ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM

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Master Thesis International Economics

Soft Power and Chinese Development Finance

An Investigation of Vote-Buying Competitions in the United Nations General Assembly

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ABSTRACT

This paper investigates the degree to which Chinese development finance influences the voting behavior of low- and middle-income economies of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East in the UNGA by using panel data from USAID, OECD, AidData, and the World Bank, along with United Nations General Assembly voting data from 2000-2018. More specifically, the contention made is that for Chinese (US) development finance should have a positive (negative) relationship to recipient's voting alignment with China; furthermore, domestic institutional factors such as the inherent political fragility of a recipient economy, its regime-type, and quality of its general political influence to attenuate the effect of development finance on voting alignment. To this end, the paper also investigates the presence of a voting competition that may persist across the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. Still, it primarily focuses on the competition between the United States and China, arguably the new leading superpowers in today's multipolar international environment. The main findings of the paper are that Chinese development finance flows are positively associated with securing vote alignment on UNGA resolutions, these votes are costlier if China is the sole deviator in a given UNGA resolution where there exists a P5 majority, and that in the face of competition from rising American aid, Chinese development finance struggles to retain the votes it does secure and remains outmatched by the buying power of per capita American development aid.

I. INTRODUCTION

Following a period of unbridled globalization at the turn of the millennium, today's world economy is in a more integrated state than ever before. No doubt that such unprecedented integration has brought tremendous growth and development to many economies around the world. Consequently, more nuanced and constructive channels through which states engage in international relations and global power dynamics have also become more viable. Transnational capital investments are increasingly bound to political ties and assimilation into the donor's sphere of influence. A potential means of assessing the efficacy of development finance vehicles in currying influence in recipient preferences on specific issues is through observing voting outcomes on United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions.

Most notably, China has been employing many strategies posited by international relations' economic soft power theory in directing development finance to emerging market economies and establishing special economic zones and other state-sponsored commercial ventures. China has also been increasingly proselytizing its "model" of development in Central Asia and Africa for the sake of geopolitical strategy. Consequently, the core focus of this thesis is to investigate the degree to which Chinese development finance is successful in influencing the voting behavior of its recipient developing economies in the UNGA. Owing to their "superpower" status in the world economy, we will also investigate the degree to which China can influence voter alignment with the US and vice versa in the presence of competition from the United Kingdom, Russia, and France – which together make up the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). We focus on UNGA resolution vote outcomes, making for the closest signal of state preference on international issues (Bailey et al., 2016). By observing vote outcomes, we may then assess the extent to which recipient states' foreign policy preferences may have been skewed by the influx of "no-strings-attached" development aid.

This thesis finds that per capita Chinese development finance flows are associated with increased odds of securing vote alignments with itself in the UNGA and decreased odds of vote alignments with the US. The opposite holds for US-directed development finance, supporting the assertion that China and the US are the primary competitors in securing foreign policy alignments among recipient states. It also finds that Chinese development finance is most effective in securing vote alignments in poorer, fragile, and autocratic economies. Regarding converting votes under

"peer pressure," it is too costly for both China and the US to retain votes when each is the sole deviator in a resolution with a clear P5 majority voting alignment. Finally, we find that regardless of the Chinese capacity to improve its odds of alignment in the UNGA, it is far costlier for China to buy votes through development finance flows than it is for the US to do the same. Outmatched concerning the potency of American aid to impede Chinese vote alignment outcomes, any vote alignments it does secure quickly evaporate as American development aid to the same recipients rises.

The results uncovered do not serve to uncover any causality in the relationship between Chinese development finance and vote alignment outcomes in the UNGA. At most, the results disentangle clear and strong correlations that support more deliberate research on the matter. The models we employed are grounded in uncertainties and probabilities and given the lack of comprehensive funding data from China. Still, we can confidently assert an observable relationship between development finance flows and vote outcomes. Thus, the thesis is of particular significance in contributing to the gap between international relations theory and the vulnerabilities of unilateral development finance. It helps further quantify the relationships and influences of Chinese outward finance on the foreign politics of vulnerable and developing economies. Furthermore, the implications that arise from the findings of this thesis also make a case for the importance of multilateral finance institutions in distinguishing between healthy outward development finance flows that foster sustainable development and those flows that only serve to influence and suppress the sovereignty of latent powers and lower-income states in the international community.

The thesis is structured as follows: Section II. briefly reviews precedent literature, Section III. establishes a background and builds the hypothesis. Section IV. discusses the data used, necessary controls employed, and elaborates on the criteria for the final sample employed in the models. Section V. reviews the methodologies that guide our model specification and consequent inferences. Section VI. presents and discusses the results. Finally, Section VII. closes by tying together the overarching narrative that arises from our findings throughout the thesis, its implications for our hypothesis and the field of international relations in general, and points to further issues that may be worthwhile pursuits for future research.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

This investigation is supported by an abundantly active discourse in the respective spheres of foreign policy and economic development. The underlying frameworks relating to the Balance of Power across advanced economies and influential states and the consequent security competition they engage in to keep each potential contender's sphere of influence to a minimum has been supported by Archaya and Ramsay (2013). Precedent papers link voting behavior on UNGA resolutions to preferences on established norms concerning individual state foreign policies, which are connected to the "established norms" that guide the institutions governing international organizations (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999). To the same end, investment in the developing economy's infrastructure and energy sectors, establishing national interests via lobbying and special interest groups, and through engaging in foreign trade has been covered extensively by Nye (2004 and 2008), Yun and Kim (2008), Atkinson (2010), and Rose (2019). Additionally, studies have also outlined the efficacy of foreign aid as a direct metric of accumulating investment, integration, goodwill, and political ties, or employing strategic foreign investment to bias multilateral institutions' agendas and manipulate latent states to pursuing domestic policies in favor of donor countries (Berman and Felter, 2014; Bjørnskov, 2010). To the end that leading economies and influential states maintain an agenda that has historically marginalized developing economies and driven them to more risky ventures have been covered by Goldsmith et al. (2014).

Extensive studies have been conducted on US Foreign Aid behavior and its propensity to influence the foreign policy agendas of its recipient states, or its use as a reward mechanism during key United Nations Security Council votes, the effectiveness of foreign aid as a policy instrument to pursue influence on key multilateral platforms, and its use to cushion against the onset of armed conflict (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Wang, 1999; Kegley, Jr. and Hook, 1991; Berman et al., 2011, Kuziemko and Werker, 2006; Nielsen et al., 2011; Brazys and Parke, 2017). On the subject of China economic statecraft studies that discuss how China may be furthering its global Foreign Policy agenda through various, highly-levered and confidential investments and outward FDI in South and Central Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. (Holyk, 2011; Ross, 2015; Kragelund, 2015; Dreher et al., 2017). Finally, there is a precedent endorsement for using United Nations General Assembly voting behavior as a signal for foreign policy orientation (Bailey et al., 2017).

III. HYPOTHESIS BUILDING

1. Alienation at the hands of the Washington Consensus

Before moving on to the core focus of our thesis, it is vital to establish how the meandering nature of the development agenda of the status quo Western-led institutions that has ostensibly given states like China the ability to influence foreign policy of vulnerable and developing states. At its conception, the international development agenda initially brought together the advanced industrial economies of the world to focus on reconstruction following the Second World War. It was only towards the tail end of the decolonization of Africa and Asia that the development agenda pivoted to address the accelerating marginalization of the poorest countries of the world economy (UNDESA – WESS, 2005).

Figure 1: ODA BY SECTOR (2000-2018) or (1967-2018)



Source: OECD.org

Despite the pivot towards addressing macro social and economic issues of health, poverty, nutrition, and discrimination, there emerged a widening rift between the advanced industrial economies that had entrenched within the donor class and the recipient developing economies that had grown increasingly dependent on foreign aid to fund their national development. Since the US financed the bulk of the reconstruction projects at the time, it secured a significant portion of influence defining the implicit institutional norms that determined the trajectory of the international development agenda, which then came to be known as the Washington consensus (Spratt, 2009; Williamson, 1999). A notable attribute of the Bretton Woods Institutions is their component entities had organizational structures that very closely resembled a private shareholder entity. Consequently, those states with the capital to do so could secure "Special Drawing Rights"

in multiples of amounts they pledged to the common fund. In doing so, the US effectively retained its "veto" simply by vastly outmatching many other developing countries and invariably prioritized the interests of private entities and advanced industrial economies over those of the developing world (Amin, 2006; Waage et al., 2010; Fukuda-Parr, 2010).

2. Regional Banks and the emergence of Chinese Development Finance

In the wake of the resentment building among developing economies to the biased and asymmetric structure of the Bretton Woods Institutions came a new generation of Regional Development Banks (RDBs) that promised to provide to their member economies a new level of representation and autonomy concerning the funding decisions that were made on the macro-level. Albeit the organizational structure of many RDBs drew from the preceding Bretton Woods Institutions, a key distinction most were clear to make was in the relationship RDBs sought to cultivate between borrowing and non-borrowing states. While the World Bank classified its member countries according to whether or not they were borrowers or donors, with the latter having a controlling influence in the World Banks's operational decisions, RDBs like the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) or the African Development Bank (AfDB) preserve a minimum voting block for borrowing economies from the outset (World Bank, 2005; Culpeper, 1997). The influx of a new generation of development institutions has also led many traditional donors to substitute debt-centric flows with concessional aid, with some even choosing to alter their system of budget support and project financing processes to engage in a more structured approach to sustainable lending instead of the more ad-hoc approach of the Bretton Woods Institutions (Classens et al., 2007). Consequently, developing states began banding together to provide funding on more concessional terms with the aims of reducing "defensive" lending, rather than highly constrained, conditional funding that flows from more advanced industrial economies (Classens et al., 2007). While the efficacy of such a model of development assistance – in essence, a shift away from the Bretton Woods model – can be contested, there are noticeable trends in emerging donor states growing in strength with the rise of Regional Development Banks. China was one such "emergent donor" that saw an opportunity to supplant itself in the potential vacuum in the international aid architecture. In the wake of the Great Recession, many states, developing and developed alike, sought to join the new China-led multilateral development lending institution,

the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The US being the only significant western power hesitating to do so.

Figure 2: Development Finance into MENA vs. SSA



Source: OECD.org and AidData.com

The AIIB is only a fragment of the numerous development finance vehicles China has employed in its quest to fund developing regions of the world, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia. The rise in Chinese finance was met with immediate criticism from the US as it depicted Chinese development finance as state policy tools that channeled 'rogue' Aid into developing states in a highly predatory manner that defied all the norms established by post-Bretton Woods liberal multilateral development lending institutions (Chin and Gallagher, 2019). This notion is further supported when looking at China's engagements in Angola, Sudan, and Nigeria (or other primary resource-dependent economies). The prevailing sentiment here being that China's mammoth demand for natural resources has kept Chinese interests at the forefront of the donor race in Africa (Busse et al., 2016; Carmignani and Chowdhury, 2012; Berthélemy, 2011; Lum et al., 2009). Additionally, intensive unilateral flows from China in exchange for natural resources also runs the risk of overvaluing the local currencies of the recipients, making them dependent on more aid and fostering rent-seeking behavior through increased corruption (Busse et al., 2016).

Figure 3: Per Capita Chinese Development Finance for Infrastructure Projects (2010)



Beyond the increasingly unconditional and confidential contracts financed by China, there are also debt sustainability concerns regarding the highly-levered nature of these contracts, running the risk of undoing the billions in debt forgiveness by the World Bank and IMF's Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (Kurlantzick, 2006). Furthermore, the very standards by which MDLIs assessed debt repayment capacity differed from China in that while Western-led institutions relied on reviewing current metrics of a recipient and project valuations, Chinese institutions preferred to do so by conducting predictive analysis of a country's debt repayment capacity and ability to general additional revenue through natural resource capitalization (Strange et al., 2013).

An important observation that sheds light on the potential "strategic" nature of Chinese Aid is that many of the contracts financed by China are in the form of aggressive export credit programs and market-rate loans, whereas Western and conventional donors tend to provide development finance on highly concessional and less 'predatory' export credit programs (Dreher et al., 2017). A study investigating the impact of Chinese outward FDI in Africa found that this channel is driven by the efficiency with which primary sector resources may be expatriated (Ross, 2015). This study further elaborates on how Chinese development finance is more prone to risky behavior, seeing as how a majority of the contracts are often underwritten by the Chinese state, which is not subject to the same constraints that conventional private sector profit-seeking firms are generally bound by (Ross, 2015). Given the critiques mentioned above regarding China's rogue development finance in Africa, it is equally important to note that while the Aid may have strings attached

concerning foreign policy convergence goals, it does not impede the recipient country's development prospects, nor does it attenuate the effectiveness of Western Aid in accelerating economic growth (Dreher et al., 2017).

Finally, the rhetoric that Chinese development finance exploited debt-fueled financing to secure political influence in recipient states grew in strength following the hotly debated Hambantota port incident. The port, located in the world's busiest shipping lane and second busiest oil transit chokepoint, is a major strategic asset in China's Belt and Road Initiative. The EXIM Bank of China financed 85% of the first phase construction of the port at a 6.3% interest rate and cost nearly USD 810 million to complete (Carrai, 2018). When the port failed to live up to its potential in the first few years after the port's construction – which by all accounts is par for the course for long-run infrastructure projects – the Sri Lankan government chose to privatize a majority share in the port to raise funds to make debt repayments. Consequently, a Chinese state-owned enterprise, CM Port, was then awarded a 70% stake in the port for a 99-year lease instead of an upfront payment of USD 1.12 billion with the remaining debt still in place. This incident was the foundation in creating a narrative that presents China as a predatory aggressor that lures countries into financing risky projects that threaten the recipient's sovereignty. In reality, this case is much more nuanced as the Sri Lankan government still retains de jure sovereignty of the port and territorial security in the Indian Ocean. However, the control of the port poses greater economic threats to India as any firms that set up manufacturing activities in the port would now be granted duty-free access to Indian markets, attenuating the degree of freedom India has to the trade deficits it maintains with Chinese companies. Thus, the loss of control of the port is not as cut and dry as popular media portrays it to be and is a much more complex case in determining the role economic soft power plays in accumulating political capital in a recipient state.

Following the context provided in the preceding sections, this thesis's core hypothesis will focus on the vote influencing competition that may occur between the US and China on UNGA resolutions. Consequently, the main hypotheses are that Chinese development finance should be positively associated with securing vote alignments with China and American development finance should be positively associated with the likelihood of securing vote alignments with the US. To the same end, Chinese development finance should be negatively associated with the likelihood of a recipient aligning on a UNGA resolution with the US, and American development

finance should be negatively associated with the likelihood of a recipient aligning with China on the same resolution.

Supplementary to these hypotheses are the following sub-hypotheses. First, owing to the BRI and the motivations for Chinese development finance in Africa, we should find that China is most effective at influencing vote alignments within Lower-Income Countries. In contrast, the US, for being the incumbent world power, should be more effective at securing the alignments of industrialized economies, or in our case, fast-industrializing Middle-Income Countries. Second, we should expect to see punitive damages to China's propensity to secure vote alignments in UNGA resolutions where it is the sole deviator. In contrast, the same for the US should be relatively more accepting. Third, to test the validity of the narrative that the Chinese state comprises of "rogue" aid to unstable and undemocratic regimes, we hypothesize that states with a higher autocracy score and a higher state fragility score are more likely to align with China than with the US on any given resolution. Fourth, to test the degree to which other states are accepting of sole deviations on resolutions with otherwise unanimous outcomes, we hypothesize that states are more punitive towards China and more accepting of the US when each is a sole deviator. Finally, we should see China being the most effective at securing vote alignments on resolutions regarding economic development issues, given its surging donor status in the world. Likewise, we expect that the US is most effective at securing vote alignments on resolutions regarding conflict and governance issues in the Middle East, owing to past military presence.

IV. DATA

1. United Nations General Assembly and United Nations Security Council Vote Data

The baseline vote and constructed vote-distance data for the UNGA come from Bailey et al. (2013). This dataset was then further cleaned and shaped to meet the requirements of this thesis. The data spans unique roll call vote outcomes for each member state from the 55th session (2000) onwards until the 73rd session (2018). For this period (2000-2018), we have state-specific roll-call vote data on 1,337 resolutions across 77 countries. Each state each year has detailed data on how that specific state voted on its respective resolutions, a count of the aggregate yeses, abstains, and no's. Furthermore, each resolution is also marked by indicators of whether it is related to Palestine conflict, nuclear weapons or material, conventional disarmament, colonialism, human rights, or economic development.

Figure 4: Proportion of UNGA Resolutions by Issue (2000 - 2018)



Also imputed to this data is a matching dummy for each country by resolution, how the UNSC P5 members voted on the same resolutions, and whether the P5 cohort vote was unanimous, whether the US or China deviated from the majority. When we compare gross vote outcomes between low and middle-income states in our sample and upper-income states in Europe, we see how the propensity to align with China is lower, pointing to the narrative that more marginalized and poor states sought to align themselves with the Beijing consensus following the new millennium (Appendix Figure A.10.1, A.10.2). Furthermore, when we compare historical vote outcomes, we can see how the US (and the West) was at one point leading in alignments but quickly conceded to China over the past few decades (Appendix Figure A.10.3).

The original UNGA comprised unique country-specific vote data from 1946-2019 across 200 member states. To meet the scope of this thesis, only those regions that have ostensibly been the subject of renewed competition, i.e., only lower and middle-income countries in the regions of the Middle East, North Africa (MENA), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), South and Central Asia (SCA), and East Asia (EAO) were retained. The bulk of the sample focusing on states in Sub-Saharan Africa. Following further filtering of only including resolutions that were non-administrative in nature, and involved all members of our sample voting on them were included. Our final sample space for the number of member states drops down to 77 states across 1337 UNGA resolutions.

2. Development Finance and Funding Data

There are three key types of data that are used for the analysis in this thesis. The first is bilateral official flows, which encompass Official Development Aid (ODA) and Other Official Flows (OOF) net of commitments and disbursements for the five permanent members of the UNSC (except for China). All of which are annual observations spanning 2000 to 2018. Data for the United Kingdom, France, Russia comes from the OECD's International Development Statistics database. It includes the net of all ODA and OOF flows in millions of current USD from these countries to recipient countries in the regions of MENA, SSA, SCA, and EAO mentioned above.

Development finance data for the US comes from the US Agency for International Development's Foreign Aid Explorer database. Since the core focus of the thesis is on the competition between China and the US specifically, development flows for the US are disaggregated into sectoral compositions in millions of current USD. The raw funding data was initially on the DAC subchannel level; however, to make the US and China comparable flows, they have been aggregated to their respective channel code. These same category aggregations are applied to the dataset compiled from AidData's Global Chinese Official Finance, How China Lends, Chinese Aid to Africa, and Chinese Public Finance in South and Central Asia datasets. Of the observation in these datasets, since these are constructed ODA- and OOF-like flows, only those observations that have been marked as safe for research, i.e., all projects except for instances that are funding into umbrella projects, pledges, canceled, or otherwise suspended projects to avoid the inclusion of any flows that were never fully committed or implemented have been included in the sample (Dreher et al., 2017).

3. Controls: Data on Key Economic and Political Indicators

All key economic indicators that serve as controls come from the Penn World Tables (10.0) and the WTO databases. Of these indicators, those present in all model specifications are the per capita output-side real GDP, real domestic absorption, population, and the share of merchandise imports by the recipient state. Real domestic absorption – the sum of real consumption of households, governments, and investments – is arguably a vital control to include in our specifications as it tracks the degree to which foreign aid is absorbed by the domestic economy of the recipient state. To account for inflation, all price values for our key variables – state-led development finance flows, multilateral development lending institution flows, and the export values have been chained to constant 2017 USD. Furthermore, to account for the scale of the

recipient state's population size, all flow data have also been scaled by their respective recipient population, thus making our key indicators per capita development finance received (in 2017 USD). Lastly, to normalize the extreme variation in the distribution of development finance flows across our P5 donors, all positive dollar values, i.e., fund flows, export values, and key indicators, have also been log-transformed (inclusive of zeros).

As for political controls, all our key indicators come from Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research's Polity Project (INSCR, 2020). The first of the two critical political indicators is the POLITY score, a 20-point scale, and is an indicator for the degree to which a state is autocratic or democratic. The POLITY score captures the "institutional democracy" of a state. It constructs a composite score based on a number of checks through which policy and leadership may be pursued legitimately in the state (Marshall and Gurr, 2020). Our sample's second key political indicator is the State Fragility Index (SFI) from INSCR's Polity Project. The SFI is also a composite index that score's a state's effectiveness and legitimacy on its capacity to manage conflict and implement policy (Marshall and Elzinga-Marshall, 2018).

V. METHODOLOGY

This thesis seeks to investigate the assertions made in the preceding hypotheses by tracking mechanisms through which the influence of Chinese development finance flows on the propensity of a recipient state aligning with the Chinese vote in United Nations General Assembly resolutions may be captured. The primary model approach employed is a logit specification where the dependent variable is a binary indicator of vote alignment. To meet the scope of this thesis, we only include resolutions on which a vote has been called, and the recipient state and all of the P5 states were present and voted on. Although a recipient state – and our "Great Powers" – have a choice among three actions when it comes to voting on a UNGA resolution (the actions being voting Yes, Abstain, or No on a given UNGA resolution), the key-dependent variable in our case only takes into consideration whether a recipient state "matched" with one of the P5 countries. Thus, our dependent variable collapses to a binary outcome.

Consequently, the logit model estimates the following population function:

$$Pr(Y = 1|\,\boldsymbol{S}) = F(p_i) \;\; where\; p_i = \boldsymbol{\beta S_i} \tag{1.1}$$

Where the probabilities of success in our outcome variable, p_i, depends on a linear function of some covariates, which is defined in our case as $\boldsymbol{\beta S}$ where $\boldsymbol{\beta}$ is the vector of regression coefficients for the vector of observed covariates S_i. Our logit model should therefore resemble:

$$\beta S_i = logit(p_i) = \log\left(\frac{p_i}{1-p_i}\right) \equiv \frac{e^{\boldsymbol{\beta S}}}{1+e^{\boldsymbol{\beta S}}} = p_i, \qquad \text{where } p_i \equiv \Pr(Y=1|\boldsymbol{S}) \quad (1.2)$$

Thus, arriving at the final logit specification. For our case, the key outcome variable is a binary indicator of whether the recipient state's vote outcome matches each of our donor states. And we will be employing a list of covariates specific to competitor P5 development finance flows, region and income group interactions, and year fixed effects. For example, for the China specification, our logit estimation should resemble:

$$\log\left(\frac{matches\_cn_{i,r,t}}{1-matches\_cn_{i,r,t}}\right) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 DFF\_China_{i,r,t} + \boldsymbol{\beta C} + \boldsymbol{\beta X} + \lambda_t + \alpha_{i,r} + \delta_{i,r} \quad (1.3)$$

The key dependent variable being interpreted as the log-odds of a recipient state's UNGA vote aligning with China indicated by the dummy $matches\_cn_{i,r,t}$, and, in alternating specifications, with the US, with Russia, with the UK, or with France; β_1 is the coefficient for the development finance flows from China (or the appropriate, context-specific donor), $\boldsymbol{\beta C}$ is a vector of covariates for competitor donor flows which changes for each specification to include the remaining four of the five permanent members of the UNSC; $\boldsymbol{\beta X}$ is a vector of coefficients for included controls. Lastly, λ_t are year fixed-effects, whereas $\alpha_{i,r}$, and $\delta_{i,r}$ are interacted region-, and income group-specific fixed-effects, respectively.

It is also important to note that because the LOGIT is estimating the equivalent of $\log\left(\frac{p}{1-p}\right)$ where p is defined as the probability of a success and by extension $(1-p)$ as the probability of a failure, the coefficient in our estimation would then be interpreted as the log-odds ratio of an event occurring – which in our case would be the log-odds ratio of a recipient state's vote matching with the context-specific donor. Additionally, instead of opting for country-specific fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneous effects across countries, we will be employing region and income fixed effects that are common to countries across their respective region and income groups.

The decision to employ region and income group fixed effects interactions rather than the comprehensive and conventionally employed country-specific fixed-effects was due to concerns of obfuscating the dynamic causal relationships between development finance flows and the log-likelihood of recipient vote alignment with the donor country. Since vote-buying and foreign policy shifting are not one-shot events that occur for any given resolution for a given state in the UNGA, and since these preferences are likely to have developed over many years of engagements with each other, past development finance flows are likely to affect the current propensity of vote alignment. Equally likely, is a scenario where a given state's propensity of aligning on an issue being a factor in whether or not a Great Power chooses to finance development projects in that state in the current period. In lieu of constructing a reliable instrument for such a scenario or employing fixed-effects on the individual level, it is an equally viable option to instead control for only those unobserved factors that are common to recipients states in the same region and income group; lastly, the interaction between the development flows, and region and income group indicators are also time-invariant as the year-specific fixed effects account for all time-varying attributes in the sample (Imai and Kim, 2019; Fischer, 2010).

An ideal model specification for this incursion would have employed a mixed-effects logit specification; instead, for the sake of keeping this model simple and because the core hypothesis of this investigation deal with the general propensity of China to influence vote outcomes for recipient states, a fixed-effect logit with clustered standard errors can make for an equivalent model specification, albeit with a few constraints. The decision to employ a fixed-effects clustered standard error logistic regression model allows us to adjust for non-independence within clusters that may persist in our sample (which is highly likely), account for potential serial correlation of errors, and to account for unobserved heterogeneity across different regions and income groups – the constraint being that by not allowing for random effects across these strata, we may arrive at a more crude, but generally parallel approximation of the impact of the various key explanatory variables in our specification.

To this end, the level at which standard errors should be clustered was an equally challenging consideration. In most general cases, the employment of clustered standard errors is to account for the unobserved heterogeneity for outcomes that may be persistent within groups. On the one hand, we could follow the suggestions made by Wooldridge et al. and cluster our

standard errors where clusters of units are assigned to a treatment (2017). The treatment in our case being the outcome of a vote on a given UNGA resolution which makes sense as it is is more than likely not identically and independently distributed at the resolution/issue cluster-level, i.e., it is highly likely that there exist correlated errors that lead all states voting on an issue to common predispositions to voting a certain way. For example, resolutions relating to the Middle East situation and resolutions pertaining to economic development or human rights may evoke common unobserved factors that uniquely affect the voting temperament of each state.

On the other hand, we could follow Cameron and Miller's lead who argue that to be conservative and avoid bias, it is better to "use bigger and more aggregate clusters when possible, up to and including the point at which there is concern about having too few clusters (2015)." By this suggestion, we would have clustered standard errors around our region variable. This strategy makes sense since including region-specific fixed effects only account for variations across states in different regions and not for unobserved correlation of errors that may occur for states within the same region, which arguably may impact our key outcome interest. For example, states in Sub-Saharan Africa are more likely to have correlated errors such as their temperament on specific UNGA resolutions that are more or less applicable to countries within these regional clusters. Lastly, even Wooldridge et al., who have taken caution against clustering on too aggregate of a level, say that at most, doing so can only lead to standard errors that are unnecessarily conservative (2017). Thus, in the interest of erring on the side of caution and account for the heteroskedasticity that will invariably be present when working with such a large sample, we will employ robust standard errors clustered at the regional level. Finally, we are also including lagged dependent variables and lagged development finance flows to control for any variation in past funding, or past voting behavior induces in current vote outcomes. The combination of lagged controls and log-transformed data paired with the choice of broad clustered standard errors are all different ways to nudge the model we will employ closer to yielding conservative estimates about the relationship between development finance and vote outcomes – in lieu of using a mixed-effects logit model with instrumental variables (Griliches, 1961; Wilkins, 2017).

VI. RESULTS

The following are the baseline results for our LOGIT specification:

$$\log\left(\frac{matches\_donor_{i,r,t}}{1-matches\_donor_{i,r,t}}\right) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 DFF\_Donor_{i,r,t} + \boldsymbol{\beta C} + \boldsymbol{\beta X} + \lambda_t \quad (2)$$

Where $matches\_donor_{i,r,t}$ and $DFF\_Donor_{i,r,t}$ corresponds to vote alignment and development finance flows from each of the five permanent UNSC members.

Table 1: Baseline LOGIT on Aggregate Funding Flows

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
variable	Matches China	Matches US	Matches UK	Matches RU	Matches FR
log CN Total Flows	-0.01396	0.00285	0.00325	-0.00065	0.00306
	(0.0147)	(0.0082)	(0.0032)	(0.0091)	(0.0032)
log US Total Flows	0.01692	0.01538	0.01790*	0.01538	0.01664
	(0.0166)	(0.0210)	(0.0091)	(0.0124)	(0.0089)
log RU Total Flows	0.11204***	-0.07659***	-0.01442	0.05909	-0.01212
	(0.0216)	(0.0130)	(0.0115)	(0.0342)	(0.0105)
log UK Total Flows	-0.02158	-0.01310	-0.02088*	-0.01844*	-0.02203*
	(0.0184)	(0.0219)	(0.0099)	(0.0089)	(0.0095)
log FR Total Flows	-0.00681	0.00128	-0.00962	-0.02340*	-0.00937
	(0.0310)	(0.0126)	(0.0062)	(0.0105)	(0.0062)
log GDP/pc	0.21258*	-0.07705	0.01553	0.05736	0.01291
	(0.1053)	(0.0677)	(0.0285)	(0.0366)	(0.0233)
log RDANA/pc	-0.13927	0.04189	-0.02430	-0.01142	-0.01879
	(0.1503)	(0.0725)	(0.0359)	(0.0464)	(0.0314)
Share of merchandize imports	-0.12931	0.00076	-0.04269	0.05363	-0.03428
	(0.1215)	(0.0783)	(0.0435)	(0.0768)	(0.0421)
log Population	0.03789	-0.00215	-0.01814***	0.00782	-0.01716***
	(0.0324)	(0.0103)	(0.0048)	(0.0082)	(0.0044)
POLITY V Score	-0.00180	0.00878*	0.00855**	-0.00260	0.00877**
	(0.0092)	(0.0037)	(0.0029)	(0.0050)	(0.0028)
State Fragility Index	0.00659	-0.00670**	-0.00471	0.00427	-0.00407
	(0.0041)	(0.0022)	(0.0026)	(0.0036)	(0.0026)
Constant	0.62933	-1.19277***	0.44511***	0.61154***	0.45632***
	(0.4202)	(0.2195)	(0.1225)	(0.0429)	(0.1204)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Fixed Effects	Year	Year	Year	Year	Year
Estimation Method	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT
N	84220	84220	84220	84220	84220
pseudo R-sq	0.033	0.031	0.008	0.026	0.008

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at the region level. Controls not shown but included in all specifications are the natural log of GDP per capita, natural log of real domestic absorption, share of merchandize imports, and population. Political controls include the POLITY V Score and the State Fragility Index. Lags include lagged coeffecients for key time-series variables with two-period lags. Where mentioned, specifications also include Region-specific, Income-group-specific, and factor effects for whether China or the US deviated from the P5 vote for that year's resolution, and whether the recipient was served on the UNSC council in the year it recieved development finance flows fixed effects. All prices are in 2017 constant USD prices, and key continuous variables (value flows) have been scaled by recipient state's population.

In the baseline specification – and in all consequent specifications that arise from the baseline – our vector of key independent variables always includes development finance flows from each of the P5 countries so as to underscore the potential "competition" in vote-buying that may exist in the UNGA. We can see from our preliminary results that none of China's logged per capita aid flows are significant at the 95% level across each of our key explanatory variables. Of the American and Chinese development finance flows, the only significant estimate is for that of vote alignment with the UK. The estimate 0.01790 (interpreted in log-odds), significant at the 95% percent level, can be translated into regular odds-ratios through $e^{\beta_i x_i}$, i.e., each 1 unit increase in the log per capita American aid flows to a given recipient state, its odds of aligning with the UK on that resolution increases by 1.8% on average, ceteris paribus.

Note that these baseline results do not account for the confounding and time-persistent effects of donor flows or vote outcomes and are likely to be misleading for that reason. Following these preliminary results, we will therefore now explore adding region and year fixed effects to account for unobserved variation across region and income groups, lagged donor flows (by two periods) to account for possibly a trailing influence of development finance on recipient vote alignment in the donor flows are treated more as a reward for voter alignment than a condition for it, and lagged vote outcomes to control for instances where past alignment with donors affects current alignment with donors. Building upon our baseline specification by adding lagged donor flows for both the country that whose alignment is the key outcome variable of interest and for the remaining four P5 donor states and region-income group fixed effects lead us to the final specification:

$$\begin{aligned}\log\left(\frac{matches\_donor_{i,r,t}}{1-matches\_donor_{i,r,t}}\right) = {} & \beta_0 + \beta_1 matches\_donor_{i,r,(t-1)} + \beta_2 matches\_donor_{i,r,(t-2)} \\ & + \beta_3 DFF\_Donor_{i,r,t} \\ & + \beta_4 DFF\_Donor_{i,r,(t-1)} + \beta_5 DFF\_Donor_{i,r,(t-2)} \\ & + \boldsymbol{\beta C} + \boldsymbol{\beta X} + \lambda_t + \alpha_{i,r} + \delta_{i,r}\end{aligned} \tag{3.1}$$

Following these preliminary results, we now explore adding lags for donor flows. Keep in mind that $\boldsymbol{\beta C}$ – which was initially a vector of competitor flow covariates – is now expanded to include the lags of the competitor flows as well.

Table 2: Final LOGIT Specification – Lags, Lagged DV

variable	(1) Matches China	(2) Matches US	(3) Matches UK	(4) Matches RU	(5) Matches FR
log CN Total Flows	0.04685**	-0.02166***	0.01910***	0.01350	0.01811***
	(0.0147)	(0.0052)	(0.0011)	(0.0142)	(0.0012)
log US Total Flows	-0.33733***	0.26974***	0.05189***	-0.06469*	0.04725***
	(0.0354)	(0.0432)	(0.0125)	(0.0303)	(0.0109)
log RU Total Flows	1.20392***	-0.56999***	-0.08920	0.40136**	-0.07438
	(0.1680)	(0.1505)	(0.0955)	(0.1283)	(0.0932)
log UK Total Flows	0.08211	0.07449	-0.06313***	0.05149*	-0.05757***
	(0.0616)	(0.0501)	(0.0145)	(0.0241)	(0.0152)
log FR Total Flows	0.38290***	-0.35077***	0.00157	0.13415*	0.00799
	(0.1002)	(0.0688)	(0.0299)	(0.0537)	(0.0303)
POLITY V Score	0.00911	0.01559***	0.00850**	0.00129	0.00889**
	(0.0109)	(0.0036)	(0.0028)	(0.0064)	(0.0028)
State Fragility Index	0.02032**	-0.01359	-0.00261	0.00980	-0.00190
	(0.0073)	(0.0078)	(0.0038)	(0.0066)	(0.0038)
Constant	-0.28028	-1.45291***	0.09730	-0.19734	-0.05383
	(0.1555)	(0.4290)	(0.2302)	(0.1938)	(0.2361)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Region Interactions	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Group Interactions	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lags	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period
Lagged DV?	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period
Estimation Method	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT
N	69282	69282	69282	69282	69282
pseudo R-sq	0.043	0.074	0.015	0.027	0.014

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at the region level. Controls not shown but included in all specifications are the natural log of GDP per capita, natural log of real domestic absorption, share of merchandize imports, and population. Political controls include the POLITY V Score and the State Fragility Index. Lags include lagged coeffecients for key time-series variables with two-period lags. Where mentioned, specifications also include Region-specific, Income-group-specific, and factor effects for whether China or the US deviated from the P5 vote for that year's resolution, and whether the recipient was served on the UNSC council in the year it recieved development finance flows fixed effects. All prices are in 2017 constant USD prices, and key continuous variables (value flows) have been scaled by recipient state's population.

Accounting for lags, regional and income group effects, and trailing dependent variables uncovers statistically significant effects for a majority of the P5 countries on vote alignment outcomes. The effects of Chinese and American development finance on a recipient state's vote alignment with China and the US are as we expected and statistically significant at the 99% level. Here, for each unit increase in the log per capita Chinese development finance flows to a recipient state, the odds of that state aligning with China increase by 4.80% while reducing the odds of recipient state vote alignment with the US by 2.14%. Conversely, each unit increase in the log per capita America development aid induces an increase of 30.96% in the odds of vote alignment with the US and decreases the odds of vote alignment with China by 28.63%. To delineate the Trump

Administration's impact on the propensity to align with the US, we also add a marker for the years Trump held office and found that our core US-China relationships between funding and vote alignments still held. Yet, the Trump administration was in part very impactful in driving recipients in our sample away from the US and to China (Appendix Table A.1.1). When we break down the composition of resolutions by issue, we find significant estimates for the US and China only on UNGA resolutions pertaining to the conflict in the Middle East and to issues of Economic Development. To the same end, we see that the US is most effective in securing voting alignments with itself and preventing voting alignments with China on resolutions regarding the Middle East, whereas China is most able to do the same on resolutions focusing on Economic Development (Appendix Table A.1.2 and A.1.3).

The impact of Chinese flows on the likelihood of vote alignment with the UK and France remains counterintuitive; however, statistically significant at the 99.9% level – as we see that each additional unit in log per capita aid flows from China to a recipient state leads to an increase of about 1.93% and 1.83% in the odds that the recipient state's vote aligns with that of the UK and France, respectively. The coefficient estimates for the log per capita US development aid flows, on the other hand, are far more consistent with what we expected and are positively associated with the propensity of a recipient state aligning with the UK or France and negatively associated with the propensity of a recipient state aligning with Russia. The coefficients on Russian foreign aid in determining vote alignments are likely to be pronounced due to Russia re-emerging as a donor state only towards the tail-end of our sample's timeline.

We should keep in mind that so far, the discussion around our results has been in terms of odds ratios of the likelihood of the recipient state aligning with a given donor on UNGA resolutions; however, we should not lose track of the distinction between improving the odds of vote alignments versus improving the actual probability of the same. As such, before we cross over into dealing with probabilities for our outcome events, we performed a link-test on the final specifications and found that we can hold some degree of confidence in the final model specification for not omitting a key predictor and devoid of any critical misspecification issues (Appendix Table A.2.1.).

When observing the continuous marginals plots of overall predictive probabilities of inducing vote alignment with China at each log unit of per capita development finance to a

recipient, notice how we see a plateauing of the probability of a state to align with China for a given amount of foreign aid. This implies that the phenomenon of vote-buying is not achieved by simply throwing an increasing amount of money and sees diminishing marginal returns in the effectiveness of each additional dollar foreign aid of securing vote alignments. On comparing the predictive probabilities of state alignment with China for the two sources of Aid, it is clear that regardless of any vote-buying power China has accumulated via its preeminent donor status in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is far outmatched with regards to its effectiveness at sufficiently balancing against its greatest competitor on the UNGA platform.

Interestingly, on plotting a continuous margin plot for the effect of a state's Fragility Score on the probabilities of matching the vote outcome for China versus the US, we see here too, that more fragile states susceptible to instances of civil conflict have a higher probability of aligning with China and, less fragile states have a higher probability of sticking with the US (Appendix Figures A.7.1 and A.7.2).

When we plot the same overall predictive margins for the US, we find that countries, on average, are less likely to agree with the US on UNGA resolutions, to begin with. But each additional dollar in US foreign aid is vastly more effective at securing vote alignments than for China (Appendix A.5.3 and A.5.4). To the same end, Figure A.8.1 in the appendix plots log per capita Chinese development finance and American development aid on the probability that a recipient state aligns with China or the US, respectively. Interestingly, we can see the effect of the US-Dollar, so to speak, as incremental increases in per capita flows to recipient states significantly reduce their underlying probability of aligning with China. In contrast, when we hold Chinese development finance at their 25^{th} and 95^{th} percentile levels, it can at the most smoothen the curve and lower the baseline effectiveness of each additional dollar per capita US foreign aid. This naturally leads us to question the rate at which Chinese and American development aid effectively deter a recipient state's vote alignment chances. Perhaps this is the most revealing portion of our findings.

Although we see that Chinese development finance flows do well to improve the odds of recipient states aligning with China on UNGA resolutions, so far, they fail to outweigh the suppressing influence of US development. When we look at the average marginal effects of Chinese development finance on inducing voter alignment, we can see that its marginal impact on

the probability of securing recipient state voter alignment is past the point of diminishing returns. This shows that China is good at securing the votes in its interest in the UNGA in the first place; it is not as capable of defending these secured votes to other competitors – especially the US. On the other hand, from Panel B in A.8.2, we can see how even when competitor flows are held constant at their 95th percentile levels, the effective marginal probability of each additional log unit of per capita development flows remain positive.

A natural progression to disentangling the differences between the US and China's effectiveness at securing votes in the UNGA is to further break them down by their influence on specific income groups and regions. In doing so, we estimate a differential effect of sorts (owing to the fixed region-specific and income-group-specific effects). Consequently, we find statistically significant estimates that show each log unit increase in per capita development finance flows from China are associated with a 5.77% increase in the odds of vote alignment with itself in the Middle-East and North Africa (MENA) relative to the base level in Eastern Asia and Oceania (EAO), and an approximately 3.08% decrease in the odds of vote alignment with the US in the same region as compared to its EAO region relative benchmark. Interestingly, US development aid flows in the MENA region are associated with a 38.21% increase in the odds of recipient vote alignments with China and a decrease in its own odds of securing vote alignment (Appendix Table A.3.1). Likewise, we can also see the theorized effect of Chinese development finance on Low-Income Countries quickly evaporating as we climb into higher tiers of Lower-Middle and Upper-Middle Income countries (Appendix Table A.3.2). We can again see the difference in the relative influence each log unit increase in the per capita development aid from the US impacts Chinese vote alignment outcomes to a greater degree than Chinese Development Finance flows hurt the probability of vote alignment with the US. Even when we look at the marginal impact of Chinese development flows on American vote alignment across regions or income groups; however, it technically does drive votes away from the US, it does so only are marginal levels at best – with a significant gulf persisting between the magnitude of impact the US has on Chinese vote alignment probabilities than vice-versa (Appendix Figure A.9.3 and A.9.4).

When we consider the "peer-pressure" effects of P5 outcomes guiding the propensity of recipient states aligning with the US or China, we can see how Chinese development finance flows are not effective in inducing vote alignments when it counts (Appendix Table A.3.3). In instances

where there exists a clear P5 majority, and China is the only P5 member deviating from the P5 majority vote, the recipient state's odds of aligning with the US increase by nearly 13.39% than when it does not deviate. Likewise, US development aid is far more effective in drawing away from the propensity of states aligning with China when China is the sole deviator from the P5 majority. Interestingly, when we see the US acting as a sole deviator from the P5 majority, recipient state temperaments toward aligning with the US are far more punitive in nature, so much so that each log unit increase in per capita development aid to recipient states is associated with significantly increased odds of alignment across the board except for its own alignment which plummets. This is a surprising outcome as it contradicts the narrative that tends to showcase the many poorer states as being deferential to the US and the degree to which the US has historically commanded influence on the world stage.

To further disentangle the influence of development finance flows on the propensity to align with the US or China and gain better insights on the specific channels of most significance in engaging in the aforementioned vote-buying competition, we also ran a model specification including disaggregated flows across the US and China. Our linktest results remain significant at the prediction level and insignificant at the prediction-squared level even with disaggregated flows. Of the statistically significant estimates from our disaggregated results, most notably, Chinese development finance flows relating to agricultural assistance, humanitarian assistance, education, and infrastructure projects increase the odds of a recipient state aligning with China and decrease the odds of aligning with the US on contested UNGA resolutions. These same categories of flows (except infrastructure aid and the inclusion of debt relief and environmental assistance) from the US decrease a recipient state's odds of aligning with China on UNGA resolutions (Appendix Table A.4.1). Incidentally, US infrastructure flows seem to have the opposite effect on Chinese alignment.

Lastly, to the degree to which Regional Development Banks help free vulnerable and developing states from being exposed to unwanted influence through tied, conditional financing, we also run our final specification on development finance flows for Multilateral Development Lending Institutions (MDLIs). The model specifications for MDLIs are also robust to the logit specification test (linktest). MDLIs in our model include the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB, China-led), the African Development Bank (AfDB, local-led), the Asian Development

Bank (ADB, Japan-led), and markers for Western-led DAC institutions. Although the estimates for AIIB funding flows on Chinese vote alignment are not significant, we find statistically significant estimates that point to the AIIB reducing the odds that the US secures vote alignment from a recipient state. More importantly, we find that funding flows from the African Development Bank and the African Development Fund – which are allegedly locally represented and led, and thus devoid of significant external influence – do decrease the odds of vote alignment with all of our P5 members across the board (Appendix Table A.5.1). An interpretation of this effect could confirm that Multilateral Development Lending Institutions do insulate recipient economies from the unwanted external influence that often comes tied to "strings-attached" aid.

VII. CONCLUSION

While not causal, we have uncovered a myriad of phenomena and relationships that persist for China and the US within the United Nations General Assembly that strongly urge further, more detailed research on the matter. We confirmed our main hypothesis that Chinese development finance is positively associated with the likelihood of securing vote alignments with itself and negatively related to the probability of obtaining vote alignments for the US on UNGA resolutions. The opposite also holds. Any vote outcomes China does secure in the UNGA, it struggles to retain given a precipitous rise in American development aid to the same recipient. Underscoring the gulf that persists across the political influence American development aid can buy compared to Chinese development finance flows.

Regarding the effectiveness of American and Chinese development finance on recipient voter alignment by topic of UNGA resolution, since we could only find consistent and comparable estimates for the votes on resolutions regarding the Middle East and issues concerning Economic Development, we cannot definitively say that the US is most effective at buying votes on resolutions about the Middle East and China on resolutions about Economic Development. We did observe Chinese propensity to influence vote alignment the highest among Low-Income Countries. On the other hand, we found that Lower-Middle Income countries are where the US is most effective at securing vote alignments rather than we initially expected Upper-Middle Income Countries. On the regional breakdown, for all of its engagements in Africa, we found that China is most effective at securing vote alignments in its own "backyard" in Eastern and Central Asia.

Any influence it accumulates in Sub-Saharan Africa quickly seems to evaporate with the influx of American aid.

Likewise, we can only partially conclude that since we can only show that increasingly Fragile states have higher odds of aligning with China. But we cannot comment on the opposite being true for any of the other countries. States with higher Polity scores, i.e., more democratic, tend to side with Western. We can make no such comment on the opposite or the same being true for China and Russia. Interestingly, we cannot conclude that states are more accepting of US deviations as we observed when the US is the sole deviator on a given UNGA vote, its odds of acquiring vote alignments in recipient states severely plummet. The odds of vote alignments for the remaining four P5 members are increasing concomitantly. Lastly, we also corroborated how Multilateral Development Lending Institutions serve as a protective membrane between donors and recipients where recipients relying on development finance institutions are less likely to align on vote outcomes with any of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

The highly opaque nature of Chinese development finance means that we are constantly forced to speculate on the nature and effect of their financing programs and the degree to which they may threaten the Washington-led international aid agenda. While this thesis does ease concerns of "status quo" and "revisionist" perspectives by showing that while China may inherently accrue more influence in the UNGA, it quickly dissipates when faced with American aid flows. At the same time, it would be imprudent to dismiss the potential of Chinese development finance in growing more effective in the coming years and should thus be more deliberately studied.

Future research after better tracking China-backed projects would serve to reinforce and corroborate the findings of this thesis. To the same end, the next step in this vein would be to delineate further the various methods and mechanisms through which the adequate vote-buying power of foreign aid from an advanced industrial economy may be amplified or suppressed. Furthermore, this thesis only in part examines the effectiveness of economic soft-power in accruing votes on a critical supranational platform states often use to signal their foreign policy preferences. As such, a more comprehensive study would not only look at the vote-competition that occurs on the diplomatic level but also contextualize it within conventional hard-power channels that states historically engage through, as it would provide a more complete perspective.

APPENDIX

Figure A.1.1: Contested Regions for the US and China Funding



Figure A.2.1: State Fragility Index (2010)



Figure A.3.1: Chinese Aid per capita minus American Aid per capita (2010)



Figure A.3.2: Chinese Aid per capita minus American Aid per capita (2018)



Figure A.5.1: Overall Predictive Probabilities of Logged per capita Chinese Aid Flows on Recipient Voter Alignment with China. (Final Specification)



Figure A.5.2: Overall Predictive Probabilities of Log per capita American Aid Flows on Recipient Voter Alignment with China. (Final Specification)



Figure A.5.3: Overall Predictive Probabilities of Logged per capita Chinese Aid Flows on Recipient Voter Alignment with the US. (Final Specification)



Figure A.5.4: Overall Predictive Probabilities of Log per capita American Aid Flows on Recipient Voter Alignment with the US. (Final Specification)



Figure A.6.1: Overall Predictive Probabilities of Log per capita Russian Aid Flows on Recipient Voter Alignment with China. (Final Specification)



Figure A.6.2: Overall Predictive Probabilities of Log per capita Russian Aid Flows on Recipient Voter Alignment with the US. (Final Specification)



Figure A.7.1: Overall Predictive Probabilities of State Fragility Index Score on Recipient Voter Alignment with China. (Final Specification)



Figure A.7.2: Overall Predictive Probabilities of State Fragility Index Score on Recipient Voter Alignment with the US. (Final Specification)



Figure A.8.1: Overall Predictive Margins for US-China Development Finance Vote Competition with Competitor Flows held constant at their 25th, 75th, and 95th percentile values.

Panel A: Probability of Chinese Vote Alignment Outcomes

Panel B: Probability of American Vote Alignment Outcomes



Figure A.8.2: Overall Predictive Margins for US-China Development Finance Vote Competition with Competitor Flows held constant at 25th, 75th, and 95th percentile values.

Panel A: Marginal Probability of Chinese Vote Alignment Outcomes



Panel B: Marginal Probability of American Vote Alignment Outcomes



Figure A.9.1: Predicted Probabilities of Chinese Alignment on Chinese and American Development Flows



Figure A.9.2: Predicted Probabilities of American Alignment on Chinese and American Development Flows



All Competitor flows held constant at their 95th percentile level to simulate a high degree of competition.

Figure A.9.3: Marginal Probabilities of Chinese Alignment on Chinese and American Development Flows



Figure A.9.4: Marginal Probabilities of American Alignment on Chinese and American Development Flows



All Competitor flows held constant at their 95th percentile level to simulate a high degree of competition.

Figure A.9.5: Predictive Probabilities of Voting Alignment on Issues of the Middle East









Figure A.9.6: Predictive Probabilities of Voting Alignment on Issues of Economic Development









All Flows are Simulated at 25th and 75th Percentile Levels to Simulate Competing Development Aid

Figure A.10.1: Vote Alignments for Countries with China and the US (By Issue)



Figure A.10.2: Vote Alignments for Countries with China and the US (By Issue)



Figure A.10.3: Historical Vote Alignments for Countries with China and the US (By Issue)



Table A.1.1: Logit Final Specification – Development Finance Flows on Voting Alignment (Including Trump Administration Marker)

variable	(1) Matches China	(2) Matches US	(3) Matches UK	(4) Matches RU	(5) Matches FR
log CN Total Flows	0.04685**	-0.02166***	0.01910***	0.01350	0.01811***
	(0.0147)	(0.0052)	(0.0011)	(0.0142)	(0.0012)
log US Total Flows	-0.33733***	0.26974***	0.05189***	-0.06469*	0.04725***
	(0.0354)	(0.0432)	(0.0125)	(0.0303)	(0.0109)
log RU Total Flows	1.20392***	-0.56999***	-0.08920	0.40136**	-0.07438
	(0.1680)	(0.1505)	(0.0955)	(0.1283)	(0.0932)
log UK Total Flows	0.08211	0.07449	-0.06313***	0.05149*	-0.05757***
	(0.0616)	(0.0501)	(0.0145)	(0.0241)	(0.0152)
log FR Total Flows	0.38290***	-0.35077***	0.00157	0.13415*	0.00799
	(0.1002)	(0.0688)	(0.0299)	(0.0537)	(0.0303)
Trump Administration	0.47129***	-0.52414***	0.76851***	0.59824***	0.68244***
	(0.0265)	(0.0417)	(0.0317)	(0.0233)	(0.0334)
POLITY V Score	0.00911	0.01559***	0.00850**	0.00129	0.00889**
	(0.0109)	(0.0036)	(0.0028)	(0.0064)	(0.0028)
State Fragility Index	0.02032**	-0.01359	-0.00261	0.00980	-0.00190
	(0.0073)	(0.0078)	(0.0038)	(0.0066)	(0.0038)
Constant	-0.75157***	-0.92877*	-0.67121**	-0.79558***	-0.73627**
	(0.1365)	(0.4225)	(0.2245)	(0.2073)	(0.2274)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Region Interactions	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Group Interactions	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lags	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period
Lagged DV?	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period
Estimation Method	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT
N	69282	69282	69282	69282	69282
pseudo R-sq	0.043	0.074	0.015	0.027	0.014

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at the region level. Controls not shown but included in all specifications are the natural log of GDP per capita, natural log of real domestic absorption, share of merchandize imports, and population. Political controls include the POLITY V Score and the State Fragility Index. Lags include lagged coeffecients for key time-series variables with two-period lags. Where mentioned, specifications also include Region-specific, Income-group-specific, and factor effects for whether China or the US deviated from the P5 vote for that year's resolution, and whether the recipient was served on the UNSC council in the year it recieved development finance flows fixed effects. All prices are in 2017 constant USD prices, and key continuous variables (value flows) have been scaled by recipient state's population.

Table A.1.2.: LOGIT Final Specification on Issues of the Middle East

variable	(1) Matches China	(2) Matches US	(3) Matches UK	(4) Matches RU	(5) Matches FR
log CN Total Flows	0.32524***	-0.34284***	0.05469***	0.05782***	0.05871***
	(0.0461)	(0.0639)	(0.0078)	(0.0059)	(0.0097)
log US Total Flows	-2.36535***	1.56154***	0.00457	0.04635	0.02586
	(0.1522)	(0.2945)	(0.0446)	(0.0576)	(0.0452)
log RU Total Flows	1.16201	2.54785	2.56619***	4.89256***	2.22533***
	(0.8251)	(2.8510)	(0.2862)	(0.6418)	(0.2977)
log UK Total Flows	1.07005**	-0.74644***	0.01661	-0.00406	-0.00753
	(0.3917)	(0.0554)	(0.0396)	(0.0674)	(0.0395)
log FR Total Flows	2.33923***	-1.23944***	0.16524*	0.18102*	0.14878
	(0.2712)	(0.2620)	(0.0801)	(0.0878)	(0.0811)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Region Interactions	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Group Interactions	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lags	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period
Lagged DV?	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period
Estimation Method	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT
N	16739	14279	17055	17055	17055
pseudo R-sq	0.257	0.224	0.013	0.016	0.012

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Notes: This model includes only those UNGA resolutions that have been marked as dealing with issues of Middle East. Robust standard errors are clustered at the region level. Controls not shown but included in all specifications are the natural log of GDP per capita, natural log of real domestic absorption, share of merchandize imports, and population. Political controls include the POLITY V Score and the State Fragility Index. Lags include lagged coeffecients for key time-series variables with two-period lags. Where mentioned, specifications also include Region-specific, Income-group-specific, and factor effects for whether China or the US deviated from the P5 vote for that year's resolution, and whether the recipient was served on the UNSC council in the year it recieved development finance flows fixed effects. All prices are in 2017 constant USD prices, and key continuous variables (value flows) have been scaled by recipient state's population.

Table A.1.3.: LOGIT Final Specification on Issues of Nuclear Arms

variable	(1) Matches China	(2) Matches US	(3) Matches UK	(4) Matches RU	(5) Matches FR
log CN Total Flows	0.00140	0.08896	0.01921	0.00596	0.02999
	(0.0212)	(0.0621)	(0.0305)	(0.0209)	(0.0376)
log US Total Flows	-0.00476	0.12187	0.06221	0.04009	0.03821
	(0.0105)	(0.1218)	(0.0481)	(0.0437)	(0.0454)
log RU Total Flows	0.21126	-1.21853	-0.06720	-0.68128*	-0.32290
	(0.1506)	(0.9374)	(0.2798)	(0.3219)	(0.3143)
log UK Total Flows	0.03110	-0.33533***	-0.10814***	-0.06954*	-0.04970
	(0.0185)	(0.0884)	(0.0280)	(0.0299)	(0.0394)
log FR Total Flows	0.06187	-0.21834	0.01385	0.00861	-0.00950
	(0.0774)	(0.2317)	(0.0441)	(0.0931)	(0.0492)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Region Interactions	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Group Interactions	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lags	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period
Lagged DV?	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period
Estimation Method	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT
N	10694	9638	10188	10694	10694
pseudo R-sq	0.042	0.147	0.099	0.109	0.148

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Notes: This model includes only those UNGA resolutions that have been marked as dealing with issues of Nuclear Arms. Robust standard errors are clustered at the region level. Controls not shown but included in all specifications are the natural log of GDP per capita, natural log of real domestic absorption, share of merchandize imports, and population. Political controls include the POLITY V Score and the State Fragility Index. Lags include lagged coeffecients for key time-series variables with two-period lags. Where mentioned, specifications also include Region-specific, Income-group-specific, and factor effects for whether China or the US deviated from the P5 vote for that year's resolution, and whether the recipient was served on the UNSC council in the year it recieved development finance flows fixed effects. All prices are in 2017 constant USD prices, and key continuous variables (value flows) have been scaled by recipient state's population.

Table A.1.4.: LOGIT Final Specification on Issues of the Disarmament

variable	(1) Matches China	(2) Matches US	(3) Matches UK	(4) Matches RU	(5) Matches FR
log CN Total Flows	-0.00829	-0.02749	0.01717	-0.02598*	0.01916
	(0.0318)	(0.0182)	(0.0091)	(0.0125)	(0.0099)
log US Total Flows	0.05434*	-0.12600	0.07781*	-0.01099	0.06231*
	(0.0276)	(0.0713)	(0.0329)	(0.0260)	(0.0288)
log RU Total Flows	-0.24340	1.29066***	0.00982	-0.28329	0.01191
	(0.2003)	(0.1663)	(0.2963)	(0.3267)	(0.3283)
log UK Total Flows	-0.14167*	0.38255***	-0.12184***	0.08153***	-0.09294***
	(0.0613)	(0.0871)	(0.0259)	(0.0198)	(0.0268)
log FR Total Flows	0.07491	-0.11809	-0.08698***	0.02250	-0.08847***
	(0.1150)	(0.1465)	(0.0242)	(0.0446)	(0.0233)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Region Interactions	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Group Interactions	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lags	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period
Lagged DV?	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period
Estimation Method	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT
N	14739	14739	14739	14739	14739
pseudo R-sq	0.091	0.126	0.029	0.069	0.028

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Notes: This model includes only those UNGA resolutions that have been marked as dealing with issues of Disarmament. Robust standard errors are clustered at the region level. Controls not shown but included in all specifications are the natural log of GDP per capita, natural log of real domestic absorption, share of merchandize imports, and population. Political controls include the POLITY V Score and the State Fragility Index. Lags include lagged coeffecients for key time-series variables with two-period lags. Where mentioned, specifications also include Region-specific, Income-group-specific, and factor effects for whether China or the US deviated from the P5 vote for that year's resolution, and whether the recipient was served on the UNSC council in the year it recieved development finance flows fixed effects. All prices are in 2017 constant USD prices, and key continuous variables (value flows) have been scaled by recipient state's population.

Table A.1.5.: LOGIT Final Specification on Issues of Colonialism

variable	(1) Matches China	(2) Matches US	(3) Matches UK	(4) Matches RU	(5) Matches FR
log CN Total Flows	0.01680	0.08439	0.00724	0.02279**	0.02574***
	(0.0497)	(0.1129)	(0.0078)	(0.0080)	(0.0058)
log US Total Flows	-0.92447***	0.51849*	0.08881***	0.15897**	0.08736***
	(0.0762)	(0.2061)	(0.0195)	(0.0507)	(0.0191)
log RU Total Flows	3.44106***	-1.08310	-0.01259	0.09855	-0.31090
	(0.9197)	(1.2186)	(0.2225)	(0.2419)	(0.2001)
log UK Total Flows	0.29841**	-0.29408	-0.04773*	-0.05478	-0.02201
	(0.0909)	(0.1834)	(0.0204)	(0.0398)	(0.0187)
log FR Total Flows	1.11880***	-0.80299***	0.06243	0.10892*	0.01790
	(0.2381)	(0.1211)	(0.0349)	(0.0458)	(0.0325)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Region Interactions	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Group Interactions	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lags	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period
Lagged DV?	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period
Estimation Method	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT
N	12388	11386	12388	12388	12388
pseudo R-sq	0.128	0.158	0.047	0.036	0.037

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Notes: This model includes only those UNGA resolutions that have been marked as dealing with issues of Colonialism. Robust standard errors are clustered at the region level. Controls not shown but included in all specifications are the natural log of GDP per capita, natural log of real domestic absorption, share of merchandize imports, and population. Political controls include the POLITY V Score and the State Fragility Index. Lags include lagged coeffecients for key time-series variables with two-period lags. Where mentioned, specifications also include Region-specific, Income-group-specific, and factor effects for whether China or the US deviated from the P5 vote for that year's resolution, and whether the recipient was served on the UNSC council in the year it recieved development finance flows fixed effects. All prices are in 2017 constant USD prices, and key continuous variables (value flows) have been scaled by recipient state's population.

Table A.1.6.: LOGIT Final Specification on Humans Rights Issues

variable	(1) Matches China	(2) Matches US	(3) Matches UK	(4) Matches RU	(5) Matches FR
log CN Total Flows	0.01680	0.01341	0.01358*	-0.01322	0.01548*
	(0.0336)	(0.0158)	(0.0065)	(0.0142)	(0.0064)
log US Total Flows	-0.61648***	0.47325***	0.13133***	0.04058*	0.14784***
	(0.0364)	(0.0309)	(0.0227)	(0.0205)	(0.0257)
log RU Total Flows	1.20584**	-2.68642***	-0.65267***	0.12427	-0.74456***
	(0.4244)	(0.3294)	(0.1231)	(0.1719)	(0.1333)
log UK Total Flows	0.43411***	-0.17167	-0.06826**	0.04050	-0.06731**
	(0.0946)	(0.0913)	(0.0251)	(0.0465)	(0.0230)
log FR Total Flows	0.58350***	-0.66043***	-0.05524***	0.08436*	-0.07505***
	(0.1619)	(0.0927)	(0.0110)	(0.0371)	(0.0120)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Region Interactions	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Group Interactions	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lags	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period
Lagged DV?	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period
Estimation Method	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT
N	22761	22761	22761	22761	22761
pseudo R-sq	0.051	0.114	0.029	0.015	0.024

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Notes: This model includes only those UNGA resolutions that have been marked as dealing with issues of Human Rights. Robust standard errors are clustered at the region level. Controls not shown but included in all specifications are the natural log of GDP per capita, natural log of real domestic absorption, share of merchandize imports, and population. Political controls include the POLITY V Score and the State Fragility Index. Lags include lagged coeffecients for key time-series variables with two-period lags. Where mentioned, specifications also include Region-specific, Income-group-specific, and factor effects for whether China or the US deviated from the P5 vote for that year's resolution, and whether the recipient was served on the UNSC council in the year it recieved development finance flows fixed effects. All prices are in 2017 constant USD prices, and key continuous variables (value flows) have been scaled by recipient state's population.

Table A.1.7.: LOGIT Final Specification on Economic Development Issues

variable	(1) Matches China	(2) Matches US	(3) Matches UK	(4) Matches RU	(5) Matches FR
log CN Total Flows	0.15393***	-0.07106***	-0.01174	0.03647	-0.01424**
	(0.0325)	(0.0114)	(0.0080)	(0.0194)	(0.0054)
log US Total Flows	-0.20253*	0.15622	0.02938*	-0.08948***	0.02884*
	(0.0969)	(0.0845)	(0.0124)	(0.0150)	(0.0129)
log RU Total Flows	0.73243*	-0.34949*	0.29844	0.32377***	0.35941**
	(0.3081)	(0.1687)	(0.1571)	(0.0859)	(0.1281)
log UK Total Flows	-0.18756**	0.20442*	0.05021***	0.09680**	0.05894***
	(0.0697)	(0.0957)	(0.0128)	(0.0324)	(0.0142)
log FR Total Flows	0.42488***	-0.27046**	-0.01808	0.21726***	-0.01308
	(0.0594)	(0.0948)	(0.0326)	(0.0498)	(0.0317)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Region Interactions	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Group Interactions	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lags	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period
Lagged DV?	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period
Estimation Method	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT
N	8241	5550	9638	9249	9638
pseudo R-sq	0.139	0.068	0.077	0.058	0.047

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Notes: This model includes only those UNGA resolutions that have been marked as dealing with issues of Economic Development. Robust standard errors are clustered at the region level. Controls not shown but included in all specifications are the natural log of GDP per capita, natural log of real domestic absorption, share of merchandize imports, and population. Political controls include the POLITY V Score and the State Fragility Index. Lags include lagged coeffecients for key time-series variables with two-period lags. Where mentioned, specifications also include Region-specific, Income-group-specific, and factor effects for whether China or the US deviated from the P5 vote for that year's resolution, and whether the recipient was served on the UNSC council in the year it recieved development finance flows fixed effects. All prices are in 2017 constant USD prices, and key continuous variables (value flows) have been scaled by recipient state's population.

Table A.2.1: LinkTest results for Aggregate Flows Final Specification

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
variable	Matches China	Matches US	Matches UK	Matches RU	Matches FR
prediction (_hat)	0.83556***	0.99265***	0.95243***	1.00279***	0.98094***
	(0.1116)	(0.1436)	(0.0841)	(0.0771)	(0.0981)
prediction-squared (_hat_sq)	0.04688	-0.00118	-0.06193	-0.00173	-0.02390
	(0.0313)	(0.0226)	(0.1036)	(0.0459)	(0.1176)
Constant	0.13129	-0.01077	-0.00369	-0.00086	-0.00187
	(0.0952)	(0.2202)	(0.0129)	(0.0305)	(0.0146)
N	69282	69282	69282	71991	71991
LR chi-sq	2410.24	1912.7	1394.16	2194.55	1242.57
pseudo R-sq	0.0426	0.0742	0.0148	0.0251	0.0127

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Table A.2.2: LinkTest results for Disaggregated Flows Specification

variable	Matches China	Matches US	Matches UK	Matches RU	Matches FR
prediction (_hat)	1.0168***	0.92363***	0.94592***	1.02728***	0.90622***
	(0.0958)	(0.1346)	(0.0751)	(0.0733)	(0.0825)
prediction-squared (_hat_sq)	-0.00474	-0.0123	-0.07052	-0.01562	-0.12230
	(0.0264)	(0.0213)	(0.0916)	(0.0402)	(0.1015)
Constant	-0.01339	-0.11058	-0.00391	-0.00927	-0.00705
	(0.0826)	(0.2048)	(0.0124)	(0.0315)	(0.0125)
N	68989	68989	68989	68989	68989
LR chi-sq	2747.83	2058.51	1454.7	2371.19	1361.48
pseudo R-sq	0.0488	0.0806	0.0155	0.0288	0.0145

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Table A.3.1: LOGIT Aggregate Flows on Region Interactions

variable	(1) Matches China	(2) Matches US	(3) Matches UK	(4) Matches RU	(5) Matches FR
log CN Total Flows × EAO	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
log CN Total Flows × MENA	0.05609*	-0.03128*	-0.00834***	0.01583	-0.01138***
	(0.0252)	(0.0129)	(0.0025)	(0.0144)	(0.0017)
log CN Total Flows × SCA	0.01624	0.01726	-0.01412***	0.02648***	-0.01332***
	(0.0090)	(0.0119)	(0.0024)	(0.0049)	(0.0017)
log CN Total Flows × SSA	-0.02672	0.02130*	-0.01382***	-0.00327	-0.01318***
	(0.0156)	(0.0087)	(0.0008)	(0.0084)	(0.0008)
log US Total Flows × EAO	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
log US Total Flows × MENA	0.32364***	-0.15524***	-0.03535*	0.03919	-0.02847
	(0.0331)	(0.0271)	(0.0152)	(0.0230)	(0.0146)
log US Total Flows × SCA	0.16301*	-0.07826	0.01546	0.14966***	0.01665
	(0.0808)	(0.0421)	(0.0210)	(0.0353)	(0.0201)
log US Total Flows × SSA	0.29935***	-0.22793***	-0.03753**	0.05707**	-0.03223*
	(0.0272)	(0.0312)	(0.0135)	(0.0187)	(0.0135)
log RU Total Flows × EAO	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
log RU Total Flows × MENA	-1.15620**	0.68691***	-0.05109	0.20426	-0.03019
	(0.3586)	(0.0804)	(0.1620)	(0.1861)	(0.1649)
log RU Total Flows × SCA	-0.91255***	0.51276**	0.14767	-0.50367***	0.13716
	(0.1414)	(0.1580)	(0.0929)	(0.0975)	(0.0887)
log RU Total Flows × SSA	-0.77198***	-0.00112	0.09448	-0.27027*	0.04316
	(0.1290)	(0.3210)	(0.1539)	(0.1282)	(0.1470)
log UK Total Flows × EAO	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
log UK Total Flows × MENA	-0.03937	-0.21575***	0.04055	-0.00553	0.02913
	(0.0480)	(0.0436)	(0.0214)	(0.0277)	(0.0218)
log UK Total Flows × SCA	0.05548	-0.22855**	-0.00390	-0.13397***	-0.00752
	(0.0970)	(0.0826)	(0.0192)	(0.0142)	(0.0173)
log UK Total Flows × SSA	-0.11302*	-0.02109	0.06706***	-0.04507***	0.05870***
	(0.0483)	(0.0339)	(0.0125)	(0.0103)	(0.0115)
log FR Total Flows × EAO	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
log FR Total Flows × MENA	-0.27582***	0.31309***	0.01887	-0.11440***	0.01623
	(0.0606)	(0.0394)	(0.0173)	(0.0312)	(0.0164)
log FR Total Flows × SCA	-0.19175	0.28128***	0.00798	-0.12425	0.00979
	(0.1019)	(0.0107)	(0.0219)	(0.0649)	(0.0221)
log FR Total Flows × SSA	-0.35752***	0.32973***	-0.00552	-0.12753*	-0.00867
	(0.0880)	(0.0522)	(0.0236)	(0.0534)	(0.0231)
Constant	-0.28028	-1.45291***	0.09730	-0.19734	-0.05383
	(0.1555)	(0.4290)	(0.2302)	(0.1938)	(0.2361)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Estimation Method	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT
N	69282	69282	69282	69282	69282
pseudo R-sq	0.043	0.074	0.015	0.027	0.014

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Legend for Region abbreviations: EAO (East Asia and Oceania), MENA (Middle-East and North Africa), SCA (South and Central Asia), SSA (Sub-Saharan Africa)

Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at the region level. All estimates that are zeros are the baselevels for the flow × region interactions. Controls not shown but included in all specifications are the natural log of GDP per capita, natural log of real domestic absorption, share of merchandize imports, and population. Political controls include the POLITY V Score and the State Fragility Index. Lags include lagged coeffecients for key time-series variables with two-period lags. Where mentioned, specifications also include Region-specific, Income-group-specific, and factor effects for whether China or the US deviated from the P5 vote for that year's resolution, and whether the recipient was served on the UNSC council in the year it recieved development finance flows fixed effects. All prices are in 2017 constant USD prices, and key continuous variables (value flows) have been scaled by recipient state's population.

Table A.3.2: LOGIT Aggregate Flows on Income Group Interactions

variable	(1) Matches China	(2) Matches US	(3) Matches UK	(4) Matches RU	(5) Matches FR
log CN Total Flows × LIC	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
log CN Total Flows × LMIC	-0.05488**	0.01599	-0.01035***	-0.02873***	-0.00958***
	(0.0170)	(0.0092)	(0.0014)	(0.0042)	(0.0015)
log CN Total Flows × UMIC	-0.06549*	0.03306	-0.00544	-0.03651*	-0.00624
	(0.0264)	(0.0205)	(0.0065)	(0.0181)	(0.0064)
log US Total Flows × LIC	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
log US Total Flows × LMIC	0.07705*	-0.11105***	-0.02349***	0.03524	-0.02072***
	(0.0356)	(0.0190)	(0.0055)	(0.0218)	(0.0046)
log US Total Flows × UMIC	-0.02692	-0.02374	-0.00948	-0.01139	-0.00795
	(0.0148)	(0.0250)	(0.0077)	(0.0240)	(0.0067)
log RU Total Flows × LIC	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
log RU Total Flows × LMIC	-0.29190***	-0.01798	-0.05120***	0.02406	-0.05199**
	(0.0871)	(0.0445)	(0.0149)	(0.0304)	(0.0173)
log RU Total Flows × UMIC	0.44091	-0.55367	0.01580	-0.37718**	0.04376
	(0.3285)	(0.8750)	(0.3962)	(0.1345)	(0.3863)
log UK Total Flows × LIC	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
log UK Total Flows × LMIC	0.05527	-0.04690	0.02142***	0.00793	0.02102***
	(0.0488)	(0.0466)	(0.0061)	(0.0232)	(0.0060)
log UK Total Flows × UMIC	-0.01309	-0.06002	0.01403***	-0.00383	0.01547**
	(0.0168)	(0.0343)	(0.0041)	(0.0157)	(0.0051)
log FR Total Flows × LIC	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
log FR Total Flows × LMIC	-0.12227***	0.10010***	-0.00478	-0.04742**	-0.00986
	(0.0098)	(0.0260)	(0.0138)	(0.0150)	(0.0138)
log FR Total Flows × UMIC	-0.07744*	0.04553	-0.01601**	-0.00282	-0.02014**
	(0.0344)	(0.0404)	(0.0051)	(0.0187)	(0.0065)
Constant	-0.28028	-1.45291***	0.09730	-0.19734	-0.05383
	(0.1555)	(0.4290)	(0.2302)	(0.1938)	(0.2361)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Estimation Method	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT
N	69282	69282	69282	69282	69282
pseudo R-sq	0.043	0.074	0.015	0.027	0.014

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Legend for Income Group abbreviations: LIC (Lower Income Countries), LMIC (Lower-Middle Income Countries), UMIC (Upper-Middle Income Countries).

Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at the region level. All estimates that are zeros are the baselevels for the flow × region interactions. Controls not shown but included in all specifications are the natural log of GDP per capita, natural log of real domestic absorption, share of merchandize imports, and population. Political controls include the POLITY V Score and the State Fragility Index. Lags include lagged coeffecients for key time-series variables with two-period lags. Where mentioned, specifications also include Region-specific, Income-group-specific, and factor effects for whether China or the US deviated from the P5 vote for that year's resolution, and whether the recipient was served on the UNSC council in the year it recieved development finance flows fixed effects. All prices are in 2017 constant USD prices, and key continuous variables (value flows) have been scaled by recipient state's population.

Table A.3.3: LOGIT Aggregate Flows on Income Group Interactions

For Chinese Deviations from the P5 Majority Vote

variable	(1) Matches China	(2) Matches US	(3) Matches UK	(4) Matches RU	(5) Matches FR
log CN Total Flows × CN No Deviation	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
log CN Total Flows × CN Deviation	-0.10449	0.14381***	-0.02576	-0.17223*	-0.03918
	(0.0561)	(0.0357)	(0.0431)	(0.0690)	(0.0444)
log US Total Flows × CN No Deviation	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
log US Total Flows × CN Deviation	-0.24346***	-0.13085	-0.43363***	-0.67038***	-0.43609***
	(0.0394)	(0.0736)	(0.0559)	(0.0744)	(0.0540)
log RU Total Flows × CN No Deviation	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
log RU Total Flows × CN Deviation	-0.07928*	-0.37415*	-0.38281*	-0.28888	-0.34811*
	(0.0341)	(0.1704)	(0.1910)	(0.2171)	(0.1735)
log UK Total Flows × CN No Deviation	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
log UK Total Flows × CN Deviation	-0.04627	-0.04936	-0.21581	-0.37775*	-0.22092
	(0.0827)	(0.1540)	(0.1411)	(0.1577)	(0.1378)
log FR Total Flows × CN No Deviation	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
log FR Total Flows × CN Deviation	-0.13295***	-0.03766	-0.30878**	-0.51655**	-0.31716**
	(0.0350)	(0.0783)	(0.1024)	(0.1610)	(0.1033)
Constant	0.60830	-1.17134***	0.59233***	0.87887***	0.60695***
	(0.4381)	(0.2172)	(0.1469)	(0.0943)	(0.1482)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Estimation Method	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT
N	84220	84220	84220	84220	84220
pseudo R-sq	0.052	0.033	0.037	0.125	0.039

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at the region level. All estimates that are zeros are the baselevels for the flow × income group interactions. Controls not shown but included in all specifications are the natural log of GDP per capita, natural log of real domestic absorption, share of merchandize imports, and population. Political controls include the POLITY V Score and the State Fragility Index. Lags include lagged coeffecients for key time-series variables with two-period lags. Where mentioned, specifications also include Region-specific, Income-group-specific, and factor effects for whether China or the US deviated from the P5 vote for that year's resolution, and whether the recipient was served on the UNSC council in the year it recieved development finance flows fixed effects. All prices are in 2017 constant USD prices, and key continuous variables (value flows) have been scaled by recipient state's population. CN Deviations are defined as instances where the vote on a particular issue was NOT split across the P5 members in the UNGA AND China deviated from the majority vote for this issue.

For American Deviations from the P5 Majority Vote

variable	(1) Matches China	(2) Matches US	(3) Matches UK	(4) Matches RU	(5) Matches FR
log CN Total Flows × US No Deviation	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
log CN Total Flows × US Deviation	-0.01169	-0.12226	0.23238*	0.04654	0.22017*
	(0.0693)	(0.1378)	(0.1147)	(0.0765)	(0.1114)
log US Total Flows × US No Deviation	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
log US Total Flows × US Deviation	0.93064***	-1.58383***	1.63897***	1.18036***	1.62787***
	(0.1443)	(0.3632)	(0.3549)	(0.1887)	(0.3629)
log RU Total Flows × US No Deviation	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
log RU Total Flows × US Deviation	2.75399	0.30560	0.96804	2.57435	1.17667
	(1.8188)	(0.4957)	(1.4716)	(2.1069)	(1.6919)
log UK Total Flows × US No Deviation	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
log UK Total Flows × US Deviation	0.09488	-0.47891	0.62621	0.24834	0.63417
	(0.0514)	(0.3047)	(0.3885)	(0.1593)	(0.3750)
log FR Total Flows × US No Deviation	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
log FR Total Flows × US Deviation	0.06283	-0.40883	0.62922	0.26073	0.62709
	(0.0952)	(0.2772)	(0.3832)	(0.1611)	(0.3812)
Constant	0.27222	-0.70318**	-0.25820	0.06813	-0.24789
	(0.6696)	(0.2246)	(0.2952)	(0.2500)	(0.2746)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year Fixed Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Estimation Method	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT
N	84220	84220	84220	84220	84220
pseudo R-sq	0.108	0.134	0.392	0.172	0.386

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at the region level. All estimates that are zeros are the baselevels for the flow × income group interactions. Controls not shown but included in all specifications are the natural log of GDP per capita, natural log of real domestic absorption, share of merchandize imports, and population. Political controls include the POLITY V Score and the State Fragility Index. Lags include lagged coeffecients for key time-series variables with two-period lags. Where mentioned, specifications also include Region-specific, Income-group-specific, and factor effects for whether China or the US deviated from the P5 vote for that year's resolution, and whether the recipient was served on the UNSC council in the year it recieved development finance flows fixed effects. All prices are in 2017 constant USD prices, and key continuous variables (value flows) have been scaled by recipient state's population. US Deviations are defined as instances where the vote on a particular issue was NOT split across the P5 members in the UNGA AND US deviated from the majority vote for this issue.

Table A.4.1: LOGIT on Disaggregated American and Chinese Development Finance

variable	(1a) Matches CN	(1b) Matches CN	(2a) Matches US	(2b) Matches US	(3a) Matches UK	(3b) Matches UK	(4a) Matches RU	(4b) Matches RU	(5a) Matches FR	(5b) Matches FR
Debt	-0.01111	-0.09988	-0.23268***	0.23521*	-0.02430**	0.07815***	-0.05511***	-0.06122	-0.02994***	0.03535*
(a): CN, (b) US	(0.0199)	(0.0612)	(0.0215)	(0.1042)	(0.0075)	(0.0224)	(0.0056)	(0.0472)	(0.0068)	(0.0162)
Agriculture	0.19778***	0.36317	0.03761	-1.05769***	0.00102	-0.30966***	0.03135	0.24062	-0.00022	-0.29790***
(a): CN, (b) US	(0.0197)	(0.2978)	(0.0274)	(0.1664)	(0.0241)	(0.0706)	(0.0236)	(0.1978)	(0.0241)	(0.0668)
Economic Development	-0.35909***	-0.00079	-0.07659	-0.13206	-0.01999	-0.08546	-0.23720***	0.29431***	-0.02993**	-0.08041
(a): CN, (b) US	(0.0557)	(0.1547)	(0.1520)	(0.1615)	(0.0140)	(0.0580)	(0.0193)	(0.0658)	(0.0095)	(0.0577)
Humanitarian Assistance	0.37332**	-0.16597**	-0.47689**	0.32264***	0.07804*	0.07622***	0.26433***	-0.03724*	0.08922*	0.06262***
(a): CN, (b) US	(0.1326)	(0.0548)	(0.1809)	(0.0488)	(0.0309)	(0.0179)	(0.0263)	(0.0158)	(0.0353)	(0.0152)
Education	0.31145***	-0.24301***	-0.40565*	0.41143***	-0.01271	0.05581	-0.02954	-0.18535***	-0.00880	0.05259
(a): CN, (b) US	(0.0380)	(0.0644)	(0.1735)	(0.0819)	(0.0154)	(0.0303)	(0.0411)	(0.0220)	(0.0162)	(0.0303)
Environmental Protection	-0.00670	-0.64789***	-1.00024***	0.22517***	-0.01563	-0.03192	-0.04209	-0.15115	-0.01127	-0.02781
(a): CN, (b) US	(0.0772)	(0.1534)	(0.1895)	(0.0613)	(0.0441)	(0.0255)	(0.0678)	(0.1243)	(0.0420)	(0.0240)
Health	0.08013	-0.06831	0.01746	0.68439***	0.02502	0.05426*	0.04810***	-0.05874	0.02668*	0.05470
(a): CN, (b) US	(0.0449)	(0.1436)	(0.0990)	(0.0582)	(0.0128)	(0.0259)	(0.0102)	(0.0967)	(0.0134)	(0.0324)
Public Sector and NGOs	0.01845	-0.23921	0.05308	-0.11348	0.00439	-0.05639***	-0.01030	-0.05519	-0.00020	-0.06595***
(a): CN, (b) US	(0.0517)	(0.1381)	(0.0463)	(0.1760)	(0.0096)	(0.0076)	(0.0187)	(0.0782)	(0.0109)	(0.0107)
Infrastructure	0.04665*	0.23019***	-0.04889*	-0.11824	0.00891***	0.09388***	0.01220	0.05931***	0.01084**	0.08618***
(a): CN, (b) US	(0.0205)	(0.0336)	(0.0202)	(0.0796)	(0.0026)	(0.0112)	(0.0127)	(0.0075)	(0.0033)	(0.0102)
Other	0.02465	-0.64820***	-0.03199	0.70901***	0.03629**	-0.02256	0.00521	-0.15136	0.02497*	-0.01026
(a): CN, (b) US	(0.0422)	(0.1685)	(0.0432)	(0.1038)	(0.0138)	(0.0147)	(0.0273)	(0.0807)	(0.0112)	(0.0138)
Russia Total Flows	1.20359*		0.05173		0.03585		0.43992*		0.03836	
	(0.5831)		(0.1333)		(0.0602)		(0.1833)		(0.0816)	
UK Total Flows	-0.13118**		0.17412***		-0.06366***		-0.02153		-0.05851***	
	(0.0483)		(0.0351)		(0.0023)		(0.0144)		(0.0041)	
France Total Flows	0.32971**		-0.41733***		0.02919		0.14687**		0.03500*	
	(0.1238)		(0.0764)		(0.0188)		(0.0475)		(0.0176)	
Constant	0.89700*		-1.72184***		0.20594		0.43770		0.08166	
	(0.3879)		(0.3588)		(0.1433)		(0.2298)		(0.1333)	
Controls	Y		Y		Y		Y		Y	
Fixed Effects	Year		Year		Year		Year		Year	
Region Interactions	Y		Y		Y		Y		Y	
Income Group Interactions	Y		Y		Y		Y		Y	
Lags	2-Period		2-Period		2-Period		2-Period		2-Period	
Lagged DV?	Y		Y		Y		Y		Y	
Estimation Method	LOGIT		LOGIT		LOGIT		LOGIT		LOGIT	
N	68989		68989		68989		68989		68989	
pseudo R-sq	0.049		0.081		0.015		0.029		0.014	

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Notes: Columns have been split into two stacks for readibility purposes. All disaggregated flows in columns (#a) pertain to disaggregated Chinese flows, (#b) pertain to disaggregated American flows. Robust standard errors are clustered at the region level. Controls not shown but included in all specifications are the natural log of GDP per capita, natural log of real domestic absorption, share of merchandize imports, and population. Political controls include the POLITY V Score and the State Fragility Index. Lags include lagged coeffecients for key time-series variables with two-period lags. Where mentioned, specifications also include Region-specific, Income-group-specific, and factor effects for whether China or the US deviated from the P5 vote for that year's resolution, and whether the recipient was served on the UNSC council in the year it recieved development finance flows fixed effects. All prices are in 2017 constant USD prices, and key continuous variables (value flows) have been scaled by recipient state's population and log normalized.

Table A.5.1.: LOGIT Multilateral Development Lending Institutions on Vote Alignment

variable	(1) Matches China	(2) Matches US	(3) Matches UK	(4) Matches RU	(5) Matches FR
log AIIB Flows	0.21276	-0.21391**	-0.04965	0.16291***	-0.07083
	(0.1874)	(0.0734)	(0.0683)	(0.0444)	(0.0645)
log AfDB Flows	-0.12765***	-0.10777	-0.10870***	-0.10633***	-0.10888***
	(0.0221)	(0.0569)	(0.0093)	(0.0257)	(0.0081)
log AfDB other-concessional Flows	0.13559	0.40107	0.12471**	0.21237	0.09780*
	(0.0884)	(0.2289)	(0.0416)	(0.1262)	(0.0394)
log AfDF Flows	-0.25002**	-0.37055*	-0.14995***	-0.20462*	-0.12900***
	(0.0815)	(0.1691)	(0.0326)	(0.1037)	(0.0308)
log ADB Flows	0.05835	-0.10891	0.00925	0.08460	0.00786
	(0.1843)	(0.1458)	(0.0282)	(0.0547)	(0.0274)
log DAC Total Flows	0.21623***	-0.35367	-0.03597	-0.04105	-0.05571
	(0.0541)	(0.2294)	(0.0622)	(0.0523)	(0.0608)
log EUI Flows	-0.28365*	0.23094	-0.01754	-0.03576	-0.00911
	(0.1172)	(0.1193)	(0.0273)	(0.0837)	(0.0270)
log IMF Concessional Flows	0.00425	-0.04200	0.01607*	0.05711	0.01208
	(0.0368)	(0.0348)	(0.0080)	(0.0405)	(0.0092)
Constant	1.88879	-2.43381*	0.03544	0.03604	-0.05139
	(1.2899)	(1.0658)	(0.4314)	(0.3805)	(0.4241)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Region Interactions	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Group Interactions	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lags	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period
Lagged DV?	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period
Estimation Method	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT
N	69282	69282	69282	69282	69282
pseudo R-sq	0.044	0.076	0.015	0.027	0.014

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at the region level. Controls not shown but included in all specifications are the natural log of GDP per capita, natural log of real domestic absorption, share of merchandize imports, and population. Political controls include the POLITY V Score and the State Fragility Index. The POLITY V score is a continuous scale from -10 to +10 and determines the degree to which a country is Autocratic or Democratic and the State Fragility Index is a continuous scale from 0 to 25 where 0 indicates "no fragility" and 25 indicates "extreme fragility".Lags include lagged coeffecients for key time-series variables with two-period lags. Where mentioned, specifications also include Region-specific, Income-group-specific, and factor effects for whether China or the US deviated from the P5 vote for that year's resolution, and whether the recipient was served on the UNSC council in the year it recieved development finance flows fixed effects. All prices are in 2017 constant USD prices, and key continuous variables (value flows) have been scaled by recipient state's population.

Table A.5.2.: LOGIT P5 – Recipient Export Dyads on Vote Alignment (US – China Highlights)

variable	(1) Matches China	(2) Matches US	(3) Matches UK	(4) Matches RU	(5) Matches FR
log CN Exports	-0.00400	0.15170**	-0.00272	0.02081	-0.00727
	(0.1476)	(0.0570)	(0.0071)	(0.0387)	(0.0059)
log FR Exports	0.24631***	-0.19800***	0.04980***	0.08211***	0.05451***
	(0.0178)	(0.0182)	(0.0109)	(0.0146)	(0.0113)
log RU Exports	0.01508	-0.08137*	-0.03392	0.01833	-0.03925
	(0.1006)	(0.0413)	(0.0294)	(0.0332)	(0.0285)
log UK Exports	-0.33023*	0.15978	-0.09396***	-0.17250***	-0.08639***
	(0.1334)	(0.0961)	(0.0146)	(0.0504)	(0.0104)
log US Exports	0.02650	0.10213	0.09536***	0.07770*	0.09117***
	(0.0948)	(0.0713)	(0.0211)	(0.0353)	(0.0188)
POLITY V Score	0.00388	0.01718***	0.00773**	0.00017	0.00805**
	(0.0101)	(0.0021)	(0.0029)	(0.0036)	(0.0029)
State Fragility Index	0.01458	-0.00789	-0.00103	0.00804	-0.00033
	(0.0136)	(0.0078)	(0.0023)	(0.0050)	(0.0024)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Region Interactions	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Income Group Interactions	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lags	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period
Lagged DV?	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period	2-Period
Estimation Method	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT	LOGIT
N	68247	68247	68247	68247	68247
pseudo R-sq	0.044	0.076	0.015	0.028	0.014

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered at the region level. Controls not shown but included in all specifications are the natural log of GDP per capita, natural log of real domestic absorption, share of merchandize imports, and population. Further Political controls include the POLITY V Score and the State Fragility Index. POLITY V score is a continuous scale from -10 to +10 and determines the degree to which a country is Autocratic or Democratic and the State Fragility Index is a continuous scale from 0 to 25 where 0 indicates "no fragility" and 25 indicates "extreme fragility" Lags include lagged coeffecients for key time-series variables with two-period lags. All prices are in 2017 constant USD prices, and export value flows data have been scaled by recipient state's population. Where mentioned, specifications also include Region-specific, Income-group-specific, and factor effects for whether China or the US deviated from the P5 vote for that year's resolution, and whether the recipient was served on the UNSC council in the year it recieved development finance flows fixed effects.

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