The EU's Obsession with Crisis:

On the Politics of the "Refugee Crisis"

Master's Thesis Engaging Public Issues

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Abstract

This thesis investigates the political implications of the declaration of the "refugee *crisis*". By means of a Critical Discourse Analysis, this thesis aims to analyze how a specific articulation of the issue of migration – as crisis – makes certain forms of politics possible, while it renders others impossible. By focusing on three dimensions of the "refugee crisis", it shows how EU migration politics are centered around an idea of immigration as a "crisis". First, the EU strategically presents the "refugee crisis" as an external problem, which paves the way for its policy of externalization. Second, and following from the latter, the EU heavily invests in securitizing its external borders. Third, this thesis shows how the aforementioned "exclusionary" dimensions are always accompanied by an underlying capitalist interest, whereby migrants and refugees form a reserve army of cheap labor power ("inclusion"). As such, the working classes are structurally fragmented by borders, thereby averting international solidarity among workers. It concludes with the observation that "crisis" has become the durable norm.

Key words: borders, crisis, EU migration politics, externalization, labor, migration management, "refugee crisis", securitization.

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Introduction

In the early 2010's, a series of anti-governmental protests arose across the Arab world, from Tunisia to Syria, in what has come to be known as the Arab Spring. In several countries civil wars erupted. As a consequence of these fierce civil wars, hundreds of thousands of people were forced to flee their home country. Many of them undertook life-endangering journeys on fragile and unseaworthy vessels in order to seek refuge in Europe. It is against this background that Europe's external Mediterranean border became "by far the world's deadliest" (IOM, 2017, p. 1). The amount of deceased people in the Mediterranean Sea is shocking – yet not surprising – with a peak in 2016, whereby 5096 fatalities were recorded (Ibid.). As is the case with every social issue, various articulations, discourses and definitions of the respective social issue emerged. Different publics articulated the issue of migration differently. Although the issue of migration is articulated in numerous ways, a common feature of the articulations contains a sense of "crisis". This crisis-articulation is reflected in the well-known phrase "refugee crisis" or "migration crisis", which is also the term that official EU-institutions employ.

The declaration of a crisis is, however, not a neutral and objective description of reality, but has to be politically and discursively constituted (Roitman, 2014, p. 93); it is just one possible way of making the issue of migration public. In this thesis, I will investigate the ways in which specific articulations of migration enable certain forms of politics, while simultaneously precluding other forms of politics. I am interested in the *politics of proclaiming a crisis,* specifically applied to the case of the "refugee crisis". In doing so, I try to answer the following research question: How is a crisis-frame co-constitutive of EU migration politics?

In order to answer my research question, I will conduct a Critical Discourse Analysis of policy documents and keynote speeches of major political actors. Additionally, I will use secondary literature pertaining to the actual practices taking place at the "borderscape" (Mezzadra & Neilson, 2013, p. 9), thereby drawing on a wide range of empirical studies and ethnographic writings. By combining an analysis of policy documents and keynote speeches with secondary literature, I hope to gain sufficient insight into how different articulations of migration are practically given form.

This thesis is meant to contribute to the existing body of literature on migration to Europe by focusing on the translation of articulating an issue into actual practices. I intend to show how something seemingly banal and apolitical, the articulation of a social issue, is in fact thoroughly political. Not only is the act of articulation in itself political, it also serves certain political outcomes, while it renders other political outcomes impossible. The currently hegemonic, solutionist articulation of the issue of migration (as "refugee *crisis*") serves the

increasing fortification of Europe: the proliferation of border enforcement, border policing, detaining refugees in camps, etc.

Accordingly, I hope to provide an insight in how EU immigration policy is grounded in the very articulation of the issue as being a "crisis". I am aware of the shortcomings of an idealistic approach to politics – that is, the idea that politics is essentially about ideas (articulations). I do not necessarily intend to provide an alternative way of dealing with the issue of immigration. The point of this thesis is rather that currently dominant articulations of immigration are inherently contradictory with progressive and inclusive forms of politics. The solutionist articulation of immigration inevitably precludes these forms of politics, while it enables the deadly policies we have been witnessing for years now. Accordingly, simply re-articulating the issue of migration alone will not bring about fundamental change, but perhaps a re-articulation can, at least, pave the way for more progressive forms of politics.

Crucially, my critical position towards the crisis-articulation is in no way meant to downplay the brutalities migrants are confronted with, but rather to investigate what is rendered possible and impossible by proclaiming the "refugee crisis". In other words, I am not interested in developing a set of criteria for something to be a "true crisis" – or whether the current situation in the Mediterranean Sea is "severe enough" to be considered a crisis – but instead in examining the *practical political implications* a crisis-articulation yields.

Theoretical Approach

Crisis

In order to answer the research question as formulated above, we have to start by conceptualizing what a crisis is. There is a long-lasting tradition of theorizing "crisis" in social theory. I want to distinguish between two influential, yet different, conceptions of crisis: crisis-as-opportunity and crisis-as-reproduction. To be clear, these conceptions of crisis are rather theoretical and historical, and will not explicitly be mentioned as such in, for instance, policy documents or keynote speeches.

The first conception of "crisis" derives from the Marxist tradition and pertains to the idea that a crisis is ultimately a concretization of the immanent contradictions of the capitalist system. Consequently, crises are often perceived as opportunities for change; namely, crises are the historical moments where the antagonisms of capitalism are rendered visible, which shape the objective conditions for a revolution to erupt. As Joshua Clover (2016, p. 25) puts it: "Crisis is development of these contradictions to the breaking point". On this account, a state of crisis first and foremost provides the desirable conditions for radical social change (Schinkel, 2015), notwithstanding the disastrous effects a crisis yields in the everyday lives of people.

For others, the conception of crisis-as-opportunity has lost its power and relevance, and have opted for an alternative conception of crisis. They show how the proclamation of a crisis is in fact a way of perpetuating what already is (Schinkel, 2015, p. 38). To put it differently, the term crisis has transformed from a moment of "decision" to a moment of "indecision" (Schinkel, 2015, p. 38), to a "condition, a state of affairs" (Roitman, 2014, p. 16). The claim of a crisis is, then, a discursive tool for reproducing the status quo. Crucially, crisis is not merely a descriptive term to designate the severity of a certain situation, it is also productive in that it performatively constitutes the very crisis itself (Roitman, 2014, p. 93). Accordingly, it paves the way for certain forms of crisis-management while it forecloses other forms of politics.

Scholars who emphasize this crisis-as-reproduction conception often criticize the idea that a crisis is a "state of emergency" or an "exception" (Agamben, 2005). The idea that crisis is an exceptional state of affairs, a disruption of the norm, is both *ahistorical* (Danewid, 2017; Keshavarz, 2020) and *apolitical* (Schinkel, 2015; Roitman, 2014). In case of the "refugee crisis", this pertains to the idea that the current events form a radical and exceptional break with an otherwise peaceful and well-functioning (b)order (Keshavarz, 2020, p. 21). However, this crisis narrative fails to locate the ongoing tragedies surrounding the Mediterranean Sea in the wider context of centuries of European imperialism and decades of racist European immigration policy. In other words, the crisis narrative erases the violent histories of Europe vis-à-vis the

Global South, while it simultaneously denies its own role in the production of the tragedies taking place – that is, I would argue that the tragedies can be largely, if not completely, explained by EU immigration policy. Accordingly, Heller & Pezzani (2016, p. 1) speak of a "crisis of the EU border regime", rather than a "refugee crisis".

(De-)Politicization and Migration

I already briefly mentioned the apolitical character of the "refugee crisis" as crisis. In this section, I will further explain the paradoxical relationship between politicization and depoliticization. On the one hand, we can observe a heavy politicization of migration. Arguably, migration was never as politicized as it is now. On the other hand, we saw in the previous section that the very articulation of the issue of migration as a crisis is an act of depoliticizing migration. It reduces the issue of migration to a matter of crisis management, or problem management, thereby eliminating political struggle in favor of technocratic, solutionist practices (Geiger & Pécoud, 2010, p. 11). With this thesis, I hope to provide an insight in how these paradoxical phenomena of politicization and depoliticization – that seem to occur simultaneously – operate, and what they *do* with respect to the issue of migration. Importantly, these processes of politicization and depoliticization are closely related to the crisis-articulation of migration. Hence, it is important to further deconstruct these processes in light of the establishment of a "refugee crisis", and to show how these processes are constitutive of EU migration politics.

Taking into account the co-existing tendencies of politicizing and depoliticizing with regard to migration, I want to further deconstruct these tendencies by differentiating between two forms of *politicization*: democratic and undemocratic forms of politicizing migration. I will primarily discuss the far-right populist articulation of migration, notably known for its extensive campaigns for a complete closure of national borders. Far-right populist parties across Europe have in common their deep investment in anti-immigration, by which they present a rather politicized version of migration. However, I contend that this specific politicization of migration is undemocratic.

The main point here pertains to the politics of peoplehood, or, put differently, what precisely constitutes "the people", to whom democracy owes legitimacy. The far-right populist politicization of migration is undemocratic, as it assumes natural, pre-political boundaries of "the people" (Wolkenstein, 2019). The boundaries of "the people", then, naturally converge with the boundaries of the nation-state. Who belongs to the nation-state, and who does not, is pre-political and therefore not open to any political contestation. Consequently, peoplehood –

the question of what constitutes "the people" – is taken for granted, thereby placing it beyond political conflict as a natural given, as if the formation of "the people" is somehow external to democratic politics. However, what constitutes "the people" is not a pre-political, fixed given, but rather an ongoing political process that can impossibly be "accomplished" within a democratic framework (Müller, 2014). Any political project that aims to give a definitive answer to the question "what constitutes 'the people?" is inherently anti-democratic. To put it differently, the constitution of "the people" should be politically and democratically articulated, and part of this ongoing process is to always leave space for political contestation (Mouffe, 2000, p. 56).

Solutionism

Another important concept of this thesis is "solutionism". My conception of solutionism is twofold. First, solutionism refers to a particular way the issue of migration is articulated in terms of *a problem requiring solutions*. Accordingly, the popular articulation "refugee crisis" is a solutionist way of making the issue of migration public. Second, solutionism not only pertains to the discursive realm of articulation, but it also refers to a wide range of actual practices of designing and implementing short-term, technical "solutions" to immigration (Heller & Pezzani, 2016). You can think about the large-scale humanitarian interventions of NGO's to help refugees, but also a whole series of implemented EU policies that aim to "solve" the "refugee crisis" (e.g. the installment of Frontex, EU-Turkey Deal, the military-humanitarian operation of *Mare Nostrum*, etc.). Solutionist practice refers to a whole set of policies and interventions – by both governmental and nongovernmental institutions – that aim for "technical mastery" of the problem of migration (Marres, 2007). Importantly, my conception of solutionism is very closely related to my conception of crisis. The establishment of a crisis precedes the establishment of solutionist practices, and crisis-recovery takes the form of solutionism.

Border as Method

Furthermore, the concept of "border as method", introduced by Mezzadra & Neilson (2013), refers to a conception of borders as "epistemological device, which is at work whenever a distinction between subject and object is established" (Ibid., p. 16). The approach to border as method can best be summarized as follows:

> On the one hand, we refer to a process of producing knowledge that holds open tension between empirical research and the invention of concepts that orient it. On the other hand, to approach the border as method means to suspend, to recall a phenomenological category, the set of disciplinary practices that present the objects of knowledge as already constituted and investigate instead the processes by which these objects are constituted. (Mezzadra & Neilson, 2013, p. 17)

This approach allows me to go beyond the usual notion of the border as a "neutral line" or a given "research object", and conceive of borders as epistemological devices allowing for a critical analysis of "how relations of domination, dispossession, and exploitation are being redefined presently but also the struggles that take shape around these changing relations" (Mezzadra & Neilson, 2013, p. 18).

Labor and Migration

So far, I relied on a conception of borders as devices for exclusion, whereby I primarily focused on how migrants and refugees are violently being kept out by European policy. At the same time, however, borders do not only exclude but also include in no less violent ways (Mezzadra & Neilson, 2013, p. 7). The globalized world as we know it today is more than ever open to cross-border flows of capital, goods and commodities, whereas the flows of people are increasingly restricted, policed, and controlled. There is, however, one commodity that is inseparable from the living human body: labor power.

The continuous process of inclusion and exclusion at the border – which should be placed on a continuum, rather than seeing them as opposites – has aptly been called "the scene of exclusion, the obscene of inclusion" by Nicholas de Genova (2013). This phrase refers to the centrality of the familiar images of border enforcement where illegalized migrants are excluded by means of detention and deportation, while the "inclusion" of illegalized migrants is obscured. This "inclusion" of migrants – and especially illegalized migrants – effectively functions as the production of a reserve army of cheap labor (De Genova, 2013; Khalili, 2017). Seen from the point of view of capital, the influx of illegalized migrants is, cynically enough, a potential opportunity to recruit cheap labor. Within this context, borders function as the devices for differentiation, hierarchization, and illegalization. Illegality of migration is thus in fact beneficial to capital, as illegalized labor is no longer legally restricted. In other words, the illegalization of migration produces a reserve army of cheap labor – which is, additionally, legally unstable, precarious and vulnerable.

In this thesis, I will further analyze this ostensible tension between on the one hand the "exclusionary" xenophobic and necropolitical migration policies of the EU and, on the other hand, the obscured "inclusionary" motives of large-scale recruitment of "illegal" labor. The whole point is of course that these ostensibly contradictory phenomena are effectively two sides of the same coin; they are "dialectically interconnected" (De Genova, 2013, p. 1186). As such, I intend to show how this double agenda of EU migration politics is grounded in capitalist social relations, and how that, in turn, affects the crisis-management of EU migration politics.

Methods & Data

Central to this thesis are articulations of the issue of migration and the subsequent practices it enables and legitimizes. I will analyze how current ways of making the issue of migration public are co-constitutive of EU migration politics. In order to gain insight in the fabric of articulations, I will analyze a combination of policy documents and keynote speeches from major political actors on the issue of immigration to Europe. Policy documents are usually comprised of a *specific articulation* of the issue, combined with a proposition of a *solution* in the form of concrete policy measures. The keynote speeches are likely to contain more general reflections on the issue of migration rather than addressing one specific aspect, as is typically the case with policy documents. Moreover, the ways in which major political actors articulate the issue of migration is relevant, as they occupy the positions of power to either decide which articulation to adopt, or to come up with new articulations themselves. Together, these sources should offer me sufficient insight into the relationship between articulation and solution.

In order to select relevant documents for my analysis, I will use a *snowball sampling strategy*. Although snowball sampling is typically employed to gather respondents for interviews, I will translate its logic to the selection of secondary data, i.e. policy documents. The policy documents contain a lot of intertextual references, since new policies are always based on precedent policies. I will use multiple entry points, in order to avoid a biased image of articulations, though I am not particularly interested in picking a statistically representative sample of documents. As such, I aim to construct a framework of interconnected policies, whereby I intend to show how this policy framework is constitutive of the structural European crisis-management with regard to migration. By employing a snowball sampling strategy, I hope to structure the seemingly endless pile of documents into a more or less coherent framework of migration policies. Although I will primarily focus on actually implemented policies, I will also include in my analysis some policy documents that are not currently in force, since these documents inform us about the formation of EU migration policy. Therefore, it is important to *hierarchize* the selected documents, that is, I will take into consideration the current state of the documents concerned (e.g. in force, not in force).

The policy documents and keynote speeches will be complemented with literature on practices taking place in the "borderscape" (Mezzadra & Neilson, 2013, p. 9), thereby drawing on a wide range of empirical studies and ethnographic writings. The use of secondary literature is supposed to provide additional information regarding concrete instances of "bordering" and the struggles of border crossing as experienced by migrants themselves. Together with my

analysis of the primary data (policy documents and keynote speeches), these materials should offer me sufficient insight in the relationship between articulation and practice.

In order to investigate how certain articulations enable certain forms of politics – while precluding other forms of politics – I will conduct a critical discourse analysis (CDA). CDA can be perfectly employed to investigate the relationship between the discursive realm of articulation and the non-discursive elements of a certain issue (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002); whereby the latter refers to the actual and material practices that are discursively shaped and constituted. It is precisely this relationship between articulation and practice that I am interested in.

Since CDA emphasizes the role of language in constituting the social world – albeit dialectically; that is, discourse is both constitutive of the social world, as well as constituted by the social world (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002) – it perfectly suits my thesis subject. CDA allows me to gain insight in how the linguistic-discursive proclamation of a crisis has profound practical, material consequences; and allows me to place these within the wider asymmetrical power structure between the EU and the Global South. Importantly, the articulation of a crisis is not only discursive – discourse is practically enacted. It is therefore important to include literature pertaining to the actual execution of policies in order to take into account how the policies are practically done, enacted, performed (Mol, 1999).

More specifically, I will analyze the connection between articulation and actual policy, and the practices it enables and directs. First, I am interested in how the issue of migration is made public, articulated, defined. This is reflected in the specific term the narrator employs (e.g. “refugee crisis”, “migration problem”, “humanitarian crisis” etc.), complemented with a description, or explanation, of the situation the policy document aims to address. Second, the articulation of the issue is followed by a call for action, that is, a guiding description of the plan of action in order to tackle the addressed issue. By way of combining the specific articulation of the issue itself, the proposition of a set of possible solutions, and literature on the day-to-day performance of these policies, I hope to be able to investigate how real-world practices at the border are shaped by the very articulation of the issue.

Chapter 1. External Problems Require External Solutions

Recent history shows us that the EU externalizes the issue of migration to "neighboring" countries. In 2004, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) was introduced, which was thoroughly revised in 2015 because of "growing numbers of refugees are arriving at the European Union's external borders" (European Commission, 2015a, p. 2). The emergent migratory pressure at the EU's external border gave impetus to further expand the EU's "cooperation" with neighboring countries, especially countries along the coast of the Mediterranean Sea. Migration management became a key pillar of the ENP. Subsequently, on March 18, 2016, the EU-Turkey deal was officially launched, adding another "neighbor" to the already far-reaching European influence in countries surrounding the Mediterranean Sea. As such, the EU has expanded its sphere of influence – when it comes to migration management – far beyond its own borders, thereby creating a first barrier for migrants and refugees intending to enter Europe, even before the shores of Europe are in sight.

The strategic externalization of migration policies to countries outside of the EU is made possible by articulating the issue of migration as being external to the EU – as a foreign threat invading the European continent. Accordingly, I distinguish between two forms of externalization; namely what I would call discursive externalization and a policy of externalization. First, discursive externalization refers to the EU's articulation of the issue being somehow external to the EU, as if the EU accidentally got involved in the "refugee crisis". Second, a policy of externalization refers to the ongoing neo-colonial and imperial European efforts to externalize its borders to third countries, thereby creating a "buffer zone" through which a first share of refugees and migrants can be stopped before even setting foot on European soil. In this chapter, I will further explain the two forms of externalization, and show how the spatial relocation of EU migration policy to "neighboring" countries is embedded in the EU's articulation of the "refugee crisis" as being external to the EU.

1.1 Discursive Externalization

Throughout the various documents I analyzed, I noticed that the EU consistently presents the issue of migration as an external problem. Of course, the migrants and refugees central to the issue of the "refugee crisis" come, technically, from countries that are outside of the EU's territory. However, the issue of immigration – as a social fact – is itself an inherent part of EU politics, inseparable from EU migration policies. By discursively externalizing the issue of migration, the EU creates an image of migration whereby incoming migrants and refugees

constitute the "refugee crisis" – thereby, albeit unsurprisingly, rendering impossible a critical interrogation of its own role in the issue of migration.

In 2015, the then-president of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker stated in the annual State of the Union Speech: "Let us also be clear and honest with our often worried citizens: as long as there is war in Syria and terror in Libya, the refugee crisis will not simply go away" (Juncker, 2015). Juncker "honestly" relates the European "refugee crisis" to political instability in countries outside the EU – to external conditions. Accordingly, what precisely triggers the "refugee crisis" is a set of external factors, be it the "war in Syria", "terror in Libya", or the activity of networks of migrant smugglers and traffickers, the latter being one of the major targets of EU migration policy. In any scenario, the EU is the innocent outsider that accidentally got involved in the problems of third countries. The inevitable consequence of this narrative – this articulation of the "refugee crisis" as being principally external to the EU – is that the EU appears to us as the heroic, humanitarian savior of people fleeing from external problems.

In the same speech, Juncker appeals to a sort of ethical obligation to a general humankind: "This [refugee crisis] is first of all a matter of humanity and human dignity. And for Europe it is also a matter of historical fairness" (Juncker, 2015). Juncker re-articulates the issue of migration in terms of an ethical obligation to humankind; to be "historically fair". Initially, the phrase "historical fairness" would point to a historicization of migration. However, such an appeal to a general humankind obfuscates the violent, asymmetrical historical relationship between Europe and the Global South. As Ida Danewid (2017) has convincingly argued, the EU's appeal to humankind and the humanitarian border employs an ontological, transhistorical – as opposed to historically specific – conception of humankind, devoid of an account of the intersecting systems of oppression, i.e. slavery, imperialism, colonialism, white supremacy and capitalism. These systems of oppression differentially shape and produce subjectivities; it is therefore important to analyze subjectivities and systems of oppression in a tandem, rather than detaching them. As such, this appeal to an ontological humankind terminates the connectedness of past and present violence, thereby erasing historical brutalities of Europe vis-à-vis the Global South (Lemberg-Pedersen, 2019). To speak with Danewid (2017, p. 1676): "The result is a veil of ignorance which, while not precisely Rawlsian, nonetheless allows the white subject to re-constitute itself as 'ethical' and 'good', innocent of its imperialist histories and present complicities."

Accordingly, the combined statements of Juncker as displayed above represent a shift from political struggle to a dehistoricized ethical issue of "human dignity" and "historical

fairness". This conversion of what is essentially a historical-political question of centuries of European oppression into an ethical and moral obligation towards a transhistorical, ontological "humankind" effectively depoliticizes and dehistoricizes the issue of migration (Fassin & Pandolfi, 2010, p. 7; Mouffe, 2005, p. 78). This articulation withdraws the political histories that structure present practices of border control and migration management. This is perfectly consistent with the crisis-articulation, which is based on the idea of the "refugee crisis" as a state of emergency, as a disruption of an otherwise peaceful border (cf. Keshavarz, 2020).

In short, the EU articulates the "refugee crisis" as an external problem evading the EU and expresses its own role in terms of an ethical obligation to an ontological humankind. What constitutes the "refugee crisis" is, then, the presence of migrants and refugees themselves at the shores of Europe, fleeing from external political instability, to which the EU must respond, driven by ethical and humanitarian motives. What is obfuscated here is the significant role of the EU itself and its migration policies in the establishment of the "refugee crisis". Moreover, it disconnects the connected histories of Europe in relation to the Global South, thereby presenting the issue of migration as an ethical and hence apolitical, ahistorical issue. In the next section, I will elaborate on the "out-sourcing" and "off-shoring" of EU migration policy to transit countries at the coastlines of the Mediterranean Sea (Bialasiewicz, 2012). This is what I would call policy externalization, which is made possible by the articulation of the "refugee crisis" as external to the EU.

1.2 A Policy of Externalization

Now that we have addressed the discursive legitimization of the EU's efforts to externalize its border, we can take a closer look at what is precisely externalized, and under what terms. Especially two policies will be addressed here, namely the European Neighborhood Policy and the EU-Turkey deal. The combination of these policies cover the most frequently used routes to the EU: the central Mediterranean route (from Libya to Italy) and the Eastern Mediterranean route (from Syria to Greece, Cyprus and Bulgaria through Turkey). As a result, the EU has signed partnerships with the main transit countries of migration to the EU. In this section, I will analyze how this ongoing neocolonial project of creating an extraterritorial buffer zone has unfolded over the last years.

A key pillar of the ENP is the promotion of "European values", at least since its revision in 2015:

> The purpose of the current review of the ENP is to propose how the EU and its neighbors can build more effective partnerships in the neighborhood. In doing so, the EU will pursue its interests which include the promotion of universal values. The EU's own stability is built on democracy, human rights and the rule of law and economic openness and the new ENP will take stabilization as its main political priority in this mandate (European Commission, 2015a, p. 2).

The quote above shows how the European partnerships with neighboring countries is predicated upon a strong neocolonial component. The promotion of supposed "European values" – notably re-articulated as "universal values" – takes center stage in the ENP, at least discursively. Interestingly, the EU phrases "European values" ideologically as "universal values". The universalization of European values allows the EU to export its values of "democracy, human rights and the rule of law and economic openness" to neighboring countries. After all, universal values serve universal humanity. Again, the ideological articulation of European values as universal values appeals to a generic humankind that is linked together by a sort of ontological commonality: being human. The starting point of such an ontological conception of humankind is equality, every human is equal since we are all human (Agier, 2010, p. 32). The point is of course that not all humans *are* equal, as humans are differentially and asymmetrically shaped by their particular histories and the unequal distribution of the repercussions of global systems of oppression (cf. Danewid, 2017).

At the same time, the EU takes an opportunistic and pragmatic stance when it comes to the promotion of its "universal values". Indeed, the underlying yet crucial interest of the EU is the externalization of migration management. The EU's cooperation with Libya – which is the main transit countries for migration to Europe via the central Mediterranean route and hence a crucial strategic partner – clearly demonstrates that strategic partnerships prevail over the principal adherence to "universal values". In other words, when the promotion of "universal values" is detrimental to the externalization of migration management, the EU is more than willing to discard its "universal values". Indeed, with the implementation of the ENP, the EU effectively supports dictatorial regimes and armed militias (as opposed to "democracy"), enslavement, human auctions, forced labor, (sexual) abuse, (as opposed to "human rights"), lack of an infrastructure to process asylum applications (as opposed to the "rule of law") (Akkerman, 2018). For this reason, some authors speak of a rectification of EU asylum policy, rather than an externalization, since, for instance, Libya does not have the facilities and the legal

framework for processing asylum applications (Andrijasevic, 2009). The right to asylum is, then, not so much externalized, but rather retracted in its entirety.

In addition to ENP, the EU has several Emergency Trust Funds, notably the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), that can be swiftly triggered in times of emergency like the "refugee crisis". The "rapid funding" in crisis-situations allows the EU to quickly support third countries "in managing their borders" (European Commission, 2016). Moreover, so-called Immigration Liaison Officers are deployed in third countries to assist and monitor the process of migration management, which is one of the points of the "Ten point action plan on migration" addressing the immediately required actions to tackle the "refugee crisis" (European Commission, 2015b).

Furthermore, the operational area of Frontex operations Triton & Poseidon – the former aiming to control the central Mediterranean route, and the latter aiming to control the Eastern Mediterranean route – is expanded beyond European territorial waters (European Commission, 2015b). Crucially, when refugees and migrants are intercepted in Libyan or Turkish territorial waters, they can be sent back immediately. These so-called "pushbacks" have become part and parcel of the activities of Frontex (Heller & Pezzani, 2016, p. 6). Recently, it turned out that Greece is building an infrastructure that is aimed at pushing back migrants and refugees into Turkish territorial waters in order to circumvent the Dublin convention (NOS, 2021). Indeed, when migrants are intercepted on Greek territorial waters, Greece is legally obliged to process those asylum applications. The violent and grim "pushbacks" allow the EU to bypass the Dublin convention and send refugees and migrants back to third countries, even when they are already on EU territorial waters.

To summarize, the continued neocolonial project of externalizing migration management to third countries unfolds under the guise of humanitarian support. While the EU engages in "dialogues" – a frequently used word in both the ENP review document (European Commission, 2015a; European Commission, 2015c) – with neighboring countries, instances of violence at the EU's external borders and beyond tighten up. The humanitarian and dialogue-focused approach of the EU, as grounded in an articulation of the "refugee crisis" as external to the EU, allows the EU to invest billions of euros in the enhancement of migration management in third countries, while engaging in a "reasonable dialogue". To speak with Schinkel & Van Reekum (2019, p. 42): "Debate is not the civilized alternative to violence, but

the possibility to perpetuate that violence through invisibilization and negation".[1] In the next chapter, I will show how the dual externalization of migration – discursive and a policy of externalization – forms the EU's incentive to "securitize" the issue of migration.

[1] Translation mine, original text in Dutch: "Debat is niet het geciviliseerde alternatief voor geweld, maar de mogelijkheid om dat geweld vol te houden via invisibilisatie en negatie." (Schinkel & Van Reekum, 2019, p. 42).

Chapter 2. Security or Safety?

The European Border and Coast Agency, commonly known as Frontex, was established in 2004. About a decade later, the European Commission (EC) proposed – in explicit response to the emergent "refugee crisis" – to rigorously expand Frontex' mandate. Today, Frontex is the cornerstone of European migration management, responsible for the day-to-day execution of border control at the EU's external borders and beyond. The enlargement of the competencies of Frontex can best be placed within the broader context of the increasing securitization of migration – which has, according to some, resulted in the rise of "Fortress Europe" (Luedtke, 2008). In the previous chapter, we saw how the EU discursively externalizes the issue of migration, combined with the strategic externalization of its migration policies. The ongoing securitization of migration is, in light of its externalization, a logical response. In order to make clear the interconnectedness of these chapters, it is worth quoting at length the compelling formulation of Harney & Moten (2013, p. 18):

> The self-defense of revolution is confronted not only by the brutalities but also by the false image of enclosure. The hard materiality of the unreal convinces us that we are surrounded, that we must take possession of ourselves, correct ourselves, remain in the urgency, on a permanent footing, settled, determined, protecting nothing but an illusionary right to what we do not have, which the settler takes for and as the commons. (…) Meanwhile, politics soldiers on, claiming to defend what it has not enclosed, enclosing what it cannot defend but only endanger.

When you feel threatened by something external – by what Harney and Moten (2013) call "the surround" – the first and foremost impulse is to defend yourself, to protect yourself against that external threat, to build walls, to "push back" migrants, to create an infrastructure of biometrical surveillance, an infrastructure of detention and deportation. In this chapter, I will further discuss the ongoing securitization of migration in the European context, thereby showing how securitization is deeply embedded in a crisis-articulation of migration.

The securitized European approach to migration can be explained in terms of slightly different connotations attached to the words "security" and "safety". Unlike most languages, the English language knows two words for the German "Sicherheit", the French "securité" and the Dutch "veiligheid", namely: security and safety. Security and safety have a slightly different connotation. Whereas safety refers to "a state in which or a place where you are safe and not in danger of risk", security refers to "protection of a person, building, organization, or country

against threats such as crime or attacks by foreign countries" (Cambridge Dictionary, 2021). The main difference between the words is that the former denotes a personal state of being safe, of being free from harm and threat. The latter, by contrast, refers to practices of protecting the safety of people against external threats.

When we relocate this semantic elaboration to the issue of migration, the different connotations become clear. The EU has heavily invested in the security of its external borders, yet the EU's external borders are far from safe. Indeed, tens of thousands of migrants have lost their lives in the Mediterranean Sea on their journeys towards Europe. In other words, security does not necessarily imply safety. In case of migration to Europe, to put it more strongly, the ongoing EU's efforts to bring security to its external borders seems to come at the expense of safety at the external borders. In what follows, I will further analyze the EU's efforts to "securitize" its external borders, thereby effectively shaping – ironically enough – the world's most *unsafe* border.

2.1 "A Chain is always only as strong as its weakest link"[2]: The Expansion of the Frontex Mandate

One of the foundational premises on which the EU is built, is the establishment of the Schengen area: an international area without internal borders which safeguards the free movement of goods, capital and people. The elimination of internal borders and the preservation of a free market within the Schengen area hinges, according to the EC, upon a heavily secured and protected external border (European Commission, 2015d). Accordingly, in direct response to the "migration crisis", the EC suggests that a new EU-wide strategy for a comprehensive approach to migration is required. In the following statement, the EC expresses the need for a European integrated border management:

> Throughout the current *migration crisis* [emphasis added], it became clear that the Schengen area without internal borders is only sustainable if the external borders are effectively secured and protected. The control of the Union's external borders is a common and shared interest which must be carried out in accordance with high and uniform Union standards (European Commission, 2015d, p. 2).

[2] (European Commission, 2015d, p. 2)

The statement above evidently demonstrates how the EC's call for an intensification of external border control is grounded in a crisis-articulation of migration. The EC's call was concretized in the proposal for an enhancement of Frontex' mandate, aimed at resolving the urgent "migration crisis". What, then, involves the expansion of the Frontex mandate? Although the expansion of the mandate of Frontex contains a wide range of new tasks and responsibilities (Frontex basically gains ground in all aspects of EU migration policy, thereby making Frontex *de facto* the executive organ of EU border management and control), I will discuss the most powerful change of the new mandate of Frontex.

Instantiated by the expansion of Frontex' mandate, Frontex gained the new possibility to overrule national governments in times of emergency. On the basis of the "mandatory vulnerability assessment" that Frontex carries out, potential vulnerabilities in the EU's external border management can be addressed. Consequently, Frontex is allowed to impose "corrective measures" to the national governments involved, which then have to implemented within a certain time-limit as determined by Frontex (European Commission, 2015d, p. 9). When the concerned member state fails to implement the "corrective measures" within the time-frame, Frontex is allowed to intervene. Ignited by the "refugee crisis", this arrangement reflects the continued EU project of Europeanizing and securitizing its migration policies. As such, the (discursive) declaration of a crisis – of a state of emergency – triggers a wide range of far-reaching policies, with a drastic relocation of power from national governments to the EU's own Frontex.

In this context, it is important to take into account the second pillar of the EU migration policy: the Dublin system, i.e. the country of arrival is responsible for processing the asylum application. First, the Dublin system deprives refugees of their agency, as the "relocation" regime operates along the lines of "objective and transparent criteria", thereby dismissing the personal intentions and rationalities of refugees themselves (Kasparek, 2016a, p. 10). Second, the Dublin system puts disproportional pressure on the Southern Member States. Through a strategy of "internal externalization" (Heller & Pezzani, 2016, p. 6), Northern member states coercively impose the processing of asylum applications to the Southern states. While recovering from the Euro-crisis of 2009, these coastal states were "bearing the greatest burden" when it comes to processing asylum applications (European Commission, 2011, p. 3). As such, Northern member states internally externalize the issue of migration to the EU's Southern member states, thereby producing a new "buffer zone" within the EU and adding a new layer of barriers for migrants to enter their national territory.

The asymmetrical distribution of the "burden" of processing asylum applications has a further implication with regard to the search and rescue activities at sea, which was also a central target of the new mandate of Frontex. What the Dublin convention *de facto* accomplished, however, is increasing reluctance of Southern member states – in cooperation with Frontex – when it comes to "saving lives at sea". Indeed, when refugees and migrants are rescued at sea, they have the fundamental right to apply for asylum, which then intensifies the pressure of asylum processing (Heller & Pezzani, 2016). This passive neglect in the form of non-assistance at sea is, furthermore, accompanied by the active and armed pushbacks of refugees into non-EU territorial waters in order to alleviate themselves from "migratory pressures".

2.2 "No Registration, no rights"[3]: Hotspots as Biopolitical Spaces of Governance

Less than a year ago, a huge fire broke out in refugee camp Moria, located on the Greek island of Lesbos (BBC, 2020). As a result, 13.000 detained refugees were left without shelter, leaving them worse off than the already horrific conditions in camp Moria. Lesbos is one of the main entry points for migrants and refugees into the EU. As such, Moria was one of the so-called "hotspots" that was actually in force. The tragedy of Moria painfully reveals the deficiencies of the "hotspot approach", notably introduced in explicit and direct response to the "refugee crisis" in 2015 (European Commission, 2015e). The main goal of the "hotspot approach" is clear: "Everyone arriving in the external borders should be registered, fingerprinted, and have their documents checked against national and international security databases" (European Commission, 2016, p. 5). The code of conduct in the hotspots is simple yet drastic: "No registration, no rights" (Ibid., p. 12). Consequently, the establishment of the "hotspot approach" represents the formal realization of an infrastructure of disenfranchisement, surveillance, detection, detention and deportation – although the legal framework for these "hotspot activities" is still lacking (European Commission, 2015f, p. 4). Consequently, the categorization of the EU's external borders as "biopolitical border" (Walters, 2002) or "biometric border" (Amoore, 2006) becomes more and more evident. In this section, I will further discuss these concepts in relation to the intersection of the "hotspot approach", terrorism, and the securitization of migration, thereby following the logic of Amoore's (Ibid.) convincing argument.

[3] (European Commission, 2016a, p. 12)

Throughout the documents I analyzed, terrorism is directly linked to immigration and hence an external threat that needs to be secured. Terrorism has, according to the EU, evolved into a "very real threat" (European Commission, 2016, p. 9). The fact that terrorism has become an issue to be addressed by migration policy, shows that the EU has an externalized and racialized conception of terrorism and its perpetrators, whereby every migrant arriving at the EU is at first a potential terrorist (De Genova, 2018). In this respect, the EU employs the logic of *guilty until proven innocent,* i.e. when no "hits" are found in the EU-wide fingerprint database (EURODAC).

In order to avoid terrorist attacks within the Schengen area, the EU deploys biometrical identification technologies at the external borders. By doing so, the EU claims the biopolitical power of governing the mobility of bodies, which is essentially a dividing practice, notably along the lines of race: on the one hand, there are legitimate and hence risk-free mobilities, and on the other hand, there are illegitimate and hence risky mobilities (Amoore, 2006, p. 339). Identity, as biometrically determined, then functions as a source for "risk profiling", prediction and prevention. As a result, the EU produces a knowable, governable and manageable transnational population.

The installment of the hotspots is an intervention aimed at resolving the urgent "migratory pressures", legitimized by a crisis-articulation of migration. As such, hotspots are articulated as temporal spaces of exception, as somehow disrupting the normal state of affairs (Agamben, 2005). However, at the time of writing, the hotspot activities have become part and parcel of EU migration management. This clearly demonstrates how, under the guise of temporary crisis-management, democratic politics and the "rule of law" are circumvented and become structural components of EU migration policy (Andrijasevic, 2010; Kasparek, 2016b). Although the EU characterizes its approach at the hotspots as relying on the "rule of law" – as opposed to the US model of pre-emptive security – the actual practice at the hotspots points to the contrary, where human rights are extensively violated (De Goede, 2008).

Furthermore, the deployment of biometrical technologies epitomizes an underlying imaginary of migration as a technical problem that requires technical, managerial and scientific solutions. A wide range of technologies – inter alia, passports, visa's, fingerprints, facial images, identity cards – are deployed as a means of technical mastery of the issue of migration (cf. Marres, 2007). Accordingly, securitization unfolds by means of technical solutions driven by science and technology, all legitimized by the articulation of migration as a "crisis" demanding immediate action. In the next chapter, I will show from a Marxist perspective how the European border functions as a technology of selection and fragmentation in order to fill

the potential gaps in the labor market, thereby averting international solidarity among workers.

Chapter 3. Between Capitalist Interests and Xenophobia

Thus far we have been looking at what is usually considered the "exclusionary" character of the EU border regime. We saw how the EU is heavily invested in shaping an extraterritorial buffer zone of migration management, thereby erecting an infrastructure of surveillance, detention, deportation, pushbacks, exploitation and abuse. In this chapter, I will turn to the strategic and selective "inclusion" of migrants, thereby addressing the persistently underlying material interest of the EU when it comes to immigration. By doing so, I will show how the EU's migration management can be placed in a larger structure of what Catherine Besteman (2019) has designated as "global militarized apartheid". More specifically, I will show how inclusion and exclusion are not so much opposites, but rather operate in a continuum of capitalist interests and xenophobia. In other words, inclusion and exclusion are two sides of the same coin.

3.1 A Continent in Demographic Decline: The EU's Need for Labor Power

In addition to a package of immediate crisis-measures, the EU argues the following in their document on "managing the refugee crisis":

> Finally, a long-term approach must include opening legal channels for migration. This is part of establishing of a robust system of migration management, and essential if we are to make migration less of a problem to be tackled, and more a well-managed resource for a continent facing severe demographic decline (European Commission, 2015g, p. 13).

The EU repeatedly expresses the need for immigration on a structural basis, as gaps in the EU's internal labor market will only grow, driven by an aging population. First, the EU explicates that migration is a "problem to be tackled", whereas the long-term aim is to turn migration into a "well-managed resource". In light of the foregoing chapters, where we saw how violence is at the very heart of the EU border regime, the EU's ambition to turn migration into a "well-managed resource" might *prima facie* come as a surprise. Indeed, why else would the EU control its external borders so violently, when demographic developments within the EU demand an increasing labor force? In this chapter, I will show that this ambition is perfectly compatible with the securitizing and externalizing tendencies as described before.

Though never explicitly mentioned as such, refugees are in the eyes of the EU border regime low-skilled (Mezzadra & Neilson, 2013, p. 137). The categorization of disenfranchised

migrants and refugees as low-skilled is defined by its counterpart: the EU's need for recruitment of highly skilled migrants. By definition, then, refugees are automatically perceived as low-skilled. As such, the EU adopts a racialized categorization logic, whereby refugees and migrants of the "refugee crisis" are persistently categorized as low-skilled. Additionally, at the core of the EU border regime lies the reification, or the dehumanization, of racialized "illegal" migrants. More specifically, "illegality" is reified, i.e. what is in fact a transnational social relation between capital and labor, appears to us as natural, objective given (De Genova, 2013). The disenfranchised migrants and refugees are, accordingly, "low-skilled" and "illegal", which are, cynically seen, the perfect conditions for a reserve army of cheap labor. The continual possibility of deportation, whether actually enforced or not, is always the threatening horizon for migrants and refugees, even "behind the border". What the EU produces, then, is a transnational *deportable* population of cheap labor power (Mezzadra & Neilson, 2013, p. 146; De Genova, 2013, p. 1188; Besteman, 2019).

In this respect, it is important to turn to the internal tensions and imbalances within the EU, where contradictory interests are commonplace. As we saw before, the northern member states exert pressure on the southern member states. Not only in terms of securitization via "internal externalization" (cf. Pezzani & Heller, 2016), but also when it comes to labor migration and the illegalization thereof. As Kasparek (2016b) shows, southern member states are, to a much larger extent than northern states, dependent on illegalized labor in sectors like construction and agriculture. Northern member states, on the contrary, rely far more on the recruitment of highly skilled migrants, whereby low-skilled migrants can be "imported" from eastern EU states (Ibid., p. 9). As such, the benefits of the EU's call for a common, comprehensive asylum system – accompanied with a call for "opening legal channels" for migration (European Commission, 2015g, p. 13) – are unequally distributed among member states. Clearly, we can see the internal contradictions of EU migration politics, with northern member states drawing the longest straw.

Furthermore, the invocation of this crisis-imaginary is not at all detrimental to the project of the EU. Instead, the EU can strategically deploy this crisis-imaginary for the purpose of invigorating the supranational project of the EU. Indeed, the "refugee crisis" has, allegedly, demonstrated the need for an EU-wide, common asylum system – which is a recurring theme throughout the various documents. In order to establish such a common asylum system, a crisis-articulation of migration provides the perfect conditions for expanding the EUropean project. In the midst of all the hustle and bustle of the "refugee crisis" – with individual member states "losing control" – the EU proceeds to expand its mandate when it comes to migration policy.

Moreover, this crisis-imaginary profoundly helps the EU in reconciling – smoothing out – existing imbalances and conflicting interests (e.g. North-South imbalance) between individual member states. Indeed, when individual member states fail to tackle urgent crisis-situations, the designated actor par excellence to intervene is the EU. In other words, the invocation of a crisis-imaginary allows the EU to re-organize national policies on a supranational level, thereby simultaneously erasing internal conflicts and revitalizing the EUropean project.

3.2 Fragmenting and De-Solidarizing the Working Classes

The border – as a technology for the production of a reserve army of cheap, illegalized labor – does not solely pertain to migrant laborers. It also has severe consequences for the domestic working class. Here, the border functions as a de-solidarizing force, which fragments the international working classes, thereby fostering national solidarity, rather than class-based solidarity. The rise of far-right nationalist parties across the European continent points to the "effectiveness" of the border regime, whereby workers are generally more prone to display solidarity with their bosses than with their migrant colleagues.

Although there is zero empirical support, the ideological myth of migration as exerting "downward pressure on domestic wages" remains a tenacious one. Here, I draw on the concept of "arbitrage", which is an often-heard argument *against* labor migration, so too under leftist parties (e.g. the Dutch Socialist Party). Arbitrage refers to the active engagement of employers in the strategic exploitation of "variations in national currencies, re/production costs and different laws around the world" in order to maximize profits (Mitropoulos, 2019). By doing so, employers actively produce an almost on-demand pool of hyper-exploitable, illegalized labor power (Khalili, 2017), thereby purportedly depressing domestic wages as well. What is obfuscated here, however, is that domestic wages are not (solely) affected by absolute demographic growth, but rather by *relative surplus populations,* that is, surplus relative to the needs of the self-expansion of capital (Mitropoulos, 2019). In other words, domestic wages are not suppressed by immigration (absolute growth), but by relative surplus populations according to the urges of accumulative capital. The ostensible tension between migration and domestic wages is, therefore, ideological in the sense that it is based on a fiction of national coherence when it comes to wages. At the end of the day, the transnational working class at large is being exploited, rather than the ideological narrative of migrants seizing the jobs of domestic workers.

When Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels (1848/2012) wrote the famous words "Workers of the World, Unite!", they were well aware of the importance of internationalist solidarity in anti-capitalist struggle. Today, we still witness the structural fragmentation of the working classes

by borders, thereby averting an internationally organized labor movement, while reinforcing the contract between capital and whiteness. However, this bond between capital and white labor has come under growing pressure, driven by neoliberal capitalism and its tendency to incrementally subjugate groups of people to its logic of precarization (Danewid, 2021, p. 10). It is against this background that we should make sense of the increasing securitization of the EU's external borders, as a final attempt to restore the strained contract between white labor and capital (Besteman, 2019; Danewid, 2021; De Genova, 2018). When we take a further step back, we witness a regime of a militarized global apartheid take shape, as the compelling formulation of Besteman outlines:

> When applied to a theory of global apartheid, it becomes clear that the aggressive penetration of neoliberal capitalism (and capitalist plunder) in the global south has created "excess populations" that are to be either captured for the market as cheap producers, exploitable workers, or temporary guest workers or made expandable through forced removals and displacements, incarceration into refugee camps, or being allowed to sicken or die. The patterning of this transformation is driven by a racist logic of securitization that defines bodies in the global south as either security threats to or exploitable labor for the global north (Besteman, 2019, S31).

Conclusion: Structural Crisis-Management

On September 9, 2015, the former president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker stated in his State of the Union speech: "So it is high time to act to manage the refugee crisis. There is no alternative to this." (Juncker, 2015). With an explicit reference to the neoliberal TINA-politics of Thatcher, Juncker applies the neoliberal logic to the issue of migration. The managerial, technical, apolitical vocabulary that is emblematic of neoliberalism has profoundly shaped EU migration politics over the last decades. Legitimized by hyperbolical language – e.g. "unprecedented pressure", "massive inflow", and notably also "crisis" – the EU has implemented a whole range of far-reaching measures in order to control migration. Under the guise of immediate crisis-management, a necropolitical infrastructure of surveillance, policing, incarceration, deportation, "pushbacks", hotspots has been established and has penetrated into the very structural core of EU migration politics.

Let us briefly reiterate the different chapters. First, we saw how the EU engages in a dual process of externalization. The discursive presentation of migration as an external problem – be it the activity of human smugglers and traffickers, war in Syria, or terrorist threats – exonerates the EU from critically interrogating its own constitutive role within the issue of migration. The underlying imaginary sustaining this externalization is the European continent as a discrete, self-contained region that is somehow alien from, and confronted with, the problems of other, less well-governed regions (Walters, 2010). The first reflex when you feel encircled by external threats and problems, is to violently defend yourself, to seek enclosure. As such, it paves the way for the neocolonial project of what I have called – in the second chapter – a policy of externalization, whereby migration management is offshored and outsourced to third countries, thereby creating an extraterritorial buffer zone where refugees and migrants are incarcerated, auctioned, abused and exploited.

What is left, then, is the circular logic of the EU trying to "solve problems" that it has created itself. In order to reduce "illegal" migration to the EU, the EU has heavily invested in securitizing and militarizing its external borders, which de facto, and by definition, increases "illegal" mobilities. Indeed, the activity of networks of human smugglers and traffickers derives its *raison d'être* precisely, and solely, from the EU's production of illegality and the ensuing securitization of its external borders. In other words, the EU's attempt to fight irregular migration is ultimately fighting its own production of illegality, yet perpetually concealing how the EU is itself implicated herein. Consequently, the solution as enacted by the EU creates the conditions of possibility for what it aims to tackle in the first place. As a result, we witness an

endless cycle of mutually reinforcing phenomena with the EU running away from its own shadow.

At the same time, the third chapter showed that the EU has a severe material interest in not entirely closing its external borders. In light of an aging population, immigrants can fill the growing gaps in the EU labor market. Immigrant labor, then, forms an escape out of a labor population in decline. This seemingly contradictory phenomenon represents what De Genova (2013) has called "the scene of exclusion, the obscene of inclusion". Accordingly, the violent "exclusion" of refugees and migrants at the EU's external borders, is always accompanied with its silent partner of "inclusion", i.e. the recruitment of cheap labor. The border functions here as a technology of differential and racialized selection, of hierarchizing migrant skills, thereby also erecting barriers for transnational class-based solidarity.

Finally, the obsessive preoccupation of the EU with crisis results in a permanent state of crisis. If immediate crises are resolved, the EU switches to its preparation-mode for potential, future crises. Crisis is, then, not so much a state of exception, but rather the normalized structural condition. Initial crisis-measures that were developed in times of the "refugee crisis" have now become part and parcel of EU migration politics. The structural management of crises never results in going "back to normal", or a *return* to the status quo: it is routinized, institutionalized crisis-management itself that constitutes that very norm; crisis is the status quo. In other words, crisis is the centripetal force around which EU migration policies are reconciled. In the foreseeable future, it is unlikely that the capitalist plundering of the Earth will come to an end, which inevitably leads to ever-growing excess populations fleeing from the disastrous effects of global warming, growing poverty, and intensified oppression. Consequently, "migratory pressures" will only intensify at the EU's external borders. With the current policy framework of the EU – predicated upon repression, violence and control – it is unthinkable that the "refugee crisis" will come to an end anytime soon.

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Appendix

CHECKLIST ETHICAL AND PRIVACY ASPECTS OF RESEARCH

INSTRUCTION

This checklist should be completed for every research study that is conducted at the Department of Public Administration and Sociology (DPAS). This checklist should be completed *before* commencing with data collection or approaching participants. Students can complete this checklist with help of their supervisor.

This checklist is a mandatory part of the empirical master's thesis and has to be uploaded along with the research proposal.

The guideline for ethical aspects of research of the Dutch Sociological Association (NSV) can be found on their website (http://www.nsv-sociologie.nl/?page_id=17). If you have doubts about ethical or privacy aspects of your research study, discuss and resolve the matter with your EUR supervisor. If needed and if advised to do so by your supervisor, you can also consult Dr. Jennifer A. Holland, coordinator of the Sociology Master's Thesis program.

PART I: GENERAL INFORMATION

Project title: The EU's Obsession with Crisis: On the Politics of the "Refugee Crisis"

Name, email of student: Niels Ike, 585997ni@eur.nl

Name, email of supervisor: prof. dr. Willem Schinkel, schinkel@essb.eur.nl

Start date and duration: 14-12-2020 till 20-06-2021

Is the research study conducted within DPAS **YES**

If 'NO': at or for what institute or organization will the study be conducted?
(e.g. internship organization)

PART II: HUMAN SUBJECTS

1. Does your research involve human participants. **NO**

   If 'NO': skip to part V.

   If 'YES': does the study involve medical or physical research? YES - NO
   Research that falls under the Medical Research Involving Human Subjects Act (WMO) must first be submitted to an accredited medical research ethics committee or the Central Committee on Research Involving Human Subjects (CCMO).

2. Does your research involve field observations without manipulations that will not involve identification of participants. YES - NO

   If 'YES': skip to part IV.

3. Research involving completely anonymous data files (secondary data that has been anonymized by someone else). YES - NO

   If 'YES': skip to part IV.

PART III: PARTICIPANTS

1. Will information about the nature of the study and about what participants can expect during the study be withheld from them? YES - NO

2. Will any of the participants not be asked for verbal or written 'informed consent,' whereby they agree to participate in the study? YES - NO

3. Will information about the possibility to discontinue the participation at any time be withheld from participants? YES - NO

4. Will the study involve actively deceiving the participants? YES - NO
   Note: almost all research studies involve some kind of deception of participants. Try to think about what types of deception are ethical or non-ethical (e.g. purpose of the study is not told, coercion is exerted on participants, giving participants the feeling that they harm other people by making certain decisions, etc.).

5. Does the study involve the risk of causing psychological stress or negative emotions beyond those normally encountered by participants? YES - NO

6. Will information be collected about special categories of data, as defined by the GDPR (e.g. racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union membership, genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a person, data concerning mental or physical health, data concerning a person's sex life or sexual orientation)? YES - NO

7. Will the study involve the participation of minors (<18 years old) or other groups that cannot give consent? YES - NO

8. Is the health and/or safety of participants at risk during the study? YES - NO

9. Can participants be identified by the study results or can the confidentiality of the participants' identity not be ensured? YES - NO

10. Are there any other possible ethical issues with regard to this study? YES - NO

If you have answered 'YES' to any of the previous questions, please indicate below why this issue is unavoidable in this study.

_____
_____
_____
_____

What safeguards are taken to relieve possible adverse consequences of these issues (e.g., informing participants about the study afterwards, extra safety regulations, etc.).

_____
_____
_____
_____

Are there any unintended circumstances in the study that can cause harm or have negative (emotional) consequences to the participants? Indicate what possible circumstances this could be.

_____
_____
_____
_____

Please attach your informed consent form in Appendix I, if applicable.

Continue to part IV.

PART IV: SAMPLE

Where will you collect or obtain your data?

_____

_____

Note: indicate for separate data sources.

What is the (anticipated) size of your sample?

_____

_____

Note: indicate for separate data sources.

What is the size of the population from which you will sample?

_____

_____

Note: indicate for separate data sources.

Continue to part V.

Part V: Data storage and backup

Where and when will you store your data in the short term, after acquisition?
I will store the data on my personal laptop during the process of data collection. When I find a document that is relevant to my thesis, I will store the specific document on my personal laptop.
Note: indicate for separate data sources, for instance for paper-and pencil test data, and for digital data files.

Who is responsible for the immediate day-to-day management, storage and backup of the data arising from your research?
I will be responsible for the day-to-day management, storage and backup of the data myself, which should not be a problem since all data I intend to use are publicly available and accessible.

How (frequently) will you back-up your research data for short-term data security?
I think once a month should be enough, given that all the data I intend to use can be publicly accessed and can therefore be retrieved again.

In case of collecting personal data how will you anonymize the data?
I do not intend to use any sensitive or personal data.
Note: It is advisable to keep directly identifying personal details separated from the rest of the data. Personal details are then replaced by a key/ code. Only the code is part of the database with data and the list of respondents/research subjects is kept separate.

PART VI: SIGNATURE

Please note that it is your responsibility to follow the ethical guidelines in the conduct of your study. This includes providing information to participants about the study and ensuring confidentiality in storage and use of personal data. Treat participants respectfully, be on time at appointments, call participants when they have signed up for your study and fulfil promises made to participants.

Furthermore, it is your responsibility that data are authentic, of high quality and properly stored. The principle is always that the supervisor (or strictly speaking the Erasmus University Rotterdam) remains owner of the data, and that the student should therefore hand over all data to the supervisor.

Hereby I declare that the study will be conducted in accordance with the ethical guidelines of the Department of Public Administration and Sociology at Erasmus University Rotterdam. I have answered the questions truthfully.

Name student: Niels Ike	Name (EUR) supervisor: prof. dr. Willem Schinkel
Date: 18-03-2021	Date: 20-03-2021

APPENDIX I: Informed Consent Form (if applicable)