

Power politics or outstanding universal value?

The politicisation of the UNESCO World Heritage List.



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Summary

The United Nations Educational, Scientific & Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is the principal international organization devoted to the worldwide protection and promotion of natural and cultural heritage deemed of outstanding universal value. To potentially jeopardize the prestige and effectiveness of the organization, however, is the politicisation of its most renowned instrument: the World Heritage Convention and the World Heritage List. Politicisation is intended here as the presence of political factors influencing the convention activity but that are outside its mandate. The present thesis investigates the phenomenon and aims to discover to what extent State Parties' political factors in the World Heritage Committee influence the chances of enlisting a site in the UNESCO World Heritage List. This has been done through a quantitative analysis of data spanning from 2003 to 2019, offering the most recent findings on the matter. Some political factors showed to influence the probability of inscription. In particular, the more years a country occupied a seat in the World Heritage Committee, the more heritage it has enlisted, and the more it financially contributes to the World Heritage Fund, the higher the probabilities it has to see its sites inscribed in the future.

Keywords: UNESCO, World Heritage List, Politicisation, probability of inscription

Acknowledgements

I have never been so sure about the topic of a thesis -at least in its broadest terms- as I have been for this one. With this research I had the intention, from the very beginning, to merge my two major interests and areas of expertise: cultural heritage studies and international organizations. I believe I have found the right match focusing on the UNESCO World Heritage List.

My academic experience and familiarity in writing theses sensibly helped me in the process, from the psychological impact of carrying out such extensive work to the more practical matters (e.g. conducting the research, managing the schedule). Nonetheless, this project has been challenging as well as a great opportunity to discover new theoretical concepts, statistical methods, and scientific approaches.

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List of abbreviations

AB = Advisory Body

IO = International Organization

WHC = World Heritage Committee

WHF = World Heritage Fund

WHL = World Heritage List

UNSC = United Nations Security Council

1. Introduction

The Colosseum in Rome, Machu Pichu in Peru, the Taj Mahal in India, the Van Nelle Factory in Rotterdam, all these sites share their membership in the UNESCO World Heritage List (henceforth, WHL). They, together with other 1,117 sites around the world, are part of a program whose objective is of undeniable importance and urgency: the protection of the cultural and natural heritage of outstanding universal value. Preservation and promotion are necessary activities to ensure that the heritage value relying on the past can be appreciated in the present and promised to future generations. Founded in 1972, the WHL represents the largest and most renowned common attempt to do so. After 44 years since its first ordinary session in 1977, the convention has an almost worldwide jurisdiction with 194 State Parties having ratified it.

1.1. Background

The United Nations Educational, Scientific & Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is one of the specialised agencies of the United Nations. The mission of this international organization (IO) is “to build peace through international cooperation in Education, the Sciences and Culture” (UNESCO, 2021e). Within the cultural field, the *Convention concerning the Protection of the World's Cultural and Natural Heritage* (henceforth, the Convention) is its spearhead in heritage preservation.

“The most effective international legal instrument for the protection of the cultural and natural heritage” is its list, the WHL, which includes all sites considered of “outstanding universal value” (Strasser, 2002, p. 215-216; Rao, 2010, p. 161; UNESCO, n.d.). This ensures a series of rights to the site, sensibly limits its exploitation, and promotes its sustainment. Furthermore, the conferred label sensibly benefits the State Party whose site belongs to. The enlisting in the WHL raises the attention of different actors: from the general public and media, in quality of tourist attraction; to the local public authorities, more willing to put the preservation of an important site on top of their agenda; to donors wishful to contribute to the cause; to for-profit firms (e.g. tourist guides, sponsoring) (Frey & Steiner, 2011).

The benefits linked to the WHL label logically generate an incentive for many stakeholders, which might try to exploit resources (either private or public) for their profit, instead of the common goal of the Convention. Through the WHL, countries might seek to enlist as many sites as possible to increase tourism influxes and international prestige for their

culture. To do so, they are likely to exert their political power. This creates a problem, which can be defined as politicisation, according to which factors that are political in nature influence the activity of the Convention (Frey, Pamini, & Steiner, 2013).

Within the Convention, the phenomenon of politicisation can occur at multiple stages and from numerous actors. One case is the influence member states can exert during the nomination and evaluation of a site by the World Heritage Committee (henceforth WHC). This is the temporary board composed of representatives from 21 countries among the State Parties that have ratified the convention. It is entitled, among other duties, to ultimately decide the acceptance or rejection of the site in the WHL (UNESCO, 2021d). Since 1977, for all nominated sites the decisions are taken during the annual ordinary session of the WHC (UNESCO, 2021a).

1.2. Problem statement

Academic literature on the politicisation of IOs has grown in the last decades (Carraro, 2017). Similarly, the WHL has been extensively studied in the cultural and economic fields (Frey & Steiner, 2011). However, “little evidence has been produced regarding the political and economic factors that influence decisions in UNESCO World Heritage”, a phenomenon ascribed to UNESCO since the 70s (Bertacchini, Liuzza, & Meskell, 2017, p. 345; Lyons, Baldwin, & Mcnemar, 1977). For this reason, the present research will try to answer the following research question:

To what extent State Parties’ political factors in the World Heritage Committee influences the chances of enlisting a site in the UNESCO World Heritage List, from 2003 to 2019?

1.3. Societal relevance

It is important to investigate the politicisation of the UNESCO WHL as a matter of high societal relevance since it could affect different parts of society (Lenhert, Miller, & Wonka, 2007).

First, it concerns all parties within the scope of the UNESCO WHL, like the governments of the different member states and their delegates. Acknowledging the potential influence of political factors on the outcome of the enlisting process can sensibly change the approach chosen by these actors when advocating for or against the inscription of a site. They might be less willing to invest resources in sites having small chances to be enlisted, and more in those which do, based on criteria that do not concern heritage quality. This could

consequently result, for instance, in a great imbalance on the representation of sites in the list, first and foremost regarding their country of origin.

Secondly, the relevance of the expertise provided by the advisory bodies (henceforth, ABs) might vacillate. The suggestion of the ABs is assumed to reflect a judgement of expertise on cultural and natural aspects. The fact that political factors outside the realm of cultural and natural characteristics could prevaricate is troublesome, if not alarming for the institution of the ABs itself. The expertise of the ABs is officially considered the only relevant and reputable opinion regarding sites eligibility. The credibility of this institution might be at stake if other factors subvert their judgement.

Actors outside the scope of the Convention might be affected, too. Local administrations, for instance, could decide whether to candidate a site in light of the chances it has to be inscribed. Similarly, private donors might reconsider the UNESCO WHL reputation, hence their support for it.

Indeed, it is ultimately the overall credibility of the WHL label and UNESCO institution to be at stake. Currently, the list is the major international instrument to safeguard heritage. Perceived unfairness in any step of the process from the public or experts is likely to affect its legitimacy, therefore its internal stability and effectiveness (Kahler, 2016).

1.4. Scientific relevance

The study also demonstrates a marked scientific relevance. The research aims to add to the academic literature on both IOs and heritage studies. It offers further insights on the decision mechanisms within IOs, and relevant factors influencing them. The added value of this study is to approach a scarcely addressed topic (the politicisation of the WHL) from another theoretical perspective, namely international relations and political science studies. In other words, it will adopt different concepts to enlarge the scientific discourse on the matter. Academic literature on the topic mainly pertains to cultural economics, and empirical research has been conducted only by few authors and for a limited period of time. No data has been collected after the year 2013. The most recent dynamics in the international arena, such as the progressive polarization between the West and the East, particularly between the United States of America and China, have probably had consequences on the WHL. Notable is the withdrawal of US financial contributions to the Convention, and the ever-greater role China has assumed in it (Sherwood, 2011). As previous literature suggests, “there is reason to believe that the study of such phenomenon characterized by diplomacy and political factors

within the international arena requires more detailed work [...]” (Bertacchini & Saccone, 2012, p. 349). In practice, the present research will contribute to cover this gap and stimulate a constructive and critical dialogue with previous scientific research by applying quantitative, statistical methods comparable to previous research to a more recent and still unstudied, empirical domain.

1.5. Outline of the thesis

To report the conducted research, the thesis is structure as follows:

First, a brief chapter on the WHL will offer further context about the Convention and the nomination procedure, to familiarise with the case study, the terms, and the dynamics of the Convention.

Second, the following chapter offers a literature review of previous relevant academic studies. Starting from two separate research spheres, on politicisation and UNESCO, it progressively moves towards the whole literature on UNESCO WHL politicisation. Notions like those of politicisation and cultural diplomacy are explained to set guidelines for the theoretical framework. Here, then, only the most useful concepts from the literature are theoretically developed. This chapter individuates a dependent variable, the chances of successfully inscribe a site in the WHL, and multiple explaining factors. For each explaining factor, the theoretical link between it and the impact it has on the inscription is treated extensively and condensed in a hypothesis. In total, the chapter formulates eight different hypotheses.

The fifth chapter presents the thesis’ research design, where the empirical research is explained in detail and the theoretical concepts are operationalised into measurable variables. To answer the research question, the thesis will conduct a statistical panel data analysis, whose outcome will be reported in the data and results chapter. This includes eventual problems encountered during the data collection and the relevant decisions taken to overcome them. The chapter is structured according to the eight hypotheses, providing a clear answer based on a thorough discussion of the results and comparison with previous literature. The chapter’s tables have a pivotal role in resuming the results of all analyses performed.

Finally, the conclusion offers a recapitulation of the whole process and explicitly answer the research question. Moreover, it provides additional insights around the thesis’ results and limitations, trying to suggest future academic research and practical recommendation for the Convention.

2. The World Heritage Convention and the UNESCO World Heritage List

To better contextualise the whole research, the current chapter offers a brief overview of the case study: the UNESCO WHL. The most important historical passages, characteristics and stakeholders are presented.

2.1. The historical path

After the Second World War, a series of international campaigns were organised to protect important monuments from destruction. The first was the International Campaign for the monuments of Nubia, a cooperation between UNESCO and the governments of Egypt and Sudan between 1959 and 1980. In light of the successful cooperation among UNESCO and national governments, the United States proposed to draft an international convention for the worldwide protection of cultural heritage. Through the collaboration between UNESCO, ICOMOS (International Council on Monuments and Sites), IUCN (International Union for Conservation of Nature), and State Parties (the countries willing to ratify the agreement, the first was the US in 1973), the Convention was finally signed and adopted by the UNESCO General Conference the 16 November 1972, to be effective in 1975.

2.2. The Convention instruments

The Convention developed two fundamental tools: the WHL, and the World Heritage Fund (WHF). Next to the advantages related to being part of a worldwide organisation for heritage preservation, these represent the two main benefits for State Parties.

The WHL comprises all inscribed properties that are labelled “UNESCO World Heritage”. The label gives not only prestige to the site and its State Party, but also the possibility to request assistance in managing the protection of the site. Within this list, the List of World Heritage in Danger pinpoints those sites that are or can potentially be endangered. Contrary to the WHL, being on this list sends a negative signal to the State Parties involved, inviting them to take action. Symbolic is the inscription of the Liverpool docks, World Heritage Site since 2004, in the endangered list in 2012, because of the proposed project of ‘Liverpool Waters’. The project was abandoned not to lose the label recognition, although the site is still considered endangered (BBC, 2018).

The WHF amounts to approximately four million US dollars every year. The Fund is used upon request by State Parties in need of financial assistance to protect seriously endangered sites. It

is principally composed of compulsory quotas and voluntary contributions from State Parties and private donations.

2.3. The main actors

The Convention also defines a series of actors and their roles. The most important ones are the General Assembly of State Parties, the WHC, the State Parties, the World Heritage Centre, and the ABs.

The General Assembly meets annually at the General Conference of UNESCO. Its tasks are to revise the report of activities of the Committee, establish States' contributions to the Fund, and elect the members of the Committee.

The Committee, composed of representatives from 21 countries among the State Parties, meets also yearly. Its tasks are implementing the Convention following the official Operational Guidelines, allocate financial resources, and solicit states in case of site mismanagement. Most importantly, the Committee decides which sites enter or exit the WHL and the List of World Heritage in Danger.

The State Parties are all those who ratified the Convention. Their role is to select and candidate sites for the WHL, according to specific criteria. Furthermore, State Parties are always responsible for the protection of inscribed sites.

Because of the increasing size of the Convention, in 1992 the World Heritage Centre has been established to perform the administrative tasks as secretariat.

To assist the Committee in nominating sites for the WHL, three official Advisory Bodies (ABs), IOs considered for their high expertise on the matter, have been selected. These are the IUCN for natural sites, ICOMOS for cultural ones, and ICCROM (International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property) for the preservation of cultural sites. The experts from these IOs give an informed opinion on why a site should be or not enlisted in the WHL or the List of World Heritage in Danger.

2.4. The process

The enlisting process is as follows. First, each State Party selects a series of sites eligible for the WHL. These sites form the Tentative List of a State Party. Sites cannot be nominated if they are not on this list. Second, each State Party select a number of sites to present¹. The World Heritage

¹ Before 2011, a maximum of one per State Party, with an overall maximum of 30 nominated sites to review. After 2011, an overall maximum of 45 nominated sites to review (E. E. Bertacchini & Saccone, 2012).

Centre assists the country in the nomination process, then the nomination is sent to the relative AB. The latter evaluates the site and communicate its opinion to the Committee, which takes the final decision on the inscription. Although a two-thirds majority is officially required, the decisions are taken by consensus after informal meetings (Bertacchini, Liuzza, & Meskell, 2017b). The final decision can have four outcomes: (1) inscription, (2) no inscription, (3) referral of the decision, and (4) deferral of the decision. ‘Inscription’ means that the site meets the requirement to be enlisted and it enters the WHL. ‘No inscription’ is when the site does not meet the requirements, hence is not enlisted. Referral and deferral both postpone the decision, but in a slightly different manner. ‘Referral’ means that the nomination is referred back to the State Party for more information, and it can be resubmitted in the future. ‘Deferral’ means that the decision is postponed for a more in-depth study.

The decision is based on the ‘outstanding universal value’ of the site, which is operationalised in the ten criteria reported below (UNESCO, 2021c). To be selected, the site must meet at least one of them.

Table 2.1 List of Official Criteria to enter the World Heritage List. Source: UNESCO, n.d.

Criterion number	Official definition
I	to represent a masterpiece of human creative genius.
II	to exhibit an important interchange of human values, over a span of time or within a cultural area of the world, on developments in architecture or technology, monumental arts, town-planning or landscape design.
III	to bear a unique or at least exceptional testimony to a cultural tradition or to a civilization which is living or which has disappeared.
IV	to be an outstanding example of a type of building, architectural or technological.
V	to be an outstanding example of a traditional human settlement, land use, or sea-use which is representative of a culture (or cultures), or human interaction with the environment especially when it has become vulnerable under the impact of irreversible change.
VI	to be directly or tangibly associated with events or living traditions, with ideas, or with beliefs, with artistic and literary works of outstanding universal significance. (The Committee considers that this criterion should preferably be used in conjunction with other criteria).

VII	to contain superlative natural phenomena or areas of exceptional natural beauty and aesthetic importance.
VIII	to be outstanding examples representing major stages of earth's history, including the record of life, significant on-going geological processes in the development of landforms, or significant geomorphic or physiographic features.
IX	to be outstanding examples representing significant on-going ecological and biological processes in the evolution and development of terrestrial, fresh water, coastal and marine ecosystems and communities of plants and animals.
X	to contain the most important and significant natural habitats for in-situ conservation of biological diversity, including those containing threatened species of outstanding universal value from the point of view of science or conservation.

3. Literature Review

3.1. Introduction

Previous literature has substantially informed the current research. It is therefore fundamental to offer a review of it. This will be done in the present chapter, which is divided thematically. The attention will be given to the issues and concepts on which scholars have focused and their most relevant conclusions, next to literature gaps and limitations.

The first subject to be addressed will be the WHL. This should be regarded as the broadest field of research to which the present thesis belongs. While a general outline of the academic literature will be given, explicit attention will be directed to the research with an angle on political issues.

The second concept reviewed will be politicisation. This represents a core of literature parallel to that of the specific case at hand. In particular, scholars researching the politicisation in IOs will be reported.

The two umbrella topics intersect each other in the study of the politicisation of the convention, notably the process of enlisting heritage sites in the WHL. This will be the third, and most specific subject presented. From the current advancements in this distinct line of research, the present study can finally start.

3.2. Studies on the WHL

This thesis aims to find its place in the academic literature interested in the WHL. This section will concentrate on what academic scholars have said about it. From the main areas of interest, special attention will be given to the studies concerned with the politics of the WHL.

3.2.1. Scholars' main areas of research: WHL impact on tourism and site management

The core of scholarly literature about UNESCO WHL is centred on its impact on tourism (Arezki, Cherif, & Piotrowski, 2009; Canale, De Simone, Di Maio, & Parenti, 2019; Huang, Tsaur, & Yang, 2012; Ryan & Silvanto, 2009; Simone, Canale, & Maio, 2019; Yang, Lin, & Han, 2010). This line of research is by far the most developed, which suggests the inherent, underlying motivation why countries aspire to get their sites enlisted: to increase tourism. Next to the consequences the WHL label has on the tourism sector, the first reason why a site should be enlisted is to recognise its value and protect it (Frey et al., 2013). The impact of the enlisting process on the managerial capacities to safeguard the site is, indeed, the second most studied issue (Bertacchini,

Saccone, & Santagata, 2011). Moreover, the two topics are so deeply interrelated that are often addressed together (Cuccia, Guccio, & Rizzo, 2016; King & Parnwell, 2011; Lo Piccolo, Leone, & Pizzuto, 2012).

Academic literature on the matter has grown exponentially over the last decades (Hølleland & Johansson, 2019). This is especially true for what concerns the impact of the WHL on tourism and site management in Italy and China. This should not surprise as the two countries are those with the most sites enlisted (both with 55 sites, UNESCO, n.d.-b).

The horizontal theme interlacing all these studies is indeed the focus on the efficacy of the WHL in providing more tourism and foster heritage management. The general trend is that the enlisting process generates a greater tourism influx. At the same time, a higher amount of people visiting a site poses serious difficulties in its management because of higher contamination and deterioration. Consequently, the site may result more endangered or even shift to the List of World Heritage in Danger.

A common denominator in the academic literature is the recognition of the Convention's failure in reaching its goals. In particular, it appears that the international WHL recognition is useless in preserving heritage if compared to local provisions and enlisting. On the contrary, it might further endanger the site due to excessive mass tourism, which leads to physical site detriment, loss of identity and authenticity (e.g. the Uluru mountain in Australia and Hoi An in Vietnam) (Avieli, 2015; Bertacchini et al., 2011; Dumper & Larkin, 2012; Frey et al., 2013; Lo Piccolo et al., 2012; Meskell, 2015; Meskell & Isakhan, 2020; Rao, 2010).

3.2.2. Academic literature on the politics of the UNESCO WHL

For the purpose of this thesis, it is necessary to explore a third line of research within the academic literature, namely the one interested in the politics of the WHL (Bertacchini et al., 2011; Cuccia et al., 2016; Dumper & Larkin, 2012; Hølleland & Phelps, 2019; James & Winter, 2017; Liljeblad, 2017; Maags, 2020; Nakano & Zhu, 2020). This literature encompasses different aspects. It investigates the explicit and implicit dynamics of powers in the Convention, taking into consideration the international relations scenario. It also focuses on other practices, like the promotion of specific policy narratives, and what are the implications for the Convention.

What most scholarly research on WHL and politics shares is the use of qualitative methods to investigate specific case studies. Dumper & Larkin (2012), for instance, try to understand the difficulties UNESCO faces when its mission clashes with national political agendas. The paper concludes that the power of UNESCO is sensibly limited by States' political preferences and that this might undermine heritage protection.

Maags (2020) comes to similar conclusions with its frame analysis on the policy narratives about heritage under threat. The author investigates if the system of government influences the adoption of ‘policy narratives’. These are defined as “stories ‘which create and shape social meaning by imposing a coherent interpretation on the whirl of events and actions around us’”, that are used to pursue a policy outcome (Fischer, 2003, as cited in Maags, 2020, p. 275). While Dumper & Larkin (2012) stresses the threat of political preferences only outside the organization, Maags (2020) recognises it both inside and outside UNESCO. The concept of policy narratives is linked with two other concepts, cultural diplomacy and advocacy networks, investigated respectively by Nakano & Zhu (2020) and Liljeblad (2017).

Nakano & Zhu (2020) claims that Japan and China use heritage as a foreign policy tool in the international arena to foster their interests. The concepts of soft power and cultural diplomacy are at the basis of their analysis. Cultural diplomacy “involves the instrumental use of national culture with a view to enhancing national security and the nation’s international standing” (Ang, Isar, & Mar, 2015, p. 368). Like policy narratives, this practice falls within the range of ‘soft power’ tools, i.e. “one’s ideas or [...] the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences that others are led to express” (Ang et al., 2015, p. 367). In general, the potential of cultural diplomacy is progressively more recognised by scholars (Mark, 2009).

Liljeblad (2017), instead, analyses the enlisting process in the WHL of the Pyu Ancient cities in Myanmar through the concept of transnational advocacy networks. These are “phenomena involving transnational efforts to advance particular issues” (ibid., p. 19). In other words, a group of actors mobilises itself to pursue a specific policy outcome. The paper reaches conclusions about the design of the advocacy network and the diffusion of norms different from previous literature (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). This suggests the relevance the context has in these case studies. The author concludes that there is space for individuals and minor entities to influence the enlisting process. The same is sustained by James & Winter (2017), underling the importance of diplomatic expertise in the enlisting process, and Lixinski (2015).

In general, there is a tendency among scholars to repute the Convention ineffective, because of the negative implications political interests brings into the WHL (Schmitt, 2009).

3.2.3. Conclusion

Literature shows the tension created by the label between the incentive to increase tourism and the potentially disastrous effects it might have on the heritage site, both structurally (i.e. physical damages to the site) and culturally (e.g. a negative impact in locals’ everyday life). It claims how political forces, even individual ones, can and -at times- have an impact on the WHL

procedures. Moreover, there are underlying interests behind the nomination of a site as this procedure is considered a valuable political tool. An important limitation of the literature is the general lack of quantitative research on the political dynamics present in the Convention.

3.3. Studies on the politicisation of international organizations

This section will elaborate on the concept of politicisation. It starts from its definition, its relationship with authority, to the assumptions on which the studies conduct their research.

3.3.1. Different definitions of politicisation

The politicisation phenomenon in IOs is widely recognised by the academic literature (Cohn, 1974; Le Gall, 2019; Nouwen & Werner, 2011; Rixen & Zangl, 2011; Zürn, Binder, & Ecker-ehrhardt, 2012) and especially in UN specialized agencies like UNESCO (Bae, 2018; Binder, 2008; Carraro, 2017; Freedman, 2011; Ghebali, 1985; Lyons et al., 1977; Terman & Voeten, 2017). The issue is studied since the '70s. Cohn (1974), Lyons et al. (1977), and Ghebali (1985) are among the firsts to theorise and investigate the phenomenon.

Lyons et al. (1977) explicitly aim to better define the concept and apply it to UN specialized agencies, looking at their consequent relationship with American foreign policy. Among all UN agencies, the authors consider UNESCO the most politicised. They define politicisation as follows (ibid., p. 81):

“that highly controversial issues not always relevant to the agencies' work are introduced by nations to further their political interests. Those who charge ‘politicisation’ infer that the agencies are being used as forums for political debate rather than the functional tasks for which they were founded”.

In other words, politicisation in an organization is present when factors that should not influence a certain decision or behaviour are instead considered to promote political interests out of those officially within the mandate of the organization. In the case of the WHL, these factors can be the relative power of a State in the international arena; as well as alliances and rivalries among countries, often sustained by military and socio-economic dynamics. The official list of criteria for the WHL (see Table 2.1) does not comprehend any of these factors.

Even though attempts to conceptualise the phenomenon are present from the beginning, politicisation assumed different connotations as research expanded. In practice, there is no solid consensus on its definition, and two major trends can be outlined.

One line of research understands politicisation as Lyons et al. (1977), i.e. where power politics drift away from the purpose of the organization (Bae, 2018; Carraro, 2017; Cohn, 1974; Freedman, 2011; Ghebali, 1985; Pepermans & Maesele, 2016; Richardson, 2019; Terman & Voeten, 2017). Another one, instead, intends politicisation as “making a matter a subject of public discussion” and having “significant effects on the quality of political decision making” (Binder, 2008; De Wilde, 2011; Rixen & Zangl, 2011; Zürn, 2014, p. 48; Zürn et al., 2012). For instance, security policies are politicised when the debate on a certain decision is captured by the public sphere. When an issue becomes of public domain, it consequently generates different incentives in decision-makers (e.g. the concern to be re-elected) that might affect the decision-making process. The dichotomy between definitions is explained in Zürn et al. (2012). According to the first definition, non-political matters become political. According to the second, political matters become public.

The academic literature has adopted either one or the other definition according to the subject studied. If the content debated was considered inherently political, e.g. security issues, the latter definition applies. If it should not be considered political, the first one was adopted. In the case of UNESCO, the first formulation appears more suitable. The UNESCO convention lists a series of criteria in its Operational Guidelines on which the enlisting process should be based. In this sense, any political and economic factor outside the list proving to be influential should be regarded as a source of politicisation.

3.3.2. Further controversies: the lack of empirical research and the cause-effect relationship

While the literature on politicisation dates back more than 40 years ago and it has grown exponentially over the past decades, the body of empirical research is disproportionately smaller (Carraro, 2017). Furthermore, most empirical studies denounce the presence of politicisation but do not investigate extensively its causes or effects (Carraro, 2017).

Next to Lyons et al. (1977), another to first address the issue of politicisation in IOs is Ghebali (1985). The author explores the reasons why politicisation is present in UN specialised agencies. points out problems related to the internal mismanagement of these institutions and warns about the potential lack of their credibility, hence authority.

Despite Ghebali (1985) claims that politicisation threatens the authority and prestige of international institutions, different authors have recognised that it is the rise of the importance of

these institutions to create, or at least worsen, the phenomenon of politicisation (Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2018; Zürn et al., 2012). There seems to be, then, a logical short circuit between causes and effects of politicisation. On the one hand, the increasing authority and prestige of the IO generate politicisation. On the other hand, politicisation undermines the authority and credibility of the organization.

Looking at the WHL, politicisation is claimed to be present from its early days (Lyons et al., 1977). Its authority and prestige have, nevertheless, grown substantially over the years, making it the most renowned instrument for international cooperation to protect heritage.

3.3.3. Diverging assumptions on the role of politicisation in international organizations

Academic literature divides itself on the question if politicisation within international institutions is positive or negative. Here, too, it is possible to distinguish different schools of thought.

One area of research assumes that politicisation can undermine the work of an international organisation dealing with supposedly non-political issues. This is a normative statement and it is further based on the assumption that there are issues inherently apolitical, i.e. not concerned with dynamics of power. The other line of research does not consider politicisation necessarily bad. This can mean that politicisation is useful for the international organisation to function effectively (Terman & Voeten, 2017). The dynamics that political interests generate produce incentives for State Parties without which the IO might not have worked effectively. It can also mean that the organization works well regardless of such dynamics (Bae, 2018). More than a normative statement, these views are based on empirical observation of specific case studies.

This division is evident in research focusing on the UN Universal Periodic Review system (Bae, 2018; Carraro, 2017; Freedman, 2011; Terman & Voeten, 2017). While Freedman (2011) explicitly accuses political interferences as the cause of the failure of the United Nations Human Rights Council, Carraro (2017)'s and Bae (2018)'s empirical analyses show something different. Although "in terms of the credibility of these mechanisms, politicisation is universally considered a negative phenomenon in the framework of both procedures", the UPR mechanism is considered effective in condemning human rights (Carraro, 2017, p. 969).

Other papers take more radical positions in favour of politicisation, claiming it is necessary to ensure a democratic debate and create incentives (Pepermans & Maesele, 2016; Terman & Voeten, 2017). Finally, other authors speak in more general terms about the importance of simply recognising the inherently political nature of issues usually assumed as apolitical (Nouwen & Werner, 2011).

3.3.4. Conclusion

Literature on politicisation is divided, from its definition to its dynamics in IOs. The present thesis does not aim to put forward any normative statement on whether political factors should or not have any role in the decision-making process of the WHL. Instead, the research limits itself to acknowledge the potential presence of politicisation. In this regard, previous academic literature finds consensus on the presence of politicisation in international institutions.

3.4. Studies on the politicisation in the Convention

A detailed overview of the academic literature on the politicisation of the WHL will be presented here. This is perhaps the most important section to individuate the methodologies and limitations of past research the present study aims to cover.

3.4.1. Research on the politicisation of the Convention: growing but limited

Academic literature on the matter is relatively recent. Schmitt (2009) is chronologically one of the first empirical researches on the political factors influencing the WHL enlisting process, although with a strong theoretical approach supported by descriptive statistics and field observations.

The first paper to carry out a quantitative analysis using inferential statistics is, instead, Bertacchini & Saccone (2012). The research compares a series of political and economic factors, with the probability of having a country's site accepted in the WHL. For instance, if being in the WHC gives a State Party more chances to see its sites successfully enlisted. Like in Schmitt (2009), the results show primary evidence of politicisation within the system. However, Bertacchini & Saccone (2012) do not rely on theoretical concepts (like Schmitt) to argue why political factors should interfere in the enlisting process, but rather on the enlisting process mechanism itself. The aforementioned presence of a State Party in the WHC is considered as a potential influencing factor because of the Convention's Operational Guidelines and not abstract, theoretical concepts.

In the following years, research grew sensibly, both quantitatively and qualitatively (Parenti & Simone, 2015). It is possible to see an evolution in the academic literature that builds up from previous conclusions and covers progressively more aspects of the topic. A clear example is Bertacchini et al. (2016, p. 105), which develops a "unique dataset" to test politicisation and polarization levels in the enlisting process. It sensibly expands the scope of factors influencing the decision-making process, and it can be considered "the first detailed quantitative analysis on the

decision making process of a UN body that has been rarely investigated” (Bertacchini et al., 2016, p. 125).

3.4.2. Literature main finding: the presence of politicisation

As for the academic literature analysed in section 3.3., the empirical research is consistent in concluding that politicisation is present in the enlisting process of heritage sites in the WHL. Politicisation has been observed in different stages of the enlisting process. The WHC is politicised by State Parties’ political and economic influence in the international arena (Meskell, 2012; Meskell, Liuzza, Bertacchini, & Saccone, 2015). Similarly, the Tentative List and the List of World Heritage in Danger are politicised by State Parties’ interests (Parenti & Simone, 2015; Brown et al., 2019). While states care about enlist as many sites as possible in the Tentative List, they aim to limit the number of their sites that falls in the List of World Heritage in Danger. NGOs are also successful in influencing the outcome of the annual conventions (Escallón, 2020). Finally, the ABs can be politicised by their experts’ political and personal interests, too (James & Winter, 2017).

Between the WHC and the ABs, scholars have witnessed a progressive polarisation between the expert opinions and the final decisions of the committee (Bertacchini et al., 2017, 2016; Meskell, 2015). The ABs’ recommendations are increasingly more at odds with the final decision of the WHC. For instance, while the experts might suggest not to enlist a site in the WHL, the WHC still decides to do it. This phenomenon is seen as a further indicator of politicisation because there are underlying reasons, likely to be political in nature and outside the list of official criteria of the Convention, able to overturn the ABs’ recommendation. This is true even though expert ABs might be biased (James & Winter, 2017). Indeed, the fact that States Parties in the committee do not follow the expert suggestion implies that they have considered factors, such as political and economic ones, other than the criteria specified by the Convention.

3.4.3. Conclusion

All scholars agree not only on the presence of politicisation in the Convention but also on the need for further empirical research on the matter. The present literature is, to a certain extent, self-referential. There is not a plurality of voices in the academic literature, nor a plurality of perspectives from different fields of study. Most research is published in scientific outlets related to cultural and economic issues, and not political science or international relations. While consistency within scholarly literature might be positive, the overall theoretical perspective on the topic is still

too narrow. Besides, the lack of meaningful quantitative research post-2013 must be covered. The important global geopolitical trends of the last years (e.g. the increasing polarization of the international arena, the crisis of the international institutions, the progressive rise of the South and China) are likely to corroborate literature findings (Cooley & Nexon, 2020; Kahler, 2016).

3.5. Literature review conclusions

The literature review proposed has followed a logical path, starting from general topics towards more ad hoc ones. The present study will better orientate its research based on the discrepancies found. Findings where academic literature is more solid will, instead, serve as the research theoretical basis. For instance, the fact that UNESCO is one of -if not the most- politicised UN specialized agency.

Finally, the main literature gaps, from the insufficient multidisciplinary of the scientific discussion, to the limited quantitative analyses (especially post-2013), indicate how the thesis can contribute to the body of knowledge around the politicisation of the WHL.

4. Theoretical Framework

4.1. Introduction

To answer the research question, it is necessary to explore its elements and concepts at a theoretical level. The chapter aims to offer this theoretical basis. The variables involved will be outlined and explained thoroughly, and so the causal relationship theoretically linking them. In practical terms, the result of this chapter will be the formulation of testable hypotheses.

To do so, the chapter will start focusing on the dependent variable (DV), which is related to the enlisting process of a site into the WHL. Afterwards, the independent variable (IV) will be defined. The variable will be contextualised focusing on the concept of political activity as rent-seeking practice, and its link to politicisation. Finally, the causal mechanism between the two variables is explained. A series of political factors are listed, specifying how and why they would influence the enlisting process.

4.2. The dependent variable: the probability of success in the enlisting process

From the perspective of a nominated site, the impact of the political activity of its State Party on the enlisting process is reflected in the outcome of the process. As Bertacchini et al. (2017, p. 335) argue, “the key outcome of the World Heritage process is the inscription of heritage sites on the World Heritage List”.

As outlined in section 2.4., the World Heritage Committee communicates its decision regarding a candidate site during its annual session. The decision can have four outcomes: (1) inscription, (2) no inscription, (3) referral of the decision, and (4) deferral of the decision. In practice, however, it is possible to consider the outcome as either inscribed or not inscribed (Bertacchini & Saccone, 2012). A successful candidacy means the inscription of the site in the list, all other cases can be considered as unsuccessful nominations.

4.3. The independent variable: State Parties’ political factors as a source of politicisation

In the research question, the independent variable is the ‘State Parties’ political factors’. The current thesis looks at a series of factors -that are political in nature- suggesting the willingness of State Parties to spend resources to influence the outcome of the WHL enlisting process or that suggests their higher capabilities to do so. In other words, these factors should reflect the (potential) political activity of a State Party in the enlisting process. The generic term ‘political activity’ is

used, here, to define all rent-seeking practices with political character (Dattilo, Padovano, & Rocaboy, 2020; Frey et al., 2013).

The definition of rent-seeking is an action meant to manipulate a policy to increase one's own profits (Khan, 2000). In the case of IOs, these practices are all actions taken by a country to favour its position in the international arena. In the specific case of the WHL, instead of investing resources to pursue the objectives of the WHL, the State Parties invest them to obtain personal gains (rents). For instance, lobbying in the WHC (or exploiting the asymmetry of information a position in the WHC confers) to subvert the final decision of the committee is an example of rent-seeking practice, as this action is done to benefit solely the State Party. Possible motives can be more power or influence, as well as more prestige.

4.3.1. Power and politics

In this regard, it is necessary to briefly reflect on the concept of power and its relations with politics. Power is inevitably linked with politics. According to Andreatta & Zambernardi (2017, p. 74), "all politics is power politics since the former always involves power". Nonetheless, the concept of power is elusive and can take different connotations (Andreatta & Zambernardi, 2017; Boonen et al., 2019). The present research will not dive in-depth into them. Instead, following Thomas Hobbes and Max Weber, it understands power as "power-over" something or someone (Boonen et al., 2019, p. 560). In other words, power is understood as either the ability to act freely despite others' will or to direct others behaviour in a particular way.

The concept of power as defined is understood more in a realist way than a liberal or constructivist one. The country uses its political activity to exploit the IO for its interests and to increase its power. It does not do so to improve the work of the Convention in protecting and valorising the world heritage, making the IO overall more powerful and effective. Furthermore, the political activity of a country makes other countries worse off, in a zero-sum game. This is because, according to the Operational Guidelines of the WHL, there is a limit to the number of sites that can be nominated every year (UNESCO, 2019). If a State Party succeeded in nominating a site, another one has been excluded. Consequently, the one nominated can be inscribed and benefit from it, while the other cannot. This rivalry leads to competition. However, when the resources employed in this competition benefit only one party and become a cost to society, instead of benefiting it (previous literature has argued about the negative externalities politicisation has in the WHL), this is defined as rent-seeking (Tollison, 2004).

4.3.2. Power politics in the WHL

A country might be interested in increasing its power in the international arena, or its prestige in the tourism sector, or use the World Heritage as a mean to exchange favours with other countries. These interests are outside the scope of WHL objectives, namely: to preserve and promote world cultural and natural heritage. Most importantly, political factors are outside the list of the ten official criteria defined by the Operational Guidelines to determine if a site has an ‘outstanding universal value’ (see table 2.1.).

The criteria are vague in their formulation. This gives more space to the State Parties to influence the outcome of the enlisting process, for example countering the decision of the ABs. Since the political factors of a country are not included in this list, this should be considered a source of politicisation within the WHL enlisting process. Indeed, politicisation has been defined in section 3.3.1. as the process in which factors that should not influence a certain decision or behaviour are instead considered to promote interests out of those officially within the mandate of the organization.

To conclude, the political activity of a State Party coincides with its rent-seeking practices to influence the Convention activity. However, literature agrees on the difficulty to measure these practices (Laband & Sophocleus, 2019). For this reason, previous research investigated the political factors suggesting the presence of rent-seeking. These factors signal the willingness of a country to invest resources to influence the outcome of the enlisting process. This thesis will adopt the same approach.

4.4. The causal relationship: political factors influencing the enlisting process

Established that State Parties’ rent-seeking practices within the WHL are plausible -if not present- and that this is a cause of politicisation, the next step is to individuate which factors can plausibly influence the probability of being inscribed, and why. According to previous research and theory, there are a series of political factors that might logically influence the enlisting process.

4.4.1. The position in the international arena

One of the principal factors is the position of a State Party in the international arena. A better position confers more powers, like decisional or operational power, and an aura of prestige additionally contributing to the State Party perceived power. If politicisation is present, this should confer more possibilities to influence the enlisting process successfully.

4.4.1.1. The position in the Convention and internal power resources

Within the context of the Convention, four are the factors considered in this thesis that can influence a State Party's position.

First, the presence of a country in the WHC should be considered indicative. The WHC, indeed, offers a privileged position in the Convention as it confers several advantages and possibilities for rent-seeking to its members. "This is because membership [to the WHC] provides the political power to push sites through the nomination process, but also because countries that are part of the Committee usually anticipate membership on the governing board and prepare their applications years before" (Bertacchini et al., 2017, p. 336). In other words, the members of the WHC not only enjoy the status conferred by their role, but they have more possibilities to lobby for the inscription of their site during the informal meetings of the Committee, where the decisions are taken. Knowing in advance that they will be part of the WHC, hence more likely to see their sites enlisted, interested States try to prepare the nominations for their sites in advance. This increases the probability of having a site enlisted even further because a longer and better preparation should logically lead to a successful candidacy. The preparation concerns not only the promotion and preservation project for the heritage site to be proposed, in line with the Operational Guidelines' criteria. It might also entail investing resources to lobby for the inscription of the site. Officially, this can consist in a greater delegation at the ordinary session; unofficially, in the creation of advocacy networks. In other words, the nexus 'presence in the WHC-higher chances of inscription' is based on (1) an officially prestigious position that is (2) officially and unofficially more powerful. Furthermore, being countries aware of these privileges, they are likely to have (3) high hopes for the inscription which, in turn, lead to (4) a better preparation of the nomination. Therefore, there should be a positive relationship between the presence of a country in the committee and the probability of having its site enlisted.

H(1): The probability of a site of being enlisted is higher if the State Party it belongs to is part of the WHC.

Similarly, the historical presence of the country in the WHC should be considered (Meskell et al., 2015). The more year a State Party has been in the WHC, the more it knows how to influence the outcome of the enlisting process. A country that has been part of the Committee for many years is likely to have learnt the 'weak spots' of the bureaucratic process and how to raise its voice effectively. Probably, it has also established alliances and advocacy networks within the Convention. Previous literature shows how individual intervention can indeed have an impact on

the process (James & Winter, 2017; Liljeblad, 2017). Furthermore, experience and seniority in the Convention confer more prestige and authority within the scope of the Convention. The logic behind this link consists, then, in (1) the learning mechanism and (2) the advocacy networks produced by years of activity in the WHC, and (3) the status seniority confers. Hence:

H(2): The probability of a site of being enlisted is higher the more years the State Party whose it belongs to has been part of the WHC.

Since the position of a State Party in the Convention can derive from the political recognition the other countries have of it, its status partly depends on other countries acknowledging its power. Within the context of the WHL, this can be also derived by the number of sites a country has already enlisted. Indeed, this is one of the most studied factors. The more heritage sites a State Party has the more power is perceived by other countries, because of (1) the higher prestige and (2) level of expertise the State Party should have after having successfully inscribed numerous sites (Bertacchini & Saccone, 2012; Bertacchini et al., 2017). More sites inscribed suggest not only a higher cultural and natural heritage endowment, highly valuable in the context of the Convention, but also a more consolidated right to be part of the Convention and influence its activity.

H(3): The higher the number of heritage sites a State Party has already inscribed in the WHL, the higher the probability of its site of being enlisted.

Besides, because the nomination of a site depends on the State Party, the number of sites already inscribed also indicates to what extent the country cares about the List, hence how much effort and resources it is willing to dedicate (Bertacchini et al., 2017).

Finally, with regards to the position of the State Party in the Convention, its historical presence in the Convention might logically influence the chances of successfully inscribe a site. The presence of a ‘discount factor’ for each year in the Convention is motivated by the fact that, over time, State Parties learn better how to nominate and lobby for inscription (Bertacchini & Saccone, 2012²). This means that they invest progressively fewer resources in rent-seeking practices

² Bertacchini & Saccone’s (2012) research focused on the nomination rate, and not the chances of inscription. However, the underlying logic is identical. It is important to notice that the authors found a negative, and not a positive relationship between this factor and the DV, obliging them to reject the hypothesis. The reason for the unexpected result was attributed to other dynamics that prevailed over expertise and prestige. Based on these findings, the present research still decides to maintain H(4) in order to check for the results of previous research and test the hypothesis in a different timeframe.

as they know how to invest them more effectively. Similarly to the aforementioned factors, it is the experience of the State Party and its established position in the Convention that might play a crucial role.

H(4): The higher the number of years a State Party has ratified the World Heritage Convention, the higher the probability of its site of being enlisted.

4.4.1.2. The position outside the Convention and external power resources

Considering the position of a country in the international arena, it is also possible to look outside the scope of the Convention. If a country is a member of other relevant IOs or has an important role in one of them, it has a more powerful position. This is because being more internationally integrated gives (1) more possibilities to settle agreements between parties, negotiate and create package deals or exchange favours. As Bertacchini et al. (2016, p. 103) state: The indirect benefits of being part of IOs “seem to be driven by some form of vote trading”. This, in turn, leads to (2) the creation of alliances and transnational advocacy network. More in general, being part of IOs can be considered as a (3) sign of social integration and higher stability, hence higher prestige.

In this sense, a potential indicator is the membership in the UNSC (Bertacchini et al., 2016; Frey et al., 2013). The decision to look at the Security Council by scholars is based on previous related studies on the United States of America’s aid flows and credits from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) to emerging countries, which indeed found a higher probability of receiving financial benefits for those countries in the UNSC (Dreher, Sturm, & Raymond, 2009a, 2009b; Kuziemko & Werker, 2006). The WHL is compared to the IMF and the WB because it can be considered a form of international assistance, too. Therefore:

H(5): The probability of a site of being enlisted is higher if the State Party it belongs to is part of the UN Security Council.

In general, “the degree at which a country is politically integrated internationally may positively influence the decisions made by the World Heritage Committee members in respect to initial Advisory Bodies’ recommendations” (Bertacchini et al., 2016, p. 103). The concept of international political integration is complex (Lindberg, 1994). For the scope of this thesis, the term intends the degree of participation of a country in international relations. This is another political factor outside the scope of the official WHL criteria. Again, the logic relies mainly on (1) higher

chances to reach informal agreements among State Parties sharing membership in numerous IOs, and (2) their interdependence around economic and political (e.g. security) issues which leads to a system of favours and alliances likely to also affect the informal voting of the WHC. The admission of Palestine in the Convention and the related obstructionism of Israel and the United States of America is a clear example of how alliances influence the Convention activity (Erlanger & Sayare, 2011).

H(6): The higher the international political integration of a State Party, the higher the probability of its site of being enlisted.

4.4.2. The willingness to influence the outcome of the enlisting process

Certain political factors directly suggest the willingness of a State Party to influence the process.

The amount of resources spent by State Parties is indicative of the political salience of the issue, i.e. the importance they attribute to it (Beyers & Dür, 2015). It is possible to consider the financial resources a country deposits in the WHF as an indicator of its interest in the List. Indeed, the Fund is made for a large part of compulsory and voluntary contributions from its State Parties. The financial contributions are a direct indicator of how much a State Party wants to invest in - hence care about- the Convention. While it does not necessarily mean that the country has specific interests in increasing its own profits, a greater investment means being a greater shareholder. More resources at stake might be translated into more interests and rights, to impose its preferences. In other words, financial contributions are a signal, sending the message of how much the country values the WHL. Furthermore, these contributions can also be politically meaningful. The above-mentioned case of the United States, deciding to withdraw its financial contributions to the organizations in 2011 in response to Palestine membership, demonstrates the link between the Fund and political motives (Sherwood, 2011).

H(7): The larger the financial contribution of a State Party, the higher the probability of its site of being enlisted.

4.4.3. Cultural diplomacy

Cultural diplomacy can be considered a proxy for the willingness of a State Party to influence the outcome of the enlisting process. The concept of cultural diplomacy has been

introduced in section 3.2.2. Engaging in cultural diplomacy entails “a course of actions, which are based on and utilize the exchange of ideas, values, traditions and other aspects of culture or identity, whether to strengthen relationships, enhance socio-cultural cooperation, promote national interests and beyond” (Institute for Cultural Diplomacy, n.d.). Culture can be instrumentally used to foster a country’s interest or prestige internationally, and it has been seen how more sites inscribed in the WHL signals the value and prestige of a country’s culture. In practice, cultural diplomacy spans from cultural exchange programs, to forms of cultural international cooperation (e.g. exhibitions, fairs, conventions), to exports of cultural goods, etc. Therefore, the tendency of a country to engage in cultural diplomacy activities to foster its position internationally suggest that the country has an interest in influencing the outcome of the WHL enlisting process. To do so, it might recur to lobbying strategies and invest resources to secure the site’s inscription, which will favour primarily the country’s position in the international arena, and not the preservation of the site.

H(8): The higher the tendency of a State Party to engage in cultural diplomacy, the higher the probability of its site of being enlisted.

4.5. Conclusion

The probability of enlisting in the WHL has been individuated as DV, based on the outcome of the nomination process. Next, the concept of politicisation and its connection with power and rent-seeking practices has been defined. Finally, great attention has been given to the different political factors potentially influencing the DV. As already mentioned, politicisation and rent-seeking practices are difficult to be observed and measured empirically, as they consist in lobbying and advocacy practices of different nature (Laband & Sophocleus, 2019). Therefore, the political factors considered capture this phenomenon only indirectly, based on the logical links offered for each of them.

5. Research design

5.1. Introduction

In this chapter, the focus will be on the methodological guidelines to empirically answer the hypotheses formulated in the theoretical framework and, eventually, the research question.

The chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2. starts with a general description of the research design and methods of choice. Section 5.3. explains the unit of observation and sampling, while in section 5.4. the political factors individuated will be operationalised into measurable variables. The next sections describe the data collection process and data analysis (sections 5.5. and 5.6.). Finally, section 5.7. reflects on the external and internal validity and reliability of the methodology proposed.

5.2. Research design and method

The research question aims to find the causal relationship between two sets of variables, namely political factors of the State Parties, and the chance of getting successfully enlisted in the WHL³. The research design is, therefore, causal or explanatory.

To answer the research question and test the relative hypotheses, this thesis will adopt a quantitative approach. Quantitative strategies aim to find a nexus between theory and research through a deductive process based on the collection of a large set of numerical data (Bryman, 2012). Quantitative analysis is preferred to qualitative to find general trends and causal mechanisms over a large dataset. It allows for an extensive study with a high N (number of units of observation) that allows results to be summarised and generalized (Babbie, 2020).

The choice is also based on feasibility issues. Previous qualitative research on the matter has mainly adopted interviews and field observations as preferred methods of inquiry. However, it is unlikely that the present research could collect meaningful information from the actors involved in the WHL enlisting process, which are generally considered difficult to reach, within the timeframe

³ It is important to underline that “when proposing heritage sites, states do not exactly know the probability of having their properties accepted in the List. However, political, economic, and institutional conditions may affect the likelihood of having a site inscribed” (Bertacchini & Saccone, 2012, p. 342). In other words, the probability of a site to be enlisted cannot be calculated mathematically, and it does not coincide with the rate of success in enlisting that a state party had in the past. Nonetheless, if there is a link between the political factors of a State Party and the outcome of the decision-making process, the probability of a site to be enlisted is affected accordingly. If higher political factors are linked to higher rates of success, they are also linked to a higher probability of being enlisted in the future (and vice-versa).

available. Moreover, field observations are impossible since the WHC annual ordinary session does not fall within the timeframe of this empirical research.

For certain IVs, data will be collected from different existing databases. Data regarding other IVs and the DV will be instead collected from a primary source: the UNESCO online database containing the official documents of the annual WHC ordinary sessions (UNESCO, 2021a).

Data will be elaborated using statistical analysis, i.e. manipulating it with computational techniques (Babbie, 2020). This is possible being the results expressed in a quantitative, numerical way (Bryman, 2012). Both descriptive and inferential statistic techniques will be used. The results of these analyses will be, to some extent, comparable to previous research results, like the ones of Bertacchini & Saccone (2012), Bertacchini et al. (2017; 2016) and Frey et al. (2013).

5.3. Dataset: unit of analysis and sampling

The unit of analysis of this research is the nomination of a site belonging to a specific country, in a given year. The unit of analysis is not the site itself, but its nomination. This difference is important because some sites are re-considered after deferment or referral. These decisions are motivated by the need for more information about the site, either to be retrieved (deferral) or be given by the State Party (referral). Deferral and referral are not based on incorrect nomination procedures, for which they will be otherwise rejected (Bertacchini & Saccone, 2012). Since political factors can and do change from one application to the next one, even if the site is the same, what should be considered is the nomination of the site in a given year.

Considering the nominations of the sites, and not the sites themselves, as the unit of analysis has also practical benefits. Separating data on the nominated sites between those who were already previously nominated (but eventually deferred or referred) and those who have never been nominated before is unnecessary and further complicates the analysis. Besides, the set of units of observations considered for the analysis will inevitably be larger without distinguish among nominations, hence strengthening the robustness of the statistical analysis.

The population considered, i.e. “the universe of units from which a sample is to be selected” coincides with all sites ever nominated for the WHL, from 1978 until 2019 (Bryman, 2012, p. 714). The size of the population is 1466 sites. The sample considered goes from the year 2019 (the last available year) until 2003 (the last year in which official sources report data consistently). The sampling is based on the need to cover the years where no research has been previously done. For more statistically relevant results, the sample considers WHC sessions before 2013. This is useful to compare results with the previous research.

The resulting dataset will have a panel structure. This is because the observations are not independent among them. Instead, there are multiple observations (about the outcome of the inscription of a site in the WHL) on the same individuals (the State Parties), over a period of time (from 2003 to 2019) (Lavrakas, 2008).

5.4. Operationalisation of concepts into measurable variables

5.4.1. The dependent variable: the outcome of the nomination process

The DV is the outcome of the nomination process, expressed by the WHC during their annual ordinary sessions. This variable is operationalised as binomial. Results can either be ‘inscribed’ (=1) or ‘not inscribed’ (=0). The latter value comprehends not only officially non-inscribed sites, but also deferred and referred, as in practice they have not been inscribed.

5.4.2. The independent variables: the political factors

The IVs of this research are political factors. The political factors pertain to the State Party to whom the nominated site belongs. Each political factor considered coincides with one or more variables. These variables have been operationalised in the same or similar way by previous literature (E. E. Bertacchini & Saccone, 2012; E. Bertacchini et al., 2017, 2016; Frey et al., 2013; Meskell et al., 2015). All data, if not otherwise specified, have been collected from the UNESCO online database (UNESCO, 2021h, 2021a, 2021f).

5.4.2.1. The position in the international arena

The concept of ‘position in the international arena’ entails four different political factors outlined in section 4.4.1. These factors are translated into the following measurable variables.

First, the ‘presence in the WHC’ measures if the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the WHC in the year of the nomination. The variable is binomial since the State Party in question can either be (=1) or not be (=0) part of the WHC.

Second, the ‘historical presence in the WHC’, meaning the number of years the State Party has been in the WHC in the past (Bertacchini et al., 2017). Together with the ‘presence in the WHC’, it suggests a higher position of the State Party in the Convention.

Third, the ‘number of heritage sites’ indicates the number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL.

Fourth, the ‘historical presence in the Convention’ indicates the number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention.

As for the presence in the WHC, the ‘presence in the UNSC’ determines if the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination. This variable is also binomial, as a country can (=1) or cannot be (=0) within the UNSC in the year of the nomination. Data will be retrieved from the UNSC online database (United Nations Security Council, 2021).

Finally, the ‘International Political Integration’ of a country measures the degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated into the international arena. To measure international political integration, the Political Globalization sub-index from the KOF globalization index is a reliable indicator (Gygli, Haelg, Potrafke, & Sturm, 2019). It measures to what extent a country participates in international relations, and it does so combining multiple sub-indicators, namely: the number of embassies in the country, citizens sent to UNSC missions, international NGOs present in the country, inter-governmental organizations to which is member, and international treaties ratified.

5.4.2.2. The willingness to influence the WHL enlisting process

The ‘willingness to influence the WHL enlisting process’ will be measured through the variable ‘financial contributions to WHF’, which states the number of US dollars the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has deposited in the WHF the year of the nomination.

5.4.2.3. Cultural diplomacy

Finally, the concept of ‘cultural diplomacy’ has been measured with different indicators. This is because of the lack of a proper index measuring cultural diplomacy for the panel dataset of this research. This also applies to indexes about soft power which, as mentioned in the literature review and theoretical framework, is a concept closely related to cultural diplomacy (cultural diplomacy can be intended as a form of soft power). Indeed, one of the most renowned indexes for soft power is ‘The Soft Power 30’ which is available only from 2015 and for thirty countries, hence unfeasible for the present research (McClory, 2019). The indicators adopted are, then, the ones more commonly used to look quantitatively at cultural diplomacy practices, or at least at the development of the cultural sector of a country internationally.

The first indicator is the value of the ‘total exports of cultural goods’ of the State Party whose nominated site belongs to in the year of the nomination, expressed in US dollars. Cultural

goods are defined as “consumer goods that convey ideas, symbols and ways of life, i.e. books, magazines, multimedia products, software, recordings, films, videos, audio-visual programmes, crafts and fashion” (UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), 2009, p. 87).

There are countries that, because of their limited size and/or export economy, cannot compete with larger countries in terms of absolute numbers. At the same time, these countries might invest substantially in cultural diplomacy practices, but the first variable will not capture it. To accommodate for this, a second variable will measure the ‘share in exports of cultural goods’ of the State Party whose nominated site belongs to in the year of the nomination, expressed as a percentage over the world value of cultural goods. Data for both variables can be retrieved on the UNESCO UIS database (UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), n.d.). Other reliable indexes also make use of this source. For instance, the aforementioned KOF globalization index combines it with other data to calculate their ‘cultural globalization’ parameter.

It is indeed the KOF ‘cultural globalization’ parameter the third variable considered. In particular, the ‘cultural globalization, de facto’, as the ‘de jure’ indicators of the parameter does not fit well to measure cultural diplomacy (Gygli et al., 2019). The indicator is a sum of the following sub-indicators: trade in cultural goods and personal services, number of international trademarks registered, and number of IKEA stores and McDonald’s restaurants (KOF Swiss Economic Institute, 2019). Although the parameter does not explicitly measure cultural diplomacy but cultural globalisation, it has been chosen for robustness check for its closeness with previous factors, larger availability of data, and reliance on an authoritative source.

5.4.3. Control Variables

To control for the influence of other factors over the outcome of the enlisting process and that are in line with the official enlisting criteria, the recommendation of the AB regarding the relative nominated site will be taken as a control variable. This variable is binomial, where 1= inscribe and 0= not inscribe.

Finally, it is important to add that, because of the type of statistical analysis that will be conducted, the various IVs present in the model specifications will mutually control for one another. In this sense, high relevance will be given to variations in the significance of the effect of an IV according to the other IVs in the model.

Table 5.1 Operationalisation of the concepts into measurable variables.

Hypothesis	Name of the variable	Definition of the variable	Variable type	Values	Source	Abbreviation
Dependent Variable						
	The outcome of the enlisting process	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question	Nominal	‘Inscribe’= 1/ ‘Not inscribe’= 0	(UNESCO, 2021a)	y
Position in the international arena						
H1	Presence in the WHC	If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the WHC in the year of the nomination.	Nominal	‘No’=0, ‘Yes’, 1	(UNESCO, 2021a)	WHC
H2	Historical presence in the WHC	The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs has been part of the WHC	Ratio ⁴ , discrete ⁵	$0 \leq x \leq 42^6$	(UNESCO, 2021h)	HiWHC
H3	Number of Heritage Sites	The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs	Ratio, discrete	$0 \leq x < 55^7$	(UNESCO, 2021h)	nrSites

⁴ Interval variable with a meaningful zero.

⁵ Not continuous. Only natural numbers are possible.

⁶ There have been only 43 annual ordinary sessions of the WHC.

⁷ 55 is the highest number of sites currently held by a single country, in particular by China and Italy.

		already have successfully inscribed in the WHL				
H4	Historical presence in the Convention	The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs has ratified the Convention	Ratio, discrete	$1 \leq x \leq 42^8$	(UNESCO, 2021h)	yearsCon
H5	Presence in the UNSC	If the State Party whose nominated site belongs is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	Nominal	'No'=0, 'Yes', 1	(United Nations Security Council, 2021)	UNSC
H6	International Political Integration	The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs is integrated into the international arena.	Ratio, continuous	$1 \leq x \leq 100$	(Gygli et al., 2019)	IntPI
		Willingness to influence the WHL enlisting process				
H7	Financial contributions to WHF	The number of US dollars the State Party whose nominated site belongs has deposited in the WHF the year of the nomination.	Ratio, continuous	$0 < x < +\infty$	(UNESCO, 2021f)	FinCon
		Cultural Diplomacy				

⁸ The number of years the Convention has been in place.

	Total Export of Cultural Goods	The value of total exports of Cultural goods of the State Party whose nominated site belongs in the year of the nomination, expressed in US dollars	Ratio, continuous	$0 \leq x < +\infty$	(UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), n.d.)	CDexp
H8	Share in exports of cultural goods	The value of exported cultural goods of the State Party whose nominated site belongs in the year of the nomination, expressed as a percentage of world value of exported cultural goods	Ratio, continuous	$0 \leq x < +\infty$	(UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), n.d.)	CDip
	Cultural Globalisation	The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs is de facto culturally globalised.	Ratio, continuous	$1 \leq x \leq 100$	(Gygli et al., 2019)	cultglobdf
Control Variable						
	Recommendation of the AB	The opinion of the AB regarding the inscription of the site in question	Nominal	‘Inscribe’= 1/ ‘Not inscribe’= 0	(UNESCO, 2021a)	ABrec

5.5. Data analysis

After collecting all data, it will be possible to analyse them to test the hypotheses formulated in section 4.4. To do so, a series of panel regression analyses based on logit and probit models will be run. Previous literature adopts this type of statistical analysis, too (Bertacchini & Saccone, 2012; Bertacchini et al., 2016; Frey et al., 2013). Both probit and logit models are used to determine the relationship between a dependent variable y and one or more independent variables x , where y can assume only two values, using a maximum likelihood estimation method. The difference between the two lies in the assumption about the distribution of errors. The logit assumes a standard logistic distribution, while the probit a normal error distribution (Moore, 2013). In any case, the results should be similar and the choice among the two models is usually at the researcher's discretion (Osborne, 2015). This thesis prefers to run both models.

5.5.1. The model

Because of the dataset is structured as panel, the analysis will be a panel data analysis; and since not all countries considered nominate a site every year, the panel data analysis is unbalanced (Greene, 2002).

Within this type of analysis, two are the most commonly estimated model types: random model and fixed effects model. The distinction relies on the assumptions made about the potential unobserved factors and time variability of the factors considered (Williams, 2018). The random effect assumes that there are no unobserved effects (effects that are not measured by the model), or that these effects are not correlated with the IVs considered. The fixed effects model, instead, accounts for the possibility of unobserved factors correlated with the IVs considered. However, to control for them, these unobserved factors need to have time-invariant values, i.e. values that do not change over time, and time-invariant effects on the outcome (Williams, 2018). The present research will adopt solely the fixed effects model, as time-invariant explanatory factors that might be correlated with the IVs considered have been omitted, for time and resource constraints. The fixed effect Panel estimation is therefore the best type of analysis for this research, as it matches with the type of dataset at hand (panel) and because the IVs considered are all time-variant factors (there are no time-invariant factors).

The structural model for panel logit and probit regression is synthesised by the following formula:

$$y_{it}^* = \beta_0 + \beta_{whc}WHC_{it} + \beta_{HiWHC}HiWHC_{it} + \beta_{nrSite}nrSite_{it} + \beta_{yearsCon}yearsCon_{it} + \beta_{UNSC}UNSC_{it} + \beta_{IntPI}IntPI_{it} + \beta_{FinCon}FinCon_{it} + \beta_{CDexp}CDexp_{it} + \beta_{CDip}CDip_{it} + \beta_{cultglobdf}cultglobdf_{it} + \beta_{ABrec}ABrec_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} + u_i$$

$$y_{it} = 1 \quad \text{if } y_{it}^* > 0$$

$$y_{it} = 0 \quad \text{if } y_{it}^* = 0$$

Where y_{it} is the DV for the state i at time t , the different β are the constant parameters for each of the IVs, ε_{it} is the error and u_i represents the unobserved factors. The IVs abbreviations are reported in table 5.1.

5.5.2. The models' assumptions

About the assumptions of the two models, probit and logistic regression are non-parametric models so that they differ sensibly from parametric models as they do not require parametric assumptions. First, they do not require a linear relationship between DV and IVs. Second, as already mentioned, the logistic model does not assume errors to be normally distributed. Third, homoscedasticity does not apply for these models since the dependent variable can only take up two values, hence the variance of the residuals does not sensibly change across values.

There are, nonetheless, a series of assumptions that must be met or tested for. Both models use maximum likelihood estimation techniques (instead of ordinary least square like linear regressions) and have the same assumptions (Osborne, 2015; StatisticSolutions, 2021).

First of all, the models are binary regressions, hence the DV must be binary. This condition is indeed met as the DV possible outcomes are 'inscribe' (= 1) and 'not inscribe' (= 0). Second, observations should be independent of each other. This condition is also met since data collection is based on already existing data (observations). Third, the sample size must be large. This condition will be controlled for after the data collection.

Fourth, there should not be "inappropriately high collinearity" among the IVs (Osborne, 2015, p. 84). To test for this condition, collinearity diagnostics will be performed in SPSS running a linear regression model among the IVs. The results of the regression are not relevant, but it is necessary to perform this model in SPSS as the software does not allow to test collinearity among IVs with binary models. Finally, although linearity between the IVs and the DV is not required, in the logit model linearity between IVs and the predicted logit is. In other words, the model assumes a linear relationship between the logit of the outcome and the IVs. This will be tested using a Box-Tidwell transformation.

The data analysis will be performed with SPSS. The statistical software does not include a direct option to run a panel analysis. Notwithstanding, there are ways to perform such a fixed effect panel analysis indirectly. In particular, this consists in creating dummy variables for the dimension of interest, which in this case is time. A dummy variable for each year will be created and used as a control variable in the model.

The result of the binary panel logit and probit regression for each IV will consist in its regression coefficient (β), standard error (SE), and odds ratio (OR). Among them, the odds ratio is the most informative result, not the parameter. This is because in logistic regression the coefficient represents the estimated increase in the log odds of the DV for each additional unit of the IV (Szumilas, 2010). Put simply, the number represents the logarithm function of the odds. The exponential function of this coefficient coincides with the odds ratio.

$$OR = e^{\beta}$$

The odds ratio “represents the odds that an outcome will occur given a particular exposure, compared to the odds of the outcome occurring in the absence of that exposure” (Szumilas, 2010, p. 227). In our case, this means that an odds ratio of 1.05, for instance, indicates a 5.00% increase in the odds of seeing the site successfully inscribed, for each additional unit of its relative IV.

Ultimately, while the significance of the IV on the DV is determined by p , the precision of the OR depends on the confidence intervals (CI, which are not explicitly reported in this research if not relevant). The CI ensure that it is possible to reject the null hypothesis for the odds ratio: $OR=1.00$ (Szumilas, 2010).

5.6. Validity and reliability

The internal validity of the design is strengthened by different factors. First of all, the present research decidedly relies on previous academic empirical research. It contributes to motivate the causal link between the IVs and the DV. It demonstrates how there is a credible causal link between them and how they can and do covary. Furthermore, the DV cannot logically influence the IV. Second, the use of several independent variables offered a complex elaboration of the concepts at hand, which are expressed in different dimensions. Besides, due to the potential threat of having a relatively high number of IVs, tests of collinearity and heteroscedasticity are planned. Being a quantitative study using inferential statistics, then, enhances the external validity of the research design, as a high number of observations allows for greater generalizability (Babbie, 2020).

The thesis reliability counts on a detailed explanation of the research design, from sampling to operationalisation, to data collection and analysis. Table 5.1. provides a straightforward summary of the operationalisation. Moreover, the next section will report eventual problems encountered during the data collection. This is done to favour transparency. Finally, quantitative research provides a narrow path to follow, where there is little room for personal interpretation and manoeuvre, increasing the thesis reliability.

6. Data collection, analysis & results

Data has been collected from the sources specified in Table 5.1. Based on them, a series of decisions regarding data collection has been taken and will be reported here.

First, it sometimes occurs that sites that have been deferred in the first round are subsequently inscribed before the following ordinary session (it has not been possible to estimate the exact number, which will not anyway influence the outcome of this research). Even in this case, deferment and referment will be considered as a failure to successfully inscribe the site at the first round. The deferment is due to the need to conduct more investigation on the site, which potentially could be overcome by political pressure. This does not bias data on the number of sites previously enlisted because the number of sites previously inscribed at the moment of the nomination is taken from a different, unaffected source. Therefore, even when a site has been first deferred but eventually inscribed, it would be counted in the number of sites previously inscribed.

Second, sites are sometimes nominated by more than one State Party. The number of cases collected that fall within this category is 34 over a total of 603 cases. They have not been considered in the analysis as it is not possible to determine the IVs values for a single country.

Third, contrary to previous research, no divergence between the recommendation of the ABs and the final decision of the WHC has ever been registered (Meskell et al., 2015). It is not clear the cause of the inconsistency, which might be due to different data source. In any case, this does not undermine the scope of the research, nor implies the absence of politicisation within the organization. Because no divergence has been measured, this control variable has been disregarded in the regressions.

The remainder of the chapter is structured according to the eight hypotheses to test, preceded by an introduction to the analysis and relevant tables. Each hypothesis is discussed and accepted or rejected, based on the results of its relevant explanatory factors. To better make sense of the results, these will be compared with previous empirical academic research.

6.1. Introduction to the analysis

The results of the panel logistic and probit regression analyses for each model have been reported in Tables 6.2 and 6.3. All models are significant (Omnibus Test is significant), appropriate for the analysis (Test of Hosmer and Lemeshow is not significant), and have an adequate predictive capacity considering that the distribution of the binary outcome is roughly evenly spread ($N_{inscribed}=267$, $N_{notinscribed}=297$, $M=.48$, $SD=.500$), as Table 6.1. reports. Indeed, for all models, the predictive capacity is higher than the intercept model. For reasons of clarity and feasibility, it is

possible to consult in detail the tables of each model performed in the appendixes, as specified in the note of Table 6.2 and 6.3.

The most important models are models 1, 2, 3, and 4 (a, b, and c) (see table 6.2. and 6.3.), while the remaining models were designed for robustness checks. Since for some variables it was not possible to retrieve data over a relatively important number of observations within the timeframe specified, the regression for those specific variables has been done separately, devising different models. This is done to keep the number of observations for each variable as high as possible, since the software running the analysis will consider only those observation presenting values for all variables considered. Therefore, models 2, 3, and 4 were performed because the number of observations varied across cases.

Table 6.1 Descriptive statistics for the DV and ratio IVs.

	<i>N</i>	<i>Minimum</i>	<i>Maximum</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Deviation</i>
Y	603	0	1	.48	.500
<i>Presence in the WHC</i>	564	0	1	.31	.464
<i>Historical presence in the WHC</i>	564	0	27	8.94	8.543
<i>Number of heritage sites</i>	564	0	55	16.67	15.732
<i>Historical presence in the Convention</i>	562	1	47	25.79	9.597
<i>Presence in the UNSC</i>	564	0	1	.22	.416
<i>International Political Integration</i>	527	12.67	98.06	78.69	17.838
<i>Financial contributions for the WHF</i>	276	.00	409,137.00	64,535.13	96,318.283
<i>Cultural globalisation</i>	526	3.99	98.76	59.02	26.360
<i>Total exports of cultural goods</i>	405	23,263.00	75,803,327,864.00	5,002,249,155.52	9,585,100,898.960
<i>Share in exports of cultural goods</i>	415	.01	7.06	1.11	1.259

Total exports												
<i>of Cultural goods</i>			.170								.290**	
			(.156)								(.128)	
<i>Share in exports of cultural goods</i>												
<i>Cultural globalisation</i>												
Constant	.694	-	.925	-.452	-.406	-.231	-.002	.386	.699	.307	-1.239	-.257
	(542)	1.454**	(.683)	(.881)	(.880)	(.706)	(.379)	(530)	(.542)	(.362)	(.821)	(.536)
		(.612)										
N	562	527	274	403	412	521	564	562	562	564	403	524

Significance: *=p <.1; **= p <.05; ***= p <.01.

Note: The tables reporting the full analysis output for each model can be retrieved in the appendixes, as follows.

Model 1: appendix A

Model 2: appendix B

Model 3: appendix C

Model 4 (a,b, and c): appendix D

Model 5: appendix E

Model 6: appendix F

Model 7 (a and b): appendix G

Model 8: appendix H

Model 9: appendix I

<i>Total exports of</i>					.101						.180**	
<i>Cultural goods</i>					(.0923)						(.0749)	
<i>Share in</i>												
<i>exports of</i>												
<i>cultural goods</i>												
<i>Cultural</i>												
<i>globalisation</i>												
Constant	.426	-.894**	.562	.221	-.263	-.145	-.004	.240	.430	.191	-.755	-.158
	(.3323)	(.3747)	(.4175)	(.6967)	(.5364)	(.4317)	(.2342)	(.3261)	(.3323)	(.2243)	(.4995)	(.3285)
N	562	527	274	403	412	521	564	562	562	564	403	524

Significance: *= $p < .1$; **= $p < .05$; ***= $p < .01$.

Note: The tables reporting the full analysis output for each model can be retrieved in the appendixes, as follows.

Model 1: appendix A

Model 2: appendix B

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Model 4 (a,b, and c): appendix D

Model 5: appendix E

Model 6: appendix F

Model 7 (a and b): appendix G

Model 8: appendix H

Model 9: appendix I

Table 6.4 Report of the Pearson's correlations between the variables measuring political factors.

		<i>Presence in the WHC</i>	<i>Historical presence in the WHC</i>	<i>Number of heritage sites</i>	<i>Presence in the UNSC</i>	<i>Historical presence in the UNSC</i>	<i>International political international</i>	<i>Financial contributions to the WHF</i>	<i>Total exports of cultural goods</i>	<i>Cultural Globalisation</i>	<i>Share in exports of cultural goods</i>
<i>Presence in the WHC</i>	<i>Pearson Correlation</i>	1	.159***	.160***	.145***	.013	.223***	.196***	.015	.059	.074
	<i>Sig. (2-tailed)</i>		.000	.000	.001	.766	.000	.001	.766	.178	.132
	<i>N</i>	564	564	564	564	562	527	275	405	526	414
<i>Historical presence in the WHC</i>	<i>Pearson Correlation</i>	.159***	1	.735***	.330**	.517***	.548**	.567***	.393***	.347***	.194***
	<i>Sig. (2-tailed)</i>	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	<i>N</i>	564	564	564	564	562	527	275	405	526	414
<i>Number of heritage sites</i>	<i>Pearson Correlation</i>	.160***	.735***	1	.500***	.411***	.657***	.605***	.597***	.353***	.369***
	<i>Sig. (2-tailed)</i>	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	<i>N</i>	564	564	564	564	562	527	275	405	526	414
<i>Presence in the UNSC</i>	<i>Pearson Correlation</i>	.145***	.330***	.500***	1	.133***	.374***	.379***	.525***	.213***	.237***
	<i>Sig. (2-tailed)</i>	.001	.000	.000		.002	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	<i>N</i>	564	564	564	564	562	527	275	405	526	414

Historical presence in the Convention	Pearson	.013	.517***	.411***	.133***	1	.419***	.109	.213***	.098**	.172***
	Correlation										
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.766	.000	.000	.002		.000	.072	.000	.025	.000
	N	562	562	562	562	562	525	274	404	524	413
International Political Integration	Pearson	.223***	.548***	.657***	.374***	.419***	1	.430***	.330***	.584***	.283***
	Correlation										
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000		.000	.000	.000	.000
	N	527	527	527	527	525	527	240	404	523	413
Financial contributions to the WHF	Pearson	.196***	.567***	.605***	.379***	.109	.430***	1	.334***	.390***	.022
	Correlation										
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.001	.000	.000	.000	.072	.000		.000	.000	.767
	N	275	275	275	275	274	240	276	184	242	184
Total exports of cultural goods	Pearson	.015	.393***	.597***	.525***	.213***	.330***	.334***	1	.152***	.484***
	Correlation										
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.766	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000		.002	.000
	N	405	405	405	405	404	404	184	405	404	405
Cultural Globalisation	Pearson	.059	.347***	.353***	.213***	.098**	.584***	.390***	.152***	1	.150***
	Correlation										
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.178	.000	.000	.000	.025	.000	.000	.002		.002
	N	526	526	526	526	524	523	242	404	526	413

<i>Share in exports of cultural goods</i>	<i>Pearson Correlation</i>	.074	.194***	.369***	.237***	.172***	.283***	.022	.484***	.150***	1
	<i>Sig. (2-tailed)</i>	.132	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.767	.000	.002	
	<i>N</i>	414	414	414	414	413	413	184	405	413	415

Significance: * = $p < .1$; ** = $p < .05$; *** = $p < .01$.

6.2. Model 1, testing assumptions

Model 1 considers multiple IVs for its panel logistic and probit analyses, namely: presence in the WHC, historical presence in the WHC, number of heritage sites, presence in the UNSC, and historical presence in the Convention. It is therefore fundamental to check for the model assumptions of multicollinearity and linearity of the logs explained in section 5.5.

6.2.1. Multicollinearity

Multicollinearity has been checked in two steps. First, the Pearson correlation between IVs has been calculated (Table 6.4.). Some of the variables present moderate to high correlation. The highest correlation recorded (.735) is between the number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC and its number of heritage sites at that time. It seems logical that the longer a State party has been in the WHC the higher the number of heritage sites it has, because it has had more chances to nominate sites. Following the same logic, it is understandable the moderate correlation between the number of years the State Party has been part of the Convention, and the number of years in the WHC (.517), and between the number of heritage sites and the number of years in the Convention (.411). As Frey et al. (2013) notice, since only sites whose country has ratified the Convention can be enlisted, the more year a State Party is on the list, the more sites it should have. There is, then, a moderate correlation also between the number of heritage sites and the presence of the State Party in the UNSC in the year of the nomination (.500). This correlation is difficult to justify logically, but it might hint at the fact that having a higher position in the international arena has historically led to more activity in the Convention (Bertacchini et al., 2016; Frey et al., 2013).

Because of these correlations, a multicollinearity check has been performed (see appendix A1). The results for tolerance does not suggest multicollinearity problems (Thompson et al., 2017). According to these results, no multicollinearity has been detected.

It is important to add that, since moderate (.300 to .600) and high (.700 or higher) correlation values have been found among IVs, secondary model specifications have been at times designed to more robust interpretations of the results. Although correlation levels lower than .500 should not be statistically problematic, performing these secondary models – and report them- is justified only in those cases where its result is significant to accept or reject the hypothesis.

6.2.2. Linearity of the logit

As specified in the research design, a Box-Tidwell transformation has been performed to test for the linearity of the logit. This applies only to continuous variables, which are transformed during the logit regression. The variables have been transformed, creating new variables. This has been done following the formula (example with ‘historical presence in the WHC’, *HiWHC*):

$$trHiWHC = \ln(HiWHC) * HiWHC$$

The linearity with the logit has been checked by looking at the p value of the transformed variables in the logit regression. All other results in the table should be disregarded (see appendix A2). The p value of the transformed variables in the regression is not significant ($p_{trHiWHC}=.619$; $p_{trnrSite}=.417$; $p_{tryearsCon}=.181$). Therefore, the linearity of the logit assumption is met.

6.3. Testing hypothesis 1: the influence of the presence in the WHC

The results of the panel logit and probit regressions show that the presence in the WHC of the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is not a significant factor influencing the outcome of the nomination (logit: $p=.475 > \alpha$, see table 6.2., model 1; probit: $p=.494 > \alpha$, see table 6.3., model 1).

Previous research on the topic shows different results. Bertacchini & Saccone’s (2012) probit estimations show that being in the WHC has a consistently significant, positive effect on the chances of inscription (equal to 15.00% before 1993, and 12.00% between 1994 and 2009). This only applies to cultural sites, while for natural sites no significant effect has been noticed. Nevertheless, the inconsistency between this and previous research might be explained by the fact that the present thesis makes no distinction among cultural and natural sites. This is because no theory justifies this division. This effect might be accentuated by the fact that, following the 2005 modification of the Operational Guidelines of the Convention, at least one heritage site of the two nominated must be natural. This led to a higher number of inscriptions of natural heritage sites than in the past. The timeframe of the present research, more recent than Bertacchini and Saccone’s one, might have captured this variation.

To conclude, the results do not find support for hypothesis 1, according to which presence in the WHC would have led to higher chances of getting a site inscribed.

6.4. Testing hypothesis 2: the influence of the historical presence in the WHC

Contrary to the presence in the WHC, the results of the panel logit and probit regressions show that the historical presence in the WHC has a significant, positive effect on the nomination outcome (logit: $B=.37$, $SE=.16$, see table 6.2., model 1; probit: $B=.023$, $SE=.01$, see table 6.3., model 1). In particular, each additional year spent as part of the WHC increases the odds of having its site inscribed from 2.30% (probit) to 3.80% (logit). As mentioned in the theoretical framework, this might be due to a learning mechanism: the more years a State Party spends in the Committee, the more confident and knowledgeable about how and when to support or oppose a decision it becomes. Learning how to efficiently make use of rent-seeking practices such as lobbying advocacy coalitions might be decisive for the nomination outcome.

The finding is in line with previous literature (Bertacchini et al., 2017). Indeed, Bertacchini et al. (2017) show that, within the different clusters of State Parties they have individuated within the Committee, the first group to distinguish itself for numbers of years spent in the WHC is the one composed mainly by Asian and BRICS countries. The authors note how these countries are characterized by, among other factors, a high number of nominations presented during Committee sessions. Furthermore, the average rate of inscriptions per year of this group has increased over time, and become more consistent, from about $M=5.87$ ($SD=3.03$) before 2000, to $M=7.00$ ($SD=2.77$) between 2000 and 2019 (UNESCO, 2021i). Considering the result, it is possible to accept hypothesis 2, by which the probability of a site of being enlisted is higher the more years the State Party whose it belongs to has been part of the WHC.

6.5. Testing hypothesis 3: the influence of the number of sites enlisted

The number of heritage sites appears not to be a significant explanatory factor to the WHC decisions, according to both panel logit and probit regressions (logit: $p=.347 > \alpha$, see table 6.2., model 1; probit: $p=.341 > \alpha$, see table 6.3., model 1). However, high collinearity has been observed between this variable and the historical presence in the WHC (.735), and moderate collinearity with the presence in the UNSC (.500) and the historical presence in the Convention (.411). For this reason, panel logistic and probit regressions have been performed leaving out the aforementioned variables with which moderate to high correlation has been found (see model 5 in table 6.2. and 6.3.). The result demonstrates that the correlations influence the significance of the variable. Indeed, in this model the number of sites is significant to the .01 level ($p=.001$) and has a positive, weak effect on the outcome of the inscription (logit: $B=.019$, $SE=.006$; probit: $B=.012$, $SE=.0036$).

According to the odds ratio, for each additional site inscribed in the WHL, the State Party has from 1.20% (probit) to 1.90% (logit) more chances to see its nomination succeed.

This result is in line with previous research. Bertacchini & Saccone (2012)'s panel probit estimation find that the total number of heritage sites enlisted at the moment of nomination has a significant, positive impact on the odds of seeing the nominated site inscribed of .80% for each additional unit. The results of both present and previous research have a positive effect of approximately the same intensity.

In light of this, it is possible to accept hypothesis 3, by which the higher the number of heritage sites a State Party has already inscribed in the WHL, the higher the probability of its site of being enlisted.

6.6. Testing hypothesis 4: the influence of the historical presence in the Convention

The historical presence in the Convention has a significant, negative effect on the outcome of the inscription (logit: $B=-.027$, $SE=.013$, $p=.036<\alpha$, see table 6.2., model 1; probit: $B=-.016$, $SE=.0078$, $p=.035<\alpha$, see table 6.3., model 1). The odds ratio indicates that, for each additional year the State Party has ratified the Convention, the site has 1.60% (probit) to 2.60% (logit) less probability of being inscribed. This result is in line with previous research, which finds the same negative relationship and intensity ($B=-.026$) (Bertacchini & Saccone, 2012, p. 343). As briefly mentioned in the theoretical framework, the reason offered by the authors is that “the majority of members states tend to submit more heritage sites that are worthy of inclusion in the first years of membership in the World Heritage Convention.” (Bertacchini & Saccone, 2012, p. 345). If this were the reason, it does not seem to substantially motivate politicisation or rent-seeking practices. On the contrary, the mentioned worthiness of these sites would be in respect to the official enlisting criteria.

Although the result is in line with previous research and logically consistent, an additional test to check for its robustness (see model 6 in table 6.2. and 6.3.) shows the relationship to be more problematic. Because of the moderate correlation between the variable, the variables “historical presence in the WHC”, and “number of sites”, the latter two have been excluded. In model 6 the effect of the historical presence in the Convention is not significant anymore (logit: $p=.691>\alpha$; probit: $p=.685>\alpha$). Further tests individuated the historical presence in the WHC as the variable causing the historical presence in the Convention to become significant.

In any case, the results do not find support for hypothesis 4. The number of years a state party has ratified the Convention appears not to be a significant factor influencing the outcome of the nomination.

6.7. Testing hypothesis 5: the influence of the presence in the UNSC

The presence in the UNSC does not have a significant effect on the outcome of the inscription (logit: $p=.536 > \alpha$, see table 6.2., model 1; probit: $p=.637 > \alpha$, see table 6.3., model 1). Because of the moderate collinearity between this factor and the number of heritage sites, another model has been performed, leaving out the second variable. Even in this case, the factor results non-significant (logit and probit: $p=.345 > \alpha$, see table 6.2. and 6.3., model 7a). Even if the variable results significant when considered alone (logit and probit: $p=.25 < \alpha$; see table 6.2. and 6.3., model 7b), it does become immediately not significant adding any other variable which is not sensibly correlated with it.

Bertacchini et al. (2016) show partially similar results. In particular, for the period 2003-2012, the authors found the variable not significant in any circumstance apart when the final decision of the site witnesses an upgrade compared to the ABs' recommendation. This result, nonetheless, is incompatible with the present research as no sign of divergence between the recommendation of the ABs and the final decision of the WHC has been noted when collecting data from the specified source. In any case, the authors specify that tests for robustness checks showed no significant influence of being in the UNSC on the outcome of the nomination. This is inconsistent with Frey et al.'s (2013) results which instead find a significant, positive link between the presence in the UNSC and the probability of successful inscription. In light of the present research results and the inconsistency with (and among) previous research, it is not possible to support hypothesis 5, by which the probability of a site of being enlisted is higher if the State Party it belongs to is part of the UNSC.

6.8. Testing hypothesis 6: the influence of the international political integration

The presence in the UNSC is one of the two variables that look at the position of the State Party outside the scope of the Convention, together with the degree of international political integration. The latter has been measured in another model (model 2), because there are no data for the year 2019 ($N=527$). Next to the dummy control variables for years, this model includes the 'presence in the WHC' as a control variable, since it is the only variable without a moderate or high correlation with the international political integration, or that would have sensibly limited the number of observations (like 'financial contributions to the WHF' and variables related to cultural diplomacy). The results of the analysis show that the degree of international political integration has a significant, positive effect on the outcome of the nomination (logit: $B=.013$, $SE=.006$, $p=.018 < \alpha$,

see table 6.2., model 2; probit: $B=.008$, $SE=.0033$, $p=.017<\alpha$, see table 6.3., model 2). In particular, the odds ratios are respectively 1.013 for the logit, and 1.008 for the probit analysis. For every additional unit in the degree of international political integration, there is .80% to 1.30% more chances to see the nominated site inscribed.

This result confirms the observations noted by Bertacchini et al. (2016). The author first results showed a significant negative relationship between the variable in question and the chances of inscription. The counterintuitive direction of the relationship suggested them to check for the correlation with the number of heritage sites already inscribed, which also in the present analysis is quite relevant (Pearson's correlation=.657). The influence of the other variable led them to the conclusion that the international political integration dimension may have influenced the result (Bertacchini et al., 2016). Consequently, in the timeframe they analysed (2003 to 2012), less politically integrated countries have inscribed more sites (e.g. China and Iran). Since the model specification of the present study differs from the one of Bertacchini et al. (2016) and present a higher N , it may have corrected the negative direction of the relationship into positive. All in all, it is possible to accept hypothesis 6.

6.9. Testing hypothesis 7: the influence of the financial contributions to the WHF

Similar to hypothesis 6, a different model (model 3) has been devised to test the influence of the financial contributions to the WHF on the chances of inscription of its nominated site. This is because data for this variable is limited only between 2011 and 2019, so that the number of observations is drastically reduced compared to other explanatory factors ($N=274$). Here too, only those variables without a high correlation with the variable in question (in particular: 'Historical presence in the Convention' and 'Number of heritage sites') or that would not limit the total number of observations, have been taken into consideration. Before running the test, the relevant variable has been adjusted, dividing by 100,000 its values. This will estimate the variation in the probability of enlisting a site in the WHL every additional 100,000 US dollars, and not every dollar, which may have resulted in a too feeble effect. It has been decided to divide by 100,000 because it approximates well the variable's $SD=96,318.283$.

According to the results, the financial contributions to the WHF have a positive, significant effect on the outcome of the nomination (logit: $B=.578$, $SE=.165$, $p=.000<\alpha$, see table 6.2., model 3; probit: $B=.351$, $SE=.0968$, $p=.000<\alpha$, see table 6.3., model 3). According to the odds ratio, the chances of successfully inscribe a site increase by 42.00% (probit) to 78.30% for every additional 100,000 US dollars the State Party has given to the WHF.

Previous studies did not look specifically at the financial contribution to the WHF so that a direct comparison is impossible in this case. In light of the significant, positive correlation it is possible to accept hypothesis 7 and affirm that the financial contributions to the WHF sensibly influence the outcome of the nomination.

6.10. Testing hypothesis 8: the influence of cultural diplomacy

To test hypothesis 8, three different variables have been considered. Because of the lack of data, a separate test has been performed for each variable. In all models, the variables not measuring cultural diplomacy have been included as control variables, apart from the ‘financial contributions to the WHF’ dimension, which would have sensibly reduced the number of observations.

The first variable considered is the total exports of cultural goods. As for the financial contribution to the WHF, the values of the variable have been divided by 10,000,000,000 (ten billion), a fair approximation of the variable’s $SD=9,585,100,898.960$. The results of the panel logit and probit analyses indicate that there is not a significant relationship with the DV (logit: $p=.277>\alpha$, see table 6.2., model 4a; probit: $p=.272>\alpha$, see table 6.3., model 4a). Another model has been devised, leaving out those variables with a moderate or high correlation with ‘total exports of cultural goods’ (‘Historical presence in the WHC’, ‘Number of heritage sites’, and ‘Presence in the UNSC’). The new results indicate that there is a positive, significant effect of the IV on the DV (logit: $B=.290$, $SE=.128$, see table 6.2., model 8; probit: $B=.180$, $SE=.0749$, see table 6.3., model 8). The odds ratio indicates that, for every additional ten billion US dollars of total exports in cultural goods, the chances of successfully inscribing a site in the WHL increase by 19.70% (probit) to 33.70% (logit).

About the share in exports of cultural goods, the results of the panel logit and probit analyses indicate that the relationship is only significant (negative) at the .1 level ($p=.065$). Therefore, the result will not be considered.

About the Cultural Globalisation parameter (model 4c, $N=521$), the results show that there is no significant relationship between the IV and the DV (logit: $p=.439$; probit: $p=.460$). As for the first variable considered, another model has been devised (see table 6.2. and 6.3., model 9) where all control variables with high collinearity have been excluded (‘International political integration’). Also in this case, the relationship is not significant (logit: $p=.296>\alpha$; probit: $p=.310>\alpha$).

The three variables show diverging results. The ‘total exports of cultural goods’ is not significant in its first model and it becomes so in the second model, with a positive direction. The share of exports of cultural goods is negatively related to the DV, but its statistical significance is

weak. Finally, cultural globalization is not significant in any model. Based on these results, it is not possible to accept hypothesis 8.

6.11. Data analysis conclusion

In sum, it is possible to say that, from 2003 to 2019, certain political factors have influenced, with different degrees, the outcome of the WHL enlisting process. In particular, it has been demonstrated how there is a moderate increase in the probability of having a site enlisted in the WHL for every additional year the State Party candidating the site has spent in the WHC (2.30% - 3.80%). Similarly, the chances of successful inscription slightly increase the more heritage sites the State Party has (1.20% - 1.90% per site), and the more it is internationally political integrated (.80% - 1.30% per percentual point). Finally, a significant increase in the chances of inscription (42.00% - 78.30%) occurs for every additional 100,000 US dollars the State Party gives to the WHF. However, considering that this unit approximates the variable's SD, about 68.26% of the observations fall within the range of 100,000 dollars from the mean, hence the increase in the probability for those observations is less substantive.

On the contrary, no data support a potential relationship between chances of inscription and presence in the WHC, nor UNSC, in the year of the nomination. The historical presence in the Convention and the degree of cultural diplomacy also appears not to have a significant influence on it.

7. Conclusion

7.1. Summary of the thesis's development

This research has been able to conduct a study on the political factors influencing the WHL enlisting process. This has been possible thanks to the extensive literature review covering the major lines of research around UNESCO, the WHL, and politicisation, in particular within IOs and in the WHL. The concepts of politicisation and rent-seeking have been outlined in the theoretical framework, together with a list of eight political factors potentially capable of influencing the chances of enlisting a heritage site in the WHL. The fixed effects panel logit and probit regressions performed on the extensive dataset collected confirmed the hypotheses on the historical presence in the WHC, number of heritage sites, degree of international political integration, and size of financial contributions to the WHF. The remaining hypotheses have been instead rejected.

7.2. Main findings and answer to the research question

The thesis's findings are sometimes not in line with previous research. The first and most relevant case regards the presence in the WHC. Plainly at odds with previous research, the present study found this factor non-significant in the enlisting process in all analyses performed. Similarly, the historical presence in the Convention, i.e. the number of years the State Party has ratified the Convention at the moment of the nomination, seems not to be a significant factor when correlated factors (the historical presence in the WHC) are partial out. Previous research did not consider the effect of other factors on this variable and reached different conclusions. For both factors, the presence in the WHC and the historical presence in the Convention, further quantitative research might solve this controversy.

Despite the aforementioned cases, the results confirm previous literature's findings. In particular, the thesis found that the more years a State Party has been in the WHC, and the more heritage sites it has enlisted at the moment of the nomination, the higher the chances to see its site in the WHL. This probably suggests that the countries learn how to lobby more effectively for inscription, the more years they have been in the WHC. The presence in the WHC could not have captured this historical dimension. At the same time, they acquire a more relevant status in the Convention through the WHC, and not only historically being in the Convention.

This thesis has also confirmed past research claims that the presence in the UNSC is not an influencing factor. But while this specific political factor outside the scope of the Convention is not relevant, international political integration is. The thesis solved previous controversies about the direction of influence of the degree of political integration on the enlisting process. The direction is

positive, meaning that the more politically integrated at an international level a country is, the more likely it is to see its site enlisted. Those countries with strong international alliances and relations are favoured in the enlisting process.

Two political factors were not investigated by previous research so that no direct comparison can be made. First, the size of financial contributions to the WHF is perhaps the most interesting result in terms of rent-seeking practices, as there is little room to doubt that a favourable treatment based on higher contributions is a source of politicisation.

The latter factor is cultural diplomacy, arguably the most problematic concept. It seems that the cause of this non-relation is due to the inadequateness of the indicators chosen. In this regard, there is the need to build a proper index measuring cultural diplomacy.

In light of these findings, it is possible to infer that certain political factors are potentially capable of influencing future nominations, increasing or decreasing the probability of successful inscription. To answer the research question: politicisation has been found in the WHL enlisting process. The presence of politicisation in the UNESCO WHL has certain implications. One above all, the credibility of the IO is at stake. This can in turn undermine the effectiveness of the WHL label and the protection of its sites, which rely heavily on the halo of prestige of the 'World Heritage Site' label.

Not to overstate the thesis's findings, the main achievement of this thesis is to corroborate what previous literature has claimed, theorised, or measured empirically: the willingness of the stakeholders involved in the enlisting process to influence its outcome. In doing so, it looked at a more recent timeframe and involved research on political science and international relations in the discussion. These should be considered the added value of this study.

7.3. Research limitations

Nonetheless, it is important to recognise the limits of the thesis, too. One above all, limitations concerning the type of analysis and model chosen. The possibility of having disregarded time-variant factors from the analysis, that will not be partial out by the model and should be instead accounted for, is clear. The type of research design chosen, a panel data fixed effect model, recognises it too. Time-invariant, unobserved factors are admitted by the model, and so are factors that vary over time across countries. However, time-variants factors that vary within countries are not. For instance, the delegation size of a country might be influential and correlated with other independent variables considered. The factors to account for can be several. For reasons of limited time and space to develop the analysis, however, this is referred to future research.

As mentioned earlier, further research should also solve the discrepancies between this and previous studies. A recurrent element of inconsistency concerned the relationship between the final decision of the WHC and the ABs' recommendations. Indeed, the recommendation of the ABs does not suggest anything about the potential political factors that could not only have influenced the WHC decision, but also the one of the ABs, as well as the whole process of inscription. Nonetheless, the fact that this research found no divergence between recommendations and final decisions while previous did, should be analysed more in-depth. A solution might be adopting a qualitative approach, disregarded by the present research, and still lacking for the timeframe analysed.

The focus on more qualitative approaches holds not only for the ABs-WHC dispute but to the study of politicisation in the WHL more generally. Document analysis or network analysis can offer insights into the creation of advocacy coalitions networks in the Convention. Indeed, measuring quantitatively politicisation and rent-seeking practices is troublesome because their presence can only be captured indirectly. It is not possible to safely affirm that the learning mechanism justifying some political factors, for instance, consists more in the creation of lobbies and advocacy networks, rather than improving the quality of the candidacy. Therefore, affirming that politicisation is present in the UNESCO WHL does not necessarily imply that rent-seeking practices necessarily occurred in the past or will in the future, as it would be hard to sustain only based on current quantitative results. Instead, the presence of politicisation entails that these practices are likely to occur given the possibility to influence the outcome of the WHL through them.

7.4. Final reflections and recommendations

Politicisation in the WHL has been found. Regardless of normative judgements for which any deviation from the Operational Guidelines criteria should or not interfere in the evaluation process, it can be argued that the credibility and effectiveness of the WHL, hence UNESCO, is at stake. This is because, as mentioned in the literature review, the current thesis understands UNESCO politicisation as Lyons et al. (1977) do, i.e. where political factors that should not be taken into account instead influence the decision-making procedures of the WHC. Claiming the opposite entails admitting that heritage is valuable because of political factors (related to power, not social or cultural in general), which the WHL official Operational Guidelines -and the author of this thesis- repute incorrect. It does not mean that heritage has a political value, which is undeniable and indeed the one likely to generate politicisation in the Convention. It is therefore fundamental for the Convention to contrast this natural phenomenon and grant an unbiased nomination process. This

can be done through alternative bureaucratic models, as some scholars propose (Bertacchini et al., 2011; Rao, 2010). Offering such reforms is outside the scope of this thesis, which suggests anyways to focus particularly on the historical presence of countries in the WHC, their number of heritage sites, and their position in the international arena.

At the same time, while these factors continue to influence the enlisting process, it is advisable also for State Parties and site managers to consider their chances of successful inscription considering these factors, to invest their resources wisely. The principal recommendation is to substantially increase the contributions to the WHF. Furthermore, they should not count on being in the WHC or in the UNSC to nominate a site. Being in the WHC is, however, the best moment to develop connections and secure alliances within the convention. In this way, the years in the WHC will benefit future nominations.

8. References

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Appendix

Appendix A

Appendix A5 Test for multicollinearity among variables in model 1.

Coefficients			
Model		Collinerativity statistics	
		Tolerance	VIF
1	Presence in the WHC	.959	1.043
	The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC	.401	2.492
	The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL	.384	2.603
	If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	.740	1.352
	The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	.722	1.386

Appendix A6 Test for linearity of the logit of the ration independent variables in model 1

Variables in the equation							
		B	S.E.	Wald	gl	Sign.	Exp(B)
Phase 1 st	Presence in the WHC	.082	.199	.169	1	.681	1.085
	The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC	.078	.091	.735	1	.391	1.081
	The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL	.059	.064	.857	1	.355	1.061
	If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	.081	.240	.114	1	.736	1.084

	The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	-.228	.150	2.310	1	.129	.796
	trHiWHC	-.014	.027	.247	1	.619	.987
	trnrSite	-.013	.016	.659	1	.417	.987
	tryearsCon	.048	.036	1.787	1	.181	1.049
	Costante	.950	.783	1.470	1	.225	2.585

Appendix A7 Tables reporting the panel logit regression for model 1

Case Processing Summary			
Unweighted Cases ^a		N	Percent
Selected Cases	Included in Analysis	562	93.2
	Missing Cases	41	6.8
	Total	603	100.0
Unselected Cases		0	.0
Total		603	100.0

a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of cases.

Dependent Variable Encoding	
Original Value	Internal Value
Not inscribe	0
Inscribe	1

Block 0: Beginning Block

Classification Table^{a,b}					
	Observed	Predicted			
		The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question		Percentage Correct	
		Not inscribe	Inscribe		
Step 0	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question	Not inscribe	295	0	100.0
		Inscribe	267	0	.0
	Overall Percentage				52.5

a. Constant is included in the model.

b. The cut value is .500

Variables in the Equation							
	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	
Step 0	Constant	-.100	.084	1.394	1	.238	.905

Variables not in the Equation ^a					
		Score	df	Sig.	
Step 0	Variables	xx18	.107	1	.744
		xx17	.296	1	.587
		xx16	.003	1	.960
		xx15	1.916	1	.166
		xx14	.645	1	.422
		xx13	.222	1	.638
		xx12	1.608	1	.205
		xx11	2.432	1	.119
		xx10	2.081	1	.149
		xx09	.296	1	.587
		xx08	.000	1	.999
		xx07	.258	1	.611
		xx06	2.347	1	.126
		xx05	2.209	1	.137
		xx04	9.912	1	.002
		xx03	.000	1	.999
		The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	.109	1	.741
		The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC	10.879	1	.001
		the year of the nomination	.278	1	.598
		Presence in the WHC	2.069	1	.150
The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL	9.358	1	.002		
If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	3.813	1	.051		

a. Residual Chi-Squares are not computed because of redundancies.

Block 1: Method = Enter

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients				
		Chi-square	df	Sig.
Step 1	Step	46.382	21	.001
	Block	46.382	21	.001
	Model	46.382	21	.001

Model Summary			
Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	731.320 ^a	.079	.106

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.

Hosmer and Lemeshow Test			
Step	Chi-square	df	Sig.
1	6.047	8	.642

Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test						
		The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question = Not inscribe		The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question = Inscribe		Total
		Observed	Expected	Observed	Expected	
Step 1	1	39	41.573	17	14.427	56
	2	42	38.890	15	18.110	57
	3	34	35.450	22	20.550	56
	4	32	33.273	24	22.727	56
	5	29	30.835	27	25.165	56
	6	28	28.662	28	27.338	56
	7	32	26.719	24	29.281	56
	8	28	24.151	28	31.849	56
	9	19	20.318	37	35.682	56
	10	12	15.130	45	41.870	57

Classification Table^a					
		Predicted			
		The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question		Percentage Correct	
Observed		Not inscribe	Inscribe		
Step 1	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question	Not inscribe	202	93	68.5
		Inscribe	129	138	51.7
Overall Percentage					60.5

a. The cut value is .500

Variables in the Equation									
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	95% C.I. for EXP(B)	
								Lower	Upper
Step 1 ^a	xx18	-.809	.545	2.206	1	.137	.445	.153	1.295
	xx17	-.832	.546	2.323	1	.127	.435	.149	1.269
	xx16	-.567	.548	1.070	1	.301	.567	.194	1.660

xx15	-.039	.520	.005	1	.941	.962	.347	2.666
xx14	-.863	.522	2.738	1	.098	.422	.152	1.173
xx13	-.462	.526	.773	1	.379	.630	.225	1.765
xx12	-1.155	.520	4.935	1	.026	.315	.114	.873
xx11	-1.167	.519	5.064	1	.024	.311	.113	.860
xx10	-1.292	.555	5.425	1	.020	.275	.093	.815
xx09	-.947	.566	2.799	1	.094	.388	.128	1.176
xx08	-.692	.512	1.828	1	.176	.500	.183	1.365
xx07	-.896	.519	2.979	1	.084	.408	.147	1.129
xx06	-1.203	.542	4.926	1	.026	.300	.104	.869
xx05	-.191	.524	.132	1	.716	.826	.296	2.308
xx04	.354	.541	.428	1	.513	1.425	.493	4.115
xx03	-.681	.512	1.766	1	.184	.506	.185	1.382
The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	-.027	.013	4.382	1	.036	.974	.949	.998
The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC	.037	.016	5.199	1	.023	1.038	1.005	1.072
Presence in the WHC	.141	.198	.511	1	.475	1.152	.782	1.696
The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL	.009	.009	.884	1	.347	1.009	.991	1.027
If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	.118	.249	.224	1	.636	1.125	.690	1.834
Constant	.694	.542	1.643	1	.200	2.002		

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: xx18. xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention. The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC. Presence in the WHC. The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination..

Appendix A8 Tables reporting the panel probit analysis for model 1

Model Information

Dependent Variable	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question ^a
Probability Distribution	Binomial
Link Function	Probit
a. The procedure models Inscribe as the response. treating Not inscribe as the reference category.	

Case Processing Summary		
	N	Percent
Included	562	93.2%
Excluded	41	6.8%
Total	603	100.0%

Categorical Variable Information				
			N	Percent
Dependent Variable	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question	Not inscribe	295	52.5%
		Inscribe	267	47.5%
		Total	562	100.0%

Continuous Variable Information						
		N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Covariate	Presence in the WHC	562	0	1	.31	.465
	The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC	562	0	27	8.96	8.547
	The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL	562	0	55	16.73	15.732
	If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	562	0	1	.22	.416

The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	562	1	47	25.79	9.597
xx18	562	.00	1.00	.0480	.21405
xx17	562	.00	1.00	.0463	.21024
xx16	562	.00	1.00	.0445	.20635
xx15	562	.00	1.00	.0569	.23193
xx14	562	.00	1.00	.0569	.23193
xx13	562	.00	1.00	.0552	.22850
xx12	562	.00	1.00	.0623	.24187
xx11	562	.00	1.00	.0658	.24822
xx10	562	.00	1.00	.0516	.22142
xx09	562	.00	1.00	.0463	.21024
xx08	562	.00	1.00	.0712	.25734
xx07	562	.00	1.00	.0694	.25435
xx06	562	.00	1.00	.0569	.23193
xx05	562	.00	1.00	.0694	.25435
xx04	562	.00	1.00	.0694	.25435
xx03	562	.00	1.00	.0712	.25734

Goodness of Fit ^a			
	Value	df	Value/df
Deviance	639.744	472	1.355
Scaled Deviance	639.744	472	
Pearson Chi-Square	488.722	472	1.035
Scaled Pearson Chi-Square	488.722	472	
Log Likelihood ^b	-342.746		
Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC)	729.491		
Finite Sample Corrected AIC (AICC)	731.369		
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)	824.784		
Consistent AIC (CAIC)	846.784		
Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question			
Model: (Intercept). Presence in the WHC. The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC. The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention. xx18. xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03			
a. Information criteria are in smaller-is-better form.			

b. The full log likelihood function is displayed and used in computing information criteria.

Omnibus Test^a		
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square	df	Sig.
46.463	21	.001
Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question Model: (Intercept). Presence in the WHC. The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC. The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention. xx18. xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03		
a. Compares the fitted model against the intercept-only model.		

Tests of Model Effects			
Source	Type III		
	Wald Chi-Square	df	Sig.
(Intercept)	1.645	1	.200
Presence in the WHC	.467	1	.494
The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC	5.258	1	.022
The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL	.908	1	.341
If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	.223	1	.637
The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	4.445	1	.035
xx18	2.255	1	.133
xx17	2.337	1	.126
xx16	1.071	1	.301
xx15	.006	1	.939
xx14	2.751	1	.097
xx13	.747	1	.387
xx12	4.983	1	.026
xx11	5.172	1	.023
xx10	5.505	1	.019

xx09	2.845	1	.092
xx08	1.837	1	.175
xx07	3.018	1	.082
xx06	5.003	1	.025
xx05	.115	1	.735
xx04	.467	1	.494
xx03	1.743	1	.187

Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question

Model: (Intercept). Presence in the WHC. The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC. The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention. xx18. xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03

Parameter Estimates										
Parameter	B	Std. Error	95% Wald Confidence Interval		Hypothesis Test			Exp(B)	95% Wald Confidence Interval for Exp(B)	
			Lower	Upper	Wald Chi-Square	df	Sig.		Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	.426	.3323	-.225	1.077	1.645	1	.200	1.531	.798	2.937
Presence in the WHC	.084	.1223	-.156	.323	.467	1	.494	1.087	.855	1.382
The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC	.023	.0101	.003	.043	5.258	1	.022	1.023	1.003	1.044

Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question
Model: (Intercept). Presence in the WHC. The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC. The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention. xx18. xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03
a. Fixed at the displayed value.

Appendix B

Appendix B1 Tables reporting panel logit estimation for model 2.

Case Processing Summary			
Unweighted Cases ^a		N	Percent
Selected Cases	Included in Analysis	527	87.4
	Missing Cases	76	12.6
	Total	603	100.0
Unselected Cases		0	.0
Total		603	100.0

a. If weight is in effect. see classification table for the total number of cases.

Dependent Variable Encoding	
Original Value	Internal Value
Not inscribe	0
Inscribe	1

Block 0: Beginning Block

Classification Table ^{a,b}					
			Predicted		Percentage Correct
			The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question		
	Observed		Not inscribe	Inscribe	
Step 0	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question	Not inscribe	281	0	100.0
		Inscribe	246	0	.0
	Overall Percentage				53.3

a. Constant is included in the model.

b. The cut value is .500

Variables in the Equation							
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 0	Constant	-.133	.087	2.321	1	.128	.875

Variables not in the Equation					
		Score	df	Sig.	
Step 0	Variables	xx17	.210	1	.647
		xx16	.018	1	.892
		xx15	2.206	1	.137
		xx14	.502	1	.479
		xx13	.031	1	.859
		xx12	1.041	1	.308
		xx11	2.131	1	.144
		xx10	1.428	1	.232
		xx09	.210	1	.647
		xx08	.012	1	.914
		xx07	.162	1	.688
		xx06	2.072	1	.150
		xx05	3.086	1	.079
		xx04	10.674	1	.001
		xx03	.012	1	.914
		The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.		5.028	1
Presence in the WHC		1.727	1	.189	
Overall Statistics		29.871	17	.027	

Block 1: Method = Enter

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients				
		Chi-square	df	Sig.
Step 1	Step	30.728	17	.022
	Block	30.728	17	.022
	Model	30.728	17	.022

Model Summary			
Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	697.523 ^a	.057	.076

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.

Classification Table ^a					
	Observed	Predicted			
		The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question		Percentage Correct	
		Not inscribe	Inscribe		
Step 1	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question	Not inscribe	215	66	76.5
		Inscribe	140	106	43.1
	Overall Percentage				60.9

a. The cut value is .500

Variables in the Equation							
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1 ^a	xx17	-.001	.555	.000	1	.999	.999
	xx16	.325	.559	.338	1	.561	1.384
	xx15	.685	.527	1.687	1	.194	1.983
	xx14	-.024	.532	.002	1	.964	.976
	xx13	.243	.540	.203	1	.652	1.275
	xx12	-.172	.527	.107	1	.743	.842
	xx11	-.240	.526	.208	1	.648	.787
	xx10	-.232	.557	.174	1	.677	.793
	xx09	-.038	.558	.005	1	.946	.963
	xx08	.327	.504	.422	1	.516	1.387
	xx07	.111	.506	.048	1	.827	1.117
	xx06	-.266	.538	.244	1	.621	.767
	xx05	.837	.513	2.670	1	.102	2.310
	xx04	1.387	.534	6.741	1	.009	4.003
	xx03	.308	.506	.369	1	.544	1.360
	The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.	.013	.006	5.587	1	.018	1.013
	Presence in the WHC	.183	.204	.807	1	.369	1.201
Constant	-1.454	.612	5.644	1	.018	.234	

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03. The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.. Presence in the WHC.

Appendix B2 Tables reporting panel probit regression for model 2

Model Information	
Dependent Variable	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question ^a
Probability Distribution	Binomial
Link Function	Probit
a. The procedure models Inscribe as the response. treating Not inscribe as the reference category.	

Case Processing Summary		
	N	Percent
Included	527	87.4%
Excluded	76	12.6%
Total	603	100.0%

Categorical Variable Information				
			N	Percent
Dependent Variable	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question	Not inscribe	281	53.3%
		Inscribe	246	46.7%
		Total	527	100.0%

Continuous Variable Information						
		N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Covariate	xx17	527	.00	1.00	.0493	.21677
	xx16	527	.00	1.00	.0474	.21278
	xx15	527	.00	1.00	.0607	.23904
	xx14	527	.00	1.00	.0607	.23904
	xx13	527	.00	1.00	.0550	.22825
	xx12	527	.00	1.00	.0645	.24590
	xx11	527	.00	1.00	.0702	.25574
	xx10	527	.00	1.00	.0531	.22451
	xx09	527	.00	1.00	.0493	.21677
	xx08	527	.00	1.00	.0759	.26509
	xx07	527	.00	1.00	.0740	.26203
	xx06	527	.00	1.00	.0607	.23904
	xx05	527	.00	1.00	.0759	.26509
	xx04	527	.00	1.00	.0740	.26203
	xx03	527	.00	1.00	.0759	.26509
		Presence in the WHC	527	0	1	.31

	The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.	527	12.67	98.06	78.6898	17.83770
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Goodness of Fit^a			
	Value	df	Value/df
Deviance	583.452	427	1.366
Scaled Deviance	583.452	427	
Pearson Chi-Square	438.791	427	1.028
Scaled Pearson Chi-Square	438.791	427	
Log Likelihood ^b	-319.805		
Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC)	675.610		
Finite Sample Corrected AIC (AICC)	676.956		
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)	752.420		
Consistent AIC (CAIC)	770.420		
Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question			
Model: (Intercept). xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03. Presence in the WHC. The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.			
a. Information criteria are in smaller-is-better form.			
b. The full log likelihood function is displayed and used in computing information criteria.			

Omnibus Test^a		
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square	df	Sig.
30.756	17	.021
Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question		
Model: (Intercept). xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03. Presence in the WHC. The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.		
a. Compares the fitted model against the intercept-only model.		

Tests of Model Effects			
Source	Type III		
	Wald Chi-Square	df	Sig.
(Intercept)	5.692	1	.017
xx17	.000	1	.990
xx16	.352	1	.553
xx15	1.704	1	.192

xx14	.002	1	.961
xx13	.209	1	.648
xx12	.088	1	.767
xx11	.210	1	.647
xx10	.178	1	.673
xx09	.004	1	.949
xx08	.415	1	.520
xx07	.049	1	.825
xx06	.247	1	.619
xx05	2.699	1	.100
xx04	6.916	1	.009
xx03	.376	1	.540
Presence in the WHC	.814	1	.367
The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.	5.718	1	.017
Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question			
Model: (Intercept). xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03. Presence in the WHC. The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.			

Parameter Estimates										
Parameter	B	Std. Error	95% Wald Confidence Interval		Hypothesis Test			Exp(B)	95% Wald Confidence Interval for Exp(B)	
			Lower	Upper	Wald Chi-Square	df	Sig.		Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	-.894	.3747	-1.629	-.160	5.692	1	.017	.409	.196	.853
xx17	.004	.3453	-.672	.681	.000	1	.990	1.004	.510	1.976
xx16	.207	.3486	-.477	.890	.352	1	.553	1.230	.621	2.435
xx15	.429	.3284	-.215	1.072	1.704	1	.192	1.535	.807	2.922
xx14	-.016	.3315	-.666	.633	.002	1	.961	.984	.514	1.884
xx13	.154	.3362	-.505	.813	.209	1	.648	1.166	.603	2.254
xx12	-.096	.3251	-.734	.541	.088	1	.767	.908	.480	1.717
xx11	-.149	.3261	-.788	.490	.210	1	.647	.861	.455	1.632
xx10	-.146	.3452	-.822	.531	.178	1	.673	.865	.439	1.701
xx09	-.022	.3475	-.704	.659	.004	1	.949	.978	.495	1.932
xx08	.203	.3148	-.414	.820	.415	1	.520	1.225	.661	2.270
xx07	.070	.3156	-.549	.688	.049	1	.825	1.072	.578	1.991

xx06	-.165	.3326	-.817	.487	.247	1	.619	.848	.442	1.627
xx05	.524	.3188	-.101	1.148	2.699	1	.100	1.688	.904	3.153
xx04	.862	.3277	.220	1.504	6.916	1	.009	2.368	1.246	4.500
xx03	.193	.3153	-.425	.811	.376	1	.540	1.213	.654	2.251
Presence in the WHC	.114	.1264	-.134	.362	.814	1	.367	1.121	.875	1.436
The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.	.008	.0033	.001	.015	5.718	1	.017	1.008	1.001	1.015
(Scale)	1 ^a									
Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question										
Model: (Intercept). xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03. Presence in the WHC. The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.										
a. Fixed at the displayed value.										

Appendix C

Appendix C1 Tables reporting panel logit estimation for model 3.

Case Processing Summary			
Unweighted Cases ^a		N	Percent
Selected Cases	Included in Analysis	274	45.4
	Missing Cases	329	54.6
	Total	603	100.0
Unselected Cases		0	.0
Total		603	100.0

a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of cases.

Dependent Variable Encoding	
Original Value	Internal Value
Not inscribe	0
Inscribe	1

Block 0: Beginning Block

Classification Table ^{a,b}					
	Observed		Predicted		
			The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question		Percentage Correct
			Not inscribe	Inscribe	
Step 0	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question	Not inscribe	147	0	100.0
		Inscribe	127	0	.0
	Overall Percentage				53.6
a. Constant is included in the model.					
b. The cut value is .500					

Variables in the Equation							
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 0	Constant	-.146	.121	1.457	1	.227	.864

Variables not in the Equation					
			Score	df	Sig.
Step 0	Variables	Presence in the WHC	1.069	1	.301
		If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	1.178	1	.278
		The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	.030	1	.863
		adjFinCon	12.938	1	.000
		xx18	.044	1	.834
		xx17	.189	1	.664
		xx16	.030	1	.862
		xx15	2.472	1	.116
		xx14	.478	1	.490
		xx13	.180	1	.671
		xx12	1.028	1	.311
		xx11	2.349	1	.125
			Overall Statistics		24.855

Block 1: Method = Enter

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients				
		Chi-square	df	Sig.
Step 1	Step	26.113	12	.010
	Block	26.113	12	.010
	Model	26.113	12	.010

Model Summary			
Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	352.271 ^a	.091	.121
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.			

Hosmer and Lemeshow Test			
Step	Chi-square	df	Sig.
1	14.058	8	.080

Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test						
		The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question = Not inscribe		The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question = Inscribe		Total
		Observed	Expected	Observed	Expected	
Step 1	1	20	20.290	7	6.710	27
	2	21	18.562	6	8.438	27
	3	18	18.463	10	9.537	28
	4	19	17.397	9	10.603	28
	5	14	15.486	13	11.514	27
	6	14	14.231	13	12.769	27
	7	6	13.129	21	13.871	27
	8	16	12.012	11	14.988	27
	9	14	10.662	13	16.338	27
	10	5	6.768	24	22.232	29

Classification Table^a					
		Predicted			Percentage Correct
		The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question			
Observed		Not inscribe	Inscribe		
Step 1	Not inscribe	106	41	72.1	

	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question	Inscribe	63	64	50.4
	Overall Percentage				62.0

a. The cut value is .500

Variables in the Equation							
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1 ^a	Presence in the WHC	-.494	.296	2.785	1	.095	.610
	If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	-.082	.347	.056	1	.812	.921
	The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	-.019	.016	1.296	1	.255	.981
	adjFinCon	.578	.165	12.264	1	.000	1.783
	xx18	-.971	.556	3.046	1	.081	.379
	xx17	-.947	.558	2.885	1	.089	.388
	xx16	-.651	.557	1.369	1	.242	.521
	xx15	-.205	.527	.152	1	.697	.814
	xx14	-.951	.537	3.140	1	.076	.386
	xx13	-.496	.544	.830	1	.362	.609
	xx12	-.983	.537	3.348	1	.067	.374
	xx11	-1.169	.546	4.577	1	.032	.311
	Constant	.925	.683	1.838	1	.175	2.523

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Presence in the WHC. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention. adjFinCon. xx18. xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11.

Appendix C2 Tables reporting panel probit regression for model 3.

Model Information	
Dependent Variable	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question ^a
Probability Distribution	Binomial
Link Function	Probit

a. The procedure models Inscribe as the response. treating Not inscribe as the reference category.

Case Processing Summary		
	N	Percent
Included	274	45.4%
Excluded	329	54.6%
Total	603	100.0%

Categorical Variable Information				
			N	Percent
Dependent Variable	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question	Not inscribe	147	53.6%
		Inscribe	127	46.4%
		Total	274	100.0%

Continuous Variable Information						
		N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Covariate	Presence in the WHC	274	0	1	.31	.462
	If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	274	0	1	.22	.417
	The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	274	1	47	30.49	8.542
	adjFinCon	274	.00	4.09	.6480	.96618
	xx18	274	.00	1.00	.0985	.29859
	xx17	274	.00	1.00	.0949	.29360
	xx16	274	.00	1.00	.0912	.28848
	xx15	274	.00	1.00	.1168	.32176
	xx14	274	.00	1.00	.1168	.32176
	xx13	274	.00	1.00	.1095	.31282
	xx12	274	.00	1.00	.1241	.33028
	xx11	274	.00	1.00	.1277	.33441

Goodness of Fit ^a			
	Value	df	Value/df
Deviance	296.899	218	1.362
Scaled Deviance	296.899	218	
Pearson Chi-Square	229.773	218	1.054

Scaled Pearson Chi-Square	229.773	218	
Log Likelihood ^b	-162.313		
Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC)	350.625		
Finite Sample Corrected AIC (AICC)	352.025		
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)	397.596		
Consistent AIC (CAIC)	410.596		
Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question			
Model: (Intercept). Presence in the WHC. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention. adjFinCon. xx18. xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11			
a. Information criteria are in smaller-is-better form.			
b. The full log likelihood function is displayed and used in computing information criteria.			

Omnibus Test ^a		
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square	df	Sig.
26.033	12	.011
Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question		
Model: (Intercept). Presence in the WHC. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention. adjFinCon. xx18. xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11		
a. Compares the fitted model against the intercept-only model.		

Tests of Model Effects			
Source	Type III		
	Wald Chi-Square	df	Sig.
(Intercept)	1.811	1	.178
Presence in the WHC	2.929	1	.087
If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	.059	1	.808
The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	1.276	1	.259
adjFinCon	13.111	1	.000
xx18	3.081	1	.079
xx17	2.817	1	.093
xx16	1.301	1	.254
xx15	.127	1	.722
xx14	3.058	1	.080

xx13	.829	1	.362
xx12	3.378	1	.066
xx11	4.566	1	.033

Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question

Model: (Intercept). Presence in the WHC. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention. adjFinCon. xx18. xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11

Parameter Estimates										
Parameter	B	Std. Error	95% Wald Confidence Interval		Hypothesis Test			Exp(B)	95% Wald Confidence Interval for Exp(B)	
			Lower	Upper	Wald Chi-Square	df	Sig.		Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	.562	.4175	-.256	1.380	1.811	1	.178	1.754	.774	3.975
Presence in the WHC	-.310	.1812	-.665	.045	2.929	1	.087	.733	.514	1.046
If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	-.052	.2129	-.469	.365	.059	1	.808	.950	.626	1.441
The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	-.011	.0101	-.031	.008	1.276	1	.259	.989	.969	1.008
adjFinCon	.351	.0968	.161	.540	13.111	1	.000	1.420	1.174	1.716
xx18	-.591	.3364	-1.250	.069	3.081	1	.079	.554	.286	1.071
xx17	-.578	.3441	-1.252	.097	2.817	1	.093	.561	.286	1.102
xx16	-.394	.3456	-1.072	.283	1.301	1	.254	.674	.342	1.327
xx15	-.115	.3223	-.746	.517	.127	1	.722	.892	.474	1.677
xx14	-.569	.3255	-1.207	.069	3.058	1	.080	.566	.299	1.071
xx13	-.305	.3347	-.961	.351	.829	1	.362	.737	.383	1.421

xx12	-.604	.3289	-1.249	.040	3.378	1	.066	.546	.287	1.041
xx11	-.710	.3322	-1.361	-.059	4.566	1	.033	.492	.256	.943
(Scale)	1 ^a									
Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question										
Model: (Intercept). Presence in the WHC. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention. adjFinCon. xx18. xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11										
a. Fixed at the displayed value.										

Appendix D

Appendix D1 Tables reporting panel logit regression for model 4a.

Case Processing Summary			
Unweighted Cases ^a		N	Percent
Selected Cases	Included in Analysis	403	66.8
	Missing Cases	200	33.2
	Total	603	100.0
Unselected Cases		0	.0
Total		603	100.0

a. If weight is in effect. see classification table for the total number of cases.

Dependent Variable Encoding	
Original Value	Internal Value
Not inscribe	0
Inscribe	1

Block 0: Beginning Block

Classification Table ^{a,b}					
	Observed		Predicted		Percentage Correct
			The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question		
			Not inscribe	Inscribe	
Step 0	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question	Not inscribe	210	0	100.0
		Inscribe	193	0	.0
Overall Percentage					52.1

a. Constant is included in the model.

b. The cut value is .500

Variables in the Equation							
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 0	Constant	-.084	.100	.717	1	.397	.919

Variables not in the Equation					
			Score	df	Sig.
Step 0	Variables	Presence in the WHC	1.076	1	.300
		The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC	9.150	1	.002
		The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL	9.349	1	.002
		If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	4.422	1	.035
		The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.	5.043	1	.025
		The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	2.102	1	.147
		adjtotalexports	6.887	1	.009
		xx16	.426	1	.514
		xx15	2.634	1	.105
		xx14	.270	1	.603
		xx13	.001	1	.978
		xx12	1.242	1	.265
		xx11	1.636	1	.201
		xx10	1.104	1	.293
		xx09	.665	1	.415
		xx08	.062	1	.803
		xx07	.188	1	.664
		xx06	1.636	1	.201
		xx05	1.778	1	.182
		xx04	9.378	1	.002

	Overall Statistics	45.494	20	.001
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Block 1: Method = Enter

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients				
		Chi-square	df	Sig.
Step 1	Step	47.939	20	.000
	Block	47.939	20	.000
	Model	47.939	20	.000

Model Summary			
Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	510.020 ^a	.112	.150

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.

Hosmer and Lemeshow Test			
Step	Chi-square	df	Sig.
1	2.808	8	.946

Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test						
		The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question = Not inscribe		The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question = Inscribe		Total
		Observed	Expected	Observed	Expected	
Step 1	1	29	31.538	11	8.462	40
	2	28	28.513	12	11.487	40
	3	27	25.933	13	14.067	40
	4	25	23.827	15	16.173	40
	5	24	22.156	16	17.844	40
	6	20	20.542	20	19.458	40
	7	19	18.968	22	22.032	41
	8	18	15.982	22	24.018	40
	9	13	13.227	27	26.773	40
	10	7	9.314	35	32.686	42

Classification Table ^a					
		Predicted			Percentage Correct
		The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question			
Observed		Not inscribe	Inscribe		

Step 1	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question	Not inscribe	150	60	71.4
		Inscribe	84	109	56.5
	Overall Percentage				64.3
a. The cut value is .500					

Variables in the Equation							
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1 ^a	Presence in the WHC	.145	.232	.391	1	.532	1.156
	The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC	.045	.020	5.220	1	.022	1.046
	The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL	.003	.013	.053	1	.818	1.003
	If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	.064	.307	.044	1	.833	1.067
	The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.	.009	.010	.945	1	.331	1.009
	The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	-.049	.016	9.320	1	.002	.952
	adjtotalexports	.170	.156	1.181	1	.277	1.185
	xx16	.647	.646	1.005	1	.316	1.910
	xx15	.999	.612	2.666	1	.103	2.716
	xx14	.181	.594	.093	1	.761	1.198
	xx13	.275	.607	.206	1	.650	1.317
	xx12	-.321	.604	.283	1	.595	.725
	xx11	-.213	.609	.123	1	.726	.808

	xx10	-.364	.637	.327	1	.567	.695
	xx09	-.237	.638	.138	1	.710	.789
	xx08	.219	.598	.134	1	.715	1.244
	xx07	-.084	.593	.020	1	.887	.919
	xx06	-.204	.607	.113	1	.736	.815
	xx05	.624	.609	1.049	1	.306	1.866
	xx04	1.259	.615	4.190	1	.041	3.523
	Constant	-.452	.881	.263	1	.608	.636

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Presence in the WHC. The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC. The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.. The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention. adjtotalexports. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04.

Appendix D2 Tables reporting panel probit regression for model 4a.

Model Information	
Dependent Variable	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question ^a
Probability Distribution	Binomial
Link Function	Probit
a. The procedure models Inscribe as the response. treating Not inscribe as the reference category.	

Case Processing Summary		
	N	Percent
Included	403	66.8%
Excluded	200	33.2%
Total	603	100.0%

Categorical Variable Information				
			N	Percent
Dependent Variable	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question	Not inscribe	210	52.1%
		Inscribe	193	47.9%
		Total	403	100.0%

Continuous Variable Information						
		N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Covariate	Presence in the WHC	403	0	1	.35	.477

The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC	403	0	27	9.42	8.584
The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL	403	0	53	18.08	15.712
If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	403	0	1	.25	.432
The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.	403	14.44	98.06	81.4381	15.43297
The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	403	1	44	25.42	9.154
adjtotalexports	403	.00	7.58	.5027	.96025
xx16	403	.00	1.00	.0496	.21744
xx15	403	.00	1.00	.0670	.25033
xx14	403	.00	1.00	.0744	.26281
xx13	403	.00	1.00	.0670	.25033
xx12	403	.00	1.00	.0720	.25874
xx11	403	.00	1.00	.0744	.26281
xx10	403	.00	1.00	.0596	.23695
xx09	403	.00	1.00	.0620	.24152
xx08	403	.00	1.00	.0794	.27071
xx07	403	.00	1.00	.0893	.28557
xx06	403	.00	1.00	.0744	.26281
xx05	403	.00	1.00	.0844	.27828
xx04	403	.00	1.00	.0893	.28557

Goodness of Fit ^a		
	Value	df

	Value	df	Value/df
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Deviance	443.424	332	1.336
Scaled Deviance	443.424	332	
Pearson Chi-Square	349.643	332	1.053
Scaled Pearson Chi-Square	349.643	332	
Log Likelihood ^b	-238.348		
Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC)	518.695		
Finite Sample Corrected AIC (AICC)	521.121		
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)	602.673		
Consistent AIC (CAIC)	623.673		
Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question			
Model: (Intercept). Presence in the WHC. The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC. The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.. The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention. adjtotalexports. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04			
a. Information criteria are in smaller-is-better form.			
b. The full log likelihood function is displayed and used in computing information criteria.			

Omnibus Test^a		
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square	df	Sig.
47.993	20	.000
Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question		
Model: (Intercept). Presence in the WHC. The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC. The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.. The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention. adjtotalexports. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04		
a. Compares the fitted model against the intercept-only model.		

Tests of Model Effects			
Source	Type III		
	Wald Chi-Square	df	Sig.
(Intercept)	.267	1	.606
Presence in the WHC	.365	1	.546
The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC	5.232	1	.022

The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL	.066	1	.797
If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	.054	1	.816
The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.	.943	1	.332
The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	9.507	1	.002
adjtotalexports	1.207	1	.272
xx16	1.046	1	.307
xx15	2.734	1	.098
xx14	.095	1	.758
xx13	.224	1	.636
xx12	.250	1	.617
xx11	.121	1	.728
xx10	.282	1	.595
xx09	.126	1	.723
xx08	.132	1	.716
xx07	.017	1	.897
xx06	.091	1	.764
xx05	1.095	1	.295
xx04	4.366	1	.037

Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question

Model: (Intercept). Presence in the WHC. The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC. The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.. The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention. adjtotalexports. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04

Parameter Estimates						
Parameter	B	Std. Error	95% Wald Confidence Interval	Hypothesis Test	Exp(B)	95% Wald Confidence Interval for Exp(B)

			Lower	Upper	Wald Chi- Square	df	Sig.		Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	-.277	.5355	-1.326	.773	.267	1	.606	.758	.265	2.166
Presence in the WHC	.086	.1429	-.194	.366	.365	1	.546	1.090	.824	1.442
The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC	.028	.0121	.004	.051	5.232	1	.022	1.028	1.004	1.053
The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL	.002	.0080	-.014	.018	.066	1	.797	1.002	.986	1.018
If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	.044	.1868	-.323	.410	.054	1	.816	1.045	.724	1.506
The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.	.006	.0058	-.006	.017	.943	1	.332	1.006	.994	1.017

The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	-.030	.0098	-.049	-.011	9.507	1	.002	.970	.952	.989
adjtotalexports	.101	.0923	-.080	.282	1.207	1	.272	1.107	.924	1.326
xx16	.407	.3978	-.373	1.186	1.046	1	.307	1.502	.689	3.275
xx15	.621	.3754	-.115	1.356	2.734	1	.098	1.860	.891	3.882
xx14	.113	.3657	-.604	.829	.095	1	.758	1.119	.547	2.292
xx13	.178	.3768	-.560	.917	.224	1	.636	1.195	.571	2.501
xx12	-.186	.3715	-.914	.542	.250	1	.617	.831	.401	1.720
xx11	-.131	.3753	-.866	.605	.121	1	.728	.878	.421	1.831
xx10	-.207	.3890	-.969	.556	.282	1	.595	.813	.379	1.743
xx09	-.139	.3910	-.905	.628	.126	1	.723	.870	.405	1.873
xx08	.135	.3718	-.594	.864	.132	1	.716	1.145	.552	2.372
xx07	-.047	.3659	-.765	.670	.017	1	.897	.954	.466	1.954
xx06	-.112	.3720	-.841	.617	.091	1	.764	.894	.431	1.854
xx05	.395	.3773	-.345	1.134	1.095	1	.295	1.484	.708	3.109
xx04	.789	.3774	.049	1.528	4.366	1	.037	2.200	1.050	4.610
(Scale)	1 ^a									
Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question										
Model: (Intercept). Presence in the WHC. The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC. The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.. The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention.										
adjtotalexports. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04										
a. Fixed at the displayed value.										

Appendix D3 Tables reporting panel logit regression for model 4b.

Case Processing Summary			
Unweighted Cases ^a		N	Percent
Selected Cases	Included in Analysis	412	68.3
	Missing Cases	191	31.7
	Total	603	100.0
Unselected Cases		0	.0
Total		603	100.0

a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of cases.

Dependent Variable Encoding	
Original Value	Internal Value
Not inscribe	0
Inscribe	1

Block 0: Beginning Block

Classification Table ^{a,b}					
		Predicted		Percentage Correct	
		The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question			
Observed		Not inscribe	Inscribe		
Step 0	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question	Not inscribe	215	0	100.0
		Inscribe	197	0	.0
Overall Percentage					52.2

a. Constant is included in the model.

b. The cut value is .500

Variables in the Equation							
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 0	Constant	-.087	.099	.786	1	.375	.916

Variables not in the Equation					
		Score	df	Sig.	
Step 0	Variables	Total exports of Cultural goods of the State Party whose nominated site belongs to in the year of the nomination	.233	1	.629
		xx16	.435	1	.510
		xx15	2.657	1	.103
		xx14	.261	1	.610
		xx13	.001	1	.971
		xx12	1.222	1	.269
		xx11	1.612	1	.204
		xx10	1.087	1	.297
		xx09	.652	1	.420
		xx08	.066	1	.797
	xx07	.180	1	.672	

	xx06	1.612	1	.204
	xx05	1.800	1	.180
	xx04	9.417	1	.002
	xx03	.042	1	.838
	Presence in the WHC	1.883	1	.170
	The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC	7.963	1	.005
	The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL	9.355	1	.002
	If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	4.952	1	.026
	The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.	4.950	1	.026
	The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	2.021	1	.155
	Overall Statistics	46.941	21	.001

Block 1: Method = Enter

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients				
		Chi-square	df	Sig.
Step 1	Step	49.483	21	.000
	Block	49.483	21	.000
	Model	49.483	21	.000

Model Summary			
Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	520.884 ^a	.113	.151
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.			

Classification Table ^a

		Predicted			
		The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question		Percentage Correct	
Observed		Not inscribe	Inscribe		
Step 1	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question	Not inscribe	144	71	67.0
		Inscribe	78	119	60.4
Overall Percentage					63.8

a. The cut value is .500

Variables in the Equation							
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1 ^a	Total exports of Cultural goods of the State Party whose nominated site belongs to in the year of the nomination	-.176	.095	3.417	1	.065	.839
	xx16	.787	.651	1.463	1	.227	2.197
	xx15	1.055	.616	2.936	1	.087	2.873
	xx14	.241	.596	.164	1	.686	1.273
	xx13	.279	.606	.212	1	.645	1.322
	xx12	-.299	.609	.240	1	.624	.742
	xx11	-.193	.614	.099	1	.753	.824
	xx10	-.377	.645	.341	1	.559	.686
	xx09	-.315	.642	.240	1	.624	.730
	xx08	.203	.604	.113	1	.737	1.225
	xx07	-.091	.599	.023	1	.879	.913
	xx06	-.210	.611	.118	1	.731	.811
	xx05	.627	.614	1.042	1	.307	1.872
	xx04	1.302	.623	4.367	1	.037	3.678
	xx03	.006	.833	.000	1	.994	1.006
	Presence in the WHC	.230	.229	1.014	1	.314	1.259
	The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC	.032	.020	2.683	1	.101	1.033

The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL	.016	.012	1.617	1	.203	1.016
If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	.245	.289	.719	1	.397	1.278
The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.	.009	.010	.819	1	.365	1.009
The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	-.045	.016	8.110	1	.004	.956
Constant	-.406	.880	.213	1	.645	.666

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Total exports of Cultural goods of the State Party whose nominated site belongs to in the year of the nomination. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03. Presence in the WHC. The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC. The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.. The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention.

Appendix D4 Tables reporting panel probit regression for model 4b.

Model Information	
Dependent Variable	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question ^a
Probability Distribution	Binomial
Link Function	Probit
a. The procedure models Inscribe as the response. treating Not inscribe as the reference category.	

Case Processing Summary		
	N	Percent
Included	412	68.3%

Excluded	191	31.7%
Total	603	100.0%

Categorical Variable Information				
			N	Percent
Dependent Variable	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question	Not inscribe	215	52.2%
		Inscribe	197	47.8%
		Total	412	100.0%

Continuous Variable Information						
		N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Covariate	Presence in the WHC	412	0	1	.35	.477
	The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC	412	0	27	9.49	8.588
	The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL	412	0	53	18.00	15.626
	If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	412	0	1	.25	.431
	The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.	412	14.44	98.06	81.4270	15.31985
	Total exports of Cultural goods of the State Party whose nominated site belongs to in the year of the nomination	412	.005	7.058	1.11385	1.260694

The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	412	1	44	25.43	9.143
xx16	412	.00	1.00	.0485	.21517
xx15	412	.00	1.00	.0655	.24777
xx14	412	.00	1.00	.0728	.26015
xx13	412	.00	1.00	.0655	.24777
xx12	412	.00	1.00	.0704	.25611
xx11	412	.00	1.00	.0728	.26015
xx10	412	.00	1.00	.0583	.23450
xx09	412	.00	1.00	.0607	.23903
xx08	412	.00	1.00	.0777	.26798
xx07	412	.00	1.00	.0874	.28273
xx06	412	.00	1.00	.0728	.26015
xx05	412	.00	1.00	.0825	.27550
xx04	412	.00	1.00	.0874	.28273
xx03	412	.00	1.00	.0218	.14635

Goodness of Fit^a			
	Value	df	Value/df
Deviance	451.517	339	1.332
Scaled Deviance	451.517	339	
Pearson Chi-Square	354.932	339	1.047
Scaled Pearson Chi-Square	354.932	339	
Log Likelihood ^b	-243.087		
Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC)	530.174		
Finite Sample Corrected AIC (AICC)	532.775		
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)	618.636		
Consistent AIC (CAIC)	640.636		
<p>Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question</p> <p>Model: (Intercept). Presence in the WHC. The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC. The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.. The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.. Total exports of Cultural goods of the State Party whose nominated site belongs to in the year of the nomination. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03</p>			
a. Information criteria are in smaller-is-better form.			

b. The full log likelihood function is displayed and used in computing information criteria.

Omnibus Test^a		
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square	df	Sig.
49.535	21	.000
<p>Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question</p> <p>Model: (Intercept). Presence in the WHC. The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC. The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.. The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.. Total exports of Cultural goods of the State Party whose nominated site belongs to in the year of the nomination. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03</p>		
a. Compares the fitted model against the intercept-only model.		

Tests of Model Effects			
Source	Type III		
	Wald Chi-Square	df	Sig.
(Intercept)	.241	1	.624
Presence in the WHC	.996	1	.318
The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC	2.761	1	.097
The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL	1.614	1	.204
If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	.683	1	.409
The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.	.846	1	.358
Total exports of Cultural goods of the State Party whose nominated site belongs to in the year of the nomination	3.456	1	.063
The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	8.181	1	.004

xx16	1.537	1	.215
xx15	2.979	1	.084
xx14	.187	1	.665
xx13	.231	1	.631
xx12	.211	1	.646
xx11	.093	1	.761
xx10	.296	1	.587
xx09	.197	1	.657
xx08	.130	1	.719
xx07	.012	1	.912
xx06	.101	1	.750
xx05	1.112	1	.292
xx04	4.551	1	.033
xx03	.001	1	.975

Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question

Model: (Intercept). Presence in the WHC. The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC. The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.. The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.. Total exports of Cultural goods of the State Party whose nominated site belongs to in the year of the nomination. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03

Parameter Estimates										
Parameter	B	Std. Error	95% Wald Confidence Interval		Hypothesis Test			Exp(B)	95% Wald Confidence Interval for Exp(B)	
			Lower	Upper	Wald Chi-Square	df	Sig.		Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	-.263	.5364	-1.314	.788	.241	1	.624	.769	.269	2.199
Presence in the WHC	.140	.1404	-.135	.415	.996	1	.318	1.150	.874	1.515

The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC	.020	.0120	-.004	.044	2.761	1	.097	1.020	.996	1.045
The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL	.010	.0075	-.005	.024	1.614	1	.204	1.010	.995	1.025
If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	.146	.1765	-.200	.492	.683	1	.409	1.157	.819	1.635
The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.	.005	.0058	-.006	.017	.846	1	.358	1.005	.994	1.017
Total exports of Cultural goods of the State Party whose nominated site belongs to in the year of the nomination	-.107	.0574	-.219	.006	3.456	1	.063	.899	.803	1.006

The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	-.028	.0097	-.047	-.009	8.181	1	.004	.973	.954	.991
xx16	.499	.4024	-.290	1.288	1.537	1	.215	1.647	.748	3.624
xx15	.651	.3772	-.088	1.390	2.979	1	.084	1.917	.916	4.015
xx14	.159	.3678	-.562	.880	.187	1	.665	1.173	.570	2.411
xx13	.181	.3764	-.557	.918	.231	1	.631	1.198	.573	2.506
xx12	-.172	.3742	-.906	.561	.211	1	.646	.842	.404	1.753
xx11	-.115	.3780	-.856	.626	.093	1	.761	.891	.425	1.870
xx10	-.214	.3937	-.986	.558	.296	1	.587	.807	.373	1.746
xx09	-.174	.3925	-.944	.595	.197	1	.657	.840	.389	1.813
xx08	.135	.3740	-.598	.868	.130	1	.719	1.144	.550	2.382
xx07	-.041	.3689	-.764	.682	.012	1	.912	.960	.466	1.978
xx06	-.120	.3758	-.856	.617	.101	1	.750	.887	.425	1.853
xx05	.402	.3812	-.345	1.149	1.112	1	.292	1.495	.708	3.156
xx04	.816	.3825	.066	1.566	4.551	1	.033	2.262	1.069	4.786
xx03	.016	.5132	-.990	1.022	.001	1	.975	1.016	.372	2.778
(Scale)	1 ^a									

Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question

Model: (Intercept). Presence in the WHC. The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC. The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.. The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena..

Total exports of Cultural goods of the State Party whose nominated site belongs to in the year of the nomination. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03

a. Fixed at the displayed value.

Appendix D5 Tables reporting panel logit regression for model 4c.

Case Processing Summary			
Unweighted Cases ^a		N	Percent
Selected Cases	Included in Analysis	521	86.4
	Missing Cases	82	13.6
	Total	603	100.0
Unselected Cases		0	.0
Total		603	100.0

a. If weight is in effect. see classification table for the total number of cases.

Dependent Variable Encoding	
Original Value	Internal Value
Not inscribe	0
Inscribe	1

Block 0: Beginning Block

Classification Table ^{a,b}					
	Observed		Predicted		Percentage Correct
			The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question		
			Not inscribe	Inscribe	
Step 0	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question	Not inscribe	276	0	100.0
		Inscribe	245	0	.0
	Overall Percentage				53.0

a. Constant is included in the model.

b. The cut value is .500

Variables in the Equation							
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 0	Constant	-.119	.088	1.842	1	.175	.888

Variables not in the Equation					
			Score	df	Sig.
Step 0	Variables	xx17	.244	1	.621
		xx16	.010	1	.920
		xx15	2.087	1	.149
		xx14	.561	1	.454
		xx13	.019	1	.890
		xx12	1.128	1	.288
		xx11	2.260	1	.133
		xx10	1.140	1	.286
		xx09	.244	1	.621
		xx08	.049	1	.826
		xx07	.200	1	.655
		xx06	1.762	1	.184
		xx05	2.999	1	.083

	xx04	10.383	1	.001
	xx03	.004	1	.950
	The degree of cultural globalisation according to KOF index de facto	6.369	1	.012
	Presence in the WHC	1.462	1	.227
	The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC	7.900	1	.005
	The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL	8.265	1	.004
	If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	3.179	1	.075
	The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.	4.124	1	.042
	The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	1.234	1	.267
	Overall Statistics	40.771	22	.009

Block 1: Method = Enter

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients				
		Chi-square	df	Sig.
Step 1	Step	42.197	22	.006
	Block	42.197	22	.006
	Model	42.197	22	.006

Model Summary			
Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	678.217 ^a	.078	.104

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.

Classification Table ^a					
	Observed	Predicted			
		The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question		Percentage Correct	
		Not inscribe	Inscribe		
Step 1	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question	Not inscribe	198	78	71.7
		Inscribe	120	125	51.0
	Overall Percentage				62.0

a. The cut value is .500

Variables in the Equation								
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	
Step 1 ^a	xx17	-.001	.571	.000	1	.998	.999	
	xx16	.283	.573	.244	1	.621	1.328	
	xx15	.762	.549	1.923	1	.166	2.142	
	xx14	-.036	.550	.004	1	.947	.964	
	xx13	.205	.562	.133	1	.715	1.227	
	xx12	-.291	.549	.280	1	.597	.748	
	xx11	-.322	.551	.342	1	.559	.725	
	xx10	-.360	.588	.374	1	.541	.698	
	xx09	-.141	.594	.056	1	.813	.869	
	xx08	.170	.540	.100	1	.752	1.186	
	xx07	-.093	.545	.029	1	.865	.911	
	xx06	-.335	.569	.347	1	.556	.715	
	xx05	.686	.558	1.507	1	.220	1.985	
	xx04	1.158	.568	4.162	1	.041	3.184	
	xx03	.158	.545	.085	1	.771	1.172	
		The degree of cultural globalisation according to KOF index de facto	.004	.005	.599	1	.439	1.004
		Presence in the WHC	.126	.208	.366	1	.545	1.134
	The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC	.030	.017	2.963	1	.085	1.030	

The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL	.011	.010	1.147	1	.284	1.011
If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	.059	.261	.051	1	.821	1.061
The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.	.000	.009	.003	1	.956	1.000
The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	-.028	.014	3.970	1	.046	.973
Constant	-.231	.706	.107	1	.744	.794

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03. The degree of cultural globalisation according to KOF index de facto. Presence in the WHC. The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC. The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.. The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention.

Appendix D6 Tables reporting panel probit regression for model 4c.

Model Information	
Dependent Variable	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question ^a
Probability Distribution	Binomial
Link Function	Probit
a. The procedure models Inscribe as the response. treating Not inscribe as the reference category.	

Case Processing Summary		
	N	Percent
Included	521	86.4%

Excluded	82	13.6%
Total	603	100.0%

Categorical Variable Information				
			N	Percent
Dependent Variable	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question	Not inscribe	276	53.0%
		Inscribe	245	47.0%
		Total	521	100.0%

Continuous Variable Information							
		N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	
Covariate	xx16	521	.00	1.00	.0480	.21394	
	xx15	521	.00	1.00	.0614	.24033	
	xx14	521	.00	1.00	.0614	.24033	
	xx13	521	.00	1.00	.0557	.22949	
	xx12	521	.00	1.00	.0653	.24722	
	xx11	521	.00	1.00	.0710	.25710	
	xx10	521	.00	1.00	.0518	.22188	
	xx09	521	.00	1.00	.0499	.21796	
	xx08	521	.00	1.00	.0749	.26341	
	xx07	521	.00	1.00	.0749	.26341	
	xx06	521	.00	1.00	.0595	.23679	
	xx05	521	.00	1.00	.0729	.26028	
	xx04	521	.00	1.00	.0749	.26341	
	xx17	521	.00	1.00	.0499	.21796	
	xx03	521	.00	1.00	.0768	.26649	
		The degree of cultural globalisation according to KOF index de facto	521	3.99	98.76	58.8679	26.37542
		Presence in the WHC	521	0	1	.32	.466
	The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC	521	0	27	8.88	8.520	
	The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL	521	0	55	16.75	15.681	

If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	521	0	1	.22	.416
The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.	521	12.67	98.06	79.0571	17.45859
The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	521	1	44	25.31	9.391

Goodness of Fit^a			
	Value	df	Value/df
Deviance	592.219	436	1.358
Scaled Deviance	592.219	436	
Pearson Chi-Square	452.644	436	1.038
Scaled Pearson Chi-Square	452.644	436	
Log Likelihood ^b	-317.597		
Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC)	681.194		
Finite Sample Corrected AIC (AICC)	683.416		
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)	779.076		
Consistent AIC (CAIC)	802.076		
Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question			
Model: (Intercept). xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx17. xx03. The degree of cultural globalisation according to KOF index de facto. Presence in the WHC. The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC. The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.. The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention			
a. Information criteria are in smaller-is-better form.			
b. The full log likelihood function is displayed and used in computing information criteria.			

Omnibus Test^a		
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square	df	Sig.

42.244	22	.006
<p>Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question</p> <p>Model: (Intercept). xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx17. xx03. The degree of cultural globalisation according to KOF index de facto. Presence in the WHC. The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC. The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.. The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention</p>		
a. Compares the fitted model against the intercept-only model.		

Tests of Model Effects			
Source	Type III		
	Wald Chi-Square	df	Sig.
(Intercept)	.113	1	.737
xx16	.236	1	.627
xx15	1.971	1	.160
xx14	.005	1	.943
xx13	.140	1	.709
xx12	.277	1	.599
xx11	.357	1	.550
xx10	.370	1	.543
xx09	.055	1	.814
xx08	.098	1	.755
xx07	.033	1	.857
xx06	.341	1	.559
xx05	1.569	1	.210
xx04	4.399	1	.036
xx17	.000	1	.992
xx03	.096	1	.757
The degree of cultural globalisation according to KOF index de facto	.546	1	.460
Presence in the WHC	.337	1	.562
The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC	2.980	1	.084
The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL	1.166	1	.280

If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	.056	1	.813
The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.	.001	1	.975
The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	4.114	1	.043

Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question

Model: (Intercept). xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx17. xx03. The degree of cultural globalisation according to KOF index de facto. Presence in the WHC. The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC. The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.. The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention

Parameter Estimates										
Parameter	B	Std. Error	95% Wald Confidence Interval		Hypothesis Test			Exp(B)	95% Wald Confidence Interval for Exp(B)	
			Lower	Upper	Wald Chi-Square	df	Sig.		Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	-.145	.4317	-.991	.701	.113	1	.737	.865	.371	2.016
xx16	.172	.3546	-.523	.867	.236	1	.627	1.188	.593	2.381
xx15	.471	.3355	-.187	1.129	1.971	1	.160	1.602	.830	3.091
xx14	-.024	.3372	-.685	.637	.005	1	.943	.976	.504	1.890
xx13	.129	.3461	-.549	.808	.140	1	.709	1.138	.577	2.243
xx12	-.176	.3345	-.832	.480	.277	1	.599	.839	.435	1.615
xx11	-.201	.3359	-.859	.458	.357	1	.550	.818	.424	1.580
xx10	-.217	.3576	-.918	.484	.370	1	.543	.805	.399	1.622
xx09	-.085	.3615	-.794	.623	.055	1	.814	.918	.452	1.865
xx08	.104	.3316	-.546	.754	.098	1	.755	1.109	.579	2.125
xx07	-.060	.3336	-.714	.594	.033	1	.857	.942	.490	1.810
xx06	-.202	.3462	-.881	.476	.341	1	.559	.817	.414	1.610
xx05	.429	.3424	-.242	1.100	1.569	1	.210	1.536	.785	3.004
xx04	.721	.3436	.047	1.394	4.399	1	.036	2.056	1.048	4.031
xx17	-.003	.3519	-.693	.686	.000	1	.992	.997	.500	1.986

xx03	.103	.3321	-.548	.753	.096	1	.757	1.108	.578	2.124
The degree of cultural globalisation according to KOF index de facto	.002	.0028	-.003	.008	.546	1	.460	1.002	.997	1.008
Presence in the WHC	.075	.1290	-.178	.328	.337	1	.562	1.078	.837	1.388
The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC	.018	.0107	-.003	.040	2.980	1	.084	1.019	.997	1.040
The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL	.007	.0064	-.006	.020	1.166	1	.280	1.007	.994	1.020
If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	.038	.1614	-.278	.354	.056	1	.813	1.039	.757	1.425
The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.	.000	.0053	-.011	.010	.001	1	.975	1.000	.989	1.010

The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	-.017	.0085	-.034	-.001	4.114	1	.043	.983	.967	.999
(Scale)	1 ^a									
<p>Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question</p> <p>Model: (Intercept). xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx17. xx03. The degree of cultural globalisation according to KOF index de facto. Presence in the WHC. The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC. The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.. The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention</p> <p>a. Fixed at the displayed value.</p>										

Appendix E

Appendix E1 Tables reporting the panel logit regression for model 5.

Case Processing Summary			
Unweighted Cases ^a		N	Percent
Selected Cases	Included in Analysis	564	93.5
	Missing Cases	39	6.5
	Total	603	100.0
Unselected Cases		0	.0
Total		603	100.0

a. If weight is in effect. see classification table for the total number of cases.

Dependent Variable Encoding	
Original Value	Internal Value
Not inscribe	0
Inscribe	1

Block 0: Beginning Block

Classification Table ^{a,b}	
Observed	Predicted

		The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question		Percentage Correct	
		Not inscribe	Inscribe		
Step 0	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question	Not inscribe	296	0	100.0
		Inscribe	268	0	.0
Overall Percentage					52.5
a. Constant is included in the model.					
b. The cut value is .500					

Variables in the Equation							
	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	
Step 0	Constant	-.099	.084	1.389	1	.239	.905

Variables not in the Equation					
	Variables	Score	df	Sig.	
Step 0	The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL	9.299	1	.002	
	xx18	.257	1	.612	
	xx17	.297	1	.586	
	xx16	.002	1	.961	
	xx15	1.913	1	.167	
	xx14	.646	1	.421	
	xx13	.221	1	.639	
	xx12	1.611	1	.204	
	xx11	2.435	1	.119	
	xx10	2.083	1	.149	
	xx09	.297	1	.586	
	xx08	.000	1	.998	
	xx07	.259	1	.611	
	xx06	2.350	1	.125	
	xx05	2.690	1	.101	
	xx04	9.902	1	.002	
	xx03	.000	1	.998	
	Presence in the WHC	2.057	1	.151	
Overall Statistics		38.609	18	.003	

Block 1: Method = Enter

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients				
		Chi-square	df	Sig.
Step 1	Step	39.698	18	.002
	Block	39.698	18	.002
	Model	39.698	18	.002

Model Summary			
Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	740.781 ^a	.068	.091
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.			

Classification Table ^a					
		Predicted			Percentage Correct
		The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question			
	Observed	Not inscribe	Inscribe		
Step 1	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question	Not inscribe	204	92	68.9
		Inscribe	129	139	51.9
Overall Percentage					60.8
a. The cut value is .500					

Variables in the Equation							
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1 ^a	The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL	.019	.006	10.883	1	.001	1.019
	xx18	-.813	.534	2.319	1	.128	.444
	xx17	-.806	.542	2.213	1	.137	.447
	xx16	-.495	.544	.828	1	.363	.610
	xx15	.006	.513	.000	1	.990	1.006
	xx14	-.777	.513	2.291	1	.130	.460
	xx13	-.354	.513	.476	1	.490	.702
	xx12	-.996	.506	3.866	1	.049	.370

xx11	-.985	.504	3.827	1	.050	.373
xx10	-1.052	.535	3.861	1	.049	.349
xx09	-.736	.542	1.848	1	.174	.479
xx08	-.420	.483	.755	1	.385	.657
xx07	-.603	.487	1.533	1	.216	.547
xx06	-1.009	.522	3.745	1	.053	.364
xx05	.151	.489	.095	1	.757	1.163
xx04	.641	.510	1.579	1	.209	1.899
xx03	-.406	.483	.705	1	.401	.666
Presence in the WHC	.187	.195	.918	1	.338	1.206
Constant	-.002	.379	.000	1	.996	.998

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL. xx18. xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03. Presence in the WHC.

Appendix E2 Tables reporting the panel probit regression for model 5.

Model Information	
Dependent Variable	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question ^a
Probability Distribution	Binomial
Link Function	Probit

a. The procedure models Inscribe as the response. treating Not inscribe as the reference category.

Case Processing Summary		
	N	Percent
Included	564	93.5%
Excluded	39	6.5%
Total	603	100.0%

Categorical Variable Information				
			N	Percent
Dependent Variable	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question	Not inscribe	296	52.5%
		Inscribe	268	47.5%
		Total	564	100.0%

Continuous Variable Information						
		N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation

Covariate	The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL	564	0	55	16.67	15.732
	xx18	564	.00	1.00	.0496	.21740
	xx17	564	.00	1.00	.0461	.20989
	xx16	564	.00	1.00	.0443	.20600
	xx15	564	.00	1.00	.0567	.23155
	xx14	564	.00	1.00	.0567	.23155
	xx13	564	.00	1.00	.0550	.22811
	xx12	564	.00	1.00	.0621	.24147
	xx11	564	.00	1.00	.0656	.24781
	xx10	564	.00	1.00	.0514	.22105
	xx09	564	.00	1.00	.0461	.20989
	xx08	564	.00	1.00	.0709	.25692
	xx07	564	.00	1.00	.0691	.25393
	xx06	564	.00	1.00	.0567	.23155
	xx05	564	.00	1.00	.0709	.25692
	xx04	564	.00	1.00	.0691	.25393
	xx03	564	.00	1.00	.0709	.25692
	Presence in the WHC	564	0	1	.31	.464

Goodness of Fit ^a			
	Value	df	Value/df
Deviance	493.227	363	1.359
Scaled Deviance	493.227	363	
Pearson Chi-Square	373.212	363	1.028
Scaled Pearson Chi-Square	373.212	363	
Log Likelihood ^b	-300.847		
Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC)	639.695		
Finite Sample Corrected AIC (AICC)	641.092		
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)	722.061		
Consistent AIC (CAIC)	741.061		
Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question			
Model: (Intercept). The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL. xx18. xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03. Presence in the WHC			
a. Information criteria are in smaller-is-better form.			
b. The full log likelihood function is displayed and used in computing information criteria.			

Omnibus Test^a

Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square	df	Sig.
39.736	18	.002

Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question

Model: (Intercept). The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL. xx18. xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03. Presence in the WHC

a. Compares the fitted model against the intercept-only model.

Tests of Model Effects			
Source	Type III		
	Wald Chi-Square	df	Sig.
(Intercept)	.000	1	.987
The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL	11.017	1	.001
xx18	2.338	1	.126
xx17	2.205	1	.138
xx16	.809	1	.368
xx15	.000	1	.984
xx14	2.290	1	.130
xx13	.447	1	.504
xx12	3.832	1	.050
xx11	3.872	1	.049
xx10	3.908	1	.048
xx09	1.847	1	.174
xx08	.739	1	.390
xx07	1.517	1	.218
xx06	3.812	1	.051
xx05	.112	1	.737
xx04	1.662	1	.197
xx03	.689	1	.407
Presence in the WHC	.867	1	.352

Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question

Model: (Intercept). The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL. xx18. xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03. Presence in the WHC

Parameter Estimates

Parameter	B	Std. Error	95% Wald Confidence Interval		Hypothesis Test			Exp(B)	95% Wald Confidence Interval for Exp(B)	
			Lower	Upper	Wald Chi-Square	df	Sig.		Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	-.004	.2342	-.463	.455	.000	1	.987	.996	.630	1.577
The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL	.012	.0036	.005	.019	11.017	1	.001	1.012	1.005	1.019
xx18	-.500	.3271	-1.141	.141	2.338	1	.126	.606	.319	1.151
xx17	-.498	.3351	-1.154	.159	2.205	1	.138	.608	.315	1.173
xx16	-.304	.3385	-.968	.359	.809	1	.368	.738	.380	1.432
xx15	.007	.3173	-.615	.628	.000	1	.984	1.007	.540	1.875
xx14	-.479	.3166	-1.100	.141	2.290	1	.130	.619	.333	1.152
xx13	-.213	.3180	-.836	.411	.447	1	.504	.808	.433	1.508
xx12	-.606	.3094	-1.212	.001	3.832	1	.050	.546	.298	1.001
xx11	-.609	.3094	-1.215	-.002	3.872	1	.049	.544	.297	.998
xx10	-.650	.3287	-1.294	-.006	3.908	1	.048	.522	.274	.994
xx09	-.453	.3334	-1.107	.200	1.847	1	.174	.636	.331	1.222
xx08	-.258	.3001	-.846	.330	.739	1	.390	.773	.429	1.391
xx07	-.372	.3018	-.963	.220	1.517	1	.218	.690	.382	1.246
xx06	-.626	.3207	-1.255	.002	3.812	1	.051	.535	.285	1.002
xx05	.102	.3029	-.492	.695	.112	1	.737	1.107	.611	2.004
xx04	.401	.3109	-.209	1.010	1.662	1	.197	1.493	.812	2.746
xx03	-.248	.2992	-.835	.338	.689	1	.407	.780	.434	1.402
Presence in the WHC	.113	.1210	-.125	.350	.867	1	.352	1.119	.883	1.419
(Scale)	1 ^a									

Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question

Model: (Intercept). The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL. xx18. xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03. Presence in the WHC

a. Fixed at the displayed value.

Appendix F

Appendix F1 Tables report panel logit regression for model 6.

Case Processing Summary			
Unweighted Cases ^a		N	Percent
Selected Cases	Included in Analysis	562	93.2
	Missing Cases	41	6.8
	Total	603	100.0
Unselected Cases		0	.0
Total		603	100.0

a. If weight is in effect. see classification table for the total number of cases.

Dependent Variable Encoding	
Original Value	Internal Value
Not inscribe	0
Inscribe	1

Block 0: Beginning Block

Classification Table ^{a,b}					
		Observed	Predicted		Percentage Correct
			The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question		
			Not inscribe	Inscribe	
Step 0	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question	Not inscribe	295	0	100.0
		Inscribe	267	0	.0
		Overall Percentage			52.5

a. Constant is included in the model.
b. The cut value is .500

Variables in the Equation							
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 0	Constant	-.100	.084	1.394	1	.238	.905

Variables not in the Equation					
			Score	df	Sig.
Step 0	Variables	xx18	.107	1	.744
		xx17	.296	1	.587

	xx16	.003	1	.960
	xx15	1.916	1	.166
	xx14	.645	1	.422
	xx13	.222	1	.638
	xx12	1.608	1	.205
	xx11	2.432	1	.119
	xx10	2.081	1	.149
	xx09	.296	1	.587
	xx08	.000	1	.999
	xx07	.258	1	.611
	xx06	2.347	1	.126
	xx05	2.209	1	.137
	xx04	9.912	1	.002
	xx03	.000	1	.999
	Presence in the WHC	2.069	1	.150
	If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	3.813	1	.051
	The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	.109	1	.741
	Overall Statistics	31.589	19	.035

Block 1: Method = Enter

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients				
		Chi-square	df	Sig.
Step 1	Step	32.360	19	.028
	Block	32.360	19	.028
	Model	32.360	19	.028

Model Summary			
Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	745.342 ^a	.056	.075

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.

Classification Table^a	
Observed	Predicted

		The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question		Percentage Correct	
		Not inscribe	Inscribe		
Step 1	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question	Not inscribe	209	86	70.8
		Inscribe	145	122	45.7
Overall Percentage					58.9

a. The cut value is .500

Variables in the Equation								
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	
Step 1 ^a	xx18	-.579	.531	1.192	1	.275	.560	
	xx17	-.736	.538	1.876	1	.171	.479	
	xx16	-.457	.540	.716	1	.397	.633	
	xx15	-.020	.511	.002	1	.969	.980	
	xx14	-.811	.514	2.494	1	.114	.444	
	xx13	-.366	.517	.499	1	.480	.694	
	xx12	-1.063	.513	4.288	1	.038	.346	
	xx11	-1.095	.511	4.595	1	.032	.335	
	xx10	-1.188	.547	4.710	1	.030	.305	
	xx09	-.839	.557	2.269	1	.132	.432	
	xx08	-.550	.504	1.192	1	.275	.577	
	xx07	-.720	.512	1.982	1	.159	.487	
	xx06	-1.059	.534	3.933	1	.047	.347	
	xx05	-.101	.519	.038	1	.845	.903	
	xx04	.477	.536	.790	1	.374	1.611	
	xx03	-.574	.507	1.281	1	.258	.563	
		Presence in the WHC	.256	.193	1.761	1	.184	1.292
		If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	.447	.216	4.261	1	.039	1.563
	The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	-.004	.011	.158	1	.691	.996	
	Constant	.386	.530	.530	1	.467	1.471	

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: xx18. xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03. Presence in the WHC. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention.

Appendix F2 Tables reporting panel probit regression for model 6.

Model Information	
Dependent Variable	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question ^a
Probability Distribution	Binomial
Link Function	Probit
a. The procedure models Inscribe as the response. treating Not inscribe as the reference category.	

Case Processing Summary		
	N	Percent
Included	562	93.2%
Excluded	41	6.8%
Total	603	100.0%

Categorical Variable Information				
			N	Percent
Dependent Variable	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question	Not inscribe	295	52.5%
		Inscribe	267	47.5%
		Total	562	100.0%

Continuous Variable Information						
		N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Covariate	xx18	562	.00	1.00	.0480	.21405
	xx17	562	.00	1.00	.0463	.21024
	xx16	562	.00	1.00	.0445	.20635
	xx15	562	.00	1.00	.0569	.23193
	xx14	562	.00	1.00	.0569	.23193
	xx13	562	.00	1.00	.0552	.22850
	xx12	562	.00	1.00	.0623	.24187
	xx11	562	.00	1.00	.0658	.24822
	xx10	562	.00	1.00	.0516	.22142
	xx09	562	.00	1.00	.0463	.21024
	xx08	562	.00	1.00	.0712	.25734
	xx07	562	.00	1.00	.0694	.25435
	xx06	562	.00	1.00	.0569	.23193
	xx05	562	.00	1.00	.0694	.25435

xx04	562	.00	1.00	.0694	.25435
xx03	562	.00	1.00	.0712	.25734
Presence in the WHC	562	0	1	.31	.465
If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	562	0	1	.22	.416
The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	562	1	47	25.79	9.597

Goodness of Fit^a			
	Value	df	Value/df
Deviance	524.066	380	1.379
Scaled Deviance	524.066	380	
Pearson Chi-Square	392.715	380	1.033
Scaled Pearson Chi-Square	392.715	380	
Log Likelihood ^b	-313.431		
Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC)	666.862		
Finite Sample Corrected AIC (AICC)	668.415		
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)	753.492		
Consistent AIC (CAIC)	773.492		
Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question			
Model: (Intercept). xx18. xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03. Presence in the WHC. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention			
a. Information criteria are in smaller-is-better form.			
b. The full log likelihood function is displayed and used in computing information criteria.			

Omnibus Test^a		
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square	df	Sig.
32.400	19	.028
Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question		
Model: (Intercept). xx18. xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03. Presence in the WHC. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention		

a. Compares the fitted model against the intercept-only model.

Tests of Model Effects			
Source	Type III		
	Wald Chi-Square	df	Sig.
(Intercept)	.544	1	.461
xx18	1.207	1	.272
xx17	1.888	1	.169
xx16	.713	1	.399
xx15	.001	1	.971
xx14	2.517	1	.113
xx13	.505	1	.478
xx12	4.331	1	.037
xx11	4.680	1	.031
xx10	4.815	1	.028
xx09	2.306	1	.129
xx08	1.198	1	.274
xx07	2.007	1	.157
xx06	4.026	1	.045
xx05	.034	1	.854
xx04	.814	1	.367
xx03	1.286	1	.257
Presence in the WHC	1.759	1	.185
If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	4.299	1	.038
The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	.164	1	.685
Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question			
Model: (Intercept). xx18. xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03. Presence in the WHC. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention			

Parameter Estimates							
Parameter	B	Std. Error	95% Wald Confidence Interval		Hypothesis Test		
			Lower	Upper	Wald Chi-Square	df	Sig.
(Intercept)	.240	.3261	-.399	.880	.544	1	.461
xx18	-.360	.3280	-1.003	.283	1.207	1	.272

xx17	-.461	.3356	-1.119	.197	1.888	1	.169
xx16	-.284	.3365	-.944	.375	.713	1	.399
xx15	-.012	.3167	-.632	.609	.001	1	.971
xx14	-.505	.3184	-1.129	.119	2.517	1	.113
xx13	-.228	.3209	-.857	.401	.505	1	.478
xx12	-.656	.3153	-1.274	-.038	4.331	1	.037
xx11	-.679	.3137	-1.293	-.064	4.680	1	.031
xx10	-.737	.3357	-1.394	-.079	4.815	1	.028
xx09	-.522	.3436	-1.195	.152	2.306	1	.129
xx08	-.343	.3129	-.956	.271	1.198	1	.274
xx07	-.449	.3171	-1.071	.172	2.007	1	.157
xx06	-.658	.3281	-1.301	-.015	4.026	1	.045
xx05	-.059	.3215	-.689	.571	.034	1	.854
xx04	.295	.3267	-.346	.935	.814	1	.367
xx03	-.356	.3137	-.971	.259	1.286	1	.257
Presence in the WHC	.159	.1198	-.076	.394	1.759	1	.185
If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	.278	.1340	.015	.540	4.299	1	.038
The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	-.003	.0068	-.016	.011	.164	1	.685
(Scale)	1 ^a						

Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question

Model: (Intercept). xx18. xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03. Presence in the WHC. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention

a. Fixed at the displayed value.

Appendix G

Appendix G4 Tables reporting panel logitit regression for model 7a

Case Processing Summary		
Unweighted Cases ^a	N	Percent

Selected Cases	Included in Analysis	562	93.2
	Missing Cases	41	6.8
	Total	603	100.0
Unselected Cases		0	.0
Total		603	100.0

a. If weight is in effect. see classification table for the total number of cases.

Dependent Variable Encoding	
Original Value	Internal Value
Not inscribe	0
Inscribe	1

Block 0: Beginning Block

Classification Table ^{a,b}					
	Observed	Predicted	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question		Percentage Correct
			Not inscribe	Inscribe	
Step 0	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question	Not inscribe	295	0	100.0
		Inscribe	267	0	.0
Overall Percentage					52.5

a. Constant is included in the model.

b. The cut value is .500

Variables in the Equation							
	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	
Step 0	Constant	-.100	.084	1.394	1	.238	.905

Variables not in the Equation					
	Variables	Score	df	Sig.	
Step 0	xx18	.107	1	.744	
	xx17	.296	1	.587	
	xx16	.003	1	.960	
	xx15	1.916	1	.166	
	xx14	.645	1	.422	
	xx13	.222	1	.638	

	xx12	1.608	1	.205
	xx11	2.432	1	.119
	xx10	2.081	1	.149
	xx09	.296	1	.587
	xx08	.000	1	.999
	xx07	.258	1	.611
	xx06	2.347	1	.126
	xx05	2.209	1	.137
	xx04	9.912	1	.002
	xx03	.000	1	.999
	Presence in the WHC	2.069	1	.150
	The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC	10.879	1	.001
	If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	3.813	1	.051
	The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	.109	1	.741
	Overall Statistics	43.987	20	.002

Block 1: Method = Enter

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients				
		Chi-square	df	Sig.
Step 1	Step	45.497	20	.001
	Block	45.497	20	.001
	Model	45.497	20	.001

Model Summary			
Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	732.205 ^a	.078	.104

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.

Classification Table ^a	
Observed	Predicted

		The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question		Percentage Correct	
		Not inscribe	Inscribe		
Step 1	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question	Not inscribe	197	98	66.8
		Inscribe	129	138	51.7
Overall Percentage					59.6

a. The cut value is .500

Variables in the Equation								
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)	
Step 1 ^a	xx18	-.762	.542	1.981	1	.159	.467	
	xx17	-.799	.544	2.157	1	.142	.450	
	xx16	-.559	.548	1.040	1	.308	.572	
	xx15	-.026	.520	.003	1	.960	.974	
	xx14	-.847	.521	2.645	1	.104	.429	
	xx13	-.434	.524	.686	1	.408	.648	
	xx12	-1.137	.519	4.794	1	.029	.321	
	xx11	-1.171	.518	5.103	1	.024	.310	
	xx10	-1.298	.556	5.460	1	.019	.273	
	xx09	-.919	.564	2.651	1	.103	.399	
	xx08	-.683	.512	1.780	1	.182	.505	
	xx07	-.879	.519	2.873	1	.090	.415	
	xx06	-1.173	.540	4.713	1	.030	.309	
	xx05	-.192	.524	.135	1	.714	.825	
	xx04	.363	.541	.450	1	.502	1.437	
	xx03	-.679	.512	1.757	1	.185	.507	
		Presence in the WHC	.150	.197	.577	1	.448	1.161
		The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC	.047	.013	12.724	1	.000	1.048
	If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	.214	.227	.891	1	.345	1.239	

	The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	-.026	.013	4.183	1	.041	.974
	Constant	.699	.542	1.667	1	.197	2.012

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: xx18. xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03. Presence in the WHC. The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention.

Appendix G4 Tables reporting panel probit regression for model 7a

Model Information	
Dependent Variable	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question ^a
Probability Distribution	Binomial
Link Function	Probit

a. The procedure models Inscribe as the response. treating Not inscribe as the reference category.

Case Processing Summary		
	N	Percent
Included	562	93.2%
Excluded	41	6.8%
Total	603	100.0%

Categorical Variable Information				
		N	Percent	
Dependent Variable	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question	Not inscribe	295	52.5%
		Inscribe	267	47.5%
		Total	562	100.0%

Continuous Variable Information						
		N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Covariate	xx18	562	.00	1.00	.0480	.21405
	xx17	562	.00	1.00	.0463	.21024
	xx16	562	.00	1.00	.0445	.20635
	xx15	562	.00	1.00	.0569	.23193
	xx14	562	.00	1.00	.0569	.23193
	xx13	562	.00	1.00	.0552	.22850

xx12	562	.00	1.00	.0623	.24187
xx11	562	.00	1.00	.0658	.24822
xx10	562	.00	1.00	.0516	.22142
xx09	562	.00	1.00	.0463	.21024
xx08	562	.00	1.00	.0712	.25734
xx07	562	.00	1.00	.0694	.25435
xx06	562	.00	1.00	.0569	.23193
xx05	562	.00	1.00	.0694	.25435
xx04	562	.00	1.00	.0694	.25435
xx03	562	.00	1.00	.0712	.25734
Presence in the WHC	562	0	1	.31	.465
The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC	562	0	27	8.96	8.547
If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	562	0	1	.22	.416
The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	562	1	47	25.79	9.597

Goodness of Fit^a			
	Value	df	Value/df
Deviance	593.518	442	1.343
Scaled Deviance	593.518	442	
Pearson Chi-Square	453.224	442	1.025
Scaled Pearson Chi-Square	453.224	442	
Log Likelihood ^b	-331.011		
Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC)	704.022		
Finite Sample Corrected AIC (AICC)	705.733		
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)	794.983		
Consistent AIC (CAIC)	815.983		

Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question Model: (Intercept). xx18. xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03. Presence in the WHC. The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention
a. Information criteria are in smaller-is-better form.
b. The full log likelihood function is displayed and used in computing information criteria.

Omnibus Test ^a		
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square	df	Sig.
45.554	20	.001
Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question Model: (Intercept). xx18. xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03. Presence in the WHC. The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention		
a. Compares the fitted model against the intercept-only model.		

Tests of Model Effects			
Source	Type III		
	Wald Chi-Square	df	Sig.
(Intercept)	1.678	1	.195
xx18	2.018	1	.155
xx17	2.181	1	.140
xx16	1.061	1	.303
xx15	.003	1	.953
xx14	2.670	1	.102
xx13	.674	1	.412
xx12	4.856	1	.028
xx11	5.233	1	.022
xx10	5.550	1	.018
xx09	2.701	1	.100
xx08	1.798	1	.180
xx07	2.925	1	.087
xx06	4.792	1	.029
xx05	.120	1	.729
xx04	.480	1	.489
xx03	1.752	1	.186
Presence in the WHC	.542	1	.462

The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC	12.922	1	.000
If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	.890	1	.345
The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	4.241	1	.039
<p>Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question</p> <p>Model: (Intercept). xx18. xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03. Presence in the WHC. The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention</p>			

Parameter Estimates										
Parameter	B	Std. Error	95% Wald Confidence Interval		Hypothesis Test			Exp(B)	95% Wald Confidence Interval for Exp(B)	
			Lower	Upper	Wald Chi-Square	df	Sig.		Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	.430	.3323	-.221	1.082	1.678	1	.195	1.538	.802	2.950
xx18	-.472	.3326	-1.124	.179	2.018	1	.155	.624	.325	1.197
xx17	-.500	.3387	-1.164	.164	2.181	1	.140	.606	.312	1.178
xx16	-.351	.3404	-1.018	.316	1.061	1	.303	.704	.361	1.372
xx15	-.019	.3197	-.645	.608	.003	1	.953	.981	.524	1.836
xx14	-.525	.3215	-1.155	.105	2.670	1	.102	.591	.315	1.110
xx13	-.267	.3256	-.906	.371	.674	1	.412	.765	.404	1.449
xx12	-.701	.3181	-1.325	-.077	4.856	1	.028	.496	.266	.925
xx11	-.728	.3181	-1.351	-.104	5.233	1	.022	.483	.259	.901
xx10	-.796	.3379	-1.458	-.134	5.550	1	.018	.451	.233	.875
xx09	-.567	.3453	-1.244	.109	2.701	1	.100	.567	.288	1.116
xx08	-.425	.3170	-1.046	.196	1.798	1	.180	.654	.351	1.217
xx07	-.548	.3204	-1.176	.080	2.925	1	.087	.578	.309	1.083
xx06	-.724	.3306	-1.372	-.076	4.792	1	.029	.485	.254	.927
xx05	-.112	.3246	-.749	.524	.120	1	.729	.894	.473	1.688
xx04	.228	.3289	-.417	.873	.480	1	.489	1.256	.659	2.393
xx03	-.416	.3145	-1.033	.200	1.752	1	.186	.659	.356	1.222

Presence in the WHC	.090	.1221	-.149	.329	.542	1	.462	1.094	.861	1.390
The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC	.029	.0081	.013	.045	12.922	1	.000	1.029	1.013	1.046
If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	.132	.1404	-.143	.408	.890	1	.345	1.142	.867	1.503
The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	-.016	.0078	-.031	-.001	4.241	1	.039	.984	.969	.999
(Scale)	1 ^a									
<p>Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question</p> <p>Model: (Intercept). xx18. xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03. Presence in the WHC. The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention</p> <p>a. Fixed at the displayed value.</p>										

Appendix G3 Tables reporting panel logit regression for model 7b

Case Processing Summary			
Unweighted Cases ^a		N	Percent
Selected Cases	Included in Analysis	564	93.5
	Missing Cases	39	6.5
	Total	603	100.0
Unselected Cases		0	.0
Total		603	100.0
a. If weight is in effect. see classification table for the total number of cases.			

Dependent Variable Encoding	
Original Value	Internal Value
Not inscribe	0
Inscribe	1

Block 0: Beginning Block

Classification Table ^{a,b}					
	Observed	Predicted			Percentage Correct
		The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question			
		Not inscribe	Inscribe		
Step 0	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question	Not inscribe	296	0	100.0
		Inscribe	268	0	.0
Overall Percentage					52.5
a. Constant is included in the model.					
b. The cut value is .500					

Variables in the Equation							
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 0	Constant	-.099	.084	1.389	1	.239	.905

Variables not in the Equation					
		Score	df	Sig.	
Step 0	Variables	xx18	.257	1	.612
		xx17	.297	1	.586
		xx16	.002	1	.961
		xx15	1.913	1	.167
		xx14	.646	1	.421
		xx13	.221	1	.639
		xx12	1.611	1	.204
		xx11	2.435	1	.119
		xx10	2.083	1	.149
		xx09	.297	1	.586
		xx08	.000	1	.998
		xx07	.259	1	.611
		xx06	2.350	1	.125

	xx05	2.690	1	.101
	xx04	9.902	1	.002
	xx03	.000	1	.998
	If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	3.800	1	.051
	Overall Statistics	30.439	17	.023

Block 1: Method = Enter

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients				
		Chi-square	df	Sig.
Step 1	Step	31.088	17	.019
	Block	31.088	17	.019
	Model	31.088	17	.019

Model Summary			
Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	749.391 ^a	.054	.072

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.

Classification Table ^a					
		Predicted			Percentage Correct
		The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question			
Observed		Not inscribe	Inscribe		
Step 1	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question	Not inscribe	203	93	68.6
		Inscribe	131	137	51.1
Overall Percentage					60.3

a. The cut value is .500

Variables in the Equation							
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1 ^a	xx18	-.681	.525	1.683	1	.195	.506
	xx17	-.729	.536	1.848	1	.174	.483
	xx16	-.501	.539	.864	1	.353	.606
	xx15	-.027	.509	.003	1	.958	.974

xx14	-.778	.509	2.335	1	.126	.459
xx13	-.302	.509	.353	1	.552	.739
xx12	-1.015	.503	4.073	1	.044	.362
xx11	-1.014	.498	4.149	1	.042	.363
xx10	-1.136	.533	4.549	1	.033	.321
xx09	-.747	.536	1.942	1	.163	.474
xx08	-.514	.479	1.150	1	.283	.598
xx07	-.663	.483	1.885	1	.170	.515
xx06	-1.032	.518	3.971	1	.046	.356
xx05	.031	.483	.004	1	.949	1.031
xx04	.538	.506	1.133	1	.287	1.713
xx03	-.502	.479	1.097	1	.295	.605
If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	.474	.212	4.994	1	.025	1.607
Constant	.307	.362	.719	1	.396	1.359

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: xx18. xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination..

Appendix G4 Tables reporting panel probit regression for model 7b

Model Information	
Dependent Variable	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question ^a
Probability Distribution	Binomial
Link Function	Probit

a. The procedure models Inscribe as the response. treating Not inscribe as the reference category.

Case Processing Summary		
	N	Percent
Included	564	93.5%
Excluded	39	6.5%
Total	603	100.0%

Categorical Variable Information				
			N	Percent
Dependent Variable	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question	Not inscribe	296	52.5%
		Inscribe	268	47.5%
		Total	564	100.0%

Continuous Variable Information						
		N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Covariate	xx18	564	.00	1.00	.0496	.21740
	xx17	564	.00	1.00	.0461	.20989
	xx16	564	.00	1.00	.0443	.20600
	xx15	564	.00	1.00	.0567	.23155
	xx14	564	.00	1.00	.0567	.23155
	xx13	564	.00	1.00	.0550	.22811
	xx12	564	.00	1.00	.0621	.24147
	xx11	564	.00	1.00	.0656	.24781
	xx10	564	.00	1.00	.0514	.22105
	xx09	564	.00	1.00	.0461	.20989
	xx08	564	.00	1.00	.0709	.25692
	xx07	564	.00	1.00	.0691	.25393
	xx06	564	.00	1.00	.0567	.23155
	xx05	564	.00	1.00	.0709	.25692
	xx04	564	.00	1.00	.0691	.25393
	xx03	564	.00	1.00	.0709	.25692
		If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	564	0	1	.22

Goodness of Fit^a			
	Value	df	Value/df
Deviance	18.902	16	1.181
Scaled Deviance	18.902	16	
Pearson Chi-Square	16.215	16	1.013
Scaled Pearson Chi-Square	16.215	16	
Log Likelihood ^b	-59.075		
Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC)	154.150		
Finite Sample Corrected AIC (AICC)	155.405		
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)	232.181		
Consistent AIC (CAIC)	250.181		
Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question			
Model: (Intercept). xx18. xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.			
a. Information criteria are in smaller-is-better form.			

b. The full log likelihood function is displayed and used in computing information criteria.

Omnibus Test^a		
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square	df	Sig.
31.125	17	.019

Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question
 Model: (Intercept). xx18. xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.

a. Compares the fitted model against the intercept-only model.

Tests of Model Effects			
Source	Type III		
	Wald Chi-Square	df	Sig.
(Intercept)	.724	1	.395
xx18	1.697	1	.193
xx17	1.860	1	.173
xx16	.862	1	.353
xx15	.003	1	.955
xx14	2.359	1	.125
xx13	.354	1	.552
xx12	4.131	1	.042
xx11	4.209	1	.040
xx10	4.652	1	.031
xx09	1.958	1	.162
xx08	1.155	1	.282
xx07	1.899	1	.168
xx06	4.056	1	.044
xx05	.005	1	.943
xx04	1.160	1	.282
xx03	1.100	1	.294
If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	5.053	1	.025

Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question
 Model: (Intercept). xx18. xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.

Parameter Estimates

Parameter	B	Std. Error	95% Wald Confidence Interval		Hypothesis Test			Exp(B)	95% Wald Confidence Interval for Exp(B)	
			Lower	Upper	Wald Chi-Square	df	Sig.		Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	.191	.2243	-.249	.630	.724	1	.395	1.210	.780	1.878
xx18	-.423	.3249	-1.060	.214	1.697	1	.193	.655	.346	1.238
xx17	-.457	.3350	-1.113	.200	1.860	1	.173	.633	.328	1.221
xx16	-.312	.3357	-.970	.346	.862	1	.353	.732	.379	1.414
xx15	-.018	.3151	-.635	.600	.003	1	.955	.982	.530	1.822
xx14	-.485	.3155	-1.103	.134	2.359	1	.125	.616	.332	1.143
xx13	-.188	.3165	-.809	.432	.354	1	.552	.828	.445	1.540
xx12	-.630	.3102	-1.238	-.022	4.131	1	.042	.532	.290	.978
xx11	-.629	.3064	-1.229	-.028	4.209	1	.040	.533	.292	.972
xx10	-.707	.3280	-1.350	-.065	4.652	1	.031	.493	.259	.938
xx09	-.464	.3317	-1.114	.186	1.958	1	.162	.629	.328	1.204
xx08	-.320	.2978	-.904	.264	1.155	1	.282	.726	.405	1.302
xx07	-.413	.3000	-1.001	.175	1.899	1	.168	.661	.367	1.191
xx06	-.643	.3192	-1.268	-.017	4.056	1	.044	.526	.281	.983
xx05	.022	.2999	-.566	.609	.005	1	.943	1.022	.568	1.839
xx04	.332	.3086	-.273	.937	1.160	1	.282	1.394	.761	2.553
xx03	-.313	.2980	-.897	.272	1.100	1	.294	.732	.408	1.312
If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	.295	.1314	.038	.553	5.053	1	.025	1.344	1.039	1.738
(Scale)	1 ^a									
Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question										
Model: (Intercept). xx18. xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.										
a. Fixed at the displayed value.										

Appendix H

Appendix H1 Tables reporting panel logit regression for model 8.

Case Processing Summary			
Unweighted Cases ^a		N	Percent
Selected Cases	Included in Analysis	403	66.8
	Missing Cases	200	33.2
	Total	603	100.0
Unselected Cases		0	.0
Total		603	100.0

a. If weight is in effect. see classification table for the total number of cases.

Dependent Variable Encoding	
Original Value	Internal Value
Not inscribe	0
Inscribe	1

Block 0: Beginning Block

Classification Table ^{a,b}					
			Predicted		Percentage Correct
			The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question		
	Observed		Not inscribe	Inscribe	
Step 0	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question	Not inscribe	210	0	100.0
		Inscribe	193	0	.0
Overall Percentage					52.1

a. Constant is included in the model.

b. The cut value is .500

Variables in the Equation							
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 0	Constant	-.084	.100	.717	1	.397	.919

Variables not in the Equation					
			Score	df	Sig.
Step 0	Variables	Presence in the WHC	1.076	1	.300
		The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	2.102	1	.147

		The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.	5.043	1	.025
		adjtotalexports	6.887	1	.009
		xx17	.750	1	.386
		xx16	.426	1	.514
		xx15	2.634	1	.105
		xx14	.270	1	.603
		xx13	.001	1	.978
		xx12	1.242	1	.265
		xx11	1.636	1	.201
	Overall Statistics		24.001	11	.013

Block 1: Method = Enter

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients				
		Chi-square	df	Sig.
Step 1	Step	24.784	11	.010
	Block	24.784	11	.010
	Model	24.784	11	.010

Model Summary			
Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	533.175 ^a	.060	.080

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 3 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.

Hosmer and Lemeshow Test			
Step	Chi-square	df	Sig.
1	7.802	8	.453

Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test						
		The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question = Not inscribe		The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question = Inscribe		Total
		Observed	Expected	Observed	Expected	
Step 1	1	31	29.083	9	10.917	40
	2	22	26.206	18	13.794	40
	3	28	25.044	13	15.956	41
	4	25	23.370	16	17.630	41
	5	20	21.564	20	18.436	40

	6	16	20.593	25	20.407	41
	7	20	18.732	20	21.268	40
	8	20	17.450	20	22.550	40
	9	18	15.762	22	24.238	40
	10	10	12.196	30	27.804	40

Classification Table ^a					
	Observed	Predicted			
		The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question		Percentage Correct	
		Not inscribe	Inscribe		
Step 1	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question	Not inscribe	133	77	63.3
		Inscribe	92	101	52.3
Overall Percentage					58.1

a. The cut value is .500

Variables in the Equation							
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1 ^a	Presence in the WHC	.218	.222	.958	1	.328	1.243
	The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	-.037	.014	6.833	1	.009	.963
	The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.	.015	.008	3.675	1	.055	1.015
	adjtotalexports	.290	.128	5.139	1	.023	1.337
	xx17	-.185	.485	.145	1	.703	.831
	xx16	.514	.519	.980	1	.322	1.672
	xx15	.724	.448	2.610	1	.106	2.062
	xx14	-.091	.418	.048	1	.827	.913
	xx13	.021	.433	.002	1	.962	1.021
	xx12	-.490	.426	1.323	1	.250	.612
	xx11	-.410	.424	.934	1	.334	.664
	Constant	-.596	.594	1.010	1	.315	.551

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Presence in the WHC. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention. The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.. adjtotalexports. xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11.

Appendix H2 Tables reporting panel probit regression for model 8.

Model Information	
Dependent Variable	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question ^a
Probability Distribution	Binomial
Link Function	Probit
a. The procedure models Inscribe as the response, treating Not inscribe as the reference category.	

Case Processing Summary		
	N	Percent
Included	403	66.8%
Excluded	200	33.2%
Total	603	100.0%

Categorical Variable Information				
			N	Percent
Dependent Variable	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question	Not inscribe	210	52.1%
		Inscribe	193	47.9%
		Total	403	100.0%

Continuous Variable Information						
		N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Covariate	Presence in the WHC	403	0	1	.35	.477
	The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.	403	14.44	98.06	81.4381	15.43297
	The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	403	1	44	25.42	9.154
	adjtotalexports	403	.00	7.58	.5027	.96025
	xx17	403	.00	1.00	.0571	.23227

xx16	403	.00	1.00	.0496	.21744
xx15	403	.00	1.00	.0670	.25033
xx14	403	.00	1.00	.0744	.26281
xx13	403	.00	1.00	.0670	.25033
xx12	403	.00	1.00	.0720	.25874
xx11	403	.00	1.00	.0744	.26281
xx10	403	.00	1.00	.0596	.23695
xx09	403	.00	1.00	.0620	.24152
xx08	403	.00	1.00	.0794	.27071
xx07	403	.00	1.00	.0893	.28557
xx06	403	.00	1.00	.0744	.26281
xx05	403	.00	1.00	.0844	.27828
xx04	403	.00	1.00	.0893	.28557
xx03	403	.00	.00	.0000	.00000

Goodness of Fit^a			
	Value	df	Value/df
Deviance	433.471	323	1.342
Scaled Deviance	433.471	323	
Pearson Chi-Square	335.399	323	1.038
Scaled Pearson Chi-Square	335.399	323	
Log Likelihood ^b	-237.765		
Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC)	511.531		
Finite Sample Corrected AIC (AICC)	513.312		
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)	583.512		
Consistent AIC (CAIC)	601.512		
Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question			
Model: (Intercept). Presence in the WHC. The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention. adjtotalexports. xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03			
a. Information criteria are in smaller-is-better form.			
b. The full log likelihood function is displayed and used in computing information criteria.			

Omnibus Test^a		
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square	df	Sig.
39.218	17	.002

<p>Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question</p> <p>Model: (Intercept). Presence in the WHC. The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention. adjtotalexports. xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03</p> <p>a. Compares the fitted model against the intercept-only model.</p>

Tests of Model Effects			
Source	Type III		
	Wald Chi-Square	df	Sig.
(Intercept)	. ^a	.	.
Presence in the WHC	.929	1	.335
The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.	5.161	1	.023
The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	4.894	1	.027
adjtotalexports	5.757	1	.016
xx17	. ^a	.	.
xx16	. ^a	.	.
xx15	. ^a	.	.
xx14	. ^a	.	.
xx13	. ^a	.	.
xx12	. ^a	.	.
xx11	. ^a	.	.
xx10	. ^a	.	.
xx09	. ^a	.	.
xx08	. ^a	.	.
xx07	. ^a	.	.
xx06	. ^a	.	.
xx05	. ^a	.	.
xx04	. ^a	.	.
xx03	. ^a	.	.

<p>Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question</p> <p>Model: (Intercept). Presence in the WHC. The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention. adjtotalexports. xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03</p> <p>a. Unable to compute due to numerical problems</p>

Parameter Estimates										
Parameter	B	Std. Error	95% Wald Confidence Interval		Hypothesis Test			Exp(B)	95% Wald Confidence Interval for Exp(B)	
			Lower	Upper	Wald Chi-Square	df	Sig.		Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	.070	.4105	-.734	.875	.029	1	.864	1.073	.480	2.399
Presence in the WHC	.136	.1407	-.140	.411	.929	1	.335	1.145	.869	1.509
The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.	.011	.0050	.002	.021	5.161	1	.023	1.011	1.002	1.021
The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	-.020	.0090	-.038	-.002	4.894	1	.027	.980	.963	.998
adjtotalexports	.180	.0749	.033	.326	5.757	1	.016	1.197	1.033	1.386
xx17	-.826	.3739	-1.558	-.093	4.875	1	.027	.438	.210	.911
xx16	-.389	.3885	-1.151	.372	1.003	1	.317	.678	.316	1.451
xx15	-.248	.3537	-.941	.445	.492	1	.483	.780	.390	1.561
xx14	-.751	.3371	-1.412	-.090	4.964	1	.026	.472	.244	.914
xx13	-.668	.3453	-1.345	.009	3.745	1	.053	.513	.261	1.009
xx12	-.972	.3386	-1.635	-.308	8.234	1	.004	.378	.195	.735
xx11	-.927	.3386	-1.591	-.264	7.501	1	.006	.396	.204	.768
xx10	-1.001	.3563	-1.699	-.303	7.890	1	.005	.368	.183	.739
xx09	-.965	.3475	-1.646	-.284	7.720	1	.005	.381	.193	.752
xx08	-.643	.3244	-1.279	-.007	3.929	1	.047	.526	.278	.993
xx07	-.833	.3140	-1.448	-.217	7.034	1	.008	.435	.235	.805
xx06	-.921	.3315	-1.571	-.271	7.713	1	.005	.398	.208	.763
xx05	-.418	.3191	-1.043	.208	1.715	1	.190	.658	.352	1.231

xx04	0 ^a	1	.	.
xx03	0 ^a	1	.	.
(Scale)	1 ^b									
Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question										
Model: (Intercept). Presence in the WHC. The degree to which the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is integrated in the international arena.. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention. adjtotalexports. xx17. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03										
a. Set to zero because this parameter is redundant.										
b. Fixed at the displayed value.										

Appendix I

Appendix II Tables reporting panel logit regression for model 9.

Case Processing Summary			
Unweighted Cases ^a		N	Percent
Selected Cases	Included in Analysis	524	86.9
	Missing Cases	79	13.1
	Total	603	100.0
Unselected Cases		0	.0
Total		603	100.0

a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of cases.

Dependent Variable Encoding	
Original Value	Internal Value
Not inscribe	0
Inscribe	1

Block 0: Beginning Block

Classification Table ^{a,b}					
			Predicted		Percentage Correct
			The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question		
	Observed		Not inscribe	Inscribe	
Step 0	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question	Not inscribe	277	0	100.0
		Inscribe	247	0	.0
Overall Percentage					52.9

a. Constant is included in the model.

b. The cut value is .500

Variables in the Equation							
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 0	Constant	-.115	.088	1.716	1	.190	.892

Variables not in the Equation					
			Score	df	Sig.
Step 0	Variables	Presence in the WHC	1.613	1	.204
		The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC	7.473	1	.006
		The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL	7.824	1	.005
		If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	3.076	1	.079
		The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	1.351	1	.245
		The degree of cultural globalisation according to KOF index de facto	6.871	1	.009
		xx16	.008	1	.929
		xx15	2.048	1	.152
		xx14	.580	1	.446
		xx13	.265	1	.607
		xx12	1.156	1	.282
		xx11	2.302	1	.129
		xx10	1.549	1	.213
		xx09	.256	1	.613
		xx08	.042	1	.837
		xx07	.213	1	.645
		xx06	1.796	1	.180
xx05	2.948	1	.086		
xx04	10.281	1	.001		

	xx03	.002	1	.962
	Overall Statistics	41.247	20	.003

Block 1: Method = Enter

Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients				
		Chi-square	df	Sig.
Step 1	Step	42.714	20	.002
	Block	42.714	20	.002
	Model	42.714	20	.002

Model Summary			
Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	681.986 ^a	.078	.104

a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.

Hosmer and Lemeshow Test			
Step	Chi-square	df	Sig.
1	6.066	8	.640

Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test						
		The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question = Not inscribe		The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question = Inscribe		Total
		Observed	Expected	Observed	Expected	
Step 1	1	38	38.891	14	13.109	52
	2	33	35.504	19	16.496	52
	3	36	33.013	16	18.987	52
	4	29	30.881	23	21.119	52
	5	30	29.455	23	23.545	53
	6	28	26.971	24	25.029	52
	7	30	25.204	22	26.796	52
	8	19	22.974	33	29.026	52
	9	22	19.332	30	32.668	52
	10	12	14.775	43	40.225	55

Classification Table ^a	
Observed	Predicted

		The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question		Percentage Correct	
		Not inscribe	Inscribe		
Step 1	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question	Not inscribe	197	80	71.1
		Inscribe	121	126	51.0
Overall Percentage					61.6

a. The cut value is .500

Variables in the Equation							
		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Step 1 ^a	Presence in the WHC	.136	.204	.445	1	.505	1.146
	The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC	.029	.017	2.861	1	.091	1.030
	The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL	.010	.010	1.097	1	.295	1.010
	If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	.068	.261	.068	1	.795	1.070
	The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	-.028	.013	4.574	1	.032	.972
	The degree of cultural globalisation accoding to KOF index de facto	.004	.004	1.092	1	.296	1.004
	xx16	.287	.499	.330	1	.566	1.332
	xx15	.750	.470	2.550	1	.110	2.117
	xx14	-.043	.470	.008	1	.927	.958
	xx13	.351	.473	.549	1	.459	1.420
xx12	-.298	.468	.406	1	.524	.742	

xx11	-.331	.469	.499	1	.480	.718
xx10	-.411	.509	.654	1	.419	.663
xx09	-.156	.516	.092	1	.762	.855
xx08	.159	.456	.122	1	.727	1.173
xx07	-.107	.461	.054	1	.816	.898
xx06	-.342	.491	.485	1	.486	.710
xx05	.668	.476	1.973	1	.160	1.951
xx04	1.144	.488	5.485	1	.019	3.139
xx03	.147	.459	.102	1	.749	1.158
Constant	-.257	.536	.230	1	.631	.773

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Presence in the WHC. The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC. The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention. The degree of cultural globalisation according to KOF index de facto. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03.

Appendix I2 Tables reporting panel probit regression for model 9.

Model Information	
Dependent Variable	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question ^a
Probability Distribution	Binomial
Link Function	Probit

a. The procedure models Inscribe as the response. treating Not inscribe as the reference category.

Case Processing Summary		
	N	Percent
Included	524	86.9%
Excluded	79	13.1%
Total	603	100.0%

Categorical Variable Information				
			N	Percent
Dependent Variable	The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question	Not inscribe	277	52.9%
		Inscribe	247	47.1%
		Total	524	100.0%

Continuous Variable Information					
	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation

Covariate	Presence in the WHC	524	0	1	.32	.466
	The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC	524	0	27	8.84	8.511
	The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL	524	0	55	16.67	15.674
	If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	524	0	1	.22	.416
	The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	524	1	44	25.31	9.379
	The degree of cultural globalisation according to KOF index de facto	524	3.99	98.76	58.9291	26.35898
	xx16	524	.00	1.00	.0477	.21336
	xx15	524	.00	1.00	.0611	.23969
	xx14	524	.00	1.00	.0611	.23969
	xx13	524	.00	1.00	.0592	.23615
	xx12	524	.00	1.00	.0649	.24656
	xx11	524	.00	1.00	.0706	.25642
	xx10	524	.00	1.00	.0534	.22511
	xx09	524	.00	1.00	.0496	.21736
	xx08	524	.00	1.00	.0744	.26272
	xx07	524	.00	1.00	.0744	.26272
	xx06	524	.00	1.00	.0592	.23615
	xx05	524	.00	1.00	.0725	.25959
	xx04	524	.00	1.00	.0744	.26272
	xx03	524	.00	1.00	.0763	.26579

Goodness of Fit^a			
	Value	df	Value/df
Deviance	595.987	440	1.355

Scaled Deviance	595.987	440	
Pearson Chi-Square	455.493	440	1.035
Scaled Pearson Chi-Square	455.493	440	
Log Likelihood ^b	-319.481		
Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC)	680.962		
Finite Sample Corrected AIC (AICC)	682.803		
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)	770.454		
Consistent AIC (CAIC)	791.454		
Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question			
Model: (Intercept). Presence in the WHC. The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC. The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention. The degree of cultural globalisation according to KOF index de facto. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03			
a. Information criteria are in smaller-is-better form.			
b. The full log likelihood function is displayed and used in computing information criteria.			

Omnibus Test ^a		
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square	df	Sig.
42.762	20	.002
Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question		
Model: (Intercept). Presence in the WHC. The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC. The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention. The degree of cultural globalisation according to KOF index de facto. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03		
a. Compares the fitted model against the intercept-only model.		

Tests of Model Effects			
Source	Type III		
	Wald Chi-Square	df	Sig.
(Intercept)	.233	1	.630
Presence in the WHC	.417	1	.518
The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC	2.866	1	.090

The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL	1.146	1	.284
If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	.073	1	.787
The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	4.671	1	.031
The degree of cultural globalisation accoding to KOF index de facto	1.030	1	.310
xx16	.317	1	.573
xx15	2.601	1	.107
xx14	.009	1	.925
xx13	.571	1	.450
xx12	.390	1	.532
xx11	.505	1	.477
xx10	.638	1	.424
xx09	.085	1	.770
xx08	.123	1	.726
xx07	.054	1	.815
xx06	.463	1	.496
xx05	2.047	1	.153
xx04	5.803	1	.016
xx03	.121	1	.728
<p>Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question</p> <p>Model: (Intercept). Presence in the WHC. The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC. The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention. The degree of cultural globalisation accoding to KOF index de facto. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03</p>			

Parameter Estimates						
Parameter	B	Std. Error	95% Wald Confidence Interval	Hypothesis Test	Exp(B)	95% Wald Confidence Interval for Exp(B)

			Lower	Upper	Wald Chi- Square	df	Sig.		Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	-.158	.3285	-.802	.485	.233	1	.630	.854	.448	1.625
Presence in the WHC	.082	.1263	-.166	.329	.417	1	.518	1.085	.847	1.390
The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC	.018	.0107	-.003	.039	2.866	1	.090	1.018	.997	1.040
The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL	.006	.0060	-.005	.018	1.146	1	.284	1.006	.995	1.018
If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.	.043	.1608	-.272	.359	.073	1	.787	1.044	.762	1.431
The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention	-.017	.0081	-.033	-.002	4.671	1	.031	.983	.967	.998
The degree of cultural globalisation accoding to KOF index de facto	.002	.0024	-.002	.007	1.030	1	.310	1.002	.998	1.007

xx16	.175	.3110	-.434	.785	.317	1	.573	1.191	.648	2.192
xx15	.466	.2890	-.100	1.033	2.601	1	.107	1.594	.905	2.808
xx14	-.027	.2901	-.596	.541	.009	1	.925	.973	.551	1.718
xx13	.222	.2937	-.354	.797	.571	1	.450	1.248	.702	2.220
xx12	-.179	.2865	-.740	.383	.390	1	.532	.836	.477	1.466
xx11	-.204	.2872	-.767	.359	.505	1	.477	.815	.464	1.432
xx10	-.248	.3099	-.855	.360	.638	1	.424	.781	.425	1.433
xx09	-.092	.3154	-.710	.526	.085	1	.770	.912	.492	1.692
xx08	.099	.2830	-.456	.654	.123	1	.726	1.104	.634	1.922
xx07	-.066	.2847	-.624	.492	.054	1	.815	.936	.536	1.635
xx06	-.204	.2996	-.791	.383	.463	1	.496	.816	.453	1.467
xx05	.420	.2938	-.156	.996	2.047	1	.153	1.522	.856	2.708
xx04	.714	.2963	.133	1.294	5.803	1	.016	2.042	1.142	3.649
xx03	.098	.2819	-.454	.651	.121	1	.728	1.103	.635	1.917
(Scale)	1 ^a									

Dependent Variable: The final decision of the WHC regarding the inscription of the site in question

Model: (Intercept). Presence in the WHC. The number of years the State Party whose nominated site belongs to has been part of the WHC. The number of heritage sites the State Party whose nominated site belongs to already have successfully inscribed in the WHL. If the State Party whose nominated site belongs to is part of the UNSC in the year of the nomination.. The number of years the State Part whose nominated site belongs to has ratified the Convention. The degree of cultural globalisation according to KOF index de facto. xx16. xx15. xx14. xx13. xx12. xx11. xx10. xx09. xx08. xx07. xx06. xx05. xx04. xx03

a. Fixed at the displayed value.