

Erasmus University Rotterdam

Erasmus School of Economics



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# POPULIST SUPPORT, GRIEVANCES AND THE INTERNET AS A MAGNIFYING GLASS

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Supervisor: Dana Sisak

Second assessor: Otto Swank

The views stated in this thesis are those of the author and not necessarily of the supervisor, second assessor, Erasmus School of Economics or Erasmus university Rotterdam.

## **Abstract**

The adventures of Donald Trump and Boris Johnson have sparked interest in the electoral implications of the increased availability of the internet. Research has pointed to the opportunities an uncensored online environment could bring for the anti-elite message but does this changing media environment really benefit populists exclusively? To answer this question, This paper starts off with examining whether individual-level changes in self-reported circumstances influence feelings towards populist parties differently than towards mainstream parties. Afterwards I analyse the effect the media environment has on these circumstances to connect online news consumption with populist support. Using 14 waves of panel data collected in the Netherlands from 2007 until 2022 I demonstrate that people who experience deteriorating perceived circumstances become relatively more supportive of populist parties, especially right wing populist parties enjoy relatively more support when confidence in- and satisfaction with the government decreases.

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## 1. Introduction

Populist parties have gained votes and seats not only in the United States (Pew Research Center, 2017), but also all over the world (Gidron et al., 2019). Across Europe their average share of the vote in the national and European parliament elections has more than doubled since the 1960s, from around 5.1% to 13.2%. During the same time period their share of seats has tripled, from 3.8% to 12.8% (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). Funke, Schularick, and Trebesch (2020) focus on populists in power across 60 countries that account for more than 95% of global GDP. They show that the recent rise of populism has been unprecedented in history. In 2018 populists ran the government in 16 countries and the number of left-wing (right-wing) populists in power increased from 2(2) at the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century to 7(9) by 2018. Populists have never had so much electoral power and the Brexit referendum is a good example of the catastrophic impact these parties can have on not only their own country but on neighbouring countries as well.

When discussing populism it is vital to use a clear definition. As a concept, populism remains contested but the so-called 'ideational approach' has gained prominence. This approach defines populism as a set of ideas that have an anti-elitist sentiment in common, where 'the pure people' are pitted against 'the corrupted elites' (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2018). The starting point of every populist is the importance of the centrality of 'the people' (Mény & Surel 2002). 'The people' on the other hand can mean many different things in different circumstances (Canovan 1981; Mudde 2004). 'The elite' is portrayed as corrupted and said to stand in the way of the centrality and the general will of the people (Mudde 2004). Populism can be seen as a communication style of political actors who refer to 'the people' and claim to speak in their name too (Canovan 1981; Jagers & Walgrave 2007). It has been argued that such a style of communication is a defining feature of populism, arguing that 'the populist ideology manifests itself in the political communication strategies of populist leaders' (Kriesi 2014: 364). Populism can thus also be conceived as a 'communication phenomenon' (De Vreese et al. 2018), where the media used to communicate the message is as important as the content of the message. The essential common denominator of the populist parties is their anti-establishment message (Roodruijn 2014). Populism cannot be seen as a 'full ideology' such as liberalism but it is a 'thin ideology' (Freedon 1998), a thin ideology only focusses on a confined range of concepts, for example nationalism or ecology. Since populism is a thin ideology it is generally found in combination with another ideology (Stanley 2008). The ideational approach definition of populism will be used in the remainder of the paper.

The electoral success of populist parties has been a popular subject among scholars for the last decade and a strong increase in publications suggest growing interest in the academic community in

exploring the role of media in political polarization (Kubin & Sikorski, 2021). However there is a wide range of possible explanations for the rise of the populist parties. I will explore the existing literature regarding reasons for voting for a populist but the main focus of this thesis will be the effect online news consumption has on opinions and grievances and in turn on populist voting in the Netherlands.

News consumption has changed drastically with the introduction of the internet and especially the younger generations obtain much of their politics related information through the internet, in specific social media. “among millennials, Facebook is far and away the most common source for news about government and politics”(Mitchell, Gottfried, and Matsa 2015, p. 8). This statement is based on an American sample but the Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2021 shows that the Dutch population too is heavily dependent on the internet as a source of news. In 2021 around 76% of Dutch respondents reported receiving news online and 37% of respondents reported receiving news through social media, of which Facebook and WhatsApp are the most popular. The way we communicate is thus changing rapidly and history suggests that populists have always used new communication technologies to spread their message. The 1896 U.S. populist presidential candidate, William Jennings Bryan, made unprecedented use of the railway and the telegraph (Eichengreen, 2018). Much later the Nazis skilfully and extensively used the radio in their rise to power (Adena et al., 2015). New technologies have thus been used to spread the “anti-elite” message in the past so what opportunities are presented by the rise in popularity of the internet?

On the internet there is such an abundance of information that for a lot of websites or apps algorithms determine what we see based on our own online behaviour, our general characteristics, and known social relations. Research suggests that because of the mechanism of selective exposure and the limited attention span of users these algorithms give rise to the “echo chamber effect” (Cinelli et al., 2020). This effect in essence means that the news or information we get fed by the algorithm is mostly in line with what we have liked or looked at in the past and the online history of our closest matches. This means that some users will have a very biased online environment. The existence of echo-chambers has been heavily researched in the last few years and it has been found that the highly polarized Facebook users tend to create mostly closed, non-interacting communities centred around different narratives. The more an user is active within an echo-chamber, the more this user will interact with others with similar beliefs (Quattrociochi et al., 2016). These echo-chambers comprised of fairly likeminded people are susceptible to targeted ads or influencing campaigns because they have an almost homogenous opinion and opposing arguments or facts might be suppressed.

This suppression of opposing arguments does not happen manually or intentionally but it is the result of the mechanisms used by algorithms to determine what is most relevant for which user. Let's say for example that you have liked a page dedicated to your favourite soccer club, Feyenoord in this case, and you are scrolling on its fan page. If someone supporting Ajax (the arch enemy) team visits the page and leaves a comment stating that Feyenoord is not the best soccer club of the Netherlands, obviously it will not receive a lot of likes as it is not "true" and most people who visit the page do not agree with the statement. Because of the low popularity, the comment will be displayed below more liked comments and it will become almost invisible to the other users. This is a very simple example but it shows some of the mechanism in place on large parts of the internet. When we were to expand the example to subjects like the abortion discussions in the US or the immigration policy debate in the Netherlands it becomes quite evident why designated portions of society only seeing one side of the debate could lead to serious polarization and in turn increased populism. In a study done in Italy and Germany by Schaub and Morisi (2019) using the dissemination of broadband internet as an instrumental variable for populist support it was found that internet use goes strongly and consistently along with voting for populist parties and that the effect is causal. Their analysis indicates that the expansion of broadband internet helps populist parties convey their message to new voters.

In short, this study examines possible drivers for populist support and analyses the effect online news consumption has on these drivers and the relationship between driver and support for populist parties. In the theoretical framework I will start by exploring the current literature regarding populist voting and the different relevant factors. Afterwards I will explain in which ways the online news environment might benefit the populist message. Finally I will be approximating the effect online news consumption has on populist voting in the Netherlands using a series of Individual Fixed Effects regressions. I will test for the effect found factors have on populist support and the ways these factors are influenced by the media through which news is consumed.

## **2. Theoretical framework**

Populism is not new but the late-twentieth century has given rise to a resurgence in its popularity. What can explain this development? There are a couple of nation-specific events that are proximate causes offering some explanation why things worked out the way they did within a given country, but they do not offer an explanation for the increased vote for populist parties across countries.

The current literature around populist voting can be divided into two sides, demand and supply. The demand side focusses on the idea that individuals are more likely to vote for a populist party when they endure hardship and have grievances. These grievances range from declining purchasing power,

to increased competition for jobs or housing to changing cultural values (Rydgren, 2007). The demand sided theory is based on the notion that declining socio-economic circumstances provide fertile ground for the populist message. The supply side is mostly interested in the influence populist actors can exert on public opinion and indirectly on voting behaviour. The two sides are both important and it is widely agreed upon that we should avoid either-or thinking (Golder, 2016; Mols & Jetten, 2020). In the upcoming part I will discuss the demand sided explanations and what factors might drive populist support. Afterwards I will explore the ways the internet might benefit populist parties in the supply-side.

### **2.1. What makes a populist appealing?**

#### *Economic insecurity*

Economic downturns and working class deprivation is often associated with increased populist support as people who are experiencing financial hardship are likely to blame the current elite for their problems. A study done by Niedemayer (1990) finds some evidence that economic anxiety is a driving force behind populist voting.

Globalization and automation have contributed to the decline of manufacturing jobs in the advanced economies of the world and moved the industrial production to lower income countries. These areas formerly heavily dependent on manufacturing jobs now face high unemployment and dissatisfaction, which could easily lead to increased populist support. Dijkstra, Poelman and Rodriguez-pose (2020) empirically show that anti-EU voting is considerably higher in areas of industrial decline. A good real world example is the enormous support Donald Trump received from the 'Rust belt', the states primarily dependent on the declining sectors of manufacturing or mining. The industrial decline of advanced economies goes hand in hand with increased competition from the Chinese market and research shows that increased Chinese competition goes together with populist voting. Colantone and Stanig (2018) explore this relationship across 15 European countries and find that exposure to Chinese imports is associated with nationalist, far-right and anti-EU voting. The nationalist and protectionist right wing parties are found to be gaining the most votes due to the increased Chinese competition.

So it is clear that industrial decline and in turn increased aggregate economic insecurity can lead to increased populist support but a recent study done by Mols and Jetten (2017) shows that populist parties tend to attract voters not only from the low income groups but also large numbers from the middle class. The result of this paper is supported by the findings of Mudde (2007) and Norris (2005) suggesting that income is a poor predictor of populist support. This is in line with the notion that the

relation between socio-economic circumstances and populist support is not purely automatic (Inglehart & Norris 2016).

The objective financial situation of an individual seems to be a somewhat weak predictor of populist voting but areas of economic decline are still more supportive of the populist message than areas less affected, so how can this be? A possible explanation can be found in the idea that perceived wealth is ever adjusting and relative. Frank (2013) found that as an individual gains social status they keep adjusting their expectations and changing their point of reference. This finding suggests that an individual will never be permanently satisfied with their material wealth. Lloyd and Lloyd (2004) support this suggestion and state that even the wealthy continue to worry about their wealth. A recent study done by Eichengreen (2020) shows that the wealthy are regularly confronted with a certain “fear of falling”. This finding is supported by Jetten et al. (2020), adding that this fear is bigger when an individual has the perception that other groups are quickly rising on the social ladder. Guiso et al. (2020) use ESS data and show that a proxy of economic insecurity is indeed a significant predictor of populist voting. In their literature review Guriev and Papaioannou (2020) find that there is ample evidence for the causal effect of economic factors on the rise of populism.

So in sum economic insecurity increases the demand for protectionist and nationalist measures, proposed by populist parties. This leads me to the following Hypothesis:

*H1a: People who feel more unsecure about their economic situation are more likely to vote for a populist.*

### *Growing Dissatisfaction*

Over the last few years inequality has been on the rise, in recent decades the real income of the majority of developed western nations has either stagnated or declined; despite continuous economic growth. The majority of the economic gains have gone to the top percentages of the population, leading to increased dissatisfaction among the working class. The group to be effected most is the low-skilled, blue collar class. This group had been the middle class for decades but because of automation, a knowledge intensive economy and globalization their relative wages have sunk, job security has diminished and they have become vulnerable to social risk, they have fallen through the cracks of the welfare state so to speak. Support for right-wing populism is remarkably strong at low income levels and lower occupational hierarchies, especially those who are a few rungs up from the bottom show strong support (Oesch 2008; Bornschier & kriesi 2012; Antonucci et al. 2017). The increased popularity of populist parties and politicians in Western democracies has been partially attributed to the relative decline in status of working-class men. Feeling left behind, this group turns to populist parties for support (Gidron & Hall 2017).

In a five-nation comparison it was found that while white collar workers are underrepresented in the populist electorate, the blue collar workers' support for populists is higher but it varies (Niedemayer 1990). With these results we cannot definitively say that support for populist is greater among blue collar workers but there is some evidence that economic inequality is associated with voting for a "strong" leader who promises to fix a countries problem, even if the leader is proposing undemocratic means to do so (Sprong et al. 2019). Algan et al. (2017) use ESS data to analyse the effects of unemployment and find that increases in regional unemployment lead to a significant decline in confidence in national and European institutions. Lechler (2019) finds very similar results connecting regional unemployment shocks to anti-EU sentiment. A negative relationship between populist voting and trust in national and European Parliaments has been found by Dustmann et al. (2017). This paper also shows that regional GDP and unemployment significantly correlate with trust in politics, finally they show that worsening economic circumstances correlate with a higher vote share for anti-EU parties.

Large parts of society are presently faced with rapidly declining purchasing power and this has led to dissatisfaction and a lack of trust in politics. Because most populists are not seen as responsible for the current situation they can easily blame the elite (Mainstream parties) for the hardship of the population. This message resonates with deprived individuals leading me to the following Hypotheses:

*H1b: People who become more dissatisfied with the institutions are more likely to vote for a populist.*

*H1c: People who lose trust in the institutions are more likely to vote for a populist.*

## **2.2. How the internet helps populists**

The supply-sided research is primarily focussed on the ways populists can increase the support for their message. First of all the populists can increase their appeal by positioning themselves strategically, just like mainstream parties (Akkerman et al, 2016). Unlike other mainstream parties it seems to be likely that populist parties not only read and use the public sentiment but also shape it to attract more voters to their current position (Rydgren, 2007; Mols, 2012; Mols & Jetten 2014).

All political parties benefit from the increased availability of data but still it seems that populist parties benefit from the increased accessibility of internet. Guriev, Melnikow and Zhuravskaya (2021) considered the impact of the expansion of mobile broadband internet on the rise of populism in 33 European democracies and found that the increased coverage had an exclusive positive relationship with populist voting. No other political parties had a significant relationship with the increased coverage, so the increased availability of the internet seems to benefit populists. So how and why



does the internet offer an edge for populists. The advantage of populist parties over the mainstream parties can be explained by three qualities commonly shared by populists, but not by the mainstream parties.

The first quality is the fact that populist parties often need to circumvent gatekeepers in the mainstream media in order to get their message to the people. Journalists in the mainstream media are tended to refuse to cover populist parties favourably, partially due to the professional norms of journalist that stress impartial, fair and responsible reporting (Aalberg et al. 2016). This does not imply a permanent hostility of the traditional media towards populist movements. As Mudde (2007) found, the media can be both friend and foe of populist parties. The friends of the populists can be the tabloid media, this could be observed during the Brexit Campaign (Deacon et al. 2016). But even when the populists do enjoy coverage in the mainstream media they are still tempted to use the online tools at their exposal. A good example of this phenomenon is the 2016 American presidential election campaign of Donald Trump. While he benefitted from increased media coverage during the primary election (Reuning & Dietrich 2019), the reason for his success was arguably his hybrid campaign relying heavily on social media (Wells et al. 2016). The possible effectiveness of hybrid campaigning is supported by evidence from a comparative study which shows that in many European countries populist parties have invested heavily in online channels of direct communication (Esser et al. 2016).

The second quality populist parties share but mainstream parties do not is the preference to avoid the established media. Among scholars it is generally accepted that populists portray society as divided into two camps, the virtuous people and the corrupt elite. The established mainstream media are often seen as part of the corrupt elite, the main opponent of the populist. So they prefer not to spread their message through these channels. As most populist messages claim to speak for and to the people they find a perfect ally in the online channels allowing them to directly communicate with their supporters while circumventing the traditional media. It has been found through content analysis on social media that the online communications of populist parties in countries such as Austria, Italy, Switzerland and the United Kingdom all contain elements of both anti-elitism and people-centrism, regardless of the stark differences in media environment between the countries (Engesser et al. 2017). So the media environment does not really matter, populist parties spread their message through online channels anyways.

The third quality that populists have in common is their tendency to use and share unverified or simply forged media items. Guess et al. (2018) found that during the 2016 American election campaign many news items circulated the internet that were later found to be factually wrong, on

top of this the vast majority of these items favoured the populist candidate Donald Trump. Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) find that even if false news stories were widely shared during the 2016 election, the average American saw at most several of them on social media, so the impact of fake news might be limited. In a publicised analysis, BuzzFeed found that in the months before the election the 20 top-performing fake news stories generated 8.6 million shares, reactions and comments while on the other hands the 20 top-performing news posts from reputable media outlets only generated 7.3 million shares, reactions and comments (Silverman 2016). So even if the impact on the average American might have been limited, fake news generates more attention than validated news. Because algorithms are engagement optimized the social media environment tends to spread disinformation packaged in emotional news stories with sensational headlines more and faster than boring factually correct news stories.

Similarly during the 2017 national election campaign in Germany, AfD representatives frequently shared news items that were manipulated and taken out of context (Sängerlaub et al. 2018). For this election BuzzFeed again analysed the content and found that seven out of the ten most shared articles about Angela Merkel on Facebook were false (Schmehl & Lytvynenko 2017). These findings are relevant because manipulative, false content appears to spread 'farther, faster, deeper and more broadly than the truth' (Vosoughi et al 2018: 1146). Because of this finding the internet seems to be a place where conspiracy theories that contain the anti-elitist stance spread very fast. Evidence has shown that beliefs in conspiracy theories are correlated with support for populist movements in Italy (Mancosu et al. 2017) and with political extremism in the US, The Netherlands and Sweden (Castanho Silva et al. 2017; Marwick & Lewis 2017; Krouwel et al. 2017). Conspiracy theories are strikingly widespread, American survey data suggests that half the American public consistently endorses at least one conspiracy theory, and belief in conspiracy theories is often divided along ideological lines (Oliver & Wood 2014).

There are growing concerns that as individuals become more exposed to pro-attitudinal news, defined as news matching their ideology, they become more polarized (Sunstein 2017). This claim is supported by a study from Levy (2021), in this analysis of news consumption on Facebook it was shown that exposure to pro-attitudinal news increased affective polarization compared to counter-attitudinal news. Higher polarization may decrease trust in government and the accountability of elected officials, which is beneficial to populist parties. The high amount of pro-attitudinal news combined with the widespread appearance of false or out of context news in the online environment leads me to the following hypothesis:

*H2c: People who start to receive their news through the internet become more likely to distrust the institutions.*

Some evidence for the existence of highly pro-attitudinal online environments, called “echo chambers” with respect to conspiracy theories and scientific information has been found. This study by Quattrociocchi et al. (2017) found indirect evidence that in these domains users are highly polarized and have the tendency to focus exclusively on one of the two types of information. They also found that users belonging to either one of the domains rarely interact with each other and that they tend to be connected only with like-minded people. A user was assigned to either one of the domains if 95% of their likes went to one of the types of posts. Another finding is the way the conspiracy users interact with debunking information. The users were exposed to debunking information aiming to correct falsehoods. Out of all the exposed users only 1.3% interacted with the post, that is commented on it. Maybe more interestingly it was shown that the exposure to the debunking actually induced higher liking and commenting rates on conspiracy theories. Users thus show a tendency to seek out and consume information strengthening their preferred narrative and reject information that undermines this narrative.

Conspiracy theories are fairly widespread on the internet and those people who actively believe in them have shown the tendency to mostly interact with likeminded individuals who reinforce their narrative. This tendency creates an environment where false information and unproven theories are seen as the truth by some and scientific findings are discredited. Because of the fact that algorithms are designed to keep us interested for as long as possible they feed us information that excites us, and outrageous news is one of the most exciting types of news out there. The homogenous online environment where users keep reinforcing each other’s narratives combined with the tendency of algorithms to spread outrageous or “bad” news more and faster than plain facts lead to a situation where the users in some bubbles of the internet have a very negative world image and are as such not satisfied with their situation.

By far not all individuals end up in the “conspiracy bubble” so not everyone’s online environment is as negative as theirs but the tendency of negativity to spread fast is always present. A study done by Bednarek (2016) analysing the sharing patterns on Facebook found that negativity seems to be a more important news value than positivity, which is in line with Hansen et al.’s (2011) study of re-tweeted news. Online sharing behaviour thus tends to favour negativity, this notion is supported by the findings of Guriev, Melnikow and Zhuravskaya (2021), who find that the expansion of the 3G network has ,on average, led to a significant reduction in government approval around the globe, this

relationship is strongest where the internet is uncensored . These results provide the basis for the following hypothesis:

*H2b: People who start to receive news through the internet become more likely to be dissatisfied with the institutions.*

The high frequency of advertisements and the boasting behaviour of individuals creates an online environment where the portrayed ideal is very materialistic. Social media enables users to carefully select and craft their positive self-representation (Zhao et al., 2008). Social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) states that people tend to compare themselves to others to assess their opinions and abilities. So when an individual enters an environment like social media they are likely to start comparing themselves to unrealistically high standards. Appel, Gerlach and Crusius (2016) found that among adolescents passive Facebook use predicts social comparison and envy, which in turn could lead to depression. Envy and especially malicious envy, which is a destructive form aimed at derogating or pulling down the envied person, has been associated with various negative outcomes. These outcomes range from anxiety, anger and resentment (Salovey & Rodin, 1984) to loosening group cohesiveness and lowering satisfaction (Duffy & Shaw, 2000) and causing dissatisfaction with life (Krasnova et al., 2013) So social media usage can have a big effect on the satisfaction one has with his materialistic standing, and in turn might make someone feel more insecure about their economic situation. This theory leads me to the following Hypothesis:

*H2a: people who start to receive their news through the internet feel more insecure about their economic situation.*

### 3. Data and methodology

To study the effect online news consumption has on populist voting I will be using the Dutch Longitudinal Internet Study for the Social sciences (LISS) panel administered by CentErdata (Tilburg University, The Netherlands). The LISS panel is a representative sample of Dutch individuals who participate in monthly Internet surveys. The panel is based on a true probability sample of households drawn from the population register. Households that could not otherwise participate are provided with a computer and Internet connection. Respondents aged younger than 16 are dropped as these people have no influence on voting outcomes. A longitudinal survey is fielded in the panel every year, covering a large variety of domains including health, work, education, income, housing, time use, political views, values and personality. The politics and values and the income questionnaire consist of 14 waves, the descriptive statistics can be found in table A1 in the appendix.

#### 3.1. Analytical strategy

Using this panel-data allows me to estimate a series of within individuals fixed effects regressions in the form:

$$Y_{it} - Y_{it-1} = \beta_1(T_{it} - T_{it-1}) + \beta_2(X_{it} - X_{it-1}) + (\gamma_t - \gamma_{t-1}) + (\varepsilon_{it} - \varepsilon_{it-1})$$

Where  $Y_{it}$  is the dependent variable for person  $i$  in month  $t$ ,  $\beta_1$  is a vector of time-varying independent variables  $T_{it}$ ,  $\beta_2$  is the vector of  $X_{it}$ , the time varying control variables that influence both  $T$  and  $Y$ ,  $\gamma_t$  is the year-specific intercept, and  $\varepsilon_{it}$  is the error term. By taking a within individuals approach I implicitly capture all observed and unobserved time-invariant factors. The year-specific term ( $\gamma_t$ ) controls for time specific shocks that affect all persons homogenously, in keeping with my focus on explaining the individual-level relationship between people's changing news consumption and their populist party support.

I will use this equation in multiple regressions, *first* I will use support for populist parties as the dependent variable and test for the effect satisfaction, confidence and economic security have on populist support. To see if the effect differs between right and left sided populist parties I will too consider separate measures as the dependent variable. To place these results in the right context the first model will be estimated using five mainstream political parties, ranging from right to left, as the dependent variable.

*Second* an interaction term will be included in the regression equations creating model 2. Including the interaction term between online news consumption and the independent variables from the first model allows me to see if the relationship between the drivers and support differ for those individuals using the internet for news. This gives us some insight into which parties might benefit

from the increased availability of the internet. The second model will too be estimated with support for the mainstream parties as dependent variable. *finally* I will separately consider satisfaction, confidence and economic security as the dependent variable and online news consumption as the independent variable to test the effect online news consumption has on these variables. As a robustness test the regressions are again estimated with other sources of news; TV and/or radio, free newspapers and paid newspapers.

### **3.2. Variables**

I will consider the primary dependent variable: *Populist Support*. This variable is measured as a feeling thermometer for each of the populist parties, ranging from 0 (very unsympathetic) to 10 (very sympathetic). The variable is a compounded average of the support for the 3 populist parties used, PVV, SP and FvD. The PVV and SP are two parties frequently regarded as populists by scholars (March and Rommerskirchen, 2015; Akkerman, Zaslove and Spruyt, 2017; Rooduijn, 2017; Rooduijn et al., 2017; van der Waal and de Koster, 2017). Another political party that I will consider a populist is the relatively new party Forum voor Democratie (FvD), according to the definition used FvD fits the populist party description very well. The right sided populist parties are the PVV and FvD whereas the left sided populist party is the SP. Using the repeated measure of feeling towards a party instead of voting records allows me to trace the relationship between starting to use the internet for news and changes in populist support. This measure also allows me to include all respondents who replied to this question instead of those who indicated they would vote for a populist, which increases the sample size. As seen in the American context, feeling thermometer ratings are good predictors of actual voting behaviour (Mutz, 2007: p. 82). Gidron and Mijs (2019) checked the predictive power of feeling thermometers for the Dutch sample using the LISS data set and found robust evidence that support and voting are related but that one does not always lead to the other.

Respondents were asked to indicate through which means they receive their news. There are multiple means to which respondents could indicate if they use it to receive news or not, leading to 4 binary variables;

*Internet usage.* Indicating one if the respondent does read news online and zero if the respondent does not.

*TV and/or radio.* Indicating one if the respondent receives news from either the news on television or radio and indicates zero if not.

*Free newspaper.* This variable measures if the respondent reads free newspapers to receive news, indicating one if the respondents does and zero if not.

*Paid newspaper.* This variable measures if the respondent reads paid newspapers to receive news, indicating one if the respondent does and zero if not.

*Satisfaction.* To measure the degree of satisfaction the respondent has with institutions I will be using a composite measure. The respondents could indicate their satisfaction with specific aspects of government (see Table 1) on a 11 point scale, from 0 (very dissatisfied) to 10 (very satisfied). I will average the satisfaction into one variable by taking the average of these 14 measures. Cronbach's alpha for the full sample is 0.9485, which indicates high internal consistency.

*Confidence.* To measure the degree of confidence the respondent has in the institutions I will be using a composite measure of fourteen questions. Respondents could indicate their confidence in different aspects of government(see Table 1), on a scale from 0 (very unconfident) to 10 (very confident). The average of the 14 measures will be the value of the variable. A Cronbach's alpha of 0.9416 has been found suggesting high internal consistency.

**Table 1.** list of survey items used to measure satisfaction with – and confidence in institutions. Source: LISS 2007-2022

Measure 1	Dutch government
Measure 2	Dutch parliament
Measure 3	The legal system
Measure 4	The police
Measure5	Politicians
Measure 6	Political parties
Measure 7	European Parliament
Measure 8	United Nations
Measure 9	The media
Measure 10	The military
Measure 11	The education system
Measure 12	The healthcare system
Measure 13	Science
Measure 14	Democracy

*Economic security.* To measure the sense of economic security the respondent has I will be using a composite measure of four questions about economic security and confidence in the economy (see Table 2). Responses were recorded on a eleven-point scale so that higher values indicate higher perceived economic security. The Cronbach's alpha that has been found has a value of 0.7313, suggesting moderate internal consistency.

**Table 2.** list of survey items used to measure perceived economic security. Source: LISS 2007-2022

Measure 1	How satisfied are you with your financial situation?
Measure 2	How satisfied are you with the current economic situation in the Netherlands?
Measure 3	Can you indicate, on a scale from 0 to 10, how hard or easy it is for you to life off your income?
Measure 4	Can you indicate, on a scale from 0 to 10, how confident you are in the economy?

*Income.* I will be using a categorical variable to control for the effects of income on feeling towards political parties and news consumption patterns. Respondents could indicate in which category their taxable yearly income in euros belongs. The scale is divided into ten categories; <2,500 , 2,500-5,000 , 5,000-10,000 , 10,000-15,000 , 15,000-20,000 , 20,000-30,000 , 30,000-40,000 , 40,000-50,000 , 50,000-75,000 , >75,000.

*Age.* I will control for the age of a respondent as this influences both the composition of ones news sources and the feeling towards certain political parties. respondents' age was calculated based on the known birthdate and the date of the survey.



## 4. Results

### 4.1. What drives populism?

I will start by elaborating on the results of the relationship between changes in self-reported economic security and support for populist parties. When we look at the results found in Table 3 we can see that an increase in economic security of one point leads to an increased support of populist parties of 0.048 ( $P < 0.05$ ) points. A higher perceived economic security thus increases the support for populist parties. When we look at the coefficients of the mainstream parties it is clear that the effect economic security has on support is smaller for populists than for the mainstream parties. As relative support predicts voting behaviour I find evidence for *H1a: People who feel more insecure about their economic situation are more likely to vote for a populist*. When interpreting these results we should keep in mind that income was included as a control variable, which might capture a part of the effect economic security would have had on support. A decreased economic security will lead to a relative advantage for populist parties. Including the interaction term in the model does not lead to significant results so there is no evidence that individuals who start to read the news through the internet have a different relationship between economic security and support for political parties.

Continuing with the results found in Table 3 I now look at the effect changes in satisfaction with institutions have on support for political parties. I found that increased satisfaction increases support for all political parties but again the populist parties have a smaller coefficient. Especially the coefficient for the right sided populist parties, 0.060 ( $P < 0.05$ ) is much smaller than the coefficients of the mainstream parties, the smallest being the coefficient of Groen Links with a value of 0.317 ( $P < 0.001$ ). Including the interaction term with internet usage does not change much in the values of the coefficients but the interaction term itself is significant for populist support with a value of -0.046 ( $P < 0.05$ ). This indicates that individuals who have started to receive news through the internet now support populist parties more as their satisfaction with institutions decreases. For no other mainstream political party or right or left sided populists was the coefficient significant so this phenomenon seems exclusive to the populist parties in general. These results offer solid evidence for the second hypothesis *H1b: People who become more dissatisfied with the institutions are more likely to vote for a populist*. An individual becomes relatively more supportive of populist parties as he/she becomes less satisfied with the institutions so the individual is more likely to vote for a populist.

The last results to be found in Table 3 are of the effect changes in confidence in institutions have on support for political parties. Significant results are found for the first model, again the coefficient is smaller for populist parties 0.111 ( $P < 0.001$ ) than for mainstream parties with the smallest coefficient again being of GL with a value of 0.342 ( $P < 0.001$ ), the smallest value is for right sided

populists 0.055 ( $P < 0.05$ ). Now looking at the second model the coefficients are still smaller for populists and the smallest for the populist right so the relative relationship is still the same. The interaction term has a significant value for the populists in general and the right side, not the left side or mainstream parties. For individuals who start to use the internet for news a decrease in confidence in the institutions thus increases support for populist parties, especially for right sided populists parties. The results found here indicate strong support for the third hypothesis *H1c: People who lose trust in the institutions are more likely to vote for a populist* as the increasing relative support of populists caused by decreasing confidence increases the chance of voting for one.

**Table 3.** Results for the within individuals fixed effects regressions of model 1 and 2, displayed for all parties. Model 1 displays the coefficient of the independent variable whereas model 2 includes the interaction term between independent and online news consumption. This table only displays parts of the regression results, the complete results can be found in the appendix Tables B – J.

Dependent variable	Economic security		Satisfaction		Confidence	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Populist	0.048* (0.018)	0.048* (0.023) 0.002 (0.024)	0.118*** (0.018)	0.147*** (0.023) -0.046* (0.024)	0.111*** (0.019)	0.152*** (0.023) -0.066** (0.023)
Populist right	0.053* (0.024)	0.053 (0.030) -0.002 (0.032)	0.060* (0.025)	0.088** (0.031) -0.048 (0.031)	0.055* (0.024)	0.092** (0.030) -0.065* (0.030)
Populist left	0.060* (0.024)	0.051 (0.030) 0.019 (0.034)	0.250*** (0.023)	0.263*** (0.030) -0.017 (0.033)	0.266** (0.023)	0.290*** (0.029) -0.036 (0.032)
CDA	0.103*** (0.022)	0.107*** (0.027) -0.006 (0.029)	0.365*** (0.021)	0.354*** (0.025) 0.017 (0.025)	0.390*** (0.021)	0.392*** (0.025) -0.004 (0.025)
VVD	0.171*** (0.027)	0.144*** (0.031) 0.046 (0.034)	0.487*** (0.022)	0.463*** (0.027) 0.042 (0.029)	0.512*** (0.022)	0.494*** (0.027) 0.032 (0.028)
GL	0.098*** (0.023)	0.096** (0.030) 0.005 (0.034)	0.317*** (0.023)	0.316*** (0.029) 0.003 (0.030)	0.342*** (0.023)	0.335*** (0.028) 0.013 (0.029)
PvdA	0.096*** (0.023)	0.095** (0.030) 0.002 (0.034)	0.394*** (0.021)	0.409*** (0.027) -0.024 (0.028)	0.426*** (0.022)	0.433*** (0.027) -0.010 (0.029)
D66	0.115*** (0.024)	0.089** (0.030) 0.042 (0.035)	0.362*** (0.023)	0.335*** (0.026) 0.043 (0.028)	0.376*** (0.023)	0.349*** (0.026) 0.040 (0.028)

Robust standard errors are displayed between parenthesis; \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $P < 0.001$

#### **4.2. How are the drivers influenced by online news consumption?**

In the following part the results with respect to the relationship of starting to use the internet for news and the possible drivers of respondent's support for populist parties are analysed. In Table K in the appendix it can be seen that starting to use the internet for news does not significantly influence the drivers of populism. Alternative sources of news did not give significant results either except the effect of starting to use the TV or radio on satisfaction with institutions, so there is no evidence that the source of news directly causes individuals to perceive their situation as being different or perceive the same situation to be less satisfying. The full results can be found in Table L-N in the appendix. In short no support is found for the three hypotheses : *H2a: people who start to receive their news through the internet feel more unsecure about their economic situation, H2b: People who start to receive news through the internet become more likely to be dissatisfied with the institutions, H2c: People who start to receive their news through the internet become more likely to distrust the institutions.*

#### **4.3. Robustness Checks**

As a first robustness check all the economic security related regressions were done again, this time without including the income as a control variable. The results found for the first 2 models show that the values of the coefficient do not differ much and the results are again significant. This would lead me to believe that including income does not improve my results but it does not hurt it that much either, The implications remain somewhat the same.

Another robustness check was done by using different compositions of the drivers to see if it would lead to other results. The variables satisfaction and confidence previously composed of the 14 measures found in table 1 are now composed of measures; 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 13, 14. Using this alternative measure for satisfaction and confidence gives significant and very comparable results so the results seem to be robust .

## **5. Discussion**

Using the within individuals fixed effects approach allows me to capture the effects of the drivers and online news consumption on voting behaviour while implicitly controlling for time-invariant individual characteristics and explicitly controlling for homogenous year effects. This method can't handle time-variant unobserved heterogeneity but I can argue that the differences in treatment are probably not caused by unobserved time-variant heterogeneity as the likely factors that do influence either ones economic security, satisfaction or confidence are age and income, for which I control in the regressions. Another possible problem of individual fixed effects is the biased outcomes if there is strong reverse causality. I again argue why this will not be a problem. The relationship between the main dependent variable feeling towards political parties and the drivers for populism are most likely not reverse causal as ones feeling towards a political party has no effect on the way an individual feels himself. The same goes for online news consumption, ones feelings do not influence where you decide to look at news. In the real population there are some people who do not have internet access so there would be some selection bias, but as all the respondents of the survey who did not have access were provided a computer with internet access this selection bias disappears in my sample.

## **6. Conclusion**

New communication technologies have enabled populist movements to rise to power in the past but is the recently increased support for populists really driven by individuals personally changing their source of news? In my effort to answer this question I started with analysing the literature on populism in western democracies. Scholarship suggests that populists benefit from economic hardship, decreased satisfaction and confidence. The effects of the online environment on these possible drivers has been discussed and it is suggested that individuals become more polarized and less confident as they become more exposed to pro-attitudinal news (Sunstein, 2017). The online environment is filled with pro-attitudinal news, more so than other sources of news, suggesting that individuals who use the internet for their politics related news become more polarized. This polarization is beneficial to populist parties as it fosters dissatisfaction.

I contribute to this body of research a micro-level investigation of the mechanisms linking the use of internet for information to individual grievances and in turn populist support. Using the individual-level panel data from the Netherlands from 2007 till 2022, I demonstrate that decreased economic security, lower satisfaction with government and diminishing confidence in government go together with increased relative support for populist parties, and thus a higher chance of voting for one. The direct effects found of starting to use the internet for news and the drivers are insignificant ,but

introducing an interaction term in the model does give some significant results. Where the relationship between support for populists and satisfaction is small and positive the interaction term has a negative sign. This result indicates that as individuals start to use the internet for news their support for populists no longer increases as they become more satisfied with the institutions. A comparable relationship is found for confidence in institutions and support for populists, but here the coefficient of support for the populist right is significant too whereas the coefficient for the left is not. Suggesting that the effect of confidence is mostly found among supporters of the populist right.

My findings give us a glimpse into the possibilities and dangers the internet brings along. People are clearly influenced by what they see and as big tech gets bigger, better and more widespread the influence a government has on what its population sees diminished rapidly. While less governmental control does not sound that bad it enables other organizations with less favourable goals to do and say whatever they want in the name of “freedom of speech”. Anyone who has the financial means can just pay the foreign advertising bureaus like Facebook or Google to target specified parts of society. And this would be the nice option, armies of bots and activists groups can systematically change the information an entire country receives. The possibly enormous effects foreign or domestic actors now have on public opinion poses a realistic danger to the future welfare of the world as there are populists parties who personally benefit from fostering grievances and dissatisfaction among people.

In conclusion, my findings primarily suggest that populist parties relatively benefit from dissatisfaction, insecurity and loss of confidence among the population and that the availability of the internet exacerbates these benefits. Populist actors can use the internet to directly influence public opinion but I do not find hard evidence that people who use the internet for news are actually being influenced. I suggest that future research examines the effects of the online environment on public opinion.

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## 8. Appendix

**Table A.** descriptive statistics

<b>Variable</b>	<b>n</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. dev.</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>
Populist support	67,245	3.786	1.747	0	10
Internet	79,600	0.523	0.499	0	1
Confidence	69,609	5.778	1.494	0	10
Satisfaction	64,307	5.675	1.534	0	10
Economic security	66,185	6.256	1.352	0	9.75
Age	1,593,746	47.267	18.142	16	122
Female(vs male)	1,593,741	0.511	0.500	0	1
Income	22,064	5.268	2.654	1	10



**Table B.** within individuals fixed effects regression results for the relation between economic security and populist support.

Variable	Populist		Right		Left	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Economic security	0.048*	0.048*	0.053*	0.053	0.060*	0.051
	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.024)	(0.030)
Internet		0.008		0.001		-0.062
		(0.155)		(0.212)		(0.224)
Internet x security		0.002		-0.002		0.019
		(0.024)		(0.032)		(0.034)
Age	-0.032	-0.033	-0.013	-0.013	-0.038*	-0.038*
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Income in € (ref = <2,500)						
2,500-5,000	-0.079	-0.081	-0.201	-0.201	0.027	0.023
	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.110)
5,000-10,000	-0.007	-0.010	-0.030	-0.033	-0.005	-0.009
	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.104)	(0.104)
10,000-15,000	-0.055	-0.056	-0.076	-0.075	-0.118	-0.120
	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.101)	(0.101)
15,000-20,000	0.018	0.019	-0.018	-0.017	0.025	0.023
	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.093)	(0.093)
20,000-30,000	-0.050	-0.054	-0.102	-0.104	-0.020	-0.024
	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.091)	(0.091)
30,000-40,000	-0.043	-0.043	-0.146	-0.144	0.041	0.038
	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.092)	(0.092)
40,000-50,000	-0.060	-0.064	-0.176	-0.173	0.019	0.007
	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.103)	(0.104)	(0.100)	(0.100)
50,000-75,000	0.053	0.051	-0.022	-0.020	0.115	0.108
	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.105)	(0.105)
> 75,000	0.038	0.039	-0.078	-0.078	0.174	0.174
	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.137)	(0.137)
Year (ref = 2007)						
2008	0.111	0.111	0.012	0.012	0.198**	0.196**
	(0.059)	(0.59)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.072)	(0.072)
2009	0.101	0.101	0.148	0.149	0.064	0.061
	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.081)	(0.081)
2010	0.288**	0.290**	0.464***	0.463***	0.145	0.146
	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.126)	(0.126)	(0.111)	(0.111)
2011	0.623***	0.620***	0.610***	0.612***	0.600***	0.593***
	(0.083)	(0.084)	(0.110)	(0.110)	(0.091)	(0.092)
2012	0.077	0.077	-0.066	-0.064	0.179	0.173
	(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.135)	(0.135)	(0.112)	(0.112)
2013	0.180	0.182	0.158	0.161	0.156	0.150
	(0.119)	(0.121)	(0.153)	(0.154)	(0.122)	(0.123)
2014	0.172	0.172	0.209	0.210	0.049	0.042
	(0.175)	(0.177)	(0.226)	(0.227)	(0.192)	(0.193)
2015	0.117	0.119	0.022	0.023	0.134	0.128
	(0.161)	(0.164)	(0.209)	(0.209)	(0.164)	(0.165)
2016	0.159	0.160	0.196	0.199	-0.011	-0.019
	(0.169)	(0.172)	(0.217)	(0.217)	(0.167)	(0.168)
2017	0.061	0.062	0.379	0.381	0.062	0.050
	(0.185)	(0.188)	(0.239)	(0.239)	(0.178)	(0.180)
2018	-0.179	-0.178	0.130	0.131	0.041	0.029
	(0.203)	(0.207)	(0.260)	(0.261)	(0.195)	(0.197)
2019	-0.373	-0.380	-0.065	-0.067	-0.163	-0.187
	(0.218)	(0.223)	(0.279)	(0.280)	(0.209)	(0.211)
2020	-0.521*	-0.519*	-0.356	-0.353	0.003	-0.010
	(0.237)	(0.241)	(0.302)	(0.303)	(0.226)	(0.228)
2021	-0.688**	-0.679**	-0.686*	-0.681*	0.133	0.123
	(0.253)	(0.258)	(0.325)	(0.326)	(0.237)	(0.240)
2022	-0.732*	-0.729*	-0.818*	-0.819*	-0.061	-0.062
	(0.299)	(0.304)	(0.390)	(0.391)	(0.312)	(0.314)
N [n]	14,162	14,150	14,463	14,452	14,660	14,647
	[5,642]	[5,641]	[5,738]	[5,737]	[5,762]	[5,761]

Robust standard errors are displayed between parentheses; \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* P < 0.001

**Table C.** within individuals fixed effects regression results for the relation between satisfaction and populist support.

Variable	Populist		Right		Left	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Satisfaction	0.118*** (0.018)	0.147*** (0.023)	0.060* (0.025)	0.088** (0.031)	0.250*** (0.023)	0.263*** (0.030)
Internet		0.259 (0.138)		0.236 (0.186)		0.130 (0.201)
Internet x Satisfaction		-0.046* (0.024)		-0.048 (0.031)		-0.017 (0.033)
Age	-0.084* (0.041)	-0.084* (0.041)	-0.084 (0.043)	-0.084 (0.031)	-0.057 (0.052)	-0.058 (0.052)
Income in € (ref = <2,500)						
2,500-5,000	-0.011 (0.074)	-0.011 (0.074)	-0.098 (0.095)	-0.096 (0.095)	0.051 (0.098)	0.050 (0.098)
5,000-10,000	0.006 (0.073)	0.003 (0.073)	0.051 (0.098)	0.047 (0.098)	-0.054 (0.095)	-0.056 (0.095)
10,000-15,000	0.004 (0.078)	0.005 (0.078)	0.009 (0.101)	0.010 (0.101)	-0.051 (0.097)	-0.051 (0.097)
15,000-20,000	0.038 (0.074)	0.040 (0.074)	0.056 (0.096)	0.058 (0.097)	0.011 (0.094)	0.011 (0.094)
20,000-30,000	0.007 (0.067)	0.006 (0.067)	-0.029 (0.090)	-0.030 (0.090)	0.048 (0.088)	0.048 (0.088)
30,000-40,000	0.043 (0.067)	0.045 (0.067)	-0.042 (0.090)	-0.039 (0.091)	0.092 (0.087)	0.093 (0.087)
40,000-50,000	0.003 (0.075)	0.002 (0.075)	-0.064 (0.101)	-0.059 (0.101)	0.039 (0.098)	0.031 (0.097)
50,000-75,000	0.149 (0.076)	0.151 (0.076)	0.122 (0.103)	0.126 (0.104)	0.168 (0.103)	0.166 (0.103)
> 75,000	0.118 (0.100)	0.122 (0.100)	-0.043 (0.122)	-0.043 (0.122)	0.295* (0.135)	0.301 (0.135)
Year (ref = 2007)						
2008	0.146* (0.071)	0.147* (0.071)	0.040 (0.092)	0.040 (0.092)	0.229* (0.090)	0.229* (0.090)
2009	0.230* (0.100)	0.237* (0.100)	0.323** (0.118)	0.321** (0.118)	0.109 (0.128)	0.108 (0.128)
2010	0.428** (0.136)	0.429** (0.157)	0.604*** (0.162)	0.602*** (0.162)	0.229 (0.173)	0.235 (0.174)
2011	0.777*** (0.156)	0.777*** (0.157)	0.869*** (0.169)	0.870*** (0.170)	0.623** (0.199)	0.622** (0.200)
2012	0.306 (0.208)	0.306 (0.209)	0.225 (0.220)	0.226 (0.221)	0.303 (0.265)	0.304 (0.266)
2013	0.476 (0.250)	0.477 (0.251)	0.543* (0.262)	0.543 (0.263)	0.308 (0.317)	0.310 (0.318)
2014	0.525 (0.286)	0.525 (0.288)	0.694* (0.318)	0.695 (0.319)	0.244 (0.358)	0.245 (0.359)
2015	0.558 (0.337)	0.558 (0.339)	0.603 (0.356)	0.603 (0.358)	0.326 (0.428)	0.332 (0.430)
2016	0.598 (0.372)	0.597 (0.373)	0.799* (0.386)	0.799* (0.387)	0.166 (0.472)	0.169 (0.474)
2017	0.562 (0.410)	0.561 (0.412)	1.054* (0.429)	1.054* (0.430)	0.231 (0.519)	0.231 (0.521)
2018	0.339 (0.453)	0.337 (0.455)	0.860 (0.471)	0.858 (0.473)	0.175 (0.573)	0.179 (0.575)
2019	0.244 (0.493)	0.234 (0.495)	0.757 (0.511)	0.752 (0.513)	0.116 (0.625)	0.107 (0.628)
2020	0.108 (0.536)	0.108 (0.538)	0.511 (0.555)	0.511 (0.557)	0.142 (0.679)	0.151 (0.682)
2021	-0.003 (0.575)	-0.006 (0.578)	0.264 (0.598)	0.260 (0.600)	0.311 (0.726)	0.316 (0.729)
2022	-0.058 (0.600)	-0.058 (0.602)	0.060 (0.640)	0.057 (0.642)	0.339 (0.756)	0.354 (0.759)
M [n]	14,072 [5,778]	14,061 [5,776]	14,318 [5,865]	14,307 [5,863]	14,537 [5,903]	14,524 [5,901]

Robust standard errors are displayed between parentheses; \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* P < 0.001



**Table D.** within individuals fixed effects regression results for the relation between confidence and populist support.

Variable	Populist		Right		Left	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Confidence	0.111*** (0.019)	0.152*** (0.023)	0.055* (0.024)	0.092** (0.030)	0.266*** (0.023)	0.290*** (0.029)
Internet		0.384** (0.139)		0.337 (0.188)		0.239 (0.197)
Internet x Confidence		-0.066** (0.023)		-0.065* (0.030)		-0.036 (0.032)
Age	-0.036* (0.018)	-0.035* (0.018)	-0.025 (0.028)	-0.024 (0.028)	-0.036* (0.015)	-0.035* (0.015)
Income in € (ref = <2,500)						
2,500-5,000	0.021 (0.071)	0.023 (0.070)	-0.053 (0.093)	-0.050 (0.092)	0.055 (0.091)	0.055 (0.091)
5,000-10,000	0.007 (0.069)	0.005 (0.069)	0.034 (0.093)	0.031 (0.093)	-0.056 (0.088)	-0.056 (0.088)
10,000-15,000	0.032 (0.073)	0.031 (0.072)	0.053 (0.094)	0.055 (0.094)	-0.088 (0.090)	-0.088 (0.090)
15,000-20,000	0.039 (0.070)	0.042 (0.070)	0.053 (0.094)	0.055 (0.092)	-0.022 (0.089)	-0.022 (0.089)
20,000-30,000	0.016 (0.064)	0.016 (0.064)	-0.021 (0.086)	-0.021 (0.086)	0.026 (0.083)	0.026 (0.083)
30,000-40,000	0.047 (0.065)	0.049 (0.065)	-0.034 (0.087)	-0.031 (0.087)	0.057 (0.083)	0.057 (0.082)
40,000-50,000	0.019 (0.073)	0.019 (0.073)	-0.078 (0.097)	-0.073 (0.097)	0.025 (0.094)	0.025 (0.094)
50,000-75,000	0.140 (0.075)	0.144 (0.075)	0.097 (0.101)	0.102 (0.101)	0.118 (0.098)	0.118 (0.098)
> 75,000	0.096 (0.096)	0.099 (0.096)	-0.048 (0.118)	-0.048 (0.118)	0.204 (0.127)	0.204 (0.127)
Year (ref = 2007)						
2008	0.089 (0.059)	0.088 (0.059)	0.001 (0.084)	0.001 (0.084)	0.170* (0.071)	0.169* (0.071)
2009	0.100 (0.066)	0.095 (0.099)	0.172 (0.098)	0.170 (0.098)	0.034 (0.079)	0.029 (0.079)
2010	0.268** (0.089)	0.268** (0.089)	0.435** (0.132)	0.433** (0.133)	0.130 (0.104)	0.132 (0.104)
2011	0.583*** (0.082)	0.581*** (0.083)	0.627*** (0.124)	0.631*** (0.125)	0.522*** (0.088)	0.517*** (0.088)
2012	0.077 (0.103)	0.074 (0.104)	-0.031 (0.155)	-0.030 (0.156)	0.161 (0.106)	0.157 (0.106)
2013	0.183 (0.117)	0.181 (0.119)	0.221 (0.179)	0.223 (0.180)	0.149 (0.115)	0.144 (0.115)
2014	0.183 (0.163)	0.182 (0.164)	0.282 (0.236)	0.285 (0.238)	0.068 (0.177)	0.062 (0.178)
2015	0.141 (0.159)	0.140 (0.161)	0.115 (0.244)	0.117 (0.245)	0.117 (0.155)	0.114 (0.155)
2016	0.144 (0.167)	0.139 (0.169)	0.254 (0.257)	0.256 (0.259)	-0.063 (0.156)	-0.071 (0.156)
2017	0.064 (0.183)	0.060 (0.185)	0.456 (0.283)	0.459 (0.285)	-0.015 (0.167)	-0.023 (0.167)
2018	-0.203 (0.200)	-0.208 (0.203)	0.200 (0.309)	0.202 (0.311)	-0.069 (0.183)	-0.078 (0.183)
2019	-0.362 (0.216)	-0.376 (0.219)	0.030 (0.334)	0.028 (0.337)	-0.173 (0.197)	-0.194 (0.197)
2020	-0.531* (0.235)	-0.535* (0.238)	-0.261 (0.363)	-0.256 (0.365)	-0.144 (0.212)	-0.153 (0.213)
2021	-0.701** (0.250)	-0.707** (0.254)	-0.589 (0.390)	-0.588 (0.393)	0.023 (0.223)	0.011 (0.223)
2022	-0.681* (0.286)	-0.684* (0.290)	-0.721 (0.436)	-0.718 (0.439)	0.084 (0.277)	0.082 (0.277)
N [n]	15,093 [6,055]	15,080 [6,052]	15,387 [6,156]	15,375 [6,154]	15,622 [6,190]	15,608 [6,187]

Robust standard errors are displayed between parentheses; \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* P < 0.001

**Table E.** Within individuals fixed effects regression results for the relation between perceived economic security and support for mainstream political parties.

Variable	CDA	VVD	GL	PvdA	D66
Economic security	0.103*** (0.022)	0.171*** (0.027)	0.098*** (0.023)	0.096*** (0.023)	0.115*** (0.024)
Age	-0.023 (0.024)	-0.078* (0.037)	-0.055* (0.027)	-0.015 (0.012)	-0.068*** (0.017)
Income in € (ref = <2,500)					
2,500-5,000	-0.220* (0.109)	-0.186 (0.117)	0.062 (0.119)	-0.165 (0.120)	-0.088 (0.122)
5,000-10,000	-0.123 (0.099)	-0.157 (0.110)	0.021 (0.095)	-0.100 (0.098)	-0.014 (0.092)
10,000-15,000	-0.248** (0.095)	-0.167 (0.100)	-0.004 (0.099)	-0.192* (0.090)	-0.031 (0.089)
15,000-20,000	-0.146 (0.095)	-0.030 (0.100)	-0.021 (0.094)	-0.083 (0.091)	-0.004 (0.090)
20,000-30,000	-0.119 (0.091)	-0.072 (0.095)	-0.084 (0.088)	-0.121 (0.085)	-0.035 (0.083)
30,000-40,000	-0.083 (0.089)	-0.165 (0.098)	-0.058 (0.091)	-0.140 (0.089)	-0.036 (0.085)
40,000-50,000	-0.086 (0.094)	-0.183 (0.104)	0.036 (0.099)	-0.129 (0.095)	-0.013 (0.091)
50,000-75,000	-0.088 (0.098)	-0.100 (0.110)	0.166 (0.104)	-0.139 (0.102)	0.012 (0.098)
>75,000	-0.047 (0.117)	-0.140 (0.125)	0.049 (0.133)	-0.225 (0.123)	0.106 (0.127)
Year (ref = 2007)					
2008	0.108 (0.063)	0.389*** (0.077)	0.288*** (0.072)	0.458*** (0.065)	0.652*** (0.074)
2009	-0.041 (0.078)	0.582*** (0.101)	0.341*** (0.086)	0.172* (0.071)	1.039*** (0.081)
2010	-0.468*** (0.117)	0.844*** (0.149)	0.563*** (0.127)	0.193 (0.101)	1.019*** (0.113)
2011	-0.441*** (0.105)	1.074*** (0.149)	0.563*** (0.115)	0.230* (0.075)	1.163*** (0.092)
2012	-0.522*** (0.133)	0.459* (0.193)	-0.055 (0.147)	0.173* (0.086)	0.944*** (0.108)
2013	-0.395* (0.155)	0.479* (0.230)	0.188 (0.174)	-0.069 (0.094)	1.044*** (0.122)
2014	-0.100 (0.219)	0.697* (0.282)	-0.056 (0.225)	-0.222 (0.169)	1.026*** (0.195)
2015	-0.134 (0.210)	0.548 (0.310)	0.405 (0.230)	-0.333** (0.094)	1.001*** (0.164)
2016	-0.290 (0.225)	0.911** (0.339)	0.458 (0.248)	-0.246* (0.124)	1.076*** (0.166)
2017	-0.233 (0.246)	0.977** (0.372)	0.714** (0.271)	-0.158 (0.132)	1.196*** (0.181)
2018	-0.431 (0.269)	0.786 (0.409)	0.629* (0.296)	-0.130 (0.139)	0.898*** (0.195)
2019	-0.247 (0.293)	0.981* (0.446)	0.439 (0.322)	0.162 (0.148)	0.927*** (0.209)
2020	0.139 (0.317)	1.789*** (0.484)	0.542 (0.349)	0.100 (0.160)	1.185*** (0.226)
2021	-0.472 (0.339)	1.204* (0.519)	0.405 (0.372)	0.015 (0.170)	1.121*** (0.240)
2022	-0.821* (0.394)	0.773 (0.579)	0.311 (0.418)	0.184 (0.245)	0.677*** (0.336)
N [n]	14,941[5,834]	14,987[5,867]	14,633[5,773]	15,011[5,870]	14,574[5,736]

Standard errors are displayed between parentheses; \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* P < 0.001

**Table F.** Within individuals fixed effects regression results for the relation between perceived economic security and support for mainstream political parties including the interaction term.

Variable	CDA	VVD	GL	PvdA	D66
Economic security	0.107*** (0.027)	0.144*** (0.031)	0.096** (0.030)	0.095** (0.030)	0.089** (0.030)
Internet	0.046 (0.190)	-0.286 (0.222)	0.010 (0.224)	-0.025 (0.220)	-0.232 (0.231)
Internet x Economic security	-0.006 (0.029)	0.046 (0.034)	0.005 (0.034)	0.002 (0.034)	0.042 (0.035)
Age	-0.023 (0.024)	-0.079* (0.037)	-0.054* (0.026)	-0.015 (0.012)	-0.067*** (0.017)
Income in € (ref = <2,500)					
2,500-5,000	-0.218* (0.109)	-0.189 (0.117)	0.062 (0.119)	-0.165 (0.120)	-0.087 (0.122)
5,000-10,000	-0.119 (0.099)	-0.159 (0.110)	0.025 (0.095)	-0.099 (0.098)	-0.007 (0.092)
10,000-15,000	-0.246* (0.095)	-0.167 (0.100)	-0.003 (0.099)	-0.194* (0.090)	-0.026 (0.089)
15,000-20,000	-0.145 (0.095)	-0.032 (0.101)	-0.020 (0.094)	-0.084 (0.091)	-0.001 (0.090)
20,000-30,000	-0.120 (0.091)	-0.071 (0.095)	-0.084 (0.088)	-0.122 (0.085)	-0.035 (0.083)
30,000-40,000	-0.085 (0.090)	-0.166 (0.098)	-0.059 (0.091)	-0.140 (0.089)	-0.035 (0.085)
40,000-50,000	-0.084 (0.095)	-0.184 (0.104)	0.033 (0.099)	-0.131 (0.095)	-0.007 (0.092)
50,000-75,000	-0.088 (0.098)	-0.102 (0.110)	0.164 (0.104)	-0.140 (0.102)	0.013 (0.099)
>75,000	-0.048 (0.118)	-0.142 (0.125)	0.047 (0.134)	-0.226 (0.123)	0.102 (0.127)
Year (ref = 2007)					
2008	0.108 (0.063)	0.384*** (0.077)	0.287*** (0.072)	0.458*** (0.065)	0.656*** (0.075)
2009	-0.040 (0.078)	0.582*** (0.102)	0.337*** (0.086)	0.174* (0.071)	1.036*** (0.081)
2010	-0.469*** (0.117)	0.839*** (0.150)	0.558*** (0.127)	0.195 (0.101)	1.007*** (0.113)
2011	-0.440*** (0.106)	1.073*** (0.150)	0.556*** (0.115)	0.233** (0.076)	1.157*** (0.092)
2012	-0.522*** (0.134)	0.457* (0.194)	-0.064 (0.147)	0.176* (0.086)	0.933*** (0.108)
2013	-0.394* (0.156)	0.477* (0.232)	0.179 (0.173)	-0.064 (0.095)	1.033*** (0.122)
2014	-0.100 (0.219)	0.697* (0.284)	-0.066 (0.224)	-0.217 (0.169)	1.018*** (0.195)
2015	-0.135 (0.211)	0.548 (0.312)	0.391 (0.229)	-0.326* (0.129)	0.984*** (0.164)
2016	-0.290 (0.225)	0.912** (0.341)	0.446 (0.247)	-0.240 (0.124)	1.065*** (0.167)
2017	-0.234 (0.247)	0.975** (0.374)	0.699** (0.270)	-0.151 (0.134)	1.181*** (0.181)
2018	-0.431 (0.270)	0.785 (0.411)	0.611* (0.295)	-0.122 (0.142)	0.884*** (0.195)
2019	-0.251 (0.294)	0.980* (0.449)	0.422 (0.321)	0.173 (0.150)	0.919*** (0.209)
2020	0.134 (0.318)	1.788*** (0.487)	0.521 (0.348)	0.111 (0.162)	1.164*** (0.226)
2021	-0.470 (0.340)	1.204* (0.522)	0.392 (0.371)	0.026 (0.173)	1.106*** (0.240)
2022	-0.821* (0.395)	0.786 (0.582)	0.297 (0.417)	0.201 (0.248)	0.663*** (0.337)
N [n]	14,928 [5,832]	14,976 [5,866]	14,619 [5,772]	14,997 [5,868]	14,563 [5,735]

Standard errors are displayed between parentheses; \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* P < 0.001

**Table G.** Within individuals fixed effects regression results for the relation between satisfaction with institutions and support for mainstream political parties.

Variable	CDA	VVD	GL	PvdA	D66
Satisfaction	0.365*** (0.021)	0.487*** (0.022)	0.317*** (0.023)	0.394*** (0.021)	0.362*** (0.023)
Age	-0.061 (0.034)	-0.128* (0.050)	-0.121* (0.056)	0.000 (0.038)	-0.095* (0.045)
Income in € (ref = <2,500)					
2,500-5,000	-0.125 (0.085)	-0.030 (0.090)	0.136 (0.104)	-0.135 (0.091)	0.109 (0.102)
5,000-10,000	-0.118 (0.082)	-0.073 (0.091)	0.014 (0.089)	-0.094 (0.081)	0.090 (0.084)
10,000-15,000	-0.267** (0.083)	-0.077 (0.085)	0.044 (0.094)	-0.154 (0.081)	-0.012 (0.083)
15,000-20,000	-0.167 (0.086)	0.008 (0.089)	-0.042 (0.094)	-0.133 (0.085)	0.032 (0.084)
20,000-30,000	-0.094 (0.080)	0.058 (0.082)	-0.054 (0.085)	-0.113 (0.078)	0.048 (0.077)
30,000-40,000	-0.087 (0.078)	-0.042 (0.085)	-0.081 (0.086)	-0.146 (0.080)	0.001 (0.077)
40,000-50,000	-0.057 (0.083)	-0.041 (0.094)	0.014 (0.096)	-0.174* (0.088)	0.055 (0.085)
50,000-75,000	-0.088 (0.089)	-0.016 (0.099)	0.159 (0.099)	-0.158 (0.102)	0.069 (0.091)
>75,000	0.051 (0.112)	-0.004 (0.120)	0.117 (0.128)	-0.083 (0.122)	0.187 (0.123)
Year (ref = 2007)					
2008	0.197** (0.070)	0.406*** (0.083)	0.335*** (0.089)	0.458*** (0.076)	0.664*** (0.089)
2009	0.059 (0.092)	0.672*** (0.121)	0.442** (0.132)	0.148 (0.098)	1.058*** (0.119)
2010	-0.243 (0.134)	0.987*** (0.173)	0.808*** (0.185)	0.131 (0.139)	1.117*** (0.163)
2011	-0.279* (0.138)	1.240*** (0.192)	0.732** (0.213)	0.151 (0.149)	1.197*** (0.178)
2012	-0.294 (0.178)	0.779** (0.250)	0.327 (0.284)	0.161 (0.194)	1.060*** (0.231)
2013	-0.075 (0.211)	0.846** (0.304)	0.602 (0.344)	-0.086 (0.230)	1.187*** (0.278)
2014	0.178 (0.261)	0.988** (0.340)	0.327 (0.385)	-0.278 (0.272)	1.193*** (0.325)
2015	0.203 (0.284)	1.066** (0.407)	0.950* (0.460)	-0.418 (0.311)	1.293** (0.372)
2016	0.062 (0.311)	1.377** (0.452)	1.032* (0.509)	-0.360 (0.341)	1.295** (0.409)
2017	0.121 (0.343)	1.396** (0.495)	1.335* (0.562)	-0.384 (0.377)	1.421** (0.452)
2018	-0.053 (0.374)	1.263* (0.547)	1.247* (0.2617)	-0.381 (0.414)	1.110* (0.494)
2019	0.238 (0.411)	1.544* (0.599)	1.233 (0.674)	-0.062 (0.453)	1.225* (0.540)
2020	0.479 (0.445)	2.222** (0.649)	1.226 (0.732)	-0.299 (0.489)	1.329* (0.588)
2021	0.062 (0.480)	1.838** (0.697)	1.266 (0.786)	-0.206 (0.528)	1.464* (0.630)
2022	-0.219* (0.505)	1.584* (0.740)	1.332 (0.818)	0.120 (0.552)	1.099 (0.675)
N [n]	14,756 [5,963]	14,817 [5,989]	14,633 [5,773]	14,809 [5,990]	14,468 [5,868]

Standard errors are displayed between parentheses; \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* P < 0.001

**Table H.** Within individuals fixed effects regression results for the relation between satisfaction with institutions and support for mainstream political parties including the interaction term.

Variable	CDA	VVD	GL	PvdA	D66
Satisfaction	0.354*** (0.025)	0.463*** (0.027)	0.316*** (0.029)	0.409*** (0.027)	0.335*** (0.026)
Internet	-0.085 (0.148)	-0.235 (0.178)	0.035 (0.183)	0.115 (0.172)	-0.193 (0.171)
Internet x Satisfaction	0.017 (0.025)	0.042 (0.029)	0.003 (0.030)	-0.024 (0.028)	0.043 (0.028)
Age	-0.061 (0.034)	-0.130* (0.050)	-0.119* (0.056)	-0.000 (0.038)	-0.095* (0.045)
Income in € (ref = <2,500)					
2,500-5,000	-0.124 (0.085)	-0.030 (0.090)	0.136 (0.104)	-0.134 (0.091)	0.110 (0.102)
5,000-10,000	-0.115 (0.082)	-0.071 (0.091)	0.017 (0.089)	-0.096 (0.081)	0.098 (0.084)
10,000-15,000	-0.265** (0.083)	-0.078 (0.085)	0.046 (0.094)	-0.155 (0.081)	-0.009 (0.083)
15,000-20,000	-0.165 (0.086)	0.008 (0.089)	-0.040 (0.090)	-0.131 (0.085)	0.036 (0.084)
20,000-30,000	-0.094 (0.080)	0.061 (0.082)	-0.053 (0.085)	-0.111 (0.078)	0.049 (0.077)
30,000-40,000	-0.088 (0.078)	-0.042 (0.085)	-0.080 (0.086)	-0.143 (0.081)	0.003 (0.077)
40,000-50,000	-0.056 (0.084)	-0.042 (0.094)	0.012 (0.096)	-0.174 (0.088)	0.061 (0.085)
50,000-75,000	-0.089 (0.089)	-0.017 (0.099)	0.159 (0.099)	-0.155 (0.095)	0.070 (0.091)
>75,000	0.050 (0.112)	-0.003 (0.120)	0.119 (0.128)	-0.080 (0.122)	0.183 (0.123)
Year (ref = 2007)					
2008	0.197** (0.070)	0.407*** (0.083)	0.333*** (0.089)	0.459*** (0.076)	0.662*** (0.089)
2009	0.062 (0.093)	0.675*** (0.121)	0.437** (0.132)	0.148 (0.098)	1.057*** (0.118)
2010	-0.240 (0.134)	0.990*** (0.173)	0.804*** (0.185)	0.134 (0.139)	1.110*** (0.163)
2011	-0.277* (0.138)	1.244*** (0.193)	0.722** (0.212)	0.154 (0.150)	1.191*** (0.178)
2012	-0.292 (0.178)	0.785** (0.252)	0.316 (0.282)	0.165 (0.194)	1.051*** (0.230)
2013	-0.071 (0.211)	0.854** (0.306)	0.590 (0.342)	-0.082 (0.230)	1.181*** (0.277)
2014	0.180 (0.261)	0.997** (0.342)	0.313 (0.383)	-0.273 (0.272)	1.183*** (0.325)
2015	0.206 (0.285)	1.076** (0.409)	0.932* (0.458)	-0.412 (0.312)	1.279** (0.371)
2016	0.067 (0.311)	1.389** (0.454)	1.014* (0.507)	-0.354 (0.124)	1.285** (0.409)
2017	0.125 (0.344)	1.409** (0.374)	1.317* (0.559)	-0.388 (0.378)	1.412** (0.451)
2018	-0.048 (0.375)	1.277* (0.550)	1.223* (0.614)	-0.375 (0.415)	1.099* (0.493)
2019	0.238 (0.412)	1.559* (0.602)	1.207 (0.671)	-0.057 (0.454)	1.220* (0.540)
2020	0.482 (0.446)	2.239** (0.652)	1.198 (0.728)	-0.288 (0.490)	1.314* (0.587)
2021	0.072 (0.481)	1.857** (0.700)	1.244 (0.782)	-0.200 (0.529)	1.456* (0.629)
2022	-0.211 (0.507)	1.612* (0.744)	1.309 (0.815)	0.136 (0.553)	1.084 (0.675)
N [n]	14,745 [5,962]	14,807 [5,987]	14,495 [5,901]	14,797 [5,989]	14,457 [5,866]

Standard errors are displayed between parentheses; \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* P < 0.001

**Table I.** Within individuals fixed effects regression results for the relation between confidence in institutions and support for mainstream political parties.

Variable	CDA	VVD	GL	PvdA	D66
Confidence	0.390*** (0.021)	0.512*** (0.022)	0.342*** (0.023)	0.426*** (0.022)	0.376*** (0.023)
Age	-0.020 (0.017)	-0.073** (0.027)	-0.050* (0.020)	-0.005 (0.014)	-0.072*** (0.016)
Income in € (ref = <2,500)					
2,500-5,000	-0.115 (0.080)	-0.000 (0.086)	0.106 (0.095)	-0.120 (0.086)	0.056 (0.094)
5,000-10,000	-0.113 (0.077)	-0.013 (0.086)	-0.008 (0.082)	-0.061 (0.075)	0.090 (0.079)
10,000-15,000	-0.227** (0.079)	-0.065 (0.081)	0.033 (0.087)	-0.165* (0.075)	0.005 (0.078)
15,000-20,000	-0.146 (0.082)	0.043 (0.085)	-0.036 (0.084)	-0.129 (0.080)	0.050 (0.080)
20,000-30,000	-0.074 (0.075)	0.074 (0.078)	-0.031 (0.080)	-0.110 (0.073)	0.056 (0.073)
30,000-40,000	-0.077 (0.073)	-0.024 (0.081)	-0.048 (0.081)	-0.138 (0.076)	0.018 (0.073)
40,000-50,000	-0.063 (0.079)	-0.049 (0.090)	0.060 (0.091)	-0.137 (0.083)	0.068 (0.082)
50,000-75,000	-0.061 (0.084)	0.029 (0.094)	0.184 (0.094)	-0.126 (0.089)	0.097 (0.088)
>75,000	0.046 (0.106)	0.062 (0.114)	0.108 (0.123)	-0.108 (0.116)	0.210 (0.118)
Year (ref = 2007)					
2008	0.112 (0.061)	0.297*** (0.071)	0.220** (0.068)	0.417*** (0.063)	0.616*** (0.074)
2009	-0.059 (0.069)	0.507*** (0.087)	0.279*** (0.078)	0.142* (0.068)	1.028*** (0.080)
2010	-0.445*** (0.101)	0.712*** (0.125)	0.514*** (0.114)	0.085 (0.099)	0.999*** (0.109)
2011	-0.477*** (0.087)	0.989*** (0.117)	0.471*** (0.097)	0.148 (0.078)	1.126*** (0.091)
2012	-0.554*** (0.104)	0.471** (0.148)	-0.079 (0.119)	0.145 (0.093)	0.913*** (0.105)
2013	-0.365** (0.118)	0.452** (0.173)	0.128 (0.138)	-0.122 (0.101)	1.039*** (0.119)
2014	-0.108 (0.177)	0.627** (0.221)	-0.052 (0.191)	-0.220 (0.163)	1.047*** (0.182)
2015	-0.167 (0.161)	0.568* (0.232)	0.314 (0.181)	-0.379 (0.141)	1.092*** (0.156)
2016	-0.357* (0.166)	0.845** (0.262)	0.375 (0.192)	-0.359 (0.141)	1.063*** (0.160)
2017	-0.334 (0.182)	0.829** (0.274)	0.609** (0.209)	-0.355* (0.152)	1.192*** (0.173)
2018	-0.549** (0.196)	0.613* (0.301)	0.477 (0.226)	-0.339* (0.165)	0.848*** (0.186)
2019	-0.299 (0.214)	0.858** (0.328)	0.376 (0.245)	-0.020 (0.178)	0.944*** (0.201)
2020	-0.073 (0.230)	1.458*** (0.355)	0.308 (0.265)	-0.247 (0.190)	1.023*** (0.217)
2021	-0.517* (0.246)	1.039** (0.380)	0.288 (0.281)	-0.158 (0.203)	1.146*** (0.229)
2022	-0.677* (0.290)	0.844 (0.434)	0.400 (0.337)	0.218 (0.254)	0.920** (0.306)
N [n]	15,893 [6,264]	15,969 [6,295]	15,597 [6,201]	14,809 [5,990]	15,532 [6,162]

Standard errors are displayed between parentheses; \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* P < 0.001

**Table J.** Within individuals fixed effects regression results for the relation between confidence in institutions and support for mainstream political parties including the interaction term.

Variable	CDA	VVD	GL	PvdA	D66
Confidence	0.392*** (0.025)	0.494*** (0.027)	0.335*** (0.028)	0.433*** (0.027)	0.349*** (0.026)
Internet	0.009 (0.152)	-0.204 (0.174)	-0.052 (0.178)	0.035 (0.175)	-0.211 (0.173)
Internet x Confidence	-0.004 (0.025)	0.032 (0.028)	0.013 (0.029)	-0.010 (0.029)	0.040 (0.028)
Age	-0.020 (0.017)	-0.074** (0.027)	-0.050* (0.020)	-0.005 (0.014)	-0.072*** (0.016)
Income in € (ref = <2,500)					
2,500-5,000	-0.124 (0.080)	-0.001 (0.086)	0.105 (0.095)	-0.119 (0.086)	0.056 (0.094)
5,000-10,000	-0.112 (0.077)	-0.012 (0.086)	-0.006 (0.082)	-0.061 (0.075)	0.096 (0.079)
10,000-15,000	-0.225** (0.079)	-0.064 (0.081)	0.033 (0.087)	-0.167 (0.075)	0.008 (0.078)
15,000-20,000	-0.145 (0.082)	0.043 (0.085)	-0.036 (0.084)	-0.129 (0.080)	0.052 (0.080)
20,000-30,000	-0.074 (0.075)	0.077 (0.079)	-0.030 (0.080)	-0.110 (0.074)	0.057 (0.073)
30,000-40,000	-0.078 (0.073)	-0.023 (0.081)	-0.048 (0.082)	-0.136 (0.076)	0.019 (0.073)
40,000-50,000	-0.060 (0.079)	-0.049 (0.090)	0.058 (0.091)	-0.139 (0.083)	0.074 (0.082)
50,000-75,000	-0.060 (0.084)	0.030 (0.095)	0.183 (0.094)	-0.125 (0.089)	0.098 (0.088)
>75,000	0.046 (0.106)	0.065 (0.114)	0.109 (0.124)	-0.107 (0.116)	0.206 (0.118)
Year (ref = 2007)					
2008	0.113 (0.061)	0.297*** (0.071)	0.219** (0.068)	0.417*** (0.063)	0.616*** (0.074)
2009	-0.057 (0.069)	0.511*** (0.087)	0.277*** (0.077)	0.143* (0.068)	1.029*** (0.080)
2010	-0.444*** (0.101)	0.716*** (0.126)	0.512*** (0.113)	0.088 (0.099)	0.994*** (0.109)
2011	-0.474*** (0.087)	0.993*** (0.118)	0.466*** (0.097)	0.151 (0.079)	1.124*** (0.091)
2012	-0.551*** (0.105)	0.477** (0.149)	-0.084 (0.119)	0.149 (0.093)	0.909*** (0.105)
2013	-0.361** (0.119)	0.459** (0.174)	0.123 (0.139)	-0.118 (0.102)	1.035*** (0.119)
2014	-0.104 (0.177)	0.634** (0.222)	-0.058 (0.191)	-0.214 (0.163)	1.042*** (0.183)
2015	-0.162 (0.161)	0.577* (0.233)	0.307 (0.180)	-0.372** (0.142)	1.084*** (0.156)
2016	-0.352* (0.167)	0.855** (0.253)	0.368 (0.191)	-0.353* (0.141)	1.059*** (0.160)
2017	-0.329 (0.182)	0.839** (0.275)	0.602** (0.207)	-0.349* (0.152)	1.188*** (0.173)
2018	-0.542** (0.197)	0.623* (0.303)	0.466* (0.224)	-0.332* (0.166)	0.842*** (0.186)
2019	-0.300 (0.215)	0.869** (0.330)	0.367 (0.244)	-0.012 (0.178)	0.946*** (0.201)
2020	-0.069 (0.231)	1.472*** (0.357)	0.296 (0.263)	-0.235 (0.191)	1.015*** (0.217)
2021	-0.564* (0.247)	1.052** (0.382)	0.280 (0.280)	-0.150 (0.203)	1.141*** (0.229)
2022	-0.668* (0.292)	0.866* (0.436)	0.394 (0.336)	0.235 (0.255)	0.914** (0.307)
N [n]	14,881 [6,263]	15,958 [6,293]	15,584 [6,199]	15,932 [6,292]	15,520 [6,160]

Standard errors are displayed between parentheses; \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* P < 0.001

**Table K.** the results of a within individuals fixed effects regression for the relationship between starting to use the internet for news and economic security, satisfaction with institutions and confidence in institutions.

Variable	Economic security	Satisfaction	Confidence
Internet	-0.040 (0.021)	-0.022 (0.029)	0.021 (0.026)
Age	-0.028 (0.016)	-0.050 (0.034)	-0.010 (0.019)
Income in € (ref = < 2,500)			
2,500-5,000	0.151* (0.067)	-0.121 (0.062)	-0.062 (0.057)
5,000-10,000	0.171** (0.065)	-0.054 (0.056)	-0.080 (0.052)
10,000-15,000	0.172** (0.061)	-0.036 (0.055)	-0.033 (0.051)
15,000-20,000	0.238*** (0.059)	-0.021 (0.055)	-0.029 (0.050)
20,000-30,000	0.385*** (0.055)	-0.081 (0.053)	-0.087 (0.048)
30,000-40,000	0.480*** (0.057)	0.051 (0.053)	0.027 (0.048)
40,000-50,000	0.521*** (0.060)	0.041 (0.057)	0.028 (0.052)
50,000-75,000	0.584*** (0.062)	0.021 (0.061)	-0.004 (0.054)
>75,000	0.666*** (0.071)	-0.028 (0.070)	-0.101 (0.063)
Year (ref = 2007)			
2008	-0.198*** (0.035)	0.065 (0.055)	0.037 (0.042)
2009	-0.083 (0.043)	0.168* (0.080)	0.064 (0.053)
2010	-0.130* (0.064)	0.083 (0.111)	0.013 (0.076)
2011	-0.110 (0.064)	0.224 (0.128)	0.072 (0.077)
2012	-0.219** (0.084)	0.073 (0.170)	-0.088 (0.098)
2013	-0.107 (0.100)	0.184 (0.207)	-0.050 (0.118)
2014	-0.070 (0.128)	0.070 (0.234)	-0.103 (0.172)
2015	0.126 (0.135)	0.428 (0.277)	0.102 (0.160)
2016	0.190 (0.148)	0.492 (0.307)	0.103 (0.172)
2017	0.299 (0.162)	0.671* (0.338)	0.263 (0.189)
2018	0.280 (0.180)	0.753* (0.373)	0.289 (0.209)
2019	0.339 (0.194)	0.772 (0.407)	0.259 (0.227)
2020	0.320 (0.211)	1.116* (0.441)	0.557* (0.246)
2021	0.364 (0.226)	0.794 (0.475)	0.203 (0.264)
2022	0.215 (0.701)	0.595 (0.494)	0.094 (0.283)
N [n]	16,154 [6,234]	15,946 [6,363]	17,253 [6,698]

Robust standard errors are displayed between parentheses; \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* P < 0.001



**Table L.** the results of a within individuals fixed effects regression for the relationship between starting to use the TV and/or Radio for news and economic security, satisfaction with institutions and confidence in institutions.

Variable	Economic security	Satisfaction	Confidence
TV & Radio	-0.036 (0.030)	0.103** (0.039)	0.058 (0.034)
Age	-0.028 (0.016)	-0.051 (0.034)	-0.010 (0.019)
Income in € (ref = < 2,500)			
2,500-5,000	0.151* (0.068)	-0.120 (0.062)	-0.062 (0.057)
5,000-10,000	0.172** (0.065)	-0.051 (0.056)	-0.080 (0.052)
10,000-15,000	0.172** (0.061)	-0.035 (0.055)	-0.033 (0.051)
15,000-20,000	0.239*** (0.059)	-0.021 (0.055)	-0.030 (0.050)
20,000-30,000	0.385*** (0.055)	-0.081 (0.053)	-0.087 (0.048)
30,000-40,000	0.480*** (0.057)	0.051 (0.053)	0.026 (0.048)
40,000-50,000	0.520*** (0.060)	0.040 (0.057)	0.028 (0.052)
50,000-75,000	0.584*** (0.062)	0.021 (0.061)	-0.004 (0.054)
>75,000	0.665*** (0.071)	-0.027 (0.070)	-0.100 (0.064)
Year (ref = 2007)			
2008	-0.199*** (0.035)	0.064 (0.054)	0.038 (0.042)
2009	-0.087* (0.043)	0.168* (0.080)	0.066 (0.053)
2010	-0.134* (0.064)	0.083 (0.111)	0.016 (0.076)
2011	-0.116 (0.065)	0.223 (0.128)	0.076 (0.077)
2012	-0.227** (0.084)	0.075 (0.171)	-0.082 (0.098)
2013	-0.115 (0.100)	0.187 (0.207)	-0.043 (0.119)
2014	-0.078 (0.129)	0.075 (0.235)	-0.097 (0.148)
2015	0.116 (0.136)	0.427 (0.278)	0.107 (0.160)
2016	0.179 (0.149)	0.495 (0.307)	0.112 (0.172)
2017	0.287 (0.163)	0.674* (0.339)	0.272 (0.190)
2018	0.267 (0.181)	0.757* (0.374)	0.299 (0.209)
2019	0.325 (0.195)	0.777 (0.408)	0.270 (0.227)
2020	0.305 (0.212)	1.117* (0.442)	0.567* (0.246)
2021	0.351 (0.228)	0.796 (0.476)	0.212 (0.265)
2022	0.199 (0.249)	0.597 (0.495)	0.105 (0.284)
N [n]	16,154 [6,234]	15,946 [6,363]	17,253 [6,698]

Robust standard errors are displayed between parentheses; \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* P < 0.001

**Table M.** the results of a within individuals fixed effects regression for the relationship between starting to use free newspapers for news and economic security, satisfaction with institutions and confidence in institutions.

Variable	Economic security	Satisfaction	Confidence
Free newspaper	0.032 (0.026)	-0.024 (0.033)	0.006 (0.030)
Age	-0.029 (0.020)	-0.048 (0.034)	-0.007 (0.021)
Income in € (ref = < 2,500)			
2,500-5,000	0.174* (0.071)	-0.137* (0.064)	-0.076 (0.059)
5,000-10,000	0.183** (0.067)	-0.057 (0.059)	-0.080 (0.055)
10,000-15,000	0.181** (0.063)	-0.068 (0.058)	-0.053 (0.054)
15,000-20,000	0.255*** (0.061)	-0.069 (0.057)	-0.061 (0.052)
20,000-30,000	0.398*** (0.058)	-0.113* (0.054)	-0.110* (0.050)
30,000-40,000	0.502*** (0.059)	0.054 (0.054)	0.028 (0.050)
40,000-50,000	0.528*** (0.062)	0.036 (0.058)	0.041 (0.053)
50,000-75,000	0.601*** (0.064)	0.026 (0.062)	0.007 (0.056)
>75,000	0.680*** (0.073)	-0.026 (0.073)	-0.097 (0.065)
Year (ref = 2007)			
2008	-0.192*** (0.037)	0.065 (0.055)	0.037 (0.043)
2009	-0.082 (0.048)	0.161* (0.080)	0.058 (0.055)
2010	-0.127 (0.071)	0.085 (0.111)	0.015 (0.079)
2011	-0.111 (0.076)	0.219 (0.129)	0.070 (0.082)
2012	-0.219* (0.100)	0.059 (0.171)	-0.099 (0.107)
2013	-0.107 (0.120)	0.166 (0.208)	-0.058 (0.129)
2014	-0.070 (0.147)	0.053 (0.236)	-0.121 (0.157)
2015	0.130 (0.163)	0.404 (0.280)	0.094 (0.174)
2016	0.197 (0.179)	0.470 (0.309)	0.086 (0.188)
2017	0.307 (0.197)	0.674 (0.341)	0.243 (0.207)
2018	0.284 (0.218)	0.707 (0.376)	0.266 (0.228)
2019	0.353 (0.237)	0.729 (0.411)	0.231 (0.249)
2020	0.315 (0.257)	1.045* (0.445)	0.503 (0.270)
2021	0.245 (0.282)	0.968* (0.471)	0.361 (0.296)
N [n]	15,057 [6,067]	15,946 [6,363]	16,062 [6,512]

Robust standard errors are displayed between parentheses; \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* P < 0.001

**Table N.** the results of a within individuals fixed effects regression for the relationship between starting to use paid newspapers for news and economic security, satisfaction with institutions and confidence in institutions.

Variable	Economic security	Satisfaction	Confidence
Paid newspaper	-0.002 (0.022)	0.026 (0.030)	0.049 (0.026)
Age	-0.028 (0.016)	-0.050 (0.034)	-0.010 (0.019)
Income in € (ref = < 2,500)			
2,500-5,000	0.151* (0.067)	-0.121 (0.062)	-0.062 (0.057)
5,000-10,000	0.173** (0.065)	-0.054 (0.056)	-0.081 (0.052)
10,000-15,000	0.173** (0.061)	-0.036 (0.055)	-0.033 (0.051)
15,000-20,000	0.239*** (0.059)	-0.021 (0.055)	-0.030 (0.050)
20,000-30,000	0.385*** (0.055)	-0.082 (0.053)	-0.087 (0.048)
30,000-40,000	0.480*** (0.057)	0.051 (0.053)	0.026 (0.048)
40,000-50,000	0.520*** (0.060)	0.040 (0.057)	0.027 (0.052)
50,000-75,000	0.584*** (0.062)	0.020 (0.061)	-0.005 (0.054)
>75,000	0.665*** (0.071)	-0.029 (0.070)	-0.101 (0.063)
Year (ref = 2007)			
2008	-0.199*** (0.035)	0.064 (0.054)	0.039 (0.042)
2009	-0.086* (0.043)	0.167* (0.079)	0.068 (0.053)
2010	-0.134* (0.065)	0.082 (0.110)	0.018 (0.075)
2011	-0.116 (0.065)	0.221 (0.127)	0.077 (0.076)
2012	-0.226** (0.084)	0.069 (0.169)	-0.082 (0.098)
2013	-0.113 (0.100)	0.181 (0.205)	-0.041 (0.117)
2014	-0.077 (0.129)	0.068 (0.233)	-0.094 (0.147)
2015	0.116 (0.136)	0.423 (0.276)	0.111 (0.159)
2016	0.181 (0.149)	0.486 (0.305)	0.112 (0.171)
2017	0.289 (0.163)	0.665* (0.337)	0.274 (0.188)
2018	0.268 (0.181)	0.746* (0.371)	0.300 (0.207)
2019	0.327 (0.196)	0.764 (0.405)	0.270 (0.225)
2020	0.306 (0.212)	1.107* (0.439)	0.568* (0.244)
2021	0.352 (0.228)	0.785 (0.473)	0.213 (0.262)
2022	0.201 (0.249)	0.584 (0.491)	0.105 (0.281)
N [n]	15,057 [6,067]	15,946 [6,363]	17,253 [6,698]

Robust standard errors are displayed between parentheses; \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* P < 0.001