# THE BACKSTAGE OF AMERICAN HUMANITARIANISM

American politicised humanitarianism in Iraq, 2003-2009

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1. Introduction.

"The U.S. government also refused to acknowledge that it was preparing for assistance and development tasks, until the Bush administration established the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance within the Office of the Secretary of Defense in February."[1] This is a statement written by Taylor Seabolt for the United States Institute of Peace. As stated in this quote, the humanitarian sector was actively involved during the preparation for the invasion of Iraq. For the humanitarian sector this was a new phenomenon. Normally humanitarians react on emergencies and offer short-term relief. This time the humanitarian sector was consulted before an actual emergency arose. Alongside American intelligence, the humanitarian sector could help create a strategy for after the US-led invasion of Iraq.[2]

US humanitarianism and humanitarianism in general, have a long history.[3] Humanitarianism itself is a broad concept with a positive connotation, it is a tradition that is rooted in religion and is often associated with acts of kindness and being forgiving and tolerant.[4] Humanitarians took pride in being apolitical, they were just involved with bringing relief to those in need. Classical humanitarianism was in a way a holistic and mystic practice and humanitarian practice was based on a set of almost sacred principles neutrality, impartiality, and independence.[5] But times have changed and so did humanitarianism.

Because of the changes in humanitarianism over time, did the distinction between long-term development and humanitarianism started to blur and politics started to find a way into humanitarian practice.[6] Where humanitarianism used to be the self-declared opposite of politics, the two did become intertwined.[7] Even though this process started in the 1990s, the

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[1] 'Humanitarian Responses to a War in Iraq', United States Institute of Peace, accessed 24 March 2022, https://www.usip.org/publications/2003/03/humanitarian-responses-war-iraq.

[2] Graig Calhoun, 'The Idea of Emergency Humanitarian Action and Global (Dis)Order. Ed. Didier Fassin and Mariella Pandolfi', in *Contemporary States of Emergency: The Politics of Military and Humanitarian Interventions.* (New York: Zone books, 2010), 18.

[3] Amanda B. Moniz, *From Empire to Humanity: The American Revolution and the Origins of Humanitarianism* (Oxford University Press, 2016), 1–3; Dorothea Hilhorst, 'Classical Humanitarianism and Resilience Humanitarianism: Making Sense of Two Brands of Humanitarian Action', *Journal of International Humanitarian Action* 3, no. 1 (December 2018): 3, https://doi.org/10.1186/s41018-018-0043-6.

[4] Mark Cutts, 'POLITICS AND HUMANITARIANISM', *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 17, no. 1 (1998): 3–4.

[5] Kurt Mills, 'Neo-Humanitarianism: The Role of International Humanitarian Norms and Organizations in Contemporary Conflict', *Global Governance* 11, no. 2 (2005): 161–83.

[6] Marie Michèle Grenon, 'Cuban Internationalism and Contemporary Humanitarianism: History, Comparison and Perspectives', *International Journal of Cuban Studies* 8, no. 2 (2016): 206, https://doi.org/10.13169/intejcubastud.8.2.0200.

[7] David Rieff, 'Humanitarianism in Crisis', *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 6 (2002): 112, https://doi.org/10.2307/20033348.

events of 9/11 is seen as a watershed moment in the humanitarian tradition.[8] This transformation calls the neutrality, impartiality, and independence of humanitarianism, the core principles, and the foundation of humanitarianism into question.[9] This is not directly a symptom of the post-9/11 world, but the post- 9/11 world does present challenges to the core principles of humanitarianism.[10]

These changes can also be identified in US humanitarianism since 2001. Since 9/11 US foreign policy renewed its focus on national security.[11] As a result the integration between the US government assistance and the US Department of State increased. Despite US commitments that stated that the humanitarian assistance should have stayed in place, the politicisation of US humanitarianism could be identified.[12] However, as this research will explain, identifying 9/11 as a watershed moment in American humanitarianism is too simplistic.

Just one and a half year after 9/11 the US invaded Iraq. President Bush forced a regime change to free the way for Iraq to become a democratic country. After that the US started with the humanitarian assistance in Iraq.[13] Until this day the USAID, United States Agency of International Development, has been present in Iraq providing humanitarian assistance in a variety of ways. The USAID is an independent organisation within the Pentagon that oversees the humanitarian and reconstruction coordination of the US. The organisation has a multitude of tasks that vary from dividing funding for NGOs to initiating their own campaigns. The humanitarian programs of the USAID strive to provide humanitarian assistance before, during, and after a crisis.[14] This is including emergency responses and non-emergency responses. These non-emergency programs were the start of short-term humanitarian assistance programs intertwining with long-term development programs. This was the case in Iraq. After the war, a link between humanitarian assistance and long-term development programs was made. Since neutrality in American humanitarian

[8] Dennis Dijkzeul and Kristin Bergtora Sandvik, 'A World in Turmoil: Governing Risk, Establishing Order in Humanitarian Crises', *Disasters* 43, no. S2 (2019): S85–108, https://doi.org/10.1111/disa.12330.

[9] Thomas G. Weiss, 'Humanitarianisms Contested Culture in War Zones 1', in *Humanitarianism and Challenges of Cooperation* (Routledge, 2016), 17.

[10] Barbara Ann Rieffer-Flanagan, 'Is Neutral Humanitarianism Dead? Red Cross Neutrality: Walking the Tightrope of Neutral Humanitarianism', *Human Rights Quarterly* 31, no. 4 (2009): 890.

[11] Kent M. Bolton, 'Introduction', in *US National Security and Foreign Policymaking After 9/11: Present and the Recreation.* (Rowm & Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 1–2.

[12] Rob Kevlihan, Karl Derouen, and Glen Biglaiser, 'Is US Humanitarian Aid Based Primarily on Need or Self-Interest?', *International Studies Quarterly* 58, no. 4 (2014): 840.

[13] 'History | Iraq | U.S. Agency for International Development', 22 June 2021, https://www.usaid.gov/iraq/history.

[14] 'Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA)', 5 March 2021, https://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/organization/bureaus/bureau-humanitarian-assistance.

practice no longer exists, questions arise about US humanitarian campaigns. How did politicised US humanitarianism play a role in the rebuilding of Iraq in the period 2003-2009?

In the past two decades, a lot of attention went out to the future of humanitarianism. The changes in the world challenged humanitarian practice. These changes are rooted in the last decade of the twentieth century and became more evident after 9/11. In 2016 the World Humanitarian summit discussed the transformation of humanitarianism and the problems it has faced until then.[15] When looking back at the period after the regime change in Iraq, the transformation of humanitarianism was in full swing. That is why it is of value to look at the humanitarian practice in Iraq while keeping these transformations in mind. Also, the change of humanitarianism is a highly debated topic, and Iraq is often mentioned in these debates. Therefore, a historical case study will add to this debate. Furthermore, scholars Isabelle Desportes, Hone Mandefro and Dorothea Hilhorst, call for more research on the politicisation of humanitarianism in areas with conflict, low-intensity conflict, or authoritarian regimes.[16] Humanitarianism has become more and more part of public relations.[17] The media covers everything, and a big part of donations comes from civil society.

1.2   Literature.

During the last twenty years, humanitarianism in general was a highly debated topic. The concept humanitarianism knows many definitions, but almost all of them have in common that they emphasise the core principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence. The following section will give an overview of the important debates in the field of humanitarianism and will mention some of the important scholars in the field. Humanitarianism is an overarching term that aims to describe the worldviews, aspirations, actions, and vocabulary to declare the accepted decency of humankind. Humanitarianism as a global value returns in all cultures and societies and acts regardless of race, gender, nationality, religion, political beliefs, and other circumstances.[18] To understand humanitarianism it is important to know the history behind it. In religions, humanitarian

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[15] 'Agenda for Humanity', Agenda for Humanity, accessed 29 January 2022, https://agendaforhumanity.org/summit.html.d

[16] Isabelle Desportes, Hone Mandefro, and Dorothea Hilhorst, 'The Humanitarian Theatre: Drought Response during Ethiopia's Low-Intensity Conflict of 2016', *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 57, no. 1 (March 2019): 56, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X18000654.

[17] Dijkzeul and Sandvik, 'A World in Turmoil', 86–87.

[18] Roberto Belloni, 'The Trouble with Humanitarianism', *Review of International Studies* 33, no. 3 (2007): 451.

impulses have always existed through compassion and solidarity towards those in need. There are different traditions in classical humanitarian practice.

The first is the Dunantist humanitarian tradition, a form of humanitarianism rooted in the efforts of Swiss businessman Henry Dunant. After Dunant witnessed the 1859 Battle of Solferino, he started lobbying for the recognition of the humanitarian principles by international law. He did this at the 1864 Geneva Convention, the first attempt to differentiate between the lawful and unlawful conduct of war. As a result, the Geneva Convention gave the International Committee of the Red Cross the role of ensuring the humanitarian rules in a time of war. The Red Cross was guided by the core humanitarian principles which are mentioned before.[19] This type of humanitarianism was free from political motivations and/or discrimination of any kind.[20] According to Graig Calhoun, exceptionalism is a very important aspect of Dunanist humanitarianism, perhaps even more important than the core principles. Humanitarian assistance reacts to some form of crisis or emergency, an exception to the normal situation. Because classical humanitarianism makes a clear distinction between crisis and normality, it can offer aid during short-term operations reacting to crises.[21]

The second is the Wilsonian humanitarian tradition. This humanitarian tradition is in line with the thoughts of Woodrow Wilson, in which he states that liberated individuals and peace were conceivable by changing political, economic, and cultural structures. From a Dunantist point of view, the Wilsonian wish to change underlying structures and causes of emergencies is political.[22] Wilsonian humanitarians themselves argue their approach is apolitical, they act in agreement with universal values and leave partisan politics for what it is.[23] This thesis will address the Wilsonian tradition and the importance of this tradition in American humanitarianism, also in the case of Iraq.

Where both Dunantist and Wilsonian humanitarianism have their origins in religion, these traditions are not particularly faith-based religions. Next to these two traditions of humanitarianism, the Christian tradition and the Islamic tradition of humanitarianism, these humanitarian traditions can be identified as faith-based humanitarianism. Faith-based humanitarianism includes different kinds of religious traditions and communities. Faith-based

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[19] Belloni, 'The Trouble with Humanitarianism', 452–53.

[20] Hilhorst, 'Classical Humanitarianism and Resilience Humanitarianism', 3.

[21] Graig Calhoun, 'The Idea of Emergency Humanitarian Action and Global (Dis)Order. Ed. Didier Fassin and Mariella Pandolfi', 724–25.

[22] Abby Stoddard, 'Humanitarian NGOs: Challenges and Trends', HPG Briefing (London: ODI: Overseas Development Institute, n.d.), 1.

[23] Michael Barnett, 'Humanitarianism Transformed', *Perspectives on Politics* 3, no. 4 (2005): 733–34.

humanitarianism is rooted in the idea that it is morally crucial to relieve physical suffering.[24] Although faith-based humanitarianism are prominent traditions in the humanitarian field the focus of this thesis is mainly on the Dunantist and the Wilsonian tradition, the faith-based traditions will not be addressed in an in-dept matter. This just showed how humanitarianism can differ within these different traditions.

Humanitarianism without politics, is it possible?

In the past, humanitarian agencies defined themselves in opposition to "politics". They recognized that humanitarianism came forward out of politics, that their activities had political consequences, and that they could not separate from the political world. [25] According to Daniel Warner this clear distinction between humanitarianism stems from realist tradition. In traditional realist view, politics is dirty. In the same realist tradition, humanitarianism offers relief in a world full of war and trouble. Humanitarianism must therefore be kept separate from politics.[26] Next to this, humanitarianism's original principles were born in a reaction to politics. By staying impartial, neutral, and independent humanitarian agencies were able to provide relief for those in need, independent from the demands of politics. Accordingly, humanitarian agencies did not accept or limit funding from governments or donors who had a stake in the outcomes of their activities.[27] Not all scholars agree with this. Cornelio Sommaruga argues that it would be naïve to state that humanitarian agencies in the past were free from political and economic influences. He agrees humanitarians have always insisted upon a clear distinction between politics and humanitarianism, but he states that the actions showed that humanitarians did not place themselves opposed to politics. Sommaruga gives two reasons why cooperation between politics and humanitarianism exists. First, states acknowledged humanitarian laws during the Geneva Conventions, when acknowledging these laws, states also pledged their respect for the humanitarian laws. Second, because they pledged to respect humanitarian laws, states opted for a humanitarian component in political action. States were committed to humanitarianism through financial, material, and diplomatic support for humanitarian agencies. Sommaruga did not say this is problematic, he just implied

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[24] Jonathan C. Agensky, 'Dr Livingstone, I Presume? Evangelicals, Africa and Faith-Based Humanitarianism', *Global Society* 27, no. 4 (1 October 2013): 457, https://doi.org/10.1080/13600826.2013.823916.

[25] Barnett, 'Humanitarianism Transformed', 724–25.

[26] Daniel Warner, 'The Politics of the Political/Humanitarian Divide', *International Review of the Red Cross* 81, no. 833 (March 1999): 110–11, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1560775500092397.

[27] Anna Khakee, 'Humanitarian Action in International Relations: Power and Politics', in *International Humanitarian Action. Ed. Hans-Joachim Heintze and Pierre Thielbörger.* (NOHA Textbook, 2018), 19.

that seeing classical humanitarianism completely opposed to politics is naïve.[28] To analyse the politicisation of humanitarianism it is important to emphasise that humanitarianism came forward out of politics.

The world changed and so did humanitarianism.

During the Cold War, the fear of communism has been an incentive for humanitarian campaigns all over the world. With the end of the Cold War it was also the end of the fear of communism. Humanitarianism became a pawn in a game played by states. States used humanitarians to show the world that they would respond to conflicts that were happening in the forgotten corners of the world. For example, the world sat by and watched the genocide in Rwanda happen. The media focused on other events in the area and the international community stirred away from calling the atrocities a genocide so they could withhold intervention.[29] Afterwards, when all the terrible events already happened, the world started sending humanitarian assistance in 1995. Rwanda was seen as a lost cause and received the least amount of money in foreign assistance in health assistance.[30]

Scholars are divided on the question of, is the politicisation of humanitarianism a bad thing or if it could be helpful? Barnett and Mills argue that the politicisation of humanitarianism was not a choice made by humanitarians themselves, it was thrust upon them by states. Many humanitarian organisations did fear the loss of their principles, but this does not mean all humanitarians were against broadening their operations. Some saw it as an opportunity to not only help those in need in times of emergency but also to eliminate the starting problems of a conflict. As a result, goals, and practices closely related to classical humanitarianism have become part of so-called neo-humanitarianism or new humanitarianism.[31] Rachel Poffley for instance sees two problems with the loss of the core principles, especially the loss of neutrality. The first problem he identifies is that the loss of neutrality risks the ability to access those in need. When humanitarians are tied to

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[28] Cornelio Sommaruga, 'Humanity: Our Priority Now and Always: Response to "Principles, Politics, and Humanitarian Action"', *Ethics & International Affairs* 13, no. 1 (1999): 24–25, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7093.1999.tb00323.x.

[29] Ibrahim Seaga Shaw, 'Historical Frames and the Politics of Humanitarian Intervention: From Ethiopia, Somalia to Rwanda', *Globalisation, Societies and Education* 5, no. 3 (November 2007): 365, https://doi.org/10.1080/14767720701662071.

[30] Agnes Binagwaho et al., 'Rwanda 20 Years on: Investing in Life', *The Lancet* 384, no. 9940 (26 July 2014): 371, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(14)60574-2.

[31] Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss, '1. Humanitarianism: A Brief History of the Present', in *1. Humanitarianism: A Brief History of the Present* (Cornell University Press, 2011), 2–4, https://doi.org/10.7591/9780801461538-003.

governments this means that they do not act neutral. This can have implications for accessing all the victims because when their actions are tied to a government, they are evidently acting on one side of the conflict. The second problem Poffley sees is that when humanitarians try to eliminate the starting problems of conflict, this means humanitarians need to choose a side. This decision is more difficult than it seems because it implies that there is a right decision to be made. In conflict situations, someone can be one of the people in need but also responsible for atrocities.[32] A good example of this is the hesitation of Western countries to deliver humanitarian assistance to Serbia. Western governments were afraid humanitarian assistance would indirectly support the Milošević regime during the war, in the nineteen nineties. However, there were many Serbian people in need of humanitarian aid.[33] This shows it is difficult to decide whether it is righteous to act when humanitarians have lost their neutrality.

Where Barnett, Mills and Poffley have been critical on the transformations of humanitarianism Fiona Fox was relatively more positive about the development of new humanitarianism. New humanitarianism breaks with the apolitical and neutral stance of classical humanitarianism and argues it is ignorant and morally dubious. A new approach has become dominant, the right-based approach. By using a right-based approach, humanitarian assistance can work on long-term development. Just offering short-term relief is now seen as outmoded. Fox introduces the concept of goal orientated humanitarianism. Instead of just saving lives in times of crisis, goal-orientated humanitarianism pays attention to the effects of offering short-term relief on long-term developments.[34] At the World Humanitarian Summit, renewed attention was given to the fact that humanitarianism alone is not enough to help the people in the most defenceless areas in the world.[35] Long-term development and conflict prevention should be part of the humanitarian practice. Fox already predicted this would be the future of humanitarianism in 2001.[36]

To provide some evidence for the intertwining of politics and humanitarianism, and to show some way in which this can occur, the following section will give some examples. Humanitarian aid in Ethiopia after the country experienced flooding in 2016. The political

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[32] Rachel Poffley, 'The Dilemma of Neutrality: To What Extent Can Humanitarian Assistance Be Combined with Efforts to Promote Development?', *Medicine, Conflict and Survival* 28, no. 2 (2012): 115–16.
[33] Devon Curtis, *Politics and Humanitarian Aid: Debates, Dilemmas and Dissension*, HPG Report, no. 10 (London: Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute, 2001), 10.
[34] Fiona Fox, 'New Humanitarianism: Does It Provide a Moral Banner for the 21st Century?', *Disasters* 25, no. 4 (2001): 276–79, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-7717.00178.
[35] Jon Harald Sande Lie, 'The Humanitarian-Development Nexus: Humanitarian Principles, Practice, and Pragmatics', *Journal of International Humanitarian Action* 5, no. 1 (December 2020): 2–3, https://doi.org/10.1186/s41018-020-00086-0.
[36] Fox, 'New Humanitarianism', 275.

aspect of it was hidden in the programs of the humanitarian organisation. During the relief actions, it became clear that humanitarian relief operations have two sides, the frontstage, and the backstage. The front stage is where the relief response is shown. The backstage shows how these operations operate, this is where the hidden agendas, that represent the values and interests of the actors, come to play.[37] During a period of political unrest in Ethiopia, there was an inconsistency between the front stage and the backstage. At the front stage aid workers worked on an adequate humanitarian response. At the backstage it was not the humanitarian response that was the most important. The backstage was occupied with the domination of the state on information and decision making, politicised humanitarian assistance, and the outcome of the political unrest.[38] This case study relates to this research because it shows the two sides of humanitarian practice. The front stage presents the humanitarian practice itself; this can be health care, food, or education programs. The backstage relates to the bigger political agendas that represent other interests than just emergency relief. And, in the case of Ethiopia, there was political unrest, which can be explained as limited statehood. In the case of Iraq there was also limited statehood after the American invasion.

Another example is the humanitarian response after the floods in Pakistan in 2010. The country suffered from a scarcity of food, and houses, schools, and hospitals were destroyed by the water, and a lot of the country's infrastructure was destroyed. Next to this, the flood contributed to pre-existing social problems in Pakistan which resulted in social unrest. Simply said, help was much needed. A big part of the rebuilding was done by local communities, the international humanitarian organisations only assisted the local aid programs. To be able to do this communication was important. Transparency was needed to make sure international aid was not misused. The local community is involved with the rebuilding process of the country. This shows that aid is not just one-sided and local communities can play a part in this practice too.[39] As this thesis will explain, Iraq was after the US-led invasion a highly politicised country in which local actors should not be taken out of the equation.

Furthermore, a part of the transformation of humanitarianism was the integration with the military. In Afghanistan aid was delivered by NATO forces and in Yemen USAID

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[37] Desportes, Mandefro, and Hilhorst, 'The Humanitarian Theatre', 31–38.
[38] Desportes, Mandefro, and Hilhorst, 'The Humanitarian Theatre', 55.
[39] Tatsushi Arai, 'Rebuilding Pakistan in the Aftermath of the Floods: Disaster Relief as Conflict Prevention', *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 7, no. 1 (1 May 2012): 56–63, https://doi.org/10.1080/15423166.2012.719331.

contract show that cooperation between USAID and the Department of Defense was likely.[40] The growing involvement of the military in humanitarian aid was not appreciated by humanitarian organisations. According to Sarah Kenyon Lischer, conflicts often lead to the misuse of aid and to attacks on aid workers. The lines are blurred, civilians are often part of the conflicts, and this makes it difficult to decide who is the victim and who is the perpetrator. Before, humanitarians were used the work on the side-lines of a conflict, the cooperation between humanitarian and the military made it possible for humanitarians to go to the midst of the conflict to provide aid.[41]

An ideology, a profession, and a movement; structures that underlie the humanitarian practice.

Since many humanitarian aid organisations have broadened their scope and included long-term development, reconstruction after conflict, practices of peacebuilding, and human rights, they see together with human rights agencies that their practices became part of discussion. Where does humanitarian aid end and where do human rights start. That the practices of humanitarianism and human rights overlap are not because human rights started to offer humanitarian relief it is because humanitarianism changed. This is where donors, again, play an important role in the aid offered by humanitarian organisations. Important donors started to prioritise by post-conflict rebuilding and the integration of a right-based approach.[42] Human rights and humanitarianism used to have a completely different view on politics. In their nature, human rights see themselves as apolitical, but the spread of human rights needs acceptance of politics in their practices. As said earlier, being apolitical is important for humanitarians, it's a part of their identity. But humanitarianism has gotten more engaged with human rights, thus gotten more intertwined with politics.[43]

Donini identifies meta functions in humanitarianism. These meta functions are defined as an ideology, a movement, and a profession, and underlay the humanitarian practice in the twenty-first century. He makes a distinction between the macro, meso, and micro functions of humanitarianism.[44] Donini sees humanitarianism as an ideology, a movement, a profession,

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[40] Mike Lewis, *Whose Aid Is It Anyway?: Politicizing Aid in Conflicts and Crises* (Oxfam, 2011), 20.

[41] Sarah Kenyan Lischer, 'Military Intervention and the Humanitarian Force Multiplier', *Global Governance* 13, no. 1 (2007): 100–101.

[42] Michael Barnett, 'Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and the Practices of Humanity', *International Theory* 10, no. 3 (November 2018): 325–26, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971918000118.

[43] Barnett, 'Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and the Practices of Humanity', 333–35.

[44] Antonio Donini, 'The Far Side: The Meta Functions of Humanitarianism in a Globalised World', *Disasters* 34 Suppl 2 (1 April 2010): 221–22, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7717.2010.01155.x.

and a sympathetic pursuit to help those in need by providing aid and protection. Next to this he defines humanitarianism as a set of institutions, a business, and an industry. Since the Cold War humanitarianism has shown an impressive global extension. [45] For this research especially the macro functions and meso functions will help analyse US humanitarianism. Macro functions are defined as the underlying structures and values that relate to the big picture of humanitarian action. Therefore, humanitarian action is a tool to spread Western ideas, values, modes of behaviour, forms of organisation, food, clothing and shapes the relationship between those who help and those who need the help.[46]

The Western influence in the existing humanitarian system is far reaching. The important NGOs all have Western origins. The humanitarian practice itself is not necessarily Western but the international field of humanitarian practice is dominated by Western humanitarianism. There is a debate about the effect of these underlying structures on humanitarian involvement. Some scholars say that the Western dominance in humanitarianism does not play a role, because humanitarians obey to universally acknowledged humanitarian and human rights laws. Others see the Western dominance as more problematic because the humanitarian practice resembles parts of the colonial and post-colonial period. In which there is an unequal power relation.[47] Humanitarian agencies often use pre-existing strategies in case of emergencies. These emergencies give the opportunity for those strategies based on democratic values to implement political models and good governance practices.[48] Meso functions relate to the political economy of humanitarianism and its links to globalisation and world order. Meso functions are important for this research because it relates to the fact that humanitarian organisations are not neutral but are part of governance or even government. This makes it possible for NGOs to fulfil an important role in shaping public opinion and government policy. Because of this, we can define humanitarianism as a form of power.[49] Del Valle adds on to this, that states who receive humanitarian aid often try to refuse some humanitarian agencies or try to stir their aid in a way it meets their own economic and social goals.[50] This again shows the delicate position of humanitarian assistance and the fact that it is hard for them to act out of neutrality.

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[45] Donini, 'The Far Side', 221.
[46] Donini, 'The Far Side',227–29.
[47] Anna Khakee, 'Humanitarian Action in International Relations: Power and Politics', 23–24.
[48] Grenon, 'Cuban Internationalism and Contemporary Humanitarianism', 209.
[49] Donini, 'The Far Side', 230–31.
[50] Hernan del Valle and Sean Healy, 'Humanitarian Agencies and Authoritarian States: A Symbiotic Relationship?', *Disasters* 37, no. s2 (2013): 198, https://doi.org/10.1111/disa.12021.

The broadening of humanitarian assistance; humanitarian governance.

The broadening of humanitarian assistance with social, political, and military aspects can be grasped under the concept of humanitarian governance. Humanitarian governance is a broadened concept of humanitarianism, the concept itself is more political than humanitarianism. It can include human rights, conflict resolution, emancipatory movements, and development cooperation.[51]

Barnett describes Humanitarian Governance as the self-conscious effort by the global community to relieve the suffering of those in need. This humanitarian order exists alongside the international security and economic order.[52] Political scientists studying Humanitarian Governance have been interested in how state and non-state actors produce cooperation and spread welfare. One of the things Barnett identifies is the amount of power humanitarians have, even though they work in name of the victims.[53] Barnett asks the question of who governs. Humanitarianism itself has become diverse and different kinds of state and non-state actors have become involved with humanitarian assistance. States use humanitarianism to further grow their global economic and political interest. It is important to acknowledge de diversity in humanitarianism because different parties might have ideas about the purpose of humanitarianism.[54] Because of the roots of humanitarianism, those stem from Western ideas and values, and the underlying aspect of humanitarianism is the aim for Western ideas and values. While humanitarianism aims for Western ideas and values, humanitarians do not have a neutral position either, they have pre-existing knowledge, ideas, and values. This shapes the relationship between the aid worker and those in need and gives the aid worker a position of power.[55]

1.3 Theory.

In this section will give and overview on the theory that will be used and why this theory is fitting for this research. Key concepts for are constructivism, transmitting values, the creation of norms.

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[51] Dijkzeul and Sandvik, 'A World in Turmoil', 86–87.
[52] Michael N. Barnett, 'Humanitarian Governance', *Annual Review of Political Science* 16, no. 1 (11 May 2013): 380, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-012512-083711.
[53] Barnett, 'Humanitarian Governance', 382.
[54] Barnett, 'Humanitarian Governance', 387.
[55] Anna Khakee, 'Humanitarian Action in International Relations: Power and Politics', 26–27.

This research will apply constructivism on the American humanitarian The underlying argument of constructivism is that behaviour, interests, and relationships are socially constructed. Therefore, actors that inhibit these social structures have the power to change them.[56] The values and ideas of these actors can impact international relations through norms, systems, and relationships.[57] This plays a proscribing role in the behaviour of states.[58]

Humanitarianism transmits values. Therefore, a humanitarian act could possibly influence ideas, values, and norms in a country where active.[59] A good example of a humanitarian response that did aim to transmit values and norms is Fidel Castro sending professionals, mostly healthcare but also educators, technicians, engineers, and specialists in other fields to third-world countries. The specialists were sent to serve as "missionaries for the Cuban revolution" and they had two important goals, to advance the economic goals of Castro's regime and to gain political influence abroad.[60] Providing aid in the host countries was an advertisement for socialism and helped strengthen the ties with the host countries.[61] As stated in the literature report, humanitarianism has become intertwined with politics and therefore became a part of international relations. Analysing norms could potentially give an inside into how and if, US political ideas and values have been transmitted through the American humanitarian enterprise.

A three-stage process in norm building, the emergence of norms, norm cascade, and the internalizing of norms, created by Finnemore and Sikkink, helps to explain the transmission of norms. Norms are the expectations of a group of actors to behave in a certain way that is in line with their identity. Norms are socially shared and accepted and have a constraining effect on how one behaves.[62] In their article Finnemore and Sikkink introduce the model on just states, but the model can also be used on non-state actors. For example, Andrea Scheiker uses the model to analyse the transmitting of norms in NGOs.[63] The first role in this cycle is played by norm entrepreneurs, they try to convince the majority of the

[56] Alex J. Bellamy, 'Humanitarian Responsibilities and Interventionist Claims in International Society', *Review of International Studies* 29, no. 3 (July 2003): 327, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210503003218.

[57] Edward Newman, 'Human Security and Constructivism', *International Studies Perspectives* 2, no. 3 (August 2001): 247, https://doi.org/10.1111/1528-3577.00055.

[58] Young Soo Kim, 'World Health Organization and Early Global Response to HIV/AIDS: Emergence and Development of International Norms', *Journal of International and Area Studies* 22, no. 1 (2015): 22.

[59] Donini, 'The Far Side', 227.

[60] Maria C Werlau, 'Cuba-Venezuala Health Diplomacy: The Politics of Humanitarianism', 2010, 143.

[61] Maria C. Werlau, 'Cuba's Health-Care Diplomacy: The Business of Humanitarianism', *World Affairs* 175, no. 6 (2013): 57.

[62] Makinda, 'Review Essay', 344.

[63] Andrea Schneiker, 'NGOs as Norm Takers: Insider–Outsider Networks as Translators of Norms', *International Studies Review* 19, no. 3 (1 September 2017): 381–82, https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viw041.

population and the norm leaders, to embrace the norms. During the second stage of the cycle, the norm leaders try to motivate others to become norm followers, the norm cascades through the rest of the population. The last phase is internalisation, the norm has become normal and is no longer part of the public debate.[64] This model is useful for this study because the activities of the American humanitarian enterprise enable to transmit values and promote norms. According to Finnemore and Sikking do all norm promoters at the international level need an organizational platform they can use to promote their norms.[65] Norms can be transmitted by different actors. First, there is from state actor to state actor. Overall, this form of norm transmitting means that a norm from one or more states becomes international normalized. The second form to transmit norms is through non-state actors. Non-state actors such as international organisations (IOs) and INGOs play a role in the diffusion of norms throughout the international system.[66] NGOs in developing countries often enjoy a lot of freedom to move.[67] NGOs promote norms, this makes them able to transmit norms and seek to normalise those norms.[68] NGOs are aware of the power they have, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), an influential humanitarian organisation established on the ideas of Henry Dunant, even tried to abide this political power. But the fact remains humanitarians have place of power, and this power can be used to transmit norms.[69]

1.4   Methodology.

This section will inform on the method used in this thesis and the sources that are used. The method that will be used to conduct this research is discourse analysis. Discourse Analysis is a method that focuses on patterns and processes in language and emphasizes the construction and deconstruction of meaning in a social and personal context. Therefore, Discourse Analysis is complementary to constructivist theory.[70] Fairclough argues 'discourse' can mean different things. First, discourse is an element of the social process. Second, discourse is the language used in a particular social domain. And last, discourse is a way of interpreting

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[64] Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 897, https://doi.org/10.1162/002081898550789.
[65] Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', 899.
[66] Susan Park, 'Theorizing Norm Diffusion Within International Organizations', *International Politics* 43, no. 3 (July 2006): 43, https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800149.
[67] Andy Storey, 'Non-Neutral Humanitarianism: Ngos and the Rwanda Crisis', *Development in Practice* 7, no. 4 (November 1997): 385–86, https://doi.org/10.1080/09614529754170.
[68] Schneiker, 'NGOs as Norm Takers', 383–84.
[69] Anna Khakee, 'Humanitarian Action in International Relations: Power and Politics', 26.
[70] Amir Lupovici, 'Constructivist Methods: A Plea and Manifesto for Pluralism', *Review of International Studies* 35, no. 1 (2009): 195.

aspects of the world associated with particular social perspectives.[71] Hodges defines 'discourse' as the idea that language is structured according to different patterns that people follow when taking part in different domains of social life for example 'political discourse' and 'humanitarian discourse'. In a simplified way, you could say discourse analysis analyses these patterns.[72] Discourse analysis is not just one approach but a group of approaches that are divided over different interdisciplinary domains. All these perspectives offer their own definition of 'discourse' and 'discourse analysis'. These different approaches come with different kinds of sources available to analyse.[73]

The approach that will be used for this research is critical discourse analysis. Critical discourse analysis recognises how discourse, as a historical, social, and cultural component, is used to construct and conceal power relations.[74] This approach is critical because it shows the role of discourse in the production and maintenance of the social structure and reveals the unequal relations of power that exist. Critical discourse analysis draws a link between discursive practices and broader social and cultural developments and structures. It analyses how discourse in interpersonal conversation relates to institutions like law, economy, science, politics, and religion.[75] Thomas Lonsdale recently used critical discourse analysis to understand if and how Trump used the death of George Floyd as a campaigning tool. The death of George Floyd was followed by a period of riots. To understand these riots, Lonsdale used the discourse surrounding these riots. To create an overarching picture of the situation Lonsdale used news articles and tweets. In his conclusion Lonsdale says that the messages people write on the internet give a good insight in the situation. And by analysing those messages he could conclude that Trump did use race as part of a populist discourse.[76] This example shows discourse analysis is an approach that gives inside into complex social phenomena. Sources Critical Discourse Analysis uses can be as simple as a tweet, they still give inside to political facts. This research will not make use of tweets but does use for

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[71] Norman Fairclough, 'Critical Discourse Analysis and Critical Policy Studies', *Critical Policy Studies* 7, no. 2 (July 2013): 179, https://doi.org/10.1080/19460171.2013.798239.

[72] Marianne W. Jørgensen and Louise J. Phillips, *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method* (SAGE, 2002), 2.

[73] Brian David Hodges, Ayelet Kuper, and Scott Reeves, 'Qualitative Research: Discourse Analysis', *BMJ: British Medical Journal* 337, no. 7669 (2008): 570.

[74] Kramer, 'The Power of Critical Discourse Analysis: Investigating Femal Perpetrated Sex Abuse Victim Discourse.', in *Transforming Research Methods in the Social Sciences: Cases Studies South Africa.* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2001), 236–37.

[75] Kramer, 'The Power of Critical Discourse Analysis', 237.

[76] Thomas Lonsdale, 'To What Extent Had Trump Used George Floyd as a Campaigning Tool? A Critical Discourse Analysis of Trump's Twitter in Its Political Context', *Annual Review of Education, Communication, and Language Sciences*, Arcels E journal, 1 (2021): 26–47.

example speeches. A speech could, in the same way as a tweet, give insides into complex social phenomena.

In general, the most critical discourse analysis is characterized by the following; (1) problem-oriented (2) analysis of semiotic data (3) the view that power relations are discursive (4) expressions of language are never neutral (5) analysis that is systematic. Interpretive, descriptive, and explanatory; and (6) interdisciplinary and eclectic methodologies.[77] Critical discourse analysis allows this research to use written or oral language/texts and data on the ways the text is used in the social domain. For example, governmental documents, speeches, and news articles.[78] Danielle Everys' research on the co-option of humanitarianism in the Australian asylum seeker debates uses critical discourse analyses. To conduct her research, she used parliamentary speeches from debates on the topic. The reason for using political discourse is that politicians are part of the so-called "elite", the people with socio-economic privilege, influence, and power. Through analysing discourse, in this case, political discourse, the underlying views of the elite could be analysed.[79]

1.5   Sources.

The primary sources this research will provide is information about US humanitarian campaigns Iraq. For example, "IRAQ: Next Steps- How to internationalize and organize the U.S government to administer reconstruction efforts."[80] This document entails a hearing given to the committee on foreign relations that took place on September 23, 2003. A panel addressed the efforts of the Bush administration to secure international financial, humanitarian, and military contributions. This source gives an insight in the political and humanitarian discourse of that period. Through the pollical discourse the underlying views of politicians could be analysed.[81] This source is a US government document; it is a transcript from what has been said at the time. Although this source is relevant to analyse political and humanitarian discourse just this source alone is not enough to analyse discourse. Another example of a primary source is a testimony given by Richard L. Armitage, Deputy Secretary

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[77] Dianna R. Mullet, 'A General Critical Discourse Analysis Framework for Educational Research', *Journal of Advanced Academics* 29, no. 2 (1 May 2018): 118, https://doi.org/10.1177/1932202X18758260.

[78] Hodges, Kuper, and Reeves, 'Qualitative Research', 572.

[79] D. Every, 'A Reasonable, Practical and Moderate Humanitarianism: The Co-Option of Humanitarianism in the Australian Asylum Seeker Debates', *Journal of Refugee Studies* 21, no. 2 (18 April 2008): 217, https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fen013.

[80] Chuck Hagel et al., 'Committee on Foreign Relations', n.d., 91.

[81] Hagel et al, 'Committee on Foreign Relations', 6.

of State, before the House of Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Organisations.[82] This document shows the amount of money the US spends on humanitarian aid, thus showing the importance of humanitarianism in foreign policy. US spending can give an inside in US policy, but it is also important to know how the US divided the money meant for humanitarian assistance. This source does not give this information.

Other sources can be found online on governmental websites or websites for humanitarians worldwide.[83] Important organisations in the American humanitarian enterprise like the USAID often gave updates on the situation on the governmental websites. Furthermore, the website of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has many documents about humanitarianism through the years. The document "Iraq humanitarian response plan 2004" was published on this website. This document addresses the humanitarian presence in Iraq in 2004 but also the local interpretation of the presence of this humanitarian aid in Iraq.

The use of these sources helps the use of critical discourse Analysis because it are sources that on its own represent the situation but also influence the situation. Therefore, the context and historical background of the sources are important.[84] The primary sources are sources that were produced in the social domain, something that is important when using critical discourse analysis. However, the use of these sources has some drawbacks. In the first place they only allow to study the American political discourse. In the second place, they only present the American and Western humanitarian organisations.

1.5   Reading guide.

The second chapter will challenge the idea of 9/11 being a watershed moment within the humanitarian practice. Tracing back the Wilsonian humanitarian tradition in the history of American humanitarianism, will give a different perspective on American humanitarianism.

The third chapter will take a closer look at the American humanitarian enterprise. Central to this chapter are the organisations that play a central role in American humanitarianism. But this chapter does not limit itself to the role these organisations play in

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[82] Bureau of Public Affairs Department Of State. The Office of Electronic Information, 'FY 2004 Supplemental' (Department Of State. The Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs., 30 September 2003), https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/armitage/remarks/24805.htm.

[83] 'Govinfo.Gov | U.S. Government Publishing Office', accessed 26 January 2022, https://www.govinfo.gov/; 'ReliefWeb - Informing Humanitarians Worldwide', ReliefWeb, accessed 26 January 2022, https://reliefweb.int/.

[84] Mullet, 'A General Critical Discourse Analysis Framework for Educational Research', 118.

American humanitarianism because American humanitarianism does also play a role in American strategy in Iraq. Both will be addressed in this chapter.

The fourth chapter follows with analysing the central role that was given to humanitarian NGOs within the American humanitarian enterprise. The chapter emphasises the distinction between American NGOs and non-American NGOs and how they fulfil their role in Iraq. With the US being the occupying country, they oversaw the humanitarian coordination. Therefore, analysing the reaction of non-American insights and the perception of the Iraqi population of American humanitarianism will give a new insightful perspective.

2. US humanitarianism, from a historical perspective.

Examining the tradition of American humanitarianism shows the importance of the historical context to contemporary American humanitarianism. Starting with the first philanthropic ideas, this chapter aims to answer the question, how do long-term traditions in US humanitarianism relate to contemporary American humanitarian practice? Acknowledging that US humanitarianism is shaped by its history, special attention will go out to the important historical events in the twentieth century, such as the First World War, the Second World War, the Cold War, and 9/11. Even though the aim of this thesis is to analyse the involvement of politics in American humanitarian campaigns in Iraq, it is important to start the analyses long before 2003. Seeing humanitarianism as an ideology, profession, and movement, knowing how US humanitarianism developed throughout the years gives context to the new developments in the field in 2003.

This chapter will use different types of primary sources. The first type of sources are speeches from different American presidents. Following critical discourse analyses, these speeches will be analysed in a specific way.[85] An important note on speeches used by presidents is that they are often created before the speech. The speeches are not just the ideas of the president himself but reflect the ideas of his administration. Other types of sources used are speeches of the Secretary of State Powell and Albright. Analysing their speeches also mirrors the ideas of the administrations they work for. Through speech, the leading political discourse on humanitarianism can be analysed, which will tell us how politicians believe humanitarian practice should work. The political discourse on the use of humanitarian assistance explains the phenomena identified throughout the twentieth century. The last type of primary source used for this chapter is the approved act for international development. Through analysing the act in the context of the nineteen sixties, political discourse will give an insight to the ideas and values of the US administration at the time.

2.1   The history of US humanitarianism and the tradition of its practice.

The origins of US humanitarianism can be found, just like the origins of other types of humanitarianism, in religion. The idea of doing good for those in need has been prominent in religion for a long time. The eighteenth-century marks the period of time during which the idea of humanity, in the form that all humans have equal dignity just because they are part of

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[85] Mullet, 'A General Critical Discourse Analysis Framework for Educational Research', 121–22.

humanity, had taken a prominent place within society. This concern for the well-being of humanity resulted in attention for the humanitarian idea outside of religion.[86]

Even though the concern for humanity gained more widespread attention during the eighteenth century, the humanitarian awakening of the country was not until the end of the nineteenth, the beginning of the twentieth century.[87] Or as the historian Cabanes called it a shift towards "scientific philanthropy" that occurred in the US. This shift meant that humanitarianism did become less religious and more secular, and a new social group of experts such as engineers, technicians, and social workers became more involved in humanitarian practice. The American discourse around humanitarianism started to change, American humanitarians did not speak about charity anymore. Instead, they also recognised a common humanity and aim to offer relief to those in need.[88] During the first years of the twentieth century, the US started to abandon its isolationist position in the world and started to become a global geopolitical player. Humanitarianism had a central role within the growing American international engagement.[89]

The outbreak of the First World War provoked a nationwide humanitarian response. While President Woodrow Wilsons' policy at the time was to uphold the neutrality of the nation, many American citizens travelled to Europe to engage in humanitarian practice long before the US became an active participant in the war.[90] The First World War can be identified as the American humanitarian awakening. Nationwide much attention was given to the men, women, and children who were suffering in Europe. While the Wilson administration stayed strictly neutral when the war broke out, many Americans donated money and collected food and clothes. The men and women that travelled to Europe provided aid to military combatants and civilian victims of the war. America at the time was deeply divided about the question of whether the country should send military support to Europe.

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[86] Amanda B Moniz, 'Protestantism, Empire, and Transatlantic Philanthropy, 1700–1760s', in *From Empire To Humanity: The American Resolution and the Origins of Humanitarianism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 115.

[87] Bruno Cabanes, 'Introduction: Human Disasters: Humanitarianism and the Transnational Turn in the Wake of World War I', in *The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism 1918-1924* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 4.

[88] David Chandler, 'The Road to Military Humanitarianism: How the Human Rights NGOs Shaped a New Humanitarian Agenda', *Human Rights Quarterly* 23, no. 3 (2001): 679.

[89] Bruno Cabanes, 'Introduction: Human Disasters: Humanitarianism and the Transnational Turn in the Wake of World War I', 4.

[90] Elisabeth Piller, American War Relief, Cultural Mobilization, and the myth of impartial humanitarianism, 1914–17', *The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era* 17, no. 4 (October 2018): 619, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537781418000270.

Therefore, it was highly surprising that humanitarian aid programs did gather so much support.[91]

A central actor in the American humanitarian enterprise was the American Red Cross (ARC). Only a month after the start of the war the ARC arrived in Europe to provide aid to both sides of the war. Together with organisations such as the American Fund for French Wounded and the American Ambulance association offered aid to the military armies of the countries participating in the war. Other organisations such as the Commission for Relief in Belgium provided aid to civilians by for example collecting food.[92] The activities and fund appropriations of the ARC were overseen by a War Council appointed by Wilson at the beginning of the war. The organisation held a quasi-governmental status because it was not only funded by the government but also by private donations. The tight relation with the American government gave the ARC a position of power, something private funded relief organisations could not have, but because the Arc also received a substantial amount of private donations the organisation was still able to follow their own agenda. The government's intentions for the ARC were to be a military charity. But because the ARC was not only government-funded the organisation did have the ability to refrain from this task and focus on providing aid to civilians.[93]

While President Wilson could still talk about America being neutral and impartial, the humanitarian involvement allowed the Americans to have an informal part in the war.[94] Back then, humanitarianism was just like it is now, a form that transmits values and plays a role within norm-building. This meant that when Wilson officially practiced neutrality, American values, ideas, and norms were already actively spread through Europe. And while the American humanitarians claimed to be neutral and impartial, the reality showed that this idea was too simplistic. American humanitarian engagement was often driven by emotional, cultural, and ethnic ties. Therefore, a distinction between pro-Allied and pro-German humanitarian organisations could be made early in the war.[95] Already at the beginning of the

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[91] Julia F. Irwin, 'Taming Total War: Great War Era American Humanitarianism and Its Legacies', in T. W. Zeiler, D. K. Ekbaldh & B. C. Montoya (Eds.), in *Beyond 1917: The United States and the Global Legacies of the Great War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 765–76.

[92] Julia F. Irwin, 'Taming Total War: Great War Era American Humanitarianism and Its Legacies', 765–66.

[93] Julia F. Irwin, 'Nation Building and Rebuilding: The American Red Cross in Italy during the Great War', *The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era* 8, no. 3 (2009): 407–11.

[94] Piller, 'American War Relief, Cultural Mobilization and the Myth of Impartial Humanitarianism, 1914–17', 622.

[95] Piller, 'American War Relief, Cultural Mobilization and the Myth of Impartial Humanitarianism, 1914–17', 624.

war, in 1914, neutral humanitarianism did become contested and many stressed that relief initiated by citizens could not be performed impartially.[96]

In 1915, the Germans sunk the British ship Lutisiana, a hundred and twenty-eight American citizens that were on board of the ship died. Because American citizens died in this attack, American retaliation was expected. As a result of the event, Wilson and his administration openly shifted their neutral stance in the war towards favouring the British and the French. Even though the biggest part of the American public was against military involvement in the war, a big part of the American population followed their government and started to favour the British and French as well. This change in discourse was also noticeable in the slow shift of activities of the ARC. The organisation itself did not favour offering relief to citizens because this would stress their neutral and impartial position. However, Wilsons' administration pushed for the ARC to play a bigger role in non-combatant relief. The administration felt the humanitarian activities of the ARC were especially useful to promote values that were important for the US such as world peace, international stability, and international cooperation. The governmental pressure on the organisation led the ARC to become America's primary civilian relief agency and to expand its role in the war.[97] The American humanitarians in Europe were able to presume a distinct agenda through their humanitarian practice. The Rockefeller Foundation, a humanitarian organisation active in Europe at the time, believed American interventions and humanitarianism were meant to promote the well-being of mankind throughout the world. American humanitarians believed that the war in Europe provided opportunities to show the 'American way' of coming up with technocratic solutions to complex emergencies.[98] The 'American way' being based on ideas, values, and norms of the Americans. The promotion of the 'American way' in Europe could, following constructivist theory, be explained as the transmission of values, ideas, and norms. Where in this case, the American humanitarians function as norm-entrepreneurs.

With the US entering the war, the ARC became an official part of the US war effort. Following Wilson's orders, all other American humanitarian organisations became under

[96] Julia F. Irwin, 'Humanitarian Preparedness', in *Making the World Safe: The American Red Cross and a Nation's Humanitarian Awakening* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 55.
[97] Julia F. Irwin, 'Humanitarian Preparedness', 54–58.
[98] Branden Little, 'An Explosion of New Endeavours: Global Humanitarian Responses to Industrialized Warfare in the First World War Era', *First World War Studies* 5, no. 1 (2 January 2014): 4, https://doi.org/10.1080/19475020.2014.901184.

coordination of the ARC.[99] This meant that the humanitarian organisation that used to strive to offer neutral and impartial relief, even though the public support for the central powers had already declined, became a partisan humanitarian organisation.[100] President Wilson and his administration made the ARC part of the country's broader foreign policy. Which is in line with Wilson's ideology, strategy and his view on humanitarianism. He believed he could bring humanitarian practice together with US foreign policy and project US values and influence to better the world.[101] That the ARC did abandon the humanitarian principles during the war became clear in a bulletin issued by the War Council of the American Red Cross in 1918. In the bulletin, the work of the ARC was described. However, what was written does not reflect a neutral, impartial, and independent organisation as the ARC used to be. The ARC was described as the mobilized heart and spirit of the American people.[102] Here the 'heart and spirit' could be identified as the values, ideas, and norms of the Americans.

The aid offered by the Americans to the European countries did not come separated from the American political agenda. During the war, organisations like the ARC became a tool of American foreign relations. Together, the ARC and the American government believed that the provided aid could help soothing ties with other countries like Italy. Hoping to not only offer emergency relief but also to create lasting social reform through transmitting American ideas about public health and social welfare.[103] Just like in Italy, American humanitarians delivered aid to nations in Eastern Europe, American values and ideas were transmitted through these campaigns. Directly after the war, the American humanitarians carried out a campaign against Bolshevism, and for peace-making and democratization in Romania.[104] From a constructivist stance it can be argued that humanitarian actors were functioning as norm entrepreneurs. Their activities in Europe were a situation in which the transmission of American norms to Europe was possible.

When the war ended it also meant the end of the major private relief efforts in the US. But humanitarian practice stayed intertwined with US foreign policy. For example, the

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[99] Daniel Roger Maul, 'The Rise of a Humanitarian Superpower: American NGOs and International Relief, 1917–1945', in *Internationalism, Imperialism and the Formation of the Contemporary World: The Pasts of the Present* (London: Palgrave Macmillian, 2017), 131.
[100] Julia F. Irwin, 'Relieving Europe', in *Making the World Safe: The American Red Cross and a Nation's Humanitarian Awakening* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 108.
[101] Abby Stoddard, 'Humanitarian NGOs: Challenges and Trends', 2.
[102] '"It Is a Remarkable Story" - War Posters - Enoch Pratt Free Library - Digital Maryland', accessed 23 June 2022, https://collections.digitalmaryland.org/digital/collection/mdwp/id/45.
[103] Irwin, 'Nation Building and Rebuilding', 410–11.
[104] Doina Anca Cretu, 'Nationalizing International Relief: Romanian Responses to American Aid for Children in the Great War Era', European Review of History: Revue Europeenne d'Histoire, 27, no. 4 (n.d.): 529–30.

'American Relief Administration' (ARA) kept providing the Europeans with food while having a clear anti Bolshevik stance.[105] The awareness that humanitarianism could be used as a tool kept growing since the beginning of the war, and the fact that the violence in Europe stopped did not change this. Only during the 1930s the American humanitarian assistance in Europe slowed down. This was mainly due to the economic crisis, which limited collaboration between government and humanitarian organisations.[106]

2.2   US humanitarianism in a divided world.

Since the beginning of the First World War and throughout the interwar period and the Second World War, American humanitarian organisations offered aid to European countries. During and after the First World War, humanitarian initiatives were organised by civilians as well as through bigger humanitarian organisations tied to the American government. The overall participation of the American population in humanitarian practice was great. Many initiatives relied on this great voluntary civilian participation. This was different after the Second World War, the voluntary civilian initiatives did not play as big a role in the aftermath of the war as they did after the First World War. Powerful states, like the US, organised the bigger part of the humanitarian relief. According to Cohen, the American-led internationalisation of humanitarian relief operations changed how humanitarian operations were performed.[107] During the war, the topic 'aid' was divided into three categories: relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction. Preferably these three categories would stay separated from each other and they kept short-term relief separated from the long-term reconstruction. But because the definitions of each category were vague, this could lead to confusion, even for the policymakers. During the aftermath of the Second World War, a global acceleration of humanitarian action could be identified. The years following the war were turbulent. Europe was recovering from the destructions of the war, former colonies transferred into nations, and Latin America followed the American example for economic reform. After the Second World War the governing of the humanitarian response was inspired by the key ideas of the New

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[105] Daniel Roger Maul, 'The Rise of a Humanitarian Superpower: American NGOs and International Relief, 1917–1945', 132.
[106] Daniel Roger Maul, 'The Rise of a Humanitarian Superpower: American NGOs and International Relief, 1917-1945', 134.
[107] Cohen, 'Between Relief', 438-439.

Deal, relief, recovery, and reform.[108] However, contrary to the New Deal, these key tenets were this time applied in a global humanitarian context.

A new development was that humanitarianism was no longer just a means to an end but also an end to a means. Humanitarianism was used as a motivation to implement policies. For example, President Truman's White House domestic advisor Clark M. Clifford argues, that the motivation of Truman to humanitarianism was a major motivation in Truman's policies.[109] By stating that humanitarianism was a motivation for Truman's' policies, demonstrates that humanitarianism had, even after the war, a central role in American policy. This central role of humanitarianism in American policy can also be identified in the American policy in Iraq, as will be explained in chapter three. Truman's inaugural address in 1949 addressed the threat of communism to the free world. He presented his four points plan with the emphasis on 'soft power' in fourth point. A strong focus of this plan was to protect the US and other nations against communism. The four-point plan emphasizes the importance of humanitarianism and the need to help the people in need. As he said, it was the first time in history that humanity had the knowledge and the skills to relieve the suffering of the people in need.[110] Truman's message was clear, the US should help the 'free people' in the world, and only democracy can help strengthen the people in need against their enemies, hunger, misery, and despair.[111] With 'free people' Truman points towards the people in the countries that have not fallen for communism. In a way, Truman used humanitarianism as a tool he could use for national security and foreign policy. The use of humanitarianism as a tool to spread democracy continued to return in American policy, as was the case in Iraq will be further explored in chapter three.

Truman was not the only President who did see the importance of humanitarianism as a tool for American foreign policy and security policy. Parallel to the spread of the fear of communism, the interest in foreign aid was spread. It was during the Kennedy presidency that the fear of communism got to a high point. In a speech in 1961 Kennedy addressed, according to him, worrying developments in the world. While two ideologies faced each other, Kennedy

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[108] Enrico Dal Lago and Kevin O'Sullivan, 'Introduction: Towards a New History of Humanitarianism', Moving the Social, 57 (2017): 12–13.

[109] Lawrence Davidson, 'Truman the Politician and the Establishment of Israel', *Journal of Palestine Studies* 39, no. 4 (1 July 2010): 38–39, https://doi.org/10.1525/jps.2010.XXXIX.4.28.

[110] 'Inaugural Address | Harry S. Truman', accessed 21 March 2022, https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/public-papers/19/inaugural-address.

[111] 'Inaugural Address | Harry S. Truman'.

emphasised the importance of the international sharing of ideas.[112] While the fear of communism in America peaked, humanitarianism and development aid became an important tool. This was translated in the passing of the "Act for International Development of 1961" by Congress.[113] The Act states that "peace depends on wider recognition of the dignity and interdependence of men, and survival of free institutions in the United States can best be assured in a worldwide atmosphere of freedom"[114] The Act identifies that the assistance that will be given through this act is economic as well as social, and will help to realise their aspirations for justice, education, dignity, and respect as individual human beings.[115] The context in which the Act was established was during a peak point of the fear of communism. According to critical discourse analyses, do external relations and the historical background of the text influence the production of the text.[116] Consequently, the Act does reflect that at the time different types of assistance, including humanitarian assistance, were seen as great importance for American foreign policy and security policy. Thus, American humanitarianism during the Cold War was driven by strategic goals and defined by the tensions between East and West.[117]

In the same year as the passing of the "Act for International Development of 1961" the USAID was established. The USAID was a unification of the already existing US government assistance programs. The organisation acted as the number one international and humanitarian assistance agency of the US government. Since the establishment of the agency, the bilateral aid flows have been guided through the USAID.[118] Kennedy had a broader vision related to international aid and development. That can be concluded from the "Act for International Development of 1961", the economic and social goals can not be interpreted as short-term goals. [119] Because of the long-term development goals of the Kennedy administration, did the USAID also focus on the more long-term development programs. Their work would promote

[112] 'President Kennedy's Special Message to the Congress on Urgent National Needs, May 25, 1961 | JFK Library', accessed 24 June 2022, https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/john-f-kennedy-speeches/united-states-congress-special-message-19610525.
[113] Public Law, 'Act for International Development 1961', Pub. L. No. 87–195, 1961 (1961).
[114] Public Law. 'Act for International Development 1961'.
[115] Public Law. 'Act for International Development 1961'.
[116] Mullet, 'A General Critical Discourse Analysis Framework for Educational Research', 122.
[117] Alynna J. Lyon and Chris J. Dolan, 'American Humanitarian Intervention: Toward a Theory of Coevolution', *Foreign Policy Analysis* 3, no. 1 (2007): 46–45.
[118] Heidi Morefield, '"More with Less": Commerce, Technology, and International Health at USAID, 1961–1981', Diplomatic History, 43, no. 4 (2019): 619.
[119] Public Law, Act for International Development 1961.

American political and economic interests through their international assistance and development programs.[120]

Throughout the Cold War, the fear of Communism kept playing a decisive role in American foreign policy which led to a central role for American humanitarianism. Humanitarian campaigns were used as a tool against the threat from the east. For example, the American pressure on the international NGOs that played a role in the Afghan refugee situation in Pakistan from 1979 onwards. The American government had close ties with the NGOs working in Pakistan as well as in the NGOs working cross border. The American NGO CARE received almost half of the organisation's income from government funds. The NGO network in place was used by the US to further enhance the country's political interests during wartime in Afghanistan. Using the network in place backed the American military activity to topple the Soviet/Afghan regime. Later representatives of the NGO admitted that while the NGO was trying to help those in need, the work was politically influenced by the American government.[121]

2.3   A new world calls for a new humanitarian practice.

As shown in the introduction, scholars like Mills, did identify a change in humanitarian practice after the end of the Cold War. They argued humanitarianism, in general, had become politicised, institutionalised, and militarized.[122] The humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence, most important in the Dunantist humanitarianism, did not play a prominent role in humanitarian practice anymore. The involvement of politics in humanitarianism might have been new for humanitarians of the Dunantist tradition. Nonetheless, since the country got on a broad scale involved in global aid, American humanitarianism did follow the Wilsonian. Since Wilson stated that humanitarianism was a useful way to spread American values, it was evident that American humanitarianism was predominantly politically driven.

The scholar Bruce Nichols wrote in 1987, the article 'Rubberband humanitarianism'. He compared American contemporary humanitarianism with a rubber band, "With all the elasticity of a rubber band, the concept of humanitarian aid is being stretched out of all recognition by practitioners more interested in its political usefulness than in the relief of

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[120] Heidi Morefield, 'More with Less', 623.
[121] Helga Baitenmann, 'NGOs and the Afghan War: The Politicisation of Humanitarian Aid', *Third World Quarterly* 12, no. 1 (1990): 63–72.
[122] Mills, 'Neo-Humanitarianism', 161–63.

human suffering."[123] This article proves that American humanitarianism was already politicised before the end of the Cold War and that the influence of politics in American humanitarianism could not be linked to the end of the Cold War, as Mills argued was the case for humanitarianism in general. However, what did change in humanitarian practice after the Cold War was the number of humanitarian campaigns that were initiated around the world.[124] Humanitarian activity increased, and this included politicised and militarised humanitarianism.[125]

For American humanitarian initiatives, it was normal to have the humanitarian assistance delivered by people wearing the American flag.[126] Having, for example, food delivered by aid workers carrying the American flag showed their relationship with America and the norms, values, and ideas of America. Therefore, humanitarian assistance delivered in this matter does not appear neutral anymore. This is part of the macro functions of humanitarianism. Through the aid that has been delivered by American humanitarians' ideas and modes of behaviour have been transmitted. The powerful mechanism that is American humanitarianism brings the food, and clothes in a way that is standardised in America.[127] Anno 2003, this American idea about humanitarianism was still unchanged as will be further explained later in this thesis.

2.4   9/11, a watershed moment?

The history of American humanitarianism leaves us with questions on the importance of the Dunantist humanitarian principles. Humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence were not as present or important in Wilsonian humanitarianism than they were and still are in Dunantist humanitarianism. From the First World War onward, humanitarianism functioned as a tool in foreign policy. The refocus on national security and the integration of the US State Department and US international assistant development after the events of 9/11 did even deepen the emphasis on this role laid out for humanitarianism. [128] This becomes clear in the speech of Secretary Powel he held to the leaders of non-governmental organisations. In this

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[123] Bruce Nichols, 'Rubberband Humanitarianism', *Ethics & International Affairs* 1 (March 1987): 191–92, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7093.1987.tb00521.x.
[124] Richard Falk, 'The Complexities of Humanitarian Intervention: A New World Order Challenge Essay', *Michigan Journal of International Law* 17, no. 2 (1996 1995): 495.
[125] Humanitarian diplomacy; theory and practice 39
[126] 'Opinion | In the Line of Fire - The New York Times', accessed 4 April 2022, https://www-nytimes-com.eur.idm.oclc.org/2004/08/04/opinion/in-the-line-of-fire.html.
[127] Donini, 'The Far Side', 228.
[128] Kent M. Bolton, 'Introduction', 1–2.

speech, Powell applauds the work of the NGOs in the Coalition for American Leadership Abroad. He said that America would not be able to succeed its objectives of shaping a freer and more prosperous world without the work of the NGOs. As a consequent of the progressively globalised world, they were facing issues that were as he said, "intertwined so complex and so transnational that no power not even a superpower can solve them on his own."[129] Powell emphasised the importance of a close partnership between government and NGOs to face the problems in the world. He sees the NGOs as a force multiplier and an important part of the combat team of the US. In his speech, he also emphasised the fact that America and the NGOs do not preach their methods and message to say their way of living is superior. According to Powell NGOs are in the ability to display American values and beliefs and show the respect for individual rights and human dignity these values and beliefs have brought them.[130] By placing this emphasis on American values, beliefs, the enhancement of individual rights, and human dignity in places in need shows the importance of NGOs in American foreign policy. It demonstrates one of the meso functions of humanitarianism because the NGOs are intertwined with the American government, and they can function as important vectors in the shaping of public opinions and government policy.[131]

Even though Powell's speech showed the continuity of the Wilsonian humanitarian tradition in American policy after 9/11, comparing it to the speech his predecessor Albright gave to the same audience a year earlier a change in tone is noticeable. Albright does applaud the work of the NGOs. She addressed the value of the advising and helping role of the NGOs, the importance of NGOs stepping up and setting the international agenda. Next to this Albright stressed the fact that America should step up when it wants to lead the world into a democratic prosperous future, NGOs are key figures in realizing this.[132] And while Albright does emphasise the importance of NGOs for American foreign policy, she did not show signs of actively incorporating the NGOs in foreign policy. Contrary to Albright, Powell did actively incorporate the NGOs in American foreign policy. He integrates the efforts made by NGOs to offer aid to people in need into the American efforts in the War on Terror.[133]

[129] Bureau of Public Affairs Department Of State. The Office of Electronic Information, 'Remarks to the National Foreign Policy Conference for Leaders of Nongovernmental Organizations' (Department Of State. The Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs.), accessed 4 April 2022, https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2001/5762.htm.
[130] Department Of State. The Office of Electronic Information.
[131] Donini, 'The Far Side', 230.
[132] '5/19/00 Albright at NGO Conference', 9, accessed 4 April 2022, https://1997-2001.state.gov/statements/2000/000519b.html.
[133] Department Of State. The Office of Electronic Information, 'Remarks to the National Foreign Policy Conference for Leaders of Nongovernmental Organizations'.

Therefore he directed the efforts of the NGOs toward a certain common goal, which deepened the relationship between government and American NGOs.

2.4   Conclusion

The first sparks of American humanitarian, or better said philanthropic practices, can be found in religion, as was the same for humanitarianism in general. While it did take a while for the American population to embrace the practice of humanitarianism, the twentieth century can be seen as the century of the nationwide awakening of American humanitarianism. Neutrality, impartiality, and independence, for Dunantist humanitarians the most important principles, were in American humanitarianism following the Wilsonian tradition not that leading for the humanitarian response.

Knowing that the American humanitarian practices really started to take off with the start of the First World War and knowing that after the American direct involvement in the war the ARC became a tool for American foreign policy. It can be concluded that the principles of being neutral, impartial and independence have never been present in American policy. The Americans preferred to have a more pragmatic stance toward humanitarianism. Throughout the years this became more evident. In the light of the threat of Bolshevism, humanitarians acted as norms entrepreneurs by spreading the American norms, values, and ideas. Furthermore, after the Second World War the efforts to protect the world against communism were an important factor for some of the humanitarian programs.

With the passing of the "Act for International Development of 1961" and the establishment of the USAID, the importance of humanitarian aid as a tool in foreign policy became normalised. But also, the establishment of the USAID meant the broadening of the humanitarian practice and the focus on long-term development. This shift towards a focus on long-term development meant that politics and economics also started to play a more influential role. This became clear in the case of the American-based NGO, CARE. The organisation received almost half of its funding from governmental funding. Without the US government CARE USA could not have existed. And yes, they did deliver humanitarian assistance to those in need but as confirmed, the staff from CARE USA got also involved in political-driven work. And even though the CARE USA staff was aware of the involvement of politics in their work it was not an objection to performing their work.

Now that it is established that politics and humanitarianism in the US go hand in hand, we can not speak of a major change in American humanitarian policy after the Cold War. And

while some authors like Mills speak of a watershed moment in humanitarianism after 9/11, this can not be said for the American case. But 9/11 did deepen the practice of politicised humanitarianism in a way that was never seen before. To answer the question stated in the introduction of this chapter, what underlying structures, ideas, and values formed US humanitarianism throughout the nineteenth century? It can be said that the American humanitarian tradition has been consistent throughout the last century. Humanitarianism since the statements of Wilson was always part of politics. It was normalised and preferred to use humanitarianism to spread American values throughout the world.

3.   The American humanitarian enterprise in Iraq.

The last chapter showed that the influence of politics on humanitarianism was not a new phenomenon in the American case. Ever since the country's humanitarian awakening during the First World War and the vision of Wilson to use humanitarianism as a tool to spread American values throughout the world, the Wilsonian tradition was leading in American humanitarianism. Therefore, the deepening of the intertwinement of humanitarianism and politics after 9/11 did not come as a surprise. This chapter starts with the American preparations for the invasion of Iraq and will aim to answer the following question, how did politicised humanitarian assistance play a role in the broadening American humanitarian enterprise in Iraq? This chapter also uses a variety of primary sources. The most important sources for this chapter are the transcripts of different hearings for Congress, the importance of these sources has been explained in the introduction.[134] The chapter also uses the official manuals for insurgency and counterinsurgency to be able to identify how the implementation of the strategy in Iraq was meant.

Since the humanitarian crisis caused by the Gulf War in 1991 Iraqi people have been almost entirely dependent on the help the government handed out to them. For years the Iraqi government received sanctions from the international community. These sanctions only helped to make the dependency of the Iraqi population on their government and the help from the international community greater. After years this resulted in a very poor nation when in 2002, when the plan of a US-led invasion started to take form.[135] There were concerns that a new war would worsen the humanitarian situation in Iraq, the country was not as strong as it was before the Gulf War. A war would have severe consequences according to the UN, it would disrupt the government's food handouts, it would stop the county's oil production, and it would degrade the county's electrical power system, it would probably also cause an outbreak of many diseases.[136] The US did agree with this however, contrary to what Iraqis and the UN argued, it was among American policymakers widely believed that the oil

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[134] Every, 'A Reasonable, Practical and Moderate Humanitarianism', 217.
[135] Rajiv Ch, rasekaran, and Peter Slevin, 'This Time Around, War Would Hit Iraq Harder', *Washington Post*, 29 October 2002, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2002/10/29/this-time-around-war-would-hit-iraq-harder/8fe22e5c-b4d3-4290-b129-938fe243f35e/. Colum Lynch, 'Iraq War Could Put 10 Million In Need of Aid, U.N. Reports', *Washington Post*, 7 January 2003, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/01/07/iraq-war-could-put-10-million-in-need-of-aid-un-reports/8efaf76e-0b79-4800-ab23-5cb4c9993b5c/.
[136] Raymond W Copson, 'Iraq War? Current Situation and Issues for Congress', n.d., 28.

reserves of Iraq could come up with the money to fund the reconstruction of the country and the humanitarian assistance after the war.

3.1   Humanitarian preparations for the US-led invasion.

The consensus throughout the international community was that a war in Iraq would worsen the situation due to the already bad circumstances in the country. The prospect of a humanitarian crisis made adequate pre-war preparations crucial. But because of the political controversy around the US-led invasion, the preparations for a humanitarian response came to a halt.[137] Important to notice is the abnormality of the political situation in Iraq before the US-led invasion but even more so after the invasion, because Iraq did become a hyper politicised country. This context provides questions on how an adequate humanitarian response would look, who takes the lead, and decides what the proper way to react is?[138]

As the occupying power, the US was given the task to oversee the well-being of the Iraqi population and the reconstruction and humanitarian assistance efforts in Iraq. Being the coordinating country gave a specific power to the US, especially with the absence of the UN right after the invasion. UN officials had left Iraq just before the war started and did not come back until after President Bush declared the end of the major combat operations on the first of May, 2003. The UN left because they did not approve the US-led invasion and staying in Iraq while the combats were going on would endanger their staff.[139] In the case of offering humanitarian assistance, many actors in the field, like other countries or humanitarian organisations, felt uncomfortable with this arrangement. It would have been better if the task of coordinating humanitarian assistance would have been in the hands of a coalition of countries. Or in a best-case scenario, the US would have handed its tasks over to the UN after the combats ended because the UN was the only organisation with an actual mandate for humanitarian assistance. According to World Vision, an American NGO, would a strong role for the UN have enhanced the international trust in the operation and this could initially have led to more countries being willing to support the rebuilding efforts in Iraq.[140]

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[137] ICG Middle East, 'War in Iraq: Managing Humanitarian Relief' (Amman/Brussels: ICG: International Crisis Group, 27 March 2003), 4.
[138] Alistair Mack, 'The Humanitarian Operations Centre, Kuwait: Operation *Iraqi Freedom* , 2003', *International Peacekeeping* 11, no. 4 (December 2004): 683, https://doi.org/10.1080/1353331042000248722.
[139] 'President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended', accessed 15 May 2022, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030501-15.html.
[140] Congress House of Representatives, 'House Hearing, 108th Congress - HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOLLOWING MILITARY OPERATIONS: OVERCOMING BARRIERS', Government, govinfo.gov (U.S. Government Printing Office, 18 July 2003), https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-

The American preparations for the war were extensive. The Bush administration brought humanitarian organisations outside the government into the process of preparing for the war and new governmental organisations were established. The American humanitarian enterprise extended. Within the pre-war planning of post-war Iraq, an extensive role was reserved for the USAID, the country's main aid organisation. Within the USAID there were offices placed that provide specific tasks of humanitarian assistance such as Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Office of Food for Peace (FFP), Office of transition initiatives (OTI), Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), US Embassy in Iraq, Department of Agriculture, Office Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), Office of Humanitarian Assistance and Mine Action, and the Office of International Information Programs (IIP).[141] As stated in the introduction the USAID and the Department of State intensified their working relationship after 9/11 and in the case of Iraq this was also evident. USAID administrator Natsios emphasised that the USAID was working in line with the ideas of the US government by stating that the USAID was working to improve the conditions in Iraq and to contribute to the vision of the US, that was for Iraq to become a sovereign, stable, prosperous, and democratic country. [142] For an organisation like the USAID, an organisation that was supposed to work independent from the US government, a statement like this was surprising. It showed that the USAID was comfortable with sharing the same agenda as the US government.

One of the tasks of the USAID during the preparation for the invasion was the planning of the deployment of the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART).[143] The application of the DART in Iraq was part of the initial plan of the Bush administration in which the military forces, the DART, would establish safe humanitarian areas on the ground before the humanitarian organisations would set foot in Iraq. The DART contained more than sixty humanitarian response experts who were brought in from the USAID and from State Departments Bureau for Population, Migration and Refugees (PRM), and Department of Health and Human Service's Public Health Service. The DART also included administrative officers in logistics, transportation, and procurement to make an adequate response in the field

108hhrg91134/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.govinfo.gov%2Fapp%2Fdetails%2FCHRG-108hhrg91134%2FCHRG-108hhrg91134. 18 juli, hearing humanitarian assistance overcoming barriers 125
[141] Thomas Coipuram, 'Iraq: United Nations and Humanitarian Aid Organizations', n.d., 6.
[142] Bureau of Public Affairs Department Of State. The Office of Electronic Information, 'Iraq and Afghanistan: Accomplishments and Next Steps' (Department Of State. The Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs., 30 September 2003), https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/24852.htm.
[143] 'USAID Iraq: DART Trip Report Az Zubayr, 22 Apr 2003 - Iraq | ReliefWeb', accessed 27 June 2022, https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/usaid-iraq-dart-trip-report-az-zubayr-22-apr-2003.

possible.[144] However, having the DART teams play such a decisive role in the humanitarian response, did illustrate that American humanitarianism in Iraq did not make clear distinctions between aid workers and the military. Having the military deliver the humanitarian assistance during the first stages of the war can be seen as a first stage of the blurred lines between different actors that in a later stage of the war resulted in difficulties and insecurities for aid workers.

Later, the newly established Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), NGOs, and Iraqi organisations would take over the DART activities.[145] The ORHA was one of the organisations that was established in preparation for the war with the purpose to serve in Iraq. The ORHA was brought under the breach of the Department of Defence. The primary role of the organisation was to plan for humanitarian assistance and reconstruction after the fall of the Iraqi regime instead of actively getting involved in these activities themselves. So, they were supposed to coordinate humanitarian and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. The ORHA started with their preparations in the Pentagon, later the activities would transfer to Iraq. During the preparations, the staff of the ORHA testified they were subordinate to combat needs and felt restricted by the Department of Defense.[146]

As earlier established, the DART would establish safe humanitarian areas on the ground. Once established, the USAID would, through the DART operations, provide humanitarian relief until it was safe enough for humanitarian organisations to work in Iraq. The involvement of the military in humanitarian response caused some confusion and insecurity. After some time of insecurity, for all involved, the US administration presented six principles on how to govern its relief strategy, "(1) minimizing both civilian displacement and damage to civilian infrastructure, (2) reliance upon civilian relief agencies, (3) effective civil-military coordination, (4) facilitation of the operations of international organisations and NGOs, (5) pre-positioning of relief supplies in the region and, (6) support for the resumption of the food ration distribution system."[147] Among the six principles presented, two rely on civil actions, and thus on humanitarian action. The centrality of the civil agencies within the relief strategy does show that relief is connected to the political agenda and military strategy. This is in line with the Wilsonian tradition but also with the deepening of the

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[144] 'USAID Relief Assistance for Iraq Update 21 Mar 2003 - Iraq', ReliefWeb, accessed 14 May 2022, https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/usaid-relief-assistance-iraq-update-21-mar-2003.
[145] ICG Middle East, 'War in Iraq: Managing Humanitarian Relief', 7.
[146] Nora Bensahel et al., 'The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance', in *After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008), 64–67.
[147] ICG Middle East, 'War in Iraq: Managing Humanitarian Relief', 7.

interconnectedness of politics and humanitarianism and the blurred lines between military and humanitarianism.[148]

The ORHA worked in close cooperation with the Department of Defense and the USAID intensified its relationship with the US State Department after 9/11. It shows, US humanitarianism had become a part of long-term development programs and it was harder to distinguish humanitarian aid from long-term development in American policy.[149] Especially because of the involvement of humanitarianism organisations in the pre-war reconstruction of post-war Iraq.[150] Before the war, providing humanitarian assistance was even linked to the American national security, as became clear in a resolution from Mr. Filner took on March 27, 2003. The resolution states that the US provides humanitarian assistance to Iraq because this is in the country's national interest. Food security is important when further reconstruction programs were to be implemented. Congress commends the Department of Defence to recognise the need for delivering humanitarian and reconstruction assistance.[151] Also, Congress declared that any American humanitarian assistance should be transported on US-flag vessels. According to Greene, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Population, Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Department of State, was providing effective humanitarian assistance in situations like this an American value.[152]

The importance of humanitarian assistance in American strategy in Iraq was great. Time and again this was emphasised by American officials, not just before the invasion but also during the war and after combats ended. For example, President Bush and prime minister Blair touched upon the topic during their speech at camp David on March 28, 2003. At that time the war had started a week earlier, according to Bush the promised humanitarian assistance was on its way to Iraq and ready to be implemented.[153] On April 2, 2003, the US

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[148] Roger Mac Ginty, 'The Pre-War Reconstruction of Post-War Iraq', *Third World Quarterly* 24, no. 4 (2003): 612.
[149] Rieff, 'Humanitarianism in Crisis', 112.
[150] Ginty, 'The Pre-War Reconstruction of Post-War Iraq', 609–10.
[151] Congress House of Representatives, 'H. Con. Res. 127 (IH) - Declaring That the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance, Including United States Agricultural Products, for Iraq Is in the National Security Interest of the United States.', Government, govinfo.gov (U.S. Government Publishing Office, 27 March 2003), https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.govinfo.gov%2Fapp%2Fdetails%2FBILLS-108hconres127ih.
[152] Congress House of Representatives, 'House Hearing, 108th Congress - HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOLLOWING MILITARY OPERATIONS: OVERCOMING BARRIERS', Government, govinfo.gov (U.S. Government Printing Office, 13 May 2003), 33, https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-108hhrg89546/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.govinfo.gov%2Fapp%2Fdetails%2FCHRG-108hhrg89546%2FCHRG-108hhrg89546.
[153] 'A Nation at War; Bush and Blair at Camp David: "Acting Together in a Noble Purpose"', *The New York Times*, 28 March 2003, sec. World, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/28/world/a-nation-at-war-bush-and-blair-at-camp-david-acting-together-in-a-noble-purpose.html.

State Department held a briefing on the assessment of humanitarian assistance in Iraq. Andrew Natsios, administrator for the US Agency for International Development started his speech by saying the US made a donation of 200 million dollars to the World Food Program that same day. At the end of his speech, Natsios applauded the humanitarian response mechanism from US Government and states that it has come up to speed.[154] On March 25 additional funding for the Department of State was requested by President Bush. The additional funding was at first meant for military support, but the request also includes humanitarian relief and reconstruction. In his request, Bush emphasised the importance military support as well as the importance of humanitarian relief for liberating the Iraqi people and supporting them to build a free-market democratic Iraq. The Bush administration desired Iraq to become a democratic state, sharing the American values.[155] Just like Truman did during his presidency, Bush made humanitarian assistance central in his policy to spread democracy.

During the preparations for the war focus of humanitarian assistance and development assistance was mainly on long-term development. While planning for the humanitarian response in Iraq, most attention was given to how to deal with the population displacement. The Department of State and other international organisations expected that somewhere around 2.3 and 3 million Iraqis would be displaced during the combat operations. This did not happen, officials from USAID even state that the severe humanitarian crisis in Iraq that was anticipated during the planning process did not occur.[156] At least not in the first moths after the invasion. General Garner of the OHRA stated that there were humanitarian issues, but the good news was that they were able to help the Iraqis by taking care of their basic needs, while emphasising on long-term planning.[157] Short-term relief, what humanitarian relief in the first place was, did not have the priority and was implemented alongside other projects in Iraq.

[154] 'US State Department Briefing on Humanitarian Assistance to Iraq 2 Apr 2003 - Iraq', ReliefWeb, accessed 13 April 2022, https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/us-state-department-briefing-humanitarian-assistance-iraq-2-apr-2003.
[155] J. Dennis Hastert, 'A Request for 2003 Supplemental Appropriations to Support Department of Defense Operations in Iraq and to Strengthen the Capabilities of Our Friends and Allies Who Will Share the Burden of Military and Stabilization Activities', Pub. L. No. 108–55, 2003 (2003).
[156] House of Representatives, 'House Hearing, 108th Congress - Humanitarian Assistance Following Military Operations', 13 May 2003, 49.
[157] House of Representatives, Humanitarian Assistance Following Military Operations, 21–23.

3.2   Winning the Hearts and Minds, the spread of ideas, values, and norms.

Winning the "hearts and minds" is a phrase often heard in the context of the US invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq during the War on Terror.[158] "Winning the hearts and minds" is part of the American counterinsurgency strategies in Afghanistan and Iraq. According to the US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual, the phrase consists of two parts that can be defined as the following, ""Hearts" means persuading people that their best interests are served by COIN success. "Minds" means convincing them that the force can protect them and that resisting it is pointless."[159] "Hearts and minds" as part of the US counterinsurgency strategy does not define a specific set of activities, it is merely an endpoint at which the operation hopes to arrive. Essentially the winning of the "hearts and minds" is about changing the ideas of the Iraqi people.

During the war in Afghanistan humanitarian aid became part of these "hearts and minds" operations, based on the assumption that humanitarian aid could bring peace.[160] It was used to show the Afghani people that their intentions were good and that they were trustworthy and win over the people. While counterinsurgency is warfare, it is as much political as military. The outcome of the war in Afghanistan, but also the war in Iraq is depended on the relationship with the people. Humanitarian assistance and financial aid were used as a reward for those who do not support the insurgents. With winning the "hearts and minds" of the people, counterinsurgents try to convince the people better times are coming.[161] The winning of the hearts and minds specifically targets the people. Because implementing democracy is a bottom-up affair, it starts with convincing the people about the ideas and values.[162] The aim was that at the end of the war Iraq should be an American ally sharing the same political ideas and values, that is what winning the hearts and minds is according to

[158] Elizabeth Dickinson, 'A Bright Shining Slogan', *Foreign Policy* (blog), accessed 15 April 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/08/22/a-bright-shining-slogan/.

[159] Headquarters, Department of the Army, 'FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, C1: Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies' (Marine Corps Warfighting Publication, 2 June 2014), 191.

[160] 'Aid, Minds and Hearts: The Impact of Aid in Conflict Zones - Jan Rasmus Böhnke, Christoph Zürcher, 2013', 411, accessed 15 April 2022, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0738894213499486.

[161] Jamie A. Williamson, 'Using Humanitarian Aid to "Win Hearts and Minds": A Costly Failure?', *International Review of the Red Cross* 93, no. 884 (December 2011): 1040, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383112000380.

[162] Congress House of Representatives, 'House Hearing, 108th Congress - Iraq- Winning Hearts and Minds', Government, govinfo.gov (U.S. Government Printing Office, 15 June 2004), 69, https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-108hhrg96993/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.govinfo.gov%2Fapp%2Fdetails%2FCHRG-108hhrg96993%2FCHRG-108hhrg96993.

Danielle Pletka, vice president, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies at the American Enterprise Institute.[163]

Within the political discourse concerning the war in Iraq, there is often talk about the importance of convincing the Iraqi people about American ideas and values, and Iraq part of the democratic world. For example, Adam Smith, the chairman of terrorism, unconventional threats, and capabilities subcommittee, who during a hearing of the 110th Congress declared that the war was not only about military power and just simply fighting terrorism. According to him the war was about ideas, and when they were able to convince the Iraqi population of the American ideas the war would end. Additionally, Smith argues America had to deliver a better and broader message, about democracy, freedom, human rights, social openness, and economic opportunity, in order to change the values and ideas of the Iraqi people.[164] Following constructivist theory, ideas shape the norms in a country and norms again shape the behaviour of a state.[165] By stating that America wins the war when American ideas are accepted by the Iraqi population is ultimately an attempt to spread American norms throughout Iraq.

To reach the people, and to transmit the American values and ideas to the Iraqi population, civilian organisations played a central role in American counterinsurgency operations. Humanitarian organisations are part of these civilian organisations. Acting closer to the people, their initiated political, social, and economic programs are more valuable to address root problems of conflict. When focussing on durable reform non-military programs often are more adequate. COIN programs are fought among the populace. Therefore, these programs have the responsibility for the overall well-being of the people. This includes security from insurgents, crime, and violence, the maintenance of social and cultural institutions. But also, the provision for basic economic needs, and essentials such as water, electricity, sanitation, and medical care. Many of these activities are handed to civilian and humanitarian organisations because they bring expertise within their specific field.[166]

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[163] House of Representatives, Iraq- Winning Hearts and Minds, 69.

[164] Congress House of Representatives, 'House Hearing, 110th Congress - [H.A.S.C. No. 110-68] STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND THE BATTLE OF IDEAS: WINNING THE HEARTS AND MINDS IN THE GLOBAL WAR AGAINST TERRORISTS', Government, govinfo.gov (U.S. Government Printing Office, 11 July 2007), 2, https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-110hhrg43849/https%3A%2F%2Fwww.govinfo.gov%2Fapp%2Fdetails%2FCHRG-110hhrg43849%2FCHRG-110hhrg43849.

[165] Bellamy, 'Humanitarian Responsibilities and Interventionist Claims in International Society', 327.

[166] 'United States Government Manual (2004-2005) Edition - UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT', 2–2, accessed 8 February 2022, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVMAN-2004-06-01/html/GOVMAN-2004-06-01-Pg539.htm.
Williamson, 'Using Humanitarian Aid to "Win Hearts and Minds"', 1045.

3.3   The establishment of the CPA, the end of the ORHA.

During the summer of 2003, the ORHA became part of a newly established, but bigger organisation, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) led by Paul L. Bremer.[167] The CPA temporarily exercised the power of government.[168] With the establishment of the CPA, all the tasks of the ORHA were discontinued and were taken over by the CPA. This also meant that the tasks concerning humanitarian assistance became the responsibility of the CPA. Just like the ORHA, the CPA worked in a close relationship with the USAID. The USAID coordinated the missions in Iraq and the programs it supported with the CPA.[169] As argued by Barnett there are questions related to the broadening of the humanitarian practice. One of these questions is "who governs?", a question applicable to the CPA. Now that American humanitarian practice was part of the tasks of the CPA, more clarification was needed about the mandate of the CPA. The CPA was vested by the President with all executives, legislative, and judicial authority necessary to achieve the goal of creating the conditions in which the people of Iraq were able to determine their political future, facilitate economic recovery, and work on sustainable reconstruction and development. In a report to Congress, required under Section 1506 of the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003, an effort has been made to explain the duties and responsibilities of the CPA. While this document was quite clear and gave an in-depth explanation about the activities of the CPA. In practice the humanitarian practitioners had their complaints about the CPA. It was difficult for Iraqi civilians and national and international NGOs to access the CPA officials. Also, many of the CPA plans and policies lacked transparency, this undermined the trust of the Iraqi people.[170]

On July 18, 2003, retired General Garner of the ORHA, testified at a Congress hearing on the functioning of American humanitarian assistance in Iraq. It was more than two months after Bush declared the end of combat in Iraq. Nevertheless, stability did not yet return to Iraq and atrocities were still committed. While American officials claimed there was no humanitarian crisis at that point in time, there were many humanitarian issues that needed to be dealt with. Judging from Garner's words humanitarian assistance already, and would only

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[167] James Dobbins et al., 'Building the CPA', in *Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, n.d.), 8.
[168] James Dobbins et al., 11–13.
[169] 'USAID Accomplishments in Iraq Mar 2003 to Mar 2004 - Iraq', ReliefWeb, accessed 21 November 2021, https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/usaid-accomplishments-iraq-mar-2003-mar-2004.
[170] House of Representatives, 'House Hearing, 108th Congress - Humanitarian Assistance Following Military Operations', 18 July 2003, 113.

more, play a decisive role in acquiring stability in Iraq. This statement coming from someone with the position of Garner, shows that humanitarianism in Iraq did play a central role and it was widely believed it should be that way. However, this is not a surprising argument but completely in line with the American traditional use of humanitarian assistance. When analysing General Garner's words, his former important position at the ORHA must be taken into consideration, his views on the situation in Iraq mirrors the view of other important figures American in Iraq.[171]

Another example of the decisive role of humanitarian actors can be found in a question that was asked to Garner during the same hearing for Congress. Garner received the following question, "what happens if we have an election and they elect a restrictive government, restrictive towards women, such as the Taliban, or restrictive in other ways towards people?"[172] He answered by saying that this is something you control with a constitution. Followed by stating that the US has a great constitution and that he hoped the Iraqi population that they would get a constitution equally as great. Because the Garner was head of the ORHA, supposed to strictly be a humanitarian and reconstruction organisation, this statement on the political future of Iraq is surprising. The shaping of the political future of Iraq was not officially part of their tasks. Therefore, the question asked and the answer that Garner gave, reflected that the American humanitarian enterprise grew broader. Furthermore, the political discourse showed that politicians believed that humanitarian programs should have a role in shaping the political future of Iraq.

3.4   Conclusion

During the months before the invasion of Iraq, humanitarian organisations were actively involved by the US government to prepare for the war. As established, the active involvement of humanitarian organisations was not surprising, but in line with the Wilsonian tradition. However, the pre-war preparations to the extent that was seen in the Iraqi case were new. New American governmental organisations were established in preparation for a humanitarian crisis in Iraq. These organisations like the ORHA did become of a part of the Department of Defense or worked in close cooperation with the USAID, which worked in close cooperation with State Department.

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[171] House of Representatives, 'House Hearing, 108th Congress - Humanitarian Assistance Following Military Operations', 13 May 2003, 19.
[172] House of Representatives, Humanitarian Assistance Following Military Operations, 26.

The ORHA was established to coordinate the reconstruction and humanitarian assistance efforts in Iraq, but the organisation often felt constrained to the needs of combat. In the early stages after the US-led invasion, Garner decided the humanitarian crisis was not as big as expected before. Therefore, the organisation decided to focus the humanitarian assistance on long-term development. This meant broadening the scope of the American humanitarian enterprise. With the establishment of the CPA, American humanitarianism again became part of a broader focus. The CPA functioned as a temporarily governmental body in Iraq until replaced by an elected Iraqi government. And according to the political discourse surrounding the future political situation in Iraq, this meant a constitution aligned with the American norms.

"Winning the Hearts and Minds" operations used civilian organisations like humanitarian organisations to work closer to the people. They were better equipped to address the root causes of conflict through political, social, and economic programs. According to, American official the war was not only a war against insurgents and terrorism. It was a war about ideas. By convincing the Iraqi people of the American ideas the US could win the War. Following constructivist theory, ideas will shape the values and norms. Stating that the war was about ideas, makes it evident that American ideas and values needed to be transmitted to Iraq. Because humanitarian organisations can function as norm-entrepreneurs, the notion of the war being about ideas gave the humanitarian organisations a central role in the American strategy.

So, answering the question, what underlying structures, ideas, and can be identified in the broadening American humanitarian enterprise in Iraq? It can be said that the underlying structure of American humanitarianism, being the Wilsonian tradition, was still visible in humanitarian assistance in Iraq. Also, the spread of ideas and values seems to play a decisive role in US humanitarian policy in Iraq. The war being identified as a war about ideas makes the role of humanitarians more important. Humanitarians were able to address the Iraqi people something the military could not achieve.

4.   NGOs and the American humanitarian enterprise, not all share the same ideas.

The last chapter demonstrated the broadening of the American humanitarian enterprise in Iraq and the values, ideas, and norms that formed the underlying structure of the American humanitarian practice. Humanitarianism in Iraq did play a prominent role in the counterinsurgency programs of the US because the humanitarian programs could get closer to the people. And because the US did see the war not only as a war about military power but also as a war about ideas, the interaction with the Iraqi population was of great importance for the outcome of the war. This chapter addresses the humanitarian NGOs working in Iraq. NGOs were a crucial part of the American humanitarian enterprise. The American coordination of humanitarian aid in Iraq was not effective and caused for miscommunication and a lack of information within the humanitarian sector. Not all organisations that were active in Iraq agreed with the American procedures concerning humanitarian practice. But in order to deliver the appropriate humanitarian assistance, all active organisations in Iraq should effectively work together. Iraq after the US-led invasion was a highly politicised context, therefore did the NGOs that were active in Iraq work from a position of power.[173] In emergencies, conflict, or a political tensed situations the power of NGOs can play a decisive role. This chapter will address the role of NGOs in Iraq and the extent to which NGOs were part of the political goals of the US following the question, how does the role of NGOs in Iraq reflect the values and ideas of American humanitarianism in Iraq? As already established, there was a difference in humanitarian tradition between American humanitarianism and humanitarianism in general. Therefore, this chapter will also make a distinction between American NGOs and non-American NGOs. This chapter will start with an analysis of American NGOs. This part will address the attitude of the US government towards NGOs and how this was received by the NGOs. The next part will address the counterreaction of non-American NGOs active in Iraq. The chapter will end with an analysis of how national and especially international aid was perceived by the Iraqi population.

As the previous chapter, the primary sources that are used are briefings of the US on the humanitarian assistance in Iraq. In these briefings the developments of the humanitarian efforts are explained and insights to the distribution of funding were given. Another primary

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[173] Donini, 'The Far Side', 230.

source that will be introduced in this chapter is a statement from MSF on the efforts to stay independent from the US. Also, an opinion piece written by a former humanitarian worker will give an insight on how American humanitarianism was perceived at the time.

4.1 American NGOs as norm entrepreneurs.

On a global scale it was estimated that NGOs received about a quarter of their funding directly from governmental humanitarian funds. Taking the numbers for the US only, this percentage is upwards 60%, which is exceptionally high. In 2002, the major NGOs receive the bigger part of their funding from the US government. For example, the established NGOs CARE and Save the Children US received 50% of their funding from the US government.[174] Without governmental funding these NGOs would simply not exist anymore. The bilateral funding of NGOs could make them reliant on their donor and therefore less able to move freely. It would tie their humanitarian goals to the political goals of their donor country. [175] NGOs highly dependent on one or two donors feel pressured to act in a certain way and feel pushed towards following a certain agenda.[176]

On April 2, 2003, during a US State Department Briefing on humanitarian assistance to Iraq the amount of American funding for NGOs at that stage of the war was announced. The amount was a sum of $20 million divided into grants for different American NGOs. The grants were handed to the following NGOs, $4 million to CARE USA, $4 million to Save the Children US, $4 million to International Medical Corps, $3 million to Mercy Corps international and $2.1 million to Air Serve International. These amounts were just the beginning of the amount of funding the NGOs would eventually receive from the US government.[177] The NGOs that received these grants from the US government also have a close relationship with the USAID.[178] Examples of American-based NGOs that were working in Iraq are American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Church World Service (CWS), Lutheran World Relief (LWR), Physicians for Human Rights

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[174] Abby Stoddard, 'Humanitarian NGOs: Challenges and Trends', 2.
[175] Susan Merrill, 'Foreign Aid in the National Interest: Promoting Freedom, Security, and Opportunity' (Washington DC: U.S agency for international development, 2002), 116.
[176] Tina Wallace, 'NGO Dilemmas: Trojan Horses for Global Neoliberalism?', *Socialist Register* 40 (2004): 215–16, https://socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/article/view/5818.
[177] 'US State Department Briefing on Humanitarian Assistance to Iraq 2 Apr 2003 - Iraq'.
[178] U.S. Agency for International Development, 'Iraq- Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance: Factsheet No 63, Fiscal Year 2003' (U.S. Department of State, 4 September 2003).

(PHR), US Committee for Refugees, World Resources Institute (WRI), and World Vision International.[179]

In 2001 the US-based NGO InterAction stated that humanitarian assistance, instead of just offering aid in immediate need, assistance should also contribute to sustainable peace and development. This is in line with the statements of Secretary of State Powell, where he emphasized the position of NGOs able to broaden their activities and become a more substantial part of American foreign policy.[180] According to a survey held by Greg Hansen on the workings of humanitarian NGOs in Iraq during the years after the American invasion the Wilsonian NGOs, thus mostly American NGOs, became part of the "with us or against us" narrative of the Global War on Terror. Therefore, these humanitarian organisations have behaved in a certain way, which made them cut out important elements of humanitarian practice such as working in contact with the "other". In this case "other" meant the Iraqi combatants that were harmed in conflict.[181]

Constructivist theory emphasises on the transmission of norms through state or non-state actors. According to Finnemore and Sinnink NGOs can function as entities through which norms could be disputed. When an NGO is active the organisation can act as a norm entrepreneur, by introducing the norms to the population.[182] In this case, American NGOs have a central role within the counterinsurgency programs of the US and are partly funded by the US government. Because of this high dependency on government funding, the humanitarian agenda of many American NGOs was tied to the political agenda of the US government.[183] American values that were highly stated on the political agenda, were therefore also highly stated on the humanitarian agenda. After the fall of the regime of Saddam Hussein, Iraq could be seen as a state in transition with a limited statehood. In this condition, international actors such as the US or NGOs can push norm adoption in Iraq. In this situation, where the statehood was very limited, norms can spread more easily than in situations with a strong statehood. American NGOs that were present in Iraq were part of the international institution in the position to push norms in the country. Right after the fall of the regime of Saddam Hussein, the only organised bodies of NGOs were the US-funded NGOs

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[179] Coipuram, 'Iraq: United Nations and Humanitarian Aid Organizations', 9.
[180] Susan Merrill, 'Foreign Aid in the National Interest: Promoting Freedom, Security, and Opportunity', 109.
[181] Greg Hansen, 'The Ethos–Practice Gap: Perceptions of Humanitarianism in Iraq', International Review of the Red Cross, 90, no. 869 (March 2008): 126.
[182] Simone Tholens and Lisa Groß, 'Diffusion, Contestation and Localisation in Post-War States: 20 Years of Western Balkans Reconstruction', *Journal of International Relations and Development* 18, no. 3 (July 2015): 254–55, https://doi.org/10.1057/jird.2015.21.
[183] Abby Stoddard, 'Humanitarian NGOs: Challenges and Trends', 2.

that were already involved in the planning of the war. The coalition forces, led by the US started to have meetings with the NGOs working in Iraq.[184]

4.2   Non-American NGOs in Iraq, different ideas, values, and norms.

With an eye on the beginning US-led invasion of Iraq, the UN withdrew its humanitarian workers and other staff from Iraq. Included with this withdrawal was the suspension of the UN mandates. Programs such as the Oil for Food program came to a halt.[185] With the withdrawal of the UN from Iraq, the only proper coordinating body for humanitarian response had left the country. As mentioned before, the coordination of the humanitarian assistance in Iraq was handed to the occupying county, the US. They organised the humanitarian response through small structures of NGOs and the civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) also started to initiate humanitarian assistance. Before the war, the NGOs that were part of these small structures were already part of this joint contingency planning. Not long after the fall of the regime of Saddam Hussein, the Coalition forces held meetings for all NGOs that were present in Iraq. For the active NGOs, these meetings were important because they were the only places where they could obtain information about the situation in Iraq and the plans of the coalition.[186]

The Iraq war was part of the Global War on Terror just like the war in Afghanistan, that started after the events of 9/11. As earlier established did the events of 9/11 coerce a deepening of the politicisation of the American humanitarianism. The war in Afghanistan, as well as the Iraq war, took place after 9/11, therefore role of humanitarianism in the American strategy for both wars had undergone the same deepening of practices. A brief examination of the American humanitarian practice in Afghanistan will be beneficial to contextualise the findings in Iraq. In Afghanistan humanitarian assistance on its whole was integrated with politics. Even the UN was not seen as a neutral and independent acting organisation, the Afghan population directly linked the UN to the US and its allies. The only organisation that was indeed able to keep and promote the humanitarian principles and work in a neutral matter was the ICRC. For other humanitarian programs in the country the close cooperation between humanitarian assistance programs and politics meant that they became part of so-called

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[184] Greg Hansen, 'Independent Evaluation: NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq (NCCI)' (Canada: Independent Consultant, March 2007), 11.
[185] 'CNN.Com - U.N. to Withdraw Iraq Inspectors - Mar. 17, 2003', accessed 7 May 2022, http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/17/sprj.irq.kuwait.un/index.html.
[186] Greg Hansen, 'Independent Evaluation: Iraq NGO Coordination and Security Office', 2004, 10.

'joined-up' approaches. Through these 'joined-up' approaches humanitarian assistance, politics, and the military, all worked following the same agenda.[187] In Afghanistan the involvement of politics in humanitarian assistance, created a situation in which the interest of donor states influenced the aid delivered by humanitarians. Therefore, humanitarian principles were compromised. An important take from this situation is that because of the influence of the donor states, humanitarian assistance was not applied based on needs anymore. [188] In Iraq many NGOs feared that like in Afghanistan, they had to compromise their principles and that the influence of donor states grew.

A small group of NGOs refused to work with funds from government that were involved in military efforts in Iraq. They felt that they should have the freedom to only intervene based on the needs of the Iraqi people and not on the needs of the occupying power the US.[189] This was partly due to the pre-war reconstruction of post-war Iraq in which the US actively tried to involve humanitarian. Consequently, not all NGOs agreed with this roll they were supposed to play in the invasion and tried to distance themselves. For example, the NGO Oxfam stated to not accept donor money from belligerent countries. By refusing the donations from belligerent countries Oxfam tried to protect their impartiality in the war in Iraq. Oxfam was anxious that taking money from belligerent countries would make their humanitarian program a tool in the foreign policy of any of the belligerent countries.[190] In 2002 Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), months before the US-led invasion, addressed the issue of humanitarianism becoming a part of international relations and a political tool. MSF is highly concerned about the transformation of humanitarianism. They fear their loss of impartiality and the loss of ability to help those in need without any preconditions.[191] According to the NGO did the active involvement of NGOs, during the preparations for the invasion of Iraq, weaken the credibility of humanitarian organisations before their activities in Iraq even

[187] Antonio Donini, 'Afghanistan: Humanitarianism under Threat', n.d., 2.
[188] Mohammed Haneef Atmar, 'Politicisation of Humanitarian Aid and Its Consequences for Afghans', *Disasters* 25, no. 4 (2001): 323–25, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-7717.00181.
[189] Alexandre Carle and Hakim Chkam, 'Humanitarian Action in the New Security Environment: Policy and Operational Implications in Iraq', HPG Background Paper (ODI: Overseas Development Institute, September 2006), 7.
[190] 'Iraq: Oxfam to Refuse Money from Belligerents during Any War - Iraq', ReliefWeb, accessed 13 May 2022, https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/iraq-oxfam-refuse-money-belligerents-during-any-war.
[191] 'Humanitarian Action Must Not Be a Tool of Political Interests | MSF', Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) International, accessed 28 January 2022, https://www.msf.org/humanitarian-action-must-not-be-tool-political-interests.

began.[192] It is important to note that during a conflict like the Iraq war humanitarian activity can not be completely free of politics. However, organisations like MSF, ICRC, and Oxfam tried to limit the influence of politics as much as possible.

In the vision of American policymakers, humanitarian assistance was an essential part of their strategy for reaching their political goals.[193] However MSF does not agree with this role, as they repeatedly stated, "We are not actors in the war on terrorism."[194] The organisation had serious doubts about the possibility to offer independent humanitarian assistance in Iraq. They blamed the Western officials who constantly tried to incorporate the humanitarian efforts into their war efforts.[195] MSF was not the only NGO with concerns about the US, and how the US actively involved humanitarian actors into their policy in Iraq. During a hearing on humanitarian and reconstruction efforts after the combat had ended, Serge Duss, the Director of Public Policy and Advocacy of World Vision US gave a statement. Duss testified that World Vision and other NGOs that were active in Iraq have been uncomfortable with the degree of influence the US Military had exercised through the HOC and the ORHA. But not only the military control was a concern. Also, the instrumentalization of the humanitarian NGOs was concerning to them worrying. The US should have handed at least a part of its tasks to the UN. The situation in which the US as occupying power coordinated humanitarian assistance in Iraq jeopardised the humanitarian principles.[196]

When in October 2003 the situation in Iraq worsened and multiple attacks throughout the country killed at least 34 people and injured at least 200 people. These events made the work of NGOs very dangerous, and some NGOs overthought the idea to leave Iraq until the situation was stable enough to return. The reaction of the US Secretary of State Powell towards the concerns of the NGO community was for MSF but also for other NGOs concerning. Powell stated the following, "Their work is needed. And if they are driven out the terrorists win".[197] Because this statement comes from a highly ranked

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[192] 'Humanitarian Action Under Attack: Reflections on the Iraq War', Doctors Without Borders - USA, accessed 24 March 2022, https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/humanitarian-action-under-attack-reflections-iraq-war.

[193] Lischer, 'Military Intervention and the Humanitarian Force Multiplier', 111.

[194] 'MSF Statement on Independent Humanitarian Aid in Iraq - Iraq', ReliefWeb, accessed 13 May 2022, https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/msf-statement-independent-humanitarian-aid-iraq.

[195] 'MSF Statement on Independent Humanitarian Aid in Iraq - Iraq'.

[196] House of Representatives, 'House Hearing, 108th Congress - Humanitarian Assistance Following Military Operations', 18 July 2003, 117.

[197] 'NGOs refuse to respond to US pressure', The New Humanitarian, 28 October 2003, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/fr/node/191506.

American, the language that was used was not neutral. This statement on its own did say something about the situation but it also actively influenced the situation. With this statement Powell, again, politicised the work of NGOs. Besides, he directly involved the NGOs on the side of the US, while humanitarian NGOs should not operate on just one side of the conflict. The statement Powell made sparked the discontent of humanitarian NGOs because each time it was implied that NGOs took the side of the US in the conflict in Iraq, it became more difficult and dangerous to deliver humanitarian aid.[198]

Not only the attitude of the US led to concerns for NGOs, but it was also impossible for NGOs to work under the coordination of the CIMIC or the US troops. Because the US-led coordination had led to blur the lines between military and humanitarian NGOs. Working under the CIMIC or the US troops would have ended the neutrality, impartiality, and independence of the NGOs. [199] A group of, mainly, healthcare NGOs started to have a couple of ad-hoc meetings. The initiative quickly got the attention of NGOs in other sectors. The select group of NGOs grew significantly into a network of around eighty international NGOs in the beginning. The network would go by the name the NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq (NCCI). Later Iraqi NGOs also became member of the NCCI.[200] The NCCI reflected four prominent objectives. The first objective, the NCCI plays the role of a national NGO forum and acts as the coordinating body for information exchange regarding the general and sectoral issues and activities. The second objective was to ensure the humanitarian needs in Iraq were well communicated to the decision-makers in Iraq. The third objective, the NCCI was meant to provide support for NGOs in Iraq. And the last objective, of the NCCI, was meant to increase the capacity of Iraqi NGOs.[201] To summarise this, the establishment of the NCCI was a reaction to the American humanitarian enterprise and what they felt was missing in the American coordination of the humanitarian response. The organisation was needed to defend the humanitarian space, both from the conflict itself but also from the influences of belligerent parties.[202]

[198] 'MSF Statement on Independent Humanitarian Aid in Iraq - Iraq'.
[199] 'Post2003 - (NCCI) | NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq', accessed 7 May 2022, https://www.ncciraq.org/en/archive/ncci-latest-publications/itemlist/tag/post2003.
[200] George Dimitriu1, 'Interrogation, Coercion and Torture: Dutch Debates and Experiences after 9/11', *Intelligence and National Security* 28, no. 4 (1 August 2013): 10–11, https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2012.699287.
[201] Claudia Rodriguez, 'The Experience of the NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq (NCCI)' (Khartoum: NGO Field Coordination Groups, September 2004), 15.
[202] 'Post2003 - (NCCI) | NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq'.

4.3   The NCCI, against American policy.

The NCCI filled the gaps that were left after the US invasion.[203] For example, when in 2006 the international society had the idea the reconstruction in Iraq was going well, the NCCI did not share this idea. According to the NCCI, the humanitarian situation in Iraq only worsened due to the "sectarian violence" in Iraq. The difference between how the international community and the NCCI regarding the situation in Iraq see is due to the difference in focus. For the US developing Iraq into a democratic country was a priority on the political agenda. The fact that on January 30, 2005, the Iraqi population voted for the National Assembly was perceived as a step forward in the reconstruction of Iraq.[204] The NCCI on the other hand was mainly concerned with the humanitarian situation in the country. And during the lead-up to the elections, violence, and insecurity flared up. And a year after the first election the NCCI questioned if democracy could be celebrated while the atrocities in the country worsened.[205] From the weekly updates of the NCCI in 2006 it became clear that the NCCI lacked the trust that the US officials would comprehend the severity of the situation. According to the NCCI the reports of the Bush administration on the reconstruction did not represent the situation. The NCCI even called it the "occupation propaganda".[206] Here it becomes clear that the NCCI did not feel American humanitarian organisations were able to adequately address the situation in Iraq.

Other organisations also stepped up after the US-led invasion of Iraq. The established NGO the ICRC for instance developed a reporting system during the conflict. This reporting system made it possible to inform the rest of the world, not controlled by belligerent countries. The organisation emphasised the importance of clarity and transparency through 'real time' reporting, it avoided commentary that could prove embarrassing to the US-led coalition.[207] Just like the establishment of the of the NCCI the efforts of the ICRC were a reaction to the American policy in Iraq, not just American humanitarian policy.

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[203] Hansen, 'Independent Evaluation: Iraq NGO Coordination and Security Office'.
[204] Andrzej Kapiszewski et al., 'The Iraqi Elections and Their Consequences. Power-Sharing, a Key to the Country's Political Future', Looking into Iraq (European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), 2005), 13, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep07015.5.
[205] 'Iraq: NCCI's Weekly Highlight 23 Mar 2006 - Iraq | ReliefWeb', accessed 20 June 2022, https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/iraq-nccis-weekly-highlight-23-mar-2006.
[206] 'Iraq: NCCI's Weekly Highlight 09 Mar 2006 - Iraq | ReliefWeb', accessed 20 June 2022, https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/iraq-nccis-weekly-highlight-09-mar-2006.
[207] Yves Sandoz, 'The International Committee of the Red Cross as Guardian of International Humanitarian Law - ICRC', 17:27:18.0, https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/misc/about-the-icrc-311298.htm.

Within the humanitarian sector the American policy on humanitarian assistance in Iraq was a highly debated topic that received a lot of criticism. The popularity of the Americans declined and in the humanitarian field they were not always welcomed. Especially after the attacks on the UN and the ICRC working together with the Americans was not preferred by a lot of NGOs. In an interview with the New York Times, Heide Feldmann, the director of the NGO Help, was clear about working with the Americans. As he said, "The closer you get to the Americans the more dangerous it becomes."[208] Help, is an NGO that offers humanitarian assistance and development assistance. The NGO tries to work together with the local organisations, helping them with the occurring emergency but also prior to the and throughout the disaster life circle.[209] Feldman was active in Iraq, he saw first-hand how humanitarian relief was coordinated in Iraq and what the consequences were. According to him, the line between humanitarian aid-worker and military was faded and not obvious for the Iraqi people. anti-American sentiment in the country started to grow under the population. This made working close to the Americans as a humanitarian organisation a dangerous practice.[210] This Anti-American sentiment could also be identified in the humanitarian sector. For instance, in the case of the NCCI, there was an outside perception that the organisation had an anti-American character. The NCCI was very conscious of its status as being neutral, impartial, and independent, and was formed as a reaction to the influence of the US government and US agencies in the humanitarian response. NCCI members were critical of the war, the behaviour of combatants, the coalition, and the CPA. The NCCI members kept their distance from the mixing of NGO staff and coalition military in a social setting due to their 'no fraternisation' policy with respect to combatants. And a visit of the NCCI to the HOC was criticised by some members as 'pro-Americanism'.[211] And while this was true that the NCCI members were critical of the US coordination of humanitarian relief, the organisation was not anti-American per se. Even some critical American-based organisations could find a place as members of the NCCI.

[208] Interview: Olaf Ihlau and Der Spiegel, 'In the Line of Fire', *The New York Times*, 3 November 2003, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/03/international/europe/in-the-line-of-fire.html.
[209] 'What We Do', Help.NGO, accessed 20 June 2022, https://www.help.ngo/what-we-do.
[210] Ihlau and Spiegel, 'In the Line of Fire'.
[211] Claudia Rodriguez, 'NGO Field Coordination Groups', 2004, 32.

4.3   The Iraqi perception, a different humanitarian discourse.

While non-American NGOs and the NCCI just focus on maintaining their distance from American involvement no actual 'anti-American sentiment' can be identified. This was different for the Iraqi people. While there was no rejection of the humanitarian practice in Iraq, there was however a country-wide consensus on how humanitarian relief should look. The Iraqi ideas about humanitarianism did not match the humanitarian relief they received. [212] Under the Iraqi population discontent with the humanitarian practice in their country became widespread. The distinctions between the different actors working in Iraq blurred because of the lack of compliance with the principles of humanitarian actors. Therefore, Iraqis were left confused and angry. According to what they read or saw in the media, a vast amount of money was attributed to Iraq, but all they were left with were unfinished construction projects, unreliable electricity supply, high costs for cooking fuel, and bad school reconstructions.[213] Gordon West, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Asia and the Near East, US Agency for International Development, gave a good example of the confusion among the Iraqi population during a hearing for congress, "You will see parents who are thrilled that they have power and electricity and they will be furious because their daughter comes home and says I cannot go to school today, it is unsafe to go through the area."[214]

However, the confusion about the delivered aid was not the only problem for the Iraqis, there was also a strong believe among the population that all governmental and international assistance efforts were corrupt. After the invasion, many hoped for a better future. But because of the blurred distinctions between military, political, commercial roles, and the humanitarian roles it became difficult to distinguish the activities of all the different actors. The expected improvement of the daily life did not take place as previously expected, leaving the Iraqis with the lack of living essentials. The disappointment of the Iraqis in the Coalition and the humanitarian assistance they were coordinating resulted in a lack of trust.[215]

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[212] Greg Hansen, 'Perceptions of Humanitarianism in Iraq', n.d., 3.
[213] Hansen 'Perceptions of Humanitarianism in Iraq',, 3.
[214] House of Representatives, 'House Hearing, 108th Congress - Iraq', 69.
[215] Greg Hansen, 'Coming to Terms with the Humanitarian Imperative in Iraq: Humanitarian Agenda 2015 Briefing Paper.' (Medford: The Feinstein International Center, January 2007), 17.

4.4   Conclusion

As this chapter discussed, NGOs did play a vital role within the American humanitarian enterprise. Relating the role of NGOs as norm entrepreneurs to the notion of the Iraq war being a war about ideas and values places them central within the counterinsurgency policy of the US. In a country without a strong statehood, such as Iraq after the US invasion, norms can be easily transmitted. Especially the NGOs that joined the war efforts of the US before the invasion to prepare for the reconstruction of Iraq, had noticeably less problems with the alignment of the American political agenda and their work. However, not all NGOs were comfortable with the positions they were given by the US. They criticised the continuous effort of US officials to make humanitarian NGOs part of the war effort. They stated that it would compromise their security and their principles. They felt trapped in the Global War on Terror narrative, and this made it seem like they sided with the US and its allies.

Once NGOs were able to start their work in Iraq, they did face some troubles with the US as the coordinator of the humanitarian response. With the absence of the UN, the only organising body with an actual humanitarian mandate all coordinative tasks were for the occupying country. Some NGOs did complain about the lack of communication from the US and started their own joined organisation the NCCI. The establishment of the NCCI can really be seen as a reaction to the US as a coordinating body of humanitarian assistance in Iraq. By creating the NCCI the NGOs tried to distance themselves from the US. They used their own sources for information and looked for their own donations to be able to effectively address the humanitarian situation in Iraq. The difference between the focus of the US and the NCCI became visible during the sectarian violence in 2006. Because democracy in Iraq was an important point on the American political agenda and in 2005 there were the first elections in Iraq for the General Assembly, the rebuilding of Iraq in the eyes of the Americans was taking steps forward. But because the NCCI have its main focus on humanitarian assistance, they did disagree. The sectarian violence did cause many deaths and injuries and therefore worsened the humanitarian situation.

Also, for the Iraqi people, the functioning of the American humanitarian response was a cause of discontent. The humanitarian assistance they received did not meet up to their ideas about humanitarianism. Furthermore, the confusion was caused by the promise of improvement and the money that was supposedly brought into the country for reconstruction, but eventually the lack of actual improvement. It was the cause for distrust and anti-Americanism throughout the whole Iraqi population.

To come back to the question asked in the introduction of this chapter, how does the role of NGOs in Iraq reflect the values and ideas of American humanitarianism in Iraq? The answer can be quite simple, the NGOs that were part of the American humanitarian enterprise were acting as norm entrepreneurs, using the lack of statehood as an advantage to spread the American ideas and values. The NGOs that did not agree with the US and the role the country played as a coordinator of humanitarian assistance did try to limit their actions to just humanitarian relief.

5.   Conclusion.

The use of constructivist theory has placed the emphasis on values, ideas, and norms throughout this thesis. By focussing on the importance of values, ideas, and norms and the role they played within US humanitarianism and US policy throughout the years, it can be established that the changes in American humanitarianism are not as simplistic as often described. The analysis of the ideas, values, and norms in American humanitarianism and American strategy in a historical perspective it has shown that while significant changes in American humanitarianism could be identified after 9/11, defining it as a watershed moment humanitarian practice does not suffice in the American case. It suits the situation more to speak of a moment after which the practice of the politicisation of humanitarianism deepened.

Humanitarianism did, during the First World War, the interwar period, the Second World War, and the Cold war have central role in American strategy. For example, Truman did us humanitarianism to spread democracy in his time as president. Bush used the American humanitarian enterprise as a tool to reform Iraq into a democratic country. It was Kennedy who during his presidency emphasised the importance of sharing ideas between countries to make sure a country would not fall for communism. And in 2003 Adams Smith stated that the Iraq war was a war about ideas and values. To win the war the Iraqi people had to be convinced of the American ideas, values, and norms. This continuation of the notion of the importance of sharing ideas resulted in Iraq in the "Winning the hearts and minds" operations. "Winning the hearts and minds" operation highly depended on the civilian organisations, thus humanitarians organisations. The centrality of the humanitarian organisations within the American strategy was of great importance because the humanitarian organisations could work as norm entrepreneurs.

The primary sources in this thesis mainly create an idea about how the political discourse surrounding humanitarianism was shaped. Critical discourse analysis does emphasise the importance of external relations and the historical background of the text, so the context of the text is important. The political discourse on humanitarianism in the primary sources showed that American officials did see humanitarianism as something broader than just humanitarianism. Barnetts' concept of humanitarian governance does cover parts of the activities that were expected of humanitarian practice. For example, in a hearing for Congress did it become clear, due to questions about the political future of Iraq, that it was expected by politicians that humanitarian organisations would play a decisive role in the political future of Iraq. Also, through the political discourse, NGOs were actively integrated in the Global War

on Terror narrative. The statements of Powell, in which he emphasised on the importance of the work of NGOs in the war, consequently made the NGOs side with the US. Therefore, the result was that NGOs in the field were expected to be part of the American humanitarian enterprise. Identifying the broadening of humanitarianism within different aspects of the field does imply that humanitarian governance, how Barnett describes it, would be a more fitting description for the humanitarian response in Iraq than just humanitarianism.

However, not all humanitarian organisations did feel comfortable with this central role within the American counterinsurgency strategy. These organisations tried to work without the support of the US and other belligerent countries. The establishment of the NCCI can be seen as a reaction to the American humanitarian enterprise. So, in the first place these NGO did not agree with how the US coordinated the humanitarian response in Iraq, they also felt that they did not get enough information. Following the years after the establishment of the NCCI the network of NGO connected to the organisation grew, and some local NGOs joined. The difference between the American humanitarian enterprise and the NCCI did become clear during the sectarian violence in 2006. Because the US focused on the spread of values and democracy, they could, after the first elections in 2005, conclude the situation was improved. However, the NCCI did focus on the humanitarian situation in Iraq, subsequently they could only conclude the situation in Iraq was deteriorating.

While this thesis has brought some new insights to the debate, there are some implications to acknowledge. The primary sources used in this research are primarily Western sources. Therefore, the perspective of this thesis is restricted to a Western view of humanitarianism in Iraq. In order to give another perspective, this research used the reports on the NCCI, and oral history studies on the Iraqi perspective on American humanitarianism. And while these sources did give another perspective, the lack of non-Wester sources would have broadened the variety of perspectives on American humanitarianism. When future research on this topic would be conducted it would certainly benefit from using non-Wester sources. This research could for example benefit from the insights that an oral history approach would give.

To answer the question stated in the introduction, how did politicised US humanitarianism play a role in the rebuilding of Iraq in the period 2003-2009? The question can be answered by stating that the humanitarian assistance that was part of the American humanitarian enterprise was politicised. For American humanitarianism, this was not a new phenomenon but a continuation of the Wilsonian humanitarian tradition. However, because of the impact the events of 9/11 had, the relationship between politics and humanitarianism did

in fact deepen. And because American officials see the war in Iraq as a war about ideas and values, the way to win the war is through convincing the Iraqi people of the American values. Humanitarianism can transmit norms therefore, humanitarian organisations can function as norm entrepreneurs. By making the war about ideas, the humanitarian organisations were given a central role in the counterinsurgency strategy of the US.

This thesis did address the politicisation of American humanitarianism and how, because of the importance of humanitarian practice in the spread of ideas, values, and norms humanitarian assistance did have a central role in the American strategy for the reconstruction and rebuilding of Iraq. This thesis also established that American humanitarianism in Iraq received criticism from as well international NGOs as the Iraqi population. The establishment of the NCCI was a reaction to the malfunctions of the American humanitarian coordination and the Wilsonian humanitarian tradition. However, politics have always been a part of American humanitarianism, and the other way around. While throughout the years many presidents have influenced American humanitarianism, it is best to speak of continuity in this policy. But now that politicised humanitarianism has been a topic of debate for the last twenty years, this might have implications for the humanitarian policies of future presidents. Therefore, the question remains, can future American presidents use humanitarianism in such a political way as been done in the past now that the politicisation of humanitarianism has been criticised by so many scholars and NGOs? And can humanitarianism still function on the scale as we have seen in the past without the involvement of politics?

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