Thriving on terror

The indirect influences of terrorism on voting behaviour

Master Thesis

Janne de Roode

578297jr

June 20th, 2021

Supervisor: Gijs Custers

Second reader: Wenda Doff

Word count: 9.573/10.000

ERASMUS UNIVERSITEIT ROTTERDAM

Table of Contents

Abstract

The terrorist attack in Paris in 2015 severely affected the Western world. Thus far, research has mainly focused on the consequences of this attack on voting behaviour in France, which was directly affected by the terrorist attack. This thesis tries to expand the knowledge of the consequences of a terrorist attack by focusing on possible indirect influences of the Paris terrorist attack on voting for populist right-wing parties in a country indirectly affected: The Netherlands. This thesis argues that the occurrence of a terrorist attack would increase voting for populist right-wing parties and would strengthen anti-immigrant attitudes. Furthermore, it would strengthen the relationship between the educational level and anti-immigrant attitudes, as well as the relationship between anti-immigrant attitudes and voting for populist right-wing parties. Using the European Social Survey waves from 2010 to 2018, these expectations were tested using regression analyses. This thesis found a period effect, which could indicate the threat of terrorism affects voting for populist right-wing parties. It also has strengthened the relationship between anti-immigrant attitude and voting for populist right-wing parties. Yet, no evidence is found for the terrorist attack affecting the relationship between the educational level and anti-immigrant attitudes. Also, no evidence is found that the Paris terrorist attack influenced anti-immigrant attitudes directly. Future research could focus on the improvement of the measurement of the threat of terrorism, as well as examining the length of the effects that terrorist attacks have on voting behaviour.

Key words: Anti-Immigrant Attitudes, Education, Populism, Populist Right-Wing Voting, Terrorism

Chapter 1: Introduction

On the evening of November 15th, 2015, the streets of Paris were filled with panic and fear. On six different locations in the city, terrorists opened fire at civilians and detonated bombs, eventually claiming the lives of 131 individuals. These attacks were soon claimed by the terrorist group Islamic State (IS) and became the first terrorist attack in Europe in ten years. These attacks not only affected France but the entirety of the West as well. Populist right-wing parties used these attacks as examples of why immigrants are a danger to society and should be kept out of the country. One example of this can be found in the statement of Geert Wilders, leader of the populist right-wing party Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2015). Just four days after the Paris attacks, Wilders spoke in front of the Dutch parliament, focussing on the fact that the terrorists were Muslims, some of whom were not born in Europe and arrived during the migration flow of 2014-2015. He stated that these migrants were dangerous and that his party warned the cabinet multiple times for this danger (Partij voor de Vrijheid, 2015).

Parties that made similar statements as the PVV received a lot of attention, and with that, the support for these parties grew (Grindheim, 2019). This growing support became especially visible during the national elections of 2017 in The Netherlands. The PVV became the second biggest party in parliament with 20 seats (Kiesraad, 2017). Just two years later, the relatively new populist right-wing party Forum voor Democratie (FVD) won the provincial council elections. That same year, one fifth of the voters voted for populist right-wing parties (Kok, 2019).

However, it remains unclear to what extent the Paris attack influenced the outcome of the elections. Previous research that focused on France has shown that the levels of fear and anger rose among citizens because of these events, resulting in increased support for populist right-wing parties (Vasilopoulos, Marcus, Valentino & Foucault, 2018). Yet, it is possible that the terrorist attacks not only directly affected voting behaviour but also influenced other mechanisms that shape voting behaviour as well. Moreover, these effects might also occur in countries in which the terrorist attack did not take place. Therefore, this research will focus on two things. First, it will study whether terrorist attacks could influence countries that were not directly affected. This research has chosen to focus on The Netherlands, because this country responded to the terrorist attack with stronger security measurements during big events (Rijke, 2016). Second, this study investigates whether the terrorist attacks influenced voting behaviour, focussing on the underlying relationships with the educational level and anti-immigrant attitudes.

Previous research has shown that the lower educated are more likely to vote for a populist right-wing party than the higher educated, because the lower educated experience more competition with migrants (group threat theory) whereas the higher educated also have more cultural capital that reduces feelings of threat (dereification theory) (Achterberg & Houtman, 2006; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2001). The higher educated thus have lower levels of anti-immigrant attitudes compared to the lower educated, making it less likely that they will vote for a populist right-wing party.

Previous studies that focussed on the consequences of a terrorist attack within a country that was directly affected by these attacks, showed that anger and fear played a great role in explaining voting for a populist right-wing party (Vasilopoulos et al., 2018). The explanations given for this direct relation could also be used to explain the possible indirect effect terrorism can have on voting behaviour. The increased levels of anger could strengthen the relationship between the educational level and anti-immigrant attitudes, especially because of the perceived link between terrorism and immigrants that has developed in the Western world. The lower educated will use this perceived link as an argument to justify their perceived threat towards immigrants, making their levels of anti-immigrant attitudes only stronger. The higher educated will be able to nuance this information, keeping their levels of anti-immigrant attitudes low. A terrorist attack also makes topics like immigration more salient than before, increasing the chance that individuals with higher levels of anti-immigration attitudes will vote for a populist right-wing party.

Lastly, previous research already focussed on effects of terrorism on countries not directly affected by the terrorist attack itself. Often, these countries are quite far away from the country directly affected. One of the examples is the research of the consequences in behaviour towards immigrants in Europe after 9/11, which happened in The United States (Buijs, 2009; van der Brug, 2003; Verkuyten & Zaremba, 2005; Vervoort & Dagevos, 2011). This research will regard the consequences of a more recent terrorist attack that happened "closer to home". Therefore, the research question reads:

To what extent does the educational level affect voting behaviour in The Netherlands and to what extent can this relation be explained through anti-immigrant attitudes and the Paris attack in 2015?

The research question will be studied with the data of the European Social Survey (ESS) of 2010-2018. It should be noted that in the ESS, the effects of terrorism cannot be fully isolated

from the effects of other factors that could explain populist right-wing voting. This will be elaborated in the discussion. This research adds to previous research by analysing the possible indirect effect of a terrorist attack on voting behaviour, focussing on a country that is not directly affected by the terrorist attack itself. This way, it could be studied whether terrorist attacks can influence voting behaviour, even if it did not happen in the country itself, but to a country close-by. This is not only relevant for scientific purposes, but also for understanding what the threat of terrorism does to individuals with different levels of education in The Netherlands. This information could help in explaining why one group might react stronger to the threat of terrorism than the other group.

Chapter 2: Theoretical framework

Before discussing the theoretical explanations, the conceptual model will be presented. As can be seen in figure 1, this paper will substantiate the idea that a higher educational level will decrease the anti-immigrant attitudes of individuals, which will in turn decrease the chances of voting for a populist right-wing party. The relation between the educational level and anti-immigrant attitudes could strengthen after the Paris terrorist attack. Lastly, the relation between anti-immigrant attitudes and voting for a populist right-wing party will also be strengthened by the Paris attack in 2015.

Figure 1: Conceptual model

2.1 The relationship between the educational level and voting for populist right-wing parties

The educational level of individuals strongly influences whether one votes for a populist right-wing party (e.g., Achterberg & Houtman, 2006; Bohman & Hjerm, 2016; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2001; van der Waal, Achterberg & Houtman, 2008). Most research shows that this relationship is mostly explained through the level of anti-immigrant attitudes (Bohman & Hjerm, 2016; Fennema, 2005; Lucassen & Lubbers, 2011; Lubbers, Gijsberts & Scheepers, 2002; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2001; Manevska & Achterberg, 2011; Savelkoul & Scheepers, 2016; Schneider, 2007). This research will employ the group threat theory and the dereification theory to explain the relationship between the educational level and anti-immigrant attitudes.

According to the group threat theory, society has scarce resources, which can be economic or cultural in nature (Bohman & Hjerm, 2016; Hjerm & Nagayoshi, 2011). People who lack these resources must compete with others to obtain the resources. Competing against a certain group – like competing against immigrants for these resources – results in a perceived threat against that group. Previous research has shown that it is mostly the less educated that experience competition with immigrants and that especially the competition on cultural grounds results in more anti-immigrant attitudes (Bohman & Hjerm, 2016; Lubbers, Gijsberts &

Scheepers, 2002; Lucassen & Lubbers, 2011; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2001; Oesch, 2008; Savelkoul & Scheepers, 2016). With the arrival of immigrants, their cultural norms and values become visible through expressions of their belief (e.g., wearing a headscarf, placements of mosques, etc.). The lower educated natives perceive the arrival of these new cultures as a threat to their own culture because they will mostly live in the same neighbourhoods as these immigrants and thus will be in closer proximity to these immigrants (Lucassen & Lubbers, 2011; Oesch, 2008; Savelkoul & Scheepers, 2016; Schneider, 2007). The visibility of the other cultures, which the natives will perceive as a threat, thus results in higher levels of anti-immigrant attitudes.

According to the dereification theory, education is described as institutionalized cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986). It could be argued that for the higher educated, the cultural capital obtained through their education reduces their anti-immigrant attitudes. Cultural capital gives individuals "the ability to recognize cultural expressions and to comprehend their meaning" (Achterberg & Houtman, 2006, p.78). In other words, cultural capital allows the higher educated to understand other cultures better, which would nuance their stances on things like immigration and eventually nuance their anti-immigrant attitudes. Through cultural capital, the higher educated learn that culture is a social construct, which entails that the society forms culture, and that culture is not a given thing we obtain from birth (Van der Waal & De Koster, 2015). This is also called the "denaturalisation of culture" (Manevska, 2014; van der Waal & de Koster, 2015). This gives higher educated the opportunity to recognize that their own culture is not superior in comparison to other cultures and recognize that these other cultures are not a threat towards their own (Achterberg & Houtman, 2006; van der Waal, Achterberg & Houtman, 2008; Manevska & Achterberg, 2011). This will result in more acceptance towards immigrants, thus decreasing the levels of anti-immigrant attitudes for the higher educated.

These two theories explain why the levels of anti-immigrant attitudes decrease when the educational level of individuals increases. Yet, one could question why higher levels of anti-immigrant attitudes would result in a higher chance of voting for populist right-wing parties. According to the research of van der Waal & de Koster (2017), individuals with higher levels of anti-immigrant attitudes feel threatened by the new cultures that enter The Netherlands. With the arrival of new cultures, the Dutch cultural order shifts, which will be perceived as threatening by individuals with anti-immigrant attitudes. They would want protection from this phenomenon, which they will find in the (populist) right-wing parties. These parties want to preserve the native population and culture, thereby problematizing other cultures as a threat to the country. The populist right-wing parties also portray an essentialist view about the

immigrants, resulting in a black-and-white view where immigrants are portrayed as the "enemy" and a threat to the culture of Western countries (Fennema, 2005; Stavrakakis, Katsambekis, Nikisianis, Kioupkiolis, & Siomos, 2017). The chances that individuals with anti-immigrant attitudes will vote for (populist) right-wing parties thus increases.

All in all, when the educational level of individuals increases, the competition about cultural norms and values with immigrants will decrease and the cultural capital will increase, resulting in a stronger belief that no culture is superior and that new cultures will not pose a threat to the native culture. This results in lower levels of anti-immigrant attitudes, which in turn will result in lower chances of voting for a populist right-wing party since these parties mostly appeal to individuals who have high levels of anti-immigrant attitudes. This results in the following hypothesis:

> *When the educational level of individuals increases, the level of anti-immigrant attitudes decreases, which in turn decreases the chances of voting for a populist right-wing party (H1).*

2.2 The direct effect of the threat of terrorism

As stated before, previous research has shown that the threat of terrorism could play a significant role in the voting behaviour of individuals (Vasilopoulos et al., 2019). When discussing the threat of terrorism, it is important to distinguish between an actual threat and a perceived threat. Jackson, Jarvis, Gunning and Smyth (2011) describe that terrorism is a minuscule threat to Europe, yet the fear for these terrorist attacks is enormous in European countries. Reasons they give for this high fear for terrorism are the lack of control individuals have over the situation, the culture of fear and the threat assessment that is stirred up and maintained by politicians, the media, the military sector, academics, and writers.

This is also found in the article of Vasilopoulos et al. (2019). In their article, the authors found that the level of anger and fear among citizens increased after the Paris terrorist attack. This fear and anger is directed towards ethnic minorities, especially towards Islamic individuals. This happens because the elite (e.g., the mainstream political leaders) blames disliked groups – like ethnic minorities and immigrants – for the existence of the threat of terrorism (Banks, 2014; Banks & Valentino, 2012; Vasilopoulos et al., 2019). This view is strengthened by the belief that current terrorism is religious and finds its origin within Islam. According to Rapoport, the world is in its fourth wave of terrorism, which he called "religious terrorism" (2004). It was also stated that the terrorists were immigrants who arrived in Europe during the migration stream in 2014-2015 (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en

Koninkrijksrelaties, 2019). This perception that terrorism is linked to immigration increases the perceived threat towards immigration among the citizens, which in turn could increase the anti-immigrant attitude of individuals. These citizens will look for support from political parties that also perceive immigration as a threat. This support is mostly found with populist right-wing parties because they aim to keep as many of the immigrants out of the country. This results in the following hypotheses:

> *When the threat of terrorism increases, individuals will develop stronger anti-immigrant attitudes (H2).*
>
> *When the threat of terrorism increases, the chance that individuals will vote for populist right-wing parties will increase (H3).*

2.3 The moderating effect of the threat of terrorism

It could also be argued that the negative relationship between educational level and anti-immigrant attitudes is strengthened when a terrorist event – like the attack in Paris in 2015 – occurs in Europe. When considering the effect that a terrorist attack might have on individuals, one could say that these increased levels of fear and anger are affecting the lower educated individuals more than the higher educated. As stated before, the lower educated compete more with immigrants, which results in more perceived threat towards immigrants. When stories start to surface that the terrorists are immigrants, the existing attitudes of individuals will strengthen even more (de Koster, Achterberg & Ivanova, 2016). For the lower educated, this means that they will perceive immigrants even more as a threat. These immigrants not only endanger their culture, but their safety as well, resulting in an increase of their anti-immigrant attitudes even more compared to before a terrorist attack. For the higher educated, one could argue that their levels of cultural capital let them separate the fact that the terrorists of the Paris attack were immigrants from the belief that all immigrants are terrorists. They recognise that immigrants themselves do not immediately pose a threat to society, just because a very small group of immigrants came to Europe with terrorist intentions. Their levels of anti-immigrant attitudes will stay low, even when a terrorist attack like the Paris attack occurs.

Although this line of theorizing has not been researched yet, previous findings suggest different effects for educational groups. Studies have shown that the higher educated in The Netherlands were less likely to vote for Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF), a populist right-wing party, even after the terrorist attack of 9/11 (van der Brug, 2003; Verkuyten & Zaremba, 2005). After 9/11, Muslims living in The Netherlands were feeling more excluded than before, with inter-ethnic contact stagnating after 2002 (Buijs, 2009; Vervoort & Dagevos, 2011). Also, it has been

shown that hate crimes towards the Arabs and Muslims in the USA increased after the attack of 9/11 (Disha, Cavendish & King, 2011). It is not clear whether this increase of hate crimes was only linked to the lower educated or to the complete native population. Yet it still is a sign that the natives started to think more negatively about immigrants such as Arabs and Muslims after the terrorist attack. Based on the theorising above, this results in the following hypothesis:

The (negative) relation between the educational level and anti-immigrant attitudes strengthens after the terrorist attack in Paris (H4).

Like stated above, one could argue that the positive effect of anti-immigrant attitudes on voting for populist right-wing parties is strengthened when a terrorist event – like the Paris attack in 2015 – occurs. Previously, it was already mentioned that in the current days, terrorism is linked to Islam, which makes it likely that the levels of anti-immigrant attitudes are quite high when a terrorist attack happens. The article of Vasilopoulos et al. (2019) found that while fear resulted in less votes for populist right-wing parties, the anger after a terrorist attack increased voting for a populist right-wing party. It was also anger that played the biggest role in explaining the voting behaviour in that article. This increase of anger after a terrorist attack could explain why the effect of anti-immigrant attitudes on voting for a populist right-wing party strengthens.

Before a terrorist attack, individuals might show high levels of anti-immigrant attitudes, yet decide to vote for a party for different reasons than cultural reasons (especially after the economic recession of 2008, the motives for voting for a party could be more economical than cultural). After a terrorist attack, individuals start to feel angry, especially those who already had high levels of anti-immigrant attitudes. For them, it is a confirmation that immigrants are a threat to society and should not be welcome in The Netherlands. This view is also confirmed by the media, which only helps to shape voting behaviour and strengthens the already existing feelings towards immigrants (de Koster, Achterberg & Ivanova, 2016). The influence of the media in combination with anger makes it an important issue for those with high levels of anti-immigrant attitudes, which makes them even more likely to vote for populist right-wing parties than individuals with lower levels of anti-immigrant attitudes. Cultural reasons become more salient for this group, and they will find support with populist right-wing parties. This results in the following hypothesis:

The (positive) relation between anti-immigrant attitudes and voting for a populist right-wing party strengthens after the terrorist attack in Paris (H5).

Chapter 3: Methods

3.1 Data

To test the hypotheses described above, this research will use the European Social Survey of 2010-2018, including five waves. The European Social Survey is a cross-national survey that has been conducted in Europe since 2001. The European Social Survey aims – among others – to measure changes in social structure, attitudes and conditions in Europe, interpretation of these changes, achieving higher standards for cross-national research, introducing indicators of national progress, and improving the visibility and outreach of data on social change (European Social Survey, n.d.). Multiple countries participate in these surveys, yet this research only focusses on The Netherlands. The selection process of respondents was different throughout the years. In 2010 and 2012, respondents were selected based on a two-stage probability sampling: postal delivery points and a person with a household (European Social Survey, 2018a; European Social Survey, 2018b). In 2014 and 2016, a three-stage design was used: first postal delivery points, then households, and then a person within these households (European Social Survey, 2018c; European Social Survey, 2020). In 2018, an equal probability stratified sample was used, where people were selected in 48 strata split by region, age and gender (European Social Survey, 2021). These respondents got a letter on paper (2010-2012) or a letter through email (2014-2018) with the question whether they would want to participate. Through the years, the response rate lies between 49 and 60 per cent. All interviews were collected through computer-assisted personal interviews (CAPI for short). In total, the five datasets combined contain 8947 respondents. Listwise deletion has been used for the instances of missing cases. This reduces the respondent group to 4989 respondents (44,2%). Most of the respondents (3676) were removed, because they did not feel close to a party and thus are not relevant in this study. The exception to the listwise deletion is the control variable income. Here, the missing values were included through a separate dummy.

3.2 Dependent variable

To measure the voting behaviour of the respondents, a two-step measurement will be used. First, the respondents were asked whether there is a particular party they feel closer to than other parties. As has been mentioned above, the respondents who answered "no" will be removed. When answered yes, respondents were then asked to which party they feel closer to. This measurement of voting behaviour is useful because it makes it possible to measure preferences for political parties without relying on elections, which are only held every four years. Likely, respondents would vote for the party they feel closer to when there would be an

election at that time. Based on the answers, respondents will be categorized as either "voting for a populist right-wing party" or "not voting for a populist right-wing party". Respondents will be categorized as "voting for a populist right-wing party" when they answered PVV or FvD. All other valid answers (also the option "other") are categorized as "not voting for a populist right-wing party". Respondents that have not responded to one of the two questions were removed.

3.3 Independent variables

The educational level of the respondents will be measured through the question "What is the highest level of education you have successfully completed?". Based on the answers of the respondents, the European Social Survey translated it to the number of years it minimally takes to complete that level of education. This resulted in a scale of 0 to 50 years spent on education.

To measure anti-immigrant attitudes, three questions were asked. The respondent is asked whether the country's cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants, whether immigrants make the country a worse or better place to live in, and whether immigration is bad or good for the country's economy. The answers vary from 0 "culture undermined"/ "worse place to live"/ "bad for the economy" to 10 "cultural life enriched"/ "better place to live"/ "good for the economy". These three questions were used together on a scale, with the condition that at least two of the three questions needed to have a valid answer. The Cronbach's Alpha of this scale is 0.770, which means that the scale is reliable. Lastly, the scale was re-coded in a way that a higher score represents a stronger anti-immigrant attitude.

Lastly, it should be noted that the European Social Survey does not have a direct measurement for the threat of terrorism. This research has decided to interpret the effects of threat of terrorism as a period effect. This means that from a certain point in time, relations start to differ due to a certain event that affected every member of society. The threat of terrorism had a clear starting point with the terrorist attack in Paris in 2015. From that moment up to 2017, Europe fell victim to ten terrorist attacks, which increased the salience of the terrorism issue in the EU (de Roy van Zuijdewijn & Sciarone, 2019). This research thus assumes that from 2015 onwards, the differences that occur in voting behaviour can be ascribed to the increased threat of terrorism. To measure this, the five waves between 2010 and 2018 will be put into five dummy variables. It is expected that the effects of the threat of terrorism are shown after 2015. This research thus uses an indirect measurement of the threat of terrorism. This will be elaborated upon in the discussion.

3.4 Control variables

Six control variables are selected for this study, based on the control variables used in previous literature. First, based on the vulnerability recruitment theory, the age of the respondent could influence the perceived threat of individuals, because individuals become more vulnerable at a certain age (Vanhoutte, Elchardus & Sjongens, 2009). This feeling of vulnerability goes hand in hand with feeling unsafe. A way of coping with these feelings of unsafeness and vulnerability is by linking the events that they are fearful for with the presence of strangers – like immigrants – and blaming these strangers for their feelings of unsafeness and vulnerability. This could influence the anti-immigrant attitudes of the respondents as well. The age varies from 14 to 97 years old. The variable is subtracted by 14 to make the B0 in the regression analysis interpretable.

Because of the nature of the questions that measure the anti-immigrant attitudes, this research will also control for the ethnicity of respondents. Respondents were asked whether they belonged to a minority group in their country. The question was recoded in a way that 0 means "not a member of a minority group" and 1 means "member of a minority group".

This study will also control for the income of respondents, because income and educational level are closely related. In the survey, respondents got a card with ten deciles, each describing a different income. The respondents could answer which decile matched their income. This variable has a lot of missings (556). To keep these respondents without losing data, the variable has been separated into six dummies. Deciles 1&2, 3&4, 5&6, 7&8 and 9&10 were combined into five separate dummies. The missings on this variable were put into their own separate dummy.

The other control variables were described by Savelkoul and Scheepers (2016) as known predictors that could influence the relationship between the educational level and voting for populist right-wing parties. This includes the gender, religiosity, and marital status of the respondents. Gender is recoded to 0 "Female" and 1 "Male", because supporters of populist right-wing parties are mostly males (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2001). The religiosity of the respondent is measured by the question "Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are?". The answers vary from "0 Not at all religious" to "10 Very religious". Lastly, the marital status of the respondents is asked. Respondents got a card in front of them with different descriptions of marital statuses. The question "Which one of the descriptions on this card describes your legal marital status now?" was asked. Possible answers ranged from "Legally married" to "None of these (NEVER married or in legally

registered civil union)". Six dummies were made for every answer. The descriptive statistics of every variable mentioned will be presented in Table 1.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard-deviation
Voting for populist right-wing parties	.00	1.00	.11	
Educational level	.00	50.00	14.07	4.22
Anti-immigrant attitudes	.00	10.00	4.30	1.61
Year	.00	1.00		
2010			.22	
2012			.22	
2014			.21	
2016			.18	
2018			.18	
Age	14.00	97.00	52.62	17.73
Gender	.00	1.00		
Female			.49	
Male			.51	
Religiosity	.00	10.00	4.53	3.20
Marital status	.00	1.00		
Married			.50	
Civil Union			.05	
Separated			.01	
Divorced			.10	
Widow			.09	
Never married			.26	
Income	.00	1.00		
1&2 decile			.12	
3&4 decile			.14	
5&6 decile			.20	
7&8 decile			.21	
9&10 decile			.22	
Missing on income			.11	
Ethnicity	.00	1.00	.05	

Source: European Social Survey 2010-2018. N=4989.

3.5 Analytic strategy

This research will use a combination of logistic and linear regression analyses. The first three models will use logistic regression analysis. These models will have voting behaviour as the dependent variable. The first model includes the educational level and the control variables. This model will focus on the relationship between the educational level, the dummies for the threat of terrorism and voting behaviour. In this model, the relationship between the threat of terrorism and voting behaviour will be tested (H3). The second model will add the anti-immigrant attitudes to the first model and thus will look at the mediating role of anti-immigrant attitudes in the relationship between the educational level and voting behaviour (H1). The third model will add the dummies made for the interaction terms of the threat of terrorism. The possible moderating role of the threat of terrorism on the relationship between anti-immigrant attitudes and voting for a populist right-wing party will be tested as well (H5).

In models 4 and 5, a linear regression analysis will be used. These models will have the anti-immigrant attitudes as the dependent variable. Model 4 will include the educational level, the dummies for the threat of terrorism and the control variables. This model will test the relationship between the threat of terrorism and anti-immigrant attitudes (H2). Model 5 will add the dummies for the interaction terms of the threat of terrorism. It will also test the possible moderating role of the threat of terrorism on the relationship between the educational level and the anti-immigrant attitudes (H4).

Chapter 4: Analysis

This chapter will discuss the analysis of the research. First, it will focus on the descriptive statistics, examining the trend of voting behaviour through the years. Next, this chapter will focus on the regression analysis, which rejects or confirms the five hypotheses of this research.

4.1 Descriptive Results

Figure 2 shows the voting trends in the years 2010 through 2018. As can be seen in the graph, the lower educated are most likely to vote for populist right-wing parties. The middle educated are a little less likely to vote for populist right-wing parties but show similar fluctuations as the lower educated through the years. Just a small percentage of the higher educated voted for populist right-wing parties.

Figure 2: Voting trends through 2010-2018 (% that voted for RRP)

Based on the literature used in this research, it is expected that from 2016 onwards, voting for populist right-wing parties will increase. This trend would mostly show for the lower- and middle educated, not for the higher educated.

When focussing on the trend of voting behaviour, the lower- and middle educated show a similar trend. The support for populist right-wing parties decreased in 2012, but strongly increased in 2014. After 2014, the percentage of respondents that would vote for populist right-wing parties slowly declines again, yet not to the point where it was in 2012. For the higher educated, a different trend occurred during the years. Up to 2014, voting for a populist right-wing party declined to the point that just 1% of the higher educated would vote for populist right-wing parties. After 2014, the support for populist right-wing parties among the higher

educated starts to increase. So far, the results of figure 2 – especially the increase between 2012-2014 – are not in line with the formulated expectations of this research. The increase of voting for populist right-wing parties started earlier than expected and did not persist as long as expected.

4.2 Regression analysis

As has been elaborated before, a total of five models will be analysed to answer the five hypotheses. The first three models (Table 2) will be tested with the logistic regression analysis, because of the dichotomic nature of the measurement for voting behaviour. Model 4 and 5 (Table 3) will be tested with the linear regression analysis and will measure the anti-immigrant attitudes.

4.2.1 Voting behaviour (Model 1-3)

Table 2 presents the results of the logistic regression analysis, measuring the effects on voting for populist right-wing parties. In Model 1, hypothesis 3 will be tested. This hypothesis expects that when the threat of terrorism increases, the chance that individuals will vote for populist right-wing parties also increases. Because the Paris terrorist attack happened at the end of 2015, it can be expected that from 2016 onwards, the chance that individuals will vote for populist right-wing parties increases. When focusing on the results, it can be seen that compared to 2010, the chances of voting for populist right-wing parties was smaller in 2012 (B = -.456). In 2014, the chances of voting for populist right-wing parties increased compared to 2010 (B = .266), yet this effect is not significant. This means that based on the results, the effect in 2014 did not differ from 2010. In 2016, the chances of voting for populist right-wing parties increased compared to 2010 (B = .298). In 2018, the effect is more positive compared to 2010, yet smaller compared to 2014 and 2016. This effect is also not significant, which entails that the effect does not differ compared to 2010. Based on these results, it can be stated that the threat of terrorism seems to have a short-term effect on voting behaviour. The found effect in 2016 disappears in 2018, even though hypothesis 3 expected for the effect to retain after 2016. Also, the effect started sooner than expected. Even though the effect for 2014 in this model is not significant, figure 2 shows that the trend of voting for populist right-wing parties already increased in 2014. Hypothesis 3 is thus partly confirmed. These results raise the question how long the effects of terrorist attack might last (cf. Vasilopolous et al., 2018). This will be elaborated upon in the discussion.

In Model 1 and 2, hypothesis 1 will be tested. This hypothesis expects that the relationship between educational level and voting for populist right-wing parties is mediated by anti-immigrant attitudes. Focusing on Model 1, when the educational level of an individual increases, the chance that this individual will vote for a populist right-wing party is lower (B = -.196). When focusing on Model 2, which adds the anti-immigrant attitude to the model, the odds for voting populist right-wing parties are almost two times higher than the odds for not voting populist right-wing parties when anti-immigrants attitudes increase (Exp(B) = 1.927). In this model, the negative effect of the educational level weakens by 28.4% (B = -.141). This means that 28.4% of the relationship between the educational level and voting for populist right-wing parties is explained by anti-immigrant attitudes. This decrease of 28.4% is a significant difference, yet not as substantial as expected. It should be noted that the Nagelkerke R square almost doubles, which entails that the explanatory value of anti-immigrant attitudes is relatively high. Even though the mediating role of anti-immigrant attitudes in the relationship between the educational level and voting for populist right-wing parties is not as substantial as expected, the mediation still plays a significant role. Based on these results, hypothesis 1 will be confirmed.

In Model 3, hypothesis 5 will be tested. This hypothesis expects that the positive relationship between the anti-immigrant attitude and voting for a populist right-wing party would become stronger from 2016 onwards. The results show that in 2010, a positive relationship between the anti-immigrant attitudes and voting for a populist right-wing party exists (B = .749). Individuals with stronger anti-immigrant attitudes thus have a higher chance of voting for a populist right-wing party in 2010. This positive effect decreases in 2012 (B = -.214). Individuals with stronger anti-immigrant attitudes still are more likely to vote for a populist right-wing party, yet less likely compared to 2010. From 2014 onwards, the relationship between anti-immigrant attitudes and voting for a populist right-wing party does not differ compared to 2010. While the effects measured show that the effects in those years would decrease compared to 2010 (2014: B = -.093; 2016: B = -.029; 2018: B = -.137), all these results were not significant, meaning the effect of anti-immigrant attitudes does not differ between years. These results are not in line with what was expected based on hypothesis 5, which expected that the relationship would strengthen even more from 2016 onwards. Based on the results, hypothesis 5 will be rejected.

When considering the control variables, in all three models, individuals are less likely to vote for populist right-wing parties when they become older and when they are more religious. Men are also more likely to vote for populist right-wing parties than women. When

focussing on the effect of income, especially the 4th and 5th decile are less likely to vote for populist right-wing parties than the first three deciles. In model 1, individuals with a minority background are less likely to vote for populist right-wing parties than natives, yet this effect disappears in models 2 and 3.

4.2.2 Anti-immigrant attitudes (Model 4-5)

Table 3 presents the results of the linear regression analysis, measuring the effects on anti-immigrant attitudes. As can be seen in Model 4, education has a negative effect on anti-immigrant attitudes. The difference in score between the 0 and 50 years of education is 4.85 (.097*50), where individuals with 0 years of education will have a score of 1.77 and individuals with 50 years of education a score of 6.20 (at reference level for other variables). This is a substantial difference, considering that the variable of anti-immigrant attitudes ranges from 0 to 10. This model tests hypothesis 2 through testing whether anti-immigrant attitudes have changed over the years. When considering the effects of the threat of terrorism, in 2014, the anti-immigrant attitudes increased (B = .25) compared to 2010. Contrary to 2014, in 2018, anti-immigrant attitudes decreased (B = -.17) compared to 2010. The years 2012 and 2016 show no significant differences in anti-immigrant attitudes compared to 2010. Because 2016 does not show significant differences compared to 2010, 2018 shows a decrease in anti-immigrant attitudes and no clear pattern in the effect of different years can be seen, hypothesis 2 will be rejected.

Model 5 will test hypothesis 4, which focuses on the moderating role of the threat of terrorism on the relation between the educational level and anti-immigrant attitudes. It can be seen that in 2010, the relationship between the educational level and anti-immigrant attitudes was negative (B = -.081). In 2012, the effect of the educational level on the anti-immigrant attitudes becomes stronger negative compared to 2010 (B = -.026), yet is not significant, which means that no significant difference in effect between 2010 and 2012 is found. In 2014, the effect of the educational level on the anti-immigrant attitude becomes stronger negative compared to 2010 (B = -.031). This means that compared to 2010, the higher educated have even lower levels of anti-immigrant attitudes than the lower educated in 2014. This effect becomes even more strongly negative in 2016 (B = -.058). Interestingly, the effect in 2018 is less negative compared to 2010 (B = .020). This means that compared to 2010, the higher educated had stronger anti-immigrant attitudes in 2018, yet still have lower levels of anti-immigrant attitudes compared to lower educated. Yet, this effect is not significant, meaning that the effect of the educational level measured in 2018 does not differ from the effect measured in

2010. Based on these results, the threat of terrorism does have a moderating effect on the relation between the educational level and anti-immigrant attitudes in 2016, but this effect is short-lived, because 2018 no longer sees this stronger negative effect. Based on these results, hypothesis 4 will be partly confirmed.

When considering the control variables, individuals have lower levels of anti-immigrant attitudes when they become older. Also, individuals earning an income from the 3rd decile onwards increasingly show lower levels of anti-immigrant attitudes. Lastly, individuals with a migration background also show lower levels of anti-immigrant attitudes than the natives.

Table 2: Logistic regression analysis explaining voting for populist right-wing parties

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)	B	Exp(B)
Constant	2.416*	11.196	-2.151**	.116	-2.683***	.068
Educational level (in years)	-.196***	.822	-.141***	.869	-.141***	.869
Anti-immigrant attitudes			.656***	1.927	.749***	2.116
Year 2010 (=ref)						
Year 2012	-.456**	.634	-.561**	.571	.628	1.873
Year 2014	.266	1.254	-.010	.990	.497	1.644
Year 2016	.298*	1.347	.149	1.161	.295	1.344
Year 2018	.125	1.134	.250	1.284	.981	2.667
Year 2012 * anti-immigrant attitude					-.214*	.807
Year 2014 * anti-immigrant attitude					-.093	.911
Year 2016 * anti-immigrant attitude					-.029	.972
Year 2018 * anti-immigrant attitude					-.137	.872
Age	-.030***	.971	-.025***	.976	-.025***	.976
Gender (0=female)	.286**	1.331	.262*	1.300	.264*	.015
Religiosity	-.097***	.908	-.092***	.912	-.094***	.911
Separated (=ref)						
Married	.065	1.067	.354	1.425	.381	1.464
Civil union	.254	1.290	.627	1.872	.680	1.974
Divorced	.002	1.002	.222	1.249	.258	1.294
Widow	-.390	.677	-.140	.870	-.096	.908
Never married	-.246	.782	.207	1.229	.226	1.254
Income: 1st decile (=ref)						
Income: 2nd decile	-.262	.769	-.211	.810	-.210	.811
Income: 3rd decile	-.460**	.631	-.313	.731	-.312	.732
Income: 4th decile	-.788***	.455	-.609**	.544	-.606**	.545
Income: 5th decile	-1.228***	.293	-1.004***	.366	-1.003***	.367
Income: missing						
Ethnicity (0=dominant)	-.778**	.459	-.168	.845	-.156	.856
Nagelkerke R square	.164		.332		.333	

Source: European Social Survey 2010-2018. N=4898.

Note: *p<0,05 **p<0,01 ***p<0,001

Table 3: Linear regression analysis explaining anti-immigrant attitudes

	Model 4	Model 5
	B-coefficient	*B-coefficient*
Intercept	6.619***	6.439***
Educational level (in years)	-.097***	-.081***
Year 2012	-.099	.259
Year 2014	.250***	.676**
Year 2016	.065	.885***
Year 2018	-.169*	-.475*
*Year 2012 * education*		-.026
*Year 2014 * education*		-.031*
*Year 2016 * education*		-.058*
*Year 2018 * education*		.020
Age	-.010***	-.010***
Gender (0=female)	.066	.078
Religiosity	-.005	-.005
Married	-.210	-.229
Civil union	-.347	-.389
Divorced	-.318	-.327
Widow	-.187	-.223
Never married	-.485	-.502
Income: 2nd decile	-.134	-.133
Income: 3rd decile	-.291***	-.290***
Income: 4th decile	-.344***	-.335***
Income: 5th decile	-.517***	-.509***
Income: missing		
Ethnicity (0=dominant)	-.777***	-.731***
R^2	.105	.109

Source: European Social Survey 2010-2018. N=4898.

Note: *p<0,05 **p<0,01 ***p<0,001

Chapter 5: Conclusion & Discussion

The terrorist attack in Paris in 2015 had a big impact which did not limit itself to the border of France, but was felt in the whole Western world, including The Netherlands. Populist right-wing parties used the attacks to increase the support for their parties, in which they succeeded. Research in France has shown that the terrorist attack had influenced voting behaviour, yet no research has focused on the possible effect the terrorist attack could have on other countries (Vasilopolous et al., 2018). This thesis focused on the possible relation between the terrorist attack and voting for populist right-wing parties in The Netherlands. Additionally, this research focused on the indirect effects the terrorist attack could have on the relation between the educational level and voting for populist right-wing parties.

This led to the following research question: "*To what extent does the educational level affect voting behaviour in The Netherlands and to what extent can this relation be explained through anti-immigrant attitudes and the Paris attack in 2015?*". To form an answer to this research question, the European Social Survey waves 5 through 9 was used.

This chapter will answer the research question in three parts. First, the relation between the educational level and voting for populist right-wing parties and the mediating role of anti-immigrant attitudes will be discussed. Next, the direct effects of the threat of terrorism on voting for populist right-wing parties and anti-immigrant attitudes will be discussed. Subsequently, the moderating role of the threat of terrorism on the relation between educational level and anti-immigrant attitudes as well as the relation between anti-immigrant attitudes and voting for populist right-wing parties will be discussed. Finally, suggestions for further research will be provided.

5.1 The relationship between educational level and voting for populist right-wing parties

This research focused on the possible mediating role of anti-immigrant attitudes in the relation between the educational level and voting for populist right-wing parties. Based on previous research, the group threat theory and the dereification theory offered explanations which support the possibility of a mediating role of anti-immigrant attitudes. First, based on the group threat theory, the lower educated have stronger anti-immigrant attitudes than the higher educated, because they must compete with the immigrants for scarce goods, especially on cultural grounds (Bohman & Hjerm, 2016; Lubbers & Scheepers, 2001; Savelkoul & Scheepers, 2016). Second, based on the dereification theory, the higher educated have lower levels of anti-immigrant attitudes than the lower educated, because they have higher levels of

cultural capital which enables them to not perceive other cultures as a threat to their own culture (Manevska, 2014; van der Waal & de Koster, 2015). Stronger anti-immigrant attitudes, in turn, result in a higher chance to vote for populist right-wing parties, because these parties share the same point of view about immigrants and support more protectionism for natives (van der Waal & de Koster, 2017; Stavrakakis et al., 2017).

The analysis shows that there is a mediating effect. The anti-immigrant attitudes explained more than a quarter of the voting for populist right-wing parties in relation to the educational level. It can thus be said that anti-immigrant attitudes indeed mediate the relationship between the educational level and voting for populist right-wing parties, but anti-immigrant attitudes do not fully explain the relationship. Other factors are likely to play a role in explaining the relationship and should not be ignored. One of these possible factors is the level of political trust, suggesting that the lower educated are more politically distrustful towards the government. Populist right-wing parties reinforced the ideas that the political "elite" cannot be trusted and actively separated themselves of the elite, positioning themselves as "the outcast" (Algan, Guriey, Papaioannou & Passari, 2017; Schulte-Cloos & Leininger, 2021). Individuals that show political distrust are more likely to agree with populist right-wing parties, which would increase the likelihood to vote for these parties. One of the events that could have influenced the level of political (dis)trust is the economic crisis of 2008 (Algan et al., 2017). The crisis has shown shortcomings in the economic and political system that especially had consequences for the lower educated in terms of their economic insecurity. This could have resulted in distrust towards government and consequently a vote for populist right-wing parties.

5.2 The direct effect of the threat of terrorism

This research also investigated the possible direct effects of the threat of terrorism on voting behaviour and anti-immigrant attitudes. Based on previous literature which focused on voting behaviour, fear and anger are likely to increase among citizens when a terrorist attack occurs. Especially the increase in anger resulted in more support for the populist right-wing parties (Vasilopolous et al, 2018). The analysis showed that just after the Paris terrorist attack, voting for populist right-wing parties did increase in 2016, yet it decreased in 2018. While it was expected that the effect of the threat of terrorism would last longer, it was not found. Previous research however has not considered the longitudinal effects of the Paris terrorist attack. When these results are compared with the results of the research of Vasilopolous et al. (2018), it might suggest a caveat in their results. While they found that individuals were more likely to vote for

populist right-wing parties because of increased levels of anger, it can be questioned for how long this effect has lasted. Based on these results, it is plausible that the measured effects in the article of Vasilopolous et al. (2018) are also short-lived and would be different when they would extend their research.

Focusing on the direct effect of the threat of terrorism on anti-immigrant attitudes, previous research has claimed that in the contemporary society, terrorism is perceived to be linked to religion, especially to Islam (Rapoport, 2004). The elite – referring to the mainstream political leaders – also blames disliked groups like immigrants for the existence of the threat of terrorism. These views result in the belief that immigrants are a threat to society, resulting in stronger anti-immigrant attitudes. The analysis showed that no clear pattern in the effect of the threat of terrorism on anti-immigrant attitudes can be seen in the years 2010-2018. It is possible that the direct effect is not found because the indirect measurement of the threat of terrorism. This will be elaborated further in the discussion.

5.3 The moderating effect of the threat of terrorism

Lastly, this research focussed on the moderating role of the threat of terrorism on two separate relationships. First, the possible moderating role in the relationship between the educational level and anti-immigrant attitudes was explored. Based on the literature, the negative relationship between the educational level and anti-immigrant attitudes would become stronger negative (de Koster, Achterberg & Ivanova, 2016). The news that the Paris attack was performed by immigrants confirmed the views for the lower educated that the immigrants are a threat, which would strengthen their anti-immigrant attitudes. For the higher educated, their cultural capital helps them separate the Paris terrorist attack from the idea that all immigrants are terrorists. The analysis shows that while the relationship between the educational level and anti-immigrant attitudes indeed became stronger negative in 2016, this effect disappeared in 2018. This means that the Paris terrorist attack had an influence on the relationship, yet this effect was short-lived.

Second, the possible moderating role in the relationship between the anti-immigrant attitudes and voting for populist right-wing parties was explored. Based on the literature, it can be stated that topics like immigration and safety became more salient after the Paris terrorist attack (de Koster, Achterberg & Ivanova, 2016). For individuals with stronger anti-immigrant attitudes, this means that their anti-immigrant attitudes might play a more significant role in deciding which party to vote for than in the years before the Paris terrorist attack. This makes them more likely to vote for populist right-wing parties than before the Paris terrorist attack.

The analysis did not provide support for these claims. From 2014 onwards, the relationship between anti-immigrant attitudes and voting for populist right-wing parties does not differ in strength. The threat of terrorism thus does not seem to have a moderating role in this relationship. It is possible that anti-immigrant attitudes already are an important factor in explaining voting for a populist right-wing party. Populist right-wing parties are often the only parties in the government that openly criticize the presence of immigrants in their country, which attract individuals with anti-immigrant attitudes. While a terrorist attack might strengthen these feelings, it is not needed to push individuals over the line to vote for a populist right-wing party. Also, the fact that The Netherlands is not directly affected might make it easier for individuals to put the event into perspective and move on. That way, the importance of the anti-immigrant attitudes in deciding which party to vote for does not differ after the occurrence of a terrorist attack, because it did not make a big impact on the individuals involved. Again, it is also possible that the indirect measurement of the threat of terrorism contributed to not finding the moderating effect.

5.4 Discussion

This research is to the best of knowledge the first research focusing on the (in)direct effects of the Paris terrorist attack on The Netherlands, a country that was not directly targeted by the attack. It contributed to the knowledge of what effects terrorist attacks can have on a country indirectly affected by the attack itself. Future research could expand on this knowledge.

Some elements of the study could be included in future research. First, considering figure 2, which shows the voting trends of 2010-2018, it becomes evident that the discussed theories cannot fully explain the trends and that other factors seem to play a role as well. Interestingly, the increase in voting for populist right-wing parties for the low- and middle educated started in 2014. An explanation of why it started earlier could be the increasing concern around the migration crisis that started in Europe in 2013. In a rapid rate, hundreds of thousands of immigrants came to Europe, which caused a shortage of shelters in multiple countries, including The Netherlands. The events were perceived as threatening by a part of the native population, on which populist right-wing parties acted, which could explain why the support for populist right-wing parties grew in 2014. Another relevant factor in explaining voting behaviour for populist right-wing parties is the (dis)trust in the government. Future research could isolate the effects of the threat of terrorism better when they also take these factors into account.

Second, this research could not give a definitive answer to which of the two theories (group threat theory and dereification theory) may explain the relationship between the educational level and anti-immigrant attitudes. The dataset used in this research did not have measurements for the feelings of competition or levels of cultural capital. Because of the lack of such measurements, it was impossible to detect which of the two theories adequately explains the relationship. By using data that measures these theories as well, this could be improved in future research.

Focussing on the methodological improvements, the measurement used in this research does not directly measure the levels of threat of terrorism but uses different waves of the questionnaire and categorized the years after the Paris attacks as the years where the threat of terrorism was high. This measurement is partly based on assumptions (assuming that differences in voting behaviour and anti-immigrant attitudes within the waves are solely consequences of the threat of terrorism), which could explain why certain expected relations were not found in this research. This could be improved upon by future research. For instance, future questionnaires could add questions such as "To what extent do you believe a terrorist attack will happen in your country?" and/or "To what extent do you believe you would fall victim to a terrorist attack?" to create a scale that represents the perceived threat of terrorism of individuals. By improving the measurement of the threat of terrorism, the involvement of other possible factors that played a significant role in the years that were measured can be isolated more effectively.

Future research could also examine whether threat of terrorism theoretically has a moderating or mediating role in the relationship between the anti-immigrant attitudes and voting for populist right-wing parties. In this research, the threat of terrorism did not seem to have a moderating role in the relationship, but it is possible that this is the result of an indirect measurement. Yet, if a moderation is not found with the appropriate measurement of threat of terrorism, it could be possible that it plays a role in a mediation. Based on the theory, one could for instance argue that when the threat of terrorism increases, individuals would develop stronger anti-immigrant attitudes, because of the perception that religion, immigration and terrorism are linked to each other. When their anti-immigrant attitudes become stronger, individuals would agree sooner with the stances of populist right-wing parties, which makes them more likely to vote for populist right-wing parties than individuals that perceive little threat of terrorism. In this case, the threat of terrorism directly affects the anti-immigrant attitudes. This differs from the moderation, which theorises that when the threat of terrorism increases, the anti-immigrant attitudes play a more important role in deciding which party to

vote for. The mediation would not state that anti-immigrant attitudes play a bigger role in the decision, but that the levels of individuals' anti-immigrant attitudes increase, which makes individuals more likely to vote for populist right-wing parties. The theoretical argument was not taken into consideration in this research, because the theoretical explanation of the moderation seemed to be more plausible, yet it still could be relevant when the moderating role cannot be found.

Initially, this research did not focus on the length of the effect of threat of terrorism. This research assumed that the threat of terrorism could be seen as a period effect, meaning that everyone is affected (although not equally) and changes in behaviour can be observed from that point onwards. Yet, the results have shown that much of the effect of threat of terrorism disappeared in 2018. It is possible that the actual effect is shorter. It thus seems that a terrorist attack might have an influence on some aspects of life, yet that a society moves on from the event after a while and is no longer affected by it. It is possible that social media – with its fast pace that makes it possible to know what happens in the world within a few seconds – made people move on quicker from traumatic events, especially if they are not directly affected by it. Future research could focus on the length of the effect that threat of terrorism might have.

References

Achterberg, P., & Houtman, D. (2006). Why do so many people vote 'unnaturally'? A cultural explanation for voting behavior. *European Journal of Political Research, 45*, 75– 92. doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2005.00291.x

Algan, Y., Guriev, S., Papaioannou, E., & Passari, E. (2017). The European trust crisis and the rise of populism. *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2017*(2), 309–400. https://doi.org/10.1353/eca.2017.0015

Banks, A. J. (2014). *Anger and racial politics: The emotional foundation of racial attitudes in America.* Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Banks, A. J., & Valentino, N. A. (2012). Emotional substrates of White racial attitudes. *American Journal of Political Science, 56*, 286–297.

Bohman, A., & Hjerm, M. (2016). In the wake of radical right electoral success: a cross-country comparative study of anti-immigration attitudes over time. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 42*(11), 1729–1747. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183x.2015.11316 07

Bourdieu, P. (1986). The forms of capital. In J. G. Richardson (Ed.), *Handbook of theory and research for the sociology of education:* 241-258. New York: Greenwood.

Buijs, F. J. (2009). Muslims in the Netherlands: Social and political developments after 9/11. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 35*(3), 421–438. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369 1830802704590

Coenders, M., & Scheepers, P. (1998). Support for ethnic discrimination in the Netherlands 1979-1993: Effects of period, cohort, and individual characteristics. *European Sociological Review, 14*(4), 405–422. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals. esr.a018247

de Koster, W., Achterberg, P., & Ivanova, N. (2016). Reconsidering the impact of informational provision on opinions of suspended sentences in the Netherlands. *Crime & Delinquency, 62*(11), 1528–1539. https://doi.org/10.1177/0011128714551405

de Roy van Zuijdewijn, J., & Sciarone, J. (2019). Convergence of the salience of terrorism in the European Union before and after terrorist attacks. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 1–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2019.1647175

Disha, I., Cavendish, J.C., & King, R.D. (2011). Historical events and spaces of hate: Hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims in post-9/11 America. Social Problems, 58(1), 21–46. https://doi.org/10.1525/sp.2011.58.1.21

European Social Survey. (n.d.). *About ESS | European Social Survey (ESS)*. Retrieved 9 April

2021, from https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/about/

European Social Survey. (2018a, December). *ESS5 - 2010 Documentation report: The ESS data archive* (4.2). https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/round5/survey/ESS5_data_ documentation_report_e04_2.pdf

European Social Survey. (2018b, December). *ESS6 - 2012 Documentation report: The ESS data archive* (2.4). https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/round6/survey/ESS6_ data_documentation_report_e02_4.pdf

European Social Survey. (2018c, December). *ESS7 - 2014 Documentation report: The ESS data archive* (3.2). https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/round7/survey/ESS7_ data_documentation_report_e03_2.pdf

European Social Survey. (2020, December). *ESS8 - 2016 Documentation report: The ESS data archive* (2.2). https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/round8/survey/ESS8_data_ documentation_report_e02_2.pdf

European Social Survey. (2021, February). *ESS9 - 2018 Documentation report: The ESS data archive* (3.1). https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/round9/survey/ESS9_data_ documentation_report_e03_1.pdf

Fennema, M. (2005). Populist parties of the right. J. Rydgren (red.). *Movements of exclusion: Radical right-wing populism. New York: Nova Science Publishers*, 1-24.

Grindheim, J. E. (2019). Why right-leaning populism has grown in the most advanced liberal democracies of Europe. *The Political Quarterly, 90*(4), 757–771. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923x.12765

Hjerm, M., & Nagayoshi, K. (2011). The composition of the minority population as a threat: Can real economic and cultural threats explain xenophobia? *International Sociology, 26*(6), 815- 843.

Jackson, R., Jarvis, L., Gunning, J., & Smyth, M.B. (2011). *Terrorism: A critical introduction (1st ed.).* Macmillan Publishers.

Kiesraad. (2017, April 18). *Officiële uitslag Tweede Kamerverkiezing 15 maart 2017*. https://www.kiesraad.nl/actueel/nieuws/2017/03/20/officiele-uitslag-tweede- kamerverkiezing-15-maart-2017

Kok, L. (2019, March 20). *De uitslag: FvD krijgt meeste stemmen en is met VVD de grootste in de senaat.* AD. https://www.ad.nl/politiek/de-uitslag-fvd-krijgt-meeste-stemmen-en- is-met-vvd-de-grootste-in-de-senaat~aa1865d6/

Lucassen, G., & Lubbers, M. (2011). Who fears what? Explaining far-right-wing preference in Europe by distinguishing perceived cultural and economic ethnic threats. *Comparative*

Political Studies, 45(5), 547–574. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414011427851

Lubbers, M., Gijsberts, M., & Scheepers, P. (2002). Extreme right-wing voting in Western Europe. *European Journal of Political Research, 41*(3), 345–378. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.00015

Lubbers, M., & Scheepers, P. (2001). Explaining the trend in extreme right-wing voting: Germany 1989–1998. *European Sociological Review, 17*(4), 431-449.

Manevska, K. (2014). *Beyond the ethnic divide towards a cultural-sociological understanding of ethnocentrism* (Doctoral dissertation). Erasmus University, Rotterdam. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/77711

Manevska, K., & Achterberg, P. (2011). Immigration and perceived ethnic threat: Cultural capital and economic explanations. *European Sociological Review, 29*(3), 437–449. https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcr085

Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties. (2019, August 15). *Gebruik van migrantenstroom en asielprocedure.* Terrorisme | AIVD. https://www.aivd.nl/ onderwerpen/terrorisme/dreiging/gebruik-van-migrantenstroom-en-asielprocedure

Oesch, D. (2008). Explaining workers' support for right-wing populist parties in Western Europe: Evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland. *International Political Science Review, 29*(3), 349-373.

Partij voor de Vrijheid. (2015, November 19). *Inbreng Geert Wilders bij debat over aanslagen in Parijs.* https://www.pvv.nl/index.php/36-fj-related/geert-wilders/8776-inbreng-geert-wilders-bij-debat-over-aanslagen-in-parijs.html

Rapoport, D. C. (2004). The four waves of modern terrorism. *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press 2004) p, 54*, 3-11.

Rijke, K. (2016, April 20). *Terreurdreiging: de marechaussee en meer.* Securitymanagement.nl. https://www.securitymanagement.nl/terreurdreiging-de-marechaussee-en-meer/

Savelkoul, M., & Scheepers, P. (2016). Why lower educated people are more likely to cast their vote for radical right parties: Testing alternative explanations in The Netherlands. *Acta Politica, 52*(4), 544–573. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41269-016-0031-z

Schneider, S. L. (2007). Anti-immigrant attitudes in Europe: Outgroup size and perceived ethnic threat. *European Sociological Review, 24*(1), 53–67. https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcm034

Schulte-Cloos, J., & Leininger, A. (2021). Electoral participation, political disaffection, and the rise of the populist radical right. *Party Politics*, 1–13.

https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068820985186 (Schulte-Cloos & Leininger, 2021)

Stavrakakis, Y., Katsambekis, G., Nikisianis, N., Kioupkiolis, A., & Siomos, T. (2017). Extreme right-wing populism in Europe: Revisiting a reified association. *Critical Discourse Studies, 14*(4), 420–439. https://doi.org/10.1080/17405904.2017.1309325

van der Brug, W. (2003). How the LPF fuelled discontent: Empirical tests of explanations of LPF support. *Acta Politica, 38*(1), 89-106. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500005

van der Waal, J., Achterberg, P., & Houtman, D. (2008). Class is not dead - it has been buried alive: Class voting and cultural voting in postwar Western societies (1956-1990). *World Political Science, 3*(4), 403–426. https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-6226.1030

van der Waal, J., & De Koster, W. (2015). Why do the less educated oppose trade openness? A test of three explanations in the Netherlands. *European Journal of Cultural and Political Sociology, 2*(3-4), 313-344.

van der Waal, J., & de Koster, W. (2017). Populism and support for protectionism: The relevance of opposition to trade openness for leftist and rightist populist voting in The Netherlands. *Political Studies, 66*(3), 560–576. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 0032321717723505

Vanhoutte, B., Elchardus, M., & Siongers, J. (Ed.) (2009). Waarom komt etnocentrisme met de leeftijd? Op zoek naar een verklaring voor generatie- en leeftijdeffecten. In *Vreemden: Naar een cultuursociologische benadering van etnocentrisme* (pp. 99-116). Acco.

Vasilopoulos, P., Marcus, G. E., Valentino, N. A., & Foucault, M. (2018). Fear, anger, and voting for the far right: Evidence from the november 13, 2015 Paris terror attacks. *Political Psychology, 40*(4), 679–704. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12513

Vervoort, M., & Dagevos, J. (2011). The social integration of ethnic minorities: An explanation of the trend in ethnic minorities' social contacts with natives in the Netherlands, 1998–2006. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 37*(4), 619–635. https://doi.org/10.1080 /1369183x.2011.545279

Appendix A: Ethical Aspects and Privacy

<u>**General information**</u>

Project title:	Thriving on Terror - The indirect influences of terrorism on voting behaviour
Name, email of student:	Janne de Roode, 578297jr@student.eur.nl
Name, email of supervisor:	Gijs Custers, custers@essb.eur.nl
Start date and duration:	February 1st – June 20th

<u>**Human subjects**</u>

Does your research involve human participants?	**YES** - NO
If 'YES': does the study involve medical or physical research?	YES - **NO**
Does your research involve field observations without manipulations that will not involve identification of participants.	YES - **NO**
Research involving completely anonymous data files (secondary data that has been anonymized by someone else).	**YES** - NO

<u>**Sample**</u>

Where will you collect or obtain your data?
European Social Survey (wave 5 through 9), using only the Dutch respondents

What is the (anticipated) size of your sample?
4898 respondents in total:
Wave 5: 1109 respondents
Wave 6: 1079 respondents
Wave 7: 1043 respondents
Wave 8: 877 respondents
Wave 9: 881 respondents

What is the size of the population from which you will sample?
Full population of The Netherlands who are 14 years and older

<u>**Data storage and backup**</u>

Where and when will you store your data in the short term, after acquisition?
The separate data files as well as the integrated data file will be stored in a personal map on my computer (not linked to the internet)

Who is responsible for the immediate day-to-day management, storage and backup of the data arising from your research?
Only I am

How (frequently) will you back-up your research data for short-term data security?
The data will be stored on my personal computer and thus is not saved on the internet. Every month, I will make a back-up on an external drive.

In case of collecting personal data how will you anonymize the data?
I use a secondary dataset, which entails that I do not have personal details. Those details already are filtered out.

Signature

Please note that it is your responsibility to follow the ethical guidelines in the conduct of your study. This includes providing information to participants about the study and ensuring confidentiality in storage and use of personal data. Treat participants respectfully, be on time at appointments, call participants when they have signed up for your study and fulfil promises made to participants.

Furthermore, it is your responsibility that data are authentic, of high quality and properly stored. The principle is always that the supervisor (or strictly speaking the Erasmus University Rotterdam) remains owner of the data, and that the student should therefore hand over all data to the supervisor.

Hereby I declare that the study will be conducted in accordance with the ethical guidelines of the Department of Public Administration and Sociology at Erasmus University Rotterdam. I have answered the questions truthfully.

Name student: Janne de Roode   Name (EUR) supervisor: Gijs Custers

Date: 18-03-2021   Date: 19-03-2021