

The Meritocratic Myth

Does information provision about unequal educational opportunities affect redistributive preferences of Dutch citizens?

Master Thesis

Name of student: Asher van der Schelde

Student number: 549036

E-mail: asher.vanderschelde@gmail.com

Study programme: RM Sociology of Culture, Media & the Arts

Faculty: Erasmus School of History, Culture and Communication

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Jeroen van der Waal

Second reader: Dr. Marc Verboord

Erasmus University Rotterdam

Date: June 15th, 2021

Word count: 8928

Suitable journals: Socio-Economic Review, Public Opinion Quarterly, Social Choice and Welfare

Abstract

Economic inequality has increased throughout the West since the 1980s. Paradoxically, this has not led to more public concern and demands for redistribution. Recent literature argues this is due to a growing belief in meritocracy, which provides people with a framework which attributes economic success and failure to individual factors instead of structural ones. In this thesis, I test this assumption in a Dutch context by providing respondents information about how unequal educational opportunities relate to economic inequality. Recent reports claim the Dutch education system is losing its function as ‘great equaliser’ as students from high-income families are much more likely to finish higher education than their equally intelligent low-income counterparts. Theoretically, this information should undermine meritocratic beliefs and subsequently produce greater support for economic redistribution. Besides examining attitudes regarding *more or less* redistribution, I also analyse *how* respondents want redistribution to take place. Due to their indirect and decommodifying nature, I argue that investment policies (e.g., childcare) fit the meritocratic belief system better than consumption policies (e.g., unemployment benefits). Therefore, confrontation with the unmeritocratic foundation of inequality should produce greater relative support for the latter policy set. However, no significant effects emerged, suggesting that information about educational inequalities does not undermine meritocratic beliefs in a Dutch context.

Keywords: Economic redistribution, inequality, meritocracy, public opinion, social policies.

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1. Introduction

Since the 1980s, economic inequality has increased throughout the Western world (Milanovic, 2016; Piketty, 2014). The Netherlands, the case study of this thesis, is no exception to this rule. The Gini coefficient, a measure of statistical dispersion between 0 (all income is shared evenly across the population) and 1 (all income is earned by one person), increased from 0.24 in the '80s to 0.29 in 2011 (Salverda et al., 2013).

Nobel Prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz argues that economic inequality poses one of the biggest contemporary challenges to society (Stiglitz, 2015). Amongst other negative outcomes, citizens of highly unequal countries are less healthy (Pickett & Wilkinson, 2015), more distrusting towards politics (Stiglitz, 2012) and express lower levels of social cohesion (Putnam, 2000). Distribution of economic resources through progressive taxation and extensive welfare spending can counteract these developments (Atkinson, 2015).

The influential median voter model suggests that rising inequality goes hand in hand with increased public concern and subsequent demands for redistribution (Meltzer & Richard, 1981), as this model assumes people's policy preferences to reflect their material interests. If wealth and income are concentrated unevenly across the population, it is in the economic interest of the majority to support more extensive redistribution (Cavaillé, 2014). However, this model does not hold much ground in reality. On the contrary, popular concern about economic inequality has decreased in most Western countries despite rising inequality (Mijs, 2019; Luttig, 2013; for a review see: Janmaat, 2013). Moreover, citizens of unequal societies are not more concerned about inequality than citizens of egalitarian societies (Kenworthy and McCall, 2008; Larsen, 2016).

To make sense of this paradox, one could assume that people lack knowledge about the scope of economic inequality. And indeed, most studies tell us that people underestimate the level of inequality in their country (Arsenio & Willems, 2017; Kenworthy & McCall, 2007; Norton & Ariely, 2011). However, providing people with factual information about inequality does not increase redistributive support (Kuziemko et al, 2015).

Apparently, people are inclined to justify the economic status quo, even when inequality is greater than they initially thought. Recent literature argues that this is caused by a strong contemporary belief in meritocracy, which means that people are inclined to perceive economic differences as the product of hard work and ambition instead of structural factors (e.g., class, gender, race). As such, this meritocratic belief system creates a framework in which inequality is perceived to be a fair outcome (Garcia-Sanchez et al, 2020; Mijs 2019;

Trump, 2020). Consequently, people are not inclined to support extensive economic redistribution.

However, people tend to overestimate the meritocratic character of their society. Intergenerational mobility (the lack of correlation between parents' and their children's income), a key sign of a true meritocracy, is declining in most Western countries including the Netherlands (Manduca et al., 2020). Despite declining mobility, meritocratic beliefs are increasing in the Netherlands (Mijs, 2018). These contrasting phenomena (decreasing mobility, increasing belief in meritocracy) suggest that Dutch citizens are mistaken about the meritocratic character of their society, and thus the roots of economic inequality.

In an experimental setting, Alesina et al. (2018) found that providing respondents pessimistic information about intergenerational mobility produces increased support for economic redistribution. Apparently, this type of information provision undermines the meritocratic belief system, which in turn affects redistributive preferences. Building on Alesina et al. (2018), I also examine how exposure to the unmeritocratic character of inequality affects support for economic redistribution. However, instead of providing information on mobility, I inform respondents about unequal opportunities in the Dutch education system, and how these opportunities relate to economic inequality. The notion that education functions as the 'great equaliser' has long been dominant, but recent reports argue that this equalising ability to be under threat, undermining the meritocratic character of Dutch society (Inspectie van het Onderwijs, 2018). By confronting respondents with this development and subsequently testing their redistributive preferences, this study broadens our understanding of what drives public support for economic redistribution.

Moreover, this study innovates by measuring the effects of two distinct types of information. One treatment group is presented with 'raw' information about economic inequality, whereas the other group is informed how inequality is (partially) caused by educational inequalities. Analysing differences in post-treatment redistributive attitudes allows me to systematically examine whether exposure to the unmeritocratic character of inequality affects support for economic redistribution to a greater degree than merely being confronted with inequality itself.

The third innovative aspect of this study is the focus on different types of redistributive policies. Instead of only examining support for more or less redistribution, I also analyse support for consumption (direct financial transfers, such as unemployment benefits) and investment policies (indirect transfers, like free education) separately as people do not only differ in the *extent* to which they support extensive redistribution, they also differ

in *how* they want redistribution to take place (Fernández-Albertos & Manzano, 2011; Häusermann et al, 2015; Hemerijck, 2013). And more importantly, building on Garritzmann et al. (2018) and Häusermann et al. (2020), I assess which of these policy sets is prioritised. Finally, whereas Alesina et al. (2018) analysed redistributive attitudes in five different countries, I only focus on the Netherlands which allows me to present the respondents with social policies that are specifically relevant for the Dutch welfare state.

2. Theory

2.1 Meritocratic beliefs and support for economic redistribution

Despite rising economic inequality in the West, public support for economic redistribution does not increase. Kuziemko et al. (2015) found this is not caused by a lack of knowledge, as informing people about the scope of inequality does not increase support for redistribution. Trump (2020) explains this apparent paradox by arguing that the general public accepts economic inequality when it is believed to be the result of a ‘fair’ process. A fair process denotes in this case that differences in income are perceived to be the product of hard work and talent rather than luck (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Trump, 2020). In other words, when people believe they live in a *meritocracy*. A society where economic success does not depend on social class, race or gender, but on merit. As such, meritocratic beliefs provide people with a framework that attributes success and failure to individual factors instead to structural ones (Garcia-Sanchez et al, 2020; Mijs 2019). If one’s societal status is purely based on merit, it makes sense to assume that those in a better economic position are more valuable and hardworking than others. McCoy and Major (2006) found that priming respondents with meritocratic beliefs in an experimental setting indeed decreases concern about inequality. In other words, meritocratic beliefs legitimise the existence of economic inequality and thereby create opposition towards extensive economic redistribution.

In a perfect meritocracy, structural factors (e.g., class, gender, race) should not play a role in one’s economic success. Rather, economic success should be the product of traits such as ambition and effort. Consequently, a perfect meritocracy should have perfect intergenerational mobility (the extent to which individuals move up (or down) the social ladder compared to their parents), assuming that such traits are distributed evenly across the population. When intergenerational mobility is high, all citizens have a chance of succeeding, whereas low mobility indicates that “people are trapped by the accident of their birth” (Case & Deaton, 2020: 140). It should therefore come as no surprise that inequality is perceived to

be fairer when mobility is high (Larsen, 2016; Page & Goldstein, 2016; Shariff et al, 2016; Trump, 2020) and that providing pessimistic information about mobility increases support for redistribution (Alesina et al., 2018). In recent decades, intergenerational mobility is decreasing in most Western countries, including the Netherlands (Manduca et al., 2020). Paradoxically, meritocratic beliefs have been on the rise since the 1970s. The Netherlands is by no means an exception to this rule (Mijs, 2018). These contrasting phenomena of decreasing mobility and increasing belief in meritocracy suggest that Dutch citizens are mistaken about the meritocratic character of their society and thus the roots of economic inequality.

2.2 Education: the great equaliser?

As mentioned in the introduction, this study's main innovative aspect is the incorporation of educational inequalities to elicit redistributive preferences. The choice for education is not random as accessible education is intrinsically linked to the concept of meritocracy. American educational reformer Horace Mann once famously said: "Education (...) is a great equaliser of conditions of men - the balance wheel of social machinery" (Grove and Montgomery, 2003). Mann meant that access to free and high-quality schools can level the playing field for children from disadvantaged backgrounds. This notion of education being the 'great equaliser' is perfectly compatible with meritocratic beliefs. In a meritocratic society, societal positions are distributed on the basis of merit, the combination of intelligence and effort (Young, 1958). Education plays a key role in the distribution of these positions. Those that possess intelligence and put in effort are more likely to finish higher education, which subsequently increases their chances of obtaining a high societal position. In an ideal meritocratic world, one's social background does not affect one's educational opportunities. Smart and hard-working students from the working class would be just as likely to achieve educational success as equally smart and hard-working kids from higher classes (De Beer, 2016). Consequently, they would be just as likely to obtain a high societal position. If this were a reality, economic mobility would be very high, a key sign of a meritocratic society.

However, this utopian meritocratic education system does not exist in reality. Recent studies overwhelmingly conclude that social background directly affects students' educational opportunities in the Netherlands. Elementary school students from low-income families are more likely to be advised to attend a lower form of secondary education than students from high-income families with similar test scores (Ravesteijn, 2021). Moreover,

low-income students are much less likely to finish higher education than their high-income and equally intelligent counterparts (Inspectie voor het Onderwijs, 2016). Researchers explain these inequalities by pointing out that high-income parents invest more in their kids' education (e.g., through tutoring), and that teachers tend to have higher expectations of the abilities of middle- and upper-class children. Consequently, economic inequality is reproduced as higher educated Dutch citizens earn almost twice as much as lower educated citizens (CBS, 2011). In other words, education does not fulfil its role as the 'great equaliser'. Despite these scientific insights, the vast majority of Dutch citizens, both lower and higher educated, believe that social background plays a much smaller role than effort does in "getting ahead in society" (Steijn et al., 2016).

Previous studies found that merely informing people about the scope of economic inequality has little to no impact on redistributive preferences (Kuziemko et al, 2015) because people are inclined to justify the economic status quo through a meritocratic lens. 'Raw' information on inequality does not undermine this meritocratic belief system and therefore does not generate greater support for economic redistribution. Alesina et al. (2018) found that exposing respondents to pessimistic information about intergenerational mobility does increase support for economic redistribution. Apparently, such information challenges the idea that economic inequality is produced by a fair and meritocratic process and thus triggers the idea that inequality should be countered. I expect a similar mechanism to kick in when respondents are presented with information about the lack of equal opportunities in the Dutch education system. After all, education should function as 'the great equaliser' and therefore plays a vital role in the meritocratic belief system. Theoretically, presenting information which contrasts this supposed role of the education system will result in weaker meritocratic beliefs, which in turn should yield increased support for economic redistribution. From these insights, the first two hypotheses are derived:

H1: Confrontation with economic inequality does not produce greater support for economic redistribution

H2: Confrontation with the unmeritocratic foundation of economic inequality produces greater support for economic redistribution than confrontation with economic inequality by itself

2.3 Meritocratic beliefs and social policy support

Recent literature on redistributive support has drifted away from the dichotomy between less or more extensive redistribution, as people do not only differ in the *extent* to which they support redistribution, they also differ in *how* redistribution should take place (Fernández-Albertos & Manzano, 2011; Häusermann et al, 2015; Hemerijck, 2013). These policies can roughly be divided in two types: consumption and investment policies. Consumption policies are traditional redistributive policies such as unemployment and disability benefits (Bonoli, 2004). These policies focus on compensating for immediate losses and taking care of urgent needs (Han & Kwon, 2019). Old age pensions are therefore also characterised as such (Nikolai, 2012). Investment policies, on the other hand, have more long-term goals. Prime examples of investment policies are free childcare and education (Beramendi et al., 2015). Governments introduce such measures to boost the economy's overall productivity (Han & Kwon, 2019). They do not serve to de-commodify citizens (meaning that "people's access to basic resources needed to sustain their lives is protected from market risks") (Anderson & Hecht, 2015: 357), but rather to mobilise human capital (Häusermann et al., 2020). To put the difference between the policy sets more simply: consumption policies *directly* redistribute money from richer to poorer segments of society, whereas investment policies function in an *indirect* manner.

Recent studies found that people's social policy preferences tend to be two-dimensional. This means that preferences for consumption and investment policies internally correlate strongly, but very weakly with one another. In other words, people who support higher unemployment benefits also want higher disability benefits, but are not necessarily inclined to favour social investments (Fossati & Häusermann, 2014; Garritzmann et al., 2018). Similarly, those in favour of social investments are more sceptical when it comes to consumption policies.

The question then arises how these policy preferences relate to meritocratic beliefs. My core argument is that consumption policies are intrinsically incompatible with meritocratic beliefs, whereas social investment policies are a much better fit. To understand this argument, we first need to get to the bottom of the meritocratic mindset. Let us imagine the prototype of a meritocratic believer: someone who truly believes economic success is solely the product of hard work, whereas structural factors do not play a role at all. This person will be inclined to perceive existing inequalities as the outcome of a fair process. The rich are rich due to their merit, whereas the poor are lazy and lack ambition. Therefore, he or she will think that economic differences are deserved, and thus oppose extensive financial

transfers from richer segments of society to the poor. Directly transferring money from the rich to the poor is exactly what consumption policies do. Through progressive taxation, the wealthy contribute more to the national treasury than the rest of society. Subsequently, these funds are passed on to those in need through social benefits. It is likely that the ‘true’ meritocratic believer will perceive this type of transfer to be unfair. After all, being in a subpar economic position is the result of a lack of effort. So why should the rest of society pay for the flaws of others?

Seemingly, consumption policies are not compatible with purely meritocratic beliefs. Investment policies, on the other hand, are much more reconcilable with these ideas for three reasons. First, whereas consumption policies tend to be directed at poorer segments of society (Garrizmann et al., 2018), investment policies are not. Citizens of all socio-economic classes benefit from policies such as subsidised childcare and education. To the meritocratic believer this resonates better with perceptions of fairness: rich people should not be punished for their economic success, and therefore have equal access to social services. Second, whereas consumption policies aim to decommodify citizens, investment policies provide them with the tools to compete on the free market. For example, free education enables citizens to obtain a proper diploma which increases economic opportunities. Nonetheless, those that attend any form of education are still forced to put in effort to succeed. If not, he or she will not graduate. In other words, investment policies require citizens to take responsibility - a central component of the meritocratic belief system. Third, I believe it is very well possible that social investments are not perceived to be redistributive measures by the general public. Social investments policies, just like consumption policies, are paid through a progressive taxation system, which makes them intrinsically redistributive. Nonetheless, unlike consumption policies, investment policies function in an indirect manner. Namely, wealth is not directly transferred from the rich to the poor in the form of benefits, but rather through a system of social services. Due to this indirect character, I expect that investment policies will be harder to recognise as redistributive, and will therefore be more popular among people with meritocratic beliefs.

Häusermann et al. (2020) convincingly argue that merely testing support for separate policies is suboptimal. Welfare state politics in advanced welfare states, such as the Netherlands, revolve around relatively minor social policy reforms, and people perceive the fiscal room to manoeuvre in social policy terms to be constrained (Häusermann et al., 2020). In other words, people tend to see such reforms as a zero-sum game: if the government invests in pensions, there are less funds to spend on labour market reintegration services. It is

therefore more informative to examine the *relative importance* that voters attribute to social policies. By presenting a wide range of social policies to which respondents attribute relative importance, I can examine which policies are prioritised. As explained before, investment policies seem to be very compatible with meritocratic beliefs whereas consumption policies are not. Receiving information about inequality by itself will not undermine this belief system. Therefore, investment policies will be relatively popular compared to consumption policies among participants in treatment group I. Exposure to information about unequal educational opportunities, on the other hand, should theoretically undermine meritocratic beliefs. As a result, relative support for consumption policies as opposed to investment policies is expected to be greater among respondents in the second treatment group compared to those in the first treatment group.

H3: Confrontation with the unmeritocratic foundation of economic inequality produces greater relative support for consumption policies over investment policies than being confronted with economic inequality by itself




Figure I: graphic visualisation of the hypotheses 2 and 3

3. Data and method

3.1 Data collection

After designing the survey with Qualtrics, respondents were collected through SurveySwap. SurveySwap is a platform which enables researchers to recruit participants for their studies on an exchange basis. To get participants, one must first fill in other researchers' surveys. As such, SurveySwap differs from other online recruitment platforms (e.g., MTurk and Prolific) by rewarding respondents with a non-monetary incentive.

Using an online recruitment platform has certain advantages. For example, data can be obtained quickly, cheaply and efficiently, and the platform enables researchers to select for demographic characteristics such as nationality. Online platforms, such as SurveySwap, also pose issues to data quality and thus the validity of the research. Two main concerns that threaten data validity are so-called *cheaters* or *speeders* (Smith et al, 2016). Cheaters are participants who misrepresent their identity to ensure inclusion in the study, or participate multiple times. The latter issue can be resolved by using the 'prevent multiple submissions' option on Qualtrics. This setting works by placing a cookie on the browser of a respondent who just finished the survey. When the respondent clicks on the survey link again, Qualtrics prohibits him/her from retaking the survey. The identity misrepresentation issue is less relevant for this study as I do not look for specific demographic groups, except for nationality. When creating an account on SurveySwap, respondents need to fill in their nationality right away and are unable to change this. Speeders, respondents who progress too quickly through the study, pose a more serious threat, taking into account that survey takers are rewarded for each finished survey. Consequently, it is beneficial to finish a survey as quickly as possible. I aim to combat this validity threat by including two attention checks: questions specifically designed to catch speeders (Heppner et al., 2016). After the information treatment, respondents are asked what the topic of the information was. Later in the survey, they are asked to answer 'agree' to a sub-question. Speeders are likely to select incorrect answers, and are subsequently removed before data analysis. Furthermore, SurveySwap uses an algorithm which punishes participants who fill out a survey too quickly, inattentively, or just fill out a straight line.

Another issue of using SurveySwap is that the sample might not be representative. SurveySwap is primarily used by students (attending university or vocational education). Therefore, the sample will most likely consist of young people with a relatively low income. Based on previous empirical findings, these people are likely to be more supportive of

economic redistribution than the average citizen (Ohtake & Tomioka, 2004). However, even if the baseline of support of these respondents is higher than among the general population, I still expect to see different outcomes in attitudes per experimental group.

Therefore, the outcomes of the experiment are still be meaningful. Some recent literature supports this assumption (Druckmann et al., 2011), whereas others are more sceptical of the value of using students as experimental participants (Hanel & Vione, 2016).

3.2 Survey set-up

The survey is designed as follows: 1) pre-treatment question on redistributive preferences; 2) randomised treatment with information differing per treatment group (control group, treatment group I and treatment group II); 3) post-treatment questions on redistribution preferences, support for and prioritisation of specific social policies, and background questions on demographic characteristics and political leanings.

3.3 Analysis

The first two hypotheses are initially tested through an ANOVA test which compares the mean levels of support of each treatment group. Subsequently, I conduct a regression analysis which includes control variables. By creating dummy variables for each treatment group, the treatment effects can be calculated while taking the controls into account. To enhance statistical power in an experimental setting, Clifford et al. (2013) argues that pre-treatment questions, which are similar but not identical to post-treatment questions, should be included as well. As such, respondents are already asked about their views on economic redistribution prior to the information provision. The pre-treatment question is also included as a control variable.

The third hypothesis, which concerns social policy support, is tested in three ways. First, I compare the groups' mean levels of absolute support (on a 1 to 5 Likert scale) for the separate social policies. Second, I compare the groups' mean levels of relative support for the separate social policies. Third, I run two regression analyses with the combined support of the separate policy sets as dependent variables.

3.4 Pre-treatment

The pre-treatment question reads as follows: "Where would you place yourself on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means that income differences should increase, and 5 means that they should decrease?".

3.5 Treatment

Kuziemko et al. (2015) argue the goal of an information treatment is to provide a ‘shock’ to the respondents’ belief system. As such, instead of representing all the nuances of income differences in the Netherlands, the information should be straight-forward and thus easy to understand for respondents. To enhance understanding, a graphical illustration of the information is often added to the treatment (e.g., Kuziemko et al., 2015; Mijs & Hoy, 2021). Furthermore, to minimise concerns about experimental demand effects (when participants infer the purpose of an experiment and respond so as to help confirm the hypothesis), the information should be short and neutrally framed (Haaland et al., 2020). The first group, the control group, is presented with information that is unrelated to economic inequality (smartphone use by age group). This group serves as a baseline, thus allowing to test whether the other informational treatments produce significant differences. Treatment group I receives information about income differences in the Netherlands. Previous studies (García-Sánchez, 2020; Kuziemko et al., 2015) found that merely presenting respondents with factual information about the scope of inequality does not affect redistribution preferences to a great degree. Therefore, treatment group II receives slightly different information: besides the same information about income differences, a couple of sentences about how inequalities in the education system produce these differences are added. Theoretically, this information should undermine meritocratic beliefs and subsequently increase support for economic redistribution. The two treatment conditions are depicted below. The original versions, written in Dutch, and the control treatment, can be found in Appendix A. Data on the income distribution in the Netherlands is derived from the Ministry of Finance (Reuten, 2014). The additional information in Treatment II is taken from Bisschop et al. (2019), and the Dutch Central Statistics Agency (CBS, 2017).

Incomes in the Netherlands are unevenly distributed

After taxes, the richest quarter of the population has €60.000 to spend on average, whereas the poorest quarter has €13.800.




Figure II: Information treatment I

Incomes in the Netherlands are unevenly distributed, which is partially caused by unequal educational opportunities

After taxes, the richest quarter of the population has €60.000 to spend on average, whereas the poorest quarter has €13.800.




Figure III: Information treatment II

3.6 Post-treatment

The main independent variable is *support for economic redistribution*. Respondents indicate on a five-point scale (ranging from 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree') whether they agree with the following statement: "It is the responsibility of the government to reduce differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes" (Bobzien, 2020; García-Sánchez et al., 2020). As mentioned before, this question is similar but not identical to

the pre-treatment question. This allows me to more precisely measure the effect of the treatment.

Second, I examine *support for social policies*, as people do not only differ in the extent to which they support redistribution, they also differ in what kind of measures they believe should be used to redistribute (Fernández-Albertos & Manzano, 2011; Häusermann et al., 2015; Hemerijck, 2013). These measures can roughly be divided into two types of policies: consumption and investment policies. On a five-point scale (ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’) respondents indicate to which extent they agree with the following policy reform proposals: 1) increase old age pension benefits, 2) increase unemployment benefits, 3) expand access to good-quality childcare services, 4) expand services that help reintegrate the long-term unemployed into the labour market, 5) the government should invest more in education (Häusermann et al., 2020). The first two policies serve as proxies for consumption policies, whereas the latter three are social investments.

Third, *social policy priorities* are measured. Häusermann et al. (2020) convincingly argues that merely asking respondents about their social policy preferences neglects differences in relative importance that are attributed to different social policies. People’s priorities are important when it comes to social policies because governments do not have unlimited funds to spend. To measure *social policy priorities*, I make use of a technique called Quadratic Voting (QV). Respondents allocate points between six policy fields, reflecting the importance they attribute to these fields. The question reads as follows: “Now imagine that the government has a limited budget to improve benefits. Meaning you have to choose which fields will be invested in, and which will not be. You can allocate 100 points. Give more points to the fields which should be invested in more extensively in your opinion, and fewer points to the fields in which you consider investments less important: 1) old age pensions, 2) disability benefits, 3) unemployment benefits, 4) higher education, 5) labour market reintegration services, and 6) childcare. As such, respondents are obliged to make a trade-off between consumption and investment policy fields. The relative importance of consumption policies is calculated as the sum of the first three fields, whereas the importance of investment is the sum of the latter three. Häusermann et al. (2020) used the exact same fields, except that they included "services for the social and labour market integration of immigrants" instead of "disability benefits". I disagree with this operationalisation due to the fact that anti-immigration attitudes correlate weakly with redistribution attitudes, and therefore obscure the measurement (Finseraas, 2012). Moreover, it is easier to compare the

sums of investment and consumption policies when both have an equal amount of included policy fields.

Political ideology is measured in two ways. First, respondents indicate for which party they voted in the Dutch Parliamentary elections of 2021. Second, participants respond to an item assessing the extent to which they identify as left-wing or right-wing using a 10-point Likert scale (1 = very left wing, 7 = very right wing). I also control for *age*, *sex*, *income* and *level of education* as previous studies found these characteristics to significantly affect support for economic redistribution (Häusermann et al., 2020; Ohtake & Tomioka, 2004)


4. Results

4.1 Sample

In total, 502 people completed the survey. Three respondents failed attention check I, meaning they did not remember what kind of information they had been shown. Eight people failed the second attention check which asked respondents to fill in ‘agree’ on a specific question. These people were deleted from the analysis as it seems they were ‘speeding’ through the survey, and thus damaged the quality of the data. After removing these respondents, 491 were left. 163 ended up in the control group, whereas both treatment group I and treatment group II contained 164 respondents.

As mentioned before, respondents were gathered through SurveySwap, a platform which enables researchers to recruit participants for their studies on an exchange basis. As a result, most participants are students, who tend to be younger, higher educated and have a lower income than the general population. Table I compares the key demographics of the sample with the general Dutch population to gain more insights on this sample’s representativeness.

Table I: comparison of key demographics between sample and general Dutch population

	Sample	Population
Men	45%	49%
Average age	27.4	40.7
Higher educated	89%	41%
Average income	€ 500-1000	€ 2.816 

· includes people who are currently attending a form of higher education but have not finished yet

·· does not include people who are currently attending a form of higher education but have not finished yet

As Table I indicates, this study’s sample includes slightly more women than average. Differences are starker when it comes to the other three categories. As expected, respondents are much younger than the general population. Moreover, almost nine-in-ten respondents are higher educated, which is much more than the national average (41%). It should be noted that the former includes those who are currently attending a form of higher education but have not finished yet, whereas the latter percentage refers to those having completed either an HBO or a WO education. The table also shows that the respondents indeed have a much lower income

than the average Dutchman as most participants report having a monthly income between 500 and 1000 euros.




Figure IV: voting behaviour of sample and Dutch population during the 2021 General Elections in %

It is to be expected that the political attitudes of the respondents differ from the general population due to the dissimilar demographic characteristics. Graph II indicates that this is indeed the case. Parties that are popular among young voters, such as D66, GroenLinks, Volt and BIJ1, are also more favoured by this study’s respondents. Christian (CDA, CU, SGP), far right (PVV, FvD) and traditional leftist parties (PvdA, SP) receive significantly less support. Right-wing liberal VVD, the winner of the most recent elections, also appears to be less popular in the sample. Overall, respondents seem to be slightly more left-wing than the general population. This hunch is confirmed when comparing their self-placement on a left-right scale with data from ESS (2018). The ESS data shows the average Dutch citizen places him or herself at 5.12 with 0 representing most left and 10 most right. This study’s respondents are almost a single point more left-wing: 4.3. To sum up, we can conclude the respondents of this study are younger, higher educated, more leftist and poorer than the average Dutch citizen which is something to keep in mind when analysing the results.

4.2 Descriptive statistics

Table II: Descriptive statistics of dependent and control variables

	Obs.	Min.	Max.	Mean	SD
Dependent variables					
Economic redistribution (pre-treatment)	491	1	5	3.83	0.90
Economic redistribution (post-treatment)	491	1	5	3.76	0.94
<i>Absolute support for social policies</i>					
Unemployment	491	1	5	2.84	1.08
Pensions	491	1	5	3.29	0.93
Education	491	1	5	4.38	0.74
Childcare	491	1	5	3.99	0.85
Labour market reintegration	491	1	5	4.09	0.81
<i>Relative support for social policies</i>					
Unemployment	491	0	100	11.10	8.37
Pensions	491	0	55	14.38	8.25
Disability	491	0	40	13.78	6.83
Education	491	0	70	26.82	11.32
Childcare	491	0	50	16.76	8.78
Labour market reintegration	491	0	100	17.16	9.08
<i>Combined relative support</i>					
Consumption policies	491	0	100	39.27	13.26
Investment policies	491	0	100	60.73	13.26
Independent variables					
Political ideology (1 = left, 10 = right)	491	1	10	4.30	2.28
Age	491	18	75	27.37	9.51
Education	491	1	3	2.52	0.68
Income	491	1	13	4.24	2.88
Sex (1 = men)	485	0	1	0.44	0.49

Table II provides an overview of the descriptive statistics of the dependent and control variables. There is little difference in the pre- and post-treatment mean scores on support for economic redistribution. In the next part of the analysis, I examine whether this is true for all experimental groups independently. Education is by far the most popular social policy terrain as can be deduced from its high absolute and relative scores. On average, respondents indicate that over a quarter of available funds should be spent on higher education. The other two investment policies, childcare and labour market reintegration, are also more popular than consumption policies. Unemployment benefits are perceived least favourably. Overall, respondents attribute around 60% of the points to investment policies, and 40% to consumption policies. Since the educational level of the respondents was extremely high, I recoded the respondents into three groups. The first group (53 respondents) consists of those that have not attended any form of higher education. The second group (127 respondents) contains respondents who have finished or are currently attending an HBO (university of

applied sciences) education, but have not attended WO (research university). Those that attended or finished WO (305 respondents) are coded as group 3. 40 respondents indicated they would rather not share their salary. In order to keep them included in the analysis, they were given the most common value (500-1000 euros). A robustness check, in which these respondents were deleted from the analysis, resulted in similar findings.

4.3 Assumption checks

One of the main assumptions for regression analysis is the homogeneity of variance of the residuals. If the variance of residuals is non-constant it is referred to as heteroscedastic. By plotting the residuals versus the fitted (predicted) values, it becomes clear that the data is not heteroscedastic. The output from the White test for heteroskedasticity paints a similar picture.

Second, I check for multicollinearity. This term applies to the phenomenon of two or more variables being nearly perfect linear combinations of one another. When this is the case, the estimates for a regression model cannot be calculated properly. The VIF values are <10 , which indicates that multicollinearity is not an issue.

Third, the distribution of the dependent variables is examined. The Likert scale variables seem to be normally distributed. This does not seem to be the case for the relative social policy support items. However, for a regression analysis it is more important that the residuals of a dependent variable are distributed normally than the variable itself (University of Utah, 2021). To test this assumption, I ran a Kernel density plot which shows the residuals follow a normal distribution. This is confirmed after conducting the Resistant Normality Check, which indicates the residuals of both summed variables do not contain severe outliers.

4.4.1 Support for economic redistribution

First, an ANOVA is conducted to examine whether the mean support for economic redistribution differs by experimental group. At first sight, the control group seems to be slightly more in favour of economic redistribution than the two treatment groups, which contradicts the hypothesis. However, the ANOVA indicates the groups do not differ significantly ($p = 0.24$), which suggests the information treatments did not have an effect. The mean redistributive support of the three groups is illustrated in Figure V.




Figure V: Support for economic redistribution with 95% CIs

Merely comparing the mean levels of support for economic redistribution is suboptimal, as this does not take confounding variables into account. To obtain a more detailed picture of the effects of the information treatment, a regression analysis is conducted. To do so, dummy variables are created for each group. As such, table X illustrates the effects on redistributive attitudes for treatment group I (inequality) and treatment group II (inequality and education) compared to the control group.

Table III: regression coefficients with support for economic redistribution as dependent variable

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<i>Treatment group (compared to control)</i>			
I: Inequality	-0.09 (0.10)	-0.13 (0.09)	-0.10 (0.09)
II: Inequality & education	-0.18 (0.10)	-0.16 (0.09)	-0.14 (0.09)
<i>Controls</i>			
Political ideology (1 = left, 10 = right)		-0.18 (0.02) **	-0.10 (0.02) **
Age		0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)
Education		0.11 (0.06) *	0.10 (0.05)
Income		-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)
Sex (1 = men, 2 = women)		-0.05 (0.08)	0.01 (0.07)
Pre-treatment			0.43 (0.04) **
Constant	3.86 (0.07)	4.32 (0.22)	2.35 (0.29)
N	485	485	485
R2	< 0.01	0.21	0.34

Standard errors are in parentheses

** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05

Table X consists of three models. The first model directly estimates the effects of the different types of information treatment on support for economic redistribution without including control variables. Treatment group I is not more in favour of economic redistribution than the control group. This finding is in line with expectations, as previous studies (e.g., Kuziemko, 2015) found that merely informing respondents about the level of inequality in a country does not affect redistributive attitudes significantly. Although the effect is negative, it is not significant ($p=0.4$).

The first model indicates the second hypothesis cannot be accepted. Receiving treatment II even seems to have a negative effect on redistributive attitudes compared to the control group, although we cannot be sure about this as $p = 0.08$. The difference between treatment group I and II is not significant either ($p=0.3$). The explained variance of this model is very low ($r^2 < 0.01$), meaning that less than one percent of the variance can be explained by the different information treatments respondents were presented.

Model II includes the following control variables: political ideology, age, education, income and sex. Two control variables have significant effects on redistributive support: ideology and education. Leftist people are much more inclined to support economic

redistribution than right-wing people ($p < 0.01$). Being higher educated also significantly drives up support for economic redistribution ($p < 0.05$). Controlling for these variables does not change the effects of the information treatments as both treatment I and treatment II still have a negative yet insignificant impact on support for economic redistribution compared to the control group. The explained variance of Model II is 21%.

Model III differs from Model II as it includes the pre-treatment variable as control variable. As could be expected, the effect of the pre-treatment variable is positive ($p < 0.01$), denoting a strong relationship between pre- and post-treatment support for economic redistribution. Inclusion of the pre-treatment variable does not change the other effects to a great degree, although education narrowly loses its significance ($p = 0.06$). The explained variance increases to 34%, which indicates that 13% of the total variance can be explained through the pre-treatment variable. The effects of the information treatments remain negative, yet not significant. Model III is depicted as a regression coefficient plot with 95% confidence intervals in Figure VI.




Figure VI: regression coefficient plot on support for economic redistribution (“It is the responsibility of the government to reduce differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes”)

4.4.2 Support for social policies

The next part of the analysis does not concern the *extent* to which redistribution is supported, but instead *how* the respondents want economic redistribution to take place. The hypothesis here is that consumption policies are incompatible with meritocratic beliefs, whereas investment policies are a much better fit. As such, receiving information about the unmeritocratic foundation of inequality *should* result in more support for consumption policies.

This hypothesis can be tested in a number of ways. First, I examine absolute social policy support. Figure VII illustrates the mean support for social policies by treatment group on a scale of 1 to 5. Investment policies are favoured by all treatment groups. Investments in education are the most popular, whereas respondents are fairly neutral when it comes to pensions and especially unemployment benefits. Running a one-way ANOVA demonstrates that no significant differences emerge between the different treatment groups, as is also illustrated by the overlapping confidence intervals.




Figure VII: Absolute social policy support with 95% CIs

However, as Häusermann et al. (2020) argue, it is better to examine relative support for social policies because people perceive the fiscal room to manoeuvre in social policy terms to be

constrained. To measure relative support, I asked respondents to distribute a total of 100 points to six social policy fields. The mean scores are illustrated in Figure X with 95% confidence intervals. Figure VIII makes it even clearer that respondents are most supportive of investments in higher education. And, once again, we observe that consumption policies are significantly less popular than investment policies. Contrary to expectations, no significant differences emerge between treatment group II and the other groups.




Figure VIII: Relative social policy support with 95% CIs

Next, two variables are computed by summing the scores of the three consumption policies and the three investment policies. These continuous variables can subsequently be used in a regression analysis which includes the same controls as the previous regression (except for pre-treatment redistributive support). Both variables are plotted as dependent variables in Figure IX. As we are specifically interested in the difference between the effects of treatment group I and treatment group II, the plot in Figure IX does not include the control group. Instead, the effects of treatment group II are compared with group I. Since respondents had to attribute a total of 100 points to the social policy fields, the combined consumption variable and the combined investment variable are interconnected. For example: if a respondent

attributes 60 points to consumption policies, he or she awards 40 points to investment policies. As a result, the coefficients of the two variables in figure IX are mirrored.

Figure IX indicates that treatment group II indeed seems to attribute slightly more importance to consumption policies than group I. However, as the confidence interval crosses zero, we cannot confirm the hypothesis ($p = 0.5$). The only significant effect is education level. Higher educated respondents heavily favour investment policies over consumption policies. Intuitively, this makes sense, as ‘education’ is one of the social investment policy fields. However, additional analyses indicate that higher educated people are also significantly more supportive towards investments in childcare ($p < 0.01$) and labour market reintegration ($p = 0.05$), whereas they perceive unemployment benefits ($p < 0.01$) and pensions ($p < 0.01$) more negatively. This seems to confirm the assumption that differences in support for investment and consumption policies are mainly driven by educational cleavages, although we need to be careful with this claim due to the fact that respondents in this study are much higher educated than the general population. Moreover, it seems like leftist people tend to be more in favour of consumption policies than those with a right-wing ideology, although we cannot be sure of this effect as the confidence intervals overlap.




Figure IX: regression coefficients of information treatment and control variables with consumption policies and investment policies as dependent variables

5. Conclusion

The main goal of this study was to broaden our understanding of what drives public support for economic redistribution. Despite growing economic inequality in Western countries, concern about inequality and support for economic redistribution has remained stable, or even decreased. Previous studies found that this cannot be attributed to a lack of knowledge about inequality (Kuziemko et al., 2015). This finding was confirmed in this study as those that were informed about economic inequality by itself did not show greater support for redistribution than the control group. Recent literature argues that this is caused by an increasing belief in meritocracy (Mijs, 2019). Alesina et al. (2018) found there is some truth to the assumption that these beliefs are related to redistributive attitudes. In an experimental setting, they found that presenting negative information about intergenerational mobility (a key sign of meritocracy) increased support for economic redistribution.

Inspired by Alesina et al., I tested this mechanism in a Dutch context, albeit in a different way. Instead of informing respondents about the lack of intergenerational mobility, I provided information about the relationship between economic inequality and its unmeritocratic foundation in the education system. Education has long been considered ‘the great equaliser’ in the Netherlands. This notion is important in the meritocratic belief system, as access to free and high-quality schools can level the playing field for children from disadvantaged backgrounds. As a result, children of rich and poor parents *should* have equal chances to have a successful educational career, and subsequently obtain a proper societal position (Biesta, 2020). However, recent reports argue that the equalising ability of the educational system is under threat, as students from poor families are provided with less opportunities to succeed (Inspectie voor het Onderwijs, 2016; Inspectie voor het Onderwijs, 2018). I hypothesised that informing respondents about how these educational inequalities are related to economic inequality would undermine meritocratic beliefs, and subsequently result in increased support for economic redistribution. However, the regression analysis indicated that the respondents who were confronted with this information were not more supportive towards economic redistribution than the control group (who were presented with information that was irrelevant to inequality) and treatment group I (who were presented with information about economic inequality by itself). In other words, receiving information about how educational inequalities are linked to economic inequality does not result in more support for economic redistribution.

Besides examining whether information provision affects support for redistribution, I also analysed whether this affects how respondents want redistribution to take place. Recent

literature divides social policies into two types: consumption and investment policies. Consumption policies (e.g., unemployment benefits) function in a direct manner, whereas investment policies (e.g. investments in higher education) function indirectly and its goals are more long-term (Beramendi et al., 2015; Bonoli, 2004). I expected investment policies to be a much better fit to meritocratic beliefs due to their indirect and commodifying nature. Therefore, I hypothesised that confrontation with the unmeritocratic foundation of inequality would result in greater relative support for consumption policies over investment policies than being confronted with inequality by itself. This hypothesis was rejected as well, as no effects were detected whether measured in absolute or relative levels.

To conclude, all analyses point in the same direction: demonstrating the unmeritocratic educational foundation of inequality does not affect redistributive attitudes nor does it affect how people want redistribution to take place in the Netherlands.

6. Discussion

The absence of effects can be explained by a number of factors which I divide into four categories: sample, treatment, theory, and negative experimental demand effects.

First, the most obvious explanation: the sample's lack of representativeness. The participants have a fairly low income, are younger, higher educated, and more left-wing than the general population. These characteristics tend to positively affect support for economic redistribution (Ohtake & Tomioka, 2004). Therefore, the baseline of support for redistribution was fairly high, leaving less room for an increase in support among those that were presented with treatment II. However, comparing the mean level of support for economic redistribution of the sample to ESS data from 2018 indicates differences are not as stark as one would think. The mean of Dutch ESS respondents, who are representative of the general population, is 3.56 on a five-point scale (ESS, 2018). Participants of this study had a slightly higher mean score of 3.76, but differences are more evident when it comes to ideological self-placement on a ten-point left-right scale (5.12 versus 4.30) (ESS, 2018).

A second possible explanation can be sought in the information treatment itself. Kuziemko (2015) argues that information treatments should be a 'shock' to the belief system in order to elicit an attitudinal change. Perhaps the information that was presented was too subtle to do so. I decided to show income differences instead of differences in wealth because there is a lack of agreement among economists on how to calculate wealth inequality properly (Van Bavel, 2014), and income inequality is more strongly linked to unequal

educational opportunities. However, wealth inequality in the Netherlands is much more extensive than income inequality (Van Bavel & Frankema, 2013). As a result, displaying wealth inequality might have caused a more severe shock to the respondents' belief system. After all, wealth inequality is to a large degree caused by inheritances (Van Bavel, 2014), a profoundly unmeritocratic source of income since inheritances are purely the product of accidents of birth. Future studies could examine whether confrontation with wealth inequality impacts support for redistribution differently than confrontation with income inequality does.

It is also possible that some of the theoretical assumptions underlying this study are incorrect. One of the main assumptions is that respondents tend to have meritocratic beliefs. This seemed reasonable as recent studies indeed found that Dutch people generally believe that meritocratic factors (e.g., hard work) are much more relevant 'to get ahead' in life than non-meritocratic factors (e.g., class) (Steijn et al., 2016). Including questions in the survey to check this assumption could have been helpful. Perhaps, this study's participants did not have such meritocratic beliefs to begin with. In that case, the information treatment did not undermine their belief system and did not alter their redistributive attitudes. The respondents primarily differ from the general population because of their youth, low income and high education. Previous studies found that young people tend to have stronger meritocratic beliefs (Reynolds & Xian, 2014), while the opposite is true for low-income people (Duru-Bellat & Tenret, 2012), and findings are more ambiguous when it comes to education (Steijn et al, 2016; Duru-Bellat & Tenret, 2012). As a result, it is not very likely that the meritocratic beliefs of the respondents differ greatly from those of the general population.

Alternatively, respondents in treatment group II did become more concerned about inequality without this concern manifesting itself in more support for economic redistribution. In other words, people can believe economic inequality to be an important issue without thinking the government should be responsible for solving it. Perhaps, they think inequality can better be countered by the free market. However, I do not find this explanation very likely due to the participants' leftist ideological attitudes.

Besides greater support for economic redistribution, I also hypothesised that being informed about the unmeritocratic foundation of inequality would result in greater relative support for consumption policies over investment policies, as the latter set of policies is a much better fit for the meritocratic belief system. The argument behind this expectation was threefold: 1) investment policies are perceived to be fairer than consumption policies as they target the entire population, instead of only the needier segments 2) investment policies

demand recipients to take responsibility and 3) investment policies function in an indirect manner which obscures their redistributive nature. Nevertheless, the information treatment did not significantly increase relative support for consumption policies. This lack of effect could be caused by the reasons mentioned before. Perhaps the information was not ‘shocking’ enough to alter the respondents’ belief system, or respondents did become more concerned about inequality but did not expect the government to solve this issue through specific policies. Alternatively, the alleged harmony between investment policies and meritocratic beliefs may not exist after all. Future studies could take a step back and systematically examine this relationship through a survey which includes items on social policy priorities and beliefs on necessary conditions ‘to get ahead in life’.

And finally, in section 3.5, I wrote that information treatments should be short and framed neutrally to prevent so-called experimental demand effects (EDEs). EDEs take place when participants infer the purpose of an experiment and respond so as to help confirm the hypothesis. This probably did not occur as none of the information treatments had a positive effect. However, negative experimental demand effects can also occur. Perhaps, respondents did infer the purpose, but were not inclined to help the researcher and therefore went in the opposite direction of what they perceive to be the study’s intentions (Mummolo and Peterson, 2019). Studies that use online survey pools tend to have smaller treatment effects than studies conducted with randomly selected participants (Chandler et al., 2015). As experienced online participants are presumably better at discerning experimenter intentions than random people, this suggests that online participants are more negativistic experimental subjects who do not aim to validate hypotheses (Mummolo & Peterson, 2019). As such, it is possible that the experienced SurveySwap participants inferred the hypothesis and decided not to play along. Including a question in the end in which participants were asked about their perception of the survey’s aim could have shined a light on whether this assumption could be true or not.

All in all, exposing respondents to the unmeritocratic foundation of inequality through information on unequal opportunities in the education system did not result in greater support for redistribution, nor did it lead to greater relative support for consumption policies over investment policies. Future research could uncover whether this is caused by the lack of representativeness of the data or by more fundamental factors like the information treatment itself, or the theoretical assumptions.

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
<https://campusguides.lib.utah.edu/c.php?g=160853&p=1054157>

Appendix A: Information treatment per experimental group

Control group

Nederlandse jongeren gebruiken vaker een smartphone dan ouderen


Meer dan 9 op de 10 van de Nederlanders tussen 12 en 45 jaar oud gebruikt een smartphone, onder 75-plussers ligt aandeel veel lager (27%)



Treatment group I

Inkomens in Nederland zijn ongelijk verdeeld


Na belastingen heeft het rijkste kwart van de bevolking gemiddeld €60.000 te besteden, en het armste kwart €13.800.



Treatment group II

Inkomens in Nederland zijn ongelijk verdeeld en dat komt deels door ongelijke kansen in het onderwijs

Na belastingen heeft het rijkste kwart van de bevolking gemiddeld €60.000 te besteden, en het armste kwart €13.800.



Appendix B: Consent form

Beste deelnemer,

Mijn naam is Asher van der Schelde. Ik volg een onderzoeksmaster sociologie aan de Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam. Hierbij wil ik u vragen deel te nemen aan het onderzoek dat wordt uitgevoerd voor mijn masterscriptie.

Onderzoeksdoel en procedure

Het doel van deze studie is om meer te weten te komen over hoe mensen denken over enkele sociaal-economische onderwerpen. Als u akkoord gaat met deelname aan het onderzoek krijgt u informatie te zien die u goed door moet nemen. Daarna stel ik u enkele vragen over uw mening ten aanzien van een aantal beleidsvoorstellen. Ten slotte vraag ik u naar enkele achtergrondkenmerken.

Uw deelname

Als er iets onduidelijk is over het onderzoek kunt u mij altijd een e-mail sturen (asher.vanderschelde@gmail.com). Als u tijdens de survey besluit dat u toch niet deel wilt nemen kunt u het proces afbreken. Uw antwoorden worden dan niet verwerkt. U wordt niet gevraagd naar persoonlijke kenmerken zoals uw naam of woonplaats, waardoor deelname volledig anoniem is. Vanwege de anonimiteit is het niet mogelijk u terug te trekken uit de studie nadat u de survey heeft afgerond. Er zijn geen risico's verbonden aan deelname.

Databescherming

Datacollectie, analyse en opslag gebeuren in overeenstemming met de wettelijke voorwaarden. De geanonimiseerde data zal worden opgeslagen op een met een wachtwoord beveiligde computer of op een veilige locatie van de Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam.

Vervolgens zal de data worden gearchiveerd waarna het alleen toegankelijk is voor verder wetenschappelijk onderzoek.

Door op het pijltje te klikken, geeft u aan tenminste 18 jaar oud te zijn, bovenstaande informatie te hebben gelezen en akkoord te gaan met vrijwillige deelname aan het onderzoek.

Asher van der Schelde
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
asher.vanderschelde@gmail.com

Appendix C: Survey

Sommige mensen vinden dat de verschillen in inkomens in Nederland groter moeten worden. Anderen dat ze kleiner moeten worden. Natuurlijk zijn er ook mensen met een mening die daar tussenin ligt. Waar zou u uzelf plaatsen op een schaal van 1 t/m 5, waarbij 1 betekent dat inkomensverschillen groter moeten worden en 5 dat ze kleiner moeten worden?

1 (inkomensverschillen moeten groter worden)	2	3	4	5 (inkomensverschillen moeten kleiner worden)
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Waar ging de informatie over die u te zien kreeg?

Klimaatverandering

Verschillen tussen arm en rijk

Immigratie

Europese Unie

In hoeverre bent u het eens of oneens met de volgende uitspraak? "Het is de verantwoordelijkheid van de overheid om inkomensverschillen te verkleinen tussen mensen met een hoog inkomen en mensen met een laag inkomen."

Helemaal oneens	Oneens	Neutraal	Eens	Helemaal eens
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

In hoeverre bent u het eens met de volgende beleidsvoorstellen?

	Helemaal oneens	Oneens	Neutraal	Eens	Helemaal eens
Verhoging van pensioenen	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Verhoging van werkloosheidsuitkeringen	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Kijken of u nog oplet: klik op 'eens'	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Meer investeren in onderwijs	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Betere toegang regelen tot goede kinderopvang	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Betere begeleiding tot de arbeidsmarkt voor langdurig werklozen	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Stel je voor dat de overheid beperkte middelen heeft waardoor het niet op alle beleidsterreinen veel kan investeren.

U kunt 100 punten verdelen. Geef meer punten aan de beleidsterreinen die u belangrijk vindt, en minder aan de beleidsterreinen die u minder belangrijk vindt.

Arbeidsongeschiktheidsuitkering	<input type="text" value="0"/>
Hoger onderwijs	<input type="text" value="0"/>
Arbeidsmarktreïntegratie	<input type="text" value="0"/>
Pensioenen	<input type="text" value="0"/>
Kinderopvang	<input type="text" value="0"/>
Werkloosheidsuitkering	<input type="text" value="0"/>
Totaal	<input type="text" value="0"/>

In de politiek wordt soms gesproken over "links" en "rechts". Waar zou u zich op deze schaal plaatsen, waarbij 0 links en 10 rechts betekent?



Op welke partij heeft u bij de laatste Tweede Kamerverkiezingen op 17 maart 2021 gestemd?

VVD

D66

CDA

PVV

CU

SGP

SP

PvdA

GroenLinks

PvdD

DENK

Volt

FvD

50Plus

BIJ1

BBB

Andere partij

Blanco

Weet ik niet

Wil ik niet zeggen

Ik heb niet gestemd

Wat is uw geslacht?

Man

Vrouw

Niet-binair

Zeg ik liever niet

Wat is uw leeftijd? (uitgedrukt in cijfers)

Wat is uw hoogst genoten opleiding (met of zonder diploma)?

Geen opleiding

Basisschool

VMBO

Havo

Vwo

MBO

HBO

WO-bachelor

WO-master of doctoraat

Anders

Zeg ik liever niet

Wat is uw bruto maandinkomen?

Geen inkomen

€500 of minder

€501 t/m €1000

€1001 t/m €1500

€1501 t/m €2000

€2001 t/m €2500

€2501 t/m €3000

€3001 t/m €3500

€3501 t/m €4000

€4001 t/m €4500

€4501 t/m €5000

€5001 t/m €7500

Meer dan €7500

Weet ik niet

Zeg ik liever niet

Hartelijk dank voor uw deelname. De survey die u net heeft afgerond betrof een experiment. Respondenten werden in drie groepen willekeurig opgedeeld. Om erachter te komen hoe opvattingen over economische herverdeling worden beïnvloed kregen deze groepen verschillende soorten informatie te zien. Aan de hand uw antwoorden in het latere deel van de survey kan ik analyseren of de verschillende informatiebronnen hebben geleid tot andere opvattingen. Mocht u geïnteresseerd zijn in de uitkomsten van het onderzoek, kunt u mij mailen op asher.vanderschelde@gmail.com.

Voor SurveySwap-gebruikers --> <https://surveyswap.io/sr/hFmx2kPKGaELjcXG>
Completion code: 8CC1B25A