Reference & Rhetoric

On narrative class as rhetorical consideration in 'Time and Narrative'

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Table of Contents

Abstract

By positioning both historiographical and fictive narrative as classes of narrative, Paul Ricoeur's 'Time and Narrative' shows us how fiction and history both relate to the world of the reader in different but fundamentally similar ways. By zooming in on the role reference and truth play in this relation, as well as the role of the narrative identity of the reader and its relation to the text, we can identify the variability of narrative class as a rhetorical tool for political change and communication which finds its exemplary form in Octavia E. Butler's 'Dawn'.

Introduction

Let me tell you what my bachelor thesis is about you piece of shit. As openers go, this would rank as one of the worst. It's kind of garish as well, but most people are not as obvious about their disdain for their readers, nor do readers expect them to be. What we encounter in most texts is not so much the author willingly disenfranchising their readers as I just tried to do, but the readers picking up hostility from the text itself. If you consider yourself to be white, black, Chinese, or Muslim, there is no shortage of texts which can very easily be interpreted, justly and unjustly, as hostile towards what you consider yourself to be. It is this hostility which the reader interprets from the text which we will deal with in this thesis, more particularly the way in which such hostility closes off the texts possibility to change the readers world and what we might do to prevent this. By way of Paul Ricoeur's three volume series 'Time and Narrative' (1983; 1984; 1985) we will begin by discussing the general problematic of 'Time and Narrative' as a general introduction to the way narrative understanding runs through three distinct moments, after which we will move on to Ricoeur's consideration of the narrative classes of history and fiction, as the framework from which we will introduce the possibility of shifting between narrative classes without losing narrative structure. Ending with the way narrative can be interpreted as identity, and how a readers perceived hostility towards a text in which they find themselves as identifying as the nemesis, might be rhetorically countered through a conscious choice in narrative class and its reference, findings an excellent example of this in Octavia E. Butler's 'Dawn' (1997).

The Aporia of Time and the Poetics of Tragedy

Whether it is Dilthey's *erklären* and *verstehen*, Descartes' mind and body, or Kant's thing-in-itself and phenomenon, there is one topic which keeps on returning in the western philosophical tradition. Namely, the relation between two seemingly incoherent modes of understanding the world, where often one shows itself immanently and one is considered outside of ourselves. Whether we call it the mind/body problem or the distinction between the soul and the material, there is something discordant about the manner in which the world presents itself when made understandable in all its facets. It is this possibility of understanding two discordant factors together which Ricoeur takes up in 'Time and Narrative'.

The Aporia of Time

For Ricoeur, no problematic embodies this discordance so clearly as the aporia of time as presented by Augustine. We approach the problem of time through the distinction between cosmological time, the "time of the world", and phenomenological time, or the "time of the soul". In his 'Confessions' Augustine, a Christian church-father/saint, confesses to god about his life in autobiographical form, moving from his infancy towards his adulthood, considering his sins, uncertainties, and life in general. It is in Book 11 of the 'Confessions' that Augustine introduces us to his time of the soul, time as seen in the soul/consciousness shows itself as; past in memory present, in present as attention present, and in future as expectation in the present (Vol. 1, p. 19). As such we find the soul getting pulled, stretched out, between the future, the present, and the past. To visualize this Augustine takes as an example the recitation of a psalm (Vol. 1, p. 20). He says that while reciting a psalm he knows intimately he starts out by expecting it in its entirety, but that once he has begun the parts of the psalm already recited are engaged by his memory while the expectation remains looking forward to what is still to be recited, it is then the faculty of attention is attentive all the time and through which passes that which is expected to that which is already recited. He calls this the *distentio animi*, the stretched out soul. Now the problem that this distentio animi has is that while it gives a phenomenal description of phenomenological time, it seems not to hold in itself the possibility of relating to the past or future as we would while considering cosmological time. And when it tries to do so, through its distention between memory and expectation as they relate to the present, there is a certain discordance as our soul seems to want/intent to go beyond itself, trying to grasp the future and/or the past in a present incapable of fully realizing this past and future, except through the mediums of memory and expectation.

Only in what Augustine calls the eternal present do we find this possibility of an all-encompassing present in which all time, future and past, is fully present. But only in god can this all-

encompassing eternity be realised. The problematic itself is therefore retained. For we are not god, and in our time of the soul we are still continuously confronted with the inability to fully do justice to past and future, however much we distend. As such how might we relate this difference between a period of time outside ourselves and our continuous experience of phenomenological time?

Aristotle's Poetics

Having introduced us to the basics of the aporia of time, Ricoeur moves on to what will become the foundation by which he will later on "make productive" the aporetic nature of this time. The Aristotelian muthos-mimesis, where muthos stands for the organization of disparate events into a single plot and mimesis as the plots role as the imitation of the world of action. To do so Ricoeur introduces Aristotle's 'Poetics' into his work. Where Augustine has left us with an unresolved aporetic notion of time we will find in Aristotle "*a way to overcome the discordance*" (Vol. 1, p. 30) in Augustine's aporia by way of the poetic act. In his 'Poetics' Aristotle makes the case for what Ricoeur calls "a model of concordance" (Vol. 1, p.38), this model of concordance in Aristotle takes the form of the organization of events in the creation of plot with a beginning and end, emphasizing the concordance of its story. This more or less comes down to the idea that in the Poetics the concept of muthos, as the way of composing tragedies, comedies, or epics, encompasses for Aristotle a creative imitation of action which makes concordant the discordanct by; making the singular, universal, the accidental, intelligible, and the episodic, necessary (Vol 1, p. 41). As such the creative here does not create things but quasi-things, it is an *imitation* of action, made understandable in such a way that it can be communicated through the medium of, for Aristotle, tragedy and can as such be understood by others. Without the universality, intelligibility, and necessity, imparted by the organizing creativity of muthos, the coherence of a tragedy would be impossible. What is most important about Aristotles muthos-mimesis to remember, and the parts which Ricoeur will most productivly incorporate into his own concept of mimesis and muthos, is that; mimesis is the creative imitation of action, and thus finds its inspiration, intelligibility, and actualization in this realm of action, and muthos is that creative process of grasping together the discordant, singular/accidental/episodic, and making these concordant, universal/intelligible/necessary, in such a way that it becomes a coherent story. While there is more to this analysis then we have covered, we will continue to the threefold mimesis as it adds significantly to the Aristotelian concept of plot and we have covered those parts most important for our argument.

Threefold Mimesis

To enrich the Augustinian aporia and the Aristotelian muthos-mimesis, Ricoeur sets out to show that "*Time becomes human to the extent that it is articulated through a narrative mode, and narrative attains its full meaning when it becomes a condition of temporal existence*" (Vol. 1, p. 52). What this means in practicality is that Ricoeur wants to develop a method by which we can explain how discordant ways of understanding time, causality, and meaning might be taken together and experienced not as divergent and separate, but together in a concordance without having to dissolve this discordance for it to be considered a productive mode of understanding. Through the mediating role of emplotment Ricoeur will show how time presents itself narratively to us. This will allow narrative to be the mode through which we approach the aporia of time. Its goal being not to dissolve the aporia as such, but to make clear how the aporetic is to be incorporated into our thinking, not as a paradox which stops us in our tracks, but as a productive mode of understanding which forms an important part of the way in which we create meaning, and influence the way we understand the world and ourselves.

To start out Ricoeur clarifies that while we will be talking about narrative, it must be understood that we will not be exclusively talking about semiotic theory, since this type of theory only reflects on the moment which we will come to call mimesis$_2$, or the process of configuring a narrative, think of this as the act of writing a book or creating a story. To reach beyond this limiting semiotic approach Ricoeur takes a hermeneutic approach with the express purpose of including the complete hermeneutic spiral, which is concerned not just with the configuration of narrative, but stretches its interests to include the features and capacities required to relate to a world in such a way that the figuration of narrative is possible to begin with, mimesis$_1$. As well as taking into account the moment in which a reader reads the actual configured narrative and re-figures it for himself to be made understood, or as Ricoeur would say, when the world of the text and the world of the reader intersect (Vol. 1, p. 53), mimesis$_3$. As such Ricoeur distinguishes three moments of mimesis as mimesis$_{1/2/3}$, or mimesis as; prefiguration, configuration, and refiguration respectively.

Prefiguration

As we stated, Ricoeur starts out his threefold mimesis with a consideration of the moment required for figuration to even be a possibility at all, mimesis$_1$. Namely, the pre-figured capacity to understand the world of action (Vol. 1, p. 54). For Ricoeur this expresses itself in three main capacities, the capacity for; identifying action by means of its structural features, identifying the symbolic mediation of action, and identifying the temporal order of actions. The identification of action by its structural features lies in the ability to distinguish an action from a physical movement.

To put it simply, this is the ability to differentiate between the fact that a ball rolls down a hill due to gravity, and someone made the ball roll down a hill because he enjoys it. The first explanation is a causally deterministic and predictable analysis of events without actors, the following an explanation from agency steeped in an understanding of motives, goals, and circumstances. This differentiation is necessary for describing a limit factor to what to include in a narrative in way of attributing actions to actants.

Secondly, the capacity for identifying the symbolic mediation of action, is for understanding "*the cultural rules of meaning by which an action can be interpreted*" (Vol 1, p. 58). To visualize what this means, let us consider the action 'the raising of a hand'. This can both be interpreted as the intention to high-five as well as the intention to hit a person. It is in the symbolic recognition of the situation and its cultural and historical relevance that we recognise specific actions to hold specific meanings. If high-fiving is not culturally part of my life, the raising of a hand is in this case more likely to be indicative of harmful intentions. This interpretation of action as holding symbolic meaning not directly related to the physical or structural aspect of the action itself is what we call the symbolic mediation of action. This capacity can also be considered as that capacity necessary to add meaning to action as we will see in mimesis$_2$.

Finally, we have the capacity to identify the temporal order of actions. This is very important as its will be the foundation from which we approach time as constitutive of narrative. And also the basis from which Ricoeur will incorporate Heidegger's Care into his temporality, and the larger role of the mimetic threefold in our consideration of hermeneutics. For Heidegger, time, as being-within-time is a part of Care, a part of, quite literally, what we care about, what we are preoccupied with in Being-in-the-world. In this sense time cannot be understood as something merely described as a succession of "nows" (Vol. 1, p. 62), as a cold and objective chronology. It is an experience which doesn't just relate to our attention in the now, but also our memory and our expectation, you will notice Augustinian's distentio-animi returning here. As such we must ask ourselves the question, if time is not a succession of "nows", but an active reckoning with time as informed by our being-interested in the world through Care, what is this reckoning with time? For Ricoeur we can find this in our capacity of recognising the temporal order, as informed by our interest and preoccupation. It is here that we find the connection between our fundamental being-within-timeness and the possibility of narrative, a discussion which we will return to in our description of mimesis$_2$ and the configuration of temporal characteristics of narrative. As for moment of mimesis$_1$, this must be taken as the fundamental capacity of "breaking with the linear representation of time", a necessary requirement for even being able to start to understand how some moments differ from others in relation to our Care.

To wrap up the moment of prefiguration, we might understand $mimesis_1$ as the fundamental necessity to engage in the process of coming to narrativize. Structural in the sense of who is doing what and why as a causality separate from that of the purely cosmological, symbolic in the sense of what meaning is imparted by which actions, and temporal in the fact of how some moments can be distinguished from other moments in a chronology of events for a living temporal being.

> *To have the required competence with narrative, familiarity with the semantic structures, symbolism and temporality of the narrated human condition is necessary in both the poet and their reader. The act of emplotment is predicated on this preunderstanding, and the richer the preunderstanding the richer the encounter with the plot.*

(Vol. 1, p. 64)

Configuration

The role of the second moment of mimesis, $mimesis_2$, is the moment of configuration or emplotment, the creation of a plot/narrative. It is the moment which semiotic theory is interested in. This would however be too narrow an interpretation of $mimesis_2$, it is specifically $mimesis_2$' role in hermeneutics which shows it going beyond the bounds of semiotics. Specifically its position in the middle of the three moments of mimesis as the mediator between $mimesis_1$ and $mimesis_3$. In *very basic* terms, emplotment takes the role between $mimesis_1$ and $mimesis_2$ of emplotting the singular and unorganized into a story/plot, and mediates going from $mimesis_2$ to $mimesis_3$ by ensuring that the way something is emplotted is followable for a reader. For Ricoeur this mediation of plot between $mimesis_1$ and $mimesis_2$ takes place in three ways.

First, plot mediates between individual events or incidents, and the plot as a whole (Vol. 1, p. 65). In this mediation the plot draws together a variety of events or incidents and transforms them into a whole to create a story.

Secondly, plot mediates the bringing together of heterogenous factors such as agents, goals, means, and interactions and allows for the infusion of plot with cultural and linguistic symbols (Vol. 1, p. 66).

Finally, and most importantly for the Augustinian paradox of time, plot mediates through its temporal characteristics. These are present in its episodic, and its configurational dimension. As we have discussed earlier in our consideration of $mimesis_1$, the necessary capacity to differentiate between moments constitutes an important feature of $mimesis_1$. It is here then, through judging and selecting, that our capacity to differentiate temporally in Care is taken up by emplotment and the Augustinian paradox of time is made productive through it (Vol. 1, p. 66). Just as emplotment

mediates between the events and heterogenous factors and symbols, so it mediates temporally by mediating between the chronological dimension, which characterizes the story in so far that it is made up of events and selects and sequences the events as we might expect from the irreversible order of the time of objects, and the non-chronological dimension, the configurational dimension which judges events for their relevance and structures them as a temporal whole, this makes the story followable. What is important for the non-chronological dimension is that its configuration is not fundamentally related to time as a continuous movement forwards. Instead, by judging, it orders in relevance, and might for the sake of a story divert fundamentally from the chronological ordering. In short one might say that the chronological dimension is comparable to the cosmic time, and the non-chronological to the phenomenological time. The reason this mode of emplotment poetically resolves the Augustinian paradox, is then because it manages to take the different temporalities of the configurational and episodic dimensions, and plot them together in one discordantly concordant temporal narrative whole. For Ricoeur this indicates the possibility of poetically taking two very different, and for each other irreducible, dimensions of time and fundamentally bringing them together in emplotted narrative. This ability to bring and understand these dimensions together, regardless of the discordance between the two dimensions, is fundamental to the possibility of following a story to begin with and can be interpreted as a "living dialectic" (Vol. 1, p. 67) between the two times, in which our phenomenological experience of time is rooted in and related to the time of the cosmos. A time we will come to call a third time, the human time of Care. To repeat once more the sentence we quoted at the beginning of our discussion of the threefold mimesis.

> "*Time becomes human to the extent that it is articulated through a narrative mode, and narrative attains its full meaning when it becomes a condition of temporal existence*"

(Vol. 1, p. 52)

As we have already mentioned, it is not just between mimesis$_1$ and mimesis$_2$ that plot mediates. Something else is necessary for the hermeneutic spiral to find its way from the pre-figured to the re-figured. Namely, the possibility of a reader, or consumer of narrative, to follow a story. To understand how a narrative might be intelligible to its reader Ricoeur presents "*Two complementary features that assure the continuity of the process that joins mimesis$_3$ to mimesis$_2$*" (Vol. 1, p. 68). These are schematization and tradition.

By schematization Ricoeur wants us to think of the rules which are used to make intelligible what is being communicated. We might for instance consider the genre satire. In interpreting satire it is necessary to follow certain rules to make intelligible the way that the books presents itself, would one not be aware of the schematizations required for the interpretation of a satirical work it

would become significantly harder to make clear what the work is attempting to say. But of course, these schematizations are not eternally stable as they change and are added to over time. One might say that a schematism has all the characteristics of a tradition (Vol. 1, p. 68).

It is here that Ricoeur introduces us to the concept of traditionality, which he differentiates from tradition in that traditionality is considering the transcendent, and tradition is referencing the particular. This could be called a differentiation along the lines of form and content. Traditionality is relevant because it is here that we make it possible for particular schematizations/traditions to change and evolve over time, making another connection between plot and temporality as it relates to the connection between $mimesis_2$ and $mimesis_3$. To return to our example of satire. Satire is based primarily on the use of expectations and exaggerations to drive home critiques of or ridicule certain ideas as they are present in society. Any temporal change to this society, and the role of satire in political change, might very well change the way the text is interpreted by future readers which have additional background considering the particular role the satirical schematism has had in political change. This makes it possible for Ricoeur's hermeneutic approach to take on fully all the temporal characteristics which influences this relation between text and reader. And so we have traversed from $mimesis_1$, to $mimesis_2$, and its eventual connection to $mimesis_3$. Finally ready for the refiguration itself.

Refiguration

$Mimesis_3$ is the moment the world of the text and the world of the reader intersect (Vol 1, p. 71). We have already discussed the way plot mediates between $mimesis_2$ and $mimesis_3$. When we talk about $mimesis_3$ here we will therefore shortly touch upon subjects we discussed in the previous part, the difference being that in refiguration we will also come at them also from the way in which the reader functions as the moment at which a narrative is once again *actualised* in the world of action from whence it came in $mimesis_1$. To approach $mimesis_3$ Ricoeur sets out four questions with regards to this intersection of the world of the text and its actualization in the world of the reader (Vol. 1, p. 71). Relating respectively to the circularity of the hermeneutic spiral/circle (going from world of action to world of action), the choice of refiguration as the conclusion of emplotment, the question of reference, and the hermeneutics of narrated time.

The first question Ricoeur calls "The Circle of Mimesis" (Vol. 1, p. 71), the reason for this questions relevance is that Ricoeur calls its circularity indisputable (Vol. 1, p. 72) and therefore it has to be addressed, he does so in two fold. The first address responds to what he calls the violence of interpretation (Vol. 1, pp. 72-73), namely that narratives creates concordance from where there is only discordance, and therefore the "as if" of a narrative can only be taken in terms of fiction, when

we then come to mimesis$_3$ it must also be refigured back into what it was, a non-formed nothing of complete discordance. Ricoeur believes this to be too much of a unnuanced view, stating that "*Emplotment is never the simple triumph of "order"*" (Vol. 1, p. 73) it is therefore not a complete discordance or concordance which we are left with. At the end of the mimetic spiral we come back to *more* understanding in the form of a discordant concordance, not absolute understanding. The second objection can be seen as the opposite of the first one, namely that if mimesis$_1$ is only a meaning effect from mimesis$_3$ that within the threefold mimesis no change would be possible as mimesis$_1$ is already completely present in mimesis$_3$ (Vol. 1, p. 74). This is for Ricoeur however a misunderstanding of plot as something which is always already there and neutral. It is specifically because not all stories have yet been told that emplotment never becomes redundant. Not all plots are ever created, our experiences increase and the same experiences can be understood differently when emplotted in a different light (Vol. 1, pp. 74-75). We can therefore never say that emplotment, as a mediator between mimesis$_1$ and mimesis$_3$, can become redundant because it adds to mimesis$_1$ through the actions inherent in configuration. To recap, while it is true that Ricoeur says that there is a certain circularity to the mimetic threefold, this circularity is better described as a spiral, and while we come back to the world of action in this spiral, the world of action is also enriched, making its circularity not pointless, but productive. Allowing for technically infinite new plots to be narrated as they feed back into each other.

The second question relates to "*…the transition between mimesis$_2$ and mimesis$_3$ brought about by the act of reading*" (Vol. 1, p. 76), here Ricoeur is responding to the question of how it might be possible that a reader relating to the world of text, can be considered its conclusion. As we have discussed before, this relation can largely be explain through the form of schematization and traditionality, which creates expectations in the form a narrated story takes, allowing for the followability of a text for a reader (Vol. 1, p. 76). It is this following of a story which actualizes it in the act of reading and itself feeds back into the process of sedimentation. Finally Ricoeur shortly touches upon the fact that the reader as completion of the meaning of a text is visible in a work such as Ulysses (Joyce, 1904), where the text is so incomplete that the act of reading most obviously comes to the fore as its completion (Vol. 1, p. 77) and without it might as well be considered non-existent. In short, without the refiguration of a narrative, the narrative will never find its way back into the world of action, nor can its narrative be considered as part of the traditionality it is reliant on, breaking the mimetic spiral.

The third question pertains to reference, which is necessary to complete mimesis$_3$ as not just a theory of reading but also as a theory of communication (Vol. 1, p. 77). This will be important for us as reception and reference will play a significant role in our considerations regarding rhetoric as

the successful reception of pre-planned strategic configuration. Here Ricoeur co-opts Hans-George Gadamer's notion of a "fusion of horizons", a concept which Gadamer uses to reject the ideas that we are completely in an open/unique-horizon or a closed/universal-horizon by fusing these together. Gadamer says that we should not interpret ourselves to be unique in such a way that we can distance ourselves completely from our history and cultural background while also admitting that while we do have this background, this does not mean we are completely swallowed up by it in such a way that it cannot be added to or changed. In co-opting this concept Ricoeur seeks to make clear that, just like $mimesis_1$, $mimesis_3$ also deals with capacities necessary for figuration, but relating to the relation between reader and text. In this case we then see that the background of the reader relates to the content of the text by limiting and opening-up the ways in which the world of a text becomes part of the worlds horizon of the reader as it is refigured temporally. To defend this approach to a theory of communication, Ricoeur defends three presuppositions in order of their specification. Starting with the act of discourse in general, then moving on to literary works, and finally concluding on narratives among these literary works. Ricoeur's presupposition with regards to acts of discourse in general states that all reference is co-reference, as we always already have the capacity to receive and have done so in the past, no human is pre-reference, and when reading the reader does not just receive the sense of a work, but the work itself brings with it references which unfold themselves within the temporality which the work unfolds in the experience of the reader (Vol. 1, pp. 78-79). On the level of the literary works among the acts of discourse, Ricoeur states that referential illusion, the experience brought by a literary work to language (Vol 1, p. 79), shows that poetic works do not just represent the world of action, but augment it through the meaning added in emplotment. Finally, with regards to the narratives among these literary works Ricoeur makes a distinction between the way particular narrative classes engage with a reader based on their referential intention and truth claim. Here Ricoeur introduces us to the two narrative classes of historical narrative, and fictional narrative, which will come to dominate the first and second volumes of 'Time and Narrative', being used explicitly to repurpose large parts of both literary and historiographical theory to show the diverse ways in which narratives relate to readers along these lines of truth claim and referential intention. On our part we will also go into these topics in particular as they form one of the primary ways in which Ricoeur's 'Time and Narrative' indirectly discusses tools for rhetorical strategy. To recap, while it is true that readers are limited by their horizons, narrative brings its own referential illusions which are refigured by the reader to open-up their horizon. Adding that narrative classes, the way a text relates to its truth claim and references, is central to the relation a text has to the world of the reader as it dictates the claims a text makes in relation to the readers horizon.

The fourth and final question is also central to our argument. It is here that Ricoeur introduces more concretely the way in which $mimesis_3$ feeds back into $mimesis_1$. To do so Ricoeur reminds us of the three capacities of $mimesis_1$, structural, symbolic, and temporal, which are all three iconically augmented (Vol. 1, pp. 83-84). This iconic augmentation represents the new ways in which the capacities of $mimesis_1$ are enriched through the refiguration of narrative in the world of the reader, this includes new ways of understanding the relation between structural aspects, new modes of understanding through symbolization, and this is all in a refigured temporal narrative in which the reader decides whether or not to accept a narrative based on the quality of the time configured. All of these feed into the horizon of the reader, in which our experience limits and opens-up the way that the world can be experienced and understood.

To recap, $mimesis_3$ shows itself as the moment in which the mimetic threefold find itself completed from whence it came, the world of action. But enriched by the activity of emplotment, and through refiguration augmenting the horizon of the reader. Leaving room for further analysis on the role of truth claims and reference as they play a major role in this relation between text and reader.

Having now reached the end of Ricoeur's threefold mimesis it is important to re-iterate that much of these ideas are expanded on in the remainder of the three volumes of 'Time and Narrative'. It is however by understanding this basic mimetic spiral that we can reference the relevance of those expansions to the larger concept of this hermeneutic spiral as a fundamental way of relating to narrative, and use it to place rhetoric as a way of strategically leveraging those aspects of mimesis which can subvert the political reluctance of a readers willingness to accept a narrative. Our next step will be to consider one of the most important parts of 'Time & Narrative', the insight that the division between fictional and historiographical forms of narrative take the form of truth claim and reference.

The Historical & Fictive, Claims of Truth & Reference

Part 2 of 'Time and Narrative: Volume 1' and part 3 of 'Time and Narrative: Volume 2' is where Ricoeur develops the particular ways in which the narrative classes of fiction and history can be used to repurpose the genres of historiographical and literary theory to investigate the threefold mimesis in relation to these narrative classes. While we will not discuss this in its entirety, we will be discussing more generally those aspects that are relevant to the overarching analysis related to the way that narrative classes represent the claims of truth, and deal with reference. The reason for this approach lies in the moments of mimesis$_2$ and mimesis$_3$. It pertains to the relation text has to the reader and his world, and the way in which the difference between narrative classes is involved in the way new temporal experience is brought to the world of the reader. We will use this later on to understand how in Butler's 'Dawn' narratively fictional structures might be used to augment understanding of historical matters. To build the foundation for this we will start off with historical narratives, as representing truth claims related to the world of the reader and referencing historical traces in the world of the reader. Followed by fiction, representing truth claims regarding the world of the text as something not directly identified with the world of the reader. Eventually we will finish up by showing how both aspects of historical and fictional narratives are present in both.

Historical narrative and its Authority

How does a historical text relate to its reader? While lofty ideals of absolute scientific certainty would be nice, historiography is sadly incapable of relating to the world in such a manner. Ricoeur shows, through the work of a multitude of authors, that history is a form of inquiry, with a reliance on authentication and justification (Vol. 1, p. 175) which, through traces/documents and the judgements of these, relates to the past by giving it a documentary status (Vol. 3, p. 222). By way of historical narrative Ricoeur introduces us to the idea that history can only be made understandable in such a way that discordant traces, combined with a capacity of understanding the past, require temporal configuration to be made into an understandable whole, much in line with the figurative practises of the threefold mimesis. In doing so Ricoeur moves historiography towards narrative, identifying a truth claim which is reliant on the justification inherent in narrativizing a story from discordant historical events and their traces, without breaking the historical narrative's reference to traces of the past. Consider for instance a text written by a historian which tells us about a man named Henry. Henry is a man whom is known to have lived in the year 1823, not only do we know this from the demographic records of the country Henry lived in, we also know about others who wrote about Henry, events in which Henry participated, as well as furniture and tools which Henry

left behind after he died. Our historian writes about Henry, who he was, what he did, what he liked, his role in society, and the effects he had on history.

First let us relate this to reference, a historical text is attempting to communicate to us an addition, or modification, to what we, the reader, understand the world to be/have been, in this case it is informing us about Henry, a man who once lived and whose life was a part of the world. Taking the analysis laid out by Hayden White (Vol. 3, p. 154), Ricoeur argues that the way this historical narrative relates to the past is in that it tells a narrative *such as* it would have happened in the past. However, this does not mean we take what the historical narrative claims for granted, for the historian does not make the things-themselves speak, it is still a work emplotted through the capacities of the author as we know from mimesis$_1$ and configured in mimesis$_2$. We will later see that this is also partly where the historic will meet the fictive. It is therefore not literally the past of Henry which is presented to us, but a text which by analogy gives us a narrative such as the life of Henry would have been in the past as configured by the historian and refigured by the reader. This insight relates to reference by moving the consideration of historical text, from the actual life of Henry as past, to the narrative telling us about the way that Henry's life would have been like. What we find here is a reference through analogy which both introduces us to the idea that fiction to a certain extend plays a role in historiographical narrativization, as well as shift our reference involved in historical text from a direct referencing to the past, and towards a referencing narratively by analogy, as reliant on the composer of the historical text and their capacity for historical narrative configuration based in part on traces of this past. It is here that reference also shows its influence on the general truth claim of the narrative at hand.

Having touched upon the idea of truth as it relates to reference, and the way it is moved from a direct relation to an actual past, to a documentarily informed as-if, what is left is the truth claim as it relates to the readers perceived source of authorship. This relation is however not direct, a readers relation to a implied author is varied and can change drastically based on the way a narrative configures itself (Vol. 3, p. 161). Opening a book with a moral statement might for instance turn a reader against the author even though the author does not actually believe the statement themselves, but uses it as an attention grabber. Therefore we will use implied author to side step these issues and variances, and focus on the way an implied author relates to the reader when talking from the perspective of the reader. Since we are discussing history this takes a particularly interesting form, namely the specific role of the historian. Where writing in general contains in itself a truth claim which relates to the world of text, historical narrative references outside of itself and brings with it a slew of political/real world implication. As such the ability of an author to hold the capacity to configure a historical narrative readers are willing to accept is then in part reliant on an

evaluation of an implied author's capacity to understand the past correctly, one might even call it; an implied moment of mimesis$_1$, or in relation to conscious authorial deception, an implied moment of mimesis$_2$. This expectation of capacity from the reader imparts authority on the text and its implied author which in writing is for Ricoeur the first moment where the claim to truth is added to meaning (Vol. 3, p. 223). This truth claim plays out when a reader is confronted with the implied-author in the narrative. The claim to truth in a narrative is then for a significant part a function between both the reader and the implied author, relating to this implied author by way of the readers trust (Vol. 3, pp. 162-163). As such when reading a tale about our historical Henry, we do not just need to accept the truth claim of what is being referenced documentarily, but also trust the implied author's role as the mediator between the documentary evidence and its emplotment standing-in for the past. This trust is vital for accepting the narrative as being a stand-in for the past by the reader and therefore the underlying requirement for mimesis$_3$'s moment of augmentation. Rhetorically speaking it is here that we find success or failure as it relates to the desired effect of the actual author.

To recap, historical narrative finds its reference indirectly in traces representing the world as it once was. It shows us the past, not in actuality, but in narratives based on these traces of a world such as it most likely would have been. Its truth claim then relates indirectly to the ability of an implied author to hold the trust of a reader to add or amend the understanding of the world the reader calls his own. But this relation is heavily dependent on the authority of historiographical capacity, and grounded by traces. It is in fiction where we will find a much less constrained form of narrative reference and truth.

Fictive narrative and its World

The idea that historical narratives have claims to truth and reference seems fairly straight forward, many references of historical narrative still stand and speak to us, we see old city walls, houses can be hundreds of years old, and our awareness of our relation to our parents as a generational continuum makes this all very natural narrative to engage with. For Fiction this might at first seem somewhat less obvious. Because surely we are not considering that the sentence "*One does not simply walk into Mordor*", references a Mordor in the real world.

To illustrate reference for fictive narrative, let us return to the moment of refiguration, mimesis$_3$, and its considerations surrounding the question of reference. In it we briefly touched upon the fact that narrative brings with it its own 'referential illusion', and that the world of a narrative unfolds itself through reconfiguration in the experience of the reader. It is this world of narrative, immanently presenting itself through the act of reading a narrative, which serves as the reference

which the narrative relies on as a refigured temporality in the experience of the reader. As such what we find is a narrative which seems to hold its reference primarily in that world which is unfolded through the act of reading, a world which in historical narrative found the form of a world as stand-in for the past. This world is in part brought by the text itself, which is also what makes it possible for two distinct human beings to both reference the same 'Lord of the Rings' world of middle-earth and make truthful claims with regards to it. As such any idea developed in the 'Lord of the Rings' might be referenced in relative isolation from the world of the reader. But this is not the only thing the non-reliance on historiographical traces brings the fictive narrative, it is also the authority which relates to the function of implied author which shifts dramatically.

Where the documentary proof and its interpretation by the implied author are incredibly significant in historiography, due to its real world implications, in fiction this trust towards the implied author finds itself considerably altered. In fiction it is not the implied-author which takes the centre stage alone, the narrator of the text in the text itself takes a large part of the spotlight (Vol. 3, p. 162). This narrator is, in fiction, given the possibility of being distinct from the implied author. This allows the reader to relate to this narrator in ways which the reader does not have to relate necessarily to the implied author, resulting in furthering the ability of the fictive narrative to distance itself from any 'real world' implications. And it does so not just by virtue of reference, but also by having the author *hide* behind a narrator. As such we can read Vladimir Nabokov's 'Lolita' (1955) through the eyes of its narrator, Humbert Humbert, without feeling the need to condemn Nabokov as a pedosexual by way of those acts Humbert partakes in as narrator and pedosexual[1]. This gives an author in fiction incredible rhetorical freedom to play with idea's, concepts, and story lines, without having to take these positions themselves, or reference them with regards to the world the reader lives in. On the readers part, it seems that because a narrator can be differentiated from the implied author, that reading does not seem to require a direct change to the views a reader has of the implied author. As a result the relation of trust between the two, while giving more freedom to the implied author, also shows itself to be less reliant on an authority as we find in the *real world* modification of historiography.

In short, fiction gives the author the freedom to present idea's without relying on reference to the actual world of the reader through the limiting factor of traces and historiographical methodology. Instead it allows the author to present from a distance, letting a narrator take the brunt of the truth claim, allowing the reader to distinguish between the two, and relying for

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[1] Some people do condemn Vladimir Nabokov as a pedophile for writing 'Lolita' but the fact that this conclusion is rare still proves the point of differentiating narrator from author.

reference primarily on the world the text brings with it. A readers world therefore seems safe, no amendments to their world seem to be requested by the text, the narrative can presents itself as just a story about another world.

Interweaving the fictive and historical

Having briefly discussed both historic and fictive narratives, and having done so in a way which attempts to divorce them along the lines of reference and truth claims. Let us now finally consider them together as classes of narrative along the axis of reference and truth claims, coming to understand how similar narrative structures might be expressed in both by making changes not to the structure of a narrative but to its reference.

Ricoeur argues that the interweaving of fiction and history is necessary because not only can we not understand fiction without what we considered historical, as fiction relates to past facts that are unreal (Vol. 3, p. 190), but we cannot take history without fiction, as a historical narrative necessarily makes use of the imaginary as a way to connect the various traces into a narrative whole, a narrative which presents itself not as past, but as a narrative such-as past would have been (Vol. 3, p. 185). What this means for narrative classes is that even in their extreme's along the axis of referencing traces and claiming the "true", they, as narrative classes, will always hold relation to the fictive as presented by the creative process of figuration and represented in the world of the text, as well as relating to the historical as represented by a necessary followability of any story and therefore a necessary relation to the actual world of the reader, without which any connection between the world of the text and the world of the reader would be impossible. We can retrace these requirements in our consideration of the threefold mimesis. The fictionality of narrative relates to the fact in $mimesis_1$ that the capacity to understand a shared world forms the basis for configuring the fictive, while the historical goes through the creative emplotment and infusion of meaning in $mimesis_2$ and references the past by virtue of a 'referential illusion' brough to the reader in $mimesis_3$. As such there is no absolute objective represented world, nor an absolute fictive detachment, which can be found through what we consider the hermeneutics of the threefold mimesis of narrative. This falls in line with the bringing together of the cosmological, as the objective past, and the phenomenological, as its figured understanding, and thus forms the basis for the creative emplotment and refiguration which we have also considered in relation to the paradox of time. Namely that they can only be understood together, without being reducible to either. Because both of these classes are found on the same scale, we can mix and match truth and reference in ways to create new narrative classes without changing narrative structure. An example would be Umberto Eco's 'Foucault's Pendulum' (1988) which combines both references and truth claims of history, with a fictional story set in this historical world, allowing for both fictive narration

and historical exposition, but never losing either one completely. This all relates to the possibility for a reader to relate to schematism's which do not hold purely historical, nor purely fictional rules, as we see in Eco, but uses the traditions of writing as the possibility for a reciprocal relation between the expectations of an author and their readers to interpret when either is the case in a single narrative whole. This changing of narrative class without losing narrative structure will later be used in relation to Butler's 'Dawn' its use in relation to rhetorical considerations.

Having now positioned narrative as something which cannot be understood as completely detached from the world of the reader, nor as something that is ever a fully objective representation of the past, it is time to move on to how this might be used to consider rhetorical strategy by way of consciously dealing with this reference.

Narrative, Identity and Integration

In this final part of the thesis we will finally consider the rhetorical use case for the differentiation of narrative classes in Ricoeur's 'Time and Narrative'. To get there we will first discuss Ricoeur's 'narrative identity' which will bring to light the role identity plays in the relation between reader and text. After which we will be able to move on to narrative integration understood as the way and reasons why narrative might or might not be integrated into someone's narrative identity, or more generally their understanding of the world, and how this relates to fiction and history. Finally ending by showing how Butler's 'Dawn' is an excellent representative of the relation between these aspects as a rhetorical strategy for change.

Narrative Identity

As we have shortly touched upon in our consideration of human time as the productive explanation to the paradox of time, the moment of refiguration is the return of the mimetic spiral to the world of action in the world of the reader. We have however not yet discussed in what way such a narrative form of understanding impacts a human, apart from the augmentation of the capacities present in $mimesis_1$. To go into more detail on narrative identity as the "*poetic resolution of the hermeneutic circle*" (Vol. 3, p. 248) we will once again focus on the differentiation between what can be considered the cosmological and what the phenomenological as we find it in the interweaving of fiction and history, as well as the paradox of time. This time we take this poetic approach to the concept of identity.

To do so Ricoeur makes the distinction between idem and ipse identity (Vol. 3, p. 246). Idem identity is here understood as that sameness identity which is cosmological, or numerical. Ipse identity takes the role of the phenomenological, as an identity of experienced self-constancy. Just like the paradox of time however, neither can be considered completely separate. When taken together they poetically becomes a narrative identity. As such the narrative identity contains both the cosmological aspects, as well as the phenomenological aspects of what we would consider a self. The not so subtle implication of this is the fact that who we narratively consider ourselves to be, as a character in our own life story, is not a purely detached self, nor purely a thing in the world. Instead it is always someone already temporally in the world whose figuration of self takes the form of narrative, refiguring and configuring who we consider ourselves to be from discordant snippets, into a discordantly concordant narrative whole. As such narrative identity cannot be understood purely in phenomenological terms, and therefore has to include the way in which we are in the world of objects. In other words, who we understand ourselves to be is narratively implicated in historical

narrative, which includes its morals, and as such subscribes morals to the role we see ourselves to have in this larger community we play a part in (Gergen, 2005, p. 116).

Narrative Integration as goal for rhetorical strategy

We will understand narrative integration as the way in which the refiguration of text by the reader relates to the modification of the reader's world of action. As such we will consider the reason why a reader's refiguration and relation to the text results in divergent modes of integrating the text into the narrative understanding of the self and the world. Considering that several readers can refigure the same narrative in different ways, we will start with the difference between these refigurations, which is not the text, but the particular reader in question.

Whether it is a fictional tale of spaceships, or a historical exposition, a reader plays the necessary role of completing the narrative by refiguring it, giving it additional meaning in the process. As we have discussed, the refiguration itself requires capacities similar to the ones we find in mimesis$_1$. The more the writer and author have a common conception of the world they live in, the more likely the configuration and refiguration of any particular narrative will align between author and reader. Have a second century Roman farmer read a translation of Kameron Hurley's 'The Stars Are Legion' (2017), a gender reimagining science-fiction book, and we will find the Roman farmer's interpretation of flying spaceships and gender exploration to differ significantly from what Kameron Hurley might have intended her audience to take away from the narrative she configured. Yet, it is not this difference between authorial intent and refiguration which we will focus on. Instead we will focus on the particular difference as it relates to the political dimensions of our narrative identity. These differences might not merely result in a difference between authorial intent and refiguration in terms of message, but political difference whose presence in the reader results in a reluctance of narrative integration by virtue of a reader refiguring hostility from the narrative towards their self. As such this political dimension gives us the most apparent example of a readers refigured self-positioning as nemesis. We will later use in this in relation to Butler's 'Dawn' as exactly that rhetorical problem which it best responds to. The particular problem here being that a reader and author might very well be on the same page plot wise, and even understand the arguments made. But that regardless of this a reader will not integrate the narratives insights into their own horizon based on the fact that they do not give the author the trust necessary to accept the narrative as a possibility. This not giving of trust by the reader is expected if we take that a reader is interested in upholding their identities' narrative validity in the larger community which they are apart of (Gergen, 2005, p. 115). Being a nemesis in the story of your community is for most not the role they see themselves in, this therefore sets a narrative up for rejection by the reader as they reject their identity as playing an immoral part in the community at large.

Let us consider as example an author who wants to communicate an understanding of their own world of action, more precisely they wants to communicate the role that colonialism played in the development of Afro-American identity. At the core this is a historical narrative. The narrative is about a current world and how it came to be. Writing such a piece would then include references to traces of the past, configured in such a way that the coming about of identity is made understandable for a reader. The nature of such a work is political in nature. Regardless of how true or historical such a work might be, the fact remains that in telling a story of Afro-American identity, the perceived nemesis, to the particular development of this post-colonial identity, is the colonizer. This could posit a problem for the author if they want the narrative to modify the understanding of those whose narrative identity are caught up in what the reader might identify as belonging to their selfhood. A good example of this is Robin DiAngelo's well known work 'White Fragility' (2018) which discusses race relations in the United States. While much can be said about the actual contents of the book, let us consider the use of the word 'White Fragility' as the title of the book and what impact this might have on the reader's relation to the text and its author. Someone who already agrees with DiAngelo is of course not the problem, but let us say that we want to use narrative as a tool for political change, and therefore must consider particularly those readers who tend to currently disagree with the narrative which is laid out. If it is then the case that the reader, as refigurer, relates to the historical work, or in this case sociological work, based on the authority the implied-author has in his field, and the implied author has chosen the title of the work to be 'White Fragility'. What is likely to happen is that a reader, whose narrative identity includes whiteness, might now read hostility in the implied author. As Ricoeur states through Hans-Robert Jauss (Vol. 3, p. 174), the text asks a reader to entrust themselves to the perceptive understanding, and suggestions of meaning, by the implied author. It is the recognition of the reader as themselves as antagonist, by virtue of their narrative identity, which will close off the readers horizon for any possible modification and suggestion brought by the text. What this means is that the historical narrative, by way of forcing reference by way of trace, limits the authorial freedom of configuration in its positioning of possible readers. This because the readers live in the same world the traces relate to, and as such might reference the reader by way of their narrative identity. Making the reader an unwilling participant of the historical narrative. Luckily, as we have already discussed, historical narrative is not the only narrative capable of augmenting a readers understanding of the world.

The elegance of positioning historical and fictional narrative, not as purely separate disciplines, but both as classes of narrative, is that in our consideration of historical narrative as a method of generating political change or historic understanding, we can consider the augmentation

in mimesis$_3$ as not necessarily directly related to either history or fiction. The very fact that historical narrative has revealed a possible political roadblock in the form of its reference relating to the possible reader, we now find the possibility to take a step back and consider what this augmentation the author wants to effectuate might look like as detached from the limits of historiographical narrativization. To do this we will consider augmentation as a more general understanding of the structural, symbolic, and temporal features by which such a re-arrangement of historical understanding might become recognisable. While it is not possible to put in text anything purely pre-figured, it is possible to abstract the historical into a more generalized narrative in which the pivoting from the historical to the fictional takes place through the underlying narrative structure. Let us reconsider our initial example of the narrative of Afro-American identity. Historically this narrative references antagonistic relations between black slaves and white settlers. The nuances of this topic are much too extensive for us to discuss but let us consider a simplified version in which we move away from the historical reference and consider what we want to communicate as the way in which Afro-American identity, as a post-colonial identity, developed in part through a dominating relation between master and slave and displacement. But remember, we do not want to reference this antagonistic role of the white settler. What we aim to do is rhetorical in nature, aimed at augmenting the understanding of those who might appropriate this antagonistic role of settler as their own through their narrative identity. This rhetorical and transformative goal is made impossible if we do not gain the trust of the reader and instead antagonise those readers we have targeted. It is now that we might move to fiction to dodge particularly those historical references which limit our rhetorical effectiveness, we will finally discuss Octavia E. Butler's 'Dawn' (1997) as the example par excellence for this fictionalization of Afro-American identity.

Butler's 'Dawn' is a story about a woman who wakes up in an alien spaceship and realizes that she and some other humans were saved from extinction by a strange race of alien creatures named the Oankali. The Oankali are an alien species incapable of surviving without interbreeding with new species, merging both the Oankali and the species being bred into a new more genetically diverse species. By creating such a strange situation, Butler manages to position humanity as a whole as being domineered over by the aliens whose culture and ways of being are slowly influencing and changing the way the humans relate to themselves and their future. Much in the same way that the African diaspora was lifted from their continent, forced to change their culture and religion, and given new colonial surnames, the humans in Butler's 'Dawn' are slowly, symbiotically, becoming part of that which is forcing them to change. As such Butler fictionalizes the historical narrative. She does so while retaining the structure of the historical narrative, leaving out the literal historical references, in favour of their fictionalized counterpart. Even going as far as

relating the experience of this identity change to the whole of humanity, as opposed to any specific historical group. The augmentations this fictionalization can bring about might be considered similarly, namely as augmentation which aims at, not the direct historical narrative, but the possibility of recognising certain structural features of identity-formation through fiction as also present in the historical narrative. As a result the reader might, after reading the fictional narrative, be more equipped to recognise these same structures in moments where the development of said narrative understanding would otherwise be complicated by the readers positioning as a narratively self-identified antagonist.

To conclude and recap, narratives capability of communicating narrative structure in both fictive and historical manners, positions fiction as a powerful tool for alleviating the referential problems present in politicised historical discourse. As such, any narrative configurer, with the express purpose of changing those readers who might be expected to consider themselves the political antagonist, ought to look at the freedom fictive reference offers as a rhetorical strategy worthy of consideration.

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