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The logo for the International Institute of Social Studies, featuring the word "Erasmus" in a stylized, cursive script.

# Post-War economies: The social and Solidarity economic actor of the FARC-EP ex-combatants in Colombia

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# Post-War economies: The social and solidarity economic actor of FARC-EP Ex-combatants' in Colombia.

## Abstract

Colombia experienced one of the longest civil wars in contemporary history. After several attempts to make peace, finally after more than 50 years, in 2016 the final peace agreement with the FARC-EP and the Colombian government was signed. In 2019, a survey developed by the National Agency for Reincorporation (ANR) concluded that 95,7% (10.415) ex-combatants aspire to have a productive business. On the other hand, only 4.3% of ex-combatants want to be part of the labour market (Agencia Nacional Para la Reincorporacion, 2019). In the agreement, FARC-EP established a collective economic reinsertion program based on the Social and Solidarity Economy (SSE) principles, mainly creating a cooperative called ECOMUN that serves as an umbrella for several territorial cooperatives and other associate projects of the ex-combatants in their local territories. For FARC-EP, this cooperative is a mechanism of peace that they already had implemented in their organization in times of war. The innovative of this type of reintegration shed light of new ways to understand the SSE actors. The focus of this research is to understand the historical roots that led the former guerrilla to willingly and collectively decided to integrate SSE models rooted in their history as a peasants movement, as military insurgency, as narcotraffic actors and now as a former guerrilla. Understanding the nuances of the solidarity actor of FARC-EP in war and in times of peace is at the heart of this research paper. Also, the challenge of reintegration due to an institutional government and communities that recognize the ex-combatants as such, while neglects them due to their past, thus constraining their collective reintegration.

**Keywords:** *Social and Solidarity Economy, Reintegration, FARC-EP, War, Peace, Ex-combatants, Post-war Economics, Colombia.*

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## *List of Acronyms*

ECOMUN	Economías Sociales del Común
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
FARC-EP	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - Ejército del Pueblo
SSE	Social and Solidarity Economy
RNR	Colombian National Register of Reincorporation
ANR	Colombian National agency for Reincorporation
UP	Union Patriótica
NP	National Pact

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# Chapter 1: Introduction

## 1.1 Overview of the Topic

On the 24<sup>th</sup> of November of 2016 the former President of Colombia Juan Manuel Santos signed the final peace agreement with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias of Colombia - Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP), ending a 50 year civil war in Colombia. The final agreement was a product of a six-year negotiation that encapsulated strong polarization between different political parties and citizens of the country. According to (Garcia and Alvarez, 2020), 14,187 ex-combatants voluntarily and collectively opted to agree on the terms of the negotiations and established a route for their reintegration into civil life. The reintegration of ex-combatants included three pillars namely: social reintegration, economic integration, and political reintegration. Under this umbrella, FARC-EP established with the government a “collaborative model of social and economic reincorporation with emphasis in an associative, collective and communal proposal of solidarity economy, sustained in a series of local and territorial cooperatives embedded in a national cooperative named Economías Sociales del Común (ECOMUN)” (Garcia and Alvarez, 2020).

Four years after the signing of the peace agreement in Colombia, much focus has been highlighted on the ongoing outcomes of the peace process and the former ex-FARC-EP militants. In particular, there has been a strong focus on the progress of the economic reinsertion programs that were established in the agreement, and sporadic reports such as (Martinez, Lefebvre, and Fundación Ideas para la Paz, 2019) had been released to understand this progress. By July 2019, a survey developed by the National Agency for Reincorporation (ANR) concluded that 95,7% (10,415) ex-combatants aspire to have a productive business and are in the process of developing a social and economic civil life reincorporation. On the other hand, according to the same report, only 4.3% of ex-combatants want to be part of the labour market (Agencia Nacional Para la Reincorporación, 2019).

The choices of their FARC-EP reintegration are unique in post-conflict phases in civil wars since they collectively formulate different integration mechanisms and in contradiction to the mainstream advisory of individual frameworks promoted by United Nations and The Colombian government in past demobilization processes with other former guerrillas (Garcia and Alvarez, 2020). These frameworks are established under the Disarmament, demobilization, and Reintegration programs (DDR). Based on the understanding of the United Nations, DDR is defined as the “processes of the removal of the arms from the hand of the ex-combatants, the retirement of the ex-combatants from military structures and the assistance to these ex-combatants for a social and economic reinsertion into a civil life” (Garcia and Alvarez, 2020 based on ONU, 2006, p.6). Countries like Sierra Leona, Liberia, Mozambique, and Colombia had experience not only war but also different kinds of DDR interventions.

The intention of DDR frameworks entails both short-term goals as the elimination of weapons in conflict areas, and long-term goals that create the proper long-lasting stability in space and time that can incentivize the no repetition of conflicts. For example, (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007) explore the possibility of understanding the limitations at the micro-level and understanding how and if the reintegration of ex-Sierra Leona ex-combatants was successful. In their surveys to more than 1,000 ex-combatants, (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007) research suggests that DDR processes should change, including contextualization and intersectionality of the ex-combatants being part of such programs. Also, the authors recognized that processes of DDR framework for Sierra Leona ex-combatants there is no satisfactory evidence that one person not included in the program was not equally successful as a person that went through a DDR program (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007). In Sierra Leona, after the process of disarming and demobilization, ex-combatants received “reinsertion allowances, counselling, and



eventually transportation to a local community where they elected to live permanently. In the community, ex-combatants benefited from training programs (largely vocational skills, including auto repair, furniture-making, etc.) designed to ease their re-entry into the local economy" (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007). In Sierra Leona, the reinsertion activities were mainly aimed to integrate the ex-combatants into traditional labour markets in their communities.

Liberia is also another contemporary case of study regarding DDR programs. (Paes, 2006) provides insights on the challenges of the Liberia DDR process based on data from the organizations that curated and led the DDR framework. The proposed reintegration processes entailed asking ex-combatants to settle in the country, and around 45% - approx. 30.000 people- choose to settle in the capital (Paes, 2006), which created a burden for ex-combatants to earn a living in a poor city without job opportunities and many displaced refugees. In terms of economic incentives, the economic reinsertion process negotiated in Liberia entailed an allowance of USD 150 once disarmed, and another USD 150 allowance once settled in their new communities. Furthermore, the lack of funding, estimated in USD 44 million, created a financial burden on the reintegration process. It is estimated that there were 57.000 ex-combatants without reinsertion monetary allowance (Paes, 2006). Moreover, "programs in existence seem to favour formal and vocational training. Given the weak absorption capacity of the labour market, it was important to steer ex-combatants away from the narrow confines of a traditional formal job (such as car mechanic) and towards a more comprehensive curriculum featuring 'life skills'" (...) important to enabling former combatants to take their economic future into their own life's (...) In this context, micro-lending could play a very important role in Liberia, but was notably absent" (Paes, 2006).

In contrast, Zimbabwe reinsertion program after the conflict has differentiated characteristics compared to Sierra Leona and Liberia. The ruling party in Zimbabwe was allegedly aligned with socialist ideologies. Therefore, "the party sought to retain ex-combatant support and build power and legitimacy by using ex-combatants in at least two ways. It deployed ex-combatants into cooperatives that symbolized economic transformation toward socialism, and it gave ex-combatants (...) privileged access to employment and training in the bureaucracy and private sector"(Kriger, 2003, p. 141). It was a dual reinsertion framework of collectiveness and insertion in traditional labour for ex-combatants. However, (Kriger, 2003, p. 142) mentioned that the ex-combatants were never in favour of forming collective institutions. In this context, "by 1987 many cooperatives had collapsed and those that continued function had not lifted ex-combatants from the very low standards of living they had hoped to escape"(Kriger, 2003, p. 142). In a "1980 survey of ex-combatants in assembly camps who wants to demobilize. Nearly 80 percent wanted jobs, and only 4 percent were interested in agricultural employment"(Kriger, 2003, p. 141). The cooperatives created in Zimbabwe defaulted after some time. According to (Kriger, 2003) some of the reasons include negligence of ex-combatants to work together since there was no obligation for them to continue to do so since there were not in war. It is also acknowledged by (Kriger, 2003), that even if the government increased their labour force by hiring a great number of ex-combatants, many of them were jobless, similar to the case in Sierra Leona and Liberia.

In Colombia, the ex-combatants took a different stand compared to the DDR historical recommendations of the United Nations on that a successful reinsertion process would imply the elimination of the power structures in the Guerrilla (Garcia and Alvarez, 2020). To the contrary, FARC-EP and the government agreed "that a collaborative social and economic reincorporation, with emphasis in an associative, collective and communitarian solidarity economy, sustain in a series of territorial and local cooperatives integrated into a national cooperative called Economias Sociales del Comun (ECOMUN)" (Garcia and Alvarez, 2020). The key argument is that the decision of a collective reintegration and the associative methods agreed, are founded on the theoretical frameworks of The Social and Solidarity Economy (SSE). The SSE is defined as the type of economy that doesn't prioritize profits. Instead, these types of economic models put people, and their environment first in order for them to gain control as an economic actor

that “shift towards decommodified economic activities” (Utting, 2015). Together, the “SSE is increasingly used to refer to forms of economic activity that prioritize social and often environmental objectives, and involve producers, workers, consumers, and citizens acting collectively and in solidarity”(Utting, 2015).

The relevance of this research is focus on the particularities of the complexity of the war and post war times in Colombia. While many organizations foreign and domestic are focusing on auditing and verifying the progress of the implementation of the peace agreements such as (Martinez, Lefebvre, and Fundacion Ideas para la Paz, 2019) and (Agencia Nacional Para la Reincorporacion, 2019), little focus has been given in understanding the particularities of the economic collective reinsertion part of the agreements. The latter is surprising since, within the promise of maintaining a long-lasting peace, the social, political, and economic collective reinsertion of ex-combatants in their communities is crucial for ex-combatants living a good life and avoid recidivism into illegal activities.

The issue of reinsertion becomes unique in Colombia due to the innovative statutory topics signed in the peace agreement in Colombia. The ex-combatants of the FARC-EP had clearly shown a disposition and had worked towards creating a new economy in Colombia: The SSE. The ex-combatant’s intention is to continue working with their fellows’ comrades in productive projects through the creation of a cooperative called ECOMUN. In this sense, the main purpose of this research paper is to understand the nuances and complexities of the FARC-EP SSE ideology towards the creation of the ECOMUN. The latter is important because it can contribute to the SSE literature in the specific case of a military group that holds to the principles of SSE while being intersectional. Clashing and also being supported from institutions like the state, local communities, war on drugs and illicit trade in the post-war economics. The latter was potentially informed by the processes in which armed groups were created in 1950 as a socially excluded peasant communities and exacerbated by a capitalistic model that neglected their access for land, land redistribution, and ways of production as small farmers. For that reason, this paper will focus on understanding FARC-EP as a social group that became military insurgents and decided to negotiate peace collectively as SSE actor in line with their ideological history. This research will try to answer the following questions:

What are the historical roots that lead to the FARC-EP decided to follow a Social and Solidarity Economy economic model through the umbrella of cooperatives as a collective reinsertion mechanism into the civil life in the context of the Disarmament demobilization and reinsertion (DDR) framework of peace agreement signed with the Colombian government?

In this sense, what type of Social and solidarity Economic actor was the FARC-EP in their transition from peasants’ communities, a military guerrilla, in their relationship with narcotraffic trade and towards the signature of the peace agreement?

And finally, what type of Social and Solidarity economic actor is the former FARC-EP in the context of the post-war economies after the signed peace agreement with the Colombian government in 2016?

To answer these questions, the research paper is organized as follows. First, I will explain the methodology used to collect the data for analysis. In chapter two, I will set the scene by showcasing the different historical pathways and conceptions of the social and solidarity economy (SSE) based on studies from scholars in the subject. I will include the nuances of the SSE in Latin America and the roots from which solidarity arise. I will finalize the first chapter portraying some of the limitations of the SSE. In chapter three I will briefly explain the Colombian 50 years of civil conflict and the particularities of the signed agreement. In chapter four, I will analyse the FARC-EP SSE actor's historical evolution from being marginalized peasants to military and narcotraffic actor. In chapter five I will showcase the progress of the peace agreement and the collective productive projects with the lenses of SSE. In chapter six, I will critically highlight how these approaches to marginalization’s of SSE intertwined or inform the economic dynamics of the FARC-EP, ideologically and in practice. At the end of the chapter, I will critically reflect an

SSE actor that intersected at the margin of the state. The latter will help me to answer the research question and sub question with the lenses of SSE. In chapter 7, I will conclude by portraying how the findings and analysis can nurture the SSE literature through a process of war and post-war economics using FARC-EP as the main actor that have use resources of SSE depending on the environment that the organization encountered; as enforced by its military power in times of war, as a protector of peasants in times of coca trade and also as a resource for peace in the post-war times.

## **1.2 Methodology**

The research paper will be based on an archival review. On the one hand, the research paper will use SSE literature review to understand the theoretical framework that will help me inform The SSE nuances and analyse how FARC-EP is considered an SSE actor. I will use literature from different scholars in the matter such as (Utting, 2015), (Laville, 2015), (Coraggio, 2015),(Amin, Cameron and Hudson, 2002), among others. I will use secondary data of interviews with members of the former FARC-EP, revise legal statutory documents of ECOMUN, press releases of times of war and after the peace agreement, public documents of the tenth national conferences made by the FARC-EP when they were an active military actor across more than fifty years. Such conferences are considered as the “charter of principles” (Lematre and Helmsing, 2012) of their demands. Part of these documentation is public, and the Guerrilla released it in the times of war.

However, some of these conferences were erased from the public domains when the peace agreement was signed, for that matter I will use secondary data regarding these conferences based on historical and biographical analysis of FARC-EP made by (Centro Nacional de Memoria Historica, 2014). Other secondary information and interviews of FARC-EP integrants and its history are obtained through scholars in the matter such as (Pécaut, 2008), (Centro Nacional de Memoria Historica, 2014),(Rodriguez and Torres, 2020), among others, that had been documented in the times of the conflict and after the peace agreement was signed. In addition, I will use reports of the status of the peace agreement such as (Agencia Nacional Para la Reincorporacion, 2019) (Martinez, Lefebvre, and Fundacion Ideas para la Paz, 2019) and (Garcia and Alvarez, 2020). Finally, I will conduct a phone call interview with a person who decided to be interviewed anonymously and worked with members of a cooperative of ex-combatants created under the umbrella of the ECOMUN in the municipality of Putumayo, in Colombia, and that created a social and solidarity economy institution.

For the analysis, I will systematize the political and economic claims of the FARC-EP. These documents will be compiled and analyzed in chronological order from the first public FARC-EP claims of agrarian reforms to other claims of the FARC-EP in the past failed peace negotiations in Colombia. The latter includes a mixture of documentation and analysis across time that will support answering the research question. The systematization will allow me to situate the SSE ideological framework of the FARC-EP with the theory of SSE and inform the complexity behind the SSE FARC-EP actor and its nuances.

## **1.3 Scope and limitations**

The main limitation of this research paper is the limited previous research on cooperatives and social and solidarity economies of a military actor that decided to reintegrate its community into civil life in a collective matter as a means to long-lasting peace in post-war economies. In this sense, even if in the case of Colombia, the SSE alternative is the main economic pillar in the economic reintegration section of the DDR framework of the peace agreement, the process is still ongoing and is in its early inception. The latter put a strong limitation on understanding and analyzing how the social economy can support ex-combatants in their reintegration process. Following this limitation, the intention is to understand the complex processes of ex combatants as social economy actors and their activities in times of war and

peace, rather than propose policy shifts and mechanisms to support the peace process. Also, this limitation portrays that, even if the process towards SSE for the ex-combatants signed in the peace process might serve the purpose of the FARC-EP, it does not mean that it will work in other contexts of civil society war in other countries.

#### **1.4 Relevance to development studies**

This essay intends to contribute to the understanding of the complexity of the Social and Solidarity Economic theoretical framework by analysing the case of a military insurgency that in is dichotomy understand itself as a Social and Solidarity Economic actor. Through archival review of the process of exclusion and within the framework of economic reintegration processes in peace agreements, this research paper aims to support the discussion on Social and Solidarity Economic and by who? Critical reflecting that actors in the case of the FARC-EP are in the margin of the state, intersecting between peasantry, insurgency, in narcotraffic activities, and Social and Solidarity Economic institutions. Through a critical SSE debate, the present paper evaluates the FARC-EP's nuances in the dimensions mentioned above rooted in the local economies.

### **Chapter 2: The Social and Solidarity Economy (SSE)**

The following chapter will analyse the social and solidarity economy. I will start by portraying the historical path of the social economy. It is not intended to debate when and where the social economy was created, rather to encapsulate the different moments in time where the social economy started to have a body that resulted in the imperativeness to provide definitions due to different socio political and economic context. In that sense, different conceptions of the social economy appeared in different timelines through the relationship of historical contexts. Thus, the chapter will explain different debates on the social economy and different ways of seeing. In this imaginary, the chapter will emphasize that different meanings of the social economy are valid in its own term and within theoretical frameworks that explain the moments in which are define.

#### **2.1 Historical pathways of Social and solidarity Economy**

The importance of understanding the historical pathway of the social and solidarity economy is not to understanding its creation, rather than understand the specific moments that required to materialize the concept beyond the idea. It is understood that humans had worked in social solidarity activities for hundreds of years, but it was in nineteenth century that communities needed a definition based on the differentiated ways that society started to be built upon, including the relationship between the human agents, the economy, and the state (Polanyi, 2001). The latter implies that, as these relationships changed, the meanings of social and solidarity economy changed as well.

In the nineteenth century, the concept of modernity starts taken place and with it a strong focus on leaving historical processes of kinship, family, and religion. In this context, human beings acquired "awareness of the societal bonds that connect them"(Laville, 2015, p. 42). People started to organize themselves in specific ways within specific topics that connected them through types of associations and "consequently, the move into modernity was not simple a move from community to society, rather, it was characterized by the condition of an open political community that overcome differences and promotes equality through the recognition of public spaces" (Laville, 2015, p. 42). However, this also possessed a

contradiction since, people that for any reason were denied for their rights decided to gather to also pronounce against their exclusion. In this sense “The solidarity that was being called upon to claim a more open public space was also to organize the economy on an egalitarian basis” (Laville, 2015, p. 42). Hence, for parts of the nineteenth century, solidarity was based on the collective action of workers that were involved in protests demanding democracy: economic and political.

In the second part of the nineteenth century, the concept of solidarity drastically changed due to an “evolutive pessimistic perspective of liberalism (...) which recommended both helping the poor and controlling their behaviour” (Laville, 2015, p. 42). In this sense, the modernity conceptual meaning of solidarity in the early nineteenth century changed to a more altruistic, philanthropic view. Therefore, institutionalizing morality from the high class towards the poor, replacing “the fight for equality with the fight against poverty” (Laville, 2015, p. 42). This period is historically conceived as the momentum of the industrial revolution and economic growth. Individualism within the market took place, as well in the society at large, making the philanthropic solidarity an individualism mechanism for supporting different spheres of human condition, thus replacing the workers associations and collective actions of the past.

In the twentieth century the discourses changed, it was apparent that overall social needs could not be solely resolved individually and altruistic. The failures of the market started to become evident, and the role of meeting people’s needs relied on the state and public policy. In this sense, “the holistic vision of society as more as the sum of the individuals of which was composed (...) stressed the public dimension of solidarity, centred on rights”(Laville, 2015, p. 43). Thus, the concept of solidarity was drastically changed from previous ways of seeing. After the Second World War, society entered a Keynesian economic model, a separation of the social and the market, hence the “social state became the so-called welfare state”(Laville, 2015, p. 44). This entailed that the state was in charged with the provision of social security in all aspects for the citizens. In turn, since the state oversaw the social, the associations and collective movements of the citizens were diminished.

Between the 1950 and the 1970 societies were living through ‘Fordism’ models. A hegemonic form of capitalism which logic “lay in the employment of large workforces to mass produce goods for a mass consumer market sustained by growing wages, state demand management policies and state welfare provision”(Amin, Cameron and Hudson, 2002, p. 15). As mentioned above, civil society organizations in this period had little interference in the provision of employment or other services for communities, “as a result, civil society came to be seen as the arena of self-help, association activity and social life, not that of economic activity or preparation to it”(Amin, Cameron and Hudson, 2002, p. 16). In this context, the needs of the needy were mostly seen as an opportunity to include these communities into the market logic by the provision of employment in masses. For the Fordism typology, social exclusion was only temporarily.

By the 1970 social movements started to rise in part due to claims for improving quality of life. In this process, the concept of progress was questioned, and feminist and environmental movements become common. In this period, social movements started to organize under the umbrella of the NGOs, “which form the neoclassical economics perspective, were a response to market failures in the provision of individuals and to state failures in the provision of the collective services”(Laville, 2015, p. 45). These market failures were partly due to the end of full employment under the Fordism model creating an atmosphere of “Job insecurity, exacerbated by job losses in the public sector linked to a new culture of privatization and deregulation” (Amin, Cameron and Hudson, 2002, p. 15). Therefore, the debates on social exclusion or socially excluded communities entered a fierce debate shaped upon the communities and people that did not have the required attributes to enter the labor market. These attributes could be of race, ethnicity, skills, education, religion, among others.

In this sense, NGOs were entities that were not part of the state, neither the private: A third sector. In this conceptual framework, the third sector was a potential corrector to potentially fill the gap when programs and solutions both from the private and the state were insufficient. However, in this model, human decisions often conformed to the 'rational choice'. Social innovations started to evolve shaping a democratization of society and democratization of the economy, changing the way of production as well the way society consume products and services. Movements involving climate change, sustainability, social justice among others "puts economy back into its role as means to achieve goals" (Laville, 2015, p. 47). The latter gave rise to the marketization of trust from private for-profit corporations, in the means of corporate social responsibility and standards and certifications (e.g., Fairtrade) competing hand on hand with NGOs movements and other non-for-profit organizations. The latter is in line with (Amin, Cameron and Hudson, 2002, p. 15 based on Grimes, 1997) mentioning "The function of the social economy is to turn needs into markets". Therefore, this period conceived the marketization of welfare, provided by a new sector that had also to compete to receive the means to operate.

As we had seen above, most of the innovations related to latest period of the twenty centuries were focus on "a set of activities contributing to democratize the economy through citizens involvement" (Laville, 2015, p. 47). The NGOs and non-for-profit organizations, including the role of CSR were, at these time, considered part of the solidarity economy. However, even if they have "some economic weight, they had no real political strength" (Laville, 2015, p. 47). The latter generates a new perspective: The Social and solidarity Economy. This theoretical framework contested the domination of public spaces by the NGOs in the international agendas by encapsulating and labelling what is and what is not the role of the civil society and more importantly adding a new political dimension. This contradiction creates a new paradigm of "analysis by mixing social economy and solidarity economy viewpoints" (Laville, 2015, p. 47). This combination was born on the juxtaposition of all the previous pathways of the social economy, including the creation of non-capitalist institutions such as cooperatives and associations that embedded the political, the economic and the social in their objectives.

In this context, the Social and solidarity economy as an integrated concept appeared. The SSE is defined as the type of economy that don't prioritize profits. Instead, these types of economic models puts people, and their environment first in order for them to gain control as an economic actor that "shift towards decommodified economic activities" (Utting, 2015). Together, the "SSE is increasingly used to refer to forms of economic activity that prioritise social and often environmental objectives, and involve producers, workers, consumers, and citizens acting collectively and in solidarity" (Utting, 2015). However, understanding the social economy and solidarity economy separately could provide us with a strategic viewpoint for giving sense of their elements.

## **2.2 The Social Economy**

According to the Western Europe and North America definitions, the social economy is such that its main goal is to "reclaim the market for social needs" (Utting, Dijk and Matheï, 2014) based on (Laville et al. 2007) and (Dash, 2014). Other definitions of social economy are based on the activities its institutions perform. For example, institutions such as commercial enterprises, mutuals and associations that operates under democratic decision making, social goals and limited return of capital and socialization of benefits. In general, these activities are based on "values of solidarity, autonomy and citizenship" (Utting, Dijk and Matheï, 2014) based on (Defourny, 1990). At the same time other scholars focus on the social economy as not in juxtaposition of the market and private sector, that is, that the social economy is not either antagonistic to both nor in competition, rather "position itself as a third form of enterprise taking place in a pluralist economy that recognizes complementarities between the private, the public and

collective enterprises (Utting, Dijk and Matheï, 2014) based on (Neamtam, 2009) giving rise as to the concept of the third sector.

If define by the typology of their organizations, exclusions might be made. For example, for associations or cooperatives that distribute their profits. Or the contrary, by the same type of organizations that had never redistribute their profits with their members. In this sense, the differences and “the border is not drawn between for profit and non-profit organizations but rather between capitalist and social economy organizations, the latter giving priority to the setting up a collective patrimony, over the return on individual investment”(Laville, 2015, p. 48). These ways of settings are what differentiate social economy institutions from the other broader spectrum of economic institutions. (Laville, 2015, p. 48 based on Defourny et al, 1999:30) mentions that “The social economy includes all economic activities conducted by enterprises, primarily cooperatives, associations and mutual benefit societies, whose ethics convey the following principles: placing services to members or the community ahead of profits; autonomous management; a democratic decision-making process; the primacy of people and work over capital in the distribution of revenues”. Therefore, the social economy can be situated as to the imaginary of all economic activities that responds to the perverse exclusionary processes of the current hegemonic economic model.

### **2.3 Solidarity economy**

The solidarity economy concept is born in the window left by the social economy conceptual framework as a ‘set of organizations’. Following (Laville, 2015, p. 50) “the social economy leaves open the broader question of its insertion into both the economy and democracy”. In this sense, the solidarity economy entails a new broader understanding of the economy that not only focus on market principles, redistribution, and reciprocity (Polanyi, 1957). These three principles are integrated into the solidarity economic activity through a hybridization, “but such hybridization implies linking the economic activity with the political”(Laville, 2015, p. 47). Following this understanding, the solidarity economy is both a political and economic model that searches the “democratization of the economy” (Utting, Dijk and Matheï, 2014). The latter includes a counter hegemonic dimension, since the intention is not to continue to work within the standard rules of the market per se, but rather to transform those rules: A new system. This would be in line with Migliaro (2013) in understanding of the social economy as a “development project (...) which responds to the major challenges of our times: poverty, unemployment, informalization and the impacts of climate change” (Migliario, 2013 in Utting, Dijk and Matheï, 2014). For the solidarity economy, is not only about reducing these challenges, but to drive systemic change towards a new alternative of a model that constructed these challenges into development projects.

### **2.4 The Social and Solidarity integration (SSE)**

According to (Amin, Cameron and Hudson, 2002, p. 20) there are different ways of seeing the social and solidarity economy as a model. The first is the institutionalization of these types of models not only as creators of employment, welfare providers and responsibility of the citizens with their communities, but at the same time as political actors providing “a voice for the economy of care and social entrepreneurship”. The second is through associative democracy where distribution of power is embedded in such institutions. In this form, the institutions of the social and solidarity economy can take the role of providing welfare to its members due to the failure of welfare state policies (Amin, Cameron and Hudson, 2002, p. 20). In addition, the social and solidarity economy is also seeing as a counter

hegemonic force against capitalist economic model. In this way SSE institutions “favour the organization of society around needs, self-autonomy, and social and ecological balance” (Amin, Cameron and Hudson, 2002, p. 20), reacting directly to the norms of the capitalistic economic model.

In this context, the social and solidarity economy is expected to have role for the community. It has the power to leverage institutions and their members as political actors that fight for their members and their needs in the political context, for example, by the creation of social movements towards public policy shifts. Also, it provides to their communities the necessary welfare to sustain their life’s through associative democracy logics and supporting counter hegemonic realities towards a “counter acquisitive culture” (Amin, Cameron and Hudson, 2002, p. 21) that neglects modes of capitalism focused on greed. Nonetheless, in the complexity of the local, one cannot discard that social movements that manage to influence and change public policy, are also changed by the public policy that they had fight for. In this sense, the social and solidarity institutions, are not only working within their environment, but as a pluralistic model. The change in their surrounding environments also changes them. The latter has been portrayed on the differentiated ways of the seeing of the social and solidarity economies across time – as seen in the previous chapter -. This was directly reactionary to the socio economic and political contexts (e.g. industrial revolution, Fordism, welfare states periods).

In addition, other advantages are expected to be encountered in SSE when applied to collective action of the members of their institutions. Some of these advantages are: i) Economic empowerment: through “strengthening capacities and capabilities needed to mobilize resources, integrate markets on fairer terms and compete economically” (Utting, Dijk and Matheï, 2014) ii) Reciprocity and social capital: through lowering transaction costs within members in the provision of products or services based on trust, iii) Political empowerment and participatory government: “Trough one people one vote” mechanism that encourage members equality and the agreements of proportionality regarding to “each person according to her participation in the activities” (Levi and Davis, 2008), and at the same time through collectively organizing to make their voice heard through various forms of contestation, dialogue and bargaining” (Utting, Dijk and Matheï, 2014) and, iv) Solidarity and ethicality: through “putting community preferences and decision making ahead of individual choice as the driver of economic activity”(Utting, Dijk and Matheï, 2014). In this sense, the SSE involves the political economic, the social and the environment in all the integration and interactions between the community, and the way these communities produces, exchange and consume (Utting, 2015).

## **2.5 The Social and solidarity economy in Latin America**

In Latin America the process of building social and solidarity economies found similitudes and differences between the conceptual framework of Europe or North America. The differences mainly due to “Structural conditions, which reflect a long history of dependence, combined with the neoliberal policies of the last three decades have resulted in massive numbers of poor and indigent people in Latin America (Both rural and urban, totalling approximately 180 million), along with the highest wealth concentration in the world” (Coraggio, 2015). In this context, “from social turmoil among populations facing increasing economic exploitation, social disintegration and impoverishment, arose solidarity”(Gaiger, 2017). Furthermore, the institutionalization of the social and solidarity economy principles and its institutions goes beyond the creation of the marketization of needs for the needy by communities since “one cannot expect that there is a critical mass of citizens with sufficient social capital and economic security to assume responsibility for ensuring that their own needs – or the needs of others – are met at the local level” (Coraggio, 2015). However, at the same time, it is recognized and problematize by (Coraggio, 2015) that the role of the private sector is also important for the survival of the SSE in Latin America since, due to the high levels of



inequalities, philanthropic organizations or for-profit social entrepreneurship can support solidarity principles and institutions. The latter can be in the form of technical assistance or capital as it already happened in global frameworks of SSE in the world as seen in the previous section, such as the conceptual framework of the SSE ways of seeing in Europe in the second part of the nineteenth century.

Given these realities, in Latin America, the SSE institutionalisation movement also needs the state. In these sense, “the role of the state consist principally of implementing the principle of redistribution (of income, public goods, and means of production), while also serving as a guarantor of social rights and leading the effort to build a sustainable economic system capable of supporting a fully integrated, unified and just society”(Coraggio, 2015). In turn, it implies that the search for an SSE movement in Latin America should not be relying only in internal processes of solidarity from institutions such as cooperatives that only produce, exchange and consume within their communities and members, but to also understand their role in an economy that is plural and that interacts, in one way or the other with the state and with the market. The latter is in line with (Gaiger, 2017) that mentions “in Latin America it also does not make sense to place solidarity economy in conceptual opposition to the state and the market. It would be better to acknowledge the solidarity economy as another way of producing and circulating goods and services, and thus ensuring the material survival of a large number of people”. For example, it has been the case in certain countries in Latin America that the SSE had managed to shift, create, or change public policy towards the institutionalization of SSE organizations in their laws or institutions (Colombia, Argentina, Brazil, among others). However as (Gaiger, 2017) mentions, the fact these activities are institutionalized by no means refer that these institutionalizations created them, since they had been implemented in socially excluded societies in the region for longer periods.

In this context, social and solidarity organizations and ideology in Latin America erupted as a social movement. These has been documented by (Lematre and Helmsing, 2012) while exploring the institutionalization of the social and solidarity economy in Brazil. In their work the authors expressed that “The oldest foundation root of SE, and the most important in terms of initiatives, which has emerged from the popular world, excluded from the mainstream sectors of the economy, be these public or private, is the so-called peoples cooperativism” (Lematre and Helmsing, 2012). In their study, the authors explain how the roots of the SSE had changed due to a response of different contextual crisis in the country, from a dictatorship regime to an industrial crisis in the 1990 that had left people in extreme poverty and homelessness. This is in line with (Coraggio, 2015) the recognizes that “the changes adopted in the social, economic and political realms can be interpreted as part of a Polanyian movement of self-defence by societies confronting the devastating neoliberal program”. Also, (Lematre and Helmsing, 2012) recognizes that “is through the social movement that a set of initiatives of work an income generation started to recognise themselves as forming part of the SE world” (Lematre and Helmsing, 2012). In regards of the exclusionary processes experienced in Brazil, the authors mention:

*“They explicitly intend to carry out a universal cause in the public sphere and to influence the forms of social life, notably through contacts with public bodies in the form of political claims (composing the ‘Platform of struggles’). Joined together around a common identity and common values (the ‘Charter of principles’), the protagonists are opposed to capitalism (the social adversary, developing thus a confrontational dimension). They defend, in a militant way, a ‘new’ mode of production, consumption and wealth distribution, an alternative model of development, generating social benefits. Much more than a given set of existing practices, for the actors involved, SE is a project of society.”* (Lematre and Helmsing, 2012).

Similar as in Brazil, in other countries in Latin America the SSE had its roots in crisis that exacerbated inequalities and pervasive exclusionary processes and organizations that had been created since “most

of them have been driven by social categories relegated to the margins of the conventional system of employment or income generation, or frustrated in their personal aspirations”(Gaiger, 2017) which include indigenous communities, rural farmers, and people that in general don't have the attributes to enter a narrow labour market. These marginalized groups “express a refusal to abandon social systems in which economic and social relations are intertwined, and in which reciprocity and trust prevail” (Gaiger, 2017), thus disregarding entering in certain capitalistic processes where trust is not prioritized in human interactions. In general, as documented by (Gaiger, 2017), social and solidarity economies in Latin America follow two principles: i) a different economic system where people of socially excluded groups come together and take shelter collectively and ii) Embracement by people that are driven by the necessity to fulfil basic needs. As mentioned, both principles fall into a crisis management perspective for the marginalized in Latin America for self-fence approaches for survival. A social project that rethinks development in the South.

## **2.6 Limitations of the Social and solidarity economies**

It is recognized between the studies of SSE that the environment where SSE is formed drastically transform their survival and grow. The latter is recognized by (Utting, Dijk and Mathei, 2014) mentioning that “each of articulations of SSE with other economies (public sector, the corporate private and popular / informal) gives rise to a variety of tensions that can undermine the possibilities of realizing the potential of SSE and cause it to deviate from core values”. For example, in economies highly leverage by neo-liberalisation and the market, tension might arise for SSE as they grow because they often become more immerse in market relations that can be more related to hegemonic market activities.

Another limitation of SSE as their grow is their capacity to continue building trust and maintaining their social capital with new members (Vertical grow). This had been documented by (Gomez, 2015) in Argentina through the “El trueque”, the world's largest complementary currency scheme. In the case of SSE, trust is a very fundamental pillar for its success, and as the SSE grow and integrate new members that might not be of the same local community, trust can be lost due to lack of interactions. This limitation might be prone to occur in cases where the spatial set up of the SSE institutions are not embedded within the same territory or the internal policies of such institutions are not arranged in a certain way that can leverage cohesion and trust. In this case, certain communities, even if apart, could have certain dimensions that recognizes themselves as equal (e.g., rural excluded communities, ex-combatants), but at the same time their different spatial contexts – environments- are different (lack of local public policies for maintaining SSE institutions, therefore, potentially moving their activities to pro-market relationships of exchange) making these SSE institutions diverting from the core values of their broader or umbrella institutions.

## **Chapter 3: Context of the Colombia peace agreement and history**

### **3.1 Historical struggles**

Colombia experienced one of the longest civil wars in contemporary history. The decade 1940's a period that the political historians called 'La Violencia' (The Violence) started, and since then, it was estimated that between 100.000 and 300.000 lives were lost (Rochlin, 2003, p. 95). La Violencia is “represented as the final phase of open warfare between the Liberals and the Conservatives”, (Rochlin, 2003, p. 95); it was a political and ideological battle between the most influential political parties in the country. It reached a critical point when in 1950, Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, a popular leader from the liberal party was killed in the

streets of Bogota city centre. Gaitan, was a fierce fighter for the “exaggerated maldistribution of wealth in the country as well as the concentration of power in the hands of a minuscule oligarchy. In fact, about three-quarters of the population at this time were peasants, with 3 percent of landowners controlling more than half of the agricultural territory”(Rochlin, 2003, p. 95). After the announcement of his head, political persecution remained strong towards liberals, which started to gather in groups for self-defence.

In this turmoil, an agreement was made in the year 1958 between the two political parties that entailed a power-sharing mechanism that enabled each party holding the country's presidency in intervals of four years. The latter was called the National Pact (NP), and it lasted for sixteen years until 1974. Nonetheless, due to the particularities of the agreement, the two parties neglected other political parties and minorities, leaving them without any political representation, including left-wing supporters, indigenous communities, small farmers and peasants’ organizations. This situation was the ignition of movements of leftist and socially excluded communities to organized themselves as self-defence guerrillas that started to organized themselves in a transformation from "liberal guerrillas transitioned into insurgencies with communist affiliations" (Segura and Mechoulan, 2017). This was the context of the creation of what will latter known as The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia- Ejercito del pueblo (FARC-EP) who assumed that name in 1966.

In the early 1960's The FARC-EP "operated as a peasant self-defence group organized in a few detachments and maintaining ties with the communist party" (Segura and Mechoulan, 2017). However, between the 1960s and the 1980's, the Guerrilla shifted from a non-military guerrilla and started to build war capacities, creating more military fronts in different parts of the country, and establishing decentralized types of leadership mechanisms. It is estimated that before the beginning of the 1990s, FARC-EP had approximated forty-eight military fronts across the country (Segura and Mechoulan, 2017). The massive expansion and increase of the guerrilla monetary and military capacity entailed atrocious funding methods that included kidnapping, extortion, taxation of crops, quotas for illicit crops, among others. Forty years after its creation, the FARC-EP had a sophisticated leadership and governance mechanism and had "expanded dramatically into key regions of the country, even amidst the intensification of the government's war on drugs" (Segura and Mechoulan, 2017). In all these 40 years, The FARC-EP maintained their traditional peasant historical background, increasing their demands in from land reform and distribution from 1964 to 1980 (Rochlin, 2003, p. 98) towards a more nurture pledge of pleas on "issues of political exclusion, access to state resources, and national security strategies such as the role, orientation, and structures of the military and the police" (Segura and Mechoulan, 2017). In all the time that the Guerrilla was established, several attempts were made by different Colombian former presidents to reach a peace agreement. However, the conditions of a final peace agreement did not happen until 2010.

### **3.2 Overview of the past peace agreements and opening the door to the final agreement signed.**

In the context of Colombia, three major attempts to establish peace were made with the Guerrilla. In 1985, “without disarming, the FARC created a new political party (...) The Union Patriótica (UP). Crucially, it represented the first time the group gave serious attention to political as opposed to military struggle” (Rochlin, 2003, p. 101). In this context, the first peace attempt was in the presidency of Virgilio Barco in 1986, which resulted in the demobilization of other revolutionary armies, hence supporting the first pillars of potential reachable agreements with other political and military insurgent troops. For the case of FARC-EP a transitory agreement was signed that "included a bilateral ceasefire and truce and a commitment by the parties to negotiate an end to the armed conflict"(Segura and Mechoulan, 2017). Nonetheless, due to

the lack of political support of the peace agreement from the national congress and the continuous killings of members of the Union Patriótica estimated in a staggering number of “between 2.000 and 4.000 of its leaders and supporters assassinated” (Rochlin, 2003, p. 102), the FARC-EP remained sceptical about the possibility of an agreement due to the allegedly responsibility of the state in this killings. The intention of peace vanished.

The second important peace agreement in Colombia happened during the presidency of Cesar Gaviria in 1990. This period is at the verge of the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, where many of the leftist guerrillas in the country started questioning their role as a leftist ideological social movements (Pécaut, 2008). This peace agreement was based on a group effort to reach peace between the state and the three biggest revolutionary armies in Colombia, including the FARC-EP, where "under this umbrella, they worked on developing a common position for negotiations" (Segura and Mechoulan, 2017). In this case, there were no pre-establishments of a ceasefire and it was the moment when Colombian policy shifted to integrate neoliberalist processes that were also denounced by the FARC-EP (Pécaut, 2008). The negotiations in 1990 dissipated fast.

The third major attempt for peace was in the presidency of Andres Pastrana in 1998. The difference of this attempt was the "demilitarization of 42.000 square Kilometres around the Caguan river basin, a jungle area in the South of Colombia" as a good sign from the government; however, this resulted in political turmoil and the feeling that the FARC-EP were using these space to continue arming themselves and producing illicit crops in this vast territory (Segura and Mechoulan, 2017). This peace attempt ended abruptly in 2002. It was mentioned that there was no plan for negotiations and that the FARC-EP's preconditions to negotiate were vast and their demands difficult to reach, creating difficulties to align and move forward.

In the negotiation, the FARC-EP established 12 agenda points in the agreement with several subpoints. These were a continuation of the pleas made since FARC-EP was established as a peasant Guerrilla, including land reform and redistribution, but as it will be discussed later, it also includes attempts for supporting a new economic model, the SSE. Also, "the talks came at a time when FARC-EP was at the apex of its military strength and territorial presence throughout Colombia"(Segura and Mechoulan, 2017). Finally, another topic for not continuing the process was the creation of Plan Colombia, and agreement made in Pastrana's presidency with the United States to eradicate illicit crops in Colombia. As I will explain later in the research paper, these illicit crops were mainly located in FARC-EP territory. Thus, creating in FARC-EP a duality with the national government intentions, since these crops were also a main source of resources of the FARC-EP.

### **3.3 The Final Peace agreement process in summary:**

As seen in the previous section, the final peace agreement signed with the FARC-EP did not fall into a vacuum. After several attempts to reach peace, there was always an ingredient missing. The strength, both military and territorial of the FARC-EP was an essential factor that did not allow for peace negotiations. However, due to military interventions, the efforts of Plan Colombia, and the democratic policy agenda from former President Alvaro Uribe in 2002, the FARC-EP military strength was substantially diminished. It is estimated that between the years 2002 and 2010, the military forces of the FARC-EP were reduced from 20.000 soldiers to 7.000 (Segura and Mechoulan, 2017) including several leaders of the FARC-EP secretariat who were killed in combat. It is in 2010, the moment when former President Juan Manuel Santos, former minister of defence of President Uribe, started "informal and confidential talks with FARC-EP that would engender a secret phase of negotiations in Havana"(Segura and Mechoulan,

2017). After six years of negotiations, entailing secrecy negotiations, public phases, integration of the international community as facilitators, polarization between political parties in relation to the peace negotiations, and a referendum, the final peace agreement was signed in 2016.

## **Chapter 4: The SSE actor of the FARC-EP**

### **4.1 FARC-EP SSE actor in times of peasantry: Social exclusion roots**

In the 1950s, the initial peasant's self-defence group that later will be known as the FARC-EP already had gathered in different zones in collective ways. For example, in Viota, a town in Colombia, peasants were socially excluded from land and the opportunity to exchange goods by latifundium owners in rural areas. Where some goods were permitted to be sold, peasants were denied producing the most valuable ones, leaving them with production only for self-consumption. In this context, "The peasants used legal resources: organization of leagues and agricultural syndicates with the formulation of petitions" (Centro Nacional de Memoria Historica, 2014) including salary payment. As these actions were considered subversive, "peasants resolve to combine these actions with a mechanism of social mobilization" (Centro Nacional de Memoria Historica, 2014). When the National Pact was established in Colombia, these peasants were already a collective political actor, in line with the typology of solidarity economy principles. According to (Pécaut, 2008) this is one reason for the importance of FARC-EP cohesion when the Guerrilla was active. He called this factor "the fundamental of sharing sociability" which the author encountered his roots in the peasant self-defence groups that later grew to become the FARC-EP.

As another example, in the same period, in the town of Chaparral, the historical information portraits the same exclusionary domination towards local peasants. As in Viota, "the peasants were organized in leagues and declared strikes involving 18.000 agricultural collectors" (Centro Nacional de Memoria Historica, 2014). In a defensive collective action, following the principles of solidarity economy, local leader Isauro Yosa remembered how the Police arrived at the community trying to question the peasants:

*"Who is the owner of this land? – All, we answered. The police did not take immediate repression, citing to chaparral town, so nobody of us went out of the land and vigilance was done collectively" (Centro Nacional de Memoria Historica, 2014)*

In the same period, "there was a process of which little reference is done on the usual historical narration of FARC" (Centro Nacional de Memoria Historica, 2014) as a peasant subject, is that there have already been attempts to create cooperatives in the history of the civil conflict. In the year 1957, the Colombian government held a referendum that legalized the establishment of the communist party. Also, it allowed that "self-defence movements could be tied to political activity (...) the talks between the self-defence agrarian groups and the state brought the financing of agrarian cooperatives and construction of roads and schools in the zones of communist influence"(Centro Nacional de Memoria Historica, 2014). The latter created opportunities to adopt solidarity typology institutions by and for the peasants and allowed a leader of these communities to become a member of the chamber of representatives in the senate becoming the voice of the peasant communities and fought in the political sphere for the pressing social issues of these communities.

However, even within disorganized schemes, these zones and communities managed to survive in the 1950s "due to their communities' collective and individual work that built and fixed roads, grinders and weeding" (Centro Nacional de Memoria Historica, 2014). The community and collective work reinforced the type of activities that the peasants created after the referendum and when the first cooperatives with

socialism ideologies were legally established. However, at the same time, these communities also experimented with exchange with external market forces to survive, for example, by selling coupons to the communist party or donations. The fact that these organizations started to establish a quota for membership to be part of organizations signals an understanding of practices of solidarity economy activities. These practices are prevalent in the creation and integration of new members in institutions such as cooperatives. The integration of new members often requires a quota, be it in kind or capital, to access membership of these institutions. Also, it allows new members to have the option to receive collective benefits.

As organized peasants, the nascent self-defence group were a mass power. With more than one third of the population living in rural areas, and with outstanding concentration of land by latifundium owners (Rochlin, 2003), founded the cohesion of the SSE roots that was based on exclusionary processes that doomed this communities to work together to secure their survival. The findings of the way the peasantry groups started to defend themselves by the police and by other capitalist processes that did not allow them to exchange goods and services, are what ignite solidarity (Gaiger, 2017). They managed, in a very volatile environment to shift public policy and allow them to have a voice in public spaces, legalized the communist party and secure the first creation of cooperatives with state funds. In their fight against exclusionary processes, the SSE peasantry actor of the FARC-EP accommodates to the understanding of the subject institutions mentioned by (Coraggio, 2015) that mix a set of activities that run from internal solidarity within their members, but also, a mixture of that did not relegate the state from their ways of doing, but at the same time the market. It is in this juncture, the SSE actor of the FARC-EP in peasantry times can be catalogued as an institutionalize social movement that operates in the juncture of the two main economic drivers but is not really part of any of them.

#### **4.2 FARC-EP SSE actor in times of war: THE SSE integrated to a military actor.**

Manuel Marulanda, which will become the leader of leaders of the FARC-EP, expressed in 1974 that "Is not sufficient with agreeing with the revolution, but to be part of it. The revolution has for each of their fighters a place tailor-made for their skills and capabilities" (Centro Nacional de Memoria Historica, 2014). This message contradicts the hegemonic exclusionary processes of the capitalistic system to integrate people into the market through 'skills' and 'attributes.' Instead, the discourse of Marulanda focuses on a systemic shift into collectiveness based on people political views rather than on exclusionary processes. Thus, generating social capital cohesion, since entailed that joining was a political statement, primarily focused on communities that had lived through the same exclusionary processes. The latter is recognized in different territories where FARC -EP had a presence across the years.

However, not only through this mechanism the Guerrilla assures its social cohesion. As a military actor, when FARC-EP controlled territory, it needed to be sure that all the people were loyal to their political principle. Therefore, "FARC-EP had imposed census of the habitants and only authorized to stay people whom fidelity was guarantee" (Pécaut, 2008), giving rise to displacement and killing of another part of the community.

These duality makes most of the FARC-EP research based on their military or political subject. Historical ways in which the FARC-EP had worked have also been contextual. There is a different response for FARC-EP activities in terms of SSE depending on the reality of the conflict. According to (Centro Nacional de Memoria Historica, 2014), the FARC acted differently if the town or rural area depending if it was a territory of constant war or region of rearguard. In the latter, the Guerrilla incentivized the creation of social organizations under its influence. Thus, supporting them financially in these areas and

democratization of justice for the communities towards habitants that acted in corruption or other crimes. In the former, the Guerrilla tried to take control strategically, having extortion, kidnapping, and illegal taxation as their primary income and prioritizing this behaviour over the collective democratization of income and social organizations.

The analysis turns to the point that FARC did not detach their economics from their military and political interest. The latter conforms with (Pécaut, 2008) referring to FARC-EP "without losing cohesion. Depending on the circumstances and places, the organization can use a diverse logic of action based on a diversity of resources. All resources are not activated simultaneously and in the same way in all the zones in which they have presence; when some resources fail, other resources are used as the substitution". As a military actor, FARC-EP deploy all ways of combat, or resources to implement, and to enforce their ideology, be it through discourses of solidarity, that were enforced through the lenses of a juxtaposition between an all are welcome to the fight and to the benefits of the collectiveness, but at the same displaced others that were not aligned with their ideological standpoints.

However, this also posed another contradiction since, these displacements and mass murders of the FARC-EP were done to people that indeed shared their struggles, they were also peasants from rural areas that had suffered the same exclusionary processes but did not attach to a military fight for their rights. In this case, the economic actor of the FARC-EP was in dichotomy with their SSE roots as peasants. One question that arise is what is the logic of the SSE of FARC-EP as a military actor? Does the Guerrilla used first SSE as a resource to integrate a community? Or does the military force was their main resource that later bounded a community into fear to establish SSE institutions? One can assume that it depended on the environment they encountered when trying to control a town. Hence, I suggest that both questions can be answer positively. This is important because highlight again that the economic actor of FARC-EP intertwined with their military one, portraying the organization as a subject that was mobile to the reality of the local development and of the conflict.

As portrayed in the historical context, in 1998, former Colombian president Andres Pastrana established negotiations with the FARC-EP to achieve a peace agreement. In these negotiations, the government gave the FARC-EP a territory of 42.139 square Kilometres in good faith. However, even if the Guerrilla had control and authority in this territory, the guerrilla "didn't try to construct there the base of an alternative society of socialistic type or to install equipment and infrastructure needed in these communities, because they consider that it will be premature to do this in this war juncture"(Pécaut, 2008). In this case, even if the Guerilla has a transitory possession of land agreed with the state, it was not at this moment that they tried to establish strong solidarity economic institutions.

In this period, the military forces of the FARC-EP were in full swing. It was at its highest points in terms of geographical presence and military capacity. The counter-military forces of the state were also in a weak position. The FARC-EP were not feeling themselves in a territory of rearguard but rather in a military offensive. However, in the 1998 negotiations, twelve points were established to be negotiated. These points not only have a repeated previous discourse from the FARC-EP, such as the agrarian reform but also, even if the FARC-EP were not creating social and solidarity economy institutions in the Caguan basin, the Guerrilla proposed a critical point in the negotiations agenda:

*"Social and economic structure: revision of the development model, income redistribution, amplification of internal and external markets and support to the cooperatives forms of ownership" (Pérez-Maura, 1999).*

While the negotiation of this peace process failed abruptly, the social and economic structure point discussed on the agenda of the talks in 1998 is the precedent of what would happen in the final peace

process. Moreover, it serves to understand new features in this SSE imaginary of FARC-EP as a military actor. Even if the land was given, the Guerrilla did not promote SSE initiatives in their time there, signaling that creating SSE institutions might not be the most prudent for them in the turmoil of war. At the same time, this goes in juxtaposition to other activities of the FARC-EP in other territories, such as regions where cocaine trafficking was notorious, as will be discussed later. However, the findings let to understand that, even if the FARC-EP did not detach some of their activities from SSE, they prioritize military actions rather than economic ideologies and alternative economic change in the communities they had presence and power. If the case, these activities would have started during the negotiations in The Caguan basin. In some of the towns of this territories, the Guerrilla acted as illegal Guerrilla in a time of truce, living a civilian life with a fusil in their hands.

#### **4.3 FARC-EP SSE actor in times of war: THE SSE integrated to illicit trade.**

There are cases that FARC-EP had used SSE institutionalization in the time of conflict. One very interesting is FARC-EP's relationship with the communities in territories of coca production. For (Gutierrez, 2021) the coca activity in Colombia started around the 1970s and shared the same attributes as the creation of the peasant guerrilla and later the FARC-EP. The author mentions that since "the difficulties faced by peasants in accessing the market and their chronic land-poverty, exacerbated by land dispossession in the context of armed conflict, had been recognized as important factors" that contribute to the development of illicit crops. However, the author recognizes that the cocaine economy had been critical to the subsistence of the peasant communities. Also, within these communities, a set of government rules and regulations were established, "which often had the armed insurgents as the enforcers of an order in which smallholders were at its very heart" (Gutierrez, 2021). In his study, the author explores the livelihoods of Argelia, a municipality in Colombia where the FARC-EP established a military front. The author interviews several members of the community, including community leaders, that ratified the power that had the Guerrilla in certain territories, for example, describing the Guerrilla a community leader mentioned that "many people see the guerrillas as the proper government here" (Interview with a community leader in Gutierrez, 2021)

In another interview with another community leader (Gutierrez, 2021) signals that "he was thankful for the FARC-EP and coca, for it was the rebels who often channeled the resources available from coca to the community" (Gutierrez, 2021). Also, even a school was built due to the power of the Guerrilla. It is important to remark that due to the difficulties of the coca trade, FARC-EP served as the protectors of peasants. The Guerrilla generated profits for them and channeled these profits into their communities. Therefore "is very difficult for coca growers to prescind of this protection" (Pécaut, 2008). In their statement at the negotiations of the peace agreement, the FARC-EP front from Argelia acknowledged a sum of more than 686.000 Euros in investments in the Argelia community that included roads, schools, productive projects, a community hall, sports infrastructure, among others. All this capital acquired through coca production allowed FARC-EP to rechannel the profits to all the Argelia community. These interactions of The Guerrilla and the coca producers in coca towns like Argelia are constant from the 1970s until the agreement was signed in Colombia. This interaction also represents the SSE dynamics of the guerrilla as a military actor integrated with the institutionalization of SSE principles through illegal trade in certain territories.

*"First of all, we created a model of society at the interior of the FARC-EP in war times. Collectiveness, community contact, contact with nature. It seems that now we are going back in time, unfortunately in the evolution, humanity lost its horizon and started to be individualized. One has to go back to the bad-called backdrop and renounce to accumulation. In the FARC-EP, we*



*created a bound that benefited all of us, not a few” (Interview with German, FARC-EP ex-combatant in Rodriguez and Torres, 2020)*

In the cases of towns like Argelia and other coca-producing towns in Colombia, the dynamics were different. Here, illegal actors collide together to survive. In towns that were and still are neglected by the state, the market is bounded by the ability to get product out. The case of FARC-EP SSE dynamics with coca trade was more bounded as local governance and distribution, while the pricing mechanism was given by external forces. The Coca portrait a massive increase in income for the communities and for the FARC-EP, so reciprocity was critical to benefit from it. Reciprocity from both sides, coca producers needed the protection and the coca routes of the FARC-EP to maintain their production and to self-guard their product against any interactions with the military forces of the state that declare the war on drugs aligned with the mandate of the United States of America.

On the other side, the FARC-EP needed the production of this coca to earn income through quote the illegal transportation of the product or benefit from the own production by building laboratories run by coca producers. The earnings then were shared with the community in salary wages and in building resilience communities such as the investments that the FARC-EP did in the town of Argelia. It is undeniable that the production of coca in Colombia is the only way of subsistence for particular communities. FARC-EP knew this. In this sense, it created a robust SSE machinery to sustain coca peasants and at the same time use this capital to maintain their forces and their political and military actions. One can understand the problem of coca production, but what is undeniable is that, in this town, FARC-EP prioritizes SSE models because it serves their economic, military, and (local) political purpose. Therefore, it did not have to choose either one or the other.

## **Chapter 5: FARC-EP SSE actor in the signed agreement: Understanding the progress and the SSE collective productive projects**

### **5.1 Progress of the reintegration program**

Similar to other DDR frameworks, The Colombian national Government agreed to provide vocational and job training, a monthly allowance for maintenance, transportation to ex-combatants to their location of preference, and other incentives. However, the collective economic reintegration processes based on SSE principles are one of the unique pillars of the Colombian peace agreement. Due to the peasant tradition of the Guerrilla, the intention was to create a new agrarian reform policy that supported the redistribution of land property of the state to support the SSE collective projects of the ex-combatants. "The proposal was to create a special program to provide land for reincorporation purposes; thus the national land agency could obtain land expropriated to criminals (mainly drug traffickers)" (Carranza-Franco, 2019) with specific requirements, such as that the ex-combatants did not have previous ownership of land.

In the final peace process negotiations in 2016, an astonishing 95.7% of ex-combatants wanted to create a productive project aligned with SSE principles. Similar to the schedule of the talks in 1998, the FARC-EP Guerrilla reinforced their internal compromise to reinsertion into civil life through support of cooperative ownership and solidarity. The result of this process was the creation of the ECOMUN. For the FARC-EP, "ECOMUN is the mean through which they can propitiate collective reintegration of their members, strengthen their economic status and support their influence in the territories" (Garcia and Alvarez, 2020). In this context, it is established in the final agreement that ECOMUN will serve as the umbrella of all cooperatives and associative activities generated by ex-combatants in different territories in the country.

In this context, it is crucial to understand how the ECOMUN is part of the SSE. "ECOMUN was registered as cooperative" (Garcia and Alvarez, 2020). According to the National law 899 of 2017, ECOMUN is "a special organization, with national coverage and with territorial sections, that could cluster other organizations of social and solidarity economy (...) ECOMUN is an organization of the solidarity economic sector, with legal entity, and with the mission of facilitate the economic reincorporation, agglutinating and supporting the associative forms created in the context of the final agreement" (Garcia and Alvarez, 2020 based on CSIVI-FARC, 2020). While the registration of ECOMUN is in line with the economic actor of FARC-EP in some of the historical context of war, it also assimilates to the military organization of the Guerrilla. Mainly due to the characteristic of ECOMUN as an umbrella cooperative that supports and dictates the other territorial cooperatives. This form is very similar to the Guerrilla military organization as a military actor, where a secretariat mandates all fronts in the territories, from Macro to Meso or Micro. This reinforces (Pécaut, 2008) understanding of the importance of guerrilla cohesion and longevity. Moreover, it showcases the intention of the guerrilla to maintain their historical and hierarchical social ties, continue their antagonistic battle against hegemonic systems and maintains self-autonomy governmental rules of their territorial livelihoods.

In this sense, the economic incentives of the peace agreement entailed a government grant for starting a new business, either alone or through cooperatives integrated to ECOMUN. During the negotiation with the FARC-EP, the revolutionary army directly requested that productive units and self-employment were at the centre of the peace agreement. The latter entailed that in the aftermath of the signing of the peace agreement, a mechanism to secure seed capital for the business should be provided. At the same time, productive units also entailed that land assignation to ex-combatants should be created for the productive units to start running. The agreement includes options for the ex-combatants' construction of individual projects that could have long-lasting positive economic or social repercussions. Therefore, the strategies that the peace agreement implemented to introduce ex-combatants into the civil life in Colombia were focused – among others- on two pillars: i) Economic opportunities and ii) Security conditions of ex-combatants.

After five years after the signing of the peace agreement in Colombia, much focus has been highlighted on the outcomes of the peace process and the ex-FARC-EP militants. The framework of the DDR program resulted in the acknowledgment of 13.190 combatants that were accredited by the label of ex-combatant. By July 2019, a survey developed by the National Register for Reincorporation (RNR) concluded that 95,7% (10.415) ex-combatants aspire to have a productive business and are in the process of developing a social and economic civil life reincorporation. On the other hand, according to the same report, only 4.3% of ex-combatants want to be part of the traditional labour market. According to the report of the Fundación ideas para la Paz (Martinez, Lefebvre, and Fundación Ideas para la Paz, 2019) "One of the key pressing issues for the national government is to create a mechanism of integration of the ex-combatants and reinsertion in the civil life". The government's challenge is that, to reduce the risk of recidivism into combat, the ex-combatants should have the means and real options to meet ends needs.

The basis of the economic reinsertion process for FARC-EP is considered in the concept of solidarity economies in terms of cooperatives or association of ex-combatants. However, other ex-combatants had decided to create individual projects as well. In terms of the creation of the ex-combatants productive projects, the reintegration program in Colombia entailed different types of support for ex-combatants:

- Economic benefits: A basic rent for sustainability and medical support
- Education programs: Training for entering the job market and entrepreneurship (Job creation)
- Productive loans: Directed for land accessibility, technical assistance, go-to-market for productive units, seed capital, and business models creation

- Labour market inclusion: The creation of a regulatory framework for integration in the labour market for the ex-combatants.

Concerning the economic support for the ex-combatants, the government agreed to the following subsidies: 1. Process of bancarization with the agricultural bank of Colombia, 2. A one-time allowance of normalization of the sum of 2.000.000 COP (approx. USD 600), 3. Basic rent of 90% of the national minimum wage for 24 months (approx. USD 200), 4. Social security for 24 months. Up to April and May 2019, the implementation of the economic agreement was the following:

Agreement	% Of coverage
Bancarization	99%
One time normalization subsidy	98%
Incorporation to health system	94%
Incorporation the pension system	79%

Table 1. Summary of coverage of economic commitments. Created by the author. Source (Martinez, Lefebvre, and Fundacion Ideas para la Paz, 2019)

## 5.2 Progress of collective productive projects

According to the final peace agreement signed, "Each integrant of FARC EP in the process of reincorporation, will have the right, for one time only, to economic support to start a productive project, either collectively or individually, up to the sum of COP 8.000.000 (Approx. USD 2.000) (Martinez, Lefebvre, and Fundacion Ideas para la Paz, 2019). However, the process requires approval from the National Centre of reincorporation (CNR) according to the following criteria: i) Technical-productive: the project should have relevance with the territorial prioritization of production (productivity criteria done by the government National planning office (DNP) based on soil efficiency, heights, resources, and weather), ii) Environmental: comply with the natural resources protection law in the country, iii) Go to market: the project should have a solid business plan and a clear innovative differential, iv) Social: The project involves gender dynamics as fundamental in search of equity between men and woman in the workforce and v) Financial: the project forecasted business model guarantee its sustainability (Martinez, Lefebvre, and Fundación Ideas para la Paz, 2019).

To comply with the criteria mentioned above, since 2018, the government had been supported by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), The National Centre for Reincorporation (CNR), and The National Agency for rural development (ADR) to support collective projects to comply and gain access to the government subsidies. Therefore, up to 2019, the following data represents the productive projects that had been submitted to the CNR for revision:

Stages of projects	Number of Projects
Projects presented to CNR	31
Projects approved by CNR	24
Projects in the technical revision	7
Projects approved and capital disbursed	17

Table 2. Project initiatives in each stage of the process. Table created by the author. Source (Martinez, Lefebvre, and Fundación Ideas para la Paz, 2019).

Economic sector	#	%
Agriculture	25	80.60%
Manufacturing	1	3.20%
Services	5	16.10%

Table 3. Economic sector of collective Projects. Table created by the author. Source (Martinez, Lefebvre, and Fundación Ideas para la Paz, 2019).

However, In the end of 2019, in another study conducted by (Garcia and Alvarez, 2020), one year after the data presented above, one hundred and thirty-five (135) associations and cooperatives had been created under the umbrella of ECOMUN. This number accounts for 34,70% of the demobilized population of the FARC-EP (4.921 people), with an average of 36.5 ex-combatants per cooperative. Also, around 90% of the collective projects were agricultural, which fits into the historical peasant root of the Guerrilla. Nonetheless, by the end of 2019, only 38 collective initiatives had been legally established. Only 21 had received the seed capital agreed under the agreement (Garcia and Alvarez, 2020) based on data provided from ECOMUN. This represents a discouraging increase of only four more cooperatives that had received their seed capital compared with the previous study of (Martinez, Lefebvre, and Fundacion Ideas para la Paz, 2019). In this context, (Garcia and Alvarez, 2020) mentions that even if the FARC-EP maintains the intention of an economic reinsertion model based on collective forms, “it crashes against an institutionalization that looks for individualism both in entrepreneurial activity as well in the collectiveness of the associative figures” (Garcia and Alvarez, 2020) . This is important since in the data presented by (Martinez, Lefebvre, and Fundacion Ideas para la Paz, 2019) a staggering number of 161 individual projects had been approved, representing more than six times the collective projects approval. The latter informed that even if FARC-EP had changed their arms for collective productive units in the form of cooperatives, the ex-combatants still face an ideological war within economic systems, very similar to the one before the 1.968 referendum.

## **Chapter 6: Critical reflections of FARC-EP as a SSE actor in times of peace: The complexity of their integration, and in their institutionalization of SSE for a long-lasting peace**

What type of SSE actor are the ex-combatants of FARC-EP? In a nutshell, the current ex-combatants' SSE activities represent a duality of experiences that can inform and nourish theoretical representations of the SSE. To start understanding the current social and solidarity economic actions by the former Guerrilla towards a collective reinsertion, it is critical to understand that in the context of Colombia, "the more history and memory a conflict haves, the more legitimacy have in its present" (Centro Nacional de Memoria Historica, 2014). As the Ex-combatants of the FARC-EP Guerrilla are considered by their members a communist guerrilla, and as seen in the historical context, their fight was more encapsulated as at least, in the beginning, a peasant revolution towards their fight against social exclusion concerning land and land rights. Today, the peasantry SSE actor is still bound on their current activities.

*“We have a lot of initiatives and plenty of illusion that we can continue with the productive projects because we are all of peasant origin and for that reason, we see that the economic and social reinsertion comes from within the territories to the outside, and from the territory to the outside means that not only us as ex-combatants but also with the communities that were with us all the time joining us along the process”* (Interview with Fanny, FARC-EP ex-combatant and member of ECOMUN in Rodriguez and Torres, 2020)

The cohesion in the discourses between the early times of the Guerrilla and the end of the conflict are still marked by the peasantry and collective community work in line with attempts of new political and economic models rooted in social and solidarity principles. As in the times of peasantry, in several territories, the peasant self-defense groups started to control the liberated zones, later known as the independent republics. These zones were called in this matter "basically, due to the lack of institutional presence of the state, which in many of these areas did not have even military presence, and when they reach these territories, it was only transitorily" (Centro Nacional de Memoria Historica, 2014).

Today, what is most interesting about the organization of these communities is that alternative powers are being constituted that support these communities both politically and economically, "generating diverse strategies oriented towards peasant live sustainability and of their autonomous governmental model" (Centro Nacional de Memoria Historica, 2014) as is the potential role of ECOMUN in the territories that are still neglected by the state. The latter is surprising since ECOMUN, rooted in the peasant movement is forecasting dictating their own rules in terms of economic activity within this communities and implementing a model in which the same community is the one to establish and guarantee social order and discipline through legal frameworks of recognition that in theory, allow them to do so. Nonetheless, the exclusionary problems of the peasantry times are still constant, and for the cooperatives created by ECOMUN, survival is still a day-to-day practice:

*"A lot of problems of the cooperatives that we are seeing after the peace agreement is that here, is very different than the cooperatives in Europe. There (Europe), people have basic needs solved, they have a ground base to work at ease. Things like energy, education. Imagine, with that, you can easily work in cooperativism. But here.... Here you don't have anything solved"* (Interview 001, 2021)

Moreover, it seems clear that the ex-combatants activities still resonate with the creation of a new social movement. An alternative way of living where communal support prevails above individualism. They are taking shelter in their commonalities of struggle (past and present) and try to work together to survive. This resonates with the cases of Brazil in (Lematre and Helmsing, 2012) and (Gaiger, 2017). At the same time, the activities that the guerrilla is promoting, in line with solidarity principles, are in line with the duality that (Coraggio, 2015) presents when assimilating that to be maintained and continue to be institutionalized, activities should support the SSE either with the market or with the state; otherwise, the difficulties towards maintaining cohesion are vast.

In this sense, as showcased, the peasant guerrillas in the 1.950s established selling coupons and other mechanisms to continue their fight against the system pressing them and support the communities' activities as prevailing for subsistence. Today, this duality still exists for the communities integrated in the cooperative models in the post-war times. The quotas still exist to be a member of the cooperative, however, due to the difficulties to make a living, the members of the cooperatives are also implementing another duality of mechanism to cope with their pressing socioeconomic status:

*"Today, many of the members of the cooperative are being killed. One of the reasons is because, after the peace agreement, they are playing for both sides because they already know the logistics of coca and narcotraffic, so they are part of the cooperative, but at the same time they trade coca"* (Interview 001, 2021)

This duality of acting from the ex-combatants can be seen with different lenses. On the one hand, as we have seen, coca has been part of peasants' lives in Colombia for a long time. Instead of being simply an illegal crop, it is usually the only escape for subsistence in these old and new independent republics. The ex-combatants not only knew that but also had supported these communities in the past. In addition, while working in the cooperative in duality with coca trade is a coping mechanism due to the difficulties and the time needed to start receiving the benefit that the cooperative is promoting for the future, for

having a good life. As it has been showcased, the institutional process of legitimization from state for support these SSE cooperatives is not being executed. On the other hand, the cooperative's relationship with external actors is still important (Coraggio, 2015) as in time of war.

However, while in this case, we are dealing with an illicit crop trade by a legal community, the repercussions for this are now different. These also inform the state that legitimizing these cooperatives and supporting them is in juxtaposition with their mandate of a war on drugs. Therefore, we encounter a wicked problem because the state has not been able to provide a solution for the war on drugs. Still, at the same time, it can't support the legitimization of organizations that in theory have a legal framework, but some of its actors deal with illegality. The latter does not undermine the analysis of (Coraggio, 2015). However, it puts another layer of difficulty in the dichotomy to sustain SSE activities that are not bounded by external legal trade, even if the primary rationale of this activity is a critical pillar to maintain SSE initiatives and the livelihoods of its members.

However, it is also important to remark that today, the FARC-EP ex-combatants also carries negatively with the history of its actions as military actor. In certain regions where they are settled and had started to create cooperatives, it has been subjugated to the political views of the local governments and the political affiliations of the members of their workforce. This has been documented by (Garcia and Alvarez, 2020 based on Alvarez et al, 2017) mentioning that to get an efficient establishment of the cooperative, the local government in these territories must see the peace agreement with good eyes. This, of course, had to do with which political party the local government follows.

Also, there are other complications, such as the time procedure to establish cooperatives; It usually takes 60 days, compared with other types of enterprises that normally take less than a week, increasing rising transaction costs for the ex-combatants (Garcia and Alvarez, 2020). Also, one major problem that is neglecting the capacity of ex-combatants to thrive collectively is the lack of access of corporate bank accounts. The ex-combatants are allowed to create individual bank accounts. Unfortunately, this has not been the case for the cooperatives (Garcia and Alvarez, 2020), thus putting economic pressure on ex-combatants.

Following these challenges, the SSE actor of FARC-EP is still facing social disintegration (Gaiger, 2017) by the institutionalized memories of their time in conflict. There is a difference in being a cooperative of peasants who did not participate in war and other if you are a member of the ex-guerrilla. This entails that the now political actor clashes in juxtaposition with a culture of categorization that constrains them to thrive politically and legitimize themselves to the state. This political actor is not in power to re-establish mechanisms and norms that allow them to be local authorities in their bounded territories and ease their activities to their will. In that sense, environments matter for the institutionalization of the cooperatives of ex-combatants. Their SSE activities can't thrive if the legitimization is denied by past perceptions and by political parties that undermined their new legal forms of living. Perhaps, this is still part of the revolutionary process of the SSE, one that includes fighting the otherization of ways of living by past activities that need time to forgive by other non-war actors.

Moreover, not only external actors still have remembrance of what happened during the conflict. In the internal governance of the cooperative, there are still clashes between governance roles and hierarchies. The theoretical framework of the SSE failed to recognize that even in the context of SSE governance, that is supposed to be democratic and that all are equal regarding of their shares or status, the precedent conditions of their members, for example being those a military front could be maintained in the collective memories if peace is signed and when the military activities cease to exist.

*"The cooperative has an ideology and a culture attached. The commander orders the work in the cooperative. He was the commander of the military front here, and now he is the commander of*

*the cooperative. He asked a lot of things as he was still in war, even with peers in the cooperative. He gives order and maintain he style as previously in war”(Interview 001, 2021)*

In this case, these FARC-EP cooperatives have a military type of hierarchy that still is being reinforced. Military commands still stand, as we have seen regarding the commander. Understanding the internal hierarchies in SSE institutions could be critical to understanding the different self-governance layers and levels of these institutions. Moreover, it allows the analysis that the SSE subject of the FARC-EP has been solidified in time, including their military organizational frameworks and commands. The latter aligns with (Gomez, 2015), conclusions on solidarity economy institutionalization when these organizations face uniformity risks when they are either too big or are not bounded in a specific territory. The risks mentioned by (Gomez, 2015) could potentially cause problems of differentiated leadership and clashes between the self-organization in certain regions and the differences between others with differentiated environments. Also, the leadership differences from a Macro or Meso level (ECOMUN), might not be the same in congruency with the typology of leadership happening in the local level (e.g. the cooperatives in the territories).

Despite all the problems of the current progress of the peace agreements, ECOMUN is still committed to being the umbrella of the associative and cooperative initiatives of the FARC-EP ex-combatants. In March 2020, the now political party agreed on different aspects of ECOMUN to the future. In their statement, it is interesting to see the creation of a solidarity bank to continue fighting against the financial sector as a counter-hegemonic system within ECOMUN (Garcia and Alvarez, 2020). At the same time, ECOMUN establishes a statutory committee that is participative and bottoms up. In more practical terms, some of the ECOMUN activities are (not exhaustive): i) prioritize productive products in the agricultural sector that can fulfill self-consumption of the ECOMUN collective, providing food sovereignty and the enhancement of local markets, ii) In line with the large amount of the ex-combatants, ECOMUN would and can create own markets that should not follow capitalistic fundamentals in terms of pricing, instead, alternatives such as exchange (trueque), reciprocity, or other types of own monetary mechanism, iii) Establishment of an own mean of exchange (own meaning of capital), but building economic circuits that can support the maintenance of collective funds to invest in the members in no commercial ways (Garcia and Alvarez, 2020).

Furthermore, according to the legal statutory establishment of ECOMUN, in their point four of its registry established that ECOMUN will “design, define and organize collective productive projects. In that sense, collective reincorporation projects are prioritized instead of individualistic, because of having a “live in the collective” in the Guerrilla military camps: “Before Troop, now a collective community,” at the same time it is preferable by ECOMUN supporting cooperative projects rather than commercial, due to the anticapitalistic ideology and orientation of the FARC-EP.””(Garcia and Alvarez, 2020). As we had seen in this paper, the creation of ECOMUN is a clear manifestation of the FARC-EP, from their starting point as a peasant social movement, and through their 60 years in conflict. The FARC-EP discourse in terms of solidarity economy has been solid, maintained, and replicated through all their existence and post-war economies.

This is an essential point since one can assume that the ex-Guerrilla understands signing the peace agreement as a zone of rearguard (as with the coca towns) and not of war. The FARC-EP then has a clear motivation of establishing the creation of social organizations and working the communal centers of the towns for their internal collective benefit, along with the local communities where they are now established. But also, this resource of solidarity economic models is a resource to maintaining their cohesion and longevity after the war, as (Pécaut, 2008) mentioned. Not as a military actor but as a political and economic actor.

## Chapter 7: Conclusion

This paper showcased the historical implications that led the FARC-EP to establish SSE models across their history. The roots of their SSE mindset are, as in other Latin American countries, founded in exclusionary processes that denied peasant communities to sustain a good life due to structural conditions of exploitation, economic hardship, access to land to work and neglect of produce and exchange products and services in their local communities (Gaiger, 2017) (Lematre and Helmsing, 2012) (Coraggio, 2015). The paper had shown the evolution of its SSE model as a military actor when the group established the FARC-EP guerrilla and started to expand to several territories in the country. Always portraying a communal peasantry discourse helped them integrate more members into their fronts, allowing the military actor to build hierarchies and leadership across the territories and independent republics that they controlled.

At the same time, we had seen the intertwined relationship of the FARC-EP between the narcotraffic and the SSE models through their interactions with peasant coca producers in line with SSE institutionalization of coca market, reciprocity, and redistribution. The latter allowed FARC-EP to play a political and local governmental action in these communities. Furthermore, we had seen the strategic political decision of the FARC-EP in understanding their relationship with war, peace, and SSE in their dynamics. Moments of a military offensive in the war were not necessarily needed to establish SSE institutions on the ground but to disseminate their intentions in political agendas. The latter is in contradiction with their SSE roots as in the peasantry movement in their early years. Finally, this paper had showcased the intersectional SSE actor of the former guerrilla today. The reinforcing mechanism that is using, that also lies in contradiction with the legitimization of their current status as a legal actor that fights with a state that do not recognize neither legitimize their status as a legal SSE actor and that continue to maintain hegemonic actions as to prioritize support to individual productive projects rather than collective.

Today, the former FARC-EP SSE is in duality. The ex-combatants see the post-war era as a territory of rearguard, hence positioning the SSE cooperatives as a source of peace, a means to an end, to reinsertion into civil life that allows them, collectively, to sustain their livelihoods and their families. However, as exposed in the paper, the post-war SSE cooperatives clash with structures that neglect them and delegitimize their new (old) ways of living. What is problematic is that the former ex-combatants had shown plenty of resilience in their history. In that sense, if continuing delegitimization, social disintegration, and denied support, there could be no other means of survival than replacing the means of their resources, as they did several times in war. These resources could be legal, like joining the traditional labour market and mobilizing to urban territories, or creating individual projects, as the government's structures push them to disintegrate their cohesion as a collective. Also, it could be illegal forms of resources, as to ultimately join narcotraffic groups or enlist again in dissidents' guerrillas. ‘

To conclude, all these dichotomies are seen through the paper. It Portraits an SSE actor that is intersectional. Depending on the environment and the historical context, that had shifted, even maintaining their discourse, to practices that put SSE principles as a priority and, in other cases, that put military actions and ideology as a mechanism of sustaining their ways of life. However, the SSE actor of the former guerrilla today is a mix of all; it presents a social and economic SSE model that still reinforces military organizational schemes as of war. ECOMUN is the shift of their war resources, bounded in the Macro level: the political arm that dictates economic policies and regulations, but is in the micro, in the local, that the context of military commands still prevails. The shift in paradigms of the agents at the micro level are not easy to change, from hierarchies to equal governance, but as (Interview 001, 2021) mentioned, “ many of the people in the cooperative arrive at the guerrilla as children, so it is a problem that it will be resolve with time, with the children of these post-war families”.



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