


Welfare attitudes among Dutch natives and ethnic minorities

Assessing the mediating roles of economic self-interest, political ideology and political and social trust



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Abstract

This study examines differences in welfare attitudes between Dutch natives and Dutch citizens of Moroccan and Turkish descent. Due to its oversampling of Turks and Moroccans, the NELLS dataset provides a unique opportunity to study attitudinal differences and its causes. Making use of a parallel mediation model, the mediating effects of socio-economic status, political ideology, political trust and social trust are assessed. The latter two mechanisms have not been incorporated in previous studies on welfare attitudes of ethnic minorities. Similar to most previous studies, ethnic minorities are found to have more progressive welfare attitudes than natives. These attitudes are primarily caused by their more leftist political ideology, followed by their subpar socio-economic status. Assessing the mediating roles of political trust and social trust resulted in surprising findings. Previous studies found positive correlations between high levels of social and political trust and progressive welfare attitudes. Since ethnic minorities tend to have less social and political trust, it was hypothesized that this would lead to more conservative welfare attitudes. However, the relationship between both indicators of trust and welfare attitudes appeared to be negative. Therefore, the lower trust levels of the Turkish and Moroccan respondents resulted in even more progressive welfare attitudes.

Keywords: welfare, ethnicity, trust, politics.

Introduction

Traditionally, attitudes towards the welfare state have been explained by two mechanisms: economic self-interest and political ideology. The economic self-interest approach argues that those with a lower socio-economic status are more in favor of extensive welfare policies because they benefit from these policies themselves (Andreß & Heien, 2001; Cusack et al, 2006; Kangas, 2017). The political ideology approach claims that attitudes towards the welfare state are shaped by one's values and principles, instead of the mere consequence of a costs and benefits calculation (Galle et al, 2019). People who identify as politically leftist are more supportive of an extensive welfare state (Fraile & Ferrer, 2005; Scheepers & Grotenhuis, 2005).

Throughout Europe, most immigrant groups are more economically deprived than their native counterparts (Huber & Oberdabernig, 2016). This also applies to Dutch citizens of Turkish and Moroccan descent. 14% of Dutch Moroccans and 9% of Dutch Turks between the ages of 15 and 17 receive social welfare, while 2% of the ethnic Dutch population receive these benefits (CBS, 2018). The stark socio-economic differences between these ethnic groups are also reflected by differences in unemployment and disposable income (total income minus taxes) (CBS, 2018).

Studies conducted in the US (Pew, 2018), the UK (Saggar, 2000), Germany (Wüst, 2000), Sweden (Goul Andersen & Hoff, 2001), Belgium (Swyngedouw et al, 2014), and Norway (Bergh & Bjørklund, 2011) found that ethnic minorities overwhelmingly support left-wing parties. This phenomenon has been described as the 'iron law of immigrant voting' by political scientist Shamit Saggar. In the Netherlands, ethnic minorities have similar preferences. Throughout the 20th century, ethnic minorities predominantly supported the social democratic PvdA (Michon et al, 2007). Nowadays, their support is split between various leftist parties (EthnoBarometer, 2017).

Dutch Turks and Moroccans tend to support DENK, PvdA or GroenLinks, which are all classified as leftist parties (Bakker et al, 2020).

Based on these findings and the above-mentioned approaches, one would assume ethnic minorities to have more progressive welfare attitudes than the native populations. Most studies indeed find this to be true (Galle et al, 2019, Lubbers et al, 2018; Reeskens & Van Oorschot, 2012; Renema & Lubbers, 2018). However, other studies find that ethnic minorities are not more progressive (Luttmer & Singhal, 2011) or even more conservative (Dancygier & Saunders, 2006) than their fellow countrymen.

Previous studies on welfare attitudes incorporated political and social trust, and found that both types of trust correlate to progressive welfare attitudes (Bergh & Bjørnskov, 2014 ;Daniele & Geys, 2015; Hetherington, 2015; Jensen & Svendsen, 2010; Rothstein et al, 2012, Svallfors, 2013). However, studies on welfare attitudes among ethnic minorities did not take these mechanisms into account (Galle et al, 2019; Lubbers et al, 2018; Luttmer & Singhal, 2011; Reeskens & Van Oorschot, 2015; Renema & Lubbers, 2018; Schmidt-Catran & Careja, 2017). This is remarkable since we know that levels of political and social trust tend to be substantially lower among immigrants and their descendants (Kokkonen et al, 2012; De Vroome et al, 2013). It is therefore possible that the low trust levels of ethnic minorities could serve as a counterforce to their subpar economic position and leftist political ideology, and thus decrease differences in welfare attitudes between them and natives.

In short, this thesis aims to provide a better understanding of the mediating effects of economic self-interest, political ideology, social and political trust in explaining differences on welfare attitudes between ethnic minorities (here Dutch citizens of Turkish and Moroccan descent) and Dutch natives. The NELLS (NEtherlands Longitudinal Lifecourse Study) dataset, in which

Dutch Turks and Moroccans are overrepresented, contains a wide range of questions on welfare attitudes. This dataset therefore provides a perfect opportunity to analyze underlying mechanisms and eventually answer the following research question:

‘How can differences in welfare attitudes between Dutch natives and ethnic minorities be explained?’

This thesis focuses on Dutch citizens of Turkish and Moroccan ancestry for three reasons. First, Moroccans and Turks are the two largest non-Western migrant groups residing in the Netherlands (CBS, 2016). Second, Turks and Moroccans have higher rates of welfare dependency than their native counterparts (CBS, 2018). Third, the NELS dataset provides a unique opportunity to compare the attitudes of natives to Turks and Moroccans but does not contain an overrepresentation of any other ethnic groups.

Relevance

Besides providing more clarity on the mediating role of political and social trust among ethnic minorities, studying welfare attitudes is intrinsically valuable itself. Swedish sociologist Stefan Svallfors argues studying welfare attitudes is important because ‘they are central components of social order, governance and legitimacy of modern societies’ (Svallfors, 2012). Analyzing these attitudes tells us whether existing social arrangements are viewed as legitimate and normatively grounded (Svallfors, 2012). Brooks and Manza (2006) argue public support for the welfare state is an important prerequisite for the persistence of the welfare state itself. If public support drops, welfare states are likely to become less extensive. In other words, public opinion heavily affects the policy choices of political elites.

Secondly, since the existence of the welfare state is dependent on the policy preferences of the population (Brooks & Manza, 2007) it is important for policy makers to be knowledgeable of the

preferences of all groups in society. However, studies on welfare tend to be conducted through the lens of the ethnic majority (Galle, 2018), resulting in a blind spot towards a substantial and growing part of Western societies. This study can increase understanding of the preferences of citizens of Moroccan and Turkish descent, and thus contribute to a better understanding of the preferences of the Dutch society as a whole.

Thirdly, this study can contribute to the public debate regarding immigration and the welfare state becoming more evidence based. Over the last couple of years, politicians from all sorts of political affiliations argued against the influx of immigrants due to the alleged threat they pose to the Dutch welfare state (Hoedeman & Den Hartog, 2015; Algemeen Dagblad, 2020; Baudet, 2019; NOS, 2018). These opinions are not unique to politicians, but also common among the general public. A 2012 study found only 17% of the Dutch population to be in favor of unconditional access for immigrants to welfare provisions (Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2012). Furthermore, native Dutch citizens believe that immigrants benefit disproportionately from the welfare state (Van der Waal et al, 2010). Even though the consequences of immigration on the existence of the welfare state are widely debated, voices of immigrants and their descendants are scarcely heard. Examining their attitudes on welfare issues will result in a more factual public debate.

Finally, this study shines light on the integration process of Dutch Turks and Moroccans. Policy makers tend to see integration as the sum of two components: the socio-economic and the socio-cultural component (SCP, 2016). The socio-cultural component can be further split into three dimensions: a social, cultural, and an emotional dimension. Cultural integration refers to the value orientations of immigrant groups (SCP, 2016). Immigrants and their descendants are perceived as more integrated when their attitudes are similar to the attitudes of the native

population (SCP, 2016). Thus, this thesis contributes to our understanding of the cultural integration of Turkish and Moroccan migrant groups in the Netherlands.

Definition welfare attitudes

Before diving into the theoretical section of this thesis, I will first provide clarity on the definition of welfare attitudes. In a study on the effect of religious context on welfare attitudes, American sociologist Tom VanHeuvelen provides the following definition of the concept: “Welfare attitudes refer to general preferences held by individuals regarding policies that provide various forms of social and economic protection, such as unemployment and health insurance, insurance provision to vulnerable populations like the elderly, and a restructured earning distribution through taxation and public employment” (VanHeuvelen, 2014). Jakobsen (2010) provides a valuable addition to this definition by distinguishing leftist (or progressive) and rightist (conservative) welfare attitudes. Leftist welfare attitudes are opinions “that are synonymous with opinions that are pro collectivism, and favorable of state responsibility and equality of incomes” (Jakobsen, 2010). Right-wing welfare attitudes go hand in hand with a more negative view towards government intervention and a preference for individualistic values and income differences (Jakobsen, 2010).

Theories and hypotheses

Ethnicity

As mentioned in the introduction, there is uncertainty about whether the welfare attitudes of ethnic minorities differ from those belonging to the ethnic majority (Dancygier & Saunders, 2006; Lubbers et al, 2018; Luttmer & Singhal, 2011; Reeskens & Van Oorschot, 2015; Renema & Lubbers, 2018). Throughout Europe, ethnic minorities' attitudes towards economic redistribution are heavily influenced by the norms in their country of origin (Luttmer & Singhal, 2011). Immigrants, and their descendants, who originate from countries with a limited welfare state are less likely to favor extensive economic redistribution. Dancygier and Saunders (2006) merely focused on Germany and Great Britain and found no evidence that immigrants are more in favor of redistribution after controlling for socio-economic characteristics. Once all controls are in place (SES, age, gender, religion, partisan identification and years in host country), immigrants in both countries tend to fall in the mainstream or are more conservative. They conclude that immigrants do not prefer higher levels of welfare spending.

However, other studies found that ethnic minorities do tend to have more progressive welfare views (Lubbers et al, 2018; Reeskens & Van Oorschot, 2015; Renema & Lubbers, 2018). Even though immigrants' welfare preferences largely follow the opinions of the ethnic majority, minorities have stronger pro-welfare opinions than natives (Reeskens & Van Oorschot, 2015). Lubbers et al (2018) analyzed migrant support for welfare state spending in Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands. They found that migrant groups are generally more supportive of welfare state spending. Citizens of Turkish descent in all three countries are more in favor of welfare spending than their native fellow countrymen (Lubbers et al, 2018)

In the upcoming theoretical sections I will introduce four mechanisms that could mediate the relationship between ethnicity and welfare attitudes. Two of them (economic self-interest and

political ideology) are hypothesized to positively affect the progressive welfare attitudes of ethnic minorities. The two others (political trust and social trust) are thought to have an adverse effect. Even though the directions of the mediators differ, I hypothesize that the total effect of belonging to an ethnic minority will be positive, primarily due to the previous study conducted in the Netherlands. Hence, the first hypothesis is as follows:

H1: *Ethnic minorities have more progressive welfare attitudes than natives*

Economic self-interest

Attitudes towards the welfare state and economic redistribution are often explained by two theories: economic self-interest and political ideology. The former approach assumes that people are more likely to favor redistribution if they personally benefit from these measures (Renema & Lubbers, 2018). Subsequently, people tend to oppose measures if they do not appear to be in their interests (Andreß & Heien, 2001). A wide range of studies found support for this mechanism (Andreß & Heien, 2001; Cusack et al, 2006; Kangas, 2017). Recipients of social benefits or people who perceive themselves to be at risk of becoming a recipient are more likely to support economic redistribution (Kangas, 1997). People who are unemployed and people who perceive themselves as likely to become unemployed are more supportive of redistributive politics (Cusack et al, 2006). Lower educated people are also more likely to be in favor of extensive welfare spending (Lubber et al, 2018). Other “consumers” of redistribution such as pensioners, young families with children and the disabled also show higher degrees of support (Andreß & Heien, 2001).

Dutch Moroccans (11%) and Turks (10%) are more often unemployed than natives (4%). In addition, they suffer more from occupational disability and are more welfare reliant than Dutch natives (CBS, 2018). Furthermore, Moroccan and Turkish households have a substantial lower

spendable income than Dutch native households (CBS, 2018). All in all, we can establish that citizens of Turkish and Moroccan descent are more likely to be economically deprived than the native population is. Therefore, Turks and Moroccans are more likely to personally benefit from extensive welfare policies. This leads to the following second hypothesis:

H2: Ethnic minorities are more likely to have a lower socio-economic status than natives, resulting in more progressive welfare attitudes

Political ideology

Scholars have criticized the self-interest approach due to its rationalistic nature (Galle, 2019). It is therefore often combined with the political ideology approach. This approach considers welfare attitudes to be the result of one's values and principles, which are rooted in political and ideological orientations, instead of the mere consequence of a costs and benefits calculation (Galle, 2019). Previous studies found strong correlations between leftist political preferences and support for an extensive welfare state (Fraile & Ferrer, 2005; Scheepers & Grotenhuis, 2005). One could argue that the causality works the other way around: being supportive of extensive welfare results in more leftist political views. However, this idea is contested by Danish sociologist Mads Meier Jæger. By making use of time dimensions in the European Social Survey, Jæger found strong support for a causal effect of a left-wing orientation and increased support for redistribution (Jæger, 2008). In other words, identifying with a left-wing political ideology results in progressive welfare attitudes.

A wide array of studies finds that ethnic minorities throughout the Western world tend to vote for left-wing parties. Hispanics, Asian Americans and African Americans overwhelmingly support the Democratic Party in the United States (Pew, 2018). Four out of five ethnic minority voters cast their vote for the Labour Party in the UK (Saggar, 2000). Similar patterns are at play

in Germany (Wüst, 2000), Sweden (Goul Andersen and Hoff, 2001), Belgium (Swyngedouw et al, 2014) and Norway (Bergh & Bjørklund, 2011).

Turks and Moroccans residing in the Netherlands share this preference. Ever since their arrival in the Netherlands, most Turkish and Moroccan immigrants voted for left-wing parties, especially for the social-democratic PvdA (Michon et al, 2007). This changed in 2017, when DENK participated in the Parliamentary elections for the first time. DENK received 47% of the Turkish vote and 37% of the Moroccan vote and thereby became the most popular party among these groups (Vermeulen et al, 2018). Three years earlier, DENK was founded when MPs Tunahan Kuzu and Selçuk Öztürk decided to leave PvdA. The MPs were unhappy with the treatment of ethnic minorities in PvdA and announced that DENK would combat “rising intolerance, right-wing thinking, and xenophobia in the Netherlands” (Vermeulen et al, 2018). Despite its ambivalent stances on moral issues (Vermeulen et al, 2018), DENK is considered to be a leftist party. Regarding welfare issues, DENK’s voting behavior in Parliament is most similar to other leftist parties such as GroenLinks, SP and PvdD (partijgedrag.nl, 2020). In other words, we can safely conclude that Dutch Turks and Moroccans still predominantly favor left-wing parties. This is not the case among Dutch natives. Since ethnic minorities tend to vote for left-wing parties, and right-wing and centrist parties make up a majority of Dutch Parliament (Bakker et al, 2019), we can be certain that Dutch natives are not as leftist as their fellow countrymen of Turkish and Moroccan descent. These insights result in the third hypothesis:

H3: Ethnic minorities are more likely to have a leftist political ideology than natives, resulting in more progressive welfare attitudes

Political trust

International variation in types of welfare states has traditionally been explained through the level to which the working class has been mobilized in a country (Rothstein et al, 2012). Political scientists Bo Rothstein, Marcus Samanni and Jan Teorell believe this does not fully explain why some welfare states are much more generous than others. They argue that the “quality of government” is equally important for the establishment of a generous welfare state (Rothstein et al, 2012). Citizens are only likely to accept the payment of a substantial portion of their money through taxation in exchange for social policies if they believe the government will handle this money in a fair, transparent, and incorrupt manner (Rothstein et al, 2012). Furthermore, citizens need to believe that the government will deliver if they ever need financial support before they agree to contribute to social policies (Rothstein et al, 2012). This mechanism has also been examined by Steven Svallfors. In a cross-European study, Svallfors (2013) found that people who perceive institutions as efficient and fair are more in favor of higher taxes and social spending. Hetherington (2005) established that decreased support for welfare policies in the US correlates to declining levels of trust in the government since the 1960s. Daniele and Geys (2015) found that the positive effect of social trust (more on that in the next section) on welfare attitudes is conditional on the perceived quality of political institutions. Thus, previous studies tell us that citizens who trust institutions and the government are more likely to support a strong welfare state.

Research on the relationship between ethnicity and trust in the United States derived substantial evidence that ethnic minorities report lower levels of trust than white Americans (Hwang, 2017). African Americans in the US report lower levels of political trust than Caucasians (Abrajano & Alvarez, 2010), which could be caused by having more negative experiences with law enforcement and the justice system (Carr et al, 2007). De Vroome et al (2013) found that Dutch Turks and Moroccans also report lower levels of political trust than native Dutch people, by and

large explained by economic position, civic and social participation, and political orientation. They also concluded that minorities' trust in political institutions is heavily influenced by feelings of discrimination (De Vroome et al, 2013). A study on the Turkish and Moroccan voting behavior during the 2017 Parliamentary elections by global market research company Ipsos found significant differences between Turks and Moroccans. Only 16% of Turkish respondents said to trust Dutch politics, while 40% of Moroccans did. The Dutch Social and Cultural Planning Office (SCP) confirmed that Dutch Turks and Moroccans tend to have lower levels of political trust, especially relating to the government, but did not find significant differences between both groups (SCP, 2012).

Previous studies on welfare attitudes of ethnic minorities did not take political trust into account (Galle, 2019). However, based on previous studies, we know that Dutch Moroccans and Turks tend to have lower levels of political trust than their native counterparts. Other studies indicated that lower levels of political trust negatively affect welfare attitudes. Therefore, the fourth hypothesis is as follows:

H4: *Ethnic minorities are more likely to have less political trust than natives, resulting in more conservative welfare attitudes*

Social trust

Social trust is the belief that most people can be trusted (Jensen & Svendsen, 2010) and is fundamentally different from political trust (Newton, 2001). Survey research that asks questions about both types of trust usually finds no relation between the two (Newton, 2001). We therefore measure the effects of both types of trust individually.

Before zooming in on differences in social trust between natives and ethnic minorities, I briefly discuss recent literature on the topic. Social trust is partially a result of specific life experiences. Whiteley (1999) argues that society's 'winners' are more trusting than its 'losers'. People with a high income are less inclined to be distrusting to others (Newton, 2001). However, this positive correlation between social trust and income is very modest (Newton, 2001). Kloosterman and Schmeets (2010) found that someone's level of education is more important. Higher educated citizens are more capable to connect to other groups due to their knowledge, skills and resources. Higher educated citizens' open attitudes and 'broad worldview' also contribute to more social trust (Kloosterman & Schmeets, 2010). Furthermore, we know that people lose social trust after being treated unfairly. Negative experiences, such as losing a partner or getting divorced, negatively affect social trust. Positive experiences, such as starting a family, result in an increase of social trust (SCP, 2012).

Apart from the above-mentioned negative experiences, previous studies also tell us that experiencing discrimination can lower social trust (Douds & Wu, 2017; Fan, 2019). Around 40% of both Turks and Moroccans experience personal discrimination in the Netherlands (SCP, 2012). 76% of both ethnic groups indicate they experience group discrimination (SCP, 2012), meaning they feel their ethnic group is being discriminated against. Needless to say, native Dutch citizens are less likely to experience discrimination in the Netherlands.

Several studies have found that high levels of social trust positively affect progressive welfare attitudes (Bergh & Bjørnskov, 2014; Daniele & Geys, 2015; Jensen et al, 2010). Jensen et al (2010) explain this as follows: a taxpayer must be confident that other citizens also contribute to the welfare state when they are able to. Citizens with lower levels of social trust will be more inclined to think his fellow citizens are ‘free-riding’ and therefore be less willing to contribute to welfare provisions (Jensen et al, 2010). Trusting citizens will be more likely to believe that others do not misbehave (such as cheating, free riding or tax evasion) in dealing with public goods, which increases support for social welfare policies (Daniele & Geys, 2015). Daniele and Geys partially derive this idea from experimental economics. Within this strand of literature, public good games (PGG) are employed to measure trust and cooperative economic behavior. A PGG consists of groups of four, and each player chooses to contribute to a public good with a certain amount of money (Thöni et al, 2012). In the end, the total amount of donations is doubled and shared among all participants. In that way, for each Euro a player contributes he or she will earn half a Euro, and the group will earn two Euros. This results in a conflict between the individual and the collective interest. Thöni (2012) found that high trusting participants make bigger donations because they are more inclined to believe their group members would do the same. Daniele and Geys (2015) argue this experiment resembles the welfare state. Social welfare policies are also systems to which all contribute a little bit for the benefit of the collective. However, if people are low trusting and do not expect reciprocal cooperation of others, they are more inclined to reject extensive welfare policies (Daniele & Geys, 2015).

Throughout Europe, most immigrants report lower levels of social trust than their native counterparts. This is especially true for the first generation of immigrants, although first- and second-generation immigrants in the Netherlands were both found to be less trusting than native Dutch citizens (Dinesen & Hooghe, 2010). Ziller (2017) suggests that these lower levels of trust are consequences of discrimination and group-based inequalities. He argues that expanding anti-

discrimination policies is related to narrowing trust gaps. An SCP study on ethnic minorities in the Netherlands revealed that a minority of Dutch Turks (40%) and Moroccans (38%) indicated that most people can be trusted (SCP, 2012). This percentage was significantly higher among Dutch natives (60%) (SCP, 2012). Hooghe et al (2013) also found that Dutch Turks and Moroccans report lower levels of social trust than natives. They argue that differences in socio-economic positions and civic and social participation are the root causes of this dissimilarity (Hooghe et al, 2013).

To summarize, we know that high levels of social trust can positively affect progressive welfare attitudes. Several studies show that Moroccans and Turks have lower levels of social trust than Dutch natives. Therefore, the final hypothesis is as follows:

H5: Ethnic minorities are more likely to have less social trust than natives, resulting in more conservative welfare attitudes




Figure I: Conceptual model of the hypothesized effects

Data and method

Dataset

The aim of this thesis is to explain differences in welfare attitudes between Dutch natives and Dutch Turks and Moroccans. At the individual level this will require data on socio-economic status, political ideology, political trust, social trust and welfare attitudes. These demands are met by the NELLS (NEtherlands' Longitudinal Lifecourse Survey) dataset, which includes an oversample of Dutch Turks and Moroccans. A parallel multiple mediator analysis will be performed in order to examine to what degree the hypothesized mechanisms explain differences in welfare attitudes between Dutch natives and those of Turkish and Moroccan descent.

For the first Wave of the NELLS dataset, data were collected through two-stage stratified sampling in 2009. First, 35 Dutch municipalities were quasi-randomly selected by region and level of urbanization. Second, a random selection was taken from the population registry based on age and country of birth of the respondent and his or her parents.

Respondents between fourteen and seventeen years of age were excluded from the dataset. Due to their young age, they are likely to be in school and not pay taxes. The overall response rate of the survey was 52%. Response rates for the native Dutch (56%) were higher than for those of Turkish (50%) and Moroccan (46%) origin. The slightly lower response rates among the minority groups are possibly a result of language difficulties since the survey was administered in Dutch and not all migrants are fluent in this language (De Vroome, 2013). Around 30% of first-generation Turkish migrants and 20% of first-generation Moroccans struggle with having a conversation in Dutch (CBS, 2008). As a consequence, the dataset is not fully representative of the ethnic minority population in the Netherlands.

In total, 5312 respondents were interviewed. 1164 of these respondents were of Moroccan ancestry, while 1137 respondents were of Turkish ancestry. 2556 respondents were classified as Dutch natives. Other respondents were of different ethnic backgrounds and were excluded from the analysis.

NELLS uses the classification of the Dutch National Statistics Bureau (CBS) to assess to which ethnic group a respondent belongs. If the respondent and one or two parents are foreign-born, he or she is considered first generation foreign origin. Respondents that are born in the Netherlands and have a foreign-born parent are considered second generation foreign origin. Respondents are classified as Dutch if both parents are born in the Netherlands, regardless of the respondent's own country of birth.

Measurements

Dependent variable: welfare attitudes

The dependent variable welfare attitudes is measured using four items. Respondents were presented the following statements: 1) the government should decrease income differences in the Netherlands, 2) the government should increase social benefits, 3) the government should increase the minimum wage more than other wages, and 4) companies should be forced to share its profits with its employees. Each item has five outcomes, from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree". Factor analysis indicates that the four statements belong to a common dimension. The reliability of the latent factor 'welfare attitudes' is acceptable (Cronbachs' Alpha = 0.70).

Independent variables

SES is captured by taking into account the following three measures: education, occupation and financial problems. A similar approach has been used by previous studies based on the NELLS data (De Vroome et al., 2013). Respondents were asked to report the highest level of education

they had completed. An eight-point scale is constructed consisting of the following levels: no education, primary education, lower general education (mavo), intermediate vocational education (mbo), intermediate general education (havo), higher general education (vwo); higher vocational education (hbo), and university education. Occupational status is measured through the 'standard international socioeconomic index of occupational status' (Ganzeboom et al, 1992). Missing values (students and the unemployed) are given the mean score of the employed respondents of one's ethnic group (for a similar approach see: De Vroome et al., 2013). Respondents were also asked whether they had experienced the following situations in the last three months: 'being unable to replace broken equipment'; 'having to borrow money for essential expenses'; 'falling behind on regular expenses'; 'being visited by a bailiff'; and 'having difficulty making ends meet'. The five items result in a reliable scale (Cronbach's alpha = 0.73).

Political ideology is captured with the following question: "Political attitudes are often described as leftist or rightist. When thinking about your own political attitudes, where would you place yourself on a 10-point scale ranging from 0 (most leftist) to 10 (most rightist)?"

Social trust is measured with the following three statements: "You can't be too careful in dealing with people", "If you trust too easily, people will take advantage of you", and "You will often be cheated when you help others". Each item has five outcomes, from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree". Factor analysis showed that all three items can be reduced to one dimension. The items' Cronbach's Alpha = 0.71, which indicates that the items are internally consistent. The same items were used to measure social trust in previous research (De Vroome et al, 2013).

Political trust is measured with the following question: "Could you indicate how much trust you have in the following institutions: a. politics, b. the government, c. the European Union, and d. the police and justice department?" Respondents could answer on a four-point scale. This scale

has also been used before by De Vroome et al (2013). Again, all items can be reduced to one dimension. The reliability of the latent factor 'political trust' is good since Cronbachs' Alpha = .83, suggesting high internal consistency.

Control variables

In addition to the above-mentioned variables, I will control for other variables that affect welfare attitudes according to previous studies: religion, gender, and age. The relevance of all control variables will now be explained briefly.

86% of Dutch Turks and 94% of Dutch Moroccans identify as Muslim (SCP, 2018). Native Dutch people predominantly identify as non-religious, though substantial groups adhere to the Protestant or Catholic faith (CBS, 2015). Scholars are divided on the relationship between individual religiosity and support for economic redistribution. Scheve and Stasavage (2006) argue that religion serves as a form of psychological insurance to adverse life events such as unemployment, and thereby functions as an alternative to economic redistribution. Stegmüller et al (2012) found that Catholics and Protestants throughout Europe show stronger opposition to economic redistribution than non-religious Europeans. Elgin (2013) did not find significant differences in welfare attitudes between Muslims, Protestants and Catholics. Galle (2019) found that strictly practicing Muslims showed stronger support for economic redistribution than non-strictly practicing Muslims and non-Muslim Moroccans and Turks. In sum, the findings on the relationship between individual religiosity are mixed. I therefore decided to incorporate religion as a control variable. As a proxy for religion, respondents were asked whether they prayed in the last 3 months. Prayer is a better indicator of religion than religious membership or attendance since it is most comparable across ethnic groups (Huijts et al, 2013). Women have more progressive welfare attitudes than men (Jaime-Castillo et al, 2016). A number of studies found

that young people are more supportive of redistribution than older people (Jæger, 2006; Renema & Lubbers, 2018). Therefore, sex and age are also both incorporated as control variables.

Method

To analyze the mediating effects of economic self-interest, political ideology, political trust and social trust, a parallel multiple mediator model is used. In this model the independent variable ethnicity is directly and indirectly related to welfare attitudes through two or more mediators that are mutually correlated (Hayes, 2017). A parallel multiple mediator model with four mediators is depicted in figure II.




Figure II: Parallel multiple mediator model

In this model, a_i is the estimate of the independent variable (X) on the mediator (M_i). B_i is the estimate of the effect of the mediator on the dependent variable (Y) controlling for X and the other three mediators. c' is the estimate of the direct effect of X on Y with all four mediators constant.

A set of the following five equations is needed for our model with four mediators:

$$M_1 = i_{M_1} + a_1X + e_{M_1}$$

$$M_2 = i_{M_2} + a_2X + e_{M_2}$$

$$M_3 = i_{M_3} + a_3X + e_{M_3}$$

$$M_4 = i_{M_4} + a_4X + e_{M_4}$$

$$Y = i_Y + c'X + b_1M_1 + b_2M_2 + b_3M_3 + e_Y$$

As illustrated above, X is modeled to affect Y through five pathways. One pathway is the direct effect (c'). The other four pathways are indirect through the mediators. These indirect effects are called 'specific indirect effects' in a multiple mediator model (Hayes, 2017). The specific indirect effects are measured by multiplying the regression coefficients of the two paths of the indirect effect (X to M_i and M_i to Y). When calculating them, all other mediators are held constant. In other words, the indirect effect is the estimated amount by which two cases that differ by one unit on X are estimated to differ on Y because of M_i , after controlling for all other mediators (Hayes, 2017). The sum of all four indirect effects is the 'total indirect effect'. The total effect of X on Y is the sum of both the direct and total indirect effect (Hayes, 2017). Bias corrected bootstrapped confidence intervals are subsequently used to compare the strengths of the specific indirect effects. This will provide information on which mediator affects welfare attitudes most.

In order to analyze the data, I installed the SPSS extension PROCESS. PROCESS is a modelling tool which can be used to estimate direct and indirect effects in multiple mediator models. The tool is designed by Andrew Hayes, Professor of Psychology at Ohio State University.

Results

Descriptive statistics

Table I: Descriptive statistics per ethnic group

	Moroccan				Turkish		Natives	
	Min.	Max.	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Welfare attitudes	1.00	5.00	3.58	0.66	3.52	0.71	3.13	0.73
Education	1.00	8.00	4.19	2.04	4.13	2.22	5.13	2.18
Occupational status (lower skilled)	16.00	88.00	37.82	10.98	38.35	13.05	43.82	13.65
Financial worries	0.00	1.00	0.44	0.50	0.49	0.50	0.25	0.43
Political orientation (0 = right-wing)	0.00	10.00	6.27	2.10	5.69	2.11	4.82	2.03
Political trust	1.00	4.00	2.21	0.62	2.23	0.63	2.36	0.55
Social trust	1.00	5.00	2.81	0.66	2.77	0.62	3.20	0.67
Female	0.00	1.00	0.54	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.53	0.49
Age	18.00	49.00	31.34	7.89	32.81	8.12	32.76	8.36
Religion	0.00	1.00	0.79	0.41	0.73	0.45	0.33	0.47
Sample size			773		768		2206	

Before proceeding with the analysis, I present an overview of the distribution of the variables per ethnic group. Table I shows Moroccans have most progressive welfare attitudes, followed by those of Turkish descent. The mean level of all groups is above the midpoint of the scale. The education variable tells us that, on average, Dutch natives are higher educated than their fellow countrymen of Moroccan and Turkish descent. Moroccans and Turks are also more likely to have a lower occupational status. The ‘financial problems’ variable indicates that the ethnic minority groups more often experience financial issues than the native group. 44% of Dutch Moroccans and 49% of Dutch Turks have experienced some sort of financial problem in the previous three months. One in four of the Dutch natives experienced this as well.

Moroccans display most affinity with a leftist ideology, while Dutch natives tend to identify as the most right-wing. The mean ideology of Turkish respondents is slightly above the midpoint of the scale, suggesting center leftist political views. Dutch natives express the highest levels of political trust, but differences are small. Differences in social trust are not substantive either. Again, natives report to be more trusting. There are slightly more women in both the Moroccan and native sample, while the genders are evenly split among the Turkish respondents. The average age of all groups is between 31 and 33. The ethnic minority groups differ most from the natives on religion. One in three of Dutch natives prayed in the last three months while 73% of Turks and 79% of Moroccans did so.

Table II: Correlations between independent variable ‘welfare attitudes’ and mediators for Dutch natives

	Welfare attitudes	Education	Occupation	Financial problems	Left-wing	Social trust
Education	-0.219***					
Occupation	-0.206***	0.368***				
Financial problems	0.195***	-0.063**	-0.083***			
Left-wing	0.271***	0.059**	0.068**	0.065**		
Social trust	-0.156***	0.225***	0.263***	-0.147***	0.168***	
Political trust	-0.166***	0.242***	0.235***	-0.133***	0.125***	0.360***


Note: * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$, *** = $p < 0.001$

Table III: Correlations between independent variable ‘welfare attitudes’ and mediators for Dutch Turks and Moroccans

	Welfare attitudes	Education	Occupation	Financial problems	Left-wing	Social trust
Education	-0.091**					
Occupation	-0.118***	0.293***				
Financial problems	0.115***	-0.095**	-0.103*			
Left-wing	0.121***	-0.036	0.013	-0.053*		
Social trust	-0.102***	0.103***	0.111***	-0.184***	0.077**	
Political trust	-0.115***	0.075**	0.046	-0.146***	-0.025	0.226***

Note: * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$, *** = $p < 0.001$


Table II shows the correlations between the dependent variable welfare attitudes and the mediating variables for Dutch natives, while Table III does so for the ethnic minorities. Dutch natives who are trusting towards politics tend to identify as politically leftist, while this correlation does not exist among the ethnic minorities. The same applies to occupation and education and political orientation: higher educated and higher occupied natives are more likely to identify as leftist, whereas these characteristics does not affect the political orientation of ethnic minorities. Most correlations are small to moderate ($p < 0.300$). Correlations are strongest between occupation and education. Higher educated people tend to have higher skilled occupations. This holds for both groups. Political and social trust are strongly correlated for Dutch natives. Surprisingly, social trust and political trust appear to be negatively correlated to progressive welfare attitudes.



Graph I: different welfare attitudes per ethnic group (Error bars are 95% confidence intervals around the mean)

Graph I provides insight into attitudes towards the four components of welfare attitudes and the mean per ethnic group. Dutch Moroccans and Dutch 'Turks' attitudes are very similar. Dutch natives are more conservative towards all four components. Differences are most stark when it comes to increasing social benefits and the minimum wage. The ethnic groups think most alike when it comes to decreasing income differences. The fifth segment of the graph shows the mean of all components. The error bars portray 95% confidence intervals around the mean and indicate that Moroccans and Turks have significantly more progressive welfare attitudes than Dutch natives.

Parallel mediation model



Note: * = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$, *** = $p < 0.001$

Figure III: Effects of mediators on the relation between ethnicity and progressive welfare attitudes, controlling for religion, sex and age.

Table III: specific indirect effects on welfare attitudes, controlling for religion, age and sex (with bias-corrected 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals)

	Indirect regression coefficients (SE)	BC 95% Bootstrapped CI	
		Lower	Upper
<i>Socioeconomic status</i>			
Education	0.034 (0.006)	0.022	0.046
Occupation	0.034 (0.006)	0.022	0.047
Financial problems	0.040 (0.007)	0.028	0.053
<i>Political ideology</i>			
Left-wing orientation	0.103 (0.010)	0.085	0.122
<i>Trust</i>			
Political trust	0.016 (0.004)	0.009	0.025
Social trust	0.032 (0.008)	0.018	0.048
Total indirect effect	0.259 (0.015)	0.230	0.289
Explained variance (R ²)		20.3%	

Table III depicts the specific indirect effects of the mediators on progressive welfare attitudes. These specific indirect effects are the product of the two effects of each mediator, which are illustrated in Figure III. Every effect is controlled for by religion, sex, age, and the other mediating variables. The results show that ethnic minorities on average have a lower education than Dutch natives. In addition, higher educated people tend to hold more conservative welfare attitudes. The indirect effect of education is 0.034 with a 95% bootstrapped CI ranging from 0.022 to 0.046. The ethnic minority groups are more likely to be lower educated, which in turn increases the likelihood of them supporting progressive welfare policies.

The indirect effect of occupation is estimated as 0.034 with a 95% bootstrapped CI ranging from 0.022 to 0.047. Ethnic minorities are more likely to have a lower skilled occupation, and those with a lower skilled occupation are more inclined to favor extensive welfare policies.

The indirect effect of financial problems is estimated as 0.040 (95% CI = 0.028 to 0.053). Dutch Turks and Moroccans are more likely to have experienced financial problems in the past three months than natives. Additionally, people that experience financial problems are more inclined to support extensive welfare policies. All three indirect effects related to SES support the second hypothesis (“Ethnic minorities are more likely to have a lower socio-economic status than natives, resulting in more progressive welfare attitudes”), which is thus confirmed.

Differences in political ideology account for an estimated difference of 0.103 (95% CI = 0.085 to 0.122) on welfare attitudes. Ethnic minorities are more likely to identify with a leftist political ideology than natives. Those identifying as leftists, are more likely to support extensive welfare measures. Therefore, the third hypothesis (“Ethnic minorities are more likely to have a leftist political ideology than natives, resulting in more progressive welfare attitudes”) is also confirmed.

As expected, ethnic minorities are less trusting towards politics. Nevertheless, the fourth hypothesis (“Ethnic minorities are more likely to have less political trust than natives, resulting in more conservative welfare attitudes”) must be rejected, since higher levels of political trust are negatively related to progressive welfare attitudes. The indirect effect of political trust is 0.016 (95% CI = 0.009 to 0.025). Ethnic minorities’ progressive welfare attitudes are partially their lower political trust.

The fifth hypothesis (“Ethnic minorities are more likely to have less social trust than natives, resulting in more conservative welfare attitudes”) must also be rejected. As hypothesized, ethnic minorities report to be less trusting towards others than natives. However, lower levels of social trust do not negatively affect welfare attitudes. In fact, the analysis shows that higher levels of

trust negatively affect welfare attitudes. The indirect effect of social trust is estimated as 0.032 (95% CI = 0.018 to 0.048).

The control variables have significant effects. Women ($\beta = 0.09, p < 0.001$) are more in favor of extensive welfare policies than men. Religiosity ($\beta = 0.06, p < 0.01$) has a positive effect as well. The older one is, the more likely he or she is to have conservative welfare attitudes ($\beta = -0.01, p < 0.05$).

The total effect is the sum of the direct effect and the total indirect effect: $0.259 + 0.143 = 0.402$, meaning that ethnic minorities have 0.402 more progressive welfare attitudes than natives on a 5-point scale. The total indirect effect is 0.259 (95% CI = 0.230 to 0.289). This implies that on a 5-point scale, ethnic minorities have 0.259 more progressive welfare attitudes than natives, as a result of the mediators that have been taken into account. The direct effect of ethnicity on welfare attitudes is 0.143, meaning that Dutch Turks and Moroccans are estimated to have 0.143 more progressive welfare attitudes irrespective of differences in SES, political ideology, political trust and social trust and the control variables. The positive direct effect is in line with the first hypothesis ("Ethnic minorities have more progressive welfare attitudes than natives"). Ethnic minorities tend to have a lower SES, be more politically leftist and report lower levels of political and social trust. All of these characteristics result in more progressive welfare attitudes. The direct effect shows that a substantial part (35.6%) of the total effect is not explained by the proposed mediating variables. This indicates that there are other mediators at play, or that differences between natives and ethnic minorities can solely be explained by ethnicity. The explained variance of our model is 20.3% ($R^2 = 0.203$). This indicates that about one fifth of the total variance in welfare attitudes is explained by ethnicity, the mediating variables and the control variables.

Table IV: Contrasts between specific indirect effects

	BC 95% CI			
	Point estimate	SE	Lower	Upper
Education vs occupation	-0.001	0.012	-0.025	0.024
Education vs financial problems	-0.009	0.012	-0.033	0.016
Education vs political ideology	-0.094	0.015	-0.124	-0.064
Education vs political trust	0.024	0.010	0.004	0.044
Education vs social trust	0.002	0.014	-0.025	0.030
Occupation vs financial problems	-0.008	0.012	-0.029	0.015
Occupation vs political ideology	-0.093	0.015	-0.123	-0.063
Occupation vs political trust	0.024	0.010	0.005	0.044
Occupation vs social trust	0.002	0.014	-0.025	0.030
Financial problems vs political ideology	-0.085	0.016	-0.118	-0.054
Financial problems vs political trust	0.032	0.011	0.012	0.053
Financial problems vs social trust	0.010	0.014	0.012	0.053
Political ideology vs political trust	0.118	0.014	0.090	0.146
Political ideology vs social trust	0.096	0.016	0.065	0.127
Political trust vs social trust	-0.022	0.013	-0.047	0.003

Note: a positive point estimate indicates that the first mentioned effect is stronger than the second effect. If zero does not lie within the interval range, the effects differ significantly in strength.

Table IV indicates which specific indirect effects significantly differ in strength. Seven of the fifteen contrasts do not include zero, and thus differ significantly. Political ideology is identified as the strongest specific indirect effect, as it significantly differs in strength from all other mediators. In other words, differences in welfare attitudes between Dutch Turks and Moroccans natives are primarily driven by differences in political ideology. The effect of political trust is also trumped by both education and occupation. The other effects do not differ significantly.

Discussion

The main goal of this study was to examine whether the welfare attitudes of Dutch natives differs to those of Dutch Turks and Moroccans, and what mechanisms cause these differences. Its innovative aspect was the incorporation of political trust and social trust, besides the traditional mechanisms of economic self-interest and political ideology. Previous studies on welfare attitudes among ethnic minorities did not take these forms of trust into account.

Most studies on welfare attitudes are conducted through the lens of the native population. The NELLS dataset provides a unique opportunity to broaden our understanding of the welfare opinions of immigrant groups. This is of great use for policy makers as the consequences of immigration and ethnic diversity on the welfare state are heavily debated throughout Europe.

Another aim of the study was to advance knowledge on the cultural integration of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. The Dutch Social and Cultural Planning Office (SCP) considers immigrant groups culturally well integrated if their values and attitudes are similar to those of the native population. We found that the attitudes of the ethnic minority group members differ to those of the natives. However, differences are rather small and partially caused by differences in SES. Since Dutch Moroccans and Turks are experiencing social mobility (CBS, 2011), it is to be expected that the attitudes of these immigrant groups will increasingly resemble those of the native population.

Nevertheless, it is certainly not certain whether the attitudes of both groups will become similar. After taking into account all mediators and control variables, the positive direct effect of ethnicity still persists. This can either be caused by different mediators that have not been incorporated in this study, or solely be the consequence of ethnicity itself. If the latter is the case,

it might not be possible for these immigrant groups to fully culturally integrate into Dutch society as long as the SCP definition is used.

The most important mechanism that contributes to the attitudinal gap between natives and the immigrant groups is political ideology. Dutch Turks and Moroccans are more likely to identify as politically leftist than Dutch natives, which results in more progressive welfare attitudes. This mechanism trumps the self-interest approach, which argues that differences in SES largely predict welfare attitudes. I do find that the three components measuring SES also contribute to the attitudinal gap. Due to their relatively disadvantaged socio-economic position, Turks and Moroccans are more in favor of extensive welfare policies. However, differences in political ideology apparently play a bigger role. As a consequence, we can establish that welfare attitudes are not merely a product of self-interest. One's values and principles, which are rooted in political ideology, are more important. This also means that people are able to support policies that oppose their economic self-interest, simply because they believe these policies to be just.

Social trust and especially political trust were found to affect welfare attitudes to a lesser degree than political ideology and SES. Contrary to what was hypothesized, the effects of social and political trust were negative. Previous studies established social trust to be positively related to progressive welfare attitudes (Bergh & Bjørnskov, 2014; Daniele & Geys, 2015; Jensen & Svendsen, 2010). The question that arises is why this study found an opposing effect. Firstly, this study differs to those by Bergh and Bjørnskov (2014) and Jensen and Svendsen (2010) regarding the level on which the analysis is conducted. These previous studies analyze differences in levels of social trust and welfare state support on the macro (country) level. They found that high trusting societies tend to provide more extensive welfare support than low trusting societies. Subsequently Jensen and Svendsen explain this finding as follows: "citizens must be confident that they are not the only one contributing to the common pool of resources". Bergh and

Bjørnskov's reasoning is similar: "trust protects social insurance arrangements against free riding". In this way, both studies provide individual-level arguments when explaining macro-level variation. It might be true that more extensive welfare arrangements exist in high-trusting societies, but this does not mean that high trusting people in those societies are automatically more in favor of these arrangements. This ecological fallacy could partially explain the different outcomes of this study and previous ones.

However, Daniele and Geys (2015) do analyze individual-level data and also find that social trust positively affects welfare attitudes. They use the fourth wave of ESS which includes the following measurement of welfare state support: "Many social benefits and services are paid for by taxes. If the government had to choose between increasing taxes and spending more on social benefits and services, or decreasing taxes and spending less on social benefits and services, which should they do?" Presenting respondents this statement is radically different from the statements that were provided by the NELLS data because of its emphasis on the trade-off between taxes and social spending. The NELLS dataset contains questions on welfare preferences without taking the possibility of higher taxes into account. It is possible that people need to be actively reminded of taxes before social trust plays a role. Untrusting people might fear the 'free riding' of others more if they are explicitly reminded of this trade-off.

The same applies to the role of political trust. Taxes are, of course, a direct payment of citizens to the government. When people are reminded of the trade-off between taxes and welfare, they might think twice whether they want to support more extensive welfare policies. If someone does not trust the government, he or she is more likely to think their tax money will be wasted. Or, as Rothstein (2012) states: "citizens are only likely to accept the payment of a substantial portion of their money through taxation in exchange for social policies if they believe the government will handle this money in a fair, transparent and incorrupt manner". When taxes are

not specifically mentioned in a survey on welfare preferences (as in the NELLS dataset), respondents might not consider their own judgment of the government or politics in general.

Future studies

Authors of future research on welfare attitudes could incorporate questions on welfare attitudes with and without the trade-off between taxes and welfare. By doing so, it can be determined whether political and social trust affect welfare attitudes differently when taxes are mentioned. Such a study would provide more clarity on the mediating roles of both types of trust.

This study has established that political ideology is the main cause of differences in welfare attitudes between ethnic minorities and Dutch natives. However, we do not know whether the ethnic groups differ on which mediators affect welfare attitudes to a greater degree. It could be that economic self-interest is more important for the native population while political ideology is more important to ethnic minorities. Future studies could perform a moderated mediation analysis to test this.

Future studies could also examine differences between first- and second-generation immigrants to get a better understanding of the cultural integration process of Dutch Turks and Moroccans. If the attitudes of the second generation are more similar to those of the native population, it can be established that these immigrant groups are becoming more integrated.

Limitations

The study's major limitation is that the survey was conducted solely in Dutch. A substantial part of the Turkish and Moroccan communities in the Netherlands are therefore excluded from the analysis, as not all Dutch Turks and Moroccans have sufficient knowledge of the Dutch language. Consequently, it is unsure whether the findings can be generalized toward these entire

communities. Future studies could be conducted in Dutch, Turkish, Kurdish, Arabic and Berber to ensure that all people within these communities can participate. A second limitation is that perceived discrimination is not incorporated in the study. Galle et al (2019) found that perceived discrimination positively affects welfare attitudes. I was unable to incorporate discrimination in the parallel mediation analysis as native respondents were not asked about this. Previous studies found that feelings of discrimination also affect social trust (Douds & Wu, 2017; Fan, 2019; Ziller, 2017) and political trust (De Vroome et al, 2013), which are included in the analysis. I therefore believe the findings will not differ greatly if discrimination had been incorporated too.

Conclusion

The objective of this thesis was to analyze differences in welfare attitudes between Dutch Turks and Moroccans and Dutch natives, and subsequently determine its causes. The analysis proved that ethnic minorities have more progressive welfare attitudes than the native group, as established by most previous studies on this topic. Differences in political ideology seem to be the main cause for dissimilarity. Dutch Turks and Moroccans are much more likely to identify as politically leftist, resulting in more progressive attitudes towards the welfare state and economic redistribution. The analysis also provided further support for the economic self-interest theory. Dutch citizens of Moroccan and Turkish descent are more socio-economically deprived than natives, resulting in more demands for redistribution. SES was measured by incorporating education, occupation and the experience of financial problems. All measures had similar effects: the higher someone's socio-economic status is, the less likely he or she is to support extensive welfare policies. No substantial differences were found between the strength of the effects of occupation, education and financial problems, suggesting that the three measures equally contribute to differences in welfare attitudes between the ethnic groups.

Contrary to the hypotheses and previous studies, no positive relationship was found between political and social trust and progressive welfare attitudes. In fact, both appeared to be negatively related to welfare attitudes. This applies to the native group and both ethnic minority groups. Dutch Turks and Moroccans report lower levels of political and social trust, thus contributing to the attitudinal gap between ethnic minorities and the native population. As explained in the discussion section, it is well possible that these surprising findings are the consequence of how welfare attitudes were measured in this study. The NELLS dataset did not mention the possibility of higher taxes when asking respondents about their welfare preferences. It is plausible that political trust and social trust only play a role when respondents are actively reminded of the trade-off between welfare and taxation. If they are reminded, people could be

less inclined to support these policies if they suspect other people to be ‘free-riding’ (lack of social trust) or deem the government to be incapable of spending the collected taxes in a correct manner (lack of political trust).

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CHECKLIST ETHICAL AND PRIVACY ASPECTS OF RESEARCH

INSTRUCTION

This checklist should be completed for every research study that is conducted at the Department of Public Administration and Sociology (DPAS). This checklist should be completed *before* commencing with data collection or approaching participants. Students can complete this checklist with help of their supervisor.

This checklist is a mandatory part of the empirical master's thesis and has to be uploaded along with the research proposal.

The guideline for ethical aspects of research of the Dutch Sociological Association (NSV) can be found on their website (http://www.nsv-sociologie.nl/?page_id=17). If you have doubts about ethical or privacy aspects of your research study, discuss and resolve the matter with your EUR supervisor. If needed and if advised to do so by your supervisor, you can also consult Dr. Jennifer A. Holland, coordinator of the Sociology Master's Thesis program.

PART I: GENERAL INFORMATION

Project title: Explaining welfare attitude differences between Dutch natives and ethnic minorities

Name, email of student: Asher van der Schelde, 549036as@eur.nl

Name, email of supervisor: Cecil Meeusen, cecil.meeusen@kuleuven.be

Start date and duration: February 1 2020, 5 months

Is the research study conducted within DPAS
NO

YES -

If 'NO': at or for what institute or organization will the study be conducted?
(e.g. internship organization)

PART II: TYPE OF RESEARCH STUDY

Please indicate the type of research study by circling the appropriate answer:

1. Research involving human participants. YES -
NO

If 'YES': does the study involve medical or physical research? YES -
NO

Research that falls under the Medical Research Involving Human Subjects Act ([WMO](#)) must first be submitted to [an accredited medical research ethics committee](#) or the Central Committee on Research Involving Human Subjects ([CCMO](#)).

2. Field observations without manipulations that will not involve identification of participants. YES - NO

3. Research involving completely anonymous data files (secondary data that has been anonymized by someone else). YES -
NO

PART III: PARTICIPANTS

(Complete this section only if your study involves human participants)

Where will you collect your data?

—
Note: indicate for separate data sources.

What is the (anticipated) size of your sample?

—
Note: indicate for separate data sources.

What is the size of the population from which you will sample?

—
Note: indicate for separate data sources.

1. Will information about the nature of the study and about what participants can expect during the study be withheld from them? YES -
NO

2. Will any of the participants not be asked for verbal or written 'informed consent,' whereby they agree to participate in the study? YES -
NO

3. Will information about the possibility to discontinue the participation at any time be withheld from participants? YES - NO
4. Will the study involve actively deceiving the participants? YES - NO
Note: almost all research studies involve some kind of deception of participants. Try to think about what types of deception are ethical or non-ethical (e.g. purpose of the study is not told, coercion is exerted on participants, giving participants the feeling that they harm other people by making certain decisions, etc.).
5. Does the study involve the risk of causing psychological stress or negative emotions beyond those normally encountered by participants? YES - NO
6. Will information be collected about special categories of data, as defined by the GDPR (e.g. racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union membership, genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a person, data concerning mental or physical health, data concerning a person's sex life or sexual orientation)? YES - NO
7. Will the study involve the participation of minors (<18 years old) or other groups that cannot give consent? YES - NO
8. Is the health and/or safety of participants at risk during the study? YES - NO
9. Can participants be identified by the study results or can the confidentiality of the participants' identity not be ensured? YES - NO
10. Are there any other possible ethical issues with regard to this study? YES - NO

If you have answered 'YES' to any of the previous questions, please indicate below why this issue is unavoidable in this study.

What safeguards are taken to relieve possible adverse consequences of these issues (e.g., informing participants about the study afterwards, extra safety regulations, etc.).

Are there any unintended circumstances in the study that can cause harm or have negative (emotional) consequences to the participants? Indicate what possible circumstances this could be.

Please attach your informed consent form in Appendix I, if applicable.

Part IV: Data storage and backup

Where and when will you store your data in the short term, after acquisition?

The data file will be stored on my MacBook which is protected by a password.

Note: indicate for separate data sources, for instance for paper-and pencil test data, and for digital data files.

Who is responsible for the immediate day-to-day management, storage and backup of the data arising from your research?

I, Asher van der Schelde, am solely responsible for the immediate day-to-day management, storage and backup of the data arising from your research

How (frequently) will you back-up your research data for short-term data security?

On a weekly basis I will back-up research data for short-term data security?

In case of collecting personal data how will you anonymize the data?

Not relevant

Note: It is advisable to keep directly identifying personal details separated from the rest of the data. Personal details are then replaced by a key/ code. Only the code is part of the database with data and the list of respondents/research subjects is kept separate.

PART VI: SIGNATURE

Please note that it is your responsibility to follow the ethical guidelines in the conduct of your study. This includes providing information to participants about the study and ensuring confidentiality in storage and use of personal data. Treat participants respectfully, be on time at appointments, call participants when they have signed up for your study and fulfil promises made to participants.

Furthermore, it is your responsibility that data are authentic, of high quality and properly stored. The principle is always that the supervisor (or strictly speaking the Erasmus University Rotterdam) remains owner of the data, and that the student should therefore hand over all data to the supervisor.

Hereby I declare that the study will be conducted in accordance with the ethical guidelines of the Department of Public Administration and Sociology at Erasmus University Rotterdam. I have answered the questions truthfully.

Name student: Asher van der Schelde

Name (EUR) supervisor: Cecil Meeusen

Date: 21-03-2020

Date: 22-03-2020

