

ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM
Erasmus School of Economics

Master Thesis Behavioural Economics

**Beliefs about corporate gender quota
And their effect on support for policies**

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Date final version: 06-09-2021

The views stated in this thesis are those of the author and not necessarily those of the supervisor, second assessor, Erasmus School of Economics or Erasmus University Rotterdam.

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Abstract

The attention to diversify the workforce increased by firms and politics. However, the share of women in top functions only increased marginally. One option to increase this representation is to implement gender quotas for board functions. In this research I investigate whether Dutch individuals hold biased beliefs about these gender quota policies. Afterwards, I research how these beliefs affect the support for these policy measures. Previous research on this topic shows ambiguous results. Some research shows the positive effects of gender quotas and others state that affirmative action policies harm firms in their performance, for example. The topic of beliefs about gender quotas and support for the policy measure is not widely researched and especially not with a quantitative way of eliciting beliefs. In the experiment, the subjects firstly state application rates of men and women when these individuals knew a gender quota was in place. In this way, beliefs are elicited quantitatively because the subjects knew what the application rates in the control group were. Afterwards, subjects played a dictator game in which they donated money to a charity which supports women rights and labour market participation. The more subjects donate, the higher their support for gender quotas. The results show that almost all subjects hold biased beliefs about gender quotas and are overoptimistic about the supportive effect on women and over pessimistic about the negative effects on men. There are, however, no significant effects of these biased beliefs on support for gender quotas.

Introduction

In the last two decades, attention to diversity at work increased massively and the labour market participation of women, migrants and LGBTI community members grew (OECD, 2020). However, the growth rate was modest over the last five years and minority groups are still underrepresented (Hunt, Dixon-Fyle, Dolan, & Prince, 2020). The inclusion of these groups is important because more diverse companies, both gender and ethnicity-based, are increasingly likely to outperform the less diverse firms in the industry on profitability (Hunt, et al., 2020). Increasing performance is partially the reason firms pay attention to diversifying their workforce.

Other reasons for firms to give minority groups and women more opportunities are the obligation from governments. Over one hundred countries introduced obligatory quotas to increase the representation of women in politics (Dahlerup, 2007). One of the first countries to implement a gender quota was France. This country introduced a law that demands equal representation of men and women on candidate lists for elections (IDEA, sd). Many countries from all over the world followed, from Australia to Cuba and from Mexico to Rwanda. The last country has the largest percentage of women in parliament in the world, with 55,7% of the seats (Congressional Research Service, 2021). Overall, the representation of women increased on every continent, possibly due to gender quotas (Congressional Research Service, 2021).

In the Netherlands, there is no compulsory quota for political parties. Some parties, nevertheless, implemented a voluntary quota. Since the elections in March 2021, women occupy 39% of the seats in both the house of representatives (Tweede Kamer) and the upper house (Eerste Kamer) (IDEA, sd). In this regard, the Netherlands has a slightly bigger percentage of women in the parliament than France (37.1), but the representation is not close to the percentage of women in society (50,32% according to the CBS¹).

In other settings, like corporate businesses, the Dutch parliament recently voted in favour of a gender quota for corporate boards (raad van commissarissen). This law is twofold. Firstly, there is the obligation that women occupy one-third of the seats at corporate boards. So, for every new vacancy, a woman needs to be hired if the firms do not comply with the law. The second part of the law requests large organisations to set ambitious targets and report on the

¹ Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek

progress made (Rijksoverheid, 2021). Other countries already introduced corporate board quotas a decade ago. The first European country to adopt this policy was Norway in 2003. In 2018, ten other countries followed and implemented a quota. However, the designs and context differ substantially between countries, which affects the effectiveness and success of the quotas (Mensi-Klarbach & Seierstad, 2020).

Previous research results are ambiguous. The effectiveness of gender quotas in creating a better representation of, mostly, women in corporate boards is not clear, but also the effects of gender quotas on firm productivity has not found a definite answer yet. Fallucchi and Quercia (2018), for instance, run an experiment on affirmative actions. The underrepresented category enters the “game” more often due to the reservation of a part of the prize for this group, whilst it does not hamper other groups to enter the competition. These results indicate that quotas would be effective. However, Maggian, Montinari and Nicolò (2020) find the opposite. In their experiment quotas are ineffective in stimulating women to apply for promotions and climb the career ladder. A review of the gender quota in Norway shows mixed results. On the positive side, the qualification of women on boards went up and the wage gap reduced. Whilst on the other hand, the quota did not help to improve the number of women working in the rest of the firm (Bertrand, Black, Jensen, & Lleras-Muney, 2019). One thing most researchers agree on is that the representation of women in corporate boards increases due to gender quotas (Natividad, 2010). However, various factors are influencing the effects on labour market outcomes and application rates (Bertrand, Black, Jensen, & Lleras-Muney, 2019).

(Biased) beliefs about gender, in the first place, hamper women from being hired for a leadership position. Besides, these gender beliefs also lower the support for gender quotas and play a role in the effectiveness of the gender quotas or targets. An explanation for the lack of support is the fear of losing control by the dominant, most often male group. Stereotypes and other biased beliefs make the dominant group reluctant to support gender quotas (Humbert, Kelan, & van den Brink, 2019). So, there is some research on how gender beliefs influence support for gender quotas.

What is missing in the current literature is the beliefs is a quantitative way of eliciting beliefs about gender quotas in different settings. For similar affirmative actions, for example, supporting black people in the labour market, there is some experimental evidence on the

support for affirmative action policies (Haaland & Roth, 2021). With this research, I will try to fill this gap in the literature for gender quotas in corporate boards. At the same times, this research will contribute to a better understanding of gender beliefs and implementation of gender quotas in the Netherlands. This leads to the following research question:

What is the effect of (biased) beliefs about corporate gender quotas on the support for gender quotas in the Netherlands?

To get an answer to the research question, I will, firstly, review the literature on gender diversification, quotas both in general and gender-related, (biased) beliefs, and the relationship between corporate gender quotas and beliefs. Then there follows an explanation of the constructed sample and the experimental design. The experiment conducted in this research is based on the experiment by Haaland and Roth (2021) on beliefs about racial discrimination and the support for pro-black policies. Next, I will discuss the results of the experiment and conclude whether Dutch individuals hold biased beliefs against gender quota policies. Besides, the results section will look at what the effects of these beliefs and an information treatment are on the support for gender quota policies. The last part of the result section will discuss mechanisms influencing the support for gender quotas and the beliefs individuals hold. Lastly, I will discuss the limitations, for example, the sample size, and give directions for future research in this area.

Literature Review

Diversification

Firms face the challenge of diversifying the workforce and include minority groups in their firms. Negative side-effects of diversification can be a higher employee turnover due to a reduction in cohesion in the workforce. Other challenges are the poor understanding of diversification theory and negative attitudes towards minority groups or women (Yong Kim, 2006). Hunt, et al. (2020) identify two other challenges. First, they notice a lack of follow-up in diversification after firms committed to building a more inclusive workforce. Firms lack a strategy or systematic firm-wide approach in diversifying. Secondly, there is a misconception about fairness as barriers to diversification. The perception of equal changes and, therefore, equality for everyone, is not true. If women (blacks) receive the same support as men (whites), they will benefit less than men (whites) would do.

These barriers need to be lowered or removed to create more opportunities for women and minority groups. The first task is to acknowledge the problem. Besides, there are different things firms can do. Among others, firms can use team building to create better cohesion between co-workers. Likewise, diversity policies should be introduced firm-wide with a pertinent focus on solving the problems while including the whole company (Babangida, sd).

Krook and Norris (2014) assess other strategies to establish a more diverse workforce. They, especially examine interventions increasing women representation in parliaments but some interventions and barriers are broader applicable. First, women should be alerted to the fact that they are proper candidates. Krook and Norris (2014) argue that this first barrier, of the negative perception of women, can be lifted by, increasing awareness, having symbolic actions highlighting the importance of women in politics, and implementing laws. Secondly, women need to be more confident in their political career. Recruitment and development programs are perfect ways to increase this confidence. In later stages of the process of becoming a politician, women face the barriers of biased beliefs of others and a lack of support to win a candidacy race. These barriers can be lifted by, for example, soft targets to give women more opportunities, regulations within political parties, giving funding opportunities, and using fundraising networks (Krook & Norris, 2014). The last two are probably less valid in the

corporate world but the other interventions could also help to diversify workforces in other fields.

Quotas

Another strategy to diversify workforces, which is widespread, are quotas or affirmative actions. Merriam-Webster (sd) defines (diversity) quotas as *“a fixed number or percentage of minority group members or women needed to meet the requirements of affirmative action.”*

Others give a more extensive definition to the concept quotas. The European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) (sd), for example, uses the following definition: *“a quota is a positive measurement instrument aimed at accelerating the achievement of gender-balanced participation and representation by establishing a defined proportion (percentage) or some places or seats to be filled by, or allocated to, women and/or men, generally under certain rules or criteria.”* The EIGE’s definition is merely focused on gender quotas whereas the definition of Merriam-Webster is more widespread.

There are different environments to implement quotas. Two settings have an implementation of quotas on a large scale, politics and corporate (supervisory) boards. In politics, the most popular policy regards the representation of women. Over a hundred countries already introduced a quota to enhance the number of women in politics (Krook & Pär, 2014). Countries try to increase the representation of minority groups by reserving seats (Dahlerup, 2007). This implementation of quotas in politics is widely researched, but it remains a controversial debate.

In this paper, I will focus on the second setting, namely a corporate setting. Like quotas in politics, research on corporate (board) quotas shows ambiguous results (Morgenroth & Ryan, 2018). For these types of quotas, the focus is on creating a more diverse (supervisory) board and a better representation of women and minority groups in higher function in business. Proponents of quotas argue that these policies are the best way to realize a better representation of minority groups in the workplace, while according to opponents quotas give an advantage to the minority groups which is unfair, the organizational performance drops, and the minority groups will only be stigmatized by quota policies (Morgenroth & Ryan, 2018).

The same discussion follows from different research papers. Farmanesh, Vehbi, Zargar, Sousan, and Bhatti (2020), for instance, argue that diversification in the workplace increases

firm performance. However, they find that diversity fatigue moderates this relation in a negative way. The evidence on the argument of proponents is inconclusive as well. Ibanez and Riener (2018) use field experiments and conclude that quotas increase the application rate of minority groups while not hampering the application rate of the dominant group. On the other hand, Leibbrandt and List (2018) argue that a statement of equal opportunity, like letting applicants know about a quota, decreases the application rate of the minority group.

There are not only different environments where quotas are implemented. Quotas also differ in their target group. Some quotas target minority groups like immigrants, blacks, or other ethnicities. Other quotas oblige firms or political parties to increase the number of women in certain functions. The first target group received less attention in scientific literature, while circa thirty countries implemented ethnicity quotas in the electoral rules (Bird, 2014). I will, however, focus on the more widely researched gender quotas. Gender quotas reserve several seats for women or require a certain percentage of women to be part of, for example, a supervisory board. Most gender quotas are implemented in politics (Dahlerup, 2007). The number of women in politics has grown over the last decades and according to Paxton, Hughes, and Painter (2010), this is partly because of gender quotas. However, the effect of national legal quotas, quotas mandated by the constitution (Dahlerup, 2009), do not make a big difference. For electoral law quotas, these are mandated by the electoral law (Dahlerup, 2009), the design matters for the effectiveness of the quota (Schwindt-Bayer, 2009). Other political quotas are voluntarily implemented by political parties. These quotas are deemed to be more effective than the quotas enforced by law (Chen, 2010).

However, as stated above, in this paper the focus is on corporate board quotas. Within an organizational context, gender quotas are less common. In Europe, only eleven countries have adopted a gender quota for corporate boards. Either they did it temporarily or they are still in place (Mensi-Klarbach & Seierstad, 2020).

Corporate gender quotas

Corporate gender quotas are extensively researched. Whether quotas are effective is twofold. It is increasing the representation of women in board functions and the (financial) performance of firms. As discussed above, opponents think that gender quotas hamper the performance of firms.

One important determinant of the success of gender quotas is the approach towards the goal of gender equality. This approach can be liberal or radical. The first approach is focused on fairness in the process. Here the policy can also be a target instead of a by-law enforced quota, which leaves more room for flexibility. The second approach is more radical. Here, the focus is on the outcome (Mensi-Klarbach & Seierstad, 2020). Another determinant is the perception of fairness. Opponents of gender quotas preach that gender quotas are unfair because quotas give an unfair advantage to women over men (Morgenroth & Ryan, 2018). However, the perception of fairness between individuals differs (Schildberg-Hörish, Trieu, & Willrodt, 2020). Only a minority thinks that affirmative action policies, like gender quotas, are less fair than no affirmative action at all. An affirmative action targeting the groups which have had bad luck is the fairest compared to quotas targeting individuals choosing shorter work times or have a lower (natural) productivity. In an experimental setting, affirmative action does not damage efficiency regarding productivity (Schildberg-Hörish, Trieu, & Willrodt, 2020).

Thirdly, the different aspects of the design of the quotas matter. The hardness of the law in terms of enforceability and precision of the wording determine the success of the corporate gender quota (Schildberg-Hörish, Trieu, & Willrodt, 2020). The more precise the wording of the laws are, the better the certainty is (Edelman, 2016). Besides, an enforceable design increases the representation of women by a larger amount because firms do have fewer options to circumvent the law. The progressiveness of the quotas is important for the increase in gender equality in boards because a higher target requires firms to hire more women in board functions (Mensi-Klarbach & Seierstad, 2020). However, the target can be too high as well. In this case, the productivity of the firm can go down. When the board is not well balanced anymore, stereotypes and group thinking can hamper the functioning of a group and conflicts may arise. These conflicts decrease the effectiveness of corporate boards and the performance of the firm (Pletzer, Nikolova, Kedzior, & Voelpel, 2015).

Furthermore, the national institutional context may influence whether gender quota laws fulfil their purpose of increasing gender equality. The Netherlands, which is the scope of this research, has a neutral to unfavourable institutional context according to Mensi-Klarbach and Seierstad (2020). Within their research, they look at different aspects of the institutional context of countries that affect the effectiveness of quotas. The Dutch context is characterized by a low equality ranking, but high female labour participation. The former makes it harder for a quota law to become successful. On the positive side, the Netherlands scores high compared to other countries in the history of policy initiatives. However, the little use of voluntary quotas and low to medium support from society makes the environment for the implementation of gender quotas not exceedingly favourable.

As discussed before, the Dutch government just accepted a corporate gender quota which demands women to occupy one-third of the board seats. This is in terms of strictness somewhere in the middle compared to other countries which implemented this type of quota like Norway, Spain, Germany, and France. The strictness of the law in the Netherlands is low using the definition of Mensi-Klarbach and Seierstad (2020) because the enforcement is not high, and the implementation time is slow.

The last determinant for the success of gender quotas I want to discuss is beliefs. Opponents often use is the stigmatization of the disadvantaged group as an argument against the implementation of corporate gender quotas. This is especially a problem for men. Men who oppose gender quotas, often associate the quota with the stigmatization of women (Meier, 2008). These beliefs of individuals have a big impact on the productivity of the firm, the improvement of women representation in firms and support in general (Scarborough, Lambouths III, & Holbrook, 2019). According to previous literature, beliefs differ between individuals. There are differences between men and women (Humbert, Kelan, & van den Brink, 2019) or different racial backgrounds (Scarborough, Lambouths III, & Holbrook, 2019).

Male leaders are a key factor towards effective gender quotas because they are already in a board function. These males are more likely to support the status quo and are mostly opposed to gender quotas. Men, more than women, think that quotas are ineffective or hampering the organization's performance (Humbert, Kelan, & van den Brink, 2019). Regarding the difference in beliefs between races. The research by Scarborough, et al. (2019) shows that blacks believe that there is the most inequality, followed by Latinos. These groups also showed the most

support for affirmative actions like gender quotas. For these reasons, I will use these demographics as control variables in the analysis and test whether in the Netherlands, these factors play a similar role.

Beliefs

Beliefs are an important factor in the support for (corporate) gender quotas. Humbert, et al. (2019), for example, find a negative relation between essentialist (essentialism associates an “essence” to, in this case, sex) gender beliefs and support for gender quotas. Aberson and Haag (2003) investigate beliefs about the fairness of affirmative actions, merit, and the value of diversity and the association with support for affirmative action policies. They report that positive belief about fairness and positive values of diversity increase support for quota policies, whilst positive beliefs in ability-based hiring negatively influenced support for affirmative actions. These papers base their results on a qualitative way of eliciting beliefs, mostly by surveys.

Eliciting beliefs about gender quotas quantitatively may help to understand the ambiguous results in corporate gender quota literature. In this way, the beliefs are better comparable because the interpretation stays the same for every subject. Besides, for every subject, the numbers mean the same instead of a differing view on what is a lot of inequality and only a little (Haaland & Roth, 2021). There is no research using this method for gender inequality and support for corporate gender quotas. In the next part, I will discuss the experimental design to elicit beliefs in a quantitatively.

Experimental Design

The main experiment consists of three parts. The research by Haaland and Roth (2021) is the basis for the first two parts of the experiment. Haaland and Roth (2021) investigate the relationship between beliefs about racial discrimination and the support for pro-black policies. This paper follows a similar approach to elicit beliefs and measuring support for gender quotas for corporate boards. In addition, in the experiment, the subjects have to self-report their beliefs about effectiveness, the necessity of gender quotas, and trust in Dutch institutions. In the next section, I discuss the experiment in further detail.

Design

The first part of the experiment introduces the subjects to a field experiment conducted by Ibanez and Riener (2018). The three field experiments they administer in Colombia investigate different types of affirmative policies and their effect on application rates. Ibanez and Riener (2018) exposed subjects to job vacancies via different networks and subjects could state their interest. For the first and the second experiment, the position was one as a teaching assistant and the third one was a consultancy function. Afterwards, half of the interested subjects were invited to apply for the job. A treatment group received information about the affirmative action policy and the control group did not receive any information a priori. In the last stage of the experiment, job seekers applied for the job they are invited for via an application form. In the end, Ibanez and Riener (2018) look at the application rates of men and women in the treatment and control group. For this experiment, the subjects read a paragraph about the experiment with a reserved seat (gender) quota as an affirmative policy (A1). I chose this experiment because, in the Netherlands, the government agreed on implementing a reserved seat gender quota for corporate boards. After the subjects read the text down below², they stated the application rate of the men and women in the treatment group, according to their beliefs. With this part of the experiment, I elicit the beliefs of subjects about reserved seats (gender) quotas.

² Subjects were shown this text in Dutch but I translated it for this paper.

Two researchers from the university of Düsseldorf and Göttingen studied affirmative action policies (gender quotas) regarding women in the labour market. For the experiment they posted job vacancies for a job as teaching assistant in different places. From the interested job seekers, they randomly selected half of the people. Those people were allowed to apply. The invited subjects were divided into two groups, a treatment group, and a control group. The subjects in the treatment group were informed about a gender quota, which makes that 50% of the teaching assistants must be women, wherefore women were preferred over men in the application process. The subjects in the control group were not provided with this information. The rest of the application procedure was the same for both groups.

As discussed before, Haaland and Roth (2021) argue a qualitative belief elicitation has various advantages over a qualitative approach to obtaining beliefs. Besides these advantages, it is hard to give an incentive to state true preferences in a survey that elicits beliefs qualitatively. This might cause participants to state desired outcomes. In this experiment, it is possible to incentivize participants to state their true beliefs by awarding them with a voucher when their estimate is close to the estimate by Ibanez and Riener (2018). However, due to a budget constraint, it is not possible to grant every subject whose estimate is close to the results of Ibanez and Riener (2018) with a voucher. Therefore, I randomly selected four participants who stated the same or very close application rates as found by Ibanez and Riener (2018) and rewarded them with a €5 voucher for Bol.com.

The second part of the experiment investigates the effect of people's beliefs on gender quota on the support for the implementation of policies increasing gender diversity in higher corporate functions. A random selection of the subjects receives information about the outcome of the experiment by Ibanez and Riener (2018). Introducing this shock in beliefs accounts for the concerns of omitted variable bias and reversed causality. According to the findings from the A1 experiment, the application rate of males drops by around 3 per cent, which is not a significant difference. For women the application rate increases in the A1 experiment by 6 per cent. Providing this information to subjects makes them update their beliefs and create an exogenous shock in beliefs about gender quotas. Besides, I presented figure 1 to participants, which randomly belong to the treatment group. Lastly, it makes it possible to influence the beliefs of a group of subjects easily (Haaland & Roth, 2021). I will address this in the next section.




Figure 1: figure with application rates of males and females in the treatment and control group of Ibanez and Riener (2018).

Afterwards, the subjects play a one-shot dictator game. The subjects all receive an endowment of €10 and decide whether they keep the money or contribute it to OXFAM NOVIB. This organisation supports women in their battle for equality and tries to empower women in different societies (van Liebergern, 2017). Therefore, a contribution to charity will reflect the support for women empowerment and gender quotas. However, there is again no budget to grant all subjects with the amount of money they allocate to themselves and donate the money devoted to OXFAM NOVIB to the charity. Therefore, I will randomly select three allocations and disburse the money to these subjects. The amount they allocate to charity, I will donate to OXFAM NOVIB. In doing so, the subjects are incentivized to state their true preferences in allocation. Without a monetary incentive, there are individual differences in stating true preferences, which may lead to biased results (Ben-Ner, Kramer, & Levy, 2008).

In the last part of the experiment, subjects had to indicate how much they agreed with a set of statements³ on a 5-point Likert scale. By asking these questions, I verify whether individuals update their beliefs due to the treatment and elicit perceived effectivity, necessity, and trust in the Dutch institutions of the subjects.

There are three questions to assess the beliefs about the effectiveness of gender quotas. The first, for example, asks subjects to state their agreement with the statement: “quotas are an

³ All statements were stated in Dutch but are translated for this paper.

effective manner for women to get higher functions (board functions) within companies". The other two questions ask about equal opportunities and the quality of the individuals hired when quotas are in place. Proponents are likely to believe that quotas are effective in creating equal opportunities and more women in board functions. On the other hand, opponents are more likely to agree with the statement that due to quotas, the person hired is not the one that is best suited for the job (Morgenroth & Ryan, 2018).

The second set of questions investigates the perceived necessity of the participants. Opponents may argue that there is no deficit for women to become leaders anymore and quotas are no longer necessary. Therefore, I asked the subjects whether they agree with the statement: "quotas were necessary ten years ago but there are now equal opportunities for men and women." Secondly, I chose a male-dominated profession (IT sector) and a profession with a more equal distribution of men and women (jurisdictional sector) in the Netherlands (CBS, 2021). Participants stated their opinion about gender quotas are necessary for these sectors.

Lastly, I asked participants to what degree they trust the Dutch government and Dutch companies. Again, these statements were answered on a 5-point Likert scale for no trust at all to complete trust. Lower trust in the Dutch institutions is likely to lead to lower support for government actions (Chanley, Rudolph, & Rahn, 2000). So, the trust of participants in the government and in whether companies follow government rules is an important determinant of the support for gender quota policies in (supervisory) boards.

After the subjects participated in the experiment, I asked for demographics. The subjects stated their age, gender, marital status, and background, for example. With these demographics, I want to observe the differences between different groups in the Dutch society. An example could be people's backgrounds. When people are from a non-western background, they are more likely to face discrimination in the labour market themselves. Therefore, I expect those subjects to have a more positive view about diversity enhancing policies. I did not ask for names to assure the anonymity of the subjects. The experiment is conducted double-blind to incentivize the subjects to respond to each question truthfully without any social pressure to give socially acceptable answers.

Results

Sample

This paper employs a framed field experiment. I want to make a statement about the beliefs of Dutch individuals on corporate gender quotas. The whole society contributes to the effectiveness of gender quotas and confirm or debunk the argument opponents of gender quota have regarding the application and hiring of less qualified individuals. Therefore, it is superior to use a random non-standard subject pool. This permits the use of an artefactual field experiment, a framed field experiment or a natural field experiment. The first one, however, is not possible due to the covid-19 regulations in the Netherlands. A natural field experiment requires subjects not to be aware that they are part of an experiment which is impractical in this case. Accordingly, I chose to use a framed field experiment with a non-standard subject pool in a non-lab environment.

As mentioned above, all subjects have the Dutch nationality. There participated 168 subjects with different socio-economic demographics in the study. These subjects, I approached via my network, job-seeking groups on social media, and survey exchange networks. This process may cause selection bias because there will be more people with a similar way of thinking to me in the subject pool. The sample may, therefore, not be a representative sample of all Dutch individuals. Covid-19 makes it nearly impossible to attain a representative sample, however, by using survey exchange websites and job-seeking groups, I tried to come as close as possible.

Sample statistics

Not all 168 respondents completed the full experiment and only stated their perceived application rates. Nine subjects dropped out after this question, which leaves 159 subjects to answer the question about support for gender quotas. After this question, again the sample size decreased. The remaining part of the survey is answered by a varying number between 149 and 155 subjects. There is no significant difference in dropout rates between the treatment and the control group. Therefore, there is no problem for the internal validity of the research (table A4.1). However, it was not possible to include all control variable due to high correlations. The most individuals dropped out for the working experience question. Therefore, the correlation between the dropout variable and this variable is extremely high. Also, the correlation between the age variable and dropping out is high because some subjects decided not to answer the question without dropping out. Including the other control

variables does not make a difference for the results of the regression. For the demographics this results in a sample in which half of the participants is female (51.63%) and the majority (94.12%) has a Dutch background, only 3 subjects do not have a Western background. The working experience is low in the sample. Almost 60% of the subjects did not work for more than five years yet. Regarding people's education and current employment status, it shows that almost half of the participants is a student (44.30%) and that there is a relatively equal spread in educational level. The students participating in the study could be looking for a job because they almost finished their studies. Therefore, I will treat those as jobseekers in the analysis when it comes to comparing the job seekers and currently employed individuals. In total, 10 of the subjects are currently unemployed and 42 have a part-time job. The age demographic supports that most participants are students because most subjects are between 21 and 25 years old (95 subjects). Table A4.2 until A4.8 in the appendix, show all statistics of part four of the experiment.

Descriptive statistics

The main variables in this analysis are the application rate estimations of the subjects, the donations to the charity, the answers to the different statements and whether the subject belongs to the treatment group that received extra information about the application rates. I decided to equally divide the subjects over the treatment and control group. This decision I based on the following formula:

$$N_0/N_1 = \delta_0/\delta_1 * \sqrt{P_1/P_0}$$

In this formula, N stands for the number of subjects in a specific group, the δ is the variance and the P is the pay-out of the different groups. I expect the variance to be the same for the treatment group and the control group. Whereas the pay-off is the same for both groups because the change of being paid for the first two parts remains equal whether a subject is in the treatment group or not. Therefore, the second two deviations will be equal to one which implies that dividing the number of participants between the groups must be equal to one as well. In the end, the number of participants there are 84 subjects in the control group and 84 subjects in the treatment group.

For the expected application rates, it does not matter whether a subject belongs to the treatment group or the control group because the subjects stated this before the treatment

information was given. The mean expected application rate for women is 56.53% with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 100. This mean is a higher than the real application rate. For the expected application rates of men, the mean is a lot closer to the actual application rate (41.60% vs. 42%). Again, the minimum is 0 and the maximum expected application rate is 100 (see table 1).

Table 1: descriptive statistics of part 1 and 2 of the experiment.

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
PerAppW	168	56.52976	20.99641	0	100
PerAppM	168	41.60119	19.88926	0	100
Donation	159	5.616352	3.469211	0	10

As stated above, some of the subjects decided to no longer participate after this question. The remaining subjects played the dictator game and donated to charity. The minimum donation was 0 and the maximum was 10 with a mean slightly above five euros (see table 1). This means that the subjects were willing to sacrifice their own possible pay-off to donate to a charity which supports women. This proxies that the mean subject would support gender quotas or affirmative actions.

From the statements stands out that 65% of the subjects has a positive image of the effectiveness of gender quotas and only 14% does think that it is not an effective tool to increase women representation. A significant part of the sample (60%) also sees gender quotas as something which is still necessary. On the other hand, the person who fits the best at a particular position will not be hired according to the majority of the subjects (60%). Lastly, the trust in the Dutch institutions varies. The trust in the government is high with 58% of the subjects having some trust or a lot of trust. For companies, the trust is lower, with one third of the subjects having low trust and 35% having a little trust. In table A4.9 until A4.16 in the appendix there is an overview of all descriptive statistics of the questions regarding perceived effectivity, necessity, and trust.

Main analysis

In following of the descriptive statistics, this section will provide a further analysis of the dataset. First, I will discuss the differences between the treatment and control group regarding their characteristics. Afterwards, several additional statistics and first (non)parametric tests will give a first glance on the beliefs of Dutch individuals for gender quotas. Regression results will provide further information on the effect of the treatment on support for gender quotas and the beliefs about affirmative actions. Afterwards, some further analyses will provide insights in alternative explanations and additional relationships.

Tables A4.17 until A4.23 show the comparison between the treatment group and the control group regarding the demographics. There are no significant differences between the groups. For example, the mean age of the treatment group is 26.94 years old, and the mean age of the control group is slightly higher with 27.48 years old, but this difference is not statistically significant. The comparison between gender shows also small but not significant differences. The control group and treatment group are, therefore, similar in characteristics and it is possible to compare the results for both groups in the remaining part of the analysis.

In the first part of the experiment, the treatment is not a factor. The perceived application rates of men and women after hearing the affirmative action policy only elicits the beliefs of the subjects. However, there are some significant differences between the treatment and the control group here. The perceived application rate of the women is significantly higher in the treatment group when comparing the means (60.107 vs. 52.952). So, the individuals who received additional information after stating their perceived application rate, a priori, judged those women applied more than the individuals who did not receive the information. This tells that randomization did not work perfectly.

The perceived application rates of the complete subject pool show that most subject overestimated the percentage of women that would apply if a gender quota were in place (70.83%). Only 1.78% of the individuals stated the right percentage and, therefore have correct beliefs about the effect of gender quotas. The remaining percentage underestimated the application rate of women. For men, this result is the other way around. Almost 60% of the subjects underestimated the application rate in the experiment by Ibanez and Riener (2018). Not one subject stated the correct application percentage for men and a little over

40% of the individuals overestimated the application rate of men when they know about a gender quota (see figure 2, 3 and table A4.24).




Figure 2: Cumulative perceived application rates plot with actual and mean predicted rate men (the dotted line is the mean and the dashed line is the actual application rate).




Figure 3: Cumulative perceived application rates plot with actual and mean predicted rate women (the dotted line is the mean and the dashed line is the actual application rate).

Additionally, the participants received information on the application rates in the control group of the experiment by Ibanez and Riener (2018). From these percentages it is possible to estimate whether individuals think information about a gender quota would stimulate, hamper or does not have any effect on the application of men and women. According to most subjects, the information about a quota stimulates women (77.38%) and hampers men (60.71%) to continue the application process. For women, 5.95% of the subjects thought the information would not make a difference and for men this percentage is even lower.

These results show a misperception about the effect of gender quotas and affirmative actions by most of the subjects. These subjects have incorrect and biased beliefs about gender quotas. Especially regarding the application rate of men, there is a negative misperception in contrast to what is found in research papers. For the application rate of women, the subjects are in general over optimistic. In the end, the beliefs are more extreme than subjects think in a positive but also in a negative manner.

Demographics influence the beliefs of individuals about application rates when a gender quota policy is in place. For example, the higher the completed education of a subject is, the lower the perceived application rate of men is. Completing high school, decreases the perceived application rate with nearly 35 percentage points compared to only completing elementary school, *ceteris paribus* (table A4.29). However, there are only two subjects' part of the base category that only completed elementary school. Secondly, a subject's ethnicity significantly influences the perceived application rates of men and women. The base category with a Dutch background, has a significantly lower (7.854 points) stated application rate of men than the subjects with a non-western background, *ceteris paribus* (*p*-value: 0.005). On the other hand, table A4.27 shows a that subjects with a western but non-Dutch background stated a 16.699 points lower application rate for women than individuals with a Dutch background, *ceteris paribus* (*p*-value: 0.022). The gender of the subjects matters as well in the beliefs of the individuals. Compared to women, men stated 7.375 points less application rate for women, *ceteris paribus*. This effect is significant at a 5% significance level. So, individual's characteristics matter for the beliefs individuals holds.

The amount of money given to OXFAM NOVIB is the proxy for support for gender quota policies. As discussed before, most individuals donated at least some money to the charity instead of making the rational decision in the dictator game to keep all the money to themselves. The treatment possibly influenced the decision of the subjects. Firstly, I checked this by comparing the means of the donations of both groups via a student t-test and two non-parametric tests. The results show no significant difference between the donations in the treatment and the control group. The additional information has not influenced the support for gender policies in these cases. Besides, including the same dummy variables as Haaland and Roth (2021) makes the sign of the coefficient change from positive to negative. The latter would imply that getting treated decreased the support for gender quota policies. The number

of observations differ between the regressions because there are less subjects who answered the questions that are used as control variables (see table 2).

Table 2: effect of treatment on support.

	Donation to charity (1)	Donation to charity (2)
Treatment	.3252612 (0.555)	-.1211475 (0.844)
Constant	5.45679*** (0.000)	8.972886** (0.034)
N	159	139
Controls	NO	YES

A possible explanation for a lower donation in the dictator game could be the significant over-positive view the treated subjects had about the application rate of women. These individuals were too overconfident in the working of gender quotas and believed affirmative action policies work better than they do according to Ibanez and Riener (2018). A model which includes the interaction term between being in the treatment and over- or underestimating the application rate of women (men) accounts for this effect. The interaction term of being treated and overestimating the application rate of women has a negative coefficient of -0.218 which implies that being treated and beforehand judged the application rate of women higher than it was negatively impact the donation in euros, *ceteris paribus*. The coefficient for being treated increases the donation by 0.045 euros and only overestimating the application rate regardless of the treatment increases the donation by 0.049 euros as well. In the end, the donation decreases by 0.124 euros when an individual received additional information and a priori overestimated the application rate for women, *ceteris paribus* (table 3). However, none of these effects is statistically significant at a 10% significance level.

Table 3: effects of over- and underestimating application rates and treatment on support.

	Overestimation W	Underestimation W	Overestimation M	Underestimation M
Treatment	.044619 (0.971)	-.043837 (0.952)	.6297412 (0.409)	-1.331489 (0.197)
Interaction term	-.2180928 (0.880)	-.2607121 (0.865)	-1.96123 (0.124)	1.96123 (0.124)
Estimation coefficient	.0490937 (0.967)	.2461853 (0.840)	.2804954 (0.788)	-.2804954 (0.788)
Constant	9.046606** (0.036)	8.754785* (0.050)	9.174199* (0.059)	9.454694** (0.045)
N	139	139	139	139
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

The effect and effect size are similar for the interaction term between the treatment dummy variable and overestimating the application rates of men. Again, being in the treatment group and overestimating the application rates (insignificantly) decreases the support for gender quota policies (-1.051), *ceteris paribus*. Pessimistic subjects underestimated the application rate of men and women. The subjects' part of the treatment group which underestimated the application rate of women also decrease their donation to OXFAM NOVIB compared to the non-treated individuals. The group of subjects that underestimated the application rate of men, in the end, are more supportive towards gender quota policies because their donation to charity is 0.349 euros higher than non-treated subjects which did not underestimate the application rate of men, *ceteris paribus*. However, all estimated coefficients are all insignificant at a 10% significance level (table 3). Subjects with an over-optimistic view of gender quotas, are likely to have less support for gender quota policies compared to being pessimistic about gender quotas and receiving information that proves differently.

Haaland and Roth (2021) identify several demographics which influence the support for affirmative action policies. As mentioned before, these demographics are included as control variables in the analysis. Table A4.25 to table A4.31 show the relationship between the demographics and the donations but also the other variables of interest. The effect of gender on donation is negative and significant at a 1% significance level. This finding is in line with previous research that women are more altruistic in dictator games than men (Brañas-Garza, Capraro, & Rascon-Ramirez, 2018). Regarding other relationships, what stands out is that compared to being single, being divorced or separated significantly changes the donation.

Divorced individuals donate over 4 euros more and individuals that are no longer together donate 4.75 euros less compared to single individuals. However, this may be explained by the low number of observations in these categories. Another demographic that matters is age. Adding one year of age increases the donation by 0.05 euros. This effect is significant at a 10% significance level. Surprisingly, ethnicity does not matter for the donation. There is no significant difference between Dutch individuals and subjects from other ethnicities, either western or not, in donations to the charity.

Other personal preferences and beliefs influence the donation and support for gender quotas regardless of being in the treatment group or not as well. Four intuitive relationships arise from the statement questions of the experiment. First, the relationship between the donation and the perceived effectivity of gender quotas. Subjects with a more positive view on the effectivity on a 5-point Likert scale donated 1.24 euros more to charity compared to subjects in one category lower, *ceteris paribus*. This effect is significant at a 1% significance level (table A4.32a+b). Likewise, an improvement of one category on a question about equal opportunities increases the donation with a little more than 50 cents, *ceteris paribus* (p-value: 0.091). So, subjects that believe gender quotas create equal opportunity for men and women within companies, have more support for affirmative action policies. Thirdly, the relationship between the donation and the perceived necessity of gender quotas. Agreeing with the question, decreases the donation to charity with 0.69 euros, *ceteris paribus* (p-value: 0.016). However, agreeing more means the necessity for quotas is higher according to the subjects. Lastly, whether subjects disagreed one category more with the statement that the hired person is not the person with the highest quality in situations with gender quotas, increases the support for affirmative action policies with 0.74 euros, *ceteris paribus* (p-value: 0.022).

Overall, subjects with more positive self-assessed views on gender quotas show more support for these policies, is the logical conclusion from these results. When subjects see more advantages of affirmative actions and belief gender quotas create a better representation of the minority group women in firms, the consequence is that people show more support for policies that stimulate women representation. On the other hand, opponents who argue that gender quotas give unequal opportunities and harm firm performance, for example, show less support and donate less money to a charity which promotes equal representation of men and women on the labour market.

Mechanisms

Additionally, I expected a difference between job searching individuals and employed subjects in their beliefs about gender quota policies and their support for gender quotas. However, the coefficients are not significantly different from zero at a 10% significance level. This holds for as well as the difference between the two groups of subjects for donations and the perceived application rates. One possible explanation is the division of group job seekers and employed subjects. Job seekers are mostly students and only seven non-students are looking for a job. Whilst the employed individuals are the group with a fulltime or parttime job. Some students may not be looking for a job yet and still have other priorities. Therefore, they may not be representative for job seekers yet. The small sample size, with only 140 observations for the labour status of the subjects.

As a second mechanism, I checked the relationship between the perceived application rates and subjects' beliefs about gender quota effectivity, necessity, and trust in the Dutch institutions. All results are visible in table A4.33a+b and A4.34a+b. There are some results I want to highlight. First, an increase in the stated application rate of women by one percent, decreases the log odds of being in a higher category of the question regarding equal opportunities between men and women due to gender quotas, all other variables held constant, *ceteris paribus* (p-value: 0.088). This is unexpected because subjects with a higher application rate for women do think gender quotas have a positive impact on women whilst it would not give an equal opportunity to men and women according to the same subjects. Another effect worth highlighting is the relationship between the application rates of men and the answer to the question whether gender quotas are effect in creating a better representation of women within firms. Again, the log odd of being in a higher category decreases when the perceived application rate of men increases. A one percent increase results in 0.0196 decreased log odds of being in a higher category of agreeing with the statement, *ceteris paribus* (p-value: 0.080). A possible explanation is having a perceived application rate of men that is very high, which does not necessarily lead to a better representation of women. The other relationships are not significant at a 10% significance level.

Being in the treatment group possibly influenced the choices made for the statements. For example, for the necessity of gender quotas for jobs in the ICT or jurisdictional jobs. The

treatment significantly impacts the log odds of agreeing with the statement i.e., being in a higher category. In both cases, the treatment negatively impacts the log odds of being in a higher category of agreement, *ceteris paribus*. Secondly, subjects that got the information treatment significantly, at a 5% significance level, differ in the log-odds of being in a higher category for the statement asking about the quality of the person hired compared to subject that did not receive the treatment. The treated subjects, have a higher log odd of agreeing with the statement, which means they are more likely to not think that the person with the most quality is hired when gender quotas are used. This is a surprising result because the treatment shows that gender quotas do not harm the application rate of men whilst it increases the application rates of women. These results need further investigation before it is possible to give an explanation.

Conclusion

In this paper, I examined the beliefs of Dutch individuals about gender quota policies in the corporate setting. Besides, I checked whether informing people about the effects of gender quotas influenced the support for these types of affirmative actions. This led to the following research question:

What is the effect of (biased) beliefs about corporate gender quotas on the support for gender quotas in the Netherlands?

There is no straightforward answer to the question whether (corporate) quotas are effective in previous literature. Various factors play a role in the successful implementation of affirmative action policies like quotas. Examples are the approach, the design, and the institutional context. Besides, beliefs play an important role in the support according to Humbert, et al. (2019) among others. However, previous research on corporate gender quotas did elicit beliefs in a qualitative way. The subject may have different perceptions on what is a lot or just a little discrimination against women. Therefore, I chose to use a quantitative way of eliciting beliefs and support for gender quotas because the values mean the same to every subject (Haaland & Roth, 2021). I hoped to solve some of the ambiguousness by eliciting beliefs about and support for gender quotas like Haaland and Roth (2021) did for racial discrimination.

First, I checked whether Dutch individuals hold biased beliefs against gender quota policies. In the experiment the subjects stated applications rates of men and women when the interested job seekers knew about a gender quota which gave the advantage to women in the application process. Most subjects either overestimated or underestimated the application rates. For men, most subjects were too pessimistic and underestimated the application rate. Therefore, I would say that 60% of the subjects holds the biased belief that gender quotas demotivate men to apply for jobs. On the other hand, 70% of the subjects is overoptimistic for the motivating effect of gender quotas on applications of women. The rest of the subjects hold the opposite beliefs because only 1.78% hold correct beliefs for female application rates and none of the subjects stated the correct application rate for men.

Secondly, I gave half of the subjects an information treatment about the actual application rates. These individuals afterwards knew the results of the experiment by Ibanez and Riener

(2018). However, the results show no difference between the support for gender quotas between the treatment and the control group. The significant difference, a priori, between the treatment group and control group and the small sample size could be explanations for this result. The treated individuals were significantly more positive about the application rate of women than the control group. The subjects in the treatment group may have updated their beliefs in a negative way, which made them less supportive for gender quota policies. This theory is supported by the results of table A4.24 where overestimating the application rates of women decreased the support for gender quotas.

Furthermore, the results show the impact individual characteristics have on beliefs about gender quotas and support for these policies. Ethnicity, gender, and highest obtained educational degree are examples of characteristics that significantly influence the beliefs individuals hold against gender quotas. The small sample size may be the origin of some of these effects but can also be the cause of the other characteristics not significantly influencing subject's beliefs in this experiment. Gender is also an important demographic that influences support for affirmative action policies in the corporate world. Besides, marital status and age influence the donation to charity and, therefore, the support for gender quota policies as well. Furthermore, other personal preferences are important for the support for gender quotas. These self-assessed preferences about gender quotas' effectivity and necessity, all relate to support in the expected way. Thinking of gender quotas as more effective and thinking they are more needed to increase women representation in firms increases the support for gender quota policies.

In the end, Dutch individuals hold biased beliefs about gender quotas because almost none of the subjects stated the true application rates. However, there is no impact of updating these biased beliefs on the support for gender quota policies because there is no significant difference between the treatment group and the control group in the donation to OXFAM NOVIB. Either underestimating or overestimating the application rates, i.e., having biased beliefs, did not affect the support for gender quotas as well. However, there are some limitations to this research which could impact the results. I will discuss these limitations in the next section.

Limitations

The research suffers from some drawbacks, which may influence the results. I will highlight four limitations in the section below. First, the sample is small. According to the power analysis more than 200 subjects were needed to get reliable results. In the end, I was able to reach 168 subjects willing to participate in the survey. This causes issues that reduce the power, whilst it increases the margin of error. However, this analysis can already give a first indication of the effects of the treatment and biased beliefs on the support for gender quotas.

Secondly, as mentioned in the results section, randomization did not work properly. There are a priori differences in the treatment and the control group. The perceived application rate for women is significantly higher in the treatment group compared to the control group. This compromises the results. However, in the analysis I tried to account for this imbalance by including it as a variable in the regressions. This should account for the randomization problems.

Furthermore, multicollinearity could cause some issues. The VIF of, for example, age and educational level is high in the main analysis. This problem undermines the significance of the independent variable of the regressions. Excluding these variables did not change the significance of the independent variables. The variables are important control variables with a significant effect on the variables of interest, as discussed in the results section. Therefore, they remained part of the analysis and I did not exclude them.

Lastly, there is the possibility that other OLS regression assumptions do not hold. Omitted variable bias could bias the results which lowers the reliability of the estimated coefficients. This happens when the independent variable is not only correlated with the dependent variable but also the error term. Besides, heteroskedasticity could be a problem. In this case the variance of the error term is not constant. I checked for this, for the main regressions and there should not be a problem. However, when heteroskedasticity is a problem, it would lower the precision of the estimates. The other OLS regression assumptions do hold or are accounted for in the analysis.

Directions for Future Research

Lastly, I want to discuss some directions for future research regarding this topic. First, this research could be replicated but with a larger sample size. This will increase the precision and reliability of the results. Furthermore, with a larger sample size which is a better representation of the Dutch population, it becomes possible to state something about the beliefs about gender quotas of the whole Dutch society.

Besides a larger sample size, the validity of this research could be increased by adding a control experiment to the analysis. Haaland and Roth (2021), for example, asked questions regarding discrimination on the housing market to the analysis as cross check. Here, another affirmative action policy which stimulates the representation of women in a situation where women are underrepresented. Due to the control experiment it becomes possible to see whether treated individuals update their beliefs about gender quotas in another situation. These results could help policymakers to handle problems in support for gender quota policies.

Lastly, future research could build upon this paper as well. Directions could be the mechanisms and the relationships between demographics and beliefs about gender quotas. First, the mechanisms. Job seekers will in the end determine the success of gender quotas, at least in the application rates of men and women. Therefore, focussing more on the beliefs of job seekers could help in determining the effect of beliefs on the effectiveness of gender quotas. In case of the demographics and beliefs of subjects, research could zoom in on one demographic or belief. One additional personal belief, investigated by Haaland and Roth (2021) is political opinion. This could also matter in the beliefs individuals hold about gender quotas. Left-wing minded individuals will, probably be, more likely to support gender quotas while right-wing minded individuals are probably more opposed to gender quotas.

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Appendix

Appendix A3: Translated version of the experiment

A3.1 General instructions:

Dear subject,

My name is Jochem Hazelaar, and I am currently pursuing the master Behavioural Economics at the Erasmus University in Rotterdam. First, I want to thank you for participating in this experiment.

Down below you will read some general instructions for the experiment. Read these carefully before you move on to the next page.

The experiment is about gender quotas. A gender quota is a policy measure that promotes equal representation of men and women in, for example, corporate boards. Most often governments require firms to reserve a percentage or number of seats for women.

There are in total four parts in this survey, for which you will receive instructions separately. I want to ask your full attention for the experiment.

There are no right or wrong answers to the questions. The most important is that you give answers that suit you.

Your answers will be processed anonymously for me as the researcher and the other subjects. So, it will not be possible to trace your answers back to you.

A3.2 Text research Ibanez and Riener (2018):

For the first part of the experiment, I would like to ask you to carefully read a text about research about gender quotas. Afterwards, I will ask you to answer some questions about this research.

There is a possibility that you will earn money when answering these questions. I will randomly award four participants that guessed the outcome of the research correctly with a voucher of 5 euros from Bol.com.

Two researchers from the university of Düsseldorf and Göttingen studied affirmative action policies (gender quotas) regarding women in the labour market. For the experiment they

posted job vacancies for a job as teaching assistant in different places. From the interest job seekers, they randomly selected half of the people. Those people were allowed to apply. The invited subjects were divided into two groups, a treatment group, and a control group. The subjects in the treatment group were informed about a gender quota, which makes that 50% of the teaching assistants must be women, wherefore women were preferred over men in the application process. The subjects in the control group were not provided with this information. The rest of the application procedure was the same for both groups.

The results show that 45% of the men in the control group proceeded with the application process whilst 38% of the women in this group continued the process.

A3.3 Question 1:

What percentage of individuals in the treatment group (they received information about a gender quota which favours women) continued the application process according to you?

In the control group 45% of the men and 38% of the women applied.

- What percentage of WOMEN do you think applied? (slider)
- What percentage of MEN do you think applied? (slider)

A3.4 Results research (FOR TREATMENT GROUP ONLY):

The results from the treatment group show that 42% of the men continued the application process. The researchers conclude that there is not significant difference between the treatment- and the control group. From the women in the treatment group 44% proceeded in the process. This is a significant increase (see figure 1).

- Is this what you expected? (YES/NO)

A3.5 Instructions part 2:

In the second part of the experiment, you will play a dictator game. I will randomly reward three participants by paying out their chosen outcomes. This selection will follow from a lottery.

The game works as follows:

You will receive a payment of 10 euros. From these 10 euros you can decide how many euros you will donate to a charity that supports the position of women on the labour market, amongst others. This charity is OXFAM NOVIB. In steps of 1 euro, you decide how much of the 10 euros endowment you want to donate to charity and, even so, how much you want to keep to yourself. Your potential pay-out is, therefore, €10 minus the amount you want to donate.

A3.6 Question3:

- Which amount of money do you want to donate to the charity that fights for more opportunities for women on the labour market? The remaining amount is for yourself (slider).

A3.7 Instructions part 3:

On the next pages you will see several statements. I want to ask you how much you agree with these statements.

Again, there are no right or wrong answers.

A3.8 Statements on a 5-point Likert scale):

- Quotas are an effective tool to get more women in higher functions within companies (strongly disagree to strongly agree).
- Quotas make sure that men and women get equal opportunities on the labour market (strongly disagree to strongly agree).
- We needed gender quotas ten years ago but now the opportunities for men and women are the same (strongly disagree to strongly agree).
- Due to quotas, the person hired is **not** the best suited person for the job (strongly disagree to strongly agree).
- To what extent do you trust the government (no trust at all to a lot of trust)?
- To what extent do you trust companies to follow the applicable rules (no trust at all to a lot of trust)?
- Gender quotas are necessary in technical jobs, like ICT (strongly disagree to strongly agree).
- Gender quotas are necessary in juridical jobs, for example, for lawyers (strongly disagree to strongly agree).

A3.9 Instructions part 4:

Lastly, I want to ask you to answer some questions about demographics. These answers will not be traceable back to you and will only be used for the purpose of this research.

A3.10 Demographic questions:

- What is your age? (In case you prefer not to answer, you can move on to the next question). (continuous)
- What is your highest completed education?
 - Elementary school
 - Highschool
 - MBO graduate
 - HBO graduate
 - Bachelor's degree
 - Master's degree
 - PhD
 - Prefer not to say
- What is your gender?
 - Male
 - Female
 - Non-binary
 - Prefer not to say
- What is your marital status?
 - Single
 - Living together
 - In a relationship
 - Married
 - Widow/Widower
 - Divorced
 - Separated
 - Prefer not to say

- What is your ethnical background?
 - Dutch background
 - Western background
 - Non-western background
 - Prefer not to say
- What is your current employment status?
 - Full-time job
 - Part-time job
 - Student
 - Retired
 - Not working, but looking for a job
 - Not working, not looking for a job
 - Not able to work
 - Prefer not to say
- What is your working experience?
 - 0-5 years
 - 5-10 years
 - 10-15 years
 - 15-20 years
 - 20-25 years
 - More than 25 years
 - Prefer not to say

A3.11 End of the survey

This is the end of the experiment. Thank you for your participation.

In case you would like to participate in the lotteries, you can leave your e-mail address on the next page. In this way I will contact you in case you won.

If you have any question regarding the experiment you can e-mail to:
jochemhazelaar@student.eur.nl

Appendix A4: Results

Table A4.1: effect of treatment on dropping out.

	Dropout	Dropout
Treatment	.0238095 (0.602)	-4.20e-17 (1.000)
Constant	.0833333*** (0.007)	-1.56e-16 (.)
N	168	152
Controls	NO	YES

Table A4.2: summary statistics of subjects' age.

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
AgeN	144	27.21528	10.26377	13	60

Table A4.3: summary statistics of gender.

Dgender	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0 (female)	79	51.63	51.63
1 (male)	74	48.37	100.00
Total	153	100.00	

Table A4.4: summary statistics of marital status.

MarStatCat	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Single	57	37.50	37.50
Divorced	1	0.66	38.16
Married	24	15.79	53.95
In a relationship	44	28.95	82.89
Living together	24	15.79	98.68
Separated	1	0.66	99.34
Widow/widower	1	0.66	100.00
Total	152	100.00	

Table A4.5: summary statistics of ethnicity.

EthnCat	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Dutch background	144	94.12	94.12
Non-western background	3	1.96	96.08
Western background	5	3.27	99.35
Prefer not to say	1	0.65	100.00
Total	153	100.00	

Table A4.6: summary statistics of labour status.

LabCat	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Full-time job	25	16.78	16.78
Retired	2	1.34	18.12
Looking for a job	7	4.70	22.82
Not employed	3	2.01	24.83
Part-time job	42	28.19	53.02
Student	66	44.30	97.32
Prefer not to say	4	2.68	100.00
Total	149	100.00	

Table A4.7: summary statistics of highest obtained education.

EducCat	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Elementary school	2	1.31	1.31
Highschool	28	18.30	19.61
MBO degree	18	11.76	21.37
HBO degree	25	22.88	54.25
Bachelor's degree	42	27.45	81.70
Master's degree	26	16.99	98.69
Prefer not to say	2	1.31	100.00
Total	153	100.00	

Table A4.8: summary statistics of working experience.

WorkExpCat	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
No experience	4	2.63	2.63
0-5 years	87	57.24	59.87
5-10 years	27	17.76	77.63
10-15 years	7	4.61	82.24
15-20 years	5	3.29	85.53
20-25 years	4	2.63	88.16
More than 25 years	18	11.84	100.00
Total	152	11.84	100.00

Table A4.9: Quotas are an effective tool to get more women in higher functions in companies.

EffectCat	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Strongly disagree	4	2.58	2.58
Disagree	19	12.26	14.84
Neutral	32	20.65	35.48
Agree	93	60.00	95.48
Strongly agree	7	4.52	100.00
Total	155	100.00	

Table A4.10: Quotas create equal opportunities on the labour market.

EqOppCat	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Strongly disagree	6	3.87	3.87
Disagree	54	34.84	38.71
Neutral	37	23.87	62.58
Agree	53	34.19	96.77
Strongly agree	5	3.23	100.00
Total	155	100.00	

Table A4.11: We needed quotas ten years ago but now men and women have equal opportunities.

NecessCat	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Strongly disagree	18	11.61	11.61
Disagree	76	49.03	60.65
Neutral	28	18.06	78.71
Agree	24	15.48	94.19
Strongly agree	9	5.81	100.00
Total	155	100.00	

Table A4.12: Due to quotas, the hired person is not the one with the most quality.

QualHirCat	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Strongly disagree	8	5.16	5.16
Disagree	21	13.55	18.71
Neutral	34	21.94	40.65
Agree	71	45.81	86.45
Strongly agree	21	13.55	100.00
Total	155	100.00	

Table A4.13: To what degree do you trust the Dutch government?

GovTrustCat	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
No trust at all	3	1.96	1.96
No trust	24	15.69	17.65
Neutral	37	24.18	41.83
A little trust	64	41.83	83.66
A lot of trust	25	16.34	100.00
Total	153	100.00	

Table A4.14: To what degree do you trust the Dutch companies to follow the rules?

CompTrustCat	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
No trust at all	8	5.23	5.23
No trust	52	33.99	39.22
Neutral	34	22.22	61.44
A little trust	54	35.29	96.73
A lot of trust	5	3.27	100.00
Total	153	100.00	

Table A4.15: Gender quotas are necessary in technical jobs like in ICT.

ICTCat	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Strongly disagree	19	12.42	12.42
Disagree	48	31.37	43.79
Neutral	37	24.18	67.97
Agree	48	31.37	99.35
Strongly agree	1	0.65	100.00
Total	153	100.00	

Table A4.16: Gender quotas are necessary for juridical jobs like lawyers.

LawCat	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Strongly disagree	12	7.84	7.84
Disagree	39	25.49	33.33
Neutral	34	22.22	55.56
Agree	66	43.14	98.69
Strongly	2	1.31	100.00
Total	153	100.00	

Table A4.17: Comparison of age between treatment and control group.

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
AgeN (T=0)	73	27.47945	10.74465	16	60
AgeN (T=1)	71	26.94366	9.81382	13	56

Table A4.18: Comparison of gender between treatment and control group.

DGender	Treatment		Total
	0	1	
Women	38	41	79
Men	40	34	74
Total	78	75	153

Table A4.19: Comparison of marital status between treatment and control group.

MarStatCat	Treatment		Total
	0	1	
Single	27	30	57
Divorced	1	0	1
Married	12	12	24
In a relationship	21	23	44
Living together	14	10	24
Separated	1	0	1
Widow/widower	1	0	1
Total	77	75	152

Table A4.20: Comparison of ethnicity between treatment and control group.

EthnCat	Treatment		Total
	0	1	
Dutch background	73	71	144
Non-western background	1	2	3
Western background	4	1	5
Prefer not to say	0	1	1
Total	78	75	153

Table A4.21: Comparison of labour status between treatment and control group.

LabCat	Treatment		Total
	0	1	
Full-time job	14	11	25
Retired	1	1	2
Searching for a job	0	7	7
Not employed	2	1	3
Part-time job	21	21	42
Student	36	30	66
Prefer not to say	1	3	4
Total	75	74	149

Table A4.22: Comparison of educational attainment between treatment and control group.

EducCat	Treatment		Total
	0	1	
Elementary school	1	1	2
Highschool	16	12	28
MBO degree	8	10	18
HBO degree	23	12	35
Bachelor's degree	16	26	42
Master's degree	12	14	26
Prefer not to say	2	0	2
Total	78	75	153

Table A4.23: Comparison of working experience between treatment and control group.

WorkexpCat	Treatment		Total
	0	1	
No experience	1	3	4
0-5 years	46	41	87
5-10 years	13	14	27
10-15 years	3	4	7
15-20 years	4	1	5
20-25 years	2	2	4
More than 25 years	8	10	18
Total	77	75	152

Table A4.24: Over- and underestimation of application rates (men/women).

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Underestimate W	168	.2738095	.4472455	0	1
Underestimate M	168	.5892857	.4934342	0	1
Correct W	168	.0178571	.132828	0	1
Correct M	168	0	0	0	0
Overestimate W	168	.7083333	.4558885	0	1
Overestimate M	168	.4107143	.4934342	0	1

Table A4.25: effect of gender on variables of interest.

	PerAppW	PerAppM	Donation
Gender	-7.374786** (0.024)	3.4078 (0.271)	-2.152241*** (0.000)
Constant	61.25316*** (0.000)	38.83544*** (0.000)	6.746835*** (0.000)
N	153	153	153

Table A4.26: effect of Marital Status on variables of interest with single as base category.

MarStatCat	PerAppW	PerAppM	Donation
Divorced	-4.070175 (0.126)	7.105263*** (0.005)	4.245614*** (0.000)
Married	2.846491 (0.563)	-4.60307 (0.364)	.245614 (0.761)
In a relationship	5.611643 (0.163)	-3.5311 (0.335)	-.254386 (0.713)
Living together	11.22149** (0.042)	-5.644737 (0.267)	.1622807 (0.856)
Separated	-13.07018*** (0.000)	24.10526*** (0.000)	-4.754386*** (0.000)
Widow/Widower	-11.07018*** (0.000)	6.105263** (0.015)	-.754386 (0.140)
Constant	54.07018*** (0.000)	42.89474*** (0.000)	5.754386*** (0.000)
N	152	152	152

Table A4.27: effect of Ethnicity on variables of interest with “Dutch background” as base category.

EthnCat	PerAppW	PerAppM	Donation
Non-Western	-4.298611 (0.696)	7.854167*** (0.005)	-1.743056 (0.494)
Western	-16.69861** (0.022)	9.7875 (0.261)	-.9430556 (0.332)
Prefer not to say	2.701389 (0.118)	30.1875*** (0.000)	4.256944*** (0.000)
Constant	58.29861*** (0.000)	39.8125*** (0.000)	5.743056*** (0.000)
N	153	153	153

Table A4.28: effect of Labour Status on variables of interest with “full-time” as base category.

LabCat	PerAppW	PerAppM	Donation
Retired	-21.84*** (0.000)	5.8 (0.264)	2.32 (0.140)
Looking for a job	-4.125714 (0.455)	4.085714 (0.399)	-.1085714 (0.940)
Not looking for a job	-7.173333 (0.615)	9.466667 (0.354)	5.32*** (0.000)
Part-time job	-2.625714 (0.606)	2.061905 (0.682)	1.153333 (0.150)
Student	-1.385455 (0.771)	1.542424 (0.722)	1.062424 (0.147)
Prefer not to say	-6.59 (0.540)	9.8 (0.446)	2.82 (0.221)
Constant	59.84*** (0.000)	38.2*** (0.000)	4.68*** (0.000)
N	149	149	149

Table A4.29: effect of highest attained Education on variables of interest with “Elementary school” as base category.

EducCat	PerAppW	PerAppM	Donation
High school	12.71429 (0.222)	-34.89286*** (0.000)	2.142857 (0.470)
MBO degree	13.55556 (0.231)	-41.83333*** (0.000)	1.777778 (0.557)
HBO degree	5.357143 (0.610)	-34.35714*** (0.000)	2.028571 (0.492)
Bachelor’s degree	11.28571 (0.272)	-35.04762*** (0.000)	1.214286 (0.680)
Master’s degree	11.61538 (0.272)	-29.03846*** (0.001)	1.653846 (0.585)
Prefer not to say	-2.5 (0.807)	-22.5*** (0.004)	2 (0.491)
Constant	47.5*** (0.000)	74.5*** (0.000)	4 (0.169)
N	153	153	153

Table A4.30: effect of Working experience on variables of interest with “No experience” as base category.

WorkExpCat	PerAppW	PerAppM	Donation
0-5 years	-.9367816 (0.950)	-.4109195 (0.965)	-4.017241*** (0.000)
5-10 years	-2.685185 (0.861)	.3425926 (0.972)	-4.907407*** (0.000)
10-15 years	-1.357143 (0.933)	2.464286 (0.841)	-3.214286*** (0.004)
15-20 years	.1 (0.995)	3.95 (0.767)	-2.5* (0.095)
20-25 years	2 (0.917)	-13.25 (0.324)	-3.75** (0.015)
More than 25 years	2.666667 (0.862)	-4.694444 (0.645)	-2.5*** (0.001)
Constant	58.5*** (0.000)	41.25*** (0.000)	9.5*** (0.000)
N	152	152	152

Table A4.31: effect of age on variables of interest.

	PerAppW	PerAppM	Donation
AgeN	.090368 (0.575)	-.2004884 (0.214)	0.0412606* (0.080)
Constant	55.20728*** (0.000)	46.0119*** (0.000)	4.439582*** (0.000)
N	144	144	144

Table A4.32a: effect of self-assessed beliefs on support for gender quotas.

	EffectCat	EqOppCat	NecessCat	QualHirCat
Donation	1.235669*** (0.000)	.5188943* (0.091)	-.6920127** (0.016)	-.7446766** (0.022)
Constant	4.52291 (0.342)	6.546804 (0.139)	11.947*** (0.003)	10.54342*** (0.009)
N	139	139	139	139
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

Table A4.32b: effect of self-assessed beliefs on support for gender quotas.

	GovTrustCat	CompTrustCat	ICTCat	LawCat
Donation	.4213462 (0.214)	.2924511 (0.399)	.5681497* (0.053)	.1747816 (0.580)
Constant	7.235304* (0.099)	7.515991* (0.088)	6.964143 (0.106)	8.170462* (0.060)
N	139	139	139	139
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

Table A4.33a: effect of perceived application rate of women on self-assessed beliefs.

	EffectCat	EqOppCat	NecessCat	QualHirCat
PerAppW	.0040976 (0.688)	-.0170795* (0.088)	-.0026689 (0.770)	-.0051813 (0.542)
Cut1	-4.816048	-7.163396	-6.569603	.4779036
Cut2	-2.446115	-4.001756	-3.528598	2.288788
Cut3	-1.164351	-2.881076	-2.532311	3.806286
Cut4	3.376747	.8173709	-.57874	6.932247
N	139	139	139	139
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

Table A4.33b: effect of perceived application rate of women on self-assessed beliefs.

	GovTrustCat	CompTrustCat	ICTCat	LawCat
PerAppW	.0001604 (0.987)	-.0060869 (0.530)	-.0131196 (0.220)	-.0071239 (0.534)
Cut1	-4.599055	-7.306116	-5.81463	-6.700437
Cut2	-2.237398	-4.406142	-3.47992	-4.330462
Cut3	-.965969	-3.203153	-2.180502	-3.138545
Cut4	1.52831	.4185832	3.212303	1.67911
N	139	139	139	139
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

Table A4.34a: effect of perceived application rate of men on self-assessed beliefs.

	EffectCat	EqOppCat	NecessCat	QualHirCat
PerAppM	-.0195592* (0.080)	.0005604 (0.961)	.0165712 (0.135)	.0132647 (0.146)
Cut1	-7.058536	-6.122805	-4.903059	2.077442
Cut2	-4.657769	-3.014203	-1.806621	3.895828
Cut3	-3.360429	-1.913628	-.7895028	5.417103
Cut4	1.242704	1.745711	1.169365	8.582682
N	139	139	139	139
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

Table A4.34b: effect of perceived application rate of men on self-assessed beliefs.

	GovTrustCat	CompTrustCat	ICTCat	LawCat
PerAppM	-.0017556 (0.867)	0.0017048 (0.863)	.0069421 (0.608)	-.0041962 (0.702)
Cut1	-4.782476	-6.77248	-4.28773	-6.737872
Cut2	-2.422192	-3.883621	-1.970085	-4.390037
Cut3	-1.150698	-2.681811	-.6778631	-3.195821
Cut4	1.343608	.9361837	4.659963	1.605114
N	139	139	139	139
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES