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"*Son buenos para imponer sus leyes acá*": Aymara Experiences and Negotiations to Recent Migration and Securitization Dynamics in the Chilean Border Communities of Colchane and Pisiga Carpa

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List of Acronyms

PDI: Police of Investigations
UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
NGOs: Non-governmental Organizations
SEREMI: *Secretaría Regional Ministerial*
PCR: Polymerase Chain Reaction
ZOFRI: Iquique Free Trade Zone
FASIC: *Fundación de Ayuda Social de las Iglesias Cristianas*

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Abstract

Based on situated ethnographic fieldwork and thirteen participant interviews, this research paper addresses how Aymara border residents of Colchane and Pisiga Carpa, in constant interaction with migrants and other relevant actors, experience and respond to increased migration flows and securitization dynamics in their communities. This paper reveals a contradiction: while Aymara identities and traditional mobilities do not ascribe to the fixity and rootedness of nation-state borders, enhanced border securitization leads border residents to dissociate with migrants and increasingly use fears to assert their belonging to the nation-state and differentiate themselves from the figure of the 'dangerous' other. This not only continues to disregard humanitarian concerns of migrants, but it also perpetuates vulnerabilities and insecurities for 'non-migrants' residing in the borderlands and throughout Chile.

Relevance to Development Studies

Given our international and interconnected geopolitical reality, migration has become increasingly relevant to the development agenda. This paper focuses on the ideas underpinning interventions in the northern borderlands of Chile and shows how they follow development initiatives to manage migration based on nation-state and sedentary roots that are challenged by Aymara native communities. It thus contributes to reconceptualizing development in ways that acknowledge mobility of everyone (migrants and non-migrants) as part of the human condition and world.

Key Words

Colchane-Pisiga border, Colchane, Pisiga Carpa, Aymara, migration, securitization of migration, im/mobility, de-migrantization, everyday politics, ethnography

Chapter 1 | Introduction

1.1 What is this Research About?

On February 11 of 2022, truck and taxi drivers formed barricades along the main roads of the Chilean country and heightened protests in the northern regions of Chile forced the suspension of flights to the cities of Arica and Iquique. The mobility of Chilean citizens was temporarily halted to critique and ultimately reduce the unwanted mobility of others: migrants and refugees, especially Venezuelans, at Chile's northern borders. The government responded to these manifestations by announcing the approval of a new migration law (No. 21.325) and the implementation of increased militarization and a state of emergency at the northern borders (Cooperativa.cl 2022).

The new migration law was initially enacted in 2021 by President Sebastian Piñera, who announced that its implementation would "put the house in order" and protect citizens from migrants regarded as threats to national security (Guizardi and Mardones 2021: 161). This is in line with the global turn to security since the 1980s, which assumes that the nation-state must secure borders and control movement to protect citizens from harm (Donnan and Wilson 2010). This considers mobility as "threatening, while immobility is seen as normal and necessary for personal security" (Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013: 184). Under this sedentary bias, Cociña-Cholaky (2019) explains that the mobility (of some) becomes synonymous to criminality, and thus, the migrant is criminalized due to difference – for being a 'dangerous other' in opposition to national citizens. Problematically, the construction of fear towards difference justifies a logic of defense (Bauman 2017) and opens "a space for coercion and policing" (Jorgensen 2019: 42).

What is crucial is that naming an issue a threat to security and survival of the nation – and the acceptance by the public about this – empowers political elites to adopt measures of exceptionality that would otherwise be unacceptable (Hansen 2011; Jorgensen 2019). The newly approved law meant that those who cross the borders in unauthorized ways become subject to immediate expulsion; an act that sides with 'security' concerns but glosses over the rights of people to juridical proceedings and internationally agreed-upon humanitarian concerns. Moreover, studies have shown that adding more obstacles to mobility does "not stop the need to flee conflict or persecution but results instead in increased risks for migrants and refugees" who seek alternative paths of entry (Jaspars and Hilhorst 2020: 5). Ultimately, securitization practices stem from a nation-state and sedentary bias, dismiss humanitarian concerns, and create counterproductive effects when put into practice (Cociña-Cholaky 2018). However, as we will see below, securitization measures also affect nationals.

The complexities of securitization can be usefully studied in border communities, which interact with the mobilities and immobilities of different migrant populations and are thus immediately affected by securitization policies and practices. Vogt (2018: 348) states that generally, migrants "become deeply intertwined in the relations, economies, and social climates of the communities they pass through." However, localities at the border zone are particularly interesting because they are spaces of interaction and cultural and territorial negotiation with other nations (Rumford 2014) – they are spaces where people "trade, work, socialize and marry as if the line between countries was not there" (Donnan and Wilson 2010: 9).

While previous studies have investigated the effects of securitization practices for migrants travelling to Chile (Maradones 2021), there is little research about how these effects are experienced and played out in border communities. This research aims to breach this gap by examining the realities of the Aymara ethnic group residing in the border communities Colchane and Pisiga Carpa – towns that became places of (interrupted) 'transit' for people crossing the newly securitized Colchane-Pisiga border between Chile and Bolivia. Despite the recognition by the Chilean State of divergent practices at cross-border spaces, it has historically exercised its authority in ways that create tensions with the Aymara living at the northern borderlands. Therefore, the

focus is on the Aymara experience (rather than migrants), whose practices challenge assumptions underpinning nation-state and sedentary approaches to migration.

Thus far, we have conceived the construction and implementation of security governance as top-down management by the nation-state. However, this research paper sides with academics who consider that border residents should not be considered as pure 'victims' (or beneficiaries) of nation-state policies (Donnan and Wilson 2010). Instead, it considers the agency of people at the edges of the state, which while marginalized, impoverished, and overlooked, still create room to negotiate the politics of securitization. Kerkvliet (2009) explores this agency through the lens of 'everyday politics,' which is low profile, unorganized, and entwined in daily practices. For this purpose, an ethnographic and qualitative approach of the experiences of Aymara border residents, in interaction with migrants and other actors, will be developed to explore how migration governance is lived and negotiated through everyday practices.

1.2 Background to the Proposed Study

Before delving into this research, this section will clarify and address background information about the national migration context and management in Chile and the local context in Colchane and Pisiga Carpa. This will situate the research and serves to contextualize the experiences shared in the results.

1.2.1 The Historic and Current State of Migration in Chile

A significant event in Chilean history is the military coup of the democratically elected government of Salvador Allende in 1973. This was followed by the implementation of a military dictatorship by Augusto Pinochet that lasted until 1990 (Tucker-Abramson 2017). Given political instability and turmoil during this period; emigration of Chileans was the norm (Solimano 2004). Therefore, in recent history Chile has been a country that sends rather than receives migrants, so much so that in the year 2007 it was estimated that for every foreigner residing in Chile there were three Chileans living abroad (Cabieses and Obach 2018).

Nevertheless, since the return to democracy in the 1990s there has been a considerable increase of migration to Chile, as immigrant representation in the population has grown from 1% in 1990 to 8% in 2019 (Doña-Reveco and Gouveia 2020). Most migrants come from Venezuela, Peru, Haiti, Colombia, and Cuba (Leal 2021). While the final destination in Chile for most is the capital city Santiago, their arrival, circulation, and sometimes permanent stay in the northern societies of Chile has been a central feature of migration patterns and has substantial effects in the configuration of these societies. According to the 2017 census, the northern regions have the highest proportion of 'immigrant' population and Tarapacá is particularly relevant because 13.7% (43,646 people) of the population consists of 'immigrants' (Tapia Landino, Contreras Gaticia and Stefoni Espinoza 2021).[1]

According to Aninat and Sierra (2019), the main reasons for the steady increases in migration to Chile are: (1) the country appears economically successful because it holds the highest income per capita in Latin America,[2] and (2) the crises experienced by some Latin American countries in the past years, for example in Venezuela, have led to an intensification of regional

[1] While 'immigration' is normal census terminology, there is a difference between those perceived as immigrants 'to stay' and those who are considered in transit. This census does not make this differentiation when referring to people as immigrants. Due to uncertainty of peoples' mobility aspirations and circumstances (voluntary or forcibly displaced), this research will speak of migrants instead of immigrants or refugees.

[2] It is important to note, however, that the economic success that has been attributed to Chile coexists with social inequality, as 1% of the Chilean population accumulates 25% of the total wealth generated in Chile (OPHI and PNUD 2020) and it is one of the most unequal countries in the world (OECD 2020). This inequality constitutes one of the main reasons for the social mobilizations of 2019, where over one million people took the streets of Santiago to express their discontent (Calderón 2020).

migration flows. However, the capacity to integrate this recent influx of people is challenged by an outdated and slow legal framework and a continuous mismanagement by the government.

The Chilean country is ruled by the Constitution enacted in 1980 during the Pinochet dictatorship. Up until this year, migration laws were based on the Decree Law No. 1094 of 1975, which had been in force for more than forty years (Leal 2021). The main aims of this law were to expel Allende's followers during the period of dictatorship and prevent the entry of foreigners conceived as potential threats to national security (Cociña-Cholaky and Andrade-Moreno 2021). Throughout the years, legislators made amendments to the law to adapt to emerging situations, but the general ideological framework inherited from the dictatorship remains unchanged.

1.2.2 Government Measures in the Face of Emerging Crises

A major source of increased migration to Chile is the Venezuelan crisis. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that it has affected five and a half million Venezuelans who have been forced to move elsewhere due to years of economic, social, and political turmoil (Cociña-Cholaky and Andrade-Moreno, 2021). To address this, the Chilean President at the time, Sebastian Piñera, travelled to Cucuta (a Colombian city next to the Venezuelan border) in 2018 to provide aid and assure the people seeking refuge that they would be welcome in Chile following the implementation of a 'democratic responsibility visa' (Cociña-Cholaky and Andrade-Moreno 2021). Under the guise of solidarity and reciprocity to a 'sister country' that had previously received Chileans during the dictatorship of Pinochet, this visa was implemented in 2019 (Cooperativa.cl 2019; Gobierno de Chile 2018). However, far from representing humanitarian ideals, the requirements of this visa have only complicated the entrance to Chile and effectively operate as barriers that incentivize clandestine migration, differentiate Venezuelan migrants as legal or illegal, and facilitate the criminalization of people seeking asylum (Cociña-Cholaky and Dufraix-Tapia 2021). Indeed, while Venezuelans could previously enter Chile as tourists and later receive a temporary or permanent visa (Ryburn 2021); the new visa requires paperwork and money that is difficult to acquire given the situation in Venezuela (Yaksic 2020). Moreover, the application for the visa must be submitted and approved in Venezuela, preventing people from leaving dangerous conditions. By 2021, 82% of these visas were rejected and the Covid-19 pandemic paused the granting of visas altogether.

The emergence of the Covid-19 pandemic has also complicated migration to Chile in other ways. Following the national security logic, Piñera stated: "[w]e must reinforce our land, sea and air borders to avoid that through illegal immigration we may be bringing to our country the contamination or infection of the virus that is attacking us" (as cited in Leal, 2021: 1). According to Leal (2021), Covid-19 was instrumentalized by the government to frame migrants as threats to national health and on March 18 of 2020, Chile and Bolivia closed their international borders. This meant that many Bolivian seasonal or informal workers, who have historically utilized mobility as a strategy for survival, were left stranded in Colchane and Pisiga Carpa as they waited to re-enter Bolivia (Rico and Leiva-Gómez 2021).

Given the context of a continuation of adverse circumstances that urge people to move, an ineffective migration legal framework, and increased barriers due to Covid-19, it is not surprising that since 2020 there was an increase of irregular entry through the northern border between Chile and Bolivia, in particular the Colchane-Pisiga border (Stang Alva, Cociña-Cholaky and Joiko 2021; Stefoni *et al.* 2022). The majority of unauthorized paths of entry to Chile are concentrated near the villages Colchane and Pisiga Carpa, where migrants tend to pass through as they continue their journey to the larger cities of Iquique and Santiago (Stefoni *et al.* 2022). Increased border-crossings were met by little to no assistance from the central government and local incapacity to manage such volumes of people – especially given the added complexities of Covid-19. After the collapse of public services in Colchane, local authorities refused to continue aiding in migrant reception (Cociña-Cholaky and Dufraix-Tapia 2021).

On October 18 of 2021, the government provided a response by merging migration and Covid-19 as one 'crisis' that must be managed to protect the nation-state. The government's health department (*Secretaría Regional Ministerial (SEREMI) de salud*) moved groups of people camping in Colchane and Pisiga Carpa to a refuge located at the border and managed by an event planner (Cooperativa.cl 2021). Currently, this refuge remains and people who enter Chile through unauthorized paths are re-directed by police officers to the refuge to self-report their irregular entry to the Police of Investigations (PDI) – a label that is not neutral because it can be used in courts to justify expulsion (Leal 2021). Bolivian migrants are immediately expelled to Bolivia after self-reporting their irregular entry. Other migrants are required to take a Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) test for Covid-19 and stay at tents for one or two days until buses financed by the *SEREMI* of health transport them to Iquique to complete a fourteen-day quarantine at a sanitary residence. Since September 2022, people with a completed vaccination report or a PCR test conducted 48 hours before arrival do not have to undergo quarantine and are transferred to transitory centers at Iquique. Appendix A holds flowchart of this process.

This implies that people can only access health, shelter, food, and transportation services by self-reporting themselves as 'illegal,' a process that facilitates immediate expulsions and disregards rights to asylum established in international treaties (1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol) and Chilean law (No. 20.430). Expulsion was made legal by the government when it approved the new migration law (No. 21.325) that allows to speed up deportations (Cociña-Cholaky and Andrade-Moreno 2021). The implementation of this law was backed by a state of emergency and increased militarization at the Colchane-Pisiga border. Finally, the government financed the construction of a *zanja* (ditch) at the border to increase barriers to mobility (Murga 2022).

This response deals with migration through the lens of control and security (Cociña-Cholaky 2018). By labelling people as 'irregular' or 'illegal' migrants, the government can convince national citizens that the expulsions are legitimate, as we must 'close our doors to criminals' (Guizardi and Mardones 2021). This practice creates perverse consequences, as Maradones (2021) found that people wanting to enter Chile during the Covid-19 pandemic were not stopped by increased border controls. Instead, they opted for unauthorized forms of transit that increased risks to their human security. While migrants are the group most visibly vulnerable to securitization measures, this response also affects the dynamics of border communities.

1.2.3 The History and Culture of Colchane and Pisiga Carpa: Two Border Villages

This section shifts from the national to the local context of Colchane and Pisiga Carpa, two villages near the Colchane-Pisiga border that separates Chile and Bolivia and whose usual dynamics have been most affected due to their proximity to most unauthorized paths of entry to Chile (Stang Alva, Cociña-Cholaky and Joiko 2021). Both villages are part of the commune Colchane, which is in the northern region of Tarapacá and was created in 1970. Map 1 provides a visualization of the location of the commune in relation to the nation-state borders and the northern regions of Chile.

Map 1. The Chilean Northern Regions and Key Locations



(Source: Map made by author)

During the 1970s, the town Colchane was established with the aim to have a permanent population near the Chilean border – a political and administrative decision taken during the military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet who sought 'regionalization' strategies in the name of national security and regional development (González Miranda, Rouviere and Ovando 2008). This is in line with state-centric perspectives of national security which suggest that borderlands are places that threaten State authority merely because of their geographical location. They are "considered to be an inherently insecure space, on account of its proximity to the fiction of external chaos," and thus, it becomes important to manage borderlands (Álvarez, Ovando and Piñones 2022: 342). The municipality of Colchane was installed in 1980, and it counts with a police station, a health center, an elementary school, and a cross-border customs control. Since the initial formalities in 1992 and the construction in 2002 of the customs control building, towns like Pisiga Carpa and Pisiga Choque were left located between this installation and the official border that separates Chile and Bolivia. The usual mobilities of people from these towns were interrupted by the creation of customs facilities because people had to comply to administrative measures and schedules to travel to towns and cities in Chile (Ferrer 2021). Ultimately, the people from Pisiga Carpa left their homes (Figure 1) and eventually created a 'new' Pisiga Carpa at the other side of the customs control to avoid administrative complications. Map 2 provides a visual of the border communities from the Chilean and Bolivian side.

Figure 1. The Abandoned Pisiga Carpa

(Source: Author)

Map 2. Border Communities and Customs Facilities (*Complejo Fronterizo*)

(Source: Mapbox.com)

As illustrated, Colchane and Pisiga Carpa are located close to the Colchane-Pisiga border crossing that separates Bolivia and Chile and was established following the War of the Pacific (1879-1884). As a result of this war, the regions of Arica and Tarapacá originally founded under the Peruvian state and the north of Antofagasta originally belonging to Bolivia, were transferred to Chilean rule. Therefore, Colchane and Pisiga Carpa are particularly interesting because they represent territories that were arbitrarily separated and that are mainly inhabited by the Aymara ethnic community that transcends rigid national borders. Indeed, Aymara communities extend from Chilean territories to Argentina, Bolivia and Peru and they engage in traditional mobility practices that seek to take advantage of the variety of ecological floors present in the Andean space (Hidalgo Dattwyler, Vergara Constela and González Rodríguez 2021). For example, Aymara communities have historically used the *bofedales* (wetlands in high altitudes) for water located in Chile and the plateaus at higher altitude for cattle raising located in Bolivia. Therefore, these border villages are places where traditional nation-state dynamics coexist with the traditional practices of highly mobile Aymara people.

During the post-war period, the national impulses to carry out a 'Chileanization' of the northern regions led to the forced emigration of many Peruvian people (Gundermann Kröll 2018; Tapia Ladino and Ramos Rodríguez 2013). Moreover, it sought to dilute Aymara cultural identity and their practices of constant movement across borders that are considered 'foreign' to the Chilean national population (Álvarez, Ovando and Piñones 2022). However, the adverse context did not prevent people of border origins (mainly Bolivians) from crossing the border to take advantage of the flourishing labor market opportunities at Chilean saltpeter mines (González Miranda 1995, 2009). Moreover, the establishment of the Iquique Free Trade Zone (ZOFRI) in 1975 created new commercial and employment opportunities (Icarte Ahumada, Torres and Ramos Rodríguez 2018), and gained significance after the flexibilization of Bolivian truck permits and the paving of road 15-CH that connects Colchane with Iquique (Garcés and Moraga 2016).

Chilean northern regions continue to be characterized by circular migration patterns (Rico and Leiva-Gómez 2021). This means that permanent settlement is not the intention behind mobility, but rather, border-crossing is used strategically depending on the asymmetries and inequalities between neighboring countries that may create differential benefits for subjects who move across them. While permanent settlement in Chile may still happen, people who inhabit borderlands tend to adopt mobile or binational ways of life that do not break cultural and familial ties with Bolivia (Icarte Ahumada, Torres and Ramos Rodríguez 2018). As indicated by the

Colchane Community Development Plan, due to Aymara ethnic ties, most of the communities are associated with high mobility patterns. Therefore, people utilize their homes in Colchane or Pisiga Carpa periodically depending on seasonal benefits for agriculture or cattle raising, traditional festivities, and binational markets that happen every two weeks for commercial exchanges (Municipalidad de Colchane 2015; Garcés and Moraga 2016).

With the return to democracy in the 1990s, central governments began to acknowledge the historical and cultural practices of indigenous peoples (with varied ethnicities) and their right to self-determination and maintenance of cross-border practices (Gundermann Kröll, 2018). The approval of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention No. 169 in 2008 demonstrates the acceptance towards the traditions of mobility by the Aymara, as the government must facilitate their economic, social, spiritual, and environmental contacts across borders (Álvarez, Ovando and Piñones 2022). Particularly relevant is that recent measures to manage the increased flows of migration to Chile may transgress these international agreements that aim to protect Aymara communities who are "constantly crossing the borders, share language, traditions and a different way of conceiving the territory" (Álvarez, Ovando and Piñones 2022: 342).

1.3 Justification and Relevance

While previous research has considered the effects of State 'security' measures for migrants travelling to Chile (Maradones 2021), there are limited studies about how these securitization practices are experienced by national residents and particularly highly mobile, Aymara border residents. This research aims to breach this academic gap by examining the Aymara experience amidst the recent migration and securitization dynamics in the border communities of Colchane and Pisiga Carpa. Doing so will add to a 'de-migrantization' of migration studies, which distances itself from a pre-supposed and normalized difference between migrants and non-migrants (Dahinden 2016). This difference stems from the idea that migration is a problem because it separates people from the 'roots' that supposedly shape and encompass their identity, belonging, and life experience. From this sedentary bias, those who migrate from their nation-state are different, "an anomaly requiring specialized correctives and therapeutic interventions" (Malkki, 1992: 33). The perceived need to manage this difference serves as a justification by nation-states to follow a deterrence approach to migration, which encourages strict border controls that 'keep people in their place' and 'for their own good' (Bakewell 2008). It becomes essential to revisit the naturalized difference between migrants and non-migrants because it can re-direct Chilean policy from ineffective securitization measures (Geiger and Pécoud 2013; Thanh-Dam and Gasper 2011). Focusing on the traditionally marginalized and mobile Aymara border communities is particularly useful because their narratives and cross-border practices allow to challenge sedentary assumptions that underpin mainstream approaches. Perhaps, by relating the experiences of highly mobile Aymara border residents with migrants, this study could contribute to mutual understanding in a highly polarized environment.

Moreover, the literature about migration in Chile frames securitization as a top-down practice by nation-states. Instead, this research also analyzes bottom-up negotiations (through everyday politics) in the border communities that respond to controls on im/mobility. This offers information about the role that border residents play amidst contested politics of securitization and differentiated mobilities. This will contribute to shifting perspectives of marginalized border communities as pure 'victims' or beneficiaries to agents who "actively shape and bend [inequities of the border] to suit their own goals" before, during, and after interferences in the name of security (Galemba 2020: 6). Everyday politics tend to happen outside mainstream media and society, so this paper brings them to light and does not diminish their significance.

Finally, in the broader scheme of migration studies, there has been little focus on 'transit' communities compared to origin and destination settings (Schapendonk and Steel 2014). Consequently, we tend to miss out on the 'in-betweens' of migration journeys and the ways in

which migrants "increasingly interact with and become incorporated in a specific locality and its economies, institutions and networks" while in transit (Drotbohm and Winters 2021: 2). Colchane and Pisiga Carpa are regarded as 'transit' villages, as migrants who cross the border tend to continue travelling to the city of Iquique and later Santiago. Nevertheless, policies such as intensified border controls and militarization create inequalities with lingering effects for both migrants and non-migrant populations. This research will thus add to emerging literature that focuses on transit spaces and initial reception of migrants.

1.4 Research Objective and Question

With the objective to understand the Aymara experience amidst new migration and securitization dynamics at the Colchane-Pisiga border, I propose the following research question and sub-questions.

1.4.1 Main Question

How do Aymara residents of Colchane and Pisiga Carpa employ everyday politics to negotiate the arrival of Venezuelan migrants and the implementation of State 'security' measures in their border communities?

1.4.2 Sub-Questions

1. What historical and contemporary im/mobilities in Colchane and Pisiga Carpa can be identified?
2. How is the recent securitization of migration implemented at the Colchane-Pisiga border and who are the relevant actors involved in this implementation?
3. How has Venezuelan migration and its accompanying securitization affected the daily lives of highly mobile Aymara residents of Colchane and Pisiga Carpa and how have they responded to these changes?

To answer these questions, this paper will first provide theoretical considerations about im/mobility, securitization of migration, and everyday politics as concepts that frame this research. This framework is brought to bear on an ethnographically situated and qualitative methodology that aims to uncover the lived realities of Aymara border residents. The results are divided into three chapters that address each sub-question. Chapter three describes the history and border context that shape Aymara identities and mobilities recently met by increased Venezuelan migration. Chapter four investigates the challenges of securitization measures and provides an approximation of the actors involved in its implementation. Chapter five considers how migration and securitization logics clash with the lives of highly mobile Aymara and how they respond using everyday politics. The concluding chapter will resume the findings and present final reflections about the roles that the Aymara – in constant interaction with migrants and securitization actors – play in shaping and contesting mobility and security narratives.

Chapter 2 | Theoretical and Methodological Considerations

2.1 Theoretical Framework

2.1.1 Mobility and Immobility

Stemming from the Latin root *migrare*, the word 'migration' means to move from one place to another. This movement can be of diverse kinds, such as migration of people, animals, microorganisms, data storage, or computer systems (Thanh-Dam and Gasper 2011). While migration of all aspects is essential to life, Foucault (1977) traced how surveillance of human movement began to be a prevalent activity since the inception of nation-states in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Europe. The installation of the use of passports to authorize and regulate movements currently "expresses the 'stateness' of states and their power to provide an 'identity' – a national identity – for citizens, which is not independent of the documents that 'prove' it" (Thanh-Dam and Gasper 2011: 4). Consequently, this document distinguishes those who belong to the nation-state from undocumented and foreign 'others' and 'anomalies' requiring interventions (Malkki, 1992). State actors currently define categories such as documentated, legal, territory, and border that shape our understanding about mobility and immobility and have justified emerging infrastructures of surveillance (Sheller and Urry 2004; Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013).

Since migration has been shaped by nation-state logics that consider sedentariness to bounded territories as normal and movement as abnormal, mobility scholars have emerged to question this prevailing theory. Mobility studies consider the movement of people and things as an integral aspect of humanity's past and present histories. Indeed, "across the millennia, migration or seasonal movements of people have been a significant aspect of the human experience" (Schiller and Salazar 2013: 185). Consequently, the mobility lens distances itself from the perception that movement is abnormal, and rather, it holds that there is a diversity of mobilities that are fundamental to humanity and social life (Dahinden 2016). For example, populations like the Aymara have historically moved between highlands and coastlands of the Andean space for different reasons before the establishment of nation-states and the new drawing of Chilean borders after the War of the Pacific (1879-1884).

Nonetheless, mobilities are differentiated as "some bodies can more easily move through space than others, due to restrictions on mobility relating to gender, race, class, ethnicity, sexuality, and physical abilities" (Sheller 2018: 24). There are certain infrastructures and hierarchies that organize the flow of people – enhancing the mobility of some and increasing immobility for others (Sheller and Urry 2006). Glick Schiller and Salazar (2013) introduce the term 'regimes of mobility' to explore mobility/immobility and migration/stasis as "interconnected aspects of the human condition." Such regimes include formal nation-state and national identity parameters but also other economic and social relationships that create movement and stasis (Schiller and Salazar 2013). This paper will use a 'regimes of mobility' approach so that what is labelled 'migration' is considered in the wider context of simultaneous and differentiated movement and stasis of people.

2.1.2 Securitized Mobilities

In the process of nation-building and 'crisis' management (such as with the increased cross-border mobility of Venezuelans), the Chilean government has implemented policies that encourage strict border controls to reduce and securitize the mobility of certain people. Ryburn (2021) found that at Chile-Peru border controls, particularly Venezuelan migrants were limited and excluded from entering the country based on their nationality. Additionally, the forces that determine mobility were racialized and class-based, as "powerful legacies of racism and classism in Chile combine" to achieve a control on mobility that favors a white racial mixture that is claimed by Chileans and considered better than other racial types in Latin America (Ryburn 2021: 7). Racialized migration

discourses and practices not only affect migrants, but they also affect border communities pertaining to indigenous groups who have traditionally crossed borders due to economic opportunities or cultural activities, such as the Aymara. Consequently, the management of im/mobility by the Chilean nation-state affects the experiences and livelihoods of migrants and border communities, who navigate borderlands differently depending on their social position (Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013).

The response by the Chilean government coincides with the turn to security since the 1980's and denominated by the Copenhagen School of Critical Security Studies as the securitization of migration (Varela Huerta 2015). Essentially, securitization is "the process by which political elites frame an issue as involving fundamental issues of security and survival against an existential threat" (Swarts and Karakatsanis 2013: 98). Swarts and Karakatsanis (2013) explain that while migration may have no immediate connection to a national security concern, such as a military threat would, political elites may still be able to construct it as such. An example of this construction is the use of the term 'invasion' to describe migration to Chile, as demographically speaking, nationals still represent 92% of the population and it can be argued that migrants will not pose such a threat to security if they are properly integrated rather than criminalized and disregarded (Guizardi and Maradones 2021).

Balzacq and Guzzini (2015) indicate the importance of investigating who holds the power to securitize migration and for which purpose. While the Copenhagen School deems that anyone can securitize an issue, Williams (2003) explains that social positioning is relevant. For example, the relationship of the government to its citizens and its political power allows it to decide how to deal with an issue and whether it should be considered through the lens of exceptionality.

The reason why securitization tends to be the political rhetoric to handle migration is because it is seen as one of the most effective ways to efficiently respond to situations of conflict (MacKenzie 2009). It empowers politicians to adopt measures of exceptionality that would be unacceptable during the 'normal' state of affairs (Hansen 2011). While it is not always detrimental to humanitarian ends – because it can stimulate fast responses, funding, and collective action to tackle emerging problems – the securitization of migration in Chile has been used for alternative purposes. Indeed, the responsibility of the state towards the human security and rights of migrants became overshadowed, and the measures taken do not adhere with international treaties establishing obligations of asylum nor national legislation that prohibits expulsion at the borders (Cociña-Cholaky and Dufraix-Tapia, 2021). Bauman (2017: 33) explains that the power of securitization also lies in its ability to shift "anxiety from problems that governments are incapable of handling […] to problems that governments can be seen – daily and on thousands of screens – to be eagerly […] tackling." Consequently, under the promise of stability or as Piñera would call it, 'putting the house in order,' political elites are capable of shifting attention to migration instead of recognizing that precarity, poverty, and vulnerability in the country comes from the reduction of social welfare and the deregulation of markets (Bauman 2017).

Ultimately, the securitization of migration "alludes to a sense of emergency" that re-directs political issues and justifies the militarization of borders and the expulsion of 'undocumented' and 'irregular' migrants (Jorgensen 2019: 42). However, this national security lens does not deter migration; instead "it creates the very conditions whereby migrants become 'stuck' and vulnerable en route and a lucrative market for smugglers" (Galemba 2018: 883). Indeed, the friction that is created between human mobility and the nation-state barriers to this mobility not only harms the safety of migrants who seek alternative (and more dangerous) paths, but it also affects the communities surrounding these paths.

2.1.3 Everyday Politics

Both migrants and non-migrants occupy and interact in borderlands, which tend to be marked by insecurity because they are often "located in poor rural areas or on the impoverished margins of cities" (Vogt 2018: 179-180). Mainwaring (2016) explains that in the context of borderlands, it

seems that sovereign power leaves little room for agency by migrants and non-migrants. However, "even on the edges of the states and societies, faced with formidable levels of marginalization, people continue to resist, find room for negotiation, and exploit these narrow margins" (Mainwaring 2016: 292-293). Kerkvliet (2009) emphasizes that the agency to negotiate and interact with the norms and rules implemented by authorities is a political action and can be analyzed through the lens of everyday politics.

In contrast to advocacy politics, everyday politics is mostly unorganized, subtle, and embedded in the expressions and practices of everyday life. For Crawford and Hutchinson (2016), emphasizing the everyday contrasts with the tendency by the nation-state to focus on 'spectacular' or 'exceptional' events that justify securitization measures beyond normal democratic politics. While everyday politics "exist at the margins of awareness of mainstream society and media [,] this does not, [...] diminish [its] significance" (Nyers and Rygiel 2012: 7). Considering everyday politics is important because ignoring them would simply reify the top-down power and attempts by the nation-state to control mobility and borders and disregard the bottom-up negotiations at the edges of the nation-state.

Instead of viewing border populations as pure 'victims' or beneficiaries of state securitization, everyday politics considers their agency to resist, support, comply, modify, or evade these interventions. Kerkvliet (2009) states that these are the different forms of everyday politics, as reactions and negotiations to state interventions may vary. First, everyday resistance involves more "subtle, indirect, and non-confrontational" forms of resistance against the status quo (Kerkvliet 2009: 233). This may take the form of derogatory conversations about government officials. Second, people may perform acts of everyday support and compliance to authorities. While this reinforces the political system that creates inequalities of im/mobility, this act is still political because it involves negotiation about the "production, distribution, and use of resources" (Kerkvliet 2009: 235). Indeed, teaming up with authorities may create networks that enable possibilities for people living in border communities. Third, everyday evasions and modifications do not directly oppose authorities, but they convey indifference and disagreement towards their rules and presumptions. Moreover, Ryburn (2021: 6) proposes that actors can also choose to *aguantar* (endure) power structures, which is also not a form of direct resistance but can sometimes signify defiance: "it indicate[s] quiet resilience and determination; a refusal to desist and disappear." To best understand the everyday political decisions of border communities, ethnography is an effective method (Jorgensen 2019).

2.2 Methodology[3]

2.2.1 An Ethnographic and Qualitative Approach

This research paper used an ethnographic approach to examine how migration and securitization dynamics play out 'on the ground' for Aymara border residents in interaction with relevant migration actors. As sensibility to a particular time and space is important to consider during the process of knowledge production (Cerwonka 2007), this paper took an "ethnographically-situated research strategy – where the place of research provides the analytical starting point" (Elmhirst 2012: 278). This place is the rural village Colchane and its neighbor village Pisiga Carpa; two border communities that are understood as pluri-local sites where different networks based on cross-border interaction and mobility co-exist.

While conducting ethnographic research in these border communities from August 15 until August 22, I aimed to be attentive to the relations that are present in people's lives by means of observation. Oral accounts and informal conversations that were naturally occurring during fieldwork are an important source of data. However, I knew that words alone could not capture the complexity and realities at these localities, which is why photography is also embedded

[3] Parts of this section were developed during my Ethnographic Research course.

throughout the text. I hoped to capture what 'naturally' occurs in this environment (during that specific time) and the existing practices and interactions of border communities that may clash with seemingly neutral State policies and 'security' intentions.

Nevertheless, actively observing the lives of people and participating in these border communities does not allow me to fully understand the perspectives, feelings, and manifestations of agency by participants. Thus, this research also employs semi-structured, qualitative interviews that can allow individuals to share experiences and opinions more in-depth (Boeije 2010). Interviews varied from 30 minutes to two hours, and three follow-up interviews provided clarifications. A list of questions was developed only to serve as a loose interview guide (Appendix B), allowing the conversations with participants to flow into the directions that mattered most to them. To respect confidentiality, interviews were audio-recorded depending on the discretion of the participant and verbal consent. Direct quotes used in this research paper are translated to English by me, with unique awareness and inclusion of relevant original vocabularies that may provide information about the participant's relation to a particular place, culture, and identity.

While these techniques gathered relevant information, the data is not a simple dig up from the site of research. Instead, it is a product of my involvement and decisions as a researcher. Borrowing from feminist epistemology, the production of knowledge in this paper is not universal nor neutral, but rather situated, embodied, and partial to the gaze of the researcher (Rose 1997: 306-307). Therefore, it becomes important to explore how the research topic, the researcher, and the researched become constructed throughout the research process by bringing into consciousness relations that are generally "hidden in our writing" (Richardson 2000: 254).

2.2.2 Origins and Development of a Research Process

I began to consider topics related to migration in January 2022, while learning about the securitization of migration in Greece for an academic course (4227 Humanitarian Action). In February 11, I had a facetime call with family members who live in Chile and informed me about the protests against migration in the north of Chile. Due to previous connections to migration theory and my nationality, this issue sparked my interest, and I followed its development for the next months. I tell this story with hopes to show that I have approached this topic from my own situated perspective: research began and will be built from my partial gaze, my political and ethical commitments to the rights of migrants and indigenous communities, and my connections to broader literature.

This background implies that I was not familiar with the research location, and thus, I began to reach out to varied actors and received a couple of answers that referred me to one functionary in Colchane and one NGO directive. I had a call with the functionary that oversees the territorial development of Colchane, and this conversation was useful to learn about the possibilities of doing research in the border communities and to manage expectations about the research focus. During this conversation I decided to focus on the Aymara residents (rather than migrants) in Colchane and Pisiga Carpa and to rent a car to have more autonomy during the journey from Iquique to Colchane and visits to different towns in the commune. This contact served as a 'gatekeeper' that helped me organize my stay in Colchane and gave me contacts of possible participants. Nevertheless, as Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) remind us, access cannot be assumed automatically regardless of a gatekeeper: it is negotiated and renegotiated in practice depending on the ways that the researcher becomes part of the social reality.

2.2.3 Positionality and Reflexivity

The place from where I conducted my research is complex because it is marked by my privileges as an educated woman who is doing a master's program in Europe, comes from the Chilean urban middle-class, and is white in a country and continent that is marked by structural racism. Therefore, my encounters were shaped by multiple power relations that created complex and varied responses to my presence in Colchane and Pisiga Carpa. According to Rose (1997), during fieldwork the

researcher can hold a double positionality as an insider/outsider who must negotiate multiple identities that are inscribed by power relations and attributed by the researched.

Notably, my 'outsider' positionality was shaped by my white skin color, occidental clothing style, Spanish language, and urban background; features that differentiated me from the Aymara rural community. Upon my arrival, the Aymara were generally guarded, distrustful, and unwilling to have extended informal conversations. Given a long history of colonial and state oppression, a white woman who studies abroad is not necessarily considered trustworthy and is perhaps associated with outsiders who have historically disrupted the practices of this Andean community. In attempts to counteract this ascribed identity, I went to the local municipality and had a conversation with the mayor Javier García Choque to inform him about my research intentions. Although official permission is not required to conduct research, establishing this contact created an atmosphere of respect and acknowledgement of the local authority that counteracts the usually invasive interventions by outsiders. Four participants who work at the local health center of Colchane agreed to participate following the approval of the mayor. At the same time, as a female researcher, I still had significantly more access to Aymara women than Aymara men. Therefore, interviews were mainly conducted with Aymara women who also offered their perspectives about the lives of Aymara men.

Delving into the possible effects of my race, my first interaction with an Aymara man in his mid-seventies is interesting to recall because his initial words were about my skin color. He was acknowledging that I hold an 'outsider' position due to my skin complexion, and simultaneously, he was complimenting me for this differentiated 'whiteness' and its resemblance to porcelain. Another participant said that many Aymara associate 'whiteness' with police and authoritarian figures. These encounters demonstrate the legacies of racism emanated by colonial and central powers and it marks how I was perceived by some Aymara. I tried to deal with this by positioning myself as someone who was there to learn with them about their lives, border communities, and especially their experiences with the arrival of migration and securitization dynamics. I established myself as someone adaptable to what participants were able and wanted to share.

During fieldwork, I was considered a tourist, journalist, and more interestingly, a communist who would be a threat to the land and water ownership rights held by the Aymara. These assigned identities imply a concern about potential asymmetries in access to space and technology, as well as potential abuse of border communities and functionaries. Since 2020 there has been increased media presence in Colchane and Pisiga Carpa due to growing concerns of irregular migration to Chile. This media coverage has created misrepresentations about the Aymara and other social actors. Moreover, I learned that journalists have previously presented themselves as students for access to certain spaces, and they unfortunately abused their access in ways that harmed organizations. Therefore, how could participants make sure that their experiences would not be taken out of context and that I am truly the student I claimed to be? I found myself reiterating my independent academic identity, ensuring participants that results would not be submitted to the press, and promoting academically ethical considerations.

While I initially thought that educational gaps between myself and some participants could be an undermining difference, I realized that my student status was an entry point to many conversations because it differentiated me from the media. Additionally, being confused as a tourist was beneficial because it attracted two Aymara women selling products. Lastly, my assigned 'insider' identity was also linked to my Chilean nationality that provided a space of commonality for some participants. Knowing general aspects of Chilean culture and slang allowed interviews and conversations flow naturally, although there were also some language barriers because I do not know the Aymara language.

2.2.4 Introduction and Recruitment of Participants

The participants consisted of Aymara residents and the range of actors that are stationed in Colchane, Pisiga Carpa, and at the border limits for different purposes and time periods. Indeed,

conversations were held with both Aymara residents and the variety of actors they interact with to acknowledge that Aymara border residents are not isolated, but rather always in interaction with other actors. I held informal conversations and thirteen semi-structured interviews with participants who fit these criteria. Information about the pseudonym, age, gender, nationality, years in Colchane/Pisiga Carpa, and occupation of the interview participants is in Appendix C. Pseudonyms and discretion about the availability of identifying information was decided by the participants and myself to protect their privacy and identities.

The method for recruitment was snowball sampling (Gubrium and Holstein 2001). After reaching out to the contacts provided by my 'gatekeeper,' I was introduced to other members of the community. I was also approached by people who fit my criteria during observations, so I asked if they would be willing to participate in an interview or informal conversation.

2.2.5 Coding and Analysis of the Data

To analyze the data, I followed a process of open coding where I read the fieldnotes and transcriptions to create familiarity with the data and reveal relevant patterns. Code names were generated considering the experience that is described and were organized into categories and themes by finding connections and shifting to larger units of analysis. The analysis of themes, categories, and codes (Appendix D) involved a process of 'tacking,' whereby the researcher moves between theory and facts from fieldwork "in a dialectic that often reshapes our theoretical ideas as well as our view of the empirical data" (Cerwonka 2007: 15). This process allows to go back and forth between theory and data to think about and (possibly) re-think models that seem pre-fixed in the wider complexity of academia.

2.2.6 Limitations and Practical Challenges

Given that this research paper is subject to a strict timeframe from the educational institution and the monetary budget is limited, fieldwork only lasted one week. Moreover, the research location provided difficulties: it is a rural town that has limited internet connection and phone signal, it is located at an altitude of 3,700 meters that limits oxygen and requires adaptation, it has harsh weather conditions with strong winds and cold temperatures, and the hostel had no heating system nor potable water. Given these conditions, along with my positionality, I am aware that this research is limited to a specific situated perspective and time frame that can only capture 'snapshots' of a very complex and dynamic situation. Although the sample size is limited to thirteen interviews, in-depth analysis of interviews, data gathered from informal conversations and observations, and an extensive literature review are still useful to answer the research question.

Chapter 3 │"The place where Chile begins": Border Identities and Mobilities

This chapter presents an account of the history and border context that inform the identity and traditional mobilities of the Aymara ethnic group living in Colchane and Pisiga Carpa, places that have recently experienced increased Venezuelan migration.

3.1 Historical Marginalization

Nora, an Aymara woman working at the health center of Colchane (Figure 2), described how a history of interventions has created distrust towards occidental practices and outsiders. She pursued a career as a nurse to 'build bridges' between the Aymara and the health workers practicing occidental medicine. In her perspective, these displays of distrust began with the colonization of the territory during the Spanish conquest initiated in 1532 and continued with 'Chileanization' processes for nation-building.[4] These events and their complex consequences cannot be equated, but they represent two instances where the Aymara from Colchane and Pisiga Carpa felt that outsider impositions created significant cultural losses.

Figure 2. Health Center of Colchane

(Source: Author)

During the processes of nation building and 'Chileanization' that followed the War of the Pacific, the State established primary schools in the Andean territories of Tarapacá by the end of the 1950s to create cultural, ideological, and linguistic integration of indigenous peoples to Chilean practices (Gundermann Kröll 2018). Despite benefits from integration, Nora explained that this created cultural losses for the Aymara; one of the main being the Aymara language:

> "My mother told me that when education, in quotations, came to our towns the teacher would hit the group with a ruler […] for speaking Aymara. They would get angry and apply violence. She thought that the same would happen to her daughter, so obviously, she did not speak Aymara to me and only spoke Spanish. The linguistic heritage stopped with my previous generation and now it is difficult to recover it. My son is 100% Aymara, but he does not speak it."

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[4] Nora stated, "The Aymara are by essence distrustful due to history. The history of everything that happened with colonization and Chileanization of the territory. People arrived at the health center, and they did not have a connection or trust with the doctor; […] so I got into my field to try to build a bridge between my community and health workers."

This was the story of many Aymara living in the commune of Colchane. Andrés, a doctor working at the health center for the last five years, explained that language is not the only cultural loss. One of his patients is an Aymara man who mentioned that the construction of houses and their roofs is another "native knowledge that has been lost with time or that is no longer done the way that previous generations did it." Similarly, traditional knowledge about weaving patterns and techniques that have historically communicated Andean culture, world views, and social changes have deteriorated with colonial and state interventions (Silverman 1998; Joslyn 2013; Desroiers 2014). Beatriz is an Aymara woman in her mid-sixties who works as an *artesana* (textiles craftswoman) and sells her products to tourists who visit Colchane and city markets. She inherited knowledge about textile weaving from her mother, who was also an *artesana* from the town Enquelga. She felt lucky to have learned how to weave from her mother, but still, the process of textile weaving has continuously changed with the introduction of occidental culture and techniques such as the pedal loom that she uses (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Pedal Loom Weaving

(Source: Author)

At the same time, Aymara border communities were also explicitly functional to the logics of the State because they helped consolidate sovereignty at the margins of the territory. With the aim of having more permanent populations at the borders, the town and municipality of Colchane was established during the military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990). Resources were provided through the municipality to maintain a permanent population at the borderlands, which one of the interlocutors referred to as "the place where Chile begins: the great land of the Aymara." More primary education services and infrastructure were provided, the lands were privatized and legally assigned to the Aymara, and there was a construction of roads that connected towns and cities (Gundermann Kröll 2018). Vicente, who works for the municipality of Colchane, believed that this history is crucial to understanding why most Aymara hold right-wing tendencies: "The town supports right-wing parties because the government of Pinochet installed highways, phone services, and the town itself. *Cachay*?" Moreover, a border resident explained that the establishment of their right to land and water created an understanding that right-wing governments protect Aymara property rights whereas 'communism' does not. Throughout the years, the Aymara have defended their rights to land and water, so it seems that they remain loyal to political ideologies that serve this purpose.

However, right-wing tendencies seem contradictory upon arrival to Colchane and Pisiga Carpa because they are still characterized by a peripheral relationship to the nation-state, hold the country's highest rate of people living under the poverty line, and lack sufficient services and infrastructure (ECLAC 2021). Esther, an Aymara and Quechua woman working as the health director of Colchane for 25 years, related some of her experiences throughout the years:

> "There are many situations […] that are difficult to have lived, and have, have gotten emotional, having suffered and cried in unity with the communities forgotten by the government. Because it is not possible that a government with so much money has not provided electricity to this town only until around a year ago. […] I have seen progress in the commune in terms of electricity, but not even the entire commune has electricity. There is still a lot to be done. […] But during this process, there has not been a respect for the culture, the customs, and the traditions of the Aymara."

Gundermann Kröll (2018) explains that government projects for integration of border communities have historically shown design errors, failed to adapt to the social and cultural realities of the Aymara, and in other times, lacked technical know-how and collective action. Therefore, border residents consider that they have been abandoned and marginalized by the Chilean State. Moreover, the aim of maintaining a border population has not been effective. Education services and infrastructure that aimed to maintain a border population had alternate effects because linguistic and educational opportunities created aspirations of urban life and educational and vocational development that is not provided at these towns (Gundermann Kröll 2018). Paired with a decline in the traditional agriculture and livestock economy, Nora described that this led "the Aymara to search for more opportunities because Colchane did not exist for the rest of Chile. So, people said, okay let's go search for labor, education, and health opportunities elsewhere." Ultimately, while traditionally linked with interior territories, now a large Aymara population is inserted into the economy of larger cities or take part of multi-local economic activities between cities and highlands. Participants explained that towns and homes are mostly visited for festivities traditional to the Aymara, and thus, towns can be full or empty depending on the time of the year. Although some homes have permanent residents that are older in age, most homes are only used periodically. The process of nation-building meant cultural losses and marginalization, yet also integration, of the Aymara communities into the nation-state.

3.2 Borderlands: Where Trans-National Mobility Shapes Lives and Livelihoods

Due to an overall cultural and social exclusion of the Aymara, a territorial marginalization from the centers of the Chilean State, and an abandonment in terms of infrastructure and services for personal development, border residents become more dependent on their relationships across the border. Moreover, Aymara communities were arbitrarily separated with the establishment of nation-state borders, and thus, already have historical or familial ties with Bolivia and Peru. One interlocutor made this connection explicit: "Us Aymara and the Bolivians; we understand each other. I will also say here that our blood is Bolivian and Peruvian." Participants also said that Bolivians bring their children to the primary school in Colchane, so people from both nationalities grow up together and hold similar ways of being. During interviews, some Aymara referred to Bolivians as 'brothers' and Esther explained that like sibling relationships, "they mutually help each other. One goes to bring vegetables and merchandise from the other side, and they come here sometimes to work or herd their llama and earn their money." Border communities from both countries cooperate for varied purposes. An example of cooperation to deal with marginalization from nation-state centers is the binational market. Nina, an Aymara woman who was born and raised in Pisiga Carpa, stated:

> "Biweekly, here in the border with Bolivia, between Pisiga Bolívar and Colchane we have an ancestral market where we barter and exchange things. We also bring things from the Iquique Free Trade Zone and things also arrive from Ururo that we buy, like pasta, rice, and things to not have to go down to Iquique."

Added to feelings of kinship between border communities from both nation-states, these examples show that the Aymara are heavily involved in national and transnational mobility for accessing

goods and making a living. They illustrate that instead of representing concrete and non-negotiable physical manifestations, borderlands are places of interaction and connection: "Us Aymara have no borders," Nora said. Figure 4 shows an Aymara woman walking to Pisiga Carpa from Bolivia via the unofficial border crossing '*Cerrito Bofedal*,' an ancestral and common practice at the borderlands.

Figure 4. Aymara Woman Walking to from Unofficial Border-Crossing

(Source: Author)

Most participants explained that transportation of goods between borders was for personal consumption and subsistence, as the closest supermarket is in Pisiga Bolívar (Bolivia). Nevertheless, smuggling licit or illicit goods has also become a business for border residents to evade taxes and official inspections. I came to understand throughout fieldwork that extralegal economic activities are one of the remaining options for borderland communities historically marginalized and experiencing a decline in their traditional economies. Esther stated,

> "School only reached eighth grade. So, children […] did not have the opportunity to say, 'I want to be a doctor.' So, they became a policeman if their parents did not have a history with smuggling, or […] a *chutero* because they had no other path or example to follow."

The term *chutero* was used by some participants to refer to those who are involved in contraband of illicit products. Vehicles with no formal documents are *autos chuto* and illicit merchandise is *mercadería chuto*. However, when referring to the smuggling of licit or formally acquired products, Aymara residents rarely used the term *contrabando* (contraband), which state agents typically use to describe cross-border trading practices that avoid taxes, inspections, and are usually prohibited. Instead, they usually referred to their cross-border practices as a *negocio* (business). Vicente explained that following the creation of paved roads that connect borderlands to Iquique and the establishment of the ZOFRI, the business of car sales and parking lots became a main source of income for Aymara border residents.[5] In the words of Oscar, "This is the business of subsistence […] and they cross cars via the *bofedales* and other unauthorized paths." Participants also explained that vehicles may carry merchandise, such as gas that is cheaper and easier to access in Bolivia.

From observations, I noticed that formal and informal businesses involving vehicles and transportation services are largely male industries, and Vicente said that when some "boys turn 18 years old, [they] give them a truck or a van to become independent and start [their] own *negocio*." However, several participants were Aymara women who, while less visibly, also used border differentials strategically to sustain livelihoods. Women would stock their stands named *choquerías* with cheaper goods bought in Bolivia. In contrast to the Bolivian side, the Chilean road leading to the official border controls is full of trucks that can wait in line for days. Figure 5 shows the line

[5] From conversations, I learned that the business of cars consists of buying cars at lower prices in the ZOFRI, bringing them to border towns like Pisiga Carpa or Pisiga Choque to store them in rented parking lots, and later driving them to Bolivia through unauthorized border crossings.

of trucks and the building at the right is the main *choquería* of the town Colchane, where Aymara women normally spend their days selling products to truckers.

Figure 5. Trucks Waiting to Enter Bolivia and *Choquerías*

(Source: Author)

While standing near this *choquería*, Celia (an Aymara woman) came towards me and asked if I was a tourist, an identity that attracted this participant because it opened space for transaction. Celia was born in Pisiga Centro, but she currently lives in Colchane. She has eight children who left Colchane for education and labor opportunities in larger cities. In Colchane, she said, "they were not given the possibility to finish their studies. They want to study but they can't. That is why people leave Colchane and us older people remain." When I asked how she managed to earn a living, she explained that she is an *artesana* who weaves and sells Aymara textiles: "*De ahí salía la platita* (From there came the money)." She showed me some of her products (Figure 6) and explained that she wanted to sell them at the *choquerías* but the other women laughed at her and called her stupid. This captures how traditional livelihoods pertaining to agriculture, cattle raising, and textile weaving have declined, and women have instead adapted to border commerce.

Figure 6. *Artesanía* Aymara

(Source: Author)

Additionally, some Aymara women closer to Pisiga Carpa carried carts with food products or luggage. Nina, while standing close to these women, provided insight into this business and the relationships between Aymara women of both countries:

"Bolivian people come to work. They do not come to steal, kill, or do those things *po*,[6] to harm their *prójimo* (neighbor) so to say. They come to work and like you can see there are Bolivian women working with carts. Maybe the carts are from Chile, but Bolivians pay a certain percentage to the owners of carts… They are honorable people."

Nina's explanation considered the mobility of Bolivians different to that of Venezuelans, something that will be developed later. For now, we can highlight that this mobility pattern coincides with literature addressing circular migration patterns, as Bolivian women do not intend to permanently settle in Chile, but rather use the border-crossing strategically.

The smuggling of goods and the trans-border relationships that have historically taken place in these border communities interrupt the state's ability to create fixed borders that separate and 'protect' national life. Even though these traditional mobility practices threaten state authority, they also reaffirm borders because borders produce the very inequalities that allow for commerce to exist. Policing of the border and the regulations applied for entry to either country create the conditions for a lucrative market between border communities. This is in line with Galemba's (2018: 16) study at the Mexican-Guatemala border-crossing, where "the relation between the state and illegal practices is rarely marked by strict opposition but instead vacillates along a continuum encompassing cooperation, antagonism, and interdependency." The next section will address how Colchane and Pisiga Carpa became places where historically marginalized and mobile border residents described being at the forefront of migration management and reception.

3.3 The Arrival of Venezuelan Migration

Since 2020 there has been an increase of Venezuelan mobility across the Colchane-Pisiga border that is traditionally used by the Aymara and holds the majority of unauthorized paths of entry to Chile. Initially, Venezuelans and others who crossed the border were unable to continue their journey to larger cities in Chile due to sanitary restrictions or monetary incapacity. Many migrants walked on the side of the main road 15-CH towards Iquique and across the desert in high altitudes (Figure 7).[7] Simultaneously, Bolivians staying in Chile for seasonal or temporary jobs were unable to re-enter Bolivia due to the closure of national frontiers. Thus, mainly Bolivians and Venezuelans were subject to immobility and 'stuck' in Colchane and Pisiga Carpa.

Figure 7. The 15-CH Road Connecting Colchane and Iquique

(Source: Author)

[6] '*Po*' is derived from the word '*pues*' and is Chilean slang typically used for emphasis when speaking.

[7] On my way to Colchane, I noticed several bags abandoned on the side of the road and I remembered a participant's story: "One time, a person with one leg was walking on the side of the road. *Osea* (I mean), he took his crutches but imagine seeing this in the middle of the desert. It was like seeing a spirit! The only thing he had with him was the tiniest bit of coca cola. […] We also saw a blind person walking from Colchane on their own. These things, certainly, they are impactful."

Initially, the experiences of Bolivians and Venezuelans sparked empathy and acts of solidarity by border residents. Ana, who worked as a nurse at the time, explained that she had to assist "Venezuelans who arrived crying, they arrived in desperate conditions, saying that they are bad parents for bringing their children in these conditions but that they saw no other way." Esther and Vicente explained that functionaries of the municipality and the health center of Colchane gathered clothes, warm drinks, and directed people to abandoned homes for shelter. Aymara women also described helping in different ways, either by distributing water, food, and clothes like in the case of Celia, or by providing free accommodation like in the case of Nina. Nina follows the evangelical church, and out of compassion and empathy, she provided basic products and accommodation to many Venezuelans. One person with tuberculosis, she specified, was welcomed into her home regardless of the risks of contagion. "God protects good people," Nina noted.

While Bolivians left when borders re-opened, Venezuelans continued to arrive to the border towns and border residents started to feel disappointment and anger about the role that they felt forced to assume due to outdated migration laws and a lack of governmental assistance. Esther expressed that added onto historical violence experienced by the Aymara,

> "there is a very, very big social harm that [the government] did not know how to handle. And it has been here for a while! It is not only now, it is not from today. They have not made clear migration laws and known how to manage the migration from other countries that has always happened, maybe not like the recent explosion, but it will continue to happen. […] So, they let a commune as vulnerable as Colchane and with the little economic resources that it has, confront and resolve a problem that is not ours, it is of the State."

Indeed, migration dynamics are not new at this border-crossing, but regardless, there was little to no legal, logistical, and infrastructural preparation by the Chilean State – shifting responsibility to border communities. Vicente noted that the municipality had foreseen and informed the government about the increased migration flows and its inability to manage the reception of migration on its own. However, there was a 'non-action' by the State that is in line with the historical disregard and marginalization of the needs and concerns of border communities. The response and management that was finally provided coincides with this exclusion, as securitization logics (reviewed in the following chapter) create detrimental effects – yet also possibilities – for border communities. Nina summarized this sentiment:

> "The government, all of the governments that have passed by Chile, have always forgotten the Aymara territories. I am Aymara and proud of this, but they have always forgotten about us. They are not interested! ***Pero son buenos para imponer sus leyes acá*** (But they are good at imposing their laws here)!"

Chapter 4 | The Implementation of Securitization

"I think Latin America knows that we cannot stop mobility because it is part and parcel of our human condition. Mobility is the only crime." –Sabrina

4.1 Ineffective Barriers to Mobility

This section investigates the implementation of securitization measures, which include the new migration law (No. 20.430), the state of emergency with increased militarization, and the construction of a ditch. While these measures consider migration an issue of national security to be managed by increasing barriers to mobility, they are subject to several challenges when put into practice, do not stop migration, and create consequences that disregard human lives.

4.1.1 Expulsion and Re-direction of 'Irregular' Migrants

Sabrina oversees the offices of the NGO *Fundación de Ayuda Social de las Iglesias Cristianas* (FASIC). As part of her work, she holds interviews with Venezuelan migrants who explained that they opted for irregular entry to the country because they were unable to get the necessary documents for formal entry. Lanzarote, who works with children and families arriving to the refuge at the Colchane-Pisiga border, also described this dynamic: "What happens is that Venezuelans need a visa to enter Chile and they don't have this visa because it is too expensive for them or because the Venezuelan embassy gives them a lot of obstacles to obtain it." Therefore, supporting previous literature, Venezuelans tend to take irregular paths of entry.

To handle increased mobility through unauthorized entry points, the government implemented the new migration law that facilitates immediate expulsions. Sabrina explained that the solution consisted in saying: "go back from where you came from, and if you came walking, return walking in the same direction to your own country." In practice, however, immediate expulsions were not possible because Bolivia does not receive non-Bolivian people. During a conversation with a police officer controlling the border, he related that they could not implement the new law due to this, so "most migrants were left in the land of no one." Adapting to this, the police officer explained that once migrants "touch Chilean territory," they are re-directed to the refuge where they must self-report their 'illegal' entry before accessing health, shelter, food, and transportation services. Oscar, who works at the refuge, explained that many of those who self-report their entry via unauthorized paths "think that this is a way to regularize their entry and register their personal background records, but in reality, they are entering a process of expulsion." Sabrina and Lanzarote considered that talking about expulsions as a solution to migration is a political instrument to please the society and provide a temporary answer. "It is a political spectacle to leave society content," Sabrina noted.

This process happens once people enter Chilean territory, as beforehand, they are met by police officers who control mobility at six border controls. Undocumented migrants are not provided authorized entry, and it is a crime to allow or facilitate entry via unofficial crossings. Figure 8 shows a police officer at the '*Cerrito Bofedal*' border control determining who can cross this ancestral crossing of the Aymara. While deciding who is allowed crossing, police officers must adapt to the Aymara customs of trans-national mobility which must be protected according to Convention 169. The police officer explained that anyone who is not from the Andean communities is denied crossing, and he is able to distinguish border residents because he has been working at the border controls for two years and the looks, clothing, and luggage of the Aymara differ from migrants. He pointed to a woman on her knees, holding a blanket around a boy (not older than two years old) and said, "Look, those are Venezuelans." When I asked if he would allow their entry, he explained that he cannot: "this is our job," to control unauthorized mobility. While

observing this border control, a couple attempted to cross from Bolivia and claimed to come from the town Pisiga Choque. The police responded, "Okay, here I will get you: point where Pisiga Choque is." The woman pointed to Pisiga Carpa, so the police did not allow crossing. While officials hold great power in deciding who is allowed crossing, Sabrina mentioned that people find ways to enter Chilean territory to reach the refuge or to continue their journeys regardless of these controls. Figure 9 shows people sitting down at far away *bofedales*, and the police officer said that they are probably waiting for the night to attempt crossing through uncontrolled areas.

Figure 8. Police Control at '*Cerrito Bofedal*'

(Source: Author)

Figure 9. People Sitting Down at Far-Away *Bofedales*

(Source: Author)

4.1.2 Militarization of the Border?

Vicente, Esther, and Oscar described that increased militarization was a political tactic rather than a measure that provided effective barriers to deter migration: the military merely produces an image of a sovereign state. "How pretty," Vicente remarked, "they stationed these military and they will not allow migrants in. No *po*, the military cannot do that. They exist for war purposes; they are not there … much less to shoot unarmed people and children. Because it's children crossing the borders, not invaders." Vicente considered that the state has effectively framed people on the move as threats to national security, particularly as 'invaders' that must be controlled. While militarization allows to spread this political rhetoric, in practice, the military is not given executive power for expulsions, re-direction, or mobility controls. Leo (a military non-commissioned officer) explained,

"What we do at the frontier is solely support police officers according to the presidential decree 265, which states that we can give logistical, technological, and transportation support to the police officer. […] No law allows us to be controlling and registering at the frontier, which is why there is always a police officer present."

Figure 10 illustrates a military vehicle transiting the closest road to the border and most likely providing transportation to police officers. Ultimately, Vicente said that sending the military "is a state-centric outlook" to migration management that only serves as a political tactic to distract the public from the real task of decreasing vulnerabilities for everyone.

Figure 10. Military Vehicle

(Source: Author)

4.1.3 A 'Last-Ditch Effort'

However, there are other ways to create barriers to mobility. The Colchane-Pisiga border has two *zanjas* built by the nation-state. The first (Figure 11) was made in 2017 during the government of Michelle Bachelet with the main purpose of reducing contraband (Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad Pública 2017). Throughout the years, small bridges and improvised crossings were built to overcome this measure, and recently, these bridges have been used by migrants to facilitate border-crossing (Murga 2022). The second *zanja* (Figure 12) was built during the beginning of 2022 with the main goal of increasing barriers to mobility and deterring migration. It is located behind the first, where officials control entry (Figure 13).

Figure 11. *Zanja* from 2017

Figure 12. *Zanja* from 2022

(Source: Author)

Figure 13. The Colchane-Pisiga Border Control '*Cerrito Bofedal*'

(Source: Author)

The police officer at the '*Cerrito Bofedal*' border control explained that the construction of the second ditch was initially helpful to control and impede the mobility of people who created irregular strategies for border crossing.[8] In the end, however, the ditch did not stop people who either decide to walk to the extremes of the ditch (where they are more vulnerable to geographic complications) or they risk crossing the ditch which can lead to injuries and hypothermia from below temperature water that seeps from the *bofedales* into the ditch. Therefore, Andrés considered that the construction of the ditch "is a band-aid solution that is not sustainable in the long-term" because it does not stop mobilities and it creates consequences that affect migrants and non-migrants who must cover additional medical expenses. Ana stated that since the creation of the second ditch there are "more injuries, people with broken bones, and […] people who get wet and end up with hypothermia." Vicente considered the construction of a second ditch 'ridiculous,' Sabrina said it is 'a waste of resources,' and Lanzarote called it 'useless.'

4.1.4 "*Están dejando morir*": Increased Vulnerabilities

The aforementioned measures are not neutral because they create detrimental consequences for migrants, who regardless of their formal or informal status, are human beings. Navigating conversations was an emotional experience, as three participants even showed pictures of people who had died at the border-crossing or in border towns. "So you can see what is happening here and what death really looks like," Oscar said while showing a picture. According to Sabrina, government measures are not only political tactics, ineffective barriers to mobility, and subject to practical challenges, but they also disregard human lives:

> "The focus is set on expulsions, delinquency, security, and at the end we know that it does not deter mobility nor the root of migration. […] There is no commitment to the lives of people who are dying at the desert, which were at least 20 last year and this year we already have like 10 deaths from hypothermia. The government needs to admit that we are allowing the death of women, children, newborns, elderly... *Están dejando morir*."

Congruent with previous literature, controls on mobility and the imposition of an irregular status does not deter migrant entry, but rather creates and cultivates vulnerability for migrants who endure more precarious border crossings and live with conditions of 'illegality.' Indeed, securitization measures fail to consider the risks to human lives, who also fall subject to trickery of *coyotes* or scammers that exploit vulnerabilities created by securitization practices. Oscar explained that *coyotes* and scammers warn and sometimes misinform people on the move about

[8] One of the strategies, according to the police officer, consisted in gathering into groups to cross on both sides of the police control or to wait for the night to decrease visibility.

police controls and re-direction to the refuge (where conditions are not optimal). Therefore, many decide to pay for transportation or guidance across unauthorized paths of entry. These may be one-off scams that do not fulfill promises and as a result, leave migrants mid-way or in the middle of the altiplano. Celia related, "A Bolivian would charge 50 thousand pesos, what do I know, to enter the country and it was a scam. […] Makes me sad, better to not touch the person, let them pass calmly." Lanzarote explained that there are also traffickers that aid crossing with the purpose of sexual exploitation or transportation of illicit products. Although outcomes vary, the blaming of these actors for taking people through environmentally risky areas shows refusal by the government to acknowledge its responsibility for the deaths at the border. Border enforcement strategies have effectively funneled people to high-risk environments that make journeys more vulnerable and deadly.

4.2 Securitization Actors

Several actors, in constant interaction with Aymara border residents and each other, are involved in the implementation of securitization measures. While this research focuses on Aymara border residents, this section provides an approximation of other migration actors that are important to mention because they help contextualize the daily practices and experiences of the Aymara.

4.2.1 Nature

Colchane and Pisiga Carpa are surrounded by beautiful mountains, land fields that vary from dry desert sands to wetlands with alpacas and llamas, and unique landmarks like salt flats and glaciers. Although the Andean territory appears neutral and has historically provided a source of livelihood for the Aymara, it can be argued that it also serves as a securitization actor. Jason de León (2015: 42) moves beyond simple divisions between humans and non-humans to avoid "erroneously positioning humans as the sole agents responsible for action, […] reducing all others to background noise, uncontrollable variables, or randomness." Instead of considering nature at the border-crossing as a random coincidence, this section investigates how seemingly innocent nature can be exploited to control mobilities. This is even more compelling when we consider that Colchane was established by the government for political and administrative purposes.

The high altitudes, strong winds, extreme temperatures, and waters of the *bofedales* produce high-risk conditions for border-crossing that can be used as weapons and effective measures by the state in its 'war' against migration. Sabrina explained that "the *bofedales* look like grass and low waters, but when you step on the grass you sink, and they have cold waters that can lead to hypothermia." Figure 14 shows the *bofedales* near the unofficial border-crossing '*Cerrito Bofedal*' and Figure 15 shows the llamas and alpacas feeding from their waters and pastures. Moreover, some people are not prepared to withstand the weather. Esther said, "sometimes health professionals have to verify the dead bodies […] and we have had a lot of deaths, mainly Venezuelans, because they come from a tropical country and […] are not prepared for the cold of the altiplano." Ultimately, instead of representing an innocent and random component, borderlands are geopolitical terrains that serve as instruments and actors for mobility controls (de León 2015).

Figure 14. *Bofedales* of the Borderlands

(Source: Author)

Figure 15. Llamas and Alpacas at the *Bofedales*

(Source: Author)

4.2.2 News and Media

Participants consider news and media platforms essential actors during the implementation of securitization: they may misinform, misrepresent, or spread half-truths to amplify some political perspectives about migration management over others. While an analysis of migration media representations is interesting, it is beyond research objectives and this paper has limited space. It suffices to mention that media is relevant actor while implementing securitization, and thus, there has been increased media presence at the border communities.

4.2.3 Police and Military

Police and military officials clearly play a role in the implementation of securitization measures by controlling and policing the Colchane-Pisiga border. However, they are also navigating the borderland as they police it. Leo was part of the first patrols displaced to the border complex and recalls struggling with the adaptation to the geographic conditions: "The experience was difficult; the temperatures are very low, you can get sick from the high altitude, and there was no type of shelter from the wind or heating system to warm up." Indeed, officials are also subject to the conditions created by nature. While some white hutches are provided for officials, they are not heated so Leo prefers to gather outside beside a wood fire to "endure the night." Ana commented that officials with diabetics, heart problems, or other conditions were sent to the border, which makes them more vulnerable to health complications at high altitudes.

Additionally, officials are exposed to sensitive experiences during their interactions with people moving across unauthorized border-crossings. Lanzarote explained: "psychological impact can be much more dangerous that a bullet in your body." The police officer at the border control '*Cerrito Bofedal*' found a mother with a new-born who had died from hypothermia and was wrapped

in a blanket in her arms.[9] When he saw elderly, women, or children at the *bofedales* he would see his mother, wife, and daughter. It is an experience that "touches your heart," he stated. Lanzarote mentioned that officials have been ridiculed by PDI working at the refuge and calling them "*las tías del jardín* (the teachers from pre-school)." This correlates with *machismo*, as society creates roles based on gender that assign how men and women should behave and *machismo* in Latin America justifies why generally male officials' mental health is disregarded. In dealing with these experiences, Oscar described cases where officials allowed border-crossing due to empathy about health concerns.[10]

4.2.4 Privatized Refuge and Aid Providers

There has been an involvement of private non-state actors in securitization implementation. Menz (2013) describes that this is in line with the embrace of neoliberalism, as the processes of migration have increasingly become associated with lucrative activities by private-sector providers. During fieldwork, the refuge at the border complex was managed by an event planner. "Unfortunately," Lanzarote said, "misery in Chile is a business." Vicente related:

> "What did the government do, they externalized, with an event planner, the task of managing a refuge […]. How does this neoliberal logic work, that they like, the state gives them money so that they create a solution, *cachay*?"

However, complications may arise from privatizations, as private actors are generally motivated by economic rather than humanitarian considerations and are untrained in nuances of migration (Gammeltoft-Hansen 2013). Vicente explained an instance of overcrowding at the refuge who claimed capacity for 300 people but only had food for 180 of them. Lanzarote overheard xenophobic and derogatory comments by staff. This is consistent with several reports that "document instances of racism, overcrowding, and ill-trained staff" when private actors take charge of migration management (Gammeltoft-Hansen 2013: 137). Moreover, Lanzarote and Oscar described that the tents meant to provide shelter "are horrible" (Figure 16). These tents, however, were being replaced to create shelters with better isolation from the cold (Figure 17). Altogether, Gammeltoft-Hansen (2013: 145) argues that the success of the private market lies in the benefits for "governments concerned that the issue of asylum and immigration puts them in a hotspot, caught between liberal principles and the need to ensure efficient border controls." Thus, private actors can insulate governments from liabilities.

Figure 16. Refuge Tents

Figure 17. New Accomodation

(Source: Authorization to use photos by Lanzarote, 2022)

[9] "Do you feel the wind, the cold here? Look, I am wearing five layers of clothing and I am still cold. They don't know this; they don't come prepared for this weather. […] One has to be strong because one's heart breaks when you see a person with a dead baby."

[10] "Entry depends on the police officers' consideration," Oscar explained, "I have been present for two cases where an elderly person with some type of health condition […] was allowed to enter because sending them to the *bofedales* translates to death. There are officials that allow entry, but others do not. It depends on the police officer, […] and if the person is very lucky, they can pass."

There are also actors who try to facilitate migrant journeys. Oscar and Lanzarote explain that NGOs have been allowed entry into the refuge to provide monetary, social, and legal services for undocumented people arriving to Chile. They installed their own reception shelters to guide people about possibilities to regularize their status and apply for accommodation. Although national resistance towards NGOs has complicated their jobs,[11] these actors collaborate to provide solutions for migrants. NGO workers like Sabrina also described feeling overwhelmed with decisions about who to provide with limited accommodation and transportation services. 'Triage' was originally a medical concept to describe the prioritization of patients based on urgency (Mena and Hilhorst 2022), and it applies to the decisions of aid providers at the refuge. Due to logistical complications, Andrés explained that sometimes the buses taking migrants from the refuge to Iquique would not arrive or were insufficient. This created a system of priorities for elderly, pregnant women, and others who suffer risky health conditions, which in turn, created a space for migrants to strategize to become eligible for prioritization (Hilhorst and Jansen 2010). Andrés said that there have been cases where people claim to be pregnant or sick, but since they have no document to prove this, they may be handed "fake priorities." Therefore, migrants have agency during aid reception.

[11] Lanzarote is met with hostility by border residents who provide lunches, as "they do not like people that work with migrants." Furthermore, Sabrina was attacked on social media, called a *funa* in Chile, "for assisting migrants who arrive to Iquique."

Chapter 5 | Everyday Politics at the Edges of the Nation-State

This chapter considers the effects of Venezuelan migration and accompanying securitization for highly mobile Aymara residents of Colchane and Pisiga Carpa; establishing that migration narratives affect both migrants and border communities. While initially there was social assistance to vulnerable migrants, emerging feelings of insecurity, disruptions to culture and traditional economy, and controls on mobility practices have contributed to a more complicated picture. In this final chapter I will describe the everyday politics that can resist and negotiate, but also support nation-state securitization measures.

5.1 Feelings of Insecurity Lead to Support of 'Security' Measures

Before the installation of the refuge, increased migration to Colchane and Pisiga Carpa was met by local incapacity to provide services and accommodation. Therefore, migrants were on the search for shelter and warmth from the extreme weather patterns. Participants explained that migrants created improvised tents and shelters under the roofs of the main plaza (Figure 18), at an abandoned construction project (Figure 19), and at temporarily or permanently unoccupied houses due to Aymara mobility practices or abandonment.

Figure 18. Main Plaza of Colchane and Surrounding Rooftops

(Source: Author)

Figure 19. Improvised Shelters at Abandoned Project

(Source: Author)

While border residents understand the vulnerabilities of migrant journeys, feelings of animosity and insecurity began when there was unauthorized entry into houses and when merchandise, clothes, textiles, and food was stolen. Food supplies (and specifically a kilo of sugar) were stolen from Lucia, the home of Nora was occupied while she was away for the weekend, textiles of Celia were stolen to use as blankets, and Nina was stopped and threatened on the highway by Venezuelan men walking to Iquique. What these experiences have in common is what Stang Alva, Cociña-Cholaky, and Joiko (2021) refer to as '*choque cultural*' (cultural shock) that is produced between two marginalized populations. It is a complex situation, as on the one hand there is a humanitarian crisis that has caused increased migration to these towns and on the other, there is a historical disregard by the Chilean state about the lives of native inhabitants of the Andean grounds whose houses, traditional textiles, and more were used as survival methods by migrants stuck en route.

With time, media and national discourses began to associate Venezuelan migrants with violent gangs and criminals, specifically the *Tren de Aragua* that originates from Venezuela and operates throughout Latin America. Coupled with scarce resources, border residents began to harbor fears that align with popular narratives and blame delinquency on Venezuelan migrants. Oscar explained that at the time, "you would see vulnerability everywhere and the *Tren de Aragua* appeared like another individual in need," and therefore, there is this general association between migrants and gangs that produces fear of all outsiders. Galemba (2018: 878) argues that the focus on criminal gangs disregards an examination about "how border securitization generated migrant desperation and entrapment at the border, which in turn produces easy prey for criminal actors." As previously mentioned, the introduction of criminal actors is incentivized by opportunities to exploit migrant vulnerabilities. Vicente recognized this: "It is a way deeper problem than saying ay, Venezuelans are *delincuentes*. […] Narcotraffic exists, yes. Robbery exists, yes. But that is another phenomenon."

Regardless, Aymara border residents expressed fear and resentment specifically towards Venezuelan migrants, as Bolivians and Peruvians are considered 'siblings' that share their history and practices at the borderlands. Nina said, "I am against them, the foreigners. But not Peruvians or Bolivians, only Venezuelans." She described Bolivians as honorable people, while Venezuelans are *delincuentes*. Oscar mentioned that no manifestations were made against Colombian or Haitian migrants. Therefore, the issue was not about trans-national mobilities in general, but rather about Venezuelan mobilities – the 'problem' arrived with Venezuelan migration. Some participants began to categorize Venezuelan migrants arriving to the towns depending on language, clothes, and racial features. The result was everyday forms of resistance by Aymara border communities against Venezuelans, expressed during informal conversations and derogatory language such as the use of the word '*Veneco*' to refer to Venezuelan migrants.

The fear by border residents towards Venezuelan migrants associated with criminal actors has changed the lives of Aymara border communities because they hold constant feelings of insecurity. Nora, Celia, Nina, and Beatriz described recent situations of violence and robbery as stark opposites to the calm towns that they used to live in. Nina said, "It is hurtful because *pucha*, we used to leave our doors open *po* and now we have to live like in the city, with fences." Indeed, there is a recent construction of fences and walls (Figure 20) to protect houses and avoid entries. Celia even got a dog to guard her house. These physical manifestations are coupled with policing their own bodies and mobilities due to feelings of insecurity. Nina said, "I live in Pisiga Carpa, and I cannot go to the valleys [and *bofedales*] where my alpacas and llamas are because I do not feel calm *po*." Lucia does not allow herself to walk outside during the night because she is too scared to get robbed and Celia has caution and remains silent when crossing to Bolivia. Nora explained that "people have changed their way of being and do not carry out their usual activities with trust because of fear that they will be attacked or robbed." Ultimately, migration and accompanying logics of securitization not only affect migrant bodies, but also lead to constant feelings of insecurity by a variety of border residents.

Figure 20. Fences and Walls

(Source: Author)

Feelings of insecurity and associations to gangs created everyday support towards 'security' measures. Nina tearfully related:

> "When I found out about the *Tren de Aragua* that are killing and causing harm, my heart which was initially soft became hardened, and I do not care about Venezuelans anymore. I am sorry, I hope that God can forgive me too, but there are good and bad people. […] We don't want them in Chile. *A todos los que vengan, que los devuelvan a su país*."

Nina supports measures that expel and re-direct people entering Chile via irregular paths due to feelings of insecurity created from migrants seeking refuge and from the introduction of criminal actors that exploit migrant vulnerabilities. Moreover, Nina expressed empathy and support towards the military who "defend the country" and the non-commissioned military officer said that he was normally approached by Aymara border residents who expressed gratitude for their presence at the towns because it gave them a sense of safety. As we will see, however, these acts of everyday support can also be strategic.

5.2 Disruptions to Aymara Culture and Traditional Economy Lead to Resentment

Aymara border residents felt that recent migration created disruptions to their culture and their traditional agriculture and livestock economic practices. While they recognize the vulnerabilities of migrant journeys, they also associate their entry into their communities with a history of interferences. Initially, a lack of State responses made some Aymara border residents feel newly disregarded and the robbery of their textiles (while understanding that it came from necessity) felt like a disregard for their cultural heritage. "Aymara culture manifests itself in textile weaving, more than music and dance, so that they steal the family textiles… it is not minimal," Nora noted. Additionally, traditional festivities were stopped, and Vicente believed this was because "they couldn't make a barbeque next to a person, thousands of people, dying from hunger." Moreover, wooden sticks that demarcate harvests were used by both migrants and military unprepared for

the harsh weather patterns at this locality. Celia pridefully showed me the wooden sticks that she replaced after hers were "used to make fire to get warm." Similarly, the animals and the nature to raise cattle have been affected by military transportation that harm the *bofedales* and trash left on the way by people funnelled to these *bofedales*. Nina stated,

> "Us Aymara are owners of the *bofedales* and valleys. Look, they are going over with military trucks where we normally plant quinoa, potato, and where our cattle walks. And they [migrants] go through the *bofedales* throwing their shoes, okay this doesn't work for me, I throw this, I throw that. The llama grabs it, eats it, its weight goes down, and it dies. Who loses? I lose. The State loses nothing."

Ultimately, coupled with feelings of insecurity, disruptions to culture and traditional economy creates further resistance against migrants and resentment about "late," "insufficient," and "de-contextualized" responses by the Chilean State. Vicente believed that the exclusion by the government shows how both migrants and indigenous border communities are subject to racial hierarchies and marginalization:

> "Indigenous populations have always been disparaged by nation-states. […] The state says, to hell with the immigrants and to hell with the native communities, *cachay*? If they don't reach the white zone at the center of Santiago, we are all content."

While both migrants and non-migrants are marginalized, Nora mentioned that assistance to migrants has arrived by means of the refuge, which was necessary because it reduced municipal expenditures and helped avoid robbery and entry into unoccupied houses. However, border residents felt that "there is still no support to the community whose traditional culture is threatened and affected by migration and State measures." This leads the Aymara to feel resentment towards the services provided for migrants. "That is what hurts," Celia noted, "that the government gives to Venezuelans but not to us." Therefore, both migrants and non-migrants must be accounted for during migration management.

5.3 Everyday Modifications, Evasions, and Contestations to Controls on Trans-National Mobility

State actors have recognized indigenous practices of trans-national mobility, as shown by Convention 169 (ILO 1989: Article 32). Despite this, the State has historically spread logics of traditional sovereignty over bounded territories and sedentary biases, particularly in the borderlands inhabited by the Aymara. In 2020 Chilean borders were closed to 'protect' nationals from foreigners who could carry the Covid-19 virus. In 2022, the installation of a state of exception in Colchane increased militarization and border controls to manage unauthorized mobilities. What is relevant for this paper is that these initiatives not only affect migrant mobilities, but they also transgress previous agreements about ancestral practices of mobility by the Aymara.

Regarding the closure of nation-state borders during the pandemic, Aymara border residents considered that this measure disregarded their rights to free border transit to sustain their lives. Not only were national borders closed, but mobility to other communes was also restricted. Vicente related, "the moment that the border was closed there was a big problem, because these idiots also closed Huara, so people could not buy in Bolivia, could not buy in Iquique, and couldn't even leave the commune!" Towns were isolated and could not access basic provisions. Celia noted, "It was sad for us because, bad… We have lived years going to buy in Bolivia and we had to speak, and they [officials] didn't understand anything. We had to explain that we have to eat there…"

Similarly, Nora, Esther, Celia, Nina, Lucia, and Beatriz described that the measures to manage migration also disrupted their trans-national mobilities, as officials policing the border did not understand traditional practices and exchanges that happen during events like the bi-weekly

markets.[12] Conflicts arose when Aymara peoples were controlled and associated with Venezuelan migrants. "Clearly," Esther shrugged, "the military sent to the borders did not know, was not taught, and had no training about the Aymara culture." This created confusions and discriminatory remarks by the officials policing the borders, as Esther mentioned, "the military would tell them, no, you are from Bolivia, so you don't enter. That is how they talked to Chilean Aymaras." Celia described that she was constantly stopped by the officials while next to her, "*caleta* (many) Venezuelans entered from under the fences. And what are we? Chileans *po*." Nina explained,

> "We couldn't do our [bi-national] markets, they didn't let us cross to buy a kilo of rice, vegetables, meat… and nothing *po*, we have to tell complete stories to the officials and show our identification cards. And we began to think, how is it that Venezuelans are crossing with no documents, and we have Chilean nationality, but they start implementing rules for us?"

This exacerbated resentment and hostility towards Venezuelan migrants, and Aymara residents began to disassociate from Venezuelans to avoid confusions by officials controlling the border and narratives that associate their trans-national mobility with criminality. Appealing to the already established rights of the indigenous communities, the Mayor of Colchane used media outlets to express the disruptions created to their community due to securitization measures. Other border residents, like Nina, decided to take border controls on their own hands:

> "Okay, you will allow their crossing over ours. Do so, but we will kill them once they enter our communities. […] I wouldn't want to say it, but I will say it anyway. They won't give us our space to follow our practices, so we won't allow entry to any Venezuelan. And the ONU or human rights, we don't care, *nos vale verga*. Here we are going to kill."

This was the result of various factors, such as feelings of insecurity, disruptions to Aymara culture, and decontextualized state measures – which compounded with poverty and exclusion – encouraged some Aymara residents to make their own controls on migration and support national security logics. Border residents often reproduced state concerns that position migrants as 'others' to protect their own belonging to the nation-state and borderlands.

With time, officials became acquainted with Aymara culture, border residents, and features that distinguish Aymara peoples from 'dangerous others.' Ana considered that while crossing is highly dependent on officials, the community was able to turn the situation from "absolute closure of borders to more habitual crossings." Esther mentioned that during bi-weekly markets, "the community appointed municipality professionals who knew the people of the commune to facilitate crossing." While I was at the official ancestral crossing of the Aymara, Nina was sitting inside the hutches for officials and (while I can only suspect this) she seemed to be ensuring that Aymara border residents were allowed crossing. These are all acts that signal strategic support to border officials to ensure crossing. Modifications to initially strict border separations were achieved and the border is currently marked by differentiated mobilities. Figure 21 shows the ancestral border crossing where the Aymara are allowed crossing and others are left waiting in the side-lines.

[12] Ana's description is useful to understand the situation: "With migration, the cultural exchanges and the traditional bi-weekly market were interrupted again, which undermines ancestral traditions from both Chilean and Bolivian Aymara. […] It was extremely decontextualized from something that had already been authorized for years. So, migration not only meant increased expenditures for the commune, but it also transgressed Aymara practices. People couldn't even go to school! The Chileans and Bolivians were treated with the same attitude as migrants coming from other places, and they were re-directed back to Bolivia. It was like no, the same for everyone and the context where the Aymara live with invisible borders was not considered."

Figure 21. Differentiated Mobilities

(Source: Author)

Increased border controls also affect the livelihoods of border residents who have relied on renting parking lots or smuggling licit or illicit merchandise. Oscar believed that smuggling businesses have suffered from greater border controls and fears of association to migrants and criminal actors that arrived at this locality. Ana noted, "Since this is a border zone, you have to understand that the context entails a lot of irregular commerce, a lot of irregular transit of species and products, so the community that is used to this commercial exchange, to put it one way, become fearful of authority and military *po*." Vicente, Esther, and Ana mentioned that the reduction of involvement in the irregular economy that has traditionally sustained livelihoods, is also not aided by fines given out by officials to residents who never got a driver's license, for instance. Nora stated that "the Aymara had a different expectation when military arrived. The expectation was that they would stop irregular migration, but it was a mix up of everything." Increased controls took a toll on informal economic practices, and coupled with the context of the pandemic, it became increasingly difficult to sustain livelihoods in the borderlands.

Regardless, border communities negotiated increased migration flows and accompanying securitization by adapting to emerging opportunities from the 'migration industry' (Hernández-León 2012; Gammeltoft-Hansen and Sørensen 2013). Evading state sovereignty, some Aymara border residents and other actors have aided migrants faced with practical barriers to mobility, and by doing so, generated economic profits. Aymara border residents did not admit or comment about these practices. Instead, other border actors shared these practices as 'public secrets' that nobody talks about, but everyone knows. "Colchane is where everything happens, yet nothing happens," Lanzarote stated.

Vicente and Esther explained that a transportation business emerged in Colchane and Pisiga Carpa when many migrants began to accommodate in the towns because of sanitary restrictions or lack of transportation options. Vicente said, "that is when the business of transportation of irregular migrants was born, *porque vieron la papa po* (because they saw the money)!" "The Aymara created a good business out of irregular migration," Vicente assumed, "because one time I was speaking with a man, and he said he made CL$750,000 per day." The transportation business was highly profitable due to initial lack of humanitarian assistance in the reception of migrants and its association with illegality. Sabrina confirmed that migrants arriving to Iquique paid transportation costs that even reached CL$100,000 while the ticket normally costs CL$4,000 for Chileans. Similarly, a temporarily stationed construction worker said that when he took transportation services from Colchane to Iquique he was charged CL$4,000 but a foreigner on the same ride was charged CL$20,000. These high profits are tied to the risks involved in this informal

business, as Esther and Ana described that increased militarization and policing have led to legal and juridical proceedings for some Aymara border residents.

Aymara women also entered the migration industry. Oscar explained that the carts at the border, usually to facilitate transportation of merchandise, also became a business for Aymara women who would carry the luggage of irregular migrants and sometimes the migrants themselves. Carts also carried luggage through the ancestral path that was later returned to migrants crossing via more precarious paths.[13] Moreover, Oscar, Lanzarote, and Vicente mentioned that migration was beneficial to Aymara women selling food and products (particularly diapers) at their *choquerías*. Lanzarote noted,

> "In the end, they have this negative narrative about migration, but simultaneously, their economy benefits from it. Migrants spent money on food, bread, etcetera in businesses owned by people who were against migration. So are they really against migration?"

Indeed, entry to the migration industry does not indicate resistance to migration, but rather evasions and modifications of state measures. Regardless if incentives are purely about profits, providing transportation and other services to irregular migrants evades and modifies controls on mobility. Nevertheless, Sabrina indicates that increasing controls and penalties for transportation led border residents to limit the distance they drive migrants (dropping them before controls at Huara), stop providing rides, or create distance from migrants altogether. Similar to Galemba's (2018: 877) findings, "whether they fear being mistaken for a migrant or being accused of being a [*coyote*], residents increasingly view migrants as a potentially dangerous 'other.'" Tied to State and media narratives, migrants have been stigmatized as criminals and border residents fear associations with migrants, *coyotes*, and criminal actors arriving to Chile and exploiting migrant vulnerability.

[13] "The carts are another transportation mechanism for migrants. I take your luggage, merchandise, whatever through the ancestral crossing to Colchane. This obviously has a price. We saw that from Pisiga Bolívar to Pisiga Carpa they can charge CL$10,000 to CL$15,000."

Chapter 6 | Conclusions

By means of an ethnographically situated and qualitative methodology, this paper sought to understand the Aymara experience and response to increased migration and accompanying securitization measures at the northern borders of Chile, particularly in Colchane and Pisiga Carpa. This allows for a de-migrantization of migration studies because it challenges pre-supposed differences between migrants and non-migrants in an interconnected mobile world, marked by differentiated regimes of mobility. The following summary and reflection about the results is presented with the disclaimer that this research holds limitations and challenges while traversing the Chilean borderlands, conversing with varied actors, and constantly learning and unlearning throughout analysis.

Aymara border residents remember a recent history of nation-state marginalization and interference to their practices that go beyond fixed territorial borders and sedentary biases. Upon increased Venezuelan migration to their communities, securitization measures were implemented by a variety of actors. However, these measures had practical challenges, did not stop mobilities, created more precarious crossings, and were not contextualized to the borderlands where the Aymara hold rights to lives across territorial borders. Indeed, securitization measures created adverse consequences for both migrants and Aymara border residents.

Regardless of this shared experience, initial solidarity and empathy towards Venezuelans decreased and the Aymara began to disassociate themselves from migrants due to fears that link migrants with crime, resentment about disruptions to their culture and traditional economy, and risks of being mistaken as migrants or smugglers whose daily movements are criminalized and curtailed by border patrols. These fears legitimized and aligned with media and nation-state narratives that differentiate migrants as dangerous others in opposition to national citizens. Aymara border residents used everyday politics that support securitized migration policies and created strategic alliances with officials to ensure border crossings. Moreover, border residents responded to the introduction of officials and criminal actors that curtailed informal livelihood strategies by becoming part of the migration industry. In their everyday practices, they evaded controls on mobility and profited from differentiation created by securitization. Nevertheless, risks attached to this business and increased controls on mobility led to a further distancing from migrants. This reveals a contradiction: while the Aymara recall histories where their own mobility in the borderlands was challenged by logics underpinning nation-state and sedentary approaches, enhanced border securitization leads residents to disassociate from other people on the move and ascribe to state and media narratives that criminalize their mobility.

Ultimately, this not only legitimizes measures that disregard humanitarian concerns and international treaties about rights to asylum, but securitization also makes the lives, livelihoods, and mobilities of Aymara residents less secure. Examining everyday politics was not only useful to recognize these effects, but it also showed how agency can sometimes work against the population's interest. Therefore, instead of analyzing migrants against non-migrants, the task for scholars and society becomes to consider how (in the context of a mobile word shared by all humanity) we can begin to tackle legacies of colonial, neoliberal, patriarchal, and racist violence that assume mobility is normal for some but a symptom of 'abnormality' for others. It remains to be seen whether the aftermath of the protests during the beginning of this year will shift focus to address how highly unequal, historically produced power relations in Chile create and maintain the very conditions for everyday forms of violence and socioeconomic insecurity to thrive.

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Appendix A: Flowchart of Migrants that Enter Via Unauthorized Paths to Chile



(Source: SEREMI Región de Tarapacá)

Appendix B: Interview Schedule

[Brief introduction to the research project and ask for vocal consent from participant for the recording, transcription, and use of the interview. Explain that this research can replace their name with pseudonyms to ensure anonymity and create a more comfortable space to share perspectives.]

Could you tell me a little about yourself?
- Where were you born and where did you grow up?
- If you have multiple nationalities, what do you consider to be the benefits and disadvantages of this? Do you feel that you belong more to one than the other?

If participant is from Aymara ethnic group: Could you tell me about the traditions of the Aymara?
- What are the main values of the community?
- What are the main aspects of the Aymara culture?

When did you move to Colchane/Pisiga Carpa or for what reasons do you return?
- How often do you live in Colchane/Pisiga Carpa?

What is your main source of livelihood?

When the territory was given to the Chilean state after the War of the Pacific, how did you and/or your family experience the 'Chilenization' of the territory?

What are the customary interactions between Colchane and the town of Pisiga Bolívar?

When the borders closed due to the Covid-19 pandemic, how did this affect your life?
- Were you able to find ways to overcome this situation?
- How did you adapt to this change?

How have you experienced the increase of migration in the area?
- Have your attitudes towards migrants changed over time?
- What are the negative and positive aspects of the increase in migration around this area?
- Have there been acts of solidarity by locals towards migrants?
- Have you assisted migrants before? Why?
- Do you think that residents create barriers and difficulties for migrants?

How do you perceive the people coming to Chile through unauthorized paths?

At the beginning of the year, the government put into action the new law of migration and there was an installation of a state of exceptionality with increased militarization and the expulsion of undocumented migrants passing through unauthorized paths.
- How did you experience this?
- Has there been a time where your own residency has been questioned?
- How do you perceive the efficiency of this law?
- Do you agree with the logic of this law?
- How did this affect your mobility and livelihood?
- How did you adapt to this or find ways to negotiate the control on mobility?

How do you perceive the police that has come to the area?
- Have you had positive or negative interactions with them?
- Do you think they have differentiated standards on who gets expelled or not?
- Are they strict in their expulsions?

What do you think about the reparation of the *zanja* at the border?
- Is it effective?

Whether and how has the municipality of Colchane received help from the central government?

- In what aspects has it not received help from the central government?
- Do you perceive the governmental response and assistance as reactive and temporary or not?

In your opinion, what would be the best way to handle this situation?

- What can be improved?
- What needs to change?

Do you have any further comments or something you would like to clarify and expand on?

Ask for key respondent characteristics is these were not mentioned during the interview (name, age, gender, nationality, time in border community, and occupation).

[Thank the respondents for their participation and ask if they would like to receive a copy of the research paper.]

Appendix C: Respondent Characteristics

Pseudonym	Age	Gender	Nationality	Years in Colchane/ Pisiga Carpa	Occupation
Sabrina	29	Female	Chilean, Iquique	Not applicable	In charge of FASIC offices at Iquique
Vicente	48	Male	Chilean, Iquique	4	Municipal Journalist
Ana	29	Female	Chilean, Concepción	4	Nurse
Andrés	29	Male	Chilean, Antofagasta	5	General Doctor
Nora	40	Female	Chilean, Colchane	17, Aymara	Nurse
Esther	53	Female	Peruvian/ Chilean, Arica	25, Aymara and Quechua	Health Director
Celia	Not disclosed	Female	Chilean, Colchane	Native, Aymara	Textile Craftswoman (*Artesana*)
Nina	Mid Forties	Female	Chilean, Colchane	Native, Aymara	Textile Craftswoman (*Artesana*) and Businesswoman (*Negociante*)
Beatriz	Mid Sixties	Female	Chilean, Colchane	Native, Aymara	Textile Craftswoman (*Artesana*)
Lucia	Not disclosed	Female	Chilean, Colchane	Native, Aymara	Assistant at Health Center
Oscar	47	Male	Chilean, Iquique	Not disclosed	Working with NGO at refuge
Lanzarote	33	Male	Chilean, Iquique	Not disclosed	Working with NGO at refuge
Leo	Not disclosed	Male	Chilean, Iquique	Not disclosed	Military non-commissioned officer (*Suboficial del ejercito*)

Appendix D: Overview of Themes, Categories, and Codes

Theme	Category	Code
Border Identities and Mobilities	Historical Marginalization	Aymara are 'closed off' and distrustful of outsiders due to history
		Loss of Aymara language and culture due to 'Chileanization'
		Right-wing tendencies
		Lack of basic services and infrastructure
		State abandonment
		Aymara left Colchane in search of work, education, and/or health services
		Towns can be empty or full depending on the time of the year
		Aymara return for traditional festivities
	Borderlands	Colchaninos and Bolivians are 'brothers'
		Aymara are Peruvian and Bolivian blood
		Bolivians cross over to go to school in Colchane
		Aymara have no borders
		Binational market connects Chileans with Bolivians
	Mobility shapes lives and livelihoods	Aymara's are involved in transnational and national commerce
		"Village with no laws": Contraband is naturalized
		Contraband is an old practice at this border crossing
		Border residents become '*chuteros*' given lack of education opportunities
		ZOFRI and roads began a business of cars
		Parking lot business by Aymara
		Truck or van is given as birthday present for boys who turn 18 and can start their own business
		Choquerías where women sell to truck drivers
		Carretas for transportation
	The Arrival of Venezuelan Migration	Increase in Venezuelan migration
		The case of Colchane and Pisiga Carpa extends to the rest of Chile
		Initial Solidarity
		Government has historically disregarded migration concerns at the edges of the state
		Because of pandemic there were no buses and people had to walk to Iquique
		Lack of services and infrastructure in Colchane to handle migration flows
		Governments impose laws but 'do not care' for the Aymara
Securitization Implementation	Ineffective Barriers to Mobility	Expulsions and Re-direction: - People enter via irregular paths because they do not have documents for entry - Expulsions and Re-direction did not work because Bolivia didn't allow Venezuelans back - Political Instrument: Talking about expulsions to please the society - Some migrants misunderstand the '*autodenuncia*' as a process that regulates their stay in Chile - '*Autodenuncia*' can lead to expulsion - Police control the borders - Police distinguish Venezuelans by their looks, clothing, and what baggage they carried. - Police officer 'tests' people if he is unsure whether they are from Colchane or not - Police officer says they know the people from the town

<table>
<tr><td rowspan="8"></td><td rowspan="5"></td><td>- New law does not deter migrant entry</td></tr>
<tr><td>Militarization:
- 6 border controls
- Militarization is a political tactic
- Difference between military and police officer
- Sending the military is a state-centric outlook that did not work in practice</td></tr>
<tr><td>Zanja:
- Second zanja was created due to ‘immigration’
- Strategies to pass through the irregular crossing
- Zanja leads to more deaths, injuries, and hypothermia
- ‘Band-aid solution’ by the government
- The new zanja is a waste of resources, useless, and ridiculous because people cross anyway</td></tr>
<tr><td>Increased Vulnerabilities to Human Life:
- Current response ignores the death of people
- Coyotes trick migrants
- Scammers or coyotes misinform migrants
- The trickery by coyotes lead to death in the bofedales
- Cases where migrants are asked to take drugs as form of payment for crossing</td></tr>
<tr style="display:none"><td></td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3">Securitization Actors</td><td>Nature:
- Nature as weapon
- Desert and bofedales create harsh conditions for the crossing
- Migrants are unprepared for the altitude and weather, which has caused deaths</td></tr>
<tr><td>Media:
- Media portrays migrant as criminal
- Media can create misrepresentations and half-truths
- Through the media Aymara experience was communicated
- NGOs can spread awareness through social media</td></tr>
<tr><td>Police and Military Officials:
- Job is to control the mobility of people
- Difficult to adapt to nature at borderlands
- Expenditure in health costs towards military
- Consequences for mental health
- Psychological impact is not accounted for
- PDI name-calls officials
- Empathy from police officers towards people with health conditions allows crossing</td></tr>
</table>

		Privatized refuge and NGOs: - Event planner oversees refuge - Overcrowding of refuge - Ill-trained staff and name-calling migrants - Tents are 'horrible' - Construction of new accomodation - Locals don't like people that work with migrants at the refuge - *Funa* for fomenting migration - NGOs have less competitiveness and have started to work collectively - Priority of transportation is given to those with risky heath conditions - Migrants give a fake health condition to get transportation priorities
Effects for Aymara border communities and Everyday Politics	Feelings of Insecurity Lead to Resistance of Venezuelans and Support of 'Security' Measures	Occupation of plaza, abandoned infrastructure, and houses
		Stolen food and kilo of sugar
		Stolen textiles
		Mobility to cities interrupted by threats
		Fears that associate migrants with gangs and crime
		Resistance against Venezuelans, not Bolivians nor Peruvians
		'*Veneco*' to refer to Venezuelans
		Introduction of the *Tren de Aragua*
		It is a bigger issue than delinquency
		Feeling of fear and insecurity by border residents
		Border residents build fences and walls to protect their houses
		Dogs to protect household
		Caution when crossing border
		People fear going to herd their animals
		Scared to walk outside at night
		Support towards 'security' State measures
	Disruptions to Aymara Culture and Traditional Economy Lead to Resentment	Increase of migration led to suspension of ceremonies and cultural parties of the Aymara
		Robbery of textiles
		Military and migrants took wooden sticks to make fire
		Bofedales and animals have been affected due to contamination
		Trash left on the way
		Military transportation is passing through their lands and destroying the *bofedal*
		Resistance against state for de-contextualised responses
		Resentment from host communities towards resources given to migrants
	Everyday Modifications, Evasions, and Contestations to Controls on Trans-National Mobility	Convention 169 to protect mobility practices
		Closure of borders meant that they cannot get provisions
		Pandemic and migration stop cultural exchanges and practices like bi-national market
		Aymara experience at the border depends on the police officer
		Aymara were misidentified
		Mobility practices were questioned by officials
		The anger towards the central government is taken out on Venezuelans for disrupting customary practices
		Support towards national security logics
		Municipality professionals control border
		Aymara woman sitting at border shelter
		The militarization at the border affected irregular commerce of the town

		More scared due to arrival of criminal actors
		Economic activity is affected because local community becomes more fearful of military and police
		Payment of fines further complicates economic position
		Business of transportation of irregular migrants evades and modifies State security measures
		Bus tickets are more expensive for irregular migrants and foreigners
		Business with carts carrying luggage, merchandise, and migrants
		Aymara could sell their products to migrants from the *choquerías*
		Legal and juridical proceedings of border residents
		Limits on driving to avoid controls
		Fears of association with emerging criminal actors