

Turkey's accession to the EU

Explaining slow progress in the period 2005-2013



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ABSTRACT

This research constitutes an attempt to explain the slow progress in Turkey's accession process over the years 2005-2013. In order to explore this situation, six hypotheses were formulated, based on studies on EU integration. These hypotheses include notions that according to literature constitute possible factors that explain the progress of a candidate country in complying with the EU conditions. In particular, these are: credibility of threats and promises; presence of intermediary rewards; domestic Euroscepticism; number of domestic veto players; institutional capacity; the inclination in the political regime. These factors were operationalized into particular indicators. In this context, it can be concluded that Turkey's progress was slowed down to a great extent due to the examined factors, since four of them were fully confirmed (credibility of threats and promises; domestic Euroscepticism; number of domestic veto players; the inclination in the political regime) and two of them were partially confirmed (presence of intermediary rewards; institutional capacity).

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After a thorough search I decided to opt for a thesis topic that would meet my personal interest. My origin is Greek, but my family comes from a region that now belongs to the Turkish territory. Some of my relatives continue to live in Turkey. Since Turkey is very close to Greece and in Europe, I would like to explore the feasibility of its Europeanization; therefore the aspect of Turkey's EU integration seems an interesting field of research.

With the guidance of my supervisor and first reader, Professor Dr. Geske Dijkstra, I managed to determine the exact parameters of this research. I extremely appreciate her support and her constant and immediate feedback from the beginning of this project towards the end. I would like to thank her for her in-depth guidance. I also would like to express my thankfulness to my second reader Dr. Michal Onderco, for his important inputs, as well as my dear family and my close friends for their emotional support.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction	5
1.1 Introduction and background	5
1.2 Aim of the thesis	8
1.3 Central question and sub-questions	9
1.4 Research approach	9
1.5 Academic relevance	10
1.6 Policy relevance	11
Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework	12
2.1 Introduction to the EU Enlargement policy	12
2.2 Accession Procedure	13
2.3 Explanations of Enlargement	14
2.3.1 Preferences and Bargaining	14
2.3.2 Europeanization of Candidate Countries	15
2.4 Conditionality and compliance	16
2.4.1 EU Incentives	17
<i>i) Credibility of threats and promises</i>	17
<i>ii) Intermediary rewards</i>	18
2.4.2 Domestic Adaptation	19
<i>i) Domestic attitudes towards the EU and acquis transposition</i>	19
<i>ii) Domestic veto players</i>	19

iii) <i>Institutional capacity</i>	20
iv) <i>Democratization level</i>	21
2.4.3 Rational choice institutionalism and conditionality.....	22
2.5 Hypotheses.....	23
Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology	26
3.1 Research design	26
3.2 Operationalization.....	26
3.2.1 Compliance with EU membership conditions	26
3.2.2 Credibility of threats and promises.....	27
3.2.3 Intermediary rewards.....	28
3.2.4 Domestic Euroscepticism	29
3.2.5 Number of domestic veto players.....	29
3.2.6 Institutional capacity	30
3.2.7 The inclination in the political regime.....	31
3.3 Data collection	32
3.4 Reliability & Validity	34
Chapter 4: Analysis of the Findings.....	36
4.1 The Turkish compliance with the EU membership	36
❖ <i>The annual progress regarding the acquis chapters</i>	36
❖ <i>The status of acquis chapters at the end of the examined period</i>	38
4.2 The credibility of threats and promises regarding Turkey's EU membership.....	40
❖ <i>EU's share in Turkish trade and Turkey's share in the EU trade</i>	40
❖ <i>The consistency in the EU's official policy during accession process steps</i>	42
❖ <i>The public opinion in the EU member states towards Turkey's eventual membership</i> 44	
4.3 Intermediary rewards	46
❖ <i>Financial aid</i>	46

❖ <i>Visa liberalization</i>	47
❖ <i>Trade rewards</i>	48
4.4 Domestic Euroscepticism in Turkey	50
❖ <i>The trends among Turkish public opinion about the support of EU-membership and the trust to the EU</i>	50
4.5 Number of domestic veto players	54
4.6. Institutional capacity	57
❖ <i>Quality of governance through the WGI dimensions of government effectiveness and rule of law</i>	57
❖ <i>Justice's capacity from the viewpoint of rule of law</i>	58
❖ <i>Education system's capacity from the viewpoint of government effectiveness</i>	59
4.7 The inclination in the political regime	60
❖ <i>The trend in the regime from the aspect of state identity</i>	60
❖ <i>The trend in the regime from the aspect of freedom of expression</i>	61
❖ <i>The trend in the regime from the aspect of social capital (in particular, Alevi religious minority and Kurdish ethnic minority)</i>	63
4.8 Overview of Results.....	64
4.9 Discussion of findings.....	66
Chapter 5: Conclusion.....	71
5.1 Final conclusion.....	71
5.2 Relevance of Findings for Turkey's Accession Prospects after 2013	73
5.3 Limitations & Recommendations	75
5.3.1 <i>Limitations</i>	75
5.3.2 <i>Recommendations</i>	76
Bibliography	78

Chapter 1: Introduction

In this chapter I am going to present an introduction in the issue of Turkish accession to the European Union by showing the important elements of the topic. Moreover, the aim of the thesis and the research questions are defined. In the next step, the research approach of answering the sub-questions is introduced. After that it is presented the academic and policy relevance of my thesis and in the end the outline of the research is included.

1.1 Introduction and background

European Union has grown from 6 members in the 1950s to 28 since 2013. This happened after decades of negotiations and big efforts but now European Union has expanded its borders and has over half a million population. As it was stated, “Integrating new members was part of the plan from the beginning. The founding fathers were confident enough of their idea to leave the door open for other European countries to join” (European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations, 2017, p.4). European Union’s enlargement policy was implemented in order to promote important values like democracy, peace and stability in the European countries. The last accessions are mostly related with the former communist countries of the Eastern Europe. European Union is in the last stage of this enlargement process. Currently, five countries are recognized by the EU as official candidates for membership: Albania, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey. Besides that, two more countries are potential candidates: Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. On July 1, 2013 Croatia was the last country that joined the European Union after a long period that many accessions took place after the Treaty of Rome.

According to the Treaty on European Union, an applicant country must be a State within geographical Europe (Eur-lex.europa.eu, 2017). So this means that any country that is defined ‘European’ can typically apply to become member of the European Union. Of course that’s not enough for the membership because there are many

conditions that a State has to fulfill in order to become a member of the European Union. Basically, if a country wants to access European Union, it needs to transform the European norms and the European laws ‘*acquis communautaire*’ into its domestic law. According to the European Commission, “*The acquis is the body of common rights and obligations that is binding on all the EU member states. It is constantly evolving and comprises: the content, principles and political objectives of the Treaties; legislation adopted pursuant to the Treaties and the case law of the Court of Justice; declarations and resolutions adopted by the Union; instruments under the Common Foreign and Security Policy; international agreements concluded by the Union and those entered into by the member states among themselves within the sphere of the Union's activities*” (European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations, 2017).

Furthermore, the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993 decided on political and economic conditions for EU membership, the so called ‘Copenhagen Criteria’:

The Copenhagen conditions for EU membership are as follows: 1) Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. 2) The existence of a functioning market economy and capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union. 3) The ability to take on the obligations of full membership- the so-called *acquis communautaire*; that is the new members must accept the objectives of European Union, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. 4) The capacity of the EU to absorb new member states, while maintaining the momentum of European integration, which indicates the fact that membership and incorporation must proceed only in line with the EU’s ability to incorporate new member states (Arikan, 2006, p.31).

Turkey’s membership in the European Union has been high on the agenda of European policy makers for decades. Although big steps have been undertaken towards Turkish accession by both Turkey and the European Union, Turkish membership is not within reach. Turkey has already done a lot of reforms and implemented the Customs Union for some policy areas; however, there are still lots of reforms that need to be implemented (Hoekman & Togan, 2005). As Öniş (2008) states, Turkey gradually becomes more integrated with the EU, despite many crises in

their relations. But this trend seems to have been overturned in the recent phase of the accession negotiations. More specifically until 2013 there was progress in the relationship between Turkey and European Union and new chapters in the negotiations were still opening. Although the general trend of integration between EU and Turkey until 2013 was positive the progress of the negotiations was very slow. The content of the Commission reports shows that the progress of the negotiations between Turkey and EU gradually decreased (Dagdeverenis, 2014).

Regarding the pros and cons of the Turkish membership, there are many who support the idea of Turkish membership and others who don't like the idea of Turkish accession in the EU. Both sides have some important arguments. Firstly, the supporters of Turkish membership base their arguments in the positive impact that the Turkish membership can bring to European Union in all the domains. On the other hand, the opponents of Turkish membership have some arguments against Turkey's accession to the European Union which are related to the cultural difference between Turkey and European Union, and the only convergence between supporters and opponents is the strategic geographic and historical position of the country (Teitelbaum & Martin, 2003).

Regarding the history of Turkey's membership application to the EU, Turkey applied for an Association Agreement with the European Economic Community in 1959. In 1963 the Ankara association agreement was signed and came into effect in 1964, which aimed at leading to Turkey's full membership through customs union (Erdemli, 2003). In 1987 Turkey applied for full membership. After a period of uncertainty in the relations between Turkey and EU, Turkey was recognized as an official candidate for membership in 1999. The next big step happened in October 2005 when the negotiations with Turkey were formally opened. Until 2018 the negotiations were still taking place with very slow progress.

After the huge delay of Turkey to integrate the EU norms, instead of integration Turkey moved further away from the EU. That led the General Affairs Council in June 2018 to freeze the accession negotiations between EU and Turkey (European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2019, p. 8). It is making sense for example that, although Croatia and Turkey opened the accession negotiations together in 2005, Croatia became already an EU member from 2013 but Turkey still has a long way to go (BBC News, 2017). As we can see in the Figure 1 below,

Turkey's accession negotiations have been taken longer than every other country that has already accessed European Union. This figure presents the length of accession negotiations until 2010 (Levin, 2011).




Figure 1 (Source: Paul T. Levin, *Turkey and the European union*, page 3)

Turkey's accession negotiations have therefore effectively come to a standstill and “no further chapters can be considered for opening or closing and no further work towards the modernization of the EU-Turkey Customs Union is foreseen” (Council of the European Union, 2018, p.13).

1.2 Aim of the thesis

The aim of this thesis is to identify and explain the factors that cause the delay of Turkey's accession to the European Union. Specifically, I am going to examine the period between 2005 and 2013. In this thesis I am not looking at the current events which are still ongoing and the Turkish position is unclear but I am going to investigate what caused the delay in the accession negotiations in the period between 2005 and 2013. In that period, the conditions for progress were theoretically better. There is a wide scientific literature until 2005, but not much has been written after the negotiations were opened between European Union and Turkey. There is not enough scientific literature regarding the slow progress of the negotiations between 2005 and

2013, a period in which the relationship between European Union and Turkey was quite good and there was still progress. More specifically in this thesis I am going to examine in depth factors that have originated from both European Union's and Turkish side causing the delay of Turkey's accession. When looking at Turkey I am going to investigate the factors that contribute to compliance with EU conditionality. When looking at the European Union I will examine the credibility of EU conditionality. By identifying the factors that caused the delay of Turkey's accession to the EU in the period between 2005 and 2013, we can understand if those factors can be overcome in the future and Turkey can become a member of European Union.

1.3 Central question and sub-questions

In order to examine the factors that I mentioned before my central question is the following:

Why were the accession negotiations between Turkey and European Union over the period 2005-2013 not successful?

The following sub-questions are formulated in order to facilitate answering the central question:

- 1) What is the procedure for a country to become a member of the European Union and how have these processes evolved in other cases?
- 2) Which factors explain compliance of countries with EU conditionality?
- 3) To what extent are these factors present in the case of the Turkey-EU relationship?

1.4 Research approach

The first chapter of my thesis was the introduction to the topic. In the second chapter, the first and the second sub-questions will be addressed through a literature review. Moreover, the first sub-question will be answered with presenting the EU conditionality and EU acquis. Examples of other countries that joined the European

Union will be used in order to identify the normal EU response to candidate member States. The countries coveting accession in the European Union need to transform the EU acquis into their domestic law, so the relative procedure needs to be examined in order to answer the first sub-question. Furthermore, the second sub-question which will be answered through the literature review and along with the theoretical framework will produce the theory of this thesis. In the third chapter of this thesis, my research design will be presented. The methodological approach will be qualitative research, using a combination of primary and secondary sources, EU reports and relevant scientific literature. Accordingly, in chapter 4, sub-question 3 will be answered in the analysis of the findings through the operationalization of the theoretical framework from chapter 2. Finally, in the last chapter the central question of this thesis will be answered and suggestions for further research will be included.

1.5 Academic relevance

The issue of Turkey's membership in the EU is a topic that has been discussed a lot. A wide literature has been written with arguments for or against the Turkey's accession in the European Union. Moreover, the European identity of Turkey is an issue that has concerned many academics in the past. Therefore, for many decades there is a debate if Turkey should accede to the European Union or not. So, scientifically the issue of Turkey's accession to the European Union seems to be covered. However, this literature is mostly written long ago; so as a result there is not enough scientific literature covering the period of the recent past. More specifically there is not enough research regarding the period that the negotiations between EU and Turkey were active (2005-2013). So, the content of this thesis will contribute to the existing literature by identifying the factors that are causing slow process of Turkey's accession to the European Union by taking into consideration the period between 2005 and 2013.

1.6 Policy relevance

As Liebowitz and Margolis (2000, p.981) have stated, “Where we go next depends not only on where we are now, but also upon where we have been”. So this indicates that by knowing clearly the factors that have caused delay in the accession negotiations between EU and Turkey, we can have a picture of the future relations between EU and Turkey. Besides that, by examining the evidence from the recent past we can jump to conclusions about the general peculiarities that determine the accession process, subject to the more specific features of each candidacy.

Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

The second Chapter presents the literature review. The purpose of this Chapter is to summarize the relevant literature on enlargement with a view to identifying conditions that make it more likely for countries to be accepted into the EU. It is organized in five sections. Following the introduction, Section 2 describes the accession procedure. Section 3 presents the academic debate on enlargement. Section 4 presents the factors that increase the likelihood of compliance with the accession conditions by the candidate countries, as well as the relevant theoretical framework – all leading to the six hypotheses in Section 5.

2.1 Introduction to the EU Enlargement policy

Enlargement has always been considered an integral part of the European integration. However, it was the admission of the Central and Eastern European countries along with Cyprus and Malta into the Union that has transformed enlargement into one of the most successful foreign policy tools at the EU's disposal (Gateva, 2018). What sets it apart from the previous rounds of enlargement are the unprecedented scope and scale of the expansion and a markedly different context in which it took place. Understandably, there has been no lack of academic interest in the subject.

Early research on enlargement has been largely informed by the debate between proponents of liberal intergovernmentalism and social constructivism (Moravcsik & Vachudova, 2003; Schimmelfennig, 2001). The backdrop of the first generation of research on the subject is the fall of the Soviet Union and the changing geopolitical context in Europe in the early 1990s. The underlying question that guided most of the research concerns the incentives of prosperous Western European states to accept poor and commercially unattractive countries from the East into the Union. This line of research has identified a broad range of explanatory variables that have pushed Western European governments to embrace enlargement as a viable policy option, ranging from economic self-interest to the influence of liberal norms. Further research

revealed that enlargement was reconceptualized as a process, which has a potential to transform domestic politics, policies, and institutions in candidate countries under the right conditions (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004; Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2008). In addition to EU-level incentives, domestic-level factors also shed some light on the transformative potential of the EU.

2.2 Accession Procedure

The enlargement regulation of the EU derives from two sources: treaty and custom (Kochenov, 2005). Article 49 TEU is the legal basis for the accession of new countries to the EU. It provides that any European state that respects freedom, democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, may become a member of the EU. Furthermore, Article 49 TEU lays down a basic structure of the accession process. First, it stipulates that an applicant country must lodge its application with the Council, which in turn must inform the European Parliament and the national parliaments about the application. Second, a candidate must comply with the eligibility criteria set out by the European Council. Finally, the admission of a candidate calls for an agreement between all contracting parties, which is subject to ratification according to national constitutional requirements.

Given a relative paucity of the relevant enlargement provisions and procedural guidelines, the EU has developed a large body of customary enlargement regulation. The structure of the accession process, as well as the competencies of the relevant actors, are just some of the aspects of enlargement, which are largely regulated by custom (Kochenov, 2005). The Commission issues its opinion on the progress made by a candidate country, which serves as a basis for granting candidacy to an applicant state. However, the candidate status does not automatically lead to accession negotiations. Rather, such a decision is subject to a unanimity vote in the Council, in addition to a positive opinion from the Commission on candidate's compliance with the eligibility criteria mentioned in Article 49 TEU (Kochenov, 2005).

The opening of accession negotiations marks the end of the pre-accession stage (Gateva, 2016). Negotiations are preceded by a series of meetings between the

Commission officials and representatives from a candidate country, whereby the Commission conducts a detailed examination of a country's conformity with the EU *acquis*. The purpose of the “screening” exercise is to identify the likely challenges during the accession negotiations, but also the policy areas with a relatively high degree of convergence (European Parliament, 2013). Following that, the Council, acting by unanimity, invites a candidate to negotiate on 35 Chapters covering the entirety of the EU's *acquis*. Upon completion, the Commission issues an opinion on the readiness of a country to become a member of the EU, which must be unanimously approved by the member states in the Council and consented by a two-thirds majority in the European Parliament (Hix & Hoyland, 2011). As a last step, the EU and a candidate country sign an accession treaty, which is subject to ratification by all contracting parties in accordance with their constitutional requirements (European Commission, 2020).

2.3 Explanations of Enlargement

2.3.1 Preferences and Bargaining

In the beginning of the 1990s, the European continent witnessed a major geopolitical transformation. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, countries in Central and Eastern Europe embarked on a monumental political, economic, and social transition from communism and command-and-control economies towards democratic rule and market economies (Mattli & Plümper, 2002). From the EU's perspective, the fall of the Soviet Union represented an unprecedented opportunity for reunification. This sentiment was expressed by the European leaders, who felt that enlargement was “both a political necessity and a historical opportunity for Europe” (Council of the European Union, 1995).

Liberal intergovernmentalism provides a good starting point for the discussion of enlargement. This approach views states as rational actors who pursue national interests in international politics (Moravcsik, 1998). As for the benefits, enlargement represented an opportunity to solve the problem of negative externalities (such as illegal immigration), which started to proliferate in the Eastern periphery in the

beginning of the 1990s (Mattli & Plümpert, 2002). Second, enlargement would also allow the EU countries to maximize economic gains through trade and investment (Mattli & Plümpert, 2002; Plümpert et al., 2005). While offering tangible benefits, enlargement was also expected to entail considerable costs for the EU, namely the increased internal trade competition due to the newcomers (Schimmelfennig, 2001) and the budgetary competition, as all incoming countries would become net recipients of the EU funds (Baldwin et al., 1997). Furthermore, enlargement armed the EU with a bargaining power to demand political and economic reforms from the candidate states as well as the creation of a functioning bureaucracy to allow for smooth implementation of the EU legislation in exchange for technical assistance and financial aid (Mattli & Plümpert, 2002; Moravcsik & Vachudova, 2003).

In case of the Western Balkan countries and Turkey, domestic conditions have played an even larger role in EU demands (Elbasani, 2013; Jano, 2016), since the EU encountered more resistance from domestic actors (Elbasani, 2013; Vachudova, 2015). At the EU level, the public discourse on enlargement has been recast in terms of “enlargement fatigue”, whereby the EU leaders have started to openly question the desirability of further expansion (Hobolt, 2014; Schimmelfennig, 2008). In addition, the EU’s political priorities have changed, since it struggles to overcome internal challenges (Zhelyazkova et al., 2019), so the EU has not been able to develop a coherent strategy and articulate a clear set of priorities with respect to new candidate countries, namely Turkey, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania and Serbia (Kochenov, 2014; Vachudova, 2015).

2.3.2 Europeanization of Candidate Countries

In the context of enlargement, Europeanization is primarily concerned with top-down rule transfer to countries with membership aspirations (Gateva, 2018). Rule transfer is commonly equated with the adoption or institutionalization of EU rules by target governments in a given governance domain (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004; Sedelmeier, 2011). Over the years, the scale and scope of reforms demanded by the EU has expanded significantly (Gateva, 2018). The fifth round of enlargement, which was completed in 2004, has proven pivotal in this respect. For the first time in the enlargement history, the EU has had to formulate a policy towards countries

undergoing a major political and economic transformation (Kochenov, 2005; Mattli & Plümper, 2002). One important innovation in the conduct of the EU enlargement policy towards the CEE states is the elaboration and inclusion of the Copenhagen criteria in the accession process. The Copenhagen criteria represent the eligibility conditions for the EU membership (Article 49 TEU) and they are divided into three types: political, economic, and institutional – which form the basis for the adoption of EU rules, norms, and standards by candidate countries (Kochenov, 2005).

The political criteria reflect the foundational values of the EU mentioned in Article 6(1) TEU, which presuppose adherence to liberal democratic norms, values, and principles by the applicant states. The economic criteria require the existence of a functioning market economy and the ability to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU. The final set of criteria aims at preparing candidate countries for obligations arising out their membership in the EU, including adherence to the aims of the political, economic, and monetary Union. They require prospective members to have an institutional capacity to effectively implement the rules, standards, and policies that make up the whole body of the EU *acquis* (European Council, 1993; Kochenov, 2004, 2005).

2.4 Conditionality and compliance

Conditionality has emerged as one of the most important levers of Europeanization developed by the EU in the recent history (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004). It has been used extensively during the fifth round of enlargement to support and promote domestic reforms in the CEE countries and govern their accession process (Grabbe, 2001; Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2008; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004). It has also been extended to the current membership candidates and features prominently in their accession negotiations (Elbasani, 2013; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2020). Conditionality has also been used outside of the enlargement context to foster reforms in countries belonging to the wider European neighbourhood (Börzel, 2011; Börzel & Risse, 2012). In sub-sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2, we will investigate the presence of factors that affect conditionality, from both EU and

candidate's perspective. In sub-section 2.4.3, a theoretical approach will be provided in order to fully frame EU conditionality.

2.4.1 EU Incentives

i) Credibility of threats and promises

At the EU level, the effectiveness of conditionality hinges on several factors. Credibility of conditionality is determinant of facilitating EU rule transfer to candidate countries. Credibility has two sides.

On one hand, candidates must believe that they will be excluded from the accession process if they do not comply with the EU demands (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004). Generally, candidate countries consider EU threats credible because the asymmetric interdependence works in EU's favour and they depend on EU for trade and investment (Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2008). However, once a country is granted candidacy or the accession date is set by the EU, the credibility of EU threats diminishes (Dimitrova & Steunenberg, 2007). Furthermore, Böhmelt and Freyburg (2013) argue that the absence of credible threats in the form of an unlikely rejection of a membership bid erodes conditionality's leverage. In essence, once a country signs an accession treaty with the EU, conditionality loses all effectiveness and compliance needs to be ensured by other means (Böhmelt & Freyburg, 2013; Dimitrova & Steunenberg, 2007).

On the other hand, candidate countries must believe that the EU will grant them the promised reward if they fulfil the required conditions (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004). As noted before, the EU fosters domestic reforms in candidate countries by following strategy of reinforcement by reward (ranging from financial and technical assistance, through numerous types of institutional association with the EU, all the way up to the EU membership). Furthermore, the accession process is divided into stages so as to create a sense of progression among candidate states, in order to ensure (Grabbe, 2001; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004).

Public attitudes towards accession in the EU countries are considered to affect the credibility of conditionality because of the requirement to ratify accession treaties concluded with candidate countries in accordance with national constitutional provisions, mentioned in Article 49 TEU. Negative public sentiment towards a particular membership candidate is likely to result in a negative vote in a mandatory domestic referendum, which detracts from the credibility of the EU's promise to enlarge (Zhelyazkova et al., 2019).

ii) Intermediary rewards

Rewards also matter for the effectiveness of conditionality (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004). As for the size of rewards, numerous studies demonstrate that only a credible membership perspective can motivate candidate countries to adopt reforms prescribed by the EU (Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2008; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2020). Absent a membership perspective, the effectiveness of conditionality is limited (Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2008).

The speed of rewards matters as well because the prospect of EU membership is a distant possibility and there is a lot of uncertainty about the sincerity of the EU's enlargement promise at least in the beginning of the accession process (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004). Especially in the post-2007 enlargement context, which has been characterized by a general lack of commitment towards enlargement on the part of the EU, the speed of rewards and particularly the availability of intermediary rewards has emerged as a factor that can potentially enhance the effectiveness of conditionality (Anastasakis, 2008; Anastasakis&Bechev, 2003).

Given relatively low credibility of the membership perspective, the EU resorts to intermediary rewards to keep candidate countries motivated enough to stay on the reform track (Pawelec& Grimm, 2014; Trauner, 2009). Trauner (2009) argues that Macedonia's alignment with the EU's justice and home affairs *acquis* was largely motivated by the promise of visa liberalization. In a similar fashion, Pawelec and Grimm (2014) show that the presence of readily available, small and credible intermediary rewards, such as the promise of foreign aid or the signing of a free trade agreement with the EU, has rendered Serbian cooperation with the ICTY a reality.

2.4.2 Domestic Adaptation

i) Domestic attitudes towards the EU and *acquis* transposition

At the domestic level, several factors influence the effectiveness of conditionality. Some researchers have focused their attention on the relationship between the preferences of the CEE governments and the transposition of EU law (Hille & Knill, 2006; Toshkov, 2008). Toshkov (2008) shows that government preferences matter in two ways. First, pro-European governments are more likely to transpose complex EU legislation on time. More specifically, the results of Toshkov's analysis (2008) showed that pro-European and right-wing governments have been beneficial for timely transposition of the European Law. Second, economically liberal government preferences increase the probability of timely transposition of EU laws dealing with the Internal Market (Toshkov, 2008).

Theoretically, all countries might have been willing to transpose the *acquis*, but those ruled by governments supportive of the EU and liberalization, have done better. Additionally, a pro-Europe stance is directly related to how susceptible governments are to the lure of accession and the pressure of conditionality. The less supportive of integration governments have been, the fewer efforts and resources they seem to have put into meeting the transposition requirements (Toshkov, 2008).

The negative attitude towards the EU comes also from below. Euroscepticism is common among publics of candidate countries that may feel disadvantaged by European policies and European supranational regulations (in economy, migration, jurisdiction etc.). Moreover, low familiarity of citizens with the role and functions of European institutions, amplifies Euroscepticism. Furthermore, the public is inclined to condemn the EU by extrapolating the responsibility of national governments for the failures in domestic affairs (Cenuşa, 2020).

ii) Domestic veto players

Legislative/regulatory conditionality is an aspect of EU conditionality that refers to the requirement to transpose the whole body of *acquis communautaire* into domestic legislation by candidate countries. A special dimension of this aspect is domestic

decision-making capacity that refers to the ability of national governments to pass new laws. In this regard, **veto players** represent one important source of adjustment costs and political constraints affecting the ability of government actors to enact new legislation (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004, 2005). Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004) argue that the number of veto players determines whether the government is the primary target of EU conditionality. Consequently, the authors hypothesize that the effectiveness of conditionality decreases with the number of veto players incurring net adoption costs (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004). The more political power is dispersed across the political system and the more actors have a say in political decision-making, the more difficult it is to foster domestic consensus which is necessary to introduce changes in response to Europeanization pressures (Börzel & Risse, 2000).

A key facilitating factor identified in the research on veto players is their attitude towards EU demands. Epstein and Johnson (2010) argue that domestic “regime and institutional discontinuity” produces governments, parliaments, and bureaucracies that are relatively more open to foreign advice and influence (Epstein & Johnson, 2010, p.1238). Conversely, domestic actors are less likely to be susceptible to EU influence if the turnover of political parties in government is low (Epstein & Johnson, 2010). This argument ties in with legacy-based explanations of domestic actor constellations and their receptiveness to EU demands. Hughes et al. (2004) argue that the absence of strong institutional legacies in a policy domain decreases the number of veto players opposed to EU demands. As a result, regulatory alignment becomes more likely if the number of veto players opposing EU demands is low (Toshkov, 2010).

iii) Institutional capacity

Another strand in the literature of enlargement emphasizes the role of institutional capacity and bureaucratic capacity as crucial factors contributing to the achievement of regulatory alignment of candidate countries (Toshkov, 2008). The availability of supportive institutions that provide domestic actors with the necessary capacity to pursue their objectives is significant (Börzel & Risse, 2000). In this case, the focus is on formal institutions, i.e. domestic organizations, political bodies, and organs of the state, which provide with material and ideational resources to exploit new opportunities at the EU level, thus challenging domestic status quo. One crucial

property of such formal institutions is their organizational capacity, such as manpower, resources, and expertise, which directly affects the ability of domestic actors to coordinate with the EU level (Börzel & Risse, 2000).

As for bureaucracy, numerous studies show that administrative capacity increases the likelihood of successful transposition of EU law into domestic legislation (Dimitrova&Toshkov, 2009; Hille&Knill, 2006; Toshkov, 2008). Dimitrova and Toshkov (2009) define administrative capacity in terms of the ability of candidate countries to coordinate with the EU level and show that the development of coordination structures and procedures for EU affairs within national bureaucracies has had a positive impact on the transposition record of the CEE countries.

iv) Democratization level

Domestic adaptation entails a dimension of political conditionality which implies that candidate states need to ensure the stability of domestic institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law on one hand, and respect for human rights including the rights of minorities on the other hand (Kochenov, 2004). Once the EU presents its membership conditions, a target government must decide whether to comply with the rules in question or not. This decision hinges primarily on a cost-benefit calculation (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004). The application of democratic conditionality creates political costs for target governments, as the introduction of liberal democratic reforms demanded by the EU directly affects a government's base of power (Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2008).

Scholars agree that the EU's ability to influence patterns of democratization in candidate countries is limited (Sedelmeier, 2011). The strategy of democratic conditionality has had hardly any impact on democratic frontrunners because in such cases the use of political conditionality is largely redundant. Nor has the strategy been effective in countries with entrenched authoritarian governments, as the political costs of adopting liberal democratic reforms have proven to be prohibitively high for them (Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2008; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004; Sedelmeier, 2011). The case in point is Slovakia under the Meciar government, which has remained autocratic and resisted any EU-sponsored democratization attempts until Meciar's term in office ended in 1998 (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004).

There is an objection to this opinion, though. It is claimed that the prospect of EU accession makes some societies to gradually move away from authoritarian governments and boost a previously weak and fragmented opposition (e.g. such as in the Balkans and in Slovakia between 1997 and 2000), putting the countries (back) on the track to membership. In that case, even if the former authoritarian parties subsequently return to power, domestic adjustment costs remain low and the EU's conditionality seems to ensure democratic change (Vachudova, 2006).

In the context of democratization, the presence of legacies in candidate countries has to be highlighted (Cirtautas & Schimmelfennig, 2010; Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2010). Legacies can be conceived as “deep conditions”, which affect how domestic actors respond to external conditions, particularly those emanating from EU conditionality (Cirtautas & Schimmelfennig, 2010; Sedelmeier, 2011). Civilizational legacies, particularly the influence of Western Christian values, matter for the subsequent adoption of democratic practices by states. However, the presence of particular legacies only indicates predisposition towards certain models of political organization, therefore it is not an autonomous explanation for (non-)compliance (Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2010).

2.4.3 Rational choice institutionalism and conditionality

We should bear in mind that various theoretical trends have approached Europeanization and its particular aspects (enlargement, compliance etc.). One of these trends is rational choice institutionalism – an approach that examines institutions as systems of rules and incentives (Ishiyama, 2014). According to this theory, states – exactly as individuals – attempt to achieve a set of goals, acting in a framework of deliberate and conscious choices. In this framework domestic responses to Europeanization follow the “logic of consequences” (March & Olsen, 1998). This logic assumes that actors possess a predefined set of preferences that they seek to attain in their interactions with others. In order to attain their goals, actors behave strategically, in that they consider how other parties are likely to behave and calculate their utility accordingly (Hall & Taylor, 1996).

Given these basic assumptions, rational choice institutionalism suggests that Europeanization influences domestic governance because it offers domestic actors additional opportunities, incentives and constraints to pursue EU's agenda. Consequently the actors choose to respond or not to these impetuses, based on a combination of a cost-benefit calculation and preconceptions (Börzel & Risse, 2000). In addition, rational choice institutionalism explains that the pursuit of interests pushes some actors with enough political power, called veto players (see above 2.4), to challenge or preserve domestic status quo, thus being able to halt EU-integration (Tsebelis, 2000). Moreover, this theory focuses on formal institutions, which provide domestic actors with material and ideational resources to exploit new opportunities at the EU level, thus allowing them to challenge domestic status quo (Börzel & Risse, 2000), while the democratization level determines the effectiveness of the EU conditionality in a candidate-state (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004).

2.5 Hypotheses

Considering the theoretical framework of the previous sub-section, alongside the factors of conditionality, as detected in 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 sub-sections, the following hypotheses constitute angles to shed light on Turkey's progress on the matter of accession to the EU, during the period 2005-2013:

First, it is fruitful to investigate credibility of the EU's threats by examining the structural context of the EU-Turkey relations. In particular, to what extent does asymmetric interdependence indeed favour the EU and affect Turkey's bargaining position? In addition, the credibility of the EU's promise to grant Turkey membership should be examined through the attitude of the existing members as to Turkey's admission, as well as through the European publics' support for Turkey's accession. So the following hypothesis should be up for discussion:

H1: The credibility of threats and promises regarding Turkey's membership will influence Turkey's compliance with the EU membership conditions.

Second, the EU's rewarding policy is likely to be relevant as well. Given that neither the EU nor Turkey have been able to commit to an accession deadline, the presence of intermediary rewards is vital to sustain the strategy of reinforcement by reward.

Intermediary rewards strengthen the link between compliant behaviour and the attainment of rewards for complying with the membership conditions. One can examine whether the EU has introduced intermediary rewards and whether such rewards have had any impact on Turkey's record of compliance with the membership conditions. Thus, the second hypothesis is the following:

H2: The presence of intermediary rewards is likely to improve Turkey's compliance with the EU membership conditions.

Moreover, domestic adjustment costs are likely to be relevant in the case of Turkey. In particular, the presence of Eurosceptic discourse among domestic political and social actors is likely to impinge on compliance with the EU membership conditions. Thus, the following hypothesis can be formulated:

H3: The presence of Euroscepticism among domestic political and social actors is likely to delay the implementation of the EU membership conditions.

Similarly, veto players represent another one source of adjustment costs, as they are actors with enough political power to challenge or preserve domestic status quo (Tsebelis, 2000). It has been proven that, the more veto players there are, the higher compliance costs for a target government (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004). A similar hypothesis to the previous one would be:

H4: A high number of veto players among domestic political elites is likely to delay the implementation of the EU membership conditions.

Another source of domestic adjustment costs is related to Turkey's capacity to comply with EU conditions. As stated before, rational choice institutionalism focuses on formal institutions and organs, which provide domestic actors with resources to exploit new opportunities at the EU level, thus allowing them to challenge domestic status quo. Thus, a crucial hypothesis arises:

H5: A higher capacity of formal institutions in Turkey is likely to increase the likelihood of the implementation of the EU membership conditions.

In the context of democratic conditionality, it is worthwhile to examine whether and to what extent the nature of the regime in Turkey impacted its receptiveness to the democratic norms of the EU. As the literature makes clear, nationalist or authoritarian political regimes impede the effectiveness of conditionality. Thus, it is worthwhile to

trace the development of national political regime in Turkey and examine whether it has influenced compliance with conditionality. Thus, the following hypothesis can be formulated:

H6: The tendency in the political regime in Turkey is likely to affect compliance with the EU membership conditions.

Keeping in mind these angles, representative of the Turkey's accession matter, it will facilitate to answer our central question of why the accession negotiations between Turkey and EU over the period 2005-2013 were not successful.

Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology

3.1 Research design

The aim of this research study is to present why Turkey's EU-accession process showed a slow progress over the years 2005-2013. To achieve this goal, a qualitative approach will be used. Qualitative methodology is extremely useful in the investigation of this subject, since it focuses on processes and meanings that cannot be examined in terms of quantity, amount, intensity or frequency (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000), and the general attempt does not rely on numerical measurements, but more on the exploration of the various aspects of the examined topic (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003) and focuses on a small number of observations to analyze the features of a phenomenon (Gschwend & Schimmelfennig, 2007).

The idea of exploring the outcome of the Turkish non-accession by examining the factors (independent variables), as postulated in the hypotheses of the previous chapter, involves translating these factors into measurable indicators in order to assess their impact on the country's compliance with the EU membership conditions (dependent variable). Therefore, besides that all factors shall be analyzed to determine how Turkish compliance meets them, the analysis should also entail to what extent compliance was achieved and in the end the results will be read in a combinatorial way to provide for an overall conclusion.

3.2 Operationalization

3.2.1 Compliance with EU membership conditions

As it is concluded from the literature review, the dependent variable of this thesis is the candidate's compliance with the EU membership conditions. In the context of EU accession process compliance means that the candidate adopts the political criteria

(Kochenov, 2005), rules and conditions posed by the EU, which entail, broadly speaking, fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria and adoption and implementation of the *acquis*. The process is the following: EU makes accession conditional on certain conditions. These conditions require domestic reforms and changes within candidate countries and the EU offers rewards (in return of these reforms and changes) such as financial assistance and most important the prospect of membership itself. At the same time, these rewards act as motivations and incentives for reforms and changes (Dagdeverenis, 2014).

In order to determine a candidate's compliance with EU conditions in a specific time period, the substantial elements of the accession process should be evaluated. That means that we have to measure the *acquis* chapters for which the screening process is completed at the end of this period. Subsequently, it should be examined how many chapters had been still open for negotiations and how many were provisionally closed and how many remained blocked (due to a member-state's veto or EU Council decision). Furthermore, the number of the opening of chapters per year should also serve to determine compliance progress over the examined period. Gathering these data in tables would be useful before leading to conclusions about our dependent variable. In any case, to determine compliance with EU membership conditions the following indicators should be tested:

- ❖ The annual progress regarding the *acquis* chapters;
- ❖ The status of *acquis* chapters in the end of the examined period (screened, opened, closed, frozen)

3.2.2 Credibility of threats and promises

In the theoretical part of this thesis, it was suggested that the existence of an agreement amongst the existing members as to a candidate's admission as well as the European public support of the accession prospect are considered to be conditions that strengthen the credibility of the EU's promise to grant membership (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004, 2005). Respectively, the credible threats constitute actions that the EU is warning against candidates' non-compliance. In order for threats to be credible the most reliable indicator is asymmetric interdependence

between the EU and the candidate. This entails the lack of diversification of trade ties of the candidate; the higher percentage the EU has in candidate's trade, the more effective threats are. Moreover, a more indirect (but still illustrative) indicator is the candidate's share in EU trade, since an increasing percentage declares that the candidate remains benefited irrespective of compliance so it has no motivation to comply with the *acquis*. It should be checked therefore the EU's share in Turkish trade and the Turkey's share in EU trade over these years.

As for the credibility of the EU's promises regarding a prospective membership, one should determine the organization's consistency in the treatment of candidates, especially those of the same period, since a different EU attitude in same or similar occasion indicates impartiality and inconsistency, thus affecting the aforesaid credibility. The credibility deficit can also be shaped by the stance of the EU members in terms of official policy or public opinion.

To summarize, we should examine the following indicators:

- ❖ Presence of asymmetric interdependence: The EU's share in Turkish trade and the Turkey's share in EU trade
- ❖ The consistency of the EU's official policy during accession process steps;
- ❖ The public opinion in the EU member states towards Turkey's eventual membership

3.2.3 Intermediary rewards

Intermediary rewards are a way of keeping candidate countries motivated enough to stay on the reform track (Pawelec & Grimm, 2014; Trauner, 2009), until they reach the final reward (becoming a member of the EU). The motives vary, including trade liberalization, visa liberalization and financial aid.

As it was proven in the literature (Pawelec & Grimm, 2014), intermediary rewards, such as the promise of foreign aid or the signing of a free trade agreement with the EU, constitute small and credible rewards that reinforce compliance. It has also been claimed by scholars that Europeanization is often instrumentalized by the EU and rewarding policy is a way to push domestic transformation and determine long-term attitudes, as well (Arvanitopoulos & Tzifakis, 2009). As long as the accession was

still a possibility during the examined period, Turkey was made to work on this, therefore the presence and the kind of such rewards-motivations needs to be detected. So, the following indicators should be examined:

- ❖ Financial aid
- ❖ Visa liberalization
- ❖ Lowering of tariffs

3.2.4 Domestic Euroscepticism

The importance of Euroscepticism's impact on compliance with EU membership conditions is crucial in the domestic aspect of this phenomenon (in the event that political parties or other social players, such as entrepreneurs and social organizations, express such a stance), because it reveals that the candidate countries do not consider enlargement a top political priority (Grabbe, 2014).

To determine the independent variable of domestic Euroscepticism, we should take into account that it is the outcome of collective mistrust of EU's sincerity that is usually triggered when the citizens of a candidate state feel that the EU shows no will to meet a collective expectation of this society. Surveys which offer an over-time depiction of Turkish public's stance towards the EU would be extremely useful in measuring this variable. In particular, the following indicator should be used to determine domestic Euroscepticism:

- ❖ The trends among Turkish public opinion about i) the support of EU-membership and ii) the trust to the EU, as reflected by surveys and by the general attitude of political and social actors towards Europeanization

3.2.5 Number of domestic veto players

By focusing on domestic veto players, in terms of EU rule adoption, the theory presents them as one source of adjustment costs, since they are actors with enough political power to challenge or preserve domestic status quo (Tsebelis, 2000) and therefore delay EU rule adoption (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004, 2005). The domestic veto players' activity does not always block directly the rule adoption

process (through voting), but it can set actual obstacles indirectly, due to another, relevant and costly behaviour. This kind of costly behaviour may consist of military actions (such as coup attempts or guerillas' hostilities) and strong political opposition (that sometimes overpasses parliamentary conflicts and leads to impeachment of the governing party), which disrupt the governmental strategy of Europeanization and enforce vetoes *de facto*.

To determine the number of domestic veto players, it should be detected the existence and the number of entities that can block or delay with their official or indirect attitude the rule adoption process. Hence, in order to examine the above, the following criterion should be examined:

- ❖ The number of actors in the Turkish political system which possibly act as veto players (army, political parties of examined period, Kurdish minority)

3.2.6 Institutional capacity

Institutions are considered very crucial in political actors' interactions with one another. The capacity of these formal entities implies their ability to absorb and implement the legislation or conversely their (either intrinsic or exogenous) difficulty to fully adopt rules. The most reliable depiction of such a capacity stems from the “good governance” measurements that scholars, policymakers and authorities tried to shape over the past decades.

In this context, the worldwide governance indicators (WGI) constitute a project that analyze the quality of governance by aggregating six dimensions, namely, voice and accountability (VA), political stability and absence of violence (PV), government effectiveness (GE), regulatory quality (RQ), rule of law (RL), and control of corruption (CC), based on 31 data sources provided by 25 different organizations (Kaufmann et al. 2007). In our case, among the aforementioned dimensions we should focus on the charts of government effectiveness and rule of law.

Given that these data show a somewhat condensed presentation of the situation, it is suggested to take a closer look at explicit cases of Turkish institutions. Justice (related to the aforementioned “rule of law” dimension, determined from this view by the independence-speediness-effectiveness of the *judicial system*) and education

system(related to the aforementioned “government effectiveness” dimension, determined from this view by the quality of public education) would be indicative cases, since they were in the center of government’s attention during this period. To sum up, the following should be checked:

- ❖ Quality of institutions through the WGI dimensions of government effectiveness and rule of law
- ❖ Justice’s capacity from the viewpoint of rule of law
- ❖ Education system’s capacity from the viewpoint of government effectiveness

3.2.7 The inclination in the political regime

We also saw how decisive is the development in the political regime, namely the evolution of the form of government, set of rules, etc. that regulate the operation of the state and its interactions with society. A political regime may evolve from an authoritarian political system to a more democratic political regime and vice versa.

In this context, it needs to be determined whether there has been a trend towards authoritarianism and the core elements that lead to this conclusion. For example, is there a strong militaristic tradition in this regime? Are there any culture aspects that shape the regime? Does the government systematically violate human rights and freedoms even though it typically adopts rules? Have religious or ethnic minorities the respect they deserve? A way to perceive this trend in Turkey’s regime is *the state of political transformation* that the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) uses to evaluate whether and how developing countries and countries in transition are steering social change toward democracy. According to BTI, *the state of political transformation* is determined through five criteria which are based on eighteen indicators. Because of size limitations, we shall examine the *state identity* (through the matter of interference of the militaristic or religious dogmas), the *respect for freedom of expression* and the *social capital* (through the governmental stance towards *ethnic and religious minorities*). Therefore, the beneath condition should be examined:

- ❖ The trend in the political regime from the aspect of state identity, freedom of expression and social capital

3.3 Data collection

According to theory (Yin, 2009), there are six types of data sources of evidence commonly used for case studies: documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant observation, and physical artifacts. The data collection of this thesis will use documentation and more specifically it will be based on a documentary analysis of primary and secondary data. This will contribute to the analysis of different sources and existing documents related to the topic of this research. When developing case studies, the documentary analysis is the most commonly used source of information (Yin, 2009).

This kind of documentation includes European Commission Reports that depict the progress of negotiations in order to determine the annual progress of *acquis* chapters and the overall progress in the end of the examined period. In particular, the reports under the title *European Union: European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges* of the period 2005-2013 will examine the annual progress. A secondary helpful source will be the *EU-Turkey Dialogue Initiative Working Paper, No. 3: Turkey's EU Accession Process 2005-2014 and the EU Conditionality* of the research center “Bridging Europe”, which will serve to evaluate the overall progress.

Statistical data (graphs and tables from *Turkish Statistical Institute* - a government agency commissioned with producing official statistics on Turkey – and the *World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS)* database of World Bank) will be helpful to examine the interdependence of EU-Turkey trade relations. The consistency in the EU's official policy towards the candidates during accession process steps will be based on the Müftüler-Baç and Çiçek's *Comparative Analysis of the European Union's Accession Negotiations for Bulgaria and Turkey* (2015), while information about the public opinion in the EU member states towards Turkey's eventual membership will derive from Eurobarometer surveys. The existence of intermediary rewards will be tested through similar academic literature, too, along with a comprehensive World Bank report of EU-Turkey economic relations (2014).

Eurobarometer surveys offer an over-time depiction of Turkish public's stance towards the EU (along with surveys from German Marshall Fund – a nonpartisan American think tank which publishes annually the Transatlantic Trends Surveys – and Pew Research Center – a nonpartisan American think tank based in Washington, D.C. that provides information on public opinion trends) and will be helpful primary sources in examining Turkish Euroscepticism. Secondary sources, such as Eralp's publication (2009) *The role of temporality and interaction in the Turkey-EU relationship* will also be used. In addition, the *Second Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey* (2009) will help to detect the actors that possibly act as veto players in the Turkish political system, in combination with Carnegie Europe's (the research department of organization *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* in Washington D.C.) information.

The institutional capacity will be examined using the World Governance Indicators, enhanced by the abovementioned *Second and Third Report* and academic literature. The *Third Report* will also give us an illustration of justice reforms, while Çakmak's study (2009) about *Pro-Islamic Public Education in Turkey: the Imam-Hatip Schools*, will help to explore an aspect of quality of public education.

The following table shows from where the data will come from for each condition.

Table 1: Indicators and sources

Factor	Indicator	Source
Compliance with the EU membership conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ The annual progress regarding the <i>acquis</i> chapters; ❖ The status of <i>acquis</i> chapters in the end of the examined period 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ European Union reports (see above) ❖ Academic literature (see above)
Credibility of threats and promises	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ The EU's share in Turkish trade and the Turkey's share in EU trade; ❖ The EU's consistency in official policy during accession process steps; ❖ The public opinion in the EU member states towards Turkey's eventual membership 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ Data from Turkish Statistical Institute and WITS (see above) ❖ Academic literature ❖ Eurobarometer surveys
Intermediary rewards	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ Financial aid ❖ Visa liberalization ❖ Lowering of tariffs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ European Union reports (see above) ❖ World Bank report (see above) ❖ Academic literature (see above)
Domestic Euroscepticism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ The trends among Turkish public opinion about i) the support of EU- 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ Eurobarometer surveys; PEW & TTS surveys

	membership and ii) the trust to the EU, as reflected by surveys and by the general attitude of political and social actors towards Europeanization	❖ Academic literature (see above)
Number of domestic veto players	❖ The number of actors in the Turkish political system which possibly act as veto players (army, judiciary, political parties, Kurdish minority)	❖ Reports of the Independent Commission on Turkey (see above) ❖ Carnegie Europe center(see above)
Institutional capacity	❖ Quality of institutions through the WGI dimensions of government effectiveness and rule of law; ❖ Justice's capacity from the viewpoint of rule of law; ❖ Education system's capacity from the viewpoint of government effectiveness	❖ WGI Tables (see above) ❖ Reports of the Independent Commission on Turkey (see above) ❖ Academic literature (see above)
The inclination in the political regime	❖ The trend in the political regime from the aspect of state identity, freedom of expression and social capital (in particular, treatment of religious & ethnic minorities)	❖ Reports of the Independent Commission on Turkey (see above) ❖ Academic literature (see above)

3.4 Reliability & Validity

Since most input for this research has been through primary or secondary documentation, it can be expected that if the research would be repeated for the same period (2005-2013), the same documents will be used to test the same phenomena and therefore the same results will most likely be generated.

Since this research is especially focused on the accession process of a certain country (Turkey) the external validity of this research is limited. Respectively, the internal validity of the research is higher, due to the fact that various sources of data collection were used, such as official reports from the EU's perspective, other entities' reports, working papers and other scholarly publications. It should be mentioned that the internal validity would have been higher if interviews were held – as initially planned – with officials and policy makers (ambassadors, diplomats, high level officeholders in domestic public administration or/and the military, politicians). Unfortunately, this has not been feasible due to the difficulty to access these individuals, language

barriers and time pressure. Therefore, only documentation was deployed, which consisted of comprehensive information so as to examine variables and their indicators and the many different sources that have been used reinforce internal validity.

Chapter 4: Analysis of the Findings

4.1 The Turkish compliance with the EU membership

❖ The annual progress regarding the acquis chapters

A combinatorial reading of Tables 2 and 3 shows that from 2005 to 2013, negotiations had opened in 14 chapters and only one (1) chapter had provisionally closed (COM, 2006). The decline in the progress of Turkey's accession to the EU is apparent after 2007, when the number of chapters where negotiations opened was decreasing and the peak of this deceleration was during 2011 – 2012 where no chapter opened (COM, 2012). Table 2 shows the most significant steps in the accession process per year (from October 2005 to November 2013), while in Table 3 the annual progress is quantified.

Table 2: Timeline of Turkey's EU accession process, 2005 – 2013

(Source: Bridging Europe 2014)

October 2005	Commencement of membership negotiations; Commencement of the screening process
January 2006	Adoption of the revised Accession Partnership for Turkey
June 2006	Opening and provisional closure of negotiations in the chapter <i>Science and Research</i>
October 2006	Completion of the screening process
December 2006	Decision of the EU Council to “freeze” negotiations in 8 chapters and also not to close provisionally any other chapter due to Turkey's refusal to implement in the case of Cyprus the Additional Protocol of the Ankara Association Agreement.
March 2007	Opening of negotiations in the chapter <i>Enterprise & Industrial Policy</i>
June 2007	Opening of negotiations in 2 chapters: <i>Statistics, Financial Control</i> ; French veto on the opening of 5 chapters
December 2007	Opening of negotiations in 2 chapters: <i>Health & Consumer Protection, Trans-European networks</i>
February 2008	Adoption of the revised Accession Partnership for Turkey
June 2008	Opening of negotiations in 2 chapters: <i>Company Law, Intellectual Property Law</i>
December 2008	Opening of negotiations in 2 chapters: <i>Free movement of</i>

	<i>capital, Information society & media</i>
June 2009	Opening of negotiations in the chapter <i>Taxation</i>
December 2009	Opening of negotiations in the chapter <i>Environment</i> ; Cyprus statement to exercise veto in the opening of 6 chapters
June 2010	Opening of negotiations in the chapter <i>Food Safety, Veterinary & Phytosanitary policy</i>
May 2012	Adoption from the EU Council of the “Positive Agenda” in support of the accession negotiations.
July 2012	Turkey’s decision to freeze relations with the EU during the Cyprus presidency (up to 31 December 2012)
February 2013	Lifting of French veto in the opening of the chapter <i>Regional Policy & Coordination of structural instruments</i>
November 2013	Opening of negotiations in the chapter <i>Regional Policy & Coordination of structural instruments</i>

Table 3: Annual progress of negotiations

Year	Opening of chapters	Provisional closure	Freezing of chapters
2005	<i>Commencement of screening process in 33 chapters (October)</i>		
2006	1	1	8
2007	5	0	5
2008	4	0	0
2009	2	0	6
2010	1	0	0
2011	0	0	0
2012	0	0	0
2013	1	0	0

As we can see the slow progress was mainly due to the fact that 18 chapters were blocked either by the EU or member states individually (France and Cyprus). In particular, in December 2006, the EU Council decided to “freeze” negotiations in 8 chapters and also not to close provisionally any other chapter due to Turkey’s refusal to implement in the case of Cyprus the Additional Protocol of the Ankara Association Agreement (except the Science and Research chapter for which negotiations had already been concluded – *Council of the European Union, 2006, p. 8-9*). Moreover, France decided to block the opening of 5 chapters in June 2007, while Cyprus acted in the same way in December 2009, by blocking another 6.

The EU Commission 2006 report (COM, 2006, p.11) on enlargement strategy stated that Turkey is making progress on reforms, but that their pace has slowed down. This statement was repeated in 2007 (COM, 2007, p.8), adding that the implementation of reforms was uneven and there was need to renew their momentum. In 2008 (COM,

2008, p.3, 13), the EU Commission did not comment on the pace of progress (as in previous years), yet it suggested that Turkey should renew its efforts for reforms. Moreover, it was the first time that the EU made a reference about the need of a consensus among the political powers in Turkey for reform efforts, showing its serious concerns about the difficulties in the accession process. In 2009, the Commission report repeated the need for a new momentum in reforms (COM, 2009, p.2).

The almost zero progress in Turkey's EU accession process is clearly depicted in the EU Commission reports of 2011 and 2012. In the 2011 report (COM, 2011, p.3, 19) there was an indirect recognition of the stagnation, the need for a new fruitful period in the EU-Turkey relations and the need for a restart in reforms implementation¹. The 2012 report (COM, 2012, p.16-17) highlighted the stagnation in accession process and discussed about the Positive Agenda as an attempt to refresh this process². The 2013 report (COM, 2013, p.21-22) was more optimistic, stating that important reforms had been introduced, but a new push in the process was still necessary.

❖ The status of *acquis* chapters at the end of the examined period

The launch of the Positive Agenda in 2012 reflected the fact that the accession process had lost its momentum and that new initiatives were necessary to make a fresh start. Furthermore, since the annual reports of the EU Commission repeatedly relate accession with reforms, we understand the contribution of the latter to the overall progress pace. Moreover, as it was illustrated by the stepping-stones of Table 2, the accession process has a strong political dimension, since either the EU or member states individually (France and Cyprus) delayed the negotiations.

¹"In the accession negotiations, it has regrettably not been possible to open a new negotiating chapter for over a year. A new constructive phase in the relations with Turkey needs to be triggered based on concrete steps in areas of common interest [...]The Commission will work to launch a new virtuous circle in the accession process with Turkey [...] a fresh and positive agenda should be developed[...] Alongside the accession negotiations, the Commission intends to enhance its cooperation with Turkey, in support of the country's efforts to pursue reforms and align with the *acquis*, including on chapters where accession negotiations cannot be opened for the time being [...]"

²"In this context, a positive agenda in the relations with Turkey was launched by the Commission in May 2012 to revive the accession process after a period of stagnation and bring fresh dynamism to the EU-Turkey relations. The positive agenda is not an alternative to the accession negotiations but rather a way of supporting them [...]"

The most indicative example has been the Cyprus case, when Turkey did not allow Cyprus vessels and aircrafts to use Turkey's ports and airports pursuant to the Additional Protocol of the Ankara Association Agreement, so the EU Council blocked negotiations in 8 chapters in 2006 (Council of the EU, 2006, p.8-9) and Cyprus blocked another six chapters in 2009. In the end of 2013, those decisions were still in force. Table 4 presents the explicit status of acquis chapters in the twilight of 2013.

Table 4: Status of acquis chapters (end of 2013)

(Source: Bridging Europe 2014)

Chapter	State of play
1) Free Movement of Goods	Blocked (EU Council decision, December 2006)
2) Freedom of Movement For Workers	Blocked (Cyprus veto, December 2009)
3) Right of Establishment For Companies & Freedom To Provide Services	Blocked (EU Council decision, December 2006)
4) Free Movement of Capital	Opening of negotiations, December 2008
5) Public Procurement	Screening completion, November 2005
6) Company Law	Opening of negotiations, June 2008
7) Intellectual Property Law	Opening of negotiations, June 2008
8) Competition Policy	Screening completion, December 2005
9) Financial Services	Blocked (EU Council decision, December 2006)
10) Information Society & Media	Opening of negotiations, December 2008
11) Agriculture & Rural Development	Blocked (EU Council decision, December 2006)
12) Food Safety, Veterinary & Phytosanitary Policy	Opening of negotiations, June 2010
13) Fisheries	Blocked (EU Council decision, December 2006)
14) Transport Policy	Blocked (EU Council decision, December 2006)
15) Energy	Blocked (Cyprus veto, December 2009)
16) Taxation	Opening of negotiations, June 2009
17) Economic & Monetary Policy	Blocked (France veto, June 2007)
18) Statistics	Opening of negotiations, June 2007
19) Social Policy & Employment	Screening completion, March 2006
20) Enterprise & Industrial Policy	Opening of negotiations, March 2007
21) Trans-European Networks	Opening of negotiations, December 2007
22) Regional Policy & Coordination of Structural Instruments	Opening of negotiations, November 2013

23) Judiciary & Fundamental Rights	Blocked (Cyprus veto, December 2009)
24) Justice, Freedom & Security	Blocked (Cyprus veto, December 2009)
25) Science & Research	Provisional closure of negotiations, June 2006
26) Education & Culture	Blocked (Cyprus veto, December 2009)
27) Environment & Climate Change	Opening of negotiations, December 2009
28) Consumer & Health Protection	Opening of negotiations, December 2007
29) Customs Union	Blocked (EU Council decision, December 2006)
30) External Relations	Blocked (EU Council decision, December 2006)
31) Foreign, Security & Defence Policy	Blocked (Cyprus veto, December 2009)
32) Financial Control	Opening of negotiations, July 2007
33) Financial & Budgetary Provisions	Blocked (France veto, June 2007)
34) Institutions	Blocked (France veto, June 2007)
35) Other issues	No negotiations required

The above Table shows that in the end of the examined period, only one (1) chapter out of thirty-five (35) was provisionally closed (*Science & Research*), whilst thirteen (13) chapters were still open for negotiations. In addition, seventeen (17) chapters out of 35 remained blocked (only the chapter *Regional Policy & Coordination of structural instruments* was unblocked due to the lifting of French veto), three (3) were just fully-screened (screening completion means the candidate familiarizes itself with the *acquis* and, subsequently, indicates level of alignment with EU legislation and outlines plans for further alignment) and only one chapter (*Other issues*) did not require negotiations.

In summary, the annual progress in the adoption of *acquis* chapters and the overall progress at the end of the examined period were slack, according to the above data, inducing the examination of the independent variables in the following sections.

4.2 The credibility of threats and promises regarding Turkey's EU membership

❖ EU's share in Turkish trade and Turkey's share in the EU trade

Turkey pulled through the global financial and economic crisis in 2008, despite experiencing a recession in 2008-2009, with annual growth rates of 0.7% in 2008 and -4.8% in 2009. The Turkish economy recovered with a 9.2% growth in 2010 and 9%

in 2011 (World Development Indicators, World Bank). This course of Turkish economy is intertwined with its trade relationships with the EU. The truth is that since the Customs Union (1996), Turkey's trade volume with the EU was augmented and only after 2008 Turkey began to diversify its external trade due to the European economic crisis.

As we can see in the Figure below, the EU has been an important trade partner for Turkey. From 2005 to 2008 the trend in Turkish exports to the EU is relatively stable or slightly upward (it went from 56.5 to 59.4% of total exports) and from 2008 onwards (when the Eurozone crisis emerged gradually) it is declining (it went from 48.3 to 41.5% of total exports). The trend in imports from EU to Turkey is generally declining over the years 2005-2013 (from 45.2 to 36.7% of total imports).

Even though there is an increase (in absolute numbers) in Turkey's exports and imports after 2010 in total, trade with the EU, while also on the rise, follows a downward trend as a share (from 46.5 to 41.5% in exports and from 39 to 36.7% in imports in the period 2010-2013). The decrease in the EU's import-share, particularly from 2010 to 2013, is attributed to the increased energy costs and needs for Turkey that increased the share of Russian and Iranian energy exports to the country, while the decrease in the share of Turkey's exports to the EU was due to the Turkey's augmented exports to alternative markets in the Middle East, Asia and the emerging economies.

Turkey has a declining penetration in the EU market, since Turkey's share in EU imports is generally slightly downwards (apart from the 3% of 2007, the trend is ranging from 2.7 to 2.5% and only by 2013 it slightly increases to 2.8%). Moreover, Turkey's share in the EU exports ranges from 3.9% to 4.1% during this period (aside from 2009, when EU exports shrank, as we can see below, and the Turkish share also fell to 3.5%), so we could state that it remains relatively stable.

Figure 2: Turkey's Trade volume with the EU 2005-2013 (in percentage)

(Source: Turkish Statistical Institute & World Integrated Trade Solution/World Bank)




Figure 2 presents the share of the EU in Turkish exports and imports and the corresponding share of Turkey in the EU exports and imports.

In conclusion, it seems that as economic growth slowed down in Europe and demand for products shrank, Turkey diversified its external markets, declining the EU's share in Turkish trade volume. On the other hand, Turkey's contribution in the EU's trade is relatively stable with small variances. Hence, we notice a shift for the worse in the EU's economic importance for Turkey's trade and a relatively stable presence of Turkey in the EU market. So, the presence of asymmetric interdependence between the two parts at the beginning of the examined period decreased to some extent over the years.

❖ The consistency in the EU's official policy during accession process steps

From the EU's perspective, the lack of political will to accept Turkey among the member states over the period 2005-2013 reflects an inconsistency in EU's initiatives. Here, it has to be noted that the EU incorporated Cyprus as a full member in 2004. Despite one of the preconditions for its accession being the division of the island via the United Nations (UN), the Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan via referendum that was held on both sides of the island (Greek and Turkish) in 2004 – one week

before the Greek Cypriots acceded to the EU – while the Turkish Cypriots accepted it. In response, the Commission recommended lifting all trade restrictions on Northern Cyprus on 26 April 2004 but the suggestion was blocked in the Council of the EU after Cyprus became a member of the EU on 1 May 2004 (Müftüler-Baç & Çiçek, 2015).

Right before the inauguration of Turkish accession negotiations, the Commission asked Turkey to extend its 1995 Customs Union Agreement to all the new members and although Turkey complied by adopting an Additional Protocol (2005), it did not implemented it in the case of Cyprus (keeping ports and harbors closed to that country). The reason was that Turkey felt betrayed by the EU's rejecting stance, despite their acceptance of the UN plan (contrary to the Greek Cypriots incorporation despite their rejection of the plan). The Council summit, then, decided in December 2006 that the eight chapters on all aspects of the freedom of movement of goods would be suspended and no other chapter that was opened could be provisionally closed and any member state could demand a renegotiation on those chapters. In this way, the EU determined that the progress of negotiation depends on Turkish implementation of the 2005 Additional Protocol for Cyprus (Müftüler-Baç & Çiçek, 2015).

What is more, the EU changed its enlargement strategy in a way that no previous candidate had faced before. First, in July 2005, the EC declared that if Turkey defaulted on political reforms, its accession negotiations could be suspended. Moreover, within the multilateral perspective, the Commission began to rely, on the one hand, on opening benchmarks, asking for specific conditions to be met rather than addressing these once the chapter was opened and, on the other hand, on multiple safeguard clauses (such as a permanent safeguard clause on freedom of mobility of labor for Turkey), which was unprecedented (Müftüler-Baç & Çiçek, 2015).

But even if the Turkish side had the ability to meet the *acquis*, member states began to use their veto rights extensively, making the Commission unable to open specific chapters due to individual vetoes. For example, although the Commission stated that “*Turkey is at an advanced level of alignment in the field of energy*” (COM, 2014), the Turkish negotiations were effectively frozen, because in 2009 Cyprus vetoed the opening of the chapter on Energy (along with Chapters of Education-Culture,


Judiciary-Fundamental Rights, Justice-Freedom-Society; Foreign & Security Policy, and Freedom of Movement of Workers). France acted similarly, by vetoing five chapters. Additionally, although in 2012 the Commission gave priority to the implementation of Chapters of Judiciary and Fundamental Rights as well as Justice, Freedom and Society, this could not foster Turkish candidacy, due to Cyprus' veto (Müftüler-Baç & Çiçek, 2015).

To summarize, the EU faced the matter of Turkish candidacy in a distinctively different way, compared to other candidates. It seemed to promote Cyprus' candidacy against the Turkish one, while it hardened its strategy during the accession process, as well as it remained tied to the interests of some member states. This inconsistency enfeebled the credibility of the EU-membership prospect.

❖ *The public opinion in the EU member states towards Turkey's eventual membership*

Regarding the public stance towards Turkish candidacy, it seems that the negative attitude towards Turkey's eventual membership escalated. According to literature this attitude was grown by increasing anti-Islamic and xenophobic notions (Aydın-Düzgit & Tocci, 2015). The most indicative finding that reflects the situation is the Eurobarometer2010 of the European Commission. As we can see in the chart below (Figure 3) the pan-EU survey that was conducted in 2010 illustrated a growing tendency in negativity towards Turkey's eventual membership from 2005 to 2010 (when the European Commission stopped asking this question) and a downward spiral of those in favor and of those unconcerned about the questioned matter (“*Are you in favor or not of Turkey's becoming part of the EU in the future?*”).

Figure 3: Eurobarometer 2010 graph on Turkey's EU perspective (2005-2010)
(Source: European Commission)



Moreover Eurobarometer 2010 showed that the populations in newer EU members (e.g. Slovenia, Malta, Poland, Lithuania, Croatia, Romania etc.) were slightly more favorable than the older ones (e.g. Germany, France, Greece), and people in Southern and Eastern European countries are slightly less skeptical than Northern and Western countries.

In addition, The German Marshall Fund conducted a Turkey-related survey in the 2013 version of their Transatlantic Trends Surveys (TTS, 2013), by examining publics of France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, U.K., Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Romania, and Sweden. It found that 20% said that Turkish EU accession would be good for the EU, 33% said it would be bad, 37% said it would be neither good nor bad and 10% answered “I don’t know” (TTS, 2013: 46). The question was slightly different compared to Eurobarometer 2010 (not asking if they were in favor of Turkish membership or whether but whether or not it would be good for the EU).

The point here is that, aside from the answer “bad” (33%), there is a significant 37% of the “neither good nor bad” category. In the Eurobarometer 2010 those in favor were approximately 30%, those not in favor were close to 60% and the “don’t know” responses were around 10%. The favorability in TTS 2013 was of 20%, the clear disapproval of Turkey’s eventual accession is 33%, the “don’t know” was 10%, while there is a category of a skeptical public (37%) which draws from both positive and negative opinions. Given that the survey was conducted in 3-27 June 2013, in the midst of the widely covered 2013 Gezi protests (Lindgaard, 2018), the transit from a

positive stance to a more apprehensive is obvious. In other words, it is misleading to isolate the percentage of negative opinions (33%) and conclude that negativity towards Turkey faded in comparison with 2010, yet the sum of negative (33%) and skeptical (37%) opinions is a better reflection of growing Euroscepticism in EU's public opinion.

In conclusion, the growing negativity among publics of the EU member-states regarding Turkey's candidacy, as reflected in the above surveys, created an ambience of estrangement from Turkey and eroded the credibility of the EU-perspective.

4.3 Intermediary rewards

In the following sub-sections there is an attempt to detect the presence and the possible impact of intermediary rewards during the 2005-2013 era.

❖ Financial aid

It has been argued (see 3.3) that the EU's plans of Turkey's democratization acted as a sufficient reason to continue conditionality. The economic consequence of this strategy was that Turkish organizations that work on civil society, democratization and human rights protection were entitled to funding. In this context, regardless of the actual accession to the EU, the conditionality facilitated progress, since it created a strong linkage between Turkey and EU institutions that helped domestic actors to fund their projects (Levinsky & Way, 2006).

In June 2005, the European Commission launched a policy under the title “Civil Society Dialogue between the EU and Candidate Countries”, highlighting the role of civil society in the accession process and dedicating 8–10% of Turkey's total annual pre-accession financial assistance to civil society related activities. The Turkish Secretariat General for EU Affairs (EUSG) developed a grants programme to absorb these funds. The aim was to award €19.3 million in various domestic organizations by dividing the grants across four schemes: Towns and Municipalities (€5 million),

Professional Organizations (€3 million), Universities (€9.3 million) and Youth Initiatives for Dialogue (€2 million). In total, 119 projects were funded, and each Turkish organization was expected to partner with a NGO from EU member-states (Ketola, 2011). In fact, according to the Commission's report (2015), the pre-accession funding in the case of Turkey (over the period 2005-2013) was estimated to be approximately €2.3 billion per year – a high amount in comparison with other candidates.

❖ Visa liberalization

Another major concern in terms of intermediary rewards has been the visa regime. The EU Schengen system's closure towards Turkey caused a public feeling of resentment. The EU decided not to reward Turkey with visa granting being alarmed by Turkish visa policy in 2009-2010, when the country signed visa-free agreements with Libya, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and Syria – a policy that was non-compatible with the EU's restrictive approach to the movement of people in the post-9/11 world. Moreover, the instability of the southern neighborhood, especially in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings in 2011, coupled with increasing protectionism at the EU's borders, prioritized this issue in the EU-Turkey relationships (Aydın-Düzgit & Tocci, 2015).

Turkey knew that the EU had signed readmission agreements (treaties that establish procedures for the identification and safe and orderly return of irregular migrants and failed asylum seekers, from the territories of the EU to the state of origin or to a state through which non-nationals had transited) with third countries, particularly in Eastern Europe, typically in exchange for visa facilitation and/or visa liberalization (e.g. with Russia in 2007, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia in 2009, Ukraine in 2013 etc.).

In the case of Turkey, the EU considered to make procedures for issuing short-stay visas easier, fees less costly and the criteria for issuing multiple-entry visas for various groups such as lorry drivers, businessmen, students and journalists more simple. Turkey was not satisfied, though, desiring a full liberalization in mobility, since the EU was the major travel destination for millions of Turkish citizens and the

visa restrictions put Turkish business people, students and journalists at a disadvantage in their aim of working and studying in Europe, in comparison with their counterparts in the EU or other candidate countries – whose citizens were granted visa-free travel during accession negotiations and not after membership (Aydın-Düzgit & Tocci, 2015).

Not until the end of the era examined (December 2013), the two sides signed the Readmission Agreement and the Protocol on the Initiation of the Visa Liberalization Dialogue which dictated that Turkey would start taking back irregular migrants who had entered the EU through Turkey, whereas the EU would vote (through qualified majority) to abolish visas for Turkish citizens once Turkey starts to implement the readmission agreement (Aydın-Düzgit & Tocci, 2015). However, Turkey was distrustful of the EU, since the government feared that EU would dump all unwanted irregular migrants and asylum seekers (Kirisci, 2012).

Moreover, Turkey was still not satisfied by visa abolishment that was promised by the EU in exchange for the readmission agreement's implementation, because, until the fulfillment of this promise, Turkish citizens remained at disadvantage with respect to their counterparts in the EU or other candidate countries (Kirisci, 2012). What is more, the citizens of most former candidates were granted visa-free travel to the EU during accession negotiations and not after membership (Apap et al. 2004).

❖ Trade rewards

Customs Union, established between the EU and Turkey on 1st January 1996 was a significant step in trade relations of the parties, since it was an agreement that facilitated Turkey's access to the Common Market of the EU. It led to the free circulation of industrial goods and processed agricultural products, while duties and charges were abolished and quantitative restrictions such as quotas were prohibited. This agreement also entailed harmonization of Turkey's commercial and competition policies including intellectual property laws with those of the European Union and it extended most of the EU's trade and competition rules to the Turkish economy (Kanbur & Bernat, 2013). In general, the Customs Union (CU) has helped Turkey's manufacturing sector through decreasing Turkey's import tariffs for most industrial

products from third countries to exactly the same levels as those faced by EU producers and opened Turkey to duty-free imports of these goods from world-class European firms.

Under the CU both the EU and Turkey were required to drop all tariffs on industrial components of processed agricultural products (biomass, machinery, agrichemicals etc). A specific bilateral agreement on trade in primary agricultural products entered into force in 1998 and was adapted once in 2006. In particular, the EU granted tariff-free quotas to Turkey on raw tobacco, raisins, dried figs and hazelnuts. Moreover, under the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement (2005), Turkey granted preferential treatment for a limited group of products imported from the EU including certain types of cheese, wine and fish products. This stance was rewarded by the EU, since Turkish exports were reinforced through expanded preferential tariff quotas and seasonal tariff concessions that have promoted trade in tomato paste, sheep and goat meat, olive oil, cheese, certain fruits and vegetables, hazelnuts, marmalade and jams (World Bank, 2014).

However, some restrictions to agricultural trade between the EU and Turkey persisted, which was due to Turkey's decision to halt imports of beef and bovines from the EU from 1996 (due to Mad Cow Disease) till 2010. When Turkey finally opened its borders to EU beef and bovines from some member states, it became, in 2011 and 2012, the largest destination of EU exports of bovine animals and beef. However, Turkey did not choose to import bovines from all member states and the EU took two retaliation measures (reintroduction of duties on imports of Turkish tomato paste and water melon) in response to Turkey's restrictions (World Bank, 2014).

Additionally, on the EU side, Turkey was not yet allowed to export any animal products of Turkish origin (except fish) to the EU including heat treated poultry. Not until November 2012, six Turkish establishments were authorized to export dairy products to the EU. Some special conditions also apply with regard to certain products of plant origin, which have a significant share in Turkey's agricultural exports to the EU (i.e. aflatoxin controls for hazelnuts and figs, pesticide residue controls for fruits and vegetables). All things considered, the roadmap that was mutually agreed in 2012 dictated that the EU would apply further reductions in agricultural trade barriers

between Turkey and the EU only in the case that full membership will take place (World Bank, 2014).

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
In summary, it was shown that on the one hand the EU granted Turkey with satisfactory intermediary rewards during this period (financial aid to Turkey) and on the other hand some other rewards remained unfulfilled (visa liberalization) or insufficient (due to the maintenance of some trade barriers).

4.4 Domestic Euroscepticism in Turkey

❖ The trends among Turkish public opinion about the support of EU-membership and the trust to the EU

In the Turkish case, as Çarkoğlu and Kentmen argue, “Although Turkey has a long and troubled relationship with the EU, there are only a few empirically informed studies analysing the determinants of Turkish public support for membership of the EU” (Çarkoğlu & Kentmen, 2011, p.365). Till 2000, the lack of systematic, scientific data collection in Turkey did not allow valid analysis (there was some kind of sporadic research conducted by different institutions or individual researchers with no over-time analysis) and the first organized attempts started at the beginning of the 2000s (Şenyuva, 2006). It should be noted that Turkey was included within the Eurobarometer studies in 2001. The following chart (Figure 4) shows Turkish public’s evaluation of the benefits of the possible EU membership over the years, since the Eurobarometer started to inquire.

Figure 4: Support for EU membership (Source: Eurobarometer)




In a similar vein, PEW global attitudes and trends survey of the American Pew Research Center reveals the trends in Turkish public opinion from spring 2005 to spring 2014 (right after the end of the examined period).

As we conclude from this survey, the Turkish favourability on EU perspective was high in 2005 (31% strongly in favour and 37% in favour vs. 12% oppose or 15% strongly oppose), as it is linked with the new negotiation era. The public opinion reflected these developments in Turkey-EU relations with high levels of support. The witnessing of chapters blocked (either by the EU or by member-states) seemed to feed in the end of the first decade of the new century an increasing mistrust and the sentiment of being left out (16% strongly in favour and 38% in favour vs. 18% oppose or 22% strongly oppose, in 2010). The opposition to the EU membership seemed to slightly decline from 2010 to 2014 (24% strongly in favour and 29% in favour vs. 13% oppose or 24% strongly oppose, in spring 2014).

Additional researches recorded trends on slightly differentiated research questions, such as the Transatlantic Trends Surveys that found that the percentage of Turkish citizens who believe that Turkey joining the EU would be a “good” thing fell from 73% in 2004 to 38% in 2010, while in the 2009 Transatlantic Trends Survey, the 65% of Turkish public thought EU membership is not likely to happen (TTS, 2009). This

skeptical view was also recorded in the Eurobarometer surveys that questioned trust among Turkish public opinion towards the EU. The following chart (Figure 5) shows a clear decline in the net trust (those who tend to trust minus those who tend not to trust) from 9 points in spring 2005 (50% tend not to trust / 41% tend to trust) to 42 points in fall 2013 (65% tend not to trust / 23% tend to trust).

Figure 5: *Trust to the EU (Source: Eurobarometer)*



The truth is that from 2008 onwards, the Eurozone crisis led to a rise in Turkish Euroscepticism, enhanced by the continued sense of EU's rejection. Not only the governing party, but also opposition parties become increasingly critical or indifferent of the EU perspective. For instance, criticism on the government's handling of politically sensitive issues (such as Cyprus, where it urged on a more aggressive policy) was at the center of CHP's agenda (it was the main opposition party of this period), whereas it did not criticize at all the slowing-down of political reforms. Furthermore, other major political parties — MHP, DSP, ANAP and DYP (*Doğru Yol Partisi*) — all adopted skeptical or anti-European political stances in the public discourse (Eralp, 2009).

The CHP (as we will see in 4.5) is the main expression of Kemalism. In the early Turkish Republic, Kemalism expressed a need for Turkey's modernization by organizing a homogeneous nation-state with a common civic, enhanced by the idea of republicanism which was perceived as a form of political universalism that clearly distinguishes the private from public spheres in an attempt to cleanse the latter from the peripheral identities (Polat, 2006). Bearing this in mind, Kemalists' opposition to EU perspective makes sense, since Kemalists firmly believe that the EU (as an embodiment of Western modernity) has deviated from the main path of modernity (as shaped by Enlightenment rationality) and espoused multiculturalism. The Republicanism's interpretation (Republicanism is one of the values of Kemalism) shaped a skeptical stance towards democracy and human rights, since Kemalists see the EU prospect as a threat to their ideology and therefore as a threat to the territorial state (Polat, 2006).

Social actors developed a Euroskeptic view, too. The small-sized and medium-sized companies feared that the Europeanization was a project of big business so as to make more profits, marginalizing small and medium entrepreneurship. Furthermore, organizations and generally members of civil society felt excluded from negotiations from 2004 onwards, since the government did not spend time to launch a substantial dialogue with civil society, just announcing the progress steps of integration. The military also went skeptical and expressed its concerns about the accession process, especially regarding national ideology (Aydın-Düzgüt & Tocci, 2015).

In particular, the military feared that minorities might claim self-determination and independence, while latent ethnic divisions within the Turkish people could re-emerge and threaten Turkish national unity (Grigoriadis, 2006). This fear was enhanced by Kemalist's intertemporal prejudice which is based on the idea that Europe always wanted Ottoman Empire's partition and that it partially achieved this in 1920 with the Treaty of Sèvres (Grigoriadis, 2006). This general trend weakened the efforts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Eralp, 2009).

The abovementioned troubles with Cyprus (see 4.2) caused an even more skeptical attitude among the public. Even the elite of the AKP was not enthusiastic about the EU process. The leadership gradually started to reflect these concerns, especially regarding the EU's criticism about religious freedoms and the freedom of expression

and after 2006 the governing party started to welcome the slowing-down of the reforms, since the EU process did not have much public support (Eralp, 2009).

In conclusion, it seems that Turkish public opinion has turned negative on EU perspective, having lost its hope about accession and trust in the EU in general. This domestic skeptical climate is a strong determinant that probably discouraged government to step up to the process despite difficulties.

4.5 Number of domestic veto players

The truth is that the promising reform era that launched since 1999 (after the EU's recognition of Turkey as a candidate state) was hindered especially from 2007 onwards. A decisive contributor to this slow-down was the pressure put on government by political opponents (military, parts of the judiciary and the main political opposition) of the governing AKP. During this period, they decided to join their forces and flagellate the AKP by arguing that it was moving away from secular values in favor of theocracy (Second Report, 2009). In several cases, they connected this criticism with an anti-EU discourse, because, as we will see below, they claimed that the EU was not the right path to secularism and modernization. This ferment was expressed in various ways (as presented in the next sub-sections of 4.5) and influenced the pace of the reform process and caused stagnation.

The truth is that the political system in Turkey did not favor a rapid reform process. Before examining the main points of possible veto players' behavior in this period, it is helpful to get acquainted with them:

- **The ruling AKP.** The Justice and Development Party (AKP) is a socially conservative political party with a religious inclination. It advocates for a market economy and a foreign policy that prioritizes Turkey's regional role. The AKP favors a strong centralized leadership for the country and advocates a presidential system of government. The AKP was established in 2001 by a number of politicians including Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey's current president (prime minister from 2003 to 2014) and it first came to power in the 2002 parliamentary election (Carnegie Europe, 2015). It then devoted much

energy to comply with the EU rules, but around 2010 it adopted a critical approach to the EU, since Erdoğan criticized on several occasions the EU's lack of decisiveness towards the country (Gulmez, 2013).

➤ **Political opposition.** The main players here are:

i) Republican People's Party (CHP). Established in 1923, the Republican People's Party is a social-democratic political party. It is Turkey's oldest party and the main opposition in the Turkish parliament. The center-left CHP stresses its close ties to the era of Turkey's first president, **Mustafa Kemal Atatürk**, and aims to defend the fundamental **Kemalist** values; Republicanism, Populism, Nationalism, Laicism, Statism and Reformism (Carnegie Europe, 2015). As the main opposition party, mainly questioned the EU's sincerity to integrate Turkey and decried additional clauses which shaped an open-ended process with no guaranteed membership (Gulmez, 2013).

ii) Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). Established in 1965, the Nationalist Movement Party is a far-right political party. The MHP has become slightly more moderate in recent years but remains particularly nationalist. For instance it is extremely critical of Kurdish demands for further autonomy and opposes the peace process between the Turkish government and the insurgent Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) (Carnegie Europe, 2015). The party does not support Turkey's possible membership in the European Union, since it rejects any loss of sovereignty to a centralized European bureaucracy (Avci, 2011).

➤ **Military.** Even though Atatürk himself insisted separating the military from politics, since the foundation of secular republic of Turkey in 1923 the Turkish military has perceived itself (with his blessing) as guardian of the official state ideology (Momayezi, 1998). Through the National Security Council (NSC) – the principal government agency composed of the highest military and civilian leaders of the country – the military's involvement in politics has been always intense (still backstairs). It intervened four times in domestic politics to “restore the democratic regime”: 1960, 1971, 1980 and indirectly in 1997 (Schimmelfennig et al., 2003). Furthermore, a serious disclose of arms caches in 2007 also revealed a plot to topple the government by Ergenekon, a clandestine, secularist ultra-nationalist organization in Turkey with possible ties to members of the country's military and security forces (Second Report,

2009). Military's view on Europeanization was summarized in the fear of loss of national sovereignty.

- **Judiciary.** The Turkish court system is based on judges (there are no juries) and verdicts for both criminal and civil trials are decided by a judge, or usually a panel of three judges, who have to base their verdicts on the law and their conviction. Public charges are brought by prosecutors who are also divided into branches regarding their area in laws, similar to that of the judges (criminal, civil, administrative). In the recent history, the judiciary intervened in politics, in a way, since in March 2008 the Supreme Court of Appeal's chief prosecutor demanded the closure of AKP and the banning from politics of 71 politicians, including President Abdullah Gül and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, for being a lever of anti-secular activities (Second Report, 2009). Generally, it has been noted that there was a tendency of the Turkish judiciary to put their perception of state's protection above the EU standards and disregard human rights, as attested in several judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (Commissioner for Human Rights, 2019).
- **Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).** PKK is a Kurdish militant political organization and armed guerrilla movement, which has historically operated throughout Greater Kurdistan, but it is currently based in the mountainous Kurdish-majority regions of southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq. Since 1984, the PKK has been involved in the Kurdish–Turkish conflict seeking various goals, including an independent Kurdish state, autonomy and increased human rights for Kurds within Turkey. It was founded in 1978 by a group of Kurdish students led by Abdullah Öcalan who was imprisoned in 1999. The following phrase of Zubeyir Aydar, a member of PKK's leadership, in 2004 (just before the new negotiations era), when he was asked whether he was concerned about renewed Kurdish violence and its impact on EU-Turkey relations, is characteristic: *“We know we may disrupt Turkey's EU process”*, thus showing PKK's indifference to the whole EU-perspective (Polat, 2006).

Therefore, there are many veto players in Turkey, capable of impeding government from complying with the EU conditions.


4.6. Institutional capacity


❖ Quality of governance through the WGI dimensions of government effectiveness and rule of law

Measuring the capacity of domestic institutions requires to measure governance by policy-relevant indicators. The project, named Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), has been an endeavor (since 1996) that pumps information from 31 data sources provided by 25 different organizations and aggregates six dimensions of governance over 200 countries annually and measure the quality of governance. These dimensions are *voice and accountability (VA)*, *political stability and absence of violence (PV)*, *government effectiveness (GE)*, *regulatory quality (RQ)*, *rule of law (RL)* and *control of corruption (CC)*.

In our attempt to detect the capacity of domestic institutions during the era 2005-2013, we took into account (Figure 6) two of the aforementioned dimensions of Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) for Turkey, drawing information from the World Bank. More specifically we took account the **government effectiveness (GE)** and the **rule of law (RL)** dimension. As seen in Figure 5, government effectiveness and rule of law tend to have an increasing trend between 2005 and 2013, sharing a common trend, reaching their peak values at around 2012. However, it should be noted that this increase is minimal.

Figure 6: Dynamics of Government Effectiveness and Rule of Law for Turkey in 2005-2013
(Source: WGI)





❖ Justice's capacity from the viewpoint of rule of law

Although WGI tools are helpful to monitor governance, we should take a closer look at explicit cases of institutions and check their performance in this era, by choosing one of the aforementioned dimensions. Justice is such an example from the viewpoint of *rule of law* (which according to the WGI is determined by notions like the *independence, speediness, effectiveness of the judicial system*).

While until 2005 the Turkish judiciary was a bulwark of secularism in difficult times, malfunctions (related to problematic legal framework and impartial judiciary practices) arose over the years 2005-2013. During this period, pretrial detention periods were prolonged up to three years for normal cases and 10 years for state security cases. Furthermore, many citizens were prosecuted under tenuous, nontransparent or unlawful evidence, while others had been often unaware of the charges against them without being able to be represented by an advocate. Finally, the court system became extremely overloaded due to protracted investigations and trials (Third Report, 2014).

A reforming endeavor took place in 2009 in order to democratize the judiciary (Aydın-Düzgit & Tocci, 2015). In September 2010, the government carried out a referendum so as to get approval for the Judicial Reform Strategy. The majority of the electorate approved the main provisions that were put to ballot and were aiming at reforming the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors (responsible for judicial career paths) and the Constitutional Court, increasing the judiciary's independence, reducing the workload of the judiciary by decriminalizing several offences, introducing legal fees for applicants to regional courts of appeal and the Court of Cassation, reviewing

the competences of courts, removing special powers from the heavy penal courts (replacing them with the narrower anti-terror courts), reducing duration and scope of pretrial detention (only in cases of founded suspicions) and narrowing the scope of terror-related crimes, which, if duly implemented, should reduce significantly the number of cases against Turkey at the European Court of Human Rights (Aydın-Düzgit & Tocci, 2015).

In practice, these reforms were not enough to alleviate courts of their heavy workload (a judge in Turkey still had to deal with more than 1000 cases on average, compared to the approximately 200 cases of their peers in the EU). In addition, independence and impartiality were not reinforced significantly, as the focus was not given on truly ensuring these values but on empowering the Ministry of Justice to replace politicized prosecutors and judges with another (a reform that arose from graft probe that enveloped Turkey at the end of 2013). On the contrary, the pattern of political activity left no room for judicial independence and impartiality (Third Report, 2014).

❖ Education system's capacity from the viewpoint of government effectiveness

On the other hand, education system can be checked from the viewpoint of *government effectiveness* (which according to WGI is determined among others by the **quality of public education**). Surveys illustrated that university-teaching staff's political stance was extremely skeptical on EU perspective, showing mistrust of the government and utter trust in the military (Polat, 2006). Moreover, despite the cementation of secularism made by Kemalist educational reform in the 1920s, some religious elements recovered after the 1980 military intervention.

The government started to promote from 1991 onwards the expansion of networks of religious brotherhoods (tarikats) and communities (cemaats) and Islamists demanded and achieved the level-up of imam-hatip schools (vocational high schools for trainee imams). Yet this strategy became more intense in the beginning of 21st century. When AKP won in 2002 elections, although it attempted to detach from Islamist label, in fact it aimed to raise the issue of the ban on headscarves in educational institutions (beginning in the universities, then probably in elementary and high schools) in the name of free exercise of Islam (Çakmak, 2009).

By 2008, pro-Islamic public education had been reinforced, since the number of students in the imam-hatip schools had increased (456 schools with 129,274 students, compared to 452 schools and 71,000 students in AKP's first election in 2002) and the imam-hatip graduates had now the ability to admit to faculties such as law, administration, medicine, economics etc and to be absorbed in the state administration. This policy revealed a motivation in strengthening political Islam, which is undoubtedly a totalitarian movement and vitiating democratization and modernization procedures, which in the light of Europeanization were still in progress (Çakmak, 2009).

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All things considered, government effectiveness and rule of law have in general an increasing trend between 2005 and 2013, according to WGI, yet a closer look at the nature of institutions, such as justice and public education, reveals particular weaknesses that have not been eradicated.

4.7 The inclination in the political regime

❖ *The trend in the regime from the aspect of state identity*

It has to be noted that the fundamental state ideology in Turkey is Kemalism which is founded on six principal values: Republicanism, Populism, Nationalism, Laicism, Statism and Reformism. Kemal Atatürk interpreted these principles as a method of employing political despotism to break down the social despotism prevalent among the traditionally-minded Turkish-Muslim population. These six principles came to be recognized as unchangeable and sacrosanct (Tunçay, 2021). It is clear that the principles of Turkish state culture are discrepant with values of western liberal democracy.

As literature has shown (Ch.2) legacy (culture) affects success in fostering democratization. The *Second Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey* (September 2009) argues that, even though the governing party (AKP) gradually became more religious and conservative, Turkish society maintained a secular

trend over the years (Second Report, 2009). This fact was proved when the citizens of western Turkish cities demonstrated massively yet peacefully in support of secular principles in 2007 and gave strong support for secularist parties in the 2009 municipal elections (Second Report, 2009).

Despite this fact, secular opposition in Turkey and some Europeans expressed a serious concern regarding the “Islamisation” of Turkish society in that period (Aydın-Düzgüt & Tocci, 2015). They censured the AKP government claiming that it artfully tries to turn Turkey into a state based on Islamist principles by using devious political methods. For instance, civil servants with a more observant religious culture were recruited since AKP’s first election. Furthermore, AKP-run municipalities were blamed for intimidating women against wearing what they want, deterring people from eating or drinking in public during the Ramadan fasting and driving the sale of alcohol out of the centers of provincial towns. Moreover, the vast majority of judges of the Constitutional Court, found the AKP guilty in 2008 of being “a focal point of anti-secular activities”, but without enough evidence to condemn the party (Second Report, 2009).

Even in city centers more women appear to wear headscarves and in conservative neighborhoods black *çarşaf* cloaks (which cover their heads and bodies) became a common phenomenon. The AKP opposed secularist opponents’ charges of Islamisation, claiming that they did not impose the Islamic law and that an Islamist agenda would endanger its chances of re-election. They attributed the increase in the importance of religion in Turkish society to a tendency that can be noticed in other faiths too, to the migration of people from more religious rural areas to the western cities and to the rivalry between the newly urbanized and conscientious conservatives of AKP and the old guard secularists in the establishment (Second Report, 2009).

❖ The trend in the regime from the aspect of freedom of expression

As far as human rights and freedoms are concerned, a disparity in Turkey’s policies was noted during the period 2005-2013 and illustrated in *Third Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey* (March 2014). The ratification of the *Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture* (signed 14 September 2005, and ratified 27 September 2011) was a step forward. In the same vein, the Law on

Foundations was amended in 2011, allowing religious foundations to be compensated when their properties were sold to a third party and could not be returned. This amendment was accompanied by acts of courtesy such as allowing religious services to take place in the Armenian Church on Akhtamar (Akdamar) island in Van (banned since 1915) or returning confiscated property to an Assyrian monastery in 2013 (Third Report, 2014).

Freedom of expression was impinged, though. Since 2005 – when there was no conviction of imprisonment related to peaceable expression of opinion – a worrisome increase in confinement of journalists had taken place. In October 2012, 61 journalists were imprisoned while in late 2013 the total number went down to 40 – a still discouraging sum. Governmental pressure on free media was also expressed by provoking employers to fire journalists, and media organizations to censor themselves. The restriction of freedom of expression was apparent in electronic public sphere too, as by December 2013 approximately 36,000 websites had been blocked and many Twitter users were arrested for Twitter messages (Third Report, 2014).

Moreover, the Anti-Terror Law that entered into force in 2006 complemented the legal framework that had been configured by dysfunctional provisions in Turkey's constitution and penal code, which allowed an extended restriction of expression in the name of national security, public order and national unity (Third Report, 2014). A number of state-affiliated judges and prosecutors imposed pre-trial detention of hundreds of individuals against whom there had been no evidence of support for or involvement in acts of political violence (and their only fault was a presumptive association with the Kurdish nationalist movement or their criticism of the government, Aydın-Düzgit & Tocci, 2015).

The urgent demand for a liberal establishment led to the Gezi Park protests of 2013. This expression of civil society activism incited Turkish government to violently squash the protests (Schimmelfennig et al., 2003). The mobilization of heterogeneous social groups indicated that Turkish democracy suffered in a wide range of freedoms (Aydın-Düzgit & Tocci, 2015). Secularists protested about government's Islamists inclinations, while Alevis (an Islamic minority) were dismayed at the government's disrespect of their massacres by Ottoman Sultan Selim the Grim (by naming the third bridge over the Bosphorous after his name). Environmentalists and elite city dwellers

contested the AKP's cementing of the city's few green spots and erecting another shopping mall on the site of Istanbul's oldest movie theatre. Youngsters, socialists, nationalists, Kemalists, Kurds, Muslims, LGBT, football fans, hackers, academics, anarchists, anti-war activists and women also brought forward their specific complaints against the government (Third Report, 2014).

❖ *The trend in the regime from the aspect of social capital (in particular, Alevi religious minority and Kurdish ethnic minority)*

With regard to the status of religious minorities in Turkey, it was mentioned above that Law on Foundations (put into force in 2008 and amended in 2011) restored non-Muslim property rights but it was considered by the Independent Commission as a baby step towards pluralism. There was limited progress in the areas of religious service and training of all legal denominations, the granting of work permits for foreign clergymen and the abrogation of bureaucratic difficulties in the maintenance and improvement of churches and prayer halls for minority faiths (Third Report, 2014). The case of Alevi community (a small Islamic group in Turkey) is characteristic. Alevis' places of worship (*cemevis*) were not officially recognized, despite the official talk of an Alevi opening in 2009, nor were they exempt from mandatory Sunni religious education, nor werethey represented in the Directorate General of Religious Affairs that represents only Sunni Islam (Third Report, 2014).

Additionally, the Kurdish matter was not faced effectively over the years we examine. Even though there was a ceasefire since 1999, an armed campaign was resumed in June 2004 (fomented to some extent by PKK's imprisoned leader AbdullahOcalan). Despite the Kurdish Opening that was announced by the Turkish government in 2009 (which complemented the Oslo talks of 2008 – Ergun et al., 2018), a sequence of failures unpicked the attempt. First, the government failed to take back a small group of Kurdish refugees and outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) affiliates from Iraq in September 2009.

Second, it banned the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (a party founded in 2005 which took place in Turkish parliamentary elections of 2007 and won seats in Southeast Turkey's provinces) in December 2009 and intensified the arrests of Kurdish activists involving alleged members of the Kurdistan Communities Union

(KCK) since 2010, leading to custody (without evidence of acts of violence) of approximately 3,000 persons by the summer of 2011 (Third Report, 2014) while it violently repressed Kurdish protests (March 2011-November 2012, when 2 protesters were killed, 308 injured and 2,506 detained by Turkish authorities – Nykanen, 2011). In fact, Turkey revenged terrorist attacks (kidnappings of security personnel and civilians) of PKK members (Watson & Comert, 2012). Finally, the government announced that the state had abandoned confidential talks with PKK leaders (Kanbur & Bernat, 2013).

Third, the Turkish government was triggered to crush the PKK militarily, causing over 700 deaths in 2012 (the highest number of casualties since the PKK's ceasefire in 1999), in retaliation for Democratic Union Party's (a PKK-affiliated group in northern Syria) activity. This group was pushed by the Syrian civil war to take control in 2012 of an area bordering Turkey. Only after these hostilities took their toll, Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan launched a peace process with jailed PKK leader Ocalan in 2013, which led to ceasefire in March 2013 and to announcement of governmental measures of reconciliation (inter alia, the government legalized education in Kurdish in private schools, allowed politicians to use Kurdish in their election campaigns entitled parties that receive over three percent of the vote to benefit from public financial assistance etc.). The announcements were received skeptically, as a first step towards the right direction (Third Report, 2014).

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To summarize, the above trends reveal a shift in the Turkish political regime. It was proved that a turn – from various aspects – to a more authoritarian scheme took place over this period.

4.8 Overview of Results

The following Table presents a summary of the findings in the previous Sections of this Chapter. Plus (+) declares the presence of the indicator, whereas minus (-) declares its absence. As you can see, four hypotheses (H. 1, 3, 4, 6) are fully applicable (++), because all indicators are present, and two hypotheses (H. 2, 5) are partially applicable (+/-), since some indicators were absent.

Table 5: Aggregate Results

Hypothesis	Indicator	Finding	YES	NO
1. The credibility of threats and promises regarding Turkey's membership will influence Turkey's compliance with the EU membership conditions	EU's share in Turkish trade and Turkey's share in EU trade	Asymmetric interdependence decreased: declining EU's share in Turkish trade and relatively stable Turkish share in EU trade	+	
	EU's consistency in policy during accession process	EU made access easier for Cyprus in the same period; set more conditions and safeguard clauses in Turkish process; remained captive in members' narrow interests and did not deter vetoes	+	
	Public opinion in the EU members towards Turkey's eventual membership	Growing negativity and skepticism among EU publics	+	
2. The presence of intermediary rewards is likely to improve Turkey's compliance with the EU membership conditions	Financial aid	High amount of Turkey's funding in comparison with other candidates	+	
	Visa liberalization	Visa abolishment had not been fulfilled by 2013		-
	Lowering of tariffs	Significant progress in trade liberalization; but still the EU persisted in some tariffs		-
3. The presence of Euroscepticism among domestic political and social actors is likely to delay the implementation of the EU membership conditions	The trends among Turkish public opinion about i) the support of EU-membership and ii) the trust to the EU, as reflected by surveys and by the general attitude of political and social actors towards Europeanization	Growing negativity of Turkish public opinion over these years on EU perspective and generally declining trust in the EU	+	
4. A high number of veto players among domestic political elites is likely to delay the implementation of the EU membership conditions	The number of actors in the Turkish political system which possibly act as veto players	A high number of possible veto players was detected (ruling AKP, opposition, military, judiciary, PKK)	+	
5. A higher capacity of formal institutions in Turkey is likely to increase the likelihood of the implementation of the EU membership conditions	Quality of institutions through the WGI dimensions of government effectiveness and rule of law	Increasing tendency in government effectiveness and rule of law dynamics between 2005 and 2013	+	
	Justice's capacity from the viewpoint of rule of law;	Workload of courts and judicial independence and impartiality were not addressed sufficiently by reforms		-
	Education system's capacity from the viewpoint of government effectiveness	Enhanced pro-Islamic elements in public education (increase in imam-hatip schools, imam-		-

		hatipgraduates' penetration to professional sectors and public administration) adulterated its quality		
6. The tendency in the political regime in Turkey is likely to impinge on the likelihood of compliance with the EU membership conditions	The trend in the political regime from the aspect of state identity, freedom of expression and social capital (in particular, treatment of religious & ethnic minorities)	The government fostered Islamisation of Turkish society	+	
		The government inhibited freedom of expression and suppressed civil opposition	+	
		The government granted Alevi minority with limited rights, banned the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party and exercised violence to crush PKK and Kurdish protesters	+	
Outcome	Indicator	Finding	Sum	
Low level of compliance with the EU membership conditions	Annual progress	No provisional closure since 2006; 19 chapters blocked from 2006 to 2009	+ =10 points - = 4 points	
	Overall status of compliance in the end of the examined period	13 chapters open; 3 chapters fully-screened; 1 chapter provisionally closed; 17 chapters blocked		

4.9 Discussion of findings

In this Chapter, there was an attempt to check the presence of the factors that are expected to have hindered compliance with EU acquis in Turkey during the 2005-2013 accession process. In the previous section, findings were summarized. In this view, it was detected that the EU's contribution to Turkish trade underperformed, whereas Turkish share in the EU's trade relations was relatively untouchable. As Müftüler-Baç (2016) notes, shifting dynamics of interdependence between Turkey and the EU started to emerge over the years. While the EU's rule transfer is effective in Central and Eastern Europe due to promises of rewards or threats of withholding them, it seems more difficult on peripheral players such as Turkey. The rising powers – interacting with Turkey – such as China, India, and Brazil, as well as a resurgent Russia, contest the rules that the EU has drawn up, as well as the European economic crisis and the decline in its credibility as a successful economic model have further

reduced the EU's impact. The EU's ability to influence Turkey is largely affected by these circumstances (Müftüler-Baç, 2016).

As for the inconsistencies in the EU's accession policy found in the Turkish case, our conclusion is perfectly depicted by the statement of the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bernard Bot, in 2009: *“This is not a European Union negotiation. This is an intergovernmental negotiation where every member state can veto whatever it wants to veto. [...] Every member state remains master of the negotiating process”* (Beudermann 2009). Turkish candidacy is a good example of the bilateral and political nature of the EU negotiations, in particular the ability of the member states to become the main players in the negotiations strategy, albeit the Commission recommends that, technically, the country meets the EU acquis. Furthermore, the EU's harder admission criteria seemed quite influential in the failure of the whole process (Müftüler-Baç & Çiçek, 2015).

Moreover, literature highlights that there are some illustrative factors in the development of European opinions on the matter of a possible Turkish membership (Lindgaard, 2018). It is noticed that the older and the farther North-West the EU member is, the less favorable popular attitude develops. The statement of former French President (France is a founding member-state of the EU, i.e., one of the oldest members) Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in 2002 is indicative of opposition to Turkey's membership: *“Turkey [is] not a European country but [...] another culture; another way of life [...] its accession would mark the end of Europe”* (Aydın-Düzgit & Tocci, 2015).

The *FEUTURE (Future of EU-Turkey Relations)* project (2018) conducted a research that attempted to identify the drivers that underpin the general declining support for Turkey's EU membership and concluded that the presence of Turkish minorities in member-states, the debates on the integration of Muslim-background immigrants, and the EU citizens' aversion to the deterioration of the human rights and democracy in Turkey increased skepticism among EU publics over this period. This situation was coupled with the rising tide of populist politics in Europe, thus the estimation has been that EU-Turkey relationship is pushed in a more conflictual direction in the near future due to this aspect (Lindgaard, 2018).

However, the EU still assesses Turkey's eventual membership as useful, because it saw the prospects of the Turkish economy. Furthermore, the competitive international trading climate is making the Union constantly build trading partnerships. This fact seems to feed a further trade liberalization (Lindgaard, 2018), whereas the signing of the readmission agreement in 2013 (see 4.3) which would lead to visa liberalization was considered as an implicit way of promoting the accession process, although Turkey had not started negotiating Chapter 24 (justice, freedom and security matters), which included migration and mobility issues (Aydın-Düzgit & Tocci, 2015). Hence, despite the troubles in the process, the EU's intermediary rewards were considered to be an effective policy that could help boost integration, so the Union tried to maintain them (Lindgaard, 2018).

Use of survey data in section 4.4 revealed a decreasing public support in Turkey for EU perspective. The general trends do not happen in a vacuum. A simple chronological analysis reveals that the major spikes are associated with political developments in Turkey-EU relations. For instance, the high favorability of 2005 is linked with the Commission's positive tone in Turkey's progress and its recommendation to start negotiations in the Progress report of October 2004 and the actual starting of this era by October 2005 (Şenyuva, 2018). However, while the support for EU membership turns both negative and positive over time, the level of trust for the European institutions among Turkish citizens is in a constant decline, as Şenyuva notices (2009) – a tendency that was linked with the blocking of various chapters and the anti-Turkish rhetoric of certain EU-member politicians (Şenyuva, 2018). This reinforces the conclusion that Turkish Euroscepticism is linked with final failure.

This period indicates the presence of multiple narratives and the further rise of alternative narratives to those of *Westernization* and *Europeanization*. One of these rising narratives in Turkey promoted the idea of a strategic focus on the neighborhood, particularly in the Middle East. This new narrative that emerged – that can be summed up as *Neo-Ottomanism* sees Turkey as inheritor of the Ottoman Empire and as strong regional power. (Hauge et al., 2016). In addition, the “*Turkey as the other*” narrative – cultivated in both Turkey and Europe – questioned that Turkey belongs to Europe due to cultural differentiation.

The sociology of engaged domestic actors (seen above as eventual veto players) in Turkey's Europeanization drew the attention of analyses, too. As Visier notes (2009), membership negotiations were pushed into the background in the years that followed AKP's victory in November 2002, due to growing political tension in Turkey between the AKP, opposition parties and the military and judiciary establishment. The military's interference in politics is particularly highlighted by the literature as an extremely limiting factor of EU integration. No earlier than 2013, civil-military relations had been hardly balanced to some extent, when the September 2012 Balyoz verdict and the August 2013 Ergenekon verdict sentenced hundreds of officers, including a former chief of staff (both cases refer to coup plots in 2003 and 2007 against the government). In the Balyoz case, the court sentenced 325 officers between 13 and 20 years. In the Ergenekon case, life and lengthy (33-47 years) sentences were imposed, while many defendants were acquitted. That was an important but not a definite blow to militaristic interventionism (Third Report, 2014).

In the context of institutional deficiencies, we found that problems in justice were not faced effectively, impeding convergence with EU conditionality. The *Third Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey* (March 2014) describes lack of reform of the judiciary as a setback for accession. The Judicial Reform Strategy that was announced in 2009 was proven insufficient to deal with courts' workload, arbitrary detention, unjust indictments for terrorism and – last but not least – political interference with judicial system (Third Report, 2014). In our analysis, it was also detected that the Islamic trend in state policy about public education perverted its nature, being a typical example of low government effectiveness which is associated with low institutional capacity level. As Çakmak underlines in his study about “*Pro-Islamic Public Education in Turkey and the Imam-Hatip Schools*” (2009), the AKP (and all the previous pro-Islamic parties in Turkish recent politics) tried to take advantage of poor, disadvantaged and unemployed parents which sent their children to the upgraded imam-hatip schools so as to guarantee their future, because it promoted the Islamisation of society. The outcome is that *tarikats* (religious sects) developed over the years 2005-2013 a network of hospitals, mosques, banks, legal aid organizations, radio and television channels, newspapers, youth clubs and day-care centers which owe their appearance to graduates of imam-hatip schools (Çakmak, 2009).

Our analysis also focused on the restrictions in the freedom of expression. Numbers reinforce our findings, since according the Reporters Without Borders' Annual Index

of Press Freedom Turkey, which in 2005 ranked 98th out of 178 surveyed countries dropped to 154th position in 2013. This worrying trend in the regime was illustrated by the number of European Court of Human Rights applications against Turkey in 2013, which are approximately 11,200, compared to 8,000 in 2012, of which approximately 450 relate to cases pertaining to the freedom of expression (Aydın-Düzgit & Tocci, 2015). The Independent Commission on Turkey concludes that this failure of political regime, along with the persisting wrangling with the Kurdish leadership, are great steps backwards that overtake the progress made (Third Report, 2014). On the contrary, it does not identify with the fear that the ruling AKP threatens secularism with its religious turn, because the overwhelming majority of Turks believes that the secular system which constitutes one of the main pillars of the Republic of Turkey is not in doubt and cannot hinder EU-accession (Second Report, 2009).

In conclusion, not all factors were present in Turkey's case. In particular, factors related to the hypotheses on intermediary rewards and institutional capacity cannot fully explain Turkey's low level of compliance (because they were partly conducive to compliance), whereas the rest of factors confirmed the country's slow progress. More specifically, it seems that *Hypothesis 1* has been met. The factors of decreasing asymmetric interdependence and inconsistency in the Union's official policy seem decisive, since they practically hindered the process, while skepticism among EU publics, albeit less decisive, contributed to general climate. *Hypothesis 2* was partially met, since Turkey's funding was high, but visa and trade liberalization are still in progress – the delay in visa abolishment generated much more criticism in Turkey than any other EU policy, because it affected a wide range of Turkish citizens.

Domestic Euroscepticism (*Hypothesis 3*) and high number of domestic veto players (*Hypothesis 4*) also shaped a negative climate in Turkey, albeit the former could be sidestepped by the government if the will of the political system to comply with the EU conditionality was constantly strong. *Hypothesis 5* was partially met, since the general level of institutional capacity – which is important when talking about EU accession – was good (albeit slightly increasing). However, particular deficiencies in rule of law and government effectiveness were also important and determined the outcome. Finally, the full confirmation of *Hypothesis 6* was probably the most important point, since country's democratization in every aspect (human rights, status of minorities, state identity) is considered fundamental for accession by the EU.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

5.1 Final conclusion

This thesis constitutes an attempt to answer the question “*Why were the accession negotiations between Turkey and European Union over the period 2005-2013 not successful*”. In this regard, the first sub-question, formulated to facilitate answering the above central question, was the following:

1) What is the procedure for a country to become a member of the European Union and how have these processes evolved in other cases?

We saw that the legal basis for the accession of new countries to the EU is Article 49 TEU. It dictates that an applicant country must lodge its application with the Council, which in turn must inform the European Parliament and the national parliaments about the application and then the candidate must comply with the eligibility criteria set out by the European Council. The opening of accession negotiations marks the end of the pre-accession stage and the Commission examines candidate's conformity with the EU *acquis*, in order to identify the likely challenges during the accession negotiations, but also the policy areas with a relatively high degree of convergence. Negotiations include 35 Chapters covering the entirety of the EU's *acquis* and the final step of this process is the accession treaty signed between the EU and the candidate country.

We also found that the EU's enlargement in the case of the CEE countries was seen by the Union as an opportunity to intercept phenomena, such as illegal immigration, and to improve business climate. Negotiations' eras in these cases were long and the EU motivated CEE countries with benefits (including freedom of movement and equal access to the EU funds) which would trigger their accession to the Union. The most important innovation in the EU enlargement policy towards the CEE states was the inclusion of the Copenhagen criteria in the accession process that practically pushed candidates to adjust domestic regulatory frameworks and governance

arrangements to the EU standards. There are three types of criteria – political, economic, and institutional.

Besides the first sub-question, Chapter 2 explores a second sub-question:

2) Which factors explain compliance of countries with EU conditionality?

In this regard, it was elaborated that the credibility of conditionality (which implies the credible threat of a candidate's exclusion from the accession process in case of non-compliance and the credible promises of opening of accession negotiations and signing of an accession treaty) is another crucial factor in successful EU rule transfer. Moreover, rewards also matter for the effectiveness of conditionality and this is proved by the use of intermediary rewards by the EU to keep candidates motivated enough to stay on the reform track. Domestic decision-making capacity also plays a crucial role in bringing domestic legislation in line with EU standards and in this regard, veto players represent one important source of adjustment costs, along with a eurosceptic public opinion. We also found that institutional capacity contributes to the achievement of regulatory alignment. Finally, compliance is intertwined with the adoption of liberal democratic norms by candidate countries.

The previous chapter (4) focused on answering the third sub-question of this thesis

3) To what extent are these factors present in the case of the Turkey-EU relationship?

Based on the theoretical groundwork and the aforementioned factors, six hypotheses were deduced (2.5) and helped to conceptualize the matter of Turkey's compliance. In the previous chapter, we found that the level of Turkey's compliance with the EU-acquis over the years 2005-2013 was low, so we attempted to test the hypotheses through certain indicators (see Chapter 3). We concluded that not all factors were present. In particular, intermediary rewards and institutional capacity cannot fully explain Turkey's low level of compliance (because they were relatively sufficient), whereas the rest of factors confirmed the country's slow progress.

Therefore, through the analysis in sections 4.2-4.7, answer to the central question is also attempted: *Why were the accession negotiations between Turkey and European Union over the period 2005-2013 not successful?* The following conclusions were deduced.

Credibility of threats and promises was weakened due to the declining EU's share in Turkish trade volume, inconsistency in which the EU faced the matter of Turkish candidacy, compared to other candidates and growing negativity among publics of the EU member-states regarding Turkey's candidacy – thus confirming the country's slow progress. Intermediate rewarding was generally satisfactory during this period (especially in terms of financial aid), with some other rewards remaining unfulfilled or insufficient. Domestic Euroscepticism confirmed the delay in compliance, along with the relatively high number of domestic veto players.

With regards to capacity of formal institutions in Turkey, it is quite difficult to examine each institution separately. The World Governance Indicators showed an increasing trend in the close-related dimensions of government effectiveness and rule of law until 2012, yet a more thorough examination of institutions, such as justice and public education, revealed particular weaknesses that have not been eradicated and possibly decrease the likelihood of the implementation of the EU membership conditions. Finally, the trend in the Turkish political regime (from the view of state identity, freedom of expression, and dealing with religious and ethnic minorities) revealed a turn to a more authoritarian scheme which seemed to impinge on the likelihood of compliance with the EU membership conditions.

5.2 Relevance of Findings for Turkey's Accession Prospects after 2013

The presence of the above examined factors that affected Turkish accession to the EU serves as a picture of future EU-Turkey relations. As Turkey is improving its trade relations with other global players (e.g. China, Russia), the asymmetric interdependence in the EU-Turkey relations keeps decreasing in the post-2013 period. We also found that the vetoes of member-states made the EU to rein back negotiations. This factor was still present in the post-2013 era, but a prospect of its mitigation emerged. Müftüler-Baç (2016) notices that transfer of technical rules seems unlikely under the Cypriot veto of the Energy chapter, but the EU and Turkey tried to get round it, by adopting a High Level Energy Dialogue in March 2015 and

publishing a Joint Declaration on Energy on March 17. Considering of the above, Turkey's membership is not favored.

Negativity towards Turkey's candidacy among EU publics over the years 2005-2013 continued in the following years. In a survey made by British research center YouGov in the summer of 2016 (among Great Britain, Germany, France, Denmark, Sweden and Finland) support for Turkish EU membership was at 7% and opposition at 76%. Findings of a mid-2017 poll conducted privately by the European People's Party (EPP) display findings in line with the YouGov survey (77% of respondents do not want Turkey in the EU, with Germany at 86% and the Netherlands at 84% topping the list, and Spain displaying the lowest resistance at 60%, Lindgaard, 2018). Therefore, this aspect does not seem to boost accession.

In our analysis, we also found that domestic Euroscepticism was linked with concrete developments (it was low in the beginning of the negotiations era and increased till 2013, as the EU-prospect was gradually fading). According to the Transatlantic Trends Survey data, in 2014, 53% of Turkish public opinion stated that Turkey's membership would be a good thing, the highest level since 2006, compared to the 29% of those who said it would be a bad thing, the lowest level since 2009. The TTS findings were in line with those of the June 2014 Eurobarometer (43% positive). This increase was linked with the frustration of Turkish voters (mainly centre-left) due to the ruling party's policies (the spike was the violent handling of Gezi protests in 2013) and their hope for a closer connection to Europe as the path to the restricted liberties' protection (Şenyuva, 2018). The failed coup attempt of July 15th 2016 in Turkey caused disappointment with the EU's incapacity to properly recognize the severity of the threat to democracy in Turkey and Euroscepticism increased again (28% positive in Eurobarometer off all 2016), whereas in 2017 the hope that the EU is an anchorage for rights and rule of law was restored (47% positive in fall 2017). In this case, the prospect of Turkey's membership depends on reviving Turkish citizens' trust in the EU.

Analysis also presented visa liberalization as a pending reward that Turkey demands imperatively. A key driver for development in this matter was Turkey's implementation of Readmission Agreement (taking back irregular migrants from the EU). New complications were added to this matter, since the Arab Spring exacerbated the migration problem and ISIL's (*Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant*) targeting of

Turkish and European capitals made EU-Turkey cooperation imperative. Therefore in 2015, the EU and Turkey decided upon an Action Plan to face uncontrollable migration (and infiltrating terrorists). For the Turkish side, visa liberalization was the lever for cooperation and until the first half of 2016 some progress was made in relative negotiations, until the failed coup of 15 July halted it again (Hauge et al., 2016). This coup attempt affected not only visa discourse, but also the conversation about authoritarian inclination; the EU harshly criticized the discussion on the death penalty that revived in Turkish politics and the introductions of the state of emergency (Hauge et al., 2016). The fluctuation in visa matter does not guarantee a credible accession prospect.

Finally, the troublesome relation between Turkey and Kurdish leadership was condemned by the EU, as we saw above, and some reconciliation steps were received skeptically. The Syrian conflict has made things worse for EU-Turkey relations since 2014. The EU allied with the U.S. military and SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces) in Kobanî (*Kurdish city in northern Syria*) to achieve victorious operations (September 2014) against ISIL. Kurdish militia (YPG) is part of SDF, thus this alliance, in combination with European Parliament's calling for Turkey to withdraw its troops in Syria, drew a strong rebuke from Turkish government. What is more the Turkish-Kurdish peace process collapsed again since 2015 and Turkey launched military operations against Kurdish militia in Syria (2016 and 2018). Therefore it seems that the Kurdish issue has deepened division between the EU and Turkey (Ergun et al., 2018). Thus, the treatment of the Kurdish minority remains harsh and impinges on Turkey's democratization level, in combination with the country's constant low score in rights and liberties (according to BTI 2020, it remains a moderate autocracy with declining trends in all dimensions of democracy). Therefore, the inclination in the political regime does not seem to favor EU-membership, even in the post-2013 era.

5.3 Limitations & Recommendations

5.3.1 Limitations

As far as limitations are concerned, there was no opportunity to conduct interviews with officials and policy makers (ambassadors, diplomats, high level officeholders in

domestic public administration or/and the military, politicians), due to the difficulty to access these individuals, language barriers and time pressure (of both interviewees and interviewer). This limited the access to information that would be fruitful for the research.

In addition, the examination of more formal institutions would illustrate more clearly their general capacity of harmonization with EU conditions, because there are many particular elements that indicate e.g. government effectiveness, such as bureaucracy or corruption in public services or deregulation level in market. Yet, this would require an extensive case study that is not feasible in terms of time and thesis size.

5.3.2 Recommendations

Considering the above, a recommendation for further examination of the central research question would be a series of interviews with the abovementioned officials. A possible questionnaire could include open-ended questions to Turkish decision makers (e.g. *Which domestic factor do you consider to be determinant of Turkey's non-compliance?*), whereas this research could be enhanced by asking relevant questions to EU key players of that period.

A further exploration could be conducted in the field of the U.S. factor in the accession process. Even before 2005, the USA viewed Turkey's eventual incorporation into the Union as extremely favorable for its strategic interests in Europe and Middle East and tried to promote this candidacy. The EU was suspicious that the U.S. attempted to undermine its transformation into a federal state (that might challenge U.S. global hegemony), by using Turkey as a "Trojan horse" (because Turkey's large population and unstable economy could reasonably unbalance Union's financial capacity and the country's loose relation with European identity could strengthen existing anti-federalist and Atlanticist views inside the EU). However, U.S.-Turkey relations are not diachronically harmonic and Anti-Americanism in Turkey rose over the years (Grigoriadis, 2006). Did U.S.-Turkey relations really affect Turkey's accession to the EU? Was there a particular activity in the context of this alliance that possibly discouraged EU key decision makers to proceed to negotiations? These questions could feed further research.

The dimension of Middle East could generate further investigation, too. Turkish-Syrian relations were developed from 2005 onwards, as the countries established a

Strategic Cooperation Council in 2009, whereas Iraqi-Turkish cooperation was fostered similarly in the same year with the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council. Additionally, Turkey's peripheral role became emphatic due to its mediation efforts between Israel and Syria between 2004 and 2008, and between the P5+1³ and Iran when in 2010 Turkey and Brazil attempted to broker a nuclear swap deal. However this role had shrunk by 2013, since Arab Spring did not lead to Arab world's democratization that Turkey coveted and recovering military regimes ignored Turkey's calls. Arab uprisings affected Europe, too, due to refugees and terrorism. Thus, the following questions demand investigation: Did the EU's need for cooperation with Turkey (so as to deal with the consequences of the Middle East turmoil) motivate the former to promote the latter's accession? Were there any EU-policies that put Middle East and Turkey's membership in the same agenda? If any, did they help or hinder the accession?

³ The P5+1 refers to the UN Security Council's five permanent members (the P5); namely China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States; plus Germany

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