

The Second Migrant
**A frame analysis of gender in European Union external migration
policy with Africa**

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Abstract

In this thesis, it will be investigated how gender is being framed in the European Union's external migration policy with Africa. Though the areas of external policy, migration and gender have been studied extensively, little research can be found on how they interplay, particularly when it comes to Africa which constitutes a highly topical player in EU geopolitics. By applying an adapted Critical Frame Analysis (CFA), a feminist research method developed to study gender equality policies across Member States, five frames are put to test: vulnerability, development, gender mainstreaming, intersectionality, and security. The results show only vulnerability and development play out as the theory suggested while the others presented differently or not at all. Tying the individual frames together, a broader, yet clearer picture of how gender is framed in Africa is painted. Finally, it will be evidenced that the EU sticks to reductive representations of gender and development which hinder a sustainable, timely approach to migration from Africa.

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1 Introduction: why does it matter?

When thinking about migrants from Africa who are trying to reach the shores of Europe, the images that come to mind are often those of overcrowded boats who are, in the worst-case scenario, in distress at sea. In 2015 when unusually large numbers of migrants and asylum seekers were coming to Europe, not just as a result of the war in Syria and ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, the European Union (EU) was overwhelmed, incapable of providing adequate solutions to an expected challenge (see Heijer, Rijpma & Spijkerboer, 2016). Nonetheless, even before this decisive year the EU has attempted to regulated who and how one is permitted to migrate to the EU. This is mostly happening on a Member State level although more comprehensive EU policies have resulted in an amplified externalization of migration policies. At the same time, migration has become more diverse. The ‘who migrates under what circumstances to where’ is multi-faceted and far from being a linear process. Gender, a hot topic that divides those who second political correctness and those who think it has gone too far is increasingly gaining foothold in the scholarly study of migration. Feminist scholars have long embraced gender studies. It has become an accepted reality that gender and migration mutually influence each other. Far from being an easily tangible term, it has still gained entry into EU external migration policy.

In this light, policies that address migration movements to Europe should ideally be built on well-founded evidence that allows policymakers to formulate the best answers to current or estimated challenges. However, policymaking is just as much driven by political interests and powerplay, institutional logics and socio-cultural discourses (see Bekkers, Fenger & Scholten, 2017). From this constructivist perspective, frames are used, and arguably needed, to make sense of the world. Formulating directly or indirectly policy problems and solutions, observing and evaluating them is an elementary part of policymaking. Bearing in mind the pictures of migration from Africa, the contestations surrounding gender and general salience of migration as a policy and political issue in the EU, it represents a topical field of research. Understanding how gender is being framed by the EU when it comes to policies with Africa can provide insights that go beyond that specific triad.

In this thesis, I make use of the terms ‘migrant’ and ‘migration’ without further specifying the legal category or type of migration. Whether individuals leaving Sub-Saharan Africa are irregular migrants, are classified as refugees, end up being recognized as asylum seeker or are

given subsidiary protection, is secondary to the subject of this thesis. The policy documents analyzed mostly deal with international migrants; hence, I also make use of the overarching and often ambiguous term ‘migrant’. Migration, though often differentiated into labor, forced, family migration or many other forms, is understood here as the crossing of international borders with the emphasis on Africa to the EU. Further, I use the term gender meaning a non-binary understanding of it, recognizing its fluidity and diversity. Responding to the theoretical considerations and analysis conducted, its applied meaning will be discussed too.

Before diving into the chapter on theoretical concepts, I argue for the societal and scientific relevance of this thesis.

1.1 Societal and scientific relevance

In the following section, I outline the relevance of this thesis research. There are three decisive elements which deserve closer attention. Namely, it needs answering why it is relevant to look at migration from Africa to Europe, why the emphasis is placed on the external dimension of migration policies (and not for instance on a comparison of Member State policies), and lastly, why gender is a category worth analyzing. All three areas individually raise exciting questions, combined they have been largely understudied. On a societal level, this study is relevant because it zooms in on one of the most topical issues for the EU – migration. It embraces the diversification of migration and societies which adds pressure to find adequate solutions (see Bayerl *et al.*, 2020) Hence, this thesis will also provide policy recommendations which should ideally help formulate and specify gender-sensitive migration policies.

Misconceptions, even falsehoods prevail when it comes to the quality and quantity of migration to Europe. Most poignantly, in 2015 during the ‘long summer of migration’ (see Hess *et al.* 2016) what is otherwise commonly referred to as the ‘refugee crisis of 2015’, some argued that Europe is overrun by masses of migrants. However, migration remains mostly stable at about two to three percent of the global population (Castles, de Haas and Miller, 2014, 27) and is less of a global and more of a regional phenomenon. These general observations also hold up for migration from and within the African continent (see Soda, 2019). Most migratory movements are focused across the continent. Nonetheless, 26 percent of African migrants aim for Europe (Hovy, Laczko & N’Guettia Kouassi, 2020, 18). Understanding who the migrants are, no matter their final legal status as e.g., asylum seekers, will allow for more precisely targeted approaches and policies.

The journey from Africa to Europe is a perilous one – if migrants survive crossing the Sahara Desert and the Mediterranean, do not get held up, as is the case in Libyan detention centers, or returned, they still only arrive in relatively small numbers (ibid). Nonetheless, today and in the future migration from Africa will remain a central focus of interest for the EU. The population is estimated to increase in Africa, most likely leading to greater migratory pressures (Soda, 2019, 11). This is being recognized by the EU which advertises to want to further the intensifying relationship with the southern continental neighbor. European Commission (after this: Commission) President Ursula von der Leyen attested to this regional emphasis when she called for a stronger ‘geopolitical Commission’, calling for more external action (Bayer, 2019).

While immigration and asylum policies have remained in the hands of EU Member States, there has been an increasing ‘export’ of European policies or, as it is called, ‘Europeanization’ of external policies (Lavenex and Uçarer 2004, 418). At the latest with the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1995, did the EU consolidate their objective to become a serious economic and political player on the international stages (ibid). This has translated into migration management within the EU to be dependent on its external dimensions too, most prominently with its neighbor in the East and South (Hennebry & Walton-Roberts, 2014, 5). A diversification of actors shapes this growing power of the external dimension which in turn leads to further questions and challenges on cooperation. The expansion of the external dimension is happening along organizational and geographical lines (ibid). Many studies look at the gendered dimensions of labor market or social integration, how it impacts family reunification or how certain women are perceived in the receiving country. Though there is a trend to simply gender mainstream policies, it is debatable whether that sufficiently considers gender and the accompanying intersectionalities.

Gender influences all stages and elements of one’s migration trajectory. One study, investigating regional migration in East Africa, found that even the choice of staple foods is influenced by a migrant’s gender and that it changes over time (see Bechoff *et al.*, 2020). Most studies place, when investigating a non-androcentric perspective on gender, their emphasis on women. According to Forbes Martin (2009, 1) 70-75 percent of refugees and displaced persons as a result of conflict are women and their dependent child. In the African context, some 47 percent of migrants are women with the number fluctuating between 43 percent in North Africa and 50 percent in Eastern Africa (Hovy, Laczko & N’Guettia Kouassi, 2020, 18). The overall feminization of migration should make policymakers, as well as scholars and those active in the field of

migration want to thoroughly understand the phenomenon. Not looking at the impact of gender leads, in the worst case, to turning a blind eye to inequalities that deserve the attention of those who have the power to overturn them.

In this thesis, the aim is to understand **how exactly the EU is framing gender in its external migration policy with Africa**. By doing so, an under-researched field will be investigated more thoroughly, put a specific form of migration into perspective and in the end provide the ground for policy recommendations.

Applying a Critical Frame Analysis (CFA), embedded in a feminist setting, the qualitative analysis of policy documents will uncover which theory-informed frames are detectable. Theoretical concepts incorporated in this thesis are the EU strategy of externalizing migration control in a multi-level governance setting that is driven by development and security interests, the role of gender in migration and, finally, the application of framing in EU policymaking. The findings suggest that gender is being understood above all as meaning women who are to large parts made responsible for fostering more economic development and consequently reduce migration. This speaks for a neoliberal setting in which intersectionality is overlooked and mainstreaming constitutes the preferred way forward. Second, and building on the findings, policy recommendations will be made on how to improve migration policies which address gender by making them more precise and inclusive.

2 Theoretical conceptualization

For the purposes of this thesis, I make use of several theoretical concepts that set the framework within which I build my research. There is the overarching, general setting in which the investigated documents are embedded in. This happens two-fold, namely through ‘multi-level governance’ within which external migration policy is being formulated in the EU. Further, I also introduce a feminist stance towards policy analysis and show why and how it differs from the mainstream, androcentric approach.

Looking more closely at the underlying theoretical conceptualizations, there are three areas which deserve a closer look. First, EU external migration policy, with focus on Africa is subsequently introduced with the purpose of highlighting the security and developments aspects thereof. Second, I trace the role of women and gender in migration, and which implications it has for policy formulation. Third, I introduce framing in policy and how it allows for a more critical

understanding of policies. Finally, I tie the theoretical considerations together with the aim of highlighting existing gaps and allowing for a unique theoretical basis for this thesis.

2.1 General setting

Within the general setting I introduce two overarching theoretical observations that have been made in the field of EU policymaking, and policy studies. They allow a clearer understanding of the assumptions which are applied in the later frame analysis.

2.1.1 Multi-level governance

Nation states no longer constitute the final authority that formulates migration related policies. In the context of the EU, Member States have largely held on to their right to formulate asylum and integration policies independently, though the authority on more fundamental matters of migration has been dispersed across a supra-national level (Adam & Caponio, 2018, 27). National sovereignty of Member States remains given, though more power has “slipped to the supranational level” (Hooghe, Marks & Blank, 1993, 341). Some degree of external control is given up in return for other benefits: Ideally, these outweigh the disadvantages potentially incurred by surrendering some sovereignty (ibid: 349ff). The Commission plays a decisive role as it negotiates and formulates policies and agreements, among others, with third country players. That is not to say that the Court of Justice (CJEU) or European Parliament (EP) do not have a say. Moreover, the Commission has the power of agenda-setting and in turn framing of solutions, though it remains constricted by increasingly restriction-driven Member States (Servant, 2018, 111).

Lavenex encourages the establishment of a multi-level governance lens because it allows for a deeper understanding of EU relations with third countries, and how Member States drive their internal policy goals on an EU level. Despite the fact that policymaking within multi-level governance has diversified to include more actors on different levels, it remains rather hierarchical when it comes to third country relations and is such reminiscent of “old” governance structures (Lavenex, 2004, 682). That is not to say that multi-level governance has not been contested. It remains clouded in conceptual and theoretical vagueness: Some authors argue that all governance activities take place in a multi-levelled environment in which cooperation and collaboration are the norm (Peters & Pierre in Caponio & Jones-Correa, 2017, 1997).

The EU's multi-level governance setting poses a specific set of challenges for feminist approaches and analysis. Due to the often-contesting positions of the Member States, disagreement remains on how gendered dimensions and feminist stances should be incorporated in shared policy domains, such as external migration policy (Guerrina, Chappell & Wright, 2018, 1038). The EU diffuses norms surrounding gender which in turn also leads to internal institutional conversion. These contestations are particularly visible in the fields of militarization and security (ibid), the latter being discussed more thoroughly later in this chapter.

For the purposes of this project, multi-level governance can be read as a reminder that any policies included in the analysis constitute the result of EU deliberations, rather than a position all Member States would necessarily individually agree on. While gender equality, LGBTI and women's rights are massively under attack in some Member States, the EU position is a different one though it does mirror to some extent archaic conceptualizations of gender.

2.1.2 Feminist policy analysis

'Policy' is commonly understood as 'public policy'. Going back to second wave feminism, the battle cry 'the private is political' comes to mind. It still holds up and exemplifies that experiences faced in the personal sphere by women are inherently political although they are largely overlooked. Expanding on the dichotomy of public vs. private/personal, the former is found to be an inherently androcentric sphere (Lombardo & Meier, 2016, 1). In policy implementation and analysis, the desire and ideal of 'value-neutrality' which alleges to capture the 'world as it is' has led to an erasure of gender and race amongst other categories. Feminist scholars challenge this notion, aiming to enrich perspectives and analyses of policy, as well as policies in practice (Hawkesworth, 2010, 277f). Hawkesworth contrasts the emergence of neoliberalism as the hegemonic force that transformed policymaking and academia with feminism. The latter has not experienced the same rise in popularity though it too has evolved extensively over the past decades. Neoliberalism has also taken over the analysis of policies, consequently failing in highlighting, explaining and challenging the androcentric *status quo* (ibid: 269). Like later explained in this chapter, women and those identifying as LGBTQI experience a specific set of reasons for migration, along with challenges on their migration trajectory and, finally, in their respective countries of destination. Though the latter will not be investigated here, it goes to show that inspecting the category 'gender' with its accompanying intersectionalities cannot just be subsumed

under a mainstreaming approach. Feminist scholars thus seek to uncover the biases against certain groups, examine the power imbalances and zoom into the “intersectional distributions of advantage and disadvantage” (Lombardo & Meier, 2015, 6)

Following this theoretical consideration, a Critical Frame Analysis (CFA) was chosen as a response to the critique outlined above because it constitutes a feminist research method which was developed over the course of two EU projects on gender equality (see van der Haar & Verloo, 2016). Its theoretical roots will be discussed later in this chapter; the methodological practicalities will be addressed in chapter 3. How I position myself as the author in a feminist thesis, will also be addressed in the part on potential research bias (chapter 3).

2.2 Three areas of theoretical considerations

The next three elements provide more detailed insights into the theoretical observations that inform the operationalization in chapter 3 on methodology and later analysis.

2.2.1 External migration policy

Only at the Tampere Council meeting in 1999, did the Member States agree that Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) should be “integrated in the definition and implementation of other Union policies and activities”– including external relations (European Council, 1999). This decision stemmed from the impression that domestic border controls are insufficient in managing migration which had increased in the preceding years and in the aftermath of the war in former Yugoslavia, among other conflicts (Boswell, 2003, 621f). While matters of asylum and immigration remained, and still do, in the hands of Member States, the need to control migration as such grew. In order to limit migration movements, the strategy of ‘externalization’ emerged (ibid). While it has been shown that migration policies have not necessarily become more restrictive, there is evidence to suggest that the space in which those are expressed has moved outside the frontiers of the EU (de Haas, Natter & Vezzoli, 2016). Migration is addressed long before migrants arrive in the EU: Hence, externalization in the broadest sense can be understood as the expansion of the EU governance sphere to other parts of the world and occurring “when the institutional/legal boundary is moved beyond the circle of member states” (Lavenex, 2004, 683ff).

At the turn of the century, migration had become an issue of utmost political weight in domestic debates. Consequently, argues Lavenex (2004, 688f), “immigration and asylum policies

were thus framed with criminal matters as issues of ‘internal security’ in the European ‘area of freedom, security and justice’”. This notion remains: The dichotomy between immigration on the one hand, and an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) on the other, signifies that migration as such was and continues to be understood foremost as a threat. Though changed after public backlash, Margaritis Schinas, Commission vice-president, was initially chosen as the Commissioner for “Protecting the European Way of Life” in 2019. Now merely ‘Promoting the European Way of Life’ – whatever this actually constitutes – works closely with Migration and Home Affairs (HOME) Commissioner Ylva Johansson on external and internal matters of security and, most prominently, on migration. Threats to internal security are then not considered home-grown, rather they are imported and considered ‘soft security risks’, like economic, social or political problems: Migrants allegedly put a strain on social services or endanger public order (Lavenex, 2004, 685; Pinyol-Jiménez, 2012, 39).

In order to contain these risks, so-called transit or sending countries¹ of migration are targeted with policies focusing on cooperation while a second set of policies can be characterized as “preventative” (Boswell, 2003, 620). The latter are essentially tied to the desire to “tackling the root causes of migration”, as the EU commonly refers to policies within the migration-development nexus. In the case of EU relations with the African continent, the European Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) is the most prominent and current example of such preventative policies, notwithstanding the fact that more development does not in fact lead to less migration, on the contrary (Castles *et al.*, 2014, 29). Zaun and Nantermoz (2021, 15) found that despite evidence pointing at a causal link between more development and more migration, the EU relies on the “tackling root causes of migration”-narrative. Not only was the Commission under pressure to act after the long summer of migration in 2015 but it was simply following a barely contested and seemingly morally sound narrative when establishing the EUTF (*ibid*). Overall, the EU has a pronounced interest in tying third countries to the internal objective of reducing immigration, promising in return “political and material problem-solving resources” (Lavenex, 2004, 694). These often come in the shape of development aid, as the EUTF demonstrates. However, this assumes an underlying conditionality in the agreements and programs warged by the EU. For the

¹ Some scholars argue that the categories of transit or sending countries are too narrow. They do not reflect the reality of many migrants who might end up staying in a ‘transit’ country far longer than intended, making it a place of temporary settlement (see e.g., Collyer & de Haas, 2012).

Union to succeed in their economic and political objectives, the receiving partners too are obligated to meet certain demands (ibid). Many agreements are “soft”, meaning that they are legally non-binding. Yet, by leveraging third country partners, using indirect implementation methods such as ‘assistance’ and ‘coordination’, and promising positive outcomes in return, the EU continues to pursue internal objectives of better migration management (Atanassov & Radjenovic, 2018, 19; Müller & Slominski, 2020, 13). Müller and Slominski (2020, 6) further argue that while ‘externalization’ continues to rely on third-country cooperation, EU involvement is shifting to orchestration which includes the integration of third parties for the pursuit of certain governance goals.

The interdependence between a perceived, dramatized internal security risk (Pinyol-Jiménez, 2012, 39) stemming from external factors, and more ‘development’ as a positive incentive to limit migration constitutes an essential triad in externalization practices. Commonly, migration-development and security-migration nexuses are investigated individually. However, for the purposes of this analysis, I assume that there is a security-migration-development nexus. EU external migration policy with Africa shows markers of this nexus, as outlined in this chapter. Scholars of the 2017 research project “The security-migration-development nexus revised: a perspective from the Sahel”, come to the conclusion that looking at this triangular nexus is “pivotal in order to avoid *the narrow and populist view* [own emphasis] that migratory flows are necessarily a threat to European security, that development aid must be increased to limit migratory movements and that border security must be tightened to stop the passage of migrants” (Venturi & Ntousas, 2017, 153). While the last aspect of ‘border security’, referring to the tightened technologization and physicality of borders, will not be in focus of this thesis, it is worth mentioning that it too constitutes a decisive aspect of externalized migration policies.

Writing about externalization in EU-Africa relations, Strange and Oliveira Martins (2019, 236) focus on the inherent “widepower asymmetry” between EU and African political actors. In their literature review on externalization, they highlight the legal and political implications, as well as the critical perspectives on border security, and remind readers of the persisting colonial practices in EU-Africa relations (ibid). In their frame analysis, Strange and Oliveira Martins (2019, 242) analyze how ‘equality’ is framed and how “practice and rhetoric” are contrasted. They find that while institutional set-ups and rhetoric are meant to create a sense of equality, it instead compels African partners to follow the EU’s governance goals more willingly (ibid).

However, research about EU external migration policy with Africa which investigates the sum of EU policies, possibly by applying a frames analysis, remains scarce. While there are some studies from an ethnographic perspective (see Andersson 2014) or with a focus on a specific policy set (see Zaun & Nantermoz, 2021), and expressed regional interests are detectable especially for West Africa (see Adam *et al*, 2020; Reslow & Vink, 2015), analyses focusing on gender, applying frame analysis and using a policy perspective are marginal. The following section will then focus on gender and migration.

2.2.2 Gender, Intersectionality and Migration

Gendered perspectives on migration draw the picture of a highly diversified migration experience in which reasons for migration, experiences on the journey and finally the settling in the place of destination vary significantly. While linear models that describe migration trajectories as informed solely by push-and-pull factors and consisting of clear-cut stages of departure, transit and arrival are outdated (Lutz, 2020, 15ff) and consequently rejected in this thesis, a gendered and intersectional approach aids in understanding the multifaceted face of migration in today's age. The vulnerabilities, the specific needs and (mis-)conceptions resulting from one's gender shape migration and responses to it (see IOM, 2015).

Migration undertaken by others than men is far from being a new or just emerging research field (Hondagneu-Sotelo & Cranford, 1999, 105; Lutz, 2010). For a long time, women constituted the focal point of interest in migration studies. It was – complementary to the evolution of feminism – a necessary step undertaken in order to make women visible in the first place. Over the course of the years, the contribution of women to migration and later how their experiences are embedded in an unequal power balance moved to the forefront of research (Lutz, 2010, 1659f). Today, following the realization that the binary understanding of an alleged biological sex does not hold up, gender has become the focal point. Rather than being of a certain gender, feminist scholarship now builds on Judith Butlers argument that one is 'doing gender'; it is essentially performative (see Butler, 1998). It cannot be investigated independently from other "socially constructed categories such as 'race'/ethnicity and class", and in turn allows for a less deterministic reading of gender and migration. Other categories, next to race, class and gender that help in an intersectional reading of migration can be able-bodiedness, religion and should above all be read not individually but as a dense net of categories and elements of a person's existence which are

often ground for discrimination. In relation to development, a prominent critique is that it remains gender-blind and -biased (Bastia, 2014, 237). Development aid ignores how different genders perceive and experience development, how they behave when it comes to striving for more development on a family basis and which instruments are put into place to curb development (ibid).

Moreover, gender allows for the uncovering of social inequalities (Lutz, 2010, 1960; Lutz, 2020, 7f.) and prevents the erasure of lived experiences of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender/transsexual and intersex persons (LGBTI). Persons subsumed under the LGBTI umbrella are constituting a growing number of asylum seekers in the past years (UNHCR, n.d.). Though these individuals should be protected under the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention which guarantees protecting of specific social groups if there is a “well-founded fear of persecution” (The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees), non-conforming or fluid gender identities are commonly questioned by authorities (see Avgeri, 2021; for Netherland specific example see van der Pijl et al., 2018). In some cases ‘proof of homosexuality’ or a certain gender identity is demanded, non-heteronormative relationships are questioned and lack of protection in reception centers are common occurrences.

Feminist scholars questions the idea of a male-headed family migration plan in which the man of the household – the supposed provider – migrates first, either later filing for family reunification or having the family stay behind (Truong, Gasper & Handmaker, 2014, 6). Women too are the brunt bearers of migration, often when migrating for labor purposes as care givers or working into professions stereotyped as ‘female’. Global Care Chains (GCC), meaning international division of reproductive labor between the Global South and North, the spurt of Transnational Social Injustice (TSI), and the emergence of an increasing number of transnational families as a result of care migration are evidencing the feminized aspects of migration. Particularly, in the case of transnational families, women who are also employees and mothers and wives offers carry numerous weights (see Parreñas, 2015).

Often, women migrants are read as “victims in need of saving” which in turn denies them of their agency and is amplified, if not induced by EU policies (Gerard & Pickering, 2014, 343). Not denying that women do often experience (sexualized) violence on their migration trajectory, violence that can potentially be incurred is a matter of negotiation and can be considered an indirect form of payment to reach the EU (ibid: 345). At the same time, violence occurs as a result of externalization effects as Gerard and Pickering found in their research in Libya where EU-

sanctioned detention centers aim to prevent women from taking boats to EU shores. Finally, just by being a woman, migrants can sometimes be more likely to be rescued on their way to the EU, especially when they are pregnant because it makes them particularly vulnerable (Tszlyer, 2019, 10).

Overall, gender in EU policies is ordinarily associated with gender mainstreaming, internally when aligning Member States' approaches, as well as externally, when dealing with third country partners. Gender mainstreaming describes the process of integrating gender equality in all policy arenas without necessarily specifying how certain, often marginalized groups can be addressed individually. In line with the feminist stance taken here, a mainstreaming approach should, while seemingly comprehensive, be embraced cautiously. Practically, it would require all involved actors of the policy frame to be equally dedicated to achieving gender equality, even from those not backing this often politicized ideal (Hafner-Burton & Pollack, 2002, 342). It is decidedly difficult to demand or guarantee that level of homogeneity, particularly in multi-levelled institutions and policy fields. Further, it is an essentially "Western" aim in policy making which might be inadequate in addressing global differences in the field of both, gender and equality. To what extent are conceptualizations of non-binary gender or non-heteronormative partner and family settings included in EU gender mainstreaming? If gender mainstreaming in external migration policy is an expression and exportation of European gender ideals (not withholding that these too differ radically across the Union), can it be detached from post-colonial, Eurocentric ideals (cf. David & Guerrina, 2013)?

2.2.3 Framing in EU policies

Analyzing public policy from a constructivist perspective has become a prominent approach since the so-called discursive turn that emerged as a response to alleged objective rationalist policy analyses. Instead of assuming a supposedly rationalist point of view, constructivist scholars' working assumption is that "social reality [is created] through interactions, language, symbols and other means of communication" (Bekkers, Fengers & Scholten, 2017, 58). This notion is picked up by Rein and Schön who theorize framing in policy as follows:

"[...] framing is a way of selecting, organizing, interpreting and making sense of a complex reality to provide guideposts for knowing, analyzing, persuading, and acting. A frame is a

perspective from which an amorphous, ill-defined, problematic situation can be made sense of and acted on” (Rein & Schön, 1993, 146).

Framing, albeit problematic for its potential to recreate and redefine social realities (ibid), is an important tool for policymakers and -analysts in order to understand what kind of stories are being created and told. Commonly, framing is applied in policy fields that are particularly controversial, contested and challenged by political actors or particular, often marginalized social groups affected by the same. Examples include refugee and foreign policy, women’s right issues and gender inequality (Verloo & Lombardo, 2007, 32; Zito, 2011, 1924). With the aim of framing being the formulation of the problem *and* the matching solution, diverse actors concentrate on different ‘pieces of the puzzle’ in order to generate certain policy discourses (Rein & Schön, 1993, 145). Eventually, and despite framings’ problematic character the very goal of framing is to seize these problematic moments and remold them in the interest of the respective actor. Essentially, not just the discourse is formulated but, following the basic principles of constructivism, the world *per se* is (re-)defined (Rein & Schön, 1993, 145; Zito, 2011, 1924).

In the context of the EU, the singular role of the Commission with its power of agenda setting contributes decidedly to framing. Because of its multi-level governance mode, both externally with various actors and internally with different Directorates-Generals (DG) cooperating on specific themes, the power to tie together conflicting issues, as well as actors lies largely with the Commission (Daviter, 2007, 659; Verloo, 2016, 19). The Commission finds itself in a tricky position: On the one hand, there is an overall growth of politicization in the EU, though the Commission itself does not necessarily mirror this in how policies are formulated. For the formulation of frames then, it is decisive for the Commission to position itself wisely along other actors (Daviter, 2007, 662; Thomas & Turnbull, 2017, 932). Finally, the objectives of the Commission to frame policies are “deliberate, utilitarian and goal-orientated” (Thomas & Turnbull, 2017, 934f). How frames come to be is the result of the interplay of a multitude of elements, including deliberations between different DGs, external bodies such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society associations and as the result of different (public) events. As migration policy is as previously argued a policy field scattered across different DGs with increasing politicization, the potential for framing appears to be particularly pronounced. Though the role of specific figures on the European stage will not be further explored here, it is noteworthy that the power of individuals can decisively contribute to framing (ibid).

EU policies concerning migration with Africa are intertwined with matters of security and development, and frames are correspondingly embedded in a complex web of overlapping discourses. Sicurelli (2008) investigates framing with Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) because it constitutes a geopolitical area of interest riddled with policies and frames relating to migration, security and development. While she focuses on the latter two, she demonstrates how the Commission which exerts power onto the Council of the European Union (hereafter: Council), has formulated and implemented an array of policies in SSA (Sicurelli, 2008, 222). Security missions under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) approach, as well as comprehensive development aid packages (e.g., European Development Fund (EDF)), are pooled under the frame of “security for the sake of peace-building” (ibid). This contentious relationship has been expanded since Sicurelli’s article to include migration control as the ultimate goal. Zaun and Nantermoz evidence how above all development is mis-framed: It is falsely upheld that more development leads to less migration (see Zaun & Nantermoz, 2020). The simplistic narrative on which this frame is built on insufficiently incorporate the complexity of migration. Another frame is attributed to migration from Africa in general. Often tied to migration to the EU and wider Europe, migrants’ trajectories are merely viewed in economic terms and their decision to migrate solely relies on so-called push-and-pull factors that overlook the non-linear, multi-focal journey of migration (McKeon, 2018, 876). Migrants are framed as poor and uneducated – McKeon specifically looks at the disputed myth of the immobile peasant – and fueling economic growth through public-private partnerships is hailed as the answer. The overarching framing is that there is a ‘crisis’, namely migrants coming from Africa to Europe, that needs to be resolved by the above outlined development approach (ibid).

Despite the demonstrated use of articles applying a frame analysis to critically engage with EU-Africa relations, a broader potential for feminist critique remains slim. It appears that the most substantial theoretical reflections were published by Mieke Verloo. For the purpose of two EU-wide projects on gender inequality, Verloo and her co-authors expanded frame analysis to include the critical aspect. She picks up the aforementioned feminist critique that women “have been excluded from the political and the solutions proposed is to include them in the world as it is” (Verloo & Lombardo, 2007, 23). They too conclude that this is insufficient as it does not challenge the *status quo*. Translating their criticism to the Commission environment of policy making, the authors’ fear that gender policy measures are depoliticized by technocrats resonates particularly.

Especially because the EU considers itself a ‘norm-setter’, it is compelling to look at the formulation of ‘gender’ in EU migration policies. Many studies have looked at how gender is framed in national Member State policies, notably when it comes to the integration of women from more culturally distanced countries of origin (see e.g., Roggeband & Verloo, 2007). However, it remains underresearched in reference to external migration.

2.3 Theoretical gap

The EU considers itself a norm-setter (Verloo & Lombardo, 2007, 31; David & Guerrina, 2013, 54), not just in the field of gender but in its role as a global political actor. Does the self-assessment of the EU being a promoter and exporter of gender equality bear true? As the above theoretical considerations have shown, the salience of externalization as well as framing as a policy tool in the EU shape decidedly migration to the EU. Adding ‘gender’ to these already contested and complex fields, mirrors the stratified, imminent challenges for the EU. Without aiming to further complicate these considerations, it is worth asking how the EU addresses the underlying inequalities resulting from a gender lens in its external migration policy. So far, and as a result of the literature review conducted for this thesis, scholarly contributions that unite these perspectives and apply them with a regional emphasis on Africa are scarce. Welfens (2020) specifically looks at gender in the aftermath of the so-called ‘Refugee Crisis’ in 2015, Zaun and Nantermoz (2020) zoom in on pseudo-narratives in the EUTF without further focusing on gender and Cascone and Knoll (2018) look at gender mainstreaming in the EUTF. However, what remains to be answered is how more broadly framing of gender in external migration policies with Africa is taking place. It is insufficient to take gender mainstreaming policies formulated by the EU as a given without considering the androcentric biases and potentially real-life implications certain policies have on an unequal relationship such as that of Africa and the EU, and particularly on the migrants eventually affected by them (cf. Lutz, 2020, 24; Truong, Gasper & Handmaker, 2014, 3). Consequently, this thesis will be a contribution to this field.

The here outlined theoretical conceptualizations will be ground for the assumed frames. Theory-informed, they will mirror a diagnosis-prognosis/solution approach. By formulating these frames, a foundation for analytical comparison will be laid in the following chapter. Before diving into the findings, a closer look at the chosen methodology and how it has been modified to suit this thesis will be taken, as well as the rationale for the collected data and its analysis.

3 Methodology: An adapted Critical Frame Analysis (CFA)

In this chapter, the methodological approach of a Critical Frame Analysis (CFA) following Verloo for this research project will be introduced. Central to the project is the following research question:

How has the European Union been framing ‘gender’ in its external migration policy with Africa since 2011?

Before introducing the research design, providing details on CFA, justifying the data collection and making the data analysis transparent, I will present the guiding research sub-questions.

3.1 Research questions

Before explain CFA as a methodology and the research design used, I will introduce the sub-questions which help guide and further delineate this research project.

Following **sub-questions** refer to the more general analysis:

- How is gender defined in the documents (if at all)?
- What characteristics do the documents produced in this field have (see methodology)?
 - o Do the documents have a legally binding character?

These **sub-questions** explore the content more thoroughly with the purpose of confirming and uncovering specific frames:

- What conclusions can be drawn from the element of vulnerability in relation gender and migration?
 - o Does vulnerability act as a call to action or constitute a limitation to women’s agency?
- What role does gender mainstreaming play?
- How is the interplay of gender and development framed in relation to reducing migration?
- How is the interplay of gender and security framed in relation to reducing migration?
- To what extent is the awareness for intersectionality including resulting patterns of discrimination being addressed and incorporated into the policies?

Finally, despite working with sub-questions, it is possible that there will be other or additional findings and findings that were not assumed within this methodological section.

3.2 Research Design

The empirical analysis will have a deductive qualitative approach. While within CFA, it is suggested that no codes are preformulated, I do make use of five theory-informed master frames which I assume for the purposes of the analysis. Additionally, pre-formulating codes would suggest that before diving into the actual analysis, in an earlier stage a thorough reading of the documents is already undertaken. This, as Verloo (2005, 21) argues, would cloud the scientific judgement to remain open and unbiased in uncovering existing frames. While this analytic process allows for greater validity, it does not prevent the formulation of additional frames. Hence, the five frames which I introduce in the subchapter on operationalization are a guide to approaching a large body of documents which will be investigated and remain subject to change. This also means that the frames assumed might not actually be detected in the analysis.

Though in this study, the prevailing objective is not to track changes or compare two cases, looking at a limited time period can be understood as taking a screenshot of a certain time period and filling a current scientific gap. Having established that the EU has in the recent years aimed to position itself as a geopolitical player that considers migration policy, as well as (gender) equality as some of its political and normative drivers, the analysis will show how that is happening with a specific regional actor (Africa) and with gender as such.

3.2.1 Critical Frame Analysis (CFA)

This methodological approach is the expansion of Rein and Schön's frame analysis. Though these two authors have substantially contributed towards formulating this methodology, it is not intended to investigate a specific element of policy making, as is done here by focusing on 'gender'. Verloo (2005) expanded on existing frame analyses with the purpose of comparing gender equality policies across Europe which constitutes an element of this research. An adapted approach will be taken, because the study does not aim to compare two or more cases as Verloo usually does but investigates one body of EU sources.

Discussing gender inequality as a policy problem, the author suggests that every policy or its proposal will contain "an implicit or explicit representation of a diagnosis, connected to an implicit or explicit prognosis and call for action" (Verloo, 2005, 22). The diagnosis-prognosis approach taken can be seen as the identifying of a problem that is accompanied by a solution

thereto. Diagnosing the problem is often driven by the interests, underlying assumptions, and norms of those formulating the policy (proposal), and consequently, the solution also depends on these factors. Asking the question ‘what is wrong’ leads to the diagnosis which can show that there is inequality in the law, unequal starting positions of men and women or gender bias in existing law and society. Part of the diagnosis should also answer who or what is responsible for the problem at hand: This can be individuals, take place at a structural level or be attributed to policy makers. The latter are to blame when an alienation of gender issues or a strong gender bias is detected. Thus, gender mainstreaming is often the answer, and the solution (prognosis) entails an internal change. Gender mainstreaming constitutes a specific diagnosis-prognosis strategy because it is at danger of becoming depoliticized and merely technocratic. Other solutions include the change of laws towards more equality and the creation of gender-specific programs and projects (Verloo, 2005, 24). Though Verloo applies CFA to comparative cases, some of her suggested research questions can also find application in this research:

- Which processes of exclusion result from dominant frames?
- Who and what is excluded?
- What inconsistencies can be detected, and what are the consequences of these inconsistencies?

And finally, though Verloo applies the following questions to a comparative case, it is also worth asking ‘What is similar?’ and ‘What is different?’ across the documents.

By with the help of the questions and diagnosis-prognosis model, frames will be uncovered. “A frame is an interpretation scheme that structures the meaning of reality”, writes Verloo (2005, 19). Though the distinction of what constitutes a frame analyses are somewhat murky, it is helpful to differentiate it from discourse analyses. While the former also pays attention to the policy rhetoric, the latter deals first and foremost with language. Frame analyses are expanded to include the actual policy documents in a broader sense with its individual elements of instruments, programs and projects proposed (Zito, 2011, 1926). Frames are fluid and ever-changing, a product of their time, influenced by the social, economic and political actors involved and are used with the purpose of (de-)legitimizing certain actions (Verloo, 2005, 20). Verloo’s approach in which she centers women and gendered dimensions of policymaking is the methodological answer to the initially formulated critique of androcentric bias in public administration and policy. CFA was conceived with the aim of studying frames in relation to legitimacy and domination. As women

and gendered dimensions have been largely excluded from public policy, as well as migration research, taking CFA as a starting point for this analysis constitutes the reconciliation between critique and the maintaining of scientific legitimacy.

3.3 Data collection

In order to trace how framing of gender has been done, which frames are applied, and which actors were involved in which capacity, all documents pertaining to external migration, ideally with a specific emphasis on EU-Africa relation or mentioning Africa as a target actor are collected. With the help of digital archives provided by the Commission, Parliament and included bodies (e.g., focused Parliament Committees), relevant policy documents, including legal and political texts are accessed. While a lot of documents were accessible, some were not available to the general public. This constituted only a marginal barrier as the body of documents which emphasize migration and gender in the African context are limited. Hence, additional documents were included which focused on one of the three elements and these were then searched for the others. Finally, the documents chosen are a broad variety of Directives and legal texts, policy briefs, reports, constituting documents and annual reports, as well as financing programs.

An additional layer of analysis is undertaken by looking at the types of documents. The table below which is taken from an EU wide gender equality frames analysis includes types of policy documents and what descriptive and/or normative features they possess. Though the primary goal here is to analyze how gender is being framed, understanding if that happens on a discursive level without a practical translation and (legal) binding call to action or if it is embedded in a precise plan can help evaluate the prevalence and power of gender as a policy element.

The data collected can be separated into two categories. The first category of documents pertains to migration bases policy documents in which the African context is describes more closely and focus is placed on gender. The second set of documents largely focus on gender and aspects relating to Africa and migration were secondary.

Type of policy document	Descriptive/normative features
Problem oriented	The document contains an analysis of the current socio-economic situation and describes how it differs from a desired/ideal situation.
Causalistic	The document contains an analysis of what leads to the current situation; how the problems identified can be explained; often assigning responsibility to particular actors for causing the problem.
Future oriented	The document has a vision about the desired/ideal situation with which the current situation is contrasted with. This vision is formulated as objectives.
Practical	The document describes how the set objectives can be achieved: it proposes a variety of activities to pursue (ends-means logic).
Delegative	The document assigns or delegates responsibilities in terms of who should pursue what activity.
Targeted	The document described which social groups are affected by the problem, and activities proposed are also linked to specific target groups.
Budget	The document provides information on how to finance the activities proposed.
Creating authority	The document uses references to support the claims it makes. The references can include scientific studies, statistics, legislative and policy examples in other countries, expert opinions or references to binding (international) norms, etc. other countries, expert opinions or references to binding (international) norms, etc.

Table 1: Types of policy documents and their characteristics. Dombos et al., 2012, 6ff.

With the help of a Boolean string search in the relevant documents specific terms were searched for. These included ‘migration’, ‘external’, ‘Africa’, ‘gender’, ‘women’ and ‘vulnerable’, and ‘refugee, ‘intersectional(ity)’. Though a more general preliminary broad reading of the documents was also undertaken there was no initial pre-formulation of codes.

3.4 Data Analysis and Operationalization

Following the theoretical considerations made in the previous chapter, several major frames will be assumed. While the frames of ‘development’ and ‘security’ look at two arenas of external migration policy, intersectionality, gender mainstreaming and vulnerability encompass a broader approach to migration policies which are more closely related with the gendered aspects of migration. New frames can emerge during the analysis but pre-formulating some frames will help guide the analysis. It is also possible that some frames might not be found. This table will later be used in the results chapter for comparison and help in answering the overall research question.

After the operationalization table, I will also address ethical considerations, reliability and validity in qualitative research and potential personal bias, as well as limitations to this research project.

Frame	Problem Diagnosis/Problem	Problem Prognosis/Solution
Vulnerability	Women are seen as victims and a particularly vulnerable group deserving of special attention. This might influence reasons for migration.	Women are provided with gender-sensitive protection mechanisms and the systematic exploitation of women is addressed at its core by calling for societal changes.
Development	There is a lack of social and political but mostly economic development in the countries of origin. Insufficient development is a driver of migration, and it disadvantages certain groups more than others.	The gendered dimensions of development are addressed in the proposed solutions. Policies acknowledge that solutions must be tailor-made with the aim of limiting gender-specific drivers of development.
Gender Mainstreaming	Gender bias or the complete disregard for the role of gender in regular and/or previous policies is recognized and addressed.	Gender mainstreaming is the answer to the prior blindness to a gendered dimension of migration.
Intersectional inclusion	Intersecting discriminations lead to women, non-binary individuals and LGBTQ persons being marginalized.	Policies talk about race, class and gender as determining factors in migration trajectories. There is a detectable awareness for how the intersecting moments can come together to fuel discrimination and adequate sensitive responses are put into place.
Security	There are pronounced security threats emanating from allegedly uncontrolled migration in which gender is a determining factor on who is labelled a threat or not.	Security responses to allegedly uncontrolled migration consider how people of certain genders act as migrants and gender-sensitive responses are included.

Table 2: Table of Operational Frameworks for their diagnoses, and solution depiction.

3.4.1 Ethical Considerations 83

No ethical considerations can be detected for the creation of this thesis. No interviews were conducted which removed the barrier of complying with extensive data regulations.

All data collected is publicly accessible through the EU's websites. After downloading and storing it in a separate password-protected file, the documents were transferred into atlas.ti, a trusted content analysis platform. After coding and analyzing, and after the successful completion and submission of this thesis, all data will nonetheless be removed from my personal devices.

3.4.2 Trustworthiness

Korstjens and Moser (2018, 121) suggest looking at five elements of qualitative research to ensure high quality standards, namely: credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability, and reflexivity. With the aim of making this thesis more credible prolonged engagement with the research topic and material was sought by regularly dealing with the thesis and exchanging with peers. Applying triangulation – which “aims to enhance the process of qualitative research by using multiple approaches” (ibid) – was mostly possible as method triangulation. Different sources and types of documents were consulted for the analysis. The necessity for data triangulation was less pronounced because the sources chosen do not change based on the time of the day, month etc., contrary to interview partner's moods. Lastly, investigator triangulation could not be guaranteed and will be addressed under limitations. For transferability, Korstjens and Moser (ibid) propose a ‘thick description’ strategy. As this thesis not only provides an extensive introduction and theoretical section but will also include a meticulous analysis and discussion of the findings, readers will hopefully find themselves diving into the topic. Further, dependability and confirmability are ensured through what the authors call an ‘audit trail’. All research steps can be traced in this methodology section. Personal records are kept on the thought process of this thesis, while the methodological and analytical steps have also been documented on the software atlas.ti and later in excel after the code analysis was completed. Finally, reflexivity can be attested by keeping a diary which serves the purpose of “examining one's own conceptual lens” (Korstjens & Moser, 2018, 121). How my personal stance might affect this research project will be addressed independently.

3.4.3 Potential Research Bias

As with any qualitative research, one's own position in the research process deserves special attention. I argue that within this thesis I take a critical feminist stance. Like many other ‘-isms’, feminism triggers a specific set of (mis-)conceptions about its history, practice and as a research

tradition. By choosing to conduct research with a feminist perspective, I am taking an active stance: I second what feminist scholars call an androcentric bias that prevails in academia (see e.g. Lombardo & Meier, 2015). I also agree that public policy, as well as the field of Public Administration suffer from a rationalist bias that prevents its scholars to sufficiently engage with the power imbalances of society (ibid). In the worst case, an open thought process can be stagnated when going into the research process with hardened positions that are impossible to change. However, despite my own political and ideological positioning, I do not doubt that my research will be academically sound. As previously outlined, precautions and (internal) control mechanism have been implemented to guarantee high quality in this qualitative research project.

3.4.5 Limitations

As previously stated, the triangulation approach could only be applied in a limited fashion. With this being an individual piece of work, possibilities for collaboration were nearly impossible. Nonetheless, exchanging ideas with peers, as well as discussing with both supervisor and peers on the analysis and writing process do contribute positively to guaranteeing more credibility.

The methodology frame analysis which is applied here inherently aims to understand complex relationships and deals with detail, wanting to go into depth about narrative relationships in policymaking (see Anderson, 2010). Similar to a discourse analysis, a frame analysis is a fluid and to some extent personal process in which new dimensions and elements can substantially influence the analysis. These factors are often criticized by proponents of quantitative research. By aiming to ensure quality as previously explained, others can verify the scientific process (ibid). It must be conceded though that, as with any qualitative research, this thesis cannot be seen as representative in all points. When transferring the same operationalization to other policy arenas or opting for another regional focus other results might come to light.

Despite these limitations, the subsequent analysis will allow readers to track and understand a complex web of gender and migration in the African context.

4 Analysis

The coding and analysis of the documents yielded the results presented in the following. Before diving into the specific frames, broader observations will also be presented in order for the reader to understand the context of the frames. First, I will present what type of documents were found and what can be said about their features. Overall, while they are less practical, causalistic and creating authority, the documents are largely targeted, problem- and future-oriented. Second, I evidence how despite the described features of the documents most remain shrouded in vagueness. The language used is often unprecise which in turn leaves room for interpretation and takes away from the binding character of the policy goals formulated. Third, I showcase that the EU acts as a norm setter and, as much as it wants to achieve migration-related objectives, it also desires to spread the European value of gender equality – notwithstanding the fact that it is not outlined what gender equality entails in the EU’s understanding.

Finally, I present if and to what extent the frames are detectable in EU external migration policy with Africa. While in the methodology section I built on the theory and assumed five major frames, namely, vulnerability, development, gender mainstreaming, intersectionality, and security, I did not identify all of them. Security in relation to gender was barely discussed and did not follow a clear problem-solution setup. At the same time, vulnerability and women as victims emerged as a major connection and frame which in turn was deeply intertwined with the human rights narrative of the EU. While not initially assumed to be a dominant element in EU external migration policy with Africa, it allows for a better understanding of the EU as a normative player on the global scene too.

With the research question addressing gender, it very quickly became apparent that EU policy documents are far from using that word in the true form of its meaning. Gender is at no point being explicitly defined in the analyzed documents. Indirectly however the definition is one of binary: There are men and women who migrate. While a migrant is typically understood to be a man, women’s experiences are seen as ‘the other’. Because they do not represent the norm in migration, their reasons to migrate, as well as experiences along the route are seen as different and almost marginal. Keeping in mind that about half of the migrants worldwide are not men, and in some cases of labor migration it is predominantly women who migrate, it appears detached from reality to view women migrants as ‘the other’. The existence and experiences of non-binary or trans migrants is entirely ignored and finds no mention in the analyzed documents. Consequently,

any mention of gender means ‘women’; gender equality is the equality of the two genders and is above all the elevation of women to the same social and economic level as men. Though I reject this understanding of gender as it is greatly contested in academia, it will be used in the following analysis because that is how it has been applied in the investigated EU policy.

4.1 Types of documents

The policy documents analyzed not only include different formats (e.g., reports, legal documents) but they possess different descriptive and normative features. Though it is more than obvious that policy frames are found in policy documents, it does contribute positively to the reading of the entire frame analysis to understand what the documents itself are like (Dombos *et al.*, 2012, 6). Following the table in chapter 3.3, the below graph shows how often each element has been detected across all documents. The total number does not equal the total number included in the analysis, as some documents showed more than just one of the possible characteristics. Targeted, problem- and future oriented stand out as the three most prevalent features seen. The least recorded ones are causalistic, practical and creating authority.

Some 29 of all policy documents can be described as future oriented which means that there is a contrast between the current situation and envisioned future depicted; it is characterized as being formulated as objectives (*ibid*). This can be evaluated as a trend in the documents because not only are many of them formulated in that way in the preamble, but that style is carried across the document. As will be shown later, in many documents a certain style of language is used which is equally vague and superficially visionary. By demanding, calling for and painting certain scenarios in the policy documents, the EU appears to have a clear picture where it is headed in the documents. This is amplified by tying this future orientation with problem orientation which is similar to the former. Here, the problem is emphasized, and the preferred alternative is contrasted with it. However, fewer clear-cut objectives are formulated and there is a more thorough description of what appears to be the problem. Many documents reference the same problems which in turn lead to the same problems (the analysis will show that an alleged lack of development is repeatedly seen as *the* problem). The third largest characteristic is that many documents are targeted. On the one hand, for the purpose of this research already targeted documents were identified, within those some of them or individual parts were more fine-tuned. As one frame will later show, many documents identify women who have experienced sexualized violence in

connection with trafficking or smuggling as a specific target group. In other cases, in some documents the focus is on relations with Sub Saharan Africa and the target group is then migrants while other documents deal with gender more generally and the narrower target group is then migrants.

Additionally, what was somewhat unexpected is that very few documents are creating authority. Dombos *et al.* (2012, 6) classify that as containing references that could be other policy examples and scientific studies among other things. Though the EU argues that they make evidence-based policies that is not being made clear to readers. The sources included are often “in-house sources”, meaning other EU legislature, documents and reports from other EU bodies or speeches made by EU representatives. Other sources include supranational policy documents, from the OECD or UN which clarify terms used or statistics referenced. The overall absence of more detailed references does weaken the message of respective documents. If, for example, many documents identify a lack of development as a driver of migration (the problem), it would strengthen proposed solutions if evidence were presented. It can be assumed that in the process of creating policy documents, scientific sources have been consulted. However, this cannot be traced.

Documents that are characterized as delegative and budget-focused are in the middle field of frequency. A striking mention of budgetary concerns is that of the EUTF. The fund which stands at 5bn euros pledged is a massive EU development package is frequently mentioned with more detailed project expenses illustrated. Particularly political statements and of course those pertaining to financing are given this characteristic. For the former, the presenting of a budget can be viewed as a seeming proof of the EU’s commitment to the cause. Documents that are delegative specifically include NGOs or intergovernmental institutions (e.g., IOM) as parties who should or are already tasked with assuming certain tasks. Thus, many projects in the EUTF are carried out by other parties or the responsibility is passed on to communities that should ideally contribute to certain migration-related processes.

What binds all documents is that although some are more targeted or less practical, the language used across all was often shrouded in vagueness.




Figure 3: Frequency of different normative features of analyzed policy documents (see more in chapter 3.3). Own depiction.

4.2 Vagueness

Though this finding cannot be classified as a frame what stood out as part of the document analysis is the missing specificity in many of the documents analyzed. Notwithstanding the fact that some of the documents were annual reports, which might have a more evaluative format, various phrases or terms are reiterated across the analysis. It contributes to the frame analysis as it allows for speculation on how binding the documents are and to what extent specific policy solutions are conceived before the actual implementation. Most commonly the following phrases were used:

- ‘Taking into account’. Across the documents, certain vulnerable populations and their needs as well as “the gendered perspective” are taken into account. It is not entirely clear how taking into account translates into practice. Partly it appears to serve as a reminder to policy makers and those who implement the policies to think outside the pre-formulated box. In other instances, it does seem to suggest that specific projects implemented, or approaches taken include i.e., women more proactively. However, merely taking into account does suggest that there are legally binding quotas for including certain target populations or transforming policy approaches in one way or another (Directive 2011/36/EU, 6; Join(2020)4final, 15; Rabat ProcessA, 11).

- ‘Particular attention’. Similarly to the above used phrase, ‘particular’ is used to imply that specific emphasis is put on various needs and areas deserving of attention. Especially the latter, ‘particular attention’ signifies that there is potentially awareness for an existing problem though it is not clarified further how this impacts policy considerations. Paying particular attention can happen along geographical or target group lines, though it is rarely formulated in ways that explicitly state who or what is meant (Join(2020)4final, 15; Rabat ProcessA, 11; Rabat ProcessB, 5).
- ‘Promote’ and ‘support’. The promotion and support of women (Rabat ProcessB, 5ff.) is one formulated objective. Often, it goes hand in hand with economic goals that envision more job opportunities and development.
 - o Related to this is the term ‘empowerment’. It is commonly referenced when there is talk about economic growth. Women must be empowered in order to partake in a growing economic which in turn contributes to migration reduction. However, this expression of empowerment only remains on an institutional level and encompasses solely the “access to different constituent of development”. In contrast, empowerment as an individual growth in agency remains disregarded (Kabeer, 2020, 7). Another critique argues that empowerment is often an “empty signifier” with no tangible meaning, remaining caught in a neoliberal understanding of women’s advancement (see Petchesky, 2010)

These key words exemplify how many of the policy documents analyzed remain shrouded in vagueness. Rather than formulate more precise goals and implementation steps, the EU casts a wider net. By doing so, a multi-level approach is actively taken. International organizations, development agencies and NGOs are tasked with translating the EU’s more unprecise objectives into practice. The projects within EUTF are the obvious example for this practice in which the implementation is in the hands of other actors. The prevalence of language also comes into play when looking at how the EU presents itself as a norm setter towards their African partners who are caught in an unequal power balance.

4.3 Setting norms in an unequal partnership 398

“Across all activities, the EU will continue to pay attention to respecting its core values”, succinctly summarizes the EU’s stance towards its African partners (Join(2020)4final, 15). In its

policies concerning migration from and between African states, the reduction and better management of migration remain fundamental though it coincides with the political will of exporting EU norms. Further, in one document it is argued that “these values are at the heart of our Union” (Com(2020)884final, 7) which showcases just how politically and somewhat emotionally charged the sharing of norms internationally is. As the recent case of Hungary’s anti-LGBT law shows, not even the agreement within the EU is high on what constitutes core values. However, in its self-image that the EU is aiming to spread in third countries, it conceives itself as the protectors of human rights above all:

“The EU continued to place gender equality, the full enjoyment of all human rights by women and girls and their empowerment at the centre of the EU’s internal and external policy and action” (CFSP/PESC 742, 2019, 85).

This quote also suggests that the EU perceives itself to be especially concerned with gender equality internally and externally and place such emphasis on this that they position themselves as the global leaders in this field (ibid). Most prominently, the GAP, which has recently been renewed for an additional funding period, outlines how the EU intends on tackling gender-based discrimination and inequality. Although gender is never defined throughout the GAP documents, it is clear that gender is understood as a binary – women and men – in which women need to be advanced to men’s social status. As such, the EU is following the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) which also recognize the importance of fighting for gender equality though the term gender remains greatly limited. Practically, this means eliminating all forms of violence against women and children in the public and private sphere, raising awareness on “gender issues to change discriminatory norms” and “rescuing [women and children] from exploitation” (European CommissionA, 2016, 19; European CommissionA, 2019, 59; Com(2020)884final, 7). Within the identified frames, it becomes apparent to what extent the EU is also driven by spreading certain core values or norms that it sees beneficial to its foreign and security policy (see Join(2020)17final, 4). The underlying assumption with which the EU works is that their African partners do not share these same core values. Consequently, working together with the EU can contribute to overhauling these grievances.

4.4 Frames

Bearing in mind the broader observations, in the following subchapters the specific frames will be addressed. A diagnosis-prognosis perspective as operationalized in the previous chapter will be applied which will allow for a reflection whether the assumed frames passed the analytical test.

4.4.1 Women as victims / vulnerable group

A frame that was not expected following the theoretical considerations is that of ‘vulnerability’ under which I also subsume the ‘women as victims’ narrative. Migration and Home Affairs defines vulnerability as a broad of group people:

“minors, unaccompanied minors, disabled people, elderly people, pregnant women, single parents with minor children, victims of trafficking in human beings, persons with serious illnesses, persons with mental disorders and persons who have been subjected to torture, rape or other serious forms of psychological, physical or sexual violence, such as victims of female genital mutilation” (Directive 2008/115/EC, 3).

Throughout the analysis it becomes evident that this is a very broad term and is used generously. On the one hand, it is meant to evidence and amplify a problem – that of vulnerability and how that contributes to migration– while on the other hand, it is intertwined with the phenomenon of human trafficking as part of migration trajectories. ‘Vulnerability’ must be looked at critically as it does not substitute a truly intersectional approach which will be discussed later in this chapter. Despite the fact that there is an official definition, it is being used rather loosely in the documents which in turn goes to show that the term itself has little to no legally binding characteristic. Though those identified as vulnerable are seemingly one overarching group, there is little information on how exactly this vulnerability comes to be and how it influences the lived experiences of those affected. There is the above provided definition, although within the documents this term is used differently and interchangeably. Other vulnerable groups are pregnant women, children, youth, pastoralists, old people, unaccompanied minors, IDPs, refugees, returning migrants and voluntary returnees (see e.g., European CommissionB, 2016; European CommissionB, 2017). It appears then that the term is used whenever a certain group needs to be emphasized in the documents or targeted with certain policies without defining the groups characteristics and explaining the consequences for policymaking. What vulnerable individuals face is an array of hurdles that include physical and gender-based violence, unspecified abusive situations, exploitation, and labor market

discrimination, both in the countries of origins as well as within the migration cycle (EUTFb, 2015, 37f.). Surprisingly, the documents identify vulnerability not merely as a prerequisite for migration or influencing factor on the migration trajectory but understand vulnerability as a result of migration too. One document stood out for calling to “mitigate vulnerabilities arising from irregular migration and to combat irregular migration” (European CommissionA, 2018, 43). In this case, vulnerability is given yet another meaning as it suggests that vulnerabilities arise from irregular migration without clarifying whether the migrants themselves or the countries of origins are hence more vulnerable. This quote again shows how unprecise language leaves room for interpretation, potentially stirring readers in different directions. One such unclarity can be found in a Directive on trafficking:

*“Other factors that **could** [own emphasis] be taken into account when assessing the vulnerability of a victim include, for example, gender, pregnancy, state of health and disability”* (Directive 2011/36/EU, 3).

In relation to gender the group that emerges as vulnerable is ‘women’. It is worth emphasizing that gender is consequently understood as a binary. The results also show that women are understood as the victims of (sex) crimes which are perpetrated because they are in fact women. Only one source mentions men as potential victims of trafficking, however, trafficking then happens for diverging reasons. Perpetrators are individuals in the countries along the migration route or in the countries of origins. They include most prominently “smugglers and transporters” and in reference to Libya, a major hub for migrants before taking off to Europe, also “militia and transporters” (EUTFb, 2015, 5ff.). Their gender is not explicitly mentioned.; readers assume that these are more often than not men. Doing so would not be pointing at “all men” with the proverbial finger but it would open a path to tackle the problem from the other, the male side. This could include policies that target men and how preconceived notions that enable sex crimes can be prevented. Indeed, studies have shown that women are more likely to suffer sexualized violence at the hand of traffickers (Berman & Frisendorf, 2008, 194). However, it has also been suggested that such practices are enabled by restrictive EU migration policies that, rather than be formulated with the purpose of creating more legal migration pathways to the EU and protect lives, are intended to deter irregular migration and repress trafficking (Freedman, 2016, 19). This notion is indirectly addressed in one Directives in which it is being recognized that Nigeria serves as a hub of trafficking with the ultimate purpose of sexual exploitation in the EU (see Com(2017)471final).

However, the resulting consequences and policy objectives do not match this reference; rather than addressing the larger problem of sexual exploitation, it is merely the networks of traffickers that need to be dissolved. Further, by largely focusing on trafficking instead of migration trajectories as a whole with different modes of transportation and reasons which influence those, some agency is taken away from the migrants. With legal pathways to the EU being few from Africa, demanding both specific skills and financial reserves, being smuggled is for many the most achievable option. Smuggling is merely “the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident” (Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children) and does not possess the same exploitative qualities as trafficking. All in all, stopping trafficking is a declared objective of the EU and is embedded in the Gender Action Plan (GAP) which recognizes trafficking as a “a serious risk on the lives of women and girls, especially refugees” (European CommissionA, 2017, 22).

In order to justify the desired norm-setting purveyed by the EU, the underlying alleged problems in the addressed communities need to be defined. Just like perpetrators are pointed out, so is the disadvantageous environment in which African women find themselves in. The EU argues that it is “concerned that the situation of women and children remain critical, in particular in Africa, due to the socio-economic situation and harmful cultural traditional practices“ (European Commission, 2006, 2). Clearly being an ethical judgement, which stands in contrast to the EU’s norms as well, it helps justify an action plan to combat trafficking.

In order to reduce the impact of vulnerabilities, different modes of action are proposed. First, there is what can be called the sum of soft actions. By paying particular attention to women and children, promoting the participation of vulnerable groups, applying gender-sensitive practices and “taking specific account of women” (European Commission, 2014, 52 & 75; EUTFb, 2015, 26) the overall social setting in which these vulnerabilities take place aims to be adjusted. Not just trainings, but also specific development programs, e.g., land management programs, are proposed. “Prioritising the creation of economic opportunities and job skills for vulnerable groups [...]” (European CommissionB, 2016, 69) will on the one hand then drive development and, on the other hand, reduce vulnerabilities.

Raising awareness that can illuminate the potential dangers resulting from choosing irregular pathways to Europe. Focusing on women and girls which is called for in many analyzed

documents can however only happen if more gender-disaggregated data is made available and gender-sensitive analyses constitute the ground on which policies are formulated. Often, women and girls are overlooked with their specific set of challenges. This is being recognized and should ideally enhance the impact force of existing and upcoming policies and projects, also with the help of external players such as international organizations (European CommissionB, 2018, 74; Join(2017)4final, 10). On a second level, the objective of reducing vulnerabilities also contributes towards reducing migration. While the seemingly linear relationship between addressing vulnerabilities is seldom explicitly written down, one document does call argue that by “taking due account of gender equality and child protection dimensions”, migrants can be protected and some drivers of migration can be reduced (EUTFb, 2015, 28). More broadly, the EU assumes that “reducing inequality and discrimination will reduce causes of irregular migration” (ibid: 13).

Applying the frame of ‘vulnerability’ then seems essential in justifying the approach the EU takes on a specific element of migration, namely trafficking. It also builds a moral foundation on which the EU can implement programs for socioeconomic development – another frame which will be discussed in the upcoming subchapter.

4.4.2 Women as drivers of development

One of the expected and most prevalent frames uncovered in this analysis is that of development. The EU works under the assumption that the third countries they cooperate with have a lack of development which needs to be overcome in order to reduce migration successfully. Characteristics are the lack of formal small and medium sized enterprises (SME), employment opportunities and access to capital. If, so the official policy line goes, people have strong economies in their countries of origin and reasons to stay (i.e., employment), then the desire to migrate to other parts of the world, specifically Europe will become less pronounced. In this equation, migrants are understood as rational *homo oeconomicus*-style actors which above all consider the economic, rather than personal or political arguments for migration. It comes as no surprise then that EU migration policies with and in Africa – a continent epitomized as undeveloped – largely build on development. Investigating the constituting and strategic policies, as well as political documents, and annual reports the aspect of economic development runs through all sources used here.

Again, it is not explicitly gender that has been used but instead ‘women’ are at the core of this frame. To put it short: Women are responsible for more development and hence, tapping into their unused potential can reduce migration. One quote succinctly summarizes how policymakers understand the role of women in development: “African women are key drivers of sustainable growth, development and peace. Responding to their aspirations will determine the future of the continent.” (Join(2020)4final, 2). Their duty is to “enhance women’s role as rightsholders, peacebuilders and decision-makers for peace and security, democracy and the rule of law [...]” (Join(2020)17final, 10). Women’s responsibilities appear to be manifold as they can drive growth and development and peace – a large task at hand. Interestingly, the EU paints itself here as a provider of services (“responding to aspirations”) rather than a setter of policy priorities and norms.

Women are throughout the sources often mentioned in one go with ‘youth’ as another target group who can help in building stronger and more resilient economies on the African continent. Both are consequently painted as overlooked groups that need more support. However, as initially outlined merely putting together different groups that are not adult men is insufficiently argued for – differences in needs prevail. Presumably, young people as well as women are considered social groups that are not fulfilling their economic potential. At least for young people on the African continent, it can be said that they constitute an ever-growing population segment that is facing considerable challenges and will exert migration pressures. By actively integrating women within their communities, ‘unlocking their potentials’ or consulting women’s organizations in decision-making processes, the ground for development can be made more fertile (EUTFb, 2015, 13; European CommissionB, 2017, 28).

In order to kickstart economic growth and development, policies envision a broad variety of instruments. First and foremost, there is a need to channel more money into the countries cooperating with by easing access to various funds (Rabat ProcessC, 9), micro-financing and better manage and access remittances (European Commission, 2014, 219). More access to funds is mirrored in the EU strategy of setting up Emergency Funds, such as the EUTF which allow for quicker and easier access to resources. While they are somewhat contested in terms of their democratic legitimization, they are becoming an increasingly prevalent EU instrument in its external policies (see Kipp, 2018). In the EUTF strategic document, it states that the “Trust Fund could focus on empowering women” (EUTFb, 2015, 18). While that is somewhat vague, a brief

review of the currently financed projects does indicate that numerous projects do address women and gender equality in one capacity or another.

Being granted access to such funds and financing more easily, by reducing cultural barriers (e.g., women are often not given land rights and thus prevented from being self-sufficient) and providing financial education (Rabat ProcessC, 9; Valletta SummitA, 3) are the suggested paths forward. Though many policy documents do not go into further details beyond the call for women's empowerment, strengthening or support and creation of certain opportunities, it is being recognized that gender-specific measures are required (ibid). This notion largely builds on the normative and ethical argumentation that the EU applies in its comprehensive strategy with Africa:

*“Security and development can only be sustainable in the long term when rooted in full respect of human rights without discrimination on any ground, democratic principles, **gender equality** [own highlighting] and the rule of law”* (Join(2020)4final, 13).

What comes first though: Is it gender equality as a “core value” (ibid: 15) which in itself is worth communicating to and fostering in third countries? Or, to put it polemically, is gender equality only understood as a tool to make better use of women's socioeconomic potentials with the ultimate objective of better managing migration? The present analysis does not yield a final result as across the policy documents only a strong causal representation was detectable. However, a similar study on the matter of gender in the EUTF concluded that due to the short implementation periods of the Fund's projects, it does risk instrumentalizing gender equality as a means to reduce migration (Cascone & Knoll, 2018, 16).

With the barrier of financial stability taken, a second layer of development includes the establishment of more job opportunities, better vocational training and education, job skills, and the strengthening of existing forms of livelihoods (EUTFb, 2015, 10ff.; European CommissionB, 2017, 28; European CommissionB, 2016, 69; Valletta SummitA, 2015, 3). One such program stood out as it particularly highlights the development-migration nexus. It evidences just how important the reduction and control of migration is to the EU if specific, seemingly volatile industries are strengthened:

“Capacity-building and job creation for women and youth in the textile sector in migration-prone areas were the focus of a programme in Ethiopia, paired with technical to upgrade the leather industry” (European CommissionA, 2019, 43).

This quote was taken from a document within the Gender Action Plan complex and goes to show once again to what extent migration is contextualized in all EU policy fields, even if the primary goal is in this case the promotion of gender equality. Again, it raises the question of what comes first, gender equality or migration management. Women indeed face more structural and systemic barriers that prevent them from social participation.

Bearing in mind that the EU not only aims to contain migration but better regulate who is granted entry, it is only consistent to find such suggestions in their policies. Within the Rabat Process which is characterized by focusing on dialogue rather than specific operations like the EUTF, one document includes the call for policy makers to

“encourage the establishment of exchange networks between vocational training institutes and employment agencies in Europe and Africa, [...] and to adapt technical training to the needs of the labour market” (Rabat ProcessB, 5).

Particular emphasis is placed on women and youth because women and youth are seemingly too inactive as potential employees or entrepreneurs. Correcting this circumstance, women would contribute positively to economic development and, if they do choose to migrate be more adaptable to other labor markets.

Summarizing this frame, it can be said that, first, it is women who are the target group at hand when talking about gender and gender equality in a binary model; it is not gender as a spectrum. On top of women’s already often fragile social standing, they are placed with the responsibility to work toward more economic development. Though finding employment, potentially gaining financial independence, and contributing positively to one’s community are certainly desirable, it comes with its own challenges of overcoming barriers in place. No data could be collected on the role of men as multipliers of more inclusive socioeconomic environments, moreover, the focus was exclusively on women. Finally, it is neither clear whether empowering women is a goal in itself, nor has it been proven that it will in fact reduce migration. Either way, one of the most prominent strategies appears to be that of gender mainstreaming.

4.4.3 Gender mainstreaming: policy and frame

Mainstreaming, as much as it is a policy strategy, can also be considered a frame here. It was assumed that the policies since 2011 analyzed for this analysis will address the shortcomings of previous approaches. This does not necessary mean that gender would be specifically addressed,

rather there would a consensus that policies should also consider the role gender plays or might play. The findings were similar: Many documents do incorporate mainstreaming by calling for actions to consider women, their vulnerabilities and potentials more, as was evidenced in the previous frames. Moreover, policies also demanded that more mainstreaming strategies are applied in projects which are funded by the EU and within the EU.

The disadvantages resulting from not incorporating gender mainstreaming are manifold. These include as described above the higher likeliness of women (and children) ending up in exploitative, abusive smuggling and trafficking situations, facing social exclusion and economic limitations, and finally, from an EU perspective, become more likely a migrant. More broadly, dealing with gender appears to be part of a political and normative scheme of the EU in which democracy, rule of law and human rights considerations are central to creating more holistic policies and approaches on the external level (see e.g., European CommissionA, 2018).

Before gender mainstreaming can be introduced, the first hurdle, namely the lack of gender-sensitive and gender-aggregated data needs to be overcome. So far, the EU recognizes, too little data is available on gender-specificities, also when it comes to migration. While the EU sees gender equality as one of its main pillars in EU-wide labor and social policy (see Guerrina, Chappell & Wright, 2018), it remains largely overlooked in CSDP and external (migration) policies more generally. Consequently, before any measures can be taken, it requires a clearer picture on who needs to be taken account of and in what fashion. EU delegations have commissioned gender reports about the country in question, make use of gender experts more actively, either on a continuous or *ad hoc* basis which goes to show that there is an apparent shortcoming on what gender entails (European CommissionA, 2017, 31). These calls for more facts and numbers show that the EU is recognizing that gender cannot be overlooked in policy making and requires a more thorough understanding before it is incorporated.

A proposed solution of the EU is to “mainstream gender across 85% of all new EU initiatives, particularly in the areas of security and migration (European CommissionA, 2017, 31). That the role of gender in relation to matters of security is weak will be shown in the subchapter after next. At the same time, the fact that the GAP acknowledges that gender as an analytical category is underrepresented in the migration policy field speaks presumably for its urgency. Adapting a UN strategy, the EU is working towards applying the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) strategy which emphasizes “gender equality and women's empowerment as a prerequisite

for dealing with the prevention, management and resolution of conflict” (EEAS, 2019, 3). Interestingly, gender mainstreaming is here practiced as two sides of the same coin. On the one side, gender mainstreaming is an internal, bureaucratic goal of the EU and aims to institute women on all hierarchical levels, with women for example also being heads of Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) missions. On the other side, if internally the mainstreaming of gender is achieved, the EU can further expand on their normative role model position and showcase that if done right, women can participate in all areas of lives, including traditionally male-dominated fields such as security. In more specific regard to Africa, the EU approach to mainstreaming is described as follows:

“Mainstreaming gender equality in all work strands of the Africa-EU Partnership, the EU should also enhance women’s role as rights-holders, peacebuilders and decision-makers for peace and security, democracy and the rule of law and promote their access to justice and basic services” (48 Join(2020)17final, 10).

Two components of this quote stand out. First, it is not just the mainstreaming of gender, but of gender equality which suggests that an advancement of equal treatment between men and women is desired. It can be assumed then that the term gender is understood and used interchangeably with gender equality when it comes to mainstreaming. Second, and although equality is desired, in the second half of the quote the focus shifts towards what women can do to fully benefit from their basic rights. It uncovers once again the contradiction that women should work more towards changing the system that discriminates against them, rather than dismantling oppressive structures by tackling those who uphold them.

Finally, whether gender mainstreaming yields (or will yield) tangible results – be it a more equal social standing of women in the countries of origin or contribute to lowering the number of migrants coming from the African continent – goes beyond the scope of this analysis. Mainstreaming, which is a prevalent policy strategy aiming to prevent the alienation of certain social groups, is also a frame here. That frame signifies to what extent the EU builds its policies on evidence – or at least tries to – with the aim of making women more visible and involved in their communities. However, within this frame intersecting discriminations are overlooked and hence not mainstreamed.

4.4.4 Intersectionality

One of the expected frames was that of intersectionality and should ideally cast a broad view on the many, intersecting discriminations one person might face. However, this frame did not emerge in the analysis – on the contrary, an apparent lack was detectable. The word ‘intersectionality’ was not used a single time across all the documents analyzed, though ‘intersectional’ was found once. Moreover, an understanding for how intersectional discriminations might show in a person’s life were also not included. There was no discussion of how race and class and gender might intersect, which implications that has on the lives of individuals, on potential migration trajectories and how the EU can respond to these. Accordingly, no documents included the terms ‘racism’, ‘sexism’ or ‘classism’, though ‘race’ was found. The prevalent frame of vulnerability painted a picture of women being victims but discredited largely their agency and the fact that it is not just their gender that can be ground for being disadvantaged. The frame that emerged instead is what I label here as ‘deficient intersectionality awareness’ in which superficially the grounds on which discrimination can take place are addressed.

One such obvious example is the mention of ‘xenophobia’ rather than racism (EUTFa, 2). The former describes the alleged fear of strangers. However, it is somewhat apologetic to write about an alleged fear instead of describing it as what it is: The hatred of different, often minority groups. That specific document describes the situation of regionally displaced persons in different African countries. It does not describe how intersecting elements of a person’s identity – gender being one, but also residential status, income level – could amplify certain experiences and discriminations. Instead, these elements are only considered stand-alone characteristics and once again understood as an expression of vulnerability. As shown previously, vulnerability is intrinsically tied to the narrative surrounding women as victims of trafficking and sexual abuse. A similar observation can be made within this frame in which a EUTF document calls for “developing gender and age appropriate responses to the crises” which can “diminish sexual violence” (EUTFb, 2015, 13). Two elements stand out: First, age can indeed be understood as a determining factor in the migration trajectories experienced by migrant women, though no further evidence is provided how specifically age molds reasons for migration and challenges encountered on the way. Second, gender and age appropriate responses are apparently goal-driven as it does not seem to be a goal in itself to reduce certain discriminations but it is aimed at a specific target.

Here the problem is clearly juxtaposed with the solution and can serve as an example of how the EU formulates seemingly linear problem-solution frames.

The initially alleged deficient intersectional awareness frame is also evidenced in the unprecise synonyms that are used *in lieu* of intersectionality. One such example is the use of the term “*cross cutting* [own emphasis] issues such as human rights and gender” (Rabat ProcessA, 5). Though it might almost be far-fetched to read some level of superficial intersectionality into this, there is an element of more inclusive awareness of human rights and gender issues. However, it can be questioned why gender is not included in human rights or whether it is singled out with the purpose of emphasis. Either way, ‘cross-cutting issues’ could hint toward other elements which individuals might be discriminated for but are not explicitly mentioned and instead forsaken for the more general human rights approach. The final subchapter on how gender is erased in the documents will pick up on the point of how a strong human rights narrative appears to be the proxy for a more thorough discussion with intersectionality. The only mention of ‘intersectional’ was used only once:

“As such, consultations involved open, pluralistic dialogue between 300 diverse women, including women of African descendant [sic] and indigenous women, alongside other survivors, rural women, young women, elderly women, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) persons, and women living with disabilities” (European CommissionB, 2018, 18).

This description was used for a project in Colombia in which women who survived conflict came together to engage in dialogue. It describes a near-ideal scenario in which gender and sexual diversity is addressed and people with disabilities are included as well. Further, it indirectly picks up on the intersectional aspect of race. Class however remains unmentioned. Unfortunately, this quote is not placed in relation to migration and Africa, though it could be an example of how more intersectional awareness can be introduced in policies. Entering into dialogue with individuals and groups who represent a diverse social reality can help shed light on the needs of these people, also keeping in mind that it can contribute to formulating more precise policies. It is striking that this is the only mention of any intersectional awareness and leaves readers presumably wondering why this erasure prevails in other documents.

Within a truly intersectional approach not only women, but individuals of all genders should be addressed in order to not just stimulate women to change, overcome and adapt but

contribute toward an inclusive community. In document this all gender-encompassing approach is alluded to when men and boys are described as “positive agents for change, including the need to address and transform gender stereotypes and help reconsider [...] deep-rooted perceptions in societies” (CFSP/PESC 742, 2019, 87). Though it is still only men and boys and not e.g., people of all genders, it is one of the few instances across the entire document analysis which leads to the impression that those writing it understand that gender equality is not a woman’s duty. Moreover, it is a societal task which calls for the active engagement of all its members and includes also institutional changes in politics and economics, amongst others.

In one of the Cotonou Agreement documents, there is a more precise description of intersectionality, though later in that text and in accompanying documents it is not made clear how this was measured and evidenced and how it translates into practice and specific projects:

“The Parties reaffirm their existing obligations and commitments in international law to ensure respect for human rights and to eliminate all forms of discrimination based particularly on origin, sex, race, language and religion” (European Commission, 2014, 32).

It is imperative to say that these final examples of a more intersectional approach do not constitute the overall reading of the documents. Rather, they are snippets from a large body of policy documents and can be viewed as best practice examples.

Before addressing the lack of gender in most documents, the frame relating to security will be presented and how it ties into development.

4.4.5 Security and gender

Building on the theoretical section, it was assumed that the policy documents discussed will specifically address to what extent security is a matter of uncontrolled migration. Within this context, solutions would be formulated without going into greater detail about the role of women. This frame was disproven. However, there is a less pronounced frame of security which is in many instances tied to the frame of development. Within this, women are given a similar role: They can be included in the security apparatus and informally contribute to more security. A lack of security is an obstacle to development which in turn can prevent migration movements:

“Security and development can only be sustainable in the long term when rooted in full respect of human rights without discrimination on any ground, democratic principles, gender equality and the rule of law” (Join(2020)4final, 13).

As has become evident in the frame ‘vulnerability’, women and girls are commonly seen as victims who fall prey to extremism, e.g., the kidnappings of Boko Haram (EUTFb, 2015, 4), cultural practices and overall lack of development. Critical security environments, little economic and social opportunities, and dangers emanating from a potential choice to migrate, push women and girls into a precarious situation. This stands in contrast to the assumed frame because security is here seen mostly under the human security aspect for the affected individuals instead of a security threat to Europe. A greater “gender sensitization” by border guards should contribute to women migrant’s safety too though it is unclear whether that should include simply the collection of gender aggregated data at borders or better protection mechanism (European CommissionA, 2018, 43;). It seems that the EU works towards creating a safer environment for women and children which is characterized with less substantial threats to life and physical integrity. This goes against the theoretical observations which painted a bleaker picture in which migrants are constructed to be a security threat. Superficially, this does not hold up in the analysis, however, a more thorough reading of the documents analyzed and connected to additional sources does lead to the observation that there is a security frame, albeit a more subtle one.

Although the EU does legitimize their actions by pointing out their deep concern over the sheer number of refugees, asylum seekers and irregular migrants (Valletta SummitB, 2015, 1), a straightforward link between migrants and security concerns could not be clearly identified in the analysis, moreover, it was insinuated and needs to be read in a larger context. “There is a mutually reinforcing relationship between gender inequalities and state fragility in the Sahel” (EUTFb, 2015, 5) at a first read only suggests that there is a relationship between gender equality and statehood. Though in this setting the next step is not explicitly mentioned, other EU policies pick up there. EUTF projects and several security missions, particularly in West Africa and the Horn of Africa address state fragility through improving governance structures and expanding border management with accompanying tools being introduced, such a biometric passports and physical border check posts. These help in controlling the permeability of the border which in turn prevent uncontrolled migration movements towards the North of Africa and onwards to the EU across the Mediterranean.

In a document outlining the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) priorities, it is emphasized to pay greater attention to the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda which constitutes the EU's translation of their own and UN strategies on how to advance the role of women in the strengthening of security and peacebuilding. Within this framework that encompasses various suggestion on applying gender mainstreaming into EU external mission and CSDP missions, amongst others with the aim of promoting the role of women. This would include women being involved in peacebuilding projects in which they act as multipliers, but also women as security personnel, be it in the police or military. Subsumed under the WPS approach, this set of suggestions aims to permeate many areas of EU external policy, including migration. Women are also meant to radiate a greater sense of security into their communities and lead with example. The GAP calls for women's roles in "peace and security from early warning to mediation, resolution and peace-building" to be strengthened (European Commission, 2018, 19), also bearing in mind that the African Union (AU) commits to the WPS approach. Again, women can play a special role in countering violent extremism which remains prevalent especially in West Africa and constitutes one of the 'root causes for migration' (ibid). It is questionable at best what the ethical implications are of tasking women with countering extremism, being more involved as security personnel and general state-building. If women are the ones who often suffer the most from instable security settings and violent extremism – e.g., the 2014 Nigerian Chibok schoolgirls kidnapping – it is difficult to imagine how precisely women can really co-create a safer environment. Ultimately, if the advancement of security standards in certain communities and the employment of more women in the security sector above all aim to reduce migration, then women face instrumentalization for the purposes of EU external migration policy.

5 Results: So how is gender being framed?

The aim of this chapter is to expand the previous analysis by embedding the analysis into the theoretical and methodological starting points more extensively. Ultimately, discussing the findings in a more material way will allow to answer the research question of **how gender is being framed in EU external migration policy with Africa**. The results section will shuffle the order of frames used so far. First, I discuss how the binary understanding of gender determines the formulation of policies and their frames. Building on that, I discuss how gender mainstreaming is

applied and which disadvantages it showcases. Second, I tie together the theoretical considerations on externalization and how they are mirrored in the frames on development and security. Finally, tying together the individual frames to create a wider reading of the framing process will constitute the ground for subsequent future research and policy propositions, and allow answering the research question.

In the methodology section, five frames were operationalized as a result of the initial theoretical considerations. Below, the same table was updated to include the actual problem diagnosis and solutions. For vulnerability and development, the assumed diagnosis or policy problem was confirmed, while the solution was partly seen. The solutions, though to some extent proving what was operationalized, emerged as leaner versions of the assumed solutions. Gender mainstreaming is on a middle ground for both diagnosis and solution, mostly because it was unexpected that it would double as an internal policy goal and as an applied policy frame. What stands out is that two frames – intersectionality/intersectional inclusion and security – were not confirmed at all and instead yielded rather different but equally thought-provoking results. That many diagnoses and prognoses have either been contrary or partly contrary to the assumed operationalization also goes to show the inconsistencies and ambiguities in this policy field. These are especially prevalent when it comes to the use of gender as such and gender mainstreaming.

Frame	Analyzed Policy Diagnosis/ Problem	Analyzed Policy Prognosis/Solution
Vulnerability	Women are seen as victims and a particularly vulnerable group deserving of special attention. This might influence reasons for migration.	Overall, policies tend to insufficiently recognize women’s agency in (re)shaping their lives and migration trajectories. Women are provided with some gender-sensitive protection mechanisms and there is some criticism surrounding the lack of societal protection and strengthening of women’s positions.
Development	There is a lack of social and political but mostly economic development in the countries of origin. Insufficient development is a driver of migration, and it disadvantages certain groups more than others.	The gendered dimensions of development are addressed in the proposed solutions. Solutions acknowledge that women must be supported and encouraged to make more and better use of their social, political, and economic positions in society. However, solutions follow an oversimplified and flawed causality between more development and less migration. Tapping into the potential of women, this causality can be allegedly amplified.
Gender Mainstreaming	Gender bias or the complete disregard for the role of gender in regular and/or previous policies is partly recognized and addressed though it remains rather unprecise.	Gender mainstreaming is the answer to the prior blindness in policy document relating to migration and more generally in the EU’s external dimension. While more attention to gender diversity should be paid to staffing, newer policies propose gender mainstreaming in projects and programs, paying little attention to gender-specific details.

Intersectional inclusion	There is almost no mention of non-binary persons, LGBTQ issues, intersectionality (race and class foremost) and intersecting discriminations. Individual cases of more intersectional awareness constitute outliers.	Policies largely focus on vulnerability and the victim narrative (see above). Individual cases do show that there seem to be first, shy approaches in creating a more intersectional approach. There is no solution proposed on how intersecting discriminations can be reduced sustainably.
Security	There are some security concerns surrounding migration. The main problem seems to concern the lack of women working toward more security.	Women should act as stabilizers and prevent security threats (work towards countering radicalization) which can diminish migration. Further, more women should work in the security forces.

Table 4: Operationalization tested. Actual frames, their diagnoses, and solutions. Own depiction.

5.1 Gender = (vulnerable) women

Although migration and gender studies, respectively, have evolved toward including a spectrum of genders, policy practice appears to remain caught up in a strict binary and heteronormativity. The awareness for gender and sexual diversity and how it impacts all stages of migration is nearly non-existent in the previous analysis. By sticking to this understanding, the EU undermines its potential to adhere to its self-proclaimed image of a gender equal norm-setter, distances itself from a highly politicized discourse and ultimately fails to adequately address the dimension of gender in migration processes.

It is telling that across the documents analyzed, no definition for what is understood as gender was found. Language shapes one’s understanding of the world; if a term like gender is used without explaining what it signifies it leaves spaces for others to fill it with meaning needed for a certain purpose. When conducting the frame analysis, asking the question ‘who/what is included is just as important as asking ‘who/what is excluded (Verloo, 2005, 19). Not just a definition for gender is excluded but men and their role in countries of origin and migration-affected communities is largely overlooked. What is included though is a narrative surrounding gender in

which overwhelmingly women are thematized. Juxtaposing this inclusion-exclusion dynamic, it appears that if men are excluded in narratives about gender, but almost exclusively women are included, gender must signify ‘women’. In turn, men must be the norm if they are not discussed in a larger setting about the relevance of gender in migration processes. Going back to the initial critique of public policy remaining caught up in an androcentric bias, the EU fails to progress beyond it. Instead of seizing the opportunity to embrace and advance an inclusive understanding and lived practice of gender diversity, the EU continues to perpetuate an outdated stance. Women are singled out as both the losers of an unfair system, as well as the agents of change for the same. If they are meant to be the latter than labeling them as vulnerable and as victims is not only unfair and untrue but counterproductive to the aim of advancing gender equality. Within this system, men are barely evaluated as the reproducers of a patriarchic system that can only be overcome through the inclusion of everyone, not just with the concentrated efforts of women. Male migrants continue to be the norm in policy making while women represent the departure from it. The analysis has shown that the objective is to reduce the number of migrants but nonetheless it is misguided to instrumentalize women for that purpose.

It must be conceded that debates surrounding gender are polarized and politicized. While some argue against gender being a spectrum, others take offense in gender specific language. Still others see a threat to national coherence and an attack on ‘family values’ when introducing children to the mere existence of LGBTI persons, as the recent developments in Hungary have shown. Undoubtedly, agreement on what constitutes gender is far from being unitary across Member States. That constant assessments and reassessments are inevitable in a MLG setting can presumably contribute towards more deliberative practices in policy making. However, it can, as this case here evidences also hinder a self-formulated objective. On the one hand, the EU does aim to promote gender equality among other values, as policy packages like the GAP show. Other documents highlight the importance of transferring gender equality in migration and development policies as a basic human right. On the other hand, internal disagreements on what constitutes gender and how far the EU can go with more feminist approaches in its external migration, development and security policies hinder a more transformative, inclusive, and ideally intersectional approach.

5.1.1 Inclusive gender mainstreaming?

But an intersectional approach is far from being achieved or even envisioned in the policy documents analyzed. The main premise continues to be gender mainstreaming in which gender signifies women. However, many aspects remain unanswered in the process of mainstreaming if gender is mentioned at all in policy documents. In light of gender equality being the goal of mainstreaming, it remains unanswered what the final result of mainstreaming should be. Merely paving the path to more economic participation will surely not eradicate injustices women continue to face and will also not stop the willingness and ability to migrate. Social barriers to participation, discrimination in land ownership, equal educational opportunities and patriarchic norms are all areas that require more than the formal integration of women into institutions. Financial means and desire to migrate, as well as more knowledge about how to migrate could equally be the outcome. Further, within gender mainstreaming as it is understood here the male norm remains untouched. Verloo's critique of equality as being understood same to men, can also be applied to this analysis:

“The idea is that each individual, irrespective of gender, should have access to the rights and opportunities enjoyed by men and should be treated according to the same principles, norms, and standards” (see Verloo, 2005, 23).

Gender mainstreaming then does not contribute toward challenging the androcentric status quo which shaped public policy, also in the field of migration policy with Africa. It is a technical term and process that is not concerned with questioning existing patriarchic norms but a liberal ideal (ibid). Mainstreaming, though some see it as an adequate tool to make sense of complex relationships (Scholten, 2020, 113), misses becoming an intersectional approach. Looking at class, race, class, able-bodiedness, legal status and the many other factors that contribute towards shaping a migrant's identity, it might just be too complex to be responded to with mainstreaming. Yet, it is strived for in the policy field analyzed here because it fits into the narrative constructed by the EU that women need to be advanced, not gender relations fundamentally rethought. Just so, development and security in regard to migration are made to suit the narrative.

5.2 Externalization: security-migration-development in practice

In the theoretical section on externalization, it was postulated that there is a triple nexus of security-migration-development. While that still holds up considering that the analysis did show how

security is tied to development and both are connected to migration movements, the emphasis was mostly placed on development across the analyzed documents. Revisiting how that happens in the African context and which role women play in it should allow for a better understanding of how gender plays out in relation to externalization.

The overarching theme is what can be referred to as ‘tackling the root causes of migration’-narrative. Extensively theorized, it has been shown that this constitutes an essential part of externalization albeit being a flawed reading of what drives migration. Development is, above all, an economic term that should ideally play out in the founding of more enterprises and increase in employment. Economic development is then understood as the foundation for everything else: It constitutes the solution for less migration, more prosperity, gender equality. Again, it is worth asking ‘who/what is excluded’. What is excluded is the strong evidence that development aid has been unsuccessful in many instances, did not contribute towards poverty reduction and has overall not created strong, autonomous economies on the African continent (see e.g, Page & Shimeles, 2015). What is also excluded is a critical examination of the post-colonial relationships between Africa and Europe which still shape economic relations, amongst many other areas of exchange. Nonetheless, the political ideal of development seems to constitute the irrevocable postulate. Mirroring the outdated model of gender, it is an overhauled reading of development that is at the core of this nexus. Women are encouraged to participate in this development narrative; without questioning the underlying assumptions this presents as a neoliberal business as usual.

Feeding into this nexus is the element of security that, as the theory suggests is EU internal security which is potentially threatened by migrants from the African continent. In the analysis, it was shown that, at least in the documents used, there was interest in the human security aspects, namely by creating safer environments for women and children. Initially, a reference to Venturi & Ntousas (2017, 153) was made who argue that it is a “narrow and populist view” which assumes that the security threat to the EU can only be reduced by paying towards more development to limit migration. Though this linear relationship is not explicitly laid down in the documents, there are implicit notions. Repeatedly, the relevance of security as a prerequisite for development is noted. I would add that it is also a narrow and populist view to put women at center of increasing security, bearing in mind that they are often most threatened by (sexualized) violence.

6 Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

This research project allowed for a glimpse into a complex and diverse expression of migration with many intersecting opportunities and challenges. Before suggesting four policy paths forward, I wish to propose three fields of further scientific research. Finally, I draw a conclusion and try to balance out this ideology-laden field.

6.1 Future research paths

First, while in this analysis only policy documents were looked at, broadening this research project could happen with the help of interviews. Interviews could fill in the gaps that are inherently prevalent when only reading policy documents. Many questions remain: why did EU policymakers choose to include or exclude certain elements? Why is the emphasis placed on development rather than security? Which factors drive policymakers to formulate certain policies? In this context, further research could interview different Directorate Generals (DGs), the European Parliament, but also representatives from Member States who participate in deliberative processes preceding the formulating of the here discussed policy documents. This line of interviewing would ideally place greater emphasis on the MLG dimension of migration policies and discuss the contesting institutional logics, as well as political motivators at play. I must concede that this thesis remains caught up in a European perspective. Doing those affected by EU policies justice, including voices of migrants, as well as societal and political actors from Sub Saharan Africa might be a way out of an EU-focused perspective. The African Union, though largely funded by the EU and influenced by their EU counterpart might have an opposing stance toward and understanding of gender.

Second, one line of research which was initially pursued for this research project was aimed at investigating the security elements of migration, specifically the CSDP missions in Mali and Niger amongst others. Albeit finding a security frame, it was not as prevalent as the others and has the potential for its own research line. Prior to opting for a frame analysis, I considered conducting interviews with members of local police forces, FRONTEX experts and EU partners. However, from a close personal source I was advised that there was little to no possibility to contact and interview these individuals. If future research could tap into this element and tying it to the highly topical debate about FRONTEX, its severe human rights abuses and the Member States' sanctioning thereof, it might expand on the suggestion that gender is being instrumentalized in the

security sector for the purpose of migration control. In this context, field analysis, such as an ethnographic approach could cast a light on how migration and gender intersect in a field traditionally characterized as male. This might be a post-pandemic endeavor.

Third, a time dimension could be applied to the initially asked research question. A comparison over time might yield potentially surprising results. Did the framing of gender change over time or has it remained somewhat stable? And if it has been transformed, why? A time-based analysis might show that the understanding of gender has indeed evolved over time. As outlined in the theoretical section, research on the intersection of gender and migration has come from overlooking non-male migrants, to including women and now, slowly, moving gender into focus. Whether this theoretical evolution is mirrored in policy making could be helpful in understanding to what extent the EU is adapting to changing societal narratives surrounding gender and investigate how (or if) this is seen as a normative element worth circulating.

6.2 Adapting policy (narratives)

Uncovering the frames inevitably leads to practical implications. Although frames aid in constructing a diagnosis-prognosis scheme, that does not mean that the diagnosis or prognosis must be the correct ones. I wish to pick up on three aspects that can be improved for future policymaking in the area of gender and migration in the Africa-EU context.

First, the term ‘gender’ needs to be used in its full scope. Gender is a spectrum; migrants identify across that spectrum. Not just for the sake of linguistic and social correctness, but for the sake of migrants, gender and sexual diversity need to be addressed more precisely, especially when it can be the ground on which migrants apply for asylum. Policymakers need to ask themselves what it does to policies as well as the individuals affected by them, if understanding male migrants as *the* migrant continues to be the norm. Additionally, labeling groups as vulnerable is stigmatizing, as much as it unprecise. Thus, while aligning the terminology on gender, vulnerability too, as a proxy descriptor for a wide variety of social groups should be reconsidered. Vulnerability is an empty term which is in no way legally binding. Instead, intersectionality needs to be embraced and incorporated. Class, gender, race and able-bodiedness fundamentally determine a migrant’s journey. Allowing these categories to get lost under the screen of vulnerability, the opportunity to establish intersectional policies is foregone. If greater cohesion

on these terms is achieved, the EU can also strengthen its position as a norm-setter in the fields of human rights and gender equality.

Second, building on the previous point, gender mainstreaming needs to be rethought. It is a policy approach that not only comes with numerous downsides but has also been often unsuccessful in EU policymaking (Lombardo & Meier, 2006, 151). The term is unprecise, remains vaguely defined by the EU at best and largely focuses on internal, procedural changes. Instead of tackling gender inequality at its core, gender mainstreaming is about women and how they must change and adapt to fit into the preexisting system. With no obvious frame on the role of men and how they contribute negatively or positively to gender equality, holding on to mainstreaming is patronizing towards women (ibid). Instead of writing that gender is “taken into account”, gender-specific programs need to be established. More data on gender-specificities needs to be generated and actively applied in EU policy. It must be explicitly stated in policies that if gender equality is to be achieved, existing hierarchies and power imbalances must be addressed. Particularly in the case of migrants from Sub Saharan Africa where racialized images play into framing processes, there needs to be a precisely formulated strategy on how injustices, be they along the lines of gender, race, class or able-bodiedness, will be tackled.

Finally, and probably most importantly, the EU needs to seriously restructure its approach to development in the context of migration. The myth that more development leads to less migration has not only been disputed but it is misleading for the future of EU immigration strategies. An outdated and scientifically disproven causal relationship between development and less migration can no longer constitute the ground on which the EU formulates policies. Instead, alternative approaches to aid, like direct payments to beneficiaries should be considered. It has been shown that the development aid strategies applied so far have had very limited success in Africa. Yet, studies have shown that directly providing cash to those otherwise targeted through aid allows in a more sustainable manner for individuals to cross the poverty line (Giugale & Ngyuen, 2016, 18). Direct-dividend payments (DDP), as their name give away, directly reaches beneficiaries, rather than being distributed on a political level (ibid: 4f). Consequently, without development functioning as the gatekeeper for migration, alternatives to current migration opportunities must be established. That should include more legal pathways as labor migrants, better protection for LGBTI migrants and more transparency on how one can emigrate to the EU.

6.3 Framing gender in EU external migration policy with Africa

It can be argued that frames are indispensable for policymakers and non-professionals alike to understand the world around them. This frame analysis tried to make sense of gender in EU external migration policy with Africa. And, to put it bluntly: the framing applied here served its purpose. The answer to the initial research question can thus be presented three-fold:

1. Migration policy in Africa is much more concerned with matters of development and to some extent security, than it is directly focused on migration processes. An alleged lack of development is framed as the core element of migration emanating from Africa.
2. Gender is framed as meaning women who are made responsible for working towards more economic development.
3. The frame 'women' is needed to fulfill the other frame 'absence of development'. It used for a neoliberal, individualistic approach in which tapping into the economic potential of individuals, far away from the EU can resolve the EU's perceived threat of migration from Africa before it reaches its borders.

Whether this framing can continue to present a solution to migration pressures the EU is facing is questionable. Maybe it is time for a feminist, intersectional approach to thinking gender in migration from Africa and elsewhere.

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