RAMIREZ, Antonio (1986): Acerca de las Rondas Campesinas, Chota, Peru.
- FEDECC- FEDERACION DE CAMPESINOS DE CAJAMARCA (1972): Wir machen unsere Geschichte selbst, (translation anonymous), West Germany: Agralit.
- FRADEPT-FEDERACION REGIONAL DE PIURA Y TUMBES (1986): Convenciones de las Rondas Campesinas 1985/1986, Piura.
- FLORES-SAENZ, Otto (1977): An Historical Analysis of Peru's Agricultural Export Sector and the Development of Agricultural Technology, London : University of
- GALJART, B.F. (1976): Peasant Mobilization and Solidarity, Amsterdam/Assen: Van Gorem.
- GARCIA, Ines; RUIZ, Patricia; DE WIT, Anton (1988): Resumen del Seminario-Taller sobre Investigacion Agraria en Cajamarca, Convenio UNC/PUC, unpublished report.
- GAYTAN PAJARES, Evelio (1986): "Cajamarca y la Rebelion de Tupac Amaru" in Instituto Nacional de Cultura, Historia de Cajamarca: Siglos XVI-XVIII, Lima: Perugraph.
- GIERHAKE, Klaus (1988): Regionale Entwicklungskonzeptionen in Peru- Programme und Implementation, Schriften des Zentrum der Universitaet Giessen, Hamburg: Verlag Weltarchiv.
- GITLITZ, John; ROJAS, Telmo (1985): "Las Rondas Campesinas en Cajamarca - Peru" APUNTES, No.16, pp.115 - 141., Lima: Universidad del Pacifico.
- GONZALES, Michael (1989) "Chinese Plantation Workers and Social Conflict in Peru, in the late Nineteenth Century", Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol.21:285-424, London
- GONZALES, Eduardo; CHAVEZ, Laura (1990): La Organizacion Campesina en Peru: las Rondas Campesinas de Cajamarca, Doctoraal thesis, University of Amsterdam, Faculty of Non-Western Anthropology.
- GONZALES, Raul (1987): "Campesinos Ronderos y Guerra Antisubversiva : tres experiencias", QUE HACER, Vol.46, pp.72-79., Lima: DESCO.
- GITLITZ, John; ROJAS, Telmo (1985): "Las Rondas Campesinas en Cajamarca - Peru" APUNTES, No.16, pp.115 - 141., Lima: Universidad del Pacifico.
- GOULET, D. (1986): Participation in Development : New Avenues, Indiana: University of Notre Dame, unpublished.
- GUZMAN, V.; VARGAS, V. (1981): El Campesinado en La Historia, Lima: Centro IDEAS
- HOBSBAWN, E. (1969): "Social Banditry", H. Landsberger (editor) Rural Protest: \peasnat Movements and Social Change, International Institute for Labour Studies, Edinburgh:Clark Ltd.
- HUIZER, Gerrit (1980): Peasant Participation in Latin America and its Obstacles: an Overview of Conflict-Resolution Strategies, ISS Occasionnal Papers No.82, The Hague: ISS.
- IINCAP- Instituto de Capacitacion e Investigacion "Jorge Basadre" (1988): Ezbozo del Programa de Manejo Integral de dos Cuencas a Nivel de la Provincia de Chota: 1989-1992, Chota, unpublished project report.
- ILLA -Centro de Educacion y Comunicacion (1988): Organicemos Rondas Campesinas, Lima: Arius.
- ILLA -Centro de Educacion y Comunicacion (1987): Rondas Campesinas de Cajamarca, Lima: TAREA.
- INSTITUTO NACIONAL de CULTURA (1986): Historia de Cajamarca: Siglos XVI-XVIII, Lima: Perugraph.

KAY, Cristobal (1983): "Agrarian Reform in Peru: An Assessment", A.Kumar Ghose (editor) Agrarian Reform in Contemporary Developing Countries :185-239, London: Cross Helm.

KAY, Cristobal (1989): Latin American Theories of Development and Underdevelopment New York and London : Routledge

KLAREN, Peter (1970): Formacion de las Haciendas Azucareras y Origenes del Apra, Lima :Instituto de Estudios Peruanos IEP.

LA MOND, Tullis (1970): Lord and Peasant in Peru: A Paradigm of Political and Social Change, Masachussets: Harvard University Press.

LAJO, Manuel (1986): La Reforma Agroalimentaria, Cusco: Centro Bartolome de las Casas.

LANDSBERGER, H.A. (1969): "the role of Peasant Movements and Revolts in Development", Latin American Peasant Movements, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

LANDSBERGER, H.A. (1974): "Peasant Unrest : Themes and Variations, H.A. Landsberger (editor) Rural Protest: Movements and Social Change, London: Macmillan

LANDSBERGER, H.A. and HEWITT, C.N. (1970): "Ten Sources of Weakness and Cleavages in Latin American Peasant Movements", in R.Stavenhagen (editor) Agrarian Problems and Peasant Movements in Latin America, New York: Anchor Books.

LONG, Norman (1980): "Some Concluding Comments: Directive Changes and the Question of Participation", D.Preston (editor) Environment, Society and Rural Change in Latin America, New York, Brisbane, Toronto: John Wiley.

LOPEZ, Jaime (1989): "Ronda y Desarrollo : un Proyecto Campesino", RURALTER, No.5, Lima: Centro Internacional de Cooperacion para el Desarrollo Agricola -CICDA-.

MAC DONALD, A.L. (1976): Agricultural Technology in Developing Countries: Social Factors Related to the Use of Modern Techniques in two Rural Areas in Peru, Rotterdam: University Press.

MARTINEZ, Daniel; TEALDO, Armando (1982): El Agro Peruano 1970 - 1980: Analisis Perspectivas, Lima: CEDEP.

MEDCALF, Juan; MIRES, Alfredo (1982): Historia de los Cajamarquinos, Lima : Centro de Estudios y Publicaciones (CEP).

ONERN-OFFICINA NACIONAL DE EVALUACION DE RECURSOS NATURALES (1986): Perfil Ambiental del Peru, Lima: ONERN.

ORLOVE, B.S. (1973): "Abigeato", Allpanchis, no.5 pp. 65-81, Cusco: Instituto Pastoral de Andino.

PAIGE, J.M. (1975): Agrarian Revolution, New York: The Free Press.

PEARSE, Andrew (1975): The Latin American Peasant, London: Frank Cass.

PETRAS, James F.; LAPORTE Jr., Robert (1971): Cultivating Revolution: The United States and Agrarian Reform in Latin America, New York.

PRATEC -PROYECTO ANDINO de TECNOLOGIAS CAMPESINAS (1988): Rondas Campesinas y Tecnologia Andina : Taller Regional Nor-Andino de Tecnologias Campesinas, Lima: PRATEC.

REVILLA, Maria Teresa (1988): "Rondas Campesinas", Mimeo, Lima: Comision Andina de Juristas.

REUTLINGER, Martin (1989): Projektbericht ueber Kurzeiteinsatz im Projekt IINCAP "Jorge Basadre", Lima: Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst DED, unpublished project report.

ROGERS, Barbara (1980): The Domestication of Women: Discrimination in Developing Societies, London: Kogan Page.

RUIZ, Patricia; GARCIA, Margarita (1989): "Cajamarca y su Region: Proceso Historico y Articulacion Regional". Unpublished mimeo.

SENADO DE LA REPUBLICA (1989): Violencia y Pacificacion:

SCOTT, C.D. (1976): "Peasants, Proletarianisation and the Articulation of Modes of Production: The Case of the Sugar-Cane Cutters in Northern Peru." In: The Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol.3, No. 3, pp.321 - 342. London: Gainsborough House.

SILVA SANTISTEBAN, (1986) "El Reino de Cuzimanco", Instituto Nacional de Cultura, Historia de Cajamarca: Siglos XVI-XVIII, Lima: Perugraph.

SINGELMANN, Peter (1981): Structures of Domination and Peasant Movements in Latin America. Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press.

SLATTA, Richard (1989): Bandidos : The Varieties of Latin American Banditry, New York, London : Greenwood Press.

SLATER , David (1985): "Social Movements and a Recasting of the Political", in: D.Slater, editor, New Social Movements and the State in Latin America , Latin American Studies No.29 pp.1-26. Dordrecht: ICG Printing.

SLATER , David (1985): "The Peruvian State and the Regional Crisis - the Development of Regional Social Movements, 1968-1980 ", in: D.Slater, editor, New Social Movements and the State in Latin America , Latin American Studies No.29 pp.147-170. Dordrecht: ICG Print.

SLATER , David (1989): Territory and State Power in Latin America : the Peruvian Case. London : Macmillan

STAVENHAGEN, Rodolfo (1981): Between Underdevelopment and Revolucion : a Latin American Perspective, New Dehli: Abhinaw Publications.

STAVENHAGEN,R. (1986): "Ethnodevelopment: a Neglected Dimension in Development Thinking", in R.A. Apthorpe and R. Krahl (eds.) Development Studies: Critique and Renewal, Leiden, E.J.Brill.

TARILLO VARGAS, Segundo and REATEGUI, Wilson (1979): "Las Rondas Campesinas en Chota", "IV Seminario sobre la Problematica Nacional Agraria en el Peru", Universidad Nacional de Cajamarca, mimeo.

TAYLOR, Lewis (1980): Bandits and Politics in Peru: Landlord and Peasant Violence in Hualgayoc, 1900 - 1930. Cambridge: Cambridge Latin American Miniatures, University of Cambridge.

TAYLOR, Lewis (1981): "Cambios Capitalistas en las Haciendas Cajamarquinas, 1900-1935", Estudios Rurales Latinoamericanos, Vol.7, No.1/84, Bogota.

WEBSTER, A. (1984): "Modernisation Theory", in Introduction to the Sociology of Development :49-63, London:Macmillan.

WIENER, Hugo (1987): Cambios en la Estructura Social del Campo Peruano, Lima: Instituto de Apoyo Agrario.

WOLF, Eric (1969): "On Peasant Rebellions", International Social Sciences Journal, Vol.21, No.2, pp.286-293,

YRIGOYEN, Raquel (1989): "Las Rondas Campesinas de Cajamarca, Peru: Orden Juridico, Administracion de Justicia y Derechos Humanos", unpublished mimeo.

ZUTTER, Pierre (1985): Una Experiencia de Curso-Taller sobre Comunicacion con Campesinos, Lima : Comision Coordinadora de Tecnologia Andina -CCTA

Appendix No.1 : SOCIAL INDICATORS FOR PERU

Social Indicators	Chronical Malnutrition (of children under 5)	Child Mortality	Hospital beds/ 1,000 Inhabitants	Med. doctors per 1,000 Inhabitant	Analphabetism of total population	Unavailability of water and electricity for the population (% of total)	Life expectancy at birth	Average annual income
Measures	(%)	(per 1,000)	(Numbers)	(Numbers)	(%)	(% of total)	(years)	(US \$)
Year Reference	1984 (**)	1987 (*)	1982 (*)	1981 (***)	1987 (*)	1987 (*)	1981 (*)	1981 (*)
Departments								
TUMBES	n.d	76,8	less than 2	0,3	below 15	80	61,0	134
PIURA	40,5	101,2	less than 2	0,3	below 25	60	53,3	115
LAMBAYEQUE	42,2	77,7	less than 2	less than 0,7	below 15	50	60,8	113
LA LIBERTAD	39,9	70,0	less than 2	less than 0,7	below 25	50	63,3	115
ANCASH	51,7	91,6	less than 2	less than 0,3	below 40	65	56,6	96
LIMA/CALLAO	16,8	60,4	over 4	less than 2,0	below 15	30	65,1	176
ICA	30,9	65,7	less than 3	less than 2,0	below 15	50	64,4	129
AREQUIPA	24,0	77,3	less than 3	less than 2,0	below 15	50	60,8	150
MOQUEGUA	n.d.	77,8	over 4	less than 2,0	below 15	60	60,8	159
TACNA	18,6	78,6	over 4	less than 0,7	n.d	30	60,8	154
PUNO	51,2	119,4	less than 1	less than 0,1	over 40	85	46,7	74
CUSCO	54,7	132,5	less than 2	less than 0,3	over 40	85	43,2	86
APURIMAC	n.d.	125,5	less than 1	less than 0,1	over 40	85	46,7	72
AYACUCHO	n.d	121,7	less than 1	less than 0,1	over 40	85	46,7	72
HUANCAVELICA	n.d	138,4	less than 1	less than 0,1	over 40	85	42,3	68

Appendix No.1 (Continuation): SOCIAL INDICATORS FOR PERU

Social Indicators	Chronical Malnutrition (of children under 5)	Child Mortality	Hospital beds/ 1,000 Inhabitants	Med. doctors per 1,000 Inhabitant	Analphabetism of total population	Unavailability of water and electricity for the population (% of total)	Life expectancy at birth	Average annual income
Measures	(%)	(per 1,000)	(Numbers)	(Numbers)	(%)	(% of total)	(years)	(US \$)
Year Reference	1984 (**)	1987 (*)	1982 (*)	1981 (***)	1987 (*)	1987 (*)	1981 (*)	1981 (*)
Departments								
JUNIN	52,8	95,6	less than 2	less than 0,3	below 25	65	53,8	103
PASCO	n.d	101,0	less than 3	less than 0,7	below 25	65	52,8	104
HUANUCO	48,9	97,8	less than 2	less than 0,3	n.d	85	53,8	90
CAJAMARCA	63,5	99,6	less than 1	less than 0,1	below 40	85	53,3	69
MADRE DE DIOS	n.d	94,7	less than 2	less than 0,7	below 15	85	65,1	132
UCAYALI	n.d	90,2	less than 2	less than 0,7	below 15	85	57,0	117
SAN MARTIN	47,5	84,7	less than 1	less than 0,1	below 15	85	60,8	81
AMAZONAS	n.d	96,2	less than 1	less than 0,1	below 25	85	55,2	75
LORETO	44,4	89,6	less than 2	less than 0,7	below 15	65	57,0	123

Note: The Departments with important Andean populations are **bolded** in the table.

Sources : ONERN,1986:22-31; Senado de la Republica,1989:144 (ref.*) and 188 (ref**); Gierhake,1988:92-93 (ref****)

Appendix No. 2: RULES AND STATUTES OF THE RONDAS CAMPESINAS**CHAPTER I****PERTAINING TO THE CHARACTER, OBJECTIVES AND TASKS**

ART. 1. - The **Rondas Campesinas** (peasant rounds) are democratic-revolutionary organisms of rural masses inhabiting the Hamlets, Peasant Communities and Indigenous Communities. They are the basic expression of popular self-government.

The **Rondas Campesinas** are independent or autonomous, democratic self-defense organisations. They do not depend on the State or on the Government, or on any political or religious organisation whatsoever. The **Rondas** belong to peasants themselves. The guidelines they obey, and the norms its leaders must follow, are decided upon by a majority, and voted for by the masses. Nobody in their midst is to be persecuted, marginalised or penalised for his or her ideas, or for political, religious, ethnical or cultural creeds. Everyone is free to have personal views and to act, as long as he or she does not affect the interests of the peasantry or the people, or go against human rights. With the organised forces of the masses, the **Rondas** conquer and defend their demands, exert their rights, reject any type of aggression from external forces, guarantee domestic order and harmony within peasant masses. The **Rondas** enforce agreements established previously by the communities, exert control over their leaders, and may even remove them if these should act against the interests of the masses. They also have as their objective not only combatting 'petty thieves', but erradicating 'high-placed thieves', those camouflaged as Public Servants who are in the service of the ruling classes; (the **Rondas**) are struggling for a new society in which the people are true owners of their destiny, where there is self-government and a new type of democracy, social justice, welfare, progress, development, sovereignty and national independence. A new society in which the nation belongs to the people, and exploitation, foreign oppression, backwardness and hunger disappear.

(The **Rondas**) also fight for the defense of small and medium-sized properties devoted to agriculture and livestock, for the existence and freedom of Peasant and Indigenous Communities, and for the promotion of small and medium-scale industry, for a new education serving the interests of regional and national development; for the prevalence of human rights, for the moralisation of Public Administration, for the nationalisation of imperialistic monopolies, for the exercise of a new type of justice in the countryside, among other things.

The **Rondas** also work towards strengthening their own structure, and, in fraternal union with proletarians, city dwellers and the **Rondas Urbanas** (Urban Rounds), they also take part in 'Frentes de Defensa de los Intereses del Pueblo' (Fronts for the Defense of the People's Interests), with a view to organising regional governments. They should take the steps necessary to constitute a single consolidated Central Union of Peruvian Peasants. They should assume as one of their tasks the constituting of a Popular National Assembly, as a democratic self-governing organ of the people, having as its criteria the comprising of a broad-ranged single front that successfully isolates and defeats the representatives of big capital and imperialism, fundamental enemies of the Peruvian people.

CHAPTER II
PERTAINING TO THE COMMANDMENTS OF THE 'Ronderos'

ART. 2. - The **Rondero Commandments** are loyalist principles marking the course which their actions must take. They are normative precepts based on a new morale placed at the disinterested service of the masses, in order to construct a new society under a new democracy. These commandments are:

- a) To continue the liberating work of Christ, Tupac Amaru, Micaela Bastidas, Jose Carlos Mariategui, our heroes and martyrs, to make of our Peru a society for the majorities, with democracy, justice and sovereignty.
- b) Peasant justice is not to be aired in the courts or begged for with petitions; It is conquered through the patient and organised action of the masses. It does not torture or murder its infractor either, it seeks to save him and make him useful to society.
- c) Together peasants will accomplish a lot; united with the poor in the cities, we will achieve everything.
- d) We **Ronderos** should love the peasantry and the people more than we love ourselves, and work on their behalf without expecting rewards.
- e) We **Ronderos** should be the first to take part in the struggle, the last to reap benefits. Leaders should set an example with their conduct and show their loyalty and commitment through their practice.
- f) Nothing good is to be expected from the authorities of the oppressors. All our trust and support go to the **Rondas Campesinas!**
- g) Not to steal a needle, or a handful of grass, to work hard and not allow lies or hypocrisy.
- h) To condemn corruption, blackmail, and firmly punish those who participate in them.
- i) To be consistent democrats. To do everything with the masses, nothing without them, discarding authoritarian, **caudillista** and sexist practices. To affirm equal rights between men and women.
- j) Every individual must comply to the statutes of the **Rondas Campesinas** and **Rondas Comunales**, and minorities must compulsorily obey majority rule; lower organisms should comply to organisms that are higher within the central peasant structure.

CHAPTER III
PERTAINING TO THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE RONDEROS

ART 3. - The duties are:

- a) To uphold the present Statute, the resolutions passed by the First National Encounter of **Rondas Campesinas** and the Directories, and to make these be upheld.
- b) To practice the commandments of the **Ronderos** and to uphold them through personal example.
- c) To defend the possessions of the entire neighborhood and the communities, and to carry out communal works.
- d) Every reward or trophy must be conveyed to the **Ronda Campesina** or **Ronda Comunal**.
- e) To aid every **Rondero** who has a problem or is at any risk.
- f) Never to break one's word and to return everything that has been borrowed.
- g) To air every type of problem and plaint among **Ronderos**, keeping it within the **ronda** itself. Decisions reached at **Rondero** assemblies are popular law, and must be obeyed in a disciplined fashion.
- h) Every male in a family, over seventeen years of age and under 60, must pay compulsory service to the **Ronda**.
- i) Every **Rondero** family will ordinarily pay a certain amount of soles, as dues, for institutional purposes. The amount is to be determined democratically at assemblies.
- j) Swearing-in of directories of **Rondas Campesinas** and **Rondas Comunales**, shall be done after reading the "**Commandments of the Ronderos**".
- k) In electing **Ronda** leaders, Governing Lieutenants, Municipal Agents, Justices of the Peace, etc., **Ronderos** shall exert their capacity to elect, fiscalise, and impeach any unfit leaders.
- l) To constitute feminine and juvenile committees that support the **Rondas**. To consolidate the **Rondas** and organise them in new places. To practice a militant solidarity with the **Ronderos**, and with the people in general. The **Rondas** do not have local frontiers. Peru is their scenario.

- ll) To contribute to building a consolidated single Central Union of Peasants, and the people's combative union.

ART. 4. - The rights of **Ronderos** are:

- a) Every **Rondero** shall be protected and respected by the **Rondas**, without discrimination.
- b) To have voice and voting rights (the whole **Rondero** family) at popular tribunals and General Assemblies, and to be elected to any post or commission.
- c) Women, males under 17 and over 60, are exempted from doing **Ronda** service, but may do so voluntarily if they should so choose.
- d) To demand that official authorities serve the masses unconditionally and respect their rights, as a condition to maintain good relations, otherwise they are to be penalised and removed from their posts.
- e) The **Rondas** will settle within their midst any conflict or suit its members may have.

CHAPTER IV

PERTAINING TO THE ORGANISATION AND STRUCTURE OF RONDAS CAMPESINAS

ART. 5. - The **Rondas** are constituted by men and women, by minors and adults, by weak and strong family members, by the hamlets, sectors or the community.

ART. 6. - Self-defense of the peasant masses is exerted by all **Rondero** families, under the necessary and adequate forms of organisation and struggle, and with the tools at their disposal.

ART. 7. - The **Ronda** group is the basic cell, upon which the **Rondas Campesinas** are structured. Its members owe each other affection, solidarity, discipline and faithfulness. They are from 5 to 8 members, elected by the General Assembly for a period of 6 to 12 months.

Each group elects a chief and a deputy chief. Ordinary service is to be provided at night and/or in the daytime, if the circumstances warrant it. Specific **Ronda** duty is generally fulfilled once a week. **Ronda** groups are the "eyes" and "ears" of hamlets and communities.

ART. 8. - The Self-Defense and Discipline Secretary, and the Deputy Secretary, control each **Ronda** group, imparting instructions, coordinating "passwords" and having under their responsibility keeping of the "**Rondero Diary**". They also control the signing of a register by its members, both when they enter and leave service.

ART. 9. - Structure and Functioning of **Rondas Campesinas** and **Rondas Comunales**:

a) The **Ronda** group: Functions:

- To guard communal goods and the integrity of the neighbourhood and its leaders, day and night.
- The Self-Defense and Discipline Secretary in the hamlets and **Rondas Comunales**, in coordination with their Directories, should mobilise the masses when any type of danger or aggression is perpetrated against **Ronderos** and their holdings.
- To capture any infractor and put him at the disposal of the Directories and General Assembly, the only bodies with the power to rule over the case in question.
- To keep the discipline in any activity pertaining to **Ronderos** or the community at large. Without discipline nothing significant can be constructed.
- It must serve families facing any trouble or suffering from any tragedy or risk. It should help passers-by under its jurisdiction and arrest all suspects, delinquents and social offenders.

b) **Rondas campesinas** or **rondas comunales** are the organisations of a designated hamlet or community. The **Ronda Comunal** supports and qualifies the **Ronda Campesina**. The Directory of the **Ronda Campesina** of any given hamlet has the following posts:

- 1.- President
- 2.- Vice President
- 3.- Organisation Secretary
- 4.- Self-Defense and Discipline Secretary
- 5.- Peasant Justice Secretary
- 6.- Secretary of Minutes and Archives
- 7.- Secretary of Economics
- 8.- Press and Propaganda Secretary
- 9.- Secretary of Women's Affairs
- 10.- Secretary of Agriculture and Livestock
- 11.- Sports Secretary

c) In peasant and indigenous communities, a Secretary of Communal Rounds is to be created, with the objective to guarantee self-defense, domestic order, and to implement peasant justice. Towards these ends, a commission made up of no less than five people will be formed, in which the Organisation Secretary must take part.

A Directory is renewed each year. It must meet at least once a month, and on the third day the hamlet or community must hold its General Assembly.

- d) The National Ronda Coordinating Commission of the independent Central Peasant Centrals and Federations will contribute to the activation of self-defense among the peasant movement, towards its revolutionary democratic unity and towards the construction of a consolidated single peasant central union which must be independent, democratic, self-defending and self-supporting.

CHAPTER V PERTAINING TO PEASANT JUSTICE AND THE POPULAR TRIBUNAL

ART. 10. - **Rondas Campesinas** and **Rondas Comunales** must intervene in the solution of all types of problems, because official laws and official authorities are generally in the service of the oppressors, because they become partial to those who have money, because they themselves do not face or deal with problems; because they make a business venture of justice, and because, finally, they instigate lawsuits, and set peasants against one another, in many cases during decades and even during whole centuries.

ART. 11. - Peasant justice is dispensed by the **Rondas** through its Peasant Justice Secretary and the corresponding commission, in hamlets, and through the Secretary of **Rondas Comunales** in the communities. These commissions in both cases will consist of no less than 5 members, in which leaders and a Peace Judge designated by **Rondero** families, participate.

ART. 12. - This Peasant Justice Secretary or **Ronda Comunal** Secretary (and corresponding commission) will undertake all suits, process and make a ruling, under the supervision of the corresponding instance. This ruling will be informed to the General Assembly, which will become a Popular Tribunal.

ART. 13. - Every plaintiff has the right to appeal, if he or she esteems it convenient, before the corresponding Directory, before the General Assembly, before the Directory of the Central to which he or she belongs, and even before the National Ronda Coordinating Commission, its ruling then being unappealable and within its own power to implement.

ART. 14. - Every plaintiff must contribute voluntary dues according to the case brought to notice, and fines will be imposed to cattle thieves and other social offenders. These sums engross the treasury holdings of the corresponding **Rondas**. The same will not be used for ends other than those decided by the **Rondas** themselves.

ART. 15. - Tortures, imprisonment and capital punishment are prohibited in **Rondas Campesinas**. Not complying with communal norms will be punished with the corresponding criticism and self-criticism, with collective fiscalisation and communal work. Physical punishment is symbolic and public, and functions as a complement of the delinquent's rehabilitation process, playing a reinforcing disciplinary role.

CHAPTER VI
PERTAINING TO GOODS, THE ECONOMY AND FINANCES

Article 16. – The **Rondas** will be guided by the self-supporting principle, are set aside from mercenary assistentialism. Every **Rondero** family will give its contribution, be it in cash, food or labour. Wealthy and impoverished families alike will give a special contribution, determined by the General Assembly. This money will serve to cover the expenses that administration demands. The **Rondas** will promote the success of productive activities within peasant communities.

Those who violate this principle weaken their communal independence and autonomy. Corruption or the misappropriation of **Ronda** funds is not permitted, or of communal funds in general.

Article 17. – The Secretary of Economics in the hamlets will keep accounting books, receipts, and make public statements of accounts every two months, and at the end of each year a detailed account is to be published.

In the communities, a rigorous system of communal accounting will also be implanted.

CHAPTER VII
PERTAINING TO DISCIPLINE, OFFENSES AND PENALTIES

Article 18. - Discipline must be conscientious and strict, and leaders must set an example. If they should incur in offenses, they should receive double punishment.

Article 19. - The Rondas Campesinas are founded on the classist principle of democratic centralism, which means once a decision is taken unanimously or by the majority, individuals should comply to the organisation, minorities should bow to the majority, inferior levels shall submit to superior ones, and all Rondas shall submit to their corresponding central headquarter, during intervals between congresses. Those who violate this principle undermine discipline, corrupt Ronda morale, and place themselves at the service of their class enemies, be they aware of it or not.

Article 20. - The following are offenses: violation of the Statute, resorting to "high-placed thieves" to deal with any kind of complaint whatsoever, illicit appropriation and bribes, being partial regarding any legal claim; not paying dues punctually, pronouncing unfair judgements about any task or responsibility that the General Assembly or Directory decrees, not respecting patriotic symbols or mocking the traditions of our people; making Ronda service while drunk, or disguised as policemen, abusing authority and searching homes without a warrant from the Community Directory or the Ronda, according to what the General Assembly esteems.

Article 21. - Penalties shall be: public admonishments, punishment during the course of the General Assembly (mass discipline), temporary or permanent suspension from leaders, being banished from the community. The delinquent will carry out civil redress, participate in communal works and make rounds from hamlet to hamlet or from community to community ('Rondero chain'), or, in the worst possible event, be handed over to the 'big thieves', (as banishment) if it is so determined by the General Assembly. This handing over will be carried out through mass mobilisation.

Article 22. - The responsibility of the Self-Defense and Discipline Secretary, as that of the Ronda Comunal, guarantee, along with the masses, the community's self-defense, domestic order, Rondero morale and peasant justice. A commission is to be established composed of the Governing Lieutenant, elected by the Community. This commission will be designated as the Self-Defense and Discipline Brigade.

CHAPTER VIII
PERTAINING TO OFFICIAL LEGALITY

Article 23. - To continue struggling to improve Law 24571, conquered by the Ronderos, inasmuch as the government that manages the state at present, has not fully taken up the Ronda's guidelines for justice.

The future of the **Rondas** does not fundamentally depend on official laws, but on the direct struggle of the masses.

Article 24. - To organise and come into functioning, the **Rondas Campesinas** do not require permission from anyone, or payed supervisors, and they will not be obliged either to render reports, or comply with the whims of corrupt officials; since they are organisations for the communal good, of a justiciary character, and also, by disposition of the ruling constitution and Law 24571.

Article 25. - Departmental, provincial and district Directories, "present their credentials" before the competent authorities, if they decide to do so voluntarily during the course of their events. In these cases, they will only make public the relation of its leaders with their corresponding identification, in compliance with what the law designates.

C H A P T E R I X

PERTAINING TO THE HEADQUARTERS, THE EMBLEM, THE SLOGAN AND THE SYMBOL

Article 26. - The national headquarters of the Departmental Federation of **Rondas Campesinas** of Cajamarca and the undersigned federations is Lima, Jr. Puno 258 - Of. C, Telephone No. 274072.

Article 27. - The **Rondas Campesinas** and **Rondas Comunales** will have a burgundy-coloured flag, with the face of Tupac Amaru stamped in the center, in black.

Article 28. - The slogan of the **Rondas** will be:
"Peace with justice, self-defense, new democracy and national sovereignty".

This shall be stamped on all its official documents.

Article 29. - The combat symbol will be Tupac Amaru.

Cieneguilla, Lima, March 28, 1987

First National Encounter of Rondas Campesinas

