Erasmus University Rotterdam

MSc in Maritime Economics and Logistics

2021/2022

The impact of a global carbon tax on the maritime industry

An analysis by shipping segments

by

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Acknowledgements

I want to thank my supervisor, Dr. Koen Berden, first and foremost, because without his encouragement and support, I would not have been able to carry out this ambitious research. As a complete beginner in economics, the fundamental ideas and insights he presented in class were priceless, and his assistance throughout the thesis was outstanding. He was a godsend to me as my thesis advisor. I would especially want to thank Felicia, Martha, and Renee from the MEL office team for making the programme memorable and assisting us in every way possible. Everyone faces difficulties in their work, but not everyone embraces problem-solving. Congratulations to the MEL team for showing grit and overcoming all of their challenges. I respect them for this reason.

One of the most energizing, inspiring, and difficult tasks I have undertaken has been the MEL programme. I've worked in the shipping sector for the past 15 years, and throughout my life, my curiosity and fascination with learning new things have been my main motivations. I believe MEL has strengthened my technical foundation while also broadening my knowledge and enhancing my experience.

With their extensive knowledge and real-world experience, all of our distinguished instructors have helped to make the MEL program one of the best starting points for our class's cohorts' careers in logistics. It was a fantastic experience made possible by my friends Suren, Sajal, and Tianshu, with whom I was able to discuss my ideas at length and share life experiences.

I want to convey my deepest gratitude to my family for their unwavering support when I made the decision to leave my shipping career and pursue higher education. I've had a wonderful year, and I can't wait to see what lies ahead.

Abstract

The topic of climate change has been the talk of the town lately. Since potential competition consequences dominate the perspective of policy makers, discussions concerning the best combination of carbon reduction policy instruments are protracted and complex. Numerous member countries have proposed remedies, but the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a worldwide maritime organization, must act on pricing emissions from maritime transport. The IMO hasn't made any convincing propositions in this area. Thus, this study helps in contributing to the above thought process by examining "the economic, trade and transport impact of a global carbon tax on the three major shipping segments of maritime industry: containers, dry bulk, and wet bulk". A partial equilibrium econometric model (Francois and Hall, 2002) is utilized as an impact assessment tool to provide answers regarding trade flows, welfare effects, production and price effects.

The producers in the liner segment stand to lose most money from the implementation of a global maritime carbon tax. A drop in exports of \$1.5 to \$2.7 trillion for a tax of \$75 would be particularly detrimental to the EU and China. Australia suffers since it is a significant exporter and a remote production hub; as a result, the impact as per our model in the dry bulk segment is significant. An export revenue loss of \$114 billion and a producer revenue loss of \$4.9 billion. China, the EU, the US, and ROA are the importing countries that are most impacted across all cargo segments. For the Wet Bulk segment, a \$75 tax scenario results in a considerable drop in producer revenues and net welfare for Middle East and Russia, with export declines ranging from \$113 to \$418 billion. With a loss in consumer surplus ranging from \$2.1 billion to \$3.7 billion, consumers in China and the EU are among the greatest losers in the wet bulk market. We also see around 146,96,260 million tons reduction in CO2 for wet bulk, dry bulk and containers respectively. The maximum transport impact is seen in the liner segment of around 210,000 TEU (or 63%).

To accomplish the objectives established for 2050, IMO, the legal global shipping body must move swiftly on a resolution to enact a carbon tax. Our research provides insight into what to anticipate if such a policy is embraced globally.

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List of Abbreviations

AHS	Effectively applied tariff	
AUS	Australia	
CBAM	Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism	
CBDRRC	Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective	
	Capabilities	
CD	Canal dues	
CEO	Chief Exceutive Officer	
CES	Constant Elasticity of Substituion	
CET	Constant Elasticity of Transformation	
CGE	Computable general equilibrium	
COVID	Coronavirus Disease	
CS	Consumer Surplus	
CSC	Clean Shipping Coalition	
ETS	Emission Trading Scheme	
EU	European Union	
FC	Fuel costs	
GCF	Green Climate Fund	
GDP	Gross Domestic Product	
GE	General Equilibrium	
GHG	Green House Gases	
GSIM	Global Simulation	
GTAP	Global Trade Analysis Project	
ICS	International Chamber of Shipping	
IMF	International Monetary Fund	
IMO	International Maritime Organization	
INTERCARGO	International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners	
MBM	Market based measures	
ME	Middle east	
MEL	Maritiime Economics and Logistics	
MEPC	Marine Environment Protection Committee	
NYK	Nippon Yūsen Kabushiki Kaisha	
NZ	New Zealand	
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development	

OPEC	The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PD	Port and light dues
PE	Partial Equilibrium
PS	Producer surplus
QL	Quasi Linear
RMT	Review of Maritim Transport
ROA	Rest of Asia
ROAF	Rest of Africa
ROE	Rest of Europe
RONA	Rest of North America
ROSA	Rest of South America
SE	Substitution Elasticity
SIDS	Small Island Developing States
SVAR	Structural vector autoregressive
TP	Tugs and pilotage
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
USA	United States of America
USD	United States Dollar
VC	Voyage costs
VLSFO	Very low sulfur fuel oil
WBG	World Bank Group
WE	Welfare effects
WITS	World Integrated Trade Solution

Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 Background

The Initial IMO Strategy on Reducing Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions from Ships was adopted in April 2018 by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the United Nations organization specifically responsible for international shipping. The initial IMO GHG strategy's main goal is to, in accordance with the Paris Agreement temperature goals, cut total annual GHG emissions by at least 50% by 2050 compared to 2008. At the same time, efforts will be made to urgently phase out GHG emissions this century (IMO, 2018). Depending on future energy advances and projected economic growth, "business as usual" models call for shipping's CO2 emissions to rise from 2008 levels by 2050 by 90 to 130 percent (J. Faber et al, 2020). If the IMO climate objective is to be met, further policy measures to reduce GHG emissions from shipping must be enacted and put into practice in light of these estimates.




Figure 1-1: IMO's targets and Paris-compatible 1.5 °C pathways

Source: Created by author in reference to (Bullock, Mason and Larkin, 2021)

The Initial IMO GHG Strategy requires that consequences on States of policy measures for climate mitigation are reviewed and taken into account before they are adopted, giving particular attention to the needs of developing nations, notably small island developing States (SIDS) and least developed countries (LDCs) (IMO, 2018).

The Initial IMO GHG Strategy comprises a non-exhaustive list of proposed short-, mid-, and long-term measures (IMO, 2019). These nations' (LDC & SIDS) worries that extra climate mitigation policy measures in shipping could have a negative impact on their economies led to the requirement. The stages involved in submitting and commenting on impact assessments are outlined in an IMO method for assessing impacts on States (IMO, 2019), which also gives some specifics on the data, the assessments should contain.

There have already been a number of impact analyses done for potential short-term solutions aimed at improving ship energy efficiency (Brazil and China, 2020) (Denmark, France, Germany, 2020) (Greece, Japan, Norway, International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), 2020) (Greece, Japan, Norway, International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), 2020) (Pacific Environment (PE) and Clean Shipping Coalition (CSC), 2020). However, a later analysis by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) critiqued that these impact assessments did not entirely address all parameters stated in the IMO procedure, highlighted several issues, such as the lack of readily available data and the existence of numerous uncertainties, and made recommendations for improving impact assessments (IMO, 2020). As a result, an extensive impact analysis of a combined IMO short-term measure was carried out. It was discovered that, in comparison to the regular market unpredictability of freight rates, the measure's overall worldwide implications on maritime logistics costs might be regarded as modest (IMO, 2021a) (IMO, 2021c). The worldwide impact on GDP and trade flows could alternatively be viewed as little in comparison to the longer-term effects of other disruptions (such as pandemics, climate change factors). However, it was discovered that some SIDS, LDCs, and developing nations would probably need assistance to help offset rising marine costs and the resulting detrimental effects on their actual income and trade flows (IMO, 2021a) (IMO, 2021c).

The discussion shifted to the mid-term measures, which include market-based measures (MBMs), once the short-term energy efficiency measures were adopted in 2021 (IMO, Further shipping GHG emission reduction measures adopted, 2021). Previous IMO negotiations on MBMs failed to reach a consensus and were suspended in 2013 (among

other reasons because of concerns about potential negative economic repercussions). The studies from (Chircop, A et al, 2018) (S. Lagouvardou et al, 2020) (Y. Shi, 2016) entail the history of IMO regulation changes related to lowering GHG emissions as well as a summary of prior MBM proposals. Recent submissions (Belgium et al, 2019) (Denmark et al, 2021) (France, 2018) (Netherlands, OECD, 2021) and a new, detailed proposal for a GHG levy that has been presented to the IMO for debate (Marshall Islands and Solomon Islands, 2021) show the Member States' desire to resume the MBM negotiations. We concentrate on the economic, trade and transport effects of carbon pricing schemes in light of this.

1.2 Problem Identification

According to ICS's comments, "[w]hen the Member States of IMO commence the development of an MBM, the preference of the global shipping industry is for a levy-based system linked to fuel consumption/CO2 emissions, as this is the form of MBM that the global industry has determined will be least likely to have an adverse impact on the industry as a whole." (Steptoe et al., 2021)

The September 2021 ICS-INTERCARGO proposal similarly states that a piecemeal approach to the introduction of MBMs would most likely fail to achieve the Organization's goals. The Organization must now act quickly to develop an MBM in order to discourage the unilateral application of MBMs to international shipping and to demonstrate continued leadership for the decarbonization of shipping via its global regulatory framework.

Importantly, support for a universal carbon tax has been expressed by other important parties. The CEO of Maersk, the largest shipping company in the world, demanded on June 2, 2021, shortly before the MEPC conference in June, that the IMO get ready to introduce a carbon tax on ship fuel starting in 2025 that would cost at least \$150 per ton (or \$450 per ton of fuel) (Wittels, 2021). Despite the fact that Maersk lacks consultative status at the IMO and is thus unable to present suggestions to the MEPC, its support for a carbon tax lends credibility to those that have already been made.

The American government hasn't publicly stated what it thinks about a global maritime carbon tax. However, it has pledged to collaborate with other IMO members to support the target of reaching net zero emissions from international shipping by no later than 2050, which may necessitate the adoption of MBM by the IMO.

It appears likely that the MEPC will now take an MBM into serious consideration given the need for additional action to meet its goal of reducing emissions by 50% from 2008 levels by 2050, industry pressure for consideration of a carbon tax, and the upcoming expansion of the EU ETS. The IMO will likely be under more pressure to make sure it keeps up with any new GHG-reduction pledges as a result of meeting after COP26. MBMs are still debatable. Concerns have been voiced about the related legal, administrative, and governance issues as well as the possible effects on Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and Least Developed Countries (LDC), which may have trouble finding the money to finance the energy-efficient ship upgrades and the purchase of newer, more modern ships. But compared to before, the likelihood of achieving an agreement now seems significantly higher. The main cause of this is the enthusiastic backing from important industry players who are hoping for a clear pricing signal from the IMO to encourage the switch to zero-carbon fuels. (Steptoe et al., 2021)

1.3 Research question and sub-research questions

We may infer from the background information on the subject, that the research question should be sufficiently general to characterize the effects of the carbon tax across the board while being particular to named shipping sectors. In light of this, the primary research question is: "What is the economic, trade and transport impact of a global carbon tax on the three major shipping segments of maritime industry: containers, dry bulk, and wet bulk?"

We must also look at the following sub-research questions in order to adequately respond to the main research question:

- 1. How do we categorize the maritime industry into three sectors?
- 2. What is the current situation and are global trends in shipping?

- 3. What is the rationale behind a carbon tax?
- 4. What types of costs are impacted by a carbon tax and to what extent?
- 5. What is the best methodological approach to quantify the economic and transport effects of carbon tax on the maritime transportation?
- 6. How do we define economic, trade and transport impact?

1.4 Research Methodology

This research's methodology will be focused on quantitative study of the economic impact of actions taken by IMO to impose global carbon tax and its impact on the economy, trade and transport on current major trade routes. To examine and assess the effects and variations in arbitrage between various shipping routes for various commodities in major shipping segments, an econometric partial equilibrium model will be utilized.

We will first investigate and assess the main shipping routes for the three shipping segments for our quantitative study, and then we will use the trade data to identify the significant nations for our econometric model. The trade volumes and elasticities for these segments will then be calculated and assumed. The many potential worldwide carbon taxes explored in various literatures will be used to build scenarios. The initial and final NTMs of the econometric model will then be determined using the method described in (Anderson and Wincoop, 2004). An econometric model will then be used to analyze the implications of the global carbon tax by the IMO on trade values, economic and transport parameters. The results of the investigations mentioned above will then be discussed.

1.5 Structure of the thesis

The structure of this thesis is as follows: After the topic is introduced, the issue is identified, and the research methodology is discussed in **Chapter 1**, **Chapter 2** includes a literature review that provides a general overview of carbon pricing, then examines the characteristics of the maritime industry in relation to potential carbon pricing. Finally, we look at more specialized literature that links the maritime sector to carbon pricing. In **Chapter 2**, where we review the current situation and the worldwide trends in shipping,

we will also go into the most recent events in relation to the global climate levy (carbon pricing). This Chapter will also examine how various ship operational expenses may change as a result of the implementation of a carbon tax. To do this, we will first categorize these costs and then further investigate which costs will be most impacted. In the **third chapter**, the author will outline the three primary shipping categories, country selection based on trade statistics, the primary trade routes and volumes along these routes, initial and final tariffs, and elasticities for the aforementioned important trading nations. Model selection, model description, data collection, and scenario construction will come next. Based on the results of econometric model calculations, linear programming, and the author's assumptions, the effects of the global carbon tax on the economy, trade, and transportation will be reported in **Chapter 4**. We'll finish off by summarizing our research's findings and making some suggestions for further research in **Chapter 5**.

Chapter 2 Literature review

2.1 Current situation

As discussed in (Parry et al., 2018) paper on "Carbon Taxation for International Maritime Fuels: Assessing the Options" more people are becoming aware of the environmental benefits of a maritime carbon tax. With regard to reducing emissions, maritime carbon taxes encourage and strike a cost-effective balance between the full range of possible opportunities (given the current state of technology) (For instance, updating the ships' technological and operational capabilities, expanding the fleet with larger, more powerful ships, etc.), as opposed to most alternative mitigation instruments (e.g., technological efficiency requirements for new ships). They also differ from other pricing instruments (e.g., emissions-based pricing) in that they do not impose a fixed price.

The IMO's guiding concept of non-discriminatory treatment of all ships regardless of flag state would be in line with the global implementation of a marine carbon tax. While there is currently little agreement on how to accomplish this, member states stress the importance of addressing the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDRRC) (UN 1992), which states that countries should be held accountable for their contributions to GHG mitigation in accordance with their economic status and respective capabilities. The IMO emphasizes the need to prevent negative effects on small island developing states (SIDS) and low-income nations (LICs) (IMO, 2015).

According to the IMF's World Bank Report (Farid et al., 2016), as of mid-2015, more than 20 sub-national governments and about 40 national governments worldwide have implemented or were implementing some type of carbon pricing. Currently, there are only 15 countries with clear carbon pricing (Grey, E. 2016). In 2015, it was anticipated that the total value of carbon pricing mechanisms worldwide was just under \$50 billion. 30% of this comes from carbon taxes, and 70%, or around \$34 billion, is ascribed to emissions trading schemes (ETSs). That enormous number, though, can be misleading. Only 12% of the world's yearly emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs), or 7GT of CO2e, are addressed by carbon pricing, and only 4% of this is due to carbon levies.

The shipping industry may make a substantial contribution by enacting broad regulations on carbon taxes. Even after compensating developing nations, a global \$30 per ton CO2 fee on fuels used in shipping and aviation combined may have brought in around \$25 billion in climate money in 2014. To raise money for climate change mitigation, The International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) opposes a carbon tax. They made this position known in 2015 when they rejected a \$25 per ton CO2 fee proposed by The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Instead, if the International Maritime Organization thought it essential, ICS would accept a "simple fuel levy". (Grey, E. 2016).

2.1.1 Global trends in shipping

Created with Datawrapper

Figure 2-1: Carbon pricing scores, 2018 In %, based on a EUR 60 per tonne CO2 benchmark < 20 20-40 40-60 60-80

Source: Prepared by author using data from (OECD, 2021)

France stated its conviction in MBMs' ability to establish the proper economic environment for low- and zero-carbon fuels and technologies in 2018. This plan calls for a carbon fee that rises over time based on how much carbon a ship emits. In addition, Antigua and Barbuda published a proposal in 2018 advocating for monetary incentives, R&D investment, and legislation in order to reach the Initial Strategy's levels of ambition. They

state that they would prefer a carbon tax or tariff on bunker fuel that is simple to administer and transparent. The Marshall and Solomon Islands were one of the first nations to make a significant proposal for a carbon shipping tax, recommending a fee of \$100 per ton of carbon dioxide (CO2) beginning in early 2021. Other nations' reactions to the proposal were unenthusiastic, and ever then, there have been several tax suggestions.

Japan suggested a financial incentive to decarbonize shipping in May 2022. The maritime industry would be required to pay \$56 per ton of CO2 starting in 2025 under the proposed global carbon tax. The tax, if implemented, is expected to bring in more than \$50 billion annually. According to the current proposal put forth by Japan, the tax would rise every five years, reaching a maximum of \$637 per ton of CO2 by 2040, from \$135 per ton in 2030. Given that each ton of bunker fuel creates around three tons of CO2, the idea also predicts that the carbon price on bunkers would be three times higher. This is especially exciting because, as the second-largest ship owner in the world, Japan's suggestions will be taken seriously and used as a model by other countries.

The EU unveiled its "Fit for 55" package, which outlines a strategy to cut emissions throughout the bloc starting in 2023, in July 2021. A carbon tax on shipping emissions is one of the Fit for 55 plan's recommendations. It's essential to mention that the concept has come under fire for posing a risk of "carbon leakage." In fact, one issue with the EU's plan to charge carbon emissions is that businesses may seek out shipping hubs outside the EU to cut costs. Therefore, it is possible for operators to dock their huge cargo ships outside of the EU before transferring their cargo onto smaller ships with lower carbon output and sailing into Europe. Japan's proposal, in contrast, addresses all worldwide shipping emissions and is, thus, more onerous on the maritime sector as a whole. However, as all businesses will be treated equally and given the same opportunity to develop greener methods with the same amount of time to complete the transition, it may create a more level playing field. Tax subsidies for zero-emission ships will encourage those who have begun the switch early.

The question of whether zero-emission ships are practical in this short timeframe or

whether it would be better to provide incentives for lower-emission ships during the transitional phase as technology is developed still needs to be answered. This is a crucial factor to take into account given the significance of the shipping sector to the supply chain at a time when the world is already experiencing significant disruption due to supply chain issues, rising living expenses, the ongoing effects of COVID-19, and the conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

2.1.2 Effects on Maritime linked Supply Chains

Companies inside and outside the shipping industry would face difficulties and opportunities as a result of a global maritime carbon tax. The majority of ships use heavy fuel oil, which produces a lot of pollution. When accessible, a GHG tax would force shippers to switch to more expensive low- and zero-carbon fuels, increasing gasoline costs for consumers. Even a slight increase in gasoline prices could be problematic for some shippers who are still working to recover from the COVID-19 outbreak. Companies would try to pass on the expense to their customers if fuel prices rose. Although this cost may occasionally be minimal and readily passed on to consumers, other times businesses may be forced to make tough decisions that need reorganizing their supply chains. Maersk has claimed that in order to fully transition to carbon-free fuel, it would have to increase costs for its own customers by 20% (Josephs, 2021).

An international maritime carbon tax might give some businesses a competitive edge. Even with a charge, many of the bigger shipping businesses would maintain or even increase their competitive edge because they have already made effective investments in lowering their GHG emissions. For instance, Maersk has been looking at alternative fuels including methanol and ammonia. The company also plans to run the world's first carbon-neutral vessel by 2023 and has a fleet-wide carbon-neutral goal of 2050. Major charterer Cargill is said to have reduced its fleet's gross carbon emissions by almost 1.5 million tons since 2017. The Maersk McKinney Moller Center for Zero Carbon Shipping is a research and development facility founded in 2020 with a goal on decarbonizing the industry. Members include Maersk, Cargill, AN Energy Solutions, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, NYK Lines, and Siemens. Smaller and medium-sized businesses, on the other hand, would be at a

relative disadvantage due to their lower capacity to invest in R&D related to decarbonization and build/retrofit with new technologies, as well as their restricted or no access to the bunkering facilities required to supply ships with alternative fuels.

The IMO's decision-making process moves slowly, so any global levy that is approved would not go into effect right away. However, the shipping industry is under pressure to decarbonize from a variety of sources and is looking to the IMO for leadership. Customers and consumers are becoming more concerned with lowering product emissions throughout their life cycles, particularly those from transportation. Thanks to the EU, the IMO cannot continue to put off a comprehensive discussion of this matter without running the risk of severely disrupting the shipping industry with multiple, conflicting levies on carbon emissions. Although the IMO may not introduce an obligatory carbon fee anytime soon, it is in the works and would have an impact on all global supply chains.

2.2 Rationale behind the Carbon tax

One of the main justifications for carbon taxes is that, given the level of technology, it is the most effective tool for stimulating all possible behavioral responses for reducing international maritime emissions and striking the most cost-effective balance among them (UNCTAD, 2016). This signal encourages the following reactions as the carbon tax is passed on in the form of higher pricing for carbon-based fuels (IMF-WBG, 2011):

- Enhancements to the technical design efficiency of new vessels, such as design changes
 to reduce their light weight, increase engine/propulsion efficiency, and integrate
 reduced carbon technology like batteries, biofuels, LNG, and hydrogen (in the long
 run).
- 2) optimization of average ship speeds, distances traveled, and port stays, as well as improved maintenance or refurbishment of existing ships' engines, propellers, and hulls, can all increase operational efficiency (for a given cargo weight)
- Other operator reactions include switching to larger (more efficient) ships (among various cargo categories) and boosting load factors.
- 4) changing customer demand away from heavy, long-distance products, whose costs rise in comparison to light, nearby products (such as high-value electronics), as well as

locally produced and unshipped goods and services (Parry et al., 2018).

The carbon tax offers the same compensation every ton of CO2 decreased, regardless of how it is achieved, which encourages equalization of the cost of the last ton lowered among mitigation options, resulting in cost-effectiveness. And in a changing environment, enacting a strong and predictable carbon tax is probably the single most crucial tool for encouraging investment in emissions-reducing technologies.

Carbon taxes can also generate substantial sums of money. If taxes were only collected domestically, it would make sense that the money would go to national budgets, but if taxes were collected internationally, the money might be better used for climate finance because national governments have less of a claim on the tax base (which is combusted in international waters). In reality, given that many developing nations' (more ambitious) mitigation obligations are dependent on getting outside funding, it could be particularly appropriate to establish a new revenue stream for the Green Climate Fund (GCF) (Parry et al., 2018).

2.3 Categorization the maritime industry into three sectors

It is challenging to estimate the value of global seaborne trade in monetary terms since trade estimates are typically expressed in terms of tons or ton-miles, which make them incomparable to statistics measuring the size of the global economy. However, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the operation of commercial ships generates roughly 380 billion US dollars in freight rates for the worldwide economy, or about 5% of all trade. (ICS, 2017)

Estimates of the volume of shipping trade (or "transportation work," as it is sometimes called) are frequently calculated in ton-miles. A general pattern of growth in the volume of global trade has been observed in the maritime industry throughout the past century. The expansion of free trade and the demand for consumer goods have been fueled by rising industrialization and the liberalization of national economies. Technology advancements have also increased the effectiveness and speed of shipping as a mode of transportation.

Estimates of global seaborne trade during the past 40 years have quadrupled, rising from just over 8 trillion ton-miles in 1968 to over 32 trillion ton-miles in 2008.

12
10
8
6
4
2
0
0
8661
16661
17anker trade^a
Main bulk
Container
Other dry cargo

Figure 2-2: International maritime trade by cargo type (in million tons)

Source: UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport, various issues. For 2006–2020, the breakdown by cargo type is based on Clarksons Research, Shipping Review and Outlook, Spring 2021 and Seaborne Trade Monitor, various issues.

Note: Given methodological differences, containerized trade data in tons sourced from Clarksons Research are not comparable with data in TEUs featured in tables 1.8 and 1.9 and figures 1.8 and 1.9 of this report and which are sourced from MDS Transmodal.

Source: UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport

The entire volume of crude oil traded was 1716 million tonnes, and the volume of other tanker trade was around 1202 million tonnes, according to the publication Review of maritime transport (2021) (UNCTAD RMT (2022)). The total volume of dry bulk trade for 2019–2020 was 5167 million tons, of which the main bulks—coal, grain, and iron ore—took up around 62% (or 3181 million tons), while the minor bulks—steel and forest products—took up the remaining 38%. (amounting to 1986 million tons). Data on container - based trade for 2021 was available, and it showed a roughly 7% increase from the figures for 2020 to 160 million TEU.

The data makes it clear that, with the exception of a few specialized vessels, the segmentation of maritime trade into the three categories of dry bulk, wet bulk, and container - based cargo will encompass substantially all of it. This has no bearing on the

^a Tanker trade includes crude oil, refined petroleum products, gas, and chemicals.

amount of cargo that is traded, and it has even less bearing on the value of the cargo (which is the important input for our econometric modelling).

2.3.1 Dry bulk trade

It represents around 54% of all seaborne trade, or more than 5 billion tons or 70,000 voyages annually. The three "Major Bulk" commodities account for 60% of dry bulk trading.

Coal (24%): Coking coal is used primarily in the making of steel (20%) and as thermal coal for the production of electricity (80%). 37% of the world's electricity is produced by coal-fired power plants. Major trade routes are as shown below:



Figure 2-3: Major trade routes for Coal

Source: (Eagle Bulk Shipping, 2021)

Grain (9%): 30% of soybeans and 70% of other cereals. Used as both animal feed and food for humans. Due to seasonality and erratic crop yields from year to year, trade patterns vary greatly. Major trade routes are as shown below:



Figure 2-4: Major trade routes of Grain

Source: (Eagle Bulk Shipping, 2021)

Iron ore (27%): any of a number of rock types with a high iron concentration (often 50% or higher). Used in the manufacture of steel. Brazil and Australia together export around 60% of the world's iron ore. Major trade routes are as shown below:



Figure 2-5: Major trade routes for Iron ore

Source: (Eagle Bulk Shipping, 2021)

2.3.2 Wet bulk trade

Crude oil and product oil are the two primary commodities in wet bulk commerce. The

global petrochemical and related sectors rely heavily on the trade of crude oil. Around the world, large amounts of crude oil are transported from oil-producing regions to developed and growing economies with significant fossil fuel consumption. Bulk oil traffic has historically been linked to routes from the Middle East to other locations across the world. However, greater trade flows from the Atlantic basin to east Asian markets have been observed due to growing US exports and refining capacity as well as geopolitical considerations like the oil export embargo against Iran. China continues to be the world's top importer of crude oil, primarily from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Oman, Russia, and Venezuela.

Maritime transportation, which follows extremely particular routes and is restricted by strategically placed passes known as chokepoints, is used to deliver the majority of the oil (62%). Oil from the *Persian Gulf* is a key supply that is transported by sea, with routes through the Strait of Malacca, the Suez Canal, China, Japan, and South Korea, as well as the Cape of Good Hope, connecting it to Europe, Asia, and North America. Through the Oresund Strait, Russian oil is mostly exported to European markets. Since there are few major producers, there is little oil trade over the Pacific. While Indonesia no longer exports much oil, Mexico still sends the majority of its oil to the US. Petroleum from Russia and the former Soviet Union that is pipelined to Europe as well as petroleum from Alaska and Canada that is pipelined to the United States represent significant continental migrations. Additional significant oil exports come from South America to North America, the North Sea to Europe, and Africa to North America (Notteboom, Pallis and Rodrigue, 2020).



Figure 2-6: Oil Transportation and Major Chokepoints

Source: Notteboom, Pallis and Rodrigue, 2020

2.3.3 Container trade

The container and the roro vessel, two significant developments from the 1960s that modernized the way we transport goods, transformed the world. Prior to the container, goods were either shipped loose or in haphazard bundles and packaging. Waste and damage were significant, and crates, bags, and barrels had to be manually removed off the ship. These liner ships transport all of our necessities, including food, medicine, computers, cars, and heavy equipment. Together, they move more than US\$ 4 trillion worth of commodities annually, or nearly 60% of the value of all seaborne trade (World Shipping Council, 2021). The trade corridors with the biggest volume and value are Trans-Pacific, Trans-Atlantic, and EU-Far East. This rise has been fuelled by rising US and Chinese imports as well as the EU economy recovering from the Eurozone crisis.

y-o-y change 250 30% Intra-Regional North-South Non-Mainlane East-Wes 25% Mainlane 200 20% 15% 150 10% 100 0% -10% -15% 2015 2013 2011 2017 2019 2021

Figure 2-7: Seaborne container trade

Source: Clarksons research, Shipping review & outlook (September, 2021)



Figure 2-8: Major container ship trade routes


Source: (GPF Team, 2016)

2.4 Types of costs impacted by carbon tax and by how much?

We will start by applying Stopford's shipping cash-flow model (Stopford, 2009). It explains how ship's earnings after expenses are deducted produce free cash flow, which is then utilized to pay taxes, dividends, and make profit for the ship's owner.

Below is the pictorial representation of simplified Stopford's shipping cash-flow model.

Figure 2-9: Shipping cash flow model



Source: (Stopford, 2009)

Ship running costs, which have to do with the ownership and operation of the vessel, are what the carrier uses to calculate the percentage of the freight rate that is demanded to move goods between two places. Fixed or varying factors impact how much it costs to operate a ship. (Stopford, 2009) identifies five main cost categories in the absence of a globally recognized standard cost classification for the shipping industry:

- 1. *Operating costs* on-going charges for maintaining and repairing the ship as well as costs for the crew, supplies, and other consumables. excluding fuel expenses.
- 2. Periodic maintenance costs incurred while the ship is docked for significant repairs.
- 3. *Voyage costs* are expenses related to making a certain voyage, such as fuel or diesel, port fees, and canal dues (if applicable).
- 4. Cargo-handling costs: the price of loading, stowing, and unloading cargo.
- 5. Capital costs these expenses are determined by how the ship is financed and may include interest, dividends, and the gradual repayment of loans.




Figure 2-10: Analysis of major costs of running a bulk carrier

Source: (Stopford, 2009)

The main ideas we shall discuss are summarized in Figure 1 above. Each box in the diagram includes the percentage cost for a ship that is ten years old, along with a summary of the major cost categories, factors that affect its value, and other information. In the remaining portions of this part, we will look at how the four major cost groups—operating costs (14 percent), routine maintenance (4 percent), voyage costs (40 percent), and capital costs (42 percent)—are combined to determine the ship's overall financial performance. The trends in fuel, capital, and other expenses illustrated in Figure 2 below demonstrate how these costs, which are combined to determine the cost of sea transport, are exceedingly volatile.

A careful examination of a ship's operating expenses reveals that a global carbon tax imposed by the IMO will have a direct impact on voyage costs. The following equation can be used to explain voyage costs:

where VC is voyage costs, FC is the fuel costs for main engines and auxiliaries, PD port and light dues, TP tugs and pilotage, and CD is canal dues.



Figure 2-11: Inflation in operating costs for three segments 2000-2022

Source: Prepared by author based on data from (Clarksons Research, 2022)

The below figure, which was provided by Stopford, shows that a significant portion of voyage costs goes toward paying for fuel. The increased global carbon tax will result in higher taxes on ships that burn fossil fuels, increasing overall fuel costs as well as overall voyage costs.

According to the cost breakdown below, which is based on a report by Kalli, J., Karvonen, T., & Makkonen, T. (2009), fuel costs range from 30% (for car and passenger ferries) to 53%. (for containers) of total costs. When a carbon tax is implemented, as Japan has

suggested, the price on bunker fuel would be roughly three times higher per ton because each ton of bunker fuel creates around three ton of CO2 (Executive, 2022). This requires a threefold increase in fuel prices, which equates to 90 percent of the entire costs incurred previously (for vehicle and passenger ferries) and 159 percent of the total expenditures incurred previously (for containers). This may result in an increase in the percentage of fuel expenses in overall operating costs to

(3*30%) / (1+60%) = 56.3% of new total cost (For car and passenger ferries) (3*53%) / (1+106%) = 77.2% of new total cost (For containers)




Figure 2-12: Running costs of ship

Source: Kalli, J., Karvonen, T., & Makkonen, T. (2009)

The statistics for other carriers will fall somewhere between the extremes mentioned above.

Chapter 3 Model description and research methodology

3.1 Choice of model and model description

Because of its interaction and spillovers with other regulatory policies and sectors as well as its macroeconomic consequences in the short and long term, it is challenging to assess any disturbances or shocks brought in the global trade in their whole. It is crucial to do a thorough empirical study using trade values, consumption and production data, and elasticities of the commodities involved because the global carbon tax is supposed to constitute a significant shock to the shipping industry. Gravity models, partial equilibrium models, and computable general equilibrium models are three models that are frequently employed in the business for this similar goal. (Chemingui, 2018)

Since they are factually founded on Newtonian gravity principles, gravity models are basically named that. According to gravity theories, trade between two nations is directly related to each nation's GDP and inversely proportionate to their distance from one another (similar to the Newton's gravitational law). The negative effects of distance have historically included rising freight costs as well as escalating linguistic and cultural barriers between distant places. Any change in trade policy, however, only has an impact until there has been significant trade penetration and integration. This can be done by utilizing simulation models of computable general or partial equilibrium.

Computable General Equilibrium (GE) and Partial Equilibrium (PE) models can be used to simulate the economic and trade effects of any shocks to the trade. The CGE model is based on the Ex-ante technique, which entails evaluating the impact of a new policy in the future through computer simulations while accounting for the interactions between the service, capital, labor, and other sectors (Chemingui, 2018). It is created by considering how supply and demand interact in various markets as modeled by (Marie-Esprit Léon Walras, 1984). These models are especially helpful when major, important policy choices entail cross-sectoral interactions. Although CGE models do offer a thorough overview of the economic and trade effects of different policy decisions, these models have a tendency to be extremely complex and are typically applied at a national or worldwide level. In a

partial equilibrium analysis, just the markets that are directly impacted by a policy move are looked at. Curves of supply and demand are used to show how policies affect prices. Utilizing producer and consumer surplus, one can gauge how well market participants are doing. A partial equilibrium study either overlooks the effects on other economic sectors or assumes that the relevant industry is extremely small and has little to no influence on other economic sectors. Below is a general overview of both the models

Table 3-1: General overview of both models

Tuble 3-1. General overview by both model	_	C
	Partial Equilibrium	General Equilibrium
Capturing economy wide linkages	NO	YES
Consistency with budget constraints	NO	YES
Capturing disaggregated effects	YES	NO
Capturing complicated policy mechanisms	YES	NO
Use of timely data	YES	NO
Capturing short and med. term effects	YES	NO
Capturing long term effects	NO	YES

Source: Prepared by author based on comparison from (Bacchetta et al., 2007)

Despite being extremely thorough and practical for projecting long-term effects on all sectors of the economy, the CGE model, use of the PE model is advantageous for a variety of reasons given that this research is focused on the effects of a global carbon tax by IMO on the primary three shipping segments. First, it is challenging to get precise trade information because the shipping industry database is still largely hypothetical. Additionally, the effects of shipping on other industries, like labor and capital, are very subtle and long-lasting, necessitating substantial study and extensive quantitative exercise. Due to the wide variety of cargoes, the elasticity of the commodities supporting the primary three shipping segments is also poorly studied in the literature and challenging to assess.

3.2 The Econometric model (GSIM)

Francois and Hall created GSIM as an expansion and enhancement of SMART (2003). It shares the same understanding that a reasonably straightforward yet adaptable PE framework was required for a thorough analysis of trade policy. One oversimplifying premise of SMART was that global markets are neglected and everything is considered in terms of bilateral partnerships. Therefore, the main distinction between the two tools is that in SMART, only import markets are subject to the market clearing rules, whereas in GSIM, the entire global market is cleared. In the most straightforward scenario, we examine a change in trade policy between two nations, such as a reduction in tariffs, and we also analyze how it will affect the rest of the globe. Global markets increase the model's complexity and need more computing power, both of which are currently readily available. Following the formulation of Jammes and Olarreaga (2005), the theoretical model on which GSIM is built up can be summarized as follows.

3.2.1 The Setup

"Below extract is from UNCTAD publication (Bacchetta et al., 2007) written in own words by the author". In addition, a detailed description of GSIM model with relevant equations as per (François and H Keith Hall, 2002) can be found in the appendix.

If we want to assess ex ante how a change in trade policy will affect prices, trade flows, tariff revenues, and welfare. We begin with a visual representation of the most basic scenario, which is the impact of a small country with set global pricing, P*, eliminating a tariff (see Figure below). (Bacchetta et al., 2007)

Domestic supply is Y_0 , domestic demand is C_0 , and imports are M_0 at world price P^{*+} t. The removal of the tariff t lowers the domestic price by the full amount t, increasing domestic demand to C_1 and domestic supply to Y_1 , as a result. M_0 to M_1 imports grow. Because the domestic price has changed, consumers can now afford to buy more items, which results in a rise in consumer surplus (a+b+c+d) (i.e. C_1-C_0). The removal of tariffs results in a loss of producer surplus (a) and a reduction in tax income from tariffs (c). The triangle beneath the import demand curve, or the region (b+d), represents the net gain of

eliminating tariffs. The deadweight loss is influenced by the tariff's square in the same way that the triangle's height and base are determined by the tariff. (Bacchetta et al., 2007)

Overall, we see that when an import tax is removed for a small country, the domestic price is reduced by the whole amount of the duty (t). Additionally, it raises imports and decreases revenue from tariffs. The net gain from eliminating a tariff, however, always depends on the square of tariff.




Figure 3-1: Tariff reduction in small country case

Source: (Bacchetta et al., 2007)

We suppose that, in the case of a big country, the foreign supply curve X slopes upward, as shown in panel (d) of Figure below. The pricing equilibrium with the tariff is at $P_0 + t$. When the tariff is removed, the export supply transfers to X, creating a new domestic price P_0 . Because of the upward slope of the supply curve, the domestic price decline is not equal to the whole tariff t. As a result, the foreign price (P) in the existence of the tariff is less than the free trade price (P_0), resulting in a terms of trade benefit (e) for the importing country. Recall that the price of a country's exports divided by the price of its imports typically defines the terms of trade. (*Bacchetta et al.*, 2007)

Eliminating a tariff (or NTM) results in lower domestic pricing, more imports, and less domestic supply, just as in the case of a tiny country. All three effects, however, are mitigated by the assumption that the foreign supply curve is upward sloping. Given that

there have been improvements in terms of trade, the welfare change now appears to be slightly different. The region e multiplies the price decline by the new import demand, M_1 , to calculate the terms of trade losses. The net gain triangle still depends on the tariff square, t^2 , and corresponds to (b + d). Therefore, for suitably small tariffs and for big tariffs, the net welfare impact, shown by the symbol e - (b + d), is positive. (Bacchetta et al., 2007)




Figure 3-2: Tariff reduction in large country case

Source: (Bacchetta et al., 2007)

3.2.2 The Harberger triangle

Now let's look at a theoretical examination of how the removal of a tariff would affect trade flows, tariff income, and welfare. Think of a situation where the representative person in the economy has quasi-linear (QL) preferences for two different goods: good zero, the numéraire, and good one (without a subscript), the import-competing product. Thus, the utility of the customer is:

$$U = C0 + u(C)$$
 Equation 3-1

where u (.) is a rising, concave sub-utility function and C_0 and C are the quantities of numéraire and good that have been ued, respectively. The following are two advantages of QL preferences:

- "The indirect utility function is the sum of income I and consumer surplus u (C) PC, where P = P*. (1+t) is the domestic price with t being the tariff rate (it can be shown that the consumer derives no consumer surplus from good zero)." (Bacchetta et al., 2007)
- Since the marginal utility of income is always 1, u' = P when the consumer is acting optimally. (Bacchetta et al., 2007)

Profits π and tariff revenue tM are added together to create income. So, after accounting for the representative person's ideal decisions, welfare as a function of the tariff is

$$W(t) = I + u(C) - PC = \pi + tM + u(C) + PC$$
 Equation 3-2

and the derivative of this expression with respect to the tariff is

$$W' = u'C' - (C + PC') + \pi' + M + tM'$$
 Equation 3-3
= $(u' - P)C' - C + Y + M + tM'$
= $Y + M - C + tM'$

Hotelling's lemma, which states that the profit function's price derivative is output (i.e., $\pi = Y$), was used to move from line one to two of (*Equation 3.3*), and the second property of QL preferences was used to move from line two to line three (namely that the marginal utility of income is one). Finally, while you read from the third to the last paragraph, keep in mind that, by definition, consumption (C) for the commodity that competes with imports equals the total of domestic output (Y) and imports (M). (*Bacchetta et al., 2007*)

Now let us take a second-order Taylor approximation of (*Equation 3.3*) around t = 0:

$$W(t) \cong W(0) + tW'(t) + \frac{1}{2}t2W''(t)$$
 Equation 3-4

so, noting that at t = 0 W'' (t) = 0 and that W'' (t) = M' (this can be directly derived from simply noting that W'' = M' + tM'' = M' if t = O),

$$\Delta W \equiv W(t) - W(0) \cong \frac{1}{2} t2 M''$$

Equation 3-5

The welfare change is $t\Delta M/2$, or the area of a right-angle triangle whose height and base are respectively the tariff and import changes—the well-known "Harberger triangle"—because tM' = dM (that is, the change in imports from a position of zero tariff is the tariff times the price derivative of import demand). (Bacchetta et al., 2007)

It is helpful to translate expression (*Equation 3.5*) in terms of the elasticity of import demand because functional forms in simulation models are frequently of the constantelasticity type. To do this, express M' as dM/dP, where P is the domestic price (p^* is the world price), and before $P = P^*(1+t)$ was the domestic price, then write:

$$M' = \frac{M}{P} \left(\frac{P}{M} \frac{dM}{dP} \right) = \frac{M}{P} \varepsilon$$
 Equation 3-6

where the price elasticity of import demand ε is in algebraic form (i.e. negative); so, finally,

$$\Delta W = \frac{1}{2} \frac{M}{P} \quad \varepsilon t \le 0$$
 Equation 3-7

According to this formula, the net welfare gain ΔW brought about by the removal of a tariff t is solely dependent on the demand's own-price elasticity and the tariff itself. Where did we err in making the necessary assumption to eliminate cross-price elasticities? Going back to the utility function, it stands to reason that there could only be one cross-price elasticity if there were only two items. Because the utility function is highly (i.e. additively) separable, even that option has been ruled out.

We could easily generalize it to $X_0 + u(X_1) + ... + u(X_n)$; as long as it remains additive, no cross-price elasticity will appear in (*Equation 3.7*). But we need to remember that this is only an assumption on preferences and not a feature of the data. (*Bacchetta et al., 2007*)

 $[W(t_1) + W(t_2)]/2$ $t_1 t_2$ W(t)

Figure 3-3: How tariff elimination increases welfare

Source: (Bacchetta et al., 2007)

Tariff variation alone lowers welfare since it decreases with the square of the tariff in equation (*Equation 3.7*) for many items. Consider a two-good economy with the following policy alternatives to show why:

- a low tariff t_1 on good one and a high tariff t_2 on good two
- a uniform tariff $t = (t_1 + t_2)/2$ on both.

Average welfare generated in the two markets is shown in Figure as a parabolic function of tariffs, with a maximum at $t_1 = t_2 = 0$.

Welfare is W(t) under a uniform tariff; under two differential tariffs, it is the average of $W(t_1)$ and $W(t_2)$. Because the arc is above the chord, it is clear that the former is higher than the latter; this is a straightforward application of the mathematical idea known as Jensen's inequality. (Bacchetta et al., 2007)

3.2.3 Product differentiation

Most simulation models make use of the "Armington assumption," which states that different types of goods are distinguished by their place of origin (Armington, 1969). According to evidence cited by Schott (2004), the price of commodities imported into the US is connected with the amount of income in the exporting nation at a highly disaggregated level. This shows that wealthy nations export higher-quality or more advanced types than do developing nations. When types are imported from nations with comparable wealth levels, the Armington assumption's justification becomes less obvious. The presumption of uniformity among national variants should be avoided for a more technical reason.

The first issue has to do with specialty and price. In a Heckscher-Ohlin model with an equal number of factors and goods, all nations are fully diversified, all products' outputs are determined by full employment (one per factor of production), and factor prices are set by zero profit conditions (one per good). In this scenario, as anticipated by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, a tariff shift will result in factor-price changes.

Things are less smooth when there are more commodities than factors, which is the common scenario in simulation exercises. Two scenarios can then occur:

- In general, the sectoral output levels of our interest country are indeterminate if the vector of good prices is such that the country is fully diversified because there are insufficient instances of full employment to decide all output levels.
- Each nation produces the same number of items as its factors, placing them in separate "diversity cones" if the price vector diverges from the specific value that ensures diversification. (Bacchetta et al., 2007)

As a result, the quantity of goods produced is now determined by good prices rather than only factor prices. This makes analysis more challenging. There are numerous remedies available. Assuming domestic varieties are not exact equivalents of one another is the alternate and typical solution to our issue; this is known as the Armington assumption. The concept of a product has now been split into two categories: "goods," like bananas, and

"varieties," such bananas from Cameroon, Costa Rica, or St. Lucia. The Armington premise, however, adds a fresh challenge. Imagine that we give all of our demand functions constant-elasticity forms, leaving us with nothing but elasticities to worry about. We must keep in mind, though, that the benefit of PE is to "go disaggregate," so if we import items from, say, 50 different nations and 5,000 different goods (at the HS-6 level). We may have 250,000 own- and cross-price elasticities to estimate with one distinct variant per nation. Of course, this is far too many. Kee et al. (2006) provided own-price elasticity values at the HS-6 level, but cross-price estimates have not yet been discovered, and even if they had, it would be difficult to evaluate a model with 250,000 elasticities.

3.2.4 Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES)

Therefore, based on the discussion in section 3.2.3, a further decomplicating component—referred to as "two-stage budgeting"—must be included. In simulation exercises, individual utility function forms are typically assumed to ensure strong separability between goods. As a result, cross-price elasticities between goods (as opposed to national varieties) are all equal to zero, and CES (constant elasticity of substitution) is assumed to be constant for national varieties.

All of these presumptions may be adjusted in accordance with the modeler's requirements, although doing so will add complexity. On the supply side, a similar premise is frequently made, according to which export markets are only insufficient alternatives to one another. A CET (constant elasticity of transformation) function is the equivalent of the CES function, and changes in producer pricing result in smooth substitution across export markets rather than total withdrawal.

As per a research by (Commission, 2006) and as illustrated in the figure below Four home country offer curves with σ (CES) set at 2, 1.1, 0.9, and 0.5. The offer curves only take on the typical shape seen in a traditional trade model when the elasticity setting is considerably above unity; they achieve this by passing through both the point E (equilibrium consumption) and the point A (endowment point).




Figure 3-4: Home offer curves with different substitution elasticities in an Armington model

Source: (Commission, 2006)

3.3 Setting up the econometric model

We'll use a partial equilibrium (PE) econometric model, which accounts for trade values between nations and regions as well as the elasticity of these trade values (as discussed in section 3.2). We must take into account all nations in the world in addition to the top trading nations mentioned above because it can only be employed when all global trade is taken into account. To better reflect all geographical regions, the other countries will be put together in regions due to the diverse nature of the three shipping categories and the economic diversity and objectives between the regions.

3.3.1 Country selection

We will choose the countries to utilize in our econometric model based on the description of the three main categories of international maritime trade as well as the primary routes linked with those segments. In order to match our model, this choice will also take into account the remainder of the world's regions and the major shipping hubs/ports associated with each sector.

Australia/ New Zealand: A sizable portion of Oceania is represented by this region.
 Bituminous coal and (non-agglomerated) iron ores and concentrates (not
 agglomerated) are the main products traded from. Petroleum oils (product) and crude

- oil are the two main imports into this region. China is its main export and import partner, followed by Japan and the United States. Although Australia and New Zealand also engage in significant intra-regional trade. In actuality, Australia is New Zealand's second-largest exporter and importer.
- 2. Brazil: Brazil has the largest economy in South America and is a major exporter of cereals like soybeans as well as iron ore to the global market. Additionally, it is a significant commerce hub for the South American region and one of the world economy's fastest-emerging markets. Brazil used to be a major exporter of goods, including crude oil, to North America and other South American nations, but as domestic consumption has increased recently, it has turned into a net importer. It is a wise choice to represent South America because it is the biggest nation with a growing economy.
- 3. **China**: We have selected China as one of the nations for our model because it has the second-largest economy in the world and is one of the greatest maritime nations. This country will be significantly impacted by the IMO's introduction of a global carbon price in shipping due to its sizable fleet of ships and substantial reliance on maritime trade. China is a major exporter of manufactured goods such monolithic integrated circuits and transmission apparatus. Additionally, it is a significant importer of big bulk goods and crude oil. As a result, it is crucial to all three of the shipping-related businesses.
- 4. Indonesia: Indonesia is a significant exporter of low-grade coal, mostly to satisfy the substantial regional demand from China and India. It is a developing nation in Southeast Asia with a special geographic setting that gives it easy access to major commerce routes that run via the Malacca Straits and the ability to serve as a transit place for liners. The country now has a high demand for both dry and wet bulk commodities due to rising population and per capita energy consumption.
- 5. Japan: It is the next largest economy to China in the Asia region. It is also the home to one of biggest liner shipping companies. Its major trading partners are China and the United States. Its major imports are crude oil and the major exports includes finished products like automobiles and monolithic integrated circuits.
- 6. Least developed countries (LDC)/ Small island developing states (SIDS): We have

- considered this group based on the study of (IMO, 2018) where it was stated that "extra climate mitigation policy measures in shipping could have a negative impact on their economies". To bolster this claim, it would be sage to research how these countries in these regions might be affected.
- 7. EU-27: Since the EU permits free market access among its member states, it will be taken into consideration as a whole. The EU's developed economies import the majority of their raw commodities, including crude oil, coal, and iron ore. The block exports finished goods and industrial products in large quantities. Given its extensive nautical history, the EU is home to numerous important ports, particularly in Western Europe's Le Havre–Hamburg region, which also serves as the entryway to the hinterland market. Along with being one of the major ship-owning nations in the world, it is also important since it has the second-largest economy after the US. The EU is a leader in both the implementation of market-based policies like ETS, CBAM, and carbon taxation.
- 8. Middle eastern nations: Large oil and natural gas deposits are found in the Middle East, and the region's economies are reliant on these resources. Over the past few decades, it has been a significant provider of products and crude oil to the rest of the world. Although Middle Eastern nations have recently worked to diversify their economies to lessen their reliance on oil, this fossil fuel nevertheless remains the most important export good and the region's primary source of income. Geographical distances to demand centers in China will be crucial in determining if any rises in freight charges will result in a change in supply and trade routes, especially with the development of the US and other nations as prospective competitors in the global market for petroleum.
- 9. Nigeria: Nigeria is a significant developing African economy and a big producer of petroleum products. Given its potential and changing demography, it will undoubtedly have a significant effect on the economic growth of the area and of Africa as a whole. In order to better comprehend the effects of trade and the economy on the region, it was decided to portray a significant African economy.
- 10. Russian Federation: Russia is the leading non-OPEC producer of crude oil, supplying numerous EU nations primarily through pipelines. However, given its proved reserves, it is currently the 2nd largest producer of natural gas and hopes to overtake it when the

Arctic sea route becomes more frequently ice-free throughout the year. Although Western Europe, a major hub for bunker supplies and an exporter of refined goods, has seen its economy grow increasingly dependent on petroleum products in recent years, it also provides the majority of the crude oil needs for those countries' refineries. Even though it is currently a small player in maritime trade, the potential and relevance it has in terms of fossil fuels makes it a worthwhile nation to research.

- 11. United Kingdom: In our research, the UK was taken into account as a different country. This is mostly due to the fact that its economy is distinct from the EU and significant enough to be taken into account in our econometric modelling. Its main imports are fuel from non-EU countries, mostly driven by rising gas imports, while its main exports are crude oil (to EU states) and also manufactured goods (e.g. Aircraft parts).
- 12. United States: The US is the largest economy in the world and is the top exporter and importer of important dry and wet bulk commodities. It is also growing as a significant provider of petroleum products in international trade. The largest exporter of agricultural goods, including grain and soybeans, to Asia and South America is the US Gulf Coast. Instability in the maritime sector has already been brought on by recent trade policies of the US administration, including higher taxes on some raw material items (such as aluminium and steel) and tariffs on Chinese imports, in expectation of retaliation actions by other countries.
- 13. Rest of Africa: We have included all the maritime nations of African continent except Nigeria in this group.
- 14. Rest of Asia: It is challenging to fully comprehend Asia as a whole due to its size, diverse economies, and uneven levels of economic progress. This region will comprise major maritime nations of this region other than the ones already included as separate countries.
- Rest of Europe: This includes all the European maritime nations excluding the UK and EU-27.
- 16. Rest of North America: Aside from the weaker economies of Central America, the rest of North America will consist of Canada and Mexico
- 17. Rest of South America: This region consists of all the maritime nations of Latin

America except Brazil

With the above selection of countries and regions we have tried to completely encompass the effect of disruption brought by the global maritime carbon tax. We have also posted the snippets from WITS database in **Annex 2** where the groups as mentioned in this section were created to use the advanced query module available on their website.

3.4 Trade value calculation for three shipping segments

The World Bank publishes data on imports, exports, and tariffs in the WITS database. First, we took the total bilateral trade values for the countries/regions listed above from the WITS database. This was done using the advanced query module available on the WITS website¹. In order to focus solely on marine trade, we calculated the proportion of maritime transit for each bilateral trade pair, excluding transport via pipeline, pipeline, road, and air. Finally, we divided marine trade flows into the three major shipping segments—wet bulk, dry bulk, and container trade—in terms of value.

3.4.1 Bilateral trade value from WITS

We were able to determine the bilateral trade values for the nations/regions indicated in section 3.4.1 from WITS. Then, using these values, the bilateral trade flow matrix (18x18) was created. All trade values were calculated c.i.f. Where more than one country was bundled together, intra-regional trade was also taken into consideration. Below is a 6x6 snap shot for the trade matrix.

Table 3-2: 6x6 snapshot of Bilateral trade value matrix (in million USD)

Countries	Aus/NZ	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan
Aus/NZ	11070,0	1342,9	179885,1	18035,2	10384,4	55005,7
Brazil	871,3	0,0	109877,9	41210,1	2621,5	9885,3
China	84705,4	53464,0	0,0	642306,5	56227,2	185664,5
EU-27	55603,9	42868,2	335470,1	3887115,3	14155,6	92737,5

¹http://wits.worldbank.org/WITS/WITS/AdvanceQuery/RawTradeData/QueryDefinition.aspx?Page=RawTradeData

Countries	Aus/NZ	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan
Indonesia	4775,5	1933,1	63886,5	22427,8	0,0	21530,9
Japan	20383,9	5427,9	205523,7	99494,2	17976,7	0,0

Source: Compiled by author using data from WITS/ UN Comtrade

3.4.2 Conversion of Bilateral trade value to maritime trade values

Trade between two nations does not always occur by sea. Different modes are used to conduct international trade. A sizable portion of it involves international maritime trade. The geography, the distances between trading partners, and the accessibility of the infrastructure all affect the mode of trade. For instance, trade in the EU-27 is split between land, rail, and sea transportation, mostly due to the close proximity of the trading nations and the availability of the infrastructure for multimodal transportation. We have accounted for these variables while determining the maritime trade values for each bilateral trade value in our matrix. As per a new release by Eurostat², in specifics, shipping accounted for 53% of EU imports and 48% of EU exports to third countries. Similar data is also available for the US from BTS (2020). 3.44

After taking into consideration the above factors, we found out the share of maritime trade between the several bilateral pairs in our matrix. Below is an extract for the trade entering EU by sea.

Table 3-3: 6x6 snapshot of Maritime trade value matrix(in million USD)

Countries	Aus/NZ	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan
Aus/NZ	9963,0	1329,5	178086,2	17854,8	10280,5	54455,6
Brazil	862,6	0,0	108779,1	40798,0	2595,3	9786,5
China	83858,4	52929,4	0,0	635883,5	55664,9	183807,8
EU-27	55047,9	42439,5	332115,4	2332269,2	14014,1	91810,1
Indonesia	4727,7	1913,8	63247,7	22203,5	0,0	21315,6
Japan	20180,1	5373,7	203468,5	98499,2	17796,9	0,0

Source: Compiled by author using data from WITS/ UN Comtrade

² https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7667714/6-28092016-AP-EN.pdf

Figure 3-5: EU international trade in goods by mode of transport, 2015 (based on value)

Source: Eurostat news release, 2016³

Created with Datawrapper




Figure 3-6: U.S. International Trade Carried in 2020 by Cargo Type (Weight/Value)

Source: Prepared by author based on data from BTS (2020)

3.4.3 Extracting trade values for three shipping segments

In order to obtain the trade values for our particular set of product groups—such as wet

³ https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7667714/6-28092016-AP-EN.pdf

bulk, dry bulk, etc.—we once again employed the WITS database. The values for each trade were taken from the database using the underlying major commodity. The maritime share of that trade type was then calculated by subtracting a similar percentage (as described in section 3.4.2) from the trade value.

Table 3-4: 6x6 snapshot of Maritime wet-bulk trade value matrix(in million USD)

Countries	Aus/NZ	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan
Aus/NZ	583,4	0,0	17344,5	90,8	943,5	15712,0
Brazil	0,5	0,0	16305,7	4389,1	15,1	77,1
China	1580,7	46,6	0,0	620,5	475,4	466,4
EU-27	655,0	2481,3	6519,9	108314,4	487,4	666,0
Indonesia	1213,7	0,0	4641,4	223,5	0,0	3293,8
Japan	2582,9	26,0	1607,6	33,6	102,1	0,0

Source: Compiled by author

Table 3-5: 6x6 snapshot of Maritime dry-bulk trade value matrix(in million USD)

Countries	Aus/NZ	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan
Aus/NZ	218,7	927,1	112498,3	3883,0	4029,2	27339,0
Brazil	65,2	0,0	38793,7	4727,3	293,4	5699,5
China	290,2	276,0	0,0	239,2	530,6	1319,5
EU-27	39,5	87,7	2040,7	17830,9	58,7	25,0
Indonesia	6,4	0,0	9825,0	340,6	0,0	3131,6
Japan	4,3	0,0	371,2	362,1	46,5	0,0

Source: Compiled by author

Table 3-6: 6x6 snapshot of Maritime container trade value matrix(in million USD)

Countries	Aus/NZ	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan
Aus/NZ	9160,8	402,5	48243,4	13881,0	5307,9	11404,7
Brazil	797,0	0,0	53679,7	31681,6	2286,8	4009,9
China	81987,5	52606,7	0,0	635023,8	54658,9	182021,9
EU-27	54353,3	39870,5	323554,9	2206123,9	13468,0	91119,2

Countries	Aus/NZ	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan
Indonesia	3507,7	1913,7	48781,3	21639,4	0,0	14890,2
Japan	17592,9	5347,6	201489,7	98103,6	17648,4	0,0

Source: Compiled by author

3.5 Tariff and Non-tariff barriers

For finding out the initial tariffs, the WITS database was used. The AHS (effectively applied tariff) was checked and weighted average calculation was done to arrive on the final bilateral tariff in case of country groups/ regions. Below is the 6x6 snippet of initial bilateral tariff as secured from the WITS database.

Table 3-7: 6x6 Snippet of initial bilateral tariff matrix

Countries	Aus/NZ	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan
Aus/NZ	1,000	1,126	1,004	1,042	1,011	1,028
Brazil	1,031	1,000	1,068	1,041	1,074	1,065
China	1,000	1,149	1,000	1,042	1,009	1,039
EU-27	1,030	1,142	1,068	1,000	1,088	1,014
Indonesia	1,000	1,167	1,004	1,027	1,000	1,009
Japan	1,001	1,132	1,070	1,002	1,011	1,000

Source: Compiled by Author with data from WITS database

Initial non-tariff measures (NTM)

As per research by (Anderson and Eric Van Wincoop, 2004), the trade costs are significant; a representative nation ad valorem tax equivalent estimate of a 170% overall trade barrier is constructed below. Costs for shipping, crossing borders, and local distribution are all included from the overseas producer to the domestic consumer. Economic policy and trade costs are intricately related. Tariffs, the tariff equivalents of quotas, and trade barriers connected to the exchange rate system are direct policy instruments that are less significant than other policies (transport infrastructure investment, law enforcement, and related property rights institutions, informational institutions, regulation, language). Trade costs have significant effects on wellbeing.

Transportation costs

Retail and wholesale distribution costs

Border related costs

Transportation costs

Tra

Figure 3-7:Tariff equivalents per trade costs type

Source: Prepared by author based on (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004)

Trade costs encompass any cost involved in delivering a good to a final consumer other than the marginal cost of manufacturing the good itself. These costs include transportation costs (both freight costs and time costs), policy obstacles (tariffs and non-tariff barriers), information expenses, contract enforcement expenses, expenses related to the use of various currencies, legal and regulatory expenses, and local distribution expenses (wholesale and retail). The trade costs are normally reported in terms of their ad-valorem equivalent. According to the formula (1.7=1.55*1.74-1), the 170% headline figure consists of 55% costs for local distribution and 74% for overseas trade.

For industrialized nations, a rough estimate of the tax equivalent of "representative" trade costs is 170%. The breakdown of this figure is as follows:

$$1.21(transportation\ costs)\ x\ 1.44(border$$
 Equation 3-8
$$-related\ costs)\ x\ 1.55(retail\ costs)\ =\ 2.70$$

$$2.70-1=1.70\ or\ 170\%$$

Transportation expenses account for 21%, border-related trade obstacles for 44%, and retail and wholesale distribution costs for 55%. Therefore, the overall cost of foreign trade is almost 74% (0.74=1.21*1.44-1). The benchmark cost of retail and wholesale distribution is set at 55%, which is about typical for industrialized nations.

As per a paper (Hummels, 1999), he studied the geography of trade costs encompassing the findings of various previous research already done on the topic (McCallum (1995), Helliwell (1996, 1997), and Wei (1996)) showed a "home bias" in the consumption of trade flows. He also stated a well-known fact that trade reduces with increasing distance as discussed earlier w.r.t. the gravity theory of trade. A technical relationship was developed between the freight and the distance to calculate the substitution elasticities and trade barrier equivalents. A different but a fruitful approach was also used by (Elswijk, 2012) in his research where he found the freight cost tariff equivalent for European region. We will be applying a similar approach in calculating the freight cost tariff equivalents taking the distances between the trading countries into account.

To determine a freight cost tariff equivalent, we must first create a distance table that takes into consideration the distances between the various ports and the areas we have chosen for our econometric model. Based on the assumption that the majority of the freight arrives at each nation's major port, the distance between ports is calculated. For smaller countries, this presumption is negligible, but for larger countries like Brazil, China, and Russia, it grows exponentially. Additionally, a distance assumption was made while computing the distances between regions and ports as well as between regions themselves. Since Singapore controls 80% of SIDS's trade, those countries' distances from other countries and regions were largely determined by Singapore's location. A matrix consisting of (18x18) 324 distances was created. Below is a snippet of the distance table with the full distance table available in the Annex 9.

Table 3-8: 6x6 Snippet of bilateral distance table matrix(in nautical miles)

Countries	Aus/NZ	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan
Aus/NZ	4270,0	8627,0	3307,0	9461,0	1276,0	3548,0
Brazil	8627,0	1200,0	11065,0	5430,0	8541,0	11500,0
China	3307,0	11065,0	700,0	10525,0	2523,0	933,0
EU-27	9461,0	5430,0	10525,0	2050,0	8550,0	11078,0
Indonesia	1276,0	8541,0	2523,0	8550,0	862,0	3125,0

Countries	Aus/NZ	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan
Japan	3548,0	11500,0	933,0	11078,0	3125,0	226,0

Source: Compiled by Author based on (Bertoli, Goujon and Santoni, 2016)

After completing the distance table matrix, next step is to use the tariff estimated for the trade pairs in Section 3.4.2 and apply it to all the distances to find out the freight cost tariff equivalent using below:

Freight cost tariff equivalent
$$= \left(\frac{Distance}{6154.17}\right) x$$
 Initial tariff $+ 1$ Equation 3-9

The bilateral distance table matrix was used to calculate an average distance of 6154.17. A new tariff was determined to take into account the effect of distance between the two maritime trade nations after this average distance was fixed at the original bilateral tariff from Section 3.4.2. As a result, the cost barrier will be larger for far-off countries and vice versa. Below is a 6x6 snippet of the freight cost tariff equivalent

Table 3-9: 6x6 Snippet of the initial tariffs corrected for distance

Countries	Aus/NZ	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan
Aus/NZ	1,000	1,176	1,002	1,064	1,002	1,016
Brazil	1,044	1,000	1,122	1,036	1,103	1,121
China	1,000	1,267	1,000	1,071	1,004	1,006
EU-27	1,047	1,126	1,116	1,000	1,123	1,025
Indonesia	1,000	1,232	1,002	1,038	1,000	1,004
Japan	1,001	1,247	1,011	1,004	1,005	1,000

Source: Compiled by Author

The 21% transport cost comprises 9% in taxes to reflect the time worth of products in transit as well as **directly assessed freight charges**. To obtain our initial trade cost equivalent, we must subtract the freight rates from the transport cost component because we are separately accounting for them in our model. This must be subtracted from the 21%

transportation costs as shown below:

The NTM computation is performed in the same manner for other trade pairs. Below is a 6x6 snippet of initial NTMs after freight and distance correction.

Table 3-10: 6x6 Snippet of the initial NTMs corrected for freight and distance

Countries	Aus/NZ	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan
Aus/NZ	2,701	2,307	2,695	2,558	2,696	2,665
Brazil	2,603	2,701	2,429	2,620	2,470	2,431
China	2,701	2,104	2,701	2,542	2,692	2,688
EU-27	2,597	2,421	2,442	2,701	2,427	2,646
Indonesia	2,701	2,183	2,697	2,616	2,701	2,691
Japan	2,699	2,149	2,677	2,693	2,689	2,701

Source: Compiled by Author

3.6 Supply and demand elasticities

Elasticity is a term used in economics to describe how a good or service's total quantity required changes in response to changes in its price. If the amount demanded of a product changes more than proportionally as its price rises or falls, it is said to be elastic. In contrast, a product is said to be inelastic if changes in price have minimal effect on changes in quantity demanded.

Demand for a product or service is influenced by a number of variables, including price, income level, and personal preference. The quantity requested of the commodity or service changes whenever one of these variables changes. Demand's sensitivity to a change in price is quantified economically as price elasticity of demand. Price elasticity of demand is the measurement of the change in quantity required as a result of a change in the price of a good or service.

A good or service's responsiveness to supply after a change in its market price is measured by its price elasticity of supply. Basic economic theory states that when a good's price grows, so will its supply. A good's supply will fall when its price rises, on the other hand.

Wet bulk cargoes

We know that the volume and total value of trade in the wet bulk segment are both dominated by crude oil transport. As a result, evaluating the elasticity for this segment depends heavily on the demand elasticity of crude oil. Crude oil's demand and supply elasticity are thought to be inelastic in the short run. This is primarily caused by the fact that all major economies are dependent on fossil fuels and that producers change oil output and long-distance transportation with relative lag times. As a result, despite rising crude oil prices, only a slight drop in demand is seen (Caldara, Cavallo and Iacoviello, 2019). In the same study, it was determined that the elasticities of supply and demand were roughly -0.13 and +0.13, respectively.

For the purpose of our study we will be taking a uniform export supply elasticity of 0.2. The composite import demand elasticity input is done considering the sensitivity of an importing nation to the crude oil price. For e.g. (Dayo and Adegbulugbe, 1987) suggested the value of -0.846 for Nigeria. (Ashraf et al., 2018) suggested demand elasticities of -0.18 for China, -0.08 for India and -0.07 for Pakistan. All these elasticities are for short-term. For Turkey a value of -0.11 was calculated by (Kavaz, İsmail. 2020). Furthe studies like (Tsirimokos, 2011) also suggested vey low price elasticity for import demand of crude oil.




Figure 3-8: Oil Demand and Supply Elasticities Implied by the SVAR

Source: (Caldara, Cavallo and Iacoviello, 2019)

Dry bulk cargoes

The demand for steel on the global market dominates the dry bulk category, which is also dominated by the volume and trade of the key raw materials for steel manufacturing, namely coal and iron ore. Since bauxite ore is also one of the main dry bulk cargoes being transported, the demand elasticity of aluminum, in addition to steel, has an impact on the overall elasticity in this segment. The study report calculated the composite demand elasticities of numerous mineral commodities utilizing the divisia moment technique, price flexibility, and working expenditure model (Fernandez, V., 2018). Using data from 1980 to 2015, it identifies the demand elasticities of 25 nations as well as several global areas.

Supply and substitution elasticities in the US were assessed to be between 1 and 3 and 4 to 7, respectively, according to a report by (US international trade commission, 2007). In this research, we will take into account supply elasticity of 2 and substitution elasticity of 5 as was similarly considered in a research by (Sathe, A. (Amit), 2019) on "Economic and trade impact of IMO 2020 Sulphur regulations on main shipping segments".

Container cargoes

It is exceedingly challenging to determine the precise elasticities of the underlying commodities in this segment because the majority of these commodities are very varied and can include both elastic and inelastic goods, including luxury or subpar goods.

In fact, as nearly all cargoes, even minor amounts of dry and wet bulk cargoes, are transported in container ships, the heterogeneity of the commodities carried in these vessels can also be portrayed as combined elasticities of global trade in general. Therefore, from a global trade prospective, liner segment elasticities were estimated. A supply elasticity of 0.75 and substitution elasticity of 2 is considered in this research.

3.7 Model scenarios

The policy change at the core of this research is the introduction of a global carbon tax for shipping by IMO. At present there is no confirmed price of a carbon tax or fuel levy decided by the IMO but there are already some member states and even some shipping lines who

have proposed a figure. This was earlier discussed in the Chapter 2.

In summary of the review in Chapter two, one of the first countries to make a serious proposal for a carbon shipping tax was the Marshall and Solomon Islands, which suggested a cost of \$100 per ton of carbon dioxide (CO2) starting in early 2021 (Lo, 2021). Under the proposed global carbon tax, the maritime sector would be compelled to pay \$56 per ton of CO2 beginning in 2025. The tax would increase by \$5 every five years, from \$135 per ton of CO2 in 2030 to a maximum of \$637 per ton by 2040, according to the Japan's current proposal. The major shipping company Maersk imposed a \$150 carbon tax on shipping fuel, which equates to a \$450 rise in fuel costs, in another article by (Wittels, 2021b). On the other hand, the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), a global trade group for ship owners, asked for a \$2 per ton fuel tax to fund research into cleaner fuels and superior propulsion (ICS, 2021). Present carbon taxes outside shipping range from \$1.03 per ton (Ukraine) to \$137.3 per ton (Uruguay).

Based on the foregoing discussion and for the purposes of this research, we will take into account a moderate carbon tax of \$75 per ton in Scenario 1 and an ambitious carbon tax of \$150 per ton in Scenario 2. For reporting purposes, we have decided to add an additional scenario with a midway tax between above two scenarios of around \$100 per ton (Scenario 3).

3.7.1 Cost calculation for both scenarios

For converting fuel to carbon, we'll use a 1:3 conversion factor. The ultimate change in fuel price should then be calculated by multiplying all of the carbon tax amounts by 3. For calculational purposes, we must also learn the national average fuel price, which changes depending on region.

Scenario 1 – Moderate scenario (\$75 carbon tax)

A \$75 per ton carbon tax amounts to an increase of \$225 per ton of marine fuel.

Figure 3-9: World bunker prices - VLSFO



Source: (Ship&Bunker, 2022)

The average cost per ton of VLSFO may be calculated to be \$770 per ton when taking into account the aforementioned information and major bunkering centers like Rotterdam, Houston, and Singapore.

Initial fuel price (f) = \$770 per ton

Note: Only VLSFO is considered in our research as it is the most widely used fuel by the marine vessels. Almost 72% vessels by GT use this type of fuel for their main propulsion (UNCTAD RMT, 2022).

Final fuel price
$$(F) = $770 + $225 = $995 per ton$$
 Equation 3-11

% increase in fuel cost =
$$df = 225/770 * 10 = 29.22 \%$$
 Equation 3-12

Fuel cost as share of total running costs for the vessel varies with the vessel types. As per the study by Kalli, J., Karvonen, T., & Makkonen, T. (2009), fuel costs range from 30% (for car and passenger ferries) to 53%. (for containers) of total costs.

Wet bulk (tankers) = 32%; Dry bulk = 40%; Containers = Equation 3-13 53%

Based on above information

% increase in total running cost of Wet bulk = dTwb

Equation 3-14

$$= 0.2922 \times 0.32 = 9.35\%$$

% increase in total running cost of Dry bulk = dTdb

$$= 0.2922 \times 0.40 = 11.69\%$$

% increase in total running cost of Containers = dTcon

$$= 0.2922 \times 0.53 = 15.49\%$$

A similar calculation is also done for scenario 2 and scenario 3 with below results

Scenario 2 – Ambitious scenario (\$150 carbon tax)

% increase in total running cost of Wet bulk = dTwb

Equation 3-15

$$= 0.5844 \times 0.32 = 18.70\%$$

% increase in total running cost of Dry bulk = dTdb

$$= 0.5844 \times 0.40 = 23.38\%$$

% increase in total running cost of Containers = dTcon

$$= 0.5844 \times 0.53 = 30.97\%$$

Scenario 3 – Additional midway tax scenario (\$100 carbon tax)

% increase in total running cost of Wet bulk = dTwb

Equation 3-16

$$= 0.3896 \times 0.32 = 12.47\%$$

% increase in total running cost of Dry bulk = dTdb

$$= 0.3896 \times 0.40 = 15.58\%$$

% increase in total running cost of Containers = dTcon

$$= 0.3896 \times 0.53 = 20.65\%$$

3.8 Final NTM calculation

We can then determine the final NTMs, using the same methodology that was used to get the initial NTM, based on the cost change information provided by section 3.7.1.

$$\{\{[1.21 - (Initial\ tariff\ corrected\ for\ distance -\ 1)] - Equation\ 3-17$$

 $1\}x(1 + 0.0935)\} + 1\}x 1.44x 1.55$

Finally, we assume an additional barrier in relation to the cost of a global carbon tax in order to account for the effect of the magnitude of trade between the regions, i.e., the regions with more trade will be more affected with the introduction of a global carbon tax and vice versa. This is accomplished by computing the weighted average of trade from a specific country (export value). We first calculate this weighted export value for each nation or region, and then we recalculate the weighted average across all regions using the share in global trade. The additional cost that takes into account the volume of bilateral trade is then calculated using this final weighted average value as a benchmark.

Equation 3.18 and Equation 3.10 are compared, and it is clear that the worldwide carbon price of \$75 per ton has added to the costs, causing the NTM for the Aus/NZ-EU trade pair to change/increase from 2.5583 to 2.5888. The other segments, such as dry bulk and containers, are calculated in a similar manner. Below is a 6x6 snippet of initial NTMs after freight and distance correction.

Table 3-11: 6x6 Snippet of the final NTM for Scenario 1(a)

Countries	Aus/NZ	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan
Aus/NZ	2,745	2,315	2,739	2,589	2,739	2,706

Countries	Aus/NZ	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan
Brazil	2,638	2,745	2,448	2,656	2,493	2,449
China	2,745	2,092	2,745	2,571	2,735	2,730
EU-27	2,631	2,438	2,462	2,745	2,445	2,684
Indonesia	2,745	2,178	2,740	2,652	2,745	2,734
Japan	2,743	2,141	2,719	2,736	2,732	2,745

Source: Compiled by Author

A final NTM table with 3 scenarios segregated into three shipping segments is available in the Annex 12, 13, 14.

Chapter 4 Results and analysis

We offer the findings and analyses for the mentioned scenarios and shipping segments in this chapter. This is how we organize the results chapter because our research focuses on the various implications for each shipping segment. We examine the various techniques and their impacts on welfare, output, and trade for each of the shipping segments. The cumulative effect on all sectors will be shown when we have reported and examined the results for each segment. We shall divide our reporting into sections for CO2 effect, welfare effect, trade effect, production effect, and pricing effect.

4.1 Wet bulk

4.1.1 Welfare Effects

Impacts on welfare measure the full economic impact of a policy shock, in this case, the imposition of a global carbon tax by the IMO. Figure 4-1 shows the welfare implications for the three scenarios from section 3.7 in billions of US dollars. Figure 4-1 shows that the key trading regions like the EU, Rest of Asia, and the Middle East are where the effects of global tax are greatest. In the first scenario, these regions anticipate losing \$5.6, \$9.5, and \$9.7 billion in terms of overall welfare in the wet bulk segment. In the third and second scenarios, when the worldwide tax is projected to be larger, this value significantly rises. As a big consumer, Asia is seeing a loss in consumer surplus, whereas the Middle East, a key producer, has witnessed a significant loss in producer surplus. Due to a significant decline in consumer surplus, big crude oil consumers like China also suffer. It is a mixed bag for the USA, reflecting its dual nature. The rise in consumer surplus benefits areas like SIDS, the rest of Africa, and nations like Indonesia, Brazil, and Nigeria since it may push domestic producers to meet home demand if global taxes are raised. The new policy has also increased government revenue for Indonesia and Australia.




Figure 4-1: Wet bulk Welfare effects for all three Scenarios

Source: Author's representation of model results

4.1.2 Trade Effects

All nations experience a drop in overall exports following the implementation of the global carbon tax, as shown in Figure 4-2. The Middle East, which is the main oil exporter in this market, will experience the most negative effects on shipments in all scenarios, which will total 418~420 billion USD. We can also observe from the below figure that, despite Scenario 2's \$150 worldwide tax having an approximately two-fold effect, the effect is rather consistent across all scenarios. This is mostly due to the fact that we take into account the low elasticity of the composite import demand for crude oil, which is a core necessity for emerging nations. The largest overall decline in wet bulk exports is observed in the Middle East and EU-27 regions. As significant oil exporters, Russia and the USA follow these regions.

Exports from the Middle East region will primarily decrease to China, Japan, the EU-27, and the rest of Asia, according to the change in export value tables in the Annex. No area or country has seen a rise in exports. Additionally, due to stronger controls and a significant amount of intra EU trade, wet bulk trade will substantially fall within the EU. The effect on the nations with less price elasticity is significantly less than the effect on the countries with more price elasticity, according to our analysis of the variations across the various scenarios, with scenario 1 and scenario 2 showing the highest differences. For instance, increasing taxes to \$150 causes a nearly \$2 billion reduction in exports from the Middle East to China and the EU-27, whereas there is an increase in trade from the Middle East to the USA due to the latter's lower elasticity than that of China and the EU-27. Table 4-1,4-2,4-3 are snippets of the change in trade values for wet bulk for Scenario 1. Complete tables are attached in Annex 15.




Figure 4-2: Change in export values in billion USD for all scenarios

Source: Author's compilation of model results

Table 4-1: 6x6 Snippet of the change in bilateral export values for Scenario 1(wet bulk) (in billion USD)

Countries	Aus/NZ	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan
Aus/NZ	-0,4	0,0	-11,0	-0,1	-0,6	-10,0
Brazil	0,0	0,0	-9,6	-2,7	0,0	0,0
China	-1,0	0,0	0,0	-0,4	-0,3	-0,3
EU-27	-0,4	-1,4	-3,6	-70,2	-0,3	-0,4
Indonesia	-0,8	0,0	-2,9	-0,1	0,0	-2,1
Japan	-1,7	0,0	-1,0	0,0	-0,1	0,0

Source: Compiled by Author

Table 4-2: 6x6 Snippet of the change in bilateral export values for Scenario 2(wet bulk) (in billion USD)

Countries	Aus/NZ	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan
Aus/NZ	-0,4	0,0	-11,0	-0,1	-0,6	-10,2
Brazil	0,0	0,0	-9,6	-2,7	0,0	0,0
China	-1,0	0,0	0,0	-0,4	-0,3	-0,3
EU-27	-0,4	-1,3	-3,3	-72,1	-0,3	-0,4
Indonesia	-0,8	0,0	-2,9	-0,1	0,0	-2,1
Japan	-1,7	0,0	-1,0	0,0	-0,1	0,0

Source: Compiled by Author

Table 4-3: 6x6 Snippet of the change in bilateral export values for Scenario 3(wet bulk) (in billion USD)

Countries	Aus/NZ	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan
Aus/NZ	-0,4	0,0	-11,0	-0,1	-0,6	-10,1
Brazil	0,0	0,0	-9,6	-2,7	0,0	0,0
China	-1,0	0,0	0,0	-0,4	-0,3	-0,3
EU-27	-0,4	-1,4	-3,5	-70,9	-0,3	-0,4
Indonesia	-0,8	0,0	-2,9	-0,1	0,0	-2,1
Japan	-1,7	0,0	-1,0	0,0	-0,1	0,0

Source: Compiled by Author

4.1.3 Effect on Producers

The production impacts of each of the three situations are displayed in Figure 4-3. After comparing producer earnings in Figure 4-3, we found that in all locations, producer revenues decline nearly twice as much under the \$150 scenario as they do under the \$75 scenario. This is because a greater worldwide tax entails substantially higher cost. Producer revenues in the Middle East, a major exporter in this market, are expected to decline the most, by up to \$12.1 billion in the first scenario and \$22.8 billion in the second. Producer revenues will also likely decline significantly in the EU, Russia, the rest of North America, and the USA. We have also analysed the effect of transition from \$75 to \$150 tax which

entails that the impact of increasing tax will be the least on the producers of the Middle east and EU-27 in % terms due to a more substantial world share and the effect will be most significant on the small producer countries/ regions like SIDS and LDC.




Figure 4-3: Production effects for all three Scenarios

Source: Author's compilation of model results

4.1.4 Price effects

From figure 4-4 below, we observe that only China, EU-27, the USA, rest of Asia and rest of North America exhibit an increase in consumer prices. Given that these countries and areas also import the most wet cargo, this makes perfect sense. Due to these countries' low price elasticity of demand and continued need for wet bulk cargo, the impact of a carbon tax on these countries is significant. With the advancement of technology and decreasing reliance on fossil fuels, this influence could change. The largest producers in the world—the Middle East, Russia, the EU27, the United States, Nigeria, and North America—also suffer from lower producer pricing.




Figure 4-4: Price effects for all three Scenarios

Source: Author's compilation of model results

4.1.5 CO2 effects

We need to demonstrate the change in global and interregional trade in terms of CO2 in order to calculate the impact of wet bulk cargo carriers on CO2 generation globally and between regions. There are several ways to calculate CO2 emissions, and you may even

make the calculations more difficult by being too specific, but that is outside the purview of this study. We gathered information from (Psaraftis and Kontovas, 2009), who investigated data on CO2 emissions for the global commercial fleet. The CO2 emissions for crude oil and product vessels for the year 2007 were then used. We reviewed the statistics for CO2 emission by shipping on (Clarksons, 2022) to verify that the values corresponded accurately to the data as of the end of the year 2021.

We then applied the research's total CO2 emissions by wet bulk carriers to our 18x18 matrix to determine the contribution of each trade lane based on the volume of cargo moved along that lane. The reduction in CO2 emissions by wet bulk carriers on each particular trade pair was calculated using the percent change in trade between the bilateral trade pairings. Globally, there was a 146.4 million tonnes, 146.8 million tonnes and 146.5 million tonnes reduction in CO2 in total for wet bulk trade in scenario 1,2,3 respectively.

Table 4-4 displays a 6x6 sliver of the change in CO2 emissions for Scenario 1. The Annex 16 contains a complete table with an 18x18 matrix of CO2 emission change.

Crude Oil Carriers

Total CO2 (million tonnes per year)

Tonne-Km (billions per year)

12,322

12,000

12,000

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Figure 4-5: Emission statistics for crude oil tankers

Source: (Psaraftis and Kontovas, 2009)

Table 4-4: 6x6 Snippet of bilateral values for change in CO2 emission(in million tons) by wet bulk carriers due to reduction of trade in Scenario 1

Countries	Aus/NZ	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan
Aus/NZ	0,0	0,0	-1,3	0,0	-0,1	-1,2
Brazil	0,0	0,0	-1,1	-0,3	0,0	0,0
China	-0,1	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0
EU-27	0,0	-0,2	-0,4	-8,2	0,0	0,0
Indonesia	-0,1	0,0	-0,3	0,0	0,0	-0,2
Japan	-0,2	0,0	-0,1	0,0	0,0	0,0

Source: Calculated and compiled by author

4.2 Dry bulk

4.2.1 Welfare Effects

Figure 4-6 displays the welfare implications of all possible global carbon tax implementations for the dry bulk section. We discover that customers in China, the EU, Japan, and the rest of Asia are most impacted, which makes sense given the high levels of dry bulk imports from these nations and regions. 44% of all imports are from China alone. In Scenario 2, China's consumer surplus has decreased by about \$15.5 billion. Australia suffers greatly on the producer side because it is the biggest exporter of dry bulk, accounting for about 36% of all exports.

Since the export from the large nations is hindered by the increased tax, producers in the lesser exporting countries/regions like Africa, Europe, and North America are marginally benefited by the movement of consumers to these regions. China's indifference to price increases also manifests in an increase in revenue from trading at high prices, which results in a higher trade value. Top importers suffered greater losses in consumer surplus in both scenarios, demonstrating that consumers—in this example, the dry bulk segment—would bear the brunt of the increase in costs.




Figure 4-6: Dry bulk Welfare effects for all three Scenarios

Source: Author's compilation of model results

4.2.2 Trade Effects

For each of the three situations, Figure 4-6 displays the variations in export values between the top exporters and importers of dry bulk commodities. As we can see, in each case Australia's export volume will significantly decrease. As the tax increases, exports decline. When we look at the percent decline with increased tax scenario, other countries and regions, excluding Australia, have a considerably smaller comparative decrease.

Tables 4-5 and 4-6 only display the changes in trade between the largest importers and exporters for scenarios 1 and 2 (full tables in Annex 15). China is most affected, followed by the EU, Japan, and the rest of Asia among major importers of dry bulk commodities. If we look more closely at Chinese imports, we can find that while imports from Brazil are almost untouched, imports from Australia have been significantly cut. On the other hand, there is a surge in Australia's exports to the EU, Japan, Indonesia, and the rest of Asia. This is as a result of our assumption that Chinese demand is positively elastic.




Figure 4-7: Change in export values in billion USD for all scenarios

Source: Author's compilation of model results

Table 4-5: 6x6 Snippet of the change in bilateral export values for Scenario 1 (wet bulk) (in billion USD)

Countries	Aus/NZ	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan
Aus/NZ	-0,1	-0,4	-75,7	-2,0	-2,4	-16,8
Brazil	0,0	0,0	-22,7	-3,0	-0,2	-3,4
China	-0,2	-0,1	0,0	-0,1	-0,4	-0,9
EU-27	0,0	-0,1	-1,0	-11,6	0,0	0,0
Indonesia	0,0	0,0	-5,8	-0,2	0,0	-2,0
Japan	0,0	0,0	-0,2	-0,2	0,0	0,0

Source: Compiled by author

Table 4-6: 6x6 Snippet of the change in bilateral export values for Scenario 2 (wet bulk) (in billion USD)

Countries	Aus/NZ	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan
Aus/NZ	-0,1	-0,3	-80,1	-1,7	-2,3	-16,6
Brazil	0,0	0,0	-22,7	-3,0	-0,2	-3,4
China	-0,2	-0,1	0,0	-0,1	-0,4	-0,9
EU-27	0,0	-0,1	-0,8	-11,9	0,0	0,0
Indonesia	0,0	0,0	-5,5	-0,2	0,0	-2,1
Japan	0,0	0,0	-0,2	-0,2	0,0	0,0

Source: Compiled by author

4.2.3 Effect on Producers

According to Figure 4-8, when we analyse producer revenues for the dry bulk segment under each scenario, we find that Australian producers suffer the greatest revenue losses because they export almost 36% of the world's goods. Additionally, we observe that 63.7% of Australia's exports go to China, 15.5% go to Japan, and 14.1% go to ROA, showing that the country is strongly dependent on trade with the Far East, with 93.3% of its overall trade going there. Due to greater fuel usage, the introduction of a worldwide carbon tax will have a significant impact on Australia's ability to conduct trade with farther countries and regions. Countries with trade segregated to nearby nations and regions will be less affected,

as evidenced in the example of Brazil. Australia is followed in producer revenue losses by the EU, Indonesia, and Brazil. China, the world's largest importer of dry bulk with a 45% market share, is the recipient of almost 64% of Australian exports. This indicates that the largest manufacturers will be most impacted by China's reduction in imports, which will have an impact on global prices. The USA is an exception to this because of the uniform distribution of its exports.




Figure 4-8: Production effects for all three Scenarios

Source: Author's compilation of model results

4.2.4 Price effects

Figure 4-9 shows that the majority of the world's nations and regions are experiencing an increase in consumer prices, with China leading the pack. For major importers of dry bulk, the impact on the consumer price is likewise considerable due to high import values. China exhibits a stronger impact due to both its higher imports and its positive demand elasticity. Australia, the largest producer in the world, is harmed by decreased producer pricing. Due to their evenly spread exports and larger import demand elasticities, Brazil and the United States, the second and third largest producers, have a minimal impact on producer pricing.




Figure 4-9: Price effects for all three Scenarios

Source: Author's compilation of model results

4.2.5 CO2 effects


We have used data for CO2 produced by bulk carriers as 151 million tonnes (Psaraftis and Kontovas, 2009) as our base value. Using this value, we follow a similar methodology as described in Section 4.1.5 to obtain the reduction in CO2 emissions by dry bulk carriers on

each particular trade pair using the percent change in trade between the bilateral trade pairings. Globally, there was a *94.2 million tonnes*, *95.2 million tonnes*, *94.5 million tonnes* reduction in CO2 in total for dry bulk trade in scenario 1,2,3 respectively.

Table 4-7 displays a 6x6 sliver of the change in CO2 emissions for Scenario 1. The Annex 16 contains a complete table with an 18x18 matrix of CO2 emission change.

Figure 4-10: Emission statistics for dry bulk tankers

Dry Bulk Carriers



Source: (Psaraftis and Kontovas, 2009)

Table 4-7: 6x6 Snippet of bilateral values for change in CO2 emission(in million tons) by dry bulk carriers due to reduction of trade in Scenario 1


Countries	Aus/NZ	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan
Aus/NZ	0,0	-0,1	-23,1	-0,6	-0,7	-5,1
Brazil	0,0	0,0	-6,9	-0,9	-0,1	-1,0
China	-0,1	0,0	0,0	0,0	-0,1	-0,3
EU-27	0,0	0,0	-0,3	-3,5	0,0	0,0
Indonesia	0,0	0,0	-1,8	-0,1	0,0	-0,6
Japan	0,0	0,0	-0,1	-0,1	0,0	0,0

Source: Calculated and compiled by author

4.3 Containers

4.3.1 Welfare Effects

Figure 4-11: Liner shipping welfare effects for all three Scenarios



Source: Author's compilation of model results

All three scenarios for the liner shipping industry will result in significant declines in net welfare for the world's main economies, including China, the EU, the USA, the rest of Asia, and the rest of North America, with the EU losing roughly \$600 billion in Scenario 2 (Figure 4-11). In these economies, the producer and consumer surplus will both decline significantly. China, the rest of Asia, and the rest of North America lose the producer surplus since they serve as the world's factories, but developed economies that also import completed goods lose more of the consumer surplus. Because of the substantially smaller trade, smaller economies exhibit a reduced impact.

The elastic nature of liner trade causes a higher percentage of producer revenue losses since in this scenario, consumers—who may be seen as liner shipping companies—will bear a smaller share of the hardship. In this case, the shift in PS and CS overshadows the practically noticeable tariff revenues.

4.3.2 Trade Effects

According to changes in overall exports as shown in fig. 4-12, there will be a significant negative impact on exports from all areas due to the global carbon tax on liner shipping. Export losses will be greatest in major economies including China, Japan, the EU, the US, rest of Asia, and rest of NA. We discover that intra-regional trade inside the EU will experience a significant decline after comparing trade flows on key trade routes on the liner segment for both scenarios. It is anticipated that intra-EU commerce will fall by around \$79.6 billion. While commerce between the EU and China is anticipated to decline by \$10.5 billion, trade between the EU and China is projected to increase by \$5.4 billion. Exports from China and the EU have increased to emerging markets like Brazil, Nigeria, and SIDS. Exports from the EU to the rest of Asia have also increased.

Overall, it is clear that even with the implementation of the carbon tax, the smaller and emerging nations continue to import more. This demonstrates their reliance on manufactured goods, in contrast to well-developed economies like the EU, which exhibit a marked decline in imports and exports. Although the EU has a significant amount of trade with the other EU members, the effect of distance is little; yet, in this situation, our

evaluation of the magnitude of trade takes precedence over the influence of distance. Table 4-8 & 4-9 are snippets of the change in trade values for wet bulk for Scenario 1. Complete tables are attached in Annex 15.




Figure 4-12: Change in export values in billion USD for all scenarios

Source: Author's compilation of model results

Table 4-8: 6x6 Snippet of the change in bilateral export values for Scenario 1 (wet bulk) (in billion USD)

Countries	Aus/NZ	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan
Aus/NZ	-5,8	-0,2	-30,7	-8,5	-3,4	-7,2
Brazil	-0,5	0,0	-31,6	-19,9	-1,4	-2,4
China	-51,8	-25,8	0,0	-396,7	-34,4	-115,2
EU-27	-32,1	-22,0	-184,2	-1487,3	-7,4	-54,8
Indonesia	-2,2	-1,0	-31,1	-13,5	0,0	-9,4
Japan	-11,1	-2,7	-128,1	-62,6	-11,2	0,0

Source: Calculated and compiled by author


Table 4-9: 6x6 Snippet of the change in bilateral export values for Scenario 2 (wet bulk) (in billion USD)

Countries	Aus/NZ	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan
Aus/NZ	-5,9	-0,2	-31,1	-8,6	-3,4	-7,2
Brazil	-0,5	0,0	-31,6	-20,2	-1,4	-2,3
China	-52,0	-23,9	0,0	-407,2	-34,5	-116,2
EU-27	-31,0	-20,6	-178,7	-1566,9	-7,0	-53,4
Indonesia	-2,2	-0,9	-31,4	-13,6	0,0	-9,5
Japan	-11,2	-2,6	-129,9	-63,4	-11,2	0,0

Source: Calculated and compiled by author

4.3.3 Effect on Producers

Figure 4-13: Production effects for all three Scenarios



Source: Author's compilation of model results

From fig. 4-13, we can observe that, all the production houses of the world suffer with the implementation of a global carbon tax. Similar to the welfare effects, larger economies

which are also top exporters of consumer goods and products which are shipped via liner shipping, will face large losses in producer revenues in all scenarios. EU will have about \$260 billion in loss of producer revenue in Scenario 2, while China, Rest of Asia and the USA will suffer loss of about \$84 billion, \$58 billion and \$33 billion respectively.

Our model considers two factors while applying the effect due to the carbon tax. First is the distance between the trading nations and second is the amount of trade. All the nations/regions in the figure 4-13 showing a major change in producer revenues are also the largest exported of consumer goods via liner shipping.

4.3.4 Price effects

According to Figure 4-14, the majority of the world's countries and regions will see a decline in consumer prices, with the exception of big importers like the EU, China, the USA, the rest of North America, and the rest of Asia. Due to large import values, the impact on consumer prices is also significant for major importers of consumer products. Due to its high import values that are heavily focused on one particular location, the EU shows a stronger impact. Due to the large nations'/regions' decreased imports, consumers in emerging economies like Brazil, Nigeria, LDC, SIDS, rest of Africa, and Australia gain from this policy. The producer prices on the other hand show a decrease over all the nations/regions with EU, rest of NA, rest of Asia and China being the ones affected the most.




Figure 4-14: Price effects for all three Scenarios

Source: Author's compilation of model results

4.3.5 CO2 effects


We have used data for CO2 produced by bulk carriers as 417 million tonnes (Psaraftis and Kontovas, 2009) as our base value. Using this value, we follow a similar methodology as

described in Section 4.1.5 to obtain the reduction in CO2 emissions by dry bulk carriers on each particular trade pair using the percent change in trade between the bilateral trade pairings. Globally, there was a *261.7 million tonnes*, *265.1 million tonnes*, *262.9 million tonnes* reduction in CO2 in total for dry bulk trade in scenario 1,2,3 respectively.

Table 4-7 displays a 6x6 sliver of the change in CO2 emissions for Scenario 1. The Annex 16 contains a complete table with an 18x18 matrix of CO2 emission change.

Figure 4-15: Emission statistics for containerships

Containerships



Source: (Psaraftis and Kontovas, 2009)

Table 4-10: 6x6 Snippet of bilateral values for change in CO2 emission(in million tons) by dry bulk carriers due to reduction of trade in Scenario 1

Countries	Aus/NZ	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan
Aus/NZ	0,0	-0,1	-23,1	-0,6	-0,7	-5,1
Brazil	0,0	0,0	-6,9	-0,9	-0,1	-1,0
China	-0,1	0,0	0,0	0,0	-0,1	-0,3

Countries	Aus/NZ	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan
EU-27	0,0	0,0	-0,3	-3,5	0,0	0,0
Indonesia	0,0	0,0	-1,8	-0,1	0,0	-0,6
Japan	0,0	0,0	-0,1	-0,1	0,0	0,0

Source: Calculated and compiled by author

4.4 Total effects

4.4.1 Welfare Effects

When analyzing the results from the aforementioned sections, we find that the liner shipping sector, which is the most elastic of all segments, has significant effects of cost changes on net welfare effects and PS/CS. On the other hand, wet and dry bulk segments exhibit very modest changes in these characteristics since they are far more inelastic. We also note that, despite the fact that the wet and dry bulk segments adopt comparable tactics, the outcomes of net welfare differ significantly. Other than major importers and exporters, there was little to no influence on smaller economies in the case of dry bulk trade, however in the case of wet bulk trade, we notice that smaller economies like SIDS, the rest of Africa, and LDC show positive consumer surplus as a result of policy implementation.




Figure 4-16: Total welfare effects per scenario

Source: Author's compilation of model results

4.4.2 Trade Effects

As was covered in the sections above, when we switch from a lower tax to a higher tax, we do not notice a significant change, but when we switch from one sort of trade to another, we do. The dry bulk trade clearly suffers the least in terms of trade, but the liner trade, which is the most elastic of all trades, is most negatively impacted (see figure 4-17 below).




Figure 4-17: Total change in exports per scenario

Source: Author's compilation of model results

4.4.3 Effect on Producers

Due to the larger value of trade, as shown in figure 4-18, manufacturers of consumer goods that engage in liner trade are those who are most impacted. For a similar reason, the producer revenues of wet bulk trade are likewise impacted more than those of dry bulk trade. The disruption in trade out of one country, namely Australia, had the biggest impact on producer revenues in the dry bulk trade.





Figure 4-18: Total change in producer revenue per scenario

Source: Author's compilation of model results

4.4.4 Price effects

Figure 4-19: Total price effect per scenario



Source: Author's compilation of model results

Figure 4-19 below makes it abundantly clear that only the dry bulk trade has seen an overall increase in consumer costs. When we dig deeper, we see that imports for the dry bulk trade did not significantly change. China alone was impacted. The EU, USA, and Japan, which were ranked second, third, and fourth in terms of the volume of imports, remained untouched, which had little impact on global prices. When a tax is implemented, this causes a definite increase in domestic consumer prices across all countries and areas.

4.4.5 CO2 effects




Figure 4-20: Total CO2 effect per scenario

Source: Author's compilation of model results

It can be claimed that the impact on CO2 emissions is exactly proportionate to commerce. Increased trade causes an increase in CO2 emissions, and vice versa. Figure 4-20, which supports this idea and provides semantic outcomes, is below. The liner trade has the greatest impact on emission change, with wet bulk trading coming in second and being followed by dry bulk trading.

4.5 Transport impact of global carbon tax

In order to evaluate how the global carbon price will impact transportation, we used two independent methodologies. For dry and wet bulk cargo, where the commodity is much

more concentrated and the historical data regarding the commodity price per unit is much more readily available from the World Bank data repository, we employed the average price per unit method. We used a different methodology to determine the transport impact on containerized cargo because the commodities are not uniform and are more homogeneous. The current operational fleet data from (Clarksons Research, 2022) was used in this calculation.

Average price per unit

A similar methodology was used to determine the transport impact in a study by (Ecorys, 2015), where the impact of CETA and TTIP on the Canadian and regional trade volumes was calculated. The change in trade values was transformed into change in trade volumes using the average price per unit per commodity where commodities were separated into groups using the HS code categorization. With the help of the average price per unit obtained from (World Bank, IBRD.IDA, 2019), we used a similar process to translate the change in trade values obtained from the econometric model into volumes. The region-specific table extract for both wet bulk and dry bulk cargo is shown under each scenario sub-heading below.

Operational fleet data

The most recent shipping intelligence data used to analyze the operational liner fleet was sourced from (Clarksons Research, 2022). The number of ships and the TEU currently in use were acquired. This was taken into account as the default scenario in which no tax is levied. The ultimate operational fleet in each scenario was then calculated by superimposing the % change in trade values obtained from the econometric model on the present operational fleet.

For a further subdivision into effect on major trade lanes, the bilateral trade data was divided into various trade lanes manually. The change in TEU was then calculated for each trade lane in each scenario. A graphical representation of this calculation may be seen in Figure 4-21.

4.5.1 Scenario 1 (\$75/ton)

For this scenario, where a worldwide carbon price of \$75 per ton is taken into consideration, the change in trade values are as listed in the Annex 15. The results are listed in below tables as change in bilateral trade volumes out of the major exporting countries for dry bulk, wet bulk and container segments. Full tables may be found in Annex 19.

Table 4-11: Change in bilateral trade volume(million tons) for wet bulk in Scenario 1

Countries	China	EU-27	Japan	SIDS	USA	ROA
ME	-129,8	-64,5	-78,2	-32,2	-33,4	-216,4
Russia	-38,5	-66,9	-7,3	-4,9	-15,7	-11,9
EU-27	-5,1	-100,3	-0,6	-4,4	-13,8	-4,8
RONA	-1,7	-6,4	-0,8	-0,5	-88,3	-4,9
ROA	-22,4	-4,4	-11,1	-19,8	-6,4	-16,5
USA	-14,7	-37,0	-9,0	-5,2	0,0	-12,9

Source: Calculated by author based on data from model and World Bank

Table 4-12: Change in bilateral trade volume(million tons) for dry bulk in Scenario 1

Countries	China	EU-27	Japan	RONA	ROA
Aus/NZ	-480,1	-12,8	-106,4	-0,2	-94,5
Brazil	-138,7	-18,1	-20,8	-0,9	-11,4
USA	-45,3	-25,3	-27,6	-0,4	-2,5
Russia	-26,3	-19,4	-9,1	0,0	-29,2
RONA	-22,2	-17,0	-9,5	-0,2	-20,5

Source: Calculated by author based on data from model and World Bank

Table 4-13: Change in bilateral trade volume ('000 TEU) for containers in Scenario 1

	0		1	, ,		
Countries	China	EU-27	UK	USA	ROA	RONA
EU-27	-354,0	-2858,6	-365,7	-636,1	-199,8	-129,7
China	0,0	-762,5	-104,5	-675,8	-389,1	-204,0
ROA	-537,0	-342,5	-39,1	-484,4	-216,4	-97,7
USA	-172,8	-344,1	-65,3	0,0	-134,6	-390,1
RONA	-47,9	-79,0	-20,2	-643,1	-18,1	-57,4
Japan	-246,3	-120,3	-15,2	-171,7	-164,5	-35,7

Source: Calculated by author based on data from model and Clarkson's research

% reduction in wet bulk exports (calculated from model)

Equation 4-1

$$= 62.02\%$$

 $absolute\ wet\ bulk\ tonnage\ reduction = 0.6202x710.2$

= 440.5 million tonnes

% reduction in dry bulk exports (calculated from model)

$$= 62.38\%$$

absolute dry bulk tonnage reduction = 0.6238x944.1

= 588.9 million tonnes

% reduction in liner exports (calculated from model)

$$= 62.75\%$$

absolute $TEU \ reduction = 0.6275x26207.6 = 16445.3'000 TEU$

From section 4.4.5 we have

% reduction in global CO2 emissions (from model)

$$= \left(\frac{502.26}{838.95}\right) = 59.87\%$$

% reduction in EU emissions (from model) = (102.35/172.83)

4.5.2 Scenario 2 (\$150/ton)

We summarize the results for Scenario 2 using a similar methodology as described in section 4.5.

Transport impact

Table 4-14: Change in bilateral trade volume(million tons) for wet bulk in Scenario 2

Countries	China	EU-27	Japan	SIDS	USA	ROA
ME	-132,0	-62,0	-77,8	-31,2	-31,5	-225,7
Russia	-38,4	-68,3	-7,2	-4,9	-15,5	-11,1
EU-27	-4,6	-103,1	-0,6	-4,2	-13,4	-4,2
RONA	-1,5	-6,0	-0,7	-0,4	-90,3	-4,0
ROA	-22,5	-4,4	-11,1	-20,3	-6,3	-16,0

Countries	China	EU-27	Japan	SIDS	USA	ROA
USA	-14,4	-37,3	-9,1	-5,1	0,0	-12,0

Source: Calculated by author based on data from model and World Bank

Table 4-15: Change in bilateral trade volume(million tons) for dry bulk in Scenario 2

Countries	China	EU-27	Japan	RONA	ROA
Aus/NZ	-507,7	-10,5	-105,1	-0,1	-91,7
Brazil	-138,7	-18,3	-20,9	-0,9	-11,3
USA	-42,5	-25,8	-28,7	-0,4	-26,7
Russia	-24,3	-19,8	-9,3	0,0	-21,1
RONA	-20,9	-17,5	-9,8	-0,2	-9,9

Source: Calculated by author based on data from model and World Bank

Table 4-16: Change in bilateral trade volume ('000 TEU) for containers in Scenario 2

Countries	China	EU-27	UK	USA	ROA	RONA
EU-27	-343,4	-3011,7	-361,4	-634,6	-193,3	-126,5
China	0,0	-782,7	-104,0	-690,9	-393,6	-204,6
ROA	-547,2	-348,0	-39,1	-492,3	-218,2	-97,1
USA	-173,5	-350,7	-65,6	0,0	-134,0	-397,6
RONA	-47,4	-79,3	-20,2	-656,1	-17,6	-57,4
Japan	-249,7	-121,9	-15,3	-173,4	-165,9	-35,9

Source: Calculated by author based on data from model and Clarkson's research

% reduction in wet bulk exports (calculated from model) Equation 4-3

= 62.20%

absolute wet bulk tonnage reduction = 0.6220x710.2

= 441.7 million tonnes

% reduction in dry bulk exports (calculated from model)

= 63.03%

absolute dry bulk tonnage reduction = 0.6303x944.1

= 595.1 million tonnes

% reduction in liner exports (calculated from model)

$$= 63.58\%$$

 $absolute\ TEU\ reduction = 0.6358x26207.6 = 16662.8\ '000TEU$

CO2 impact

% reduction in global CO2 emissions (from model)

$$= \left(\frac{507.11}{838.95}\right) = 60.45\%$$

% reduction in EU emissions (from model) = (104.07/172.83)

= 60.22 %

4.5.3 Scenario 3 (\$100/ton)

We summarize the results for Scenario 3 using a similar methodology as described in section 4.5.

Transport impact

Table 4-17: Change in bilateral trade volume(million tons) for wet bulk in Scenario 3

Countries	China	EU-27	Japan	SIDS	USA	ROA
ME	-130,5	-63,6	-78,0	-31,9	-32,7	-219,6
Russia	-38,5	-67,4	-7,2	-4,9	-15,6	-11,6
EU-27	-4,9	-101,3	-0,6	-4,3	-13,6	-4,6
RONA	-1,6	-6,3	-0,7	-0,5	-89,0	-4,6
ROA	-22,4	-4,4	-11,1	-20,0	-6,3	-16,3
USA	-14,6	-37,1	-9,0	-5,2	0,0	-12,6

Source: Calculated by author based on data from model and World Bank

Table 4-18: Change in bilateral trade volume(million tons) for dry bulk in Scenario 3

Countries	China	EU-27	Japan	RONA	ROA
Aus/NZ	-489,7	-12,1	-105,9	-0,2	-93,5
Brazil	-138,6	-18,1	-20,8	-0,9	-11,3
USA	-44,4	-25,5	-28,0	-37,7	-26,6

Countries	China	EU-27	Japan	RONA	ROA
Russia	-25,6	-19,6	-9,2	-0,2	-20,7
RONA	-21,7	-17,1	-9,6	-1,1	-10,0

Source: Calculated by author based on data from model and World Bank

Table 4-19: Change in bilateral trade volume ('000 TEU) for containers in Scenario 3

Countries	China	EU-27	UK	USA	ROA	RONA
EU-27	-350,2	-2913,1	-364,0	-635,2	-197,5	-128,5
China	0,0	-769,4	-104,3	-681,0	-390,6	-204,2
ROA	-540,5	-344,4	-39,1	-487,0	-217,0	-97,5
USA	-173,0	-346,4	-65,4	0,0	-134,4	-392,7
RONA	-47,8	-79,1	-20,2	-647,6	-17,9	-57,4
Japan	-247,4	-120,9	-15,3	-172,3	-165,0	-35,7

Source: Calculated by author based on data from model and Clarkson's research

% reduction in wet bulk exports (calculated from model)

Equation 4-5

 $absolute\ wet\ bulk\ tonnage\ reduction = 0.6208x710.2$

$$= 440.9 million tnnes$$

% reduction in dry bulk exports (calculated from model)

$$= 62.60\%$$

absolute dry bulk tonnage reduction = 0.6260x944.1

$$= 591.0 million tonnes$$

% reduction in liner exports (calculated from model)

$$= 63.04\%$$

absolute TEU reduction = 0.6304x26207.6 = 16521.3'000TEU

CO2 impact

% reduction in global CO2 emissions (from model)

Equation 4-6

$$= \left(\frac{503.93}{838.95}\right) = 60.07\%$$

% reduction in EU emissions (from model) = (102.95/172.83)




Figure 4-21: The transport impact on line shipping trade lane wise for all three scenarios (in '000 TEUs)

Source: Author's calculation (Data: Model, (Clarksons Research, 2022))




Figure 4-22: The infographics for leading transport impact in each segment – Scenario1

Source: Prepared by author based on calculation from econometric model




Figure 4-23: The infographics for transport impact within EU for liner trade - Scenario1

Source: Prepared by author based on calculation from econometric model

4.6 Sensitivity Analysis

The interpretation of shifting consumer and producer surplus with regard to elasticity values was muddled by the results of the econometric analyses that were given. These include the notion that wet bulk product import demand elasticity is relatively low, and that wet bulk product export supply elasticity is similarly low, based on the literature that is currently accessible. We discovered literature with somewhat low import demand elasticities for dry bulk commodities as well. In terms of import demand and export supply, the elasticities were thought to be rather constant for liners trade. Based on how customers behave toward the various product categories, reasonable assumptions about the substitution elasticities were also made.

Therefore, it is essential to research how surplus values react to variations in elasticity. This involves evaluating several inputs for the elasticities. The first section will concentrate

on substitution elasticities. An international analysis will be carried out because it is presumed that they are region-generic. The second section looks at how variation in import demand and export supply elasticities of different product categories impact surplus values relative to each scenario. This will shed some light on the above-mentioned uncertainties. Additionally, because elasticity values react to broader market movements, time value is introduced. This may entail, for instance, the use of innovative technology or alternative fuel, which would increase the elasticity of import demand in case of wet bulk products. All in all, the sensitivity analysis will enable us to determine how susceptible our model is to our presumptions.

4.6.1 Substitution Elasticity

The extent to which domestically produced goods may replace imported goods is defined as substitution elasticity in plain terms. The greater the substitution elasticity, the more willing consumers are to choose the alternative that is relatively less expensive, such as sourcing internally. The PE econometric model typically employs a substitution elasticity of 1 to 5. For wet bulk, dry bulk, and liner trade, we have utilized substitution elasticities of 5, 8, and 2, respectively.

For each cargo segment, we have picked three substitution elasticities to conduct a sensitivity analysis. Low, mid, and high substitution elasticities are represented by values of 1.5, 5.0, and 10. Below for each segment, the outcomes of PS, CS, and Welfare effect are compared.

Wet bulk (Figures 4-21, 4-22, 4-23)

Only the main producing economies like the EU, Middle East, Russia, and USA are showing some effect, although the change with varying elasticity is not significant. In this segment, the original SE was regarded as 5. By changing the amount to a lower one, we can see that the largest exporters' PS has decreased (\$1.6 billion for M/E). No significant changes in PS are observed when the SE is increased to a value of 10. When we compare the CS over the three SE, a similar effect is observed for major importing nations/regions like EU, ROA and China. The EU's net welfare is most negatively impacted (down by \$0.6

billion). Overall, no significant effects are seen, hence it is safe to say that the model is not overly sensitive to changes in SE of wet bulk products.

Dry bulk (Figures in Annex 17)

On the producer side, Australia is the sole country most impacted. We see that when we set the SE to a low value, there is an increase of \$0.65 billion or a 25% rise. Interestingly, China's CS value rises first from a low SE to a mid SE before falling for a high SE. When China moves from low SE to mid SE, there are noticeable changes in WE (+\$0.74 billion, 4.5% change). There are no significant effects on the model other than these slight modifications.

Figure 4-25: Wet bulk consumer surplus in billion USD (Sensitivity to SE) Figure 4-24: Wet bulk producer surplus in billion USD (Sensitivity to





Figure 4-26: Wet bulk welfare effect in billion USD (Sensitivity to SE)



Source: Author's compilation of model results

Containers (Figures in Annex 17)

The countries or regions of interest for this study include China, the EU, the rest of Asia, and the USA. Every time the SE is increased, the PS for the EU goes up by \$2 billion, or 1.9%. On the other hand, when the SE is increased to 5, the CS first falls by \$7 billion or 3.2%, and it then rises by \$3 billion or 1.3% when the SE is extended to 10. When the SE was changed from its current value of 2 to a high SE value of 10, welfare for the EU increased by 1.2%. The impact of change in SE on other countries is relatively small.

4.6.2 Import demand and export supply elasticity

Trade elasticities frequently change over time as a result of economic trends and developments. This could be on either the import supply or demand side, or both. A global maritime carbon tax's impact on the import and export sides can also change over time due to such conditions.

This study includes three new categories in addition to the one already in use as indicated in section 3.6, namely elastic supply and demand (S=2,D=(-1.5)), inelastic supply and demand (S=0.7,D=(-0.7)), and highly inelastic supply and demand (S=10,D=(-10)). With this in mind, it is also conceivable to state that supply and demand may become less elastic in the future. Two further elements of the completed analysis must be mentioned. First of all, just one scenario per category is examined. Secondly, both elasticity changes have been made at the same time. So, individual effect of import demand and export supply elasticities are not shown.

Wet bulk (Figures 4-24, 4-25, 4-26)

On the producer side, countries like ME, EU, Russia, USA, and RONA are of interest. On the consumer side, countries like China, EU, and ROA are. On both the supply and demand sides, our initial elasticities for the wet bulk segment were comparatively inelastic. PS for ME increased significantly by \$4 billion, or 31%, when demand and supply were changed to the elastic values described above. Other significant exporters also experienced PS changes of a comparable size. The values for ME grow by about 50% when we compare the initial PS values to the PS in a highly elastic supply and demand environment. When supply and demand are made elastic, the three main importers—China, the EU, and ROA—

show a sharp increase in CS. Values for China show increase of 148% (\$4.3 billion), the EU by 100% (\$4.9 billion), and ROA by 60% (\$6 billion). The Chinese consumers are not much impacted by further rising elasticity values, but the ROA consumer surplus continues to rise by 20% (\$3.3 billion) when the supply and demand are made highly elastic. Our model shows sensitivity to D&S elasticities in this segment.


Dry bulk (Figures in Annex 18)

On the production side, we'll investigate the effects on Australia, and on the consumer side, we'll monitor the effects on China and ROA. For this sector, we employed an elastic supply and a rather inelastic demand originally. We observe a decline in PS as we move from our initial state to one where demand and supply are both made elastic. This fall in PS continues when demand and supply are both made inelastic. On the other hand, we have the highest PS values for extremely elastic D&S. When D&S are elastic for China and ROA, the CS rises significantly. A subsequent rise is shown while the D&S elasticities are made inelastic, where ROA even assumed a positive value. The CS for both China and ROA lowers significantly for highly elastic values. Yet again, the model is remarkably sensitive to variations in elasticities for this segment.

Containers (Figures in Annex 18)


We begin by examining the impact on PS for the key exporters in this sector, including the EU, China, ROA, and USA. For this sector, we initially used elastic demand and inelastic supply values. When both D&S were made elastic, PS for the EU increased significantly by \$43 billion (28.9%) and by \$12.4 billion (26%) for China. For values of inelastic D&S, the PS is not much impacted. The PS for all major exporters significantly rises when the D&S elasticity values are made highly elastic. EU saw a 53% increase (\$79 billion) while China saw an almost 39.6% increase (\$19 billion). For ROA and USA, comparable impacts are seen. EU CS declines significantly by 30.7% (\$104 billion). China sees a nearly 300% decline in CS values. The D&S value margins are significantly wider for highly inelastic products. All of the major exporting and importing countries' elasticity values have a drastic impact on the model's behavior.

Figure 4-28: Wet bulk producer surplus in billion USD (Sensitivity to D&S elasticities)



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Figure 4-29: Wet bulk welfare effect in billion USD (Sensitivity to D&S elasticities)



Source: Author's compilation of model results

Chapter 5 Conclusions

5.1 Main findings

Due to the size of the study, a variety of aspects of the intricate economic, trade and transport effects of the global carbon tax were examined from a maritime perspective to report the effects of such a market-based measure. The following conclusions were reached after qualitative analysis of important shipping segments and analysis of the econometric model's results. This conclusion will also provide a summary of the research's responses to all sub-questions.

The primary research topic was broken into six sub-research questions in order to provide a thorough analysis. Organizing the maritime sector into three principal shipping sectors was the first challenge. Global seaborne trade has a significant share of global trade. 70% of all trade is carried by sea in terms of value and about 80% by volume. By further dividing trade into its component cargo segments using UNCTAD statistics, we were able to identify three major groups: liner industry, which is primarily dominated by container shipping; wet bulk, which is dominated by crude oil and oil products; and dry bulk, which is dominated by coal, steel, and iron ore. While the container trade has the largest share of the world's seaborne trade by value, dry bulk trade has the largest share by volume. We were able to respond to our first sub-research question using the statistical information provided by UNCTAD.

As a part of our research, we had to also delve into the current industry trends to have a bird's eye view of the approach taken by the key stakeholders. We discussed this in Chapter 2, where we discovered several ideas from stakeholders like shipping companies, IMO member states, and ship owner unions (ICS). The recommendation on taxing shipping was utterly different from other vantage points. This discussion was also our foundation for formulating tax values for our model scenarios. Without a justification for carbon taxes, our analysis would be lacking in both substance and foundation. This was also covered in Chapter 2, which provides a strong technological argument for a global maritime carbon

price. In order to help developing countries advance toward a greener future, it is also discussed that a new revenue stream for GCF needs to be established. Additionally, the merits of a global tax over a domestic tax are explored. This will enhance climate funding rather than national treasuries, which will be more beneficial.

To answer the sub-research question (4), we had to define our experiment or, in other words, the shock we will input into our econometric model. Our shock was a non-tariff shock. There were cost changes in the operation of the ships. Various literature, including (Stopford, 2009) and (Kalli, Karvonen, and Makkonen, 2009), were referred to for this purpose. We chose the more detailed and recent study by Kalli for our research, which clearly distinguished the operational costs for various types of ships. We then used the model by (Anderson and Wincoop, 2004) to incorporate these changes into the NTMs by altering the transportation costs part of it.

Further, we found the freight cost tariff equivalent for each bilateral trade pair to introduce the effect of distance between the two nations. We did it to state that distant nations will incur more costs compared to nearer ones. Then we had also to consider the effect of the magnitude of trade between two countries, i.e., the more trade there is, the higher the costs will be. For this, we took the original cost and assigned it a value of the weighted average of the global trade and then formulated higher costs for the bilateral pairs with more trade and vice versa. In Chapters 3 and 4 combined, we were able to answer our sub-research question (4).

Finally, we concluded with the sub-research question (6), which results from our quantitative analysis using the PE econometric model. The economic, trade, and transport impact was divided into three major shipping segments to give disaggregated effects on the major shipping sectors. For Scenario 1 (\$75 tax), we will present some significant numbers that came from our research in the sections below. Scenario 2 and 3 results are linearly impacted.

Firstly, the wet bulk segment, where the significant exporters are ME, Russia, the EU and the USA. The impact on these producers will be huge, ranging from \$1.1 billion to \$10.1 billion. Major importers (consumers) likewise will also encounter huge losses from \$2.1 billion for China to \$7.9 billion for ROA. The consumers of countries/regions on the lower side of import values stand to gain from these policy changes for e.g. Japan, LDC, SIDS, ROAF. Amongst the trade routes with the maximum effect on trade were the trade from ME-ROA, ME-China, ME-Japan, ME-USA, ME-EU, Russia-China & Russia-EU. The value of exports from ME will be reduced by about \$418 billion. Additionally, exports from the EU, Russia, and the USA will decrease by almost \$110 billion apiece. The producer prices will fall in all the producing countries, with ME experiencing the most price decrease (4%). High consumer prices are having an impact on the main importers, with ROA experiencing the largest consumer price rise (about 1.9%). ME's producer revenues will drop by almost \$12.1 billion followed by the EU and Russia with fall of \$2.2 billion and \$1.6 billion respectively. We estimate that a decrease in wet bulk trade will result in a reduction in CO2 emissions of roughly 146 million tons since the impact on world CO2 emissions is proportionate to the impact on international trade. We were able to calculate the impact on wet bulk transport of 441 million tons using the methods in section 4.5. Major trade routes that will experience a decrease in trade include ME-China (down 130 million tons), ME-ROA (down 216 million tons), and intra-EU trade (down 100 million tons).

For the dry bulk segment, trade out of Australia will be the one most affected. The trade routes Aus/NZ-China, Brazil-China, Aus/NZ-Japan, Aus/NZ-ROA, intra-EU, and Indonesia-ROA will be the most affected ones. The PS loss of \$1.6 billion will be experienced by Aus/NZ, while the highest CS loss for China amounts to \$7.9 billion. The positive PS in the ROAF, RONA, ROSA, and LDC regions is due to an increase in producer prices there as a result of a decline in imports and higher reliance on the domestic suppliers. Brazil is the second-largest bulk exporter after Australia and New Zealand, but the impact for Brazilian producers is rather minimal because Australia also engages in substantial trade with Japan and ROA (distant regions). Contrarily, Brazil trades with these areas on a relatively small scale, hence the impact of distance on Brazilian trade is lessened and only

significantly affects one trade route (Brazil-China). Australian producers, who account for 36% of all dry bulk exports, also experience significant revenue losses of \$4.9 billion and a 2.6% drop in producer prices. China will experience the highest increase in consumer prices, which is about 3.4%, while the EU will experience a consumer price increase of 1.9%. The USA, RONA, ROSA, the UK, and ME are next, but the impact of the consumer price increase on these countries/regions is not as great due to the lower values of import. Australia's overall trade will decline by roughly \$114 billion. Brazil's exports will decrease by \$35 billion, while US exports will decrease by \$31 billion. The estimated reduction in CO2 emissions as a result of the decline in dry bulk export values was found to be in the range of 94 million tons. The impact on transport was calculated by converting the change in dry value export values to volumes. Results indicated that the volume of dry bulk trade globally will decline by 589 million tons. Major trade routes that will experience a decrease in trade include Aus/NZ-China (down 480 million tons), Brazil-China (down 139 million tons), Aus/NZ-Japan (down 106 million tons), and Aus/NZ-ROA trade (down 95 million tons).

The liner segment was the most affected due to the higher trade values in this segment. From the trade value data, it was apparent that the most trade is intra-EU in this segment, followed by China-EU, China-USA, EU-USA, RONA-USA, ROA-China & ROA-USA basically, the trans-pacific, trans-Atlantic, and far east-Europe trade lanes. Not surprisingly, trade out of the EU will be the most affected, with a loss of \$2.7 trillion, followed by China exports (\$1.5 trillion) and ROA exports (\$1.1 trillion). It is estimated that producers in key exporting nations including the EU, China, ROA, and the USA will lose roughly \$83 billion, \$25 billion, \$17 billion, and \$10 billion, respectively. With the introduction of this policy, consumers in nations like Brazil, SIDS, LDCs, and Nigeria will benefit slightly, while among the big importers, the EU will have a huge CS loss of \$168 billion, followed by the USA with a loss of \$25 billion. The introduction of the worldwide tax policy has had the greatest impact on intra-EU trade, which is the EU's primary source of revenue. The EU's producer revenues will decrease by \$145 billion, China's by \$44 billion, and the USA's by \$30 billion. This is a result of a parallel decline in producer prices in these regions with a decline of 5.2% in the EU, 2.6% in China, and 2.5% in ROA. While

nations like Brazil and Nigeria show the highest price drops of 2.0–2.2%, the EU's consumer prices show the biggest increase of 3.8%. When we consider the enormous trade value change connected with liner transport, it makes sense that the estimated reduction in CO2 emissions as a result of the decline in liner export values is in the range of 262 million tons. The transport impact on the liner shipping was determined by converting the change in export values to volumes. According to the findings, liner trade will decrease by 16445 '000TEU globally. Major trade routes that will experience a decrease in trade include intra-EU (down 2859 '000TEU), China-EU (down 763 '000TEU), China-USA (down 676 '000TEU), RONA-USA (down 643 '000TEU), EU-USA (down 636 '000TEU), and ROA-China trade (down 537 '000TEU).

We have used two distinct approaches to determine the transport impact. We used the average price per unit method, which was also used in a study by (Ecorys, 2015), where the impact of CETA and TTIP on the Canadian and regional trade volumes was calculated, for dry and wet bulk cargo, where the commodity is much more concentrated, and the historical data regarding the commodity price per unit is much more readily available from the World Bank data repository. Since the commodities inside the containers are more homogeneous and it is much harder to estimate pricing data, the second methodology was employed for the container sector. We looked at operational fleet data from (Clarksons Research, 2022). The current fleet data was overlay with the percent change in trade values that the econometric model predicted. By doing so, we could determine how the TEU transported will change in response to the change in the value of bilateral trade.

Combining the findings and calculations from all the segments, we also calculated that the worldwide CO2 reduction under the \$75 tax scenario will be around 502.3 million tons, compared to the 507.1 million tons and 503.9 million tons under the \$150 and \$100 scenarios. This outcome is understandable given that a greater shipping tax based on carbon emissions will make marine transportation more expensive, especially over longer distances, leading to a decrease in trade over the sea or any mode with a significant carbon emission.

5.2 Areas of further research

To answer the main research question of "the economic, trade and transport impact of a global carbon tax on the three major shipping segments of the maritime industry: containers, dry bulk, and wet bulk," this thesis examined the specifics of each trade, the underlying commodities, and the main trade routes, using partial equilibrium methodology to forecast and assess the impact.

IMO does not provide a clear indication of a carbon pricing structure. Although the market-based measures linked to levy-based systems are said to be more effective, this was covered in Chapter 1. There is little literature and discussion on this subject, and what little there is doesn't seem very authoritative. The streamlined carbon pricing structure will significantly influence future outcomes, which will be made possible by an IMO regulation and clear guidelines. Results based on existing research and a potential carbon price are presented here.

The influence of distance on freight prices to discount short sea trade if such pricing mechanisms are established is one of the central assumptions made for the research, in addition to the above. Additionally, the (Anderson and Wincoop, 2004) model, which averages the freight rate percentage to 21%, is the main foundation for calculating the initial and final NTMs. Using a different model with dedicated proportions for each segment makes it possible to distinguish effects on different segments in a more refined manner because segment proportions range greatly.

Additionally, the study by Kalli, Karvonen, and Makkonen (2009), served as the foundation for the problem description and shock calculation considering the effect of carbon tax on operational expenses of a ship. We propose delving deeper into the particulars of ship operation, where even some operational costs are impacted by a technological advancement in the marine industry. This will contribute to the assessment of additional costs brought on by the global carbon tax being strengthened. Due to the variety of goods transported on board, gathering elasticity data for the container segment was complex, thus the use of elasticities is regarded as an assumption. Results will be more refined if each sector is

examined in greater detail. Last but not least, because it is a partial equilibrium model, the adoption of this specific econometric model itself precludes the occurrence of cross-sectoral effects and spillover effects to other sectors, as was covered in Chapter 3. To calculate thorough effects on related economic sectors, a CGE model, such as the one offered by GTAP, would be providing additional insights.

Further investigation into the leakage in trade and transportation is also noteworthy. In the event that a global carbon tax is implemented, trade will likely migrate to other less expensive forms of transportation because maritime shipping will become more expensive. We have read in the literature that many of the IMO member states have suggested a progressively rising carbon tax to encourage research and development in the area of reducing carbon emissions. If the higher carbon emission modes do not evolve over time, this merely implies that they will gradually be replaced.

With these exceptions, this specialized study highlights effects on economies, trade (segmented), and the impact on major transport sectors that may serve as a guide for policymakers. To keep assumptions to a minimum and deliver more accurate results, we propose conducting a segment-centric study on this subject as further research. Additionally, changes in vessel size, type, and age within a segment are crucial to fully comprehending the impact of the carbon tax. To perform this research, we had to make several assumptions about trade patterns and the utilization of specific vessel types on particular trade lanes. Although these hypotheses have a significant impact, it is required to conduct thorough research into this topic to acquire them accurately, which was out of the scope of this study. This study can serve as a basis for presenting a more valuable and comprehensive view of the evolving shipping business.

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Chapter 7 - Annexure:

Annex 1 {Econometric model(GSIM) by (Francois and H Keith Hall, 2002)}

1) Demand function

In this GSIM model, there are different countries and n kinds of products. Importing country v import product i from exporting country R, and at the same time, country S will also export i to country v. The demand m of the importing country V depends on the expenditure Y (i, v) of the importing country on the product, the price P (i, v), r of the product exported by country R to country V, and the price P (i, v), s of the product exported by other countries to country v $M_{(i,v),r} = f\left(P_{(i,v),r}, P_{(i,v),s}, Y_{(i,v)}\right)$ price elasticity and cross price elasticity of I products are as follow

$$\begin{split} N_{(i,v),(r,s)} &= \theta_{(i,v),s} \Big(E_m + E_s \Big) \\ N_{(i,v),(r,r)} &= \theta_{(i,v),s} E_m - \sum_{s \neq r} \theta_{(i,v),s} E_s = \theta_{(i,v),s} E_m - \Big[1 - \theta_{(i,v),r} \Big] E_s \end{split}$$

In 3.22, $\theta(i,v)$, r and $\theta(i,v)$, s mean the ratio that the product I country v import from country r and s account for all products I the country V import from other countries. Em represents the total demand elasticity of I products in importing countries, and ES means the substitution elasticity of I products in different countries.

At the first, we assume that the world price of product I that country R export to other countries is $P^*_{(i,v),r}$. The domestic price of product I exported to country V is p (i, v), r, as a result: $P_{(i,v),r} = [1 + t_{(i,v),r}]P^*_{i,r} = T_{(i,v),r}P^*_{i,r}$

2) Supply function

We assume that the export supply of a country X, country R export product i are only related to the world price $P^*_{i,r}$: $X_{i,r} = f(P^*_{i,r})$

3) Market equilibrium

Because we need to think about the influence of the scheme, we need to think about the change, in the mathematical view, change means derivate, so we can derive 3.2.1,3.2.4,

$$\widehat{P}_{(i,v),r} = \widehat{P}^*_{i,r} + \widehat{T}_{(i,v),r}$$

$$\widehat{X}_{i,r} = E_{X(i,r)} \widehat{P}^*_{i,r}$$
3.2.5 as follows:
$$\widehat{M}_{(i,v),r} = N_{(i,v),(r,r)} \widehat{P}_{(i,v),r} + \sum_{s \neq r} N_{(i,v),(r,r)} \widehat{P}_{(i,v),s}$$

The symbol "^" means the change rate of an economic quantity, Ex (i, r) means the supply price elasticity of the export I products of country R, and the product price change rate of the export country R to country V depends on the change rate of world price and tariff; the total amount of product I that imported from country r is as follow:

$$\begin{split} \widehat{M}_{i,r} &= \sum_{v} \widehat{M}_{(i,v),(r,s)} = \sum_{v} N_{(i,v),(r,r)} \widehat{P}_{(i,v),r} + \sum_{v} \sum_{s \neq r} N_{(i,v),(r,s)} \widehat{P}_{(i,v),s} \\ &= \sum_{v} N_{(i,v),(r,r)} \Big[P^*_{(i,v),r} + \widehat{T}_{(i,v),r} \Big] + \sum_{v} \sum_{s \neq r} N_{(i,v),(r,s)} \Big[\widehat{P}^*_{i,s} + \widehat{T}_{(i,v),s} \Big] \end{split}$$

The price change rates of different countries under equilibrium conditions can be obtained by solving the simultaneous equations. Other economic variables can be obtained according to the rate of price change.

4) Other economic variables

The equilibrium price change rate is solved according to equation, and then the change rate of demand can be obtained according to equation. When the international price of the product of country V is unchanged, the change rate of the product of country R is only related to the tariff change rate of its own export products and its own price elasticity. M (I, V), R represents the import volume:

$$TC_{(i,v),r} = M_{(i,v),r} [N_{(i,v),(r,r)} \hat{T}_{(i,v),r}]$$

When the price of the export change rate of other countries to V countries remains unchanged, the change rate is the tariff change rate of country R multiplying the cross-price elasticity. The change rate of exports from other countries s to V is:

$$TD_{(i,v),s} = M_{(i,v),r} \cdot \sum_{s \neq r} N_{(i,v),(r,s)} \widehat{T}_{(i,v),s}$$

5) Producer surplus and consumer surplus

We could get the producer surplus and consumer surplus from the graph of price and supply; the area is calculated by the product of the original producer surplus and the change rate:

$$\begin{split} & \Delta PS_{(i,r)} \! = \! R^0_{(i,r)} \widehat{P}^*_{i,r} \! + \! \frac{1}{2} R^0_{(i,r)} \widehat{P}^*_{(i,r)} \widehat{\chi}_{i,r} \! = \! R^0_{(i,r)} \widehat{P}^*_{(i,r)} \bigg[1 + \frac{E_{X(i,r)} \widehat{P}^*_{(i,r)}}{2} \bigg] \\ & \Delta CS_{(i,r)} \! = \! \bigg(\! \sum_r R^0_{(i,v),r} \! T^0_{(i,v),r} \bigg)_r \! \bigg[\! \frac{1}{2} E_{M,(i,v)} \widehat{P}^2_{(i,v)} - \widehat{P}_{(i,v)} \bigg] \end{split}$$


Figure 7-1: Notation

INDEXES exporting regions r,simporting regions v,windustry designation VARIABLES M: imports (quantity) X: exports (quantity) aggregate import demand elasticity Defined for aggregate imports $M_{(i,v)}$ and composite price $P_{(i,v)}$ $E_{m,(i,v)}$: elasticity of export supply $= \frac{\partial X_{(i,r)}}{\partial P_{(i,r)}} * \frac{P_{(i,r)} *}{X_{(i,r)}}$ $E_{x,(i,r)}$: elasticity of substitution E_s : $N_{(i,\nu),(r,r)}$: own price demand elasticity $N_{(i,\nu),(r,s)}$: cross-price elasticity The power of the tariff, T=(1+t) $T_{(i,v),r}$: $\theta_{(i,v),r}$: demand expenditure share (at internal prices) $\theta_{(i,v),r} = M_{(i,v),r} T_{(i,v),r} / \sum M_{(i,v),s} T_{(i,v),s}$ export quantity shares $\phi_{(i,v),r} = M_{(i,v),r} / \sum_{r} M_{(i,w),r}$ $\phi_{(i,v),r}$:


Source: (Francois and H Keith Hall, 2002)

Figure 7-2: Producer and consumer surplus measures

Export markers and producer surplus



Import markers and consumer surplus



Source: (Francois and H Keith Hall, 2002)

Annex 2 (Country Aggregation on WITS)

Table 7-1: Markets (Reporting Countries or Regions)

	BRA	076	Brazil	g Countries or .		OAF	Rest o	f Afric	a ROAF
	CHN	156	China				CMR	120	Cameroon
	GBR	826	United	l Kingdom			GAB	266	Gabon
I	IDN	360	Indone	esia			GHA	288	Ghana
J	JPN	392	Japan				CIV	384	Coted'Ivoire
1	NGA	566	Nigeri	a			KEN	404	Kenya
I	RUS	643	Russia	n Federation			MAR	504	Morocco
τ	USA	840	United	l States			NAM	516	Namibia
							ZAF	710	South Africa
					E	GY	818	Egypt,	, Arab Rep.
RONAI	Rest o	f North	Amer	ica RONA	ROSA R	est o	f South	Ameri	ica ROSA
		CAN	124	Canada			ARG	032	Argentina
		CRI	188	Costa Rica			CHL	152	Chile
		CUB	192	Cuba			COL	170	Colombia
		SLV	222	El Salvador			ECU	218	Ecuador
		HND	340	Honduras			PER	604	Peru
		MEX	484	Mexico			URY	858	Uruguay
		NIC	558	Nicaragua			VEN	862	Venezuela
		PAN	591	Panama					
I	ROAs	Rest o	f Asia -	ROAs	ROEs R	est o	f Euroj	pe R	OEs
		LKA	144	Sri Lanka			ALB	800	Albania
		IND	356	India			AZE	031	Azerbaijan
		KOR	410	Korea, Rep.			GEO	268	Georgia
		MYS	458	Malaysia			ISL	352	Iceland
		PAK	586	Pakistan			MNT	499	Montenegro
		PHL	608	Philippines			NOR	578	Norway
		VNM	704	Vietnam			TUR	792	Turkey
		THA	764	Thailand					

EU27	EU27	EU2	7 mem	bers EU27	LDC	Least	Develo	oped	Countries
		AUT	040	Austria	LDC				
		BEL	056	Belgium			AFG	004	Afghanistan
BLX	058	Belgiu	ım-Lux	embourg			AGO	024	Angola
		BGR	100	Bulgaria			BGD	050	Bangladesh
		HRV	191	Croatia			BTN	064	Bhutan
		CYP	196	Cyprus			SLB	090	Solomon
	CZE	203	Czech	Republic	Island	s			
		DNK	208	Denmark			MMR	104	Myanmar
		EST	233	Estonia			BDI	108	Burundi
		FIN	246	Finland			KHM	116	Cambodia
		FRA	250	France			CAF	140	Central
		DEU	276	Germany	Africa	ın Repul	olic		
		GRC	300	Greece			TCD	148	Chad
		HUN	348	Hungary			COM	174	Comoros
		IRL	372	Ireland			ZAR	180	Congo,
		ITA	380	Italy	Dem.	Rep.			
		LVA	428	Latvia			BEN	204	Benin
		LTU	440	Lithuania			GNQ	226	Equatorial
	LUX	442	Luxen	nbourg	Guine	a			
		MLT	470	Malta			ETH	231	
		NLD	528	Netherlands		Ethiop	ia(excl	udes I	Eritrea)
		POL	616	Poland			ERI	232	Eritrea
		PRT	620	Portugal			DJI	262	Djibouti
		ROM	642	Romania			GMB	270	Gambia,
	SVK	703	Sloval	k Republic	The				
		SVN	705	Slovenia			KIR	296	Kiribati
		ESP	724	Spain			GIN	324	Guinea
		SWE	752	Sweden			HTI	332	Haiti
AusNz	z Austr	alia	AusNz				LAO	418	Lao PDR
		AUS	036	Australia			LSO	426	Lesotho

,	NZL	554	New Z	Zealand				LBR	430	Liberia
Middle	East	Count	ries in	Middle	East			MDG	450	Madagascar
Mid	dleEa	st						MWI	454	Malawi
		BHR	048	Bahrai	n			MLI	466	Mali
		CYP	196	Cypru	S			MRT	478	Mauritania
	IRN	364	Iran, I	slamic I	Rep.		MOZ	508	Mozaı	mbique
		IRQ	368	Iraq				NPL	524	Nepal
		ISR	376	Israel				VUT	548	Vanuatu
		JOR	400	Jordan	L			NER	562	Niger
		KWT	414	Kuwai	t		GNB	624	Guine	a-Bissau
		LBN	422	Leban	on			TMP	626	East Timor
		OMN	512	Oman				RWA	646	Rwanda
		QAT	634	Qatar		STP	678	Sao To	ome and	d Principe
	SAU	682	Saudi	Arabia				SEN	686	Senegal
ARE	784	United	Arab I	Emirates	3			SLE	694	Sierra Leone
EGY	818	Egypt,	Arab I	Rep.				SOM	706	Somalia
		YEM	887	Yemer	ı			SDN	736	Fm Sudan
								TGO	768	Togo
								TUV	798	Tuvalu
								UGA	800	Uganda
								TZA	834	Tanzania
							BFA	854	Burkii	na Faso
								WSM	882	Samoa
								YEM	887	Yemen
								ZMB	894	Zambia
SIDS	Small	Island	Develo	ping St	ates	SIDS				
ATG	028	Antigu	ıa and I	Barbuda		BHS	044	Bahan	nas, The	e
	048	Bahrai			BRB	052	Barba	dos		
	084	Belize		CPV	132	Cape				
	192	Cuba		DMA		Domi	nica			
DOM :	214	Domin	ican R	epublic	FJI	242	Fiji			

GRD	308	Grenada	GUY	328	Guyana
JAM	388	Jamaica	MDV	462	Maldives
MUS	480	Mauritius	NRU	520	Nauru
VUT	548	Vanuatu.	FSM	583	Micronesia, Fed. Sts.
MHL	584	Marshall Islands	PLW	585	Palau
PNG	598	Papua New Guinea	KNA	659	St. Kitts and Nevis
LCA	662	St. Lucia. VCT	670	St. Vi	ncent and the Grenadines
SYC	690	Seychelles	SGP	702	Singapore
SUR	740	Suriname	TON	776	Tonga
TTO	780	Trinidad and Tobago	WSM	882	Samoa

Source: Aggregated by author on WITS

Table 7-2: Trade value matrix(in million USD)

Countries		Aus/NZ	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan	TDC	Middle East	Nigeria	Russia	SIDS	UK	NSA	Rest of Africa	Rest of Asia	Rest of Europe	Rest of N.America	Rest of S.America
ZN/snV		11070,00142	871,333968	84705,40947	5560394493	4775,488962	20383.92566	2676,43089	6762,929034	441,969212	430,916231	13437,07688	6852,845194	30874,32712	2124,159004	51964,12517	1.993,994897	5728,050541	E0.92,921
Brazil		1342,948485	0	53464,01677	42868,18322	9601 LEE91	5427,931111	750,749032	5347,570,376	1587,147514	6228,322609	4885,972874	2694,123424	41502,92665	3897,520197	20349,42641	2128,515704	8115,640,407	22555,4764
Countries Aus/NZ Brazil China EU-27 Indonesia Japa		179885,0753	109877,8763	0	335470,129	63886,54658	205523,7145	63574,30545	188841,3875	3034,654772	78970,61101	44155,85601	2565293751	180971,9322	42794,13368	522304,403	16518,25639	52300,3513	86470,37324
EU-27		18095,15471	41210,09128	642306,5283	3887115,299	2242775523	99494,17391	55663,02727	11544,8625	24418,19254	195639,1672	35476,10904	206487,3305	334241,6543	83424,99234	2902%,0415	23 1680,5493	78883,81628	41165,831.71
Indonesia		10384,37327	3621,511394	56227,3023	14155,64991	0	17976,71141	1626,52974	9682,235852	2527,457033	1551,11739	21655,32299	1212,545291	11308,70699	2795,469407	41.418,04908	1242,009073	345,890129	2518,723481
Japan		55005,70566	9885,348141	18564,4767	92737,49477	21530,89203	0	6229,824351	94172,64486	917,060357	1591,54835	13846,48366	8231,614335	83640,15095	11062,30171	118720,4045	2810,540131	2089,60885	13488,66719
TDC		664.998721	1330,99963	24690,42521	1507,47573	2275,4590%	3126,738299	5846,652821	9173,546451	692,822242	1113,015301	6928,835895	1266,687924	3061,434634	10011,33527	24070,11385	1595,7184	549,768262	554,703984
Middle	East	5691,7685	5726,949455	76833,30408	113440,467	3425,736597	20998,55223	27396,21525	71223,7164	90(21395	91729,26289	9522,239083	14151,74161	3920,02179	10545,07248	68145,48726	19364,99235	5925,125245	5 103,708 51.9
Nigeria		341,51911	1156,327972	12879,07702	1639,31276	384,354181	365,919631	280,076695	139,06648	0	2092,83423	361,592468	1036,278384	3178,638657	1036,125298	77.58,040,276	2134,229385	998,077161	310,34201
Russia		806,860002	2470,851234	52217,63737	89082,41421	1715,317903	8821,944535	1306,88923	2412,5875.52	33,138346	0	1047,940504	4037,210511	12690,81374	2382,589676	1836622989	5986,429325	1846,407999	3698,0308.08
SIDS		8431,240184	3173,44764	57206,15858	5682,9099	13590,22321	23963,46883	1605,928282	48107,29079	600,183632	5982,895019	353,692691	8707,834935	56530,00964	2206,684581	89970,17304	2138,930951	6.585,91781.3	3184126423
UK		4844,949367	3394,120784	91162,19183	356250,5876	2047,994846	12917,86283	6128,601013	10381,80257	3090,126332	34851,43961	2949,922691	0	6224,16256	14450,3603	3420,35478	2009,74546	18457055	3607,786-466
USA		17021,59285	32843,01022	563203,1195	599897,1473	28953,07109	145902,2525	23085,853.56	74956,483.35	5766,545651	30762,2715	46362,53128	61748,82609	0	24921,56641	415587,019	23067,89043	372,637,576	60944,17963
Rest of	Africa	1770,225443	2337,679578	26480,70695	61450,968	1028,35421	3715,293667	5810,729821	13142,35272	5391,1763.25	2622,814645	2334,761929	5028,583463	11114,5513	7467,369169	15180,00748	3865,3058.14	2074,800013	1992,168907
Rest of	Asia	57912,97814	16443,058	370299,2866	188109,7671	56330,10929	142164,2149	33212,701%	287263,8242	16554,43052	32064,73911	68468,56766	21872,06084	144830,8312	28293,861.34	249790,9255	9336,305761	27745,11878	3273454884
Rest of	Europe	1788,721,714	6127,442699	48846,7652	8561,105621	2327,322789	6986,749208	2130,70043	21745,96503	147,559382	34656,92346	1639,939721	13243,92699	21554,49843	5788,1608.5	27884,90807	9319,725,727	5981,963007	5497,395401
Rest of	N.America	9087,373519	15221,01236	174977,1754	115963,3232	3629,927379	30097,93099	512,838	6737,310089	1648,936306	4219,271159	5309,641613	8475,213606	468678,5303	44.39,818.818	87161,02941	5171,586742	49186,68197	13862,9377.5
Rest of	S.America	1123,06968	30116,45846	61843,95043	38405,47345	1188,780802	6534,373002	1142,654849	3137,179551	740,926837	11666,99311	23%,106/26	2243,28548	49675,41098	1409,296383	17290,2668	1816,385482	15979,2408	34259,99511

Annex 4 (Maritime trade value matrix)

Table 7-3: Maritime trade value matrix(in million USD)

Countries Aus		Aus/NZ 9963	Brazil 862,0	China 8385	EU-27 5304	Indonesia 4727	Japan 2018	LDC 2649	Middle East 6995	Nigeria 437,5	Russia 446,	SIDS 130	UK 6784	USA 3056	Rest of 2002 Africa	Rest of Axia 5144	Rest of 1577 Europe	Rest of 5670 N.America	Rest of 1840 S.America
Aus/NZ Brazil		9963,001279 1329,519	862,6306134 0	83858,35538 529,29,3766	53047,90548 42439,50139	4727,734072 1913,77988	20130,0854 5373,6518	2649,666581 735,7340514	6095,299744 5294,094672	437,5495199 1571,276039	446,4070687 6166,039383	1302,70611 4739,393688	5784,316742 2667,18219	30565,58384 41087,897.38	2102,917414 3858,544995	51444,48391 20145,93215	1577,658948 2107,230547	5670,770036 8034,484003	1840,995123 18044,8112
China		178086,2346	108779,0975	0	9 332115,4277	63247,68111	203468,4774	4 62939,05739	186952,9736	9 3004,308.224	3 78180,9049	8 43714,29744	25396,40813	8 179162,2129	42366,19235	470613,9627	7 16353,07383	8 5177,34779	2 85605,66951
EU-27		17854,80316	40797,99037	635883,4631	2332369,156	22203,47768	98499,23217	55106,39699	114260,7138	24173,97101	117383,5003	35121,34795	204422,4572	330899,2378	8290,74242	1182,67.67.82	139308,5696	7809497811	40754,17339
Indonesia		10280,52954	2595,29628	55664,99028	14014,09341	0	17736,94429	1610,294143	9885,413493	2502,182463	1335,606611	21438,76976	1200,419838	11195,61992	2767,514713	40175,90761	1229,588982	3429,351,228	348,536346
Japan		54455,6436	9736,49466	183807,8319	91810,11982	21315,58311	0	6167,526107	9323091841	907,8897.534	15435,63286	13708,01882	8149,298192	82803,74944	10951,67369	117533,2004	2782,48473	20680,71078	13324,08052
LDC		658,3487.338	1317,293647	24443,52035	14926,70097	2252,704905	3095,470916	5788,186283	966018,1809	685,8940196	1101,885148	68.99,547.536	1254,021045	3030,820278	9911271192	23829,41271	1579,761216	5442705794	549,156942
Middle	East	5634,830815	3689,67996	76163,97104	112306,0623	3391,439231	20783,56671	27122,25309	44344,70417	892,2018105	9730,973062	9427,036492	14010,22419	39421,82157	10439,62176	67464,03239	19072,34342	5865,8,3993	5022,671434
Nigeria		938,1039189	1144,764692	12750,28625	16423,41964	380,5106392	362,2604842	117,2759281	1831,565815	0	2071,905888	357,9765483	1075,4156	3146,85227	932,512,682	7680,459873	2103,284289	992,0963894	307,2385899
Russia		798,791402	2446,142722	198,26918	5349,44853	1698,164724	8733,72509	1491,330338	2.388,4616.76	32,356,363.54	0	1037,461099	3996,838406	12563,9056	2358,763779	18182,5676	4467,321994	1827,943919	3661,0305
SIDS		8346,927782	3141,713164	56634,097	56016,76308	15434,32097	23723,83419	1589,868999	47626,21788	594,1817957	5923,066069	3427,68191	8620,75636	53964,70955	2184,61733	88476,47131	2117,541641	620,038.635	3152,285159
UK		4796,900368	3360,179576	90250,56991	320625,5288	3027,118898	12788,6842	6067,315003	1027798455	3039,225069	34602.92521	2920,423464	0	6261,2239	14305,85669	33878,15123	47348.96582	18448,32384	3571,708601
NSA		16851,31752	32514,58012	557571,0883	554298,1758	28653,54038	144443,23	24834,99502	74206,91851	5708,830194	30454,64878	45898,90597	61131,33783	0	24572,35074	411431,1488	24817,013.52	618210,6215	60334,73783
Rest of	Africa	1752,523189	2314,302782	26215,89988	60836,45832	1013,070668	3678,14667	5752,622.523	13010,92919	4852,058693	2996,586499	2311,41431	4978,297628	11003,40628	7343,348094	13028,30737	3826,527.56	2054,052018	1972,247218
Rest of	Asia	57333,4836	16283,57742	333233,3579	18622,7294	55766,3082	140742,5727	32880,57494	284391,186	16388,90602	31744,09172	67783,88199	21653,34023	143432,0239	2801092273	1988.E. 2004	9243,140703	27467,66799	32407,20434
Rest of	Europe	1770,834497	6066,168272	48358,29754	95700,71749	2304,049561	6916,881,716	2158,893436	21528,49548	146,0837882	2992,99299	1623,5403.34	13111,48772	21338,95344	\$730,279242	27605,66299	9226,52847	5922,J 43377	5442,421447
Rest of	N.America	3056,499784	15068,80224	173227,4036	114209,6899	3599,628105	29796,95163	5101,057724	6649,936983	1632,447438	4177,078447	5256,545197	8390,46147	374942,8342	4395,42063	86289,41911	5119,870875	48694,81515	13724,30837
Rest	S.America	1111,838983	24093,16677	61225,51093	33219,41871	1176,892994	6469,029272	1131,228301	3105,307755	733,5175686	1882,979318	2213,74556	2230,825963	49178,65687	1389,263419	17117,36413	1798,221627	15819,44839	24017,39516

Source: Compiled by author based on various data sources

Annex 5 (Wet bulk trade values)

Table 7-4: Wet bulk trade value matrix(in million USD)

Rest of	S.America	4,03827237	1935,604163	422,3432.991	1591,896173	0,10052163	406,815847	660,3749401	1388,178,158	698,7100,289	370,8001,074	1402,417423	523,771,373	15518,58211	40,67225019	1265,287486	177,8217359	1386,199013	42,93423
of Re																			
Rest	N.America	0,131851873	4,354631345	224,1891982	2530,704302	0,032774544	117,6990378	2,032540301	2799,033463	1565,060826	322,953688	239,6180039	812,6687241	49186,27346	139,6787361	522,3488159	1629,735429	602,1348064	566,7363.534
Rest of	Europe	0,253621755	97,37136292	1,187005971	2543,288034	4,063648946	4,105413477	4,907693562	1726,517971	51,47382093	3755,495151	18,94076377	722,4914103	1710,3574	142,8276208	2731,994512	1236,89523	154,729553	0,365000418
Rest of		9166,425268	2363,2530%	6399,713904	6189,844631	4894,678504	2767,133483	11140,77778	231422,4622	15454,16545	14558,44231	15435,22771	2845,994095	16536,822	48.63,892734	19149,14846	2540,31584	6995,651945	10343,55703
Rest of	Africa	13,65420276	25,78369761	110,4807667	4665,11974	47,15214174	10,1331945	2055,088624	8208,369439	4624717412	905,0236866	722,8844915	402,9615167	1542,7916.69	954,4422506	906,68 IB574	283,8992884	65,64405078	298,4785422
USA		41,6163429	\$172,20108	522,9293731	16000,14999	1305,112915	795,75837.36	3484,68891	40029,17498	5513,966103	17879,70497	5942,144263	4308,56736	0	2324,688646	7318,530936	3988,137561	9969,41062	27310,11391
UK		0,22030965	1,642.9117	38,53123758	11397,72005	0,05492718	3,730@193	188,1483605	5740,629067	3012,07104	6366,233175	408,3901168	0	7550,047736	393,030,97	926,00066	30073,47058	971,0456996	321,357,251,2
SIDS		2283,074174	777,8769689	6271,83076	5219,399268	3899,563717	121,854901	609,1069634	37796,60965	579,0330899	5623,89461	1515,287413	167,0278936	6329,040068	346,6083.397	21939,02511	161,6038331	603.02.7661.5	1751,271386
Russin		0,01753488	0,00648054	1,1099187	339,2896066	0,06358801	42,788,77614	0	29,82604086	0	0	80,735.302.89	6,5366,3043	36,340%152	1,64934594	94,277,808.9	18,988,359	9,43007367	0
Nigeria		0,10007217	27,10068768	103,003,402	9996,255301	0,05857533	0,04202055	72,88136361	579,2216621	0	1403,227.991	199,2239411	257,9739.938	092,6846246	124,8948.495	3435,924131	1320,916218	26,9123,757	0
Middle		76,74815313	14,76811512	50,23387116	5286,329159	7,80201477	22,73445801	335,2238644	13990,41.491	239,111825	3856,514985	2600,441296	464,9547603	88528,1851	636,1819111	2900,953,775	2917,388643	697898619	2,20063437
1.DC		11,15010765	0,35123121	204,7720772	1393,684759	28,79450411	17,90223039	2179,429986	5439,198.571	553,5205,979	554,5351439	4046,350785	225,861173	276,4200315	893,0385813	41 13,580-604	124,9971179	20,03383899	20,73675879
		15711,99279	77,06152575	466,4237896	6659619349	3293,763327	0	429,1270642	39100,43074	703,8544224	8301,52323	3805,210572	53,48916342	10232,35872	2502780331	1225625157	164,599773	885,5372086	1764,167099
27 Indonesia Japan		943,4569815	15,11696736	475,3812769	487,430956	0	102,07435	981,274338	6509,874439	3436,38294	44,4950055	11520,51342	29,42631034	926E10,103£	312,3307539	512,969.48	758,2964945	1,01321451	11,6565471
		90,78880635	4389,116031	620,4564462	106314,3763	223,481 1883	33,563234	5713,697384	75517,50035	23061,6779	73587,2693	3218,994142	24455,94908	41481,27205	6966,644801	5080,523,8304	46311,85062	7573,132812	2328,85 18%
China EU		17344,52.996	16305,6698	0	6519,851562	4641,409435	1607,564228	301221021	146219,8579	2470,923923	45110,48606	5872,108028	4442,737906	17392,72445	6066,459671	25079.92342	6854,848046	2077,991,703	13645,78156
Brazil		0,0030789	0	46,64682297	2481,323945	0,03160872	26,03710692	450,7738614	135,538885	1426,3651.56	466,392467	2054,1353.95	277,5125014	13178,02903	2,92952187	1697,556739	92,50035998	154,46.2245	803,20578.24
Aus/NZ		583,4176	0,48363925	1580,684005	625,0450008	1213,659143	2582,910941	24,38321787	4234,876449	436,6003643	169,400087	7603,367884	155,295.258	616,738.7922	366,638.3642	125643452	58.71346866	3,315%518	44,6630,9067
Countries Aus/NZ Brazil China		Aus/NZ	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan	TDC	Middle East	Nigeria	Russia	SIDS	UK	NSA	Rest of Africa	Rest of Asla	Rest of Europe	Rest of N.America	Rest of S.America

Annex 6 (Dry bulk trade values)

Countries Aus/NZ I			65,16384732 0	290,1752934 2	EU-27 39,513,5918 8	Indonesia 6,36560199 0	Japan 4,2873633 0	1.80,309.0597	Middle East 22,45174965 0	Nigeria 0 0	Russia 12,55037236 s	SIDS 106,095752 6	6,7166748 0	308,491.1825	Rest of 5,11068391 9	Rest of Asia 522,4089156 1	Rest of 0,44665235 0 Europe	Rest of 0,71120604 2	
Brazil		927,083525	0	276,0441592	87,71766498	0,02711907	0,03439656	757228,181	0,11362725	0	568,7415994	6,91.997487	0,00067221	1652,140921	90,718.353	134,3473909	0,14493303	280,596494	
China		112498,277	38793,73842	0	2040,705497	9824,969773	371,2292298	2682,386644	1663,980481	0,14130172	8757,316721	532,3658304	236,2167631	12553,79272	78.56,714.305	7127,418659	294,4444051	8175,472668	
F.U-2/		3883,0441	4727,393918	239,1613785	17830,88957	340,5803336	362,066657	1302,438799	63,13235346	0,43088067	5630,187086	112,093443	769,6993838	6260,557111	2815,98731	1331,119866	343,0473408	5509,77887	
Indonesia Japan		4029,169701	293,3700422	530,6415672	58,68837909	0	46,4894793	15,010@449	84,23051169	0	418,0640627	248,4173706	0,1578357	294,1161092	46,90717456	1301,645853	17,14333303	701,6325426	
Japan		27338,97605	5699,509337	1319,492307	24,9704829	3131,643425	0	244,6336629	8,96292837	0	2609,096788	0	4,27396365	6693,494043	907,1276772	581,951,3971	0,14011965	3035,64921	
rpc		2189243994	43,58957922	93,04181667	278,3015572	258.9734411	13,90905747	200,1972723	121,9496335	4,57019937	492,7213546	41,13630378	2,46982131	156,7756476	203,6071947	1369,737409	3,18537845	57,63150855	
Middle	East	\$12,2263.226	1551,916928	741,3071797	1901,16764	17,1002997	0,61497711	130,0830,281	1137,222081	0,006138	1389,671544	922,7972385	480,4945497	599,5981,277	214,0828846	3127,400142	57,67390035	2669814635	
Nigeria		80,17623306	10,42009254	21,59377803	1006,313449	0,21592598	0,00098307	10,31921797	4,47196563	0	510,777,1974	1,371,82518	8,38777599	549,2722019	23,2392807	13,04108289	16,63235838	380,8865134	
Kussia		1,25536851	0,51120234	132,5365668	125,9023704	0	30,12914817	9,08277282	0,19173132	0,0001133	0	0	15,92387874	5,27836122	1,1992.731.3	84,006%232	53,983,7835	0,11376684	
SIDS		111,4695787	586,3957.259	159,693035	77,96907558	65,38094541	7,04801394	7,79867352	67,61623176	0	11,325.28518	37,16722713	0,36180243	482,003969	100,8406852	399,2182317	20,71917738	167,1749086	
á		251,1138423	271,0880063	34,55986743	1430,424302	0,1110087	250,7615877	78,36761295	30,78153144	0,00490347	534,1769681	5,541 16266	0	550,875105	142,371,439.7	33,0705164	92,34036343	738,4344227	
NSA		9,1042216	682,4505333	69,08184162	486,3143528	75,21765669	33,74815653	4,714281	104,25,70188	0,0243319	70,35340257	82,13116131	27,504715.99	0	30,041,968.77	887,6863918	95,708.30148	2338,061606	
Rest of	Africa	263,3846045	195,6028685	328,20203.59	787,8361521	0,56141712	1,2741,696	299,4188694	25,90056355	3,2423085	756,4775754	1,2086997	1,41919074	855,6426717	126,939534	141278862	4,62132198	434,9746784	
Rest of	Asia	24884,33209	3180,095776	2691,382298	976,7804419	15344,0728	501,9895505	13%,38264	1821,084967	0,51553062	6012,108143	1299,607074	187,8898725	6987,140465	6701,825077	16008,350091	11,00,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,0	3695,275763	
Rest of	Europe	769,8914438	900,4213518	187,1977536	934,3459762	0,1784475	0,19650906	26,3290198	380,2193951	0,00159093	3740,844911	11.93846641	45,90553275	1017,934049	234,2309092	106,3074761	59,40625284	196,7828148	
Kest of	N.America	54,31373145	243,4959846	8,65170702	151,2646305	0,00868636	0,96416694	1,507,99081	1,5999048	0,04203243	54,89148159	1989/6#79	9,17322516	9132,149462	1,53222003	175,16169	3,97311849	382,6777.991	
Kest of	S.America	489,2362902	988,1525464	11,04128487	98,54106375	0	0,00630036	0,02858823	0,00078903	0	118,7327285	0,03593898	0,53881146	3415,952666	20,61363892	33,64094052	0,07859056	129,99309	

Annex 7 (Liner shiping trade values)

Table 7-6: Line shipping trade value matrix(in million USD)

	Rest of Rest of Namerica		14820,95162 21199,41006	1729945@7 60792,12634	111527,721 36:31,98148	3599,386644 1176,792,472	29678,28848 6062,207125	3097,517993 470,8247722	3875,003534 1717,628308	67,34457972 34,30753969	3799,233278 1399,446482	4980,477423 811,2921973	7568,619521 1996,910014	316624,4013 31244,1221	425,299884 1327,97253	85.991,90761 15818,43571	34%,162327 1620,321341	47710,000,258 13173,25.607	1240,31358 17514,08518
	Rest of	- F	5068,375557	48169,912.78	92223,18348	2299,802465	6912,579793	2127,5857212	19421,75811	94,608.376.32	18496,35253	1992641094	12313,09078	18610,672	5353,230712	24767,361	7910,462693	101690125	3477942788
	Rest of	23283,091	1074022855	324182,3617	179056,1043	35428,05689	137471,4497	20343,4145	51147,63887	934,2250335	11173,54127	51088,5472	18618,85626	119908,0604	16445,20493	1787.38,2018	6651,303264	16776,73988	19308,81192
	Rest of	1475,484381	2092,916216	25777,21707	55383,90243	930,357109	3666,739306	3438,115029	477709186	234,0989722	935,0852,366	1587,3211.34	4573,916,921	3604,971,942	6161,965309	13679,248.65	3538,132145	1553,433,289	1344,05144
	USA	96966'001891	2665992851	1770,679,52	537811,7114	27383,2098	143613,7235	21345,99183	34073,486.52	194,8897566	12504,99041	39874,63054	56795,26575	0	22317,62013	4032349115	20733,16766	519903,1492	32390,55041
	E E	4545,166216	3087,448979	90177,47881	307747,384	3036,952962	12534,17199	800,799229	4506,573949	47,14912521	702,515071	2505,992185	0	54560,30,106	13770,45306	32619.01164	17682,65487	16768,84372	2977,360527
	SIDS	5952,38403	1777,440469	50202,5732	50719,39673	11469,37631	22494,93168	972,9633623	6461661926	15,148,70577	287,8461739	1875,22727	8453,36639	49151,66551	1737,16871	66144,22797	1985,218631	5749,83606.5	1108,583%
	Russia	797,5184986	2445,625039	51561,81451	52964,25655	98,111166	8650,807165	1482,737565	2358,443904	32,856,3474	0	956,7257961	3974,327907	12522,38666	235591516	18004,282.82	4394,3498.51	1313,400073	3648,750445
	Nigeria	257,827,6137	1107,243912	12625,68873	6021,850886	380,2361379	352,2174806	193,5753465	1247,872187	0	157,8010995	1777181771	809,0478644	1904,395444	784,378638	2231,49466	765,7357128	184,2969952	176,9153493
	Middle	5045,876329	4102,994917	75372,42999	105116,5655	3366,576917	20765,21727	26666,9462	29317,06718	633,8449	4515,786533	5873,797958	13064,77488	37480,36965	9589,35696	61345,67897	16097,27988	598,913543	440,619.91
200 110	CBC	428,742367	1273,352836	24145,70706	13254,71486	1964,93046	3063,659628	3408,559025	3520,662792	127,809,2234	54,62854946	2772,060447	1025,69005	2597,624999	88 14,576 144	18345,6947	1451,57872	466,6052318	315,4569917
21 12111 112	Japan	11404,67976	4009,923797	182021.9153	91119,18741	14890,17636	0	5499,71538	4121,47433	2040353311	4525,012847	9902,808252	8091,535065	65877,89668	9794,272979	1046949974	2617,694837	16759,42436	10870,4628
VI nam	Indonesia	5307,902854	2236,30927	54658,90743	13457,97408	0	17648,38046	614,0097701	2931,248543	75,82366836	1073,047543	9649,838971	1170,835672	8300,489885	3408,676784	3350,89241	454,1491.558	1726,655471	2078,177215
varac	EU-27	1388097026	31681,58042	635023,8452	2206123,89	21639,41615	61009E0186	48090,26081	33680,081,13	1111,86223	38146,04392	31790,66036	179196,3487	283157,4086	72808,16031	230929,224	92353,67161	65018,06643	35715,33031
ig man	China	48243,42162	53679,6893	0	323554,8707	48781,3019	201489,6839	30129,56854	39069,13518	533,2431001	24313,10212	37309,82359	20717,45346	149215,6958	28443,01837	438406,6206	9203,781378	41523,88342	63799,42779
пддше	Brazil	402,4623963	0	52606,68562	39870,45978	1913,721152	5347,580296	2474,974304 151,9949142	3958,42216	144,9108827	5130905317		2389,669016	26257,72743	3764,8971.2	18324,23802	2014,585254	799,422.64	14466,09927
O. E.III.	Aus/NZ	9160,846838	796,9681319	81987,49608	54353,34679	3807,709328	17592,8881	2474,974304	2437,971545	0,94915557	264,2566093	5.993,37865	6622,304809	29640,35387	1731,148464	3836,73148	1518,498816	566,662364	1771,613563
ruote 1-0. Emic simpling dade value inadia(in minon obe)	Countries	Aus/NZ	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan	TDC	Middle East	Nigeria	Russia	SIDS	UK	USA	Rest of Africa	Rest of Asia	Rest of Europe	Rest of N.America	Rest of S.America

Annex 8 (Initial bilateral tariffs)

Table 7-7: Initial bilateral tariffs matrix(in million USD)

-/ aloni	table /-/. Initial bilateral lariffs	u viiaie	rai tar		mairix in million OSD)	מסוווו	(15)											
Countries	Aus/NZ	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan	TDC	Middle	Nigeria	Russia	SIDS	UK	USA	Rest of	Rest of	Rest of	Rest of	Rest of
								East						Africa	Asia	Europe	N.America	S.America
Aus/NZ	1,0000	1,1257	1,0044	1,0415	1,0108	1,0275	1,1080	1,0581	1,1116	1,0545	1,0857	1,0380	1,0130	1,1235	1,0475	1,0595	1,0343	1,0457
Brazil	1,0313	1,0000	1,0676	1,0411	1,0744	1,0648	1,1279	1,0653	1,1186	1,0564	1,0812	1,0378	1,0359	1,1227	1,0960	1,0613	1,0478	1,0009
China	1,0000	1,1487	1,0000	1,0417	1,0092	1,0388	1,1185	1,0625	1,1214	1,0601	1,0834	1,0415	1,0351	1,1129	1,0521	1,0379	1,0494	1,0817
EU-27	1,0303	1,1422	1,0678	1,0000	1,0884	1,0137	1,1224	1,0528	1,1283	1,0581	1,0550	1,0000	1,0359	1,0900	1,0783	1,0263	1,0185	1,0478
Indonesia	1,0000	1,1672	1,0043	1,0273	1,0000	1,0087	1,1013	1,0694	1,1409	1,0594	1,0731	1,0266	1,0420	1,1575	1,0361	1,0377	1,0667	1,1059
Japan	1,0014	1,1324	1,0701	1,0020	1,0105	1,0000	1,1078	1,0527	1,1034	1,0592	1,0628	1,0019	1,0352	1,0991	1,0463	1,0359	1,0247	1,0527
LDC	1,0002	1,2278	1,0296	1,0001	1,0741	1,0059	1,0606	1,0577	1,0597	1,0404	1,0509	1,0077	1,0298	1,0818	1,0510	1,0474	1,0550	1,1481
Middle East	1,0313	1,0755	1,0638	1,0223	1,0985	1,0346	1,1389	1,0141	1,1304	1,0564	1,0427	1,0201	1,0213	1,1166	1,1060	1,0482	1,0495	1,0720
Nigeria	1,0269	1,1732	1,0639	1,0243	1,1008	1,1006	1,0611	1,0450	1,0000	1,0468	1,0940	1,0124	1,0062	1,0529	1,1474	1,1096	1,0563	1,0576
Russia	1,0292	1,1143	1,0641	1,0399	1,0920	1,0282	1,1145	1,0628	1,0000	1,0000	1,0526	1,0320	1,0327	1,1029	1,0912	1,0168	1,0458	1,0640
SIDS	1,0057	1,1297	1,0234	1,0113	1,0242	1,0164	1,0773	1,0278	1,1255	1,0494	1,0438	1,0078	1,0066	1,1163	1,0521	1,0266	1,0396	1,0613
ΩK	1,0275	1,1368	1,0697	1,0000	1,0921	1,0125	1,1247	1,0512	1,1246	1,0586	1,0606	1,0000	1,0356	1,0948	1,0832	1,0289	1,0139	1,0400
USA	1,0115	1,1354	1,0720	1,0407	1,0848	1,0395	1,1240	1,0428	1,1187	1,0586	1,1008	1,0398	1,0000	1,1089	1,0793	1,0428	1,0113	1,0611
Rest of Africa	1,0339	1,1587	1,0660	1,0010	1,1072	1,0507	1,0689	1,0316	1,1390	1,0566	1,0407	1,0009	1,0111	1,1012	1,1164	1,0419	1,0632	1,1052
Rest of Asia	1,0098	1,1572	1,0237	1,0196	1,0183	1,0196	1,0957	1,0663	1,1259	1,0538	1,0582	1,0188	1,0309	1,1398	1,0406	1,0378	1,0529	1,0849
Rest of Europe	1,0335	1,1567	1,0596	1,0020	1,0942	1,0398	1,1395	1,0514	1,1351	1,0489	1,0658	1,0018	1,0368	1,1032	1,0874	1,0275	1,0531	1,0803
Rest of N.America	1,0062	1,1138	1,0625	1,0010	1,0897	1,0192	1,1261	1,0475	1,1107	1,0525	1,1039	1,0007	1,0010	1,1247	1,0829	1,0356	1,0210	1,0406
Rest of S.America	1,0219	1,0006	1,0415	1,0127	1,0870	1,0615	1,1397	1,0669	1,0861	1,0576	1,1044	1,0094	1,0162	1,1327	1,0934	1,0707	1,0389	1,0014

Source: Compiled by author based on data from WITS database

Annex 9 (Bilateral distance table matrix)

Table 7-8: Bilateral distance table matrix(in nautical miles)

Source: Compiled by author based on data from (Bertoli, Goujon and Santoni, 2016)

Annex 10 (Initial tariffs corrected for distance)

Table 7-9: Tariffs corrected for distance

Rest of	S.America	1,0700	1,0007	1,1235	1,0480	1,1756	1,0733	1,1703	1,1564	1,0600	1,0828	1,0817	1,0403	1,0289	1,1317	1,1471	1,1024	1,0163	1,0005
Rest of	N.America	1,0484	1,0481	1,0550	1,0197	1,0969	1,0246	1,0719	1,0983	1,0622	1,0621	1,0476	1,0147	1,0060	1,0831	1,0950	1,0710	1,0079	1,0156
Rest of	Europe	1,0707	1,0649	1,0516	1,0150	1,0392	1,0521	1,0089	1,0315	1,0932	1,0010	1,0367	1,0190	1,0481	1,0083	1,0256	1,0027	1,0476	1,0901
Rest of	Asia	1,0286	1,1241	1,0396	1,0804	1,0159	1,0393	1,0265	1,0193	1,1713	1,0635	1,0406	1,0872	1,1253	1,0560	1,0161	1,0593	1,1488	1,1618
Rest of	Africa	1,1224	1,1271	1,1314	1,0492	1,1328	1,1243	1,0267	1,0531	1,0438	1,0222	1,1209	1,0539	1,1198	1,0333	1,0672	1,0204	1,1639	1,1661
USA		1,0207	1,0321	1,0428	1,0295	1,0375	1,0426	1,0314	1,0331	1,0060	1,0373	1,0096	1,0283	1,0000	1,0122	1,0488	1,0413	1,0005	1,0077
ΩK		1,0587	1,0326	1,0718	1,0000	1,0374	1,0039	1,0043	1,0204	1,0086	1,0208	1,0122	1,0000	1,0317	1,0005	1,0197	1,0012	1,0007	1,0095
SIDS		1,1017	1,1338	1,0561	1,0867	1,0123	1,0515	1,0505	1,0361	1,1491	1,0540	1,0512	1,0950	1,1469	1,0423	1,0454	1,0909	1,1249	1,1391
Russia		1,0658	1,0608	1,0829	1,0341	1,0629	1,0870	1,0082	1,0379	1,0407	1,0000	1,0507	1,0381	1,0669	1,0122	1,0375	1,0029	1,0712	1,0745
Nigeria		1,1419	1,1508	1,2023	1,0870	1,1772	1,1816	1,0503	1,1549	1,0000	1,0000	1,1990	1,0860	1,1148	1,1151	1,1464	1,1149	1,1223	1,0897
Middle	East	1,0444	1,0914	1,0576	1,0529	1,0418	1,0533	1,0277	1,0050	1,0534	1,0422	1,0235	1,0520	1,0666	1,0144	1,0121	1,0336	1,0943	1,1453
TDC		1,1053	1,1313	1,1367	1,0676	1,0864	1,1366	1,0394	1,0668	1,0515	1,0233	1,0766	1,0699	1,1306	1,0224	1,0498	1,0263	1,1649	1,1606
Japan		1,0159	1,1211	1,0059	1,0247	1,0044	1,0000	1,0075	1,0350	1,1767	1,0415	1,0134	1,0255	1,0478	1,0636	1,0166	1,0578	1,0191	1,0855
Indonesia		1,0022	1,1033	1,0038	1,1228	1,0000	1,0053	1,0632	1,0593	1,1268	1,0974	1,0041	1,1295	1,0758	1,0904	1,0081	1,0980	1,1303	1,1443
EU-27 Ind		1,0638	1,0363	1,0713	1,0000	1,0379	1,0036	1,0050	1,0223	1,0165	1,0235	1,0178	1,0000	1,0334	1,0005	1,0201	1,0011	1,0011	1,0128
China		1,0024	1,1215	1,0000	1,1160	1,0018	1,0106	1,0341	1,0587	1,1065	1,0885	1,0157	1,1206	1,0877		1,0180	1,0811	1,0696	1,0627
Brazil		1,1762	1,0000	1,2674	1,1255	1,2320	1,2474	1,2339	1,1056	1,2202	1,1232	1,2137	1,1178	1,1212	1,1644 1,0768	1,2032	1,1660	1,1146	1,0005
Aus/NZ		1,0000	1,0439	1,0000	1,0466	1,0000	1,0008	1,0002	1,0239	1,0342	1,0352	1,0068	1,0425	1,0183	1,0336	1,0059	1,0398	1,0088	1,0335
Countries Aus/NZ Brazil China		Aus/NZ	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan	TDC	Middle East	Nigeria	Russia	SIDS	UK	USA	Rest of Africa	Rest of Asia	Rest of Europe	Rest of N.America	Rest of S.America

Annex 11 (Initial NTMs corrected for freight and distance)

Table 7-10: Initial NTMs corrected for freight and distance

1 21221		1111	1100 611	cere J	tacte / 10. thinker it it is converted of Judgin and assume	י מונה מו	o company											
Countries	Aus/NZ	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan	TDC	Middle	Nigeria	Russia	SIDS	UK	USA	Rest of	Rest of	Rest of	Rest of	Rest of
								East						Africa	Asia	Europe	N.America	S.America
Aus/NZ	2,7007	2,3074	2,6954	2,5583	2,6957	2,6653	2,4657	2,6017	2,3840	2,5539	2,4738	2,5698	2,6546	2,4275	2,6369	2,5429	2,5926	2,5445
Brazil	2,6028	2,7007	2,4294	2,6198	2,4703	2,4305	2,4076	2,4968	2,3641	2,5650	2,4021	2,6281	2,6290	2,4169	2,4237	2,5558	2,5933	2,6992
China	2,7007	2,1040	2,7007	2,5415	2,6923	2,6876	2,3956	2,5723	2,2492	2,5156	2,5756	2,5404	2,6052	2,4074	2,6124	2,5855	2,5779	2,4250
EU-27	2,5968	2,4207	2,4419	2,7007	2,4266	2,6457	2,5498	2,5827	2,5066	2,6245	2,5072	2,7007	2,6349	2,5910	2,5212	2,6673	2,6567	2,5936
Indonesia	2,7007	2,1828	2,6968	2,6161	2,7007	2,6909	2,5078	2,6075	2,3052	2,5603	2,6732	2,6173	2,6169	2,4043	2,6652	2,6132	2,4845	2,3087
Japan	2,6989	2,1485	2,6770	2,6927	2,6888	2,7007	2,3958	2,5818	2,2954	2,5065	2,5858	2,6921	2,6056	2,4234	2,6130	2,5844	2,6459	2,5371
LDC	2,7003	2,1786	2,6245	2,6895	2,5596	2,6840	2,6128	2,6388	2,5883	2,6824	2,5881	2,6911	2,6307	2,6412	2,6415	2,6808	2,5401	2,3207
Middle	2,6474	2,4649	2,5696	2,6509	2,5684	2,6227	2,5517	2,6895	2,3551	2,6162	2,6202	2,6552	2,6268	2,5821	2,6576	2,6305	2,4814	2,3517
East																		
Nigeria	2,6244	2,2092	2,4631	2,6640	2,4178	2,3063	2,5857	2,5814	2,7007	2,6099	2,3680	2,6816	2,6873	2,6030	2,3183	2,4926	2,5619	2,5668
Russia	2,6220	2,4258	2,5033	2,6484	2,4832	2,6082	2,6488	2,6066	2,7007	2,7007	2,5802	2,6543	2,6174	2,6511	2,5589	2,6985	2,5621	2,5160
SIDS	2,6856	2,2237	2,6656	2,6610	2,6916	2,6707	2,5297	2,6483	2,2565	2,5875	2,5863	2,6734	2,6792	2,4308	2,6100	2,6187	2,5944	2,5184
UK	2,6060	2,4378	2,4315	2,7007	2,4118	2,6438	2,5447	2,5847	2,5087	2,6157	2,4886	2,7007	2,6375	2,5804	2,5061	2,6583	2,6680	2,6108
USA	2,6599	2,4301	2,5049	2,6261	2,5316	2,5940	2,4093	2,5521	2,4445	2,5514	2,3728	2,6300	2,7007	2,4334	2,4210	2,5935	2,6872	2,6363
Rest of	2,6257	2,3337	2,5292	2,6995	2,4990	2,5588	2,6506	2,6686	2,4439	2,6734	2,6062	2,6996	2,6735	2,6264	2,5758	2,6823	2,5153	2,4068
Africa																		
Rest of	2,6876	2,2471	2,6606	2,6558	2,6827	2,6636	2,5897	2,6737	2,3741	2,6171	2,5994	2,6567	2,5917	2,5507	2,6649	2,6435	2,4888	2,3724
Asia																		
Rest of	2,6118	2,3302	2,5196	2,6982	2,4819	2,5718	2,6420	2,6258	2,4442	2,6943	2,4979	2,6981	2,6085	2,6552	2,5684	2,6946	2,5422	2,4722
Europe																		
Rest of	2,6812	2,4450	2,5453	2,6983	2,4100	2,6581	2,3326	2,4902	2,4278	2,5418	2,4219	2,6991	2,6995	2,3349	2,3685	2,5944	2,6830	2,6643
N.America																		
Rest of	2,6259	2,6997	2,5607	2,6723	2,3787	2,5098	2,3423	2,3764	2,5005	2,5344	2,3902	2,6796	2,6836	2,3299	2,3395	2,4995	2,6658	2,6997
S.America																		
		;	,															

nnex 12 (Final NTMs calculated for Scenario 1 - \$75 global carbon tax)

Table 7-11: Final NTMs for	II: Fin	al NTN		Scenario Ia	io Ia													
Countrie	Aus/N	Brazi	Chin	EU-	Indonesi	Japa	TDC	Middl	Nigeri	Russi	SIDS	UK	NSA	Rest	Rest	Rest	Rest of	f Rest of
Aus/NZ	2,7449	2,314	2,750	2,588	2,7397	2,716	2,487	2,6363	2,3982	2,584	2,498	2,601	2,694	2,445	2,681	2,5719	2,6263	2,5737
Brazil	2,6375	2,744	2,459	2,659	2,4925	2,449	2,424	2,5216	2,3765	2,596	2,418	2,665	2,669	2,434	2,443	2,5861	2,6271	2,7442
China	2,7456	2,092	2,744	2,570	2,7357	2,730	2,411	2,6041	2,2509	2,542	2,612	2,569	2,640	2,423	2,652	2,6186	2,6104	2,4434
EU-27	2,6313	2,440	2,466	2,819	2,4451	2,684	2,580	2,6191	2,5388	2,661	2,536	2,752	2,683	2,627	2,552	2,7098	2,6981	2,6285
Indonesia	2,7454	2,178	2,743	2,652	2,7445	2,736	2,533	2,6426	2,3121	2,591	2,717	2,653	2,653	2,420	2,709	2,6488	2,5081	2,3159
Japan	2,7444	2,140	2,719	2,735	2,7316	2,744	2,411	2,6146	2,3013	2,532	2,619	2,735	2,641	2,441	2,650	2,6174	2,6847	2,5659
TDC	2,7441	2,173	2,681	2,736	2,5909	2,726	2,649	2,6771	2,6217	2,724	2,621	2,734	2,670	2,680	2,687	2,7227	2,5690	2,3294
Middle	2,6891	2,487	2,701	2,742	2,6043	2,720	2,585	2,7418	2,3670	2,652	2,682	2,698	2,691	2,620	2,856	2,6689	2,5066	2,3638
Nigeria	2,6614	2,208	2,486	2,720	2,4368	2,313	2,619	2,6143	2,7445	2,645	2,381	2,725	2,733	2,640	2,337	2,5170	2,5939	2,5986
Russia	2,6586	2,444	2,559	2,738	2,5068	2,649	2,688	2,6443	2,7455	2,744	2,616	2,698	2,665	2,690	2,599	2,7447	2,5932	2,5428
SIDS	2,7333	2,224	2,710	2,703	2,7425	2,714	2,560	2,6890	2,2589	2,620	2,620	2,715	2,725	2,449	2,656	2,6549	2,6285	2,5462
UK	2,6410	2,457	2,453	2,761	2,4286	2,682	2,574	2,6180	2,5347	2,651	2,512	2,744	2,678	2,613	2,533	2,6986	2,7093	2,6463
USA	2,7003	2,457	2,542	2,691	2,5614	2,634	2,426	2,5830	2,4648	2,581	2,390	2,672	2,744	2,453	2,450	2,6284	2,7637	2,6848
Rest of	2,6628	2,343	2,561	2,748	2,5242	2,589	2,690	2,7098	2,4638	2,714	2,641	2,743	2,716	2,664	2,611	2,7245	2,5419	2,4232
Rest of	2,7388	2,249	2,717	2,698	2,7285	2,712	2,625	2,7171	2,3890	2,653	2,648	2,697	2,630	2,581	2,718	2,6839	2,5131	2,3864
Rest of	2,6474	2,339	2,551	2,773	2,5058	2,603	2,680	2,6646	2,4649	2,737	2,522	2,762	2,646	2,695	2,601	2,7387	2,5723	2,4948
Rest of	2,7232	2,465	2,576	2,747	2,4266	2,698	2,342	2,5144	2,4462	2,570	2,440	2,743	2,809	2,344	2,386	2,6284	2,7256	2,7056
Rest of	2,6627	2,744	2,600	2,715	2,3924	2,537	2,352	2,3899	2,5256	2,562	2,406	2,721	2,744	2,339	2,356	2,5246	2,7068	2,7464

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Table 7-12: Final NTMs for Scenario 1b

THOSE / -12. I THUS INTENDED	2. 1. 1110	TATTAT TO	-	occuratio to	010													
Countries	Aus/N	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesi	Japan	TDC	Middl	Nigeri	Russia	SIIDS	UK	USA	Rest of	Rest of	Rest of	Rest of	Rest of
Aus/NZ	2,7558	2,317	2,896	2,601	2,7552	2,751	2,493	2,6456	2,4019	2,591	2,502	2,609	2,704	2,450	2,716	2,5802	2,6348	2,5817
Brazil	2,6462	2,755	2,503	2,671	2,4985	2,461	2,428	2,5298	2,3796	2,604	2,422	2,674	2,676	2,438	2,450	2,5948	2,6358	2,7550
China	2,7559	2,089	2,755	2,578	2,7468	2,742	2,414	2,6130	2,2513	2,548	2,615	2,576	2,649	2,428	2,660	2,6271	2,6184	2,4476
EU-27	2,6394	2,442	2,469	2,778	2,4494	2,694	2,587	2,6261	2,5401	2,670	2,539	2,757	2,682	2,634	2,556	2,7194	2,7065	2,6360
Indonesia	2,7555	2,177	2,763	2,661	2,7555	2,748	2,540	2,6514	2,3138	2,598	2,724	2,662	2,662	2,424	2,735	2,6577	2,5140	2,3177
Japan	2,7535	2,138	2,729	2,747	2,7423	2,755	2,414	2,6227	2,3028	2,538	2,627	2,746	2,649	2,445	2,658	2,6256	2,6943	2,5728
LDC	2,7552	2,172	2,673	2,744	2,5979	2,737	2,657	2,6865	2,6300	2,735	2,629	2,744	2,677	2,689	2,691	2,7333	2,5762	2,3311
Middle	2,6960	2,492	2,611	2,699	2,6078	2,668	2,589	2,7444	2,3694	2,661	2,665	2,704	2,673	2,623	2,709	2,6775	2,5105	2,3657
Nigeria	2,6702	2,206	2,490	2,714	2,4395	2,315	2,627	2,6223	2,7555	2,654	2,383	2,734	2,740	2,646	2,328	2,5231	2,6005	2,6059
Russia	2,6677	2,449	2,546	2,704	2,5132	2,655	2,698	2,6521	2,7562	2,755	2,620	2,704	2,662	2,701	2,604	2,7579	2,6008	2,5493
SIDS	2,7388	2,222	2,717	2,711	2,7457	2,722	2,564	2,6982	2,2593	2,629	2,627	2,725	2,731	2,454	2,655	2,6639	2,6369	2,5519
UK	2,6497	2,461	2,455	2,756	2,4328	2,692	2,581	2,6265	2,5410	2,660	2,518	2,755	2,684	2,621	2,538	2,7082	2,7189	2,6551
USA	2,7103	2,455	2,553	2,680	2,5670	2,645	2,430	2,5903	2,4700	2,588	2,389	2,677	2,755	2,458	2,452	2,6370	2,7523	2,6867
Rest of	2,6718	2,345	2,574	2,757	2,5302	2,598	2,699	2,7199	2,4687	2,725	2,650	2,754	2,725	2,672	2,624	2,7352	2,5484	2,4272
Rest of	2,7415	2,249	2,719	2,707	2,7371	2,714	2,633	2,7295	2,3907	2,662	2,642	2,706	2,634	2,589	2,718	2,6917	2,5190	2,3888
Rest of	2,6562	2,341	2,553	2,753	2,5112	2,611	2,690	2,6719	2,4690	2,748	2,529	2,752	2,652	2,704	2,607	2,7487	2,5785	2,5003
Rest of	2,7337	2,470	2,592	2,760	2,4317	2,711	2,344	2,5208	2,4512	2,578	2,444	2,754	2,757	2,347	2,389	2,6371	2,7362	2,7164
Rest of	2,6719	2,758	2,609	2,727	2,3963	2,543	2,355	2,3941	2,5321	2,569	2,409	2,732	2,737	2,341	2,355	2,5334	2,7174	2,7572
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Table 7-13: Final NTMs for Scenario 1c

Countries Aus/NZ Brazil China	Aus/NZ	Brazil	China	EU-27 Indon	Indonesia	Japan	TDC	Middle	Nigeria	Russia	SIDS	UK	USA	Rest of	Rest of	Rest of	Rest of	Rest of
								East						Africa	Asia	Europe	ieri	S.America
Aus/NZ	2,7744	2,3192	2,7728	2,6105	2,7682	2,7338	2,5020	2,6596	2,40.76	2,6038	2,5120	2,62.26	2,7219	2,4579	2,7023	2,5911	2,6488	2,5930
Brazil	2,6603	2,7733	2,4662	2,6835	2,5074	2,4617	2,4349	2,5383	2,3847	2,6169	2,4287	2,6898	2,6935	2,4458	2,4546	2,6065	2,6510	2,7740
China	2,7827	2,0902	2,7733	2,6623	2,7699	2,7790	2,4237	2,6336	2,2534	2,5654	2,6345	2,5985	2,7270	2,4375	2,7086	2,6458	2,6513	2,4619
EU-27	2,6595	2,4545	2,5115	3,0264	2,4583	2,7202	2,6005	2,6490	2,5499	2,6914	2,5557	2,8086	2,7591	2,6530	2,5866	2,7453	2,7352	2,6538
Indonesia	2,7737	2,1754	2,7744	2,6780	2,7733	2,7636	2,5508	2,6660	2,3166	2,6113	2,7429	2,6772	2,6797	2,4311	2,7364	2,6725	2,5241	2,3207
Japan	2,7733	2,1362	2,7690	2,77.53	2,7616	2,7733	2,4215	2,6384	2,30.52	2,5500	2,6432	2,7648	2,6800	2,4534	2,6878	2,6398	2,7134	2,5851
TDC	2,7731	2,1703	2,6888	2,76.59	2,6104	2,7547	2,6722	2,7049	2,6436	2,7523	2,6434	2,7629	2,6949	2,7050	2,7073	2,7505	2,5885	2,3345
Middle East	2,7120	2,5015	2,6264	2,72.02	2,6208	2,6837	2,6016	2,7637	2,3743	2,6760	2,6814	2,72,12	2,6918	2,6369	2,7294	2,6944	2,5204	2,3704
Nigeria	2,6852	2,2057	2,4989	2,73 10	2,4466	2,3179	2,6405	2,6356	2,7733	2,6685	2,3890	2,7513	2,7579	2,6605	2,3317	2,5330	2,6130	2,6186
Russia	2,6825	2,4564	2,5481	2,71.73	2,5223	2,6670	2,7134	2,6651	2,7733	2,7733	2,6342	2,72.17	2,6786	2,7162	2,6108	2,7729	2,6137	2,5601
SIDS	2,7565	2,22.28	2,7370	2,7311	2,7639	2,7398	2,5761	2,7134	2,2603	2,6427	2,6414	2,7421	2,7531	2,4617	2,6744	2,6788	2,6512	2,5629
UK	2,6647	2,4699	2,4648	2,7939	2,4398	2,7085	2,5932	2,6408	2,5516	2,6756	2,5293	2,7733	2,7068	2,6349	2,5507	2,7257	2,7363	2,6697
USA	2,7296	2,4638	2,5643	2,7197	2,5789	2,6576	2,4371	2,6060	2,47.76	2,6024	2,4002	2,6979	2,7733	2,4656	2,4640	2,6516	2,7941	2,7025
Rest of Africa	2,6869	2,3499	2,5785	2,7803	2,5406	2,6106	2,7165	2,7373	2,4768	2,7421	2,6644	2,7736	2,7444	2,6882	2,6309	2,7526	2,5597	2,4340
Rest of Asia	2,7625	2,2516	2,777.2	2,7537	2,7564	2,7424	2,6472	2,7492	2,3967	2,6788	2,6639	2,7263	2,6937	2,6015	2,7524	2,7101	2,5383	2,3960
Rest of Europe	2,6709	2,3457	2,5652	2,7810	2,5207	2,6247	2,7057	2,6886	2,4771	2,7664	2,5393	2,7723	2,6692	2,7212	2,6213	2,7672	2,5907	2,5096
Rest of N.America	2,7514	2,4788	2,5986	2,7780	2,4377	2,7260	2,3482	2,5309	2,4582	2,5900	2,4519	2,7733	2,8316	2,3510	2,3916	2,6512	2,7583	2,7327
Rest of S.America	2,6871	2,7738	2,6189	2,7445	2,4016	2,5541	2,3594	2,3993	2,5421	2,5817	2,4149	2,7493	2,7573	2,3453	2,3584	2,5414	2,7344	2,7741
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Annex 13 (Final NTMs calculated for Scenario 2 - \$150 global carbon tax)

Table 7-14: Final NTMs for Scenario 2a

7 /	Countries Aus/NZ	Ī	Aus/NZ 2,7892	Brazil 2,6721	China 2,7905	EU-27 2,6659	Indonesia 2,7900	Japan 2,7898	2,7879	Middle East 2,7309	Nigeria 2,6984	Russia 2,6952	2,7809	2,6761	2,7407	Rest of 2,6999 Africa	Rest of Asia 2,7901	Rest of 2,6830 Europe	Rest of 2,7652 N.America	Rest of 2,6996 S.America
ומו זאזז	Brazil		2,3215	2,7884	2,0801	2,4594	2,1736	2,1329	2,1692	2,5103	2,2069	2,4626	2,2250	2,4766	2,4853	2,3527	2,2523	2,3487	2,48.50	2,7882
-	China		2,8060	2,4888	2,7884	2,4901	2,7901	2,7624	2,7394	2,8341	2,5097	2,6161	2,7548	2,4749	2,5799	2,5932	2,77.52	2,5828	2,6068	2,6409
ocenario za	E U-27		2,6195	2,6983	2,6003	2,9375	2,6882	2,7789	2,7829	2,8332	2,7765	2,8276	2,7456	2,8221	2,7570	2,7965	2,7421	2,8491	2,7960	2,7578
77 0	Indon esta		2,7837	2,5148	2,7790	2,4637	2,7884	2,7744	2,6222	2,6403	2,45.59	2,5303	2,7934	2,4454	2,5912	2,5493	2,7744	2,5297	2,4433	2,4061
	Japan		2,7680	2,4677	2,7734	2,7240	2,7812	2,7884	2,7691	2,8184	2,3212	2,6900	2,7580	2,7209	2,6758	2,6203	2,7612	2,6356	2,7390	2,5642
	og a		2,5094	2,4404	2,4264	2,6111	2,5595	2,4264	2,6870	2,6189	2,6526	2,7275	2,5909	2,6035	2,4428	2,7301	2,6622	2,7189	2,3514	2,3629
	Middle	FRIN	2,6710	2,5463	2,6360	2,6555	2,6777	2,6473	2,7153	2,7942	2,6471	2,6819	2,7297	2,6513	2,6139	2,7511	2,7605	2,7035	2,5385	2,4034
	Nigena		2,4124	2,3889	2,2526	2,5709	2,3189	2,3072	2,6551	2,3789	2,7884	2,7903	2,2613	2,5608	2,4852	2,4837	2,40.40	2,4857	2,4645	2,5507
	Kussia		2,6141	2,6273	2,5686	2,6984	2,6217	2,5579	2,7666	2,6881	2,6806	2,7884	2,6541	2,6874	2,6112	2,7560	2,6892	2,7808	2,5998	2,5910
	SIDS		2,5222	2,43.50	2,6484	2,5659	2,7611	2,6536	2,6555	2,7448	2,3942	2,6531	2,6547	2,5368	2,4078	2,6767	2,6983	2,5478	2,4582	2,4222
	š		2,6330	2,7021	2,5982	2,8041	2,6893	2,7781	2,7772	2,7422	2,7698	2,7420	2,7565	2,7884	2,7148	2,7876	2,7374	2,8266	2,7877	2,7637
			2,7336	2,7103	2,6758	2,7323	2,6906	2,6766	2,7100	2,7557	2,7801	2,7141	1,177,1	2,7192	2,7884	2,7592	2,6691	2,6844	2,9191	2,8057
	Kest of	AIITE	2,4641	2,4516	2,4403	2,6646	2,4366	2,4592	2,7206	2,6589	2,6787	2,7307	2,4689	2,6461	2,4732	2,7015	2,6115	2,7348	2,3542	2,3487
	Kest of	ASIA	2,7253	2,4628	2,6923	2,5839	2,7530	2,6881	2,7335	3,0559	2,3557	2,6401	2,7020	2,5613	2,4791	2,6468	2,77.22	2,6348	2,4037	2,3739
	Kest of	Europe	2,6010	2,6165	2,6517	2,7522	2,6844	2,6503	2,7647	2,7074	2,5414	2,7909	2,6911	2,7390	2,6634	2,7667	2,7242	2,7828	2,6624	2,5496
	Kest of	MAMenca	2,6600	2,6609	2,6429	2,7396	2,5317	2,7235	2,5978	2,5318	2,6258	2,6243	2,6625	2,7506	2,8401	2,5685	2,5375	2,6025	2,7682	2,7477
	Kest of	S.America	2,6029	2,7892	2,4617	2,6634	2,3230	2,5947	2,3382	2,3760	2,6303	2,5696	2,5739	2,6819	2,7333	2,4395	2,4004	2,5174	2,7470	2,7931

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Table 7-15: Final NTMs for Scenario 2b

Aus/NZ	Countries Aus/NZ Brazil China		EU-27 Indon	Indonesia	Japan	TDC	Middle	Nigeria	Russia	SIDS	UK	USA	Rest of	Rest of	Rest of	Rest of	Rest of
							East						Africa	Asia	Europe	N.America	S.America
2,8109 2,3275		3,0967	2,6447	2,8146	2,8378	2,5209	2,6895	2,4197	2,6291	2,5307	2,6494	2,7534	2,4739	2,7964	2,6176	2,6771	2,6189
2,6896 2,8103		2,5766	2,7227	2,52.67	2,4917	2,4487	2,5627	2,3951	2,6429	2,4434	2,7214	2,7236	2,4607	2,4768	2,6338	2,6784	2,8109
2,8111 2,0748		2,8103	2,6145	2,8013	2,7975	2,4341	2,6537	2,2533	2,5822	2,6563	2,6126	2,6927	2,4492	2,7084	2,6687	2,6588	2,4702
2,6821 2,4650	0	2,4963	2,8567	2,47.22	2,7425	2,6248	2,6696	2,5735	2,7166	2,5718	2,8142	2,7304	2,6770	2,5914	2,7715	2,7564	2,6784
2,8103 2,1713	13	2,8310	2,7067	2,8103	2,8063	2,5730	2,6953	2,3224	2,6371	2,7765	2,7073	2,7071	2,4446	2,8062	2,7023	2,5436	2,3266
2,8081 2,1290	96	2,7820	2,8013	2,7957	2,8103	2,4341	2,6636	2,3102	2,5708	2,6685	2,8003	2,6930	2,4681	2,7034	2,6668	2,7427	2,6085
2,8102 2,1	2,1664	2,7232	2,7999	2,6363	2,7904	2,7024	2,7342	2,6717	2,7877	2,6714	2,7986	2,7239	2,7376	2,7409	2,7858	2,6122	2,3414
2,7446 2,	2,5194	2,6529	2,7490	2,6472	2,7140	2,6267	2,7994	2,3838	2,7060	2,7111	2,7542	2,7193	2,6641	2,7618	2,7246	2,5397	2,3797
2,7161 2,	2,2038	2,5171	2,7650	2,4612	2,3237	2,6684	2,6631	2,8103	2,6983	2,3998	2,7867	2,7938	2,6897	2,3384	2,5535	2,6391	2,6450
2,7133 2,	2,4725	2,5895	2,7604	2,5431	2,7029	2,7475	2,6977	2,8116	2,8103	2,6617	2,7544	2,7077	2,7511	2,6510	2,8173	2,6394	2,5827
2,7920 2,	2,2218	2,7684	2,7616	2,7997	2,7733	2,5994	2,7481	2,2622	2,6707	2,6693	2,7766	2,7840	2,4772	2,7017	2,7092	2,6793	2,5854
2,6934 2.	2,4859	2,4788	2,8123	2,4538	2,7401	2,6178	2,6684	2,5734	2,7054	2,5486	2,8103	2,7323	2,6618	2,5707	2,7581	2,7699	2,6993
2,7607 2	2,4808	2,6014	2,7346	2,6024	2,6961	2,4512	2,6284	2,4956	2,6261	2,4070	2,7245	2,8103	2,4827	2,4833	2,6806	2,8174	2,7371
2,7178 2	2,3577	2,6192	2,8161	2,5615	2,6376	2,7490	2,7712	2,4935	2,7767	2,6940	2,8093	2,7768	2,7190	2,6736	2,7881	2,5816	2,4477
2,7954 2	2,2510	2,7793	2,7583	2,7915	2,7660	2,6768	2,7852	2,4073	2,7073	2,6863	2,7569	2,6781	2,6290	2,7711	2,7400	2,5492	2,4053
2,7007	2,3532	2,5876	2,8081	2,5404	2,6512	2,7379	2,7180	2,4938	2,8025	2,5601	2,8073	2,6968	2,7542	2,6472	2,8029	2,6147	2,5284
2,7862	2,4955	2,6399	2,8217	2,4534	2,7656	2,3562	2,5513	2,4746	2,6143	2,4667	2,8101	2,8149	2,3601	2,4101	2,6797	2,7894	2,7686
2,7180	2,8163	2,6588	2,7822	2,4140	2,5766	2,3686	2,4118	2,5636	2,6052	2,4280	2,7849	2,7909	2,3537	2,3721	2,5672	2,7690	2,8146

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Table 7-16: Final NTMs for Scenario 2c

Annex 14 (Final NTMs calculated for Scenario 3 - \$100 global carbon tax)

Table 7-17: Final NTMs for Scenario 3a

Table 7-18: Final NTMs for Scenario 3b

Countries	Aus/NZ	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan	TDC	Middle	Nigeria	Russia	SIDS	UK	USA	Rest	Rest	Rest of	Rest of	Rest of
								East						Jo	Jo	Europe	N.America	S.America
														Africa	Asia			
Aus/NZ	2,7741	2,3208	2,9628	2,6159	2,7750	2,7803	2,5025	2,6602	2,4078	2,6040	2,5117	2,6229	2,7204	2,4584	2,7432	2,5926	2,6489	2,5941
Brazil	2,6607	2,7737	2,5275	2,6884	2,5079	2,4713	2,4350	2,5407	2,3847	2,6169	2,4296	2,6902	2,6920	2,4461	2,4591	2,6078	2,6500	2,7736
China	2,7743	2,0845	2,7737	2,5902	2,7649	2,7609	2,4212	2,6266	2,2520	2,5600	2,6294	2,5885	2,6635	2,4353	2,6764	2,6410	2,6318	2,4551
EU-27	2,6536	2,4502	2,4782	2,8047	2,4570	2,7102	2,5998	2,6406	2,5512	2,6859	2,5502	2,7763	2,6986	2,6483	2,5680	2,7367	2,7231	2,6501
Indonesia	2,7738	2,1751	2,7862	2,6765	2,7737	2,7678	2,5513	2,6660	2,3167	2,6115	2,7421	2,6773	2,6770	2,4312	2,7592	2,6725	2,5239	2,3206
Japan	2,7717	2,1355	2,7470	2,7651	2,7601	2,7737	2,4213	2,6363	2,3052	2,5493	2,6409	2,7642	2,6639	2,4532	2,6732	2,6393	2,7104	2,5847
LDC	2,7735	2,1705	2,6903	2,7630	2,6107	2,7549	2,6725	2,7024	2,6439	2,7526	2,6436	2,7627	2,6928	2,7054	2,7078	2,7507	2,5882	2,3345
Middle East	2,7121	2,5012	2,6251	2,7162	2,6209	2,6835	2,6017	2,7627	2,3742	2,6760	2,6808	2,7211	2,6885	2,6367	2,7271	2,6932	2,5202	2,3703
Nigeria	2,6855	2,2056	2,4991	2,7313	2,4467	2,3179	2,6408	2,6359	2,7737	2,6688	2,3892	2,7517	2,7583	2,6608	2,3317	2,5332	2,6133	2,6189
Russia	2,6828	2,4569	2,5607	2,7231	2,5231	2,6713	2,7146	2,6673	2,7746	2,7737	2,6345	2,7210	2,6776	2,7177	2,6202	2,7777	2,6136	2,5604
SIDS	2,7565	2,2225	2,7341	2,7280	2,7636	2,7391	2,5762	2,7148	2,2603	2,6429	2,6416	2,7422	2,7491	2,4617	2,6711	2,6790	2,6510	2,5630
UK	2,6642	2,4698	2,4630	2,7751	2,4398	2,7080	2,5934	2,6404	2,5518	2,6755	2,5286	2,7737	2,7007	2,6347	2,5491	2,7248	2,7359	2,6698
USA	2,7271	2,4639	2,5692	2,6984	2,5787	2,6620	2,4372	2,6030	2,4785	2,6012	2,3956	2,6930	2,7737	2,4663	2,4625	2,6515	2,7740	2,7035
Rest of Africa	2,6871	2,3497	2,5892	2,7772	2,5407	2,6113	2,7162	2,7370	2,4770	2,7422	2,6647	2,7727	2,7423	2,6881	2,6410	2,7528	2,5595	2,4340
Rest of Asia	2,7594	2,2497	2,7397	2,7241	2,7552	2,7318	2,6478	2,7480	2,3962	2,6772	2,6573	2,7235	2,6493	2,6028	2,7357	2,7078	2,5291	2,3943
Rest of Europe	2,6710	2,3455	2,5649	2,7714	2,5209	2,6247	2,7059	2,6873	2,4772	2,7664	2,5393	2,7709	2,6673	2,7212	2,6209	2,7668	2,5905	2,5096
Rest of N.America	2,7512	2,4786	2,6083	2,7805	2,4389	2,7298	2,3483	2,5309	2,4590	2,5901	2,4517	2,7731	2,7764	2,3517	2,3962	2,6513	2,7539	2,7338
Rest of S.America	2,6873	2,7774	2,6260	2,7455	2,4022	2,5543	2,3598	2,4000	2,5426	2,5816	2,4154	2,7498	2,7551	2,3458	2,3612	2,5446	2,7345	2,7763

Table 7-19: Final NTMs for Scenario 3c

Countries Aus/NZ Brazil China EU-27 Indone	Aus/NZ	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan	TDC	Middle	Nigeria	Russia	SIDS	UK	USA	Rest	Rest	Rest of	Rest of	Rest of
								East						Jo	Jo	Europe	N.America	S.America
														Africa	Asia			
Aus/NZ	2,7989	2,3231	2,7985	2,6278	2,7923	2,7566	2,5140	2,6788	2,4154	2,6205	2,5247	2,6402	2,7444	2,4681	2,7241	2,6072	2,6675	2,6091
Brazil	2,6795	2,7975	2,4784	2,7047	2,5198	2,4720	2,4440	2,5521	2,3916	2,6342	2,4375	2,7103	2,7150	2,4554	2,4649	2,6234	2,6702	2,7989
China	2,8100	2,0856	2,7975	2,7026	2,7957	2,8095	2,4331	2,6541	2,2547	2,5820	2,6542	2,6179	2,7675	2,4475	2,7406	2,6659	2,6758	2,4742
EU-27	2,6804	2,4657	2,5347	3,1349	2,4688	2,7450	2,6174	2,6712	2,5643	2,7137	2,5718	2,8446	2,8004	2,6736	2,6084	2,7713	2,7614	2,6738
Indonesia	2,7980	2,1729	2,8002	2,6987	2,7975	2,7879	2,5651	2,6855	2,3204	2,6284	2,7661	2,6971	2,7006	2,4400	2,7602	2,6922	2,5372	2,3247
Japan	2,7980	2,1321	2,7997	2,8028	2,7859	2,7975	2,4300	2,6573	2,3085	2,5645	2,6623	2,7890	2,7047	2,4634	2,7127	2,6583	2,7359	2,6011
TDC	2,7974	2,1676	2,7102	2,7913	2,6274	2,7782	2,6920	2,7269	2,6620	2,7756	2,6618	2,7868	2,7163	2,7263	2,7292	2,7738	2,6046	2,3391
Middle East	2,7335	2,5136	2,6453	2,7433	2,6383	2,7040	2,6182	2,7884	2,3807	2,6959	2,7018	2,7432	2,7135	2,6552	2,7533	2,7157	2,5334	2,3767
Nigeria	2,7054	2,2045	2,5109	2,7533	2,4562	2,3217	2,6588	2,6537	2,7975	2,6880	2,3961	2,7745	2,7814	2,6796	2,3362	2,5464	2,6301	2,6359
Russia	2,7026	2,4665	2,5630	2,7402	2,5353	2,6866	2,7349	2,6846	2,7975	2,7975	2,6522	2,7442	2,6989	2,7378	2,6281	2,7977	2,6309	2,5748
SIDS	2,7802	2,2224	2,7608	2,7544	2,7880	2,7628	2,5916	2,7352	2,2616	2,6611	2,6598	2,7650	2,7777	2,4721	2,6959	2,6988	2,6700	2,5777
UK	2,6842	2,4806	2,4759	2,8249	2,4491	2,7301	2,6094	2,6595	2,5659	2,6955	2,5429	2,7975	2,7299	2,6530	2,5655	2,7482	2,7591	2,6893
USA	2,7528	2,4751	2,5840	2,7508	2,5947	2,6788	2,4463	2,6240	2,4887	2,6193	2,4094	2,7205	2,7975	2,4763	2,4783	2,6709	2,8297	2,7246
Rest of Africa	2,7073	2,3552	2,5950	2,8072	2,5545	2,6278	2,7384	2,7602	2,4878	2,7650	2,6838	2,7982	2,7681	2,7088	2,6493	2,7761	2,5745	2,4431
Rest of Asia	2,7875	2,2530	2,8161	2,7863	2,7809	2,7687	2,6663	2,7743	2,4042	2,6993	2,6854	2,7494	7,727,2	2,6184	2,7816	2,7323	2,5549	2,4038
Rest of Europe	2,6905	2,3508	2,5804	2,8086	2,5336	2,6424	2,7269	2,7096	2,4881	2,7904	2,5531	2,7970	2,6894	2,7432	2,6389	2,7913	2,6068	2,5221
Rest of N.America	2,7748	2,4901	2,6164	2,8046	2,4470	2,7487	2,3534	2,5444	2,4683	2,6061	2,4620	2,7981	2,8756	2,3564	2,3993	2,6701	2,7834	2,7556
Rest of S.America	2,7075	2,7985	2,6383	2,7686	2,4093	2,5688	2,3651	2,4069	2,5560	2,5974	2,4231	2,7725	2,7819	2,3504	2,3647	2,5553	2,7573	2,7989

Annex 15 (Change in trade values in billion USD)

Table 7-20: Change in trade values for Wet bulk Scenario 1

	Kesi ol S.America	-0,002	-1,252	-0,247	-0,941	00'0	-0,248	-0,364	-0,688	-0,434	-0,218	-0,842	-0,139	-9,742	-0,024	-0.70.7	£0f'0-	-0,829	-2,785
	N.America R																		
	a N	0000	£00'0-	-0,135	-1,494	0000	-0,073	100'0-	E44.1-	660-	-0,188	-01#	-0,50B	-31,466	E80'0-	-0.239	#60-	BE0-	-0,351
	a. E																		
	Kest of Europe	0000	-0,061	1000-	-1,562	-0003	-0003	-0003	-0.997	-0,031	-2,381	-0,012	-0,480	-1,060	-0,092	-1,719	-0,782	160'0-	000'0
	Now of Assa	-5,473	-1,314	-3,800	-3,357	-2958	1591-	-6694	-151513	-8277	-8,324	-9208	919'1-	E06-	-2,875	99,111-	-1,4D	-3,431	-5,478
	nex of Africa	800°0-	910'0-	990'0-	-2,829	-0,028	900'0-	-1,315	474	-2,974		-0,430	-023	-0912	-0,614	-0,539	62.10-	-0,035	171,0-
		-0,026	3,260	-0,324	9,630	-0,745	-0,493	2,162	23,379	3,537	10,958	-3,750	2,687	0000	-1,476	4,455	2,411	61,812	17,588
		0,000	100'0-	-0,034	-7,044	0,000	-000	0.130	-3,315	1940	-3,946	-0,239	0,000	-4,703	-0,253	-0,578	19,232	-0,587	-0,204
	S S	-1,368	-0,462	3,930	3,045	2,512	0,770	0,380	22,566	66,64	3,452	10,947	101'0-	3,633	-0,230	13,864	960'0	0,332	-1,022
,	Y	0000	00000	100'0-	-0,219	00000	-0,026	0,000	-0,017	00000	00000	-0,051	-0,004	-0,022	100'0-	-0,039	-0,012	5000-	0,000,0
	EL SON	0,000	910'0-	-0,057	-5,535	0000	0,000	-0,046	-0.297	0000	-0,896	601'0-	-0,158	-0,410	-0.075	6661-	-0.772	-0015	0000
	Fine	870'0-	600'0-	2000	3,203	500,0-	40,014	0,214	#E'8	21,0	2,404	0.9,1-	-0,293	158'0	0,415	0.920	4,829	100°0	100'0-
		0,007	0000	0,121	. 0,828	0,018	110'0	1,380	3,086	- CE'0	0,348	2,438	0,140	0,161		2,588	0,078	11000	0,012
	1	10,003	-0,046	0,299	-0,401	42,104	0,000	0,272	54,72.7	9,393	-5,080	2,412	-0,034	-6,318	151,0	7,738	660'0	625,0	-1,063
2000	Modern	£090-	600'0-	-0307	-0271	0,000	990'0-	E09'0-	-3,702	-1,439	-0,036	-7,433	-0,017	EL\$1-	061'0-	-3,390	14 p' 0 -	100'0-	-0,007
		-0,054	2,719	-0,370	70,232			-3,566	45,144	. 14,683		-1987	15,563		44.4	3,113	29,316	4,493	-1,448
0		0.691	-9,584	000'0	-3,556		11011-	18,882	90,841	1,45	26,960	-3,699	-2,543		-3,659	19697	-3980	19f1:	-8,301
	Brazal	00000	0,000	-0,023	-1,398	00000	-0.014	-0,235	-0,725	-0,776	-0,270	-1,106	-0,165	-7,839	-0,002	E160-	150'0-	980°0-	-0,523
	V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V	OC.£0-	0,000	-1,014	-0,386	-0,774	-169	910'0-	2,428	-0,275	EDT'0-	-4,840	960'0-		-0,230	5962-	980'0-	200°-	8Z0'0-
information in in Section 10 - 1 against	Committee	Awa	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonecia	Japan	TDC	Middle	Nigeria	Russia	SIDS	a K	vsa	Rest of Africa	Rest of Asia	Rest of Europe	Rest of NAmerica	Rest of S.America

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Table 7-21: Change in trade values for Wet bulk Scenario 2

	the Samuel State of the Sa	0	Chim	,	Terdomonic	1	201	Mistalla	Misseula	Duranto	ome	211	1011	Donator	Joseph of D	Dog		
Countries	AUSINE	Brazil	China	EU-2/	Indonesia	Japan	201	Middle	Nigeria	Kussia	eme	۰ ۷	PSO	Kest of	Kest of	Kest of	Kest of	Kest of
								East						Africa	Asia	Europe	N.America	S.America
Aus/NZ	-0,373	0,000	-11,028	-0,052	-0,613	-10,166	-0,007	-0,049	0,000	0,000	-1,374	0,000	-0,026	-0,008	-5,279	0,000	0,000	-0,002
Brazil	0,000	0,000	-9,575	-2,724	600'0-	-0,046	0,000	600,0-	-0,016	0,000	-0,468	-0,001	-3,311	-0,016	-1,244	-0,062	-0,003	-1,284
China	-1,031	-0,022	0,000	-0,363	-0,314	-0,303	-0,122	-0,033	-0,056	-0,001	-4,051	-0,024	-0,325	-0,067	-3,690	-0,001	-0,134	-0,245
EU-27	-0,371	-1,344	-3,255	-72,146	-0,256	-0,388	-0,812	-3,172	-5,438	-0,215	-2,959	-6,931	-9,351	-2,802	-2,972	-1,539	-1,413	906'0-
Indonesia	-0,784	0,000	-2,928	-0,134	0,000	-2,134	810,0-	-0,005	0,000	0,000	-2,576	0,000	-0,745	-0,028	-2,869	-0,003	0,000	0,000
Japan	-1,690	-0,013	-1,014	-0,021	-0,067	0,000	-0,011	-0,015	0,000	-0,027	-0,788	-0,002	-0,495	-0,006	-1,600	-0,003	-0,073	-0,250
TDC	-0,016	-0,227	960'61-	-3,543	809'0-	-0,275	-1,412	-0,220	-0,047	0,000	-0,386	-0,121	-2,161	-1,350	-6,491	-0,003	-0,001	-0,351
Middle	-2,221	-0,656	-92,424	-43,427	-3,397	-54,465	-2,872	-8,090	-0,259	-0,016	-21,852	-3,052	-22,015	-4,470	,	-0,926	-1,200	-0,569
East															157,979			
Nigeria	-0,280	-0,772	-1,437	-14,948	-1,457	-0,387	-0,364	-0,158	0,000	0,000	-0,342	-1,988	-3,605	-3,087	-7,800	-0,032	-0,945	-0,441
Russia	-0,102	-0,266	-26,851	-47,828	-0,025	-5,039	-0,351	-2,429	806'0-	0,000	-3,459	-3,928	-10,872	-0,577	-7,803	-2,399	-0,180	-0,212
SIDS	-4,906	-1,078	-3,648	-1,965	-7,615	-2,438	-2,545	-1,715	-0,107	-0,051	-0,962	-0,261	-3,771	-0,434	-8,930	-0,012	-0,142	-0,840
UK	-0,097	-0,167	-2,469	-15,722	-0,017	-0,034	-0,143	-0,300	-0,161	-0,004	-0,102	0,000	-2,697	-0,260	-1,526	-0,490	-0,500	-0,140
USA	-0,385	-7,922	-10,098	-26,126	-1,573	-6,338	-0,161	-0,867	-0,410	-0,022	-3,601	-4,726	0,000	-0,915	-8,420	-1,068	-32,040	-9,854
Rest of Africa	-0,234	-0,002	-3,638	-4,440	-0,193	-0,156	-0,597	-0,429	-0,077	-0,001	-0,226	-0,258	-1,495	-0,635	-2,786	-0,095	-0,081	-0,024
Rest of Asia	-8,043	-0,884	-15,738	-3,054	-3,435	-7,802	-2,609	-1,963	-1,388	-0,060	-14,194	-0,578	4,414	-0,565	-11,217	-1,738	-0,286	-0,683
Rest of Europe	-0,035	-0,050	-3,824	-29,527	-0,435	-0,097	-0,079	-1,850	-0,764	-0,012	-0,095	-19,527	-2,362	-0,181	-1,334	-0,787	-0,900	660'0-
Rest of N.America	-0,002	-0,082	-1,064	4,226	-0,001	-0,506	-0,010	-0,004	-0,014	-0,005	-0,311	-0,565	-63,212	-0,032	-2,777	-0,088	-0,330	-0,795
Rest of S.America	-0,028	-0,539	-8,293	-1,440	-0,007	-1,063	-0,012	-0,001	0,000	0,000	-1,025	-0,207	-18,013	-0,171	-5,049	0,000	-0,349	-2,837

Source: Compiled by author

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Table 7-22: Change in trade values for Wet bulk Scenario 3

Commence	Z.Wow V		China	PT 113		Lonon	Jul	Middle	Nigordo	Ducoto	eme	211	170.4	Don't of	Don't of	Door of	Don't	
		Drazii	Z IIII	EU-2/	Indonesia	Japan	7	Mildale	Ngeria	Kussia	eme	4	Neo.	Kest of	Rest of	Rest of	Kest of	Rest 01
								East						Africa	Asia	Europe	N.America	S.America
	-0,371	0,000	-10,989	-0,053	-0,607	-10,060	-0,007	-0,049	0,000	0,000	-1,370	0,000	-0,026	800'0-	-5,406	0,000	0,000	-0,002
	0,000	0,000	-9,581	-2,720	-0,009	-0,046	0,000	-0,009	-0,016	0,000	-0,464	-0,001	-3,278	-0,016	-1,290	-0,061	-0,003	-1,263
	-1,020	-0,023	0,000	-0,368	-0,309	-0,300	-0,121	-0,032	-0,057	-0,001	-3,985	-0,024	-0,324	990'0-	-3,762	-0,001	-0,135	-0,246
	-0,381	-1,380	-3,457	-70,883	-0,266	-0,397	-0,822	-3,192	-5,501	-0,217	-3,016	-7,004	-9,535	-2,819	-3,229	-1,554	-1,467	-0,929
	-0,778	0,000	-2,926	-0,135	0,000	-2,115	810,0-	-0,005	0,000	0,000	-2,534	00000	-0,745	-0,028	-2,927	-0,003	0,000	0,000
	-1,669	-0,013	-1,012	-0,021	-0,066	0,000	-0,011	-0,015	0,000	-0,026	-0,776	-0,002	-0,494	-0,006	-1,633	-0,003	-0,073	-0,249
	-0,016	-0,233	-18,956	-3,558	-0,605	-0,273	-1,391	-0,216	-0,046	0,000	-0,383	-0,120	-2,162	-1,327	-6,623	-0,003	-0,001	-0,360
	-2,359	-0,702	-91,364	-44,552	-3,600	-54,626	-3,014	-8,289	-0,284	-0,017	-22,318	-3,227	-22,918	-4,650	153,745	-0,973	-1,364	-0,649
	-0,277	-0,775	-1,447	-14,773	-1,445	-0,391	-0,356	-0,154	0,000	0,000	-0,340	-1,956	-3,560	-3,013	-8,114	-0,032	-0,947	-0,436
	-0,103	-0,268	-26,922	-47,182	-0,026	-5,067	-0,349	-2,412	-0,900	0,000	-3,454	-3,939	-10,929	-0,572	-8,147	-2,387	-0,185	-0,216
	-4,862	-1,096	-3,656	-1,980	-7,495	-2,421	-2,514	-1,686	-0,108	-0,051	-0,952	-0,259	-3,757	-0,431	-9,111	-0,012	-0,143	-0,841
	960'0-	-0,166	-2,518	-15,617	-0,017	-0,034	-0,141	-0,296	-0,159	-0,004	-0,101	0,000	-2,690	-0,256	-1,585	-0,483	-0,502	-0,139
	-0,385	-7,867	-10,214	-25,983	-1,573	-6,326	-0,161	-0,859	-0,410	-0,022	-3,623	-4,711	0,000	-0,913	-8,840	-1,063	-31,659	677,6-
5	-0,232	-0,002	-3,648	-4,423	-0,191	-0,155	-0,584	-0,420	-0,076	-0,001	-0,222	-0,255	-1,483	-0,621	-2,844	-0,093	-0,082	-0,024
Jo	-7,991	-0,903	-15,711	-3,093	-3,405	-7,759	-2,582	-1,935	-1,396	-0,059	-13,978	-0,578	-4,442	-0,561	-11,444	-1,726	-0,295	669,0-
Jo	-0,035	-0,051	-3,928	-29,399	-0,441	860'0-	-0,079	-1,837	-0,770	-0,012	960'0-	-19,332	-2,394	-0,180	-1,406	-0,784	-0,929	-0,102
jo 8	-0,002	-0,085	-1,131	-4,403	-0,001	-0,521	-0,010	-0,004	-0,015	-0,005	-0,325	-0,580	-62,279	-0,034	-3,217	060'0-	-0,345	-0,817
Jo g	-0,028	-0,528	-8,297	-1,445	-0,007	-1,063	-0,012	-0,001	0,000	0,000	-1,023	-0,205	-17,733	-0,171	-5,333	0,000	-0,351	-2,802

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Table 7-23: Change in trade values for Dry bulk Scenario 1

Countries Aus/NZ Brazil China	Ans/NZ.	Brazil		E11-27	Indonesia Janan LDC	Janan	I.DC	Middle	Nioeria	Russia	SIDS	IIK	ASII	Rest of	Rest of	Rest of	Rest of	Rest of
								East						Africa	Asia	Europe	neric	į
Aus/NZ	-0,125	-0,424	-75,727	-2,022	-2,429	-16,788	-0,111	-0,279	-0,039	-0,001	-0,058	-0,133	-0,005	-0,130	-14,909	-0,402	-0,028	-0,257
Brazil	-0,041	0,000	-22,736	-2,961	-0,181	-3,402	-0,025	-0,933	900'0-	0,000	-0,343	-0,171	-0,427	-0,114	-1,864	-0,552	-0,147	-0,617
China	-0,185	-0,124	0,000	-0,140	-0,350	-0,852	-0,052	-0,451	-0,011	6/0,0-	-0,099	-0,021	-0,042	-0,186	-1,683	-0,114	-0,005	-0,006
EU-27	-0,024	-0,051	-1,022	-11,555	-0,034	-0,016	-0,168	-1,158	-0,602	8.70,0-	-0,047	-0,940	-0,297	-0,488	-0,580	-0,585	-0,091	-0,057
Indonesia	-0,004	0,000	-5,839	-0,205	0,000	-2,022	-0,153	-0,010	0,000	00000	-0,042	0,000	-0,046	0,000	-9,944	0,000	0,000	0,000
Japan	-0,003	0,000	-0,219	-0,230	-0,031	0,000	-0,008	0,000	0,000	8 10,0-	-0,004	-0,161	-0,021	-0,001	-0,319	0,000	-0,001	0,000
LDC	860'0-	890'0-	-1,573	-0,838	-0,010	-0,161	-0,128	-0,077	-0,007	900'0-	-0,005	-0,051	-0,003	-0,169	-0,904	-0,017	-0,001	0,000
Middle East	-0,014	0,000	-0,937	-0,040	-0,054	900'0-	-0,076	-0,739	-0,003	0,000	-0,044	-0,020	-0,065	-0,016	-1,179	-0,240	-0,001	0,000
Nigeria	0,00,0	00000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	-0,003	0,000	0,000	00000	0,000	0,000	0,000	-0,002	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000
Russia	-0,008	-0,339	-4,857	-3,584	-0,259	-1,670	-0,318	-0,856	-0,338	0,000	-0,007	-0,341	-0,044	-0,491	-3,780	-2,440	-0,033	-0,071
SIDS	890'0-	-0,004	-0,309	-0,070	-0,165	00000	-0,025	-0,603	-0,001	00000	-0,023	-0,004	-0,052	-0,001	-0,790	-0,007	-0,022	0,000
UK	-0,004	0,000	-0,122	-0,494	0,000	-0,003	-0,002	-0,300	-0,005	0,010	0,000	0,000	-0,017	-0,001	-0,114	-0,029	900'0-	0,000
USA	-0,198	166'0-	-7,065	-3,947	-0,186	-4,304	-0,091	-0,344	-0,328	-0,003	-0,277	-0,348	0,000	-0,506	-4,138	-0,635	-5,846	-1,526
Rest of Africa	-0,003	-0,052	-4,455	-1,823	-0,029	-0,572	-0,132	-0,139	-0,014	-0,001	-0,065	-0,093	-0,019	-0,082	-4,282	-0,152	-0,001	-0,012
Rest of Asia	-0,338	-0,066	-4,238	-0,835	-0,869	-0,377	-0,862	-2,022	-0,007	-0,053	-0,251	-0,212	-0,544	868'0-	-1,258	-0,067	-0,100	-0,018
Rest of Europe	0,000	0,000	-0,162	-0,221	-0,011	0,000	-0,002	-0,037	-0,010	-0,035	-0,013	-0,061	090'0-	-0,003	-0,032	-0,039	-0,002	0,000
Rest of N.America	-0,001	-0,170	-4,667	-3,574	-0,422	-1,991	-0,032	-0,160	-0,226	0,000	-0,099	-0,462	-1,514	-0,244	-2,117	-0,123	-0,241	-0,806
Rest of S.America	-0,016	-1,872	4,717	-1,739	-0,240	-0,426	-0,120	-0,346	-0,080	-0,008	-0,171	-0,177	-0,408	-0,185	-1,610	-1,189	-0,419	-1,407

Source: Compiled by author

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-0,022 -0,005 -5,952 -0,144 -0,032 -0,021 -0,094 -0,088 00000 -0,001 -0,001 -0,001 0,000 900'0--0,001 -0,002 -0,242 -0,422 -0,113 -0,645 -0,332 -0,587 8 10,0--2,522 -0,007 -0,030 -0,125 -0,555 00000 -0,245 0,000 -0,157 -0,068 -0,040 -1,200 0.000 -14,471 -10,321 -2,095 -1,705 -4,167 -1,850 -0,572 -0,325 -0,936 -0,802 -0,115 -1,295 -0,033 -1,582 -1,218 0,000 -3,886 -4,444 Rest of -0,509 -0,240 616'0--0,104 -0,181 -0,176 -0,002 -0,114 -0,493 -0,017 -0,510 -0,001 -0,085 -0,182 0,000 -0,001 -0,001 -0,003 0,000 0,000 -0,003 -0,044 -0,543 -0,004 -0,429 -0,041 -0,292 -0,045 -0,021 -0,066 -0,052 -0,017 -0,020 -0,476 -1,554 -0,418 -0,061 -0,355 -0,111 -0,020 -0,053 0,000 -0,348 -0,215 -0,183 -0,174 -0,949 0,000 -0,020 -0,004 960'0--0,063 -0,165 0,000 -0,276 -0,048 -0,342 -0,101 -0,047 -0,043 -0.005 -0,005 -0,045 0,000 -0,007 -0,024 890,0--0,259 -0,013 -0,100 -0,173 SIDS 0,000 Russia -0,003 -0,001 8 20,0-900'0-0,000 0,010 -0,054 -0,037 -0,008 -0,078 -0,018 0,000 100,0-0,000 00000 0,000 0,000 0,000 Nigeria -0,030 -0,010 -0,331 -0,600 -0,007 -0,353 -0,005 -0,014 -0,007 -0,010 -0,229 900'0-0,000 -0,002 0,000 -0,001 -0.0830.000 -0,348 -0,875 -0,612 -0,241 -0,933 -0,449 -1,153 -0,010 -0,079 -0,306 -0,143 -2,081 -0,161 -0,764 -0,038 -0,339 0.000 0,000 East Table 7-24: Change in trade values for Dry bulk Scenario 2 060'0--0,090 -0,003 -0,031 -0,050 -0,151 -0,133 -0,883 -0,025 -0,168 -0,077 -0,329 -0,025 -0,002 -0,138 -0,118 -0,002 -0.008 0,000 -16,584 -0,389 -2,074 -0,873 -4,467 -0,435 -3,427 -0,016 -2,071 -0,168 -1,723 -0,006 -0,003 -0,588 0,000 0,000 0.000 -2,340 -0,185 -0,365 -0,034 00000 -0.033 -0,010 -0,056 0,000 -0,267 -0,172 -0,193 -0,030 -0,913 -0,433 -0,245 0,000 -0,011 -11,879 -4,019 -3,679 -1,654 -0,135 -0,201 0,000 -0,841 -2,993 -0,233 -0,857 -0,040 -3,654 -0,070 -0,503 -1,872 -1,781 -0,226 -80,080 -4,399 -22,733 0,000 -6,630 -4,053 -5,536 -1,494 00000 -0,823 -0,862 -4,478 -0,286 -0,104 -4,189 -0,148 -4,489 -0.206-0,174 -0,315 -1,014 -1,985 -0,063 -0,103 -0,050 -0,064 0,000 -0,345 -0,003 -0,052 00000 0,000 0,000 0.000 0,000 0,000 -0,113 -0,102 -0,203 -0,016 -0,041 -0,024 -0,004 -0,003 0,000 -0,008 690'0--0,004 -0,003 -0,346 -0,001 -0,188 -0,015 0,000 fiddle srazil

0,000

0,000

-1,553

0,000

-0,017

-0,825

0,000

-1,452

-0,207 -0,630 -0,006 -0,056 0,000 0,000

0,000

Source: Compiled by author

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Table 7-25: Change in trade values for Dry bulk Scenario 3

Countries	V. V. V. V.	Countries Annual China	Chimo	FE 117	Indonesia	Lonon	24.1	Middle	Nicosio	Dussila	otto	A11	VOLL	Does of	Does of	Dont of	Don't of	Don't of
Countries	Austra	DESE	Cmma	EU-2/	Indonesia	Japan	3	MIGGIE	Nigeria	Kussia				Kest of	Kest of	Rest of		
								East						Africa	Asia	Europe	N.America	S.America
Aus/NZ	-0,121	-0,388	-77,239	-1,902	-2,398	-16,711	-0,104	-0,266	-0,036	-0,001	-0,055	-0,126	-0,005	-0,122	-14,752	-0,379	-0,026	-0,241
Brazil	-0,041	0,000	-22,726	-2,972	-0,182	-3,413	-0,025	-0,933	-0,006	0,000	-0,343	-0,172	-0,428	-0,114	-1,860	-0,553	-0,146	-0,622
China	-0,186	-0,117	0,000	-0,138	-0,355	-0,859	-0,051	-0,450	-0,011	8 / 0 ' 0 -	-0,100	-0,020	-0,042	-0,185	-1,691	-0,113	-0,005	-0,006
EU-27	-0,024	-0,050	-0,957	-11,663	-0,034	-0,016	-0,168	-1,156	-0,601	-0,078	-0,047	-0,943	-0,295	-0,489	-0,578	-0,586	-0,090	-0,057
Indonesia	-0,004	0,000	-5,734	-0,204	0,000	-2,039	-0,153	-0,010	0,000	0,000	-0,042	00000	-0,045	0,000	-10,074	0,000	0,000	0,000
Japan	-0,003	0,000	-0,214	-0,231	-0,032	0,000	-0,008	0,000	0,000	810,0-	-0,005	-0,163	-0,021	-0,001	-0,321	0,000	-0,001	0,000
TDC	-0,100	-0,067	-1,546	-0,844	-0,010	-0,164	-0,130	-0,078	-0,007	900'0-	-0,005	-0,052	-0,003	-0,171	-0,915	8 10,0-	-0,001	0,000
Middle East	-0,014	0,000	-0,912	-0,040	-0,055	900'0-	-0,076	-0,748	-0,003	0,000	-0,044	-0,020	-0,065	-0,016	-1,193	-0,242	-0,001	0,000
Nigeria	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	-0,003	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	-0,002	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000
Russia	-0,008	-0,341	-4,728	-3,607	-0,262	-1,689	-0,322	-0,862	-0,343	0,000	-0,007	-0,343	-0,044	-0,497	-3,816	-2,468	-0,032	-0,070
SIDS	890'0-	-0,003	-0,301	-0,070	-0,167	0,000	-0,025	909'0-	-0,001	0,000	-0,024	-0,004	-0,052	-0,001	-0,794	-0,007	-0,021	0,000
UK	-0,004	0,000	-0,116	-0,497	0,000	-0,003	-0,002	-0,302	-0,005	010,0-	0,000	0,000	-0,017	-0,001	-0,114	-0,030	900'0-	0,000
USA	-0,200	866'0-	916'9-	-3,971	-0,189	-4,362	-0,091	-0,346	-0,329	-0,003	-0,277	-0,351	0,000	-0,507	-4,148	-0,638	-5,882	-1,535
Rest of Africa	-0,003	-0,052	4,364	-1,840	-0,030	-0,577	-0,134	-0,140	-0,014	-0,001	990'0-	-0,094	-0,019	-0,083	4,338	-0,154	-0,001	-0,012
Rest of Asia	-0,341	-0,065	4,174	-0,837	-0,884	-0,381	-0,870	-2,042	-0,007	-0,053	-0,253	-0,213	-0,544	-0,905	-1,271	890'0-	860'0-	-0,018
Rest of Europe	0,000	0,000	-0,157	-0,223	-0,011	0,000	-0,002	-0,037	-0,010	-0,036	-0,013	-0,061	090'0-	-0,003	-0,032	-0,039	-0,002	0,000
Rest of N.America	-0,001	-0,171	4,575	-3,609	-0,426	-2,020	-0,032	-0,161	-0,227	00000	-0,100	-0,467	-1,528	-0,243	-2,110	-0,124	-0,241	-0,812
Rest of S.America	910'0-	-1,911	4,638	-1,753	-0,242	-0,429	-0,119	-0,344	-0,081	800,0-	-0,172	-0,179	-0,412	-0,184	-1,601	-1,192	-0,420	-1,422

Table 7-26: Change in trade values for Containers Scenario 1

Seminary Colonia	L. W. W. 7		Chim	E11 34	Turdomosto	Louis	24.1	Medalls	Nº Comple	Duranta	erne	20.0	101	Dontof	Don't of	Done		Don't
Commiss	AUS/INE	DI SIVII		E0-2/	E I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I	- a pan	7	ammar	inigeria	Mussia	enne	4	Ven	In reau	In teat	In 1834	IO IKON	Nest of
								East						Africa	Asia	Europe	N.America	S.America
Aus/NZ	-5,825	-0,223	-30,711	-8,517	-3,371	-7,187	-0,253	-3,119	-0,147	-0,485	-3,528	-2,782	-10,571	-0,859	-14,565	-0,607	-1,852	-0,369
Brazil	-0,495	0,000	-31,605	-19,900	-1,361	-2,353	-0,740	-2,463	-0,631	-1,500	-1,031	-1,931	-16,730	-1,219	-6,291	-3,102	-9,192	-13,528
China	-51,815	- 25.767	0,000	-396,723	-34,426	-	- 13.741	45,862	-6,703	-30,734	30.636	-54,355	161 601	- 14 720	200.461	-29,382	-106,143	-35,104
		70/,07					15,/41				C7 C*0.C			14,/29	707,401			
EU-27	-32,121	21 950	184 159	1487 298	-7,445	-54,844	-7,679	-61,993	-3,426	-31,551	20.005	190 283	130 057	20 617	- 103 936	-55,832	-67,465	-21,530
Indonacia	2 220	0.000	31 055	13 511	000	0.447	1 177	2 064	0100	1.035				0 550		1 475	2 140	0.663
Indonesia	677'7-	-0,994	cc0,1c-	115,61-	0,000		-1,1//			-1,035				655,0-		-1,425	-2,140	-0,055
Ja pan	-11,147	-2,708	128,121	-62,587	-11,154	0,000	-1,755	-12,720	-0,198	-5,170	13,793	-7,922	-89,358	-2,122	-85,593	-4,234	-18,558	-3,657
LDC	-1,572	-0,078	-18,772	-30,660	-0,374	-3,475	-2,110	-16,664	-0,119	-0,936	865,0-	-3,674	-13,330	-2,145	-12,728	-1,343	-3,091	-0,262
Middle East	-1,528	-2,335	-23,991	-24,425	-1,795	-2,566	-2,142	-18,605	-0,705	-1,463	-6,069	-2,830	-21,296	-2,933	-32,237	-12,118	-2,307	-0,971
Nigeria	-0,001	-0,077	-0,318	-0,708	-0,044	-0,114	620,0-	-0,404	0,00,0	-0,020	600'0-	-0,030	-0,124	-0,139	-0,526	-0,057	-0,041	-0,021
Russia	-0,165	-2,986	-14,618	-24,094	-0,639	-2,808	-0,034	-2,799	-0,100	0,000	-0,177	-11,130	-7,794	-0,586	-6,834	-11,770	-2,326	-0,839
SIDS	-3,540	-1,421	-23,536	-20,106	-6,132	-6,245	-1,673	-3,678	-0,085	-0,588	-1,152	-1,580	-25,273	-0,924	-31,739	-0,988	-3,074	-0,488
UK	-4,083	-1,388	-12,064	-114,949	-0,675	-5,047	-0,620	-8,003	-0,482	-2,455	-5,014	0,000	-35,491	-2,793	-11,131	-7,707	-4,755	-1,232
USA	-18,592	15,238	-89,930	-179,046	-5,003	-40,631	-1,496	-22,767	-1,110	-7,589	27,994	-33,963	0,000	-5,000	-70,021	-11,437	-202,983	-19,458
Rest of Africa	-1,077	-2,105	-17,216	-46,611	-1,440	-5,977	-5,521	-6,040	-0,459	-1,484	-1,074	-8,747	-14,110	-3,830	-10,093	-3,383	-2,560	-0,767
Rest of Asia	-24,137	-9,739	279,382	-178,209	-21,077	-65,686	- 661,111	-38,488	-2,947	-11,081	40,611	-20,337	252,005	-7,636	-112,599	-15,376	-50,835	-8,930
Rest of Europe	-0,939	-1,122	-5,536	-59,057	-0,269	-1,600	506'0-	-10,002	-0,447	-2,780	-1,153	-11,210	-12,845	-2,213	-4,063	-5,020	-2,112	-0,957
Rest of N.America	-3,537	-4,377	-24,931	-41,089	-0,984	-10,401	-0,257	-3,283	-0,105	-1,086	-3,289	-10,520	334,619	-0,855	-9,409	-3,387	-29,879	-8,181
Rest of S.America	-1,105	-9,195	-39,191	-22,718	-1,192	-6,548	-0,178	-2,544	-0,106	-2,212	-0,638	-1,885	-20,597	-0,754	-10,858	-2,085	-7,891	-11,154

Table 7-27: Change in trade values for Containers Scenario 2

	Rest of S.America			-0,369	-13,703	-34,530		-20,757	-0,638	-3 643		-0,257	-0,956	-0,022	-0,839	-0,487	-1,233	-19,530	-0,758	-8,717	-0,950	-8,141	-11,277
	Rest of	N.America		-1,861	-9,275	-106,471		-65,834	-2,134	-18654		-3,093	-2,302	-0,042	-2,335	-3,086	-4,779	-206,873	-2,558	-50,510	-2,110	-29,854	-7,974
	Rest of	Europe		-0,607	-3,119	-29,260		-54,392	-1,431	-4232		-1,353	-12,197	-0,057	-11,893	-0,993	-7,735	-11,447	-3,409	-15,363	-5,054	-3,354	-2,084
	Rest of	Asia		-14,674	-6,275		204,805	100 583	-22,675	-86 307		-12,812	-32,559	-0,521	-6,861	-31,960	-11,081	-69,714	-10,127	113,521	4,066	-9,134	-10,724
	Rest		Africa	-0,850	-1,212		14,409	31.430	-0,553	-2 091		-2,154	-2,939	-0,141	-0,590	-0,915	-2,787	4,935	-3,845	-7,572	-2,221	-0,823	-0,741
	NSA			-10,666	-16,932		359,448	330.181	-17,176	-90 105		-13,426	-21,485	-0,127	-7,858	-25,543	-35,724	0,000	-14,247	256,116	-12,906	341,374	-20,860
	A E			-2,788	-1,949	-54,101		188 008	-1,264	-7 967		-3,702	-2,850	-0,030	-11,227	165,1-	0,000	-34,126	-8,825	-20,346	-11,293	-10,495	-1,903
9	SIIIS			-3,512	-1,024		30,373	27.716	-7,287		13,795	665,0-	-6,101	600'0-	-0,178	-1,155	4,976	27,573	-1,078	40,549	-1,147	-3,206	-0,632
1	Russia			-0,486	-1,508		30,444	30 532	-1,036	-5137		-0,942	-1,470	-0,021	0,000	685'0-	-2,456	-7,569	-1,494	11,046	-2,797	-1,070	-2,215
	Nigeria			-0,145	-0,624	-6,3%		-3,255	-0,206	910		-0,119	-0,693	00000	-0,101	-0,082	-0,478	-1,095	4.45	-2,869	-0,441	-0,103	-0,106
2	Middle	East		-3,132	-2,468		45,705	. 00009	-2,092		12,722	16,767	18,787	-0,408	-2,815	-3,701	-8,001	22,733	-6,084	38,590	10,039	-3,225	-2,517
	TDC			-0,251	-0,735			-7,353	-1,174	-1736		-2,117	-2,144	080'0-	-0,034	-1,670	-0,617	-1,473	5,533	11,144	806'0-	-0,247	-0,175
	Japan			-7,245	-2,347		116,179	-53,380	-9,534	0000		-3,503	-2,581	-0,113	-2,826	-6,295	-5,064	40,794	-5,988	-65,998	-1,601	-10,358	-6,558
or musical programmes and community	Indonesia			-3,401	-1,361	-34,516		-7,018	0,000	-11 222		-0,375	-1,800	-0,044	-0,638	-6,185	-0,666	4,987	-1,436	-21,123	-0,268	-0,958	-1,180
	EU-27			-8,576	-20,189	-407,228		9 70 9951	-13,645	-63 439		-31,078	-24,739	-0,721	-24,422	-20,351	-116,901	-182,476	-47,330	-181,037	-59,923	-41,265	-23,060
	China			-31,059	-31,633	00000		178 684	-31,402		129,913	-18,894	-24,117	-0,319	-14,638	-23,751	-11,940	-90,248	-17,240	284,707	-5,524	-24,683	-39,494
0	Brazil			-0,217	0,000		23,877	20.637	-0,949	-2 553		-0,075	-2,318	-0,075	-2,959	-1,368	-1,368	15,037	-2,060	-9,307	-1,095	-4,268	-9,280
	Aus/NZ			-5,880	-0,499	-52,031		-31,038	-2,249	-11 219		-1,585	-1,538	-0,001	-0,166	-3,569	4,087	-18,691	-1,083	-24,198	-0,942	-3,524	-1,114
tacie / z/: change in man	Countries			Aus/NZ	Brazil	China		EU-27	Indonesia	Janan		LDC	Middle East	Nig erla	Russia	SIDS	UK	NSA	Rest of Africa	Rest of Asia	Rest of Europe	Rest of N.America	Rest of S.America

Table 7-28: Change in trade values for Containers Scenario 3

table 7-20. Change in thate				3				e or muse			0410							
Countries	Aus/NZ	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indo nesia	Japan	 CDC	Middle	Nigeria	Kussia	SIIIS	OK OK	OSA	Restof	Rest of	Rest of	Rest of	Rest of
								East						Africa	Asia	Europe	N.America	S.America
Aus/NZ	-5,844	-0,221	-30,829	-8,537	-3,381	-7,206	-0,252	-3,123	-0,147	-0,485	-3,522	-2,784	-10,603	-0,856	-14,602	-0,607	-1,855	-0,369
Brazil	-0,496	0,000	-31,613	-19,998	-1,361	-2,351	-0,738	-2,465	-0,629	-1,503	-1,028	-1,937	-16,798	-1,217	-6,285	-3,107	-9,220	-13,588
China	-51,884	25,143	0,000	-400,333	-34,454	- 115,541	13,636	45,804	-6,601	30,633	30,471	-54,263	354,293	14,620	203,246	-29,338	-106,245	-34,908
EU-27	-31,738	,	,	,	-7,298	-54,319	-7,565	-61,285	-3,367	,	,	,	,	,	,	-55,314	-66,876	-21,257
		21,498	182,191	1515,634						31,189	28,555	189,404	330,511	32,198	102,742			
Indonesia	-2,236	626'0-	-31,172	-13,556	0,000	-9,476	-1,176	-2,086	-0,208	-1,035	-7,251	-1,260	-17,092	-0,557	-22,540	-1,427	-2,138	-0,648
Japan	-11,171	-2,657	128,730	-62,878	-11,176	0,000	-1,745	-12,720	-0,196	-5,159	13,793	-7,937	-89,639	-2,111	-85,833	-4,233	-18,590	-3,652
TDC	-1,576	-0,077	-18,813	-30,803	-0,374	-3,484	-2,112	-16,698	-0,119	-0,938	-0,598	-3,683	-13,362	-2,148	-12,756	-1,346	-3,092	-0,260
Middle East	-1,531	-2,329	-24,033	-24,532	-1,796	-2,571	-2,143	-18,667	-0,701	-1,466	-6,079	-2,836	-21,360	-2,935	-32,346	-12,144	-2,306	996'0-
Nigeria	-0,001	-0,076	-0,318	-0,712	-0,044	-0,114	-0,079	-0,406	0,000	-0,021	-0,009	-0,030	-0,125	-0,140	-0,525	-0,057	-0,042	-0,022
Russia	-0,165	-2,977	-14,624	-24,206	-0,639	-2,814	-0,034	-2,804	-0,101	0,000	-0,177	-11,163	-7,815	-0,588	-6,842	-11,811	-2,329	-0,839
SIDS	-3,550	-1,403	-23,608	-20,190	-6,150	-6,262	-1,672	-3,686	-0,084	-0,588	-1,153	-1,584	-25,364	-0,921	-31,813	066'0-	-3,078	-0,488
UK	-4,084	-1,381	-12,021	-115,615	-0,672	-5,052	619,0-	-8,002	-0,481	-2,455	-5,001	0,000	-35,568	-2,791	-11,114	-7,716	-4,763	-1,232
USA	-18,625	15,170	-90,032	-180,219	-4,997	-40,684	-1,488	-22,761	-1,105	-7,582	27,851	-34,015	0,000	4,978	-69,913	-11,440	-204,311	-19,481
Rest of Africa	-1,079	-2,090	-17,223	-46,857	-1,439	-5,980	-5,532	-6,054	-0,457	-1,488	-1,075	-8,773	-14,156	-3,835	-10,104	-3,392	-2,559	-0,764
Rest of	-24,156	565,6-	,	-179,174	-21,091	-62,789	,	-38,521	-2,921			-20,338	,	-7,614	,	-15,370	-50,722	-8,858
Asia			281,202				11,179			11,068	40,588		253,402		112,908			
Rest of Europe	-0,940	-1,113	-5,531	-59,352	-0,269	-1,600	906'0-	-10,014	-0,445	-2,785	-1,151	-11,238	-12,865	-2,216	-4,064	-5,031	-2,111	-0,955
Rest of N.America	-3,532	-4,340	-24,845	-41,147	-0,975	-10,386	-0,254	-3,263	-0,104	1,081	-3,261	-10,510	336,929	-0,844	-9,317	-3,375	-29,868	-8,167
Rest of S.America	-1,108	-9,224	-39,292	-22,835	-1,188	-6,551	-0,177	-2,535	-0,106	-2,213	-0,636	-1,891	-20,686	-0,750	-10,813	-2,084	-7,919	-11,195

Annex 16 (Change in CO2 emission, in million tonnes, due to reduction of trade)

Table 7-29: Absolute change in CO2 emissions for Wet bulk in Scenario 1

TO III Summa amagair 17 Carant			20			200							ŀ					
Countries	Aus/NZ	Brazii	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan	207	Middle	Nigeria	Kussia	enne	4	PSO	Kest of	Kest of	Kest of	Kest of	Kest of
								East						Africa	Asia	Europe	N.America	S.America
Aus/NZ	-0,043	0,000	-1,288	900'0-	-0,071	-1,174	-0,001	900,0-	0,000	00000	-0,161	0,000	-0,003	-0,001	-0,642	0,000	0,000	0,000
Brazil	0,000	0,000	-1,125	-0,319	-0,001	-0,005	00000	-0,001	-0,002	0,000	-0,054	0,000	-0,383	-0,002	-0,154	-0,007	0,000	-0,147
China	-0,119	-0,003	0,000	-0,043	-0,036	-0,035	-0,014	-0,004	-0,007	0,000	-0,464	-0,003	-0,038	800,0-	-0,446	0,000	-0,016	-0,029
EU-27	-0,045	-0,164	-0,418	-8,245	-0,032	-0,047	-0,097	-0,376	-0,650	-0,026	-0,358	-0,827	-1,131	-0,332	-0,394	-0,183	-0,175	-0,110
Indonesia	160,0-	0,000	-0,343	-0,016	0,000	-0,247	-0,002	-0,001	0,000	0,000	-0,295	0,000	-0,087	-0,003	-0,347	0,000	0,000	0,000
Japan	-0,195	-0,002	-0,119	-0,002	-0,008	0,000	-0,001	-0,002	0,000	-0,003	-0,090	0,000	-0,058	-0,001	-0,194	0,000	600,0-	-0,029
TDC	-0,002	-0,028	-2,217	-0,419	-0,071	-0,032	-0,162	-0,025	-0,005	0,000	-0,045	-0,014	-0,254	-0,154	-0,786	0,000	0,000	-0,043
Middle East	-0,285	-0,085	-10,664	-5,300	-0,435	-6,425	-0,362	-0,985	-0,035	-0,002	-2,649	-0,389	-2,745	-0,557	-17,787	-0,117	-0,169	-0,081
Nigeria	-0,032	160'0-	-0,170	-1,724	-0,169	-0,046	-0,041	-0,018	0,000	0,000	-0,040	-0,228	-0,415	-0,349	-0,972	-0,004	-0,111	-0,051
Russia	-0,012	-0,032	-3,165	-5,500	-0,003	965'0-	-0,041	-0,282	-0,105	0,000	-0,405	-0,463	-1,286	-0,067	-0,977	-0,280	-0,022	-0,026
SIDS	-0,568	-0,130	-0,430	-0,233	-0,873	-0,283	-0,293	-0,196	-0,013	900'0-	-0,111	-0,030	-0,440	-0,050	-1,081	-0,001	-0,017	-0,099
UK	-0,011	610,0-	-0,298	-1,827	-0,002	-0,004	-0,016	-0,034	-0,019	0,000	-0,012	0,000	-0,315	-0,030	-0,190	-0,056	-0,059	-0,016
USA	-0,045	-0,920	-1,206	-3,042	-0,185	-0,742	-0,019	-0,100	-0,048	-0,003	-0,427	-0,552	0,000	-0,107	-1,063	-0,124	-3,694	-1,144
Rest of Africa	-0,027	0,000	-0,429	-0,518	-0,022	-0,018	-0,068	-0,049	-0,009	00000	-0,026	-0,030	-0,173	-0,072	-0,337	-0,011	-0,010	-0,003
Rest of Asia	-0,935	-0,107	-1,843	-0,365	-0,398	806'0-	-0,301	-0,225	-0, 164	-0,007	-1,628	890'0-	-0,523	990'0-	-1,358	-0,202	-0,035	-0,083
Rest of Europe	-0,004	900'0-	-0,467	-3,444	-0,052	-0,012	-0,009	-0,215	-0,091	-0,001	-0,011	-2,258	-0,283	-0,021	-0,169	-0,092	-0,111	-0,012
Rest of N.America	0,000	-0,010	-0,137	-0,527	0,000	-0,062	-0,001	0,000	-0,002	100'0-	-0,039	690'0-	-7,256	-0,004	-0,403	-0,011	-0,041	-0,097
Rest of S.America	-0,003	-0,061	-0,974	-0,170	-0,001	-0,125	-0,001	0,000	0,000	0,000	-0,120	-0,024	-2,065	-0,020	-0,643	0,000	-0,041	-0,327

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Table 7-30: Absolute change in CO2 emissions for Wet bulk in Scenario 2

China EU-27 Indonesia
-0,072 -1,193
-0,001 -0,005
-0,037 -0,036
-0,030 -0,046
0,000 -0,251
-0,008 0,000
-0,071 -0,032
-0,399 -6,394
-0,171 -0,045
-0,003 -0,592
-0,894 -0,286
-0,002 -0,004
-0,185 -0,744
-0,023 -0,018
-0,403 -0,916
-0,051 -0,011
0,000 0,005
-0,001 -0,125

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910'0--0,172 -0,111 -0,022 -0,017 -3,717 -0,010 -0,035 -0.009 -0,160 -0,059 -0,109 00000 0,000 -0,041 -0,041 -0,004 -0,011 -0,182 -0,114 -0,280 -0,001 -0,057 -0,125 -0,011 -0,203 -0,092 0,000 -0,007 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 -18,049 -0,635 -0,442 -0,379 -0,344 -0,192 -0,778 956'0--1,070 -0,186 -1,038 -1,343 -0,378 -0,151 -0,953 -0,334 -0,165 -0,626 Rest of -0,354 -0,107 990'0--0,156 -0,001 -0,008 -0,003 -0,067 -0,051 -0,004 -0,020 -0,002 -0,331 -0,001 -0,546 -0,030 -0,073 -0,021 -7,311 -0,254 -0,418 -0,316 0,000 -0,003 -0,385 -0,038 -1,119 -0,087 -0.058 -2,690 -1,283 -0,441 -0,174 -0,521 -0,281 -2,082 890,0--0,553 890'0--0,003 -0,014 -0,230 -0,822 -0,379 -0,462 -0,030 -0,030 -2,269 -0,024 0,000 00000 0,000 0,000 00000 -0,040 -0,425 -0,468 -0,297 -0,045 -2,620 -0,405 -0,112 -0,012 -1,641 -0,120 -0,161 -0,054 -0,354 -0.091 -0,026 -0,011 -0,038 0,000 0,000 -0,026 -0,003 -0,002 0,000 900'0--0,003 -0,007 -0,001 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 -0,001 0,000 0,000 Table 7-31: Absolute change in CO2 emissions for Wet bulk in Scenario 3 0,000 0,000 -0,048 -0,164 -0,002 -0,002 -0,007 -0,646 -0,005 -0,033 -0,106 -0,013 -0,019 -0,009 -0,090 00000 0.000 0,000 900'0-810,0--0,101 -0,004 -0,375 -0,001 -0,002 -0,025 -0,973 -0,283 861,0--0,035 -0,049 -0,001 -0,227 -0,216 0,000 0,000 -0,042 -0,019 -0,001 -0,014 -0,097 -0,002 -0,163 -0,354 -0,041 -0,295 -0,017 690'0--0,303 -0,001 -0,009 -0,001 -0,001 0,000 -0,046 -0,743 -1,181 -0,035 -0,911 -0,061 -0,248 -0,032 -0,595 -0,284 -0,125 -0,005 -0,047 -6,413 -0,004 810,0--0,012 0.000 -0,071 -0,170 -0,003 -0,880 -0,002 -0,185 -0,400 -0,036 -0,031 -0.008 -0,071 -0,423 -0,022 -0,052 -0,001 00000 -0,001 0,000 900'0--3,050 -0,043 910,0--0,418 -5,539 -0,232 -1,833 615,0--0,363 -0,517 -0,170 -0,319 -0,002 -5,230 -1,734 -8,321 -3,451 -1,290 -0,343 -2,225 -10,726 -0,170 -3,160 -0,429 -0,296 -1,199 -1,844 -0,133 -1,125 0,000 -0,406 -0,119 -0,428 -0,461 -0,974 -0,010 -0,923 -0,091 -0,003 -0,129 -0,106 -0,062 0,000 -0,162 0,000 -0,002 -0,027 -0,082 -0,032 -0,019 900,0-0,000 0,000 -0,033 -0,044 -0,120 -0,045 -0,091 -0,196 -0,002 -0,012 -0,571 -0,045 -0,027 -0,938 -0,004 0.000 -0,003 -0,277 -0,011 0,000

-0,029

0,000

-0,148

-0,042

-0,076

-0,051 -0,025 -0,099 -0,016 -0,082

-0,012

-0.096

-0,329

Source: Compiled by author

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Rest of -0,194 -0,123 -0,169 -0,035 -0,179 -0,005 -0,073 -0,745 -0,002 -0,009 -0,046 -0,012 0,000 0,000 -0,021 0,000 0,000 -0,514 -3,037 -0,276 -0,241 -1,264 -0,384 -0,010 -0,569 -0,177 -0,097 -0,360 -1,154 -0,035 -4,554 -1,308 Rest of -0,001 -0,057 -0,149 -0,052 -0,150 -0,155 -0,040 -0,035 00000 -0,005 -0,025 -0,274 -0,001 0,000 0,000 0,000 -0,013 -0,166 -0,014 -0,001 0,000 -0,130 -0,020 0,000 -0,091 900'0--0,013 -0,016 -0,005 900'0--0,018 -0,002 900'0--0,287 0,000 -0,106 -0,065 -0,019 -0,041 -0,052 -0,049 -0,016 900,0--0,104 -0,028 0,000 -0,001 0,000 810,0--0,105 -0,030 -0,014 -0,013 -0,001 -0,002 -0,013 0,000 -0,002 -0,007 -0,085 -0,020 -0,077 -0,004 0,000 SIDS -0,024 -0,024 -0,002 -0,003 -0,001 -0,016 0,000 0,000 900'0-0,000 0,000 0,000 -0,011 0,000 0,000 0,000 Table 7-32: Absolute change in CO2 emissions for Dry bulk in Scenario 1 -0,184 -0,012 -0,003 -0,002 -0,103 -0,002 -0,100 -0,002 0,000 -0,001 -0,004 -0,002 -0,003 0,000 0,000 0,000 -0,024 -0,285 -0,138 -0,354 -0,003 -0,261 -0,184 -0,092 -0,105 -0,042 819,0--0.085 0.000 -0,226 0,000 -0,011 East -0,016 -0,039 -0,001 -0,028 -0,008 -0,047 -0,040 -0,263 -0,034 -0,051 -0,002 -0,023 -0,097 -0,008 -0,001 0,000 -1,315 -5,128 -1,039 -0,260 -0,005 819,0--0,049 -0,002 -0,510 -0,001 -0,115 0.000 0,000 0,000 0,000 -0,055 -0,107 0,010 -0,003 0,000 -0,009 -0,017 -0,079 -0,050 -0,057 600'0--0,003 0,000 0,000 -0,265 819,0--0,063 -0,043 -3,529 -0,070 -0,256 -0,012 0,000 -0,151 -1,206 -0,255 -0,904 -1,095 -0,021 -0,557 -0,068 -23,130 -0,480 -2,158 -0,312 -1,784 -0,037 -6,944 0,000 -0,067 -0,286 0,000 -1,483 -0,094 -1,361 -1,295 -0,050 -0,130 0,000 -0,038 -0,015 0,000 -0,021 0,000 -0,103 100,0-0,000 -0,303 910,0--0,020 0.000 0,000 0,000 -0.038 -0,012 -0,030 090'0--0,103 -0,057 -0,007 -0,001 -0,004 -0,002 -0,021 -0,001 -0,001 -0,001 0,000 0,000 Tiddle East Rest of Asia Vigeria Russia Brazil

-0,079 -0,189 -0,002 -0,018

-0,009

-0,045

-0,002

-0,028

0,000

00000

0,000

0,000

0,000

0,000

0,000

-0,022

0,010

0,000

-0,007

0,000

0,000

-0,466

0,000

-0,002

900'0-

-0,030

-0,246

-0,074

-0,038

-0,647

-0,075

-0,463

-0,141

-0,030

0,000

-0,069

-0,049

-0,010

809'0-

-0,129

-1,092

-1,425

-0,052

0,000

0,000

-0,001

-0,430

-0,128

-0,363

-0,492

-0,057

-0,125

-0,054

-0,052

-0,002

-0,025

-0,106

-0,037

-0,130

-0,073

-0,531

-1,441

-0,572

Source: Compiled by author

160

Table 7-33: Absolute change in CO2 emissions for Dry bulk in Scenario 2

	Rest of	S.America		-0,063	-0,192	-0,002	-0,017	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	-0,021	0,000	0,000	-0,474	-0,003	-0,005	0,000	-0,252	-0,443
	Rest of	N.America		-0,007	-0,044	-0,001	-0,027	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	-0,010	-0,006	-0,002	-1,818	0,000	-0,029	-0,001	-0,074	-0,129
	Rest of	Europe		-0,101	-0,170	-0,035	-0,179	0,000	0,000	-0,005	-0,075	0,000	-0,770	-0,002	600'0-	-0,197	-0,048	-0,021	-0,012	-0,038	-0,367
	Rest	Jo	Asia	-4,420	-0,565	-0,521	-0,175	-3,152	-0,099	-0,286	-0,372	0,000	-1,187	-0,245	-0,035	-1,273	-1,357	-0,395	-0,010	-0,640	-0,483
	Rest of	Africa		-0,032	-0,035	-0,055	-0,151	0,000	0,000	-0,054	-0,005	-0,001	-0,156	0,000	0,000	-0,155	-0,026	-0,281	-0,001	-0,073	-0,056
	USA			-0,001	-0,131	-0,013	680'0-	-0,014	900'0-	-0,001	-0,020	0,000	-0,013	-0,016	-0,005	0,000	-0,006	-0,166	-0,018	-0,475	-0,128
	UK			-0,034	-0,053	900'0-	-0,290	0,000	-0,050	-0,016	-0,006	00000	-0,106	-0,001	0,000	-0,108	-0,029	990'0-	-0,019	-0,146	-0,056
	SIDS			-0,015	-0,105	-0,031	-0,014	-0,013	-0,001	-0,002	-0,014	0,000	-0,002	-0,007	0,000	-0,084	-0,021	620'0-	-0,004	-0,031	-0,053
	Russia			0,000	0,000	-0,024	-0,024	0,000	-0,006	-0,002	0,000	00000	0,000	0,000	-0,003	-0,001	0,000	-0,017	-0,011	0,000	-0,002
or much	Nigeria			-0,009	-0,002	-0,003	-0,183	0,000	0,000	-0,002	-0,001	0,000	-0, 108	0,000	-0,002	-0, 101	-0,004	-0,002	-0,003	-0,070	-0,025
	Middle	East		-0,074	-0,285	-0,137	-0,352	-0,003	0,000	-0,024	-0,233	0,000	-0,267	-0,187	-0,093	-0,106	-0,044	-0,636	-0,012	-0,049	-0,104
200	LDC			-0,027	-0,008	-0,015	-0,051	-0,046	-0,002	-0,041	-0,024	-0,001	-0,100	-0,008	0,000	-0,027	-0,042	-0,270	-0,001	-0,010	-0,036
of cu	Japan			-5,065	-1,047	-0,267	-0,005	-0,633	0,000	-0,051	-0,002	0,000	-0,526	0,000	-0,001	-1,364	-0,180	-0,1119	0,000	-0,634	-0,133
m coz emissionis joi Di y oum m	Indonesia			-0,715	-0,057	-0,111	-0,010	0,000	-0,010	-0,003	-0,017	0,000	-0,082	-0,053	0,000	-0,059	600'0-	-0,279	-0,003	-0,132	-0,075
200	EU-27			-0,505	-0,914	-0,041	-3,628	-0,061	-0,071	-0,262	-0,012	0,000	-1,116	-0,021	-0,154	-1,228	-0,572	-0,257	-0,069	-1,124	-0,544
١	Chima			-24,460	-6,944	0,000	-0,251	-1,691	-0,063	-0,456	-0,263	0,000	-1,368	-0,087	-0,032	-2,025	-1,279	-1,238	-0,045	-1,344	-1,371
5	Brazil			960'0-	0,000	-0,031	510,0-	0,000	0,000	-0,020	0,000	0,000	-0,105	100,0-	0,000	-0,310	-0,016	610,0-	0,000	-0,053	-0,606
J. 1103C	Aus/NZ			-0,034	-0,013	850,0-	-0,007	-0,001	-0,001	-0,031	-0,004	0,000	-0,003	-0,021	-0,001	-0,062	-0,001	-0,106	0,000	00000	-0,005
Tack Comme	Countries			Aus/NZ	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan	TDC	Middle East	Nigeria	Russia	SIDS	UK	USA	Rest of Africa	Rest of Asia	Rest of Europe	Rest of N.America	Rest of S.America

161

0,000 -0,516 -0,176 -3,077 -0,280 -0,243 -0,568 860'0--0,364 -1,166 -4,506 Rest of -0,001 950,0--0,149 -0,052 -0,037 -0,035 00000 -0,005 -0,152 0,000 0,000 -0,013 -0,014 0,000 -0,001 -0,090 -0,020 -0,001 -0,131 900'0--0,013 -0,016 900'0--0,288 -0,050 0,000 -0.038 -0,053 -0,016 -0,006 -0,105 0,000 -0,001 -0,017 -0,105 -0,030 -0,014 -0,013 -0,001 -0,002 -0,013 0,000 -0,002 -0,007 SIDS -0,024 -0,024 -0,002 0,000 0,000 900'0-0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 Table 7-34: Absolute change in CO2 emissions for Dry bulk in Scenario 3 -0,184 -0,011 -0,002 -0,002 -0,003 0,000 -0,001 -0,105 0,000 0,000 0,000 -0.081 -0,285 -0,137 -0,353 -0,003 -0,024 -0,263 -0,185 0.000 -0,228 0,000 East -0,016 -0,040 -0,001 -0,008 -0,051 -0,047 -0.032 -0,002 860.0--0,008 -0,023 -5,104 -0,262 -1,042 -0,005 -0,623 -0,050 -0,002 -0,516 0.000 0,000 0,000 -0,732 950,0--0,109 0,010 0,010 -0,003 -0,080 0,000 -0,017 0,000 -0,051 -0,581 0,000 -0,042 -3,562 -0,062 -0,071 -0,258 -0,012 806,0--1,102 -0,021 -23,592 -1,751 -0,472 -0,292 -0,065 -6,941 0,000 -0,278 0,000 -1,444 -0,092 -0,119 -0,036 0,000 -0,015 0,000 -0,020 0,000 -0,104 100,0-0.000 0,000 -0,037 -0,013 -0,030 -0,057 -0,007 -0,001 -0,004 -0,002 -0,001 -0,021 0,000 Tiddle East Vigeria Russia Brazil

-0,074 -0,190 -0,002

-0,116 -0,169 -0,035

Rest of

-0,002

-0,028

-0,045

00000

0,000

-0,005

0,000

0,000

0,000

0,000

0,000

0,000

-0,021

0,010

-0,754 -0,002 -0,009

-0,007

0,000

0,000

0,000

-0,469

-0,195

-1,267

-0,155

0,000

-0,107

-0,085

0,000

-0,047

-1,325

-0,025

900'0-

-0,029

0,000

-0,004

0,000

-0,002

-0,035

0,000

-0,005

0,000

0,000

-0,003

-0,002

-0,092

0,000

-0,001

0,000

-0,152

-0,035

0,000

-0,001

-0,028

-0,041

-1,332

-0,058

-1,213

-2,112

190,0-

-0,001

-0,562

-1,333

-0,005

-0,030

-0,021

-0,388

-0,276

-0,166

-0,065

-0,077

-0,016

-0,002

-0,624

-0,266

-0,116

-0,270

-0,256

-1,275

-0,020

-0,104

Rest of Asia

-0,248

-0,074

-0,038

-0,644

-0,074

-0,467

-0,143

-0,030

0,000

-0,069

-0,049

-0,010

-0,617

-0,130

-1,102

-1,397

-0,052

0,000

0,000

-0,001

-0,012

-0,010

-0,001

-0,018

-0,019

-0,004

-0,011

-0,003

-0,011

-0,001

0,000

-0,003

-0,068

-0,048

0,000

0,000

-0,434

-0,128

-0,364

-0,489

-0,056

-0,126

-0,055

-0,053

-0,002

-0,025

-0,105

-0,036

-0,131

-0,074

-0,536

-1,417

-0,584

Source: Compiled by author

162

-0,057 -0,281 -3,246 -2,063 -0,065 -0,568 -0,095 -0,001 -0,071 -0,094 -0,145 -6,208 -1,555 -0,914 -0,071 -0,078 -0,065 -0,241 Rest of -0,002 -0,350 -0,470 -0,019 -0,360 -0,030 -0,104 -0,095 668'0--1,707 -0.044 -0,129 -0,041 -0,371 -0,236 -0,103 -0,154 -0,064 Rest of -0,445 -0,192 -6,192 -3,178 -0,687 -0,389 986'0--0,016 -0,209 -0,971 -0,340 -2,141 -0,309 -3,443 -0,124 -0,288 -0.332-2,618 Rest of -0,004 -0,153 -0,450 -0,026 -0,017 -0,234 -0,026 -0,037 -0,997 -0.065 -0,066 -0,090 810,0--0,028 -0,085 -0,117 -0,068 -0,023 -10,753 -10,121 -10,233 00000 -0,323 -0,521 -0,004 -7,707 -0,512 -2,733 -0,408 159'0--0,238 -0,773 -1,085 -0,432 -0,393 -0,630 -1,039 -0,322 -0,085 -1,662 -5,819 -0,038 -0,112 -0,622 -0,059 -0,242 -0,087 -0,001 -0,340 -0,048 -0,268 -0,343 -0,058 0,000 UK -0,856 0,000 -0,933 -1,242 -0,108 -0,018 -0,035 -0,101 -0,032 -0,887 -0,221 -0,422 -0,186 -0,005 -0,153 -0,033 -0,035 -0,020 SIDS Table 7-35: Absolute change in CO2 emissions for Containers in Scenario 1 -0,015 -0,232 -0,033 -0,940 -0,032 -0,339 -0,046 -0,965 -0.158 -0,029 -0,045 -0,001 0,000 -0,018 -0,075 -0,045 -0,085 -0.068 -0,005 0,000 -0,034 -0,003 -0,019 -0,205 -0,105 900'0-900'0--0,004 -0,003 -0,003 -0,015 -0,014 -0,090 -0,014 -0,022 -0,003 -0,095 969'0--1,177 -1,403 -0,510 -0,012 -0,112 -0,100 -1,896 -0,064 -0,389 695.0-980,0--0,245 -0,185 -0,306 -0,075 -0,078 800'0--0,002 -0,342 800'0--0,023 -0,420 -0,235 -0.036 -0.054 -0,065 990,0--0,001 -0,051 -0,019 -0,046 -0,169 -0,028 -0,005 -0,003 -0,220 -3,524 -0,191 -1,243 -2,009 -0,318 -0,289 -0,106 980,0--0,154 -0,200 -0,072 -1,677 -0,078 -0,183 -0,049 0.000 -0,103 -1,053 -0,001 -0,020 -0,188 -0,153 -0,645 -0,030 -0,042 -0,341 -0,011 -0,055 -0,021 -0,044 -0,228 00000 -0,008 -0,036 -12,132 -45,484 -0,260 -5,475 -0,413 -1,914 -0,938 -0,022 -0,615 -5,450 609,0--0,747 -0,737 -3,515 -1,425 -1,257 -0,695 -1,806 -0,939 -0,950 -0,574 -0,010 -0,447 -2,750 -0,762 -0,967 0000'0 -5,632 -3.918 -0,734 -0,720 -0,369 -0,526 -8,544 -0,169 -1,199 -0,134 -0,002 -0,466 -0,007 -0,788 -0,030 -0,002 -0,043 -0,671 -0.083 -0,071 -0,091 -0,042 -0,064 -0,298 -0,034 -0,281 0,000 -0,178 -0,015 -1,585 -0,982 -0,068 -0,048 -0,047 0,000 -0,005 -0,108 -0,125 -0,569 -0,033 -0,738 -0,029 -0,108 -0,341 -0.034Middle Russia la pan srazil

-0,015

-0,038

-0,001

-0,595

-0,023

-0,273

-0,029

-0,250

-0,341

-1,074

-0,658

-0,020

-0,112

Source: Compiled by author

163

-0,057 -0,284 -3,256 -2,013 -0,065 -0,570 -0,095 -0,070 -0,001 -0,071 -0,094 -0,146 -6,326 -1,545 -0,913 -0,078 -0,065 -0,244 Rest of -0,019 -0,002 -0,350 -0,470 -0,103 -0,364 -0,030 -0,095 -0,895 -1,663 -0,044 -0,129 -0,041 -0,373 -0,237 -0,104 -0,155 -0,064 Rest of -2,132 -3,472 -0,449 -0,192 -6,263 -3,076 -0,693 -2,639 -0,392 966'0--0,016 -0,210 -0,977 -0,339 -0,310 -0,124 -0,279 -0,328 Rest of -0,004 -0,151 0,441 -0,026 810,0--0,232 -0,025 -0,037 -0,961 -0,017 -0,064 -0,066 -0,090 -0,028 -0,085 -0,118 890,0--0,023 -10,992 -10,097 -10,440 -0,004 00000 -7,832 -0,326 -0,525 -0,411 -0,518 -2,758 -0,657 -0,240 -0,781 -1,092 -0,436 -0,395 -0,638 -0,321 -0,085 -1,654 -0,113 -1,044 -0,622 -0,060 -5,750 -0,039 -0,244 -0,087 -0,001 -0,343 -0,049 -0,270 -0,345 -0,058 0,000 UK -0,843 0,000 -0,107 -0,929 -0,223 -0,018 -0,035 -1,240 -0,031 -0,848 -0,422 -0,187 -0,005 -0,152 -0,033 -0,035 860'0--0.019 Table 7-36: Absolute change in CO2 emissions for Containers in Scenario 2 -0,015 -0,931 -0,231 -0,033 -0,032 -0,338 -0,046 -0,934 -0.157 -0,029 -0,045 -0,001 0,000 8 10,0--0,075 -0,046 980,0--0,068 -0,004 0,000 -0,033 -0,003 -0,019 -0,196 -0,100 900'0-900'0--0,004 -0,003 -0,003 -0,015 -0,014 -0,088 -0,014 -0,021 -0,003 -1,180 960'0--0,012 969'0--0,513 -1,398 -1,835 -0,064 -0,389 -0,575 980,0--0,113 -0,245 -0,186 660,0--0.077 -0,075 -0,307 800'0--0,002 -0,045 800'0--0,022 -0,411 -0,225 -0,036 -0.053 -0,065 990,0--0,001 -0,051 -0,019 -0,170 -0,341 -0,005 -0,028 -0,003 -0,317 -0,222 -3,553 -0,193 -1,248 -0,292 -0,107 980,0--0,155 -0,183 -2,018 -0,072 -1,632 620,0--0,049 -0,201 0.000 -0,104 -1,056 -0,001 -0,020 -0,189 -0,152 -0,646 -0,029 -0,042 -0,215 -0,343 -0,011 -0,055 -0,020 -0,044 00000 -0,008 -0,036 -12,454 47,919 -0,262 -0,617 -0,417 -0,950 -0,022 -0,622 -5,580 -1,262 -1.940 -0,757 -0,747 -3,575 -1,447 -5,536 -1,833 -0,705 -0,950 -0.578 -0,010 -2,760 -0,967 0000'0 -5,464 096'0--3.973 -0,738 -0,448 -0,726 -0,365 -0,527 -8,707 -0,169 -0,755 -1,208 -0,131 -0,002 -0,460 -0,007 -0,730 -0,002 -0,090 -0,042 -0,631 -0,029 -0.078 -0,071 -0,042 -0,063 -0,285 -0,033 -0,284 0,000 -0,180 -0,740 -0,015 165,1--0,949 690'0--0.343-0,048 -0,047 0,000 -0,005 -0,109 -0,125 -0,572 -0,033 -0,029 -0,108 -0.034Middle Russia srazil

-0,015

-0,001

-0,597

-0,023

-0,267

-0,249

-0,345

-0,029

-0,038

-1,056

-0,419

-0,020

-0,111

Source: Compiled by author

164

-0,095 -0,057 -0,282 -3,249 -2,045 -0,065 -0,001 -0,071 -0,094 -0,146 -6,248 -0,913 -0.568 -0,071 8 /0,0--1,551 -0,065 -0,242 Rest of -0,897 -1,692 -0,044 -0,129 -0,041 -0,002 -0,236 -0,350 -0,470 -0,095 -0,371 -0,361 -0,030 -0,104 -0,154 -0,103 -0,064 -0,019 -0,016 -6,216 -3,142 689.0--0,390 -0,973 -0,340 -2,138 -3,453 -0,124 -0,285 -0,192 -2,625 686'0--0,209 -0,309 -0,331 -0,447 Rest of -0,004 -0,026 -0,447 -0,037 -0,985 -0,017 -0,065 -0,090 -0.018 -0,028 -0,085 -0,152 -0,117 -0,233 -0,068 -0,026 -0,023 -0,066 -10,304 -10,835 -10,107 -0,409 -0,004 -0,324 -0,514 -0,523 -2,741 -0,653 -0,239 977.0--1,088 0,000 -0,433 -7,749 -0,393 -0,633 -1,659 -0,113 -0,001 -1,040 -5,792 -0,039 -0,085 -0,059 -0,243 -0,087 -0,622 -0,344 -0,321 -0,341 -0,048 0,000 -0,268 -0,058 -0,932 -0,873 -0,222 -0,018 -0,186 0,000 -0,005 -0,035 -0,153 -0,852 -0,033 -1,241 -0,035 -0,100 -0,019 -0,108 -0,031 -0,422 SIDS -0,015 -0,937 -0,954 -0,032 -0,029 -0,001 -0,075 -0,232 -0,045 -0,033 -0,068 Table 7-37: Absolute change in CO2 emissions for Containers in Scenario 3 -0,046 -0,158 -0,045 810,0--0,338 -0,085 0,000 -0,004 -0,004 610,0--0,202 -0,103 900'0--0,006 -0,003 -0,003 -0,015 -0,034 -0,089 -0,014 -0,003 -0,003 -0,021 0,000 -0,014 -0,511 -0,012 -0,100 960.0--0,075 -1,401 -1,874 -0,064 -0,389 980.0--0,113 -0,245 969,0--0,185 -1,178 -0,306 8/0.0--0,571 East -0,417 -0,065 -0,002 -0,046 -0,342 800,0--0,023 -0,036 610,0--0,231 -0,053 990,0--0,001 -0,051 -0,169 -0,028 -0,005 -0,003 -2,012 -0,220 -3,533 -0,107 -0,192 -0,155 -1,244 -0,318 -0,200 -0,072 -1,661 -0,290 -0,079 -0,086 -0,183 -0,049 0,000 -0,103 -0,042 -1,054 -0,223 -0,342 -0,011 -0,020 -0,021 -0,153 -0,044 -0,030 -0,036 00000 -0,055 100,0--0,188 -0,645 800,0-46,350 -12,243 -0,415 -0,942 -5,511 -0,261 -0,612 -1,923 -0,750 -0,022 -0,740 -0,617 -3,536 -1,433 -5,479 -1,815 -0,698 -1,258 -0,010 -0,760 -0,575 -2,753 -0,953 -0,967 -5,572 -3,937 -0,735 -0,447 -0,722 -0,368 -0,527 -8,600 -0,169 -1,202 -0.943 0,000 -0,133 -0,002 -0,769 -0,007 0,000 -0,657 -0,030 -0,081 -0,002 -0,071 -0,091 -0,043 -0,042 -0,464 -0,064 -0,293 -0,034 -0,282 -0,015 -1,587 -0,048 -0,570 -0,033 -0,739 -0,029 -0,034 -0,179 -0,971 890.0--0,342 -0,047 -0,005 -0,109 -0,125 -0,108 0,000 Rest of Asia Middle East Nigeria Russia Brazil

-0,001 -0,026 -0,015 -0,038 -0,596 -0,023 -0,029

-0,271

-0,250

-0,342


S.America

-0,416 -1,068 -0,650 -0,020 -0,112 -0,008

Source: Compiled by author

Annex 17 (Sensitivity analysis – Substitution elasticity)


Figure 7-4: Dry bulk consumer surplus in billion USD (Sensitivity to Figure 7-5: Dry bulk producer surplus in billion USD (Sensitivity to SE)



ZN/sny

0

Figure 7-3: Dry bulk welfare in billion USD (Sensitivity to SE)



Source: Author's compilation of model results





Figure 7-8: Liner welfare in billion USD (Sensitivity to SE)



Annex 18 (Sensitivity analysis – Demand & Supply elasticity)

Figure 7-10: Dry bulk producer surplus in billion USD (Sensitivity to Figure 7-11: Dry bulk consumer surplus in billion USD (Sensitivity to D&S elasticity) D&S elasticity)





Figure 7-9: Dry bulk welfare in billion USD (Sensitivity to D&S elasticity)



Source: Author's compilation of model results

Figure 7-13: Liner producer surplus in billion USD (Sensitivity to D&S elasticity)




Figure 7-14: Liner consumer surplus in billion USD (Sensitivity to $D\&S\ elasticity)$





Figure 7-12: Liner welfare in billion USD (Sensitivity to D&S elasticity)



Source: Author's compilation of model results

Annex 19(Change in bilateral trade volumes in all three scenarios for each segment)

Table 7-38: Change in bilateral trade volume(million tons) for wet bulk in Scenario 1

rable /-5	os: Cnang	ie in ou	arerai	raae	table /-58. Change in bliateral trade Volume(million tons) for wet builk in Scenario 1	מוסוו	of (suc	r wer	outk in .	scenari	10							
Countries	Countries AUS/NZ Brazil	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan	TDC	ME	Nigeria	Russia	SIDS	ΔM	USA	ROAF	ROA	ROE	RONA	ROSA
EU-27	9,0-	-2,0	-5,1	-100,3	-0,4	9,0-	-1,2	-4,6	6,7-	-0,3	4,4	-10,1	-13,8	4,0	-4,8	-2,2	-2,1	-1,3
TDC	0,0	-0,3	-27,0	-5,1	6'0-	-0,4	-2,0	-0,3	-0,1	0,0	-0,5	-0,2	-3,1	-1,9	9,6-	0,0	0,0	-0,5
ME	-3,5	-1,0	-129,8	-64,5	5,3	-78,2	4,4	-12,0	-0,4	0,0	-32,2	4,7	-33,4	8,9-	-216,4	-1,4	-2,1	-1,0
Nigeria	-0,4	-1,1	-2,1	-21,0	-2,1	9,0-	5,0-	-0,7	0,0	0,0	5,0-	-2,8	-5,1	4,2	-11,8	0,0	-1,4	9,0-
Russia	-0,1	-0,4	-38,5	6,99-	0,0	-7,3	5,0-	-3,4	-1,3	0,0	4,9	-5,6	-15,7	8,0-	-11,9	-3,4	-0,3	-0,3
SIDS	6'9-	-1,6	-5,2	-2,8	-10,6	-3,4	-3,6	-2,4	-0,2	-0,1	-1,4	-0,4	-5,4	9,0-	-13,2	0,0	-0,2	-1,2
USA	-0,5	-11,2	-14,7	-37,0	-2,2	0,6-	-0,7	-1,2	9,0-	0,0	-5,2	-6,7	0,0	-1,3	-12,9	-1,5	-45,0	-13,9
ROA	-11,4	-1,3	-22,4	4,4	4, 8,	-11,1	-3,7	-2,7	-2,0	-0,1	-19,8	8,0-	-6,4	8,0-	-16,5	-2,5	-0,4	-1,0
ROE	-0,1	-0,1	-5,7	-41,9	9,0-	-0,1	-0,1	-2,6	-1,1	0,0	-0,1	-27,5	-3,4	-0,3	-2,1	-1,1	-1,3	-0,1
RONA	0,0	-0,1	-1,7	-6,4	0,0	8,0-	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	5,0-	8,0-	-88,3	0,0	-4,9	-0,1	-0,5	-1,2

Source: Calculated by author based on data from model and World Bank

Table 7-39: Change in bilateral trade volume(million tons) for wet bulk in Scenario 2

Table 1-37. Change in pliate	, Cum	Sc III O	ומוכומו	2227	at trace volume (minion tons) for wet bain in Seenario 2	2 10111	of len	124	כמנע נוו י) certain	1							
Countries	AUS/NZ	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan	TDC	ME	Nigeria	Russia	SIDS	ΩK	USA	ROAF	ROA	ROE	RONA	ROSA
EU-27	5,0-	-1,9	-4,6	-103,1	-0,4	9,0-	-1,2	-4,5	-7,8	-0,3	4,2	6'6-	-13,4	4,0	4,2	-2,2	-2,0	-1,3
LDC	0,0	-0,3	-27,3	-5,1	6'0-	-0,4	-2,0	-0,3	-0,1	0,0	9,0-	-0,2	-3,1	-1,9	-9,3	0,0	0,0	-0,5
ME	-3,2	6'0-	-132,0	-62,0	4,9	8,77-	-4,1	-11,6	-0,4	0,0	-31,2	4,4	-31,5	-6,4	-225,7	-1,3	-1,7	8,0-
Nigeria	-0,4	-1,1	-2,1	-21,4	-2,1	9,0-	-0,5	-0,2	0,0	0,0	5,0-	-2,8	-5,2	4,4	-11,1	0,0	-1,3	9,0-
Russia	-0,1	-0,4	-38,4	-68,3	0,0	-7,2	-0,5	-3,5	-1,3	0,0	4,9	-5,6	-15,5	8,0-	-11,1	-3,4	-0,3	-0,3
SIDS	-7,0	-1,5	-5,2	-2,8	-10,9	-3,5	-3,6	-2,5	-0,2	-0,1	-1,4	-0,4	-5,4	9,0-	-12,8	0,0	-0,2	-1,2
USA	9,0-	-11,3	-14,4	-37,3	-2,2	-9,1	-0,2	-1,2	9,0-	0,0	-5,1	8,9-	0,0	-1,3	-12,0	-1,5	-45,8	-14,1
ROA	-11,5	-1,3	-22,5	4,4	-4,9	-11,1	-3,7	-2,8	-2,0	-0,1	-20,3	8,0-	-6,3	8,0-	-16,0	-2,5	-0,4	-1,0

AUS/NZ 1	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan	TDC	ME	Nigeria	Russia	SIDS	ΩK	NSA	ROAF	ROA	ROE	RONA	ROSA
	-0,1	-5,5	-42,2	9'0-	-0,1	-0,1	-2,6	-1,1	0,0	-0,1	-27,9	-3,4	-0,3	-1,9	-1,1	-1,3	-0,1
	-0,1	-1,5	-6,0	0,0	-0,7	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	-0,4	8,0-	-90,3	0,0	4,0	-0,1	-0,5	-1,1

Source: Calculated by author based on data from model and World Bank

Table 7-40: Change in bilateral trade volume(million tons) for wet bulk in Scenario 3

6- / 210n1	Table / -40. Change in bilateral trade	מב ונו מו	mierai	naa	2	מונסוו מ	of lene	1244 1	ions) for wer bark in scenario 3	Scenari	0			9	3			
Countries	AUS/NZ Brazil	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan	CDC	ME	Nigeria	Russia	SIDS	ž	OSA	ROAF	ROA	ROE	RONA	ROSA
EU-27	-0,5	-2,0	4,9	-101,3	-0,4	9'0-	-1,2	-4,6	6'2-	-0,3	4,3	-10,0	-13,6	-4,0	4,6	-2,2	-2,1	-1,3
LDC	0'0	-0,3	-27,1	-5,1	6'0-	-0,4	-2,0	-0,3	-0,1	0′0	-0,5	-0,2	-3,1	-1,9	5'6-	0'0	0'0	-0,5
ME	-3,4	-1,0	-130,5	-63,6	-5,1	-78,0	-4,3	-11,8	-0,4	0′0	-31,9	-4,6	-32,7	9'9-	-219,6	-1,4	-1,9	6'0-
Nigeria	-0,4	-1,1	-2,1	-21,1	-2,1	9'0-	-0,5	-0,2	0,0	0′0	-0,5	-2,8	-5,1	-4,3	-11,6	0'0	-1,4	9'0-
Russia	-0,1	-0,4	-38,5	-67,4	0'0	-7,2	-0,5	-3,4	-1,3	0'0	4,9	9′5-	-15,6	8′0-	-11,6	-3,4	-0,3	-0,3
SIDS	6'9-	-1,6	-5,2	-2,8	-10,7	-3,5	-3,6	-2,4	-0,2	-0,1	-1,4	-0,4	-5,4	9'0-	-13,0	0'0	-0,2	-1,2
USA	-0,5	-11,2	-14,6	-37,1	-2,2	0'6-	-0,2	-1,2	9′0-	0′0	-5,2	-6,7	0′0	-1,3	-12,6	-1,5	-45,2	-14,0
ROA	-11,4	-1,3	-22,4	4,4	-4,9	-11,1	-3,7	-2,8	-2,0	-0,1	-20,0	8′0-	-6,3	8′0-	-16,3	-2,5	-0,4	-1,0
ROE	-0,1	-0,1	9'5-	-42,0	9'0-	-0,1	-0,1	-2,6	-1,1	0′0	-0,1	-27,6	-3,4	-0,3	-2,0	-1,1	-1,3	-0,1
RONA	0'0	-0,1	-1,6	-6,3	0'0	-0,7	0′0	0′0	0,0	0′0	-0,5	8′0-	0'68-	0,0	4,6	-0,1	-0,5	-1,2

Source: Calculated by author based on data from model and World Bank

Table 7-41: Change in bilateral trade volume(million tons) for dry bulk in Scenario 1

AUS/NZ	NZ Brazil	rzil China		EU-27 I	Indonesia	Japan	TDC	ME	Nigeria	Russia	SIDS	ΩK	OSA	ROAF	ROA	ROE	RONA	ROSA
	8,0-	-2,7 480,1		-12,8	-15,4	-106,4	-0,7	-1,8	-0,2	0,0	-0,4	8,0-	0,0	8.0-	-94,5	-2,5	-0,2	-1,6
	-0,2	0,0 -138,7		-18,1	-1,1	-20,8	-0,2	-5,7	0,0	0,0	-2,1	-1,0	-2,6	-0,7	-11,4	-3,4	6,0-	-3,8
	-0,1	-0,24	4,4	-49,2	-0,1	-0,1	-0,7	-4,9	-2,6	-0,3	-0,2	-4,0	-1,3	-2,1	-2,5	-2,5	-0,4	-0,2
	0,0	0,0	17,1	9,0-	0,0	-5,9	-0,4	0,0	0,0	0,0	-0,1	0,0	-0,1	0,0	-29,2	0,0	0,0	0,0

Countries	AUS/NZ	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan	Трс	ME	Nigeria	Russia	SIDS	UK	OSA	ROAF	ROA	ROE	RONA	ROSA
	0,0	-1,8	-26,3	-19,4	-1,4	-9,1	-1,7	-4,6	-1,8	0,0	0,0	-1,8	-0,2	-2,7	-20,5	-13,2	-0,5	-0,4
	-1,3	-6,4	-45,3	-25,3	-1,2	-27,6	9,0-	-2,2	-2,1	0,0	-1,8	-2,2	0,0	-3,2	-26,5	-4,1	-37,5	8'6-
	0,0	-0,5	-18,8	1,7-	-0,1	-2,4	9,0-	9,0-	-0,1	0,0	-0,3	-0,4	-0,1	-0,3	-18,1	9,0-	0,0	0,0
	-1,6	-0,3	-20,0	-3,9	-4,1	-1,8	4,1	5,6-	0,0	-0,3	-1,2	-1,0	-2,6	-4,5	-5,9	-0,3	-0,5	-0,1
	0,0	8,0-	-22,2	-17,0	-2,0	5,6-	-0,2	8,0-	-1,1	0,0	-0,5	-2,2	-7,2	-1,2	-10,0	9,0-	-1,1	-3,8
	0,0	-5,6	-14,1	-5,2	-0,7	-1,3	-0,4	-1,0	-0,5	0,0	-0,5	-0,5	-1,2	9,0-	-4,8	-3,6	-1,3	-4,2

Source: Calculated by author based on data from model and World Bank

Table 7-42: Change in bilateral trade volume(million tons) for dry bulk in Scenario 2

Table 7-42. Change in onateral trace volume (minion tons) for	Change	ounic i	ימו ומו	1101 221	me (mm	300	2	1 y 0 u	ary vain in occitario	Cirai	1							
Countries	AUS/NZ Brazil	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan	TDC	ME	Nigeria	Russia	SIDS	UK	USA	ROAF	ROA	ROE	RONA	ROSA
AUS/NZ	7,0-	-2,0	-507,7	-10,5	-14,8	-105,1	9,0-	-1,5	-0,5	0,0	-0,3	-0,7	0,0	-0,7	-61,7	-2,1	-0,1	-1,3
Brazil	-0,3	0,0	-138,7	-18,3	-1,1	-20,9	-0,7	-5,7	0,0	0,0	-2,1	-1,1	-2,6	-0,7	-11,3	-3,4	6,0-	-3,8
EU-27	-0,1	-0,5	-3,5	-50,6	-0,1	-0,1	7,0-	-4,9	-2,6	-0,3	-0,2	-4,0	-1,2	-2,1	-2,4	-2,5	-0,4	-0,5
Indonesia	0,0	0,0	-16,2	9,0-	0,0	-6,1	-0,4	0,0	0,0	0,0	-0,1	0,0	-0,1	0,0	-30,3	0,0	0,0	0,0
Russia	0,0	-1,9	-24,3	-19,8	-1,4	-9,3	-1,8	7,4-	-1,9	0,0	0,0	-1,9	-0,2	-2,8	-21,1	-13,7	-0,5	-0,4
nsa	-1,3	-6,5	-42,5	-25,8	-1,2	-28,7	9,0-	-2,2	-2,1	0,0	-1,8	-2,3	0,0	-3,3	-26,7	-4,1	-38,2	-10,0
ROAF	0,0	-0,5	-17,7	6.7-	-0,1	-2,5	9,0-	9,0-	-0,1	0,0	-0,3	-0,4	-0,1	-0,4	-18,8	-0,7	0,0	0,0
ROA	-1,6	-0,3	-19,1	-4,0	-4,3	-1,8	4,2	8,6-	0,0	-0,3	-1,2	-1,0	-2,6	-4,3	-6,1	-0,3	-0,4	-0,1
RONA	0,0	8,0-	-20,9	-17,5	-2,1	8.6-	-0,1	8,0-	-1,1	0,0	-0,5	-2,3	-7,4	-1,1	6,6-	9,0-	-1,1	-3,9
ROSA	0,0	-5,9	-13,4	-5,3	-0,7	-1,3	-0,4	-1,0	-0,2	0,0	-0,5	-0,5	-1,3	-0,5	-4,7	-3,6	-1,3	-4,3

Source: Calculated by author based on data from model and World Bank

Table 7-43: Change in bilateral trade volume(million tons) for dry bulk in Scenario 3

AUSINZ -0.8 -2.5 -489,7 -12,1 -15,2 -105,9 -0,7 -1,7 -0,2 0,0 -0,3 -0,8 -0,0 -0,3 -0,3 -0,8 -0,9 -0,9 -0,2 -1,5 -1,5 -15,1 -15,2 -105,9 -0,7 -1,7 -0,2 0,0 -0,3 -0,8 -0,8 -0,9 -0,2 -1,5			
Brazil China EU-27 Indonesia Japan LDC ME Nigeria Russia SIDS UK USA ROAF ROA ROE RO -2,5 489,7 -12,1 -15,2 105,9 -0,7 -1,7 -0,2 0,0 -0,3 -0,8 0,0 -0,8 -93,5 -2,4		ROSA	-1,5
Brazil China EU-27 Indonesia Japan LDC ME Nigeria Russia SIDS UK USA ROAF ROA R -2,5 489,7 -12,1 -15,2 -105,9 -0,7 -1,7 -0,2 0,0 -0,3 -0,8 0,0 -0,8 -93,5		RONA	
Brazil China EU-27 Indonesia Japan LDC ME Nigeria Russia SIDS UK USA ROAF 1 -2,5 489,7 -12,1 -15,2 105,9 -0,7 -1,7 -0,2 0,0 -0,3 -0,8 -0,8		ROE	-2,4
Brazil China EU-27 Indonesia Japan LDC ME Nigeria Russia SIDS UK USA RO -2,5 489,7 -12,1 -15,2 -105,9 -0,7 -1,7 -0,2 0,0 -0,3 -0,8 0,0		ROA	-93,5
Brazil China EU-27 Indonesia Japan LDC ME Nigeria Russia SIDS UK U -2,5 489,7 -12,1 -15,2 105,9 -0,7 -1,7 -0,2 0,0 -0,3 -0,8		ROAF	8′0-
Brazil China EU-27 Indonesia Japan LDC ME Nigeria Russia SIDS -2,5 489,7 -12,1 -15,2 105,9 -0,7 -1,7 -0,2 0,0 -0,3		NSA	0'0
Brazil China EU-27 Indonesia Japan LDC ME Nigeria Russia S -2,5 489,7 -12,1 -15,2 -105,9 -0,7 -1,7 -0,2 0,0		UK	8′0-
Brazil China EU-27 Indonesia Jap -2,5 -489,7 -12,1 -15,2 -10	,	SIDS	-0,3
Brazil China EU-27 Indonesia Jap -2,5 -489,7 -12,1 -15,2 -10	cuano		0'0
Brazil China EU-27 Indonesia Jap -2,5 -489,7 -12,1 -15,2 -10	און או	Nigeria	-0,2
Brazil China EU-27 Indonesia Jap -2,5 -489,7 -12,1 -15,2 -10	17 04	ME	-1,7
Brazil China EU-27 Indonesia Jap -2,5 -489,7 -12,1 -15,2 -10	2000	TDC	L'0-
Brazil China EU-27 Indon -2,5 489,7 -12,1	SHOT III	Japan	-105,9
Brazil China E -2,5 -489,7	me mm	Indonesia	-15,2
Brazil	מכ גמוו	EU-27	-12,1
Brazil	ומו וומ	China	-489,7
Countries AUS/NZ AUS/NZ AUS/NZ -0,8	onna	Brazil	-2,5
Countries AUS/NZ	Change	AUS/NZ	8′0-
	1401E / -+3.	Countries	AUS/NZ

Source: Calculated by author based on data from model and World Bank

Table /-44: Change in bilateral trade volume('000 1EU) for containers in Scenario 1	1: Chang	șe in b	laterai	trade 1	g.)əmnloc	100 TE	U) for	contai	ners in	Scenai	io I							
Countries	Aus/NZ	Brazil China	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan	TDC	ME	Nigeria	Russia	SIDS	UK	NSA	ROAF	ROA	ROE	RONA	ROSA
EU-27	-61,7	42,2	42,2 -354,0	-2858,6	-14,3	-105,4	-14,8	-119,2	9'9-	9,09-	-55,7	-365,7	-636,1	-62,7	8,661-	-107,3	-129,7	-41,4
China	9,66-	49,5	0,0	-762,5	-66,2	-221,5	-26,4	-88,1	-12,9	-59,1	-58,7	-104,5	-675,8	-28,3	-389,1	-56,5	-204,0	-67,5
ROA	-46,4	-18,7	-537,0	-342,5	-40,5	-126,3	-21,5	-74,0	-5,7	-21,3	-78,1	-39,1	-484,4	-14,7	-216,4	-29,6	7,76-	-17,2
USA	-35,7	-29,3	-172,8	-344,1	9,6-	-78,1	-2,9	43,8	-2,1	-14,6	-53,8	-65,3	0,0	9,6-	-134,6	-22,0	-390,1	-37,4
RONA	-6,8	-8,4	-47,9	0,67-	-1,9	-20,0	5,0-	-6,3	-0,2	-2,1	-6,3	-20,2	-643,1	-1,6	-18,1	-6,5	-57,4	-15,7
Japan	-21,4	-5,2	-246,3	-120,3	-21,4	0,0	-3,4	-24,4	-0,4	6,6-	-26,5	-15,2	-171,7	4,1	-164,5	-8,1	-35,7	-7,0
UK	-7,8	-2,7	-23,2	-220,9	-1,3	7,6-	-1,2	-15,4	6,0-	4,7	9,6-	0,0	-68,2	-5,4	-21,4	-14,8	-9,1	-2,4
ME	-2,9	4,5	-46,1	-46,9	-3,4	-4,9	4,	-35,8	-1,4	-2,8	-11,7	-5,4	-40,9	-5,6	-62,0	-23,3	4,4-	-1,9
ROSA	-2,1	-17,7	-75,3	-43,7	-2,3	-12,6	-0,3	-4,9	-0,2	4,3	-1,2	-3,6	-39,6	-1,4	-20,9	-4,0	-15,2	-21,4

Calculated by author based on data from model and Clarkson's research

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Table 7-45: Change in bilateral trade volume ('000 TEU) for containers in Scenario 2

Table 7 15: Change in chance at the control of the	3	2 2 2	20121	2227) America	77 00	20/10	Contra	11 6121	occura.	1							
Countries	Aus/NZ	Brazil	China	EU-27	Indonesia	Japan	TDC	ME	Nigeria	Russia	SIDS	UK	NSA	ROAF	ROA	ROE	RONA	ROSA
EU-27	7,65-	-39,7	-343,4	-3011,7	-13,5	-102,6	-14,1	-115,3	-6,3	-58,7	-53,3	-361,4	-634,6	-60,4	-193,3	-104,5	-126,5	-39,9
China	-100,0	45,9	0,0	-782,7	-66,3	-223,3	-25,8	-87,8	-12,3	-58,5	-58,4	-104,0	6,069-	-27,7	-393,6	-56,2	-204,6	-66,4
ROA	-46,5	-17,9	-547,2	-348,0	-40,6	-126,9	-21,4	-74,2	5,5-	-21,2	6,77-	-39,1	-492,3	-14,6	-218,2	-29,5	-97,1	-16,8
USA	-35,9	-28,9	-173,5	-350,7	9,6-	-78,4	-2,8	43,7	-2,1	-14,5	-53,0	-65,6	0,0	-9,5	-134,0	-22,0	-397,6	-37,5
RONA	8,9-	-8,2	-47,4	-79,3	-1,8	-19,9	-0,5	-6,5	-0,2	-2,1	-6,2	-20,2	-656,1	-1,6	-17,6	-6,4	-57,4	-15,6
Japan	-21,6	4,9	-249,7	-121,9	-21,6	0,0	-3,3	-24,5	-0,4	6,6-	-26,5	-15,3	-173,4	-4,0	-165,9	-8,1	-35,9	-7,0
UK	6,7-	-2,6	-22,9	-224,7	-1,3	2.6-	-1,2	-15,4	6'0-	4,7	9,6-	0,0	-68,7	-5,4	-21,3	-14,9	-9,2	-2,4
ME	-3,0	4,5	-46,4	-47,5	-3,5	-5,0	4,1	-36,1	-1,3	-2,8	-11,7	-5,5	-41,3	-5,6	-62,6	-23,4	4,4-	-1,8
ROSA	-2,1	-17,8	-75,9	-44,3	-2,3	-12,6	-0,3	8,4-	-0,2	4,3	-1,2	-3,7	-40,1	-1,4	-20,6	-4,0	-15,3	-21,7
,	:			,		,												

Calculated by author based on data from model and Clarkson's research

Table 7-46: Change in bilateral trade volume ('000 TEU) for containers in Scenario 3

	ROSA	-40,9	-67,1	-17,0	-37,4	-15,7	-7,0	-2,4	-1,9	-21,5
table 7-40. Change in bliateral trade volume (000 1EO) for containers in scenario 3	RONA	-128,5	-204,2	-97,5	-392,7	-57,4	-35,7	-9,2	4,4	-15,2
	ROE	-106,3	-56,4	-29,5	-22,0	-6,5	-8,1	-14,8	-23,3	-4,0
	ROA	-197,5	-390,6	-217,0	-134,4	-17,9	-165,0	-21,4	-62,2	-20,8
	ROAF	-619	-28,1	-14,6	9,6-	-1,6	4,1	-5,4	-5,6	-1,4
	NSA	-635,2	-681,0	-487,0	0,0	-647,6	-172,3	-68,4	-41,1	-39,8
	UK	-364,0	-104,3	-39,1	-65,4	-20,2	-15,3	0,0	-5,5	-3,6
	SIIDS	-54,9	-58,6	-78,0	-53,5	-6,3	-26,5	9,6-	-11,7	-1,2
	Russia	6,65-	-58,9	-21,3	-14,6	-2,1	6.6-	4,7	-2,8	4,3
	Nigeria	-6,5	-12,7	-5,6	-2,1	-0,2	-0,4	6'0-	-1,3	-0,2
	ME	-117,8	-88,0	-74,0	43,7	-6,3	-24,4	-15,4	-35,9	-4,9
	TDC	-14,5	-26,2	-21,5	-2,9	5,0-	-3,4	-1,2	4,1	-0,3
	Japan	-104,4	-222,1	-126,4	-78,2	-20,0	0,0	7.6-	-4,9	-12,6
	Indonesia	-14,0	-66,2	-40,5	9.6-	-1,9	-21,5	-1,3	-3,5	-2,3
	EU-27	-2913,1	-769,4	-344,4	-346,4	-79,1	-120,9	-222,2	-47,2	-43,9
	China	-350,2	0,0	-540,5	-173,0	-47,8	-247,4	-23,1	-46,2	-75,5
	Brazil	41,3	48,3	-18,4	-29,2	6,8-	-5,1	-2,7	4,5	-17,7
	Aus/NZ Brazil	-61,0	7,66-	-46,4	-35,8	-6,8	-21,5	-7,8	-2,9	-2,1
1401c / -40	Countries	EU-27	China	ROA	nsa	RONA	Japan	UK	ME	ROSA

Calculated by author based on data from model and Clarkson's research