

(Re)Framing History:
An Historical Examination of Postcolonialism, Decolonialism,
and the Philosophy of History

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ABSTRACT:

This thesis concerns itself with the university as an institution of and for society – utilising academic history’s relationship with critical theories of postcolonialism and decolonialism as a case study to analyse the impact of global discourses of power on processes of (historical) knowledge production and dissemination. Within the context of increased hyper-globalisation, the university, as a scientific institution whose mission is to discover the truth, is currently experiencing a friction in its existential purpose. Understanding the current global order to be a product of the 500-year-old world-system in which the university emerged as a Euro-Western centre of knowledge production and in which contemporary history developed its academic standards, the main research question therefore is: How does academia, as a centre of knowledge production of and for the Euro-Western world, impact critical theories? More specifically, how does history, as an academic discipline of the Humanities within the university, interact with theories of postcolonialism and decolonialism since their advent in scholarly literature in the 1970s? Informed by a poststructuralist approach to literary and discourse analysis, this thesis examines the works of Edward Said, Homi K. Bhabha, and Dipesh Chakrabarty as well as Frantz Fanon, Enrique Dussel, and Anibal Quijano to understand postcolonial and decolonial criticism within the creation of academic history. This literary and discourse analysis is thereafter focused on at least one critical review for each of the work of the respective authors above. The reviews examined the legitimacy and validity of postcolonial and decolonial scholarship through the lens of empiricism expressed as an hermeneutical historical interpretation based in rational realism, which ultimately limits and defines historical “truth” according to global discourses of power emanating from the 500-year-old world-system: Eurocentrism. This Eurocentrism expands beyond academic history and the university, permeating through the global order in its institutions and structure – as seen with the United Nation’s framework for human rights. Albeit an honourable and necessary concept, human rights are influenced by the Euro-Western experience, conceptualisation, and epistemology of global matters thereby inevitably enshrouding the value of human rights within Eurocentrism. All in all, I argue that history, academia, and the university more broadly impose a Eurocentric framework on knowledge production and its unending search for the “truth”. Despite being based on empirical scientific processes, the search for truth – in the historical sense – through the use of rational realism in hermeneutic interpretation leads to a narrow-minded approach to historical enquiry, limiting our knowledge, potential, and humanity to a homogenous (Euro-Western) unit. Demonstrative of a lack of inter-epistemological dialogue within inter(-)national relations, it necessary that history, academia, and the university begin to understanding the plurality of humanity and its multiple ways of being within its conceptualisation and framing of the truth.

Keywords: Philosophy of History, Postcolonialism, Decolonialism, Eurocentrism, Global Order, 500-Year-Old World-System, the University and Inter-Epistemological Interactions

List of Abbreviations:

BESS – Black Europe Summer School (2021)

UDHR – Universal Declaration of Human Rights

UN – United Nations

UNDRIP – United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples

UNMD – United Nations Millennium Declaration

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Table of Contents

ABSTRACT:	2
List of Abbreviations:	3
Acknowledgments:	4
Chapter 1: Introduction	7
Research Question & Main Argument:	9
Theoretical Concepts:	12
Literature Review:	20
Social Relevance and Innovative Aspects:	25
Sources and Methodology:	26
Conclusion:	29
Chapter 2 - Postcolonialism	30
Historical Context: A Political-Historical Era and its Literature	30
Postcolonialism: An Academic Theory	34
Foundational Figures of Postcolonial Thought: Said, Bhabha, and Chakrabarty	35
<i>Edward Said</i>	36
<i>Homi K. Bhabha</i>	39
<i>Dipesh Chakrabarty</i>	43
Conclusion:	47
Chapter 3 – Decolonialism	50
Historical Context: The Americas and 1492	51
Anti-colonialism and Decolonisation: Two Sides of the Same “Decolonialism” Coin	54
Foundational Figures of Decolonial Thought: Fanon, Dussel, Quijano	57
<i>Frantz Fanon:</i>	57
<i>Enrique Dussel:</i>	61
<i>Anibal Quijano:</i>	66
Conclusion:	70
Chapter 4 – Academic History (Re)Actionism	72
History & Postcolonialism:	73
<i>Review: Edward Said & Bernard Lewis</i>	74
<i>Review: Homi K. Bhabha & Phillip Howell</i>	78
<i>Review: Dipesh Chakrabarty & Carola Dietze</i>	82
History & Decolonialism:	87
<i>Review: Frantz Fanon, W. A. E. Skurnik, & Robyn Dane</i>	88
<i>Review: Enrique Dussel, Bernard Mergen & Latin American Postcolonial School</i>	92

<i>Review: Aníbal Quijano and Latin American Decolonial Scholarship</i>	94
Conclusion:	98
Chapter 5: Human Rights	100
Historical Context:	101
Eurocentrism & Human Rights:	105
<i>Universal Declaration of Human Rights:</i>	105
<i>United Nations Millennium Declaration:</i>	106
<i>United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples:</i>	107
Eurocentrism, Race Relations Industry, and Human Rights:	110
<i>Universal Declaration of Human Rights:</i>	111
<i>United Nations Millennium Declaration:</i>	114
<i>United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples:</i>	116
Conclusion:	120
Chapter 6: Conclusion	122
Thesis Bibliography:	129
Primary Sources:	129
Secondary Sources:	131

Chapter 1: Introduction

“The exact same experience can mean two completely different things to two different people, given those people’s two different belief templates and two different ways of constructing meaning from experience. Because we prize tolerance and diversity of belief, nowhere in our liberal arts analysis do we want to claim that one guy’s interpretation is true and the other guy’s is false or bad. Which is fine, except we also never end up talking about just where these individual templates and beliefs come from, meaning, where they come from *inside* the two guys. As if a person’s most basic orientation toward the world and the meaning of his experience were somehow automatically hardwired, like height or shoe size, or absorbed from the culture, like language. As if how we construct meaning were not actually a matter of personal, intentional choice, of conscious decision.”

David Foster Wallace – Kenyon College
Graduation Commencement Speech, 2005 (43-44)

Why do we think the way we do? How do our minds process reality? Is this process dependent on culture, society, biology, history? Or is it an innate and unique ability of human beings – having been lucky enough to be born with, through some sort of measure, rational thought? The way we think and why we think in this way has been a topic of interest for generations of scholars, providing us with numerous philosophies on how human beings obtain knowledge. But, as David Foster Wallace noted in his Graduation Commencement Speech at Kenyon College in 2005, we rarely question how the university, as an academic research and education centre, teaches us how to think or even what to think. In fact, we rarely think about the history of the university or the university itself as a key epistemological institution within society. And yet, universities in Europe have existed since the late Middle-Ages, some – like the University of Bologna and Oxford for example – claiming their origins back to the 11th century.¹

The university has always been involved in the search for knowledge and the truth. In Europe, this process initially took the form of the Medieval university, a place of theology that became officially institutionalised during the late Middle-Ages. It was a space to pursue Christian truths, provide monastic training, and theological tutoring. Its structure was divided into four faculties: theology, medicine, law, and philosophy.² But the university’s focus on the Christian, religious way of being and thinking changed dramatically with the advent of the

¹ See “Our History,” University of Bologna, accessed September 10, 2021, <https://www.unibo.it/en/university/who-we-are/our-history/our-history>; and “Introduction and History,” University of Oxford, accessed September 10, 2021, <https://www.ox.ac.uk/about/organisation/history>.

² Immanuel Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2004), 3.

Enlightenment. Although the university had by the 18th century become a place for philosophers, who (since the 1600s) had already begun arguing that human beings could discern truth through their own rational abilities (i.e., reasoning), not needing the Church or God to do so, the Enlightenment brought forth a new line of questioning, making the faculty of philosophy a locus of debate.³ Scientists questioned the methods of philosophers, empiricism being the foundation of their argument. According to them, only empirical evidence could lead to truth. This way of thinking fractured the structure of the Medieval university, dividing the faculty of philosophy in two: philosophy and science, or, as we know it today, the humanities and the sciences.⁴ The latter emphasises empirical methods and experimental research, testing hypotheses in laboratories for example, while the former favours hermeneutic understanding and analytical interpretation.⁵ During the 19th century, this division sharpened with the emergence of disciplines, the faculty of science for example categorising itself along the lines of physics, chemistry, biology, etc., while the humanities encompassed philosophy, classical studies, languages, and so forth.⁶ Today, the only remnant left of their connection is that, in either the sciences or the humanities, one can obtain a Doctorate of Philosophy. These are the foundations of the university as we know it today – from its origins in theology, its progression into philosophy, to its modern form as a scientific institution.

The university's evolution in its process of discovering truth holds a pivotal role within a Euro-Western understanding and conceptualisation of the world. I say Euro-Western because the university as it exists today is largely understood to be a product of Europe, as was demonstrated by the narrative above. This despite the fact that universities existed in other parts of the world before the 11th century, like Al-Qarawiyyin University in Morocco or Al-Azhar University in Egypt – both founded in the 9th and 10th centuries respectively.⁷ The contribution of these universities and non-Euro-Western scholars are omitted from the general conceptualisation of the university and its historical narrative. For example, Islamic scholars as early as the 9th century were debating the nature of optics,

³ Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis*, 2.

⁴ Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis*, 2-3.

⁵ Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis*, 3.

⁶ Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis*, 3.

⁷ See “Fatima al-Fihri: Founder of the world’s oldest university,” Deutsche Welle, African Roots, accessed November 29, 2021, <https://www.dw.com/en/fatima-al-fihri-founder-of-the-worlds-oldest-university/a-53371150>; and “Al-Azhar University,” Al-Azhar University, About Us, accessed November 29, 2021, <http://www.azhar.edu.eg/en/>.

light, and the ability to see – important scientific contributions for our knowledge today.⁸ This exclusion has a profound impact, for – if we are reliant on the narrative presented above – it reduces the history of the university as well as its cultural, societal, epistemological fabric to Europe and the Euro-Western influence in the world. It reduces human knowledge to a specific group, location, and culture, effectively discriminating against other groups, locations, and cultures. In sum, it promotes a Eurocentric rationale, way of being, and exclusive power.

This thesis is dedicated to understanding the history of the university and the hermeneutic development in historical interpretation since the 1970s. That is to say, I am interested in analysing how, since the advent of critical theories in academia, the university, and particularly history – considered a discipline of the humanities herein – has approached its Eurocentric biases. I have chosen the 1970s as the starting point so as to note the impact of two publications: Frantz Fanon’s *Black Skin; White Masks* (published in English in 1967) and Edward Said’s *Orientalism* (1978) – two widely influential authors within history and academia. My focus on history and hermeneutic interpretation is due to my personal interest in the subject. Furthermore, the social and political context of the 1970s is important to consider in relation to this academic advent, being marked by the post-1945 movement for universal sovereignty and the increasing impact of globalisation. Since the 1970s, globalisation has come to mean not only increased global economic integration but also a process of cultural integration.⁹ Considering this context of transformation and integration within society, and taking into account the university’s role within this changing society, it is important to analyse how the university, through a case-study of history, has adapted to these conditions and the impact of hyper-globalisation today. Put simply, if society has increasingly become the site of cultural integration and we acknowledge that the university is a key institution of and for society that teaches us how to think, then we need to begin reflecting on the university’s role and impact on our way of being.

Research Question & Main Argument:

Referencing the university’s historical narrative above, academia has played a historic role within the current world-system and international relations. As Immanuel Wallerstein elaborates in his book, *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction*, the economic world-system that we call today capitalism expanded across the world at the beginning of the 16th century through European empires, requiring

⁸ “Hiding in the Light,” Episode 5, *Cosmos: A Spacetime Odyssey*, narrated by Neil DeGrasse Tyson, (National Geographic Channel, premiered April 7, 2014).

⁹ For more information, see: Theodore Pelagidis and Harry Papatotiriou, “Globalisation or Regionalism? States, Markets, and the Structure of International Trade,” *Cambridge University Press* 28, 3(2002): 519-535.

constant, further innovation to maintain its structure.¹⁰ This development inevitably impacted the university as a developing centre of scientific discovery and a pursuer of the truth. As Wallerstein writes: “The imperative of the endless accumulation of capital had generated a need for constant technological change, a constant expansion of frontiers – geographical, psychological, intellectual, scientific. There arose in consequence a felt need to know how we know, and to debate how we may know.”¹¹ As such, the university became a centre where knowledge was produced and disseminated. However, with the power dynamics of the international system being reliant on metropole-periphery (or empire-colony) relationships, the search for knowledge was not only claimed to be Euro-Western, but also embodied a Euro-Western way of being. In other words, the university was and continues to be a centre of knowledge production of and for the Euro-Western world, helping maintain the latter’s position within the global hierarchy of the international system. Thus, the research question of this thesis is: How does academia, as a centre of knowledge production of and for the Euro-Western world, impact critical theories? More specifically, how does history, as an academic discipline within the university, interact with theories of postcolonialism and decolonialism since their advent in scholarly literature in the 1970s?

I have chosen postcolonialism and decolonialism due to their inter-connected activism as well as their active presence within academic history and international relations. Although closely related, the traditions associated with postcolonialism and decolonialism differ. Margaret Kohn and Kavita Reddy summarise it nicely: “Whereas postcolonial theory is associated with the issues of hybridity, diaspora, representation, narrative, and knowledge/power, theories of decolonization are concerned with revolution, economic inequality, violence, and political identity.”¹² Both theories therefore work together in deconstructing the centrality of Euro-Western superiority and the hierarchically induced inequalities within history and the global order. Consequently, understanding these theories’ contextual socio-political past and its connection to their epistemological interactions with academic history will not only promote thought-provoking questions regarding the future of critical theories within academia, but will also reveal how open the university truly is as a space of and for intellectual debate and inter-epistemological interaction.

¹⁰ Immanuel Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2004), 2.

¹¹ Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis*, 2.

¹² Margaret Kohn and Kavita Reddy, “Colonialism,” *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall – online): 1-15.

To answer how the discipline of history interacts with both theories, Chapter 2 and 3 are dedicated to the activism of postcolonialism and decolonialism respectively, demonstrating how three main pillars of these critical theories are advocating against the hegemonic norm of historical scholarship of their time. In other words, the main sub-question asked is: to what are postcolonial and decolonial scholars (re)acting against? Although this will be elaborated upon in the chapters, postcolonialism presents a literary criticism of history whose interpretations are influenced by Euro-Western centrality – and, consequently, Eurocentric – realities within the global order, while decolonialism builds upon this scholarship by also positioning itself against enduring (neo)colonial realities within international relations and the fabric of the global order itself. After presenting the activism of these critical theories, Chapter 4 examines how the discipline of history (re)acted against this scholarship. Briefly said, critics and skeptics of postcolonialism and decolonialism usually rely on academic historical empiricism that manifests itself as a form of rational realism within the hermeneutic interpretation of these works, consequently reflecting discourses of Euro-Western power within the global order. That is to say, the critics' reception of postcolonial and decolonial criticisms reveals their own perception which in turn illuminates their way of being that is based upon a comprehension of knowledge that stems from a world-system in which Europe and the West historically have dominated. Put simply, historical (academic) epistemology – how we know history and why we know it in this way – is dependent on mechanisms of power inherent to the global structure and its hierarchy. In turn, this epistemology defines “good” from “bad” history and validates a hierchisation of truth, experiences, and humanness. This will provide the transition to Chapter 5, which focuses this philosophical/ideological Eurocentric reality within the processes of (historical) knowledge production and its reflection on human rights. Considering the fact that the current global order is directly connected to the post-1945 era, a time in which human rights were established and entrenched in international law, grasping the extent of how these “human rights” were then conceptualised is crucial in understanding their connection to the current and much older world-system and its power dynamics. In the end, this thesis argues that history, through its relation within the university as an academic discipline, has imposed a Euro-Western epistemology that is still entrenched within Eurocentrism and the power dynamics of the 500-year-old world-system from which it emerged. This Eurocentric epistemology within academia has consequently also entrenched a Eurocentric conceptualisation of “human rights” – defining accordingly the historical human experience, thought, rational, and interpretation of reality through this lens. In other words, the university, as a societal institution that teaches us how and

what to think, has instilled a monopoly over the societal imaginary of the human, the human-world, and human-life that is entrenched in a Eurocentric way of being due to its institutional connection to the concept of the 500-year-old world-system.

My thesis demonstrates how the university, as an institution that has its own structure, norms, and values interacts within a society that is increasingly globalised and interconnected. As a space of contact and interaction, the university is steeped in old mechanisms created by the conception of the 500-year-old world-system and is struggling to transform itself so as to better address power differentials. Considering the global context of today, wherein globalisation has contributed to an increase in inter-cultural, inter-ethnic, and inter-societal interactions, relying on Eurocentric mechanisms is, quite frankly, outdated. It simply does not make sense that the university and its history, as a key institution of and for society, represents only a certain demographic especially when individual societies of today encompass multiple ways of being. This realisation is even more disappointing when taking into account the multiple ways of being embodied by the university's student and professor population, for this Eurocentrism disregards many of their life experiences, knowledge, and philosophies through its favouritism of Euro-Western epistemology. This narrative, therefore, also proves to be dangerous for social cohesion, since it promotes the exceptionalism of one group while simultaneously excluding others. Eurocentrism limits our knowledge to Euro-Western ontology, epistemology, and ways of being rather than encompassing all human ontologies, epistemologies, and ways of being. The fact that it exists within the university itself, incorporated within academic structure, knowledge, and history is deeply problematic. In both the sense of the Euro-Western world coming to terms with its colonial and imperial past and in the sense of traditionally "white" populations being increasingly "diversified", the university – and academia more generally – should play a stronger role in inter-cultural, inter-racial, inter(-)national, and inter-epistemological interactions. As with any interaction, communication is key – and it is essential that history understands how it can transform itself so as to better facilitate these forms of communication within the university in the future. It is just as essential that historians understand their responsibility within this transformation. I hope to demonstrate the need for more open-mindedness in academic history and the university with this project.

Theoretical Concepts:

Considering this thesis uses postcolonialism and decolonialism within history as a case study to understand how the university has adapted to the contemporary hyper-globalised context, it is important

to consider the global power dynamics present within the international system. Utilising these as theoretical concepts through which to complete my analysis enables me to examine the extent through which Eurocentrism and its mechanisms of power – mainly, (neo)colonialism – are connected to historical understanding and processes of (historical) knowledge production: the 500-year-old world-system.

Understanding the 500-year-old World-System:

As was alluded to above, this thesis assumes the world-systems theory as the foundation for Euro-Western epistemology and the permeation of Eurocentrism within the global order. Scholars today widely understand the current global order to be the product of European expansionism beginning in the 16th century. This phenomenon enabled the distribution of the European economic-system, namely capitalism, to expand on a global scale through the creation of colonies and empires. Inevitably, this created a specific global hierarchy wherein European metropolises were the core and colonies were the periphery. The latter supplied the needs of the former. This relationship culminated with what historians have termed, “The Scramble for Africa,” in the 19th century, and transformed itself during the post-1945 era into “First World”-“Third World” relations. Fathered by Immanuel Wallerstein, world-systems theory expands on this narrative and seeks to explain how and why capitalism (the ceaseless accumulation of wealth), from the *longue durée* perspective, began in the 1500s in Europe specifically and came to be the current global order. It posits that European economic growth and expansionism created a network in which the entire world through empire-colony relations, followed by economic industrialisation and development, became inextricably inter-connected. This process directly influenced the current world structure, hierarchy, and power distribution of today – what academics term: the global order.

Although some will rightly say that the global order of today is not the same as the one which emerged from the European Age of Exploration, the world-system nevertheless remains intact. After the Second World War, America replaced the British Empire and the rest of Europe as the leading hegemon in the so-called Western world. Despite the Soviet Bloc (and what became later known as the non-Alignment Bloc) existing throughout the Cold War, the fall of the USSR in the 1990s was and continues to be seen as the triumph of capitalism across the Atlantic and the Euro-Western world. Capitalism, hegemony, and power alongside common culture,

language, and way of being have therefore held a pivotal role in the Euro-Western imaginary and historical narrative. Europe and America, or the “West” (in this thesis referred to as the Euro-Western world), is its own cultural, spatial, ethnic, racial zone of existence on the planet. As Wallerstein writes:

Note the hyphen in world-system and its two subcategories, world-economies and world-empires. Putting in the hyphen was intended to underline that we are talking not about systems, economies, empires of the (whole) world, but about systems, economies, empires that are a world (but quite possibly, and indeed usually, not encompassing the entire globe). This is a key initial concept to grasp. It says that in “world-systems” we are dealing with a spatial/temporal zone which cuts across many political and cultural units, one that represents an integrated zone of activity and institutions which obey certain systemic rules.¹³

It just so happens that the economic-world-system of the 1500s now encompasses the entire planet rather than just a “spatial/temporal zone.” According to Wallerstein, whether other economies existed or not, it was ultimately the European world-system of capitalism that was the first to emerge on the global stage and expand to the point of becoming the only viable option within international relations.

The relevance of Wallerstein’s world-systems theory to the subject of this thesis is the connection between the university and construction of knowledge as a system of its own functioning within and for the benefit of the wider economic-world-system. To simplify, the structures and mechanisms of power that grew out of the expansion of European empires and their cultural-societal-ontological interactions with other nations impacted the Euro-Western way of being and, ultimately, the way they viewed their place in the world. In other words, there exists a symbiotic relationship between the world-system and Euro-Western epistemology. This means that there also exists a link between the world-system, its mechanisms of power, and the university. In relaying the history of the world-systems theory, Wallerstein writes:

The story of the emergence of world-systems analysis [*sic* theory] is embedded in the history of the modern world-system and the structures of knowledge that grew up as part of that system. *It is most useful to trace the beginning of this particular story not to the 1970s but to the mid-eighteenth century. The capitalist world-economy had then been in existence for some two centuries already.* The imperative of the endless accumulation of capital had generated a need for constant technological change, a constant expansion of frontiers – geographical, psychological, intellectual, scientific.¹⁴

¹³ Immanuel Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2004), 16-17.

¹⁴ Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis*, 1. Emphasis added.

As was previously stated, the 18th century saw a transformation within the structure of the university – scientists separating themselves from the humanities and advocating for rational, unbiased, empirical interpretation of data within the faculty of philosophy. We can therefore see the inevitable connection between the 500-year-old world-system and the structure of the university as a centre of and for knowledge production. Consequently, I argue that the 500-year-old world-system and all of its mechanisms of power are at the forefront of Euro-Western epistemology – a problem that permeates the university today as a space for inter-cultural, inter-ethnic, inter(-)national, and inter-epistemological interaction.

The 500-year-old world-system and Eurocentrism:

Eurocentrism is often defined as a perspective or narrative within history that excludes the non-Euro-Western world. For example, the Cambridge Dictionary writes that Eurocentrism is: “the fact of seeing things from the point of view of Europe or European people; the fact of considering Europe or Europeans to be the most important”.¹⁵ Meanwhile, the Oxford Dictionary proposes it to be: “an attitude that focuses on European culture or history and regards it as more important than the culture or history of other regions”.¹⁶ These definitions solely rely on perspective, narrative, or vaguely said “attitude”, thereby strictly defining Eurocentrism as a form of Euro-Western favouritism within history. However, as we have seen above, this bias is symbiotically reflected in the nature of the 500-year-old world-system and its mechanisms of power. Therefore, I define Eurocentrism as comprising both the historical-cultural bias as well as the concurrent reality of international relations, revolving to maintain the privileged position of the Euro-Western world within global power dynamics as well as within historical scholarship and academic thought. This overarching discourse of Eurocentrism is thereafter symbiotically reflected within the construction and dissemination of knowledge, meaning that it is steeped within Euro-Western epistemology, society, and way of being. Eurocentrism thus cannot be defined as only a perspective, narrative, or attitude. Our understanding of Eurocentrism must also include the reasons for its existence within the world today.

¹⁵ “Eurocentrism,” Cambridge Dictionary, accessed October 12, 2021, <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/eurocentrism>.

¹⁶ “Eurocentrism,” Oxford Learner’s Dictionary, accessed October 12, 2021, <https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/eurocentrism>.

This idea has been implied by scholars already, but I would like to emphasise my meaning here. Samir Amin, who states:

Eurocentrism is a culturalist phenomenon in the sense that it assumes the existence of irreducibly distinct cultural variants that shape the historical paths of different peoples. Eurocentrism is therefore anti-universalist, since it is not interested in seeking possible general laws of human evolution. But it does present itself as universalist, *for it claims that imitations of the Western model by all peoples is the only solution to challenges of our time.*¹⁷

This complex discourse proposes multiple apparent dichotomies, the most evident of which being the tensions between Euro-Western exceptionalism and universalism. To begin with, exceptionalism is intricately connected to mechanisms of modernity and development. Tied to “cultural variants”, modernity and development equate inherent factors of people to their “natural” inclination for “development” or “under-development.” Yet universalism presents a set of possibilities for all peoples, for example with “standards of civilisation,” thereby appearing to mitigate against discrimination, poverty, and autocracy. However, it is important to note that “standards of civilisation,” as a universal concept, implies proper economic standards which were themselves proposed by the Euro-Western world. Universalism is therefore connected to international realities that entrench exceptionalism. This “double-standard” within Eurocentrism is critical in defining the latter as the main discourse of the global order and the 500-year-old world-system. As Wallerstein himself explained:

Universalism means in general the priority to general rules applying equally to all persons, and therefore the rejection of particularistic preferences in most spheres. *The only rules that are considered permissible within the framework of universalism are those which can be shown to apply directly to the narrowly defined proper functioning of the world-system.*¹⁸

He therefore demonstrates, without intending to, how Eurocentrism is more than mere prejudice and is actually a part of the 500-year-old world-system, proposing and establishing the rules of the functioning and practicing of capitalism that benefits and privileges Euro-Western centrality within international power dynamics, the world hierarchy, and the global order. Wallerstein elaborates:

...universalism is believed to ensure relatively competent performance and thus make for a more efficient world-economy, which in turn improves the ability to accumulate capital.

¹⁷ Samir Amin, *Eurocentrism*, translated by Russell Moore (UK: Zed Books, 1988), vii. Emphasis added.

¹⁸ Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis*, 38. Emphasis added.

Hence, normally those who control production processes push for such universalistic criteria.¹⁹

Universalism thus implies the diffusion and propagation of unequal exchanges which were originally entrenched during the era of European expansionism and the establishment of the global 500-year-old world-system. Consequently, universalism is not the idea of promoting equality amongst everyone, but rather to maintain the international divisions of labour within the world market, thereby effectively upholding and affirming Euro-Western exceptionalism. It subterfuges exceptionalism so as to present the illusion of equality within an unequal and unjust hierarchy and division of power. Through universalism, Eurocentrism encompasses not only the historical bias and prejudice of Euro-Western exceptionalism, but also current international power dynamics, the hierarchy of the global order, and the reality of the 500-year-old world-system.

Economic Development and the Legacy Colonialism:

The 500-year-old world-system is inextricably tied to power differentials connected to economic development and power caused by colonialism and imperialism. Nevertheless, scholars often use colonialism and imperialism interchangeably to describe the expansion of European empires specifically, not the expansion of the world-system. This results in a strictly historical interpretation of these terms. As the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* elaborates:

Colonialism is a practice of domination, which involves the subjugation of one people to another. One of the difficulties in defining colonialism is that it is hard to distinguish it from imperialism. Frequently the two concepts are treated as synonyms. Like colonialism, imperialism also involves political and economic control over a dependent territory. The etymology of the two terms, however, provides some clues about how they differ. The term colony comes from the Latin word *colonus*, meaning farmer. This root reminds us that *the practice of colonialism usually involved the transfer of population to a new territory*, where the arrivals lived as permanent settlers while maintaining political allegiance to their country of origin. Imperialism, on the other hand, comes from the Latin term *imperium*, meaning to command. Thus, *the term imperialism draws attention to the way that one country exercises power over another, whether through settlement, sovereignty, or indirect mechanisms of control.*²⁰

¹⁹ Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis*, 40.

²⁰ "Colonialism," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, accessed September 30, 2021, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/colonialism/>. Emphasis Added.

Note the use of the past tense in relation to colonialism and the use of the present tense for imperialism. This is reflective of economic Marxist ideas that equate colonialism and imperialism to being successive developmental stages of capitalism. Far from being a new idea, Marxist theorists like Lenin himself, who in *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1916), argued that imperialism is but a continuation of colonialism within the history of capitalism and human development.²¹ This means that as fully developed capitalist countries, states of the Euro-Western world exercise imperial power in international relations. This is key for it incorporates both the idea of capitalism and Marxist theory alongside the concept of economic transformation and development. In relation to the current post-1945 global order, it is a means to understand how the economic development and progress of old colonies became absorbed as independent countries within the intact, capitalistic 500-year-old world-system.

Nevertheless, this poses a platitude of problems: on the one hand, it continues to tie the concept of colonisation to capitalism thereby persisting the process of economic imperialism today; while on the other, it denies the unequal power differentials resulting directly from the establishment of the 500-year-old world-system.²² That is to say, the economic participation of old colonies within the world-system of modern-day capitalism involves a continued relationship of economic subjugation to members of the Euro-Western world.²³ For without the unequal exchanges within imperial relations, the current power dynamics between “developed” (economically strong) and “under-developed” (economically weak) countries would not have a new-found legacy within international ideals of development and the global institutions of hierarchy. As Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisam explain in, *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader*: “...if colonialism is a way of maintaining an unequal international relation of economic and political power...then no doubt we have not fully transcended the colonial. Perhaps this amounts to saying that we are not yet post-imperialist.”²⁴ Accordingly,

²¹ V. I. Lenin, *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (London: Wellred Books, republished in 2020).

²² As Williams and Chrisam explain on page 4 of their introduction: “If there is a problem connected with calling some societies post-colonial because of the extent of their implications in contemporary capitalism, a different kind of problem arises about whether the historical relation of other societies to colonialism allows them to now be claimed as post-colonial.” Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisam, ed. *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader* (New York & London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994), 4.

²³ See Arghiri Emmanuel, *Unequal Exchange: A Study of the Imperialism of Trade*, translated by Brian Pearce (New York & London: Monthly Review Press, 1972).

²⁴ Williams and Chrisam, *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory*, 4.

scholars have begun utilising the term “neo-colonialism” as a means to express the continued legacy of colonialism and the endurance of economic imperialism within the global order.

This thesis rejects the idea that colonialism and imperialism are exclusive, distinct historical processes. Instead, I posit that they are two policies of a concurrent ideology through which the Euro-Western world can exercise its economic and political power, maintaining the current global hierarchy within the world-system. I thus acknowledge the continued legacy of colonialism and, by proxy, imperialism within global dynamics while also recognising that its form has changed over the course of time. So, in spite of scholars recognising the existence of neo-colonial/imperial realities within the contemporary world, particularly with regards to core-periphery/developed and under-developed dichotomies created by the capitalistic system, these exist because of the expansion and creation of European empires in the 16th century. Hence, (neo)colonialism will be used as the preferred choice, defining the continued processes of colonialism and imperialism that coexist and are virtually inseparable within the current global order and the hierarchy of the 500-year-old world-system.

Conclusion of Theoretical Concepts:

My thesis embraces a critical approach in its analysis of inter-epistemological interaction between critical theories of postcolonialism and decolonialism with Euro-Western academic history, recognising the effect global power differentials emplaced by Eurocentrism and (neo)colonialism have on the transmission and acceptance of ideas as well as the kind of knowledge produced within the global order and 500-year-old world-system. Eurocentrism presupposes the presence of (neo)colonial power dynamics within the global order, the 500-year-old world-system from which it emerged, and consequently the structures of knowledge that we have today. In relation to the main argument of this thesis, academia and history more specifically need to go beyond the 500-year-old world-system and the prescribed power dynamics which entrench various ways of being into a hierarchy of truth, experience, and humanness. These mechanisms of Eurocentric power have molded the Euro-Western way of being, and consequently have influenced how and what the university teaches us to think. In other words, the way we do history is entrenched within Eurocentrism and mechanisms of Euro-Western power within the global order.

Literature Review:

The following section focuses on what scholars have said about the ways in which Eurocentrism gradually manifested itself in academic history. That is to say, how Eurocentrism came to exist within the conceptualisation of history. As noted above, the 500-year-old world-system is inalienable from processes of (neo)colonialism, which in turn feed into discourses of Eurocentrism within the global order and the production of knowledge. Nelson Maldonado-Torres in his article entitled, “The Topology of Being and the Geopolitics of Knowledge: Modernity, Empire, Coloniality,” illuminates the connection between Eurocentrism, Euro-Western epistemology, and (historical) knowledge production by examining how Eurocentric biases are found within Euro-Western philosophy. Basing himself off of Heidegger’s notion of “being”, Maldonado-Torres originates the term, “Coloniality of Being,” to describe the experience of the Other within a colonial context and the various dynamics of power inhabiting such an experience. He explains: “It is out of these reflections on modernity, coloniality and the modern/colonial world that the concept of coloniality of Being first emerged. The relationship between power and knowledge led to the concept of being.”²⁵ Epistemologically speaking, Maldonado-Torres references Euro-Western ideals of knowledge being placed, through colonial discourses of power and Eurocentrism, at the top of the global hierarchy. If knowledge is therefore colonised along with one’s experience, then the logic that follows also includes one’s being.

Coloniality of Being suggests that Being in some way militates against one’s own existence... That is, I suggest that Being is to history and tradition, as coloniality of Being is to coloniality of power and colonial difference. The coloniality of Being refers to the process whereby common sense and tradition are marked by dynamics of power that are preferential in character: they discriminate people and target communities.²⁶

The process of colonisation was therefore inextricably tied to imposing the Euro-Western way of being, their knowledge, and Euro-Western epistemology on others. Established through settler populations, imperial governance, and the expansion of European empires, Euro-Western epistemology and way of being was thus directly tied to historical and political processes of the international system and the global order – namely, (neo)colonialism.

²⁵ Nelson Maldonado-Torres, “The Topology of Being and the Geopolitics of Knowledge: Modernity, Empire, Coloniality,” *City: Analysis of Urban Trends, Culture, Theory, Policy, Action* 8, 1 (2004): 36.

²⁶ Maldonado-Torres, “The Topology of Being and the Geopolitics of Knowledge,” 43.

Building upon this impact of (neo)colonialism upon subjugated colonial subjects, Ramón Grosfoguel in his article, entitled “The Structure of Knowledge in Westernized Universities Epistemic Racism/Sexism and the Four Genocides/Epistemicides of the Long 16th Century,” describes four epistemic genocides – epistemicides – committed by Europeans in the Age of Exploration against Muslims and Jews, Indigenous and African peoples of the Americas, as well as Indo-European women.²⁷ The basis of his argument is that these peoples’ epistemologies were destroyed through expulsion, book-burning, war, the inquisition, conquest, domination, and murder through the establishment of European empires. Disowning these peoples of their lands, ways of being, and their own (experiential) knowledge resulted in either the destruction of their epistemologies or their classification as inherently inferior to Euro-Western epistemologies. Eurocentric historical knowledge production is therefore connected to the violence, eradication, and genocide which often accompanied European imperial expansionism and the imposition of (neo)colonialism as a Eurocentric mechanism of power within the global order. Within the expansion of European empires, (neo)colonialism, and the establishment of the 500-year-old world-system, there occurred many inter-epistemological interactions. They have been present throughout human history, the presumption of their non-existence being due to Eurocentrism. Walter D. Mignolo offers an example of inter-epistemological interaction within a (neo)colonial and Eurocentric context. Like most academics, Mignolo’s monologue, *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking* (2000), was an extension of one of his earlier articles entitled, “The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Colonization and Discontinuity of the Classical Tradition,” published in 1992. Therein, Mignolo analyses what he terms “the darker side” of the Renaissance. That is to say, the norms, values, ideas, concepts, ways of being of the Other, that did not conform with the Renaissance Euro-Western equivalents during the exploration of the Americas. These were, in turn, excluded from Euro-Western conceptualisation of history that emerged within the university thereafter. Coining the term, “colonial semiosis,” Mignolo describes the power struggles in the centre and the periphery created by the inter-cultural and, consequently, inter-epistemological interactions of the Americas regarding the definition of concepts during the early-modern period, and how the

²⁷ Ramón Grosfoguel, “The Structure of Knowledge in Westernized Universities Epistemic Racism/Sexism and the Four Genocides/Epistemicides of the Long 16th Century,” *Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge* 9, 1 (2013):73-90.

outcomes were imposed thereafter globally.²⁸ The result of “colonial semiosis” is a sort of “border thinking”, which Mignolo describes as the perspective of coloniality of power from the subaltern, the Other, or today, the Global South. It is the result of lived experiences within a colonial reality and history, meaning that the process of “colonial semiosis” constantly represses “border thinking” and fractures the epistemic traditions of the other. He writes:

The colonial difference creates the conditions for dialogic situations in which a fractured enunciation is enacted from the subaltern perspective as a response to the hegemonic discourse and perspective. Thus, border thinking is more than a hybrid enunciation. It is a fractured enunciation in dialogic situations with the territorial and hegemonic cosmology.²⁹

Referencing dialogic situations within “hegemonic cosmology” is quite important, since considering the ordering mechanisms of the global order, inter-cultural communication cannot be disassociated from international discourses of power and its Eurocentric constructs. This dialogic fracturing is more than mere epistemological hybridity; indeed, it indicates the extent to which Eurocentrism and (neo)colonialism entrenches historical narratives within a dialectical reality and superior-inferior relationship. In other words, Eurocentric history came to be out of the (neo)colonial success and imposing a Euro-Western epistemology and way of being on the rest of the world.

However, this (neo)colonial imposition is also present today – as evidenced above through the discussion about the nature of (neo)colonialism. The historical enquiry about the continued subjugation of “colonial” countries today through international relations between “developed” and “under-developed” nations is also questioned by proponents of the Dependency Theory, who argue that the “under-development” of “Third World” countries is not tied to their failure to implement capitalistic ideals, but rather is a result of the continued differentials of power between them and the “First World”. An example is Arghiri Emmanuel who, in *Unequal Exchange: A Study of the Imperialism of Trade*, utilises a core-periphery model to explain the continued unequal exchange within the functioning of the world market.³⁰ He reveals how capitalism, which helped exploit colonies during the time of European empires through

²⁸ Walter D. Mignolo, “The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Colonization and the Discontinuity of the Classical Tradition,” *Renaissance Quarterly* 45, 4 (1992): 808.

²⁹ Walter D. Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), x.

³⁰ Arghiri Emmanuel, *Unequal Exchange: A Study of the Imperialism of Trade*, translated by Brian Pearce (New York & London: Monthly Review Press, 1972).

colonialism and imperialism, continues to subjugate the periphery today, Emmanuel reveals how the unequal international division of labour remains divided across the historical and political lines demarcated by the 500-year-old world-system. Taking into account the fact that economic “developments” emerge in the core, and that these are then redistributed to the periphery, this means that not only is the profit greater in the metropole, but the kind of labour available in the periphery is also cheaper.³¹ Thus, the periphery is impoverished on the one hand through the restriction of investment opportunities within the world market, while on the other through the type of work and lower wages available to its people. Dependency theory therefore reveals the extent to which the hierarchical economic divisions within the current post-1945 global order are exacerbated by core-periphery relations established by the process of unequal exchange and promulgated through the division of international labour within the world market and the 500-year-old world-system. Relating this form of (neo)colonialism back to processes of (historical) knowledge production, this economic superiority-inferiority reality could easily slip into tropes of European exceptionalism and universalism – in a word, Eurocentrism – and explain the continuation of Eurocentric narratives in history.

This thesis builds upon this niche of scholarship by examining Eurocentrism as a discourse of power and its influence on the kind of (historical) knowledge produced within the university. Recognising (neo)colonialism as a contemporary phenomenon that has the ability to influence the perception of the Euro-Western way of being as inherently superior could explain the reasons for the continuation of Eurocentric history in the university today. This thesis also builds on this body of scholarship by using a multidimensional approach: examining the intersectionality between these critics of Eurocentric history and Euro-Western historical traditions in the university.

Using an example at Erasmus University Rotterdam in the Netherlands, the class in question is “Rethinking History II”, and the textbook chosen is, *History and Philosophy of the Humanities: An Introduction*, by Michiel Leezenberg.³² As is evident by the title, the book focuses on how history became an academic discipline and the standards and expectations of historical writing within the university. This book dedicates a shocking amount of its attention on

³¹ See Emmanuel’s Chapter on the “Limits and Implications of Unequal Exchange” in *Unequal Exchange*, 1972.

³² Michiel Leezenberg, *History and Philosophy of the Humanities: An Introduction* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018).

Euro-Western contributions to the establishment of history. The table of contents gives us a first impression, with the exception of the Postcolonial section – ironically also the last – devoted to non-Euro-Western academic contributions to the construction of history. The consequence of having this book as a required textbook for a university class in which history and how to do history is taught is problematic, for it reflects only one way of thinking about the past, its relation to the present and future, as well as one single conceptualisation of time. History students learn this through theories and methodologies, all of which are also mainly created and formed by and for the Euro-Western world.

As previously mentioned, the university (and history) felt the impact of the scientific revolution and the Enlightenment, which led to the fracturing of the faculty of philosophy in the 19th century. Leezenberg references this when explaining the main difference between the philosophy of science and the philosophy of the humanities, summarising that the former “aims for *explanation* and for uniquely correct descriptions of facts,” while saying that the latter “aims for *interpretation* of cultural products.”³³ In this sense, Leezenberg draws a distinct difference between the natural sciences and “human” sciences (humanities), going so far as to say that finding the truth is distinctive to the natural sciences while the “proliferation” of interpretations remains the domain of the humanities. However, the distinction the university makes today between these two faculties is relatively recent, and both of their roots lead back to the Enlightenment.

The scientific revolution brought forth an emphasis on empirical thinking. Despite being generally associated with the natural sciences, empiricism (or the compilation of data) is equally relevant to both the natural sciences and the humanities. Within history, for example, a rational, unbiased account of the past that is supported by facts remains a key component of academic historical writing. Theodore von Ranke is largely attributed with this shift in historical production. A historian of the 19th century, Ranke used footnotes and references as a means to support his account and narrative – showing to the reader his sources and data. This demonstrates that today’s academic separation of natural and human sciences is not as clear as initially perceived, and that the empirical traditions of the natural sciences permeate the humanities. This is further evidenced by Leezenberg, who, despite writing about the history and philosophy of the humanities, begins his introduction with an explanation of the philosophy of science. Note the

³³ Leezenberg, *History and Philosophy of the Humanities*, 35. Original emphasis.

plural of the former and the singular of the latter: there are multiple humanities, but only one science. This is telling, for it reveals an unconscious bias within Euro-Western thinking that is related to the scientific process and traditions inherited from the Enlightenment.

By acknowledging the Euro-Western historical tradition alongside the Eurocentric narratives that emerged in the academic construction of history, this thesis positions itself between these two scholarly traditions in its attempt to comprehend their interactions. That is to say, examining the inter-epistemological interaction between postcolonialism and decolonialism with traditional academic history enables me to examine how global discourses of power like Eurocentrism manifests itself within processes of (historical) knowledge production. All in all, this thesis embraces this intersectional approach in its examination of inter-epistemological interaction between critical theories of postcolonialism and decolonialism with Euro-Western academic history, recognising the effect global power differentials have on the transmission and acceptance of ideas as well as the kind of knowledge produced within the global order.

Social Relevance and Innovative Aspects:

This thesis is a form of personal activism in relation to the unequal treatment of demographics of humans as members of the same species in this world. It is the belief in humanity's ability to treat each other fairly, equitably, and with dignity. Everyone has a right to their history; their past experiences, their stories, their life – after all, history is just another story. It is inevitably dialectic. But in order to treat each other respectfully, the university, history department, and particularly historians must come to realise their role in mediating dialogue within this hyper-globalised context for the betterment of *human* society.

In a way, my thesis is not truly innovative, since I am simply repeating what countless scholars have said before me. But I would like to believe that the innovative aspect of my thesis ties into the inter-disciplinary, holistic mentality with which I approach the discipline of history and its connection to international relations. That is to say, I acknowledge the multitude of ways of being that exist in this world, and the various understandings, conceptions, and manifestations of humanity and, therefore, history. I use my own humanity, its experiences and emotions to inform my analysis and conclusion. Although critics may say that this is historical bias and informs a certain irrationality, the fact remains that as human beings we are innately emotional beings, inter-connected with much more than just each other. Our environment, the land on

which we live upon, the people with whom we interact – all feed into our existentialism and our way of being. I see the future of history, therefore, not as the inevitable consequence of dialectic divisions produced by the 500-year-old world-system, but as the possibility to relate the innumerable stories of humanity’s past. My innovation is thus not only considering peoples’ emotions in academic historical writing but daring to embrace them within my analysis so as to – on the one hand, enable humane treatment within the discipline of history, while on the other better understand history’s meaning to and for human society.

Sources and Methodology:

This thesis is divided in four chapters – the first two being dedicated to three postcolonial and decolonial historical works respectively, while the third reviews the critics of these works and the fourth examines the practical implications of Euro-Western historical epistemology in a case study on human rights. The following are the works and authors, as well as international declarations chosen:

- Chapter 2 Case-Study: Postcolonialism
 - o Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon, 1978);
 - o Homi K. Bhabha, *Location of Culture* (London & New York: Routledge, 1994);
 - o Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing of Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000).
- Chapter 3 Case-Study: Decolonialism
 - o Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin; White Masks – 3rd Edition* (UK: Pluto Press, 2008);
 - o Enrique Dussel *The Invention of the Americas: The Eclipse of “the Other” and the Myth of Modernity*, trans. Michael D. Barber (New York: Continuum, 1995).
 - o Anibal Quijano, “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America,” *Neplanta: Views from South* 1, 3 (2000): 533-580.
- Chapter 4:
 - o At least one critical review of each of the author’s works in question
- Chapter 5:
 - o Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)
 - o The United Nations Millennium Declaration (2000)
 - o UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007)

The reasons for choosing these authors are twofold: the first, obvious reason is for their uncontested contribution to theories of postcolonialism and decolonialism and the field as a whole. The fact that most, if not all, postcolonial and/or decolonial scholars reference these scholars emphasises the importance of analysing these works specifically, as they continue to greatly influence the direction of the field. The second reason is because of the authors' positionality and lived experiences. They have all navigated some form or another of the "in-between" spaces created by (neo)colonialism. This particular position, despite academics striving to avoid bias in any sense of the word, is reflected in their writing, revealing (un)conscious truths and realities regarding the global order and dynamics of power they study and inhabit. Furthermore, juxtaposing their experiences and scholarship may reveal some particularities regarding the permeance of Eurocentric system and its development within the global imaginary thereby adding nuance to my analysis. It is important to note, however, the lack of feminine representation within my choice. I recognise the impact of patriarchy and its implications within power dynamics and the production of knowledge. So despite my not using scholarship produced by women, this reality and mechanism of power is considered within my analysis.

Furthermore, utilising at least one critical review of these works is crucial in understanding how academic Euro-Western historical epistemology functions within the university, particularly in regards to an empiricist and scientific methodology, and its interaction with other ways of being and epistemological traditions. By delving into how history specifically (re)acts to postcolonial and decolonial criticisms, I argue that Euro-Western epistemology in history narrowly defines and conceptualises the "human" within the mechanisms of power of the 500-year-old world-system. That is to say, not only does the response to postcolonial and decolonial scholarship reflect the innate Eurocentrism of the world-system, but it also symbiotically entrenches its mechanisms of power within the international order. Thus, historical truth is categorised within the narrative of development, modernity, economic prosperity, and exceptionalism, while the human truth is limited to racial, (neo)colonial, Euro-Western-centric power dynamics. This intersectionality between history, international politics, and the various human ways of being in this world is hierarchised within the university, history departments, and their existential fabric.

In order to further demonstrate the symbiotic, tautological, cyclical pattern between Eurocentrism and historical knowledge production, three declarations of the United Nations will

be assessed in Chapter 5. These declarations were chosen due to the fact that they are all connected to the United Nations and the establishment of the current global order (American hegemony). Upon examination, these three declarations reflect the historical academic conceptualisation of human rights to Euro-Western experience, ontology, and epistemology, thereby demonstrating the permeability of mechanisms of power of the 500-year-old world-system and the need for historians to review how they manifest within academic knowledge production and so-called “universal” global values.

The methodological approach used within this analysis is a mixture of literary and discourse analysis. As previously mentioned, I am not only interested in the experiences of the authors/critics, but also their lived emotions and inner humanity. Traditional literary analysis is therefore useful, as it reflects upon the perspective, interpretation, and argumentation of the works based on the authors’ themselves. Put simply, basic hermeneutic skills are used for my interpretation, with my added consciousness regarding their humanness. This in turn will be reflected by discourse analysis – that is to say, the impact of power dynamics and the respective contexts on the writing of the works themselves. In other words, I am approaching the literary analysis by keeping in mind how the political international context of the authors’ time influences, and is influenced by, their writing. Not only does this enable me to delve deeper into the literary analysis of Said, Bhabha, Chakrabarty, Fanon, Quijano, and Dussel, but also that of their critics. Reminiscent of critical discourse analysis, I am analysing the vocabulary, methodology, and the nature of historical academic standards to further demonstrate the reflection of the socio-political context, namely the 500-year-old world-system, within the production of history.

All in all, I utilise a poststructuralist approach, emphasising the link between theory – that is, epistemology – and practice (way of being).

[P]oststructuralism, instead of seeing a distinction between theory and practice, sees theory as practice. This comes about because poststructuralism poses a series of meta-theoretical questions—questions about the theory of theory—in order to understand how particular ways of knowing, what counts as knowing, and who can know, have been established over time.³⁴

³⁴ David Campbell and Roland Bleiker, “Poststructuralism,” in *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity – 4th Edition*, ed. by Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 198.

At this point, it may sound redundant to emphasise the connection between knowledge production, history, and the current dynamics of power within the global order resulting from the 500-year-old world-system. Nevertheless, poststructuralism poses that dynamic at the forefront of its analysis, rendering it extremely useful to become aware of the unjust conceptualisations present and reflected within academic historical scholarship. I hope to demonstrate the need for academia, and historians, to reconsider its conceptualisation of the “human”, its departmental and faculty expectations, and how it has contributed to a lack of inter-epistemological communication and understanding despite being a space for inter-cultural, inter-ethnic, inter(-)national, and inter-racial dialogue.

Conclusion:

Some might consider the history of the university as a societal institution to be, quite simply, boring. Others may regard the philosophy of thought and theory of knowledge as being useless, mind-numbing subjects that have no practical, quotidian value. But I believe that understanding the university’s role within society, historically and contemporarily, may provide insights into various issues of today. The Euro-Western epistemological traditions, norms, and values present within historical scholarship is necessary to evaluate within our contemporary context. Reorienting our critical questioning towards an analysis of the university and, more specifically history, and how they teach us how and what to think is consequently an important issue to consider, for it reveals essential information about the role of academia and history within society and the creation of knowledge today. Although historians have begun questioning where lies the future of history as a field, it is important that they recognise its limits to properly address a new direction and truly emancipate history from Eurocentric discourses of power that emerge from the 500-year-old world-system. So, in spite of critical theories (like postcolonialism and decolonialism) being extremely helpful and necessary theories – especially in regard to offering differing, alternate perspectives and narratives to the Euro-Western world – scholars and theorists alike, as human beings in this world, need to move beyond debates that mainly focus on reactionary challenges to Euro-Western supremacy. Humanity in all of its plurality needs to be centred within the grand narrative of history.

Chapter 2 - Postcolonialism

What is postcolonialism? This chapter is dedicated in understanding postcolonialism's emergence in academia and its main criticisms of Euro-Western historical traditions through an intersectional approach between international relations and history. The research question is: to what are postcolonial authors (re)acting against in academic historical scholarship? More specifically, to what are Edward Said, Homi K. Bhabha, and Dipesh Chakarabarty (re)acting against in academic historical scholarship? I use the term (re)actionary specifically to emphasise the agency of these scholars in their activism against unjust global discourses of power – both acting and reacting against political realities.

Before delving into these foundational works and their impact on the establishment of postcolonialism in academia, this chapter begins by providing an overview of postcolonialism's emergence as a historical era and as a body of literature so as to comprehend the extent of the connection between its eventual advent as an academic theory and Eurocentrism, its mechanisms of power, and the production of historical knowledge within the university. Indeed, Said, Bhabha, and Chakrabarty's respective context is crucial to understand the postcolonial nature of their argument, for it informs their hermeneutic understanding of history and contemporary politics. In the end, it will be argued that each author is taking a stance against Eurocentrism as a global discourse of power – whether it is related to cultural bias and supremacy, the simplification of inter-cultural interactions, or its universal principle and application. Said, Bhabha, and Chakrabarty, as foundational authors within the field of postcolonialism, reveal the way in which Eurocentrism manifests itself within academic history, demonstrating its presence as an over-arching global discourse of power connected to the 500-year-old world-system. By critiquing Eurocentrism in the writing of history, these scholars are using the university's space, along with its Euro-Western structure, norms, and values to establish a postcolonial counter-discourse.

Historical Context: A Political-Historical Era and its Literature

Historical Era: A Global Movement for Independence

The Postcolonial era is often defined as the “era of decolonialisation” following the end of the Second World War. European empires fell apart as their old colonies reclaimed their sovereignty and asserted their new-found independence. Although each experience was different, these colonies emerged as sovereign nation-states and were included within the hierarchy and ordering

mechanisms of the global order. However, the term “decolonisation” is misleading when referencing the dismantling of European empires since (neo)colonialism (as explained in Chapter 1) still endures today. It also reduces the political movement for independence to the post-1945 era, when in some cases colonies began mobilising politically before World War I, significantly prior to the actual independence achieved in the second half of the 20th century.³⁵ Furthermore, The ways in which European empires “accepted” colonial independence varied from empire to empire, with most wanting to retain economic benefits and continue what Arghiri Emmanuel argued was a relationship of dependent “unequal exchange”.³⁶

It is important to note that the Postcolonial era also comprised the Cold War and was ultimately influenced by the bipolar hegemonic dynamic that permeated the international system. Seeing as the fear of communism permeated the Euro-Western world, specifically the American superpower competing with the Soviet Union, independence movements were perceived as a potential threat for the Euro-Western world, with colonies falling prey to the Soviet, communist sphere of influence. Perhaps the most famous example of this American anti-communist policy is the Vietnam War, employing a form of imperialism to stop the Soviet sphere from expanding.³⁷

The colonies’ movements for independence and their status as “post-colonial” nation-states was therefore a heterogenous experience, being intricately tied to European states and their economic, imperial interests. This is illustrative of the interconnectedness between colonialism, imperialism, and postcolonialism as a historical era. In general, scholars describe five ways of “decolonisation,” one for each of the five decades following the Second World War: (1) The wave in South Asia and the Middle East; (2) Southeast Asia; (3) North Africa; (4) Sub-Saharan Africa (West to East); and (5) the Island Territories in the Caribbean and Pacific.³⁸ Interestingly, these so-called five waves of decolonisation frames Postcolonialism within the independence context of Asian and African countries in the second half of the 20th century from European empires who dominated them during the second imperial wave (mid-to-late 19th century). As we

³⁵ See for example, the Amritsar Massacre of 1919 in India. Notes of author taken in: Mark Hay, “Mapping Global Order – 1500 to Present,” Bloc 1 Class – Global History and International Relations Master’s, *Erasmus University Rotterdam*, CH4010 Week 5.

³⁶ See Arghiri Emmanuel, *Unequal Exchange: A Study of the Imperialism of Trade*, translated by Brian Pearce (New York & London: Monthly Review Press, 1972).

³⁷ For more information, see the Truman Doctrine.

³⁸ Notes of author taken in: Mark Hay, “Mapping Global Order – 1500 to Present,” Bloc 1 Class – Global History and International Relations Master’s, *Erasmus University Rotterdam*, CH4010 Week 5.

will see in Chapter 3, this reality differs greatly from the Americas, who have large settler populations and were colonised within the first imperial wave (16th-18th centuries).

In defining Postcolonialism as a historical era, scholars debated the idea of postcolonial literature being “postcolonial” or “post-colonial.” Although not unique to the field of postcolonialism, the idea of “post”-colonialism implied the beginning of a new era that was not marked by European colonisation or imperialism. As Williams and Chrisam explain in *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory*: “The persistence of neo-colonialist or imperialist practices in the contemporary world is a very obvious, perhaps the most serious, obstacle to any unproblematic use of the term post-colonial.”³⁹ Using the hyphen thus marked an era of total emancipation and liberation from colonialism and imperialism, whereas postcolonialism expressed the continuous movements and processes that are striving to achieve this. Some scholars, like Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin nevertheless continue to use the hyphen to demonstrate the diversity within colonial experience.⁴⁰

Post-colonialism and postcolonialism are therefore used interchangeably depending on the perception of the author and the position they wish to take regarding the colonial past and its continued legacy. This thesis will aspire to take the middle-ground: it will use postcolonialism to refer to the theory itself along with the scholarship, thereby also acknowledging the continued legacy of (neo)colonialism within the current global order. Consequently, it will only refer to post-colonial (with hyphen) in its future sense. That is to say, the hyphen will only be used when discussing the goals of postcolonialism (and later decolonialism) in striving for a truly post-colonial world that is not dictated by (neo)colonial tensions or perverted by Eurocentric power dynamics.

Postcolonial Literature:

³⁹ Williams and Chrisam, *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory*, 3.

⁴⁰ As expressed in their co-authored book, *The Empire Strikes Back*: “We use the term 'post-colonial', however, to cover all the cultures affected by the imperial process from the moment of colonization to the present day. This is because there is a continuity of preoccupations throughout the historical process initiated by European imperial aggression. We also suggest that it is most appropriate as the term for the new cross-cultural criticism which has emerged in recent years and for the discourse through which this is constituted.” Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, *The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-Colonial Literatures - 2nd Edition* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 2.

Within the Postcolonial historical era, a vast body of scholarship emerged that either propelled sentiments of independence or sought to reflect their own perception, interpretation – to put it simply, history – of their past. This scholarship would later be known as postcolonial literature, although its nature too was debated. Numerous scholars posited what exactly was “postcolonial” literature. Previously referred to as “Commonwealth literatures,” “nonwestern literatures,” “emergent literatures,” or even “world literatures,” postcolonial literature involves a wide variety of texts that change according to academic disciplines.⁴¹ Even then, academic faculties, disciplines, subfields, and theoretical approaches can influence categories of postcolonial literature today.⁴²

Nevertheless, the general agreement was tied to the idea that postcolonial literature referred to ex-colonies now being independent and having the status of “nation-state” within the international system, an important factor to bear in mind for it is closely connected to power dynamics present within the global order. Independence, economic development, technological innovation and progress – all are measures of analysis within the international system feeding into the global ordering of nations.⁴³ In turn, this international hierarchy is reflected, even validated, in the writing of history through the use of historicism and economic development. Historical narratives are, therefore, not only central to the nation itself, but also for how it is perceived by other nations within the system. Indeed, the creation of national historical literature – specifically the ways through which history is written, and how the history of Europe and the West became universally known as “history” – became the locus of criticism of postcolonial nation-states in its privileging of Euro-Western narratives. This project became to be known in postcolonial literature as “the dislocation of the West.”⁴⁴

Within the postcolonial context of the second half of the 20th century, wherein many colonies gained their independence, historical narratives needed to be (re)written so as to properly represent these new nations from the point of view of its people, not from the perspective of an empire – a critical project for newly independent nations in asserting their agency. In many ways, this can be seen as the first postcolonial step in dismantling the primacy

⁴¹ Gaurav Desai and Supriya Nair, ed., *Postcolonialisms: An Anthology of Cultural Theory and Criticism* (UK: Berg, 2005), 1.

⁴² Desai and Nair, ed., *Postcolonialism*, 1.

⁴³ See “Human Development Index,” Human Development Reports, United Nations Development Programme, accessed October 17, 2021, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi>.

⁴⁴ See Gyan Pakrash, “Orientalism Now,” *History and Theory* 34, 3 (1995): 211-212.

of the Euro-Western world. Yet, postcolonialism as an academic field was only recognised in the 1980s. The field most widely known in academia that addressed the creation of new national narratives, and which largely influenced postcolonialism, is *Subaltern Studies*.

A field of history that emerged in India following its independence and which came to prominence in the 1960s, *Subaltern Studies* sought to consolidate the country's colonial past with its new-found freedom. As a newly founded nation-state, India needed its own narrative regarding its past, one that was not dictated by British colonialism and imperialism. Tasked with not only understanding, but also creating this new history, Indian scholars applied traditional Marxist theory to nationalist movements largely led by subaltern, peasant masses – hence *Subaltern Studies*. Some quickly came to realise, however, that Euro-Western philosophies and ideologies were inadequate to explain parts of the historical realities of the subaltern subject.⁴⁵ The universal use and application of Euro-Western theories (like Marxism in this case) proved to be challenging within a postcolonial context like that of India. As many subaltern scholars recognised and sought to redress, the influence of Euro-Western historical theories within national-historical narratives often created awkward ambivalences, leading to complications in the writing of postcolonial history.

Postcolonialism: An Academic Theory

Today postcolonialism is understood within academia as not only a body of literature, but also a theoretical approach. It is understood to foreground the voices of the “Other” in order to offer alternate perspectives to Euro-Western hegemonic understandings of events, processes, and politics.⁴⁶ How colonialism's legacy continues to endure today, its impact on (primarily) post(-)colonial subjects within the current global order, and the nature of its discourses of power within international ordering institutions are some of the main questions posited by postcolonial scholars in order to understand why and how European-Western centrality remains at the top of the contemporary global hierarchy.

Despite the contribution of *Subaltern Studies* in beginning to question the universalism of Euro-Western academic historical narratives, it was not until the publication of Edward Said's, *Orientalism*, that postcolonialism was launched within academia as a distinct and separate

⁴⁵ For example, see Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, *Can the Subaltern Speak? - Reflections on the History of an Idea* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).

⁴⁶ See Spivak, *Can the Subaltern Speak?*, 2010.

theoretical body. The book was infamous for directly challenging the scholarship of Orientalists, specifically the works of those that fed into American foreign policy in the Middle East. As described by Gyan Pakrash in a 1995 review:

Since 1978, when it launched an audacious attack on Western representations of the Orient, the book has breathed insurgency. Its history is now inseparable from the severe condemnations it provoked from some and the high praises it elicited from others. Denounced as an uncharitable and poisonous attack on the integrity of Orientalist scholarship, it opened the floodgate of postcolonial criticism that has breached the authority of Western scholarship of Other societies.⁴⁷

Although Said's work will be elaborated upon below, it is interesting to note how his work, not *Subaltern Studies* or other scholarship, was the one which propelled postcolonialism within academia. The fact that he was a Palestinian-American scholar working in an American university is telling, for it reveals how the influence of "Euro-Western" academia specifically – as *the* centre for knowledge production - plays into global discourses of power. Although *Subaltern Studies* questioned the legitimacy of Eurocentrism, *Orientalism*, as a product of Euro-Western academic scholarship, became a scathing critique from "within" – something which could not, and was not, ignored.

Foundational Figures of Postcolonial Thought: Said, Bhabha, and Chakrabarty

Since its academic emergence as a theory in the 1980s, postcolonialism has not only produced a wide body of scholarship that elucidates the experience of the "Other", but it also has created innumerable debates on the nature of Euro-Western power, its centrality, and its consequences within history. Whether focusing on the actual lived experiences of the colonial subject or reflecting on how colonialism and imperialism of the Euro-Western world impacted, and continue to impact, global interactions, postcolonial scholars began asking critical questions regarding the nature of history and its role within global power dynamics evidenced through practices of domination and subjugation. Acknowledging the fact that academic, professional history was institutionalised within the centre of Euro-Western knowledge production – the university – and that it held specific empirical standards that stemmed from the rationality of the European Enlightenment of the 18th century, numerous scholars such as Edward Said, Homi K. Bhabha, and Dipesh Chakrabarty, pondered about the epistemological foundations and consequent realities of history – so-called historical truths – within the creation of knowledge

⁴⁷ Pakrash, "Orientalism Now," 199.

regarding non-European/non-Western people. This next section focuses on the literary analysis of *Orientalism*, *The Location of Culture*, and *Provincializing Europe*, specifically examining the main historical criticisms of their respective scholars in relation to global power dynamics. This means that discourse and critical discourse analysis will be utilised simultaneously within my literary analysis. Consequently, some may criticise that I do not devote enough to the structure, methodology, or vocabulary of these authors. My response rests in the fact that these are not just literary works, they are political statements stimulating an activist response. My thesis does not utilise a constructivist approach, nor does it pretend to be a work about the use of the English language. It is, however, interested in the political-historical argument and positionality of the author, and how in turn these are reflected within their works. Thus, I turn to *Orientalism*.

Edward Said

Using an elusive concept as a title, Said reveals in one word the subject of study in his book: *Orientalism*.⁴⁸ Previously unrecognised, the obscure concept of Orientalism is revealed to have a key role within academia, knowledge creation and dissemination, as well as global discourses of power. Defining Orientalism as the historical sedimentation of knowledge of the “Other” (in this case, the Arab world) by and for the Euro-Western world, Said veritably shocks academia and the Orientalist discipline by unveiling the hypocritical, racist, and anti-Semitic discourse they embody.⁴⁹

Defining Orientalism as a discourse of Euro-Western power, Said uses the subject as a lens through which to expose the unjust ideals of the West about the East – the Other. Right from the beginning of his book, in the Introduction, Said expresses the need to oppose American anti-Semitic sentiment. By this, Said specifically means anti-Arabic American sentiment, particularly with regards to its policy in the Middle East. This political stance is embodied in Said’s description of Orientalism as also being “a way [for the West] of coming to terms with the Orient.”⁵⁰ In other words, Said is not just contesting Western intrusion in Middle East affairs but

⁴⁸ Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, (New York: Pantheon, 1978).

⁴⁹ As he writes on page 122: “My thesis is that the essential aspects of modern Orientalist theory and praxis (from which present-day Orientalism derives) can be understood not as a sudden access of objective knowledge about the Orient, but as a set of structures inherited from the past, secularized, redisposed, and re-formed by such disciplines as philology, which in turn were naturalized, modernized and laicized substitutes for (or versions of) Christian supernaturalism... In the form of new texts and ideas, the East was accommodated to all these structures.” Said, *Orientalism*, 122. Emphasis added

⁵⁰ Said, *Orientalism*, 1.

is also actively protesting against the medium through which the Euro-Western world, specifically hegemonic America, controls its knowledge and understanding of Arab culture and society.

Although Said directly criticizes American Orientalist foreign policy, he is also critical of French and British policy in the Middle East. Throughout his book, he offers a chronological historical account of French and British Orientalist scholarship of the region and aligns this body of literature directly with French and British imperial-colonial interests, thereby demonstrating how this discourse expressed in literature can directly feed into American Orientalist foreign policy. As he writes: “From the beginning of the nineteenth century until the end of World War II France and Britain dominated the Orient and Orientalism; since World War II America has dominated the Orient, and approaches it as France and Britain once did.”⁵¹ This Orientalist inheritance is due to the shift in hegemony within the global order: Europe, after WWII, taking the back-seat in global affairs, and America becoming the hegemon-superpower. Said therefore not only protests against American foreign policy, but also European dominance in, and of, the Orient. Simply put, Said positions himself in opposition to Euro-Western imperial interests and superior domination in the Middle East.

It is telling that Said uses the verb “dominated” when describing French-British-American involvement in the Middle East, for it connotes ideas of colonisation and imperialism. By referencing historical domination, colonisation, and imperialism, it enables Said to question Euro-Western ideals of superiority and authority. In presenting his methodology, he says: “Above all, authority can, indeed must, be analyzed.”⁵² Through *strategic location* (analysing the relationship of the author vis-à-vis the subject of his text) and *strategic formation* (examining the relationship between texts and the “referential power” of the body of literature in which they are a part), Said simultaneously questions the legitimacy of Orientalist knowledge and confronts the authority of Euro-Western supremacy in the Orient.⁵³ By doing so, he lays the bedrock for the foundation of postcolonial scholarship.

Throughout his entire book, Said utilises this methodology to criticize academic authority by pointing out the illusion of “rational realism” present within Orientalist scholarship, and the

⁵¹ Said, *Orientalism*, 4.

⁵² Said, *Orientalism*, 20.

⁵³ Said, *Orientalism*, 22.

legitimacy of the academic written word as being inherently unbiased and neutral.⁵⁴ He demonstrates how arguments of Orientalist scholars are in fact biased, prejudiced, sometimes even racist, opinions about the Other, due, on the one hand, to the positionality of these scholars as being “outside-observers,” while on the other, having the documented support of previous Euro-Western Orientalist sources. Orientalist scholarship therefore is anything but a clear, neutral rationale appropriate for foreign policy. The fact that Said refers back, at the end of his book, to Euro-Western political and economic dominance in the Middle East, further emphasises his point and links his argument to political activism. “As I have characterized it in this study, Orientalism calls in question not only the possibility of nonpolitical [sic] scholarship but also the advisability of too close a relationship between the scholar and the state.”⁵⁵ Thus, he connects the production of knowledge with the production of power within the state, which inevitably feeds into the global order and its ordering institutions hierarchising nation-states.

This hegemonic power is ultimately seen within American international relations in the Middle East, something Said brings up to further emphasise the imperial motivations of Orientalist scholarship. Not only does this academic body continue the legacy of domination in the region, but also anchors and favours American economic interests.

There are all kinds of other indications of how the cultural domination is maintained, as much by Oriental consent as by direct crude economic pressure from the United States... The Arab and Islamic world as a whole is hooked into the Western market system. No one needs to be reminded that oil, the region’s greatest resource, has been totally absorbed into the United States economy.⁵⁶

Although Said openly confronts the political bias of Orientalist scholarship, he also brings to the fore the political issues of the Arab elite favouring American imperialism. This is important, for it reveals that Said is not anti-American, but rather is anti-imperial and anti-colonial. His activism therefore is not just critical of (American) imperialism, but of those that are benefitting and promoting its affluence. The fact that he himself is both Palestinian and American may have

⁵⁴ As Said writes on page 72: “Philosophically, then, the kind of language, thought, and vision that I have been calling Orientalism very generally is a form of radical realism; anyone employing Orientalism, which is the habit for dealing with questions, objects, qualities, and regions deemed Oriental, will designate, name, point to, fix what he is talking or thinking about with a word or phrase, which then is considered either to have acquired, or more simply to be, reality.” Said, *Orientalism*, 72.

⁵⁵ Said, *Orientalism*, 326.

⁵⁶ Said, *Orientalism*, 324.

further influenced him in this regard, as his positionality refuses to be both a foreigner and internal coloniser.

During his entire career, Said was very vocal about American involvement in the Middle East, specifically with regards to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. As an American-Palestinian, he was personally invested in the situation. Although it simplifies the complexity of his person, Said's identity as an American and Palestinian, Westerner and Muslim, academic and Other, could be said to have provided him with a unique lens through which to view the issue. Upon being asked in an interview how *Orientalism* originated, Said responded:

The immediate background was the period from '67 through '73: two Arab-Israeli wars with different outcomes; the relative explosion of interest in the contemporary Middle East in the Western media and in the academic world. The quality of the writing, intellectually and politically as well as from a literary standpoint, struck me as incredibly impoverished and backward. *My own sense of my history as an Arab and as a Palestinian didn't seem to bear any relationship to what I was reading. I felt that my own history, which had been enmeshed with the West in various ways, had never really responded to the challenge of the West.* My generation had grown up in the shadow of direct colonialism and then imperialism. There was a whole texture of relationships having to do with knowledge and power, and identity and political events, that required an inventory. The thrust to actually write the book with the force that it had owed to the emergence of the Palestinian movement. This I took also to be an attempt to act as interlocutor rather than as a silent and inert Other.⁵⁷

His achievement in *Orientalism* is therefore not centered upon the breadth of the work of scholarship itself, but rather on its activism against Euro-Western discourses of power maintaining favourable positions, relations, and opportunities for Euro-Western interests. By actively dismantling the veil obscuring the hypocrisy of American hegemony and the assumptions supporting the hierarchy of the international system, *Orientalism* embodies Said's activism against the manifestation of Eurocentric discourses of power of his time.

Homi K. Bhabha

Homi K. Bhabha in his book, *The Location of Culture*, focuses on understanding cultural difference in the context of postcolonialism.⁵⁸ Beginning with the idea of boundaries, where they begin and where they end, Bhabha reveals the establishment of binaries. The beginning is placed in contrast to the end, just as the end is understood in relation to the beginning. What Bhabha

⁵⁷ Edward W. Said and James Paul, "Orientalism Revisited: An Interview with Edward W. Said," interview by James Paul, *MERIP Middle East Report* 150 (1988): 32.

⁵⁸ Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, (London & New York: Routledge, 1994).

points out to be missing in scholarly analysis is the middle – the “in-between” space produced by these binaries. He relates these binaries to current categories of identities like race, gender, sexuality, etc., and how these are in turn entrenched in a relationship of difference, of opposition, of “otherness”. Whiteness is therefore understood in relation to blackness and vice-versa, woman-ness in contrast to manliness and vice-versa, “us” in juxtaposition to “them” and vice-versa. Using binaries as simple categories of identification that in turn become markers of understanding is something Bhabha recognises as missing from not only scholarly writing but also from wider popular conceptions of individuals, communities, and nations. He writes:

The move away from the singularities of ‘class’ or ‘gender’ as primary conceptual and organizational categories, has resulted in an awareness of the subject positions – of race, gender, generation, institutional location, geopolitical locale, sexual orientation – that inhabit any claim to identity in the modern world. What is theoretically innovative, and politically crucial, is the need to think beyond narratives of originary and initial subjectivities and to focus on those moments or processes that are produced in the articulation of cultural differences.⁵⁹

The Location of Culture is thus dedicated to understanding and mitigating against the oversimplification of processes of becoming within the context of cultural difference, thus opposing what Bhabha’s terms cultural comparativism within colonial interactions.

Cultural comparativism – that is, to position one culture against another in a comparative relationship – is simplistic for it negates the complex processes of identity formation while also reducing cultural differences to binary oppositionality. The positioning of “othering” reduces cultural understanding to fixed attributions between “us” and “them”. It foregoes a deeper comprehension of the “why” in historical analysis.⁶⁰ The idea that cultural differences can be understood within a context of (post)colonialism as fixed, predetermined, delineated attributes and characteristics overlooks the complexity of inter-cultural interactions and their influence on one another. It implies a historical teleology in which the “in-between” space of cultural formation is neglected. Bhabha’s third space – the “in-between” – disrupts the teleological narrative of history by emphasising the uncertainty, accidental reality, and coincidental chance of history. He therefore opposes presumed (colonial) assumptions as being equal to historical truths.

Bhabha further explores these so-called historical “truths” by examining the processes of British colonisation in India as a case-study to illustrate the complexity of the “in-between”

⁵⁹ Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 1.

⁶⁰ Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 5.

space creating, and created by, cultural difference between the colonised (i.e., the colonial subject) and the coloniser. However, he does not present his evidence in a chronological way – rather, he opts for a thematic chapter division around theory, identity, mimicry, hybridity, nationhood, ambivalence, agency, and resistance enabling him to emphasise on the one hand cultural comparativism within colonialism and on the other the enunciation of cultural difference.⁶¹ Within these, Bhabha elaborates on the “in-between” space and the formation of culture, defining concepts of hybridity and mimicry. The latter is based on the idea of the colonised subject absorbing the customs and ideals of the colonial regime, living within it, “*as subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite.*”⁶² Due to this embodied difference of the colonised subject, hybridity is often cited alongside mimicry as:

...the revaluation of the assumption of colonial identity through the repetition of discriminatory identity effects. It displays the necessary deformation and displacement of all sites of discrimination and domination. It unsettles the mimetic or narcissistic demands of colonial power but reimplicates its identifications in strategies of subversion that turn the gaze of the discriminated back upon the eye of power. For the colonial hybrid is the articulation of the ambivalent space where the rite of power is enacted on the site of desire, making tis objects at once disciplinary and disseminatory – or, in my mixed metaphor, a negative transparency.⁶³

In this sense, Bhabha explains how colonial cultural comparativism embodies, through processes of colonisation expressed in action as mimicry and hybridity of the colonial subject, the enunciation of cultural difference as a form of subaltern agency in the “in-between” space produced.

By presenting mimicry and hybridity as theoretical frameworks through which to understand cultural difference and subaltern agency, Bhabha mitigates the predetermined assumptions of colonial truths. Not only does this (re)inscribe an historical agency for the colonial subject, but it also contests the binaries produced and established by colonial epistemological frameworks. Bhabha’s “in-between” space, the locale for the expression of hybridity and mimicry, destroys the binary presumptions upholding the oppositions that enable and promote Eurocentric power.

I want to ask whether this synchronous constancy of reconstruction and reinvention of the subject does not assume a cultural temporality that may not be universalist in its

⁶¹ See Table of Contents: Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 1994.

⁶² Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 86. Original emphasis.

⁶³ Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 112.

epistemological moment of judgement, but may, indeed, be ethnocentric in its construction of cultural ‘difference’.⁶⁴

By saying that the “reinvention of the subject”, meaning processes of labeling, defining, delineating, is “ethnocentric in its construction of cultural ‘difference’,” Bhabha discloses how Eurocentric power dynamics are inalienable from binaries within epistemological constructions. Standing in opposition to simplistic binaries, Bhabha thus also (re)acts against Eurocentric power dynamics entrenching a specific colonial understanding of cultural difference – namely, cultural comparativism.

It is telling that towards the end of his book, Bhabha refers to the colonial subject’s ability to (re)assert agency.⁶⁵ The idea of agency for a colonial subject need not be defined in opposition to the coloniser. Reducing historical analysis of colonial encounters to simple characteristics of othering is precisely the idea that Bhabha has been advocating against. By emphasising the “in-between” space wherein hybridity and mimicry are enacted, Bhabha references these processes as an embodied assertion of the colonial subject’s agency. It is not by placing the latter in contrast to colonial presumptions, but by taking this binary of colonised and coloniser out of the equation which enables Bhabha to advocate for the emphasising of the position and perspective of the colonial subject as being the essential factor within historical understanding of cultural difference and social transformation.

Thus, Bhabha’s (re)actionism against Eurocentrism and its binaries is framed within a context of cultural difference – its Eurocentric ontology, epistemology, and perspective embraced in cultural comparativism. Despite acknowledging the existence of neocolonialism, his activism lies within the power of perspectives (note the plural) and their validity within the creation of knowledge. Upon attending a conference in Beijing as keynote speaker, Bhabha was asked for his thoughts on the idea of postcolonialism as having emerged simultaneously and evolved alongside colonialism. His response led to the following being expressed:

I think ‘postcolonialism’ is frankly one of those titles and names that does not mean very much, but since you ask me the question, I am answering. Postcolonialism emphasizes the fact that the countries that were once colonized, in spite of neocolonialism, have developed lives, worlds and values of their own. They have gone down their own

⁶⁴ Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 240.

⁶⁵ On page 256, Bhabha writes: “What is crucial to such a vision of the future is the belief that we must not merely change the *narratives* of our histories, but transform our sense of what it means to live, to be, in other times and different spaces, both human and historical.” Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 256. Original emphasis.

pathways. Yes, they are exploited by wealthy countries or they are exploited by international agencies, but their exploitation is not simply caused by those from outside who come to exploit them. There are also internal elites who collaborate in the exploitation of their own countries. So I think *postcolonialism is first of all a way of seeing* – a much more complicated way of seeing – how the regions that once were colonized have themselves developed, on account of both internal and external dynamism. Second, I think postcolonialism as an area of academic study has emphasized the question of culture, whereas the paradigm of neocolonialism emphasizes economics, politics and history. *Postcolonialism, as it developed through literature departments and through the Humanities, has actually raised the question of colonization and its aftermath to the level of a paradigm within the Humanities.*⁶⁶

Bhabha's postcolonialism thus rests within the idea of there being multiple ways of being that continually transform and are expressed within the in-between space of cultural difference, or, as I would say, inter-epistemological communication. Bhabha's (re)actionism therefore is embodied within his activism against Eurocentrism and its presumed certainty of a simple, unilinear, singular perspective of history that entrenches binary oppositions as being equal to the enunciation of cultural difference and is devoid of a plurality of ways of being within historical hermeneutic interpretation.

Dipesh Chakrabarty

In *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, Dipesh Chakrabarty questions the universal application of Euro-Western ideals within the making of history.⁶⁷ As a South Asian historian, he explores the universalism of history in the context of nationhood and independence in the region. More specifically, Chakrabarty presents the reader with the idea that doing history is not tied to Hegelian historicism or Marxist economic phases; history is connected to world views and experiences rather than general phases of denominational progress and modernity. This is presented right at the beginning of the introduction, wherein Chakrabarty elaborates on his title and the idea of his project of "provincializing Europe".

"PROVINCIALIZING EUROPE is not a book about the region of the world we call "Europe.""⁶⁸ By this, Chakrabarty clarifies that what he means is not the geographically defined socio-political territory, but rather what this unit, this idea of "Europe", its imaginary

⁶⁶ Homi K. Bhabha, "Minoritization as a Global Measure in the Age of Global Postcoloniality: An Interview with Homi K. Bhabha," interview by Sheng Anpeng, *ARIEL* 40, 1 (2009): 170.

⁶⁷ Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000).

⁶⁸ Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 3.

conceptualisation represents. For it is the soft power of this “imaginary Europe” that permeates the global order and individual minds today. The fact that Euro-Western theories, ideas, and philosophies for example, that stem as far back as Ancient Greece are still actively debated in academia classifies them, according to Chakrabarty, as being “alive” – meaning that there is a strong “unbroken” historical narrative of Euro-Western intellectual tradition that is intricately tied to contemporary power dynamics.⁶⁹ Having “alive” theories is a privilege of the Euro-Western world, established and maintained by the expansion of European empires and colonisation, and with it, Euro-Western ideas and customs. This fed into a universalisation process of Euro-Western thought and practices. However, these theories developed within a largely European context, an aspect which Chakrabarty posits is difficult to fully translate into a non-European/non-Western postcolonial reality – in this case, South Asian political modernity.⁷⁰ Chakrabarty thus positions himself against the universalism of Euro-Western thought, specifically with regards to the making of “history”.

Beginning with an overview of how history, particularly national history, is created, Chakrabarty explains how even though European history is generally no longer acknowledged as being world history, the ways in which history is made and written for it to be considered “proper” history still need to adhere to Euro-Western standards. Historicism and Marxism play a large role in these standards, feeding into Euro-Western understanding and perception of historical development and progress – or, to put it simply, modernity. These in turn are embodied within the history of the nation and its current level of importance and involvement in international politics. Within Euro-Western history, historicism and Marxism have little or no problematic issues of translation. But within a postcolonial context, as Chakrabarty explains throughout his book, historicist and Marxist notions of history can be problematic as they do not readily translate economic stages of political development into causality of a predetermined effect.⁷¹ Historicism within Marxist theory is thus at odds with itself. This paradox feeds into

⁶⁹ As Chakrabarty writes on page 5 and 6: “Sad though it is, one result of European colonial rule in South Asia is that the intellectual traditions once unbroken and alive in Sanskrit or Persian or Arabic are now only matters of historical research for most—perhaps all—modern social scientists in the region. They treat these traditions as truly dead, as history. ... And yet past European thinkers and their categories are never quite dead for us in the same way. South Asian(ist) social scientists would argue passionately with a Marx or a Weber without feeling any need to historicize them or to place them in their European intellectual contexts.” Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 5-6.

⁷⁰ Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 18.

⁷¹ For example, he writes on page 11: “: “This problem of how to conceptualize the historical and the political in a context where the peasant was already part of the political was indeed one of the key questions that drove the historiographic project of *Subaltern Studies*.” Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 11.

wider power dynamics of Euro-Western exceptionalism – being simultaneously universally applicable while remaining unique to Europe and the West. Chakrabarty writes: “Historicism is what made modernity or capitalism look not simply global but rather as something that became global over time, by originating in one place (Europe) and then spreading outside it.”⁷²

Postcolonial nations therefore can become modern, but only after exposure to Euro-Western ways. He continues: “Historicism thus posited historical time as a measure of the cultural distance (at least in institutional development) that was assumed to exist between the West and non-West.”⁷³ This exceptionalism created an imaginary delay between “developed” and “developing” countries, or, to put it another way, between “modern” and “modernising” nations. In other words, the implication of historicism and Marxism within contemporary history writing is problematic for its exceptionalism on the one hand, and its universalism on the other.

Despite recognising these problems with translation, Chakrabarty does not oppose historicism or Marxism as historical theories. His point is that these are useful within and according to the right context. The structure of *Provincializing Europe* offers a good example – the first section focusing on the theory of historicism and Marxism in relation to the history of the nation; while the second section is dedicated to a case-study on Bengali middle-class during the movement for independence. By structuring his work as such, Chakrabarty illustrates how historicism and Marxism are translated in the Bengali context with difficulty, since they do not inhabit the same ways of being or conceptualising of the world. Applying Euro-Western historical concepts blindly and universally thus poses political issues for not only postcolonial nations and peoples in (re)claiming their (historical) agency, but also for historical writing in general.

Chakrabarty relates this issue of translation at the end of his book with the notion of heterotemporality of the modern political subject. Explained briefly, heterotemporality implies that a person embodies, and therefore represents, different conceptions of “time” – in a Marxist, modernist sense of the word. As an imaginary unit itself, time in relation to progress and modernity is the unilinear cause-and-effect force driving historicist notions. By stating the possibility of there being multiple “times”, that is to say, various embodiments of progress and modernity within the postcolonial subject that are not “traditionally” aligned with Euro-Western

⁷² Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 7.

⁷³ Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 7.

conceptions of development, Chakrabarty reveals the flaws in universal application of Marxism and historicism and their expression as “political modernity.”⁷⁴ Furthermore, it emphasises the agency of the postcolonial subject and their world-view. Despite being different from Euro-Western understanding of progress, modernity, and development, Chakrabarty reveals that Bengali world-views are no less meaningful or important. He therefore also challenges the hierarchy present within Euro-Western universalism and supported by its exceptionalism. Chakrabarty’s (re)actionism thus is inherently tied to the purpose of his book, “provincializing” the concepts of that render the Euro-Western world universally applicable while simultaneously exceptional – provincializing the primacy of historicist and Marxist theories in historical thought and practice. In an interview with Saurabh Dube, Chakrabarty says:

Again, for me, PE [*Provincializing Europe*] was a way of saying that European social thought only gives us a limited—though critical—purchase on the life-practices through which we world the worlds (and we do not do this in one single way). Hence, the need to know European thought as giving us a particular, and not universal, genealogy of thought, which we translate into other genealogies. Indeed, to know it as a particular genealogy is to move away from its transhistorical pretensions.⁷⁵

Thus, through *Provincializing Europe*, Chakrabarty actively contests Eurocentric historical consciousness. Leaving it at this would imply that Chakrabarty’s (re)actionism is being anti-European or anti-Western. But it is important to note that he is not against Euro-Western ontology, epistemology or way of being. On the contrary, he even acknowledges their contribution to the world at large, finishing his book as follows:

As I hope is obvious from what has been said, provincializing Europe cannot ever be a project of shunning European thought. For at the end of European imperialism, European thought is a gift to us all. We can talk of provincializing it only in an anticolonial spirit of gratitude.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ As he writes on page 255: “My attempt in this book has been to write some very particular ways of being-in-the-world—I call them Bengali only in a provisional manner—into some of the universal, abstract, and European categories of capitalist/political modernity. For me, provincializing Europe has been a question of how we create conjoined and disjunctive genealogies for European categories of political modernity as we contemplate the necessarily fragmentary histories of human belonging that never constitute a one or a whole.” Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 255.

⁷⁵ Dipesh Chakrabarty and Saurabh Dube, “Presence of Europe: An Interview with Dipesh Chakrabarty,” interview by Saurabh Dube, *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 101, 4 (2002): 863-864.

⁷⁶ Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 255.

Chakrabarty's opposition therefore rests within the universalisation of Euro-Western norms, values, put simply – Euro-Western way of being – as the only possibility for being considered “modern”. In Dube's interview, he elaborates:

My point in PE was that being modern did not involve us in thinking universals (though it may find us using universal-sounding words pragmatically and rhetorically). Yet thinking about political modernity is impossible to do without engaging some universals of “European thought.” The problem with these universals is this: they, as thought concepts, come packaged as though they have transcended the particular histories in which they were born. But being pieces of prose and language, they carry intimations of histories of belonging, which are not everybody's history. When we translate them—practically, theoretically—into our languages and practice, we make them speak to other histories of belonging, and that is how difference and heterogeneity enter these words. Or, in thinking about them and self-consciously looking for places for them in life-practices we have fabricated using them, we sometimes rediscover their own plural histories in the history of European thought.⁷⁷

In other words, by positioning himself in opposition to Eurocentric tropes of exceptionalism and universalism in academic historical writing, Chakrabarty is presenting the issue of translation as an issue of inter-epistemological communication between various ways of being – namely, the plurality of humanity within this world. Chakrabarty's (re)actionism thus lies not only in opposing Euro-Western universalism and exceptionalism within Marxist and historicist ideals that permeate the making of history, but also rests in advocating against these ideal's politicisation in global power dynamics and the endurance of Eurocentrism today. By applying these theories and their preconceived ideas about progress, modernity, and development universally, it feeds into an ideational conception of making another like oneself – a key trope within colonialism. Thus, Chakrabarty positions himself against Eurocentric (neo)colonial power dynamics that continue to permeate the process of creating knowledge and historical writing.

Conclusion:

As foundational scholars of postcolonialism, Said, Bhabha, and Chakrabarty present a literary criticism of academic history for inhibiting Eurocentric, (neo)colonial realities within the global order through mechanisms of soft power and knowledge production. Despite the postcolonial era, we do not live in a post-colonial world. (Neo)colonial realities continue to endure, and

⁷⁷ Chakrabarty, interview.

Eurocentric hegemonic soft-power dynamics are still maintained within the creation of history and the general production of knowledge.

To summarise, all three authors are (re)actionary to Eurocentric realities of their time. Said actively opposed (American) imperial hegemony and therefore the endurance of Euro-Western supremacy within the global order; Bhabha mitigates against Eurocentrism and its simplified binaries as assumed truth; and Chakrabarty reveals the need to “provincialize” Euro-Western theories, philosophies, and epistemologies within historical writing, specifically with regards to Marxism and historicism. Broadly speaking, all three authors are (re)acting against the consequence of an unequal distribution of power within the global order. It is not “who” holds this power that they are concerned with – neither is it specifically “how” this power is used. That is, these authors are not anti-American, anti-European, or anti-Western. Rather, these authors are interested in understanding the “why” of these power dynamics. They focus on questioning why this power exists within the grander scheme of the global order, not on reasons how Europe or the West came to hold this power. It is the negotiation, the push-and-pull, tug-o’-war dynamics of power which concerns them, and how one can navigate this in a position of “subalternity”: put simply, Eurocentric discourses of power are at the core of Said, Bhabha, and Chakrabarty’s postcolonial criticism.

Although the purpose of each respective work is closely tied to their personal motivations and activism, it only feeds (as it does every single human) their perspective and understanding of global power dynamics. This is ultimately seen in the tone of the works in question. For example, Said – who is personally invested in an on-going, evident form of imperialism – has, at times, a more direct tone, the reader feeling his frustration with regard to America’s involvement in Arabic affairs, as was already seen in the example above about American oil... “The Arab and Islamic world as a whole is hooked into the Western market system. No one needs to be reminded that oil, the region’s greatest resource, has been totally absorbed into the United States economy.”⁷⁸ Meanwhile, Bhabha and Chakrabarty addressed postcoloniality from the *Subaltern Studies* perspective – that is to say, their national independence accomplished, they focused on asserting their post-colonial agency. Bhabha and Chakrabarty are working towards further liberation – soft power liberation, to be themselves in their own way of being that has, admittedly, been influenced by the Euro-Western way of being.

⁷⁸ Said, *Orientalism*, 324.

Thus, they advocate for total independence – nationally and individually – thereby emphasising true post-coloniality while acknowledging the myth of academic historical unbiased rationality. By positing their arguments – exposing the hypocrisy of academic knowledge creation, the simple classification of Eurocentric binaries, and the myth of universal history – these three authors offer a partial means through which to counter Eurocentrism within the global order, thereby creating a postcolonial counter-discourse that is inalienable from its Eurocentric counterpart. For both Euro-Western discourse and the postcolonial counter-discourse still function (not exclusively) within academia’s institutional and structural paradigm. As we will see in the following chapter, postcoloniality remains a tense question in the Americas, where decolonialism poses further critical questions regarding the institutional, structural paradigm of the international system.

Chapter 3 – Decolonialism

What is decolonialism? Last chapter, we saw how three foundational pillars of postcolonialism had written historical works that related to nations and peoples that are today independent. Not only is the historical era of Postcolonialism connected to the birth of independent nation-states, but these countries are also sovereign in their territoriality. Despite its name, however, the field acknowledges and actively positions itself against Eurocentrism, a discourse of power established and maintained as a result of the inequalities imposed by imperial domination – historically and contemporarily. Thus, there is an understanding that despite empires falling and colonies gaining independence, there is an enduring Eurocentric legacy present within the global order.

Decolonialism is also connected to mitigating against Eurocentrism. Decolonialism is, nevertheless, not a synonym of or the same as postcolonialism although the former is perhaps encompassed by the latter. Simply put, postcolonialism refers to the post-1945 historical era as well as an academic theoretical field, while decolonialism can be described as a continuous movement and an academic theory. As a movement, it could be said that decolonialism is as old as colonialism itself, being the opposite force to – the reaction against – Euro-Western imperial ambitions and power.⁷⁹ As an academic field, however, decolonialism not only encompasses “resistance literature”, but it also includes more recent academic research published on contemporary movements for sovereignty – like those in the Americas. This chapter is therefore dedicated in understanding decolonialism’s emergence in academia through its main criticisms of Euro-Western historical traditions with an intersectional approach between inter(-)national relations, the history of Euro-Western exploration of the Americas, and the establishment of the 500-year-old world-system. The use of the hyphen and parentheses in inter(-)national relations is used to better represent the context in the Americas, wherein Indigenous-settler interactions persist in a single body politic and therefore convolute the term international. The research question is: to what are decolonial scholars (re)acting against in academic historical scholarship? More specifically, to what are Frantz Fanon, Enrique Dussel, and Anibal Quijano (re)acting

⁷⁹ Perhaps the most famous “first” instance of successful resistance is Toussaint Louverture and his overthrow of French presence in Haiti. As was demonstrated by numerous authors, there have been many resistances by Indigenous peoples in the Americas against the incursion of European powers. The fact that this is not necessarily present in global historical consciousness reflects the power dynamics present in the world. See Enrique Dussel later on.

against in academic historical scholarship? Before delving into an analysis of these works, decolonialism's historical context will be provided so as to demonstrate the important connection between the inter(-)national reality in the Americas, Eurocentrism, and the continuation of (neo)colonialism within the global order. In the end, it will be argued that decolonialism, as a theory emerging out of an existing political movement for colonial emancipation, contributes to the academic postcolonial counter-discourse while being inextricably linked to mitigating against the 500-year-old world-system and the on-going colonisation it embodies. Because of this, decolonialism is also offering a counter-epistemological perspective of history that is based outside of Eurocentrism.

Historical Context: The Americas and 1492

The Americas: The Question of Independence and Sovereignty

Following the Second World War, many countries gained their independence from European empires. With this independence, people (re)gained sovereignty over their territory alongside democracy. But this connection between “democracy,” independence, and sovereignty holds a different connotation in the historical consciousness and experiences of the Americas.

Colonialism's history in the Americas extends back to Columbus' voyage and arrival to the continent in 1492. This so-called “discovery” led to the invasion and conquest of the entire North, South, and central peninsula. The Americas was divided into Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, French, and English colonies – the land, its people, its territory, were transformed into new-Europe(s). As with universal sovereignty of the post-1945 era, people in the Americas did gain independence. However, not all of them achieved sovereignty. Indeed, attainment of sovereignty in the context of the Americas is dependent on the dialectic narrative of history itself. This can be seen through the various historical colonial experiences of the Americas.

North America:

The northern peninsula of the continent was initially divided amongst the Dutch, English, French, and Spanish. The Dutch colonies were soon overtaken by the English, who in turn lost the majority of its colonies with the American Revolution in 1776. Meanwhile, the French lost its colonies to England and Spain, meaning that by the 19th century, North America was (geopolitically speaking) English, Spanish, and American. By 1810, Mexico had declared

independence, creating a war with Spain that would last until 1821 when the empire receded. In the 1830s, the English colonies – Upper and Lower Canada – would also revolt, the movement for proper representation and democracy enduring throughout the rest of the century and leading to the successful negotiations for independence with Queen Victoria in 1867. By the 20th century, North America was geopolitically divided amongst Canadian, American, and Mexican nation-states.

This is a Euro-Western narrative of North American history. It does not include the views or experiences of Africans or Indigenous peoples within the division of territory and the formation of sovereignty through nation-states. In fact, the revolts and resistances of Canada, the United States, and Mexico were led by Euro-Western inheritors – namely, Euro-North-American settlers. It simply changed the focus through which colonialism was entrenched, being transferred from Europeans to Euro-Canadians, Euro-Americans, and Euro-Mexicans respectively. This is demonstrative of a racial aspect within power, asserting sovereignty, independence, and democracy through whiteness. The Latin American experience holds similarities, the presence of colonialism enduring and propagating its legacy throughout the continent.

Latin America:

Latin America herein will be defined as the Central and Southern peninsula of the continent, excluding Mexico despite its evident part in Latin American identity. This is not to say that Mexico has not gone through similar experiences as its other Latin American counterparts. The division is purely made for reasons of organisation within this paper. After 1492, Latin America was divided between Spain and Portugal. Indigenous peoples were conquered and indentured to work for the respective Empire's extraction of raw materials (prominently gold and silver). Within the wider imperial trade network, Africans were brought to the Americas as slaves to work on plantations, furthering the metropole's enrichment and the periphery's extraction. There resulted a division of power and labour along racial lines – the white Europeans located at the top (the administrative branch), and the Indigenous and Africans at the bottom (indentured servants and slaves). Mario Roberto Morales, in his chapter entitled "Peripheral Modernity and Differential *Mestizaje* in Latin America: Outside Subalternist Postcolonialism," provides a

concise summary of the colonial context of Latin America and its racial hierarchy.⁸⁰ He explains how, within the conquest, these three racial groups (European, Indigenous, and Africans) intermingled and birthed people of mixed heritage – *mestizos* (European-Indigenous), *mulattos* (European-African), and *zambo* (Indigenous-African) – who posed a problem for the intersectional division between labour and power because their heritage enabled them to transcend these social-hierarchical categories. For example, it is important to note the complexity of the *mestizo* experience, many of them ignoring their dual heritage and ascribing to European ideals of racial purity and, consequently, division of labour.⁸¹ The *mestizo* identification with European-heritage greatly influenced their participation in the political-social-economic context of Latin America, who had the support of the “racially superior” *criollos*.⁸² Since they were purely “white” (European), *criollos* inherited the administrative positions and title for land. However, these positions were in turn subordinate to Spaniards in Europe and the Empire. Being the main landowners while also having to enforce Spanish law eventually created a fissure in Crown-colonial common interest. Inspired by other movements for independence in the 19th century, many *criollos* revolted against the Crown and gained sovereignty over the territory.⁸³ Over the course of the 1800s, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, the Portuguese colony of Brazil, amongst others, were formed. These independence movement continued throughout the 19th century and through to the early 20th century.

Such a narrative of Latin American history favours the dialectic position of the *criollos* and aspiring *mestizos*. It does not consider the continuous rebellions of Indigenous and African

⁸⁰ Mario Roberto Morales, “Peripheral Modernity and Differential *Mestizaje* in Latin America: Outside Subalternist Postcolonialism,” in *Coloniality at Large: Latin America and the Postcolonial Debate*, ed. by Mabel Moraña, Enrique Dussel, and Carlos A. Jáuregui (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2008), 479-505.

⁸¹ As Roberto Morales writes on page 591: “However, the Eurocentric and modern criollo [sons of Spanish men and women born in the colonies] cultural criteria became the cultural heritage of the mestizos who, in an illusory appropriation, also embraced the criollo ideals of “purity of blood” and, by way of a binary contradiction, made the Indians the counterpart of their “white” anxieties in the very same way in which the criollos use mestizos and Indians alike as a reference to validate their supremacist differentiation, characterizing them as inferior. This is the dynamic of ethnocultural differentiation and racist hierarchy that has animated our conflictive inter-cultural life since colonial times.” Roberto Morales, “Peripheral Modernity and Differential *Mestizaje* in Latin America,” 491.

⁸² *Criollo* is a term used to describe individuals that were born of Spanish men and women in the colonies.

⁸³ As Roberto Morales continues on page 491: “It is a well-known fact that, from the end of the sixteenth century on, the criollos created what according to the criteria of the modern Eurocentric episteme is known as “Latin American culture,” in reference to colonial and republican literature and arts. It was also the criollos who implemented the processes that led to independence from Spain and the popularization of liberal ideas and Enlightenment ideals in the educational systems, all the while enforcing fierce military dictatorships and semifeudal economic and social regimes. Ever since the contact of Latin America with the capitalist world market by way of the exportation of single products, the criollos delegate the exercise of political power in the hands of their mestizo military caudillos.” Roberto Morales, “Peripheral Modernity and Differential *Mestizaje* in Latin America,” 491

peoples. Indeed, despite the colonies gaining independence from the empire, only the *criollos* and *mestizos* that identified with them gained and asserted sovereignty over the territory. In other words, Indigenous, African, *Zambo*, and non-*criollo* identifying *mestizos* were dominated by the elite, Euro-Americana class. The former had, and continue to have, no democratic right or place in governance. They have no sovereignty. Resistance is thus inextricably tied to race as a societal construct and its connection to power (or lack thereof) in Latin America.

In fact, Indigenous, African, *Zambo*, non-*criollo* identifying *mestizos* did not passively stand-by and let themselves be dictated by *criollo* interests. The history of Latin America is ripe with stories of resistance. From the Indigenous resistances against further land encroachment in the Amazon, for example, to the socialist movements of the 60s and 70s: since its European “discovery,” the people of the Americas have been actively fighting against economic exploitation and domination. These resistance movements were also present in North America, for example the Seminoles fighting off American incursion into their territory (what is known as Florida today), or the Métis resistance in the Canadian prairies (Manitoba & Saskatchewan), amongst other too numerous instances to list here. Resistance is not unique to Latin America. Rather, resistance is part of the history of the Americas.

Anti-colonialism and Decolonisation: Two Sides of the Same “Decolonialism” Coin

Simply put, decolonialism is therefore inextricably connected to questions of sovereignty in a on-going colonial context. Consequently, in order to truly understand the extent of decolonial (re)actionism, one needs to examine anti-colonialism and decolonisation.

As Christopher J. Lee discusses in his chapter entitled, “Anti-Colonialism: Origins, practices, and Historical Legacies,” defining anti-colonialism is not an easy task.⁸⁴ Briefly said, it is a movement that has existed since the onslaught of colonisation. It is the expression of the counterweight to pro-colonialism, while also encompassing the non-Euro-Western perspectives supporting resistance against colonisation. Anti-colonialism exists therefore within a binary relationship, an opposition to, pro-colonisation sentiment (as expressed, for example, by those who thought they were improving the world by bringing civilisation to all its corners). Anti-colonialism is thus the oppositional rhetoric, the counterbalance to modernising and civilising

⁸⁴ Christopher J. Lee, “Anti-Colonialism: Origins, Practices, and Historical Legacies,” in *The Oxford Handbook of the Ends of Empire*, ed. Martin Thomas and Andrew S. Thompson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018): 436-448.

arguments in favour of colonisation and colonialism. However, it also encompasses other ways of being, other perspectives and sentiments regarding Euro-Western imperial-colonialism. As a form of political conduct – dispersed across space and time – as well as being a rhetorical device, Lee implies that anti-colonialism is in fact a discourse.⁸⁵ Placed in its binary opposition to colonialism, anti-colonialism is thus the counter-discourse of the people (whether within the core or the periphery) challenging the discourses of power within processes of colonisation.

On the other hand, there also is the phenomenon of decolonisation. Put simply, decolonisation seeks to de-colonise. This goal implies also engaging with anti-colonialism. But decolonisation is not the same, nor is it a synonym for, anti-colonialism. Intricately related, anti-colonialism and decolonisation can be said to be two sides of the same decolonialism coin. While anti-colonialism is the direct oppositional force mitigating against colonial power dynamics, decolonisation seeks to redress the institutional, structural injustices meant to subjugate and control the Other. It is the mechanisms through which colonialism is structurally and institutionally undone.⁸⁶ That is to say, decolonisation restructures the hierarchy of power between non-Euro-Western and Euro-Western people within the nation-state.

Although its goal is to “undo” colonialism, the process of decolonisation remains highly convoluted, especially within the context of the Americas. A look at dictionary definitions will provide more insight. The Oxford English Dictionary defines decolonisation as: “the withdrawal from its former colonies of a colonial power; the acquisition of political or economic independence by such colonies.”⁸⁷ This definition therefore encompasses a settler positionality, understanding their nation as independent from Europe and its imperialism. The Cambridge Dictionary holds a similar definition, writing that decolonisation is: “the process in which a country that was previously a colony (controlled by another country) becomes politically

⁸⁵ As Lee writes on page 436: “Anti-colonialism as a historical phenomenon defies easy categorization. Despite wide usage as an expression across a range of academic disciplines, anti-colonialism resists simple definitions of practical form, political scope, and empirical content. This situation is undoubtedly due to the ubiquity of anti-colonial thought and activism across time and geography. Indeed, in a basic sense of opposing foreign domination, it is arguably one of the oldest forms of political conduct. Yet, more often than not, it has primarily served as a generic rhetorical device to describe that which is against colonialism.” Christopher J. Lee, “Anti-Colonialism: Origins, Practices, and Historical Legacies,” 436. Emphasis added.

⁸⁶ For more information, see Brad Simpson, “Self-Determination and Decolonization,” in *The Oxford Handbook of the Ends of Empire*, ed. Martin Thomas and Andrew S. Thompson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018): 417-430.

⁸⁷ “decolonization, n.” OED – Oxford English Dictionary: The definitive record of the English Language, accessed October 21, 2021, <https://www-oed-com.eur.idm.oclc.org/view/Entry/48333?redirectedFrom=decolonisation#eid>.

independent.”⁸⁸ This explains why some scholars use the term decolonisation to explain the post-1945 era. Nonetheless, this is not reflective of the context of the Americas, wherein decolonisation in the sense of undoing colonialism does not equate to the “traditional” idea of imperial bureaucrats, politicians, or representatives leaving, for that would also imply the expatriation of settlers. Decolonising the Americas means to undo the structures that maintain Eurocentrism within society and nation, thereby also implementing a democratic system wherein all peoples are sovereign. This is seemingly a more difficult task to accomplish, as it necessitates inter-ethnic, inter-cultural, inter-epistemological, inter(-)national, even inter-racial commitment by individuals and communities.

In doing so, decolonisation begins the process of (re)placing unjust hierarchical structures with the peoples’ own structures of governance in line with their multiple ways of being and epistemologies. This does not mean to entirely remove and substitute Euro-Western epistemology in the Americas for Indigenous or African ways of being.⁸⁹ Rather, decolonisation upholds the plurality of ways of being present in the Americas, meaning that the core mission of de-colonising is to mitigate against the structural, institutional, epistemological injustices enduring from 1492, not to reject the Euro-Western way of being. Thus, decolonialism, like postcolonialism, is not in a dialectic opposition to the Euro-Western way of being. By comprising anti-colonial movements as well as calls for decolonisation within its activism, decolonialism’s political goals are to redress the injustices imposed by the unequal distribution of power within the global order and established through the 500-year-old world-system.

⁸⁸ “decolonization,” Cambridge Dictionary, accessed October 21, 2021, <https://dictionary-cambridge-org.eur.idm.oclc.org/dictionary/english/decolonization?q=decolonisation>.

⁸⁹ As Canada has begun to demonstrate, decolonisation implies finding a middle-ground of mutual-respect, appreciation, and trust between Indigenous peoples and settler-Canadians. For example, Cheryl Bartlett, Murdena and Albert Mashall argue for an integration of Indigenous voices through the “Two-Eyed Seeing Method”, thereby upholding Indigenous ways to the same level as settler-Canadian ideals. Despite being theoretically appealing, it is important to note that in practice it is much harder to achieve. Nevertheless, one could argue that there emerges a historical-cultural syncretism within Canadian-Indigenous epistemologies, establishing the legitimacy of current political goals within the country – like the TRC. For Two-Eyed Seeing Method, see: Cheryl Bartlett, Murdena Marshall, and Albert Marshall, “Two-Eyed Seeing and other lessons learned within a co-learning journey of bringing together indigenous and mainstream knowledges and ways of knowing,” *Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences* 2, 4 (2012): 331-340. For example of application, see: C. Whiting et al., “Using Two-Eyed Seeing to Explore Interagency Collaboration,” *The Canadian Journal of Nursing Research* 50, 3 (2018): 133-144; A. L. Wight et al., “An Application of Two-Eyed Seeing to Community Engaged Research with Indigenous Mothers,” *International Journal of Qualitative Methods* 18 (2019): 1-17. Also see the Truth and Reconciliation Commission: <https://nctr.ca/about/history-of-the-trc/trc-website/>.

Foundational Figures of Decolonial Thought: Fanon, Dussel, Quijano

Considering decolonialism is grounded in political movements of anti-colonial and decolonial activism, it is important to consider the works of Frantz Fanon, Enrique Dussel, and Anibal Quijano in this light. That is to say, this following section will be dedicated to understanding these author's respective anti-colonial and decolonising activism within their respective contexts so as to understand decolonialism's development in academia. Despite the field coming to the fore in the 1990s in Latin America specifically, its attachment to anti-colonial and decolonisation political movements requires me to analyse Fanon since he is a major figure in decolonial activism. Consequently, I argue that, like postcolonialism, decolonialism contributes to the establishment of a counter-discourse against Eurocentrism – politically, ideologically, as well as epistemologically. Decolonialism, as developed by these authors, advocates for self-determination, agency, and active continued resistance through presenting alternate methodologies grounded in non-Euro-Western ways of being, thereby also contesting (neo)colonial discourses of power tied to the 500-year-old world-system.

Frantz Fanon:

Originally published in French in 1952, *Black Skin, White Masks* provides a psychoanalysis of colonialism through a case study of French Martinique.⁹⁰ Fanon divulges the consequences of colonisation through his psychiatric and medical evaluation of racial relations on man – white or black – while also reflecting on his own experiences as a French-Martinican. Although the book's content is complex, Fanon's purpose is simple: to set man free. "I propose nothing short of the liberation of the man of color from himself."⁹¹ This liberation, despite being focused on

⁹⁰ *Black Skin, White Masks* was published originally in French in 1952 despite me using the 3rd edition translated in English and published in 2008. See Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks - 3rd Edition*, trans. Charles Lam Markmann (UK: Pluto Press, 2008). Fanon's notion of "man", despite being narrow by today's definition of the term, is more broadly conceptualised as referring to "humankind". Although he has been criticized by feminist scholars for being sexist and misogynistic in his analysis of the Black woman, this thesis will not dwell on this matter due to space and the fact that patriarchy is acknowledged herein as a global, Eurocentric discourse of power. As I described in the introduction, I seek to incorporate the "human" in my analysis, that is to say, the totality of the human experience – emotions, feelings, processing, etc. – instead of simply dismissing them as historical events. By recognising the historical context of the 1950s, alongside the discourses of power of the 500-year-old world-system therein reflected, it enables me to pause and see how Fanon navigated this in his own way – how his humanity developed and was expressed. It enables me to see the truth of his reality, and how this in turn is connected to his decolonialism. For more information on feminist critique of Fanon, see: Luis Galanes Valldejuli, "Malinchismo and Misogyny in Fanon's Black Skin, White Masks: Reading Fanon from the Hispanic Caribbean," *Karib – Nordic Journal for Caribbean Studies* 2, 1(2015): 112-127; and Gwen Bergner, "Who Is That Masked Woman? Or, the Role of Gender in Fanon's Black Skin, White Masks," *Modern Language Association* 110, 1 (1995): 75-88.

⁹¹ Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 2.

the black experience, also encompasses setting the white man free from his delusions of presumed superiority, authority, and power over all people. “There is a fact: White men consider themselves superior to black men. There is another fact: Black men want to prove to white men, at all costs, the richness of their thought, the equal value of their intellect. How do we extricate ourselves?”⁹² The purpose of liberating the man of colour is thus inalienable from also destroying conceptions of white superiority. This leads Fanon to recognise that white-black relations, as a colonial hierarchisation of power, is a societal problem. The psychiatrist offers his prognosis: a psychoexistential complex established and maintained by colonialism that he seeks to analyse and destroy.⁹³ Therein lies Fanon’s anti-colonialism. He confronts colonialism directly by exposing its social-political structures enabling white-black racial hierarchy in the world today.

The first step in confronting this colonialism is through (anti-colonial) resistance. Although Fanon spends his entire book advocating for liberation, he places more emphasis on action. Being more urgently necessary and needed than words, his call for action emphasises the importance of revolution within resistance as being a necessary step towards liberation. Towards the end of this book, Fanon writes:

I do not carry innocence to the point of believing that appeals to reason or to respect for human dignity can alter reality. For the Negro who works on a sugar plantation in Le Robert, there is only one solution: to fight. He will embark on this struggle, and he will pursue it, not as the result of a Marxist or idealistic analysis but quite simply because he cannot conceive of life otherwise than in the form of a battle against exploitation, misery, and hunger.⁹⁴

By making a connection between survival and resistance, an observation that may be obvious to some, Fanon further accentuates the dire need for liberation. Only through freedom will subordinate people be able to be free again according to their own ways of being. Political liberation is an anti-colonial struggle for survival.

Nevertheless, political liberation alone is not enough to ensure long-term survival. Due to the psychoexistential complex that is entrenched within colonial structures, decolonising the mind, the body, and the Being is necessary. This implies the assertion of self-determination

⁹² Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 3.

⁹³ Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 5. See also the following citation on page 3: “Indeed, I believe that only a psychoanalytical interpretation of the black problem can lay bare the anomalies of affect that are responsible for the structure of the complex.” Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 3.

⁹⁴ Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 174.

through space and time, to effectively decolonise one's mind from the intersectional white-superiority/black-inferiority social hierarchy, to (re)claim one's own power as a human being. Fanon wants to go beyond white ideals of history that entrenches the white man into the realm of the master and blackness into the world of slavery. His decolonisation activism thus effectively implies going beyond the colonial experience, the white-black binaries, in order to determine one-self.⁹⁵ The internalisation of inferiority or superiority, the classification of black and white men – these are constructions of European exposure and interactions with peoples of the African continent since before the 15th century.⁹⁶ They have been instilled throughout history and claimed as contemporary denominations of identity. By going beyond these colonial dialectical categorisations, Fanon is advocating for self-determination. However, he refutes a nativist sensational activism as being a form of resistance: “In no way should I dedicate myself to the revival of an unjustly unrecognized Negro civilization. I will not make myself the man of any past. I do not want to exalt the past at the expense of my present and of my future.”⁹⁷ Freeing himself from the shackles of colonial domination, Fanon asserts self-determination and sovereignty over his self by aspiring to go outside the colonial power's periphery.

Fanon's decolonial activism is therefore entrenched in mitigating against Eurocentric discourses of power present within the 500-year-old world-system through his call for complete and total liberation. His call to action through an anti-colonial struggle of resistance, and his call for self-determination through decolonisation of the Being are means through which “man” – that is, the human – whether black or white, can be liberated. Although his experiences as a black French-Martinique psychiatrist exposed him to racist, hierarchically induced trauma, it would be false to claim that his activism lies solely within his identity.⁹⁸ Saying so reduces his activism back into the colonial binary between the white man and blackness. It does not reflect his entire

⁹⁵ As Fanon writes on page 175: “The discovery of the existence of a Negro civilization in the fifteenth century confers no patent of humanity on me. Like it or not, the past can in no way guide me in the present moment. The situation that I have examined, it is clear by now, is not a classic one. Scientific objectivity was barred to me, for the alienated, the neurotic, was my brother, my sister, my father. I have ceaselessly striven to show the Negro that in a sense he makes himself abnormal; to show the white man that he is at once the perpetrator and the victim of a delusion.” Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 175.

⁹⁶ Notes of author taken in: David Theo Goldberg, “Race/Racisms: A Euro-History,” *Black Europe Summer School*, Week 2. For more information, see: Jan Nederveen Pieterse, 2002 “*Europe and its Others*”, in *Blackwell Companion to Racial and Ethnic Studies*, ed. David Theo Goldberg and John Solomos (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 2002): 17-24.

⁹⁷ Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 176.

⁹⁸ See Ziauddin Sardar, “Forward to the 2008 Edition,” in *Black Skin, White Masks – 3rd Edition*, by Frantz Fanon and trans. Charles Lam Markmann (UK: Pluto Press, 2008), vi-xx.

Being, overshadowing the complexity of his person with the simple fact of him having black skin. Fanon's motivations, as any individual's, is more complex. Although impossible to completely fathom, he does express some of his reasons for believing in a need for anti-colonial, decolonising struggles towards liberation.

If the question of practical solidarity with a given past ever arose for me, it did so only to the extent to which I was committed to myself and to my neighbor to fight for all my life and with all my strength so that never again would a people on the earth be subjugated. It was not the black world that laid down my course of conduct. My black skin is not the wrapping of specific values. It is a long time since the starry sky that took away Kant's breath revealed the last of its secrets to us. And the moral law is not certain of itself. As a man, I undertake to face the possibility of annihilation in order that two or three truths may cast their eternal brilliance over the world.⁹⁹

Herein, his tone seems resolute in accepting his possible demise. It is mixed with sadness, a sort of acceptance in grieving himself, while also inhibiting pride in the possibility of common humanity – “committing to myself and to my neighbor to fight”. Fanon thereby emphasises the necessity of resistance while noting the cost of liberation. In spite of his own “possible annihilation”, achieving liberation in the name of *people* (neither white nor black – but people) is necessary for the sake of the future of humanity – “so that two or three truths may cast their eternal brilliance over the world.”

Nevertheless, resistance is futile without deconstructing one's own being that has been living, and continues to live, within colonialism. “It was not the black world that laid down my course of conduct. My black skin is not the wrapping of specific values.” In this, Fanon is going beyond the colonial binary of whiteness juxtaposed with blackness. By stating this, he is emphasising the human within himself, his neighbour, and people in general. That is to say, he illustrates the human within colonial interactions, stressing the need for liberation from colonialism and its mechanisms of power for the future of all of humanity. Fanon's decolonialism rests in decolonising one's mind, body, and Being so as to ensure that humanity's identity rests within the human rather than the idea of the white man and blackness. Interwoven with the resoluteness of his tone, Fanon demonstrates the psychological work necessary by all to go beyond the binaries of the white man and blackness entrenched within the 500-year-old world-system and its mechanisms of power.

⁹⁹ Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 177.

Enrique Dussel:

Enrique Dussel focuses on the enduring existence of colonialism within the global order in his philosophical work for Latin America. Originally from Argentina, wherein he began his bachelor's in philosophy, he became a political refugee in Mexico following the 1975 military coup.¹⁰⁰ At the time, Dussel was studying what he now terms "Eurocentric" philosophy, in the sense of it being devoted to the Ancient Greeks, Latin, and Middle Age Philosophers that encompassed European philosophical tradition. But upon pursuing his post-graduate studies in Spain, Dussel realised that studying European philosophy did not equate him to being European.¹⁰¹ There was an identity rupture between the knowledge he was taught and the discourses of power within the 500-year-old world-system. Dussel came to the realisation that as a Latin American philosopher, he needed to study Latin American philosophy – a domain that did not yet exist for Latin American philosophy, as his experience suggests, was at the time considered to be European philosophy. For him, Latin American philosophical tradition encompassed more than just the European tradition, as Indigenous and African peoples also lived within the Latin American peripheral context. Answering this question was thus closely tied to the space, time, and inter-cultural syncretism within the colonial context of the Americas. As Dussel says: "For me, philosophy was first and foremost the discovery of what it means to be a philosopher in Latin America." His life-long project was therefore tied to understanding the philosophical traditions of all Latin America. That is not to say, of all the countries currently existing in Latin America – rather, he focuses on the geographical space and time of Latin America, particularly the pre-Columbian, Indigenous traditions and the impact of European "discovery" (as he terms it) on the philosophical thought of the peninsulas. Consequently, he seeks to establish a Latin American philosophical tradition rather than one centred on the Euro-Western world. Dussel's work is thus his decolonialism, being simultaneously anti-colonial in contesting Eurocentrism, while being decolonising in its philosophical self-determination. This legacy is

¹⁰⁰ Enrique Dussel in an interview with Mahvish Ahmad. Mahvish Ahmad, "The Philosophy of Liberation: An Interview with Enrique Dussel (Part 1)," *The Naked Punch*, published on 13 November 2013, <http://nakedpunch.com/articles/186>.

¹⁰¹ As Dussel recounts in an interview: "So studying philosophy in Argentina was the same as studying in Madrid, Paris or Berlin. At the age of 23, I received a stipend to pursue a post-graduate doctorate in philosophy in Spain. It was at this point that I discovered that I was not a European, but a Latin American. And, then, I didn't know what happened. I spent a total of 10 years in Europe. After Madrid, I went to Sorbonne in Paris, and Germany for two years. I went to Israel, the Mediterranean, Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Greece, and so on." Enrique Dussel and Mahvish Ahmad, "The Philosophy of Liberation: An Interview with Enrique Dussel (Part 1)," interview by Mahvish Ahmad, *Naked Punch*, posted 28 June 2015, <http://nakedpunch.com/articles/186>.

found within his work, *The Invention of the Americas: The Eclipse of “the Other” and the Myth of Modernity*.¹⁰²

In this book, Dussel focuses on the European exploration of the Americas and its conceptualisation within (Euro-Western/Latin American) history. Although the Eurocentric narrative is well-known and encompassed within the idea of the “discovery” of a “New World,” the Indigenous conceptualisation, interpretation, and representation of European arrival is often discarded. He presents this dialectical reality through the structure of the book, dividing it among three sections: the first being dedicated to the European Ego, or what Dussel elaborates as the manifestation of Cartesian philosophy within the so-called conquest (I think, therefore I am – or, in this context, I am, therefore I conquer) – the principle of *ego cogito*. The second devotes itself to explaining how *ego cogito* is tied into the construct of modernity and thus the inevitable eclipsing of Amerindia. But he also simultaneously places Amerindia within a true context of world history, focusing on its own world-system and its relationship to the Pacific. The third and last section offers an Indigenous perspective of the advent of European exploration in the Americas and the entrenchment of the 500-year-old world-system – that is, the coming of the 6th Sun. Dussel’s anti-colonial activism can thus be seen in his disavowal of the Eurocentric interpretation of Latin American history, while he decolonises and rebuilds this historical narrative through his account of Amerindian history.

Upon first glance, Dussel mitigates against a Eurocentric account of Latin America’s history – that is, the omission and, consequently, the elimination of Amerindia. By reducing Latin America’s history to a narrative that is centred upon Europe and the Euro-Western world, the history of Indigenous peoples, of Africans on the continent, and the multiple interactions and human connections that took place in Amerindia are “eclipsed” – covered over by Eurocentrism. European centrality in Latin American history thus equates to European supremacy: I think, therefore I am – I exist, therefore I am – I conquer, therefore I am. According to Dussel, Eurocentrism is therefore not simply the centre of history, but also the centre of existence.¹⁰³ By directly relating Eurocentrism to the history of colonialism in the Americas, the “discovery” of

¹⁰² Enrique Dussel, *The Invention of the Americas: The Eclipse of “the Other” and the Myth of Modernity*, trans. Michael D. Barber (New York: Continuum, 1995).

¹⁰³ As Dussel writes in his Preface: “I focus on the immense majority of humanity, the seventy-five per cent of the world situated in the southern hemisphere, the excolonial world. These exploited, excluded, and poor peoples, whom Fanon termed the “wretched of the earth,” consume less than fifteen per cent of the planet’s income. Their history of oppression began five hundred years ago.” Dussel, *The Invention of the Americas*, 9.

the “New World,” and the global establishment of the 500-year-old world-system, Dussel is directly opposing colonialism as an international Eurocentric mechanism of power.

Upon further examination, his argument becomes more complex, searching for the reasons how Eurocentrism, as a supposed sign of European superiority that eclipses the history of Amerindia, came to be. His answer: modernity. Dussel elaborates on how modernity came to feed Eurocentrism and how, in turn, this form of egocentrism fed modernity. He writes:

This history of world domination originates with modernity, which thinkers such as Charles Taylor, Stephen Toulmin, or Jürgen Habermas consider as exclusively a European occurrence, having nothing to do with the so-called Third World. The expositions of these thinkers explain modernity by referring only to classical European and North American authors and events. My undertaking here differs from theirs, since *I argue that while modernity is undoubtedly a European occurrence, it also originates in a dialectical relation with non-Europe. Modernity appears when Europe organizes the initial world-system and places itself at the center of world history over against a periphery equally constitutive of modernity.* The forgetting of the periphery, which took place from the end of the fifteenth, Hispanic-Lusitanian century to the beginning of the seventeenth century, has led great thinkers of the center to commit the Eurocentric fallacy in understanding modernity.¹⁰⁴

The core of Dussel’s anti-colonial activism against Eurocentrism thus lies in the fact that modernity, as a mechanism of Eurocentric power within the global order, covers over – “discovers” – and eclipses Amerindia in Latin America. He can make this argument due to the unique experience of the Americas with colonialism, the Indigenous and African peoples enduring war, exploitation, and genocide – quite literally placing Amerindia in the realm of non-existence and covering it over with Latin America. In this way, Eurocentrism justified modernity and, through the eclipsing of Indigenous people at the hands of genocide, modernity was in turn justifying Eurocentrism. Dussel’s stance against Eurocentrism is thus not only focused on a Eurocentric, modern narrative of history, but also on its presence as a discourse of power that rejects the possibility of Amerindian experiences with modernity. “Modernity is a world phenomenon, commencing with the simultaneous constitution of Spain with reference to its periphery, Amerindia, including the Caribbean, Mexico, and Peru.”¹⁰⁵ He contests Eurocentric superiority and the colonial processes that fed into the “myth of modernity.”

¹⁰⁴ Dussel, *The Invention of the Americas*, 9-10. Emphasis added.

¹⁰⁵ Dussel, *The Invention of the Americas*, 11.

Dussel's anti-colonial activism also encompasses his decolonial activism: undoing the "dis-discovery" of Eurocentrism within Latin American history. He does so by juxtaposing Eurocentric rationale favouring modernity with the Aztec hermeneutic interpretation of the arrival of Cortes and the conquistadors. Specifically, he analyses the figure of Moctezuma, the Aztec emperor, and his Indigenous cosmology so as to perceive this history from an Aztec way of being. Contrary to Eurocentric ideals, Moctezuma was a rational figure, interpreting the arrival of Cortes politically through his own knowledge, beliefs, and norms. As Dussel explains:

Did Moctezuma behave *rationally*? Yes, if one considers his world instead of projecting a Eurocentric perspective upon him. What possibilities presented themselves to a man with his perspective, to an Aztec emperor, to a good warrior but a better *tlamatini*, to someone educated in the austere moral tradition of the wise *toltecas*? For an emperor as educated and refined as Moctezuma, the resources of his civilization afforded him three options: (1) The recent arrivals were mere human beings—the least probable from the Náhuatl hermeneutic perspective until later events confirming this hypothesis had occurred. Moctezuma reasonably shelved this possibility *at first*, and he could have only known that this was actually an invasion if those later data had been available to him. (2) The only rational alternative was that they were gods. If so, which gods? Everything from the opinion of astrologers to that of the *tlamatinime* indicated that Cortés was Quetzalcóatl, possibly returning after having been expelled from Tula by the Toltecs and other peoples. (3) In the third alternative, a variant of the second, this apparent Quetzalcóatl only masked the actual presence of the divine principle Ometeótl. This truly ominous event would have spelled the end of the fifth sun.¹⁰⁶

Herein, Dussel demonstrates how contrary to modernist, Eurocentric tropes, Moctezuma is rational within his own way of being. Thus, Dussel illustrates the need for his methodology in (re)constructing Latin American history: trans-modernity. Using Spanish colonial sources as a point of reference from which he reads in-between the lines and against the grain, Dussel pairs this information with Aztec linguistics so as to comprehend the Aztec perspective, interpretation, and way of being. This enables him to not only present the Aztec hermeneutic narrative of Latin American history, but also to reinforce his call for trans-modernity – that is, to go beyond modernity and disclaim its irrational, sacrificial myth.¹⁰⁷ Put simply, humanity cannot move forward in its aspiration for universal equality if it continues to believe in the myth of modernity.

¹⁰⁶ Dussel, *The Invention of the Americas*, 101. Original emphasis.

¹⁰⁷ As Dussel writes on page 131: "I simply desire to show modernity's other face, the structural product of its myth, and to recognize that myth for the sacrificial, violent, and irrational myth it is. During the long history from 1492 to 1992, the era of the sixth sun, the Latin American people, the social block of the oppressed, have struggled to create their own culture. Any attempt at modernization which ignores this history is doomed to fail, since it will be overlooking its own other face." Dussel, *The Invention of the Americas*, 131.

In its rational nucleus, modernity entails the emancipation of humanity from cultural immaturity. As a world encompassing myth, however, modernity exploits and immolates men and women in the peripheral, colonial world as it first did with the Amerindians. Modernity hides this victimization, though, by claiming that it is the necessary price of modernization. The act of liberation rationalizes modernity by transcending and deconstructing its irrational myth. As a practico-political program, liberation surpasses both capitalism and modernity in search of a new transmodernity characterized by ecological civilization, popular democracy, and economic justice.¹⁰⁸

Dussel's anti-colonial and decolonial activism encompasses a call for total liberation and sovereignty over the self, both politically and inter(-)nationally. He recognises the plurality of humanity and its existence within Latin America as a space for and of intercultural (as he terms it) interactions, positing a philosophical mission to encourage such communication.¹⁰⁹

Considering the rich inter-ethnic, inter-cultural, inter-epistemological, inter(-)national, and inter-racial history of Latin America (and the Americas in general), Dussel is advocating for an emancipated philosophical tradition that goes beyond Eurocentrism, tropes of modernity, and (neo)colonial power dynamics. Upon being asked in an interview with Mahvish Ahmad what the role of philosophy and a philosopher is, Dussel responds:

So to answer your question, for me philosophy is to think, to critique in a radical manner, against the foundational moment of domination. The oppressed constitute the majority in the periphery, the South and the old colonies. Modern philosophy is bourgeois. Consciously or unconsciously, this philosophy justifies imperialism, bourgeoisie, capitalism, eurocentrism. Domination has a last philosophical moment. We build a critique against this foundational moment so the oppressed people can become free. That, for me, is the function of philosophy. It is a critique of the status quo.¹¹⁰

Dussel's (re)actionism is not anti-European or anti-Western. Rather, it is entrenched within his own journey in search of a Latin American philosophy that expresses the plurality of being in contemporary Amerindia. This includes European philosophical traditions, but excludes its demeaning exclusivity on historical interpretation and practices of domination. By presenting trans-modernity as an active methodological form of resistance, Dussel is affirming his own self as a Latin American philosopher, person, and being, having his own contextual, experiential, and

¹⁰⁸ Dussel, *The Invention of the Americas*, 117.

¹⁰⁹ As Dussel writes on page 132: "This book serves only as a historico-philosophical introduction to an intercultural dialogue that will encompass diverse political, economic, theological, and epistemological standpoints. Such a dialogue endeavors to construct not an abstract universality, but an analogic and concrete world in which all cultures, philosophies, and theologies will make their contribution toward a future, pluralist humanity." Dussel, *The Invention of the Americas*, 132.

¹¹⁰ Dussel and Ahmad, interview.

living knowledge that is equally as deserving of attention as Euro-Western philosophical traditions.

Anibal Quijano:

In his seminal article, “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism and Latin American” Quijano explores the intersectionality between power, colonialism as a form of capitalism, and the hierachisation of humankind within the international world-system.¹¹¹ In a word, he cross-examines the construct of race and processes of racialisation within the establishment of global capitalism through the colonisation of the Americas. His decolonialism thus lies within exposing the continuation of colonialism on the one hand, while on the other illustrating the mechanisms of power at work within the distribution of the global market and its discriminatory division along the lines of race.

Quijano begins his article by elaborating on the impact of the “Discovery” of the “New World” within the global establishment of capitalism as the European world-system. From there, he delves into two sections: race as a construct of modernity, and the division of labour within world-capitalism. It is important to note that race and labour are not mutually indivisible from each other, as emerging geo-locales intersected with labour and race became inseparably associated with power.¹¹² In this sense, Indigenous and African peoples were seen as inferior races because they were dominated by Europeans, who in turn were then privileged through the economic benefits of this conquest and colonialism.¹¹³ He writes:

The racial classification of the population and the early association of the new racial identities of the colonized with the forms of control of unpaid, unwaged labor developed among the Europeans the singular perception that paid labor was the whites’ privilege. The racial inferiority of the colonized implied that they were not worthy of wages.¹¹⁴

¹¹¹ Anibal Quijano, “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism and Latin America,” trans. Michael Ennis, *Neplanta* 1, 3 (2000): 533-580.

¹¹² As Quijano writes on page 536: “The new historical identities produced around the foundation of the idea of race in the new global structure of the control of labor were associated with social roles and geohistorical places.” Quijano, “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism and Latin America,” 536.

¹¹³ As Quijano writes on page 538: “The fact is that from the very beginning of the colonization of America, Europeans associated nonpaid or nonwaged labor with the dominated races because they were “inferior” races.” Quijano, “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism and Latin America,” 538.

¹¹⁴ Quijano, “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism and Latin America,” 539.

Elaborating this observation to the context of today, Quijano notes how the current lower wages of “inferior races” for the same work done by whites (Euro-Westerners) is indicative of this legacy – what he terms the “capitalist coloniality of power”.

Coloniality of power assumes the intersectionality of race and labour in relation to human hierarchy and power. That is to say, the distribution of power within the global order and, consequently, the world-system is intricately associated with geo-locals representative of race, labour, and capital.

Coloniality of labor control determined the geographic distribution of each one of the integrated forms of labor control in global capitalism. In other words, it determined the social geography of capitalism: capital, as a social formation for control of wage labor, was the axis around which all remaining forms of labor control, resources, and products were articulated. But, at the same time, capital’s specific social configuration was geographically and socially concentrated in Europe and, above all, among Europeans in the whole world of capitalism. Through these measures, Europe and the European constituted themselves as the center of the capitalist world economy.¹¹⁵

By carefully illustrating the principle axis of power between race and labour, and how this in turn configured the distribution of power along geo-localities, Quijano actively mitigates against multiple forms – economic, racial, and political – of colonialism within the current global order. His anti-colonialism encompasses being against the diminishment of identity along racial lines, the human suffering imposed on lower races for the sake of capital accumulation, and Eurocentrism as a hegemonic, discriminatory discourse of power within the international system maintaining this injustice – in a word: (neo)colonialism.

It is important to note that Quijano does not position himself in opposition to hegemony as an ordering institution of the international system. Although he does oppose domination, conquest, humiliation, and loss of human dignity, this activism is posited against Eurocentrism as the mechanism through which the conceptualisation of colonialism, race, and global capitalism came to be established. As a premise of modernity, economic development through capitalism assumes to be unilinear and deterministic in its outcome. From the pre-modern era wherein feudalism reigned, to the modern era and the industrialisation of capitalism through the establishment of the bourgeoisie, the narrative of modernity is based on a dichotomous relationship between pre-capitalism and capitalism. As Quijano demonstrates, however, this is not the case in Latin America, where pre-capital and capital forms of labour were used

¹¹⁵ Quijano, “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism and Latin America,” 539.

simultaneously for the production of commodities on the world market. For example, slavery and indentured servitude on feudal land symbiotically existed within the industrial development of the peninsula.¹¹⁶ By pointing out the inconsistencies of Euro-Western universality within modernity, Quijano is not only presenting his anti-colonial activism, but he is also asserting Latin America's position as its own unique geo-locale. Latin America, as a space and place of multiple inter-cultural, inter-ethnic, inter-epistemological, inter(-)national, and inter-racial interactions does not "fit" within Euro-Western universal truth of modernity. Being anti-Eurocentric thus does not equate Quijano to being anti-European or anti-Western. Rather, his activism is in asserting Latin America as its own true self instead of a product and result of the coloniality of power within the world-system.

Latin America embodies a different lived reality, wherein the intersectionality between race, labour, and power is evidently seen within the body politic of the nation-state. Although Quijano presents nuance, elaborating on the difference between the cone-countries (Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay) and the rest of the peninsula, he demonstrates how the distribution of power in all of Latin America is reflective of the coloniality of power entrenched within the wider 500-year-old world-system – with those in political power enticing capital investment and adhering to a white-*criollo* ideology while the rest of the diverse population, embodying multi-racial identities, is dominated.¹¹⁷ Despite the continent's litany of revolutionary movements, Quijano reveals how Eurocentrism, as a discourse of knowledge and power, is tied to the failure of these revolutions in the sense of democratising the Latin-American nation-state:

The Eurocentric perspective of knowledge operates as a mirror that distorts what it reflects, as we can see in the Latin American historical experience. That is to say, what we Latin Americans find in that mirror is not completely chimerical, since we possess so many and such important historically European traits in many material and intersubjective aspects. But at the same time we are profoundly different. Consequently, when we look in our Eurocentric mirror, the image that we see is not just composite, but also necessarily partial and distorted. *Here the tragedy is that we have all been led,*

¹¹⁶ As Quijano writes on page 550: "Slavery, in America, was deliberately established and organized as a commodity in order to produce goods for the world market and to serve the purposes and needs of capitalism. Likewise, the serfdom imposed on Indians, including the redefinition of the institutions of reciprocity, was organized in order to serve the same ends: to produce merchandise for the global market. Independent commodity production was established and expanded for the same purposes. This means that all the forms of labor and control of labor were not only simultaneously performed in America, but they were also articulated around the axis of capital and the global market. Consequently, all of these forms of labor were part of a new model of organization and labor control. Together these forms of labor configured a new economic system: capitalism." Quijano, "Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism and Latin America," 550.

¹¹⁷ Quijano, "Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism and Latin America," 562-564

*knowingly or not, wanting it or not, to see and accept that image as our own and as belonging to us alone. In this way, we continue being what we are not. And as a result we can never identify our true problems, much less resolve them, except in a partial and distorted way.*¹¹⁸

The distorted mirror entices belief, recognition, affiliation to Eurocentric identities constructed along racial lines which in turn are intersected by the division of labour within the world market, producing geopolitical realities within the global order and maintaining the realities of the 500-year-old world-system. In denouncing the illogical rationality of Eurocentrism, Quijano is revealing his decolonial activism: the necessity to recognise the plurality of human beings and radically democratise the inter(-)national political system.

All possible democratization of society in Latin America should occur in the majority of these countries at the same time and in the same historical movement as decolonization and as a radical redistribution of power. The reason underlying these statements is that social classes in Latin America are marked by color, any color that can be found in any country at any time. This means that the classification of people is realized not only in one sphere of power—the economy, for example—but in each and every sphere. *Domination is the requisite for exploitation, and race is the most effective instrument for domination that, associated with exploitation, serves as the universal classifier in the current global model of power. In terms of the national question, only through the process of the democratization of society can the construction of a modern nation-state, with all of its implications, including citizenship and political representation, be possible and successful.*¹¹⁹

His tone is affirmative and assertive, pressing the need for radical revisionism of the division of power within the construction of the nation-state in Latin America. The fact that he recognises the construction of race within modernity, and sees its intersectionality with the global division of labour that is itself reflective of the division of power within the international system is key: this observation is one of the main reason why his work became the foundation of decolonial studies in Latin America. For not only did he mitigate against colonialism, but he also advocated for the need for Latin Americans to find their own being, defining themselves according to their own lived experiences, not those of Eurocentrism. It is on this note, that Quijano finishes his article:

What we could advance and conquer in terms of political and civil rights in a necessary redistribution of power (of which the decolonization of power is the presupposition and point of departure) is now being torn down in the process of the reconcentration of the

¹¹⁸ Quijano, “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism and Latin America,” 556. Emphasis added.

¹¹⁹ Quijano, “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism and Latin America,” 572. Emphasis added.

control of power in global capitalism and of its management of the colonality of power by the same functionaries. Consequently, it is time to learn to free ourselves from the Eurocentric mirror where our image is always, necessarily, distorted. It is time, finally, to cease being what we are not.¹²⁰

As a Peruvian himself, who was exiled in Mexico after criticising the reformist Velasco military regime,¹²¹ Quijano's final plea is also a personal one: he is redefining himself as a Latin American in spite of existing within a Eurocentric world. His decolonialism is thus embodied in his own being as a scholar and as an individual, his activism encompassing both anti-colonial movements and calls toward decolonisation not only for others, but for his people and his own person.

Conclusion:

Decolonialism as a political movement and as an academic theory is predicated on mitigating Eurocentrism through anti-colonialism and calls for successful decolonisation. As we have seen above, decolonialism is a form of scholarship activism against Eurocentrism and its maintaining of unjust (neo)colonial realities permeating the global order, advocating for their deconstruction and (re)placement with alternate frameworks that respect the plurality of humanity.

Fanon demonstrated the psychological work necessary to deconstruct the being as a racial ideal of the 500-year-old world-system, thereby advocating for people to go beyond Eurocentrism and the colonial era as an ordering discourse of the global order. Dussel built upon this by advocating for the need to see history, specifically within the context and space of Amerindia, from the "other's" perspective, revealing the possibility for hermeneutical historical interpretation based on the Aztec way of being. By recognising race and (neo)colonialism a Eurocentric construct and its impact on Latin America, Quijano added to Fanon and Dussel's work by stressing the need to not only define oneself outside of the Eurocentric realm, but to democratically liberate Latin America from the constraints of (neo)colonialism and the capitalist colonality of power.

Like postcolonial scholarship, decolonial scholarship contributes to the establishment of a counter-discourse against Eurocentrism. However, it also advocates for self-determination, agency, and active continued resistance through alternative methodologies grounded in non-Euro-Western ways of being. That is to say, decolonialism actively acknowledges the function of

¹²⁰ Quijano, "Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism and Latin America," 573-574.

¹²¹ William Bollinger, "In Memoriam Aníbal Quijano (1928–2018)," *Latin American Perspectives* 45, 5 (2018): 232.

race as a Eurocentric construct that continues, through processes of racialisation, to maintain the division of power established through the implementation of the 500-year-old world-system. Thus, decolonialism is not just a literary criticism, but a political stance actively against the permeation of (neo)colonialism within the global order. Between anti-colonialism and decolonisation, decolonialism's (re)actionism asserts its purpose towards complete and total (political, ideological, individual) sovereignty through self-determination. On the one hand, anti-colonialism confronts colonial impositions and forces of domination, while on the other, decolonisation (re)asserts the colonial subject's agency through the implementation of their own epistemologies and ways of being. National self-determination, in the sense of it being the will of the people, is (even in Euro-Western political epistemology) an assertion of sovereignty. As we will see in this next chapter, however, (neo)colonialism and Eurocentrism are not simply erased through epistemological-methodological translation. They are active in their construction of hierarchy, meaning that the incorporation of new methodologies based on non-Euro-Western ways of being within academia poses some problematic ethical questions regarding the production of history and academia's role today as an institution by and for an increasingly "diverse" society.

Chapter 4 – Academic History (Re)Actionism

As we have seen in the previous chapters, postcolonial and decolonial theory impacted the university with its activism against Eurocentric academic historical narratives. Not only were other perspectives represented, but their self-assertion (whether through postcoloniality of decolonial activism) triggered a movement within academia to broaden historical understanding. This can be seen today in the existence of Postcolonial Studies, Latin American Postcolonial School, and postcolonial theory in general. Nevertheless, the advent of postcolonial and decolonial theory was not sudden or immediate – it was a process, just as it continues to be a process of transformation within the university and history.¹²² Considering the legacy of Said, Bhabha, Chakrabarty, Fanon, Dussel, and Quijano, it is not surprising that academia, through the peer-review process, had its own (re)action to their findings, assertions, and activism.

This chapter focuses on the academic response to these respective works and is interested in understanding what this reveals about academic standards, norms, customs, and values. Specifically, it is an analysis of the critical reviews and academic debates held about Said, Bhabha, Chakrabarty, Fanon, Dussel, and Quijano’s works, so as to understand the impact of academia on postcolonialism and decolonialism. The research question therefore is: how did the academic community (re)act to postcolonial and decolonial criticisms of “traditional” academic history? Although I focus specifically on historians and their reception of these works, I state academic community to reflect the fact that many scholars, not just historians, were conscious of the postcolonial and decolonial academic debate – as was the case, for example, with Orientalists. Examining the nature of these critical reviews will enable me to answer my wider thesis research question, which seeks to understand how history, as an academic discipline within the university, interacts with theories of postcolonialism and decolonialism since the 1970s.

¹²² For example, various universities of the Euro-Western world are currently struggling to include postcoloniality and decolonise their curriculum so as to effectively address their Eurocentric biases. This is particularly the case in Canada, where social movements and official inquiries such as the *Truth and Reconciliation Commission* are calling on universities to not only decolonise but also indigenise their epistemological approaches so as to be more inclusive and reflective of multiple Indigenous ways of being. See, “Indigenisation,” University of Saskatchewan, Teaching and Learning – Curriculum, accessed September 20, 2021, <https://teaching.usask.ca/curriculum/indigenization.php#EldersMessage>. Many history departments and historians are also actively working towards goals of decolonisation and indigenisation, since the country’s history has, like the Eurocentric narrative of the university’s past, largely excluded indigenous perspectives and experiences. See John Milloy, “Doing Public History and Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” *The Public Historian* 35, 4(2013): 10-19

Considering the importance of the Enlightenment within the structural and institutional classification of the university (Faculty of Philosophy being divided in the Faculty of Science and the Faculty of Arts/Humanities), as well as the ideological impact of empiricism within academic scientific research, I will utilise the four pillars of Science – as described by Kwame Nimako during the 2021 Black Europe Summer School – as a unit of analysis for these reviews.¹²³ That is to say, the critical reviews will be analysed within the framework of the following four pillars – measurement, standardisation, evidence, and classification – so as to examine the extent of empirical permeation within history as a discipline of the humanities. As we will see, the critics’ reviews measure the historical “fit” of these works within the framework of traditional academic history, expecting (and consequently imposing) a standardised narrative of hermeneutic interpretation based on rational, unbiased, facts derived from historical evidence (sources) that enable them to classify the work within the epistemological fabric of knowledge production within academia at large. In the end, it will be argued that academic historical epistemology is dependent on these pillars of science, and empiricism more specifically, within its process of historical knowledge production to be able to classify “good” from “bad” history. This classification, in turn, is reflective of the global order and its hierarchy, being a product of the 500-year-old world-system and thereby legitimising its ordering institutions and the endurance of Eurocentrism and (neo)colonialism. The argument implies a tautological and teleological reality within contemporary historical knowledge production and dissemination at the university – an increasingly problematic fact within today’s context of hyper-globalisation.

History & Postcolonialism:

This chapter is divided chronologically and thematically so as to acknowledge the multiple variables influencing inter-epistemological interactions within academia. Thus, postcolonialism will be addressed first following decolonialism despite Fanon’s original publication of *Masks* being in 1952. Doing so will demonstrate the nuances between the reviews of postcolonialism and decolonialism, while also considering changes within Euro-Western society since the 1970s. We therefore turn to postcolonialism and its entrance on the academic playing field.

¹²³ As part of the Honour’s Programme of this Degree, I needed to complete an extra 15 ECTS – some of which were completed by attending the Black Europe Summer School (BESS) happening from June 20th to July 2nd, 2021. The point of attending the Summer School was to implement some of its teachings into my thesis, hence the use of Nimako’s four pillars of science. See Notes of author taken in: Kwame Nimako, “On Foundations of the “Race Relations Industry”,” *Black Europe Summer School*, Week 1.

Review: Edward Said & Bernard Lewis

When Edward Said first published *Orientalism*, he became a controversial figure. Many supported him in his endeavour to call-out American hypocrisy with regards to its foreign policy in the Middle-East, particularly the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while others rejected his work entirely and saw it as an affront to scholarly knowledge and legitimacy.¹²⁴ Most of his critics were Orientalists – scholars who studied the Orient (more specifically the Middle East) in its contemporary and historical setting. In fact, his most avid critic was Bernard Lewis, a British-American scholar dedicated to studying Arab countries and the Middle East in general. He was a well-established scholar within Oriental Studies, and obtained increased popularity in the 1970s as an advisor to various congress-people in the US.¹²⁵ Later, with the onslaught of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, he would become a central figure within the Bush administration and Cheney approach to America’s “crusade” against Islamic terrorism.¹²⁶ In 1982, he wrote a scathing review of *Orientalism* in *The New York Review of Books* which sparked a heated debate between himself and Said.¹²⁷ This will be the review analysed below so as to present an initial academic (re)action to postcolonialism.

Lewis begins his review by stating that his first problem with *Orientalism* lies in its critique of Orientalists as illegitimate researchers producing illegitimate scholarship about the Orient. For Lewis, Said reduces the legitimate study of the Orient to only those who are from the Orient – that is, Oriental people themselves – something that is alarming. As he writes: “What then is Orientalism? What did the word mean before it was poisoned by the kind of intellectual pollution that in our time has made so many previously useful words unfit for use in rational

¹²⁴ See Pakrash, “Orientalism Now,” 211-212.

¹²⁵ Douglas Martin, “Bernard Lewis, Influential Scholar of Islam, is Dead at 101,” *The New York Times*, published on May 21, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com.eur.idm.oclc.org/2018/05/21/obituaries/bernard-lewis-islam-scholar-dies.html>.

¹²⁶ As Martin writes in *The New York Times*: “Though he later said he would have preferred that the United States had fomented rebellion in northern Iraq rather than invading the country, he was widely perceived to have beaten the drum for war. In an essay in *The Wall Street Journal* in 2002, he predicted that Iraqis would “rejoice” over an American invasion, a flawed forecast echoed by Mr. Cheney and others in the White House. People spoke of a “Lewis doctrine” of imposing democracy on despotic regimes. His book “What Went Wrong? The Clash between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East” (2002) became a handbook for understanding what had happened on Sept. 11. (The book was at the printer when the attacks occurred.) Articles he wrote in *The New Yorker*, *The Atlantic* and *The Wall Street Journal* were widely discussed.” Martin, “Bernard Lewis,”

¹²⁷ Bernard Lewis, “The Question of Orientalism,” review of *Orientalism*, by Edward Said, *The New York Review of Books*, published June 24, 1982, <https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1982/06/24/the-question-of-orientalism/?pagination=false>.

discourse?”¹²⁸ His words are strong: “intellectual pollution” connoting a loss of legitimacy within academic standards that necessitates “rational discourse” – simply put, rationality. Here we see how Lewis, as a prominent figure within Orientalist Studies and the university in general, imposes a standard grounded in what Said has termed “rational realism” – that is, we see a clash between what Lewis considers to be “good” and true academic scholarship and Said’s concept of Orientalism as a discourse that is empirically seen as true but remains untrue.¹²⁹ But by denying Said’s interpretation while basing his argument on reason, Lewis measures, questions, and standardises *Orientalism* in a way which ultimately classifies it as illegitimate, biased work produced by an equally illegitimate, biased scholar. Put simply, Lewis’ argument is that Said, through his irrational attack on Orientalist scholarship, has himself committed the sin of irrational thought in his analysis.

Lewis’ measurement of *Orientalism* begins with restricting Said’s argument to his own conceptualisation of the Orient, the Middle East, as well as Islamic and Arab countries – in other words, his definition of Orientalism as a form of academic scholarship. Providing the reader with an overview of how the term “Orientalism” has held different meanings and connotations within academia – being initially used as an umbrella term for the Far East and Middle East, then eventually including Arabists, to then be entirely dropped – Lewis writes that:

To prove this point, Mr. Said makes a number of very arbitrary decisions. His Orient is reduced to the Middle East, and his Middle East to a part of the Arab world. By eliminating Turkish and Persian studies on the one hand and Semitic studies on the other, he isolates Arabic studies from both their historical and philological contexts. The period and area of Orientalism are similarly restricted.¹³⁰

Because his measurement of Said’s concept of Orientalism as a discourse produced by and for the Euro-Western world does not fall in line with his own conceptualisation of Orientalism as an academic field of study, Lewis rejects the premise of Said’s argument entirely. Here we see how inter-epistemological miscommunication can happen – different experiences leading to different conceptualisations, understandings, and processing of reality.

¹²⁸ Lewis, “The Question of Orientalism,” 3.

¹²⁹ As Said writes on page 72: “Philosophically, then, the kind of language, thought, and vision that I have been calling Orientalism very generally is a form of radical realism; anyone employing Orientalism, which is the habit for dealing with questions, objects, qualities, and regions deemed Oriental, will designate, name, point to, fix what he is talking or thinking about with a word or phrase, which then is considered either to have acquired, or more simply to be, reality.” Said, *Orientalism*, 72.

¹³⁰ Lewis, “The Question of Orientalism,” 9.

Lewis thereafter wastes no time questioning the legitimacy of *Orientalism* by presenting the ridiculousness of its historical sources. Said has been deemed “ahistorical” by more than one critic, but Lewis’ conceptualisation of Orientalism as an academic field also reflects his perception regarding the value of Said’s sources.¹³¹ For Lewis, Orientalism is a field produced by scholars, not Euro-Western writers or travellers in the Orient.¹³² By questioning the legitimacy of Said’s sources, Lewis is effectively questioning Said’s entire argument and therefore his legitimacy as a scholar as well. Lewis thus does not accept Said’s argument because his sources are not classified as Orientalist. This is key, for it reveals not only how Lewis questions the evidence brought forward by Said, but also indicates Lewis’ own classification of legitimate Oriental sources. In this sense, according to Lewis, Said fails at being an Oriental scholar.

Lewis emphasises this point when discussing German Orientalism – a facet that Said chose to ignore in his book. According to Said, this was a choice that not only reflected how the discourse of Orientalism was initially produced in England and France, and later claimed by America, but also emphasised how Germany’s involvement in the construction of Orientalism was an “elaboration of techniques,” not a foundational influence in the discourse itself.¹³³ For Lewis, this screams inaccurate, biased, and illegitimate scholarship produced by Said.

The whole passage is not merely false but absurd. It reveals a disquieting lack of knowledge of what scholars do and what scholarship is about. The reader’s anxiety is not allayed by the frequent occurrence of stronger synonyms such as “appropriate,” “accumulate,” “wrench,” “ransack,” and even “rape” to describe the growth of knowledge in the West about the East. For Mr. Said, it would seem, *scholarship and science are commodities which exist in finite quantities*; the West has grabbed an unfair share of these as well as other resources, leaving the East not only impoverished but also unscholarly and unscientific. Apart from embodying a hitherto unknown theory of knowledge, Mr. Said expresses a contempt for modern Arab scholarly achievement worse than anything that he attributes to his demonic Orientalists.¹³⁴

¹³¹ See: Irene A. Bierman, “Review,” review of *Orientalism*, by Edward W. Said, *Middle East Association of North America – MESA* 13, 1 (1979): 68.

¹³² As Lewis writes on page 11: “Another is to bring into the category of ‘Orientalist’ a whole series of writers — litterateurs like Chateaubriand and Nerval, imperial administrators like Lord Cromer, and others—whose works were no doubt relevant to the formation of Western cultural attitudes, but who had nothing to do with the academic tradition of Orientalism which is Mr. Said’s main target.” Lewis, “The Question of Orientalism,” 11.

¹³³ Said writes on page 17: “Then too, I believe that the sheer quality, consistency, and mass of British, French, and American writing on the Orient lifts it above the doubtless crucial work done in Germany, Italy, Russia, and elsewhere.” For more information, see Said, *Orientalism*, 17-18.

¹³⁴ Lewis, “The Question of Orientalism,” 10. Emphasis added.

The fact that Lewis posits that Said's ignoring of German Orientalism is "a disquieting lack of knowledge of what scholars do and what scholarship is about" classifies Said as not being a scholar due to him failing to meet Lewis' academic standards and expectations. That is to say, there is a standardisation present within academic scholarship, ensuring that the work and knowledge produced is valid and legitimate – in a word, true. By failing to use so-called "proper" Orientalist sources, including "strong synonyms" in his descriptive analysis, and not abiding by Orientalist conceptualisations of the Orient, Lewis effectively presents Said (not just his *Orientalism*) as untrue – the taboo of academic scholarship.

A historian of science is not expected to be a scientist, but he is expected to have some basic knowledge of the scientific alphabet. Similarly, a historian of Orientalism—that is to say, the work of historians and philologists—should have at least some acquaintance with the history and philology with which they were concerned. Mr. Said shows astonishing blind spots.¹³⁵

In a word, Lewis believes that Said does not understand Orientalist scholarship, which is demonstrated to him by Said's "clear" disregard for academic standards in both the sense of the validity of his sources and evidence of his political bias.

In the end, Lewis' argument is supported by the ideology of empiricism within hermeneutic interpretation which show how Said's *Orientalism* is untrue and should thus be disregarded. But Lewis takes it one step further by wanting to prove the supposed illegitimacy of Said – meaning him being a "bad" scholar. "One final point, perhaps the most astonishing. Mr. Said's attitude to the Orient, Arab and other, as revealed in his book, is far more negative than that of the most arrogant European imperialist writers whom he condemns."¹³⁶ In other words, Said is guilty of doing what he accuses: biased scholarship. Not only does this tautological reasoning label Said as a "bad" scholar, but it also demonstrates him being rejected by Orientalists and their academic field. He therefore does not have the academic institutional weight of the Orientalism departments, and is effectively treated as the "Other." As Lewis notes:

The most important question—least mentioned by the current wave of critics—is that of the scholarly merits, indeed the scholarly validity, of Orientalist findings. Prudently, Mr. Said has hardly touched on this question, and has indeed given very little attention to the scholarly writings of the scholars whose putative attitudes, motives, and purposes form the theme of his book. Scholarly criticism of Orientalist scholarship is a legitimate and indeed a necessary, inherent part of the process. Fortunately, it is going on all the time —

¹³⁵ Lewis, "The Question of Orientalism," 12.

¹³⁶ Lewis, "The Question of Orientalism," 13.

*not a criticism of Orientalism, which would be meaningless, but a criticism of the research and results of individual scholars or schools of scholars. The most rigorous and penetrating critique of Orientalist scholarship has always been and will remain that of the Orientalists themselves.*¹³⁷

By simultaneously acknowledging the validity of Orientalist scholarship while disregarding *Orientalism* as its critique, Lewis effectively rejects Said within the academic community and its hermeneutic, “empirical” interpretation.

Unfortunately for Lewis, Said had an enormous impact on academic scholarship. Since the publication of *Orientalism*, postcolonialism as a theory has been used in multiple disciplines, such as history, international relations, even literature, while some universities specifically developed a Postcolonial Studies discipline. Although Said passed away in 2003 from leukemia, many scholars remember his contribution to academia.¹³⁸ Despite the fact that Said may remain a controversial figure in some circles, he is widely accepted today within the academic community as a pillar of postcolonial thought. This indicates that the university, as an institution of and for society, alongside history and its other disciplines gradually accepted and claimed postcolonial theory within their subject matter. In other words, it can be said that history adapted to include his Eurocentric criticism and historical analysis of Orientalism as a discourse of power in the world.

Review: Homi K. Bhabha & Phillip Howell

Homi K. Bhabha and his theoretical approach of mimicry and hybridity has, since the publication of *The Location of Culture*, often been used within postcolonial scholarship, examining the impact of colonial soft power dynamics on subjugated peoples. Today, critics accept his work – at least in the sense of recognising its academic value and engaging with Bhabha’s thoughts – gaining increasing legitimacy for himself and the postcolonial field throughout his scholarly career.¹³⁹ Bhabha’s academic journey began with *Subaltern Studies*. Although theorising about

¹³⁷ Lewis, “The Question of Orientalism,” 18. Emphasis added.

¹³⁸ As Catherine Hall writes in an Obituary: “In April 2003 I was honoured to be invited to speak at a one-day conference at Columbia University, New York, organized to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the publication of Edward Said’s path-breaking book, *Orientalism*. It was a very special occasion. A number of scholars spoke about the significance of the book in their different disciplines and from their different locations. People in comparative literature, anthropology, critical theory, history, Middle Eastern Studies, from the US, Britain and the Middle East all spoke of the lasting significance of the book in their areas of work.” Catherine Hall, “Remembering Edward Said (1935-2003),” *History Workshop Journal* 57 (2004): 235.

¹³⁹ As Frank Schulze-Engler, Pavan Kumar Malreddy, and John Njenga Karugia explain in the introduction of their interview with Bhabha: “In postcolonial studies and beyond, Homi Bhabha has been a household name for many

the effects of colonialism on the enunciation of culture, Bhabha's theoretical context is considerably different to that of Said. Contrary to the latter, Bhabha's academic work was not vocally focused nor involved in protesting American foreign policy in the Middle East. He and his theories thus remained less controversial, dealing with what could be conceptualised as a past event: the colonisation of India. Perhaps it also helped that his postcolonial theory was and continues to be challenging to grasp. As Philip Howell writes in his review of *The Location of Culture*: "...in a curious way Bhabha's postcolonial intellectual project appears rather appropriately to take on the characteristics of the colonial texts he analyses - that is to say both being ambivalent, uncertain, provisional, unstable, and above all dislocated."¹⁴⁰ By specifically alluding to colonial texts, Howell demonstrates the presence of an illusory temporal reality between colonialism, neo-colonialism, and contemporary imperialism. That is to say, the fact that Bhabha's postcolonial criticism theorised colonialism in the context of India and was not evidently interpreted as questioning neo-colonial interests of today, consequently distancing his study and theories from contemporary politics that seek to maintain the division of power established through the 500-year-old world-system. This could explain why critics engage with Bhabha – as a less controversial figure, his ideas are more politically “safe” to consider and debate.

Howell's 1996 review will be analysed herein, so as to ascertain how Bhabha's theoretical input was accepted – although debated – within history and academia in general. He begins his review by presenting an ambiguous position with regards to accepting Bhabha's work.

In a review of his early essays, Robert Young rightly noted that Homi Bhabha's work is difficult to place, discomfiting, disorienting, perhaps even directionless in the sense of lacking a specific addressee. *The location of culture* (a collection of several reprinted and essays alongside a number of new pieces) will do little, I suspect, to counter this general assessment. This is not entirely, or perhaps even largely, meant as criticism...¹⁴¹

years. Countless scholars have worked (or struggled) with key concepts in postcolonial theory such as hybridity, liminality, Third Space, nationalist pedagogy, and vernacular cosmopolitanism that Homi Bhabha has defined in new and challenging ways in his flagship publications.” Frank Schulze-Engler, Pavan Kumar Malreddy, and John Njenga Karugia, ““Even the dead have human rights”: A conversation with Homi K. Bhabha,” interview by Frank Schulze-Engler, Pavan Kumar Malreddy, and John Njenga Karugia, *Journal of Postcolonial Writing* 54, 5 (2018): 702.

¹⁴⁰ Philip Howell, “The location of culture. By K. Homi Bhabha. London: Routledge. 1994. xiii + 285 pp. £11.99 paper. ISBN 0 415 05406 0,” review of *The Location of Culture*, by Homi K. Bhabha, *Ecumene* 3, 1 (1996): 113.

¹⁴¹ Howell, “The location of culture,” 113.

It is precisely this ambiguity, encompassed by the realm of the theoretical, that enables Howell to consider Bhabha in the safety of temporal distance seeing as he does not consider this temporal distancing negatively. His criticism may therefore appear less vehement than Lewis' of Said. But the foundation of Howell's concerns are the same as Lewis', stemming from a hermeneutic interpretation that is grounded in rationality and pillars of scientific empiricism.

Howell's understanding of *The Location of Culture* resides in his measurement of Bhabha's academic theory, the latter's adherence to historical standards, his evidence, and the work's proper classification within the production of knowledge. For example, Howell intersects Euro-Western academic classifications of disciplines with historical standards by alluding to Bhabha's "slips" between linguistic theory and social analysis.¹⁴² By expressing this "slippage" as lack of consistency leading to a difficulty in understanding Bhabha's argument, Howell is allowed to question the validity of Bhabha's conclusion with regards to postcolonial agency.

...Bhabha once more draws parallels between colonial and enunciative conditions that remain a matter of assertion rather than demonstration. Here, he is just as blithely idealistic about the norms of communication and the possibility of an emancipatory politics as is, say, Jurgen Habermas. Nowhere is this faith convincingly justified."¹⁴³

Howell herein demonstrates Bhabha's lack of theoretical support for his own conclusions. In other words, Howell reveals how by being "difficult to place" – i.e. un-classifiable – *The Location of Culture*, despite its theoretical insights, falls short of academic measure of history. This in turn places Bhabha outside the realm of rationalism, enabling Howell to describe him as "blithely idealistic about the norms of communication and the possibility of an emancipatory politics". So, despite the fact that *The Location of Culture* is understood within the realm of theory, Bhabha's theoretical logic obtained through hermeneutical interpretation fails to measure completely to Howell's own understanding of academic thought. He goes on to write:

If Bhabha's methodology is relatively untroublesome, however, there are related reservations which are ultimately more damaging. These become clearer, I think, if we trace the development of his work, which neither begins nor ends, of course, with the spatially resonant analysis of hybridity and ambivalence.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴² As Howell writes on page 116: "It is still far from clear, however, whether Bhabha is able even now to avoid the criticism that he slips unconvincingly between linguistic theory and social analysis." Howell, "The location of culture," 113.

¹⁴³ Howell, "The location of culture," 116-117.

¹⁴⁴ Howell, "The location of culture," 115.

This passage is important, for it reveals how tautological Howell's own criticism becomes: first stating that Bhabha's work as being ambivalent is "not entirely, or even perhaps even largely, meant as a criticism" to then classify the very essence of the book as "more damaging." This seemingly contradictory attitude is demonstrative of Eurocentric tropes of universalism and exceptionalism. By not completely disregarding Bhabha's work but actually engaging with it through his criticisms, Howell's review is demonstrative of how the academic peer-review process reflects international discourses of power through tropes of Eurocentrism— universalism being embodied by his general acceptance of the work, while exceptionalism peaks through with its hermeneutical interpretation based in empirical ideology. Howell continues:

Here, for instance, lies the nagging problem noted by Robert Young: is such hybridization and ambivalence essentially spatial, that is, part of the process of translation from metropole to colony, or is it rather located at the point of enunciation, part of the psychic economy of the colonial power? I suppose we might thus ask: is Bhabha's work a theory of location or of locution? *How far is he justified in hybridizing the theory of enunciation and the theory of emancipation?*¹⁴⁵

Howell's questions illustrate the cyclical nature of Eurocentrism and processes of (neo)colonialism, the power through which the Euro-Western world maintains its position as the core, dictating the rules of classification, standardisation, and the measure of quality with regards to Bhabha's theoretical interpretations of cultural enunciation within the context of colonial emancipation. Where does enunciation begin – where does emancipation begin? By questioning Bhabha's reasoning *and* judgement, Howell places his own reasoning superior to Bhabha's in its interpretation due to its ascribed empiricism within historical hermeneutical analysis. Put simply, Howell's review demonstrates how empiricism within history and the university is tied to Eurocentrism and mechanisms of power established by the 500-year-old world-system, being present within the peer-review process and, consequently, the production of knowledge within academia.

The review finishes with Howell determining that for all of its theoretical innovation, *The Location of Culture* is not historically substantive in its argument, meaning its reasoning is judged as being inadequate by its apparent inability to be applied solely within the study of history.¹⁴⁶ This is interesting, for while the ambivalence of the work creates an illusory temporal

¹⁴⁵ Howell, "The location of culture," 115-116. Emphasis added.

¹⁴⁶ Howell, "The location of culture," 117.

distance, the theoretical reasoning cancels this illusion by confronting the binary contradictions of Euro-Western historical narrative through the fluidity of expression of time, culture, and being. Thus, by disavowing the historical use of *The Location of Culture*, Howell effectively places Bhabha within the realm of irrationality, governed by bias and emotions, or what he writes – disdain:

What is more, Bhabha, in privileging his theories of enunciation, is driven to disparage what he sees as a western paradigm of 'historical' narrative. This is doubly unfortunate considering his new-found emphasis on temporality, for he is unable and unwilling to use historical argument in a substantive as opposed to simply a suggestive manner. This disdain - in which Bhabha is hardly alone - leaves his theoretical interventions largely sterile and disappointing, and as a result, for all his conceptual sophistication, he remains curiously untidy at times, especially at the margins of his own text.¹⁴⁷

Because he is seen as challenging what Howell terms the “western paradigm of ‘historical’ narrative”, the value, quality, and reasoning of Bhabha’s work is questioned. This does not mean that the work is entirely rejected – rather, it demonstrates how not all theories have the same epistemological value within academic conceptions of history. In this sense, theory – by being a key ontological practice to understand the past – is hierarchised through Eurocentric empiricism within the production of historical knowledge, and, consequently, the 500-year-old world-system.

Review: Dipesh Chakrabarty & Carola Dietze

Also a *Subaltern Studies* scholar, Dipesh Chakrabarty became actively involved in postcolonialism and its establishment within academia. As is described on his *University of Chicago* profile: “He is a founding member of the editorial collective of *Subaltern Studies*, a consulting editor of *Critical Inquiry*, a founding editor of *Postcolonial Studies* and has served on the editorial boards of the *American Historical Review* and *Public Culture*.”¹⁴⁸ His work, *Provincializing Europe*, gained international attention and provided more insights into the plausibility of multiple historical narratives and expressions within academic history.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁷ Howell, “The location of culture,” 117.

¹⁴⁸ “Dipesh Chakrabarty,” The Department of History, University of Chicago, accessed November 3, 2021, <https://history-uchicago-edu.eur.idm.oclc.org/directory/dipesh-chakrabarty>.

¹⁴⁹ As Pandey writes on page 504: “This is less a book about history in its traditional sense than a contribution to the philosophy of history – an intervention in the debate on how histories might today be written. It takes the form of a sustained reflection of history writing even as it seeks to recover the histories in this instance – of a set of colonized peoples and practices.” Gyanendra Pandey, “Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference. By Dipesh Chakrabarty. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. Pp. xii + 301. \$16.95 (paper),”

In this sense, *Provincializing Europe* marked academic history through its example of original narrative and multilateral approach to Bengali history. Through this publication, Chakrabarty not only helped legitimise postcolonialism but also Subaltern Studies in its discursive approach to an internationally oriented audience. Jon E. Wilson, for example, a professor at King's College London, despite having some reservations about early Subaltern Studies' scholars, says:

...so-called 'late Subaltern Studies' has been relatively successful at using a discursive approach to examine particular instances of nineteenth and twentieth-century South Asian social practice. Dipesh Chakrabarty's book is an excellent example of this. Chakrabarty offers a sensitive treatment of heterogenous Indian 'life-worlds'. His prose resists the hegemony of grand narratives, whether they are of capitalism, modernization or liberalization.¹⁵⁰

This reveals that by the 2000s, postcolonialism and Subaltern Studies had garnered enough international attention and were noticeably internationally present to be legitimately recognised within Euro-Western academic historical tradition. This evolution from Said as a controversial academic figure, to the historical disregard and simultaneous tolerance of Bhabha's theory, to Chakrabarty being legitimately considered on the international stage demonstrates how academic history slowly accepted, albeit with difficulty, postcolonial thoughts and criticisms. In this sense, the attention *Provincializing Europe* fostered reflects the legitimacy of postcolonialism as an academic field and theory.

This is not to say that there were no criticisms of *Provincializing Europe*. Wilson himself admitted that: "In some ways - and in some places - Chakrabarty's book is one of the most thought-provoking attempts to adopt a post-structuralist, discursive approach to writing South Asian history. But its shortcomings lie in the fact that it does not take the discursive turn far enough."¹⁵¹ In other words, by the early 2000s, Euro-Western historical epistemology not only accepted postcolonialism but also used it as the main source of criticism for Eurocentrism within academic history.

Provincializing Europe challenged Eurocentrism through Chakrabarty's opposition to using historical narratives based in modernity that are, consequently, innately unilinear and deterministic and are applied universally unquestionably. In a word, he criticizes historicism as a

review of *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, by Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Journal of World History* 13, 2 (2002): 504.

¹⁵⁰ Jon E. Wilson, "Taking Europe for Granted," review of *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, by Dipesh Chakrabarty, *History Workshop Journal* 52 (2001): 288.

¹⁵¹ Wilson, "Taking Europe for Granted," 288.

philosophy of universal, and consequently often-times Eurocentric, historical thought. Chakrabarty's criticisms of Eurocentrism through his objections to historicism, embodied within his project of provincialising Europe as a modern core in global historical thought and consciousness, are included within the global, (Euro-Western) historical tradition. As Carola Dietze writes:

The parallels between this founding idea of the discipline of history and *Provincializing Europe* and the intentions shared by Herder and Chakrabarty in their works are obvious: both have great respect for the ideas of the European Enlightenment and its values, but at the same time both recognize cultural differences and criticize the idea that the histories of peoples all over the world can be adequately described and measured according to a set of European norms. This is why a critique of the grand narratives of the European Enlightenment is central to both of them, and why they conceive of history-writing mainly as an empirical task.¹⁵²

In other words, we can see how academia, and historical academic epistemology more specifically, has merged with postcolonial criticism in its attempt to address inequalities and injustices that were caused by colonialism and imperialism. That is not to say, however, that postcolonialism or *Provincializing Europe* are appropriated or completely integrated within Euro-Western academic historical epistemology. As we will see below, there is much work remaining to be done with regards to inter-epistemological communication and dialogue. But the fact that Chakrabarty is, in this instance, addressed in the same category as Herder, renowned philosopher in the Euro-Western world, is demonstrative of the fact that postcolonial scholarship, theory, and movement has become a recognisably important counter-discourse as well as a sub-epistemic field within the structure and institution of the university.

The question remains how postcolonialism exists within the university, and how it is itself continuing to endure criticism from Euro-Western historical traditions. The following will focus on Carola Dietze's response to Chakrabarty's work, entitled "Toward a History on Equal Terms: A Discussion of "Provincializing Europe"," wherein she acknowledges the necessary changes needed to combat Eurocentrism within academic historical writing.¹⁵³ In particular, she agrees with Chakrabarty that the use of universal, grand meta-narratives which are unilinear and deterministic – in a word, "modern" – should not be unequivocally applied to other people's

¹⁵² Carola Dietze, "Toward a History on Equal Terms: A Discussion of "Provincializing Europe"," *History and Theory* 47, 1 (2008): 75.

¹⁵³ Carola Dietze, "Toward a History on Equal Terms: A Discussion of "Provincializing Europe"," *History and Theory* 47, 1 (2008): 69-85.

history and then measured, compared, even judged according to Euro-Western standards and ideals. But she challenges the premise of Chakrabarty's idea of "provincialising Europe" – that is, his conceptualisation of historicism as a universal philosophy – through her own project for creating a "history on equal terms."

First, she compares Chakrabarty's conceptualisation of historicism to her own Euro-Germanic understanding of the term, differentiating between *Historismus* and Historicism. The former is engulfed by modernity, defining historical events within unilinear, deterministic, and universal narratives of development. Historicism, however, is not the same as *historismus*. According to Dietze, Historicism can be described as a German philosophy about history that is tied to the idea that historical subjects of enquiry need to be understood within their contextual space in time. It is not in itself a meta-narrative like *historismus*.¹⁵⁴ Neither Historicism nor *historismus* equate to being the discipline of history. Instead, they are two different approaches to studying and understanding the past. Both, however, continue to permeate the Euro-Western academic historical tradition. This distinction enables Dietze to see *Provincializing Europe* not as a critique of history itself, but as a radical historicist (in the second meaning of the word) approach to Eurocentric meta-narratives. In other words, according to Dietze, Chakrabarty is applying a radical historicist approach to critique the permeation of *historismus* within the academic historical tradition. What is important to note herein is the existence of an inter-epistemological dialogue happening between Chakrabarty and Dietze, the latter relating her own historical epistemology to his.

However, Dietze's Historicism also comprises empiricism as a founding ideology. In it of itself, empiricism does not hold a Manichean value – but it is ascribed as an inescapable necessity to conduct proper, correct, and thus "good" historical scholarship. That is why Dietze propose a history on equal terms rather than endorsing the project of provincializing Europe.¹⁵⁵ This poses problems with regards to inter-epistemological dialogue as it entrenches components of rational realism within the use of empiricism in the academic historical tradition. By understanding Historicism differently through an empirical ideological framework, Dietze's

¹⁵⁴ Dietze, "Toward a History on Equal Terms," 73-75.

¹⁵⁵ As Dietze explains on page 73: "Research done within the framework of "political modernity" is hardly able to incorporate the qualities he [Chakrabarty] demands because of its teleology, its binary code, and its condescension toward "modernity's" inherent opposite. Chakrabarty therefore proposes a history of the subaltern and calls for the deconstruction of historicism, which he equates with the discipline of history." Dietze, "Toward a History on Equal Terms," 78.

project of creating a “history on equal terms” becomes incompatible with Chakrabarty’s idea of “provincialising Europe.” Her focus on the empirical value of Historicism, in the sense of rationally and properly contextualising events, results in Dietze imposing a rational realist idea on *Provincializing Europe*. “...we need to differentiate clearly between theoretical texts and everyday life, comparing empirics with empirics and relating metanarratives with other metanarratives.”¹⁵⁶ Simply put, Dietze’s project of creating a “history on equal terms” rests within empirical methodology – for it is only through empirical evidence that biased meta-narratives of *historismus* may be countered. “History on equal terms” is fundamentally different to “provincialising Europe” through its empirical historicizing of modernity which implies placing, understanding, and conceptualising modernity in its contextual place in time. In this way, not only do multiple modernities exist, but various “life-worlds” are represented in history.¹⁵⁷ Dietze clarifies:

A “History on Equal Terms” interested in this way in a precise description of historical actors and their specific back grounds will therefore preferably operate on the micro- and the meso-level. Such empirical research on specific questions reintegrates Western and non European history on an equal basis.¹⁵⁸

This empiricism is indicative of Dietze’s wish to adhere to rational, unbiased history in order to ensure the equality of histories within academic historical consciousness, but by doing so she inadvertently entrenches Eurocentrism. Her reference to “Western” and “non European” history betrays this fact – the Eurocentric discourses comparing, just as her empiricism, other histories in reference to the Euro-Western world. Despite attempting to entice non-Eurocentric empirical research, Dietze reveals how intricately interconnected empiricism, as a mode of thinking which emerged within the 500-year-old world-system, is to Eurocentric discourses of power within the global order.

Dietze further reinforces this herself when she suggests, at the end of her response, that empiricism is crucial within historical judgment. “A “History on Equal Terms” needs a clear concept of human dignity, which gives historians a position from which to judge ideologies and

¹⁵⁶ Dietze, “Toward a History on Equal Terms,” 77.

¹⁵⁷ As Dietze writes on page 78: “Furthermore, we should deconstruct the concept of modernity. While the plurality of modernities has to be established from the margins, the deconstructionist work needs to begin at the center: mainly nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophy and social science in Europe and the United States. Thus, instead of deconstructing the discipline of history, we need to historicize “modernity” and thereby make room for the plurality of life-worlds.” Dietze, “Toward a History on Equal Terms,” 78.

¹⁵⁸ Dietze, “Toward a History on Equal Terms,” 81.

political systems like National Socialism and the Third Reich.”¹⁵⁹ In other words, historians should have clear, concise, proper judgement when conclusions are derived from empirical evidence. This not only reveals how empiricism continues to permeate Eurocentrism within historical academic epistemology, but also how it actually is a form of rational realism within academic measurement, standardisation, evidence, and classification of historical hermeneutical interpretation – the historian’s judgement entrenched within discourses of power of the 500-year-old world-system.

Dietze’s response to Chakrabarty, as an academic dialogue, reveals how difficult inter-epistemological interaction is within the realm of Eurocentrism. By referring Chakrabarty and his idea of provincializing Europe to the Euro-Western (Germanic) context, Dietze is effectively attempting to have an inter-epistemological conversation – of creating a history on equal terms. However, due to the mechanisms of power of Eurocentrism, whose legacy rests in (re)centering the Euro-Western world within the 500-year-old world-system, her inter-epistemological dialogue quickly turns into a Eurocentric reinforcement of global dynamics. Consequently, Dietze’s response demonstrates how the continued criticism and skepticism of postcolonialism – despite being accepted within academia and history as a sub-epistemic field that is used to counter Eurocentric narratives – continues to endure through history’s adherence to ideological empiricism within its academic measurement, standardisation, evidence, and classification of postcolonial hermeneutical interpretation. Thus, history, the university, and academia – having eventually accepted and utilised postcolonialism as a means to counter Eurocentric narratives – remains entrenched within the 500-year-old world system through their adherence to ideological empiricism manifested as rational realism within hermeneutical interpretation of the humanities.

History & Decolonialism:

Despite emerging from postcolonialism, decolonialism navigated its own distinctive path within the university. As was demonstrated in the previous chapter, decolonial scholarship took a pivotal role within the context of the Americas (specifically Latin America) and its on-going colonial context. It is therefore not only a form of scholarship activism that seeks to – like postcolonialism – mitigate against Eurocentrism, but also focuses on advocating for inter(-)national liberation and decolonisation. This following section will be organised chronologically

¹⁵⁹ Dietze, “Toward a History on Equal Terms,” 83.

and thematically, seeking to understand how decolonialism, a theory that emerged from a specific geo-spatial-political context, was criticized within academic history and the nature of its existence within the field.

Review: Frantz Fanon, W. A. E. Skurnik, & Robyn Dane

Frantz Fanon's publications were the source of controversy. Many today still have difficulty accepting his views on violence with regards to colonial liberation and movements for independence.¹⁶⁰ Nonetheless, he is continuously understood as a pillar of *postcolonial* thought – a detail we will address later on – and a militant activist for colonial liberation. His work is often cited as being unavoidable and crucially relevant due to its unparalleled analysis on the psychology of racism.¹⁶¹ This ambiguous relationship between Fanon's (activist) work and the academic interest it garnered is telling, for it demonstrates how his scholarship was not always readily accepted or used in academic interpretations.

In fact, Fanon's 1967 reviewer, W. A. E. Skurnik, a scholar specialising in Sub-Saharan international policy, was blatantly open about his disapproval of Fanon, going to the extent of stating: "Addressing himself to the false and pernicious self-image which black men have adopted from whites, the author [Fanon] deftly dissects - and discards - linguistic, sexual and psychological aspects of that image as a result of which the Negro tends to despise himself."¹⁶² It is not difficult to see the racism placed within this review. Not only is Skurnik omitting to debate Fanon's sources and comparatively examine them to academic expectations, but he is also neglecting to consider *Black Skin, White Masks* within academic standardisation practices and measurement. By reducing Fanon to his Black identity, rather than a professional psychiatrist,

¹⁶⁰ Adam Schatz, "The Doctor Prescribed Violence," *New York Times*, published on Sept. 2, 2001, <https://www-nytimes-com.eur.idm.oclc.org/2001/09/02/books/the-doctor-prescribed-violence.html>.

¹⁶¹ As Dennis Dworkin writes in a review of Isaac Julien's biographical movie of Fanon: "Since his death from leukemia in 1961, Frantz Fanon—the author of *Black Skin, White Mask* (1952) and *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961)—has emerged as one of the most influential thinkers of the postcolonial world. As a prophet of Third World liberation, Fanon was embraced by colonial liberation struggles and the international student movement of the 1960s and 1970s. He was an original thinker on the psychological dimension of racism and the relationship between colonized and colonizer, and his work has given rise to a substantial and growing scholarly literature in a number of disciplines. Although it would be perhaps an exaggeration to say that there is currently a resurgence of interest in Fanon (as a recently edited collection of Fanon studies makes clear, interest in him has never really waned), it is probably true that scholarly engagement with his work has intensified and broadened." Dennis Dworkin, "FRANTZ FANON: BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASK. Produced by Mark Nash for the Arts Council of England; directed by Isaac Julien; written by Isaac Julien and Mark Nash. 1995; color and black and white; 50 minutes. UK. Distributor: California Newsreel." *American Historical Review* Feb (2000): 327.

¹⁶² W. A. E. Skurnik, "BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASKS. By Frantz Fanon. (New York: Grove Press, 1967. 232 pages, \$5.00.)," review of *Black Skin, White Masks*, by Frantz Fanon, *Current History* 54, 318 (1968): 103.

Skurnik allows himself to understand *Black Skin, White Masks* as a non-academic work – that is, he permits himself to not view the work according to academic empirical hermeneutical interpretation. This is further antagonised by the length of the review, which is comprised only of one paragraph in a double-column page, and is shared with three other reviews about works on Asia and Africa. This ultimately emphasises the illegitimacy of Fanon’s academic thought and his ability for academic “reason” – in a word: empiricism.

Today, the university, and academia in general, is no longer tolerant of racism or racist attitudes. This is important to consider within Fanon’s increasing popularity – Euro-Western academic epistemology recognising racial injustices and seeking to remedy its colonial legacy.¹⁶³ But the fact that Fanon is still recognised as a *postcolonial* scholar instead of a *decolonial* scholar showcases the extent to which Euro-Western academic epistemology has accepted decolonialism *only within* the framework of postcolonialism. This is problematic: by referencing Fanon’s work as postcolonial rather than decolonial, academia, and history more specifically, creates a temporal and spatial distance between itself and the continuing legacy of (neo)colonialism – the prefix “post” in postcolonialism implying a passed colonial reality which decolonialism not only rejects but also actively mitigates against.

Robyn Dane’s critical reflection of Fanon’s works provides insight into why this may be the case. His work will be analysed herein since no review other than Skurnik’s was found in English at the time of *Black Skin, White Masks*’ publication. Published in 1995, “When Mirror Turns Lamp: Frantz Fanon as Cultural Visionary,” Dane reflects on the relevance of Fanon and the ways in which Euro-Western academic hermeneutical interpretation can properly grasp and express his controversial figure.¹⁶⁴ He goes on to explain how Fanon creates a discomfort, forcing individuals to come face to face with the colonial past and its racial presence.¹⁶⁵ In relation to academic empirical measurement, standardisation, evidence, and classification, Fanon’s intention hardly aligns with academic historical empiricism within hermeneutical interpretation. This can, as demonstrated with Skurnik, explain Fanon’s temporal and spatial placement in the past – that is, as a primitive black man to a recognised *postcolonial* scholar –

¹⁶³ See Dworkin, “FRANTZ FANON,”.

¹⁶⁴ Robyn Dane, “When Mirror Turns Lamp: Frantz Fanon as Cultural Visionary,” *Africa Today* 41, 2 (1994): 70-91.

¹⁶⁵ As Dane cites on page 72: “...he was after nothing less than a visceral union with his readers. When asked to clarify a phrase in *Masks*, Fanon replied to interviewer Francois Jeanson that he could not “explain the phrase more fully. I try, when I write such things, to touch the nerves of my reader. That’s to say irrationally, almost sensually”.

Dane, “When Mirror Turns Lamp,” 72.

for it would enable comfort with (neo)colonialism through this illusionary temporal space. Dane continues:

More than anything else he writes, here lies exposed colonialism's ugly detritus. Fanon is liberating today, edifying today, because the offspring, the processes, of those systems still thrive. *Fanon is saying something the dominant world doesn't want to hear. Imperialism is immoral.* As a psychological medium, it forces flash point pathology. It has evil consequences. He proves this imposing truth in *Masks*.¹⁶⁶

Avoidance through ignorance is therefore used as a coping mechanism to maintain Eurocentrism within the global order and ensure the continuation of capitalism through the 500-year-old world-system. Indeed, if empiricism relies on rational, unbiased observations to consider and discover the truth, then a lack of observation – an avoidance to look and see – keeps the truth about Eurocentrism, the construction of race, and the distribution of wealth and power within the international system obscure. It insidiously keeps Fanon's work, and the field of decolonialism more generally speaking, outside of the "Enlightenment", the truth, and retains it outside the (Eurocentric) core.

Recognising this reality, Dane chooses to frame Fanon as a cultural visionary, implying through the term the latter's ability to see, to observe, to rationalise, to be. This also places Fanon, however, within Euro-Western epistemology and tries to translate his work within the Euro-Western way of being. More specifically, it places him within the realm of the Enlightenment.

*It is more instructive and internally consistent to view Fanon as a cultural visionary, one of those vexing thinkers for whom we have no label, a philosopher of language, a poetic epistemologist, that person who points to the symbolic, drags us to the event, because we have lost sight of something very precious – usually our humanity. ... Fanon's chief and lasting contribution is correcting normative reality so it more closely approximates the truth; it is, at core, epistemological and challenges basic meaning-making.*¹⁶⁷

By stating that Fanon corrects "normative reality" so that it "approximates the truth," Dane shows how inter-epistemological dialogue is possible within historical academic knowledge production. That is to say, in relation to empirical hermeneutical historical interpretation, "we have lost sight of something very precious – usually our humanity" implies that Fanon is rational, a figure of the present and future, actively mitigating against Eurocentrism,

¹⁶⁶ Dane, "When Mirror Turns Lamp," 76.

¹⁶⁷ Dane, "When Mirror Turns Lamp," 74-75. Emphasis added.

(neo)colonialism, and the current division of power within the international system. Fanon's controversy therefore lies between the (political) relevance of his work in the present-day and his departure as a person of the past.

Nonetheless, the avoidance of seeing problems or issues within society because they contradict the current discourses of power maintaining the hierarchy of the global order is still reflected within the university and international relations. It is, regrettably, easier to ignore something and pretend it is not there than to address and remedy the problem. As Immanuel Wallerstein himself recounts Fanon saying:

I was able to visit him in hospital in Washington, where we discussed the nascent Black Power movement in the United States with which he was fascinated. He exploded with anger about US policies in the world. He said 'Americans are not engaged in dialogue; they still speak monologues'.¹⁶⁸

Considering the current global order is known as the American Liberal Order, this statement entails the necessity for the Euro-Western world to acknowledge, accept, and remedy the lack of an epistemological dialogue within the university, academia, and history due to avoidance and its adherence to empiricism as an ideology of rational realism within hermeneutic interpretation. This is even more so necessary when taking into consideration the context of hyper-globalisation in which we live in today.

Remaining a controversial figure, Fanon's journey within academia has been marked by discourses of power within the framework of accepting postcolonialism as a legitimate hermeneutical interpretation. As Roland Littlewood writes upon reflecting Fanon's influence:

What is the relevance of Fanon today? Europe's empires have apparently fallen but in our globalised (a.k.a. neoliberal) world, domination and power have hardly shifted their focus: the colonised are now more likely to be located in the metropole as well as in the global marketplace, while they still seek their identity through simulacra of the oppressors; as we, the beneficiaries, pursue our phantasmal desires at their expense. I particularly respond to his comments on the French colonial attempt to divest Algerian women of the haik (veil): yes, said Fanon, but not yet, and not at the bequest of the European – but by themselves, in their own time, and at their own wish.¹⁶⁹

By referencing European empires in reference to the neoliberal, globalised world, Littlewood reveals how classifying Fanon as a postcolonial instead of a decolonial scholar enables Euro-

¹⁶⁸ Immanuel Wallerstein, "Reading Fanon in the 21st Century," *New Left Review* 57 (2009): 118.

¹⁶⁹ Roland Littlewood, "Reflection: Frantz Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks*," *The British Journal of Psychiatry* 203 (2013): 187.

Western epistemology, through historical understanding, to create a temporal space between (neo)colonialism, the construction of race, and its connection to power within the 500-year-old world-system, thereby effectively avoiding to address contemporary global issues and continuing to see Fanon as controversial.

Review: Enrique Dussel, Bernard Mergen & Latin American Postcolonial School

Like Fanon, when *The Invention of the Americas* was first translated into English in 1995, the review was scathing and short. Bernard Mergen, an American Studies Professor writes:

Dussel's points, in a nutshell, are that Eurocentrism is bad, that the native peoples of the Americas are the descendants of "Australoid, Tasmanian, Melanesian, Protoindonesian, Mongoloid, and even Malayan-Polynesian races," and that native people throughout the world have been denied humanity in the name of modernism. This book is a curious blend of critical theory and science-fiction.¹⁷⁰

Reserving only the opening paragraph of his three-page multiple-review to *The Invention of the Americas*, Mergen reveals quantitatively and qualitatively how Dussel is effectively placed, like Fanon, outside the realm of rationalism. Reducing the book to a “curious blend of critical theory and science-fiction” demonstrates Mergen’s disregard for Dussel’s evidence, his reasoning, and his empirical hermeneutical interpretation. Despite citing him, Mergen does not mention Dussel’s sources, nor elaborate on how the latter got to his conclusion. This marks a stark difference between criticisms of postcolonialism and those of decolonialism – demonstrating how decolonial scholars faced different obstacles to academic acceptance. By simply rejecting Dussel’s conclusion instead of debating his evidence and his hermeneutic interpretation, Mergen illustrates how Dussel’s work is inadequate to measure, standardise, use as evidence, and classify as academic history. The citation above is the only opinion Mergen mentioned on *The Invention of the Americas*, which further demonstrates the importance of “empirical” observation within historical hermeneutic interpretation and epistemology. Thus, traditional academic history, as a discipline of the humanities, is regarded through a lens of rational realism steeped within empirical observations that must be supported and properly interpreted from valid historical sources. With this review, Mergen allows himself to accept Dussel’s conclusions as

¹⁷⁰ Bernard Mergen, “Review,” review of *The Invention of the Americas: Eclipse of "the Other" and the Myth of Modernity* by Enrique Dussel; *American Literature for Non-American Readers* by Meta Grosman; *American Studies in Germany: European Contexts and Intercultural Relations* by Gunter H. Lenz and Klaus J. Milich; *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History* by Michel-Rolph Trouillot, *American Studies International* 34, 1 (1996): 73.

(scientifically) untrue and, in a word, made-up. Although it is important to note that Mergen does not, as Skurnik did, directly racially reduce Dussel, his interpretation of *The Invention of the Americas* does devalue the academic legitimacy of the work by placing him in the same realm as Skurnik did with Fanon: beyond the scope of the truth.

This being said, Dussel is well renowned within Latin American Postcolonial Scholarship.¹⁷¹ Considering that there is no other specific review of *The Invention of the Americas* in English, Dussel's connection to the wider Latin American Postcolonial School will be analysed herein. Again, it is interesting to note the use of the term postcolonial instead of decolonial, thereby establishing an illusory temporal space between the militancy of decolonial scholarship against on-going processes of (neo)colonialism – that is, against political power dynamics with(in) Latin America and the global order. Nevertheless, the Latin American School recognises Dussel as a foundational pillar.¹⁷² This is telling, for it indicates that Latin American decolonial scholarship, albeit framed as postcolonial, is established within Latin America. As Dussel's peer, Walter D. Mignolo emphasises, there is a presence of an academic tradition within Latin America. But he stresses the fracturing of this knowledge within the Latin American universities and academia more generally.¹⁷³ Mignolo, like Dussel and other Latin American decolonial scholars, seek to establish a Latin American historical and sociological philosophy – but this in turn is fractured by nations and their universities. For example, the fact that Dussel “is known but is known as the Dussel of the 1970s,” – that is, when he was still in Argentina – despite him being in Mexico since that time emphasises this fracturing of knowledge production

¹⁷¹ See for example: Mabel Moraña, Enrique Dussel, and Carlos A. Jáuregui, ed. *Coloniality at Large: Latin America and the Postcolonial Debate* (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2008).

¹⁷² As Burton writes on page 20: “In this article we introduce Dussel and explore the relevance of his work to psychology in general and especially the history and philosophy of psychology. In this context it can be noted that Dussel along with other writers within the specifically Latin American traditions of liberatory praxis (Flores, 2009: 21), has been an influence on the Latin American Social Psychology of Liberation (Burton & Kagan, 2005; Montero & Sonn, 21 2009).” Mark Burton, “Introducing Dussel: The Philosophy of Liberation and a Really Social Psychology,” *PINS* 41 (2011): 20.

¹⁷³ As Mignolo says in an interview: “I edited a book that will be published in Buenos Aires next month titled *Capitalism and the Geopolitics of Knowledge: Liberation Philosophy in the Contemporary Intellectual Debate*. It is interesting that the material I compiled in this book was, according to the editors, unknown in Argentina. And in the case of Dussel, he is known but is known as the Dussel of the 1970s not what he did since late seventies, when he moved to Mexico. Furthermore, Nepantla: Views from South (2.3) published a long article by Quijano where he summarizes what he has been writing on coloniality of power since 1990, and has also an article by Dussel, an article by Santiago-Castro Gómez (from Universidad Javeriana) and another by Edgardo Lander, sociologist from Caracas, Universidad Central. All in all, I am also working on disseminating a certain type of critical thought, in Latin America, that is crucial for my own work.” L. Elena Delgado, Rolando J. Romero, and Walter Mignolo, “Local Histories and Global Designs: An Interview with Walter Mignolo,” interview by Discourse, *Wayne State University Press* 22, 3 (2000): 24.

and dissemination.¹⁷⁴ Although this may also be the case in Europe, its presence in the periphery cannot be ignored within our analysis and its function within the 500-year-old world-system. Indeed, this fracturing – whether it is revealed by the niche of the Latin American School within international knowledge production or the fracturing of knowledge within nations in Latin America – indicates the power of Eurocentrism in maintaining the Euro-Western world’s position as the core. In other words, by fracturing knowledge in the periphery, Eurocentrism actively works against decolonial activism and its ability to reunite, amass, and stand-up together. It also therefore weakens the weight of decolonial academic scholarship, enabling the core to ignore (or avoid) the peripheral knowledge produced while simultaneously disregarding it within academic historical tradition and epistemology. As Burton further writes:

Only some of his work, which extends to some 40 books, is so far available in English. *Coming as he does from the periphery of the world system, and writing in Spanish rather than the usual languages of philosophy (German, French, English) we contend that his work has not received the attention it warrants.*¹⁷⁵

Put simply, language itself is a means of fracturing and an effective way through which to avoid, ignore, or simply disregard peripheral knowledge. English, as the common international language of the Euro-Western world, is therefore essential to the production and dissemination of knowledge in the core, and its valid legitimacy within academia internationally. Language is thus also demonstrative of the nuance in the acceptance of Dussel’s work within an international context: being rejected (if we take Mergen as the example) in the core, while being accepted within the Latin American School. Decolonialism thus has a nuanced existence that is representative of the distribution of power within the global order and the 500-year-old world-system.

Review: Aníbal Quijano and Latin American Decolonial Scholarship

Before delving into critical reviews of Quijano’s work, it is important to note the fact that his work, contrary to those of the other postcolonial and decolonial scholars herein analysed, was an article. There is therefore no specific critical review available for his work. However, there does exist responses – in the sense of other academics using his concept of “coloniality of power” within their own historical, sociological, cultural, and political enquiries. Scholars have used

¹⁷⁴ Mignolo, interview, 24.

¹⁷⁵ Mark Burton, “Introducing Dussel,” 22. Emphasis Added.

Quijano's concept within Latin American scholarship to produce more knowledge regarding the Latin American colonial context specifically.¹⁷⁶

Because of this, Quijano holds a certain legacy within the field, being recognised not only for the academic ingenuity of his work, but also his personal contributions as a Latin American scholar to the construction of knowledge in the field of Latin American scholarship. This was particularly noted in his eulogies. Nicolás Lynch, for example, writes:

He [Quijano] would indeed dedicate his life to finding out why the social and political processes which shape our society are the way they are, and to exploring the mechanisms for their transformation. The first aspect of his contribution is epistemological. Quijano provides an explanation “from the South” for social processes in the region. In doing so, he breaks away from the tradition/modernity dichotomy derived from functionalist sociology and makes a case for historical-structural heterogeneity as the main narrative. He sees a set of forms of production coexisting in Latin American societies, organized around capital as a phenomenon which is not only national but also transnational and, eventually, global.¹⁷⁷

In other words, this demonstrates how, as its own sub-epistemic school of thought, Latin American decolonialism measures the impact of the continuation of colonialism on Latin American peoples, which are then standardised within the context of the Global South, are supported by triangulated and interdisciplinary economic-historical evidence, and classified

¹⁷⁶ As Ana Cecilia Dinerstein begins: “Since the 1990s, Latin American movements have been prefiguring alternative politics and social relations with political imagination. Social movements led by women, indigenous people, the landless, the unemployed, rural workers, the marginalised and so on have become the protagonists of a sea of radical organising which is politically and socially oppressed, with some exceptions, by the governments of the region. One of the features of these new mobilisations is that they are undertaking a ‘decolonial turn’ (Maldonado-Torres 2011). This ‘turn’, writes Maldonado-Torres (2011), means a new ‘shift away from modernization towards decoloniality as an unfinished project that took place in the twentieth century and is still unfolding now’ (p. 2; see also Castro-Gómez and Grosfoguel 2007). They are doing so by exposing and contesting in writing and action, what Aníbal Quijano coined as the ‘coloniality of power’ (Quijano 2008) in the present post-colonial world. The process of independence in Latin America did not lead to a noticeable democratisation of the political on the bases on which coloniality could be dismantled, argues Quijano. It rather meant ‘a re-articulation of the coloniality of power over new bases’ (Quijano 2008: 214). The ‘coloniality of power’ is the practice that penetrates social, cultural, economic, political interactions and relations and exists between countries in the Global North and South, between countries in the North and South of Europe, and between people within European countries, all intertwined by class and gender discriminations. As they embrace the decolonial turn in a greater or lesser degree, today’s social mobilisation rejects Eurocentric critical theory and politics, for the latter is detached from real experiences and represent the coloniality of knowledge and power that subaltern subjects reject.” Ana Cecilia Dinerstein, “Coloniality of power and emancipation today – Luis Martínez Andrade *Religion without Redemption: Social Contradictions and Awakened Dreams in Latin America* (Decolonial Studies, Postcolonial Horizons), London; New York: Pluto Press, 2015; 176 pp.: ISBN 9780745335728, £27.99,” review of *Religion without Redemption: Social Contradictions and Awakened Dreams in Latin America*, by Luis Martínez Andrade. *Capital & Class* 43, 1 (2019): 173.

¹⁷⁷ Nicolás Lynch, “Aníbal Quijano: The Intellectual Par Excellence,” *Global Dialogue – Magazine of the International Sociological Association* 8, 3 (2018): 12.

within its own context of Latin American scholarship. Quijano's impact on the Latin American School not only emphasises its peripheral existence (as demonstrated with Dussel), but also its own epistemological and, consequently, methodological approach to the creation of knowledge.

All in all, Quijano's work illustrates how decolonialism, despite its activism against Eurocentrism, can function and exist within Eurocentric discourses of power and the 500-year-old world-system. For despite abiding by Eurocentric empiricism within the university – measurement, standardisation, evidence, and classification – this is effectively done within a Latin American way of being. Simply stating that Quijano and his supportive peers (and reviewers) are reproducing empirical academic historical epistemology would reduce and limit our understanding of the on-going colonialism happening in the Americas and its impact on their ways of being. As Quijano himself summarised nicely upon being conferred an honorary doctorate: “Live within and against... There is no other way to live in a world that brings together power, exploitation, and violence.”¹⁷⁸ It is therefore impossible for decolonialism to escape the impacts of Eurocentrism within academic history and the creation of knowledge. But this does not limit its ability to produce knowledge that is more reflective of the Latin American context and their way of being.

Therein lies the subversive truth of decolonialism: it exists both within and outside of Eurocentrism and global discourses of power. Adhering to traditional academic empiricism within hermeneutical interpretation while simultaneously denying rational realism enables Quijano to stay true to the plurality of the Latin American way of being. Quijano's work embodies the living contradictions present within the expressions of discourses of power within the peripheral world and how it is manifesting in Latin American identity. As Lynch continues to say:

His contribution on the issue of identity is based on the concept of race. In Quijano's view, this concept originates with the European colonization of what came to be called America, and becomes a central element in the classification of the social hierarchy prevailing in the region. Identity is built around race, and so is domination. Along with dependency, the concept of race was to be key in the construction of the coloniality of power. Quijano argues that the coloniality of power entails an external domination, of an empire over a colony or neocolony, but also an internal domination, of the ruling elite over the rest of the society – precisely due to a differential racial construction. Thus the coloniality of power becomes the main challenge for the formation of genuinely national

¹⁷⁸ Raquel Sosa Elizaga, “Aníbal Quijano: The Joy of the Warrior,” *Global Dialogue – Magazine of the International Sociological Association* 8, 3 (2018): 13.

and plurinational states in Latin America. As we can see here, Aníbal Quijano's theoretical creativity and his position within the tradition of autonomous social thought in the region have made him a landmark figure in the sociology of Peru and the wider continent.¹⁷⁹

Quijano's academic contribution to decolonialism was to theoreticise the reality and truth of the Latin American context, thereby asserting the plurality of its identities and ways of being. In this way, Quijano illustrated how history, the university, and academia, having evolved within (and as) a scientific institution within the 500-year-old world-system – a system wherein race and racialization were conceptualised and hierarchized – is bound to Eurocentrism and processes of (neo)colonialism through its approach to scientific discovery (i.e. empiricism) justifying the global division of power.

Today, decolonialism remains a political academic project of and in Latin America. The Euro-Western world, despite trying to come to terms with its (neo)colonial past, has not recognised nor utilised decolonial scholarship in the same way as it has postcolonialism. Although postcolonial critique is employed within historical scholarship to counter Eurocentric narratives, decolonial methodologies and its approaches are just beginning to appear.¹⁸⁰ However, this remains within the context of the Americas – Europe, and arguably the United States – are struggling to incorporate decolonial criticism within their epistemology.¹⁸¹ Although the idea of postcolonialism is only just beginning to be conceptualised as a long-term process, decolonialism remains “eclipsed” within Euro-Western history.¹⁸² By ignoring decolonialism's usefulness in the core, the Euro-Western world is effectively creating a temporal space between processes of (neo)colonialism, thus enabling the truth of the continuation of economic injustices and the disparity within the distribution of power within the global order to remain unseen, covered-over, and eclipsed.

¹⁷⁹ Nicolás Lynch, “Aníbal Quijano: The Intellectual Par Excellence,” 12.

¹⁸⁰ For example, see: Cheryl Bartlett, Murdena Marshall, and Albert Marshall, “Two-Eyed Seeing and other lessons learned within a co-learning journey of bringing together indigenous and mainstream knowledges and ways of knowing,” *Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences* 2, 4 (2012): 331-340.

¹⁸¹ See for example, *The New York Times 1619 Project*: Jake Silverstein, “The 1619 Project and the Long Battle over U.S History,” *The New York Times*, published November 9, 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/09/magazine/1619-project-us-history.html>.

¹⁸² See for example: “The UGlobe Decolonisation Group,” Centre for Global Challenges, Utrecht University, accessed November 25, 2021, <https://www.uu.nl/en/organisation/centre-for-global-challenges/projects/the-uglobe-decolonisation-group>.

The works of Fanon, Dussel, and Quijano demonstrate how the university, academia, and history has gradually accepted their scholarship by either compartmentalising them within the sub-epistemic field of postcolonialism or the Latin American school. This fragmentation enables continued avoidance, and therefore maintains Eurocentric discourses of power within the construction and dissemination of historical knowledge within the global order as well as the permeation of the distribution of power innate to the 500-year-old world-system.

Conclusion:

Historical academic criticism of postcolonial and decolonial scholarship has a complex history – it is not linear, nor does it inevitably lead to acceptance. Its ideological empiricism, expressed through rational realism as truthful hermeneutical interpretation, causes issues for a plurality of understandings, conceptualisations, and truths regarding the reality of the human world. Although historical academic scholarship eventually came to accept the legitimacy of postcolonialism within the realm of hermeneutic interpretation, this, however, was done through the continuance of academic measurement, standardisation, evidence, and classification of “good” history which simultaneously grew to acknowledge Eurocentrism as a biased narrative of history. Nevertheless, postcolonialism continues to be disputed on the grounds of empiricism, specifically through manifestations of rational realism, thus ultimately marginalising its research within historical scholarship. The permeation of this Eurocentrism is not only reflected within the structure of the university itself (as seen through mechanisms of peer-review), but also within the continued ignorance of decolonialism, eclipsed by either the Eurocentric classification of it being postcolonial scholarship or restricting it to the Latin American School. That is to say, history’s academic acceptance of postcolonialism and decolonialism is reflective of the power dynamics within the current global order explained by postcolonial and decolonial scholars: Euro-Western hermeneutic interpretation is the centre, postcolonialism remains on the margins (the “Other’s” perspective), and decolonialism is eclipsed – ignored – thanks to the centrality of Euro-Western language, dialogue, and debates happening within academic history. In turn, this is reflective of an established hierarchy of rationality, wherein empirical hermeneutic interpretations that manifest themselves as rational realism is more valued. But this rationality is also reflective of a hierarchy of humanness, and therefore a hierarchy of worthiness, being tied to racial Cartesian philosophy of “I think, therefore I am”. This paradigm illustrates how Eurocentrism continues to thrive within the 500-year-old world-system and its institutions.

History, through its relation within the university as an academic discipline, thus continues to impose a Euro-Western epistemology that remains entrenched within Eurocentrism and the 500-year-old world-system from which it emerged. This Eurocentric epistemology within history has consequently also entrenched a Eurocentric conceptualisation of the “human” through rational realism as an ideological form of empiricism – defining the human experience, thought, rational, and interpretation of reality. In other words, the university and academic history instill through Eurocentrism a monopoly on what can and cannot be construed as truth – a hegemonic power which also dictates the societal imaginary of the human.

Chapter 5: Human Rights

The previous chapter has demonstrated how, in spite of postcolonial and decolonial scholarship activism, academic historical epistemology remains entrenched within a Eurocentric framework inherent to the 500-year-old world-system. This is evidenced through traditional academic acceptance or rejection of postcolonial and decolonial scholarship, as well as through these reviews' adherence to ideological empiricism – namely judging postcolonialism and decolonialism within the framework of “proper” and “good” academic historical measurement, standardisation, evidence, and classification. This hermeneutical interpretation rests within a manifestation of rational realism, ultimately defining postcolonial and decolonial scholarship according to Euro-Western conceptualisation of reason. In sum, this leads the university, academia, and history more specifically to have a hegemonic power over the concept of (historical) “truth” and what can and cannot be defined as “truthful”. Considering the intimate connection between processes of knowledge production and power within the global order, the hegemony over truth is reflective of the international division of power established through the 500-year-old world-system.

Considering this thesis understands Eurocentrism to not only be Euro-Western-centered narratives within history and the production of knowledge more generally, but also processes and discourses of power within the global order, the following chapter will examine how Euro-Western academic (historical) hegemony is also present within the idea of “human rights”. The question posited therefore is: how is the “human” in the idea of human rights conceptualised within the Euro-Western world? Knowing the power of America within the current global order, and its transatlantic relationship with Europe, three United Nations Declarations focusing on human rights will be analysed – the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (UDHR – 1948), the *United Nations Millennium Declaration* (UNMD – 2000), and the *United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples* (UNDRIP – 2007) – so as to understand how human rights are conceptualised and, consequently, institutionalised within the global order.¹⁸³ A key

¹⁸³ See: United Nations, *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, (General Assembly Resolution 217A), Paris: UN General Assembly, December 10, 1948, <https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/udhr.pdf>; United Nations, *United Nations Millennium Declaration*, (General Assembly Resolution 55/2), New York: UN General Assembly, September 8, 2000, <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Millennium.aspx>; and United Nations, *United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples*, (Resolution adopted by the General Assembly [without reference to a Main Committee (A/61/L.67 and Add.1)] 61/295), New York: UN General Assembly, September 13, 2007, https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/wp-content/uploads/sites/19/2018/11/UNDRIP_E_web.pdf.

assumption within this examination is that the hegemonic power within the global order seeks to structure the international system in a way that is advantageous for its position economically, politically, and militarily within the world.

The first section examines the context from which each declaration emerged so as to better understand their purpose as an ordering principle within the global order and the international system. As will be demonstrated, the concept of human rights and its institutionalisation within the UN largely stems from a Euro-Western context. Although this does not inherently imply Eurocentrism, the Declarations' contextual relationship with discourses of power within the American (hegemonic) liberal order betrays the influence of Eurocentrism on human rights. Indeed, the second section focuses on the parallel evolution of "Race Relations Industry" developed in the Euro-Western world as a response to the post-1945 postcolonial era and its impact on the conceptualisation and formulation of human rights. Borrowing from Kwame Nimako's four-pillar approach, when analysing the (1) assumptions, (2) ideology/philosophy, (3) policy, and (4) practice underlying the three UN Declarations above, the racialisation of human rights becomes evident.¹⁸⁴ In the end, I will demonstrate how there exists a tension within the Euro-Western conceptualisation of human rights between their value as an inalienable, equal right to every human and as a mechanism within the ordering institutions of the global order existing within Eurocentrism. As a result, I argue for the need to reformulate human rights within the Euro-Western world outside of the realm of Eurocentrism, (neo)colonialism, and the 500-year-old world-system.

Historical Context:

The legal idea of institutionalising human rights came to be after the atrocities of the Second World War, but the concept of human rights, its ethics, has roots that go beyond this history. Micheline R. Ishay in, *The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalisation Era*, examines – as the title of the book suggests – how the idea of human rights, despite its legalisation in the second half of the 20th century, took on many previous forms throughout the course of human history. For example, in her preface she contends the idea that religion is antithetical to "the secular view of human rights" since "each great religion contains important

¹⁸⁴ See Notes of author taken in: Kwame Nimako, "On Foundations of the "Race Relations Industry"," *Black Europe Summer School*, Week 1.

humanistic elements that anticipated our modern conception of rights.”¹⁸⁵ In this sense, Ishay takes on a *longue durée* approach to her analysis, enabling her to emphasise nuance between the ethical equality embodied within the idea of human rights existing amongst all peoples and its institutionalist advent from the Euro-Western world. That is the shape, form, structure of human rights in the world today emerged from a system of Euro-Western hegemony within the international system.¹⁸⁶ As such, the conceptualisation of human rights and its institutionalisation within the United Nations is inherently from a Euro-Western interpretation of the “human”, of “rights”, and consequently “human rights”.¹⁸⁷ This is not a new nor is it a radical interpretation of human rights. Many scholars have studied the (Euro-Western) interpretation of human rights and its implementation in the non-Euro-Western world. Sachiko Takeda, for example, examined the implementation of human rights education in Japan, writing:

When discussing human rights education, it is crucial to recognise this process and that societies have different historical frameworks with regard to human rights as a concept. Consequently, the concept poses unique challenges to any society, resulting in societies having varying approaches to human rights education.¹⁸⁸

In other words, due to the nature of the global order and the Euro-Western hegemonic position, human rights have been conceptualised and institutionalised from a largely Euro-Western context.

Despite being generally accepted globally, it is because of this Euro-Western context that human rights have been critiqued by postcolonial scholars who, although agreeing with the spirit of human rights, view its implementation as a new form of imperialism. This is interesting, for it reveals a tension between the essence of “all human beings being born equal” and its actual

¹⁸⁵ Micheline R. Ishay, *The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008): 5.

¹⁸⁶ As Ishay writes on page 5: “...our modern conception of rights, wherever in the world they may be voiced, is predominantly European in origin.” Ishay, *The History of Human Rights*, 5.

¹⁸⁷ As Takeda writes on page 5: “...the concept of human rights, as we currently understand, is of Western origin. In fact, the Universal Declaration was drafted primarily by representatives of the United States and Western Europe, and reflects liberal traditions. The rest of the world was not offered much opportunity to influence the contents of the text. This is not surprising considering that only eleven African and Asian countries were among the founding UN members, with seven more joining over the following ten years (An-Na’im, 1990). Since then, an increasing number of non-Western states have joined the UN. Accordingly, the concept and norms of human rights, as contained in the Universal Declaration and other UN human rights instruments, have been formally accepted by the governments of countries with different social and cultural traditions.” Sachiko Takeda, “Human rights education in Japan: an historical account, characteristics and suggestions for a better-balanced approach,” *Cambridge Journal of Education* 42, 1 (2012): 5.

¹⁸⁸ Takeda, “Human rights education in Japan,” 5.

practice in international relations. For example, the International Criminal Court has been criticized on numerous occasions for its disproportionate attention to the continent of Africa in its prosecutions, rather than looking at all countries (even the USA) in their failed compliance to respect human rights.¹⁸⁹ Evident of a form of Eurocentrism (favouring the Euro-Western world by failing to prosecute its acts of violence against humanity), this critique of international human rights has been present since the post-1945 era itself. In fact, when discussing the evolution of this anticolonial human rights critique, Roland Burke, in his Chapter of *The Routledge History of Human Rights*, explains how the essence of human rights – in the sense of all humans being born equal – was essential within the decolonisation discourse of post-1945.¹⁹⁰ The notion of “universal sovereignty” and the creation of independent nation-states was inextricably linked to the idea that all humans are born equal. The question of sovereignty was therefore asserted and justified through the use of human rights’ discourse, ex-colonies utilising this argument to become equal on the international stage by being in charge of their own international and foreign affairs – free of (neo)colonial and imperial foreign-European rule.¹⁹¹

However, eventually postcolonial nation-states came to reject the human rights’ discourse, particularly with regards to the rules set in place by America. As one of two superpowers within the system, the United States valued an open system to support the free-market. But within its struggle with the Soviet Union, America feared the spread and influence of communism within the postcolonial world. In attempting to stop the spread of communism, America also asserted its power as one of two hegemonies within the system, ultimately imposing imperial preferences to maintaining its position of power against the USSR.¹⁹² As Burke continues:

In their rejections of [Euro-Western/First World] NGO scrutiny, Third World governments denounced the authority of Western activists, which formed much of the

¹⁸⁹ For more information, see: “Invited Experts on Africa Question,” ICC – Office of the Prosecutor, ICC Forum, accessed November 10, 2021, <https://iccforum.com/africa>.

¹⁹⁰ Roland Burke, “Decolonization, Development, and Identity: The evolution of the anticolonial human rights critique, 1948-78,” in *The Routledge History of Human Rights – 1st Edition*, ed. Jean H. Quataert and Lora Wildenthal (London: Routledge, 2019): 222-240.

¹⁹¹ As Burke writes on page 222: “In the peak years of the anticolonial movement, human rights were embraced as a language integral to opposing empire. Liberal nationalist movements that, in the late 1940s through early 1960s, were the principal force for decolonization, saw their own aspirations in the precepts of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Universalistic, promising the full swathe of freedoms – civil and political, economic and social – human rights were at once the answer to patronizing imperial claims of civilizational tutelage, the foremost weapon against colonial authoritarianism, and the most fundamental rejoinder to racial discrimination.” Burke, “Decolonization, Development, and Identity,” 222.

¹⁹² For more information, see The Truman Doctrine.

early transnational human rights movement. Yet these states – and numerous others, notably apartheid South Africa – went further than debating substantive merit of NGO criticisms: they began to attack those concepts of universality, indivisibility, and inherence, the very features that had subtended the power of human rights as an anti-imperial discourse. In the rhetoric of many postcolonial regimes, human rights scrutiny was increasingly dismissed as a new mode of imperialism.¹⁹³

The existing tensions between human rights as an inalienable and fundamental right to equality and human rights as a discourse of (neo)colonial power within the American global order are remarkably incompatible: it illustrates the hypocritical nature of Eurocentrism – being both universal and exceptional. As noble a pursuit as it may be, the concept of human rights not only comes out of a Euro-Western context but is also enshrouded within Eurocentrism and the discourses of power of the 500-year-old world-system. In turn, this reflects a lack of epistemological translation with regards to human rights, and how their embroilment with Eurocentrism negates their main purpose of promoting, achieving, and maintaining equality amongst human beings.

These clearly contradictory tensions are not present within the idea of human rights in the Euro-Western world. In fact, human rights are generally seen as an ethically and morally crucial duty, obligation, and right to ensure. So much so, that a lack of human rights is interpreted as a lack (or rather inexistence) of democracy. Intricately connected to rights as an individual and a citizen, democracy – as a governing principle – ensures the respect of human rights within the state. Ned Richardson-Little, in his respective chapter of *The Routledge History of Human Rights*, examines how human rights rhetoric were used by East Germans in the people's wish to participate democratically in the decisions of the German Democratic Republic. He writes:

Years of state propaganda about human rights meant that those who still believed in the cause of socialism could take on the language of human rights for the purpose of reform without needing to reject their ideology entirely. By the fall of 1989, mass demonstrations led in part by human rights activists gained momentum as the SED failed to produce viable alternatives to adapt to growing unrest. Ultimately, the security services refused to use mass violence to stem the spread of unrest, upon concluding that *the people in the streets demanding human rights were not counter-revolutionaries, but citizens seeking to take part in the affairs of their own country.*¹⁹⁴

¹⁹³ Burke, "Decolonization, Development, and Identity," 223.

¹⁹⁴ Ned Richardson-Little, "Human Rights Movements and the Fall of the Berlin Wall: Explaining the peaceful revolution of 1989," in *The Routledge History of Human Rights – 1st Edition*, ed. Jean H. Quataert and Lora Wildenthal (London: Routledge, 2019): 282. Emphasis added.

The fact that East Germany, despite being influenced by Soviet epistemology, was more amenable to epistemological translation than the postcolonial world reveals the extent of Eurocentrism's permeation in the conceptualisation and institutionalisation of human rights. The Eurocentrism present within human rights is thus not only tied to its focus on Europe and Eurocentric discourses of power, but also its inability to encompass non-Euro-Western ways of being within its conceptualisation and manifestation.

As alluded to above, the context in which human rights emerged institutionally within the international system was within the Euro-Western world. Although emerging from Europe and the West does not inherently assume Eurocentrism, its epistemological imposition within the global order does maintain a Euro-Western superiority with regards to the idea, conceptualisation, establishment, and manifestation of human rights. The context in which the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, the *United Nations Millennium Declaration*, and the *United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples* were established can inform us on how this focus on the Euro-Western world quickly led to the permeation of human rights as an ordering mechanism of Eurocentrism.

Eurocentrism & Human Rights:

Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

Following the Second World War, the Euro-Western world had been destroyed by two catastrophic events and was coming to terms with the force of nationalism, global violence, and the Holocaust. Having endured not one, but two World Wars, Europe was faced with accepting reality: its "innate superiority" had come to an end within the global order. Although the two world wars marked the European continent, the atrocities of the Holocaust fuelled the need to ensure peace, respect, and justice. Indeed, the Jewish genocide of the Second World War had a particular role within the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the first two points of the Preamble stating:

- 1) Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,
- 2) Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human

beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people, ...¹⁹⁵

Referencing the “recognition of inherent dignity and of the equal inalienable rights of all members of the human family” of the first point to the “disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind” of the second point emphasises the impact the Holocaust atrocities had on the Euro-Western world and its idea of the concept of human rights. Since the Holocaust physically happened on the European continent, it makes sense that the Euro-Western world would want to address, respond, and ensure that war crimes – genocide – could never happen again. The conceptualisation and institutionalisation of human rights therefore not only ensured legal and criminal accountability to any body contravening this declaration, but also promoted the spread of these values within Europe, the West, and the world. Simply put, the Euro-Western context fed into the very concept of human rights institutionalised within the American liberal global order, which in turn reflected a Eurocentric reality in international relations.

United Nations Millennium Declaration:

Due to the nature of the bipolar system, the American liberal order, the United Nations and its ideals for human rights could not encompass the entire world – the USSR posing as a strong counterbalance to total American hegemony. It was only in 2000, with the beginning of a new era and the end of the Cold War, that the American hegemonic liberal order was able to encompass the entire world. The fact that the United Nations convened to pass the *Millennium Declaration*, embodying the values presented in the “Millennium Development Goals” to eradicate poverty, ensure peace, and promote economic prosperity reflects the neo-liberal American system establishing its dominance within the international system and the global order.¹⁹⁶ As the first three points of the Principles and Values of the *UNMD* indicate:

- 1) We, heads of State and Government, have gathered at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 6 to 8 September 2000, *at the dawn of a new millennium*, to reaffirm our faith in the Organization and its Charter as indispensable foundations of a more peaceful, prosperous and just world.
- 2) We recognize that, *in addition to our separate responsibilities to our individual societies, we have a collective responsibility to uphold the principles of human dignity, equality*

¹⁹⁵ *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, December 10, 1948.

¹⁹⁶ “We can end poverty – Millennium Development Goals and Beyond 2015,” United Nations, News on Millennium Development Goals, accessed November 25, 2021, <https://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/>.

and equity at the global level. As leaders we have a duty therefore to all the world's people, especially the most vulnerable and, in particular, the children of the world, to whom the future belongs.

- 3) *We reaffirm our commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, which have proved timeless and universal.* Indeed, their relevance and capacity to inspire have increased, as nations and peoples have become increasingly interconnected and interdependent.¹⁹⁷

The fact that these three values and principles are placed in this order is telling: the first point emphasises the victory of capitalism over communism – that is, American hegemonic liberal order effectively encompassing the entire world instead of Soviet socialism; the second point complements the first by using an internationally hegemonic vocabulary like, “at the global level” or “to all the world’s people, especially the most vulnerable” – it presents a hierarchy between the Euro-Western world, specifically active participants in the American liberal order, and the rest of the world; the third point, in turn, supports the second by accentuating the superiority of the American liberal order and the Euro-Western world by affirming Eurocentric values of universalism and exceptionalism. The second part of the third point is particularly interesting, as it underscores the on-going process of globalisation and economic integration as key goals within the American liberal order. These points are thus illustrative of the coloniality of power existing within the global order and the continuation of the Eurocentric 500-year-old world-system.

United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples:

Although the *UDHR* and the *UNMD* can be clearly connected to the Euro-Western world and the assertion of the American liberal hegemonic order within the 500-year-old world-system, the *United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP)* is, upon first glance, less obviously linked to Eurocentrism. *UNDRIP* advocates for the human and Indigenous rights of Indigenous peoples in the world, maintaining their individual and communal rights as inalienable within the conceptualisation of human rights. Its history is nevertheless controversial. Dating back to the 1980s, the drafting of Indigenous rights, specifically with regard to Indigenous rights within colonial states (i.e. Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States), proved problematic since it could question the legitimacy and sovereignty of these nation-states over their territoriality. This complicated the process and slowed it down

¹⁹⁷ *United Nations Millennium Declaration*, September 8, 2000.

considerably.¹⁹⁸ Consequently, it was favourable for the American liberal order not to accept or promote UNDRIP, a fact which became reality in 2007 when the United States, along with Canada, Australia, and New Zealand voted against the UN's adoption of the declaration.¹⁹⁹ Although in 2011, the Obama administration "lend its support to *UNDRIP*," its historical evolution as a UN Declaration, institutionalised within the global order, may be demonstrative of the shifting power dynamics – whether they be values or interests – within the international system.²⁰⁰ After all, the context of the 1980s is significantly different to the context of today, wherein Cold War tensions tamed drastically with the waning USSR compared to today's rising challenge of China to the US hegemonic order. Although it is a cynical observation, *UNDRIP*'s acceptance in the Euro-Western world may be seen as a means through which to maintain the current functioning and organisation of the international system, protecting Eurocentrism within the global order.

It is important to note that I am not contesting the importance or relevance of *UNDRIP*. It is, in fact, a crucial document that helps in maintaining colonial states accountable to their human rights injustices against Indigenous peoples. In this section, I simply wish to show its epistemological inclusion within Euro-Western conceptualisation of human rights and Eurocentric power dynamics. That is to say, I do not argue that *UNDRIP* or human rights in general are Eurocentric. Rather, I explore how it is included within Euro-Western conceptualisation of human rights and its intersectionality with wider global power dynamics like Eurocentrism.

This idea can be supported by the articles of *UNDRIP* themselves, the first three articles incorporating Indigenous human rights within the Euro-Western conceptualisation as framed within the *UDHR*.

- 1) Indigenous peoples have the right to the full enjoyment, as a collective or as individuals, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognized in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international human rights law.

¹⁹⁸ As stated on the UNDRIP Historical Context webpage: "The process moved very slowly because of concerns expressed by States with regard to some of the core provisions of the draft declaration, namely the right to self-determination of indigenous peoples and the control over natural resources existing on indigenous peoples' traditional lands." "United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples," United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs – Indigenous Peoples, accessed November 11, 2021, <https://www-un.org.eur.idm.oclc.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/declaration-on-the-rights-of-indigenous-peoples.html>.

¹⁹⁹ "United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples," United Nations.

²⁰⁰ "Announcement for U.S. Support of the United Nations' Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples," U.S. Department of State, Archive, accessed November 11, 2021, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/srgia/154553.htm>.

- 2) Indigenous peoples and individuals are free and equal to all other peoples and individuals and have the right to be free from any kind of discrimination, in the exercise of their rights, in particular that based on their indigenous origin or identity.
- 3) Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.²⁰¹

Upon reading these articles, it is unsurprising that colonial states like the US chose to initially vote against the declaration, seeing as the idea of Indigenous self-determination immediately questions the legitimacy of state-sovereignty.²⁰² However, its framing rests within the Euro-Western conceptualisation of human rights and the UN as an ordering institution within the American hegemonic liberal order. Albeit not translated into American law, *UNDRIP*'s presence within the UN reveals underlying power dynamics, changing values, and perhaps even the struggle to maintain the American hegemonic liberal order.²⁰³ For whether accepting *UNDRIP* marks a change in Euro-Western values or whether it is a strategic positionality to better counter Chinese contestation, the fact remains that *UNDRIP* exists within the American liberal hegemonic order, being institutionalised and compartmentalised within the UN.

The history of *UNDRIP* and the conceptualisation of human rights therefore illustrates the long-existing tensions between human rights as the inalienable fact that all human beings are born equal and human rights as a Euro-Western conceptualisation working within a Eurocentric global order and the 500-year-old world-system. As such, the next section will focus on the parallel development of the institutionalisation of human rights within the American liberal order and the Race Relations Industry, commenting on the intersectionality between race, economic development, and the distribution of power within the global order through the lens of Eurocentrism and its influence on human rights.

²⁰¹ *United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples*, September 13, 2007.

²⁰² For more information, see: Brad Simpson, "Self-Determination and Decolonization," in *The Oxford Handbook of the Ends of Empire*, ed. Martin Thomas and Andrew S. Thompson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 417-430.

²⁰³ As written on USAID: "The UNDRIP is not legally binding on States and does not impose legal obligations on governments, but like all human rights instruments, it carries moral force. While not endorsing the UNDRIP, the United States has agreed to support the Declaration." "Indigenous Peoples," USAID – From the American People, accessed on Nov. 14, 2021, <https://www.usaid.gov/environmental-policy-roadmap/indigenous-peoples>.

Eurocentrism, Race Relations Industry, and Human Rights:

The “Race Relations Industry” is what Kwame Nimako during BESS 2021 defined as the (neo)colonial hegemonic (American) response to the decolonisation “crisis”.²⁰⁴ The current global order, the American hegemonic liberal order, was inherited from the previous European global order. The latter’s roots can be traced back to 500 years ago and the European age of exploration – hence, the 500-year-old world-system. As such, the American hegemonic liberal order has inherited certain characteristics of the European global order, namely – the adherence to capitalism, the division of labour within the international system, and processes of racialisation – in a word, Eurocentrism. It is unsurprising therefore that following the ascension of American hegemony in 1945 in the bipolar system that discussions would hold place regarding the economic, political, social, and racial position of the United States and – because of its strategic location within the Cold War – Europe in what is termed as the “decolonisation” era. Nimako, in his forthcoming article entitled, *Power, (Mis)representation, and Black European Studies*, elaborates on how the study of Black people and individuals was institutionalised through liberal-capitalist interest and stakeholders within the global order. He writes:

...after the Second World War, in response to the processes of decolonization, the study of Black people became a defensive mechanism (Nimako 2018). Decolonization in principle made it possible for former colonized people to travel and prompted the colonizers to enact immigration policies to regulate the flow of former colonized subjects to Europe. In England, for example, it was also the decolonization process that prompted H.V. Hudson, editor of *The Sunday Times*, in 1950 to call a meeting at the reputed (think-tank) Chatham House in London to plead for the establishment of a Commonwealth Institute of Race Relations to address the ‘race’ question. His rationale was that: “There are two problems in the world politics today which transcend all others. They are the struggle between Communism [i.e. class] and liberal democracy, and the problem of race relations... Both problems are of crucial importance for the survival of our [i.e. white people’s] civilization”. Hudson received a hearing from the corporate world with interest in Africa and beyond; corporate entities that signed on to fund the Commonwealth Institute of Race Relations included British South Africa Company, Rhodesian Selection Trust, Anglo-American Corporation, Rockefeller Foundation, and Ford Foundation (Mullard 1986).²⁰⁵

²⁰⁴ See Notes of author taken in: Kwame Nimako, “On Foundations of the “Race Relations Industry”,” *Black Europe Summer School*, Week 1; and Kwame Nimako, “Power, (Mis)representation, and Black European Studies,” in *Black Studies in Europe: Questioning the Politics of Knowledge*, ed. Nicole Gregoir, Sarah Fila-Bakabadio, and Jacinthe Mazzocchetti (Northwestern University Press, forthcoming): 7.

²⁰⁵ Nimako, “Power, (Mis)representation, and Black European Studies,” 7.

Race-relations is therefore an industry because it is inextricably connected to liberal, capitalist, and economic interests of the Euro-Western world in relation to postcolonial states and people in ensuring the continuation of Eurocentric power dynamics of the 500-year-old world-system. There are four pillars are: assumption, ideology/philosophy, policy, and practice.²⁰⁶ Race relations are conducted according to these principles – for example: assumptions about Black individuals are supported by an ideology or philosophy that they are inferior to white individuals, that this then informs their mentality (or policy approach) to Black individuals which ultimately creates a practice grounded in processes of racialisation and, also, racism – as expressed by Hudson above.

Considering the fact that human rights were developed within the same context, it is crucial to relate this development of a race-relations industry to the principle, construction, and conceptualisation of human rights so as to understand the extent of its implications within international relations and the structural formation of the current global order.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

As discussed above, the *UDHR* came out of a Euro-Western context that sought to recover from the ravage of two world wars and a genocide. Within Euro-Western tradition, the rights of human beings were formulated on the grounds of the individual person and the individual citizen. That is to say, citizenship – as an individual right inalienable to a member of a nation – is key within the declaration along with individual rights as a person living in a democratic, just country. This is embodied, for example, in Article 21, which is formulated as follows:

- i. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
- ii. Everyone has the right to equal access to public service in his country.
- iii. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.²⁰⁷

Here, we can see how citizenship, the individual, and the nation-state are triangulated to form the realm of democracy. In other words, justice, political expression, and personal affairs are protected and guaranteed by the State as a member of that said nation – i.e. citizenship. Democracy in it of itself is not only a Euro-Western tradition, but it is often narrated as emerging

²⁰⁶ See Notes of author taken in: Nimako, “On Foundations of the “Race Relations Industry”,” Week 1.

²⁰⁷ *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, December 10, 1948.

in Ancient Greece and being inherited by Europe.²⁰⁸ The fact that it is so deeply entrenched in the respect of human rights is telling, for it also promotes the idea of human rights as a democratic principle. Thus, in connection to the American liberal order, democracy is a human right as well as an expectation.²⁰⁹

The underlying assumptions present in the formulation of citizenship come from the European context: war is bad, peace is necessary, and democracy is therefore inherently crucial. These assumptions can be said to be supported by the ideology of “never again” – a common phrase used in remembering the two world wars. As most historians acknowledge, there was then a reframing of values within the Euro-Western world. This process of reformulation expresses a policy of democratic principles, namely the importance of the nation-state in guaranteeing the rights of its citizens, and individual rights being protected within the international system itself in case of infringement. The result is the practice of institutionalised democracy and human rights within the very fabric of the global order through the establishment of international institutions like the UN who govern, ensure, and maintain these policy principles.

Despite not being evident upon first glance, these pillars reflect the presence of race-relations within the Euro-Western conceptualisation of human rights for it also illustrates the Euro-Western conceptualisation of the nation, the citizen, and the “human” as being “white”. The history of the nation, the premise of citizenship, and even the idea of the “human” itself are tied to a Euro-Western colonial understanding that stem from the foundation of the 500-year-old world-system, seeing the European nations as the core of “capital,” “development,” and – inevitably – as “white”.²¹⁰ Indeed, it is important to remember the importance of slavery as a principle economic construct of the era, its legacy enduring today. The institutionalisation of human rights through the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights is inextricably connected to the Euro-Western experience in the two world wars and the discourses of power within the global order and the 500-year-old world-system. When relating human rights to the history of colonialism and the discourses of power within the global order, we can see the racialization of

²⁰⁸ See for example, the Haudenosaunee and Five Nations’ Confederacy *Great Law of Piece*. “Roots of Western Democracy,” Indigenous Values Initiative, accessed November 26, 2021, <https://indigenousvalues.org/contributions/roots-western-democracy/>.

²⁰⁹ See O’Hagan, “The Role of Civilization in the Globalization of International Society,” 227-247.

²¹⁰ Notes of author taken in: David Theo Goldberg, “Race/Racisms: A Euro-History,” *Black Europe Summer School*, Week 2. For more information, see: Jan Nederveen Pieterse, 2002 “*Europe and its Others*”, in *Blackwell Companion to Racial and Ethnic Studies*, ed. David Theo Goldberg and John Solomos (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 2002): 17-24.

the nation-state, the citizen, and the human as “white” in Euro-Western conceptualisation, ultimately impacting the idea of human rights as a Euro-Western right, a “white” right. In connection to the post-1945 era of decolonisation, Nimako, referred above, writes:

“Decolonization in principle made it possible for former colonized people to travel and prompted the colonizers to enact immigration policies to regulate the flow of former colonized subjects to Europe.”²¹¹ Herein, we see how the idea of human rights seems to be only applicable to the Euro-Western context and, consequently, white individuals. For these immigration policies regulating “the flow of former colonized subjects to Europe,” clearly present a contradiction between Article 13 and Article 15 of the *UDHR*. Article 13 states that:

- i. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State.
- ii. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.²¹²

According to Article 13, freedom of movement is encapsulated within human rights and the democratic state, meaning that a nation – under democratic rule – cannot restrict its citizens from moving, even if they choose to immigrate to a new country. Article 15 continues guaranteeing that:

- i. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
- ii. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his [*sic.* their] nationality nor denied the right to change [their] nationality.²¹³

So, while Article 13 guarantees freedom of movement, Article 15 guarantees rights of emigration and immigration. By imposing immigration policies to restrict the flow of immigrants, European countries in the decolonisation era were attempting to maintain the “whiteness” of the country. Framed differently, European countries were trying to keep Europe as the core of capital, economic development, and freedom as exclusively “white.” This realisation becomes even more problematic when considering Article 22 of the *Universal Declaration*:

- i. Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with

²¹¹ Nimako, “Power, (Mis)representation, and Black European Studies,” 7.

²¹² *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, December 10, 1948.

²¹³ *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, December 10, 1948.

the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.²¹⁴

“Everyone, as a member of society” – not as a member of the nation, as a citizen, or as an individual, but as a “member of society” is entitled to enjoy the benefits, privileges, and rights of the said nation-state. However, this contravenes the very essence of the *Declaration*, since it reveals how despite promoting “equality”, the reality of the global order, its discourses of power, continue to maintain inequality amongst nations, citizens, individuals, and races in its hierarchisation of humanity.

In this light, human rights themselves are not exclusively “white,” but their application has benefitted “white” privilege. Indeed, Euro-Western nations are not exclusively “white” either – that is to say, European and Western nations have non-white citizens. The reality is far more complex than outlined above, but the fact remains that human rights were conceptualised within a context where the *idea* of the nation was seen as white. Understanding this historical caveat in the implementation of human rights could illuminate reasons why the Euro-Western world is currently struggling with “race,” seeing issues of migration, immigration, and asylum through the lens of race-relations rather than the protection of human rights.

United Nations Millennium Declaration:

The race-relations’ pillars are more evident within the *UNMD*. Written after the Cold War but before 9/11, the *UN Millennium Declaration* builds upon the race-relations’ pillars inherent within the application of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*. Referencing the post-Cold War context, the underlying assumptions represented within the Millennium Declaration are tied to the victory of capitalism against communism. In this sense, capitalism is a force for good, feeding into the ideology of (neo)liberalism and the necessity of a free, open-system within the world market. This inevitably feeds into a policy of bringing development to the rest of the world, sharing the fruits of capitalism in its victory, resulting in a practice of total global economic integration within the American-hegemonic sphere of influence. As is encompassed by the 5th point of the “Values and Principles” of the *UNMD*:

We believe that the central challenge we face today is to *ensure that globalization becomes a positive force for all the world’s people*. For while globalization offers great opportunities, at present its benefits are very unevenly shared, while its costs are unevenly distributed. We recognize that developing countries and countries with

²¹⁴ *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, December 10, 1948.

economies in transition face special difficulties in responding to this central challenge. Thus, *only through broad and sustained efforts to create a shared future, based upon our common humanity in all its diversity, can globalization be made fully inclusive and equitable.* These efforts must include policies and measures, at the global level, which correspond to the needs of developing countries and economies in transition and are formulated and implemented with their effective participation.²¹⁵

Although it is important to note the general inclusion present herein, the force of globalisation as an (neo)liberal ideology that pushes a policy of shared development – that is, economic equality – through a practice of growing economic integration only serves to promote a (neo)colonial distribution of power – that is, Eurocentrism – within the global order. This is further emphasised by the 5th section of the *Declaration*, entitled “Human rights, democracy, and good governance,” which stipulates that: “We will spare no effort to promote democracy and strengthen the rule of law, as well as respect for all internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, *including the right to development.*”²¹⁶ The fact that development is now construed as a human right is telling, for it reveals how the concept of development, through (neo)liberal economic prosperity, is tied to a concept – human rights – which is itself racialized due to Eurocentric, (neo)colonial discourses of power of the 500-year-old world-system of Euro-Western economic capitalism.

Indeed, the racial axis of the 500-year-old world-system continues to permeate the American hegemonic order, whose victory against the Soviet Union is used to justify its expanding sphere of influence. It is not surprising that the following Section 6 is entitled, “Protecting the Vulnerable,” and Section 7 is labelled “Meeting the Special Needs of Africa,” wherein the *Millennium Declaration* asserts that: “We will support the consolidation of democracy in Africa and assist Africans in their struggle for lasting peace, poverty eradication and sustainable development, thereby *bringing Africa into the mainstream of the world economy.*”²¹⁷ By organising these sections as such, the *Millennium Declaration*, as a document of the American hegemonic liberal order through the ordering institution of the UN, betrays the presence of an unconscious link between human rights, protecting the vulnerable, and the African continent. In other words, there is a Euro-Western triangulation between ensuring the respect of human rights – which is, through its processes of Eurocentric racialisation – justifying

²¹⁵ *United Nations Millennium Declaration*, September 8, 2000.

²¹⁶ *United Nations Millennium Declaration*, September 8, 2000.

²¹⁷ *United Nations Millennium Declaration*, September 8, 2000. Emphasis added.

its actions with the imagery of the so-called “vulnerable”, which is in turn connected to Africa. This demonstrates the continuation of race-relations, assuming that through its capitalistic victory, the (neo)liberal ideology needs to be spread globally for it bring “good” and “wealth” through policy and practice of economic integration. It is important to note that helping African countries is not morally or ethically wrong – rather, the point here is that the underlying assumptions leading to such intentions are problematic, for they further entrench Eurocentrism and its unjust, prejudiced, even violent mechanisms to ensure Euro-Western supremacy within the global order and the endurance of global-capitalism (i.e. the 500-year-old world-system).

The last point of the *Millennium Declaration* is Section 8 – “Strengthening the United Nations.”²¹⁸ As a key institution within the American hegemonic global order, the strengthening of the UN is not only expressed so as to expand the American liberal order globally, but also represents how this institution feeds into global discourses of power thereby enabling the continuation of (neo)colonialism and the racial international hierarchy. It illustrates the entrenchment of international power dynamics based in Eurocentric discourses of power that came out of the 500-year-old world-system, the history – or rather, the presence – of (neo)colonialism, and the colonality of power within the current global order.

United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples:

As mentioned above, *UNDRIP* took years to draft and was only accepted within the UN in 2007 without the support of the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia.²¹⁹ These states opposed *UNDRIP* due to on-going inter(-)national issues with Indigenous peoples, namely the latter’s activism toward self-determination, and often times contesting state territoriality.²²⁰ Despite the American support in 2011, *UNDRIP* remains controversial. The underlying assumptions are tied to the continued subjugation of Indigenous peoples based on their indigeneity. That is to say, human rights of Indigenous peoples – as human beings who are Indigenous – are not respected. This supports, and in turn is supported by, the ideology that human rights are morally necessary and inalienable with regard to Indigeneity. This belief and

²¹⁸ *United Nations Millennium Declaration*, September 8, 2000.

²¹⁹ See “United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,” United Nations.

²²⁰ For Canadian example, see: Taylor C. Noakes, “2020 was the Year of Indigenous Activism in Canada,” *Foreign Policy*, published on Dec. 17, 2020, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/12/17/2020-indigenous-activism-canada-trudeau/>; Maham Abedi, “Why a UN declaration on Indigenous rights has struggled to become Canadian law,” *Global News*, published on Nov. 2, 2019, <https://globalnews.ca/news/6101723/undrip-indigenous-relations-canada/>.

justification in human rights therefore translates into a policy of anti-colonialism and a practice of self-determination; or, within the context of the American hegemonic liberal order, it translates into a policy document that provides practical, vague guidelines for states to respect Indigenous human rights. But within the current global order, there is no power to keep the United States and the rest of the Euro-Western world accountable. Indeed, the UN cannot impose legislation on nation-states – hence why *UNDRIP* remains legally unendorsed nor binding in the US.²²¹ This is a crucial point to consider, since it reveals how Indigenous peoples are conceptualised as being “outside” of the nation. That is to say, they are not part of the Euro-Western identity of the nation-state itself. Therefore, in relation to the Eurocentrism influencing the conceptualisation of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* and the *Millennium Declaration*, *UNDRIP* illustrates how Eurocentrism continues to permeate the global order and the very idea of human rights themselves. The fact that a UN Declaration needed to be made to consider and ensure the respect of the human rights of Indigenous peoples as human beings who are also Indigenous further emphasises the racial “white” identity of the Euro-Western world and its connection to the global distribution of power.

Despite *UNDRIP* marks the beginning of the inclusion of Indigeneity within the conceptualisation of human rights, it still falls short of conceptualising human rights from an epistemologically Indigenous perspective. Indeed, the *Declaration* – although an important step forward in the recognition of Indigenous human rights – illustrates the influence of a Eurocentric epistemology, framing these rights within the context of the UN’s institutional role within the American liberal order. For example, *UNDRIP* considers the continued legacy of (neo)colonialism within infringements of Indigenous human rights, but it also does presents contradictions in relation to Indigenous self-determination, sovereignty, and territorial legitimacy. In Article 3 and 4, *UNDRIP* defines self-determination as an Indigenous human right, stating:

- 3) Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

²²¹ For more information, see: “Indigenous Peoples,” USAID – From the American People, accessed on Nov. 14, 2021, <https://www.usaid.gov/environmental-policy-roadmap/indigenous-peoples>.

- 4) Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions.²²²

In other words, Indigenous peoples are nations within a nation – having political, economic, social, historical, cultural, and structural authority of their matters. But this does nothing to clarify the legal and political conundrum between Indigenous sovereignty and nation-state sovereignty. Self-determination, in this sense, ensures the respect of Indigenous peoples as collective and individual human beings within the nation-state, but it does not necessarily imply Indigenous sovereignty over nation-state sovereignty. Article 5 and 6 emphasise the importance of the nation-state, saying that:

- 5) Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining their right to participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the State.
- 6) Every indigenous individual has the right to a nationality.²²³

Considering the *Universal Declaration* emphasised the importance of the nation-state in respecting the rights of the human being as an individual and as a citizen thereby emphasising the importance of democracy in ensuring human rights, *UNDRIP* herein aligns Indigenous human rights with the Euro-Western conceptualisation of human rights through its adherence to the *Universal Declaration*'s framework. The imagined community of the nation is thus maintained through the delicate balance of power between the state as a democratic form of government and individual people as its citizens. But in the context of (neo)colonialism, the nation-state is guilty of breaking that balance with Indigenous peoples, excluding them from its imagined community and imposing a foreign rule on their land. Thus, there exists a tension within *UNDRIP*, it being unable to mediate between the idea of the nation as an imagined community within a democratic state and their role in maintaining a (neo)colonial reality.

The three sub-articles of Article 46 further demonstrate this tension, being contradictory to the principles of self-determination formulated at the beginning of the Declaration.

- i. *Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which*

²²² *United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples*, Septer 13, 2007.

²²³ *United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples*, Septer 13, 2007.

would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States.

- ii. In the exercise of the rights enunciated in the present Declaration, human rights and fundamental freedoms of all shall be respected. The exercise of the rights set forth in this Declaration shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law and in accordance with international human rights obligations. Any such limitations shall be non-discriminatory and strictly necessary solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and *for meeting the just and most compelling requirements of a democratic society.*
- iii. The provisions set forth in this Declaration shall be interpreted in accordance with the principles of justice, democracy, respect for human rights, equality, non-discrimination, good governance and good faith.²²⁴

The fact that *UNDRIP* ends with emphasising the importance of the nation-state, its territoriality and sovereignty, limits its ability to fully epistemologically translate the Indigenous experience in human rights with (neo)colonialism and the Eurocentric international system. Its emphasis on the idea that nothing in *UNDRIP* can be “construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity of political unity of *sovereign and independent States,*” directly contradicts the idea of Indigenous self-determination, undermining the concept through its adherence to nation-state sovereignty as one of the ordering mechanisms in the international system. So despite being recognised as a nation – a people – within a nation, Indigenous people’s status on the international stage remains limited, their sovereignty being restricted within the confines of the Euro-Western nation-state while their human rights are constrained within Eurocentrism. *UNDRIP*’s emphasis on the form and shape of this nation-state – that is, democracy – and its relation to “principles of justice” and “respect for human rights” further emphasise the Eurocentric epistemology permeating through *UNDRIP*, imposing a Euro-Western context and conceptualisation of human rights that is congruent with the ordering mechanisms and discourses of power within the global order on non-Euro-Western realities, like Indigenous human rights.

All in all, the underlying assumptions, ideologies/philosophies, policies, and practices of the *UDHR*, the *UNMD*, and *UNDRIP* reveals how the conceptualisation of human rights not only emerged from a Euro-Western context and was entrenched within Eurocentrism, but also how its institutionalisation as an ordering principle of the global order resulted in the continuation of (neo)colonialism and the racialisation of the distribution of power within the international

²²⁴ *United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples*, Septer 13, 2007.

system. Consequently, there exists a tension between the idea of human rights as an inalienable, equal right amongst all human beings and human rights being implemented practically within Eurocentrism, ensuring the enduring legacy of (neo)colonialism, the structuring of the American hegemonic liberal order, and the 500-year-old world-system.

Conclusion:

The concept of human rights became institutionalised within the United Nations following the Second World War. Its innately Euro-Western context fed into its conceptualisation within the ordering mechanisms of the American liberal order, which became hegemonic after the end of the Cold War. The *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* assured the principle that all human beings are born equal, but as the *Millennium Declaration* revealed, due to historical realities like (neo)colonialism, current inequalities endured. It therefore sought to bring democracy, good governance, and economic development to developing countries. But despite the good intention of this initiative, its underlying assumptions and ideologies encouraged the permeation of (neo)liberalism and capitalist enterprise – consequently enabling the continuation of (neo)colonial and imperial discourses of power maintaining the Euro-Western world as its capitalist, white core. In relation to the continued subjugation of Indigenous peoples, *UNDRIP* sought to mitigate against enduring injustices and infringement of human rights for Indigenous peoples and individuals. But by emphasising the Euro-Western conceptualisation of human rights within the framework of the nation-state, citizenship, and democracy, *UNDRIP* ultimately reveals the underlying presence of Eurocentrism within global discourses of power that maintain and support the continuation of the American hegemonic liberal order and the 500-year-old world-system. Consequently, despite the moral essence of human rights, its conceptualisation within the Euro-Western world is reflected on the international system thereby continuing processes of racialisation instigated by the division of power resulting from the capitalist world-system. In the end, Eurocentrism, as a prevalent discourse of power, maintains the intersectionality between race, labour, and power within the global order, effectively creating tensions within the practical applicability of human rights and their moral prerogative, limiting our abilities for inter-epistemological translation, communication, and dialogue in the world today. Human rights are morally and ethically crucial and necessary, but Euro-Western conceptualisation – as the hegemonic forces of the global order – need to reframe their epistemology outside the realm of Eurocentrism and its mechanisms of power entrenched by the

500-year-old world-system so as to ensure the possibility of a successful inter-epistemological dialogue, thereby respecting the plurality of humanity within the world.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

This thesis concerns itself with the university as an institution of and for society – utilising academic history’s relationship with critical theories of postcolonialism and decolonialism as a case study to analyse the impact of global discourses of power on processes of (historical) knowledge production and dissemination. In answering the main research question of this thesis – how has academic history interacted with critical theories of postcolonialism and decolonialism since their academic advent in the 1970s – history, as a discipline of the humanities, continues to instill empirical ideology within the process of discerning historical truth, maintaining the idea of unbiased, truthful history through its adherence to rational realism, and consequently partaking in the symbiotic relationship between knowledge production and the 500-year-old world-system that ensures the permeation of Eurocentrism and the (neo)colonial-based hierarchy within the current global order. Subsequently, the knowledge produced influences Euro-Western conceptualisations, perceptions, and interpretations of the world, the truth, and reality – as evidence in the conceptualisation of human rights. All in all, I argue that history, academia, and the university more broadly impose a Eurocentric framework on processes of knowledge production and its unending search for the “truth”. Despite being based in scientific empiricism, the search for truth – in the historical sense – through the manifestation of rational realism in hermeneutic interpretation leads to a narrow-minded approach to historical enquiry, limiting our knowledge, potential, and humanity to a homogenous (Euro-Western) unit.

After presenting the interconnectedness between Eurocentrism, (neo)colonialism, the global order, and the 500-year-old world-system in the Introduction, Chapter 2 proceeded to analyse postcolonialism as a critique of these realities within historical knowledge production. Edward Said’s *Orientalism* launched a postcolonial anti-Eurocentric critical analysis within academic scholarship. Despite initially being a source of controversy, the field of postcolonialism was further legitimised through *Subaltern Studies* scholars’ Homi K. Bhabha, and Dipesh Chakrabarty, who also criticised the legitimacy of Eurocentric theories, definitions, and conceptualisations of history. That is to say, postcolonial scholars mitigated against Euro-Western narratives and perspectives being interpreted and presented as *universal* history.

This postcolonial critique was further analysed in Chapter 3, which focused on decolonialism. Three foundational scholars of decolonialism were examined: Frantz Fanon, Enrique Dussel, and Anibal Quijano. Building upon postcolonial critique against Eurocentric

history, this chapter revealed how these decolonial scholars also advocated against continued processes of (neo)colonialism and, consequently, the continued establishment of Eurocentrism as an ordering discourse of power within the global order. As such, these three decolonial scholars also provided new methodological approaches in analysing the history of the Americas.

In Chapter 4, the thesis demonstrated how postcolonialism and decolonialism had become a counter-discourse against Eurocentrism as well as an anti-colonial and decolonising sub-epistemic field in academia. Although this process was not immediate or linear, the critical reviews of Said, Bhabha, and Chakrabarty revealed an increased interest and validation of postcolonial anti-Eurocentric critique; hermeneutical interpretation based in the four pillars of science eventually understanding Eurocentrism to be an ideological problem within the creation of unbiased, empirical, truthful history. Thus, postcolonialism became the main medium through which to criticise and confront Eurocentrism within academic history. Decolonialism, on the other hand, was at first disregarded – classified in the realm of “science fiction” – its truth, methods, and epistemology initially deemed inadequate within empirical hermeneutical interpretations. This revealed how the entrenchment of empiricism manifested itself as rational realism within historical knowledge production. For example, decolonialism’s classification as fiction indicates how academic history could not even consider this scholarship within the realm of empiricism, for its premise was so radically against Eurocentric and (neo)colonial narratives that it immediately appeared to be irrational, “un-real”, and therefore without truth. But through its criticism of Eurocentrism, decolonialism was accepted in the margins of academic history under the postcolonial umbrella: hence the Latin American Postcolonial School. As evidenced by the fragmentation of decolonial knowledge, its activism against on-going forms of colonialism continues to be rejected, even eclipsed, by the core and Eurocentric discourses of power within the Latin American context itself. Its marginalisation within the context of the Americas, specifically Latin America, denotes the continued adherence of academic history to empiricism and science as an ideological support for Eurocentrism and (neo)colonial discourses of power.

Chapter 5 sought to reflect on the permeation of Eurocentrism within knowledge production and its connection to the global order through its examination of human rights. Seeing as history, academia, and the university limits and defines (historical) “truth” according to global discourses of power emanating from the 500-year-old world-system – that is, Eurocentrism and (neo)colonialism – this consequently classifies histories, critical theories, and

human experiences within a hierarchy of legitimacy, worthiness, and humanness. This hierarchy is symbiotically reflected in and by the global order and the 500-year-old world-system as evidenced by the institutionalisation and conceptualisation of human rights. Each UN Declaration was contextualised within their respective Euro-Western setting. Although in it of itself, the Euro-Western context does not render human rights Eurocentric, the discourses of power present within the international system – that is, the division of power and the hierarchy of nation-states within the global order – reveals how Eurocentrism seeps into the institutionalisation of Human Rights as an ordering principle. Juxtaposing this institutionalisation to the Race-Relations Industry pillars, the assumptions, ideologies/philosophies, policies, and practices underlying and presented within each Declaration revealed the permeation of Eurocentric epistemology in the institutionalisation of human rights as an ordering principle of the global order.

All in all, Eurocentrism, as a restrictive historical narrative and (neo)colonial reality of the global order, not only continues to permeate (historical) knowledge production, but also the contemporary international distribution of power. In order for history to emancipate itself, it must therefore go beyond Eurocentrism and (neo)colonialism and their reflection within the world.

But how can this be accomplished? Many scholars, like those featured in this thesis, have debated where to go from here – how academia, and the discipline of history specifically, can truly represent unbiased, scientific historical knowledge. One scholar in particular, Andre Gunder Frank, tied this issue to the conceptualisation of the 500-year-old world-system itself. Being the main opponent to Wallerstein’s world-system(s) theory, Gunder Frank asserted that the world-system was in fact a single world system (no hyphen) thereby contending that capitalism (or the ceaseless accumulation of wealth) was not inherently European or Western in origin. Collaborating with Barry K. Gills, he presented their world system analysis in an article entitled, “The Five-Thousand Year World System: An Interdisciplinary Introduction”. Therein, they presented how the current, singular world system through the ceaseless accumulation of capital extends far beyond the 1500s and, therefore, beyond European borders.²²⁵ Stated

²²⁵ As they write on page 5: “According to Wallerstein, and many students of world capitalism, the *differencia specifica* of the modern world system is the ceaseless accumulation of capital.” Andre Gunder Frank and Barry K. Gills, “The Five-Thousand Year World System: An Interdisciplinary Introduction,” 5.

differently, Gunder Frank and Gills argue that the ceaseless accumulation of capital was not necessarily unique to the European system of the 1500s, and therefore extends beyond European centrality and, consequently, Eurocentrism.

They do not contest the force of European expansionism, but this era was part of a wider whole within the international system – a global world system that was already in existence. By furthering the scope of *longue durée*, they explain how the world system is not a constellation of multiple world-systems from which a dominant European framework emerged, but rather that there is only *one* world system that extends beyond Europe's borders – spatially and temporally – all the way back to Mesopotamia.

We content that this imperative both in the familiar form of money as well as other forms is not a unique systemic feature of modern capitalism...Rather, the imperative of ceaseless accumulation is a characteristic of competitive pressures throughout world system history.²²⁶

Thus, the global order is not a product of a 500-year-old world-system of European capitalism, but a result of a 5000-year-old world system in which European centrality and capitalistic supremacy is but an episode.

In his book, *ReORIENT: Global Economy in the Asian Age*, Gunder Frank elaborates on his and Gill's singular world system approach, examining the era of European expansionism in light of a larger world economy on a global scale. His conclusions lead him to believe that Asia, particularly China, had a crucial impact on European expansionism, and that the premise of European exceptionalism, the 500-year-old world-system, is in it of itself, Eurocentric.

Still less was any part of Europe able to exercise any hegemonic power or even economic leadership in or over the world. This was certainly not possible for the Iberian Peninsula or little Portugal with one million inhabitants in the sixteenth century, nor for the small Netherlands in the seventeenth century, nor even for "Great" Britain in the eighteenth century. The very notion of such economic leadership or political power or even balance of power (as for example after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648) is itself only the effect of an optical illusion from the myopic perspective of a "European world-economy/system." It is just plain Eurocentrism.²²⁷

In other words, the foundation of the world-system (with hyphen) as being inherently European and, consequently, 500 years-old, is due to a restrictively Euro-Western perspective on global

²²⁶ Andre Gunder Frank and Barry K. Gillis, "The Five-Thousand Year World System: An Interdisciplinary Introduction." 6.

²²⁷ Gunder Frank, 333.

history. Although in of itself, a Euro-Western perspective is not Eurocentric, its international presence in the global order and processes of knowledge production as universal excludes other historical interpretations and render it Eurocentric.

Gunder Frank is careful to also address the so-called “empirical” evidence supporting the existence of a 500-year-old world-system. Throughout his book, he contests this evidence through his own empiricism, thereby demonstrating how the idea of empiricism within the Euro-Western conceptualisation of global history is, in fact, simply another form of Eurocentrism. He writes:

The conclusions are doubly troubling: the historical evidence against these widely held theoretical propositions [500-year-old world-system] is so abundant and systematic that it empirically invalidates them altogether. However, these propositions form the very basis and heart of nineteenth- and twentieth century social theory. Therefore, the fact that these propositions are themselves quite untenable also pulls the historical and empirical rug out from under this theory itself. Thus, *this "theory" turns out to be no more than Eurocentric ideology*. Since this ideology has been used to "legitimate" and support colonialism and imperialism, the falsity of these propositions also exposes the Eurocentric Emperor as having no clothes.²²⁸

It is important to note that Gunder Frank is not saying the empiricism is bad, or that it should not be used in academic historical enquiry. Rather, he is illustrating how empiricism has been used politically as a form of rationality lending legitimacy to academic historical knowledge production to conform to the structures and inequalities present within the 500-year-old world-system. Thus, there exists a tension between empiricism as a Euro-Western value and empiricism as a product of Eurocentric mechanisms of power.

Empiricism, in of itself, may be claimed to be apolitical. But it is used within academic historical knowledge production and philosophy of history, specifically with the 500-year-old world-system approach – politically. As we have seen in this thesis, empiricism is a foundational criterion for rational conclusions to be considered as historical “truths”. Thus, the way in which empiricism is used in academic history to understand global history as a discipline of the Humanities is Eurocentric. This directly confronts global, Euro-Western values such as human rights, (racial) equality, and universalism. In this sense, the Euro-Western world, through its perception of global history and its discourses of power in relation to its contemporary values today, is experiencing an existential crisis.

²²⁸ Gunder Frank, 321-322.

Many universities and history departments are feeling the impact of this crisis – being confounded with which way to move forward in an increasingly hyper-globalised world. Historians have turned to the past, as they usually do, to offer different perspectives and possibilities in this regard. Gunder Frank, for example, has offered a “humano-centric” rather than a Eurocentric approach to global history with his 5,000-year-old singular world system, thereby transcending Euro-centrality by focusing instead on the history of humans and their economic development. However, he also presents criticism to this view, referencing Sing Chew and his idea of “eco-centrism”.²²⁹ In this sense, the focus is on the history of humanity and the ecology, rather than a form of humanity. Enrique Dussel offers to go beyond tropes of modernity, presenting an argument for “trans-modernity”, which “affirms “from *without*” the essential components of modernity’s own excluded cultures in order to develop a new civilization for the twenty-first century”.²³⁰

In the end, it is not enough to utilise only *one* approach – history departments, the university, academia needs to accept multilateral attempts for solutions. I say attempts because the “solution” to Eurocentrism cannot be accomplished in a year or two – it will need continuous dedication, reinvention, and assertion. I believe historians have a key role within this process, being the present mediators between the past and the future. I also believe that historians, as scholars within the Humanities, must begin to look at and accept the totality of the *human* experiences within history. This includes the irrationality of actions, beliefs, ideas within historical analysis – examining the past from the heart as the well the mind. Just as historians must do this, so too must the university begin to look at itself again as a *societal* institution, representing a different society than it did when it emerged as a scientific institution in the European Enlightenment. Societies of today are increasingly multi-national, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, multi-racial. As an institution of and for society, the university – and, consequently, history departments – need to embody this new context, perception, and way of being. Only then will academia be able to truly engage in inter-epistemological dialogue, accepting the plurality of truths and realities within the human experience.

“The point here is that I think this is some part of what the liberal arts mantra of “teaching me how to think” is really supposed to mean: to be just a little less arrogant, to have some “critical

²²⁹ Gunder Frank, *ReORIENT*, xxvi-xxvii.

²³⁰ Enrique D. Dussel and Alessandro Fornazzari, “World-System and “Trans”-Modernity,” *Neplanta: Views from the South* 3, 2 (2002): 224.

awareness” about myself and my certainties...because a huge percentage of the stuff that I tend to be automatically certain of is, it turns out, totally wrong and deluded.”

David Foster Wallace – Kenyon College
Graduation Commencement Speech, 2005 (44-45)

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