



Explaining motivations of China's emergency aid

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Word count: 18,956

A thesis submitted to:

Erasmus University Rotterdam

Master of International Public Management and Policy

Abstract

As reoccurring natural and man-made disasters continue to cost lives and inflict suffering, different forms of humanitarian aid and relief assistance remain a consistent necessity in the international community. With an increasing number of donors providing such relief, a question arises how emerging donors participate and contribute to humanitarian efforts. This thesis explores an aspect of this topic by utilizing the core international relations theories, realism, liberalism, and constructivism, to determine motivations behind China's "emergency humanitarian aid". Though each theory offers alternative explanations for China's emergency aid behavior, a congruence analysis was used to determine the theory which best explains the motivations. The thesis analyzes 140 emergency response cases for 31 countries between 2000 and 2015. Among the competing theories, the findings suggest realism offers the most compelling explanation for China's provision of emergency aid.

Keywords: China; congruence analysis; emergency aid; humanitarian; international relations

Acknowledgements

I would first like to thank my thesis supervisor, Prof. Dr. Geske Dijkstra, for enduring numerous revisions and providing the most useful feedback a supervisor could offer. As my main thesis supervisor, I felt she exceeded all expectations a student could possibly have for the thesis process. Her feedback was not only delivered in a timely manner, but with clarity and an encouraging attitude. Moreover, her meticulous attention to detail pushed me to improve areas of my work and to make my final thesis the best I could make it.

I would also like to express my appreciation to the International Office at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam for assistance in coordination with the US Veteran's Affairs. As some officials know, the process for accessing the "Post 9/11 GI Bill" may be time consuming and tedious. However, thanks to the consistent communications with the VA, the International Office helped me in all my endeavors for both Master's programs at Erasmus.

Finally, I would express my profound appreciation to my loved ones for their encouragement and consistent support throughout the process. First, to my family in the US for being there, while being apart. And second, to my partner, Nadie, and my best friend, Richard, for their support and encouragement while writing my final thesis.

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List of abbreviations and acronyms

BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CGD	Center for Global Development
CIDCA	China's International Development Cooperation Agency
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
ECHO	European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
EU	European Union
FTS	Financial Tracking Service
IR	International Relations
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NGO	Non-governmental organization
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PolGeoNow	Political Geography Now
PRC	People's Republic of China
UN	United Nations
UN ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
UN GA	General Assembly
UN OCHA	Office of Humanitarian Affairs
US	United States of America
WFP	World Food Program

1. Introduction

1.1 Problem statement

The stated objectives of emergency or humanitarian aid have been to alleviate suffering, save lives, and maintain human dignity (Hidalgo & Lopez-Carlos, 2007; Hofmann et al., 2004). With these objectives in mind, states have provided relief for both natural catastrophes (i.e. hurricanes, tsunamis, floods, and earthquakes) and during man-made emergencies, such as armed conflicts. The norms and principles guiding this underlying aim are humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence, all of which center around a case for the “humanitarian imperative” – to provide assistance to whom and wherever it is needed (Hidalgo & Lopez-Carlos, 2007; OCHA, 2012).

Bearing these principles in mind, the underlying motivations behind the provision of humanitarian aid may seem arbitrary to observers so long as aid is provided. Though this reaction is understandable, the motivations are relevant in terms of ensuring equity in the provision of emergency or humanitarian aid. To illustrate, the decision whether or not to provide humanitarian aid to those impacted by emergencies should be guided by these principles. In other words, potential risks exist that states may selectively provide emergency aid only to their closest allies, to pursue other donor related interests, or that the humanitarian aid only reaches a particular group (Terry, 2002). In this way, the choice to provide humanitarian aid signals a state's willingness or reluctance to deliver support to those most severely impacted by natural or man-made disasters.

Considering several Western states are the largest providers of general humanitarian aid, this raises questions on the role of humanitarian aid and relief support from other states. For example, in the past few years, this question has been raised by Germany and other EU member states, which called upon China to provide more humanitarian assistance as deemed “well within the state's economic capacity” (Chadwick, 2020). Although the per capita income is lower compared to high-income countries, China has developed the second largest economy (in USD) in the world. Moreover, China is categorized by the World Bank as an upper-middle income country, making the state a potentially larger contributor in the humanitarian domain, at least compared to the state's emergency aid efforts to date.

According to official Chinese documents, it is worth noting that China predominantly refers to “emergency humanitarian aid” while interchangeably referring to humanitarian aid. For all intents and purposes, emergency aid in this context henceforth refers to China's short-term humanitarian responses. Moreover, some authors claim that China's humanitarian efforts have shifted between the last State Council white paper in 2014 and the most recent white

paper in 2021 (Chao & Yuxuan, 2021; Saldinger, 2021). In Chao & Yuxuan's review of the recent white paper, they discuss how the shift occurred from briefly mentioning "emergency humanitarian aid" to an entire chapter dedicated to China's humanitarian aid efforts in general (Chao & Yuxuan, 2021). This is indeed significant if it signals a genuine shift in China's focus on emergency aid to humanitarian aid in its foreign policy, especially due to the humanitarian action and relief required from the COVID-19 pandemic.

Apart from emergency aid, China has increased the amount of projects and development aid in recent years, with most of the increased academic attention focusing around African development (Furuoka, 2017). In this regard, additional analysis is needed to understand the driving factors of Chinese aid in general but more specifically in relation to China's emergency aid. Most recently, authors have continued to closely investigate several types of Chinese aid, in particular following the establishment of China's International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) in 2018 (Chao & Yuxuan, 2019; Cheng, 2019). Effectively, one aim of the agency is deemed to be part of China's efforts to externally differentiate various types of financial flows and areas of cooperation (Lynch et al., 2020). This includes distinguishing between financial flows which are grants or donations, interest-free loans, and concessional loans. Furthermore, through CIDCA, the Chinese government indicates where it aims to provide emergency aid among other areas of cooperation. Nonetheless, the motivations to provide emergency aid, in particular within the Chinese context, remains a uniquely fresh field. Given the relevance and importance of providing humanitarian aid in general, this niche area is the main focus of analysis in this study.

1.2 Research focus

In the relevant literature, authors have focused heavily on Western donors in the provision of various types of aid and the underlying motives behind them (Alessina & Dollar, 1998; Büthe et al., 2012; Kevlihan et al., 2014; Maizels & Nissanke, 1984). However, with the rising economic strength of a state such as China, considerably less is known about the drivers of foreign aid and more specifically, emergency aid. In the domain of humanitarian aid, there are competing explanations behind the motivations, though most are strictly aimed at the dichotomy between self-interests and recipient needs (Büthe et al., 2012; Kevlihan et al., 2014). To this extent, there is not a strong theoretical framework on state behavior in the provision of either humanitarian or emergency aid. However, the theoretical paradigms of International Relations (IR) are pertinent and valuable in understanding this ongoing activity. This is of relevance in understanding the theoretical underpinnings of how global powers

adhere to and preserve the humanitarian principles. Therefore, this study aims to address this domain by posing the following research question:

Between realism, liberalism, and constructivism, which core international relations theory best explains China's motivations for the provision of emergency aid?

This study investigates the provision of China's emergency aid between 2000 and 2015. This time frame accounts for the period following China's "Going Out" strategy and a period of significant economic growth of the state. In reference to China's rapid rise and other international events, Colgan states that these types of questions are not merely empirical questions but deeply rooted in theory (Colgan, 2016, p. 496). The study proceeds in two stages. In the first stage, the study examines the prevalent IR theories (i.e. realism, liberalism, and constructivism) which leads to several propositions. In the second stage, each theory will be analyzed together with the others, forming the basis of the congruence analysis (Blatter & Haverland, 2012). During this stage, the study will investigate instances of China's numerous emergency responses from AidData and examine the allocation of this aid (AidData, 2017; Custer et al., 2019; Dreher et al., 2017). Throughout the process, several alternative sources are added as supplements to the emergency response cases from AidData. The supplemental sources include official state documents, such as China's State Council white papers, statements from ambassadors, and various news sources around the emergency responses.

1.3 Relevance

1.3.1 Academic relevance

As briefly described in the introduction, there has been plenty of focus on both the development aid of China and economic aspects in terms of global governance. Given China's exponential growth and increasing foreign investments since the early 2000s, there has gradually been more academic interest around the state's foreign involvement. Many of those engaged in political science, development studies, or other international studies have focused on China, in particular due to Chinese involvement in development projects and infrastructure. Whether this relates to the impacts on development in Africa, economic growth, or governance issues, there is now an abundance of scholarly work on China covering the past decade. However, the types of studies are increasingly lacking examinations on the broader level of theoretical paradigms in IR. Therefore, this thesis uniquely connects the

predominant IR paradigms with emergency aid. In doing so, it seeks to explain the state behavior of China in providing some form of humanitarian assistance.

In terms of general humanitarian aid, academics and researchers have produced several examples of performance measurement tools or related discussions on the effectiveness of humanitarian aid. However, there has been relatively limited focus on China's role in providing emergency humanitarian aid. In this regard, there may be two main reasons for the limited amount of attention on China's humanitarian efforts. The first being in part due to the lack of available data which indicates where China is providing humanitarian assistance that is not strictly development related. This is understandable given the obscure nature of Chinese foreign aid, which has been historically difficult to disentangle development aid from the state's humanitarian actions. Second, with the status of a developing economy, attention to Chinese humanitarian or emergency aid efforts was perhaps less warranted. Considering the substantial economic capacity of China, it is now worth investigating the practical implications in terms of cooperation and distribution of emergency aid.

This study makes relevant academic contributions in two significant ways. First, it contributes to the increasing body of research on China's foreign aid. In doing so, it separates the areas of Chinese development aid and what is strictly considered emergency aid. Second, the study contributes towards the major question of donor's motivations behind this aid by examining state behavior within the global context.

1.3.2 Social relevance

Emergencies requiring a rapid response and international assistance are not new phenomena. Regardless of whether the emergency stems from a natural catastrophe or through armed conflict, many states have committed themselves to providing support next to their normal channels of aid flows. Given that the outbreak of global emergencies appear to be increasing, the topical nature of humanitarian aid remains a highly relevant subject. Moreover, the humanitarian principles are meant to encapsulate a humanitarian imperative to save lives and alleviate suffering (UN OCHA, 2012). This entails that norms and values additionally play a role when considering emergency aid – and conversely, when deciding not to provide it. Furthermore, the norms and values shape both domestic and international politics in a manner that renders humanitarian aid a politicized process.

One primary example of this is related to the COVID-19 pandemic. At the time of writing, the pandemic has been ongoing for more than a year. The consequences have been the loss of nearly three and a half million lives and severe economic downturn. Additionally,

global trends such as the rate of poverty are impacted by the relentless nature of the pandemic. According to official sources, the relative progress made to reduce extreme poverty over the past 20 years is now threatened by renewed spikes in poverty related to the COVID-19 situation (UN GA, 2020 (Engelberg & Kelsey)). Furthermore, it is estimated that nearly 235 million people will require emergency aid as a result of the pandemic (UN GA, 2020). This rough estimate not only considers the number of people requiring medical assistance but the remnants of armed conflict or catastrophes where the consequences have only been exacerbated by coronavirus measures. Considering most states are heavily impacted, both financially and in terms of mortality, fundamental questions arise as to how the globe will start to recover from the pandemic. This again sheds light on the questions of norms and values on how to proceed with providing humanitarian relief.

2. Literature review

At the outset, it is essential to establish fixed parameters surrounding previous literature on China's foreign aid. As such, there are two distinct areas of relevant literature within the study that establish the main focus of the literature review. The first area focuses on the increasing literature on Chinese foreign aid, under which the "emergency humanitarian aid" is defined as a grant (State Council PRC, 2011). The second area is more directly concerned with the driving motivations for the provision of foreign aid and humanitarian aid in general.

2.1 Defining Chinese foreign aid and "emergency humanitarian aid"

Over the past decade, studies on China's foreign aid have slowly become more prominent in the academic field (Carter, 2017; Glennie et al., 2020; Haibing, 2017; Lynch et al., 2020). This is understandable given the relative timing of China's "Going Out" policy towards the end of the 1990s. Even with the increase in such studies, understanding the role or effects of China's foreign aid have been challenging to map out. Besides withholding general information on financial flows for external analysis, China typically defines foreign aid in different terms compared to the OECD's terminology for "official development assistance" (ODA) (Carter, 2017, p. 2). Therefore, it is unsurprising that a large body of the literature concerns itself with a question on the nature of China's foreign aid. As Carter (2017) points out, two previous State Council white papers began to shed light on Chinese foreign aid, though only by indicating overall objectives to external actors. The main conclusion therein being that China provides three types of foreign aid in the form of interest-free loans, concessional state loans, and grants (Carter, 2017, p. 5). Although Carter indicates that China's external assistance is to some degree defined through concessionality, the grants

category shows some forms of assistance broadly aimed at poverty reduction, social welfare, and humanitarian activities. Additionally, China interchangeably refers to “emergency humanitarian aid” and “humanitarian aid”, with an emphasis on the former. Technically, all humanitarian relief efforts are commonly referred to as “humanitarian aid”. However, the emphasis on the emergency aspect may function as China’s notice for the short-term response of humanitarian activities, compared to more long-term development projects for example.

Other authors from the Center for Global Development (CGD) followed Carter in a similar way by discussing the significance of Chinese economic growth and identifying the same types of Chinese foreign aid (Lynch et al., 2020). The authors present a brief historical record of Chinese foreign aid and come to the same conclusion as authors before them, which is that China’s lack of transparency and definitions of “foreign aid” have made it generally challenging to compare externally. Yet, with the establishment of China’s International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) in 2018, there was meant to be a clearer presentation of the structure of China’s foreign financial flows (Lynch et al., 2020). Nonetheless, the CGD report is predominantly descriptive literature on Chinese institutions with some insights into overall financial flows, rather than an empirical or analytical case on Chinese foreign aid.

Beyond Carter’s initial review or the Center’s report on Chinese foreign aid, other authors have placed a particular emphasis on the effects of Chinese development aid and cooperation flows (Dreher et al., 2017; Glennie et al., 2020). Within this area of literature, most of the attention has been on Chinese development and infrastructure investments, mostly within Africa, or to better understand how China is promoting economic development in other countries. For example, Dreher et al. (2017) introduced a Chinese financial flows dataset in a working paper. This data included forms of concessional and non-concessional financing to 138 countries between 2000 and 2014 (Dreher et. al, 2017). Their study was done to determine to what extent Chinese aid affects economic growth in recipient countries. Compared alongside the US and other OECD member states, it was then shown that the Chinese foreign aid did have a positive effect on economic growth. However, the authors noted the compositional differences of “aid” and how these may either improve or reduce the economic growth effects. For example, China’s financial support was provided mostly in the form of export credit programs or loans, whereas Western donors provided more concessional terms in standard development finance (Dreher et. al, 2017, p. 2).

In other reports, authors have cited China as one of most established emerging powers in terms of international development cooperation. As one example, Glennie et al. (2020) set

out to better understand China's development aid effectiveness from the perspective of recipient countries. The main aim of this policy report was not only to provide aid recipients insights into China's foreign aid structure but also to provide insights for the Chinese government on how the aid is received. In this way, the report identified a positive trend in China's aid effectiveness, while adding further policy recommendations on improving the complex loans and grants procedures, implementing result measurements and evaluations, and increasing transparency. Similar to previous studies, the issue of defining aid and opaqueness of Chinese data proved to be a persistent challenge. However, the authors report encouraged recipient countries to consistently report such problems and encourage China to create more transparency (Glennie et al., 2020).

2.2 Motivations for foreign aid and general humanitarian aid

There is an abundance of literature on the drivers and motivations behind foreign aid whereby authors have studied the patterns of aid allocation and the underlying motivations behind them (Alessina & Dollar, 1998; Carter, 2017; Maizels & Nissanke, 1984). As an example, Maizels and Nissanke studied two different models: recipient need due to a lack of resources and donor interests defined by political or economic interests (Maizels & Nissanke, 1984). Next to determining that the motivations for aid allocations shift between bilateral aid compared to multilateral aid, the authors identified general policy shifts from the recipient need to the donor interests' model over time.

In comparison, Alesina and Dollar (1998) avoid the recipient need model and focus more on the policy performance of the recipient country compared to political-strategic interests. The authors concluded that foreign aid was largely determined by political and strategic considerations, while also indicating significant differences in the behavior of specific donors such as France, Japan, and the US. For example, while France provided most foreign aid to former colonies, Japan's aid was correlated with UN voting patterns in agreement with Japan. Moreover, besides controlling for special interests in Egypt and Israel, the US aid had predominantly targeted democratizers and trade liberalizers (Alesina & Dollar, 1998, p. 23).

In another study, Furuoka (2017) studied the same motivations with a strict focus on the determinants of China and Japan's foreign aid allocations to Africa by utilizing similar concepts (Furuoka, 2017). Although Furuoka determined there was no substantial difference in determinants of aid allocations between the two, the main finding was that the provision of foreign aid was largely driven by the donor's self-interests. Thus, in relation to foreign aid

there appears to be a limited body of empirical evidence showing that countries focus to a greater degree on some form of self-interest, however defined.

Compared to the motivations of foreign aid, there are less studies done which specifically investigate the underlying motivations behind humanitarian aid or specifically emergency aid. In one paper from Drury et al. (2005), the authors state that US foreign aid allocations may be influenced by foreign policy and domestic considerations, yet humanitarian aid allocations until then had remained unexplored. After studying thirty years of US foreign disaster assistance, the authors concluded that humanitarian aid was predominantly determined by the same foreign policy interests and domestic considerations. Most importantly, the authors also found that the initial decision to grant any form of disaster assistance was primarily a political consideration (Drury et al., 2005). Though the Drury et al. study investigated a broad timeframe of US humanitarian assistance from 1964 to 1995, the study only focused on natural catastrophes.

In an opposing study, Kevlihan et al. (2014) investigated claims on the relationship between humanitarian aid and recipient need versus donor interest. While studying the US, they argued the country has made public commitments to provide humanitarian aid based primarily on recipient need (Kevlihan et al., 2014). As Kevlihan et al. (2014) pointed out, purposively excluding complex emergencies that include those caused by conflicts represents a significant restraint by limiting other complex instances of humanitarian assistance. In this sense, the motivation for donor's to provide humanitarian aid might inadvertently be attributed more to donor interest, rather than recipient need.

In the example from Carter's review (2017), she points to the broad interest in China's foreign economic engagement, as well as the drivers of foreign aid, yet not motivations of humanitarian aid. Hirono greatly reduces this gap by examining the link between Chinese national interests, foreign policy, and humanitarian action. While Hirono states China's humanitarian spending is predominantly ad hoc, rather than based on a systematic approach, the report falls short of identifying a primary motivation behind China's behavior (Hirono, 2018, p. 20). Instead, the key findings suggest an intricate web of multiple interests, such as economic and commercial interests, multiple actors and processes, and problems of integration into the international system, simultaneously overlapping altruistic efforts. Furthermore, given the complexity of the topic, Hirono identifies a number of obstacles and future opportunities for China's humanitarian action, as well as policy recommendations to the Chinese humanitarian community and DAC donors (Hirono, 2018).

In another example, Fuchs and Rudyak (2019) stand out in the literature for considerations of possible humanitarian motives. Though their study is mostly about foreign aid and the political, commercial, and humanitarian motivations behind them, the authors additionally investigate China's general humanitarian aid. Similar to Hirono, the authors describe that Chinese humanitarian aid is delivered on an ad hoc basis, depending on the urgency of the crisis and China's bilateral political relations with the recipient country (Fuchs & Rudyak, 2019, p.401). To further support China's humanitarian motive, they suggest that bilateral political relations also affect Western donor's humanitarian aid allocations, which remains a contested claim in the literature (c.f. Kevlihan et al., 2014).

As more academics and researchers recognize the role of China as an emerging large-scale donor, the literature focusing on China's foreign aid gradually increases. With this attention on China's foreign aid, and as further data becomes available, the ability to study the aid flows and motivations becomes clearer. Yet, as previously mentioned, the broader literature focuses largely on the effects of China's foreign aid with only limited attention paid to the area of humanitarian aid or emergency aid. Moreover, though many academics and scholars have focused more narrowly on the drivers and motivations for foreign aid, there is a limited body of theoretical and empirical evidence on humanitarian and emergency aid. Both Hirono (2018) and Fuchs and Rudyak (2019) indicated a broad relationship between Chinese interests and general foreign aid, while pointing out the ad hoc nature of China's humanitarian aid. This study therefore aims to contribute to this field by applying the IR framework to the study of state behavior and shedding light on particular motivations for China's emergency aid.

3. Theoretical framework

The discussion on the provision of humanitarian or emergency aid may be deeply situated within the context of IR for a number of reasons. First, providing aid of any sort raises questions on the assumptions of a state's behavior. Do states provide aid in an attempt to gain something in return, such as resources or other material gains? Is it more likely that states do this for political recognition and influence? Second, there is a normative element to providing aid, and more specifically, humanitarian aid. This includes the values aspect of providing humanitarian assistance in order to alleviate suffering, save lives, and preserve human dignity. From this perspective, what does it say about a state which does not provide some minimal type of humanitarian assistance? Moreover, beyond state interests or norms and values, there is a third element involved, which focuses on structure of the international system and the

enormous complexity involved with providing timely emergency relief. At the center of these broad questions we might find different theories offer a stark contrast and competing explanations of why states provide humanitarian or emergency aid.

There are several widely utilized theories relevant to the field of international relations. Beyond the prevalent theories, such as realism, liberalism, and constructivism, there are additionally Marxist theories (i.e. Gramscianism and critical theory) and alternative approaches to international theory (i.e. postmodernism and feminist theory)(Baylis et al., 2017). While the alternative theories present feasible ideas, they extend beyond the scope relative to establishing propositions for this thesis. For example, feminist theory points to shifting narratives in the waves of feminism that may be attributable to either constructivism or Marxism. Furthermore, the assumptions related to postmodernism are bound to the analysis of discourse, in particular with a focus on narratives of power. This may be theoretically applicable in many instances, yet in studying state behavior for providing emergency aid and in terms of state preferences, it may extend too far beyond standard power discussions in realism, for example. In comparison, the contemporary branches of realism and liberalism tend to share some common core assumptions suitable for the application of propositions (Baylis et al., 2017, p. 339). For this reason, this chapter presents an overview of the three prevalent international relations theories: realism, liberalism, and constructivism, including propositions based on predominant views associated with each paradigm.

3.1 Realism

Within the scope of realist theory, there is a delineation between classical realism, neorealism (or structural realism), and neoclassical realism. As is often the case within theories, other authors have attempted to alter these standard typologies, including for example “biological realists” to overemphasize the importance of human nature, or even “radical realists” (Donnelly, 2000). This study largely avoids semantic sub-classification by selecting the main typology used regularly in the literature. Thus, it relies on the delineation between the categories of classical realism extending back to historical texts such as Morgenthau’s *Politics Among Nations* (originally 1948; 1978) to neorealism, and further through to neoclassical realists, such as Schweller (1996).

Before considering varying realist perspectives, it is best to look at the overlapping themes that broadly define realism. From each of the realist’s perspectives, there are three main concerns, which include the state, survival, and self-help (Dunne & Schmidt, 2017, p. 207). Generally, the state is viewed as the main actor in international affairs, guided by either

human behavior or the structure of the international system, depending on the school of realist thought (Dunne & Schmidt, 2017 p. 41; Morgenthau, 1978). At the center of the state is the principle of *raison d'état* (reason of state), under which realists conceptualize the manner leaders ought to behave to ensure the security of the state. They accept that the survival of the state is always susceptible to external actors and therefore security is essential. Outside of the state, cooperation with external actors is possible but generally due to the fact that it serves the self-interests of the state. Beyond this form of cooperation and boundaries of the state, realists argue that anarchy is the underlying condition of the international realm. This realist view of anarchy is not made up of complete lawlessness and disarray but instead views the realm of international politics as lacking one central authority (Dunne & Schmidt, 2017, p.192). Moreover, for realists, power struggles characterize the motivations behind international politics. In this way, national interests are at the core of a state's agenda.

Additionally crucial to the realist theory is the amount of power, considering power is both relative to the state compared to other states and that power struggles still exist both nationally and internationally. In other words, sovereign states are indeed the highest authority, whereas domestic politics occur within their own hierarchical structure of competing political actors. Power in the realist approach is often defined and operationalized differently by numerous academics. However, the most common definition emphasizes the importance of resources and the possession of capabilities, including the size of a state's military, the gross national product, and a state's population, with a belief that material resources translates into influence (Baylis et al., 2017, p. 1126).

The third major concern for realists to endorse is the principle of self-help. To explain, realists argue that state survival is ultimately a national issue and states should not rely too heavily upon international institutions or other states for their own survival (Dunne & Schmidt, 2017, p. 193). As previously suggested, state security is viewed as relative to the amount of power each state has and is therefore also relevant for the self-help doctrine. Based on the idea states will pursue more power to increase the security of the state, some states might be compelled to engage in alliances in order to increase the likelihood of state survival.

On the heels of classical realism is a form of structural realism, commonly referred to as neorealism. One of the key distinguishing characteristics between classical realism and neorealism is classical realists emphasis on human nature's role in politics compared to the neorealist view of the anarchical international system in politics. For example, Hans Morgenthau (1978), who was a classical realist, perceived the power-seeking behavior of states as one element of the biological nature of human beings. This encompasses the idea that

laws stem from human nature and the way to understand international politics is through an intricate understanding of power struggles. In comparison, Kenneth Waltz (1979) ushered in the neorealist thought, highlighting the idea that it is not just human nature but the structure of the international system in its anarchic state which influences state behavior. In the *Theory of International Politics* (1979), Waltz identified that anarchy in international politics is the drive behind self-help for the state to maximize security and hierarchy as the means to understanding the domestic order.

Following from this focus on security, two subsequent variations of neorealism also emerged, which highlight key aspects of state behavior in an anarchic system: defensive and offensive realism. Defensive realism is about the interest of pursuing maximum security and the concern of the state should not solely be the maximization of power because it could trigger a counterbalancing of power (Waltz, 1979). On the contrary, from the offensive realist perspective, the state should ultimately seek to maximize power, rather than security. In this way, the primary differentiation between defensive and offensive realism rests on the focus being centered on either security or power. As Mearsheimer suggested, considering state's intentions are never certain and security is limited, there should be a push to maximize power (1995).

Beyond this important breakdown and fracture in neorealism, some scholars have also returned to other dimensions of power and foreign policy behavior by emphasizing the role of domestic politics, state resources, and capabilities (Dunne & Schmidt, 2017; Schweller, 1996;). Additionally, neoclassical realists such as Schweller (1996) have revisited the idea that historically states have had varying interests, influencing and shaping broader state interests over the course of time. As an example, Schweller returns to Morgenthau's earlier distinctions between status quo and revisionist states central to realist literature (Schweller, 1996). (Dunne & Schmidt, 2017; p. 205). In essence, Schweller describes status quo states as states which have partaken in the establishment of the rules and mostly stand to benefit from them. Revisionist states are therefore seen as challengers who value more than what they currently possess and express some form of dissatisfaction with the existing order. However, this is a very condensed explanation of the conceptualization. As Johnston (2003) pointed out, not all realists have ascribed to the dichotomy between status quo and revisionist states. For example, within offensive realism, Johnston points to Mearsheimer's explanation that great powers are by their very nature revisionist due to their ongoing efforts to maximize power in an anarchistic system (Johnston, 2003).

Given the broad theoretical underpinnings of realism, it is difficult to accept realist theory as one general stream of theory. However, as previously outlined, there are three predominant areas of concern central to realism. First, realists view the state as center to international relations and mostly focus on the distribution of power and relative gains compared to other states. Second, the survival of the state is the ultimate aim in an anarchic system. Although offensive and defensive realist thought within neorealism separates the two areas between the maximization of power versus security, the state's survival is key for both. And third, states exist within a self-help system and seek to optimize their chances for survival. In the international system, smaller states may cooperate with larger states in order to protect themselves against potential threats and rivals, while bearing in mind the interests of their allies.

3.1.2 Realist propositions for China's emergency aid

Considering the various streams of realism, the predominant areas central to each perspective help identify areas of theoretical overlap. If realism best explains China's provision of emergency aid, there would need to be a significant degree of emphasis in the central themes of statism, survival, or the self-help principle embedded in their institutions and actions. In this case, survival is both part and parcel of the self-help system and the nature of the state. To illustrate, the self-help principle stipulates that states should not rely on international institutions or other states for their survival. Although smaller states may seek alliances which are beneficial for the state's survival, they are selective towards states which continue to respect their own sovereignty. For this reason, it seems likely that China would mostly consider allies as recipient countries for their emergency aid. Though there might be instances where China has pledged and implemented support to non-allies in times of emergency, such instances would likely be highly exceptional.

The concept of power additionally plays a fundamental role in the realist perspective. However, with the emphasis on material resources and relative gains, this perspective on power begs the question of how important power dynamics are in the provision of any humanitarian assistance? If realists identify types of material resources and influence as sources of power, then even emergency aid would be subject to a power relationship between the donor and the recipient. Though this is difficult to capture, a symbolic power dynamic might be the underlying motivation behind the aid from a realist perspective. Thus, the capability to provide direct support to the recipient state bilaterally, rather than mostly to

multilateral institutions, might help emphasize China's power as a provider of support. Based on these ideas, the following propositions might be expected from a realist explanation:

P1: China will provide more emergency aid to political allies.

P2: China will provide most emergency funding bilaterally to state governments instead of through multilateral institutions or NGOs.

3.2 Liberalism

Compared to realism, liberalism presents an alternate theory of world politics that is more closely rooted in notions of progress and individual freedoms, private property, and other democratic values. Liberals therefore reject the realist's view that the state is the main actor in world politics and that war is the natural situation of politics (Dunne, 2017). The primary argument behind this is due to the fact that multiple interests, including from bureaucratic organizations or political institutions, determine decision-making processes, making national interests less prevalent. Moreover, whereas realists view cooperation as a means to achieving a state's national interests, liberals take a broader view, stressing cooperation is the means to creating and maintaining international stability. For example, liberals postulate that cooperation and increasing interdependence lead to the democratic peace, which suggests that democracies are not likely to enter armed conflict with other democracies (Doyle, 1986; Dunne, 2017). Another point of divergence is that liberals are less concerned with the state of sovereignty compared to realists. To illustrate, states have gradually become interwoven through a mirage of trade agreements, international laws, and to some degree, general norms, where states are placed in the position to negotiate their preferences with external actors (Dunne 2017).

Similar to realism, liberalism has been fragmented into variants and rests on at least three common assumptions. The general premise underlying state behavior is that domestic influence shapes national representation abroad and that economic interdependence is increasingly reflected through a transnational society (Moravcsik, 2002, p.4). The first assumption is a "bottom-up" approach to politics where individuals behave as rational actors to promote varying interests. From this assumption, individuals and societal groups are the main actors who subsequently drive the state to promote political or collective action. Within interstate relations, societal pressures such as the scarcity of goods or inequality, are potential drivers of conflict. As Moravcsik (2002) describes, these motivations are what gave rise to further variants in liberal thought, such as commercial, ideational, and republican liberalism

(Moravcsik, 2002, p. 5). Although the further breakdown of these concepts helps contextualize the strains of liberalism, they are not as centrally relevant to the core assumptions and are therefore not handled here in greater depth.

The second assumption extends to the state and stipulates it is more a political institution which embodies a subcategory of domestic society and that external interests are pursued vis-à-vis international politics. As such, the represented interests within the domestic arena are expressed outwardly as general state preferences. Although individuals and societal groups may have varying interests domestically, there is some underlying form of representation, at least in reference to democratic regimes (Moravcsik, 2002). The third and final assumption, as Moravcsik (2002) describes, is that the composition of state preferences determines state behavior within interstate relations. In other words, multiple states have varying interests and these competing interests additionally shape state behavior. Therefore, in the international arena states may be constrained or supported by other states in pursuit of individual state preferences. At the core of this assumption is the idea that states require a specific purpose in order to seek cooperation, engage in conflict, or partake in other areas of foreign policy action (Moravcsik, 2002, p.7). At the core of these assumptions is a focus on international cooperation. Liberals continue to maintain that economic cooperation and economic interdependence are the foundation for international stability.

Next to liberalism was also the emergence of neoliberalism, which bears some important distinction. Though neoliberalism builds upon liberalism, it also derives some aspects from realism, such as the focus on the state as the main actor in international relations and emphasizing state security. Even as Moravcsik (2002) pointed out, although state preferences help shape state behavior, the individual state is a representative institution based on the preferences of domestic groups. In this way, neoliberalism theoretically seems to place the state as a central actor, rather than individuals as domestic drivers of state preferences. Nonetheless, neoliberalism is different than neorealism, even while these theories share similar foundations in the desire to maintain the status-quo or existing systems. For example, whereas neorealists emphasize the importance of security and survival in geopolitical relations, neoliberals focus on the political economy and the mutual gains to be made through cooperation for state security. Moreover, the ideals of free trade and democratic peace are present in neoliberal foreign policy, yet guided more narrowly by national and economic interests in maintaining the status-quo. Compared to neorealists, neoliberals maintain that state's objectives for cooperation and absolute gains are undermined by either non-complying or cheating states. For neoliberals, this presents an incentive to strengthen institutions to seek

compliance, while maintaining the current structure. In this manner, the theories may share similar assumptions about power arrangements and actors within the international system (Lamy, 2017, p. 250). Thus, neoliberals might argue that in the existing structure, multilateralism and cooperation are the best means towards maintaining national security.

Though cooperation remains an essential aspect of both classical liberalism and neoliberalism, there is a gap between the economic and political aspects of the two variants. From the economic aspect, the neoliberals emphasize minimalizing governing institutions with freedom in economic areas and a strong emphasis on the free market. From the political aspect, there is a requirement to safeguard fundamental freedoms, which ultimately requires robust institutions to uphold them (Dunne, 2017, p. 224). Whereas classical liberalism was concerned with maximizing individual freedom, neoliberalism is mostly concerned with economics.

3.2.1 Liberal propositions for China's emergency aid

The previous theoretical structure for liberalism has led to some degree of varying perspectives among liberal scholars. However, a few common assumptions are present throughout liberalism. First, the bottom-up perspective translates domestic politics to the international arena in a relatively representative manner. Second, states enter international politics with their own preferences and the configuration of preferences exerts some influence on other state's behavior. In this way, state behavior may be driven or constrained by other state preferences. Although many countries have tight political and economic relationships with countries where they have provided humanitarian aid, there is evidence that this is not always the case (Kevlihan et al., 2014). In other words, humanitarian or emergency aid may not necessarily only flow as a result of political relationships. Indeed, the principles underlying humanitarian efforts are intended to support a humanitarian imperative, regardless of the existing political and economic relationships.

From the liberal perspective, if state preferences are expressed through economic cooperation, then it might be expected China would provide emergency aid to recipients with whom the state has intense levels of economic cooperation. The level of the interaction should be indicated through the intensity of trade with recipient countries. As a secondary proposition, liberal theorists might expect more embedded cooperation. In this way, it could be expected that China would contribute more emergency aid to international funds, international agencies, or NGOs, as a gesture of stronger international cooperation. This would have to be controlled for by examining the amount of emergency aid generally given

bilaterally compared to funding through emergency aid organizations. Ultimately, if the proposition is correct, China will provide most funding through multilateral institutions or NGOs. Moreover, China's official offices, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), might be expected to publicly announce their commitments and call upon other member states to provide support. From these two perspectives of state preferences and cooperation, the following propositions on China's emergency aid might be expected:

P3: China will provide more emergency aid to countries with which it has intensive economic relations.

P4: China will mostly contribute to a pooled funding of emergency resources and encourage other states to do the same.

3.3 Constructivism

Constructivism, also commonly referred to as social constructivism, is an emerging social theory in IR concerned with conceptualizing the relationship between agents and structures. Although the philosophical and social scientific foundations are older, constructivism developed mostly out academia in the 1980s (Barnett, 2017). Over the course of the past forty years, constructivism has become increasingly influential throughout a broad range of the social sciences, such as political science and political sociology. Compared to other theoretical approaches in IR, constructivists argue that the social world is constructed or shaped by the identities of people within society. Under this assumption, constructivists focus on ideas, norms, and knowledge as the main understanding behind political activities. Whereas realists concentrated on national interests and power dynamics and liberals on preferences in the international arena, constructivists emphasize how ideas have transformative effects on organizations in world politics (Barnett, 2017, p. 313). Moreover, knowledge shapes the way in which actors give meaning to the world and how they construct social realities.

Although constructivism, as with all theoretical paradigms, has incurred fragmentations over the course of time, as Wendt (1999) points out, at least two core tenets have become increasingly accepted. The first tenet advances an "idealist" approach, more than a "materialist" approach, conceiving of structures of human interaction as determined by shared ideas. In a similar way, the second tenet maintains that identities and interests of agents are socially constructed, more than they are given by nature (Wendt, 1999, p. 1). In this way, the second tenet is based on a more holistic or structuralist approach within constructivism,

which expresses that the social world is shaped by actors and that actors produce international structures and systems. Together these tenets lead to the conclusion that social facts stem from the collective of human agreement. As an example, sovereignty is an idea situated within an agreed upon set of boundaries for what constitutes one aspect of statehood.

Constructivism is mostly presented as a social theory, rather than a substantive theory, such as with realism or liberalism. To briefly explain, whereas substantive theory might propose particular claims about the state of world politics, social theory is more concerned with conceptualizing the relationship of agents and structures (Barnett, 2017, p. 315). Nonetheless, constructivism's broad conceptualizations about the social construction of reality or the importance of actor's identities and interests, suggests how constructivists ought to investigate the world in a meaningful manner. Along these lines, constructivism has been presented as an alternative theoretical guide to international politics. Furthermore, the driving force behind the theoretical underpinnings of constructivism may be attributed to the diffusion and institutionalization of norms. For constructivists, the diffusion around particular values, beliefs, strategies, and models have led to a degree of similarity in international institutions, generally referred to as institutional isomorphism (Barnett, 2017; p. 326). In other words, institutions sharing similar objectives begin to resemble other institutions over time.

Additionally critical to the constructivist theory, is the focus on norms and values. A norm is typically defined as an expectation or accepted standard for a generally accepted form of behavior. As Reilly (2012) suggests, norms are more compelling if they are logically coherent, consistent with authentic practice, and institutionalized (Reilly, 2012, p.73). While some constructivists have focused on norm life cycles, others such as Reilly have examined the dichotomy between norm-takers and norm-makers within the constructivist approach (akin to the realist status-quo and revisionist approaches). Norm-takers in the international setting are viewed as states which increasingly resemble other states through an underlying process of social influence, persuasion, or mimicking. In comparison, the norm-makers approach suggests a state will more likely promote alternative norms in light of their own national set of ideologies (Reilly, 2012, p. 72). As Reilly (2012) pointed out, investigating whether or not China is adopting dominate norms of the liberal international order or attempting to reshape the norms and practices within institutions highlights an important research agenda (Reilly, 2012).

3.3.1 Constructivism and China's emergency aid

The modern foundation for humanitarian norms are based both in international humanitarian law and human rights law. The core norms mostly focus on the facilitation of humanitarian assistance and the protection of civilians. Moreover, these norms are embedded in the humanitarian principles derived from UN GA Resolution 46/182 from 1991. As previously mentioned in the introduction, the principles are humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence, though independence was later added. The first principle entails that human suffering must be addressed regardless of location and the purpose of action is to protect lives and uphold human dignity. Neutrality suggests that humanitarian actors remain neutral in hostilities and conflicts. Third, the principle of impartiality means that humanitarian action must be carried out on the basis of need alone and prioritized based on urgent humanitarian need. The fourth principle of independence, adopted subsequently by GA Resolution 58/114 in 2004, states that humanitarian action must be separate from external objectives, such as economic, political, or military goals where the assistance is required (UN OCHA, 2014).

Considering the importance of norms and identities giving rise to collective meanings and ideas within the international system, a constructivist explanation on the provision of humanitarian aid would seek to connect the two. Moreover, the propositions need to account for how China interprets humanitarian norms as well as China's identity as an emergency aid provider. Therefore, China may be understood as either a norm-maker or a norm-taker when it comes to humanitarian norms. As a norm-maker, China might establish its own Chinese norms that go beyond the more "traditional" humanitarian norms and principles. As a norm-taker, it might be expected China would adhere to those particular norms and principles in a similar way to large humanitarian donor countries. From a constructivist perspective, the latter might be the most likely case for two relevant reasons. First, due to institutional growth and institutional isomorphism in the international system. For example, since the UN GA Resolution 46/182 a host of humanitarian units and standards have been established, including the UN OCHA in the same year. Second, based on the continued agency of humanitarian aid, especially given the rise in climate related catastrophes. Indeed, given the context of institutional growth and attention on humanitarian incidents, it seems more likely that larger emerging donors would adopt existing norms and principles coinciding with humanitarian efforts .

The identities and norms aspect is crucial insofar as political relationships are concerned and might play a fundamental role in the provision of emergency aid. Indeed, the perception of the state identity might be a strong factor which shapes donor behavior in the

international structure. Based on this identity concern, one possible assumption arises regarding the one-China policy and China's relationship with Taiwan. To this extent, China continues to consider Taiwan a renegade region and is known for not providing support to states that formally recognize Taiwan. If China were to provide emergency support to a handful of states recognizing Taiwan, the question might be raised as to why China would temporarily abandon this strategy? Effectively, providing emergency aid to a country recognizing China's political adversary would indicate some adherence to existing humanitarian norms. Stemming from these ideas are the following constructivist propositions:

P5: China operates as a norm-taker of existing humanitarian norms.

P6: China's adheres to the core humanitarian principles and will provide general emergency relief to countries formally recognizing Taiwan.

Table 1. *Motivations and propositions on China's emergency aid*

Theory	Motivations	Propositions
Realism	Statism / self-help Symbolic power dynamic / self-help principle	(P1) China will provide more emergency to political allies (P2) China will provide more bilateral funding rather than through multilateral institutions or NGOs.
Liberalism	Economic cooperation International cooperation	(P3) China will provide more emergency aid to countries with which it has intensive economic relations (P4) China pushes for external cooperation through pooled funding and convinces other states to contribute
Constructivism	Humanitarian norms and principles	(P5) China operates as a norm-taker of humanitarian norms (P6) China adheres to humanitarian norms and provides emergency aid to countries recognizing Taiwan

4. Methodology

This section starts by briefly explaining the research design and the methodological appropriateness of a congruence analysis for the case study research. To begin, a brief

description on the congruence analysis is provided followed by an explanation for the case selection of China and reasoning behind the theoretical approaches. The case study is based on the total cases of emergency aid, amounting to approximately 140 responses to 31 countries between 2000 and 2015 (see Appendix A for an overview of emergency responses). Next, it outlines an explanation on the indicators and measurements for each proposition and is followed by the details on the data collection. Lastly, a reflection on the reliability and validity of the specific design are presented.

4.1 Research strategy: Congruence analysis

A congruence analysis is a research design utilizing case studies to explore the explanatory effect of one theory against other theoretical paradigms. According to Blatter and Haverland (2012), there are two critical foundations of the congruence analysis. First, a theory-oriented case study to compare empirical observations with at least two theories. Second, that the collection of theories within the discussion provides the most relevant and crucial information on what is expected as the outcome of a congruence analysis (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p.144).

At the onset of the congruence analysis, information is demarcated by establishing expectations deduced from the adopted theories. In this way, the propositions are deduced *a priori* in relation to the theoretical paradigms, rather than as concrete predictions. Indeed, most scholars utilizing the congruence analysis generally do not formulate concrete predictions but develop a series of expectations instead (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p.185). By identifying expectations based in the theory early on, clearer leaps between the concrete observations and the expectations, or propositions, may be detected later.

In the first stage of the analysis, the empirical information is analyzed and compared to the expectations from each theory. The empirical outcome of the proposition then determines the individual strength of each theory. In the subsequent stage, the theories are compared to one another to determine the level of congruence between the propositions and empirical observations, referred to as the empirical congruence. At this stage it should be possible to determine the dominate theory or if the theories work complementary to another.

4.1.2 Case study research and theories

Throughout the academic literature, numerous definitions and explanations of case studies have been identified. Center to each definition is the notion that case studies focus on a limited sample or small-N with an emphasis on a singular phenomenon, event, or outcome

(Bryman, 2012). From this definition, it may be gathered that the quantity and diversity of empirical observations is central to the strength of the case, particularly for complex situations.

In this case study, the focus is specifically on China's provision of emergency aid between 2000 and 2015. China was selected as it represents a unique case study in light of the state's rapid economic rise and responses to humanitarian situations. According to the World Bank, China has averaged almost 10% GDP annual growth since opening up and reforming its economy in 1978 (WB, 2021). Following China's Going Out policy, this trend continued on a path that made China the second largest economy in 2010 (total GDP in USD). However, as an upper-middle income country, China spends a smaller fraction of its GDP on humanitarian relief compared to some of the largest donors. Though many of the largest donors are designated as high income countries, there are requests for China to commit more resources to humanitarian aid in the international community (Kurtzer, 2020).

Compared to a typical congruence analysis, the logic behind choosing multiple theories came after the selection of the case study. China was selected as the main case to understand how the world's second largest economy is motivated to provide emergency aid. This case choice then led to a selection of the predominant IR theories, especially given the lack of research connecting humanitarian or emergency aid to grand theory approaches in the literature. Though some authors utilize a singular theory to explain a phenomenon, this type of theoretical conceptualization lends itself to a potentially skewed representation of the particular case if not countered by alternative theoretical explanations. In this way, utilizing a diverse set of theoretical approaches is more likely to lead to differentiated results compared to a singular theoretical approach. Furthermore, the selection of multiple theories will be conducive to differentiations between expectations and observations in a more meaningful way (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p.174). This points to two different approaches to a congruence analysis: a competing or a complementary theories approach. The first approach demonstrates a positivist rationale whereby the researcher expects to find a more applicable theory compared to others. On the contrary, the complementary theories approach recognizes the potential for overlap in theories (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 31).

The benchmarks on the propositions support the possibility for conclusions and thus help to determine the relative strength of each theory compared to the alternatives. In a "horizontal" element of control, the theories should show whether the implications match empirical observations and if one has a higher level of empirical congruence than the others (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 146). The outcome for each proposition should therefore

include a high, moderate, or low level of empirical congruence, meaning the extent to which observations correspond to the expectations. In this way, the congruence analysis is essentially concluded through the confirmation, or disconfirmation, of each proposition compared to the competing theories. Though there are arguments to be made for each IR theory, there is likely one competing theory which stands out. In this way, it should be feasible to identify the best theory for explaining China's emergency aid compared to alternative explanations.

4.2 Operationalization of propositions

After previously establishing the propositions deduced from the theoretical perspectives, this section of the research strategy establishes how they are operationalized. The indicators and measurements are presented beginning with an operationalization of emergency aid and sequentially followed with the realist, liberal, and constructivist propositions. Finally, Table 2 provides an overview of the operationalization.

As previously stated, the Chinese government officially refers to “emergency humanitarian aid”, which captures many of the state's humanitarian efforts. Effectively, it means a short-term response to natural and man-made disasters whereby China provides money, materials, or dispatches relief personnel (State Council PRC, 2011). Moreover, emergency aid is normally listed as a grant under China's foreign aid. In this study, China's emergency aid is examined in a timeframe between 2000 and 2015 and includes approximately 31 countries in the AidData sets. In the study, emergency aid is established from the category “emergency response” (i.e. *csr_sector_name*) in the AidData sets (see Appendix A for the emergency recipient overview). In this way, China's emergency aid was largely determined with the combination of the “Chinese Official Financial Dataset” and “China's Public Diplomacy in South and Central Asia” data (Custer et al., 2019; Dreher et al.; 2017). Both datasets were included for a broader and more transparent range of China's emergency responses available from AidData. The timeframe captures the period following China's Going Out policy and allows for a substantial collection of specific emergency responses.

The realist propositions were focused around concepts of statism, survival, self-help and power. The first proposition (P1) deduced from these concepts focused primarily around political allies. In this way, it suggests China will provide most emergency aid to its political allies. As such, this study relies on data about voting agreement in the UN GA as merely one indication of political allies (Voeten & Bailey, 2009). Voting agreement in the UN GA refers

to the pattern of similarity and dissimilarity in voting behavior. In this way, a high percentage of voting agreement with China serves as one indication of a closer political relationship as opposed to countries with lower percentages of agreement. Furthermore, this is analyzed by the correlation between the total amount of Chinese emergency aid received compared to the extent of voting agreement with China (see Appendix B for UN GA agreement scores).

The second proposition (P2) stated that emergency aid would be provided to state governments instead of multilateral institutions or NGOs. Multilateral institutions refer to international organizations comprised of at least three or more states, which work on globally relevant issues. This additionally includes NGOs where China provided funds specifically to those organizations, rather than directly to the state. Though there are numerous multilateral institutions, in many humanitarian cases funding and support would be channeled through the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), if not directly to other programs, such as the World Food Program (WFP) or World Health Organization (WHO). The UN OCHA is the central organ of the international system responsible for strengthening the global response to natural disasters and emergencies. In comparison to emergency aid to multilateral institutions, aid provided directly to the state is referred to as bilateral emergency aid. In each case, both may be measured from the share of bilateral funding compared to the amount of multilateral funding during emergency responses compared to the largest humanitarian aid donors. AidData details the emergency response and includes the emergency recipient by organization or country.

The five largest donors were selected as a small comparative sample of the largest humanitarian aid donors compared to China's emergency aid efforts. Though the specific five largest humanitarian aid donors shifts per year, the most common five between 2000 and 2015 included Canada, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US (UN OCHA, 2021). Although the European Commission was also listed as one of the largest humanitarian aid donors, only individual countries were considered in order to capture the bilateral relation to other states in the humanitarian domain. Furthermore, for some years Sweden was a larger humanitarian aid donor but the UK was chosen as a less progressive donor. Nevertheless, the main motivation for selecting the top five donors stems from their high level of contributions to humanitarian efforts and emergencies. In this way, the largest humanitarian aid donors represent the epitome of humanitarian contributions. In the studied timeframe, these countries also had some of the highest levels of total GDP. Although China is not a wealthy country, humanitarian stakeholders have called for the state to participate and contribute more in total humanitarian efforts where possible (Kurtzer, 2020).

While the liberal propositions pay attention to state preferences, these preferences were stated to be expressed through economic and international cooperation. The third proposition (P3) considers the economic aspect as a basis for cooperation. The economic cooperation indicator is measured from the share in China's exports for countries receiving emergency aid compared with those not receiving emergency aid (see Appendix B for export shares). For this measurement, 2015 was selected as it captures all available countries which maintained economic trade relations with China in the last year of the emergency aid timeframe. There are some countries which recognize Taiwan and therefore have zero share in China's exports. Additionally, the amounts of exports are compared among the highest emergency aid recipients to the lowest aid recipients to supplement the analysis. The data on export partner shares and amounts may be retrieved from the IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS).

The fourth proposition (P4) entails two parts of international cooperation. In the first instance, the proposition reasons that China will provide most funding to a community pool. Effectively, P4 is the liberal opposite of P2, whereby China focused mostly on bilateral emergency aid. This is similarly measured from the total amount of pooled funds expressed in the AidData sets and compared to the largest humanitarian aid donors. In the second instance, the fourth proposition (P4b) also suggests China will encourage other states to commit to pooled humanitarian aid funding. Though this aspect is more difficult to capture, it should be expected in the amount of appeals from official Chinese sources. Here it is measured by China's appeals to the international community or vis-à-vis the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). It is expected that China will also call upon other member states to contribute, financially or otherwise with emergency operations, to jointly provided humanitarian relief, similar to the behavior the larger humanitarian aid donors.

Lastly, the constructivist propositions were based around norms and identities and how these shape ideas and interests in the international system. Many authors have provided a foundation for norm research, considering for example shifts in norms (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Reilly, 2012). In comparison, there is less focus on the techniques of norm operationalization (Huelss, 2017). According to Huelss (2017), norms can be operationalized through constitutional documents, policy documentation, or other standardized procedures that establish substance in norms (Huelss, 2017, p. 383). As a norm-taker, it should be expected China adheres to the facilitation of humanitarian assistance and protection of civilians based on the principles laid forth in UN GA Resolution 46/182. These include norms and principles mentioned earlier in section 3.3.1 (i.e. humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and

independence). To this extent, a content analysis is best equipped to identify the particular content and context indicating China's possible behavior as a norm-taker compared to other larger humanitarian aid donors. Similar to P4b, P5 utilizes statements referring to comments from ambassadors and other high-level officials speaking on behalf of China's MFA, the Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China (PRC) to the UN, and two State Council white papers. In doing so, the content analysis aims to capture references to the humanitarian norms and principles and the relevant resolution enshrining them. Additionally, statements may also be traced back to the UN news for different emergency responses.

The sixth proposition (P6) focuses on China's emergency aid relation to states which formally support or recognize Taiwan. This proposition presupposes that an adherence to humanitarian norms would mean China provides aid on the basis of need alone, regardless of a recipient's relation to a Chinese political adversary. The indicator, emergency aid recipient, refers to countries which have or had formal relations to Taiwan between 2000 and 2015. This is measured by countries formally recognizing Taiwan which receive emergency aid from China, compared to countries recognizing Taiwan and experiencing emergencies, which are excluded.

Following the analysis of the empirical observations compared to the individual propositions, in the final stage of the analysis the theories are then compared to one another with the level of empirical congruence between the propositions. The individual strength of each theory compared to the others is therefore dependent upon the outcome of the propositions and the main motivations behind them suggested in Table 1. Though multiple propositions may hold true, the outcome depends on the empirical support for each proposition. This step should help determine the most dominant theory or if they work to complement each other.

Table 2. *Operationalization of propositions for China's emergency responses 2000-2015*

Proposition	Indicator	Benchmark	Source
China's emergency aid	Emergency response (under csr_sector_name)	(Not applicable)	AidData / (Appendix A)
(P1) Emergency aid to China's political allies	Percent of UN voting agreement compared to percentage of total emergency aid received by countries	Correlation between higher agreement scores and emergency aid	UN GA voting data and AidData
(P2) Emergency aid to state governments instead of multilateral institutions or NGOs	Ratio of bilateral funding relative to total emergency funding	Higher ratio of bilateral emergency aid compared to the five largest donors	AidData and UN OCHA (FTS)
(P3) Emergency aid to countries with intensive economic relations	Trade relations measured from percentage of exports compared from largest to smallest recipients and non-recipients	Export partner share higher among emergency aid recipients and a higher share for more emergency aid	IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS)
(P4) Emergency aid contributed mostly to a pooled fund and (b) encouraging other states to do the same.	Ratio of multilateral and NGO funding measured from the total funds and (b) trend of requests from Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Similar ratio of transfer to pooled funds compared to the larger donors and (b) more statements calling for multilateral funding than to individual countries	AidData and UN OCHA FTS / China's MFA online archive and UN press (UN GA & ECOSOC)
(P5) China operates as a norm-taker of humanitarian norms	References to UN GA 46/182 and humanitarian norms and principles	Similar attention to humanitarian norms and principles compared to larger donors	China's MFA online archive, State Council white papers
(P6) China provides emergency aid to countries recognizing Taiwan	Measured by provision of emergency aid to countries recognizing Taiwan compared to excluded countries experiencing emergencies	Several countries recognizing Taiwan as Chinese emergency aid recipients	UN OCHA FTS, AidData, PolGeoNow archive, and Relief Web's disaster records

4.2.1 Data collection

Data collected for this study is derived from information surrounding the observations and related to the deduced expectations or propositions. Furthermore, van Thiel (2014) emphasizes the importance of primary and secondary material in the collection process, in order to mitigate external influences. Primary data is defined by Van Thiel as information not necessarily intended for research purposes, such as with policy documents, legal papers, newsletters, speeches, and so forth. Secondary data relates more closely to earlier research findings and generally consists of statistical information or other sources of analyzed data (van Thiel, 2014, p. 104). For this study, the primary data was gathered predominantly from an official Chinese national setting, including the State Council's white papers on foreign aid, statements from the MFA, and supplemental UN news surrounding numerous emergency situations. From the white papers and MFA, there are a number of statements on Chinese humanitarian aid and China's foreign policy objectives.

The secondary data combines information mentioned above from Dreher et al. (2017) and Custer et. al (2019) from two AidData sets. Data from the UN OCHA is utilized alongside the AidData in order to compare trends in funding and review the large donors of humanitarian aid by, filtered by emergency and destination organization type (i.e. government, NGO, UN agency). The study also utilizes a UN GA voting data set from Voeten and Bailey (2009) to outline state voting preferences and agreement with individual countries. Lastly, data from the IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) data base is gathered for the purpose of capturing the intensity of trade relations with China.

4.3 Validity and reliability

The purpose of this sub-section is to concisely reflect on the validity and reliability of the research design, in particular as it relates to the congruence analysis.

The main concern of validity is focused on the legitimacy of the research conclusions, which is narrowed down by the concepts of internal and external validity. Internal validity refers specifically to the manner in which a researcher reduces systematic biases through confirmation in the research. Moreover, it refers to the idea that the research procedure demonstrates a causal relationship and not one created by a spurious relationship (Buttolph Johnson et al., 2016, p. 177). Though this predominantly relates to more causal studies regarding the relationship between an independent and dependent variable, internal validity is equally of concern within a congruence analysis. The most relevant criteria in a congruence analysis is therefore the concept validity, which questions if the gathered empirical

observations are aligned with the abstract conceptualizations (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 166). For this case study, the two propositions per theory is useful for increasing the concept validity. Moreover, the benchmarks on the propositions support the possibility for conclusions and determining the relative strength of each theory compared to the alternatives.

External validity is the extent to which results can be generalized across a broader number of cases. The external validity should be enhanced in this study by including approximately 140 cases of emergency aid responses. Additionally, generalization is possible in the event that other researchers would apply the theoretical IR framework to conceptualizations of state behavior from other upper-middle income countries providing emergency aid. As others, such as Drury et al. (2005) and Kevlihan et al. (2014), previously focused on general motivations underlying humanitarian aid with different methods, this approach might be particularly useful in determining how emerging donors might behave.

Lastly, reliability in social science research concerns itself with how transparent and repeatable a study is. This ensures that other researchers who seek to replicate the particular study are able to do so by relying on the same measurements and data as proposed throughout the study (Bryman, 2012, p.46). In the context of a congruence analysis, reliability is enhanced once the propositions are clearly derived from the abstract theory and well-justified in the course of the empirical analysis. In other words, researchers aiming to replicate this particular study would be able to deduce similar propositions from the selected theory and derive similar conclusions reached from the empirical observations.


5. Analysis

The empirical analysis begins by testing both propositions for each individual theory. As previously stated, the strength of each theory is dependent upon the empirical congruence of the propositions. In this manner, two plausible propositions for a single theory denotes greater support for that particular theory. Bearing in mind multiple propositions are likely plausible, greater support for the theories may be gathered in the analysis of the empirical observations.

In the AidData sets, approximately 31 counties were listed as emergency aid recipients between 2000 and 2015. The total amount provided from China to emergency responses throughout this timeframe is roughly 168 million (USD). Given the timeframe of 15 years, this pales in comparison to other five largest donors. To illustrate, in 2000 Japan and the US spent between 220 million and 399 million (USD) alone. In the same year, the other three donors, Canada, Germany, and the UK, all spent between 42 and 96 million (UN OCHA, 2021).

In relation to China's emergency aid, Figure 1 reveals that Myanmar, North Korea, Indonesia, Cambodia, and Thailand are the five largest recipients. Although North Korea is one of the largest recipients in this timeframe, nearly 18 million (USD) of emergency aid for a major flood was distributed only in 2012. In comparison, the other four countries are more frequent recipients of emergency aid, particularly Indonesia and Myanmar. Other emergency aid responses with one incident in the sample include countries such as Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and India, for example. In many of these cases, the total funding was less than five million and sometimes as low as 5,000 (USD) (see Appendix A for full list).

Fig. 1 Largest recipients of Chinese emergency aid



5.1 Realist propositions: Emergency aid for allies?


The realist propositions indicated statism, the self-help principle, and a symbolic power dynamic were posed to be significant motivators for China's provision of emergency aid. From these motivations, the propositions suggested that China is expected to provide more aid to political allies and that bilateral funding would be more pronounced than through multilateral institutions and NGOs.

When analyzing the agreement in UN GA voting, particular patterns become apparent, as shown by the regional voting patterns in Figure 2. Most of the smaller clusters of voting divergence are centered around North America and Europe, while the highest clusters are around Southeast Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, and South Asia (see Appendix B for country overview). Here it is essential to proceed in two parts by examining the correlation between UN GA voting agreement and emergency aid recipients, then by reviewing the countries least and most in agreement with China as these patterns and

individual recipients are relevant to P1. Lastly, individual countries with a middle range of agreement that received emergency aid are examined.

To begin, the Pearson's r correlation examined the relationship between the percent in UN GA voting agreement and extent to which countries received emergency aid. The mean for UN GA voting agreement was 73.7 (SD = 15.3) and the mean for amount of emergency aid was 854,053.8 (SD= 226,119.4). As the analysis indicated, the relationship was positive, though very weak, $r(191) = .011$, even when leaving out countries with zero emergency aid from China, $r(191) = .014$.

Figure 2. *UN GA voting agreement by region*



Source: UN GA voting data (Voeten & Bailey, 2009)

On the individual country level, the countries least in agreement are comprised of one of the larger clusters of European votes, centered around a 50% threshold with some countries falling just below. Yet, given the high-income status of these countries and membership in the OECD, it would be unlikely for China to provide them with emergency aid. Though only listed by regions as North America and Western Europe, the two noticeable outliers in Figure 2 are the US (16%) and Israel (19%). These outliers point to an important caveat in UN GA resolutions, namely that nearly a fifth of votes focus on the Israel-Palestinian conflict (Voeten & Bailey, 2009). Bearing this consideration in mind, it is no surprise that the US has such a low voting agreement with China.

Southeast Asia represents the highest group in agreement with China, including countries such as Myanmar, Cambodia, and Indonesia. As previously stated, these three countries make up the majority of the emergency responses from China, including Indonesia (26 cases), Myanmar (20 cases), and Cambodia (13 cases). Moreover, as pointed out in Figure 1, these three countries also represent the largest group of emergency aid recipients and additionally include North Korea and Thailand. From the 168 million (USD) provided in

emergency aid, nearly 84.5 million (USD), or 51%, went to these five recipients. When considering further agreement scores that are situated between 80 and 100% (excluding those five countries), this constitutes an additional 47 million (USD), or roughly 28% of emergency aid funding. However, as Table 3 indicates, there is no clear relationship between the amount of emergency aid received and the voting agreement.

Most importantly this raises a question regarding developing countries with similarly high agreement scores which were impacted by emergencies, yet received no emergency aid. For example, five countries affected by humanitarian crises during the timeframe, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen, all have higher agreement scores than 85% and have received no emergency aid according to the emergency responses in the AidData sets.

Table 3. *Agreement in UN GA voting greater than 80% per emergency aid recipient*

Country	Agreement in UN GA	China's emergency aid (USD) per AidData
Vietnam	91.1	20,000
Laos	89.4	1,190,055
Cuba	88.2	8,000,000
Malaysia	87.4	1,869,241
Sudan	87.2	2,927,651
Lebanon	85	8,000,000
Jordan	84.4	8,000,000
Namibia	83.9	468,247
Philippines	83.9	2,610,140
Kyrgyzstan	83.6	5,549,937
Mongolia	83.2	2,181,127
Dominica	82.3	100,000
Congo (DRC)	81.7	585,530
Equatorial Guinea	81.5	4,598,527
Liberia	81.5	1,000,000
Total =		47,100,455

The second proposition considered the provision of emergency aid to state governments compared to provisions made to multilateral institutions and NGOs. This was considered by the ratio of bilateral to multilateral aid compared to the five largest donors. First, the AidData sets used here embodies China's ratio and captures a total of 136 bilateral

cases and 158 million from the total 168 million (USD) in emergency funding. According to these findings, less than 5% went to multilateral institutions or NGOs. Though the high volume of bilateral aid is quite striking, the noteworthy point is the provision of aid through national NGOs, rather than through multilateral institutions. Indeed, the recipient agencies in AidData mostly points to a very limited number of independent, national Red Cross Societies (e.g. Cambodian RC, Vietnam RC, and Fiji RC).

As Table 4 shows, the five largest donors are on the exact opposite end of the spectrum of funding, whereby multilateral funding is higher in the total share bilateral funding. This was concluded by filtering UN OCHA donor data by the destination organization type listed as government. Thus, whereas it appears China spent less than 4% on those multilateral organizations and NGOs, including national Red Cross Societies, the five larger donors spent above 90% of emergency aid on these both multilateral institutions and NGOs. This is represented by the data on the five largest donors in UN OCHA as seen below in Table 3.

Table 4. *Share of bilateral and multilateral total humanitarian aid between 2000 – 2015*

Country	China	Canada	Germany	Japan	UK	US
Bilateral (%)	96	>1%	2	3	3	2
Multilateral and NGOs (%)	4	99	98	97	97	98
Total funding	168 million	5.6 billion	6.7 billion	16 billion	7.7 billion	49.9 billion

Source: AidData (China) & UN OCHA FTS

5.1.1 Conclusion on the realist propositions

Having compared the percentage of agreement scores to the percentage of total emergency aid provided, a mixed image begins to form surrounding China's emergency response funding. The correlation between the two indicated a weak relationship between higher UN GA agreement scores and emergency aid. Most importantly, some countries which had high agreement scores in the UN GA received no humanitarian aid from China, according to the emergency responses listed in the AidData set. This first finding makes patterns for the distribution of China's emergency aid appear ad hoc, as noted in studies on China's total foreign aid (Fuchs & Rudyak, 2019; Hirono, 2018). However, considering the five largest recipients of China's emergency aid, there still appears to be some support for a minority of political allies which is not concretely captured by UN GA voting agreement. Indeed, the

motivation of statism and the self-help principle would account for limiting the number of emergency recipients to countries where China believes there might be some relationship benefit. This explanation might help to explain why Indonesia and Myanmar represent a large number of the cases in the AidData set and the large sums provided to North Korea. Though the relationship between the scores and emergency aid is weak, the provision to these recipients offers some moderate level of support for this proposition.

In relation to P2, the funding flows indicates that in times of emergencies, China operates by providing more funding to states bilaterally, as was expected with the motivation of a symbolic power dynamic. In comparison, Table 3 showed that in the vast majority of cases, the other large donors would provide more funding to multilateral institutions and NGOs, than bilaterally. In this way, support is found for P2 by confirming the large bilateral share of China's emergency aid.

5.2 Liberal propositions: Economic cooperation and humanitarianism

The liberal proposition postulated that economic and international cooperation would be the main motivations for China's provision of emergency aid. From the liberal motivations, the third proposition (P3) suggested China would provide emergency aid to countries with intensive economic relations. The fourth proposition (P4) was broken down into two parts to capture international cooperation. Effectively, P4 postulated emergency aid would be mostly contributed to a community pool and other states would be encouraged to do the same (P4b).

In order to capture the intensity of trade, the analysis considered the relationship between the share of a country in Chinese exports in 2015 and the amount of emergency aid received. A second Pearson's r correlation was utilized to examine this relationship. The mean for the percent in export share was .005 (SD = .019) and the mean for amount for emergency aid was 854,053.8 (SD= 226,119.4). Though the relationship was still positive, the analysis showed no significant correlation, $r(191) = .02$. Additionally, omitting the countries which received zero emergency aid yielded a similar result, $r(191) = .03$.

Considering there is no significant correlation between China's export share and their receipt of emergency aid, an individual analysis was done for the five largest and smallest emergency aid recipients. The purpose was to determine whether there would still be any significant intensity of trade in their economic relationship that supported a singular underlying motivation for China's emergency aid. Accordingly, Figures 3 and 4 show the recipients and the value of exports, contrasting the five largest emergency aid recipients with the five smallest emergency aid recipients. As Fig. 3 shows, Thailand and Indonesia have

become significant export partners over time. Vietnam maintained a rising substantial share in exports and India had an export share of nearly 18,000 in 2011, yet both countries combined received less than 75,000 (USD) in emergency aid. Moreover, the smallest emergency aid recipients, such as Congo DRC and Equatorial Guinea had no significant share in exports compared to Cambodia, Myanmar, and North Korea, as seen in Fig. 4.

Figure 3. *China's exports to the five largest emergency aid recipients*





Figure 4. China's exports to the five smallest emergency aid recipients



Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS)

In relation to the fourth proposition (P4), an inverse relationship to P2 on the allocation of emergency aid was considered. With this in mind, it is clear there are only a limited number of emergency responses whereby multilateral institutions and NGOs were engaged by China. However, looking at the provision of emergency aid from five larger donors, there was a greater focus on multilateral support. To illustrate this, there are numerous instances from each country in the analyzed timeframe. As previously stated, this was identified by utilizing the total funding per donor and year and filtering by recipient “government” through the UN OCHA FTS. When analyzing the funding from the largest donors to recipient organizations through UN OCHA, many of the first level recipients include the WFP, the ICRC, and UNICEF, for example. When specifically looking at each country, the image of funding becomes more transparent.

As Table 4 showed, each of the larger donors had only spent a fraction on direct government spending for emergency responses. These examples only further help emphasize the differences in bilateral emergency aid spending between China and the other donors. In

comparison, the other donors mostly utilize multilateral institutions, such as UN agencies, international and national NGOs, or foundations.

Some of the exceptional Chinese cases analyzed further fail to exemplify this liberal proposition. In one instance, China granted 1.6 million (USD) to the UN for the construction of shelters for internally displaced people in South Sudan in 2014. After reviewing the individual case, the source for the funding led to a statement from China's National Petroleum Company, whereby the company claimed to have provided the funding (CNPC, n.d.). In this case, it was then unclear whether the Chinese government or the CNPC indeed provided the funding to the UN. This distinction is interesting mostly for exploring the motivations for supporting the organization. In other words, Chinese oil fears in South Sudan mostly highlighted a seemingly realist concern in international politics (Wu, 2014).

A second example is the provision of 2 million (USD) to the WFP during the West African Ebola outbreak in Liberia 2014. Yet, even in this instance an additional 1 million (USD) was donated to the state during a ceremony between then President Sirleaf and the PRC Ambassador to Liberia. According to President Sirleaf, the additional 1 million would then be channeled through to the National Ebola Trust Fund (Executive Mansion, 2014). In this way, there seems to be limited support in the AidData sets for direct support of pooled funding, as was expected in P4.

In light of these findings, the addendum to the proposition (P4b) postulated that China would encourage other states to commit to pooled funding. For this analysis, at least 16 statements from China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs were identified throughout 2000 and 2015. As seen in Table 5, the coding scheme separated general calls for cooperation, calls for support regarding individual countries, and those which called on more support for the multilateral funding, such as for OCHA or the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). Most of the statements, or communiques, stem from the UN GA or later from the BRICS Summits.

Table 5. *Supporting statements for international cooperation*

Statements	Calls for cooperation (1)	Calls for support (to countries) (2)	Calls for support (multilateral) (3)
16	8	5	5

Among these statements, direct prompts to provide more humanitarian support were stated, and three of them were indirect calls for the international community to respond. In one example, the Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN stated on behalf of China:

“We hope that OCHA will be able to get sufficient financial resources for its operations so that it can ensure that global humanitarian efforts will have more resources and respond to emergency situations more effectively.” - Ambassador Shen Guofang (PM PRC UN, 2001).

Similarly, one Chinese Minister Counsellor, Shaogang Zhang, commended the work and cooperation of the UN's CERF for strengthening the global coordination to humanitarian needs, while not pushing for further financial contributions (PM PRC UN, 2009).¹

Most appeals to contribute to an international pool were undertaken during the UN Economic and Social Council (UN ECOSOC) sitting, under the item “Strengthening of the Coordination of Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Assistance of the United Nations”. These meetings occur annually within the UN GA framework and are pursuant to the UN GA Res 46/182 on humanitarian principles and responses. In these instances, Chinese officials used their time to call upon member states to contribute to international pools. Moreover, in at least two instances, the Chinese delegation emphasized a strong interest in the UN playing a larger role in coordinating humanitarian assistance and funding. In 2010, Minister Counsellor Wang Hongbo spoke on the fragmentation of humanitarian aid and the need for coordination vis-à-vis the UN OCHA (PM PRC UN, 2010). Additionally, in 2015 Ambassador Wang Min called for the increased participation and to “push to forge synergy among humanitarian assistance” (PM PRC UN, 2015). In this same 2015 speech, the Ambassador also called upon donors to “intensify their efforts and provide funding on more flexible terms” (PM PRC UN, 2015).

With 16 statements and only five comments on increasing support for community pooled funds, there is not enough evidence to support a confirmation of this proposition. Furthermore, bearing in mind the annual sessions under the UN ECOSOC focuses precisely on the coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief, this type of rhetoric is already highly anticipated. When comparing statements from the largest donors, the same rhetoric is frequently utilized as seen in a few examples in Table 6.: calls for cooperation, enhancing coordination, and intensifying contributions. These statements highlight only a few which

¹ Coded 1 for cooperation

could be traced back to the individual delegates throughout the timeframe. Surprisingly, no concrete statements from Germany on the matter were identified in the GA plenary sessions or ECOSOC between 2000 and 2015.

Table 6. *Example statements from larger donors in the UN GA (2000 – 2015)*

Country	Summary and delegate ²	Source
Canada	Statement on Canada's contributions to CERF and calls for member states to provide more (John McNee)	61 st session (UN GA, 2006)
Japan	Statement on Japan's contributions to CERF, calls for an essential review to the CERF fund, an improvement in the speed of disbursements, and international funding (Takakiro Shinyo)	61 st session (UN GA, 2006)
UK	Strongly encouraging others to come forward with financial support (unnamed)	26 th Meeting (UN ECOSOC, 2014)
US	Securing more financing through the World Humanitarian Summit and a better coordination of international humanitarian aid. (Stefanie Amadeo)	70 th session (UN GA, 2015)

5.2.1 Conclusion on the liberal propositions

Following the analysis, it was quickly determined there was no significant correlation between the export share and amount of emergency aid. Although the relationship was contradicted with Pearson's r , further consideration was given to the idea that larger emergency aid recipients might exhibit a higher intensity of trade relations than the smaller recipients on a national level. As both Figures 3 and 4 indicated, this was not necessarily the case, leading to a complete dismissal of P3.

In relation to P4, there was similarly limited evidence to be found. In most emergency response cases, the funding was given directly to the recipient state. When funding was not provided directly to the emergency recipient country, it was granted to a few multilateral agencies, including a handful of national Red Cross societies, as indicated by the sample in the AidData sets. Finally, limited evidence was found for P4b, which suggests that China would call on other states to contribute to community pools. Though statements did call for more cooperation, most limited any statements on providing to existing community pools.

² Delegate summaries are paraphrased statements captured from the UN GA session.

Lastly, a handful suggested individual support to countries, which made it unclear whether funding should be channeled through multilateral agencies or bilaterally.

5.3 Constructivist propositions: China as a norm-taker in the humanitarian domain?

The main motivations behind the constructivist propositions are humanitarian norms and principles and their relationship to a state's identity. Therefore, the recognition and adherence to existing humanitarian norms was selected as an indication that China might be a norm-taker in this particular domain. In this section, this claim is investigated by means of a content analysis (P5) and a comparative analysis (P6). The fifth proposition takes into account similar statements compared to other humanitarian donors which were made about the guiding principles of UN GA 46/182. The principles are part and parcel of the underlying humanitarian norms to facilitate humanitarian assistance and protect civilians. Table 7 offers the outcome of the coding schedule. Finally, the sixth proposition turns to a more active engagement of humanitarian norms by investigating emergency responses for countries recognizing Taiwan.

Following China's development over the course of several decades, the state has consistently described principles of foreign aid important to the state. One of the first instances was the establishment of the "Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence", signed by Premier Zhou Enlai in 1954 (Hirono, 2018). The key principles included non-interference, sovereignty and mutual-benefit and laid a foundation for Chinese humanitarian aid. However, the notion of humanitarianism was first dismissed from China's earliest communist period as it was conceived as a "capitalist tool of oppression and exploitation" (Hirono, 2018, p.3). Today the concept is more widely utilized and reflects a short-term provision of emergency aid to provide food, materials, technical assistance, and rescue support. In this way, China appears to have shifted away from the exploitative view of humanitarianism to an accepting view in some cases. As such, Chinese officials state the importance of humanitarian aid in 15 official statements and documents, including some occasions through donation ceremonies where a Chinese Ambassador meets a government official to discuss the emergency aid grant. Unfortunately, only these 15 documents were available across the varying sources.

Table 7. *Supporting statements on humanitarianism*

Statements	UN GA 46/182 ("guiding principles")	References to humanitarian norms and principles (humanity /neutrality / impartiality /independence)			
		5	2	3	3
15	8				

Among the 15 documents, eight explicitly acknowledge UN GA 46/182 as the bedrock to humanitarian assistance during their speeches. For example, in two speeches from Minister Counsellor Wang Hongbo and Ambassador Wang, adherence to these norms were expressed in relation to China's own practices as shown here:

"China's humanitarian relief practice once again proves that the guiding principles of humanitarian assistance set forth in the annex of the General Assembly resolution 46/182 are an effective prerequisite for the implementation of humanitarian assistance[...]. Parties involved in humanitarian efforts must abide by the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality, respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of the affected countries [...]." - Minister Counsellor Wang Hongbo (PM PRC UN, 2010)

In another example in a speech to the UN GA in 2001 Ambassador Shen Guofang praised the effectiveness of Resolution 46/182 over the past ten years since it was adopted. Furthermore, the Ambassador called upon member states and other agencies of the UN to "strictly abide by this resolution in carrying out humanitarian assistance" (PM PRC UN, 2001).

As was previously acknowledged in P4b, this type of rhetoric might be expected within the context of the UN. And although most acknowledgements of the resolution and guiding norms were stated at the UN, a few occurred at the BRICS Summits as well. To illustrate, at the 4th BRICS Summit, Chinese officials expressed their commitment to the alleviation of the humanitarian crisis affecting millions in the Horn of Africa (MFA, 2012). Additionally, one communique from the Chinese MFA during the 7th BRICS Summit in 2015 emphasizes each norm in its own manner by expressing concern in Syria. This included stating concerns over the deterioration of humanitarian well-being in Syria (i.e. humanity), reaffirming unhindered access of humanitarian agencies (i.e. neutrality), and rejecting the politicization of humanitarian assistance (independence) (MFA, 2015).

Beyond the primarily international events, some of the 15 statements were made during donation ceremonies between Chinese Ambassadors and an official from the emergency aid country. Some of the statements were less implicit in relation to all norms, however, a focus on humanity seems noticeable compared to the others in Table 7. For example, in 2005, the Chinese Ambassador to Indonesia, Lu Shumin, conveyed condolences and deepest sympathies with those suffering in the aftermath of natural disasters in Aceh and North Sumatra and the tragic loss of life (MFA, 2005).

In a different way, Chinese officials documented an overview of foreign assistance and enumerated certain emergency responses from the State Council white papers on foreign aid. In detailing the forms of foreign assistance, the white papers offer no detailed discussion on the norms of humanitarianism, however, it casts a light on how China views itself as an emerging provider of humanitarian assistance. Indeed, the State Council emphasizes the increasingly active role China has played in international emergency operations in making relief quicker and more effective (State Council PRC, 2011). In essence, this self-identification as an “emerging humanitarian aid provider” helped to underscore the notion that China behaves as a norm-taker, rather than a norm-maker, in the humanitarian domain.

Based on the limited findings surrounding Chinese statements, it does appear the larger donors all make similar statements on humanitarian norms either within the walls of the UN or through their foreign affairs offices. For example, during the 70th session of the UN GA in 2015, the US referenced commitments to preserving and strengthening the respect to the humanitarian principles laid forth in UN GA 46/182 (UN GA, 2015). Additionally, both statements from Germany's Federal Foreign Office and their Permanent Mission to the UN present the same guidelines to humanitarian aid as fundamental principles of humanitarian aid. Indeed, these references seem to be common for the larger donors. Bearing in mind many of these countries have engaged in large amounts of humanitarian aid for numerous years, it should be obvious that they would prescribe to norm-taking behavior, at least in the humanitarian domain. A final question would be whether such statements truly translate into domestic and international action. However, rather than viewing statements as separate from activities, “political talk” might be a further indication of norm-taking behavior in institutional settings such as the UN. In other words, the statements at least indicate a proclivity towards pre-existing norms in the humanitarian domain, compared to any establishment of new humanitarian norms.

Following the fifth proposition, the sixth proposition builds upon the norm-taking behavior by stating that China would provide humanitarian aid to countries formally

recognizing Taiwan. In this way, a more distinct operationalization on the adherence to humanitarian norms and principles might be confirmed as China would be providing support that is based on humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence. In particular, impartiality and independence would be prominent due to the prioritization of urgent cases and autonomous action without political, economic, or military objectives.

The analysis starts with the total emergencies between 2000 and 2015 for countries formally recognizing Taiwan and those which previously recognized Taiwan (see Table 9). This note is important as several countries have shifted their support from Taiwan to China within the timeframe, including three out of 26 countries. Next to compiling data for countries which have recognized Taiwan, data was collected from Reliefweb's disaster database. For the analyzed timeframe, a total of 286 emergencies were identified among all the countries which recognized Taiwan.³

Table 8. *Countries formally recognizing Taiwan and emergency aid*

Country	Recognition of Taiwan	Emergencies	Emergency aid
Belize	Continued	20	No
Burkina Faso	2018	16	No
Costa Rica	2007	11	No
Dominican Republic	2018	36	No
El Salvador	2018	36	No
Eswatini (Swaziland)	Continued	8	No
Gambia	2013	14	No
Guatemala	Continued	51	No
Haiti	Continued	52	Yes (2010)
Honduras	Continued	39	No
Kiribati	2019	4	No
Malawi	2008	19	No
Marshall Islands	Continued	4	No
Micronesia	Continued	9	No
Nicaragua	Continued	37	No
Nauru	Continued	1	No

³ Some natural disasters affected several countries simultaneously increasing the total amount

Palau	Continued	3	No
Panama	2017	29	No ⁴
Paraguay	Continued	27	No
São Tomé and Príncipe	1997 - 2016	1	No
Solomon Islands	2019	18	No
St. Kitts and Nevis	Continued	7	No
St. Lucia	Continued	14	No
St. Vincent & the Grenadines	Continued	12	No
Tuvalu	Continued	3	No
Vatican City	Continued	0	No

Following the identification of the total emergencies, only one case where China provided emergency aid was pinpointed. The case identified was an emergency response to the earthquake striking Haiti in 2010. Interestingly, this case was omitted in the total responses in the AidData set and was found referenced in the State Council white papers.

Thus, with the hundreds of emergencies, there seems to be limited indication that China has provided humanitarian relief to countries recognizing Taiwan. Instead, the 140 emergency responses from AidData suggests quite the opposite. Many of the countries continuing to recognize Taiwan are also prone to natural catastrophes, including at least 10 island countries. Other geographically close Oceania countries such as Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu, have in fact received emergency aid from China in similarly severe situations. In some instances, this was also undertaken with China offering material support, rather than financial support. For example, during Cyclone Ami in January 2003, China provided tents and blankets among other items to Tonga. Additionally, in 2012 Tonga's National Emergency Management Office was given disaster relief tools and equipment from China (AidData, 2017). Although support for Taiwan might not be the direct causal mechanism for excluding countries from emergency aid, there appears to be a relationship between the two. Therefore, an open question can be raised as to why numerous other countries experiencing natural disasters would not be supported by China.

Compared to the larger donors it is difficult to capture a similar situation as many of them fail to experience a similar political struggle as China does with Taiwan. The closest in

⁴ Panama received emergency assistance relief from Taiwan in 2006, listed under China in UN OCHA FTS.

proximity would therefore depend on politically strained relationships as experienced between Western countries, Iran, and North Korea. According to the UN OCHA FTS, Iran and North Korea received humanitarian aid on several occasions from all of the five large donors between 2000 and 2015 (see Table 9). Even when only considering the US's political tensions with Iran and North Korea, it could still be shown that humanitarian aid was earmarked in several instances for both countries.

Finally, it should be stated these transfers generally capture multilateral transfers which are earmarked for these particular countries. For example, the UN OCHA FTS lists the source organization or donor country, destination organization (i.e. UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNICEF, ICRC, WFP, etc.) and a description of how the funds supported the individual country. In multiple years, this was done directly by the member states but also vis-à-vis the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department. As mentioned earlier, the EU was omitted and focus was only on the individual EU member states during the timeframe. In any case, these instances appear to indicate a relative adherence to the humanitarian norms and principles.

Table 9. *Provision of humanitarian aid to Iran and North Korea from the largest donors*

Year	Iran	North Korea
2000	UK	CAN / GER / J / UK / US
2001	GER	CAN / GER / J / UK / US
2002	GER / J / UK / US	CAN / GER / J / UK / US
2003	GER / US	CAN / GER / US
2004	CAN / GER / J / UK / US	CAN / GER / J / UK / US
2005	GER / J	CAN / GER
2006	J / US	GER
2007	-	CAN / GER / UK / US
2008	US	CAN / GER
2009	GER	CAN / GER
2010	GER	CAN / GER / US
2011	GER / J	CAN / GER
2012	GER / J	CAN / GER
2013	GER / J	CAN / GER

2014	GER	CAN / GER
2015	GER	CAN / GER

5.3.1 Conclusions on the constructivist propositions

In comparison to the other propositions, the constructivist proposition utilized one main motivation, listed only as humanitarian norms and principles. From this motivation, the proposition postulated that China might rely on the existing humanitarian norms and principles (humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence) as a norm-taker, similar to other major donors. In relation to P5, the statements in China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs archive following UN meetings, BRICS summits, and donation ceremonies seem to moderately confirm this idea. Whereas eight statements from the 15 made reference to "guiding principles", only a few emphasized the specific one the speaker was referring to. However, it was stated that within the institutional setting of the UN and other multilateral meetings, the activity of political talk may yet serve as one exemplary source for norm-taking behavior.

Although high support was found for a stated commitment to existing humanitarian norms, P6 went deeper in the operationalization to determine if this behavior translates into another form of action. By comparing emergency aid recipients with countries that recognize Taiwan, only one instance among hundreds of emergencies was found outside the original AidData set. Indeed, Haiti appears to be an extraordinary case and outlier to China's normal behavior towards countries recognizing Taiwan. With 286 external emergencies in other countries recognizing Taiwan, none were afforded emergency relief.

In comparison, a brief reflection on the humanitarian aid from the other five donors to politically contentious states was offered. Though the relationships between the other donors, Iran, and North Korea may be considered contentious, the nature of these relationships is different compared to China and Taiwan. However, emergency responses from the five appeared to moderately support the notion that humanitarian aid would nonetheless be a standard commitment.

6. Discussion

Following the analysis and conclusions on each proposition, a clearer image forms surrounding the most compelling theoretical explanation. In this section, an overview is presented in Table 10 and the results are discussed. Though the theoretical framework and

analysis began with realism, followed by liberalism and constructivism, here it is best to begin with liberalism due to the low empirical congruence.

For the liberal theory, state preferences were stated to be expressed through the representation of domestic groups transferred to the international system. From this theoretical perspective, the underlying motivations were assessed as economic and international cooperation. In this way, it was expected that intensive economic relations would manifest into deeper cooperation with other states and accordingly reveal a tighter relationship with countries impacted by emergencies. The primary analysis for P3 revealed a non-significant relationship between China's export share and emergency aid received. Moreover, supplemental data on the value of exports between large and small emergency aid recipients revealed no economic relationship had disproportionately incentivized the agency of humanitarian action for a particular country.

In terms of international cooperation, I expected more funding to be channeled through to multilateral institutions and NGOs. However, the analysis of the second realist proposition showed this would not be the case. Very different from how the five largest donors provided most funding to multilateral institutions, most of China's emergency aid was provided directly to the state experiencing the emergency situation. As a further expectation for the liberal theory, I anticipated China would also call upon the international community to provide more funding to pooled funds to increase international cooperation. While a few instances were shown, there weren't a significant amount compared to the number of cases in the content analysis. In light of these findings, the liberal motivations for China's humanitarian aid were considered low.

Table 10. *Outcome overview*

Theory	Realism		Liberalism		Constructivism	
Proposition	P1	P2	P3	P4 / P4(b)	P5	P6
Empirical congruence	Moderate	High	Low	Low / Low	Moderate	Low

The constructivist propositions were structured around the motivation of humanitarian norms. Since the norms focus on the facilitation of humanitarian assistance and the protection of civilians, the constructivist explanation sought to connect these through values and identities. More specifically, the explanation attempted to uncover norm-taking behavior as China emerges as a humanitarian agent. Through the statements in international settings, it

was found that China appears to moderately operate as a norm-taker in the humanitarian domain. The empirical observations showed eight out of 15 statements referring to the “guiding principles” of UN GA Resolution 46/182, a pillar in humanitarian norms. In relation to the specific principles (i.e. humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence), only a small number of statements were found on the explicit principles themselves. However, with a few examples from the larger humanitarian donors it was shown that these references may serve to establish a standard starting point in discussions on humanitarian assistance. In this way, the consideration of “political talk” served as merely one indication of norm-taking in this context.

The sixth proposition (P6) analytically captured the idea that China does not necessarily abide by existing humanitarian norms and principles as often stated. Though Haiti had received emergency assistance from China, this singular outlier might alternatively be explained by the high level of international attention on Haiti at the time. Compared to the 25 states which recognized Taiwan, it was shown that none had received emergency aid even in light of frequent emergencies. Moreover, the comparison to the five largest donors showed that they would mostly continue to abide by the humanitarian norms and principles when providing relief for Iran and North Korea.

In relation to the first proposition (P1), a justification of the moderate assessment is essential for external clarity. The proposition was specifically about the relationship between political allies and emergency aid recipients. The means for testing a political alliance were based on the notion that UN GA voting agreement indicates some level of that alliance. However, during the analysis, a non-significant relationship was shown between the similarity and emergency aid receipts. Understandably, the UN GA voting agreements are not the only reason to conclude on a political alliance. Indeed, other factors, such as historical alliances and diplomatic relationships between countries might play a role which is not captured through voting scores. The decisive justification for a moderate assessment was given in light of the five largest emergency aid recipients, especially considering for example Myanmar, North Korea, and Indonesia. Second to this, Myanmar and Indonesia made up many of the 140 cases, whereas North Korea still received the second highest volume in emergency aid in 2012. Bearing this justification in mind, it is still debatable why some developing countries which were also politically close according to the agreement scores had zero instances of emergency aid in the AidData set.

The second realist proposition concluded with a high empirical congruence based on the ratio of bilateral funding to multilateral funding compared to the largest donors. As the

AidData revealed, most transfers were made directly to the state, listed as grants in China's foreign aid, as explained in the introduction.

Whereas China might behave as a norm-taker in terms of political talk, the determination to provide humanitarian assistance is more telling. There are numerous cases where China has provided assistance to a range of countries, yet some of the countries appear to receive more support more often or in higher volumes than others. However, this begs the question why some countries which maintain tight political relations with China are not emergency aid recipients. Many of them, including for example Pakistan and Russia, have experienced emergencies throughout the analyzed timeframe, yet were not listed as emergency aid recipients. Considering that different forms of China's foreign aid and financial flows have not been entirely transparent, it is possible that other arrangements were made between countries such as these. An alternative explanation previously considered that China's general humanitarian spending is ad hoc, rather than systematic. As Hirono explained, any form of China's humanitarian assistance is driven predominantly by different national interests, rather than a specific policy framework (Hirono, 2018, p. 20). Keeping in mind that only 31 countries were listed as emergency aid recipients, this conclusion could be correct.

7. Conclusions

The main research question considered which core IR theory best explains China's motivation for emergency aid. This study utilized 140 cases of emergency responses to over 31 countries between 2000 and 2015, providing a substantial amount of cases for the analysis. Though the congruence analysis does not conclusively prove that realist motivations accurately explain China's provision of emergency aid, the analysis at least indicates it is the most fitting theory. The underlying realist motivations were defined as statism, the self-help principle, and a symbolic power dynamic, which linked these concepts to the propositions. Two of the most revealing faucets were China's largest emergency aid recipients and the dominance of flows for bilateral emergency aid, rather than through multilateral institutions and NGOs.

One constructivist proposition offered a moderate explanation of China's norm-taking behavior in institutional settings, yet the strength of that particular proposition was not as substantial in terms of acting on political talk. The liberal theory considered economic and international cooperation as other motivations for China's emergency aid. However, there was limited evidence to support this conceptual motivation.

Bearing these findings in mind, this study is academically and socially relevant for a few reasons. First, it contributes to the growing body of research on aspects of China's foreign aid, while specifically investigating the niche area of emergency aid. In this way, it adds a layer of transparency to the available research on China's financial flows. Second, by examining emergency aid, this study contributes to the small body of research which examines general humanitarian aid motivations, such as by the studies from Drury et. al (2005) and Kevlihan et al. (2014). Though the particular motivations may appear arbitrary as long as humanitarian or emergency aid are provided, these underlying factors may support humanitarian agencies in encouraging more donor transparency and contributions on the basis of recipient need. Third, as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, understanding how a state behaves during emergency situations may shed light on particular areas of improvement for humanitarian donors. Finally, general reactions to emergency responses highlight ethical considerations in the behavior of donors, which is of considerable importance based on the guiding principles of humanitarianism.

Given the lack of research connecting emergency or humanitarian aid to grand theories, such as the IR theories, this study provides a unique way to combine the academic area of research with concrete humanitarian action. In the introduction to the theoretical framework, I considered the feasibility of discussing more alternative theories more in depth, yet decided in favor of limiting this to constructivism. In hindsight, including Marxist theory as a competing theory, rather than constructivism, might have offered more insights considering the continuation of the Chinese Communist Party. In this way, Marxist theory may have potentially offered a stronger explanatory value. Additionally, in relation to the propositions, future research in this area might utilize a slightly broader set of expectations in order to arrive at stronger conclusions. Nevertheless, this research strategy and perhaps more elaborate quantitative studies could be useful for providing context on how other upper-middle income countries contribute to humanitarian efforts.

As far limitations are concerned, one of the main limitations in the study is that the AidData referred to might only offer a snapshot of China's emergency responses and may not capture all emergency responses. For example, there was no clarification on Haiti being removed from China's emergency responses within the AidData codebooks. Another limitation was access to relevant statements for both P4b and in particular for P5. Considering the timeframe was 15 years, I anticipated a larger volume of official statements, specifically on China's humanitarian aid or responses to emergencies.

In conclusion, this study casts a light on the limited area of attention on China's humanitarian efforts. Further research into humanitarian action could not only consider how China provides emergency aid but offer concrete proposals for how China could better engage with existing humanitarian agents and programs. Although CIDCA was established in 2018 to create more transparency for China's foreign spending, limited clarity on the state's humanitarian responses compared to standard development operations persists. For this reason, the Chinese government could explore ways to work with other humanitarian donors to gain more experience and better showcase the state's humanitarian efforts. In light of the main findings, the Chinese government is also encouraged to contribute more to specific UN agencies and programs, such as the WFP and CERF, which focus on global humanitarian responses. Though bilateral responses may serve to uphold relations with other states, existing UN agencies and programs are aimed towards offering more effective global coordination in emergency and humanitarian relief efforts.

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Appendix A: *Emergency response index from AidData (2000 – 2015)*

Recipient	Emergency cases	Agency	Millions USD
Cambodia	13		12,232,042
Congo, Dem. Rep.	1		585,530
Cuba	1		8,000,000
Dominica	1		100,000
Equatorial Guinea	1		2,500,000
Fiji	3	1x National Red Cross (NGO)	5,080,000
India	1		50,000
Indonesia	26	1x National Red Cross (NGO)/ 1x NGO	18,333,714
Jordan	1	1x UN agency	8,000,000
Kenya	1		7,228,011
Kyrgyz Republic	1		5,000,000
Laos	6		1,190,055
Lebanon	1	1x UN agency	8,000,000
Liberia	1		1,000,000
Malaysia	7	1x Red Cross (NGO) /1x UN agency	1,869,241
Moldova	3		4,954,092
Mongolia	4		2,181,127
Myanmar	20		24,639,373
Namibia	2		468,247
New Zealand	3		500,000
North Korea	2		19,208,196
Papua New Guinea	3		109,260
Philippines	6		2,610,140
Samoa	5	1x Samoan Red Cross (NGO)	6,090,000
South Sudan	2	1x UN agency	6,483,262
Sudan	1		2,927,651
Thailand	9	1x other (Bangkok Metropolitan Admin)	10,065,422
Tonga	5	1x NGO	732,000
Ukraine	4		2,728,760
Vanuatu	4		4,867,351
Vietnam	2	1x National Red Cross (NGO)	20,000
Total	140		167,753,474

Appendix B: UN GA agreement score, Chinese exports, and export share

Country	UN GA (agreement %)	Exports in USD Millions (2015)	Export share	Emergency aid
Afghanistan, Islamic Rep. of	88.30	10.15	0.00074%	0
Albania	50.60	52.13	0.00380%	0
Algeria	87.10	654.13	0.04768%	0
Angola	55.40	14,320.57	1.04376%	0
Antigua and Barbuda	83.00	0.21	0.00002%	0
Argentina	83.90	5,173.79	0.37709%	0
Armenia, Rep. of	76.80	165.32	0.01205%	0
Australia	74.00	60,774.30	4.42956%	0
Austria	46.60	3,407.07	0.24833%	0
Azerbaijan, Rep. of	56.10	53.19	0.00388%	0
Bahamas, The	84.80	0.38	0.00003%	0
Bahrain, Kingdom of	82.40	37.36	0.00272%	0
Bangladesh	85.70	675.08	0.04920%	0
Barbados	88.30	12.56	0.00092%	0
Belarus, Rep. of	83.40	781.00	0.05692%	0
Belgium	84.50	7,515.87	0.54780%	0
Belize	53.60	0.16	0.00001%	0
Benin	85.10	32.87	0.00240%	0
Bermuda	83.00	0.01	0.00000%	0
Bhutan	79.20	0.54	0.00004%	0
Bolivia	82.80	468.25	0.03413%	0
Bosnia and Herzegovina	55.80	16.03	0.00117%	0
Botswana	82.40	38.22	0.00279%	0
Brazil	82.00	35,607.52	2.59527%	0
Brunei Darussalam	87.70	94.93	0.00692%	0
Bulgaria	54.30	596.18	0.04345%	0
Burkina Faso	84.90	64.73	0.00472%	0
Burundi	81.60	0.78	0.00006%	0
Cambodia	84.00	405.52	0.02956%	12,232,042
Cameroon	87.40	506.67	0.03693%	0
Canada	64.50	15,802.46	1.15177%	0
Central African Rep.	82.20	6.64	0.00048%	0
Chad	82.40	85.56	0.00624%	0
Chile	79.10	16,219.36	1.18216%	0
China, P.R.: Hong Kong	0.00	285,894.92	20.83759%	0
China, P.R.: Macao	0.00	227.99	0.01662%	0

Explaining motivations of China's emergency aid

Colombia	78.10	1,869.21	0.13624%	0
Comoros, Union of the	86.30	0.00	0.00000%	0
Congo, Dem. Rep. of the	85.50	1,997.98	0.14562%	585,530
Congo, Rep. of	81.70	1,377.02	0.10036%	0
Costa Rica	78.90	80.17	0.00584%	0
Côte d'Ivoire	75.70	95.16	0.00694%	0
Croatia, Rep. of	54.30	77.75	0.00567%	0
Cuba	88.20	14.30	0.00104%	8,000,000
Cyprus	59.90	42.89	0.00313%	0
Czech Rep.	53.50	1,852.89	0.13505%	0
Denmark	54.30	3,977.79	0.28992%	0
Djibouti	84.20	0.06	0.00000%	0
Dominica	82.30	0.01	0.00000%	100,000
Dominican Rep.	80.00	122.75	0.00895%	0
Ecuador	83.90	723.02	0.05270%	0
Egypt, Arab Rep. of	87.50	425.19	0.03099%	0
El Salvador	78.50	43.91	0.00320%	0
Equatorial Guinea, Rep. of	81.50	1,099.40	0.08013%	4,598,527
Eritrea, The State of	85.50	187.33	0.01365%	0
Estonia, Rep. of	53.10	150.04	0.01094%	0
Eswatini, Kingdom of	83.50	0.03	0.00000%	0
Ethiopia, The Federal Dem. Rep. of	82.30	330.51	0.02409%	0
Fiji, Rep. of	74.60	40.76	0.00297%	5,080,000
Finland	54.20	2,805.41	0.20447%	0
France	44.80	19,889.47	1.44965%	0
Gabon	86.70	700.80	0.05108%	0
Gambia, The	85.20	2.34	0.00017%	0
Georgia	55.70	125.80	0.00917%	0
Germany	53.30	79,730.45	5.81119%	0
Ghana	82.50	1,112.87	0.08111%	0
Greece	56.70	252.40	0.01840%	0
Greenland	80.20	1.91	0.00014%	0
Guatemala	77.40	207.18	0.01510%	0
Guinea	86.00	27.91	0.00203%	0
Guinea-Bissau	84.30	17.81	0.00130%	0
Guyana	84.60	15.65	0.00114%	0
Haiti	80.80	10.11	0.00074%	0
Honduras	74.90	20.76	0.00151%	0
Hungary	53.20	1,399.70	0.10202%	0
Iceland	55.00	72.64	0.00529%	0

Explaining motivations of China's emergency aid

India	76.30	9,689.94	0.70626%	50,000
Indonesia	87.40	15,044.66	1.09654%	18,333,174
Iran, Islamic Rep. of	87.00	15,106.84	1.10107%	0
Iraq	85.20	11,939.93	0.87025%	0
Ireland	57.20	1,827.25	0.13318%	0
Israel	19.40	3,245.40	0.23654%	0
Italy	55.20	11,531.14	0.84045%	0
Jamaica	83.40	28.63	0.00209%	0
Japan	58.30	109,215.78	7.96024%	0
Jordan	84.40	210.81	0.01536%	8,000,000
Kazakhstan, Rep. of	81.90	5,480.14	0.39942%	0
Kenya	82.50	86.11	0.00628%	7,228,001
Kiribati	64.10	0.82	0.00006%	0
Korea, Rep. of	56.60	137,123.93	9.99434%	0
Kuwait	86.80	268.67	0.01958%	0
Kyrgyz Rep.	83.60	35.88	0.00261%	0
Lao People's Dem. Rep.	89.40	1,224.62	0.08926%	1,190,055
Latvia	52.70	122.49	0.00893%	0
Lebanon	85.00	162.08	0.01181%	8,000,000
Lesotho, Kingdom of	83.50	0.01	0.00000%	0
Liberia	81.50	1.77	0.00013%	1,000,000
Libya	87.70	4,933.37	0.35957%	0
Liechtenstein	56.30		0.00000%	
Lithuania	53.20	113.36	0.00826%	0
Luxembourg	54.60	256.21	0.01867%	0
Madagascar, Rep. of	82.50	142.97	0.01042%	0
Malawi	78.80	55.87	0.00407%	0
Malaysia	87.40	25,986.96	1.89407%	1,869,241
Maldives	86.50	0.03	0.00000%	0
Mali	85.10	27.42	0.00200%	0
Malta	59.80	26.96	0.00196%	0
Marshall Islands	34.70		0.00000%	
Mauritania, Islamic Rep. of	85.10	579.76	0.04226%	0
Mauritius	79.90	18.40	0.00134%	0
Mexico	79.30	4,873.15	0.35518%	0
Micronesia	28.60		0.00000%	
Moldova, Rep. of	55.40	8.55	0.00062%	4,954,092
Monaco	52.50		0.00000%	
Mongolia	83.20	3,897.42	0.28407%	2,181,127
Montenegro	56.40	8.80	0.00064%	0
Morocco	84.90	225.91	0.01647%	0

Explaining motivations of China's emergency aid

Mozambique, Rep. of	85.60	144.04	0.01050%	0
Myanmar	87.80	4,511.61	0.32883%	24,639,373
Namibia	83.90	157.32	0.01147%	468,247
Nauru, Rep. of	47.90	0.11	0.00001%	0
Nepal	83.60	11.48	0.00084%	0
Netherlands, The	53.20	10,586.88	0.77163%	0
New Zealand	58.80	6,028.42	0.43938%	500,000
Nicaragua	80.30	21.57	0.00157%	0
Niger	86.20	7.62	0.00056%	0
Nigeria	84.10	2,131.46	0.15535%	0
Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of	87.20	2,343.34	0.17080%	19,208,196
North Macedonia, Republic of	54.70	146.44	0.01067%	0
Norway	54.60	2,963.68	0.21601%	0
Oman	87.70	14,724.71	1.07322%	0
Pakistan	84.40	1,934.93	0.14103%	0
Palau, Rep. of	26.60	0.00	0.00000%	0
Panama	74.70	40.94	0.00298%	0
Papua New Guinea	70.00	853.12	0.06218%	109,619
Paraguay	77.50	30.47	0.00222%	0
Peru	77.50	7,359.47	0.53640%	0
Philippines	83.90	6,393.07	0.46596%	2,610,140
Poland, Rep. of	53.50	2,014.25	0.14681%	0
Portugal	55.60	928.82	0.06770%	0
Qatar	86.80	5,289.81	0.38555%	0
Romania	54.40	582.38	0.04245%	0
Russian Federation	75.70	28,606.41	2.08499%	0
Rwanda	73.60	12.82	0.00093%	0
Samoa	68.90	0.83	0.00006%	6,090,000
San Marino	56.10		0.00000%	
Sao Tome & Principe	82.50		0.00000%	
Saudi Arabia	85.80	33,972.34	2.47609%	0
Senegal	86.70	117.68	0.00858%	0
Serbia, Rep. of	70.90	20.57	0.00150%	0
Seychelles	85.60	0.02	0.00000%	0
Sierra Leone	83.90	1.08	0.00008%	0
Singapore	82.20	48,253.87	3.51701%	0
Slovak Rep.	54.10	1,130.90	0.08243%	0
Slovenia, Rep. of	54.60	325.44	0.02372%	0
Solomon Islands	79.00	232.21	0.01692%	0

Explaining motivations of China's emergency aid

Somalia	87.60	23.28	0.00170%	0
South Africa	83.30	7,468.80	0.54437%	0
South Sudan, Rep. of	54.00	2,190.49	0.15965%	6,483,262
Spain	54.60	4,854.46	0.35382%	0
Sri Lanka	87.00		0.00000%	
St. Kitts and Nevis	80.00	0.13	0.00001%	0
St. Lucia	85.40	1.56	0.00011%	0
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	82.80	0.00	0.00000%	0
Sudan	87.20		0.00000%	2,927,651
Suriname	85.80	13.19	0.00096%	0
Sweden	55.90	5,358.14	0.39053%	0
Switzerland	56.60	20,075.54	1.46322%	0
Syrian Arab Rep.	85.10	3.22	0.00023%	0
Tajikistan, Rep. of	85.80	188.58	0.01375%	0
Tanzania, United Rep. of	82.90	562.32	0.04099%	0
Thailand	82.50	23,356.27	1.70233%	10,065,422
Timor-Leste, Dem. Rep. of	80.60	0.95	0.00007%	0
Togo	84.30	7.67	0.00056%	0
Tonga	64.30	1.20	0.00009%	732,000
Trinidad and Tobago	82.80	101.81	0.00742%	0
Tunisia	86.70	28.31	0.00206%	0
Turkey	64.70	2,500.62	0.18226%	0
Turkmenistan	88.40	7,384.53	0.53822%	0
Tuvalu	75.20	0.94	0.00007%	0
Uganda	78.00	57.74	0.00421%	0
Ukraine	59.40	2,399.09	0.17486%	2,678,760
United Arab Emirates	84.90	10,641.91	0.77564%	0
United Kingdom	44.10	27,426.63	1.99900%	0
United States	15.90	116,186.26	8.46829%	0
Uruguay	78.20	1,066.03	0.07770%	0
Uzbekistan, Rep. of	80.90	1,744.98	0.12718%	0
Vanuatu	62.50	1.51	0.00011%	4,867,351
Venezuela, Rep. Bolivariana de	85.40	4,791.03	0.34920%	0
Vietnam	91.10	16,567.69	1.20754%	20,000
Yemen, Rep. of	86.50	2.27	0.00017%	0
Zambia	84.20	1,017.80	0.07418%	0
Zimbabwe	89.40	4.44	0.00032%	0
Total				167,753,474