

A social perspective on COVID-19: How the pandemic impacts experienced socioeconomic insecurity among people of migrant background in the Dutch Randstad

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Abstract

Based on multiple linear regression analyses of the Impact Corona dataset compiled by Kieskompas, in the Netherlands, the moderating effect of social capital on migrant background-related socioeconomic insecurity due to COVID-19 is measured. The context in which this occurs is explored, investigating the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic in the Randstad metropole area in the Netherlands, consisting of the cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and The Hague. This study shows that migrant background increases experienced socioeconomic insecurity, and that differences can be found among the different groups. Social capital is capable of decreasing the experienced socioeconomic insecurity generally. Analysis of its moderating effect indicates that its protective qualities differ across migrant groups. For some, the social capital held within their group alleviates their experienced socioeconomic insecurity, and for others it does not.

Keywords: COVID-19; social capital; ethnic diversity; socioeconomic insecurity.

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Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic has been a health crisis of not commonly seen proportions. As an unprecedented event in the lives of most people alive today, it has managed to leave a mark on the world. It has also managed to occupy the minds of many a scholar, leading a growing collection of works on all aspects of the pandemic. While many of these focus on the health consequences of COVID-19, there is a smaller though equally vital part of academia that focuses on the social consequences of the disease. This thesis aims to add to this growing literature.

International research has shown that COVID-19 does not affect people equally. Globally, many reports have already been published that outline the health inequalities caused by COVID-19. The pandemic has exposed many vulnerabilities, and has made it painfully clear that some groups are hit harder than others. One of these factors that was found to contribute to these health inequalities is people's ethnic background. In The Netherlands, the effect of this has been studied primarily in the Randstad area, consisting of the three largest cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and The Hague (see, for instance, Stronks, 2021). Ethnic background can contribute to inequalities on the whole, and health is by no means the only thing affected by the pandemic. This is also the basic premise for the Dutch Impact Corona research project, which aims to investigate the social impact of COVID-19 in The Netherlands.¹ Though this research project focuses on the experiences of many Dutch residents of all sorts of background, it does not focus much on people with a ethnic minority or migrant background. It is not the only entity that cannot yet shed enough light upon the social and economic impact of the pandemic on people with a migrant background, with the blind spot extending to government too. This blind spot also means that neither causes can be found nor additional protective measures against these socioeconomic consequences of COVID-19 cannot be formulated or taken.

As far as health is concerned, there has been one key social theory that has been applied to people's behavior during the pandemic that has offered protective capabilities. This social theory is social capital, which helped push people to social distance during the beginning of the pandemic (Bartscher et al., 2020). It may also extend to the socioeconomic realm.

¹ For further details, information, and publications, see: <https://www.impactcorona.nl/>.

Problem statement

The socioeconomic consequences of COVID-19 on people of migrant background are overlooked, and the protective capabilities of social capital in this context are also underresearched. I attempt to shed light on both of these, and will accordingly look into the correlation between them. I will test the role of migrant background on the moderation effect of social capital on these social consequences.

The conceptual model is as follows:




Figure 1

The above has resulted in the following research question: ‘What is the socioeconomic impact of COVID-19 on people of a migrant background in the Randstad area of The Netherlands?’.

This question will be answered through two subquestions:

1. To what extent is there a relation between migrant background and the degree of socioeconomic insecurity in the Randstad?
2. Does social capital protect against socioeconomic inequality due to migrant background in the Randstad, and if so, how and how much?

Scientific relevance

This thesis adds onto the growing literature about the impact of COVID-19 globally, and provides an additional perspective of social capital during COVID-19. It also contributes to research on ethnic minorities during the COVID-19 pandemic, and is unique in the particular socioeconomic perspective it offers.

Social relevance

This thesis also demonstrates the inequalities that occur or get enlarged due to COVID-19, particularly on vulnerable groups. In the inclusion of social capital, an extension of this thesis may offer policy ideas for (non-)government on how to prevent certain issues.

Theoretical framework

In this section, I will outline the relevant literature, starting with an overview of findings about health inequalities due to COVID-19, going into socioeconomic and diversity-related inequalities experienced by people of migrant background in the Netherlands. From there, social capital will be explained and discussed in relation to the pandemic and diversity.

Inequalities

The COVID-19 pandemic has made certain inequalities glaringly visible. In many countries, the different consequences for the native and/or White population and for the ethnic minority population have become quite clear. Across the Western world, data regarding the health inequalities for ethnic minorities has been accumulated. In North America, Canada and the US, infection rates and mortality rates are disproportionately higher for ethnic minorities such as those of African and Hispanic descent (Tai et al., 2021, p. 705; Etowa & Hyman, 2021, p. 9). On the other side of the ocean, in the UK, though COVID-19 infection and mortality rates differ across ethnic groups, White British still have lower infection rates than all other groups (Platt & Warwick, 2020, p. 266). In Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, people of migrant background are overrepresented when it comes to infection and mortality rates (Diaz et al., 2020).

In the Netherlands, it is becoming increasingly clear that these same health inequalities are happening here too. The Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics found that the excess mortality rates during the first six weeks of the pandemic were relatively high for people of migrant background (CBS, 2020). Preliminary research results published by Dr. Karin Stronks of the Amsterdam University Medical Centre, indicate that at first, there was barely any discrepancy between Amsterdam's ethnic groups in infection rates. The only exception was people of Ghanaian background, for whom it seemed to be up to five times as high as for other groups. In May 2021, Dr. Stronks published new research, which now indicated something completely different. During the first wave, from February to May 2020, in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and The Hague, people with a migrant background, originating in lower income countries had a mortality rate that was 1,5 times higher than that of the native Dutch population. The mortality rate was especially high for people with a Turkish or Surinamese background. During the same time period, hospital admissions were 2 to 3 times higher for Amsterdam residents with a lower income country background than for those with a Dutch background. The risk of being admitted to hospital was highest for Amsterdam residents with a Turkish or Ghanaian background, followed by Amsterdam residents with a Surinamese or Moroccan background. The disease

itself infects nearly all groups equally, but the actual progression of it differs strongly. Research into the exact causes is still ongoing, though it is clear that migrant groups are in a more vulnerable position than many native Dutch to begin with (Stronks et al., 2021, p. 3-4).

Certain diseases tend to be far more common among these groups, such as diabetes, depression, and obesity, which complicate a COVID-19 infection. People of migrant background usually also have a lower socioeconomic status, which in itself make them more prone to diseases. During the first wave, the groups that had the lowest 20% income were twice as likely to die from COVID-19 as the richest 20%. Other factors, such as genetic differences, discrimination and long-term stress due to migrating may also feature into this (Stronks et al., 2021, p. 7). Older research also indicates that while mortality rates on the whole differ among ethnic groups in the Netherlands, they are overall higher for ethnic minorities. This too is related to the lower socioeconomic status of these groups (for instance, see Bos et al., 2004).

These socioeconomic inequalities are expressed in ways beyond health too, and are perhaps self-perpetuating, depending also on levels of social mobility. Data on people of migrant background in the Netherlands shows that they are more likely to have a weaker labor market position. Along with other vulnerable groups, such as young people, lower educated people, and people with disabilities, people of migrant background tend to have short term, as opposed to long term work contracts, to a larger degree than the average native Dutch person. Even under normal circumstances, people with such short term contracts tend to feel more stress, are more likely to become unemployed, have less autonomy, and are less educated (SCP, 2020). On top of that, people with short term work contracts tend to have a lower overall well-being due to their relative work insecurity, as they are more likely to lose their jobs due to the pandemic, if they have not already (SCP, 2020a). This has quite a negative impact on Dutch socio-economic welfare on the whole. When the economy spirals into crisis, migrants are among the first to lose their jobs, which opens them up for many other consequences. During the lockdowns of the COVID-19 crisis in the Netherlands, people of migrant background are more likely to be out of work as they are overrepresented among workers in sectors that were forced to close down (SCP, 2020). The COVID-19 crisis, as such, has weakened the labor market position of people of migrant background, and as they are losing their jobs, they have to rely more and more on unemployment benefits (Burema et al., 2020).

When it comes to income insecurity, stark differences can be observed. Members of the main four ethnic minority groups usually discussed in Dutch studies (Surinamese, Dutch Antillean, Turkish, and Moroccan) have a lower average income than native Dutch. Surinamese earn 16% less, Dutch Antilleans 21%, Turks 26%, and Moroccans 31% (CPB, 2019). There are

also differences in the type of work and contracts people with a migrant background usually have. People of lower income country background have short term contracts much more often than people with a higher income country background or native Dutch. On the other hand, people with a higher income country background also tend to be self-employed more than the other two groups. Aside from this, migrants with roots in lower income countries also work almost twice as often in service-oriented jobs, most often as cooks, and in healthcare (CBS, 2020a). The lockdowns affected these sectors in particular, forcing restaurants to close down or decrease their business, and put massive additional strain on healthcare workers. Employees of these sectors would thus be especially vulnerable, in particular in combination with other personal characteristics. It is likely that due to their migrant background and corresponding lower socioeconomic standing, they are affected more severely by the pandemic. That is what will be tested with the first hypothesis:

H1a: People of migrant background will experience worse socioeconomic insecurity with regards to work and income due to COVID-19, than people without a migrant background.

Superdiversity

What must also be considered in a discussion of migrant backgrounds, is the increasing diversification of diversity observed in many cities globally. This ‘superdiversity’ is a term famously coined by Steven Vertovec, and denotes the process in which immigration patterns changed and expanded over time. People now not only come from many more different ethnic origins, their background characteristics have also become more diverse. This can refer to immigration status, differential access to rights resulting from this, wider age ranges, location of residence once settled, and many more. More than anything, the term ‘superdiversity’ allows for people’s intersectional identities to become apparent. On top of that, it also highlights how migrants from the same country may have similar, yet always unique experiences. It prevents any conceptualization of ‘the migrant’ as a monolithic entity, and thus demands that those studying and making policy for migrant communities pay attention to the many variables that make a community’s lived experience (Vertovec, 2007, p. 1025).

This superdiverse perspective is often neglected in Dutch studies, though it is by all means relevant. The three largest cities of the country, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and The Hague, have a population of which more than half has a migrant background (Jennissen et al., 2018, p. 12). This superdiversity does not come with benefits per se, though this depends on many

factors (Jennissen et al., 2018, p. 18). In addition, the process of migration in and of itself is already inherently unequal (Castles et al., 2014, p. 7). Effects of superdiversity should thus also be considered from multiple perspectives, as they are highly differential and some may benefit while others may not. Beyond this, there is a broader context in which not only diversity is increasing, but so are socioeconomic inequality and segregation across European cities, including Amsterdam (Musterd et al., 2015).

H1b: There will be differences in the socioeconomic impact of COVID-19 among people of migrant background, divided per subgroup.

Social capital

In order to gain an understanding of the protection social capital may offer from these inequalities, I will outline some main theories on social capital, and the practical applications of social capital in a COVID-19 and migrant background context. As a key author on social capital, Pierre Bourdieu introduced new forms of capital beyond economic capital, namely cultural capital and social capital, in 1986. Cultural capital has three forms: embodied - relating to dispositions of the mind and body, objectified - relating to cultural goods such as books, and institutionalized (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 242-243). Social capital itself lies vested in the actual or potential resources which relationships with and membership of certain groups provide. These resources can take any form and shape, both material and immaterial. As such, social capital is not held by one individual, but rather by their connections to others and the capital they possess. The investments people make into their social networks reconfigure the networks as stepping stones for establishing, reproducing and transforming social relations. Investing in social capital requires time, energy, and also economic capital. As Bourdieu states, the profitability of social capital rises in proportion to economic capital. A wealthy person is more likely to have friends or acquaintances that have similar economic standings and privileges (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 248-250). Having said that, Bourdieu also notes that indeed, while having large economic, cultural, and social capital will be beneficial to an individual, it does not mean that this person will automatically receive access to all goods and services offered by society. In addition, the law of conservation applies to capital too. Gaining in economic capital (by working more hours, for instance) is likely to result in losses in another dimension of capital (inability to meet with friends due to increased working hours) (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 252-253). This does assume that an individual has full awareness of the consequences of their decision for their capital, which

in itself is a large discussion within economics, and is thus a bit questionable. Nevertheless, Bourdieu's reinvention of capital has laid the foundation for many later studies, and it stresses the interconnections that can be so decisive for people. Social capital can be both a source of greater equality, but also of greater inequality.

Robert Putnam wrote his similarly impactful works on social capital some years after Bourdieu's. Through studies of civic engagement in both Italy and the US, he argues that strong social capital is necessary for a strong democracy. Weaker social capital can thus lead to all sorts of problems (Putnam, 1995/2013, p. 70). In his works, he also makes the distinction between so-called 'bonding' and 'bridging' social capital. 'Bonding' social capital consists of the ties to people who are similar to a given individual. Strengthening these ties will strengthen in-group social capital. 'Bridging' social capital consists of ties to people who are not similar to a given individual. This can refer to people of a different gender, age, nationality, or any other number of characteristics (Putnam, 2007). He further perceives social capital itself as being made up of three elements: norms and values, networks, and social trust (Putnam, 1995/2013, p. 70).

These latter two of these three dimensions of social capital also return in the survey analyzed here. Networks are, in line with Bourdieu's perspective, the core of social capital. It is social networks that establish shared norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness, and promote social trust. His central argument is that social networks and civic engagement have a large positive effect on public and private life (Putnam, 1995/2013, p. 70). It is important to take from Putnam's research that social capital offers many benefits to individuals and societies alike. A decrease in social capital does not bode well for anyone. In 2007, a paper was published in which Putnam argued that ethnic diversity, and by extension immigration, is detrimental to social solidarity and social capital on the short term. Due to diversity, people are likely to 'hunker down' and forego ties with their surrounding 'out-group'. He does note, however, that in successfully constructed immigration societies new forms of social solidarity are created, and the negative effects of diversity decrease as new, broader identities are shaped (Putnam, 2007, p. 138).

Like most things, then, social capital has both positive and negative sides. In its strength it can uphold inequality, even increase it, though it can also provide benefits to societies. Diversity may weaken it on a short term, national scale, though it may also strengthen it on a long term, international scale (Putnam, 2007). As established previously, the crisis that COVID-19 has caused seems, like most crises, to increase inequalities. This brings new groups into vulnerable positions, and makes groups that were already vulnerable even more so. Social

capital, with its basis in social networks and reciprocity, may possibly shelter people from at least some of the harmful effects of crises. It can do so in several ways.

During crises, social capital has the ability to mitigate the negative impact of these crises on people's well-being (Helliwell et al., 2014). A study on the well-being of residents of US cities during the 2007-2008 financial crisis shows that social capital protects and in fact improves subjective well-being in the face of community-wide rising unemployment, though its effect on personal well-being in individual unemployment is negligible (Ibid., p. 153). Using a similar analysis for European transition economies, social capital has a larger impact on well-being than an increase in income does (Ibid., p. 158). There is thus an indication that social capital can protect or even improve personal, mental/emotional well-being.

Social capital and disasters

The field of sociology of disaster has some vital points to glean from it for understanding the connection between social capital and protection from negative effects of COVID-19. As for any other disaster, social capital does nothing to stop the virus from happening. Research done in conflict regions in Colombia, however, shows that social capital, in the form of social networks and the trust that holds these together, can protect people's subjective well-being and their perceived political, economic, and communitarian insecurities. The higher social capital is, the smaller the influence of the insecurities on a person's subjective well-being. The influence of economic insecurity on subjective well-being was quite small in this particular study, but it was also shown that that influence could be reduced even further by social capital (Wills-Herrera et al., 2011).

During a disaster, social capital itself may also change, turning into 'communitas'. 'Communitas' is temporary social bonds that develop between people during a situation of crisis, and is characterized by high levels of mutual support and shared norms of reciprocity that are facilitated through pre-existing networks, and ones founded in the disaster context. It is often framed as though people are 'all in this together'. Nevertheless, it requires communities to have a reasonable social equality. The scale of the disaster plays a role in the appearance of 'communitas' too, and if the capacity of a community or society is overwhelmed, it is unlikely to appear or be effective. In the end, it is also most certainly a temporary occurrence, and will disappear to make way for 'regular' social capital after some point in time (Uekusa et al., 2020, p. 6-8). The type of disaster also matters here, with natural disasters having a different impact than man-made ones. When it comes to natural disasters, there is often little possibility to put

the blame on any specific person or institution, and togetherness can flourish. With man-made disasters, there usually is some attempt to blame someone, and scapegoating and community division may occur instead (Uekusa et al., 2020, p. 10). Vulnerable groups such as migrants could be expected to develop less ‘communitas’, but since they are usually quite close-knit, disasters may also create opportunities for them to expand their social capital (Uekusa et al., 2020, p. 13).

H2: social capital has a negative relation with socioeconomic insecurity.

Social capital and COVID-19

Social capital can thus grow, and is clearly quite valuable during disaster situations, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. Research on this particular aspect of social capital during COVID-19 does not show particularly rosy results, however.

Francesca Borgonovi and Elodie Andrieu find that people living in US counties with relatively high social capital altered their behavior during the first wave to a much greater extent than people in lower social capital counties. It appears that as COVID-19 infections rose, those living in higher social capital counties were much more willing to take steps to protect themselves and their surroundings (Borgonovi & Andrieu, 2020, p. 8). In the European context, this can be further nuanced. Before any meaningful social distancing began, infection rates rose at first in high social capital countries, such as the Netherlands. Eventually, once measures against the virus were implemented, infection declined before the effect of these measures should be expected to be seen. In other words, people began socially distancing before it was mandatory (Bartscher et al., 2020, p. 6).

The measures taken against the virus, as beneficial as they were in the struggle to slow down its spread, have had serious socioeconomic consequences. Economies slowed, income inequality grew, and the longer the lockdowns lasted, the more people are affected (Perugini & Vladislavljević, 2020, p. 10-11). Lengthy lockdowns may also eat away at that which protects people: social capital. Social distancing measures force people to retreat into their innermost social circles, with many hardly having contact with anyone outside of their households or families. Communities that have strong social capital to begin with may fare well, but groups with less social capital are more vulnerable. Their safety nets are small, and even a small decline in social capital could already be too much (Pitas & Ehmer, 2020, p. 942-943). For various reasons, members of ethnic minorities do not have strong social capital on all fronts, bonding, bridging, and linking (Ibid., 2020, p. 942).

Several broader theories relating to migration and migrant incorporation, namely ethnic attachment, ethnic mobility entrapment, ethnic enclave economy, and ethnic transnationalism, seem to point towards only bonding social capital as being the strongest among migrant groups (Li, 2004). Presence of merely one or two forms of social capital provides a partial safety net, while the presence of all three forms provides the biggest safety net (Pitas & Ehmer, 2020, p. 943). This in turn could constitute part of an explanation of why people of migrant background are affected more severely than people without a migrant background.

Superdiversity and social capital

In the Dutch context, studies show that in more diverse areas social capital is weaker, or find that it is linked to other individual characteristics. Results for these are not conclusive, however, as other studies demonstrate the opposite (Jennissen et al., 2018a, p. 84). When looking at neighborhood contacts, diversity has a negative impact on the social capital possibly gained from these. People with a native Dutch background are found to have less contacts with their neighbors. People with a migrant background will more often have contacts with their neighbors of the same or another non-Dutch background, meaning that people of migrant background flock together, in spite of their differences, while native Dutch seem to prefer to stay within their own community. Nevertheless, overall instances of ‘hunkering down’ are not widespread at all in the Netherlands. Residents of diverse neighborhoods seem to be more tolerant, and report higher rates of interethnic trust (Jennissen et al., 2018a, p. 86). Ethnic diversity seems to mostly have an effect on the neighborhood level at which residents of more diverse neighborhoods report lower neighborhood cohesion. This is also tied to other factors such as socioeconomic status, employment status, and age, but diversity seems to have the biggest impact (Jennissen et al., 2018a, p. 87-89).

Social networks hold many resources for socioeconomic mobility, though not everyone has equal access to this element of social capital. When people know others who have jobs with higher socioeconomic status than they themselves, this can be seen as providing stronger social capital. In addition, when more of these contacts have different types of jobs, this also has a positive impact (Van Tubergen & Volker, 2015). Education level and age are important factors in this, but so is ethnicity. An ethnically diverse friend group tends to mean that an individual also has contacts with people with a higher variety of jobs. Van Tubergen and Volker find that people of Turkish background barely differ from native Dutch in their access to social capital, while for Moroccans there is a noticeable and negative difference. More contacts overall mean

stronger social capital (Van Tubergen & Volker, 2015, p. 532-533). A possible explanation for people of Turkish background having stronger social capital than Moroccans in this study could be the level of organization already present within Dutch-Turkish communities (Van Tubergen & Volker, 2015, p. 535). Social capital thus does not need to be less for people of migrant background automatically, but the dataset will further show this for the groups studied in this thesis.

H3: People of migrant background will have lower social capital than people without a migrant background.

H4: Social capital will protect people of migrant background against the experienced socioeconomic insecurity due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The conceptual framework now looks as follows:




Figure 2

Data and methodology

Data, sample, and weighting method

To paint a full picture of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on people of migrant background in the Netherlands, I will be making use of data collected by Kieskompas in the context of the Impact Corona study. As its name implies, the project gathers information on how a wide variety of people in the Netherlands have felt the societal effects of COVID-19. It looks into the following themes: work and income; healthcare avoidance and use; emotional wellbeing; solidarity and informal help; social relations in neighborhoods; and trust. The survey has taken place in four ‘waves’ so far: April, July, and November 2020, and March 2021. For the purposes of this thesis, I make use of data from the third installment, in November 2020. At this point in time, COVID-19 had now been in The Netherlands for 8 months, and was slowly re-establishing its infectious power as infection rates grew after a relatively calm summer.

The Impact Corona survey has been set up in cooperation with Kieskompas. The organization is known to many people in the Netherlands as being the maker of a well-known test that offers voting advice for elections, but it also participates in more research beyond this, both nationally and internationally. Much of their work consists of opinion research. For this, they make use of their so-called ‘VIP Panel’. This is a group of roughly 16 000 people, who have volunteered to contribute to scientific research, and have been selected to get a sample that is as representative for the Dutch population on the whole as possible. They have been selected based on gender, age, province, education level, and migration background. When necessary, Kieskompas also makes use of snowball sampling to supplement the sample (Kieskompas, n.d.).

This has been the case for the Impact Corona survey. Municipalities have also contributed by distributing the survey among groups in their city that were underrepresented among the respondents. Very important to note is that primarily people who have voting rights in national elections have participated. This means that the people of migrant background involved in this survey are often already well-established, and likely hold Dutch passports as well. Consequently, more recent migrants are not represented in this study. Nevertheless, it may be all the more interesting to assess whether their ethnic background still makes a notable difference for the experienced consequences of the pandemic.

The dataset itself has been filtered for the three largest cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and The Hague, and was then weighted with Kieskompas’ weighting factor, results of which can be seen in the Descriptives table 1 in the Appendix. This corrects for the abovementioned

characteristics, ensuring that these are more similar to what can actually be seen in these cities. In addition, it corrects for the amount of residents in these cities, ensuring that no city is over- or under-represented.

The November installment of the Impact Corona survey has received about 25 000 responses nationally. Of these, 10 379 were from the Randstad. The precise gender and age division, education level, province, and migration background can be found in the Appendix. The weighting factor made by Kieskompas is applied in the descriptives table (see Appendix, table 1), but not in the regression analyses.

In a sample, weighting is normally applied in order to make it representative for the whole of, in this case, the Randstad. When a panel of respondents is used, as for the Impact Corona survey, it is assumed it is assembled in accordance with the proportion of certain background variables in the whole population. Snowball sampling is also applied here, as is targeted selection. One might think that weighting would, if anything, make the sample even more representative. However, the contrary may occur as the variance of the sample increases when the weight factor per respondent fluctuates. When research deals with matters that originate in reality, often investigating causality between multiple independent variables X and dependent variable Y, weighting should not be applied to the analyses. If there is a causal relation, it will occur in the sample regardless, and representativeness does not matter. In that case, weighting may actually have adverse effects (Sikkel, 2000).

The following paragraphs outline the selected variables and corresponding questions in the dataset.

Dependent variable

The dependent variable is experienced socioeconomic insecurity. This is itself made up of income insecurity and work insecurity. The variable for income insecurity is formed based on the question ‘Are you scared to lose a large part of your income due to the outbreak of COVID-19?’. The variable for work insecurity is based on the questions ‘Are you scared to lose your job due to the outbreak of COVID-19?’, ‘Are you scared that you will not be able to find a job due to the outbreak of COVID-19?’, and ‘Are you scared to suffer such damages due to the outbreak of COVID-19 that your business may go bankrupt?’. These questions differ with the employment type respondents have indicated, in other words, someone who is unemployed will only see the second question. The possible answers are ‘Not scared at all’, ‘A bit scared’, ‘Very scared’, ‘I have already lost my job due to the outbreak of COVID-19’ and ‘My business has already gone bankrupt due to the outbreak of COVID-19’. The higher the score on each of these

subvariables and the combined variable of socioeconomic insecurity, the higher the feelings of insecurity overall. This means that what is measured is not fully the actual socioeconomic impact, but rather also people's experience of this.

Independent variable

The independent variable is migrant background. In the survey, respondents were asked where they, their mother, and their father were born. For each of these, 15 options were given: 'the Netherlands', 'Indonesia or Japan', 'Other European country', 'North America', 'Oceania', 'Surinam', 'the Dutch Antilles', 'Turkey', 'Morocco', 'Other South American country', 'Other African country', 'Other Asian country', 'Other, namely:', and finally 'I do not wish to say/I do not know'. These categories are a mix of both geographic/continental and national identifications. The national identifications are not arbitrarily chosen: they represent the migrant groups that are most prominent in the Netherlands. This has various social, cultural, and historical causes. The three questions asking about respondents' origins were recoded into a variable that is much simpler, and ultimately encompasses the background of the respondent themselves. If they have one parent born abroad, they are categorized as having that background. This is in line with what the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics practices, whereby one already has a migrant background even if only one of their parents, but they themselves did not migrate. If a respondent would have two parents born abroad, both in different countries, the more 'negative' one would be used, which boils down to being one of the national identifications.

In table 1 in the Appendix, the weighted size of each of the migrant groups can be seen. Some groups were quite small, even with weighting. This has meant that North America and Oceania have been combined into an 'Anglo-Saxon' group, as North America had an unweighted sample size of $N = 98$, and Oceania $N=9$ (unweighted). All 'Other' origins aside from 'Other European' have been grouped together in order to strengthen the results. The groups that remain are unsurprisingly the national origin groups. Even if their unweighted size is not quite as large as it should be, with Turkey, Morocco, and the Dutch Antilles each having about 50 respondents with their roots there, due to the history and relevance of these groups, they are left as is. This is expected to lead to insignificant results, though this would not immediately need to dismiss the correlation. Table 2 in the Appendix provides a full overview of the unweighted descriptives. The categories of 'Other, namely:', and 'I do not wish to say/I do not know' are automatically deleted by SPSS when analysis is run, as no correlation could be found. For an initial regression analysis (Model 1a) that only looks at (not) having a migrant

background, the variable is recoded into a dichotomous one. The dichotomous variable and the full variable with all migrant groups are recoded into dummy variables due to their categorical nature, with 'Dutch' as the reference category.

Moderator

Social capital is included in the analyses as the moderating variable. It too is a combined variable that consists of several subvariables. These are each made up of one question that have several elements to it. The first subvariable is contact, based on a set of questions that asks respondents how often they have had face-to-face, phone, or digital contact with different people: relatives, friends, neighbors, other nearby residents, colleagues or classmates, or generally people online. There are six possible answers, 'daily', 'at least once a week', 'two or three times per month', 'once a month', 'less than once a month', and 'never'. The contact variable is composed from the mean of these questions, and is moderately reliable (Cronbach's alpha: 0,614).

The second variable is support received, and the main question for this is 'If you yourself would require help due to the COVID-19 outbreak, from who would you expect to receive this help, other than your household? To what degree would you expect help from...'. Then it continues with '...from relatives who do not live in your household?', '...friends?', '...neighbors?', and '...strangers?'. Answer options are 'I already receive help from them', 'Surely', 'Maybe', 'Definitely not', 'Does not apply', and 'I do not know/No opinion'. The scale resulting from the combination of these questions is moderately reliable (Cronbach's alpha: 0,603).

The third subvariable is support given, and the main question for this is 'As a consequence of the COVID-19 outbreak certain people need help. This could be help with groceries, help with childcare, or having a chat. To what extent are you prepared to give help to...'. The different situations here are the same as previously, that is, relatives, friends, neighbors, and strangers. The answer options are 'I am already doing so', 'Surely', 'Maybe', 'Definitely not', 'Does not apply', and 'I do not know/No opinion'. It is a moderately reliable subvariable (Cronbach's alpha: 0,681).

The trust subvariables are based on different sections of one question. The first half is trust in institutions, which is based on the question 'Could you indicate how much you trust each of the mentioned institutions and groups?' and is then differentiated into 'The national government', 'the local government', 'the Dutch National Institute for Public Health and

Environment', and 'the municipal health services'. Respondents can answer 'Very little trust', 'Little trust', 'Not much/not little trust', 'Some trust', 'A lot of trust', or 'No opinion'. The scale for trust in institutions is quite reliable (Cronbach's alpha: 0,851).

The second half of this subvariable is trust in people in general. Based on the same question, the same options are offered for respondents to indicate their level of trust. It is only based on one question, so no reliability analysis is needed here.

These four subvariables, of given support, received support, trust in institutions, and trust in other people, have then been combined to create one social capital variable. These variables have all been adjusted so that a high score means an individual has a lot of social capital or each of its components.

Control variables

The control variables used in this study are age, gender, education level, contract type, and financial comfort. These are all connected to someone's socioeconomic status. Someone who is young may not have a high education level per se, their income may still be low as they are just entering the labor market, and their contract may be short term without any clear possibility for extension. Similarly, age also affects someone's socioeconomic status. Age has been left as is, while the rest has been recoded into dummy variables. Gender was divided into the dummy categories of 'Male' (reference category) and 'Female'. Education level was recoded into three levels, and then made into a dummy variable, with 'Lower educated', 'Middle educated', with 'Higher educated' as reference category in most models. Financial comfort is recoded into three categories, which were made into 'Little financial comfort', 'much financial comfort' as reference category, and 'Unknown financial comfort'. The variable itself is based on the question 'Can you easily, reasonably, difficultly or not make ends meet with your household's income?', giving the answer options of 'not', 'very difficultly', 'difficultly', 'reasonably', 'easily', 'very easily', 'I do not know', and 'I do not wish to say'. This was then recoded into the three categories mentioned.

Analysis strategy

The analysis here is fourfold, and will be done primarily through multiple regression analysis in four models. Each will be run with and without the control variables, in order to investigate whether these too explain some of the observed outcomes, and to what extent. The first model looks at migrant background and the experienced socioeconomic insecurity as a result of

COVID-19. At first, a descriptives table will show how each group scored on work insecurity, income insecurity, and the combined socioeconomic insecurity. After having established this, the first multiple regression model will be run. This will show the correlations between migrant background and experienced socioeconomic insecurity (Model 1a and 1b). Then, the correlations between the different components of social capital and socioeconomic insecurity will be assessed (Model 2a and 2b). The third regression model will show how migrant background relates to social capital (Model 3a and 3b). The fourth and final regression model will determine the moderation effect of social capital on socioeconomic insecurity per background (Model 4a and 4b). The A Models will show the correlation without control variables, and the B Models will show the correlations with control variables. These are analyzed separately in order to gauge their impact.

The socioeconomic impact of COVID-19: Findings

Migrant background and the socioeconomic impact of COVID-19

In this section, model 1a, 1b, 1c, and 1d will be analyzed to gain insights on whether and how migrant background related to experienced socioeconomic insecurity. Model 1a and 1b should prove or disprove H1a, which states that *People of migrant background will experience worse socioeconomic insecurity with regards to work and income due to COVID-19, than people without a migrant background.* Model 1c and 1d will then be used to prove or disprove H1b: *There will be differences in the socioeconomic impact of COVID-19 among people of migrant background, divided per subgroup.*

The detailed descriptive data can be found in the Appendix, and shows the outcome per migrant group and the control variables (age, gender, education, work contract, and financial comfort) for the dependent variables of work insecurity, income insecurity, and the combined variable of socioeconomic insecurity (Appendix, Table 3). To briefly summarize, it shows that the degree of socioeconomic insecurity overall are highest for most (migrant) groups, aside from the Dutch, Anglo-Saxon, and Other group. It is also relatively low for those over the age of 50, men, higher educated people, and those with a long-term work contract. From here, the actual correlation between these characteristics and observed outcome is studied through models 1a through 1d, in Tables 1 and 2.

The first regression model 1a is run without control variables, with socioeconomic insecurity as the dependent variable, and migrant background as a dichotomous dummy variable as the independent variable. The resulting model is significant, with $F(1, 3970) = 12,258$ and $p < 0,001$. This model only predicts 0,03% of the observed variance ($R^2 = 0,003$), though it shows that migrant background is positively, though weakly, correlated with socioeconomic insecurity ($B = 0,085$ and $p < 0,001$). The low variance also implies that there are other factors at play that lead to these observations.

Indeed, in Model 1b, the explained variance is higher. The model includes the control variables, but uses the same variables otherwise as Model 1a. The model is significant, with $F(10, 3961) = 38,488$, $p < 0,001$. The prediction is stronger than Model 1a, but still not very strong: only 8,9% of the differences are addressed by the model ($R^2 = 0,089$). Model 1b further indicates that migrant background is still significantly, though not very strongly, positively correlated with socioeconomic insecurity, $B = 0,074$ and $p < 0,01$. The control variables of age, gender, and 'other' contract type are all insignificant. Being lower or medium educated, having a long term work contract, having a short term contract with possibility to extend, and having

little financial comfort are all significant control variables with regard to their respective reference categories of ‘higher educated’, having ‘a short term work contract without possibility to extend’, and having ‘much financial comfort’.

Being lower educated ($B = 0,116$ and $p < 0,05$) has a slightly stronger positive correlation with socioeconomic insecurity than being medium educated ($B = 0,081$ and $p < 0,001$). Having little financial comfort has the strongest positive correlation with socioeconomic insecurity, namely $B = 0,429$ and $p < 0,001$. The correlations observed here prove Hypothesis 1a. In other words, people of migrant background appear to experience worse socioeconomic insecurity than native Dutch based on the data analyzed here. Model 1b also gives a first impression of the role of the background variables in explaining the observations.

Model 1 (A and B): (Not) having a migrant background as predictor for socioeconomic insecurity (linear regression) (unweighted)^a

	Model								
	1a				1b				
	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	Sig.	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	Sig.	
B	Std. Error	Beta	B		Std. Error	Beta			
(Constant)	1,348	,010		,000	1,560	,034		46,016	,000
Not having a migrant background (reference category)									
Having a migrant background	,085	,024	,055	,000	,074	,023	,048	3,155	,002
Age					-,001	,001	-,027	-1,697	,090
Male (reference category)									
Female					-,018	,018	-,016	-1,035	,301
Lower educated					,116	,048	,038	2,445	,015
Middle educated					,081	,023	,055	3,593	,000
Higher educated (reference category)									
Long term work contract					-,260	,029	-,176	-8,948	,000
Short term work contract with possibility to extend (reference category)									
Short term work contract without possibility to extend					,149	,044	,063	3,388	,001
Other work contract					,094	,076	,020	1,235	,217
Little financial comfort					,429	,043	,154	10,022	,000
Much financial comfort (reference category)									
Unknown financial comfort					,327	,130	,038	2,525	,012
R squared		,003				,089			

a. Dependent Variable: Socioeconomic insecurity

Table 1

The next question is then how these relations look across migrant backgrounds. Models 1c and 1d model the correlation between different migrant background and experienced socioeconomic insecurity. These models will prove or disprove H1b: *There will be differences in the socioeconomic impact of COVID-19 among people of migrant background, divided per subgroup.*

Model 1c shows the correlation of different migrant background as independent variables to experienced socioeconomic insecurity without control variables, and model 1d shows these with control variables. Model 1c is significant with $F(8, 3963) = 2,455$ with $p < 0,05$, and $R^2 = 0,005$, meaning it explains a mere 0,5% of the variance in the data. Of the aforementioned migrant groups, only Indonesia or Japan, and Other European are significant with $B = 0,093$ and $p < 0,05$, and $B = 0,129$ and $p < 0,001$ respectively. Due to the significance of these results, for these groups it can be assumed that their background plays a role in their experienced socioeconomic insecurity. Including insignificant results, the relationship between the respective backgrounds is positive for all, with the exception of the 'Other' group. This is not surprising since in itself it is not a particularly large group, and as a combined group it is also highly diverse. Although the results for the Moroccan background are insignificant, it has the strongest positive correlation at $B = 0,222$ and $p = 0,053$. Model 1c shows that having a migrant background would mean more socioeconomic insecurity for these groups, barring individual characteristics found within the control variables.

Model 1d includes the same control variables used in Model 1b (age, gender, education, work contract, and financial comfort). It is a significant model, $F(17, 3954) = 23,132$, $p < 0,001$, and $R^2 = 0,090$. The results change from a positive correlation between their background and experienced socioeconomic insecurity to a negative one for the Anglo-Saxon, Turkish, and Other groups. This means that their background characteristics decrease their experienced socioeconomic insecurity.

Similar to Model 1c, however, the only migrant groups that have a significant correlation are the Indonesian or Japanese and Other European group, with $B = 0,093$ and $p < 0,05$, and $B = 0,127$ and $p < 0,01$ respectively. Except for gender, all control variables are significant and show a positive relationship with experienced socioeconomic insecurity. The fact that these positive correlations are significant while most of the various migrant backgrounds are not may also point to these factors being underlying causes for the socioeconomic insecurity these groups experience. Consider for instance the labor market insecurity that was argued by the SCP (2020) to be especially likely to affect people of migrant background, among others. This labor market insecurity often takes the shape of short term

contracts, so it is not surprising the effect of short term work contracts is relatively so strong, with short term without possibility to extend and with possibility to extend having $B = 0,408$ and $p < 0,001$ and $B = 0,258$ and $p < 0,001$ respectively. When a person already has concerns over being able to sustain themselves and/or their household with their income, this could easily become worse under uncertain economic circumstances. It is surprising however that gender and age do not play a significant role. Perhaps concerns over socioeconomic insecurity due to COVID-19 are shared fairly evenly across gender and age boundaries. Or, possibly there is a difference, but it is alleviated by individuals' respective social capital.

Model 1 (C and D): Different migrant backgrounds as predictors for socioeconomic insecurity (linear regression) (unweighted)^a

	Model							
	1c				1d			
	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardize d Coefficients	Sig.	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardize d Coefficients	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		B	Std. Error	Beta	
(Constant)	1,348	,010		,000	1,308	,029		,000
The Netherlands (reference category)								
Indonesia or Japan	,093	,045	,033	,036	,093	,043	,033	,029
Other European	,129	,039	,053	,001	,127	,037	,052	,001
Anglo-Saxon	,032	,099	,005	,745	-,012	,095	-,002	,903
Surinam	,063	,064	,016	,327	,049	,061	,012	,424
Dutch Antilles	,066	,113	,009	,561	,013	,108	,002	,902
Turkey	,007	,132	,001	,955	-,002	,126	,000	,985
Morocco	,222	,115	,031	,053	,124	,110	,017	,260
Other	-,044	,067	-,010	,515	-,054	,065	-,013	,404
Age					-,001	,001	-,032	,050
Male (reference category)								
Female					-,019	,018	-,017	,268
Lower educated					,117	,048	,038	,014
Middle educated					,082	,023	,056	,000
Higher educated (reference category)								
Long term contract (reference category)								
Short term contract with possibility to extend					,258	,029	,139	,000
Short term contract without possibility to extend					,408	,037	,172	,000
Other contract					,353	,071	,075	,000
Little financial comfort					,428	,043	,153	,000
Much financial comfort (reference category)								
Unknown financial comfort					,323	,130	,038	,013
R squared	,005				,090			

a. Dependent Variable: Socioeconomic insecurity

Table 2

Social capital and the socioeconomic impact of COVID-19

Social capital has the ability to at least partially shelter people from the most detrimental experienced concerns over their wellbeing. The impact of social capital on experienced socioeconomic insecurity will be analyzed in this section using Models 2a and 2b. Model 2a will show the correlation of each component of social capital as measured in the dataset, and Model 2b will show the correlation of social capital totally. They will prove or disprove H2: *social capital has a negative relation with socioeconomic insecurity*.

Model 2a is significant at $F(5, 9360) = 53,529$, $p < 0,001$, and $R^2 = 0,028$. It is not a particularly well-predicting model, but that is to be expected from its simplicity. Most components are significant ($p < 0,001$), except for contact. Interestingly, although a negative effect can be observed for almost all components, a positive effect can be observed for support given ($B = 0,129$ and $p < 0,001$), which means that as people are more willing to give support, their experienced socioeconomic insecurity is larger. On the contrary, the significant correlations for support received ($B = -0,068$ and $p < 0,001$), trust in institutions ($B = -0,094$ and $p < 0,001$) and trust in people ($B = -0,060$ and $p < 0,001$) indicate that as people receive more support and have more trust, they experience less socioeconomic insecurity. With regards to support, it appears that 8 months into the COVID-19 crisis in The Netherlands, people who experienced more socioeconomic insecurity were more willing to give help, and expect to receive less support.

Model 2b shows the correlation between the fully combined variable of social capital and socioeconomic insecurity, and it is significant with $F(1, 10106) = 120,158$, $p < 0,001$, and $R^2 = 0,012$. It shows that overall social capital has a negative relationship ($B = -0,170$, $p < 0,001$) with socioeconomic insecurity. This supports hypothesis 2, *social capital will have a negative relation with socioeconomic insecurity*, which emphasizes that social capital indeed has a protective function, as having less social capital means experiencing higher socioeconomic insecurity.

Model 2a: The different components of social capital as predictors for socioeconomic insecurity (linear regression) (unweighted)^a

	Model			
	2a			
	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardize d Coefficients	Sig.
B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	1,861	,058		,000
Contacts	-,009	,008	-,012	,265
Support received	-,068	,018	-,044	,000
Support given	,129	,018	,082	,000
Trust institutions	-,094	,009	-,114	,000
Trust in people	-,060	,009	-,071	,000
R squared	,028			

a. Dependent Variable: Socioeconomic insecurity

Table 3

Model 2b: Social capital as predictor for socioeconomic insecurity (linear regression) (unweighted)^a

	Model			
	2b			
	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardize d Coefficients	Sig.
B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	2,008	,048		,000
Social capital	-,170	,016	-,108	,000
R squared	,012			

a. Dependent Variable: Socioeconomic insecurity

Table 4

Migrant background-related social capital and the socioeconomic impact of COVID-19

Migrant background and social capital

Thus far, the previous models have established that having migrant background correlates to, for most groups, higher experienced socioeconomic insecurity during the COVID-19 crisis in The Netherlands, and that social capital overall is correlated to lower levels of experienced socioeconomic insecurity. The following four models will show whether social capital has a moderating effect on the socioeconomic insecurity experienced by migrant groups. Models 3a and 3b will model the correlations between the various migrant backgrounds and social capital. Model 3a will be run without control variables, and these will be included in Model 3b. These models will prove or disprove H3: *People of migrant background will have lower social capital than people without a migrant background.*

Model 3a is significant with $F(8, 3964) = 3,606$, $p < 0,001$, and $R^2 = 0,007$. The results for this model vary quite widely. They are insignificant for all migrant groups, except Indonesia or Japan, Morocco, and Other. All backgrounds, except for Indonesia or Japan ($B = 0,076$, and $p < 0,05$), have a negative correlation, meaning that only the Indonesian or Japanese group has more social capital due to their background. The strongest negative correlation is Morocco with $B = -0,246$ and $p < 0,01$. It is quite interesting that the Indonesian or Japanese group has more social capital, though this could be due to their history in The Netherlands. It is also quite interesting that the Moroccan group has the lowest social capital, though it is in line with Van Tubergen and Volker's (2015) study.

The control variables are added to make model 3b, which creates a model that is significant with $F(17, 3955) = 14,234$, $p < 0,001$, and $R^2 = 0,058$. Notably, the explained variance is much higher with this model. The only migrant groups with significant correlations are again Indonesia or Japan, Morocco, and Other. The correlations are again negative for all groups with the exception of Indonesian and Japanese. The Moroccan group still has the least social capital due to background ($B = -0,184$ and $p < 0,05$) though the effect has been tempered a bit by adding in the control variables, meaning these may have a bigger role in the amount of social capital observed. For the Dutch Antillean group, their background has little impact ($B = -0,010$ and $p = 0,906$).

The control variables are, with the exception of contract type and unknown financial comfort, significant at $p < 0,001$. Gender has a small positive correlation ($B = 0,091$), age has a tiny positive correlation ($B = 0,003$), being lower educated has a moderate negative correlation

($B = -0,196$), being middle educated has a moderate negative correlation ($B = -0,127$), and having little financial comfort has a reasonable negative correlation ($B = -0,237$). A lower socioeconomic status is tied to having less social capital. This is more normal for younger people, who are still expanding their social circle and usually only just starting off in their career. The higher one's education is, the more likely one is to know more people of a similar level of education, meaning more resources are held within that network. Having less disposable income is related to one's level of education, but also with the amount of social capital one has. Model 3 (A and B) mostly prove *H3: People of migrant background will have lower social capital than people without a migrant background*. The only exception is the Indonesian or Japanese group.

Model 3(A and B): The different migrant backgrounds as predictors for social capital (linear regression) (unweighted)^a

	Model							
	3a				3b			
	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	Sig.	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	Sig.
B	Std. Error	Beta	B		Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	3,061	,007		,000	2,959	,022		,000
The Netherlands (reference category)								
Indonesia or Japan	,076	,033	,036	,023	,069	,032	,033	,035
Other European	-,035	,029	-,019	,221	-,035	,028	-,019	,215
Anglo-Saxon	-,135	,074	-,029	,065	-,126	,072	-,027	,081
Surinam	-,059	,048	-,020	,217	-,046	,047	-,015	,327
Dutch Antilles	-,045	,084	-,008	,594	-,010	,082	-,002	,906
Turkey	-,131	,098	-,021	,182	-,102	,096	-,016	,288
Morocco	-,246	,086	-,046	,004	-,184	,084	-,034	,028
Other	-,133	,050	-,042	,008	-,100	,049	-,031	,043
Age					,003	,001	,090	,000
Male (reference category)								
Female					,091	,013	,106	,000
Lower educated					-,196	,036	-,085	,000
Middle educated					-,127	,017	-,117	,000
Higher educated (reference category)								
Long term work contract (reference category)								
Short term work contract with possibility to extend					,004	,022	,003	,856
Short term work contract without possibility to extend					-,009	,028	-,005	,754
Other work contract					,021	,054	,006	,703
Little financial comfort					-,237	,033	-,114	,000
Much financial comfort (reference category)								
Unknown financial comfort					-,093	,096	-,015	,333
R squared	,007				,058			

a. Dependent Variable: Social capital

Table 5

Model 4a and 4b are set up to analyze the possible moderation effect of social capital on the experienced socioeconomic insecurity by migrant groups. They include migrant background per group, the centered social capital variable and the interaction effect of migrant background per group (as dummy variables) and social capital. The control variables remain the same throughout, and will be added into the regression in Model 4b. Models 4a and 4b will

prove or disprove H4: *social capital will protect people of migrant background against the experienced socioeconomic insecurity due to the COVID-19 pandemic.*

Model 4a is a significant model with $F(17, 3954) = 2,824$, $p < 0,001$, and $R^2 = 0,012$. The effect of the different migrant backgrounds on socioeconomic insecurity remains present in the uncontrolled model 4a. The only groups that have a significant correlation are the Indonesia or Japan, and Other group. With the exception of the Other group, all other migrant groups have a negative correlation between their background and their experienced socioeconomic insecurity. This first section of the model maps the same correlation as Model 1a. Unsurprisingly, the results are the same.

The section with the interaction effect of social capital per migrant group shows interesting results, as some groups have a positive and others a negative effect of the social capital of their background on their socioeconomic insecurity. All correlations between migrant background and socioeconomic insecurity are insignificant in Model 4a. For those with a negative effect, this means that the higher their social capital, the weaker the correlation between their background and their socioeconomic insecurity. The Dutch Antillean group has the strongest negative correlation between the social capital its background holds and its socioeconomic insecurity ($B = -0,619$ and $p < 0,01$). The results for the correlation between their background and their social capital in Model 3b were neither significant nor strong ($B = -0,010$ and $p = 0,906$). The Dutch Antillean group's social capital nevertheless has the strongest negative significant relationship with socioeconomic insecurity of all groups. In other words, stronger social capital would offer them the most protection against the downsides of their background with regards for their socioeconomic security. For all other groups with a negative effect of social capital, which are Dutch, Anglo-Saxon, Moroccan, and Other, social capital does affect the experienced socioeconomic impact of their background. Their experienced socioeconomic insecurity is, partly, due to the social capital held by each group. If their social capital is higher, their experienced socioeconomic insecurity would become less.

The groups that have positive outcomes with regard to their social capital and socioeconomic insecurity are the Indonesian or Japanese, Other European, Surinamese, and Turkish groups. This means that the socioeconomic insecurity they experience is not due to their social capital. All three of these groups experience socioeconomic insecurity, be it in different amounts. The social capital for these groups (Model 3b) varies, and the correlation of migrant background and social capital is negative for the Other European, Surinamese, and Turkish groups. It is positive however for the Indonesian or Japanese group, meaning they have higher social capital due to their background. The positive correlations in Model 4a, however,

mean that the moderating effect of social capital is not present or not strong for these groups, as it does not weaken the impact of the migrant background. The positive correlation could mean that for some groups, the socioeconomic insecurity is higher in spite of their social capital. However, for all four of the groups with a positive interaction effect of social capital by migrant background, the correlations are not strong at all, and also quite insignificant.

Model 4b shows the impact of the background variables on the interaction. The model is significant, with $F(26, 3945) = 15,524$, $p < 0,001$, and $R^2 = 0,093$. The explained variance increases notably here. The different migrant backgrounds still do not have any significant results, nor does the interaction effect between social capital and the respective migrant background. Both the negative interaction and the positive interaction effects for all migrant groups have gone up, meaning that the negative effects have gotten smaller, and the positive effect bigger. The weakening of the negative effects means that the control variables have a bigger role in the protection against worsening socioeconomic insecurity, while the strengthening of the positive effects means they have less of a role, because the social capital per migrant background is more important. Though this may also be explained by factors not included here, it nevertheless means that having a certain origin can affect both one's experienced socioeconomic insecurity and the protection offered by one's social capital. The same observations regarding the positive interaction effect for some groups and the negative interaction effect for others remain.

Zooming in on the control variables, age and gender also give insignificant correlations. Being lower educated ($B = 0,105$ and $p < 0,05$), being medium educated ($B = 0,076$ and $p < 0,01$), having a short term contract with possibility to extend ($B = 0,257$ and $p < 0,001$), having a short term contract without possibility to extend ($B = 0,406$ and $p < 0,001$), having another type of contract ($B = 0,353$ and $p < 0,001$), having little financial comfort ($B = 0,415$ and $p < 0,001$), and having an unknown financial comfort ($B = 0,310$ and $p < 0,05$) are all significant. This means that the observed correlations of the background variables are much rather explanations for (most) people's worse socioeconomic insecurity. This proves *H4: social capital will protect people of migrant background against the experienced consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic*, though it must be modified a bit. H4 holds for most groups, but not for all, namely the Indonesian or Japanese, Other European, Surinamese and Turkish groups. When social capital does moderate the experienced socioeconomic insecurity due to background, the models indicate that the background variables still play larger role. Nevertheless, social capital could alleviate some socioeconomic insecurity for some groups, though it is most certainly not the only possible solution.

Model 4 (A and B): The interaction effect of social capital and migrant background on socioeconomic insecurity (linear regression) (unweighted)^{a,b}

	Model							
	3c				3d			
	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardize d Coefficients	Sig.	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardize d Coefficients	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		B	Std. Error	Beta	
(Constant)	1,352	,010		,000	1,305	,029		,000
The Netherlands								
Indonesia or Japan	,086	,046	,031	,063	,087	,044	,031	,052
Other European	,125	,039	,051	,001	,124	,037	,051	,001
Anglo-Saxon	,003	,101	,000	,976	-,034	,097	-,005	,726
Surinam	,060	,064	,015	,348	,049	,061	,012	,428
Dutch Antilles	,058	,112	,008	,605	,012	,108	,002	,913
Turkey	,015	,135	,002	,913	,010	,129	,001	,936
Morocco	,189	,129	,026	,143	,108	,124	,015	,383
Other	-,064	,069	-,015	,352	-,058	,066	-,014	,383
Social Capital x the Netherlands	-,114	,024	-,076	,000	-,065	,023	-,044	,005
Social Capital x Indonesia or Japan	,027	,113	,004	,809	,035	,109	,005	,749
Social Capital x Other European	,027	,081	,005	,737	,055	,078	,011	,476
Social Capital x Anglo-Saxon	-,252	,230	-,018	,274	-,208	,221	-,015	,347
Social Capital x Surinam	,062	,113	,009	,584	,052	,109	,007	,631
Social Capital x Dutch Antilles	-,401	,309	-,021	,195	-,118	,297	-,006	,690
Social Capital x Turkey	,122	,320	,006	,702	,147	,308	,007	,634
Social Capital x Morocco	-,137	,283	-,009	,629	-,082	,272	-,005	,764
Social Capital x Other	-,164	,142	-,019	,247	-,030	,137	-,003	,825
Age					-,001	,001	-,028	,083
Male (reference category)								
Female					-,015	,018	-,013	,403
Lower educated					,105	,048	,034	,028
Middle educated					,076	,023	,052	,001
Higher educated (reference category)								
Long term work contract (reference category)								
Short term work contract with possibility to extend					,257	,029	,139	,000
Short term work contract without possibility to extend					,406	,037	,172	,000
Other work contract					,353	,072	,075	,000
Little financial comfort					,415	,043	,149	,000
Much financial comfort (reference category)								
Unknown financial comfort					,310	,130	,036	,017
R squared	,012				,093			

a. Dependent Variable: Socioeconomic insecurity

b. The social capital variable is centred using the mean.

Table 6

Conclusion and discussion

This thesis looked into the impact of COVID-19 on the experienced socioeconomic insecurity of people of migrant background in the Randstad, and whether social capital plays a role in reducing this migrant background-related insecurity. It was guided by the questions ‘To what extent is there a relation between migrant background and the degree of socioeconomic insecurity in the Randstad?’ and ‘Does social capital protect against socioeconomic insecurity due to migrant background in the Randstad, and if so, how and how much?’. The analyses indicate that people of migrant background do indeed experience worse socioeconomic insecurity than people without a migrant background. This corresponds with the expectations, disappointing as though it may be that the analysis of this sample proves them to be true. However, the experienced socioeconomic insecurity is largely due to individual socioeconomic characteristics, not solely migrant background. These characteristics are still tied to an individual’s migrant background, and so this does not change the concerning nature of these findings. Social capital does protect somewhat against socioeconomic insecurity, but this differs per group and its strength also varies. The background characteristics also have quite an influence.

Nevertheless, differences are observed across different migrant groups. The migrant groups studied here each have a variety of results with regards to their socioeconomic insecurity, their social capital, and the effect the latter has on the former. Interesting results came forward for, overall, the Indonesian or Japanese, Other European, and Dutch Antillean group. The Indonesian or Japanese group had more social capital than the native Dutch group, though they did experience more socioeconomic insecurity. This was found not to be due to their background. The Other European group was similar to the Indonesian or Japanese group, as they experienced relatively high socioeconomic insecurity, but their background-related social capital did not protect them. The Dutch Antillean group was interesting as the negative correlation of their background to their social capital was quite weak, but the moderating effect of the social capital they held was the highest of all groups.

Based on the literature, people of migrant background are usually in a vulnerable socioeconomic position to start. The superdiverse context found in many cities globally and most definitely the Randstad area, does not necessarily offer benefits in this regard, in particular in the short term. The social capital that makes the value in social relations so visible does not necessarily grow well in such a context. This can be quite detrimental, as it can bring people closer together as disaster unfolds. If disaster unfolds and people do not come together, the consequences could be severe. COVID-19 complicates this further, however, as people are unable to come together at all. The protection social capital may offer is thus all the more interesting as a topic of study.

The hypotheses formulated in this thesis were proven, though it must be noted that many results were insignificant due to the small sample size for some groups. Hypothesis 1 (A and B) stated that migrant background was correlated to experienced socioeconomic insecurity. Hypothesis 2 (A and B) stated that there are differences between migrant groups in how they are affected by the COVID-19

pandemic. Hypothesis 3 (A and B) stated that social capital would decrease socioeconomic insecurity, and indeed based on the data, it does. Hypothesis 4 (A and B) was the culmination of the steps made with hypotheses 1 through 3. It stated that social capital would protect people of migrant background from socioeconomic insecurity. While it did, it did not do so for all groups, nor did it in an equal amount. In further research, increasing the sample size for the different migrant groups would be highly recommendable, as would a more diverse sample. Furthermore, formulating new questions that are more specifically geared towards studying the social impact of COVID-19 and social capital would be highly useful. It would also be very interesting to see how social capital changes with time, and particularly, as the concept of disaster social capital outlines, whether it loses its strength as the disaster grows protracted.

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Appendix

Table 1. Descriptives table of migrant background, age, gender, education, work contract, and financial comfort (weighted)

		Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Standard Deviation	Count	Subtable N %
Socioeconomic insecurity		2	1	4	1		
Migrant background	Netherlands					5314	57,8%
	Indonesia or Japan					511	5,6%
	Other European					965	10,5%
	AngloSaxon					150	1,6%
	Surinam					750	8,2%
	Dutch Antilles					225	2,4%
	Turkey					333	3,6%
	Morocco					314	3,4%
	Other					629	6,8%
	Unknown					0	0,0%
Social capital		2,91	,25	5,00	,52		
Gender	Male					4600	50,0%
	Female					4592	50,0%
	Other					0	0,0%
Age		33	3	81	17		
Education	Lower educated					1958	21,3%
	Middle educated					2890	31,5%
	Higher educated					4337	47,2%
Work contract type	Long term work contract					3283	75,4%
	Short term work contract with possibility to extend					599	13,8%
	Short term work contract without possibility to extend					404	9,3%
	Other work contract					67	1,5%
Financial comfort	Little financial comfort					1484	16,1%
	Much financial comfort					7552	82,2%
	Unknown financial comfort					157	1,7%

Table 2. Descriptives table of socioeconomic insecurity, migrant background, social capital, gender, age, education, work contract and financial comfort (unweighted)

		Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Standard Deviation	Count	Subtable N %
Socioeconomic insecurity		1	1	4	1	10379	100,0%
Migrant background	Netherlands					8370	
	Indonesia or Japan					473	
	Other European					759	
	AngloSaxon					107	
	Surinam					192	
	Dutch Antilles					53	
	Turkey					52	
	Morocco					47	
	Other					221	
	Unknown					105	
Social capital		3,02	,25	5,00	,47	10379	100,0%
Gender	Male					5617	
	Female					4707	
	Other					50	
Age		41					
Education	Lower educated					646	
	Middle educated					1899	
	Higher educated					6655	
Work contract	Long term work contract					3566	
	Short term work contract with possibility to extend					489	
	Short term contract without possibility to extend					278	
	Other work contract					63	
Financial comfort	Little financial comfort					950	
	Much financial comfort					9083	
	Unknown financial comfort					346	

Table 3. Descriptives for work insecurity, income insecurity, and socioeconomic insecurity (weighted)

		Work insecurity	Income insecurity	Socioeconomic insecurity
		Mean	Mean	Mean
Migrant background	Netherlands	1,50	1,54	1
	Indonesia or Japan	1,62	1,74	2
	Other European	1,68	1,74	2
	Anglo-Saxon	1,38	1,56	1
	Surinam	1,60	1,63	2
	Dutch Antilles	1,89	2,16	2
	Turkey	2,05	1,90	2
	Morocco	1,66	1,94	2
	Other	1,39	1,48	1
	Unknown	.	.	.
Gender	Male	1,55	1,59	2
	Female	1,57	1,64	2
	Other	.	.	.
Age	18-34	1,53	1,67	2
	35-49	1,63	1,74	2
	50-64	1,56	1,63	2
	65+	1,32	1,37	1
Work contract type	Long term work contract	1,32	1,41	1
	Short term work contract with possibility to extend	1,58	1,60	2
	Short term work contract without possibility to extend	1,60	1,87	2
	Other work contract	1,76	1,62	2
Education	Lower educated	1,67	1,58	2
	Middle educated	1,62	1,71	2
	Higher educated	1,49	1,56	2
Financial comfort	Little financial comfort	2,03	2,09	2
	Much financial comfort	1,45	1,51	1
	Unknown	2,32	2,23	2