

Lijepa Naša Domovino, or Maybe Not?;

A Comparative Analysis of Euroscepticism Among Croatian Young Adults in Croatia and in
The Netherlands

Kim Pušić
Msc Thesis Politics and Society
Erasmus University Rotterdam
Cecil Meeusen
July 5, 2020



Abstract

Euroscepticism, a phenomenon that we can witness more and more nowadays. The younger generations are deemed to have a more positive stance towards the European Union than the older age cohorts. Nevertheless, earlier studies have found that youth in Eastern Europe tends to be more Eurosceptic than their peers in Western Europe. This thesis focuses on Croatian young adults in Croatia and the Netherlands as the question arises if young adults who left their home country in search for better living standards, think differently about European integration than their fellow Croatians in Croatia. Through a parallel mediator model, using self-obtained data, various mediators are being tested in relation to the differences in Euroscepticism among the two groups. Besides general explanations for Euroscepticism such as political trust, knowledge and social-economic position, a specific focus is being put on nationalism due to Croatia's complex history. The findings indicate that overall, there is limited difference between living in Croatia or the Netherlands on Euroscepticism. However, it can be stated that Croatian young adults in Croatia are slightly more Eurosceptic than their peers in the Netherlands. I found that, as expected, especially nationalism can explain the effect of living in Croatia or the Netherlands on Euroscepticism more for the Croatian young adults in Croatia than in the Netherlands. Hence, the findings of this research contribute to broadening the theory on the phenomenon Euroscepticism by shedding a light on the importance of nationalism among Croatian young adults.

Keywords: Euroscepticism, nationalism, young adults, Croatia, the Netherlands

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION	4
<i>‘LIJEPA NAŠA’</i>	4
1. ZOOMING IN ON CROATIA	7
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	9
2.1 <i>THE RISE OF EUROSCEPTICISM</i>	9
2.2 <i>FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO EUROSCEPTICISM</i>	10
2.2.1 <i>SOCIAL-ECONOMIC POSITION</i>	11
2.2.2 <i>POLITICAL TRUST</i>	12
2.2.3 <i>NATIONAL IDENTITY IN CONNECTION TO NATIONALISM</i>	13
2.2.4 <i>KNOWLEDGE</i>	15
3. METHODOLOGY	18
3.1 <i>PROCEDURE</i>	18
3.2 <i>RESPONDENTS</i>	20
3.3 <i>INSTRUMENTATION</i>	21
3.3.1 <i>CONTROL VARIABLES</i>	22
3.3.2 <i>SOCIAL-ECONOMIC POSITION</i>	22
3.3.3 <i>POLITICAL TRUST</i>	22
3.3.4 <i>NATIONALISM</i>	23
3.3.5 <i>SUBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE EU</i>	23
3.3.6 <i>EUROSCEPTICISM</i>	24
3.4 <i>DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS</i>	25
3.5 <i>METHOD</i>	26
4. RESULTS	26
4.1 <i>MODEL 1: SOCIAL-ECONOMIC POSITION</i>	29
4.2 <i>MODEL 2: KNOWLEDGE EU</i>	30
4.3 <i>MODEL 3: NATIONALISM; NATIONAL IDENTITY</i>	31
4.4 <i>MODEL 4: POLITICAL TRUST</i>	32
4.5 <i>MODEL 5: ALL MECHANISMS</i>	33
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION	35
5.1 <i>DISCUSSION</i>	35
5.2 <i>LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH</i>	37
5.3 <i>CONCLUSION</i>	38
REFERENCES	40
6 APPENDICES	43
APPENDIX A: SURVEY QUESTIONS IN DUTCH AND IN CROATIAN	43
APPENDIX B: FA NATIONALISM AND EUROSCEPTICISM	63
APPENDIX C: CHECKLIST ETHICS AND PRIVACY ASPECTS OF RESEARCH	64

Introduction

‘Lijepa Naša’

“*Lijepa naša domovino, oj junačka zemljo mila. Stare slave djedovino, da bi vazda sretna bila!*” is the first strophe in the Croatian national anthem. Translated into English it means “Our beautiful homeland, o so fearless and gracious. Our fathers’ ancient glory, may you be blessed forever”. The first two words, *lijepa naša* (*our beautiful*), are also used in daily life to refer to Croatia as the country itself. While many national anthems contain national pride, the way Croatian citizens adhere to these words stems from the turbulent history of the country. The end of the Yugoslavian war, where neighboring countries Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia fought against each other, sparked great patriotism and pride among the Croatian citizens as independence followed in 1991 (Pavlakovic, 2010). The underlying reason for this strong sense of nationalism is that the three entities (Serbs, Bosnians, and Croats) did, and still at times, do not want to be related in any way to each other.

Since Croatia’s independence, the country has undertaken different steps towards progress. One of these steps includes Croatia’s trajectory to the European Union (EU). In 2013, the relatively young country Croatia was the latest to join the EU and became the 28th member state. During the referendum about joining the EU in 2012, 66% of the citizens were in favor of entering the EU. Nevertheless, the average turnout of the referendum at the time in Croatia was only 43,51%, and even though it was perceived as valid, it was still seen as a low percentage. Additionally, within this 43,51% turnout, it appeared to be very hard to mobilize young people for the referendum (Guerra, 2018).

Since Croatia entered the EU, a number of 189.000 Croatian citizens left the country to other European countries to work and/or study, as this has been made easier by Croatia becoming a member state (Croatian Bureau of Statistics, 2019). The most popular host countries for emigration are other European countries like Germany, Austria, Ireland but also the Netherlands (CBS, 2013; Poslovni.hr, 2020). While in the ‘90s many people fled the Western Balkan as a consequence of the war, nowadays the main motivations for emigration are lack of employment, corruption and a perceived lack of

opportunities within Croatia. According to the Croatian Bureau of Statistics (2019), the biggest group that has emigrated is aged between 20 and 40 years. This is the same age cohort that was hard to mobilize during the Croatian referendum for entering the EU.

In general, literature shows that young adults aged between 18 and 30 years are seen as the most supportive group for European Integration as compared to older age cohorts (Fox & Pearce, 2018; Guerra, 2018). One of the reasons for younger people to be more supportive is their access to education which leads to the familiarization of politics. As well as young adults' ability to develop a more European civic identity through educational programs (Guerra, 2018). The same pattern was found in the Brexit case where the referendum showed that younger people were more in favor of being part of the EU than the older generations. Contrary, literature finds young adults from Eastern European, post-communist, countries to be less supportive of European integration than young adults from Western European countries (De Vries, 2013). In previous studies conducted prior to Croatia being a European member state, Kersan-Škabić and Tomić (2009) found that especially Croatian students were Eurosceptical as they feared the economic costs of being a member state. Moreover, young adults are seen as the future of democracy and thus an important part of European integration. Euroscepticism among this group could thus be seen as problematic for the European integration process.

There are different ways of understanding the current rise of Euroscepticism within academia such as a lack of knowledge about the EU, social-economic position (SEP), and political trust. While Kersan-Škabić and Tomić (2009) found an economic-related fear among Croatian students prior to entering the EU, this study will shed a light on another possible mechanism in the period after accession. Previous studies touched upon the East and West divide in support of European integration among young adults. Besides, nationalism is highly embedded within the national culture of the country since becoming independent. Yet, many young adults choose to emigrate to other European countries in search for better economic opportunities. One of these host countries is the Western European country the Netherlands. The question arises if the young adults who left their home country

think differently about European integration than their fellow Croatians in Croatia. While previous studies mostly focused on students in Zagreb with a university degree and the economic aspect of Euroscepticism, this paper will aim to be more inclusive. Given the history of Croatia, this research will focus on the role nationalism plays within attitudes towards the European Union. Hence, this thesis will aim to answer the following research question: *To what extent does Euroscepticism differ among Croatian young adults in Croatia and Croatian young adults in the Netherlands and, what is the role of nationalism in explaining Euroscepticism between these two groups?*

1. Zooming in on Croatia

In this section Croatia's past will briefly be discussed in order to get a grasp of the degree of nationalism in the country as it is an important factor for this research. Additionally, Croatia's road to the European Union will be outlined and previously conducted work on Croatian students and their attitudes towards European integration will be discussed.

Croatia is a relatively young country that got its independence from former Yugoslavia in 1991. What followed after the collapse of Yugoslavia, was an extremely bloody ethnic war between Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians. As the war happened less than 30 years ago, the wounds are still open and the consequences are still omnipresent in the daily lives of Croatians. Croatian nationalism goes hand in hand with the nation-building and anything related to the war, such as symbols, has created a form of group solidarity that is used to distinguish oneself from the other ethnicities i.e. Serbs and Bosnians (Pavlakovic, 2010). One of these symbols is Ante Gotovina, a Croatian Army General who led the final operation of the army in freeing Croatia from Serbia's aggression on Croatia. In Croatia, Gotovina is perceived as a national hero while on the outside he is seen as a war criminal. It is exactly the detention of Gotovina and Croatia's full cooperation with the *International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia* (I.C.T.Y.) which was a precondition of the EU in Croatia's accession (Vataman, 2013). For many Croatians, Gotovina is the hero that freed Croatia and thus his indictment triggered controversies towards the EU. This can be seen back at the yearly celebration on August 5th (Day of Victory and Homeland Thanksgiving) everywhere in Croatia, where Ante Gotovina is still a central figure. Moreover, when Gotovina got arrested mass demonstrations in many Croatian cities were organized where anti-EU banners could be seen and posters across Croatia became visible saying 'A hero, not a war criminal' (Pavlakovic, 2010). Thus, besides already being a symbol against Serbia, Gotovina also became a symbol against the I.C.T.Y. and the EU (Pavlakovic, 2010).

Once the preconditions were met, Croatia became officially the 28th member state on July 1st, 2013, nearly ten years after applying for membership (Carkoglu & Glupker-Kesebir, 2016). At the beginning of independence most political parties were right-wing oriented and saw European

integration as a loss of the just obtained independence. After 2000, party-based Euroscepticism faded and popular Euroscepticism rose (Kersan-Škabić & Tomić, 2009). This rise could be noted in the referendum on Croatia's accession (Guerra, 2018). Various Croatian scholars conducted research in the period prior to Croatia entering the EU to examine why Croats lack support. Where Bagić and Šalinović (2006) found that Eurosceptic attitudes were based on general impressions, Štulhofer (2006) argued that the roots lay in economic fears. Kersan-Škabić and Tomić (2009) focused on the Croatian students in the capital Zagreb and found that the students mostly feared the economic costs that the accession would bring along. The skepticism of the younger generation is a paradox with general literature as it is argued that young people are more supportive than older age cohorts.

Nowadays, almost 7 years after Croatia became a member state, around 189.000 people have emigrated from Croatia to other European countries like Germany, the Netherlands and Ireland (CBS, 2013; Poslovni.hr, 2020). Most of them are aged between 20 and 40 years old and have left the country as a consequence of the lack of possibilities in Croatia due to unemployment and corruption (Croatian Bureau of Statistics, 2019). As the general consensus in literature remains that young people are the future of the EU and democracy, it is of vast importance to examine their attitudes towards the EU (Fox & Pearce, 2018; Guerra, 2018). Besides, while different sources of Euroscepticism have been tested, the case of Croats in relation to their strong sense of nationalism lacks representation in the current literature.

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1 *The Rise of Euroscepticism*

Euroscepticism, a phenomenon that can be witnessed nowadays more and more. The concept is defined and approached by scholars in various ways, which leaves us with a broad academic literature regarding the topic. Hooghe and Marks (2007) define Euroscepticism as the doubt about an ever integrated Europe and the policies that come along. Taggart (1998) distinguished between contingent and outright opposition. With this, the author stated that one's Eurosceptic attitude does not necessarily entail rejecting the complete idea of the EU and its further integration, but that Eurosceptic stances can also be based on single elements. A couple of years later, Taggart together with Szczerbiak (2001) re-conceptualized Euroscepticism by distinguishing between soft- and hard Euroscepticism. Hard Euroscepticism refers to rejecting the EU and all the integration processes entirely by opting for leaving the union or not joining in the first place. On the other hand, the authors propose the term soft Euroscepticism which can be seen as a more certified term. Soft Euroscepticism entails, like Taggart (1998) stated in his earlier work, that opposition to European integration is based on different elements within this integration process. This can be Euroscepticism based on policy measures, different political institutions within the EU, or critique on the incongruity between national and EU interests. The authors argue that it is especially this type of Euroscepticism that can be found throughout Europe as it is connected to certain events and times within the European process that call for this soft Euroscepticism (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2001). On the same note, Kopecky and Mudde (2002) approach the concept Euroscepticism in a more profound way than their colleagues. The authors conceptualize stances on the EU and the integration process through two different types of support; diffuse and specific support. Diffuse support refers to the overall support of what the EU stands for and its integration process. Within this type of support, the authors classify the ones who support these general beliefs as Europhiles and the ones who do not show diffuse support as Europhobes. On the other hand, specific support focuses more on the evaluation of the practices

within the EU and its political actors. Here again, the authors classify between Euro-optimists and Euro-pessimists (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002).

The type of Euroscepticism that we identify and try to conceptualize nowadays is not the same as before the Treaty of Maastricht. Hooghe and Marks (2008) explain this by arguing that after the treaty, citizens are more exposed and affected by European decision-making. Guerra (2018) adds that Euroscepticism has grown out to an even more general type of Euroscepticism as different crises-induced political parties turn against the integration process and spark popular discontent. Thus, spreading Euroscepticism from the elite to the ordinary population.

This section has shown the various explanations and approaches to the conceptualization of Euroscepticism within a vast range of literature. This research conceptualizes Euroscepticism as ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ based on the degree of Euroscepticism found in the analysis. This conceptualization takes into account the inclusive nature of the phenomenon by allowing a person to either oppose the EU as whole or oppose partially. The next section will discuss the various foundations of Euroscepticism.

2.2 Factors Contributing to Euroscepticism

There is a substantial body of literature on the sources of Euroscepticism, ranging from public to party attitudes on European integration. To identify the different degrees of Euroscepticism in the proposed study, it is important to distinguish literature that focuses on Euroscepticism from a political party viewpoint and Euroscepticism among ordinary citizens. This because Euroscepticism from a party-based point focuses mostly on the agenda strategies of parties, whereas this research is focused on public opinion. Different authors discuss a variety of individual-level based theories that aim to explain why citizens would support or reject European integration (Gabel, 1998; Grimm, Pollock & Ellison, 2018; Hooghe & Marks, 2005; Inglehart, 1970; McLaren, 2002; Sørensen, 2013). In the following sections, the different theories will be combined and discussed in order to be able to connect these to the conducted surveys. The chosen theories are paramount within the general literature by the aforementioned authors. Some authors, besides the main theories, discuss other possible natures of

Euroscepticism. This thesis will focus on the main theories social-economic position, political trust, knowledge about the EU and nationalism (see Figure 1). Given the history and the current state of Croatia, I believe that these explanations are theoretically the best fitting.

2.2.1 Social-Economic Position

One of the EU's primary policies is the creation of a growth-oriented environment through economic liberalization and deregulation, which directly affects the labour market structures of member states (Gabel, 1998). According to Hooghe and Marks (2005), the utilitarian model is based on the cost-benefit considerations of the ordinary people who assess whether the integrated market of the EU benefits their country economically. The distinction is made between the so-called winning and losing countries in relation to European integration which influences people's stances towards the EU. On a similar note, Gabel (1998) touches upon the notion that the social-economic position (SEP) of citizens is a strong indicator for their presumed stances towards European integration. It is argued that individuals with a higher SEP ('winners') reap the benefits from an integrated Europe and therefore are also more inclined to show support for the European Union. On the other hand, individuals with a lower SEP, often the lower educated and thus lower-skilled ('losers'), have more to fear from European integration as there is more competition and are thus inclined to be more Eurosceptic (Sørensen, 2013).

According to the International Monetary Fund (2019), Croatia ranks among the poorest countries in the European Union with a GDP of \$27.664 in 2019, while the Netherlands ranks among the richest with a GDP of \$59.105. Additionally, previous studies like Kersan-Škabić and Tomić (2009) found that Croatian students were afraid of the costs accession to the EU would bring along. This research will use the SEP theory by Gabel (1998) and Sørensen (2013) instead of the utilitarian theory by Hooghe and Marks (2005) as the focus is on individuals' own social-economic evaluation rather than their evaluation of their country's economic position. This leads to the following expectations:

H1a: The higher the SEP for both the Croatian young adults in Croatia and in the Netherlands, the less Eurosceptic these individuals will be.

H1b: Croatian young adults in Croatia will be more Eurosceptic than Croatian young adults in the Netherlands as in general, Croatian young adults in Croatia have a lower SES compared to the Croatian young adults in the Netherlands.

2.2.2 Political Trust

Political trust is based on individuals' evaluation of political institutions and political actors' performance (Grimm, Pollock & Ellison, 2018). Nowadays, this evaluation of political trust has become more complex as the political system within the EU exists of multiple layers.

Anderson (1998) argues that individuals who positively evaluate their national political institutions, and thus have trust, are also more inclined to have a rather positive stance towards the EU. Grimm et al. (2018) claim that citizens who evaluate the democratic performance of their country to be insufficient, due to either corruption or low accountability, will be more positive toward the EU. In a similar vein, Sánchez-Cuenca (2000) states that individuals who lack any form of political trust are in fact more inclined to be supportive towards the EU as they view that the EU can make up for the weakness of national political institutions. This is in contradiction with Anderson (1998), who argues that lower national trust, affects attitudes towards the EU negatively. Nevertheless, within this part of academic literature, it is questioned whether citizens are actually capable of distinguishing national institutional trust and European institutional trust (Mishler & Rose, 1997). This research will consider both arguments.

An often heard argument from Croatian citizens leaving Croatia is corruption, which indicates low political trust in the national government. On the other hand, with Croatia becoming part of the EU, emigration to other European countries became easier. Thus, Croatian young adults that were able

to leave Croatia to the Netherlands might view the EU positively, while viewing the Croatian national government negatively. Applying the theory to the case study, leads the following hypotheses:

H2: Croatian young adults living in Croatia have less national political trust than their peers in the Netherlands and are therefore more Eurosceptic.

2.2.3 National Identity in Connection to Nationalism

A strong sense of national identity due to nationalism is also seen as one of the possible triggers for Euroscepticism (Abts et al., 2009; Hooghe & Marks, 2004; McLaren, 2002; Štulhofer, 2006). In other words, Euroscepticism can be understood in connection to identity politics as a strong sense of belonging to a certain nation-state is challenged by European integration (McLaren, 2002).

In this line of reasoning, McLaren (2002) argues that Euroscepticism is not so much based on the individual but on the societal-level, as through European integration the integrity of the nation is undermined as a whole. He finds that a lack of support for the EU can be explained by the perceived threat of other cultures, as the EU allows a free flow of not only goods but also people. Besides a perceived threat of other cultures, McLaren (2002) also argues that a lack of support for the EU stems from a perceived threat of Brussels on the status quo including national norms and values. According to McLaren (2002), viewing the EU and any further integration as a threat to the nation can be understood symbolically. Meaning, individuals react to certain policy proposals in a symbolic manner as these reactions are based on early childhood socialization. With regard to Euroscepticism, McLaren (2002) argues that individuals, mostly in Eastern-European countries, are socialized to look positively at the power and sovereignty of their own nation, as a form of nationalism, from early on. This results in seeing European integration as a symbol of threat to their nations' power and sovereignty. In a similar vein, Štulhofer (2006) argues that through a high sense of nationalism the European Union is seen as a catalyzer for the fragmentation of national identity. Moreover, the author points out how

the actual integration process of a country, through the imposed criteria for access, undervalue national pride. This would lead to a perceived threat of norms and values and trigger Euroscepticism.

Likewise, Hooghe and Marks (2004) argue that humans possess over a strong emotional capacity which forms their group loyalty. Part of this group loyalty is national identity which stems from shared linguistic and cultural ties and leads to a strong sense of nationalism. In this sense, Hooghe and Marks (2004) argue that there is a distinction between an inclusive and exclusive type of national identity. The authors state that individuals who exclusively identify with their own country, and thus hold a singular form of national identity, are more likely to oppose the EU as it threatens their national sovereignty, national pride, as well as their norms and values. On the other hand, what Hooghe and Marks (2004) call the paradox, there are individuals who besides identifying with their own nation also simultaneously identify with multiple other nations or communities and thus form a more inclusive identity as to which they do not develop a strong sense of nationalism. According to the authors, this inclusive type of national identity allows forming a more positive stance towards EU.

For this thesis, a focus will be put on the distinction between inclusive and exclusive national identity as the comparative analysis focuses on two groups who might identify themselves differently. In the case of Croatia, where nationalism due to historic events is upheld to a great extent, the various ways in which national identity plays a role in opposing the EU are important to consider when conducting the research. The arrest of the Croatian army general Ante Gotovina is one of the indicators that shows the level of nationalism in the country. This example showcases the exclusive national identity that many Croats hold as a consequence of the Yugoslavian war. Meaning, Croats do not want to be identified as one of the other Yugoslavian entities. Something that can also be seen back in the national anthem ‘Lijepa li si’. On the other hand, the Croatian young adults who emigrated might have adapted more to their host country and thus formed an inclusive identity that would foster support for the EU according to the theory. This leads to the following hypotheses:

H3a: Having a strong national identity due to nationalism, will result in more Euroscepticism as the EU is perceived as a cultural threat.

H3b: Croatian young adults in Croatia have a more exclusive national identity and are subsequently more Eurosceptic, whilst Croatian young adults in the Netherlands have a more inclusive national identity and therefore are subsequently less Eurosceptic.

2.2.4 Knowledge

As we have seen, there are various explanations in academia for the rise of Eurosceptic attitudes among European citizens. The last factor to be discussed in this paper is individuals' level of knowledge about the EU. One of the earliest works conducted on this aspect is the one from Inglehart (1970) where he introduced the concept of cognitive mobilization. He argued that having a higher capacity of political sophistication, meaning possessing and coping with political information, will make a person more familiar with institutions and therefore perceive them as less threatening. Inglehart (1970) indeed finds that a higher level of cognitive mobilization on the EU leads to citizens taking a more positive stance on European integration. Moreover, the author finds that this cognitive mobilization is connected to having a high level of education, as through education this cognitive ability is developed and political norms and values are being internalized. Inglehart (1970) concluded that possessing cognitive capacity to deal with politically related information is a necessary step for supporting the EU, but it is not the sole condition.

On the other hand, there is literature that questions the theory of Inglehart (1970) by introducing the democratic deficit hypothesis. Clark (2014) and Karp et al. (2003) argue that political sophistication will not generate more support. On the contrary, having more information will decrease the satisfaction with the EU as people become more critical about the political processes. Both Clark (2014) and Karp et al. (2003) find that through this political sophistication, citizens become more aware of the flaws and have higher demands. Moreover, Clark (2014) along with Inglehart (1970) argues that education and socioeconomic status play an important role in obtaining knowledge about the EU, as

well as forming political interest. He states that through a higher level of education, one obtains more political knowledge and therefore is less sensitive to information spread by the media. Additionally, someone who holds less political knowledge, often lower educated, needs to rely on information shortcuts by the news which often lacks to cover EU politics and when it does it is often one-sided. This, according to Clark (2014) but also Karp et al. (2003), leads to individuals forming attitudes about the EU in line with the media or by using proxies of the performance of the national government. In general, while there are contrasting expectations on the effect of political sophistication on the support for the EU, scholars do agree that more education is beneficial for political interest as well as for forming political judgments.

This thesis will take both the cognitive mobilization by Inglehart (1970) and the democratic deficit hypothesis proposed by Clark (2014) and Karp et al. (2003) into account when conducting the research as it broadens the possible outcomes for both groups. More precisely, the level of education seemingly is of great importance when considering the effect of political knowledge on support for the EU. Connecting this to the case study leads to the following hypotheses:

H4a: Croatian young adults in Croatia and in the Netherlands with a lower level of education have less knowledge about the EU than Croatian young adults in both countries with a higher level of education.

H4b: Having more knowledge about the EU for both groups results in less fear of the EU and thus less Eurosceptic attitudes.

H4c: Croatian young adults in Croatia have less knowledge about the European Union than Croatian young adults in the Netherlands and are therefore more Eurosceptic.




Figure 1: Conceptual model portraying mechanisms (mediators) on Eurosepticism for Croatian young adults living in Croatia and the Netherlands

3. Methodology

3.1 Procedure

In order to answer the research question, this thesis relied on self-obtained data through the use of an online questionnaire. This questionnaire, with a duration of 6 minutes (see Appendix A) was completely anonymous, on a voluntary basis and designed using the program ‘Qualtrics’. It has been available online from 5.5.2020 till 19.5.2020, as the target amount of respondents had been reached within the first few days. The survey questions were designed in both Croatian and Dutch in order to control for affinity of the respondents.

The redistribution of the survey relied on snowball sampling, as the survey has been shared via various social media platforms. The different platforms used were Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp. Within this process of redistributing the survey, I first spread the survey through my own social media platforms to attract eligible respondents who in their turn could share the survey with their network.

In order to stay as neutral as possible regarding the subject and my own background as a born Dutch Croat, I approached the possible respondents with an introductory text within the survey but also in the posts on the social media platforms. Moreover, in order to control for any form of manipulating respondents into answering in a certain way, I did not mention anything boldly stated and related to nationalism, my own background or the research between the two different groups. Nevertheless, I still aimed to be transparent about the research. The text for the posts on Facebook and Instagram (both in Croatian and Dutch) looked as follows:

Dear all, for my Master thesis on opinions toward the European Union I am looking for **Croats** (both men and women) **aged between 18 and 30 years** living in the **Netherlands or in Croatia**.

The survey will only take 6 minutes. If you are eligible, you can help me graduating by filling in the survey completely anonymous. I would highly appreciate it if you could also share this with

your network! In case you have any questions, you can send me a message. Thank you in advance!

The text within the survey, before answering has been used to ask a form of consent and looked as follows:

Welcome! My name is Kim Pusic and I am a master student at the Erasmus University in Rotterdam. This survey is part of the Politics and Society master thesis research. The survey will only take 6 minutes and by completing it you will help me develop insights about the European Union. Your participation is completely anonymous and voluntary and the obtained data will only be used for academic purposes. The survey is only to be filled in by both men and women holding a Croatian identity aged 18-30 who live either in the Netherlands or in Croatia. If you have any question about the survey, please feel free to contact me via my email: kp_dtc@hotmail.com. Thank you in advance!

On Facebook, the link of the survey has been shared on my own profile with a reach of 1197 people. Moreover, the survey has been posted in eight different preselected Facebook groups¹. For the groups ‘Nizozemski kutak’ (Dutch corner), ‘Balkan expats in the Netherlands’ and ‘Idem u svijet-Nizozemska (We are going into the world- The Netherlands) counts that also different ex-Yugoslavian ethnicities are part of the group. This did not form a specific problem as various people who were not eligible to fill in the survey, shared the survey with Croats they know in their own community. Moreover, no specific posts related to nationalistic issues were detected in these groups. Nevertheless, this did not indicate clearly whether someone might be nationalistic or not. Therefore, two other groups² that focused more on nationalistic content were preselected in order to create a diverse as possible group of respondents.

¹‘Nizozemski kutak’ (Dutch corner: 3911 members), ‘Balkan expats in the Netherlands’ (575 members), ‘Hrvati u Nizozemskoj (Croats in the Netherlands: 1236 members), ‘Idem u svijet-Nizozemska (We are going into the world- The Netherlands: 797 members), ‘Kroaten in Nederland (Croats in The Netherlands: 254 members), ‘Everything Croatian’ (6664 members), and ‘Hrvati u Dijaspори (Croats in the Diaspora: 4271 likes).

² ‘Everything Croatian’ (6664 members), and ‘Hrvati u Dijaspори (Croats in the Diaspora: 4271 likes).

Furthermore, for recruitment in Croatia on Facebook, besides my own network and that of friends and family, I shared the survey in different groups³ that focus specifically on Croats in Croatia. These groups have different focuses but are based on Croats in Croatia and mostly young people.

For Instagram the survey was as well shared via my own profile with 1.055 people by the means of the survey link in my bio. Furthermore, friends and family living in different parts of Croatia and, to the best of my knowledge, with different SEP were approached to fill in the survey and share with their online/offline community.

Additionally, the survey link was shared via WhatsApp with acquaintances who I deemed eligible and who are not active on Instagram and/or Facebook to fill in and share the survey.

Furthermore, consent of the respondents was asked before starting the survey and in order to safeguard the personal data that has been collected, I stored the obtained data on my personal laptop in a separate file with a password. Additionally, the obtained data per respondent has been coded numerically and visible IP-addresses were filtered out of the process to ensure the anonymity of the respondents and their data. Further considerations regarding ethics and privacy can be found in Appendix C.

3.2 Respondents

The research targeted young Croatian adults aged between 18 and 30 years old, in Croatia and in the Netherlands. Both men and women were included. The age restriction stems from the fact that young adults are seen as the future of the EU and are also deemed to be more supportive of the EU in general (Fox and Pearce, 2018). Furthermore, from 18 years onwards one is eligible to vote for European Parliament elections in both Croatia and the Netherlands. Another requirement for being eligible was to hold the Croatian nationality (for Croats in Croatia/ working Croats in the Netherlands) and/or to

³ ‘Bog i Hrvati’ (God and Croats: 3.800 members), ‘Studentski posao- Zagreb’ (Student jobs -Zagreb: 2.399 members), ‘Sveučilište u Zadru (studenti) (University in Zadar: 12.729 members), ‘Hrvatski antikomunisti’ (Croatian anti-communists: 2.063 members).

have Croatian parents (Croatian diaspora in the Netherlands). The aim was to recruit at least 100 respondents per group.

In total a number of 304 people participated in the survey (see Table 1). Nevertheless, 14 people have been filtered out for being too old. This brought the number of total eligible respondents to 290 of which 107 people live in the Netherlands and 183 in Croatia. What stands out from the descriptive data is that the majority of total respondents identifies as female, is higher educated and is overall content with their current income. Having this little variation in these variables limits the conclusions that can be drawn from the control variables gender and education, as well as for the mediator social-economic position (SEP). A complete comparable overview of the descriptive data can be seen in Table 1.

3.3 Instrumentation

In general theory, there are three main explanations to understand the dependent variable of the research, Euroscepticism. These include SEP, knowledge about the EU, and political trust. Moreover, living in a Western or Eastern European country has been found to be an important indicator for support. This thesis is interested in Croatian young adults in Croatia and in the Netherlands, which indicates differences between countries in Eastern and Western Europe. Thus, the main independent variable this research is based on is the country of residence (1=NL/2=CRO). Within this line of reasoning, a fourth mediation is expected to explain any difference in degree of Euroscepticism, namely nationalism. These four concepts form the independent variables of the research.

The online questionnaire consisted of 18 questions and were at least 5-point Likert scale questions. In total 43 items were asked. The questions were designed to measure the five desired concepts for the analysis (see Figure 1). In order to combine the Croatian and Dutch version, the exact same questions in both languages were computed into one variable. Furthermore, the ‘I don’t know’/rather won’t say’ answers were coded as missings.

3.3.1 Control Variables

Various social-demographic variables are added within the analysis as control variables. The first variable is education as the different theories in connection to Euroscepticism have shown that one's educational level might influence the degree of Euroscepticism. This control variable had to be re-categorized since the Dutch education levels did not exactly match the Croatian education levels. Hence, the Croatian and Dutch educational levels were grouped and recoded into 1=low to middle and 2=high education levels. Low and middle were grouped together so that when forming the dummy variables of education, the total number of lower educated would not be too low to analyze. Other social-demographic variables used are age (in years) and gender (1=male/2=female).

3.3.2 Social-Economic Position

In order to measure one's *social-economic position*, the single variable subjective income is used as an indicator for this concept. The question connected to this variable is “Which of the following statements best describes your feeling about your current income”⁴. This 5-point Likert variable (1= Struggling- 5= Living comfortable) has been developed by ESS round 8 (2016).

3.3.3 Political Trust

The concept *political trust* is measured by one computed variable. The questions connected to this variable are “On a scale from 0-10 can you tell me how much you trust: the Croatian government/ NL government”. The two questions have been computed to form one general variable for political trust. The initial 11-point Likert-scale (0= no trust at all- 10= complete trust) has been regrouped and recoded into a 5-point Liker-scale.

⁴ A side note has been added for students to use the current income of their parents as an indicator

3.3.4 Nationalism

Nationalism was set to be measured by 12 questions. A principal component analysis with direct oblimin revealed a two factor solution. Nevertheless, only one scale is used within the analysis (see Appendix B).⁵

The scale *national identity* as an indicator for Nationalism consists of six items ($\alpha=.88$). The statements are: “*Ante Gotovina is a hero*”, “*I am a proud Croat*”, “*I fly the Croatian flag for national holidays*”, “*I proudly celebrate Victory day*”, “*Wherever I might be in the world, I carry Croatia in my heart*”, and “*The Croatian national anthem ‘Lijepa nasa’ is an important part of my identity as a Croat*”. These are statements based on a 5-point Likert-scale (1= Completely disagree - 5= Completely agree).

3.3.5 Subjective Knowledge About the EU

The concept *knowledge about the EU* is measured using a scale of 3 items based on a 5-point Likert-scale ($\alpha=.88$). The scale subjective knowledge is used as an indicator for this concept. The statements forming this scale are: “*I understand how the EU works*”, “*I know the different organs that the EU consists of and their competences*”, “*I am aware of the political developments within the EU*” with answers ranging from 1= Completely disagree to 5= Completely agree.

⁵ The second scale (cultural threat) has not been used as errors occurred within the mediation analysis.

3.3.6 Euroscepticism

Lastly, the dependent variable of the research, Euroscepticism, is measured using a scale of 6 items ($\alpha=.88$). Initially, 10 questions were set to be used for this scale. However, a principal component analysis with direct oblimin revealed a two factor solution (see Appendix B). Only items solely loading on the first component were used within the analysis⁶. The questions for this scale are: *“Croatia should step out of the European Union”*, *“EU integration has gone too far”*, *“the EU should return a great part of its competences to the national member states”*, and *“the EU is useless”*, *“Croatia lost her sovereignty to the EU”*, *“Croatian habits have disappeared since its EU membership”*. The answers range from 1= I do not agree at all to 5= I completely agree. Thus, a higher score indicates more Euroscepticism.

⁶ Items loading on the second scale also loaded on the first scale and thus were left out of the analysis.

3.4 Descriptive Statistics

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of all variable scales Croats in NL and Croatia (N=290)

	Croats in the Netherlands				Croats in Croatia	
	Min.	Max.	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
<u>Knowledge about EU</u> Subjective knowledge	1.00	5.00	3.49	0.99	3.10	0.96
<u>Nationalism</u> National identity	1.00	5.00	3.43	1.02	3.73	0.95
<u>Political Trust</u> Trust	1.00	5.00	3.30	1.07	2.44	1.04
<u>Social-economic position</u> Subjective income	1.00	5.00	4.40	0.85	3.87	1.12
<u>Eurocepticism</u> Eurocepticism	1.00	5.00	2.33	1.02	2.39	0.87
<u>Control variables</u>						
Age (in years)	18.00	30.00	25.13	3.32	23.05	2.96
Gender (1=male/2=female)	1.00	2.00	1.66	0.47	1.74	0.44
Education Low-Middle	0.00	1.00	0.25	0.44	0.23	0.42
Education High	0.00	1.00	0.75	0.44	0.77	0.42
N				107	183	

3.5 Method

In order to test which of the theoretically proposed mechanisms might explain differences in Euroscepticism between the Croats in Croatia and the Netherlands, a parallel multiple moderator model will be used. The direct effect of country of residence (Croatia or the Netherlands) on Euroscepticism can be mediated by the four different variables: social-economic position, political trust, knowledge about the EU and nationalism. Figure 1 depicts the model. In a first step, all mediators will be analyzed in separate models, because of the limited sample size. In a second, exploratory step, I will estimate a model including all mechanisms. This will be done making use of the PROCESS macro by Andrew Hayes in SPSS.

4. Results

For each of the models the indirect and direct effect will be discussed per mediator in the following sections. All models have been controlled for gender, age and education, but were estimated in separate models for reasons of power. In the last part of this section, the model that incorporated all mechanisms will be estimated as well.

As can be seen in Table 2, the total effect (c) of country of residence on Euroscepticism shows that Croats in Croatia might slightly be more Eurosceptic than the Croats in NL but this effect is not significant ($B=0.165$; $p>0.05$). Thus, the country of residence does not affect a difference in Euroscepticism among the groups. This is not in line with the expectation. The indirect effect of the different mediators might give an explanation for this.

Table 2: Non-standardized regression coefficients and model significance of total effect and of all mediation

models separately, as well as one model with all mediators together on the dependent variable Euroscepticism

	Model 0: Total effect	Model 1: Subj. income	Model 2: Political Trust	Model 3:National Identity	Model 4: Subj. Knowledge	Model 5: All mechanisms
<i>Intercept</i>	1.575 (0.554)***	2.309 (0.628)****	2.643 (0.553)****	0.795 (0.575)*	2.028 (0.601)****	2.472 (0.659)****
<i>Country of residence</i>	0.165(0.119)	0.086 (0.121)	0.102 (0.111)	0.105 (0.116)	0.121 (0.120)	-0.072 (0.114)
Mediators						
<i>Subj. Income</i>		-0.131 (0.053)***				-0.072 (0.050)*
<i>Political rust</i>			-0.306 (0.050)****			-0.330 (0.051)****
<i>National ID</i>				0.201 (0.054)****		0.265 (0.053)****
<i>Subj. Knowledge</i>					-0.109 (0.056)**	-0.89 (0.052)*
Control var.						
<i>Gender</i>	-0.271(0.123)*	-0.249 (0.123)**	-0.200 (0.115)*	-0.153 (0.120)	-0.244 (0.123)**	-0.116 (0.116)
<i>Age</i>	0.046 (0.017)***	0.040 (0.017)**	0.031 (0.016)*	0.042 (0.017)***	0.041 (0.123)**	0.030 (0.016)*
<i>Education</i>	-0.115 (0.134)	-0.104 (0.132)	-0.128 (0.125)	-0.111 (0.127)	-0.086 (0.134)	0.034 (0.127)
R²	0.038	0.059	0.161	0.083	0.050	0.250

Note:*=p<0.1;**=p<.05;***=p<.01;****=p<.001

Table 3: Indirect effects on Euroscepticism, controlling for gender, age and education (with bias-corrected 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals)

	Indirect regression coefficients (SE)	BC 95% Bootstrapped CI	
		Lower	Upper
<i>Socio-economic position</i>			
Subjective income	0.070 (0.039)	0.004	0.155
<i>Knowledge about the EU</i>			
Subjective knowledge	0.044 (0.028)	-0.008	0.106
<i>Political Trust</i>			
Trust	0.067(0.043)	-0.016	0.158
<i>Nationalism</i>			
National Identity	0.063 (0.032)	0.009	0.135

4.1 Model 1: Social-Economic Position

Model 1 (see Figure 2) shows that there is a negative, significant, relationship between the country of residence and social-economic position ($B=-0.531$; $p<0.001$). Thus, living in Croatia leads to scoring 0.53 points lower on a 5-point scale of subjective income which is an indicator for SEP.

Further, there is a relatively small, negative, but significant relation between the mediator SEP and Euroscepticism ($B=-0.131$; $p<0.01$). Accordingly, having a higher SEP leads to less Euroscepticism. Together, the indirect effect of country of residence, via SEP, on Euroscepticism is 0.070 (95% CI= 0.004 to 0.155). Indicating that a small part of living in Croatia or the Netherlands on Euroscepticism is being mediated by SEP (see Table 3).

Controlling for age, gender and education within this model only showed a small but significant effect for age ($B=0.040$; $p<0.1$) and gender ($B=-0.251$; $p<0.1$). Therefore, both H1a (Croatian young adults in Croatia will be more Eurosceptic than Croatian young adults in the Netherlands as in general, Croatian young adults in Croatia have a lower SEP compared to the Croatian young adults in the Netherlands) and H1b (The higher the SEP for both the Croatian young adults in Croatia and in the Netherlands, the less Eurosceptic these individuals will be) can be confirmed.




Figure 2: Mediation model 1; Note: $*=p<0.1$; $**=p<.05$; $***=p<.01$; $****=p<.001$

4.2 Model 2: Knowledge EU

Model 2 (see Figure 3) shows that Croatian young adults in Croatia score 0.40 lower on knowledge and thus know less about the EU than the ones in the Netherlands ($B = -0.404$; $p < 0,001$). Here only the control variable education was significant and showed that the higher someone’s educational level, the more knowledge about the EU he or she has ($B = 0.340$; $p < 0.05$).

Furthermore, a small negative, significant, relationship was found between knowledge and Euroscepticism ($B = -0.109$, $p < 0,05$), meaning that the less a person knows about the EU the more Eurosceptic he or she will be. Together, the indirect effect of this model is 0.044 (95% CI = -0.008 to 0.106). Results indicate that Croatian young adults in NL know more about the European Union and people who know more are less Eurosceptic. Nevertheless, the Bootstrap CI shows that the indirect effect is not significantly different from 0 (see Table 3). Therefore, the effect of being a Croat in NL or CRO on Euroscepticism is not significantly being mediated by knowledge about the EU.

Consequently, H4a (Croatian young adults in Croatia and in the Netherlands with a lower level of education have less knowledge about the EU than Croatian young adults in both countries with a higher level of education) and H4b (Having more knowledge about the EU for both groups results in less fear of the EU and thus less Eurosceptic attitude.) can be confirmed while H4c (Croatian young adults in Croatia have less knowledge about the European Union than Croatian young adults in the Netherlands and are therefore more Eurosceptic) needs to be rejected as the Bootstrap CI showed no significance.




Figure 3: Mediation model 4; Note: *= $p < 0.1$; **= $p < 0.05$; ***= $p < 0.01$; ****= $p < 0.001$

4.3 Model 3: Nationalism; National Identity

Model 3 (see Figure 4) depicts the main focus of this study, namely national identity as an indicator for nationalism in connection to Euroscepticism. A positive, significant, relationship between country of residence and national identity (NI) is found ($B=0.309$; $p<0.01$). Thus, Croats in Croatia score 0.31 points higher on a 5-point scale of national identity and thus hold a more exclusive national identity than the Croats in NL. The only significant control variable is gender ($B=-0.360$; $p<0.05$), meaning that women hold a less exclusive national identity.

Moreover, a positive, significant, relation is found between the mediator NI and Euroscepticism ($B=0.201$; $p<0.001$), as well as a small positive influence of age ($B=0.04$; $p<0.05$). Hence, having a more exclusive national identity leads to more Euroscepticism, as well as being older. Together, the indirect effect of country of residence, via NI, on Euroscepticism is 0.063 (95% CI= 0.009 to 0.135). Indicating that a small part of living in Croatia or the Netherlands on Euroscepticism is being mediated by NI (see Table 3).

Controlling for age, gender and education for the rest of this model did not show any significant effects. Therefore, both H3a (Having a strong national identity due to nationalism, will result in more Euroscepticism as the EU is perceived as a cultural threat) and H3b (Croatian young adults in Croatia have a more exclusive national identity and are subsequently more Eurosceptic, whilst Croatian young adults in the Netherlands have a more inclusive national identity and therefore are subsequently less Eurosceptic) can be confirmed.




Figure 4: Mediation model 3; Note: $*=p<0.1$; $**=p<0.05$; $***=p<0.01$; $****=p<0.001$

4.4 Model 4: Political Trust

Model 4 (see Figure 5) shows a negative, significant, relationship between the country of residence and general trust in the government ($B=-0.219$; $p<0.1$). Thus, living in Croatia leads to scoring 0.22 points lower on a 5-point scale of trust. Both the control variables age ($B=-0.040$; $p<0.01$) and education ($B=0.40$; $p<0.001$) are significant. Thus, the older one is the less trust he or she has and the higher educated the more trust one has.

Furthermore, the results indicate that having more trust in the government leads to less Euroscepticism ($B=-0.306$; $p<0.001$). Together, the indirect effect of country of residence, via political trust, on Euroscepticism is 0.067 (95% CI= -0.016 to 0.158). While results indicate that Croatian young adults in Croatia have less trust in their government than their peers in the Netherlands, as well as that having more political trust leads to less Euroscepticism, the Bootstrap CI shows that the indirect effect is not significantly different from 0 (see Table 3). Therefore, the effect of being a Croat in NL or CRO on Euroscepticism is not significantly being mediated by political trust.

Consequently, H2 (Croatian young adults living in Croatia have less national political trust than their peers in the Netherlands and are therefore more Eurosceptic) needs to be rejected.




Figure 5: Mediation model 2; Note: *= $p<0.1$; **= $p<.05$; ***= $p<.01$; ****= $p<.001$

4.5 Model 5: All Mechanisms

Lastly, as an exploratory step, Figure 6 shows statistical model 5 which includes all mechanisms. Looking at the indirect effect, Table 4 shows that only the mediator nationalism (B= 0.077) holds after controlling for all other mediators in the same model. This is the only mediator where the Bootstrap CI shows that the indirect effect is significantly different from 0. Thus, when controlling for all other mediators, a small part of living in Croatia or the Netherlands on Euroscepticism is being mediated by nationalism.

When comparing the separately analyzed models (see Table 3) and the model including all mechanisms (see Table 4), it can be noted that all indirect regression coefficients decline and that SEP becomes non-significantly different from 0.

Moreover, none of the models within the whole analysis showed a significant direct effect, indicating that there is no significant difference found between the two groups on Euroscepticism.

Table 4: Indirect effects on Euroscepticism all mechanisms combined, controlling for gender, age and education (with bias-corrected 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals)

	Indirect regression coefficients (SE)	BC 95% Bootstrapped CI	
		Lower	Upper
<i>Socio-economic position</i>			
Subjective income	0.038 (0.033)	-0.022	0.112
<i>Knowledge about the EU</i>			
Subjective knowledge	0.036 (0.025)	-0.056	0.092
<i>Political Trust</i>			
Trust	0.080 (0.048)	-0.008	0.182
<i>Nationalism</i>			
National Identity	0.077 (0.038)	0.007	0.160




Figure 6: Mediation model 5; Note: *= $p < 0.1$; **= $p < 0.05$; ***= $p < 0.01$; ****= $p < 0.001$

5. Discussion and Conclusion

5.1 Discussion

The aim of this research has been to provide a deeper insight into the mechanisms at play when researching the degree of Euroscepticism between the two groups; Croatian young adults in Croatia and in the Netherlands. While previous studies were conducted on this topic prior to Croatia entering the EU, the focus was solely on Croatian students in Croatia's capital. Besides the comparison between the two groups, this thesis has intended to provide a broader perspective on the phenomenon Euroscepticism by including the mechanism nationalism among Croats due to Croatia's complex past.

Through different mediations, I found that social-economic position indeed plays a small role in explaining the relationship between country of residence and Euroscepticism when ran as the only mediator. While I did not find a significant difference between the groups on Euroscepticism, I did see that, as general literature claims, having a higher SEP lessens the degree of Euroscepticism. This is in line with Gabel's (1998) theory on the winners and losers of the European Union. Moreover, while the variation in income-as indicator for SEP- was low, I did find that Croats in Croatia scored lower on income than their peers in the Netherlands. This can be considered a reason for the claims that have been made as to why younger people nowadays leave Croatia to for example the Netherlands.

Furthermore, findings indicate that Croatian young adults subjectively know less about the European Union and that more knowledge, in combination with a higher educational level, slightly decreases the degree of Euroscepticism. This confirms the theory of cognitive mobilization by Inglehart (1970) and undermines the knowledge deficit hypothesis by Clark (2014) who stated that more knowledge will lead to more Euroscepticism as a consequence of identifying the flaws of the European Union better. Nevertheless, the total indirect effect was not significant and thus it can be concluded that overall knowledge about the EU does not mediate the effect of living in Croatia or the Netherlands on Euroscepticism. A point of discussion regarding this variable is that people were asked to judge their own knowledge on the EU and were not tested with actual knowledge questions on the EU. Thus, with

subjective knowledge it can be that people view themselves as more knowledgeable than they actually are.

Moreover, it can be concluded that Croats in Croatia have less political trust in their government and that more political trust in the national government leads to less Euroscepticism. This is in line with Anderson (1998) theory on political trust and Euroscepticism. Nevertheless, no clear significant effect was found on the difference between the Croatian young adults in Croatia and the Netherlands in relation to Euroscepticism.

Lastly, results indicate that indeed the indicator for nationalism, national identity, plays a role in explaining part of the effect of living in Croatia or the Netherlands on Euroscepticism. I found that Croats in Croatia score higher on the scale of national identity than the Croats in the Netherlands and that having a more exclusive national identity leads to more Euroscepticism. This supports the contextualization earlier in the paper which depicted the nationalistic society at play in Croatia. Croats, overall, have a strong sense of national belonging and are keen on their culture, values and traditions. As the literature suggests, becoming part of the EU might threaten this. For Croats in the Netherlands for various reasons, like socialization, this effect of national identity on Euroscepticism is lessened but still present to a certain degree.

While none of the direct effects showed any significant difference between the Croatian young adults in Croatia and the Netherlands on their degree of Euroscepticism, the obtained results do indicate a difference in the mechanisms at play and especially the importance of a strong sense of nationalism in relation to Euroscepticism. I found that Croats in Croatia know less about the EU, subjectively think less about their income, have less political trust and hold a more exclusive national identity than their peers in the Netherlands. Besides, a bigger sample size would perhaps show more significant differences between the two groups in relation to Euroscepticism.

These findings contribute to broadening the theory on the phenomenon Euroscepticism by shedding a light on the importance of nationalism. Additionally, the thesis has shown through a comparison between Croats living in a Western and Eastern European country, that there is a slight

difference in Euroscepticism and thus contributes to the literature supporting earlier claims on this notion. These findings can help the EU map out important underlying mechanisms in battling Euroscepticism and show how Euroscepticism is present among younger people in Eastern European countries like Croatia due to deeper rooted factors as nationalism.

5.2 Limitations and Further Research

Conducting a research using self-obtained data has several limitations. While having in mind that the research would not be representative for all Croatian young adults, I tried to be as inclusive as possible when recruiting respondents. Nevertheless, the eventual sample size did not have as much variation as hoped. The aim was to have a wide variation of respondents in their social-economic status, gender, educational level and degree of nationalism. Therefore, the survey has been distributed, among other ways, via various Facebook groups that were all different in order to approach a diverse as possible group of respondents. Nevertheless, in the end there was little variation in especially the gender, social-economic position and the educational level of the respondents. This has limited my research in a sense that it does not allow me to draw any concrete conclusions in how these aspects play a role in relation to the degree of Euroscepticism. In this sense, I should be critical about my sampling method. While I did everything in my power to strive for an inclusive as possible sample, using my own network has influenced the eventual diversity of respondents.

Another aspect that has shown its limitations in my work has been the making of the survey itself. While creating a survey allowed a lot of room for my own ideas, it has shown to be rather challenging to get the right questions and scales for the concepts that I wanted to measure. I have experienced difficulties in the process to get to the right results as a consequences of missing questions that, in the end, should have been asked within the survey. Such as more questions on SEP as well as different questions for political trust. This has limited my research to the extent that not all questions were usable and that variables used for some proposed scales eventually had to be used separately for the sake of reliability.

Nonetheless, the survey can be considered unique in the sense that it was created in Croatian and Dutch in order to adopt to the chosen groups and to control for affinity. Furthermore, the scale of national identity, which I created myself, as an indicator for nationalism made me able to collect the exact data that I needed for this research. Additionally, while the sampling method might not have been ideal, I managed to get a total of 304 respondents within a short amount of time which has been more than the target I set for myself. Moreover, I believe that this thesis did provide an interesting new perspective by focusing on nationalism as an indicator for Euroscepticism within Eastern Europe. Besides, taking into account the Croatian young adults in the Netherlands, who are not often part of the research, in comparison to the group in Croatia, makes this thesis distinct from other previous researches. Hence, this thesis could be considered a stepping stone for further research. An idea could be to conduct a qualitative research on the role of nationalism and socialization in relation to Euroscepticism by focusing solely on Croatian young adults in the Netherlands.

5.3 Conclusion

Overall, we can conclude that the degree of Euroscepticism does not differ much among Croatian young adults in Croatia and in the Netherlands. While different mechanisms have shown to play a role in the degree of Euroscepticism, the effect of living in Croatia or the Netherlands on Euroscepticism itself did not show to be significant. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that Croatian young adults are slightly more Eurosceptic, but this claim would need more research. Additionally, nationalism did show to be one of the mechanisms explaining a part of the tested effect, especially for the Croats in Croatia. Thus, Euroscepticism among Croats in Croatia can partially be explained by the complex past of the country. This strong sense of national belonging and pride thus cannot only be seen back within the daily lives of Croatian young adults in Croatia but also in relation to Euroscepticism. And, while a big number of young people in Croatia has emigrated to other European countries, ‘Lijepa li si...’ still holds power among Croats. Nonetheless, the results cannot be generalized beyond these specific findings

without any further research on Euroscepticism in relation to the two groups as different factors might explain any possible difference found, but it can be considered a stepping stone.

References

- Anderson, C.J. (1998) When in Doubt, use Proxies. Attitudes toward Domestic Politics and Support for European Integration, *Comparative Political Studies*, 31(5): 569-601.
- Bagić, D., & Šalinović, A. (2006). Analysis of benefits and harms as a factor in citizen support to Croatian accession to the European Union. In K. Ott (Ed.), *Croatian accession to the European Union*. Vol. 4, The challenges of participation (pp. 161-188). Zagreb: Institute of Public Finance, Zagreb. <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-61310>
- Carkoglu, A., & Glupker-Kesebir, G. (2016). Comparing public attitudes on EU membership in candidate countries: The cases of Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey from 2004 to 2011. *Southeast European And Black Sea Studies*, 16(2), 255-274.
- Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek. (2013). *Kroaten in Nederland* (3). Retrieved from <https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2013/26/ongeveer-5-900-kroaten-in-nederland>
- Clark, N. (2014). The EU's Information Deficit: Comparing Political Knowledge across Levels of Governance. *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 15(4), 445-463.
- Crespy, A. & Verschueren, N. (2009) From Euroscepticism to Resistance to European Integration: An Interdisciplinary Perspective, *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 10 (3): 377-393.
- Croatian Bureau of Statistics. (2019). *MIGRATION OF POPULATION OF REPUBLIC OF CROATIA, 2018* (7.1.2). Retrieved from https://www.dzs.hr/Hrv_Eng/publication/2019/07-01-02_01_2019.htm
- Dan Vătăman. (2013). CROATIA: THE 28th MEMBER STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. *Challenges of the Knowledge Society*, 3, 701-70
- De Vries, C. (2013). Ambivalent Europeans? Public Support for European Integration in East and West. *Government and Opposition*, 48(3), 434-461.
- Gabel, M. 1998. Public Support for European Integration: An Empirical Test of Five Theories. *The Journal of Politics*, Vol.60(2), pp.333-354.
- Grimm, R., Pollock, G. & Ellison, M. (2018) Eurosceptic Youth. Interest, trust and ideology. In: Leruth, B., Startin, N. & Usherwood, S. (Eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Euroscepticism*. London / New York: Routledge, 215-230.
- Guerra, S. (2014) 'Angry young Europeans? Croatian attitudes towards the EU in comparative perspective'. Retrieved from <http://epern.wordpress.com/2014/07/14/angry-young-europeans-croatian-attitudes-towards-the-eu-in-comparative-perspective>.
- Guerra, S. (2018) Young People and the EU at Times of Crisis. In: Leruth, B., Startin, N. & Usherwood, S. (Eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Euroscepticism*. London / New York: Routledge, 204-214.
- Hooghe, L. & Marks G. (2004) Does Identity or Economic Rationality Drive Public Opinion on European Integration?, *PS*, 37 (3): 415-420.

- Hooghe, L. & Marks, G. (2007) Sources of Euroscepticism, *Acta Politica*, 2007 (42): 119-127.
- Hooghe, L. & Marks, G. (2008) A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus, *British Journal of Political Science*, 39: 1-23.
- Inglehart, R. (1970) Cognitive Mobilization and European Identity, *Comparative Politics*, 3 (1): 45-70.
- International Monetary Fund. (z.d.). *Report for Selected Countries and Subjects*. Retrieved from <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2018/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=45&pr.y=2&sy=2019&ey=2019&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=914%2C946%2C137%2C962%2C122%2C181%2C913%2C124%2C921%2C943%2C963%2C918%2C138%2C142%2C964%2C182%2C960%2C423%2C935%2C968%2C128%2C922%2C942%2C939%2C936%2C961%2C172%2C132%2C184%2C134%2C174%2C144%2C146%2C944%2C176%2C178%2C136%2C926%2C112%2C967%2C941&s=PPPPC&grp=0&a=>
- Karp, J., Banducci, S., & Bowler, S. (2003). To Know it is to Love it?: Satisfaction with Democracy in the European Union. *Comparative Political Studies*, 36(3), 271-292.
- Kersan-Škabić, I. & Tomić, D. (2009) Recognizing Euroscepticism in Croatia – Study Upon a Student Population, *Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja*, 22 (4): 100-117.
- Kopecký, P. & Mudde, C. (2002) The Two Sides of Euroscepticism Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe, *European Union Politics*, 3: 297-326.
- McLaren, L. (2002). Public Support for the European Union: Cost/Benefit Analysis or Perceived Cultural Threat? *The Journal of Politics*, 64(2), 551-566.
- Milekic, S. (2018) *Croatian Nationalist Singer Acquitted of Inciting Hatred*. Retrieved from <https://balkaninsight.com/2018/06/06/croatian-nationalist-singer-acquitted-for-using-fascist-chant-06-06-2018/>
- Mishler, W., & Rose, R. (1997). Trust, Distrust and Skepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies. *The Journal of Politics*, 59(2), 418–451. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2998171>
- Niemi, R.G. & Hepburn, M. A. (1995) The rebirth of political socialization, *Perspectives on Political Science*, 24 (1): 7-16.
- Poslovni.hr. (2020, 10 februar). *Zašto se Hrvati iseljavaju u Njemačku? Novo istraživanje otkriva iznenađujuće razloge*. Retrieved from <https://www.poslovni.hr/hrvatska/zasto-se-hrvati-iseljavaju-u-njemacku-novo-istrazivanje-otkriva-iznenaujuce-razloge-351644>
- Roter, P., & Bojinović, A. (2005). Croatia and the European Union: A Troubled Relationship: Profiles. *Mediterranean Politics*, 10(3), 447-454.
- Sánchez-Cuenca, I. (2000). The Political Basis of Support for European Integration. *European Union Politics*, 1(2), 147–171. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116500001002001>

- Sørensen, C. (2007). *CONCEPTUALISING PUBLIC EUROSCEPTICISM: the cases of Denmark, France and the United Kingdom* (Doctoral Dissertation). Retrieved from http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/en/2008/10/sorensen_conceptualising_public_euroscepticism.pdf
- Spanje, van., J. & Vreese, de., C. (2014) Europhile Media and Eurosceptic Voting: Effects of News Media Coverage on Eurosceptic Voting in the 2009 European Parliamentary Elections, *Political Communication*, 31: 325-354.
- Szczerbiak, A. & Taggart, P. (2018) Contemporary Research on Euroscepticism. The State of the Art. In: Leruth, B., Startin, N. & Usherwood, S. (Eds.) *The Routledge Handbook of Euroscepticism*. London / New York: Routledge, 11-21.
- Taggart, P. (1998) A touchstone of dissent: Euroscepticism in contemporary Western European party systems, *European Journal of Political Research*, 33: 363-388.
- Tominac, I. (2020). *Iako ih sve više završava fakultet, puno se teže zapošljavaju od ostalih*. Geraadpleegd op 19 maart 2020, van <https://www.poslovni.hr/hrvatska/iako-ih-sve-vise-završava-fakultet-puno-se-teže-zaposljavaju-od-ostalih-342347>
- Usherwood, S. & Startin, N. (2013) Euroscepticism as a Persistent Phenomenon, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 51 (1): 1-16.
- Vasilopoulou, S. (2013) Continuity and Change in the Study of Euroscepticism: Plus ça change?, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 51 (1): 153-168.

6 Appendices

Appendix A: Survey Questions in Dutch and in Croatian

Dobrodošli!

Moje ime je Kim Pušić i studentica sam Mastera političke sociologije na Erasmus fakultetu u Rotterdamu. Ova anketa je dio mog magistarskog rada ‘Politika i društvo’ i traje samo 6 minuta. Popunjavanjem ankete pomažete mi da razvijem uvid vezan za Europsku uniju. Vaše sudjelovanje je potpuno anonimno i dobrovoljno, a dobiveni podaci koristit će se samo za akademske svrhe. Anketu mogu ispuniti samo **muškarci i žene** u dobi od **18 do 30 godina s Hrvatskim identitetom** (= rođeni u Hrvatskoj ili rođeni u Nizozemskoj s najmanje jednim roditeljem rođenim u Hrvatskoj) koji **žive u Nizozemskoj ili Hrvatskoj**. Ako imate bilo kakvih pitanja o anketi, slobodno me kontaktirajte putem e-poste: **kp_dtc@hotmail.com**. Hvala unaprijed!

Welkom! Mijn naam is Kim Pušić en ik ben een master student aan de Erasmus Universiteit in Rotterdam. Deze survey maakt deel uit van het master scriptie onderzoek politiek en maatschappij. De survey duurt slechts 6 minuten en door deze in te vullen helpt u mij inzichten over de Europese Unie te ontwikkelen. Uw deelname is volledig anoniem en vrijwillig en de verkregen gegevens zullen alleen voor academische doeleinden gebruikt worden. De survey dient alleen ingevuld te worden door zowel **mannen als vrouwen** tussen de **18 en 30 jaar** met een **Kroatische identiteit** (in Kroatië geboren of in Nederland geboren met tenminste één ouder die in Kroatië is geboren) die in **Nederland of in Kroatië wonen**. Mocht u vragen hebben over de survey, neem dan gerust contact met mij op via mijn e-mail: **kp_dtc@hotmail.com**. Alvast bedankt!

Q1 Ik wil de survey beantwoorden in het.../ Želim odgovoriti anketu na...

- Nederlands/Nizozemskom
- Kroatisch/Hrvatskom

Q2 Koliko godina imate?

Q3 Koji je Vaš spol?

- Muško
 - Žensko
 - Drugo
 - Radije ne bih rekao/rekla
-

Q4 Koje je Vaše osnovno prebivalište (veći dio godine):

- Nizozemska
- Hrvatska

Skip To: Q6 If Koje je Vaše osnovno prebivalište (veći dio godine): = Nizozemska

Skip To: Q7 If Koje je Vaše osnovno prebivalište (veći dio godine): = Hrvatska

Q5 Koliko dugo već živite u Nizozemskoj?

Q6 Koji je Vaš najviši postignuti stupanj obrazovanja? Ako trenutno još studirate, možete odabrati stupanj obrazovanja koji očekujete postići

- Bez škole
- Nepotpuna osnovna škola
- Nepotpuna srednja škola
- Zanat, škola za zanimanje u trajanju do 3 godine
- Srednja škola: gimnazija; prirodoslovno -matematička, jezična, klasična, opća gimnazija, sportska gimnazija prirodoslovna gimnazija
- Srednja škola: obrtničke škole
- Srednja škola: strukovne škole
- Srednja škola: umjetničke škole
- Veleučilište
- Sveučilište
- Specijalizacija, magisteriji, doktorat

Display This Question:

If Koje je Vaše osnovno prebivalište (veći dio godine): = Hrvatska

Q7 Planirate li se preseliti iz Hrvatske (u roku sada i pet godina) u neku drugu europsku zemlju?

- Da
- Ne
- Možda
- Radije ne bih rekao/rekla

Display This Question:

If Koje je Vaše osnovno prebivalište (veći dio godine): = Nizozemska

Q8 Planirate li se vratiti u Hrvatsku u skoroj budućnosti?

- Da
- Ne
- Možda
- Radije ne bih rekao/rekla

Q9 Koji od sljedećih opisa najbolje opisuje vas osjećaj vezano za Vaša primanja? Ako ste student, možete primanje od svojih roditelja koristiti kao indikaciju.

- Jako mi je teško sa trenutnim primanjima
- Borim se sa trenutnim primanjima
- Niti mi je ugodno, niti se borim sa trenutnim primanjima
- Uspijevam sa trenutnim primanjima
- Ugodno živim sa trenutnim primanjima
- Ne znam
- Radije ne bih rekao/rekla

Q10 Koja su Vaša očekivanja za iduću godinu vezano za Vašu poslovnu i financijsku situaciju? Moja poslovna situacija/financijska situacija će biti...

	Mnogo lošija	Malo lošija	Niti bolja, niti lošija	Malo bolja	Mnogo bolja	Ne znam
Poslovna situacija	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Financijska situacija	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q11 Možete li mi reci za svaku od sljedećih institucija na skali od 0 do 10, koliko povjerenje imate u njih?

	0 (uopće nemam povjerenja)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 (potpuno povjerenje)	Ne znam	Radije ne bih rekao/rekla
Hrvatska vlada	<input type="radio"/>										<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Nizozemska vlada	<input type="radio"/>										<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q12 U koliko smatrate da politički sustav u Hrvatskoj omogućuje ljudima poput Vas da imaju utjecaj u šta vlada radi?

- Nimalo omogućuje
- Minimalno omogućuje
- Malo omogućuje
- Mnogo omogućuje
- Izuzetno mnogo omogućuje
- Ne znam
- Radije ne bih rekao/rekla

Q13 Koliko ste zadovoljni kako Europska Unija, Hrvatska vlada i Nizozemska vlada obavljaju svoje dužnosti? (u koliko niste poznati sa Nizozemskom, možete birati odgovor koji dolazi najbliže vašem mišljenju o Nizozemskoj vladi)

	Vrlo nezadovoljan/n ezadovoljna	Poprilično nezadovoljan/n ezadovoljna	Niti zadovoljan/zad ovoljna, niti nezadovoljan/n ezadovoljna	Poprilično zadovoljan/z adovoljna	Vrlo zadovoljan/z adovoljna	Ne zn a m
Europska Unija	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	
Hrvatska vlada	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	
Nizozemska vlada	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	

Q15 Koja od sljedećih izjava se najviše odnosi na Vas?

- Jedino se osjećam kao Hrvat/Hrvatica
- Osjećam se više kao Hrvat/Hrvatica nego Europljanin/Europljanka
- Jednako se osjećam kao Hrvat/Hrvatica i Europljanin/Europljanka
- Osjećam se više kao Europljanin/Europljanka nego Hrvat/Hrvatica
- Jedino se osjećam kao Europljanin/Europljanka

Q16 Ljudi se u različitom stupnju mogu osjećati emocionalno vezanima za svoju zemlju ili Europu. Možete li mi reci koliko ste vezani za...

	Nimalo vezan/vezana	Poprilično ne vezan/vezana	Niti vezan/vezana, niti ne vezan/vezana	Poprilično vezan/vezana	Mnogo vezan/vezana
Hrvatsku	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Europu	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q17 Koliko vas općenito zanima politika?

- Uopće me ne zanima
- Uglavnom me ne zanima
- Niti me zanima, niti me ne zanima
- Uglavnom me zanima
- Potpuno me zanima

Q18 U kojoj se mjeri slažete ili ne slažete sa sljedećim tvrdnjama?

	Uopće se ne slažem	Uglavnom se ne slažem	Niti se slažem, niti se ne slažem	Uglavnom se slažem	U potpunosti se slažem	Ne znam
Razumijem kako funkcionira Europska unija	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Upoznat(a) sam s različitim tijelima Europske unije i njihovom nadležnosti	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Svjestan/svjesna sam političkih zbivanja unutar Europske unije	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q19 U kojoj se mjeri slažete ili ne slažete sa sljedećim tvrdnjama?

Previše poreznog novca ide iz prosperitetnih zemalja EU u siromašnije države EU	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
EU mora vratiti velik dio svojih ovlasti nacionalnim državama članicama	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Europska unija je beskorisna	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Skip To: End of Survey If U kojoj se mjeri slažete ili ne slažete sa sljedećim tvrdnjama? , Europska unija je beskorisna [Uopće se ne slažem] Is Displayed

Q3 Wat is uw leeftijd?

Q4 Wat is uw geslacht?

- Man
- Vrouw
- Anders
- Zeg ik liever niet

Q5 Wat is uw primaire verblijfplaats? (Het merendeel van het jaar)

- Nederland
- Kroatië

Skip To: Q6 If Wat is uw primaire verblijfplaats? (Het merendeel van het jaar) = Nederland

Skip To: Q7 If Wat is uw primaire verblijfplaats? (Het merendeel van het jaar) = Kroatië

Q6 Hoe lang woont u al in Nederland?

Q7 Wat is uw hoogst behaalde opleidingsniveau? Mocht u hedendaags nog bezig zijn met het afronden van een studie kies dan het opleidingsniveau waar u op dit moment mee bezig bent.

- Basisschool niet afgemaakt
- Alleen basisschool afgemaakt
- MBO niveau 1 afgemaakt
- HAVO, MMS, MSVM afgemaakt
- VWO, HBS, atheneum, gymnasium afgemaakt
- MBO niveau 2 en 3 afgemaakt
- MBO niveau 4 afgemaakt
- Propedeuse WO, OU-certificaat
- Bachelor HBO, PABO, conservatorium afgemaakt
- Bachelor Universiteit afgemaakt
- HBO: Master's degree, tweede fase opleidingen; post HBO-opleidingen, pre-master onderwijs voor HBO
- WO/universiteit: Master's degree, tweede fase opleideingen; ingenieur, meester, doctorandus
- Doctoraat/gepromoveerd
- Zeg ik liever niet

Display This Question:

If Wat is uw primaire verblijfplaats? (Het merendeel van het jaar) = Nederland

Q8 Bent u van plan om in de nabije toekomst terug te keren naar Kroatië?

- Ja
 - Nee
 - Misschien
 - Zeg ik liever niet
-

Display This Question:

If Wat is uw primaire verblijfplaats? (Het merendeel van het jaar) = Kroatië

Q9 Bent u van plan om uit Kroatië te migreren (binnen nu en 5 jaar) naar een ander Europees land?

- Ja
 - Nee
 - Misschien
 - Zeg ik liever niet
-

Q10 Welke van de volgende omschrijvingen komt het dichtste in de buurt van hoe u zich hedendaags voelt over het inkomen van uw huishouden? (Indien u een student bent, kunt u het inkomen van uw

ouders als indicatie gebruiken)

- Ik heb het zeer moeilijk met het huidige inkomen
- Ik heb het redelijk moeilijk met het huidige inkomen
- Noch moeite met het huidige inkomen, noch comfortabel
- Ik weet mij te redden met het huidige inkomen
- Ik leef comfortabel met mijn huidige inkomen
- Ik weet het niet
- Zeg ik liever niet

Q11 Wat zijn uw verwachtingen voor volgend jaar betreffende uw persoonlijke werksituatie en uw financiële situatie? Mijn persoonlijke werksituatie en financiële situatie volgend jaar zullen beter worden, slechter worden of hetzelfde blijven...

	Veel slechter	Iets slechter	Noch beter, noch slechter	Iets beter	Veel beter	Ik weet het niet
Persoonlijke werksituatie	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Persoonlijke financiële situatie	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q12 Voor ieder van de volgende stellingen, kunt u mij vertellen op een schaal van 0 tot 10 of u deze instellingen vertrouwt of niet?

	0 (totaal geen vertrouwen)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 (compleet vertrouwen)	Ik weet het niet	Zeg ik liever niet
De Kroatische overheid	<input type="radio"/>										<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Nederlandse overheid	<input type="radio"/>										<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Q13 Hoeveel laat het politieke systeem in Kroatie het toe voor mensen zoals u om iets te zeggen te hebben in wat de overheid doet?

- Helemaal niet
- Minimaal
- Een beetje
- Veel
- Heel erg veel
- Ik weet het niet
- Zeg ik liever niet

Q14 Hoe tevreden bent u met hoe de Europese Unie, de Kroatische overheid en de Nederlandse overheid hun taken uitvoeren?

	Ze er ontevreden	Redelijk ontevreden	Noch tevreden, noch ontevreden	Redelijk tevreden	Ze er tevreden	Ik weet het niet	Zeg ik liever niet
De Kroatische overheid	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
De Nederlandse overheid	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
De Europese Unie	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Appendix B: FA Nationalism and Euroscepticism

Component Matrix of Nationalism

	Component	
	1	2
Ante Gotovina	.747	-.109
Proud Croat	.791	-.276
Croatian flag	.762	-.077
Homeland victory	.853	-.090
Cro in heart	.744	-.074
Ideal state	.543	-.634
Nationality	.303	-.730
Lijepa nasa	.784	-.028
Patriotism	.543	-.216
Belonging NL/Cro	-.631	.221
Attached Cro	.612	.563
Attached EU	.486	.374

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

a. 2 components extracted.

Component Matrix of Euroscepticism

	Component	
	1	2
Lost sovereignty	.758	-.074
Losing CRO language	.195	-.599
Losing CRO habits	.805	-.056
Kroxit	.853	-.171
EU integration	.811	-.119
Interests EU citizens	-.452	.210
Pressure	.539	.480
Money to poor countries	.346	.686
Give back authorization	.795	-.294
EU useless	.799	-.113

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

a. 2 components extracted.

Appendix C: Checklist Ethics and Privacy Aspects of Research



CHECKLIST ETHICAL AND PRIVACY ASPECTS OF RESEARCH

INSTRUCTION

This checklist should be completed for every research study that is conducted at the Department of Public Administration and Sociology (DPAS). This checklist should be completed *before* commencing with data collection or approaching participants. Students can complete this checklist with help of their supervisor.

This checklist is a mandatory part of the empirical master's thesis and has to be uploaded along with the research proposal.

The guideline for ethical aspects of research of the Dutch Sociological Association (NSV) can be found on their website (http://www.nsv-sociologie.nl/?page_id=17). If you have doubts about ethical or privacy aspects of your research study, discuss and resolve the matter with your EUR supervisor. If needed and if advised to do so by your supervisor, you can also consult Dr. Jennifer A. Holland, coordinator of the Sociology Master's Thesis program.

PART I: GENERAL INFORMATION

Project title: Lijepa nasa domovino, or maybe not?; A comparative analysis of Euroscepticism among Croatian young adults in Croatia and in The Netherlands

Name, email of student: Kim Pusic, kp_dtc@hotmail.com / 551977kp@eur.nl

Name, email of supervisor: Cecil Meeusen, cecil.meeusen@kuleuven.be

Start date and duration: 5.2.2020 – 21.6.2020

Is the research study conducted within DPAS **YES** - NO

If 'NO': at or for what institute or organization will the study be conducted?
(e.g. internship organization)

PART II: TYPE OF RESEARCH STUDY

Please indicate the type of research study by circling the appropriate answer:

1. Research involving human participants. **YES - NO**

If ‘YES’: does the study involve medical or physical research? **YES - NO**
Research that falls under the Medical Research Involving Human Subjects Act ([WMO](#)) must first be submitted to [an accredited medical research ethics committee](#) or the Central Committee on Research Involving Human Subjects ([CCMO](#)).

2. Field observations without manipulations that will not involve identification of participants. **YES - NO**

3. Research involving completely anonymous data files (secondary data that has been anonymized by someone else). **YES - NO**

PART III: PARTICIPANTS
(Complete this section only if your study involves human participants)

Where will you collect your data?

I will collect the data myself via an online survey with validated Eurobarometer survey questions

Note: indicate for separate data sources.

What is the (anticipated) size of your sample?

100 per group meaning: 100 Croatian young adults in Croatia and 100 Croatian young adults in the Netherlands. 200 in total.

Note: indicate for separate data sources.

What is the size of the population from which you will sample?

The focus is on Croatian young adults 18-30 in Croatia and the Netherlands. Around 634.759 people in Croatia fall into this age group and Croats in the Netherlands (estimated because no official data available) around 2000 between the age of 18-30.

Note: indicate for separate data sources.

1. Will information about the nature of the study and about what participants can expect during the study be withheld from them? **YES - NO**

2. Will any of the participants not be asked for verbal or written ‘informed consent,’ whereby they agree to participate in the study? **YES - NO**

3. Will information about the possibility to discontinue the participation at any time be withheld from participants? **YES - NO**

4. Will the study involve actively deceiving the participants? **YES - NO**

Note: almost all research studies involve some kind of deception of participants. Try to think about what types of deception are ethical or non-ethical (e.g. purpose of the study)

is not told, coercion is exerted on participants, giving participants the feeling that they harm other people by making certain decisions, etc.).

Does the study involve the risk of causing psychological stress or negative emotions beyond those normally encountered by participants?

YES - **NO**

Will information be collected about special categories of data, as defined by the GDPR (e.g. racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union membership, genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a person, data concerning mental or physical health, data concerning a person’s sex life or sexual orientation)?

YES - NO

Will the study involve the participation of minors (<18 years old) or other groups that cannot give consent?

YES - **NO**

Is the health and/or safety of participants at risk during the study?

YES - **NO**

Can participants be identified by the study results or can the confidentiality of the participants’ identity not be ensured?

YES - **NO**

Are there any other possible ethical issues with regard to this study?

YES - **NO**

If you have answered ‘YES’ to any of the previous questions, please indicate below why this issue is unavoidable in this study.

I will need ask about the ethnicity of the respondents in order to get the right sampling design for the proposed research as it is specifically about people holding a Croatian national identity in Croatia and in the Netherlands and not any other ex-Yugoslavian ethnicity. Political opinion will be asked in the form trust in the national government and the European union institutions via widely used measures for political trust. This because it is part of one of the explanations for the nature of Euroscepticism No questions about political preferences or ideology will be included.

What safeguards are taken to relieve possible adverse consequences of these issues (e.g., informing participants about the study afterwards, extra safety regulations, etc.).

There are no consequences as indicated above

Are there any unintended circumstances in the study that can cause harm or have negative (emotional) consequences to the participants? Indicate what possible circumstances this could be.

NO

Please attach your informed consent form in Appendix I, if applicable.

Part IV: Data storage and backup

Where and when will you store your data in the short term, after acquisition?

Data will be stored on my personal laptop in a separate file with a password after saving the data anonymously from Qualtrics and a back-up will be made on my hard-drive to ensure that data will not be lost.

Note: indicate for separate data sources, for instance for paper-and pencil test data, and for digital data files.

Who is responsible for the immediate day-to-day management, storage and backup of the data arising from your research?

I am responsible and nobody else, except for my supervisor Cecil Meeusen, will have access to the obtained data.

How (frequently) will you back-up your research data for short-term data security?

The data will be backed up in Qualtrics once after the survey closes (copy) and on my hard-drive in order to prevent any loss of data.

In case of collecting personal data how will you anonymize the data?

Qualtrics will already code the data by listing the respondents numerically in order. The only personal details visible are the IP-adresses from which the survey has been filled in. Nevertheless, this data is irrelevant and will therefore not be stored and analyzed in the process.

Note: It is advisable to keep directly identifying personal details separated from the rest of the data. Personal details are then replaced by a key/ code. Only the code is part of the database with data and the list of respondents/research subjects is kept separate.

PART VI: SIGNATURE

Please note that it is your responsibility to follow the ethical guidelines in the conduct of your study. This includes providing information to participants about the study and ensuring confidentiality in storage and use of personal data. Treat participants respectfully, be on time at appointments, call participants when they have signed up for your study and fulfil promises made to participants.

Furthermore, it is your responsibility that data are authentic, of high quality and properly stored. The principle is always that the supervisor (or strictly speaking the Erasmus University Rotterdam) remains owner of the data, and that the student should therefore hand over all data to the supervisor.



Hereby I declare that the study will be conducted in accordance with the ethical guidelines of the Department of Public Administration and Sociology at Erasmus University Rotterdam. I have answered the questions truthfully.

Name student: Kim Pusic

Name (EUR) supervisor: Cecil Meeusen

Date: 19.3. 2020

Date: 19.3.2020

A handwritten signature in black ink on a light-colored background. The signature is stylized and appears to read 'Kim Pusic'.A handwritten signature in blue ink on a grid background. The signature is stylized and appears to read 'Cecil Meeusen'.