

THE BLUEPRINT: ROOSEVELT, NEHRU, AND
INDIA'S FRAUGHT FIRST ENCOUNTER WITH THE
UNITED STATES

MASTER THESIS

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INTRODUCTION

The Second World War was a period in Global History that saw geopolitics undertake marked shifts. The global political order was drastically altered upon the conclusion of the conflict for a multitude of reasons. What the war did was cause shifts in the order that was omnipresent around the world. One of the marked changes brought about by the conclusion of WWII was the end of colonialism. The war added a new and devastating element to colonial rule, with colonies being utilised as bottomless breeding grounds for soldiers, food, and other wartime supplies. In turn, this resulted in the wrecking of colonial economies the world over, leaving several populations around the world in states of severe deprivation. Therefore, as the war drew to a close, calls for decolonisation and nationalist movements for independence became increasingly fervent across the globe.

One colony in which there was a determined and pressing nationalist struggle was in the ‘Crown Jewel’ of Britain’s colonial empire; India.

This paper, however, will not examine Britain’s relationship with India. Instead, it will look at the relationship between India and the world’s foremost global power, The United States. The United States and India have endured a tenuous political relationship for decades, one that has been largely shaped and dictated by the association that the two nations had with one another during the Second World War and in the years that followed Indian independence. The majority of the historical examination of the relationship has simplified the elements and nature of Indo-American interaction through the years. The relationship between the two parties in actuality, was and is far more complex. This paper will examine the nature of Indo-American relations from the Second World War through to the end of Harold Truman’s presidency. It will conduct an examination of American action and (in)action towards what this paper will refer to

as the ‘Indian question’ during the period of the Indian independence struggle. Following this, it will look at the representations and expectations that American interest and influence toward the Indian Question constructed, and then seek to understand the Indian reaction to these representations and expectations. Through an examination of this largely forgotten period of history, this thesis will attempt to cultivate a gainful understanding of how the Indo-American relationship was framed and created, and why interaction between the two parties transpired in the manner that it did, ultimately seeking to understand how this period structured the Indo-American relationship in the years that followed.

To create a substantial depth of analysis, the thesis will specifically examine the role of American President Franklin D. Roosevelt in constructing a new representation and blueprint of an independent India through his dealings with issues surrounding the question of Indian independence. It will study how these dealings during the war served to structure the relationship that an independent India, and its key governmental actor at the time Jawaharlal Nehru had with the United States in the early 1950s.

RESEARCH QUESTION AND SUB-QUESTIONS

The research question for this paper will be as follows: **How did American representations of India structure the relationship between the period of 1941 through to the initial years of Indian independence in the 1950s?**

The broadness of this question is clear to see. Therefore, it is necessary to establish certain sub-questions that will form the basis of this research paper. The paper avoids delving into deep considerations of America and India's relationships with Britain and instead focuses primarily on how the determinations of two primary actors served to structure and dictate the nature of the relationship between the two countries. Therefore, the two sub-questions that this paper will answer will be as follows:

- A) Through his interaction with the question of a colonised India's independence in the 1940s, what representations did Franklin Roosevelt create of an independent India, and how did these representations manifest and entrench themselves?
- B) How did the key governmental actor of an independent India Jawaharlal Nehru respond to these American representations on a global stage, and how did his response dictate the Indo-American relationship in the immediate years following India's independence.

This thesis poses the question of how the American representations of India during the Second World War and in the immediate aftermath of its independence structured the complicated and the relationship between the two countries. This paper postulates, that two integral elements determined the structuring and character of the relationship:

i) The new metaphorical blueprint that America would use to represent a post-independent India was both directly and indirectly constructed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt during the Second World War through his dealings with the Indian question.

ii) The Indian response to these representations and expectations in global politics in the immediate aftermath of the country's independence.

To carry out this analysis, the thesis will undertake an examination of the periods before, during, and after Indian independence with specific attention being afforded to the United States' involvement with Indian issues. In doing so, the paper will attempt to answer the research question and understand how the happenings during these periods served to structure the relationship in the years that followed.

THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS

The thesis will be reliant on the theory of Constructivism when it comes to the examination of how Roosevelt both constructed the idea of an independent India, and how he constructed the blueprint that determined the representations and expectations that the United States would have of an independent India. The application of constructivist theory to this end will provide a heightened understanding of how the idea of an independent India was constructed within the United States, even though the idea of an independent India had never been considered before within American political circles. The discipline of International Relations benefits from constructivism as it addresses issues and concepts that are neglected by mainstream theories, therefore the application of constructivism to International Relations offers alternative explanations for the occurrence of particular events. In this regard, constructivist theory will be applied to the analysis of how Roosevelt created his metaphorical blueprint, and how his legacy served to entrench the representations and expectations laid out within it.

The thesis will also be heavily reliant on its application of postcolonial discourses to the subject matter being researched to ensure and guarantee a more detailed and nuanced understanding of the determinants that characterised the blueprint and therefore the Indo-American relationship during the period being studied. The application of Postcolonial discourses to this study will offer another viewpoint of the factors that determined the construction of Roosevelt's blueprint, and the manner by which India and the United States responded to it. The paper will also borrow from the ideas of othering, orientalism, and alienation put forth by authors such as Franz Fanon, Edward Said, and Gayatri Spivak, while not directly employing them.

HISTORIOGRAPHY

The thesis will now assess the state of research within the field by providing a historiography of the authorship centred around the Indo-American relationship during the course of the Second World War, and the years that immediately followed India's independence. Through the historiography, the paper will attempt to detail the gaps in the existing narratives and literature on the time period, actors, and the issues being examined within this paper. As the historiography progresses, it will also attempt to address key absences that have collectively emerged in the authorship, and try to address them when later answering the research question. The historiography will look at three themes that have characterised the existing authorship relating to the Indo-American relationship during the period in question. It will firstly highlight the manner in which the period has been examined and written about, and how this has left certain significant gaps in the research.

The thesis attempts to study and discuss the American representations of India and the Indo-American political relationship across the span of roughly fifteen years. Beginning with Roosevelt's first involvement with India as a British colony in the 1940s, unto the period of India as an independent nation during the Cold War. This larger time period will be separated into two smaller intervals. These are as follows: a) The period of India as a colony and b) India in the immediate aftermath of its independence. While several secondary sources will be utilised and detailed for each of these specific periods, this thesis also finds it necessary to employ a secondary source that provides a detailed overview of the entire period in question.

Therefore, it will also avail the use of a comprehensive historical overview of the relationship titled 'India and the United States: Estranged Democracies'¹ by Dennis Kux. The work gives a

¹ Dennis Kux, *Estranged Democracies: India and the United States: 1941-1991* (University Press of the Pacific, 2002).

comprehensive account of the American relationship with India across an extended period. This book's primary complement to the historiography around the topic is that it provides the most detailed and nuanced understanding of American representations of India before the latter's independence by looking at direct correspondences relating to India between American, Western, and South Asian leaders, something which is addressed scarcely by other relevant authors. Due to its comprehensive and informational nature, this book will be used as the backbone upon which much of the research is structured. While 'Estranged Democracies' is informational and will be useful with regards to providing context, it also exemplifies the existing gaps concerning how this period has been represented by historical examination and authorship. Two key issues that emerge in this book are that firstly there is no prevalent threading together of how this relationship changed throughout these conflicts, as it sees each conflict as an isolated event. Secondly, there is no accounting for how India was represented and why it was represented that way. What 'Estranged Democracies' fails to do is provide a more detailed and nuanced account of the motivations behind particular happenings, and fails to touch upon why they happened. It serves as a useful historical review of what happened, and what representations were created, rather than why they were created. Secondly, when examining 'Estranged Democracies' we find that the history is told from a pointedly westernised perspective. While this is not to say that Indian discourses and the voice of the subaltern are completely ignored, how the book is written serves to elucidate history through the American viewpoint, rather than the viewpoint of both countries concerned. The representations of India before and after the country's independence are accounted for, but not explained in great detail. Furthermore, the application of Postcolonial discourses to the relationship can offer a lot of information concerning how and why the changes in the relationship occurred. In the aforementioned source, there is little to no application of

these discourses to understanding the *why's* of what happened during these years of the Indo-American relationship. Despite the criticisms that have been levelled against this work, 'Estranged Democracies' still provides this authorship with the ability to more clearly understand every key juncture in the Indo-American relationship and American representations of India from Roosevelt's first involvement with the country to the end of Truman's presidency in 1953. Therefore, it will be referenced and utilised as the central secondary source of this thesis. Apart from this work, the historiography will now proceed to examine the other key secondary sources that will be utilised in the paper and highlight their strengths and weaknesses when it comes to contributing to the narrative on the topic.

As noted on the previous page, this thesis will be examining American representations of India and the political relationship between the two parties across two specific periods. Firstly, the thesis will look at the period of India as a colony of Great Britain during the Second World War. This period looks at how the relationship between the two parties was first forged, and how initial representations of India were created in the United States. This specific part of the research is dependent on certain key spheres of Indian and American existence during the time period. The central pillars of this period are the American President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his relationship with India and the question of Indian independence. As this paper puts forth, through his association with the question of India and Indian independence, Roosevelt also constructed the first impressions of what American representations of an independent India would look like. Therefore this portion of the historiography will examine the prevailing literature relating to this period, and attempt to highlight the key areas in the research that are missing. One of the most well-composed and detailed pieces of literature relating specifically to this period is the paper by Salim Kidwai, titled 'Roosevelt, Nehru, and India's Freedom

Movement². In his work, Kidwai asserts the importance of Roosevelt to the Indian independence struggle, and entrenches the idea, through his writing, that Roosevelt's continuous and steadfast efforts for Indian independence were crucial to the country when it came to finally attaining the goal. Kidwai believed that Roosevelt's anti-colonial ambitions and a keen interest in Indian emancipation proved to be a key determinant in India getting its independence from Britain. What Kidwai does account for in his writings, although not in direct terms, is the fact that Roosevelt through his involvement with the question of Indian independence served to legitimise the perception of India as an independent nation in the political and socio-cultural spheres of the United States. What he seems to exaggerate, however, are the actualities of Roosevelt's impact on India's ultimate attainment of independence, which this paper will find to be negligible. In a similar vein, despite touching on the importance of Roosevelt's legacy and influence on global proceedings, he fails to address how this influence exerted itself when it came to creating new representations of India within American spheres of influence, and how these representations served to dictate the relationship between the two entities in the future. Another prominent work studying this period that echoes a similar sentiment is A. Guy Hope's 'America and Swaraj'³, this book too however is constructed from an American-centric perspective that greatly overestimates the American interest and influence on British rule in India. Hope goes further than Kidwai in his assertions of American influence in the struggle for Indian independence were crucial to its ultimate attainment in 1948, and writes that American support was a requisite for India's independence. What both these works fail to address is how America's involvement with

² M. Saleem Kidwai, "Roosevelt, Nehru and India's Freedom Movement," *Indian Historical Review* 26, no. 2 (1999): pp. 114-132,

<https://doi.org/10.1177/037698369902600205>.

³ A. Guy Hope, *America and Swaraj: The United States Role in Indian Independence* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1968).

Indian independence was passive and dictated primarily by its own wartime needs; consequently, they also fail to address how these interactions contributed to the larger blueprint that was created by Roosevelt during this period.

The larger historical narrative, especially to those with minimal knowledge on the subject is that Roosevelt played a significant role in anti-colonial struggles the world over, but especially in India. In Kenton J. Clymer's 'Franklin D. Roosevelt, Louis Johnson, India, and Anti-colonialism: Another Look'⁴ the author writes that Roosevelt did have a keen interest in the struggle for Indian independence, but that his tactics and strategies in the manner by which to attain it were flawed. A similar belief is echoed in the writings of S. Banerjee in his work 'American Interest and Indian Independence'⁵ wherein he, although asserting that American involvement with the Indian question at the time never went beyond "official interest", still believed that through various channels such as state interest and democratic pressure that America had a positive impact on the Indian independence struggle. The aim of this paper is not to refute the mere assertion that Roosevelt did have a keen interest in Indian affairs, nor is it to espouse that the United States had no impact on the Indian independence struggle. Instead, it is to highlight that this interest and involvement were dictated by certain representations of the nation that were created by Roosevelt during the war, representations that were directly aligned with American geopolitical ambition. Both Clymer and Banerjee fail to address this. Something similar can be seen in writing from the 1950s. In their writing 'The Anticolonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt'⁶, Foster Rhea Dulles and Gerald D. Ridinger both accept that Roosevelt

⁴ Kenton J. Clymer, "Franklin D. Roosevelt, Louis Johnson, India, and Anticolonialism: Another Look," *Pacific Historical Review* 57, no. 3 (January 1988): pp. 261-284, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3640705>.

⁵ Somendu K. Banerjee, "American Interest in Indian Independence 1930-43," *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs* 24, no. 4 (1968): pp. 311-332, <https://doi.org/10.1177/097492846802400402>.

⁶ Foster Rhea Dulles and Gerald E. Ridinger, "The Anti-Colonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt," *Political Science Quarterly* 70, no. 1 (1955): p. 1, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2145412>.

may or may not have been able to directly influence independence for colonies in Asia, however his interest in the question of independence for the colonies was born out of his fervent concern for the welfare and well-being of all disadvantaged peoples around the world. The authors, however, fail to make note of how Roosevelt's concerns for the colonies, especially India, aligned directly with American interests being at stake. Assertions of this kind are directly challenged by two Indian authors, Manish Sinha and M.S Venkataramani, who in their respective works 'The Bengal Famine and the Insensitiveness of Food Aid'⁷ and 'The Roosevelt Administration and the Great Indian Famine'⁸ challenge this notion by bringing to light the complete inaction of the Roosevelt administration when it came to providing food security for millions of starved Indians in Eastern India during a crippling famine in 1943. Sinha and Venkataramani go to great pains to highlight how the Roosevelt administration remained uninterested when it came to the needs of Indian people on the ground as it would hinder the war effort, but fail to delve deeper into understanding how Roosevelt's interest in India and Indian issues was directly aligned to American involvement in the war.

Although general narratives for a long time were dictated by the pervading opinion that Roosevelt played an integral role in India's attainment of independence, newer historians have begun to refute this notion. Gradually, there has been an increase in authorship that looks toward American involvement in India during the 1940s from a more nuanced lens that details the efficacy of Roosevelt's policy towards India. In his writing, 'The Anti-Colonial Policies of

7 Manish Sinha, "THE BENGAL FAMINE OF 1943 AND THE AMERICAN INSENSITIVENESS TO FOOD AID." *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress* 70 (2009): 887–93. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/44147736>.

8 M.S. Venkataramani, "The Roosevelt Administration and the Great Indian Famine," *International Studies* 4, no. 3 (1962): pp. 241-264, <https://doi.org/10.1177/002088176200400301>.

Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Reappraisal'⁹ John T. Sebrega writes of Roosevelt's high degree of idealism but general ambivalence concerning action when dealing with India, asserting that the policy led the United States to be associated with the other European colonial powers of the world. While the latter part of the contention would require a different historical review, it must be noted that Sabrega's writing does provide a new dimension to understanding Roosevelt's policy towards India. Sabrega writes at length about Roosevelt's influence and how through his ambivalent policy said influence was absent in securing Indian independence during his lifetime. What he fails to do is address what this influence did when it came to creating American representations of India for the future. Weigold and Copland in a similar way, in 'Louis Fischer and Edgar Snow: Roosevelt's emissaries in India, 1942'¹⁰ went further to declare Roosevelt an 'impartial observer' on the Indian issue, but fail to address what this did for the Indo-American relationship or American representations of India in the future.

While the first interval of historical examination is primarily centred around the United States' representations of a non-independent India, Roosevelt's influence within American political spheres, and his ultimate creation of a blueprint through which interaction with India would be conducted; the next interval more looks more closely at how the representations of India in the blueprint served to structure the relationship between the two parties once India actually became an independent nation. Therefore the next set of secondary sources that this historiography will examine will be centred around the same. This set of sources is centred around India's actions as an independent state in the global sphere, how these interactions reacted with the blueprint laid

9 John J. Sebrega, "The Anticolonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Reappraisal," *Political Science Quarterly* 101, no. 1 (1986): p. 65, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2151444>.

10 Auriol Weigold and Ian Copland, "Louis Fischer and Edgar Snow: Roosevelt's Emissaries in India, 1942," *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies* 35, no. 3 (2012): pp. 709-725, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00856401.2012.658964>.

out by Roosevelt, and how they served to structure the relationship between the two countries in the years that came after.

India's fraught relationship with the United States as an independent nation began with the leadership of the former's Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Nehru's interactions with the United States and its new leader Harold Truman, and their combined responses to the blueprint that was laid out by Roosevelt in the years leading to Indian independence, served to dictate the bilateral relationship in the years that followed. In the present authorship on this period of the Indo-American relationship, we can see critiques of both Nehru and Truman, as well as their foreign policies. These critiques lead to a resultant examination of the various flashpoints that involved the two countries over the interval, however once again, there is the absence of a threading together of how these relationships and interactions served to interact with each other over a longer period of time. The examination of Indo-American political flashpoints such as Kashmir and Korea as isolated issues, and the examination of Truman and Nehru as isolated characters, has provided a lack of depth into an understanding of why events transpired in the manner that they did. In a similar regard, there is a notable absence of postcolonial critiques in the research, and there is no acknowledgment of the significance of Roosevelt to the relationship that India had with the United States once independent.

This part of the historiography will start by looking at what this paper believes to be the most comprehensive account of the Indo-American relationship in the period from 1947 to the outbreak of the Korean War, Harold Gould's 'Anticommunism and Anticolonialism: The Domestic Determinants of Determining the US-Indian Relationship during the Truman Era'¹¹. In this work, Gould asserts that what could have been a lasting and fruitful bilateral relationship

¹¹ Harold A. Gould, "Anticommunism and Anticolonialism," *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 15, no. 4 (1988): pp. 194-203, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00927678.1988.10553628>.

was made fraught by preoccupations and fixations on both sides which served to burgeon over the years and dismantle any hopes for mutual prosperity between the two countries. Gould postulates that the Indian fixation on anti-colonialism and the American fixation on anti-communism served to push the two countries apart from one another. While this is a correct assertion, what Gould fails to account for is the expectations that the United States had of India as a result of this fixation, and how India, and indeed Nehru, responded to these expectations through a fervent commitment to anti-colonialism. This can be seen with regards to much of the authorship put forth surrounding both Nehru and Truman's foreign policies with regards to each other. With regard to the examination of Nehru's foreign policy as India's new leader, authors have tended to focus more closely on the fact that Nehru was committed to non-alignment, and have focused their research and writing around the fact that Nehru's commitment to non-alignment was something that was entrenched within his moral framework. While this is true, there is little attention given to how Nehru's nonalignment and commitment to anti-imperialism were directly intertwined with what he saw as American neo-imperialism during the Cold War years. This can be particularly evidenced in the writings by L.M Bhatia in his piece 'Nehru's Foreign Policy and Concept of Security'¹². Similarly, when looking at Truman, authors have tended to focus on his association with India only as a part of the Cold War struggle in South Asia, but not how his association with India was framed by expectations and representations of the country that had been constructed in the years before his leadership. Regarding Kashmir, both Kux¹³ in his aforementioned book and Paul McGarr in his book 'The

¹² L.M Bhatia. "Nehru's Foreign Policy and Concept of Security." *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues* 1 (1990): 106–8. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45083446>.

¹³ Dennis Kux, "Estranged Democracies."

Cold War in South Asia'¹⁴, treat the issue more superficially. Both authors correctly postulate that the American relationship with India over the Kashmir issue was based on American interests in Cold War politicking in South Asia. What they fail to address, however, are the specifics of how the American treatment of the Kashmir issue in 1948 mirrored how the US dealt with issues relating to India during the 1940s, and how these interactions were a direct reflection of the blueprint that had been constructed years before. Furthermore, they fail to detail how the Kashmir issue reflected Nehru's first true reaction to the new American representations of India, and how it served to structure the interactions between the two parties in the immediate years that followed. Something similar is echoed when examining the literature relating to India's involvement in the Korean War a few years later. In 'Between the Blocs: India, The United Nations, and Ending the Korean War'¹⁵ Robert Barnes writes extensively in a chronological manner about India's importance and involvement in peacemaking during the Korean War. He even accounts for how Nehru's commitment to non-entanglement and neutrality shaped Indian involvement, and how it only became strengthened after the war concluded. What he fails to account for however is how Nehru's commitment to non-alignment and non-entanglement in Korea was a direct rebuking of the expectations held of India by the United States, and how it only served to push the two countries further away. In Iqbal Singh's 'Korean Crisis of 1950: Nehru's Peace Initiative, the author can provide a detailed account of the exact problems that arose between India and the United States over Korea, but he too fails to take into account important elements of the Indo-American relationship during the Korean conflict. In actuality, all of the authorship relating to India's involvement in Korea makes note of the American

¹⁴ Paul M. McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia: Britain, the United States and the Indian Subcontinent, 1945-1965* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

¹⁵ Robert Barnes, "Between the Blocs: India, the United Nations, and Ending the Korean War," *Journal of Korean Studies* 18, no. 2 (2013): pp. 263-286, <https://doi.org/10.1353/jks.2013.0022>.

disenchantment when it came to peacemaking efforts, but it fails to, through the application of postcolonial discourses, understand how this disenchantment was a result of expectations that America had of India that were not fulfilled. An application of these discourses to the study would highlight that American disappointment and disillusionment with India was a result of India exacting its will, and rebuking the expectations laid out by the construction of an independent India that had been laid years earlier.

i) Remarks on Historiography

The historiography has examined two key intervals of study. An examination of the authorship of both periods highlights certain key absences in the manner and matter of the research. A result of this, therefore, is that there is a lack of depth in understanding the true reasoning behind why events transpired in the manner in which they did, and how these happenings were reflected in the structure of the Indo-American relationship in the future. This historiography has found certain key problematic elements in the prevailing authorship which this thesis will attempt to address.

- A) The westernisation of the authorship has led to a simplification of the way most American and Western representations are addressed. Authors have examined the relationship in individualised moments and not in a collective manner. This means that the authorship is unable to address the relationship between India and the United States during this period collectively. This paper will attempt to put forth new research that explains how these relations changed across the said period, and not just in certain moments within it. What this shows is a lack of cohesiveness in authorship regarding how the relationship changed, while it addresses certain key moments, no authorship provides an overarching analysis of what happened across the entirety of this period and

why. A detailed examination of how each event related to another causally will result in a more finespun understanding of the relationship between the United States and India.

B) None of the authorship in question has successfully been able to apply significant postcolonial discourses to their study of Indo-American relations. This, therefore, means that when examining the interactions that took place between India and the United States during this period, there is no acknowledgment of how the construction of the idea of an independent India, the blueprint by which the United States represented India, and the Indian reaction to said blueprint, were determined by lingering legacies of colonialism and racism. The majority of the explanations behind the relationship between the two parties, while sometimes accounting for the presence of colonial legacies, do not use them to explain how and why the relationship deteriorated. This thesis will also attempt to show how Postcolonial discourses can be used to further deepen the understanding we have of this relationship and how it changed.

These two significant gaps in the authorship have created a cursory and somewhat superficial representation of the Indo-American relationship during the period in question. There is a lack of depth, not with research but instead with analysis. As a result, there is no present account of how Roosevelt's interactions with the questions of India and Indian independence by virtue of his influence inadvertently constructed a blueprint of how the United States would interact with an independent India. Consequently, there is no clear understanding of how Nehru's actions as Indian Prime Minister were a response to the elements of this blueprint, and how they served to ultimately structure the relationship between the two powers in the years that followed.

SOURCES AND SOURCE CRITICISMS

This proposal will now assess certain key sources that will form the backbone of the thesis and their strengths. While these are some sources that will be utilized, there are significantly more that will be used in the research. This chapter will now proceed to break down and categorise the types of sources being used. Firstly, it is integral to make note of the points of distinction between the different types of primary sources that are being utilised. Being that this thesis conducts a historical review of events passed, the primary sources being utilised will be largely from the period in question- 1941 to 1953. The sources will be centrally based on the key actors of American and Indian politics during this period. The sources can be categorised first by time, into sources being used from the period prior to Indian independence, and sources being used from the period following India as an independent nation. Within these two broader categorisations, the thesis will also further break the sources down. In this regard, the sources are categorized by type. Within both time categorisations, there are parallels in the types of sources being utilised.

As this paper most closely associates itself with government machinations and interactions within domestic circles, the majority of the most important primary sources will be correspondences that were carried out between key political actors and their associates. The importance of sources of this kind cannot be understated, for they provide the research with the most developed and nuanced understanding of the *whys* of how certain events transpired. The types of correspondences being used will vary, ranging from letters to telegrams. Secondly, the paper will also rely heavily upon personal memoirs of political leaders and actors during the period. The memoirs also give us a multifaceted understanding of the thought processes and psychological elements which determined the nature of happenings within the Indo-American

bilateral relationship at the time. Speeches will also play a key role in determining the course of the research and the narrative, as they give us a clearer understanding of the outward ambitions and positions of governments and persons during particular periods. The paper will also utilise primary sources such as charters, agreements, and declarations, as they too are important when it comes to understanding the nature of the representations and relationships at a specific point in time. It will also employ facts and figures, such as statistics around food aid or casualties in conflict to assist with the provision of a more robust and detailed argument. They will be used to supplement the argument that has been laid out through the use of the more significant primary sources. Lastly, the paper will utilise sources from spheres of cultural transmission, especially in the United States, to better understand and highlight how representations of India were represented and reflected within American society. Now that this has been established, the paper will now highlight the utility of the key sources from these categories and show how they will be effective when it comes to answering the research question and bettering the thesis.

As detailed earlier, the primary sources will also be split into two time periods, before and after Indian independence. Regarding the former, the paper will first attempt to elucidate the legacy and influence of former American President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Multiple sources highlight the importance that Roosevelt still had within American society and American politics after his death. This paper postulates that the most important one is the speech given by incoming American President Harold Truman announcing his death.¹⁶ The importance that this source holds concerning the narrative of this thesis is two-fold. Firstly, Truman through his words highlighted the importance that Roosevelt held towards American society and foreign policy even after his death. The importance of Roosevelt's legacy is integral to the narrative being put forth in the thesis, and his continued importance to American foreign policy is something that

¹⁶ Harold Truman, 1945. "Speech announcing the death of President Roosevelt." Washington DC.

contributes to the postulation being put forth by the research. Secondly, the fact that the speech was given by the incoming President Truman is also imperative, as the second part of the thesis deals exclusively with American representations of an independent India when Truman was the former's President. The source, along with certain other supplementary ones, will serve to lay the foundations of understanding of the important legacy and influence that Roosevelt left on American politics, and how this influence served to dictate Indo-American relations in the years that followed his passing.

Concerning the rest of the first interval being examined, the paper will look with most interest at correspondences made by Roosevelt and his advisors, specifically relating to the issue of India. In addition, it will also employ resources that related American policymakers, who included Roosevelt and many others, to the Indian issue. In its first chapter, the paper will postulate about a blueprint of an independent India that Roosevelt had created through his association with Indian issues across the course of the Second World War. When examining said blueprint, the thesis will employ primary sources to help supplement the specific assertions being made. The sources in this section vary, they include Roosevelt's correspondences with his advisors from 1941 to 1945, to correspondences with the then British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, to public declarations that he made regarding the India question. Furthermore, this section will look at correspondences that Roosevelt conducted with Indian leaders such as Gandhi and Nehru, and it will also examine statistical data which represented the extent to which India and the United States were interacting with one another during this time. Collectively putting all of these primary sources to use, the thesis will attempt to detail and explain the blueprint that was constructed by Roosevelt through his dealings with India. Each source will help with the

understanding and framing of each element of the blueprint, (discussed in the following chapter) and will also assist with threading together the larger narrative being put forward by the thesis. Similarly, for the second interval of examination, the thesis will look at correspondences conducted by American leaders who came after Roosevelt on issues relating to now-independent India. When examining this period, the thesis will employ resources that highlight how American representations of India were determined by the blueprint constructed by Roosevelt. Regarding this, it will also utilise sources that demonstrate India's reaction to this blueprint. Combining these sources, the thesis will finally seek to demonstrate how the representations that were created by the blueprint, and India's reaction to them, ultimately served to determine and structure the Indo-American relationship in the following years. For example, a key source that the paper will engage with is a quote from Nehru on the question of India's position as an independent nation at the Allahabad conference in 1948.¹⁷ This quote highlights India's position concerning the United States, and also the construction of India that had been created in the United States before Indian independence. This chapter will also engage with sources that highlighted how the United States dealt with Indian issues and the expectations that the United States held of an independent India. Examples of these sources are a quote from the acting American Secretary of State Loy Henderson in 1948,¹⁸ on which America's position towards the Kashmir issue and India are made clear, and the second is a quote from John Foster Dulles in 1953,¹⁹ when he makes clear America's position towards India once again, after the former subverted expectations of the blueprint for its geopolitical ambitions.

¹⁷ Jawaharlal Nehru. 1948. Speech at Allahabad Conference, Allahabad.

¹⁸ Foreign Relations of the US, 1948, vol.V. Henderson to Lovett, report of discussions between the British delegation and US Officials. January 10, 1948.

¹⁹ FRUS, 1950, vol VII. Minutes of staff meeting of US Delegation to UN General Assembly, September 21, 1950.

To assist with answering the research question, this paper will use these primary sources as well as some others as cornerstones of the research to detail the narrative being espoused in the thesis. Each source from each period will be employed to help demonstrate and detail a different element of the argument that is being put forth, and with the assistance of secondary sources, answer the research question in a nuanced and pointed manner.

METHODOLOGY

The paper will now highlight the various elements of research and analysis that will comprise the larger methodology that is being carried out in answering the research question. Within it, there are important components that need to be explained, especially regarding how they will be utilised when it comes to answering the research question. The methodology and process of research for this paper will be straightforward. It will use a chronological approach through a detailed case study of the representations of India in the US before and after the periods of Indian independence. Through the chronological application and analysis of primary sources, the paper will detail a concrete argument to answer the research question. Primary sources will be employed to understand the intervals being studied, and they will be used to detail how the Indo-American relationship during these periods was structured. In the first chapter, the primary sources being used will, along with the help of secondary sources, serve to give the thesis a clear understanding of Roosevelt's legacy, and how this legacy contributed to the construction of a blueprint of India. In the next section, the paper will use primary sources to understand how India reacted to the representations laid out by this metaphorical blueprint, and how India's reactions structured the relationship between the two parties. The paper will seek to put these primary sources at the centre of the narrative of the Indo-American relationship, and with the assistance of secondary sources, attempt to characterise the American representations of India across the period under examination. In the examination of the primary and secondary sources, particular importance will be provided to the period being examined, the key political actors at the time, and the institutions of cultural and social transmission that were present.

The utilisation of secondary sources will also be important. For through the usage of these sources, the paper will be able to gauge a deeper understanding of the circumstances and

situations that were dictating the relationship between the two parties at a particular point in time.

The last and most important aspect of the methodology of this paper is that it will look toward constructivist theory when examining how the notion of an independent India was constructed, and it will apply postcolonial discourses throughout the research to also gain a more critical understanding of the determinants that structured the blueprint. Postcolonial discourses specifically will be repeatedly adhered to throughout the research, because, as established in the historiography, there is a general lack of postcolonial ideas being applied to the historical examination of this period. The application of such discourses will allow the research to achieve the most all-encompassing findings possible, as they will help with understanding the nuances that characterised the relationship between the two parties, especially after India's independence. A final important point concerning the analysis of sources that is necessary to mention is that all of the sources are heavily centred around the representations that governmental actors, leaders, and means of informational and cultural transmissions held of India. An examination of Roosevelt and Nehru specifically will form an important part of the methodology, for it will provide the research with a significantly more clear understanding of the motivations behind the political activity of their two countries.

CHAPTER 1: ROOSEVELT AND THE FORMATIVE YEARS

To begin the analysis, we must understand the nature of the relationship between The United States and India before and after the eve of India's independence, and how this relationship was based on and determined by the representations of a newly independent India that had been constructed in the years prior. This paper postulates that the revered American President Franklin D. Roosevelt played a crucial, if not exclusive role in constructing the representation of a newly independent India before its independence for the governmental actors and institutions who followed him. Roosevelt's efforts to secure self-determination for the Indian people, paired with his involvement with the issue of Indian independence served to create entrenched representations of a post-independent India within American political circles and the country's general sociocultural conscious. Furthermore, the paper will argue that through the challenges, character, visions, and nature of the relationship with India that Roosevelt had constructed, a metaphorical blueprint was formed that both outlined the American expectations of India as an independent nation and also highlighted how India was to be dealt with when it came to the global geopolitical power struggle that was to follow. This chapter will proceed to examine Roosevelt's activity about India and how this activity laid the foundations and created the blueprint that determined how America was to interact with India as an independent nation. It will begin with an examination of Franklin D. Roosevelt and his contributions to American politics and society. Through said examination, the paper will demonstrate and highlight the importance of Roosevelt to the United States, and consequently the importance of his legacy and influence on American politics, even after his death. What this will do is establish how Roosevelt was integral to the creation of the idea of an independent India, and how his creation of the same

inadvertently created a blueprint through which future American representations and dealings with India would be conducted.

The chapter will then detail the blueprint and the specific elements that comprise it. Through the examination of primary sources, and subsequent application of constructivist and postcolonial discourses, the paper will understand how each element of the blueprint was framed and devised, and understand how the representations of the blueprint were reflected upon India. The paper will postulate that the blueprint constructed two key themes of American interaction with India in the form of:

- i) Representations of the way an independent India would be interacted and dealt with.
- ii) Expectations of an independent India's action in the global geopolitical sphere.

To begin with, the chapter will examine Roosevelt and his dealings with issues surrounding India during the war. It will then proceed to detail the efficacy and importance of his legacy to American politics, and how this legacy served to construct a blueprint surrounding the idea of an independent India.

The Second World War devastated the economies and infrastructures of most of the global powers of the time. Great Britain and France especially, saw their economies and military infrastructures get destroyed as a result of their involvement in the war. To alleviate the massive impact felt by this within their borders, they looked towards their colonies to support their wartime ambitions. American involvement with India first came to be when it was dragged into the war as an ally of the imperial powers. India was an important source of wartime resources for the allies, as the imperial powers used their colonies as feeding grounds for the wartime effort, draining manpower and resources from the colonies and putting them towards the ongoing global

conflict. Therefore, the disposal of Indian resources, Indian wartime support, and other issues relating to India demanded American attention.

Britain's employment of resources from the British Raj was immense, at the height of Indian involvement in the conflict, more than 2.5 million troops were fighting the Axis forces in different theatres around the globe.²⁰ Along with its employment of manpower from the subcontinent, Britain also utilised a large number of Indian food resources to feed its troops around the world. This resulted in a pernicious famine that hit the Indian province of Bengal in 1943. The effects of the famine on the people of the province, and apart from causing widespread disease, poverty, and starvation, the famine also caused the deaths of 3.1 million people in the region.²¹ Britain's wartime leader, Winston Churchill, refused to acknowledge the massive debt that Britain owed to India for the wartime effort, and also did not incline to guarantee India its independence. Churchill was steadfast in his desire to maintain British imperialism in the sub-continent as the war ran its course, much of the rest of the international community on the allied side also did little to voice support for Indian nationalism, mostly out of interest in maintaining their colonies and security. The question of Indian independence was at the forefront of issues in the sub-continent. The fervent growth of the struggle for nationalism and the general discontent over British rule was threatening to boil over and cost the Allied war effort in Asia heavily. The importance of India to the Allied war effort prompted Roosevelt's interest in the Indian question, as he understood that India's cooperation and the employment of the region's vast resource base as crucial to an Allied victory. This brought about Roosevelt's interest in

²⁰ Yasmin Khan, "Has India's Contribution to WW2 Been Ignored?," BBC News (BBC, June 16, 2015), <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-33105898>.

²¹ Ibid.

issues arising from the subcontinent that specifically related to Indian support in the war effort, the most noteworthy being the fervent calls for Indian independence.

It is important to note at this juncture that Roosevelt was the first Western political leader to raise the voice of anticolonialism. His first efforts to this end are evidenced when examining his activities surrounding the formation of the Atlantic Charter in 1941. The joint declaration by the American government of Roosevelt and the British government of Churchill outlined the Western aims of a postwar world. At this juncture, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour was yet to take place, and America was not yet an active participant in the conflict. Despite this, Roosevelt fought to include certain anti-colonial elements within its key points. Roosevelt ensured that freedom would be granted to all peoples of the world through self-determination. This was specifically evident in Article 3 of the Charter, which stated that “ "They respect the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they live, and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who had been forcibly deprived of them".²² At this point in history, Roosevelt was steadfast and ardent in his desire for the emancipation of all colonised peoples, he further echoed this belief when addressing the American Congress on the 6th of January 1942, when he declared “ Our objectives are clear; the objective of smashing militarism imposed by warlords upon their enslaved people - the objective of liberating the subjugated nation-the objective of establishing and securing the freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want and freedom from fear anywhere in the world.”²³ At this stage, American ambitions were not yet so closely intertwined with those of their British counterparts, and it could be argued that this was the last point in history that

²² "Joint declaration by the President of the United States of America and Mr. Winston Churchill, representing His Majesty's government in the United Kingdom, known as the Atlantic Charter," 14 August 1941.

²³ Ibid.

Roosevelt's push for decolonisation was exclusively based on his humanist inclination.

America's commitment to isolationism at this juncture is also an important point to note, as it was still a country enveloped by the liberal upsurge of American economic and social recovery at the time. Although the declarations of the charter were put forth, America and Britain still differed on the exact specifications of who would feel its impact. In a September 1941 speech, Churchill stated that the charter was meant to apply only to states under German occupation, certainly not to those that were part of the British Empire.²⁴ He and other British government figures argued that British colonies never had "sovereign rights", thus there was no pre-existing sovereign government to restore to power after the war.²⁵ Despite self-determination being a guiding factor of Roosevelt's ambition concerning the Charter, he did not want to further pressure Britain on its colonial possessions during a war that America was not a part of, one year later, however, Roosevelt's policy and action toward the colonial question was to be altered and accelerated in a transformative manner.

When Japan attacked the American naval base at Pearl Harbour on the 7th of December of 1942, The United States was forced into the conflict on the Allied side. The fact that The United States had been directly drawn into the war by Japan, the foremost Axis power in Asia, meant that American foreign policy now had to put the continent into its frame of important geopolitical consideration. A direct result of this was heightened American interest in Japan's militaristic charge through the region, which therefore also brought the Indian question under more keen examination. Roosevelt understood the strategic importance of India to the wartime effort and considered India a vital cog when it came to defeating the Japanese. He stressed the necessity of

²⁴ Winston Churchill. Address to Parliament, September 9, 1941.

²⁵ Ibid.

Indian cooperation in the effort too and understood that the support of India and its nationalist leaders, most of whom directly reflected the wants and needs of its large population base was crucial if Japan was to be stopped.²⁶ As a result of this, throughout the war until his death, Roosevelt began a complex relationship with India, and Britain, and the question of Indian emancipation.

Once the United States entered the war, it became involved in battles on all frontiers. In American eyes, the foremost opponent was Japan, who remained the only Axis power to have attacked The United States on its soil. Therefore, as the war raged on in Asia, and Japanese power and influence in the region grew, Roosevelt began to prod his close friend and ally, British Prime Minister and staunch imperialist Winston Churchill, on the India issue. Roosevelt's interest in India came to characterise American representations of the colony during the war. His interactions with other American governmental actors on the Indian issue, his relationship with Churchill over India, and his relationship with the Indian nationalists all played an integral role in constructing the representations of a post-independent India that came in the years to follow. As detailed earlier, Roosevelt and his associates did have some interest in Indian independence before America entered into the conflict in 1941. Even at this time, they understood the importance of Indian cooperation in the war effort. Churchill's rigidity on the Indian issue was also noted though, and the Americans saw it prescient to not alienate their closest ally. When Japan attacked The United States in December of 1941, matters changed. India was now at the forefront of the war against the Japanese in Asia, and Roosevelt and his generals were now far more keenly interested in the matter of Indian cooperation. As Roosevelt's leading General Dwight D. Eisenhower once commented, " We've got to keep Germany in the war-and hold

²⁶ Kidwai. " Roosevelt, Nehru and India's Freedom Movement", pp 116.

India!”²⁷ India’s strategic importance was clear, its large resource base and amount of manpower that had already contributed so much to the war effort, paired with its immensely important geopolitical and strategic location, made it clear to Roosevelt and other American actors that the necessity of full Indian cooperation in the war effort was necessary and unavoidable for guaranteeing a swift victory. What was not as clear, however, was how to challenge Churchill on how best to garner Indian cooperation. Roosevelt understood very quickly that providing self-determination to the Indian people was not something that Churchill would be willing to consider. This was particularly evidenced by certain key interactions between Churchill and Roosevelt on the question of India, in which the latter would find himself being consistently rebuffed by his British counterpart. Roosevelt’s closest advisor, Harry Hopkins, went so far as to say that no American suggestions “were so wrathfully received as those relating to the solution of the Indian problem”²⁸ when in discussion with Churchill on the issue during a meeting in Washington in 1942.

The British Prime Minister’s steadfastness and rigidity when it came to India forced Roosevelt to play his cards in another manner. If India could not be represented as an equal ally whose self-determination would be guaranteed by the British, then there would have to be other means used to placate the Indian nationalists and guarantee their support during the wartime effort. This seemed to be the overarching policy that Roosevelt considered from this point on when dealing with the Indian question. His machinations toward India now became characterised by weaker and emptier efforts to gain the support of the nationalists, with more attention and caution being given to not upsetting the British and his greatest ally in Churchill.

²⁷ Quoted in MS Venkatramani and BK Shrivastava, “Quit India: The American Response to the 1942 Struggle,” *Vikas*, 1979, pp. 53-54, https://doi.org/10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_sim130110155.

²⁸ FRUS, 1942. Vol. I pp 633-34. Roosevelt to Harry Hopkins, 11 April, 1942.

From this point onwards, India continuously flared up in the bilateral discourses that took place between the United States and Britain. Roosevelt, for his part, continuously prodded Churchill on the issue until his death in 1945 in one way or another. Perhaps Roosevelt's greatest and most visible achievement concerning Indian independence came very early in his tenuous relationship with the sub-continent. Although Britain had chosen to not include India as one of the signatories of the United Nations Declaration, Roosevelt, Hopkins, and Roosevelt's Secretary of State Cordell Hull prodded Britain on the issue, eventually causing a surprising turnaround in the British standpoint on that issue. This was communicated to Roosevelt by Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador in Washington, who informed the Americans of their first small victory on the Indian issue.²⁹ As a result, India became one of the twenty-six signatories of the declaration on New Year's Day of 1942.

If Roosevelt and the Indians were provided with a degree of optimism about the battle for self-determination by Britain's concessions regarding the United Nations, this would soon have been found to have been misguided. The concessions of Churchill's Conservative government when allowing India to be one of the signatories of the declaration were as far as they went when considering India. At this time, in India things also continued to take a more drastic turn. The subcontinent's massive resource base continued to heavily provide for the war effort, while also draining the region's resource base and leaving its people significantly disadvantaged. As a result, calls for independence from Indian leaders only grew. Still, ambivalence and entrenched legacies of colonialism continued to dictate the British policy towards India after 1942, and these tenants soon came to influence Roosevelt's construction of India as well. With that being said,

²⁹ Ibid. pp 634-35.

however, Roosevelt still did not give up on asking the Indian question in several different ways throughout the war.

Three major happenings came to dictate Roosevelt's involvement with the Indian question from 1942 onwards. These were the Cripps Mission of 1942, and the arrivals of Americans Colonel Louis Johnson and diplomat William Phillips in 1942, and 1943 respectively.

The research will now examine the Cripps Mission of 1942, and the American association with it. In early 1942, the onward charge of the Axis powers was in full swing. In the Asian theatre specifically, the Japanese were making significant strides. American paranoia and concern about the Japanese war machine's domination reached a fever pitch when the Japanese defeated the British in Singapore in March of 1942, with the aggressors now setting their sights further west on Burma and then looking towards the Indian subcontinent. The Americans at this point had established two things. Firstly, India and Indian support was crucial to an Allied victory.

Secondly, and more importantly, they had also ascertained that rising anti-British sentiments within India were making it less and less likely that the Allies would have the support of Indian nationalist leaders if they were fighting on behalf of the British empire. Therefore, the need to show Indians that they would be fighting for themselves and not for Britain was important. As Assistant Undersecretary Breckenridge Long wrote in a communication with Roosevelt: "The only way to get the people of India to fight was to get them to fight for India".³⁰

While Roosevelt was cautious to not further antagonise the British on the issue of India, he carefully continued to raise the issue on differing occasions. He made the first suggestion of the formation of a dominion government that ensured some degree of Indian wartime involvement in 1942.³¹ In this regard, Roosevelt and his government were instrumental in legitimising the Indian

³⁰ Quoted in Auriol Weigold, "Churchill, Roosevelt and India," February 2010, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203894507>.

³¹ Dennis Kux, "Estranged Democracies" pp 22.

independence struggle during World War Two, however, still, there was no guarantee of dominion status that came from the British at the time. For all of Churchill's devotion to the maintenance of the British empire in India, it was a sole result of American pressure that the Cripps Mission was sent by Churchill to India in 1942. While Roosevelt saw it prescient to not completely alienate Churchill by continuous mentions of the Indian issue, it must be noted that the latter's obstinance was also at times swayed as a result of Britain's equivalent dependence on America for the wartime effort.

Therefore, to placate the American leader in some way, Churchill sent a mission, led by veteran diplomat Sir Stafford Cripps, to India to discuss the promise of Indian independence and self-determination upon the conclusion of the war if it was asked for by a constituent assembly.³² This would however only be granted in return for full Indian cooperation in the war.³³ The mission's plan was deliberately vague, and in fact, Churchill had no intentions of the Cripps Mission reaching a conclusion that would suit all involved parties. His intentions were more to placate the wishes of Roosevelt and to try and put the issue of India on the backburner for the time being. Unsurprisingly, the mission failed for a multitude of reasons. The officials of the Indian National Congress, the leading Indian nationalist group, disagreed with the plan for differing reasons relating from the time barriers to the provision for the creation of a separate Muslim-only state of Pakistan.³⁴

At the same time, Roosevelt decided to try and employ another strategy in his dealings with the Indian question when he created the role of a 'Personal Representative' to India, to help mediate the issue between the Indians and the British, and to help the two parties reach a political

³² Nicholas Mansergh. "The Cripps Mission to India, March-April 1942." *International Journal* 26, no. 2 (1971): 338. <https://doi.org/10.2307/40201045>.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

agreement to engage Indian energies more fully behind the war effort.³⁵ The role was first filled by Colonel Louis Johnson, a veteran military man whose knowledge of India was limited, but ultimately grew to become one of the most prominent and unsung proponents of Indian independence in the United States. Johnson's arrival in India on the second of April coincided with the already faltering Cripps Mission. Fortunately for the Americans however, both Cripps and Johnson seemed somewhat determined to achieve some sort of settlement with the Indian nationalists. What followed Johnson's arrival, therefore, were weeks of turbulent negotiations with the Indians wherein Johnson acted as a willful mediator between the two parties. Progress was swift, and in fact, it looked as if some agreement might have been reached on the Cripps Proposals between the involved parties.³⁶ Optimism around this was soon dashed though at the hands of the Viceroy in India, Lord Lithlingow. Lithlingow, an ardent imperialist, felt that he had been usurped by Cripps and Johnson, and instead had continued direct communications with Churchill on the issue of the Cripps Mission, elucidating his belief that he felt that Johnson was acting as if he had come to India to on Roosevelt's orders to mediate an Indian settlement.³⁷ This bothered Churchill too, who immediately wrote to Delhi, reprimanding Cripps and questioning the extent of Johnson's influence in negotiations.³⁸ The Americans, when informed of this, once again acquiesced on the issue and attempted to downplay the work of Johnson in India. As a result of this Cripps' final efforts on April 10th failed, and his arduous mission in India finally came to an end.³⁹ Once again, Roosevelt saw it invaluable to maintain his alliance with Churchill and avoid playing with fire when it came to raising the question of India again with Churchill.

³⁵ Dennis Kux. "Estranged Democracies." pp 14.

³⁶ Ibid. pp 16

³⁷ FRUS 1942. Vol I. "Cripps to Churchill". 8 April, 1942.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Nicholas Mansergh. "The Cripps Mission to India, March-April 1942." pp 344.

While the British were fairly happy with the outcomes of the Cripps Mission, Roosevelt was not yet satisfied that any Indian support had been garnered and continued to tentatively and gently prod Churchill on the issue after the mission's failure. Feelings of hope and ambition in the West, however, could not have been more in opposition to the general sense of despondence in the Indian subcontinent. The focal point of the Indian Nationalist struggle, Mahatma Gandhi, became especially anti-western in his writings and grew to become suspicious of the American role in Indian affairs.⁴⁰ This, paired with the crumbling Allied wartime infrastructure and Axis victories in Africa only helped to draw Roosevelt back closer to his primary ally in Britain and distance him from the Indian cause. Roosevelt's interest in the Indian question took its biggest hit however when the working committee of the subcontinent's leading nationalist group the Indian National Congress, led by Mahatma Gandhi, who was equally as staunch in his own beliefs as Churchill was, announced the commencement of the 'Quit India' civil disobedience movement in August.⁴¹ The purpose of the movement was to carry out complete Indian non-compliance to the wartime effort until full independence was granted. This decision left leaders in America, including Roosevelt, astonished and dismayed. The Americans did not object to the widespread arrest and imprisonment of the Indian nationalist leaders and took a backseat when it came to addressing the question of India.⁴² As a result of Roosevelt backing down from his ambitions for Indian self-determination, his policy became more focused on how the subcontinent could be utilised to assist in the war effort without Indian cooperation. Consequently, this led to an

⁴⁰ Letter from M.K Gandhi to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1 August, 1942.

⁴¹ All India Congress Committee Session, Bombay, 8 August, 1942.

⁴² Kux, "Estranged Democracies" pp 20.

increased presence of around 250,000 American GIs in the subcontinent to fight alongside the Chinese in preparation for the forthcoming Japanese onslaught.⁴³

The Summer of 1942 also represented a changing tide in Allied fortunes in Asia and Africa. As the Allied power and influence grew in the regions, Roosevelt's concern with India once again seemed to decrease for some time. It can be said that if Roosevelt's hand was forced by his designs on Indian support in the war effort when he sent Johnson to the country, the second appointment of a personal representative came from pressure from other avenues. On this occasion, Roosevelt faced pressure from American public opinion and most crucially from opposing politician Wendell Wilkie, who more so than anything else was able to remind Roosevelt of the importance of Asian support in a postwar global order when he stated "They cannot ascertain from our government's wishy-washy attitude toward the problem of India that we are likely to feel at the end of the war about the other hundreds of millions of eastern peoples."⁴⁴ This declaration, which Wilkie made after a visit to Asia, was in stark contrast to the reports that Johnson had provided, which portrayed reverence for Roosevelt amongst Indian people.

Irrespective of the reasoning behind it, outside pressure this time forced Roosevelt to reconsider the Indian question. He went back to the position of a personal representative that he had created for Johnson, this time opting to place the British-backed William Phillips in the role.

Phillips was a career politician who, the British hoped, would have been more aligned with their ambitions than Johnson was. He was cautious and aristocratic. As Dennis Kux put it, it was hard for the British to "imagine someone less likely than Phillips to sympathise with the Indian

⁴³ Eugene B. Vest, "Native Words Learned by American Soldiers in India and Burma in World War II," *American Speech* 23, no. 3/4 (1948): p. 223, <https://doi.org/10.2307/486923>.

⁴⁴ Wendell Wilkie, *The New York Times*. 27 October 1942.

leaders, much less the masses.”⁴⁵ However Phillips too, to British dismay, also became captivated by the Indian struggle and spent an extended period in the subcontinent to mediate the issue of Indian independence. Phillips was well received by the British after he arrived in 1943, and while the outward facade was congenial, Phillips was immediately disenchanted after ascertaining what the British attitude towards Indian independence would be. With the Congress leaders in prison as a result of the Quit India Movement, the Nationalist struggle had stagnated heavily. Phillips made conscious efforts to meet Gandhi, but they were all to no avail. When the Indian leader went on one of his famous fasts, Phillips urged Roosevelt to push for the release of Gandhi for his death would have grave consequences on the relationship, Roosevelt considered the idea, but once again avoided raising issues with the British. This attitude came to characterise much of Roosevelt’s dealings with Phillips and indeed the question of India after 1943. When Phillips suggested that the United States help convene a US-mediated all-party conference to discuss the political deadlock that had emerged, Roosevelt rebuked it and declared the suggestion to be “amazingly radical”⁴⁶ for a man like Phillips. Phillips was dedicated to the Indian cause, however, his trip ultimately proved to be completely fruitless. He left India with the opinion that the British had no genuine desire or interest in giving India up. This opinion was further ratified when he raised the question of India in a meeting with Churchill in May of 1943, and Churchill rebuked him more vociferously and furiously.⁴⁷ This cemented the opinion of Phillips and indeed Roosevelt that little could be done about India as long as Churchill remained in power. Roosevelt then seemed to assume this position for the rest of his life. As Allied victory in the war became

⁴⁵ Kux, “Estranged Democracies”. Pp 41.

⁴⁶ Quoted from Gary R. Hess, in *America Encounters India, 1941-1947* (Baltimore, 1971), p. 106.

⁴⁷ William Phillips, “Ventures in Diplomacy,” *American Political Science Review* 48, no. 1 (1954): pp. 261-261, <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055400198983>.

more likely, his interest in the Indian question began to decrease. This was particularly evident when he chose not to send Phillips back to India, despite the former's recommendation that it would help with resolving the issue.

From 1943 to 1945, Roosevelt's relationship with India was characterised primarily by inactivity. He found that the cooperation of the Indian leaders was evidently not necessary to secure a victory in the war, and now his interactions with India were more based on how the United States would interact with the Indian people in the postwar world order. Roosevelt had been informed by both Johnson and Phillips about the importance that he held in the eyes of the Indian people with regards to their struggle, and that upon the conclusion of the war if these people had not yet been emancipated that it would portray the United States in a negative light in Asia. Therefore, Roosevelt revisited the Indian issue at certain times in an attempt to placate the Indian leaders, even going so far as to mention the necessity for the independence of the colonies in the Tehran Conference of 1943.⁴⁸ Notably, though, Roosevelt's rhetoric now was less about emancipation and self-determination but more centred around the necessity to preserve support from the people of these regions in the postwar world order, when he stated, "our goal must be to help them achieve independence, 1,000,000 potential enemies are dangerous."⁴⁹

Despite all his efforts, Roosevelt was never able to see India gain its independence in his lifetime. His death in 1945 brought about the end of specialised American interest in the Indian issue, and upon the time of his death, despite his efforts, he was unable to gain much ground in assisting the Indian independence struggle to reach its ultimate goal of independence. Indian independence only arrived when the newly elected Labour government in Britain, saw it impossible to maintain the massive colony after the burden Britain had borne in the war.

⁴⁸ Franklin D. Roosevelt, Tehran Conference, 28 November, 1943.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

This did not mean that Roosevelt's continuous activity surrounding India and his interest in the Indian question did not have any consequences. Through his activity and positioning on the issue, Roosevelt created representations of British India, the Indian people, and an independent India that had never been present before within American political and socio-cultural circles. He indirectly created a metaphorical blueprint through which India would be represented in the immediate years that followed. This ideological and metaphorical blueprint would dictate and structure American interaction with India as a newly independent nation. Roosevelt's treatment of the Indian question came to in some way mould the American representations of India in the turbulent years that were to come, it made way for the creation of certain expectations around how an independent India would act in the geopolitical sphere, and ideas of how an independent India was to be represented with regards to the United States and its interests.

What is extremely important to establish at this juncture of the paper is the legacy, influence, and importance that Franklin Delano Roosevelt holds with regard to American foreign policy and political machinations. His image and legacy have transcended generations of American and indeed global society. His influence on American and global politics cannot be overstated, and the victories that he was able to generate for the United States helped to transform the country into what it was for the coming generations. Roosevelt was America's leader through the Great Depression until a few months before the conclusion of the Second World War. The revolutionary economic policies he introduced as a part of the New Deal were instrumental in lifting The United States out of the state of economic and social disarray that it had found itself in at the hands of the Great Depression. His ability for political maneuvering, paired with his charisma and indomitable desire to fight for The United States and its people made him one of the most popular and influential leaders in American history. When the US was dragged into the

Second World War, Roosevelt this time showed the world, not just the United States, his prowess by becoming one of the most well-respected and revered wartime leaders of all time through his swift handling of American wartime issues.

Roosevelt carried the United States from a financial, social, and geopolitical position that was inarguably the weakest that it had ever been during the Great Depression to become the foremost power in global politics by the end of the war in 1945. He galvanised the spirits and hopes of the nation and the cult of personality that he had developed left a gravitational hole in American hearts and political consciousness after his death. As a result, politicians who followed Roosevelt, especially those who dealt with American foreign policy after his death became particularly dependent on representations of matters in global politics that Roosevelt had constructed during his time as President of the country. This was most clearly echoed by the new president Harold Truman, who in his address following the death of Roosevelt stated “ Though his voice is silent, his courage is not spent, his faith is not extinguished. The courage of great men outlives them to become the courage of their people and the peoples of the world. It lives beyond them and upholds their purposes and brings their hopes to pass.”⁵⁰ The postulation of Roosevelt’s influence on American foreign policy is further evidenced by the front page of the New York Times on April 12th, 1945, which reported the news of Roosevelt’s demise broadcasting the headline “President Roosevelt is Dead; Truman to Continue Policies.”⁵¹ Nowhere was this ‘continuation of policies’ more clearly evidenced than with regard to India, wherein Roosevelt through his interactions with the nation had indirectly constructed and framed a blueprint by which India would be represented and interacted with by the United States. The blueprint was constructed through Roosevelt’s influence and his legacy and was dependent on the fact that there had been

⁵⁰ Harold Truman, 1945. “Speech announcing the death of President Roosevelt.” Washington DC.

⁵¹ “President Roosevelt is Dead; Truman to Continue Policies” New York Times. April 12, 1945.

no constructions of an independent India in the United States before Roosevelt took interest in the issue.

The paper will now proceed to examine the key facets of the larger and nuanced representation of India that Roosevelt had created through the blueprint. Through his advanced network of interactions and dealings with the British Government, Indian leaders, and American diplomats he employed in India, Roosevelt inadvertently constructed a blueprint that represented the nation of India that had never been considered in the decades before.

As detailed earlier, this paper postulates that two key elements comprised the blueprint. Firstly, the blueprint comprised the construction of how India was to be represented and dealt with as an independent nation, and secondly, it created certain expectations that The United States would hold of India as an independent nation. Under these two categorisations, the thesis will also proceed to highlight sub-categorisations under each. Regarding the representations that Roosevelt's blueprint constructed, there is much to be detailed surrounding his creation of

- i) The *legitimisation* of the Indian independence movement and India as an independent nation.
- ii) The representation of India as a *utility* to the United States, whose utilitarian value to America should dictate American involvement with the nation more so than anything else.

Concerning the expectations created by the blueprint, this paper postulates that the elements are also two-fold.

Regarding the expectations that Roosevelt's blueprint constructed, the paper will focus on the following: The expectations of *dependency and alliance* that the United States had of India once it became an independent nation.

This chapter will now proceed to examine how Roosevelt's association and interaction with the Indian Question served to construct this blueprint and vision of an independent India before its

independence. In doing so, it will analyse the key actions of Roosevelt that contributed to the construction of the various elements of the blueprint before proceeding to examine and analyse how the elements of the blueprint went on to dictate American representations of an independent India, and how the Indian response to the blueprint served to structure the relationship in the years that followed.

i) Recognition and Legitimacy

When examining Roosevelt's efforts towards the cause of Indian independence, it is integral to first take account of his most crucial contribution to the cause; the recognition and legitimisation of the Indian independence movement and India as a nation. Roosevelt constructed a new representation of India, the Indian people, and the idea of an independent India that had never reached a point of real consideration in the United States before. India as a part of the British Raj was largely not considered by the United States when it came to political examination, bilateral relations, or representation until Roosevelt brought light to the issue of colonialism in 1941. As M Salim Kidwai writes, "before President Roosevelt, American interest and sympathy for India's independence were academic, idealistic and unofficial. It was because of Roosevelt that the American interest in Indian nationalism began manifesting at the official and diplomatic level."⁵² In providing legitimacy to the Indian independence struggle through his continued interest in the cause, Roosevelt also inadvertently provided legitimacy to the protests being carried out within the subcontinent by leaders such as Nehru and Gandhi, and therefore also, irrespective of his underlying motives, shed some light on colonial evils being

⁵² Kidwai. "Roosevelt, Nehru, and India's Freedom Movement." pp 118.

exacted upon the Indian people. This caused public opinion in America to sway toward the Indian side and evoked interest from American institutions in the Indian question. The attention Roosevelt afforded to India during this period also highlighted to American policymakers that India was an entity to be considered when it came to political and wartime planning. Roosevelt showed to the United States the importance of the Indian resource base, and in turn, also shed light upon the necessity for political interaction with the subcontinent for strategic purposes in the future. More than anything else though, the greatest benefit that India was granted from this portion of the larger blueprint of representation Roosevelt was creating was the necessity of recognition. Through his strategic and calculated determination regarding the Indian independence struggle, Roosevelt highlighted to The United States' policymakers and American political circles that recognition of the questions surrounding India on some level at least was necessary. Furthermore, he constructed the idea that the concept of an independent India was a legitimate one that required political consideration from the United States.

ii) Utilitarian Value

While the provision of recognition and legitimacy of the Indian struggle from the West was an inadvertent positive development of Roosevelt's construction of India, he also served to create key representations of the nation and its people that were to entrench themselves in American political discourse and later harm how the Indo-American relationship was to be structured. It seemed as if the claims for self-determination for all people that he had made in 1941 were the last time that his relationship with Indian independence was influenced by his humanistic disposition. Soon it became clear, as historical examination highlights, that Roosevelt's activity with regards to the Indian

question was directly aligned to American interests in the war, and that if happenings in the subcontinent's struggle for independence were not in alignment with American interests and goals, then the issue of assistance to Indians would be largely forgotten. It must be recognised that despite his waxings about self-determination and freedom for the colonised peoples worldwide when signing the Atlantic Charter in 1941, Roosevelt saw India and the Indian people first and foremost as a political pawn whose cooperation with the American effort was essential to an Allied victory in the Second World War.

Throughout this period Roosevelt mostly viewed India in the eyes of American self-interest, and his actions reflected so. His determination for placating India was less because he wanted to see the downtrodden be emancipated from British rule and suffering, but more because he saw full Indian participation in the war and the support of Indian nationalists for the Allied wartime effort as essential to an Allied victory in World War 2. His efforts for India were driven more by his belief that Indian resources, manpower, and cooperation were necessary for ensuring the defeat of the Japanese, as well as hampering the efforts of the renegade Indian Nationalist Army who were fighting the Allies alongside the Japanese. He also believed that should India secure independence after the war, it would be a supportive and important ally of the United States in the years to come. To Roosevelt, the battle for Indian independence and the Indian cause was directly correlated to how far it would assist the United States in its wartime effort and after. These are bold assertions, however evidence from historical examination highlights the same. They evidenced when examining certain correspondences from Roosevelt during this period. The most crucial pieces of evidence to support this claim are the two times that Roosevelt raised the question of India with the most vigour. The first evidence

comes from Roosevelt's action toward the India question immediately after The United States was attacked by the Japanese at Pearl Harbour. As Dennis Kux writes, "The US war planners saw the subcontinent as a key bastion for supporting China and a potentially enormous source of manpower and war goods for the Allied cause."⁵³ As a result of this, Roosevelt raised the issue of India with Churchill in a Christmas meeting immediately after the American entry into the conflict and pushed for it to become a signatory of the United Nations declaration. The second evidence to support this claim is through the fact that Roosevelt stepped up his action regarding Indian independence only after the fall of Singapore to the Japanese on February 15 of 1942.⁵⁴ Ten days later, he instructed Averil Harriman, his special representative to London to address the British relationship with Indian Nationalists again and make efforts to secure their support.⁵⁵ Throughout this period, it can be seen that Roosevelt's actions toward India were based more on his desire to gain Indian support and cooperation to secure American interests in the war and less to dismantle the colonial infrastructure that was oppressing so many in the country. Should the activities occurring in India as a part of the Indian struggle for independence be completely non-aligned with the American ambitions, then support was to cease. This can be most clearly understood when examining the Roosevelt government's reaction to the launching of the 'Quit India' civil disobedience movement in India in 1942. Appalled at the launching of the 'Quit India' movement during the height of the war, the American attitude towards India became significantly more indifferent and hard-nosed, thereby ratifying the finding that the Roosevelt government's attempted assistance for Indian

⁵³ Dennis Kux. "Estranged Democracies." pp 28.

⁵⁴ Ibid. pp. 20.

⁵⁵ Martin H. Folly, "W. Averell Harriman, 1946," *The Embassy in Grosvenor Square*, n.d., <https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137295576.0010>.

demands was heavily based upon the American designs during wartime effort. This claim is further evidenced when reading the following correspondence between Roosevelt and his ally, the Chinese Premier Chiang-Kai-Shek, who called for American vocalisation against the British for the imprisonment of Indian leaders in the Quit India movement. In the correspondence, Roosevelt wrote, “ Irrespective of the merits of the case, any action which slows the war effort in India results not in theoretical assistance, but in actual assistance to the armed forces of Japan... I wish Mr. Gandhi could understand that the very worst thing that could happen to the people of India would be a victory by Axis powers ...and we have not the moral right to force ourselves upon the British or the Congress Party.”⁵⁶ This correspondence also highlights that Roosevelt’s mentality towards India was that he would work towards assisting India with gaining some autonomy from the British, but only if it did not get in the way of American geopolitical ambitions.

In direct relation to this, throughout the war, Roosevelt was continually tentative when it came to directly challenging Britain and Churchill on the issue of India. This is most clearly evidenced by the fact that despite his efforts to challenge the colonial regime in India, he was always cautious to never directly challenge Churchill on the issue in a more purposeful manner, knowing Churchill’s aggressive and resolute stance on the issue of Indian independence. In fact, in correspondences with Churchill, Roosevelt echoed this exact sentiment. After suggesting the formation of an interim Indian government in 1942, Roosevelt was also cautious to placate Churchill by ensuring him that his suggestions were only for the greater good of the Allied campaign, concluding his message by stating “ For the love of Heaven, do not bring me into this,

⁵⁶ Franklin D. Roosevelt. Letter from Roosevelt to Churchill. August 9, 1942. Quoted in Winston Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2005). P 508.

though I want to be of help. It is, strictly speaking, none of my business except in so far as it is a part and parcel of the successful fight that you and I are waging.⁵⁷ Furthermore, as the course of the war took a turn and the Allies began to gain ground, Roosevelt began to shift his focus to ensuring an Allied victory, and his relationship with India became enveloped by a sense of inaction. William Phillips, who had himself become thoroughly invested in the Indian cause after the time that he had spent in the subcontinent, made different recommendations to Roosevelt on how to tackle the issue. He wrote to Roosevelt, clearly stating that Indians looked to Roosevelt as the best hope for their emancipation and that it was necessary to “go beyond mere public assurances of friendship”⁵⁸ to secure India’s allyship. As a result, Roosevelt recalled Phillips and had him meet with Churchill, who once again rebuffed the American requests. Phillips recommended to Roosevelt that he go back to India and re-assume his representative role. He believed that the issues in the sub-continent would be best solved through collective discourse amongst all concerned parties. This, however, never came to fruition as Phillips never returned to India, and British Empire continued as an externally undisturbed presence in the region until the end of the war.

What political interactions of this kind did for the representation of India in American eyes was depict it as a necessary political entity to be considered now and in the future, but only to the point that its cooperation, or lack thereof, was associated with American interests. While he legitimised India and highlighted its importance to geopolitics, Roosevelt also carved out a representation that shaped India in a manner that deemed it as a strategically important location but not one that deserved full American consideration. By how Roosevelt handled Britain, he indirectly represented India as the weaker other whose interests were largely secondary to the

⁵⁷ *FRUS 1942*. Vol I. “Correspondence between Roosevelt and Churchill” pp 615-16.

⁵⁸ *FRUS 1943*. Vol IV. “Phillips to Roosevelt” 17 April 1943. Pp 217-20.

greater cause that was being fought for, unless they were of direct relevance to American victory or ambition in the wartime effort. The construction of this representation of India was perhaps the element of the blueprint that remained most entrenched in American dealings with the country following its independence. As the paper will proceed to detail in a later section, the representation of India in this manner was something that was carried over by the American leaders who followed him once India gained its independence and a key tenant that characterised the structure of the relationship in the immediate aftermath of the country's independence. Further examination only serves to greater legitimise the claim being made at this point. This is especially true when examining Roosevelt's dealings with issues arising from the subcontinent that did not directly relate to Indian support for the war, but the suffering of Indian people. Historical examination suggests that he largely ignored issues of this kind. Roosevelt's dealing with these issues most clearly highlights the policy of concerned ambivalence that he had adopted toward issues relating to the Indian people. While he detailed publicly the need for the emancipation of India's subjugated population and attempted to garner support within the country for the American cause, when it came to assisting Indians on the plethora of issues that the native population was being plagued by, Roosevelt remained ambivalent. This is to say that Roosevelt constructed an image of India that began and ended with the struggle for independence and self-determination. He saw these ideals as central and of exclusive importance to the Indian cooperation or lack thereof in the war effort. In doing so, however, Roosevelt neglected other horrific happenings in India. His reaction to the Bengal Famine of 1943 particularly, highlights how the perceptions of India that he had constructed were still based exclusively on political gain and less so upon the humanistic tendencies that he had espoused a few years earlier. Foodstuffs and grain were already being supplied to the war effort from the continent, feeding both British

and American troops.⁵⁹ However, it seemed clear that in the East Indian province of Bengal, problems were brewing concerning the resource base. It seemed that the United States knew about the famine too, but did not take any action. A report that was titled 'Indian Agriculture and Food Problems' was submitted to the American Government in July of 1943. Within it, the report stated that in India 'Famine has been a real and ever-present threat, and it is now reliably estimated that unless substantial quantities of foodstuff are forthcoming from outside sources, hundreds of thousands of deaths will occur from starvation in India in the current year'. Further continuing that, 'Immediate relief shipments of large quantities of foodstuffs will ameliorate the situation during the winter of 1943- 1944'⁶⁰. Still, though, no foodstuffs were sent to India. The situation in Bengal worsened as the months went by, however, due to the British refusal to consider the problem, the necessity for Indian resources to drive the war effort, and frustration at the Quit India movement meant that American assistance was absent. This trend continued through to the end of 1945. The formation of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, the UNRRA⁶¹, was seen as a potential boon to help alleviate the crisis in Bengal, however, it was only to assist victims of the war. In this vein, Britain refused to acknowledge that victims of the Bengal Famine were in fact victims of the conflict for the reason that they had not taken part in the armed struggle. On this technicality, the United States once again acquiesced and did not assist in India whatsoever. In fact, as per the Government of India: "during the period April 1944 -March 1945 the United States Government did not send a single ton of cereals to India, nor did it divert a single ship carry food from other sources to the victims of the

⁵⁹ Mark B. Tauger, "The Indian Famine Crises of World War II," *British Scholar* 1, no. 2 (2009): pp. 166-196, <https://doi.org/10.3366/brs.2009.0004>.

⁶⁰ M.S Venkatramani. Bengal Famine of 1943, The American Response. 1973, p 16.

⁶¹ Agreement for UNRRA. 9 November, 1943.

famine in India.”⁶² How the United States and Roosevelt dealt with the famine characterised how India would be assisted by the United States in future issues that it faced as an independent country too. Real problems that were not of strategic importance, such as famines, would not be taken into consideration as part of the American policy towards the subcontinent, and therefore American action in this regard could be characterised by a policy that was threaded together by empty gestures and concerned ambivalence.

iii) Expectations

The last and perhaps most crucial element that this blueprint created was the outlining of certain expectations of a postcolonial India and its relationship with the United States. These expectations can be further broken down and examined.

Firstly, as exemplified earlier, India was recognised by Roosevelt as a place of geopolitical and strategic importance both during and even after the war. For the postwar geopolitical order, Roosevelt had certain clear aims. He wanted America to be seen as a ‘policeman’⁶³ in the new world order, an entity that was looked up to and revered, especially by the people of former colonies. Race and othering formed key components of this strain of thinking. Roosevelt and his advisors, throughout their time spent dealing with the Indian question, consistently considered the potential ramifications of being at odds with the othered, coloured people of the third world in a postwar global order. Therefore, when considering India specifically in a postwar order, a crucial determinant for the recognition of its importance was the massive population base of the country and how it would in turn represent the United States once it was an emancipated people. This was particularly evidenced by the aforementioned statement that was made by Roosevelt

⁶² Government of India, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Directorate of ECONOMICS, Food Situation in India 1939-43, (New Delhi).

⁶³ Stephen Schlesinger, “FDR’s Five Policemen: Creating the United Nations,” *World Policy Journal* 11, no. 3 (September 1994): pp. 88-93, https://doi.org/10.1163/2468-1733_shafr_sim130110078.

with regards to the independence of the colonies in Tehran, when he stated that “ Our goal must be to help them achieve independence, 1,100,000,000 enemies potential enemies are dangerous.”⁶⁴ This statement shows that even after the war Roosevelt understood the importance of allyship with India, but mostly because as a faraway, distinct, and othered identity, it could prove to be a danger to the United States in the years to follow. The sentiments of othering were echoed even by the champions of Indian independence such as William Phillips, who in correspondence with Roosevelt wrote “ if we do nothing...then we must be prepared for various serious consequences in the internal situation in India which may develop as a result of despair and misery and anti-white sentiments of hundreds of millions of subject people.”⁶⁵ Roosevelt and his aides considered this element quite heavily, however, they were of the firm belief that despite this consideration and American inaction the goodwill that Roosevelt held in India would be enough to ensure its support in the years to come. The idea of this goodwill was not misguided, Roosevelt had recognised and legitimised the need for Indian independence, and was the foremost proponent of the cause when it came to governmental actors outside of the country. Furthermore, his aides on the ground in India consistently asserted that India, thanks to Roosevelt’s actions, viewed the United States in a favourable light and would continue to do so as an independent nation. This is particularly evidenced by a cable from Louis Johnson to Roosevelt in 1942 when he was working on salvaging the Cripps Mission. In his cable, Johnson stated that “ The magic name over here is Roosevelt; the land, the people would follow and love, America.”⁶⁶ Phillips, once he had assumed the position, also continuously reiterated to Roosevelt the importance that he held in Indian eyes, and how he was still being looked upon as the saviour

⁶⁴ Franklin D. Roosevelt. Tehran Conference.

⁶⁵ FRUS, 1943. Vol. IV. “Phillips to Roosevelt” 17 April 1943. Pp 217-220.

⁶⁶ FRUS, 1942. Vol. I. Johnson to President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull. 6 April, 1942.

of the Indian people.⁶⁷ Further ground was given to these assumptions due to the favourable relationship that Roosevelt endured with India's pre-eminent nationalist leader Jawaharlal Nehru. Nehru was a great admirer of Roosevelt too, as echoed by the following writing he delivered: "For my part I admire President Roosevelt and consider that he has been shouldering a very great burden worthily. I think he will inevitably play a great part in the future."⁶⁸ The Americans saw Nehru as a significantly more compliant leader than the stubborn Gandhi, and also assumed that the simplistic correspondences that he had had with Roosevelt before his death would be enough to ensure American goodwill in the subcontinent. As this paper will proceed to detail in the next chapter, however, the Americans were misguided in these expectations.

These discourses put forth the idea that Roosevelt was considered in India to be the saviour of the subjugated, coloured, backward masses. America understood that it would only be through American support that India would have independence, and that therefore should the nation become a sovereign entity, it would continue to be dependent on the United States in a postwar global order. The entrenched perceptions of the colonised as backward and othered played a crucial role in determining the expectations that Roosevelt's construction of an independent India had put forth. The United States ignored the possibility that once independent, India would look towards further self-determination and even consider nonalignment with the United States. Their simplistic belief that the colonised would not be able to think or fend for themselves, and their gross estimation of India's ability for self-determination were integral to the blueprint that Roosevelt fostered during his years of interest in the Indian issue. Therefore, once India was an independent country, the expectations were that it would, based on these positive representations

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ S. Gopal, *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, p. 200.

that had been fostered, be a willful, subservient, and participant entity in helping to dictate American foreign policy in Asia.

The blueprint created by Roosevelt played a tremendous role in framing the American representations of an independent India. After Roosevelt's death and India's independence, American policymakers stuck rigidly to this metaphorical blueprint that had been created years prior by their revered leader. Their dealings with India were heavily dependent on this blueprint, and certain actions mirrored in many ways the way Roosevelt had carried out his interactions with happenings in the subcontinent. Similarly, the expectations of an independent India that framed the construction looked at India through a colonial lens and therefore dictated American policy towards India in similar regard.

What transpired over the decade, however, was very different from what America had anticipated. As the next chapter will detail, the immediate years of Indian independence caused a fraught and tenuous relationship between the two countries. This was most notably due to the emergence of Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru as the determining force in India's geopolitical decision-making. Ultimately, It was Nehru's response to the American enactment of this blueprint that served to structure the Indo-American relationship in the years that followed and create a long-lasting legacy of tension and mistrust between the two political entities.

CHAPTER 2: NEHRU, KASHMIR, AND AMERICAN REPRESENTATIONS OF INDIA

In the years that immediately followed Roosevelt's demise, his influence and legacy on American political activity continued to be omnipresent. He was succeeded by his Vice-President Harold Truman, who also sought to employ the same strategies and outlooks as his predecessor when dealing with various geopolitical issues. This was no different when it came to Truman's treatment of India. India, as elucidated upon in the previous chapter, had no clear representations of itself in the United States before Roosevelt took interest in the issues arising from the subcontinent during the Second World War. Therefore, through his dealings on issues surrounding India and Indian independence, Roosevelt's commanding legacy in the United States allowed for these interactions to create a blueprint within which future American politicians who had never encountered an independent India could operate. The previous chapter detailed the activity of Roosevelt regarding the question of India, and how this activity in turn created a blueprint that as this paper finds, brought about four key elements of how India was to be represented and dealt with. The American government, as this paper will proceed to detail, aligned itself very closely with these representations and reflected actions and dealings with problems arising from India in a manner that was very similar and almost identical to how Roosevelt had dealt with issues arising from India in years prior. The only difference now was that India was no longer shackled by colonial rule, and as an independent democracy capable of self-determination, it was able to react to the deployment of this blueprint in differing ways. This chapter will proceed to examine how India in the immediate years of its independence responded to the American execution of Roosevelt's blueprint, and how it served to freeze Indo-American relations for the years to come.

The period that began Indian independence was shrouded in an overwhelming sense of idealism about the relationship between both parties. As mentioned earlier, The United States had anticipated that its goodwill would be enough to ensure Indian support of the United States in the postwar global order. This postwar global order however grew to involve The United States and the Soviet Union becoming the two omnipotent powers of the world, and fractured this new order by splitting countries into one of the two camps. Events in the subcontinent also continued to be characterised by turbulence. The demand for a separate land for India's Muslim minority began to take shape with the formation of Pakistan, adding a wholly new dimension to what was already going to be an incredibly complicated and divisive relationship.

Through the processes of India and Pakistan gaining independence, The United States maintained a watchful eye, but like his predecessor, Truman refused to bring American involvement into the subcontinent if it did not reflect American interests. This process continued as significant casualties emerged during the partition, as India finally gained its independence and became a new nation.⁶⁹ Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru became the Prime Minister of the newly independent India in 1947, and American ambitions and designs in the subcontinent were heavily dependent upon how he would act as the leader of this new country. American hopes were still optimistic, that Nehru, who had made clear his anti-imperial stance, would be in support of American efforts, especially when it came to dealing with the Soviet threat.⁷⁰

What transpired over the decade however, was very different from what America had anticipated. This was most notably due to the emergence of Nehru as the determining force in India's geopolitical decision-making. Nehru, as will be detailed in the following section, was an mercurial political figure in his own right. His belief systems concerning the United States, The

⁶⁹ Birth of India's Freedom."Times of India." 15 August, 1947.

⁷⁰ Dennis Kux. "Estranged Democracies." p. 48.

Soviet Union, The Cold War, and the global geopolitical order, in general, shaped the nature of American representations of India during this period and delivered tremendous consequences to the relationship that the United States and India endured in the times that followed.

This chapter will now proceed to examine how the elements of Roosevelt's blueprint characterised American representations and expectations of an independent India in the global sphere. It will specifically examine the aforementioned elements concerning the first two political flareups involving India after the country attained its independence in 1947, the war with Pakistan in Kashmir, and the Korean Conflict. The paper will examine how the representations laid out by Roosevelt's blueprint were reflected through American dealings with Kashmir while examining how the expectations of an independent India as laid out by the blueprint were reflected in American dealings with India relating to the Korean War. Throughout this analysis, the research will also provide significant attention to how the sole determinant of India's foreign policy at the time, Jawaharlal Nehru reacted to the elements of the blueprint. By carrying out this analysis, the thesis will be able to understand how the combination of these interacting elements served to structure the relationship between the two parties in the future. It will postulate that the United States dealt with India in a manner that adhered to the blueprint. American representations of how to deal with India during the Second World War have been reflected in its dealing with the Kashmir issue, wherein concerned ambivalence once again characterised American involvement. Furthermore, American interest in the Kashmir issue was directly aligned with its own South Asian geopolitical ambitions during the Cold War. With regards to Korea, we can see how Nehru's heightened involvement in peacemaking efforts served to subvert the expectations of dependency and alliance laid out by the blueprint, therefore vilifying India and demonising representations of the country in the United States.

i) *Understanding Nehru*

Jawaharlal Nehru was the father of modern India. For an elongated period, he was an anomaly within the postcolonial power structures of the newly independent countries of the world. Democratically elected and supported by most of India's population, he staunchly stuck to his belief systems and philosophies throughout his time in power as the leader of India. From the outset of India's independence, Nehru made his ambitions and desires for an independent India clear. He established a distinct national philosophy for his leadership in the country, and clearly outlined his intentions for an independent India in the global sphere. Nehru's 'National Philosophy' for India is comprised of seven national goals or tenants. These were national unity, parliamentary democracy, industrialisation, scientific temper, secularism, socialism, and nonalignment.⁷¹ Of these seven principles, the two that came to most significantly influence America's views of India, and thereby the relationship between the two countries during this period, were those of socialism and nonalignment.⁷² Nehru's unwavering commitment to these ideals became apparent and observable to the United States through several geopolitical flare-ups during the 1950s, playing an integral role in affecting the existing American representations of India and structuring the relationship between the two parties in the next few years that followed. This paper postulates that the central issue that hindered American and Indian bilateral relations and codependence in the early 1950s was Nehru. His continuous assertions of non-alignment and neutrality worried Harold Truman, who had little to no experience in dealing with India or Indian leaders before his time as president.⁷³ Truman, therefore, relied heavily upon the blueprint that

⁷¹ Bhikhu Parekh, "Nehru and the National Philosophy of India". *Economic and Political Weekly* 26, no. 1/2 (1991): 35–48.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/4397189>.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Harold A. Gould, "Anticommunism and Anticolonialism," *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 15, no. 4 (1988): pp. 194-203, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00927678.1988.10553628>.

had been laid out by Roosevelt before him when it came to framing issues that related to India and the Indian subcontinent. For two years following India's independence, the interaction between the country and the United States was limited. The American preoccupation with Soviet aggression elsewhere seemed to dictate much of American foreign policy at the time, however, Nehru's belief system around how an independent India would carry itself in the global sphere still began to draw criticism and concern from the United States.⁷⁴ Still, as a result of Soviet aggression and expansionism, the American policy on how to deal with South Asia had already been set. The pervasive and intense fear of the communist threat had now reached all levels of American political consciousness, and as Roosevelt had correctly opined earlier, South Asia looked as if it would be an integral cog in stopping the 'Red Threat'. This belief is echoed by a memorandum that was produced in 1949 by American officials which read " We must recognize that, should we not provide at least the minimum assistance deemed essential by the countries of the area, South Asia might give effect to its predilection for neutrality, vis-a-vis the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. or, at worst, it might fall into the Soviet orbit. In either event, we should find it difficult to prevent the countries of the area from developing political and economic principles incompatible with our own and should war come, we might find ourselves denied access to the raw materials, manpower, limited industrial capacity, and possible bases of South Asia."⁷⁵

The paranoia of American aspersions of how an independent India intended on conducting itself on the world stage was further exacerbated by the statements of Nehru, who talked extensively of Indian self-determination and non alignment,⁷⁶ statements that were antithetical to the

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Report by the SANACC Subcommittee for the Near and Middle East. Washington. April 19, 1949.

⁷⁶ Bhikhu Parekh, "Nehru and the National Philosophy of India". Pp. 45-46

expectations that had been laid out by Roosevelt's metaphorical blueprint of a few years prior. The United States had incorrectly expected initially that Nehru, who was western educated, an admirer of Roosevelt, and a democratically elected leader, would be willing to go along with the American Cold War agenda. In addition to this expectation, the United States relied heavily on the belief that Nehru through his reverence for Roosevelt would exercise willful participation with the United States on its foreign policy agenda. The belief within the United States that reverence and respect for Roosevelt's efforts toward the Indian independence struggle would manifest itself in Indian subservience once independence had been received was commonplace. This, however, was not the case. What the United States did not anticipate was Nehru's commitment to non-alignment and neutrality. What they also failed to anticipate was that the Roosevelt policy of concerned ambivalence to issues in the subcontinent might have worked in generating Indian cooperation and goodwill while it was under the umbrella of colonialism, but as an independent nation, empty gestures of a similar kind would have significantly more drastic implications on the relationship.

As mentioned earlier in the chapter, two significant events occurred in the immediate aftermath of Indian independence that characterised the Indo-American relationship during this period. These were the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947, and the Korean War which began in 1950. Both conflicts played different roles when it came to interacting with the blueprint that Roosevelt had laid out. Concerning Kashmir, The United States recognised the necessity to support India, however, its actions, based on certain elements of the aforementioned blueprint only resulted in the alienation of Nehru and vice-versa. Regarding Korea, India continued to forego any expectations that the United States had for it as an independent nation by forcing its hand in the Cold War politicking, serving to further disrupt the relationship between the two parties. The

following sections will now proceed to examine how American activity concerning India in these two conflicts was determined directly by the blueprint and the representations within the blueprint that Roosevelt had created, and how the Indian response to these representations served to demolish any semblance of goodwill that the two countries strived to cultivate in the early 1950s.

ii) *Kashmir and American Representations*

Independent India's first conflict came as a result of a dispute with Pakistan over the region of Kashmir. The disputed region of Kashmir, which was of strategic and geopolitical importance to India, was one of the last states to decide whether or not to accede to becoming a part of the newly independent India or Pakistan. At the time, Kashmir was ruled by a Hindu monarch, Hari Singh. Despite this, the majority of its population was Muslim. Furthermore, the Muslim majority of Kashmir had for years put forth their contestations against Hari Singh's rule in the region. The burgeoning unrest in the region, paired with its strategic importance to both states ultimately resulted in Pakistan claiming proprietorship of the region. India also saw Kashmir be an important and necessary part of the Union of India for a multitude of reasons. The geopolitical advantages that the region provided due to its location were immense for India. With the help of the Himalayas mountain range, Kashmir could act as a buffer between the north of the country and the volatility that surrounded it. Kashmir was also a region that was blessed with an abundance of natural resources in the form of graphite, lead, and zinc, making it a financially important centre for India. More importantly than anything else, however, Nehru believed that Kashmir needed to be a part of India to secure and maintain the secularity of the country. As Josef Korbel, one-time president of the UNCIP stated, "The struggle for Kashmir is in every sense another battle in this continuing struggle and by now an irrational war of ideals. In the

minds of Nehru and the Congress, Kashmir is, in miniature, another Pakistan, and if this Muslim nation can be successfully governed by India, then their philosophy of secularism is vindicated".⁷⁷

Interests on the Pakistani side were equally as pertinent, as they had their own geopolitical and strategic securities to consider, for which Kashmir held extreme importance as well. Therefore, both countries had a determined and vested desire to take control of Kashmir. The issue's complicated and multilayered nature brought about a question of who would ultimately decide the fate of Kashmir. The decision of which way to go fell to Maharaja Hari Singh, who while weighing out the multitude of options before him saw the growth of insurgent ideals in various parts of the region.⁷⁸ Therefore before the monarch could make his decision, Pakistani-backed Pathan tribal fighters struck in the district of Poonch in October of 1947 and attempted to take control of the region.⁷⁹ The tribal forces, well trained and native to the region, were able to drive forward and ultimately reach the footsteps of the Kashmiri capital of Srinagar. Desperate, the Monarch of Kashmir appealed to India for assistance.⁸⁰ India however, only promised Hari Singh assistance should he sign the instrument of accession in its favour.⁸¹ In a desperate bid to prevent further chaos from engulfing the region, the monarch signed the instrument of accession on October 27th, 1947.⁸² As a result of this, an airlift of Indian troops arrived in Kashmir and secured the capital, eventually driving the invading forces further back into the province.⁸³

⁷⁷ Josef Korbel, in *Danger in Kashmir* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 79-80.

⁷⁸ Alice Thorner, "The Issues in Kashmir," *Far Eastern Survey* 17, no. 15 (November 1948): pp. 173-178, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3022818>.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ B. Krishna, "Kashmir War of 1947-48: Slender Was the Thread," *International Affairs* 47, no. 1 (1971): pp. 212-215, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2614773>.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² "Kashmir Accedes to India" *The Hindustan Times*. New Delhi. 28 October, 1947.

⁸³ Ibid.

It did not take long for the issue to be brought forward on the international stage in the newly-formed United Nations. It had been brought to the Security Council by the Indians after bilateral attempts at negotiation had failed.⁸⁴ The large gap between India and Pakistan on the Kashmir issue however produced a political deadlock regarding the region. The next major development came with the formation of the Western-backed United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP)⁸⁵ to help with the mediation of the issue, and the creation of a plebiscite to determine the fate of Kashmir. Although the UNCIP had worked towards a ceasefire in 1949, issues then arose surrounding the question of whether if a plebiscite was to take place, who would control the Kashmir while it was being carried out. The UNCIP's policies by 1949 seemed to suit the Pakistanis, who accepted most of them, while Nehru and India dug their heels in further. The American position also grew to firmly support the UNCIP, and America continued to keep its involvement in the conflict limited. The United States continued to push for arbitration and understanding between the two aggrieved parties over the issue of Kashmir, without directly involving itself in the dispute. Politicking around the issue of Kashmir continued similarly for a continued period after this. Problems continued to arise, primarily on India's end, that stalled the process of arbitration on the issue. Resultantly, frustrations began to mount within the United States concerning the Indian position, however, the issue still never came to directly involve American interests, and still did not, therefore, attract any significant American attention. The American apathy towards the intricacies of the issue, in turn, frustrated Nehru, and Kashmir grew to be the first point of divergence between The United States and India in what was to become a tenuous relationship between the two.

⁸⁴ Sisir Gupta. "A Study in Indo-Pak Relations" New Delhi. Asia Publishing House. 1966. Pp 129-39.

⁸⁵ Security Council Resolution 39. January 1948.

When examining the American involvement in the Kashmir issue we can make note of a few important points. Firstly, the American attitude towards the issue of Kashmir was dictated by its geopolitical interests, rather than the merits of the issue. Therefore, through the United Nations and UNCIP, the United States exerted its policy of passivity and concerned ambivalence once again towards India. Consequently, this attitude served to only further alienate Nehru from the United States in several ways, and vice versa ultimately stoking the flames for further events to come.

When examining how the elements of Roosevelt's blueprint manifested themselves in America's association with Kashmir in 1948 and 1949, we can see that the Truman government relied heavily on the representations of India that it had constructed. Firstly, it is clear to see that the provision of some interest in the issues relating to the subcontinent, especially in the United Nations, highlighted how Roosevelt's representations of legitimacy translated into interactions with an independent India on the global stage in global organisations. More pertinently, however, we can see how the blueprint relied on the representations laid out by the blueprint that encouraged American interest towards India only if the latter's utilitarian value was at stake.

- The Indian Position

Nehru showed throughout that he would remain steadfast in his position on the Kashmir issue. He believed, that due to the rights afforded by the accession that Kashmir was rightfully India's. He felt that UN involvement in the issue would only be fruitful if it saw the removal of Pakistani troops from the region. What Nehru was also sure of was that the administration of a plebiscite as the UNCIP had initially suggested would be devastating for Indian secularism and security. For the reasons that Kashmir was first and foremost a Muslim-dominated region, and that Pakistani

control of it, with its strategic and geopolitical importance to South Asia, would have devastating ramifications on Indian stability and security.

The crux of the disagreements between Nehru and the United States was that Nehru was of the fervent belief that Pakistan was the aggressor, as a result, he felt that Pakistan should have been treated in that manner. India's position was therefore driven further away from the United States when its involvement in the issue was characterised by passivity and ambivalence. Often, it seemed that America, in Nehru's eyes at least, was leaning towards Pakistan not because of the merits of the issue, but because of the country's self-interest.⁸⁶ This is further evidenced by a correspondence between Nehru and British Commonwealth Office Undersecretary Gordon Walker wherein he wrote that "The motives of the United States were to get military and economic concessions from Pakistan".⁸⁷ American dealings with India over the Kashmir issue brought about Nehru's first reactions to the Roosevelt blueprint, reactions that only served to distance the two powers for the immediate future.

- The American Position

The American position on Kashmir was solely determined by self-interest. It was made evident as early as January of 1948 by Loy Henderson, the man who was soon to be the American ambassador to India, who wrote to the then Acting Secretary of State Robert Lovett detailing American designs in South Asia. He argued that the United States should not make a choice "between giving support to the interests of India or Pakistan"⁸⁸ and that the US should not "provide the Soviets with an opening to mix into the affairs of South Asia."⁸⁹ As the

⁸⁶ Dennis Kux. "Estranged Democracies." pp 68.

⁸⁷ FRUS 1948. Vol V. Ambassador in India to the Secretary of State. 21 February 1948. Correspondence between Nehru and Gordon was mentioned in this correspondence.

⁸⁸ FRUS, 1948, vol.V. Henderson to Lovett, report of discussions between the British delegation and US Officials. January 10, 1948.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

correspondence from Loy Henderson suggests, American decision-making was significantly more involved with considerations of how best to deal with the issue to minimise the Soviet threat in the region. America's only real interest in the issue was in how it would affect the Soviet Union's power and position in South Asia. The U.S.S.R played a major role, therefore, in determining how America positioned itself over the Kashmir issue. While Soviet interest in Kashmir, especially in the late 1940s was minimal, the American policy towards the region was designed to minimise its influence. The US therefore also saw it necessary to preserve the support of Pakistan, which it felt could be drawn closer to the USSR due to its geography and resource imbalance. As Rakesh Ankit writes, "In 1948, it became imperative to stop a desperate Pakistan from making overtures to Russia, and this was shared with the Americans to cooperate on policy at the United Nations."⁹⁰ Consequently, the United States also began to gently patronise Pakistan over the Kashmir issue, as the country was also important to the fight against the Soviets due because it was an important location for establishing air bases and intelligence gathering facilities. Furthermore, Pakistan's proximity to the Persian Gulf made it useful as a shield for protecting the Middle East oil fields in the eventuality of hostilities in Asia.⁹¹ The United States saw a willing and dependent ally in Pakistan, one which could be dealt with through the blueprint to secure American foreign policy interests. The United States was also surprised to find that Nehru was significantly more difficult to sway than they had initially anticipated. American governmental actors found Nehru's steadfastness exhausting and were equally as suspicious of his claims of neutrality. Acheson even went so far as to refer to Nehru

⁹⁰ Rakesh Ankit. "1948: The Crucial Year in the History of Jammu and Kashmir." *Economic and Political Weekly* 45, no. 11 (2010): pp 49–58. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25664224>.

⁹¹ Parama Parit, "The Kashmir Policy of the United States: A Study of the Perceptions, Conflicts and Dilemmas," Taylor & Francis, accessed June 18, 2022, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09700160108458997>.

as one of the most difficult men he had ever dealt with.⁹² What this did was also increase American suspicions of where Nehru's loyalties lay, especially after his claims of nonalignment in the months prior. For these reasons, The United States felt that eliminating any minimal Soviet influence in the region by placating Pakistan, but not directly involving itself and completely alienating India, was the best course of action. As a result, the American policy towards Kashmir was once again characterised by passivity and concerned ambivalence toward the intricacies of the conflict.

iii) American Representations of India

All of the American attempts to resolve the Kashmir dispute, especially during this period, were characterised by the same representation of interacting and assisting India only if India provided some utilitarian value to the United States. The Truman government, just like the Roosevelt government before him attempted to utilise the strategy of placation through what were fairly empty gestures, such as the formation of the UNCIP and the introduction of proposals for a plebiscite. The Americans continued to favour the Pakistanis on issues relating to identifying the aggressor, the plebiscite, and the validity of the original accession all the while playing the role of an unbiased mediator. In all of these areas, the US chose to ignore important and true subtleties of the case that furthered the Indian cause. These subtleties were specifically centred around the fact that the United States did not condemn Pakistan as the aggressor in the conflict, and denied the validity of the original instrument of accession⁹³ to instead preserve its interests. These American involvements, however, were seen to be ineffective when it came to dealing

⁹² Dean Acheson. *Present at the Creation*. New York. Norton & Co. 1969. p 336.

⁹³ Ronald Wrigley, "American Policy in the Kashmir-Jammu Dispute before the United Nations 1948-1957," *University of Rhode Island*, 1958, <https://doi.org/10.23860/thesis-wrigley-ronald-1958>.

with Nehru who appeared to be far more strong-willed on the issue than the Americans had initially anticipated.

Ultimately, Kashmir served to only cool American relations with India. The Americans reacted to the issue in Kashmir with a lack of understanding similar to what had been seen before when Roosevelt was dealing with the independence struggle. American interest and understanding of Kashmir were dictated by its interests relating to Cold War security in South Asia. While India and Pakistan were legitimised and addressed as independent nations, they were represented as nothing more than necessary cogs in the South Asian political machinery that needed to be placated in some way. In doing so, the Americans ignored the legal mechanisms that placed Pakistan in the wrong and furthered India's cause for Kashmir. Therefore, the passive American gestures that were motivated by self-interest to mediate the issue seemed to only further alienate the resolute Nehru from allyship with The United States. Ultimately, the Kashmir issue made Nehru altogether somewhat disenchanted with American influence on the issue in the United Nations, and he once again grew to distrust American efforts in affairs surrounding Asia. In a similar vein, The United States was taken aback and disappointed by Nehru's steadfastness and commitment to Kashmir and found his steadfastness on the issue to be disconcerting. These suspicions were only exacerbated when combined with his firmness concerning neutrality and nonentanglement.

An application of postcolonial discourses to the American handling of Kashmir highlights certain key points too. Similar to Roosevelt, the Truman government did not look at the subcontinent as anything more than a faraway part of the larger American battle that was being fought. It continued to gradually increase its support for Pakistan due to the latter's obedience to alliance

and alienated itself from India the more that Nehru exercised India's sovereignty on the global stage.

Through its interaction with India over the Kashmir issue in the late 1940s, the Truman government dutifully adhered to elements of Roosevelt's metaphorical blueprint. The United States understood the legitimacy and importance of India but also saw that its utilitarian value at the time was less than that of Pakistan. Indian interests in Kashmir, irrespective of the legal and cultural technicalities of the case were not deemed important enough to receive American support or interest. Instead, the American policy was centred around the subtle appeasement of Pakistan to secure its allyship against the Soviets, while also not alienating India and outwardly appearing to be a mediator. Therefore it carried out the blueprint's policy of concerned ambivalence towards India on the Kashmir issue. Nehru's response to these representations, however, served as a major catalyst in determining the nature of Indo-American relations going into the 1950s. After the war of 1948-49, he became increasingly suspicious of the United States, and vice versa. However, if the United States found the Indian response to the representations laid out by the blueprint to be problematic, issues would only be exacerbated further soon later in Korea when for the first time, the Cold War turned into a hot war.

CHAPTER 3: NEHRU, KOREA, AND AMERICAN EXPECTATIONS

The conflict in Korea should not necessarily have involved either the United States or India, however, both parties grew to play an imperative role in its ultimate outcomes. While the Korean War is known for playing an important role in shaping Cold War dynamics during the 1950s, it also played an equally important role in shaping the relationship between India and the United States during the decade. The main contestation that arose between India and the United States during this period was surrounding the role that Jawaharlal Nehru and India chose to play in the conflict.

i) The Korean War

The Korean War began in June of 1950 when around seventy-five thousand Soviet-backed North Korean troops invaded the pro-Western South across the border between the two countries, known as the 38th Parallel.⁹⁴ After the emergence of the Soviet Union as a true superpower, and the subsequent fall of China to communism, the United States became enveloped by the ideological struggle of the Cold War. When examining Asia, the Truman government became particularly concerned with what he called the ‘Domino Theory’. The core belief of this theory was that if one nation in Asia fell to communism, the others would immediately follow and that Asia would soon entirely be a victim of red expansionism. As a result, The United States saw it necessary to involve itself in the conflict and bring about its speedy conclusion. This began in the United Nations with a public condemnation of the attack.⁹⁵ After the tumultuous entry into interactions with Nehru and Indian foreign policy in Kashmir, the United States was

⁹⁴ “Northern, Southern Koreans at War!”. San Diego Union. 25 June, 1950.

⁹⁵ Robert Barnes, “Between the Blocs: India, the United Nations, and Ending the Korean War,” *Journal of Korean Studies* 18, no. 2 (2013): pp. 263-286, <https://doi.org/10.1353/jks.2013.0022>.

apprehensive about Indian support over Korea. To the Americans' surprise, however, India initially stood alongside it and supported UN Security Council resolutions that first condemned the invasion, and then called for support for South Korea to fight against the attack.⁹⁶ However, this willingness to cooperate dissipated soon after. This happened primarily due to the growing suspicions that Nehru held of the United States and its designs in Asia. Nehru was committed to neutrality, and cautious of American ambition in the region. Further, his interactions with Truman over Kashmir had already sown the seeds of distrust between the two in the years prior and he suspected American neo-colonial ideals were at play. These fears were only entrenched further when the Truman administration drafted an additional proposal recommending UN members to make forces and other assistance "available to a unified command under the United States of America" and requesting "the United States to designate the commander of such forces."⁹⁷ This proposal served to cause a strain on Indo-American relations, as Nehru became increasingly aware and suspicious of American intentions. Still, however, India did not go directly against the proposal and chose to abstain instead. While the resolution narrowly passed in the Security Council, Nehru's concern grew into an active desire to place India in the role of peacemaker during the conflict. This chapter will now proceed to examine the course of the Korean War through the lens of India's peacemaking activity, how this activity interacted with the blueprint, and also how it served to structure Indo-American relations in the years that followed.

ii) Indian Peacemaking

Nehru's efforts of peacemaking began in July of 1950 when he attempted to organise peace talks between the Soviets, the Chinese, and the West. The crux of Nehru's proposal was that in return

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

for discussions on the Korean issue, the Soviets would return to the Security Council and that the Chinese Communists would be recognised.⁹⁸ Unsurprisingly, the Americans rejected the offer with immediacy. As American involvement in Korea intensified, by late 1950, the stage was set for a complete repulsion of North Korean troops from the South. The US mulled over whether to invade over the 38th Parallel line and despite Nehru's warning of a Chinese response⁹⁹ should the US do so, American forces crossed the border in September of 1950. This prompted an immediate response from the Chinese, who as Nehru had warned, intervened, further escalating the conflict.¹⁰⁰

While Nehru's warnings and peacemaking efforts seemed to be winning him no friends in the West and pushing India closer to being represented in the same way as the communists, he did not give up on his peacemaking efforts. The next Indian push came in 1951 when Nehru advocated for a ceasefire agreement, supported by the British, that was in opposition to American efforts for a UN resolution that condemned Chinese aggression.¹⁰¹ After intense deliberation, the resolution went through, only to be rejected by the Chinese communists.¹⁰² After this, the General Assembly voted to condemn Chinese aggression nonetheless and Nehru was forced to take a temporary backseat when it came to his efforts of championing peace. For all of the United States' concerns about Nehru and his stance on neutrality and nonalignment, it was India's commitment to the same which allowed it to be seen as a

⁹⁸ FRUS, 1950, Vol. VII, Telegram: US Permanent Representative to the UN Warren Austin to Acheson, New York, July 6, 1950. p 321.

⁹⁹ Dennis Kux. "Estranged Democracies." p 77.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Kim ChanWahn, "The Role of India in the Korean War," *International Area Review* 13, no. 2 (2010): pp. 21-37, <https://doi.org/10.1177/223386591001300202>.

¹⁰² Ibid.

legitimately neutral peacemaker in Asia that could help in dealing with the hostilities. Therefore, India once again became involved in peacemaking efforts in 1952. This time at the request of the United States, Nehru enlisted his old friend and parliamentarian, V.K Krishna Menon to assist with drafting a resolution that would satisfy the North Koreans, the Chinese, and the Americans.¹⁰³ After a significant back and forth, Dean Acheson eventually agreed to accept the Indian resolution after it was tweaked to ensure that American interests were preserved, and it was passed in the UN General Assembly resoundingly. Any headway that was made however was cancelled out by the Soviets and ten days later, the Chinese Communists, who both chose to reject the offer leaving Nehru despondent and consequently bringing his peacemaking efforts in East Asia to a temporary end.

Nonetheless, Nehru's efforts were still paramount to maintaining peace as the foremost goal of the exchanges between India, the US, and the other involved parties in the UN. While his efforts could have sometimes been seen as naive or misguided, they were well-intentioned and centred around his belief that the West, especially Washington, should not be able to exact its will with the United Nations when it came to affairs in Asia.

iii) American Expectations

When examining how India's activity during the Korean Conflict related to the metaphorical blueprint, the connection is clear to see. India's activity as a peacemaker during this conflict served to directly subvert the American expectations of the country that were laid out in the blueprint. The United States had expected that as a three-year-old former colony, which had been stripped of its financial and cultural identities through years of colonial rule, India would begin to be and remain a wilful and subservient ally to the United States, assisting with the prevention

¹⁰³ S. K. Choube "Krishna Menon in the United Nations." *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 25, no. 3/4 (1964): 101–16.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/41854021>.

of communist expansionism in South Asia. In the eyes of the United States, India doubling down on its stance of non-alignment, and thereafter broadcasting this stance on the international stage, was not a welcome sight. At every juncture, the Americans seemed to oppose Nehru's efforts to find a peaceful settlement, instead only becoming increasingly suspicious of his efforts and further associating him and India with the othered Communist enemies in the Soviet Union and China. This is most clearly evidenced by first a statement from Truman, who in 1950 declared that Nehru and his associates "played the game of the communists regularly."¹⁰⁴ Truman's sentiments were echoed by John Foster Dulles, an American advisor at the United Nations, who stated "perhaps the United States should sit on the sidelines and let the Indians try to solve Korea. That might make them less willing to meddle in other people's affairs."¹⁰⁵ The American distaste of Nehru and his machinations extended as far as larger institutions of cultural transmission too, such as the New York Times, who ran an article which read "Pandit Nehru purports to speak for Asia, but it is the voice of abnegation, his criticism turns out to be obstructive, his policy appeasement".¹⁰⁶ Statements like these highlighted the displeasure of the Americans towards Nehru and his foreign policy. By this juncture, American polity had become convinced that because Nehru was so openly and aggressively putting forth his ideals of peace, he was shifting closer and closer to the enemy. To the Americans, it seemed unfathomable that a newly-independent nation, postcolonial, and third world nation of coloured people like India, which in their eyes owed so much to the United States and Roosevelt, should have the authority or ability to dictate and sway affairs regarding matters of American interest.

¹⁰⁴ Harry S. Truman. "Memoirs, Years of Trouble and Hope". Garden City: Doubleday and Company Inc. 1956. pp 361-62.

¹⁰⁵ *FRUS, 1950*, vol VII. Minutes of staff meeting of US Delegation to UN General Assembly, September 21, 1950.

¹⁰⁶ New York Times, 10 October 1950.

The reason Indian involvement in Korea caused such a significant degradation in relations though, was primarily because India had strayed completely from the expectations that the United States had set for it. While the US was willing to begrudgingly accept Indian non-alignment for the time being, the idea of India attempting to put forth similar ideologies on a global scale, especially when affecting American interests, was a complete deviation from what America expected and anticipated. The US had initially hoped that India could act as a bulwark in the subcontinent to prevent the spread of Communism. They had, as per the representations and expectations constructed years prior, believed that India could be shaped in the American mould and act as a vessel for American-sponsored politicking in South Asia. It was ultimately Nehru's desire to stand against what he saw as a new form of American imperialism, and his rebukes of American influence in the region that drove the two entities further and further apart. Examining the American reaction to the Indian involvement in Korea more closely, we can also see that the American derision towards Indian involvement in the issue was based purely on the entrenched legacies of colonialism that still determined much of the American expectations of India at the time. Through the blueprint, The United States had anticipated that the purported reverence that Roosevelt held within the country, paired with India's perceived postcolonial ineptitude would be contributory factors to ensuring Indian allyship with the United States. The notion of the 'white saviour' that was touched upon by authors such as Fanon and Said was a key determinant in framing this aspect of American representations. Therefore, once India began to enact its own free will on the global stage, going against American expectations, the relationship took a drastic hit. This was a direct result of the United States finding it to be inconceivable that a newly independent, deprived, former colony like India should make its foreign policy ambitions so apparent in the international sphere, especially when going against the United

States. In addition, the United States did not expect that Nehru's influence on proceedings in the United Nations would be as prevalent as it was. As a result, instead of viewing Nehru's peacekeeping efforts as an exemplification of India's commitment to neutrality, the United States viewed the efforts as a subversion of the expectations of India that were laid out by the blueprint. Ultimately, what Indian action in this regard served to do was further alienate the country from the United States, and push it towards being represented as an alienated ally of the other, which in this case comprised of the red enemies to the East.

CONCLUSIONS

When referring back to the research question of how American representations of India structured the relationship between the two parties between the year 1941 to the year 1953, this paper can now present its findings. At this juncture, it is important to also revisit the two sub-questions that were put forth at the beginning of this paper to provide the most detailed understanding of how these representations structured the relationship.

When examining the first sub-question, this paper can postulate the following findings: Through his dealings with the question of Indian independence during WWII, Roosevelt, through his legacy and influence on American politics, inadvertently constructed the idea of an independent India within the United States. In doing so, he also created a metaphorical blueprint by which future dealings that the US conducted with an independent India would be characterised. The core tenants of the blueprint that Roosevelt created were as follows:

- i) By raising the question of Indian independence, Roosevelt brought attention to the legitimacy of the question of decolonisation and the Indian independence struggle. He legitimised the representation of India as an independent nation and one that would be of strategic importance in the postwar geopolitical order.
- ii) He created the representation of India as an entity whose goals and ambitions would in many cases be aligned to those of the United States, but also through his dealings with the issue showed that India was to only truly be considered if American interests were also directly at stake in the situation. With this, Roosevelt also highlighted to future policymakers that Indian interests were to still be subservient to those of its more powerful allies, such as Great Britain,

thereby already reducing the perceived ability and importance of an independent India's activity in a postwar geopolitical order.

iii) Roosevelt created the representation that the United States would be able to tackle issues arising from India in a particular manner. If issues did not directly involve American interest, they would be largely ignored, as evidenced by his treatment of the Bengal Famine. When Roosevelt did consider problems in India, he also created a philosophy of what can only be described as 'concerned ambivalence' towards these during the war. This philosophy, characterised by largely empty gestures and small concessions laid the foundations for how issues concerning India would be dealt with by the United States in the years that followed India's independence.

iv) Lastly, Roosevelt, whether directly or indirectly, fostered and cultivated the belief amongst American political circles that the need for the support of the formerly subjugated peoples was necessary, but that it was almost guaranteed. America saw itself as the champion of the free world, and concerning India, America felt that Roosevelt's position was imperious.

Governmental actors and indeed American society, in general, seemed to believe that due to Roosevelt's efforts, America would be seen in high regard by Indian eyes, leading to their willful cooperation in any struggles that were to follow.

When examining the second sub-question, this paper postulates that as the leader of an independent India, Jawaharlal Nehru sought to maintain Indian interests of neutrality and nonalignment at the forefront of the country's foreign policy, while also being cautious to withhold Indian political dependence on the United States. As a result, two key findings can be ascertained.

i) The policy of concerned ambivalence towards Indian issues when they did not directly affect American interests that were carried over by the Truman government after India's independence served to only further alienate Nehru from the United States' allyship, as evidenced by the happenings in Kashmir. What the American involvement in Kashmir highlighted to Nehru was the American desire to preserve its interests in South Asia, before actually examining the intricacies of the situation and addressing them fairly and equivalently. Kashmir made Nehru suspicious of American interests with regard to India and pushed him further away from allyship with the United States.

ii) Consequently, Nehru saw it important that India act as a neutral peacemaker in Asia to prevent the American influence in the region from becoming all-pervasive. This, however, served to completely subvert the American expectations of India as an independent nation, and because Indian activity was not in accordance with American geopolitical ambitions, it pushed representations of India within American circles toward the othered enemies of the time.

Ultimately, when examining how the findings from the sub-questions relate to the larger research question as a whole; this paper postulates the following: Through his dealings with the Indian question during the Second World War, Roosevelt indirectly constructed the notion of an independent India in the United States, and also constructed a blueprint for American actors to follow when addressing issues relating to India. The blueprint created by Roosevelt played a tremendous role in framing the American representations of an independent India and it was determined by legacies of colonialism that had existed during the time of its construction. After Roosevelt's death and India's independence, American policymakers stuck rigidly to this metaphorical blueprint that had been created years prior by their revered leader. Their dealings with India were heavily dependent on this blueprint, and certain actions mirrored in many ways

the way Roosevelt had interacted with happenings in the subcontinent. As much of Roosevelt's dealings with questions arising from India came during its time as a colony, much of the blueprint was also framed from a colonial lens. Strict American adherence to these elements of the blueprint even after India's independence served to only alienate the two from one another. This blueprint served to structure how the US represented an independent India but also structured the relationship between the two countries through Nehru's response to it. Nehru's reaction to how America responded to the Kashmir issue, which was based solely on the way Roosevelt handled the issue of Indian independence, was met with surprise and frustration within American circles. On the flip side, American ambivalence towards Kashmir, and its dependence on adhering to its self-interest when addressing the issue served to also alienate India from the United States. A few years later, Nehru's obstinate self-determination and his ardent commitment to neutrality and non-entanglement drove the United States further away, for their expectations of him and India had been centred around how India would be obedient and subservient ally. Collectively, the colonial legacies that dictated particular elements of the blueprint made Nehru warier of how American self-interest was the sole determinant of its activity in Asia. By all accounts, it seemed that Nehru would have been favourable to the US, but the Americans made a miscalculation by not understanding the Indian leader's policies and belief systems while sticking so rigidly to the blueprint that Roosevelt had laid out before them. Therefore, when examining how the American representations of India served to structure the relationship during the period being examined, we can find that these representations, which were laid out in Roosevelt's metaphorical blueprint, only served to alienate the United States and India from one another in the years that followed the latter's independence. The Americans had miscalculated Nehru's positioning as India's leader, and by sticking steadfastly to the

representations of how to deal with India espoused by the blueprint in Kashmir, they antagonised and pushed him further away from allyship with the United States. Similarly, Nehru's subversion of the expectations that were laid out by the blueprint when he acted as a peacemaker during the Korean conflict served to only further alienate India when it came to representations in the United States, and push it further towards the communist block. Ultimately, it can be said that while the blueprint did provide legitimacy to India as an independent nation, Nehru's reactions to various elements of the blueprint only served to push the United States and India further away from one another in the immediate aftermath of the country's independence. As a result of this, history bore witness to the fraught, tense, and vitriolic relationship between the two parties that began in the early 1950s and carried over for the decade to follow.

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