# MSc Programme in Urban Management and Development

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# Disaster in Context of Crisis: Assessing the performance of community-based initiatives in urban disaster recovery

*A case study on Beirut port explosion.*

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# Summary

Urban areas are more vulnerable to human and economic losses from disasters. Natural and human-caused disasters persisted during the Covid-19 pandemic, putting urban resilience to the test. Community-based initiatives have been appraised in post-disaster recovery by several scholars; however, the performance of community-based initiatives has not been addressed when disasters happen in crisis. The objective of this research is to explain how a pre-existing context of crisis affects the performance of community-based initiatives in disaster recovery of the built environment. This is done through the case study of the Beirut Port explosion in 2020 that occurred amid a political and economic crisis, and a global covid-19 pandemic. 10 months prior to the explosion, a self-organized social movement united the diverse and fragmented Lebanese community and mobilized in urban spaces relying heavily on informed call to action on social media. Despite the socio-political instability and the limited healthcare and economic resources resulting from the crises, community-based initiatives performed well in disaster recovery. In-depth interviews were conducted with leaders of Community based initiatives (CBIs), as key informants. Qualitative primary data from those interviews was analysed and triangulated with secondary data and primary data from interviews with NGOs and Beneficiaries.

Following the explosion, and in the absence of a disaster management strategy, CBIs emerged from the motivation of activists who shared altruistic values, patriotism and solidarity, invoked by the social movement. Formed of well-educated members with extensive personal networks, CBIs were characterized with individuality in acquiring resources, strategy, and type of outputs. Acknowledging their unique capacities and limited resources, CBIs were resourceful. They capitalized on their network strength and established partnerships with other groups who shared similar visions, to achieve larger goals. Moreover, through their networks, they were able to establish credibility and link to international organizations for funding. The crisis enabled CBIs with better organization capacities, where they built internal structure for operation and external structure for coordination. As a result of high networking capacity and increased motivation, CBIs were vital to the Beirut recovery efforts. They formed close relationships with the beneficiaries, who found in them a rescue from an incapable government. This relationship instilled a responsibility in CBIs who developed their recovery initiatives to urban recovery neighbourhood scale interventions.

This research provides insights into academic literature. In crisis, the network strength of community-based initiatives relies heavily on the personal network of the core members and collaborations with other like-minded groups. Unlike cities in the global north, community-based initiatives in the global south do not have the opportunity to link to local institutions; instead, they link directly to international bodies. Moreover, for grassroot community-based initiatives, credibility is essential to acquiring those international funds.

These findings can be applied to future disaster management frameworks, where it is advised that distribution of CBI efforts should be capacity-based and done from the ground up. Moreover, disaster management frameworks need to capitalize on the skilled human capital that has made itself available for disaster recovery.

# Keywords

Community-Based Initiatives, Disaster Recovery, Crisis, Social Movement, Performance

# Acknowledgements

Born and raised in Lebanon, I witnessed crises, conflict, and war, but I always managed to detach myself from the pressures in my context. Maybe I learned to live with the situation. Or have I turned a blind eye? A coping mechanism? That's up to a psychologist to decide! When the protests started in Beirut in 2019, my natural response was to detach myself. I observed. When it got too much, I "turned off" the news, social media, and my surrounding. Every day at 6:07 pm I pass by those massive silos, leaving the office in Beirut. The morning of August 04, 2020, I decided that I deserved a day off from the long commute. I would like to think of it as a strike of luck, or maybe a coincidence… BOOM. My natural reaction was to detach myself. I "turned off" the world around me and engulfed myself in a 1000-piece jigsaw puzzle of the Duomo di Milano. Two months later, the puzzle was complete, my bags were packed, and I headed to Rotterdam. At IHS, I learned how to examine cities, see potential, and respond to weaknesses. With the tools I acquired, I decided there was no more 'turning it off'. In the past few months, I had to dig through my context, dwell into its complexity and look for answers. But worst of all? I had to look Beirut straight in the eye and acknowledge: I survived the Beirut Port Explosion.

In my research, I shifted focus from the tragedy of the event. Instead, I highlighted the resilience of the Lebanese community. Another coping mechanism? Maybe! Therefore, my first acknowledgement goes to all the volunteers, CBIs, NGOs, Red cross, Army, and Civil Defence personnel, who gave incessantly. I am also grateful for the CBI and NGO leaders whom I interviewed for this research. You are truly inspirational.

I would like to thank my supervisors Saskia Ruijsink and Dr. Alexander Jachnow for their valuable guidance. Thank you, Saskia, for encouraging me to take on this research, with all its challenging context. Your insightful suggestions and valuable experience sharpened my thinking. Thank you for your patience, those long Zoom chats prospered! Thank you, Alex, for inspiring me to think outside the box and for highlighting my strengths and weaknesses. Most of all, for teaching me how to be concise. My sentences are no longer 4 lines long! I also want to extend my gratitude to my second reader, Carolina Lunetta. Your feedback challenged me to define my research. I will always remember your response after I've talked too much: "Angie, what do you want to know?"

None of this would have been possible if it weren't for Mr. Moustapha El Solh. Thank you for believing in me and extending me with the courage and support to pursue my dreams. Every time I felt the tendency to give up, I remember you asking me "How much do you want this?" and I am reminded of why I started and how important this is to me.

I am grateful for this beautiful experience with my colleagues at IHS. It has been one hectic adventure with all the lockdowns and zoom sessions, but I would do it all over again! To my dear friend Sankha, thank you for all those conversations. Your biryani kept me going!

I cannot begin to express thanks to my friends and family back home. It has been a rough year, but you were resilient, and supported me regardless. I am grateful for my brothers William, Gilbert, and Ronald, for being there for me as friends, humourists, and guides. I am forever grateful to my partner, Marc, for bearing my stress, for waking me up every day and most of all, for the encouragement, support, and positivity you've instilled in me. Me, being here today, would not have been possible without the support and nurturing of my parents. Mom, you set a perfect example on perseverance. Dad, you were always the first to encourage me to explore new directions. I dedicate this milestone to both of you.

For months I questioned whether it was right to 'turn it off', whether I should have been there to fight for and rebuild my city. But now, this is my contribution. **Beirut, this is for you.**

# Abbreviations

| | |
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| IHS | Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies |
| CBI | Community-Based Initiative |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organization |
| LNGO | Local Non-Governmental Organization |
| INGO | International Non-Governmental Organization |
| DGA | Directorate General of Antiquities |
| Beirut FER | Beirut Forward Emergency Room |
| Covid-19 | Model Corona Virus |
| UN | United Nations |
| IG | Instagram |
| SM | Social Movement |
| SoP | Sense of Place |
| SC | Social Capital |

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# Chapter 1: Introduction

## 1.1 Crisis and Disaster

In 2020, disasters were responsible for the death of ca. 8000 victims and economic losses of 202 billion USD (Bevere & Weigel, 2021). 55% of the world's population live in urban areas in 2018 and expected to reach 68% in 2050 (United Nations, 2019). This makes Urban areas more vulnerable to human and economic losses from disasters (Henkey, 2018). Natural and human-caused disasters persisted during the Covid-19 pandemic, putting urban resilience to the test. Among these disasters: plane crash in Tehran (January 2020), floods in Jakarta (January 2020), port explosion in Beirut (August 2020), and earthquake in Izmir (October 2020). With 90% of covid cases located in urbanized areas (United Nations, 2020), the vulnerabilities of cities were highlighted. Covid-19 pandemic has provoked discussions over crisis, emergency, and disaster management protocols. Formal disaster response strategies were disrupted by the pandemic because of interrupted supply routes, and unattainable distancing in evacuation centres. The informal community-based initiatives proved immanent to disaster response. This research dives into the performance of community-based initiatives when faced with urban disasters.

Before proceeding, it is important to briefly distinguish between disaster and crisis. Crisis is an abnormal situation where important decisions have to be made regarding threats or opportunities. Crisis may result from political or economic issues or disaster(Shaluf, Ahmadun, & Said, 2003). Disaster has no universal definition but is dependent on the discipline. Within the social definition, the focus of disruption and vulnerability is the social construct and not the agent causing it. Perry (2007) defines disaster as a sudden occasion, that disrupts social routines, causes the undertaking of unplanned courses of action, and poses danger to valued social objects.

## 1.2 Background information and problem statement

On the 4th of August 2020, 6:07 pm, one of the worst non-nuclear man-made explosions erupted at the Port of Beirut, registering a force of 3.5 magnitude earthquake. The direct cause was not revealed by investigations, but the explosion was attributed to ca. 2,750 tons of ammonium nitrate, improperly stored in the port warehouse. The explosion caused approximately 220 casualties, 6,500 injuries and 300,000 homeless (International Medical Corps, 2021). The damage extended up to 20 kilometres radius from the epicentre: severe damage within 6 km, moderate damage within 10 km and light damage up to the 20th km. (OCHA, 2020)



**Image 1 Beirut port explosion (T. Kristiansen, 2020)**

The year 2020 was globally exceptional due to the Covid-19 pandemic, but the situation was much more dire in Lebanon. Towards the end of 2019, the Lebanese economy went into financial

crisis. The Lebanese pound fluctuated in a situation of hyperinflation, causing exchange rate and banking crises. This resulted in 1million Lebanese people living below the poverty line (World Bank, 2020). In October 2019, the crisis sparked massive protests. A social movement, that called itself a "Revolution", formed claiming distrust in the government, demanding its resignation, and crying for reform. It aimed to overthrow the current leaders and their sectarian regime and bring forward young and capable leaders. The social movement organized itself nationwide in the streets and squares and on social media. It brought together thousands of Lebanese from different backgrounds, each with their own set of demands and vision for change. The socio-political unrest led to three Government resignations in less than one year and an unstable political situation with conflicts between the national security forces and protesters.



**Image 2 Social movement symbol - a clenched fist that reads Revolution (hrw.org, 2019)**

The implications of the Covid-19 Pandemic stressed the health sector where many intensive care units in Beirut reached maximum capacity. On August 3, 2020, Beirut governorate scored the second-highest number of covid cases in the country (MOPH, 2020). The pandemic affected the livelihoods of many Lebanese locals where "almost 4/5 respondents reported having no savings and 37% reported no income." (OCHA, 2020).

As a result of the crisis, community-based initiatives (CBIs) emerged and mobilized to support vulnerable communities through food supply, financial support, medication provision, employment, etc.



**Image 3 CBI providing support during Covid-19 pandemic (@balawala.chi IG)**

**Image 4 CBI providing housing to medical professionals during Covid-19 pandemic (@baytnabaytak IG)**

**Image 5 CBI collecting donations during crisis (@shaabemasouleyati IG)**

Following the explosion, the Lebanese citizens and the government found themselves in a multifaceted crisis that challenged their coping capacity. The response and relief phase of disaster management comprised a strong reactive community. The civil society immediately mobilized itself to save, clear, and solace. The Civil Defence and Armed forces concentrated on the areas at risk of a secondary accident, namely the port. International mechanisms were put to action such as the United Nations and the European Disaster Response Centre (Grunewald, Durocher, & Keldani, 2020).

The disaster recovery phase consisted of diverse rhythms and scales. The civil society and the private sector were the fastest to respond. Their actions included minor rehabilitation, humanitarian support, and local NGO support. Within weeks, the civil society's response developed into fully structured CBIs mobilized to recovery. The Lebanese Army took charge of coordination of the recovery efforts. Otherwise, the government was absent.

**Problem statement:**

Lebanon was suffering from economic & political crises and a global pandemic when the Beirut port explosion erupted. This context of crisis provoked a nationwide social movement that demanded the government's resignation and distrust in its associated political class. It self-organized on social media and by capitalizing on social networks running across individuals, groups, and hierarchies. A diverse and fragmented society was united as they mobilized in protests, marches, sit-ins, and open discussions. The social movement occupied the few public spaces available in Beirut, streets, institutional buildings, and the Beirut central district. These spaces gained meaning and relevance as they represented a symbol for reclaiming the city.

In August 2020, 10 months after the social movement mobilized, the disaster hit Beirut. The authorities were inadequately equipped for disaster relief. Numerous community-based initiatives (CBIs) emerged and were essential to relief and recovery. They contributed to displacement response, basic needs, damage assessments, debris removal, and reconstruction. Within 3 weeks from the blast, UN Volunteers documented 200 individual and group initiatives in Beirut. In the absence of a disaster management strategy, CBIs coordinated and established partnerships among themselves and with local NGOs to accomplish larger scale recovery objectives. Despite the socio-political instability and the limited healthcare and economic resources resulting from the crises, CBIs performed well in disaster recovery. Academic literature has acknowledged the value community-led initiatives in post-disaster and recovery situations (Cretney, 2018) & (Aldrich, 2015), but has not addressed how a pre-existing context of crisis affects their performance. How did the social movement, through its self-organizing capabilities, strong social networks, and motivated young community, affect the performance of community-based initiatives in disaster recovery?

## 1.3 Relevance of the research topic

This research addresses the academic gap in literature on the performance of CBIs in disaster recovery, while in a pre-existing context of crisis. The Beirut explosion is not the only disaster that occurred in crisis. The disasters that happened amid the Covid-19 pandemic are proof of this occurrence. This research contributes to understanding how a crisis context can build up networks and motivation, and how this results in high performing CBIs. In turn, these CBIs can become an asset to disaster recovery, leaving long term socio-spatial impacts. This thesis contributes to more research on disaster recovery, and the role of CBIs when in crisis. The findings can be incorporated into disaster management frameworks.

This research also has social relevance. It expands the knowledge on Beirut's social construct and explains how a fragmented society was able to act in solidarity as a reaction to crisis and disaster. It puts the local socio-political crisis context as a catalyst to better disaster recovery.

The research also highlights the role of CBIs in Beirut's urban transformations, and it invites local disaster management strategies to capitalize on CBIs.

## 1.4 Research Objectives

The main research objective is to explain how the pre-existing context of crisis affects the performance of CBIs in disaster recovery of the built environment. This is done through the case study of the Beirut Port explosion in 2020 that occurred amid a crisis context. The specific objectives are:

- Examine how the social movements organized in crisis.
- Examine how the organized social movement built up social networks and motivation
- Examine performance of CBIs as a result of increased networking and motivation

## 1.5 Research question and sub-questions

How does a self-organized social movement, that emerged in a context of crisis, affect the network strength and motivation and consequently the performance of CBIs that focus on rebuilding the city in disaster recovery?
1. How can the self-organized social movement that emerged in crisis be characterized?
2. How did CBIs, focusing on rebuilding the city in disaster recovery, emerge?
3. What is the network strength of the CBIs?
4. What is the motivation behind the work of CBIs?
5. How did the CBIs perform in the disaster recovery of the built environment?
6. How do the factors above influence each other?

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# Chapter 2: Literature Review

## 2.1 Disaster Recovery

Disaster management covers five phases in an overlapping cycle: prevention, preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery (Henkey, 2018) *(Figure1)*. This research focuses on the recovery phase. Disaster recovery aids the affected communities to return to normal functioning.



**Figure 1 Disaster Management cycle per Henkey (by author)**

Scholars describe recovery as a process rather an outcome (Johnson & Olshansky, 2017) & (Henkey, 2018). As per Contreras (2016), disaster recovery is a complex and multidimensional process of restoring sustainable living conditions in its physical, social, economic, institutional, cultural, and ecological layers.

Reflecting on the complexity theory, disaster recovery is influenced by the levels of adaptability and resilience specific to the city and cannot be reduced to a uniform sequence of activities. Although early studies presented models of urban recovery phases, current disaster literature critiques this linear process (Cretney, 2018) (Contreras, 2016). Smith & Birkland (2012), identified short-term and long-term recovery phases. Short-term recovery is the transition from the disaster response phase. It includes "managing donations and volunteers, conducting damage assessments, securing temporary housing, restoring lifelines and clearing debris" (Smith & Birkland, 2012). Long-term recovery concerns activities extending for several years aiming to restore urban activities. It includes: "debris management, historical preservation, housing, businesses, infrastructure, and public sector" (Smith & Birkland, 2012). This research was conducted one year after the explosion. It is concerned with short-term and the beginning stages of long-term disaster recovery.

## 2.2 Social Movements in Crisis

Crises induce instability. In response, social movements (SM) mobilize & advocate for radical transformations (Smith & Wiest, 2012). According to Diani (2013), networking is essential to mobilizing individuals, collective performance, and inter-organizational collaboration. Communication is essential to the networking of SM since they are not an entire organization, rather a network of organizations (Porta & Mattoni, 2015). Communication constructs solidarity, a shared identity, and defines the conflict.

SMs self-organize when communities initiate themselves for civic engagement. Self-organization is the networking, cooperation and coordinated production of qualities and systems (Fuchs, 2006). In an article on Black Lives Matter movement, three components contribute to the organization and motivation of contemporary urban movements: social media, local community, and public space (Karduni & Sauda, 2020). *Social media* is a form of "online activism". It facilitates initiating and coordinating collective action and expressing a desire for change (Tufekci & Wilson, 2012). Social media is a place for communication of activists (expressing ideas, demands, agendas) and a call to action for mobilizing in urban spaces (organizing protests, marches, sit-ins) (Karduni & Sauda, 2020). *The local community* is the subject of this networking and spatializing. Qualities of the active community are reflected in characteristics of the SM. *Public space* is the setting where the SM mobilizes for implementing initiatives, protests, and forming networks. In this research, public space is not reduced to the perception of what is public. Instead, urban space is considered. <u>A self-organizing social movement is the community initiating itself for civic engagement by coordinating action through local community, urban space, and social media.</u>

According to Nicholls (2009), the spatiality of the social networks and their geographical construct are essential to the dynamics of the SM. Agnew (2002) adds that people take up their social experiences of the places which they inhabit; they reflect those built-up emotions on their decisions over identities and interests. Spatial relationships give the community a sense of meaning in their location, or a 'sense of place'. As a result, 'sense of place' defines a cultural frame that guides collective actors and forges solidarity in SMs (Nicholls, 2009). Place encourages activists to mobilize initiatives and SMs; this results in strengthening the ties in subjects of interest. With time, these ties become main contributors to social networks, or 'social capital'. Nicholls establishes a two-way relationship between networking and place that strengthens SMs. This sets the concepts 'social capital' and 'sense of place' as contributors and outcomes of SMs.

## 2.3 Social Capital

Woolcock (2002) defines social capital (SC) as the norms and networks that enable people to act collectively. Woolcock (2002) defines three categories for SC: bonding, bridging, and linking. Each type recognizes a different relationship strength and arrangement of networks, resulting in varied outcomes. *Bonding SC* refers to the horizontal ties that lie between people belonging to the same community, share demographic traits, or are in the same situation (family members, friends, neighbours). *Bridging SC* refers to another type of horizontal, but more distant ties that lie between people who come from different backgrounds (ethnic, geographic, or occupational) but share similar socio-economic situations. *Linking SC* refers to vertical ties between a community and formal organizations in higher level of institutional power (authorities, banks, municipalities).

Woolcock's definition is not the only way to frame SC, but it is more relevant to this research that focuses on how CBIs network horizontally and vertically. Other important contributions include Bourdieu, Putnam and Uphoff. Bourdieu (1986) saw SC as a private good; a resource

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that defines an individual's social class. Putnam (2001) focuses on the public gains of SC and defines it as the networks, norms and trust that enable a community to collectively to pursue shared objectives. Uphoff (2000) categorized SC in structural forms (processes, rules) and cognitive forms (values, beliefs). Those contributions help in understanding SC but pay less attention to the networking dimension.

In conclusion, <u>SC is a quality of social organizations that enables members of the community to act and cooperate effectively in collective action based on common objectives. It is categorized into bonding bridging and linking.</u>

Disasters can destroy human and economic capital, but SC remains the least affected. According to Smith & Birkland (2012), SC allows more cooperation among actors in disaster recovery networks and contributes to improved outcomes. Sanyal & Routray (2016) explained that SC highly contributes to disaster management at the local level since social networks are the basic units to respond to disaster.

In disaster, bonding SC provides individuals with immediate aid, and initial recovery assistance where the affected refer to their family members for support (Aldrich & Meyer, 2015). Nakagawa & Shaw (2004) stated that communities that have higher levels of trust, established norms and participation are capable of a quicker disaster recovery.

Bridging SC in disaster recovery contributes to exchange of information and resources between the non-affected and affected communities and between social groups working in disaster recovery. A positive correlation exists between the number of social groups and post-disaster recovery (Aldrich & Meyer, 2015).

Among disaster recovery networks, individuals and emergent groups have high understanding of local needs but have low resources. States and institutions have more resources and less understanding of the local needs (Smith & Birkland, 2012). Linking SC happens when the mobilized organizations and individuals are capable of retrieving the necessary resources from institutions and pairing it with the local needs.

## 2.4 Sense of Place

Williams (2008) defines sense of place (SoP) as the relations that exist between people and place through building a personal history with the location. Space is a geographic location. When space is filled with events and meanings, it becomes a place that is unique because of its patterns or associated meanings (Williams, 2008).

Jorgensen & Steinman (2001) define SoP as a multidimensional attitude towards space. They refer to the Attitude theory to organize the relationships between place elements. Accordingly, SoP is a cognitive, affective, and conative relationship between human and environment. It encompasses the constructs of identity, attachment, and dependence. (Jorgensen & Steiman, 2001) *Identity* (cognitive attitude) is when place is part of the individual's perception of self. It relates to the physical aspects of an environment that align with the individual's beliefs, patterns, and values. *Attachment* (affective attitude) is when an individual forms feeling or an emotional bond with the place. It is a result of time, connectedness, and memories that are associated with a place. *Dependence* (conative attitude) is when a person attributes exclusive behaviour not found in comparison to other alternatives. It is the feelings of satisfaction that one gets from his interest from a place.

Montgomery (1998) draws on Putner's components of a SoP to identify principles for a successful urban place: the components are a combination of *activity* (diverse use of the space)*, form* (physical quality of space)*,* and *image* (user's impression). According to Montgomery, a quality combination of those components creates a SoP. In this research, Jorgensen & Steinman's interpretation through the attitude theory can be more constructive to the theoretical framework

of this research where the attitude of people towards a place is considered a motive in disaster recovery.

Sense of place is an individual's attitude towards their experience of place whose qualities make it unique to the individual's perception. SoP is represented by identity dependence and attachment.

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*What are community-based initiatives and what is their value in Disaster recovery?*

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## 2.5 Community Based Initiatives

According to Igalla et al. (2019), community-based Initiatives (CBIs) are a form of self-organization where citizens gather human and material resources to provide public goods or services for their own community. Healey (2015) attributes to the citizens a sense of control over the objective, method, and realization of those initiatives. CBIs often rise in the global north because of government's financial downsizing on public sectors. In the global south CBIs often emerge in response to incapable governments, corruption, or scarcity in financial resources (Edelenbos, et al., 2020).

Edelenbos et al. (2020) summarised CBIs in 5 characteristics: being locally oriented, providing alternatives for public services, autonomous in decision making, linked to formal institutions, not aiming for profit. Moreover, Edelenbos et al (2020) explained that CBIs can be defined differently, depending on their context. In developing countries, CBIs are more likely to mobilize due to incapacity of the state and its institutions. Therefore, in this research CBIs are not necessarily linked to formal institutions; CBIs will be associated with insurgent citizenship instead. According to Miraftab (2012), insurgent citizenship is a form of democratic practice where citizens exert control over protecting their interests rather than delegating them to the appropriate institutions. They do so while holding the state accountable. Furthermore, movements of insurgent citizenship organize to defy the regimes, and fight for their civic rights (Holston, 2009).

Smith and Birkland (2012) defined a 'recovery assistance framework' that is a network of various stakeholders that contribute to disaster recovery. In this research, CBI are those that are grassroot and fall under the emergent groups category. These Grassroots are able to bypass the rules of disaster recovery, provide locally grounded resources and identify the specific needs of the community. (*Figure2*)



**Figure 2 Resource Rules and Understanding of local needs (Smith & Birkland, 2012)**

According to Cretney (2018), grassroot led disaster recovery initiate ways of public participation in the recovery of the city where the community can take ownership of the recovery. Cretney's input is relevant to insurgent citizenship, where grassroot led recovery opens a pathway for participation when citizens are not feeling engaged or powered by the government led coordination.

Disaster recovery initiatives cover all aspects of individual well-being within the five environments: natural, agricultural, social, economic, and built. This research is concerned with urban recovery. The CBIs considered are in the built environment. The built environment is the product of "human building activity" that encompasses both the built forms (buildings, architectural elements) and unbuilt spaces (public spaces: piazzas squares and streets) (Denise L. Lawrence, 1990)

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*What factors influence the performance of community-based initiatives?*

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## 2.6 Factors affecting the Performance of CBI

Performance is a complex concept with several context-based interpretations. Kendall & Knapp (2000) identified 8 categories of performance indicators: economy, effectiveness, efficiency, choice, equity, participation, innovation, and advocacy. In this research, performance of CBIs is measured in its effectiveness in contributing to disaster recovery.

Igalla et al. (2019) conducted a systematic literature review and defind 9 factors that influence the outcomes of CBIs: *network structure, organizational capacity, government support, leaders and leadership, support of non-profit institutions, democratic structure, strategies, pre-existing conditions, and motivation*. While considering all 9 factors to assess the performance of CBI can be a comprehensive approach, this research focuses on two factors Network strength and Motivation. The choice of factors is based the role that 'social capital' and 'sense of place' played in the context of crisis in terms of *network strength,* and *motivation* respectively.

According to Edelenbos et al (2020), *Network Strength* is centred around Putnam's definition of social capital(SC), and consists of bonding, bridging, and linking as its components. For CBIs, 'bonding' concerns the relationship of the members within the CBI. It is based on trust, familiarity, and engagement. 'Bridging' concerns the relationship between different CBIs or other organizations that share the same vision. It translates into the collaboration, and exchange of information & data. 'Linking' concerns the relationship between CBIs and higher forms of organizations (INGOs, institutions, governments). In linking, CBIs receive guidance, financial support and collaborate as part of larger scale projects. The higher the SC, the stronger the network, and a better performance of CBI.

Edelenbos et al (2020) identified two types of *Motivation:* intrinsic, based on personal motive without a material reward, and extrinsic when the individual is expecting material return. In this context, CBIs are based on volunteering; therefore, intrinsic motivation is considered. Intrinsic motivation is when individuals participate in an activity for the associated satisfaction of performing it. Clary, et al (1998) identified 6 motivational functions: values, understanding, social, career, protective, enhancement. Alford (2002) highlighted *Values, Enhancement* and *Social* as most significant in volunteering.
*Values* are an expression of the volunteers' humanity compassion, and altruism and are characterised by concern to others. (Clary, et al., 1998) *Enhancement* is the willingness to

develop psychological well-being and improve self-esteem. In disaster recovery, enhancement to self-esteem can be associated with having a purpose, or a contribution. *Social* is when volunteers seek acceptance from social groups, with the aim of fitting in or belonging. An increase in the presence of those motives results in an increase in commitment to CBIs and an increase in performance. (Alford, 2002)

The research focuses on CBIs in the recovery of built environment. In a context of crisis, Sense of Place (SoP) was a contributor and outcome of social movements (section2.4). Silver & Martin (2015) highlighted a relationship between SoP and disaster recovery where the physical scars on the disaster affected environment, was a unified suffering of the community. This prompted the community to focus on restoration of aesthetic and culturally significant aspects of the environment as a mean for psychosocial healing. In this theoretical framework, 'sense of place', that has been heightened by the SM, is considered as a dimension of motivation for CBIs.

Performance of CBI is the measure of effectiveness and the degree of which the objectives were achieved, as a factor of network strength and motivation (including intrinsic motivation and sense of place).

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*How to assess the performance of community-based initiatives?*

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## 2.7 Assessing the performance of CBIs

Bagnoli & Megali (2011) identify 3 fields for assessing the performance of social enterprises: economic-financial, results-based/social-effectiveness and institutional legitimacy. Social effectiveness is considered in this research. Effectiveness is determined as the extent of goals achieved and strategies implemented. The components of social effectiveness are inputs, outputs, outcomes and impact. They are explained in context of the recovery of the built environment. *Inputs* are the resources that support the recovery initiatives (such as volunteers, professionals, finances, knowhow). *Outputs* are the quality of the volumes of goods and services produced (Kendall & Knapp, 2000). In this case, they are interventions on the built form and unbuilt spaces (such as reconstruction, clearing debris, protecting heritage buildings). *Outcomes* are the actual benefits of target communities or Beneficiaries (Kendall & Knapp, 2000). These include community building, participation in recovery, neighbourhood scale recovery. *Impacts* are the effects on the wider community. This research is conducted only one year since the explosion; therefore, impacts cannot be measured yet in this research.

The challenges faced and the ability to overcome them are also an indicator for performance of CBIs. They are context specific.

The CBIs concerned in this research are grassroots and informal. Hence, the growth of CBIs is an indicator of performance including establishing credibility, registering as a formal organization, and planning for future initiatives.

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*What is the impact of crisis on performance of CBIs in disaster recovery?*

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## 2.8 Conceptual Framework



**Figure 3 Conceptual framework (by author)**

| Context | Crisis | an abnormal situation where important decisions have to be made regarding threats or opportunities. |
|---|---|---|
| **Independent Variable** | **Self organized Social movements** | the community initiating itself for civic engagement by coordinating action through local community, urban space, and social media |
| **Dependent Variable** | **performance of CBIs in disaster recovery** | the measure of effectiveness and the degree of which the objectives were achieved, as a factor of network strength and motivation |
| **Moderating Variable** | **Occurrence of a Disaster** | a sudden occasion, that disrupts social routines, causes the undertaking of unplanned courses of action, and poses danger to valued social objects |
| **Mediating Variable 1** | **Factors Influencing performance of CBIs** | a quality of social organizations that enables members of the community to act and cooperate effectively in collective action based on common objectives. |
| | **Social Capital** | |
| **Mediating Variable 2** | **Factors Influencing performance of CBIs** | Sense of place is an individual's attitude towards their experience of place whose qualities make it unique to the individual's perception. |
| | **Motivation** | Intrinsic motivation is when individuals participate in an activity for the associated satisfaction of performing it. |

# Chapter 3: Research design, methods, and limitations

## 3.1 Description of the research design and methods

This research explains how a pre-existing context of crisis contributes to the performance of CBIs in disaster recovery. It is explanatory where existing theories are applied to observe the relationship between the variables. The research was conducted in a case study (CS) that expresses a snapshot of what happened before and after the disaster. A CS allows for larger depth to thoroughly explain phenomena especially for qualitative data. A CS is convenient because the number of variables is large (factors that influence the performance of CBIs) and because the number of units is small (number of CBIs to be studied). The chosen CS is an event: the Beirut port explosion of August 2020, and its resulting CBIs. It is space bound by the city of Beirut and time bound between October 2019 when the SM mobilized as a response to crisis, and August 2021, 1 year after the explosion. This CS is critical since the Beirut port explosion is classified as "the most powerful non-nuclear explosion of the 21st Century" (Rincon, 2020).

The explosion impacts went beyond the city of Beirut. Moderate damage reached a radius of 10 km from the port. The area of focus in this research falls within a radius of 2 km from the blast site, in the severely affected areas. Neighbourhoods of this area have varying socioeconomic vulnerabilities and spatial characteristics. *Annex 3* contains an overview of the neighbourhoods, enabling a better understanding of the context.



**Map 1 Impact of Beirut Explosion - Source:  MapAction MA025V1 -– 2020**

## 3.3 Sampling

CBIs are the units of analysis of this research. They were assessed through their core members. According to *Figure 4* an approximate of 87 citizen initiatives were providing recovery efforts. The sample was acquired from elda3em.com, a community-initiated platform containing a database of recovery efforts. Within the resource limitations of this research in terms of time, money, and access to respondents, 12 CBIs were interviewed. This accounts for an estimated 15% of the total number of CBIs with a variety of interventions.

The selection criteria of the CBI sample are:

-   Grassroot CBIs
-   Emerged from crisis initiatives or as a post-disaster initiative.
-   Informal CBIs
-   Initiatives in recovery of built environment

TYPE OF RESPONSE

TYPE OF ACTORS RESPONDING IN BEIRUT

**Figure 4 Mapping response stakeholders (Beyond Group , 2020)**



**Figure 5 Sampling - by author**

## 3.4 Validity and Reliability

To enhance reliability, Interview questions were tested on respondents similar to the sample and then enhanced for the accuracy of measurement. Interview steps were documented to standardise the research. CS have a high internal validity due to the richness of collected data. To ensure the correct measurement, operationalisation of theoretical framework was translated into measurable indicators. A CS provides low external validity because it is contextualized with a low number of units. Data was triangulated on the level of data sources and research instruments to enhance external validity and the extent of generalization of the findings. Data was triangulated on two layers *(Figure 6)*.

1. Primary data retrieved from the questionnaire and the in-depth interviews conducted with CBIs were triangulated with in depth-interviews with NGOs and Beneficiaries to give an outsider's perspective on the performance of CBIs.

2. Primary data retrieved from the interviews was triangulated with secondary data including reports, news articles and social media channels.


**Figure 6 Data triangulation - by author**

## 3.5 Data Collection Methods

The research is qualitative. It focuses on understanding the context of the phenomena through description. Mixed-method data collection was used: semi-structured interviews, secondary data content analysis and questionnaires. To reduce the duration of CBI interviews, a questionnaire was sent to CBIs to collect numerical & categorical data. It was conducted via Qualtrics a GDPR compliant software.

**Table 1 Primary Data Collection**

| Primary Data Collection | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Unit | CBIs | NGOs | Beneficiaries |
| Data type | Qualitative | Qualitative | Qualitative |
| Data collection method | In-depth semi-structured interviews + Questionnaire | In-depth semi-structured interviews | In-depth semi-structured interviews |
| Respondents | Leaders/core members of CBIs (as key informants) | Project leaders of NGOs working in disaster recovery | Beneficiaries supported by CBIs |
| Aim | to understand how the CBI operated | To understand CBI performance, form an established & formal organization's perspective | To understand CBI performance, form the Beneficiary's perspective |
| Sampling | Purposive | Stratified Random | Stratified Random |
| Sample size | 12 | 3 | 3 |

*(See Annex 1 for Research Instruments)*

**Table 2 Secondary Data Collection**

| Secondary Data Collection | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Unit | Social Media | News & Articles | Reports & papers |
| Data type | Qualitative | Qualitative | Qualitative |
| Data collection method | Content (rhetoric contextual) analysis | Content (narrative) analysis | Content (narrative) analysis |
| Sample | Social media accounts of CBIs, and SM online platforms | News articles on CBIs and SM | Reports on Beirut blast assessments |
| Sample size | 12 CBI accounts & 11 SM accounts | 16 | 13 |

*(See Annex 5 for secondary data sources)*

## 3.6 Data Analysis Methods

Atlas.ti was used for analysing the data collected from primary and secondary sources. Data was coded according to the indicators of the operationalization (*see Annex 2* for codes report). This research is deductive but includes inductive coding to Performance. Therefore, the operationalization of Performance was developed throughout analysis. Atlas.ti analysis tools such as Co-occurrence tables and Queries were used to identify patterns and relationships between the codes. A content analysis was performed for the resulting quotations report.

## 3.7 Operationalization: variables, indicators

| independent Variable | Self-Organized social movement | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Working definition | Community initiating itself to coordinate social movements through local community, urban space, and social media. | | |
| *Local community* | *the subject of networking and spatializing, it characterizes the SM* | | |
| *Urban space* | *Location of implementing initiatives, expressing demands, and forming networks* | | |
| *Social media* | *a form of "online activism" that facilitates initiating and coordinating collective action and expression* | | |
| **Concept** | **Sub-variable** | **indicators** | **Data Sources** |
| Self-organizing of social movements | Local community | • Participation in open discussions<br>• Diversity of activists<br>• Coordination of activities | Semi-structured interviews with CBIs<br><br>Questionnaire for CBIs<br><br>Content analysis of secondary data |
| | Urban space | • Urban initiatives they participated in<br>• Locations of agglomeration<br>• Activities distribution in different neighborhoods of the city | |
| | Social media | • Expressing ideas & demands<br>• Call to action<br>• Awareness campaigns | |
| *Source: based on qualities of Social movements by (Karduni & Sauda, 2020)* | | | |

| mediating Variable | Social Capital as dimension of Network structure of CBI | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Working definition | A quality of social organizations that enables a community to act and cooperate effectively in collective action based on common objectives. | | | |
| *Bonding* | *Horizontal ties within members of CBI* | | | |
| *Bridging* | *Horizontal ties within different CBIs and likeminded organizations* | | | |
| *Linking* | *Vertical ties between CBI & higher levels of power* | | | |
| **Concept** | **Sub-variable** | **indicators** | | **Data Sources** |
| Social Capital as Network structure | Bonding | • maintained relationships (trust)<br>• committed members with no overdependence on leader (engagement of members)<br>• core group members familiarity | | Semi-structured interviews with CBIs<br><br>Questionnaire for CBIs<br><br>Content analysis of secondary data |
| | Bridging | • exchanging information or knowledge with other CBIs or LNGOs<br>• exchanging resources among CBIs or LNGOs<br>• collaboration over common projects/initiatives with other CBIs or LNGOs | | |
| | Linking | • financial support from INGOs or institutions<br>• collaboration with INGOs or institutions on shared goals<br>• advisory or training from INGOs or institutions | | |
| *Source: Based on Operationalization of social capital for CBIs* (Igalla, Edelenbos, & Meerkerk, 2019) | | | | |

| mediating Variable | **Sense of Place as factor affecting Motivation for CBI** | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Working definition | An individual's attitude towards their experience of place whose qualities make it unique to the individual's perception | | | |
| *Attachment* | *emotions provoked from the person's image of the place* | | | |
| *Identity* | *physical aspects of place aligning with the individual's beliefs & values* | | | |
| *Dependence* | *Satisfaction resulting from activities that cater to individual's needs of the place* | | | |
| **Concept** | **Sub-variable** | **indicators** | | **Data Sources** |
| Sense of Place as Motivation | Attachment | • having memories of the neighborhood<br>• how often do they visit the neighborhood<br>• Social ties to the neighborhood | | Semi-structured interviews with CBIs<br><br>Questionnaires for CBIs<br><br>Content analysis of secondary data |
| | Identity | • feeling of pride from the place<br>• Aesthetics of place's physical form (architecture, public realm, scale)<br>• Association with Landmarks | | |
| | Dependence | • variety of activity (work/play/live)<br>• Indispensable reasons to visit | | |
| *Source: Attitude theory* (Jorgensen & Steiman, 2001) *and space components* (Montgomery, 1998) | | | | |

| mediating Variable | Intrinsic motives as factor affecting Motivation for CBI | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Working definition | Intrinsic motivation is when individuals participate in an activity for the associated satisfaction of performing it. | | |
| *Values* | *expression of humanity, compassion, and altruism* | | |
| *Enhancement* | *willingness to develop self and improve self-esteem* | | |
| *Social* | *when volunteers seek acceptance from social groups* | | |
| *Personal* | *Personal motives relative to each person* | | |
| **Concept** | **Sub-variable** | **indicators** | **Data Sources** |
| Intrinsic motivation | Values | • Putting others first<br>• Enjoying helping others | Semi-structured interviews with CBIs<br><br>Questionnaire for CBIs<br><br>Content analysis of secondary data |
| | Enhancement | • Having a purpose<br>• Wanting to learn new things | |
| | Social | • Influenced by peer pressure<br>• Wanting to be part of a community | |
| | Personal | • Interest to rebuild own neighborhood/house<br>• Interest to help friends/relatives | |
| *Source: Values based on* (Kahana, Bhatta, Lovegreen, Kahana, & Midlarsky, 2013)*, Enhancement and social based on* (Zainuddin, Yusof, Zaini, & Mansor, 2020) | | | |

| Dependent Variable | Performance of CBI in Built Environment | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| definition | Effectiveness and degree to which the objectives were achieved | | |
| Challenges | Challenges faced and how CBIs overcame them (*operationalized inductively*) | | |
| Input | Resources supporting the recovery initiatives | | |
| Output | initiatives undertaken on the built environment | | |
| Outcome | benefits of the affected community | | |
| CBI Growth | development of the CBI | | |
| **Concept** | **Sub-variable** | **indicators** | **Data Sources** |
| Performance of CBI in Built Environment | Input | • # of Volunteers<br>• # of professional volunteers (engineers)<br>• Financial resources (USD) | Semi-structured interviews with CBIs<br><br>Questionnaires for CBIs<br><br>Content analysis of secondary data and CBI impact reports |
| | Outputs | • # of protected heritage buildings<br>• # of restored Buildings<br>• # of interventions on public domain<br>• Management of resources | |
| | Outcomes | • Community Building initiatives (y/n)<br>• Developed a relationship with beneficiaries (communication, participation)<br>• Neighborhood scale initiatives (y/n) | |
| | CBI Growth | • Methods of achieving credibility<br>• Registration of CBI<br>• Future initiatives | |
| *Source: Based on assessment of social effectiveness of social enterprises* (Bagnoli & Megali, 2011) | | | |

## 3.8 Challenges and limitations

Covid-19 pandemic limited data collection methods to online interviews instead of in-person interviews; however, interviews were conducted through a video call, to capture non-verbal data. Respondents had steady access to internet.

One challenge encountered was that respondents tended to refer to the political context as a main challenge or factor to the performance of CBI. It was clear that the pollical dimension is not the focus of data collection, rather the socio spatial patterns. The large number of variables resulted in long interviews exceeding 60 minutes at times. This was not an issue to the respondents who were keen to share the accomplishments of their CBIs. Moreover, primary data collection was done through an interview and questionnaire to relieve the load of questions from each one.

Since this research deals with a traumatizing event, participants were informed that data collection includes questions about their CBIs, not about the disaster or their feelings about it. Respondents were informed that they are free to stop the interview at any time without a justification. This reduced the risk of reliving trauma and focused on the constructive aspect of CBIs. Informed consent was required from all participants before data collection started, and respondent's identity and data collected was treated in privacy throughout the research.

# Chapter 4: Presentation of data and analysis

A sample of 12 CBIs was selected based on the criteria in section 3.3 (*see Annex 4 for CBI profiles*). Thirteen in-depth interviews were conducted in English, online via Zoom, and averaging 1-hour duration. The respondents were leaders or core members of CBIs. They were responsive and supported data collection through sending impact reports, and referrals.

A sample of 3 beneficiaries and a sample of 3 NGOs (1 INGO & 2 LNGOs) were interviewed to triangulate the primary data collected from CBIs. (*see Annex 1 for interview guide)* Beneficiary interviews averaged 20 minutes and NGO interviews averaged 1 hour each. The identity of theses samples will not be shared to respect anonymity of the CBI evaluators.

Secondary data consisted of 16 online news & journal articles, 10 reports, 3 research papers and 20 social media accounts (*see Annex 5 for secondary data sources*).

## 4.1 Beirut: Disaster in crisis

Lebanon has a complex past of internal conflict between its religiously and ethnically diverse community. The 15-year civil war ended with a sectarian power-sharing agreement in 1990. This resulted in structural challenges in the society that became politically and spatially fragmented.

The post-war reconstruction of Beirut Central District involved a public-private partnership with Solidere s.a.l. Solidere gained ownership of properties in the redevelopment zone in return for reconstruction. This reconstruction remains, until today, a controversial issue for the residents of the city. *(See Annex 26 for an analysis)*

Lebanon ranked 149/180 in corruption in 2020 (Trading Economics, 2021), but its population is well educated with 95% literacy rate in 2018 (Unesco, 2021). The country has high international interference, in politics, peacekeeping, development and human rights. This is reflected in the large numbers of NGOs deployed in the country.

This context was feeding into the 2019 crises: political, financial, refugee and covid-19 pandemic. The Lebanese community lost trust in the government and its political entities. The situation climaxed in October 2019 when discussions over an additional tax to a communication app sparked nationwide protests. The social movement (SM) mobilized itself in the streets for months, demanding political reform and resignation of the government.

The Beirut port explosion on August 04, 2020, resulted in damages worth 3.1 billion USD. Around 13,500 buildings were damaged, leaving 300,000 people homeless (*Figure7*). Amid the unrest from the accumulated crises, the explosion made the situation even worse.

A state of emergency was declared. The Lebanese army took charge and created Beirut Forward Emergency Room (Beirut FER) to coordinate the recovery efforts. The municipality of Beirut (MoB) was ill-equipped for disaster management; it focused on permit approvals. Other stakeholders involved were international organizations, donors, volunteers, CBIs, LNGOs and INGOs. *(See annex 6 for stakeholder mapping by Beyond Group (2020))* CBIs were a vital stakeholder in disaster recovery, with 356 collective actions in August, as opposed to 107 state security responses, and 80 policy decisions. (Lebanon Support, 2020)

**Figure 7 Impact assessment, September 2020 (Strategy&, 2020)**

## 4.2 The emergence of the Social Movement (SM)

On October 17, 2019, the SM was sparked by a decision to tax WhatsApp calls, but it was also a reaction to the combination of crises: "rising public debt, growing inflation and deteriorating living conditions" (Yammine & Abi Yaghi, 2020). The SM is known as 'Thawra' or "ثورة" (meaning Revolution).



**Image 6 The SM in Martyr's Square Beirut (Source: Jade Saab)**



**Image 7 SM held back against riot police (brookings.edu)**

The SM spread nationally and internationally with expats protesting in cities worldwide. It remains active until today: seeking radical change in governance, demanding rights, and access to services *(figure 8)*. The protests grew violent and clashed with the riot police. Meanwhile, inflation reached 120% in August 2020, and the socio-economic situation worsened with the Covid-19 pandemic.

## Number of collective actions by Objective

Hover over each column to see the number of collective actions.

**Date of collective action**

**Start date** **End date**

[ 2019 ∨ ] [ 2020 ∨ ] [Apply] [Reset]

**Figure 8 Collective demands 2019-2020 (Civil society Centre, 2021)**

The SM is comprised of a diverse and fragmented community that united in major cities. It advocated for a united civil society in opposition to the government. It organized marches, chants, and events as symbols for unity.

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*"Lebanese citizens, united across party and sectarian lines, gathered in protests all over the country." (Zakharia, 2020)*

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**Image 8 Solidarity in Beirut's protests (Source: IG @omarimady)**

**Image 9 Mothers for Peace - a march for unity among Christians & Muslims (source: Getty Images)**

The Civil Society Center (2021) registered 3,655 collective actions led by informal groups from 2019 – 2020; that is 86% of the yearly total. The diverse range of actors who participated in the SM included political parties, activists, CSOs, individuals, and private institutions. Yammine &

Abi Yaghi (2020) explained that this diversity prompted cooperation and heated discussions within the SM across spheres. Martyr's square in Beirut was filled with tents that gathered likeminded activists who advocated common rights. In these tents, activists invited experts to explain, manage debates or discussion groups on topics including women's rights, environmental activism, financial crisis, LGBTQ rights, etc.



**Image 10 Open discussion in one of the tents in Martyrs Square  (Zakharia, 2020)**

This form of communication characterised the SM with inclusiveness and open-mindedness. Open discussions extended beyond the tents, in public areas, on social media platforms, in the streets or in iconic buildings. This exchange of knowledge permitted the coordination of diverse objectives.



**Image 11 Open discussion in the "Egg", an abandoned modern heritage building in Beirut (source: Reuters)**



**Image 12 Open discussions by activists in Samir Kassir Garden Beirut (©Aseel Naamani/International Alert)**

The collective actions culminated in urban space with 2550 road blockades, 2,235 sit-ins and 1,190 demonstrations registered in 2019 (Civil society Centre, 2021). The locations of those manifestations were either inaccessible or privatised public spaces, emblematic spaces, or heritage buildings. *(See image 13)*

**Image 13 Crop of #OccupyBeirut: Re-Imagining the City Since the October 2019 Protests (Soure: Lebanon Support)**

*(full poster in Annex 7)*

As per Lebanon Support (2020), the location of the SM collective actions was a cry for reclaiming the space:

- Downtown Beirut: set up kiosks, tents, and stage for open discussion
- Zeituna Bay: Sit ins to regain access to public space of privatized coastline
- The egg: as a theatre for sociocultural talks, artist gatherings
- The grand theatre: meeting point and observation location
- The ring bridge: civil war demarcation line blocked & occupied, symbolising unity
- Chevrolet intersection: links Beirut & its suburbs, blocked at different occasions

> *"Since October 17, citizens took over as the narrators of their city's story and exercised their right to the capital. [...]A new city centre could be rebuilt by the people and for the people, in their most diverse components" (Atallah, 2019)*

The SM initiated urban activities and initiatives to protect or reclaim urban spaces. Examples include beach clean ups, human chain across the coastline, marches across Muslim and Christian neighborhoods, road blockades to the parliament, etc.



**Image 14 170 km human chain (tellerreport.com, 2019)**

To better organize and mobilize in the city, a collective map called 'Thawra Map' became a reference for activists. It included trails for marches, locations of squares, governmental institutions, banks and other urban landmarks.



**Image 15 Screenshot of Thawra Map (source: google maps)**

Digital platforms played an important role in organizing the SM and creating its coherent image. Within 6 months, the SM recorded 53 trending hashtags on twitter, 33 Facebook groups, 9 YouTube channels, and 14 Instagram accounts (AUB, 2021). One example is the Instagram (IG) account 'Daleel Thawra' *(Revolution Guide)* that became a reference for activists. Daleel Thawra mobilized activists, set up a calendar of events, and shared news updates. Other sites include *lebanonrevolts.weebly.com* which livestreamed protests, and *lebanonprotests.com* that provided open-source data on the movement. The SM was very active on social media platforms; *Figure9* shows 2.8 million tweets for 'Thawra'-related hashtags within 6 months of SM activity.

**Figure 9 Statistical data on tweets belonging to the SM (Source: Lebanonprotests.com)**

*Figure 10* represents the network of codes for the SM activity in October and November 2019, based on 'Daleel Thawra' calendar. The SM was active daily with open discussions & seminars among 186 organized events, and 57 urban initiatives.



**Figure 10  Coding of 'Thawra calendar' by daleelthawra.com from October to December 2019 (Atlas.ti Network)**

The analysis of 8 social media accounts in support of the SM, revealed a strong mobilisation capacity. The posts called to action and motivated the activists to act as a unified front in opposition of the government. Call to action was supported with facts, insights, and updates on current developments in the crisis. Experts in financial governance, political analysts and lawyers are among many individuals invited to explain current issues. This resulted in an informed call to action and a strategy of persuasion. Moreover, social media was a place where activists expressed their ideas and demands. For example, *Lebanonprotests.com* included an 'Express your Opinion' page.

Social media provided instant updates and rapidly mobilized activists. For example, Instagram pages and WhatsApp groups transmitted instant news about clashes between protesters and the riot police or call for backup for activists to support a protest.

## 4.3 The Emergence of CBIs

CBIs emerged to disaster recovery in two major tracks (*Figure11*) (1) CBIs emerged from volunteers who rushed to the blast site. They were not necessarily residents of the affected area. They were either networks of professionals or friends, or acquaintances from the social movement. (2) The other track concerns pre-existing CBIs that provided support during the crisis. They transformed their initiatives to disaster recovery.



**Figure 11 Lifecycle of CBIs in Beirut - by author**

The SM contributed to the emergence of CBIs through three aspects: social media's call to action, its diverse community & the resulting the social connections made, and its manifestation in urban space. (*Table3*)

**Table 3 Co-occurence between social movement indicators and CBI emergence (Atlas.ti)**

| Co-occurrence between Self Organized SM & Emergence of CBIs | ● D: CBI_Emergence |
|---|---|
| ● I:SO_LocalComm_Diversity | **8** |
| ● I: SO_LocalComm_Exchange of Knowledge | 3 |
| ● I: SO_LocalComm_Social Connections | **7** |
| ● I: SO_SM_Awareness Campaigns | 1 |
| ● I: SO_SM_Call to action | **7** |
| ● I: SO_SM_express ideas & demands | 5 |
| ● I: SO_UrbSpace_initiatives | 1 |
| ● I: SO_UrbSpace_Locations | **6** |

All respondents agreed that social media played an important role in their emergence. Through it, they called for action, gathered volunteers, and funds. However, social media contributed to some CBIs more than others. For example, one CBI was formed of SM activists who met on a communication platform, a WhatsApp group. One respondent said: "I was part of a task force of 100+ people. […] I put it out there: let's start helping these people. Two other people in that [WhatsApp] group decided to join me. I did not know who they were on a personal level, but we created another group and started the CBI."

Moreover, some core members said they "met on the streets" of Beirut during the protests. CBIs explained that they bonded with people who were different from them, yet they grew connections based on similar objectives.

The social movement did more than bring people together. The sense of solidarity that was uniting the SM motivated people to come together and emerge as CBIs. The crisis and the incapacity of the government prompted a self-dependency response where volunteers felt they had to fill a gap and "do what the government should be doing."

## 4.4 The network Strength of CBIs

Network strength of CBIs is dependent on 3 categories: bonding, bridging, and linking. *(Section 2.3)* However, data collection revealed a third dimension: core members' personal network. All the leaders of the CBI sample were highly educated and working professionals. They relied on their <u>personal network</u> to link to donors, as it supported their credibility. If the core members were architects or engineers, they were able to recruit more professional volunteers, construction material suppliers and contractors. (*See Annex 8 for quotations report on personal network*)

> *"Don't forget, [my cofounder] and I already have many connections. Many of our friends had money and were capable. They were the ones who launched us off." – CBI interview02*

<u>Bonding</u> refers to the inner strength of the CBI. Although literature supports familiarity between CBI members as a contributor to better bonding, core members of CBIs were not necessarily familiar with each other. 80% of the interviewed sample did not have a personal history or deep familiarity among its core members. (*See Annex 9 for a quotations report on familiarity and CBI sample summary on familiarity*)

> *"Lama introduces me to a group of young people who seem to be old friends, but appearances are deceiving because in reality they have only known each other for a few days" (SoS Chretiens d'Orient, 2020)*

Although CBIs members had low familiarity, data showed a good level of trust among them. This was linked to having shared values and vision towards making a change in the country. Furthermore CBIs, whose members were activists in the SM attributed their trust to the shared experience in the streets as the quotation below explains. (*See Annex 10 for quotations report*)

> *"We met on the streets, after five months of standing side by side every day. There was already a certain level of trust when you're put in those kinds of [...] hostile situations. You realize that the people standing by you [...] are the people you can depend on. These are the people you can trust." - CBI interview02*

80% of the CBI sample are still active in disaster recovery, one year after the blast. They attributed their success to their core members' perseverance, and commitment to their tasks. However, after disaster relief phase, it was challenging to maintain engagement of the core members who had full-time jobs. Some CBIs compensated their members with salaries.

*"With time, we lost engagement of some members and volunteers. It was a momentum that passed. Only those who were committed stayed with us"*
*Interview08*

Trust was higher in CBI members who were activists in the SM *(Table4)* because they have similar motivation in terms of values and patriotism. The following quote expresses this relationship:

*"We met in the 'Thawra'. We didn't know each other, and there's a blind trust. It is very easy to collaborate or work with people that have the same mindset, sense of patriotism, and the will to make a difference in people's lives."-*
*Interview12*

**Table 4 Co-occurence table between Bonding and Self Organized SM (Atlas.ti)**

|  | ● I: SC_Bond_engagement Gr=22 | ● I: SC_Bond_familiarity Gr=21 | ● I: SC_Bond_Trust Gr=15 |
|---|---|---|---|
| ● I: SO_LocalComm_Diversity Gr=17 | 1 | 4 | 2 |
| ● I: SO_LocalComm_Exchange of Knowledge Gr=12 | 0 | 2 | 1 |
| ● I: SO_LocalComm_Social Connections Gr=19 | 3 | 8 | 5 |
| ● I: SO_SM_Awareness Campaigns Gr=5 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| ● I: SO_SM_Call to action Gr=49 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| ● I: SO_SM_express ideas & demands Gr=47 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| ● I: SO_UrbSpace_initiatives Gr=42 | 0 | 5 | 1 |
| ● I: SO_UrbSpace_Locations Gr=8 | 0 | 3 | 2 |

<u>Bridging</u> relies on horizontal collaboration between CBIs and LNGOs with aligned visions. Respondents described collaborations as necessary to answer to a growing need and a joint effort, where CBIs had to "put their egos aside". They referred to each other as "sister initiatives" who held similar visions and values. *(See Annex 11 for data report)* Moreover, a positive attitude towards collaboration was conveyed in the interviews. The word cloud with regards to collaboration illustrates the tone: us, work, together, people, collaboration, initiative"

**Image 16 Word cloud for CBI collaboration (Source: primary data, Atlas.ti)**

Bridging was a response to the challenges faced: the lack of resources, knowhow, data, and coordination. *(see challenges in section 4.6.1)*

Bridging in CBIs provided the legal framework for funds transfer. Per Lebanese law, a CBI cannot open a bank account unless registered. After disaster relief phase, CBIs either registered as an NGO or CBO, or affiliated themselves to NGOs or institutions and received funding through them. CBIs had different capacities to secure funds. In some cases, CBIs acquired large amounts of funds that surpassed their capacity to work or their limited expertise. As a result, they collaborated with other CBIs.

Human resources and know-how were exchanged more often than financial resources. In some cases, NGOs allocated funds to the disaster recovery projects, but did not have the know-how in construction. They collaborated with CBIs formed of professionals.

The municipality of Beirut (MoB) lacked an updated database: city plans, demographic data, and socio-economic vulnerability. CBIs & NGOs conducted their own data collection and assessments. "Unintegrated data management pertaining to assessed needs and priorities resulted in incoherent definition of needs and priorities." (Beyond Group , 2020) This prompted CBIs to collaborate on exchanging data with each other to avoid overlap.

CBIs shared their data with independent research institutions such as Beirut Urban Lab, but not with governmental institutions. When the core members were activists in the SM, CBIs felt strongly about not sharing data. They distrusted the institutions and believed the data might be used for political rallies or other intentions as described by the quotation below.

> *"Keep in mind, the biggest asset is data. That's where the value is. We have people willing to pay for it, but no, this data we've gathered for the past 11 months is sacred. This is people's lives." – Interview 03*

*Figure 12* indicates 26% of the organizations willing to share their assessments.

The lack of data was projected on linking SC that went in the opposite direction. The flow of data was directed from the CBIs & NGOs to the institutions & municipality through Beirut FER & UN agencies.

**Figure 12 Needs Assessment Conducted (Right) & Willingness to share the assessment (Left) (Lebanon Support, 2020)**

CBIs acknowledged their diverse resources, capacities, and expertise. This made it necessary to exchange resources and to collaborate. To answer the need for a coordinating entity, websites & platforms were created by private initiatives to increase coordination of efforts and enhance the allocation of resources between CBIs, volunteers & beneficiaries. "elda3em.com" is one example that connected CBIs, donors, volunteers, and beneficiaries. CBIs can name the services they provide and ask for missing resources. Volunteers would look for CBIs to deploy their expertise. Beneficiaries can connect to the suitable CBIs. (*see Annex 12 for other informal coordinating platforms*) Other platforms tracked the initiatives: their location, progress and the entity responsible for the reconstruction.



**Image 17 Screenshot of Elda3em platform "an initiative by & for the Lebanese people" (source https://elda3em.com/)**

83% of the interviewed CBI sample were activists or supporters of the SM. Being part of the SM contributed to increased trust and enhanced collaboration between CBIs. *(see Annex 13 for quotations report)* Moreover, CBIs bridged out to the SM online platforms where the online tools of the SM were used to organize recovery efforts.

> *"I was active during the 'Thawra'. We realized that organizing anything can be done very easily with the online tools available. This skill was acquired in Thawra. [...] So when we started to organize ourselves in the [CBI], we had the tools that we used for 'Thawra' and we were able to organize remotely [...] especially with the pandemic."- Interview06*

Bridging formed between CBIs and SM online platforms that called for donations, volunteers, and other resources needed by CBIs working in recovery. *(see Annex 14 for examples)*

The SM's sense of solidarity enhanced Bridging. Initiatives were already collaborating when they mobilized for crisis support, especially after Covid-19 pandemic. A UN Volunteers report (2021) on initiatives for covid-19 in Lebanon noted: "Strong collaboration and coordination are seen between initiatives reflecting cooperative efforts and sustainable practices." Furthermore, the following quotation from interviews asserts the above:

> *"The civil war divided the Lebanese [...] The 'Thawra' created relationships between people of different backgrounds and societies. People forgot about this division and worked together because they had the same goal. And I think that the fact that we started collaborating back then [in the SM] helped out a lot with everyone working together in disaster recovery." Interview04*

The pre-existing crisis already weakened the community's trust in the governmental institutions. When the state of emergency was declared and the army was put in charge, other public institutions were excluded from participating in disaster response, to overcome corruption (Beyond Group , 2020). Furthermore, the Lebanese government, while in debt and facing an economic and financial crisis, was unable to support financially. According to Lebanon Support (2020), less than 1% of the recovery initiatives were done by a government entity. (*Figure13*)



**Figure 13 Types of Organizations with recovery initiatives (Lebanon Support, 2020)**

Beirut FER was created by the Lebanese Army to coordinate relief and reconstruction efforts among involved entities. (*See Annex 15 for more information on Beirut FER*) However, it had centralized decision making and lacked experience in disaster response (Beyond Group , 2020). The Municipality of Beirut lacked resources, experience in disaster management, and updated data. Within this context, linking to governmental institutions for collaborations, advisory, and financing was not available for CBIs.

Beirut FER was the only public entity working in disaster recovery. Some CBIs described coordination with Beirut FER as time-consuming and unorganized. They decided not to proceed with it.

Other CBIs favoured the cooperation with the army, and thought it was an effort to coordinate action. The latter were CBIs that were not too involved in the SM and whose leaders had prior experience working in organizations or project management. These acknowledged the need for a coordinating entity.

Nevertheless, within two months from the blast, it became compulsory for all actors working for disaster recovery to register with and report to Beirut FER. The interviewed sample described their relationship with Beirut FER, not as a collaboration, but as a requirement or a must to obtain permits and proceed with work.

The initial strategy of Beirut FER was to assign all organizations to specific neighbourhoods. This was not favoured by some CBIs who believed their work is being limited, and their resources would be deployed inefficiently as the quotation explains. Later, a more flexible approach was adopted by Beirut FER, as per figure 14.

| Construction categories | Category specific guidelines | |
|---|---|---|
| **Category A:** Light repairs *(windows, doors, small fixes)*<br><br>**Category B:** Large repairs with no structural damage *(rebuilding in plots with conserved structural integrity)*<br><br>**Category C:** Structure of the building at risk<br><br>**Category D:** Destroyed structures | Category A | • Register with FER<br>• Update on ongoing works and discuss upcoming works (sign-off agreement)<br>• Coordinate with FER on progress and quality control<br>• Inform when job is complete |
| | Categories B,C, and D | • Register with FER<br>• Set a meeting in-person to coordinate potential zone, building, or flat<br>• Bring the required credentials to get agreement to proceed (proof of funds, suggested time plan, BOQ/assessment)<br>• Sign-off agreement and launch works<br>• Coordinate with FER on progress and quality control<br>• Run final check to close the job once completed |

**Figure 14 Coordination framework with Beirut FER**

Another active institution was DGA (Directorate General of Antiquities), part of the Ministry of Culture. The explosion resulted in the damage of 480 heritage buildings in 8 historical areas. Interventions on classified heritage buildings require permit and approval from DGA. Beirut Heritage Initiative (BHI) is a CBI formed by a group of professionals in heritage buildings. BHI operated as an independent entity linked to the DGA. The DGA provided it with a legal framework to operate but did not have influence on decisions or financing.

The Municipality of Beirut was described as "absent" by CBIs. There was no collaboration beyond permit approvals. Some CBIs acknowledged its capacity and limitations. Others faced challenges as it was perceived as not supportive financially, technically, or morally.

> *"The municipality didn't get involved, it was not even curious, they didn't even send someone to contact us. I don't know about the others."- Interview03*

Government agencies were responsible for only 3.6% of the funds deployed to recovery. (*figure15*) The majority of the funding came through international agencies (33.9%). International funds were pledged to recovery, but they will not be sent through state institutions due to mistrust and corruption *(See Annex 16 for supporting articles)*. Moreover, CBIs managed to link to international organizations, foundations, and embassies for financial support; the following were named in the interviews: UN agencies, German NGO, Fondation de France, UNHCR, German Foundation, an Italian NGO, and several Embassies.



**Figure 15 Sources of funding to all recovery efforts (Lebanon Support, 2020)**

The sample CBI did not report any training or advisory from the Lebanese institutions. Currently UNHCR is providing training to the Municipality of Beirut in data collection and GIS mapping. UNHCR created the Municipal Social Cell to bridge communication between Beirut's residents and the municipality (UN, 2021).

The SM had no direct impact on Linking. However, the context of distrust in governmental institutions affected the relationship between the latter and CBIs. Some CBIs were reluctant to share data and cooperate with Beirut FER. International bodies dispersed funds directly to CBIs or through local NGOs, overpassing the government. This was the result of the SM activists pleading international donors to "Help the Lebanese people, not the government." CBIs refused to receive funds from existing political parties. CBIs blamed the explosion on the current political class and the government. *(see Annex 17 for quotations report on lack of trust in Institutions)*

> *"Never once did any official or government entity visit us, [...] No one offered help — not that we would accept it, but they didn't even offer." (Lewis, 2021)*

## 4.5 The motivation behind CBIs

According to the questionnaire sent to CBI respondents (*Annex 1*), putting others first, having a purpose in the community, and helping others were the top 3 <u>intrinsic motives</u> for mobilizing the CBIs *(Survey results in Annex 18)*.

Driven by enhancement, young professionals volunteered in disaster recovery. They saw an opportunity to launch their career and receive on-site training. Some CBIs capitalised on that and called for fresh graduates and university students, who in return, received training from experienced volunteers. CBI core members, who were not professionals in construction, expressed curiosity and pride to learn procedures in construction. They also expressed interest in heritage buildings, their specific requirements, and elements. Having a purpose was another form of enhancement that drove experienced professionals to deploy their skills in disaster recovery. (*See Annex 19 for quotations report*)

The values of helping others and putting others first were an important motive to CBIs as volunteers flooded the streets within days. This was influenced by the built-up solidarity of the SM. (*See Annex 20 for quotations report*).



**Image 18 Flood of volunteers in Beirut within days of the explosion (source: Caritas Lebanon)**

The pre-existing crisis raised patriotism as another value that motivated CBIs to disaster recovery. Through interviews, Patriotism was described as the need to serve one's country and community. Volunteers were motivated to be the change that the SM advocated for. One CBI respondent explained: "after the Thawra, everyone was motivated to help the country to see the change."

*"I am Lebanese at the end of the day. It is my country and my land. I am part of this community and this government. I want to make a difference and I don't want to sit and watch. There's always something we can do."*
*Interview13*

Other intrinsic motivations included personal drive to rebuild one's own home, or neighborhood, and helping friends and family.

The need to be united with those who were affected by the blast was a form of social motivation. As one of the respondents said: "the explosion brought us closer as a community. It united us as Lebanese." The value of helping others overcame the socio-political differences and built solidarity.

The absence of institutional support also motivated volunteers. The built-up conflict between the SM and the state, the mistrust in the institutions, and the absence of the government in the relief effort, created an anger that fueled CBIs. (*see Annex 21 for quotations*) Being self-reliant and independent from the government was a political statement by CBIs.

*"The government isn't here, so we need to step up."*


**Image 19 Graffiti in Beirut (source: the961)**

Moreover, Social media accounts that were used to communicate with and mobilize the SM, directed their efforts to motivate people to rebuild. They were calling volunteers heroes and praising them for their work.


**Image 20 Operation Lebanon (@DaleelThawra IG)**


**Image 21 Motivating posts (@muwatinlebnene IG)**

CBIs acknowledged emotional attachment to neighbourhoods that acted as the city's hub to art and nightlife, such as Gemmayze and Mar Mikhael. However, their intervention was not constrained to their <u>Sense of Place</u>. Instead, CBIs performed quick socio-economic vulnerability assessments to direct their interventions.

SoP motivated volunteers who rushed to the neighbourhoods they were most familiar with. CBIs redirected their efforts to other neighbourhoods. The lack of SoP to some neighbourhoods, such as Karantina, a poor residential/industrial area, motivated CBIs to locate interventions there.

*"I remembered Karantina. Everybody used to forget Karantina. I remembered back in 1988, we used to distribute food boxes there when I was younger. I brought around 500 meals, and I told my daughter to come with me. She said why? Everybody is in Gemmayze & Mar Mikhael. I told her come with me, this is a forgotten area. Nobody ever thinks about it." – Interview12*

SoP, in terms of identity, motivated CBIs that focused on heritage buildings. Non-professionals working on heritage buildings, reported an increased appreciation to those neighborhoods. One of the respondents, who was a dentist by profession, said: "These heritage buildings, we are not only saving for the current tenants or owners; we are saving them for the future generations."

*"I wanted to tell people stories about those heritage buildings and show them the architectural features, the arches and pitched roofs. We don't have a lot left in Lebanon, and heritage is one of the things we need to protect." Interview11*

Neighbourhoods with more sociocultural value were more attractive to CBIs and LNGOs. These provided exposure. That's why many initiatives focused on the main streets of Gemmayze & Mar Mikhael. Moreover, SoP was heightened after the explosion, where CBI members got personally involved in the protection of heritage buildings.

*"Now, I have more connection to Mar Mikhael & Gemmayze. I didn't know that connection before, and I used hang out a lot at restaurants & bars there. - Interview02*

During the protests in 2019, there were clashes between the SM and the residents of 'Khandak al Ghamik'. Most of the neighbourhood's residents support political party which the SM opposes to. CBIs purposely mobilized in this neighbourhood, to prove to the politically affiliated communities there are alternatives to the current leaders, and there's a need to be united as a Lebanese community.

*"We're not going to fix your house, unless you move this (photo of politician) removed […] They're the ones who caused the explosion" Interview 09*

*"We went to' Khandak al Ghamik' to deliver a small message. We are here to help if we have differences in politics, It's not an issue. We can help each other we can work, and we can live with each other. So, politics should not separate us. we wanted to make a point and help people, Lebanese people."*
*Interview 02*

Collective memory of the post-war reconstruction of Beirut central district prompted the community to protect local residents from developers seeking to buy damaged plots. (See Annex 31 for an overview of Beirut's post-war reconstruction.)

*"Naji says both property developers and owners of rent-controlled apartments are trying to take advantage of the destruction following the blast." (Collard, 2020)*



**Image 22 Beirut is not for Sale (@nouriflayhan IG)**



**Image 23 Signs pushing away developers (Rebecca Collard)**

## 4.6 Performance of CBIs

### 4.6.1 Challenges

The challenges faced by CBIs were coded inductively then grouped into 7 categories:

1- Lack of institutional support (32%): This was due to incapacity of the governmental institutions. Declaring the state of emergency put the Army in charge and side-lined other institutions.
2- Coordination of initiatives (19%): Beirut FER coordinated the recovery efforts, but still, overlaps happened. CBIs turned to coordinating among each other.
3- Financial challenges (18%): Governmental funds were lacking. The economic crisis and rising inflation challenged the affordability of construction material.
4- Knowhow (10%) The drive to help motivated many CBIs who did not have prior experience in reconstruction or humanitarian work.
5- Challenges with Beneficiaries (10%): Due to lacking coordination, Beneficiaries sought support from several actors and CBI resources were misallocated.
6- Lack of available data (7%): the absence of updated maps and demographic data was an additional burden on CBIs who had to collect data.
7- Covid-19 Lockdown (5%): Strict lockdowns halted the construction works for months.

### 4.6.2 Inputs

CBIs gathered funds through 3 main sources: local donors, expats, and foreign organizations. At first, CBIs gathered financial and material resources from the core member's personal network, but these were limited and challenged by the financial crisis. Expats played an important role in gathering funds. Impact Lebanon NGO, started out as an initiative to bring together the Lebanese diaspora in support of the SM. It then started initiatives during the crisis period then redirected its efforts to disaster recovery. In 1 year, it raised $8.8 million to disperse to CBIs and NGOs for disaster recovery (*See Annex22 for more on Impact Lebanon*).

CBIs connected to larger financing institutions by contacting embassies, international NGOs, foreign organizations. International organizations, in turn, refrained from financing the Lebanese government for recovery efforts. CBIs performed well in terms of funding. Through their credibility, they accessed large funds. With the challenge of lacking institutional support, CBIs secured funding through their high network strength.

CBIs overcame the lack of knowhow in reconstruction. They gathered professional volunteers through social media, personal network, and referrals. CBIs contacted university clubs; this resulted in flow of young professionals seeking on-site experience. CBIs formed of professionals were better at managing resources. They established credibility through their professional reputation, quality of work, skilled reports, and project management skills.

Motivated by the values of patriotism and helping others, volunteers flooded to ground zero, even before CBIs called for help. CBIs described a sense of unity among the volunteers who came from diverse backgrounds. After the relief phase, CBIs could not rely on volunteers since they lacked commitment. Instead, they created teams of professionals, whom they depended on, and they managed the inconsistent flow of volunteers. After they registered, some CBIs paid salaries for their core team of volunteers, to maintain engagement and to compensate for their efforts.

SM online platforms called for donations and volunteers to CBIs. This form of bridging expanded the network and exposure of CBIs. Platforms that were used to organize the SM transformed their efforts towards coordinating the recovery efforts to connect volunteers, donors, beneficiaries NGOs and CBIs. *(see Annex14 for examples)*

### 4.6.3 Outputs

According to Beirut FER, the completed repairs account to 1% of the total damages, while the ongoing repairs account to only 30.5% in August 2021 (Map 2). One year after the explosion, the repaired damages are still small.



**Map 2 Progress of Recovery efforts - source: Beirutrecovery.org**

CBIs recovered buildings depending on availability of funds. The sample CBI's outputs ranged from 22 to 1250 homes (*see Annex4 for CBI profiles*). CBIs chose their interventions based on their expertise and knowhow. CBIs with little knowhow in construction refrained from intervening on structurally affected buildings and focused on small to medium scale impacts.



**Image 24 Achievements of Baytna Baytak in 11 months (Source: @Baytnabaytak IG)**

During disaster relief, the quality of work was poor because of the urgency of closing openings and to protect homes from looting and rain. CBIs whose members were not professionals went through a learning curve to establish an efficient workflow, and desired quality to price.

The number of grassroot CBIs working in disaster recovery decreased since the explosion (data on those numbers is not available). However, CBIs that maintained recovery efforts, developed a reputation for good quality of outputs, increasing their credibility and access to funding.

For heritage buildings, knowhow and experience were an asset to delivering quality work. Heritage buildings in Beirut date back to the Ottoman era, the French mandate, and the Modern era (1860-1970). In disaster recovery, driven by motivation and urgency, CBIs made poor reconstruction choices and negatively affected heritage buildings. CBIs later acknowledged the extent of their capabilities: they either avoided working on heritage buildings, bridged out to specialised CBIs, or sought professional volunteers. Heritage buildings were suffering from previous decay and lack of maintenance. This made them more fragile to the explosion impact,

thus aggravating the work required to fix them. CBIs questioned the neglect of the concerned institutions, yet another aspect of the crisis. Moreover, there was a mutual appreciation to heritage buildings and all CBIs acknowledged the need to preserve their cultural and architectural value.



**Image 25 Ongoing renovations to 2 century old house (@Beirutheritageinitiative IG)**

CBIs saw sociocultural value in the neighbourhoods and became attached to the community. They recently redirected their efforts from working on single units to neighbourhood scale initiatives. These encompass capacity building, business development of SMEs, rehabilitation of informal public spaces, initiating community activities, and bottom-up community led interventions. One example is the Sustainable Urban Neighbourhood project by Basecamp that includes developing a community centre, setting up urban furniture, development of SMEs, capacity building for the community, etc. *(See* basecampbeirut.com *for more information)*

The number of initiatives in heritage buildings is dependent on available resources in terms of professionals and funds. Heritage buildings require specific materials and methods which makes them costly. This resulted in collaborations between CBIs & LNGOs (bridging) who combined their resources. Interventions on heritage buildings requires permits with the DGA (Linking), who had to approve set standards. Recovery of residential buildings was dependent on availability of resources. However, it was backed by the input of non-professional volunteers who supported in form of labour.

SoP was a direct factor to increased intervention on heritage buildings specifically in the identity dimension. (*See table5*) CBIs refer to the reconstruction of post-war Beirut where Solidere demolished heritage buildings causing a loss in place identity.

*"We are not only working on Heritage buildings. We have an urban vision, a master plan and preservation plan for the whole area. We want to prevent, and we do not want a Solidere 2." Interview05*

|  | ● I: Perf_Output_Architectural Heritage<br>Gr=38 |
|---|---|
| ● I: SoP_Attachment<br>Gr=40 | 1 |
| ● I: SoP_Dependence<br>Gr=19 | 2 |
| ● I: SoP_Identity<br>Gr=20 | **11** |

**Table 5 Co-occurence table between architectural heritage & SoP (Source: Atlas.ti)**

### 4.6.4 Outcomes

The bond between CBIs and the beneficiaries developed into a personal relationship of respect and admiration. CBIs saw themselves as the trustworthy support that the beneficiaries could not find in the government. This bond permitted better participation of the tenants in the decisions to rehabilitate their homes, shops, or their neighbourhoods. (See *Annex23* for quotations report).

> *"These families became our families. […] It's amazing to see that when people may have lost their last round of hope, there are people willing to stand by them and support them. It makes a big difference." Interview 02*

Some CBIs specialised in retail units and SMEs. They saw this was key to revitalising neighbourhood activity and providing a sustainable livelihood for the tenants. They are developing the neighbourhood retail mix, suggesting a business model, and refurbishing their utilities.



**Image 26 Basecamp supporting SMEs (@basecampbeirut IG)**

CBIs are no longer intervening on single units but on clusters of buildings. They are revitalising the informal public spaces between them. Some CBIs expanded their recovery initiatives to establishing neighbourhood services such as free clinics and community kitchens.

The remaining reconstruction is the severely damaged buildings, which require budgets that go beyond the capabilities of smaller CBIs. This prompted CBIs to redirect their work towards community building initiatives, capacity building, public space revitalisation, and socio-urban recovery (*See Annex24 for examples on neighbourhood scale initiatives*).

### 4.6.5 CBI Growth

Many CBIs did not continue their work after disaster relief phase. They either stopped their activity or returned to their previous objectives. Data on those figures is not available, but social media pages of some CBIs no longer show activity beyond disaster relief. Once the long-term disaster recovery phase started, many active CBIs, registered as NGOs or affiliated themselves to NGOs. This provided them with a legal entity and allowed them to acquire permits and funding. However, some active CBIs did not register. One of the respondents said: "we are not registered, although we are still getting funds without registering, but it is harder to move around without it."

CBIs established credibility; where one year after the blast, they are still acquiring funds even if they are not a legal entity. According to the sample CBI, credibility was achieved through:

- Collecting funds on project basis
- Linking donors to suppliers directly
- Providing detailed proposals and reports

To achieve credibility, CBIs also relied on the core members' reputation, sharing achievements on social media, and referrals from donors. Some donors trusted CBIs more if they were independent from the government, or the core members were activists in the SM. This is reflected in Impact Lebanon's distribution of funds only to apolitical CBIs.

CBIs are now planning for future initiatives that extend beyond Beirut city and beyond reconstruction. They formed partnerships with INGOs over community projects such as the BLAST initiative by Rashet Kheir. They worked on crisis related initiatives, in parallel to reconstruction, such as Baytna Baytak distributing oxygen machines in response to covid-19.

## 4.7 Perspective on CBI performance from LNGOs & INGOs

Interviews were conducted with 1 INGO and 2 LNGOs to understand performance of CBIs from an outsider's perspective. They acknowledged that CBIs were able to react faster because they were not slowed by bureaucratic procedures. Although CBIs did not have a strategy at first, they performed well in organizing themselves and their initiatives. In disaster relief, the quality of work delivered was poor, but it was understandable considering the urgency of the situation. The respondents were impressed by the amount of funds collected by CBIs, and the credibility that they established. While not explicitly stated, doubts were expressed about how funds were used. However, there is no reliable data on this matter.

## 4.8 Perspective on CBI performance from Beneficiaries

Three interviews were conducted with affected beneficiaries who received help from CBIs. They reported overlaps between actors, especially in assessment and data collection. They noticed a competition between the actors as one respondent said, "More projects mean more funds". Actors competed on acquiring buildings located on the main streets that provide more exposure. However, appreciation was expressed to CBIs, appraising their professionalism, the quality of their work, and their compassion. (*See Annex25 for beneficiary statements from secondary data*)

*"We could have never done it without them; there is no government to rely on."*

## 4.9 Other Observations

- CBIs are groups of well-educated individuals. CBI core members are working professionals, owners of businesses or full-time employees.
- CBIs developed organically with no clear objective but to help. They did not expect to continue working beyond disaster relief.
- Media highlighted the efforts of CBIs and gave them international exposure. This allowed them to access more funds.
- CBIs faced challenges with owners who did not want to reconstruct their heritage buildings, with the plan to sell their land for development.
- Some donors were discriminative on the basis or religion and nationality. CBIs refused excluding any beneficiary who needed their help.
- CBIs considered themselves to be more competent than the institutions who did not contribute to disaster recovery.
- From interviews with CBI respondents, there was an overlap between the definitions of different types of organizations. Often any group – CBI, CBO, CSO, or NGO, was referred to as an NGO. This can be an indication of CBIs organic emergence and lack of experience in humanitarian/public work.

# Chapter 5: Conclusion

This research intends to explain CBIs performance in disaster recovery while in a pre-existing crisis. Based on the conceptual framework in chapter 2, the formation of a self-organized SM in crisis increases network strength and motivation of CBIs, contributing to a better performance.

In Lebanon, the crisis united a diverse and fragmented community in a solidified, yet still diverse, SM. It advocated for the resignation of the untrusted government. The SM had a strong mobilization capacity that allowed it to organize large numbers quickly. It was persuasive through its open discussions and awareness campaigns, resulting in an informed call to action. Motivated by the solidarity of the SM and the absence of public services, CBIs emerged to support the vulnerable communities during the crisis.

Aware of the government incapacity and motivated by helping others, the civil society rushed to the affected areas of the explosion. CBIs emerged from professional volunteers, residents of a neighbourhood, or activists in the SM. Core members relied on their personal network to establish credibility and develop as a CBI.

CBIs in Beirut are characterised by their individuality. The core members' network, professional backgrounds and resourcefulness developed CBIs with unique capacities. CBIs are characterised with high bridging social capital. With absent government support, CBIs acknowledged the extent of their resources. This prompted them to collaborate and capitalise on each other's capabilities. Partnerships developed among CBIs or LNGOs that shared a common vision. CBIs also bridged to SM online platforms that gathered resources for the initiatives. CBIs did not rely on linking SC with the Lebanese government. Characterised with highly educated members, CBIs established credibility through their performance and professionalism. This linked them to international organizations, bypassing the government. The limited linking SC was a motivation for CBIs who felt the need to fill the gap and compensate for government incapacity. The network strength of CBIs in Beirut is characterized by high dependence on the core member's personal network, solid bonding, and strong bridging capacity. The linking social capital of CBIs is limited with the governmental institutions, but possible with international bodies.

Influenced by the SM's solidarity, CBIs were motivated by the value to help others disregarding social differences. CBIs harnessed the availability of young professionals, who were motivated by personal enhancement. Patriotism was a major motivator that drove a paradox: love for the nation but not the government. Patriotism was intensified by the lack of institutional support or linking social capital.

Although CBIs acknowledged their attachment to the destroyed neighbourhoods, they turned to socio-economic vulnerability in their interventions and not their sense of place, especially that the SM motivated CBIs to extend beyond geopolitical borders. SoP motivated volunteers to rush to their most loved neighbourhoods. However, SoP was intensified in members of CBIs who found more appreciation to the community, neighbourhoods, and heritage buildings, a possible impact of CBI performance.

Within the existing conditions, CBIs performed well in terms of input. CBIs were resourceful in crisis. Their network strength and the motivated Lebanese diaspora allowed them to access large funds. CBIs gathered professional volunteers who led the reconstruction efforts. This resulted in an informed resource management. Depending on their unique capabilities, CBIs contributed the reconstruction of units, ranging from 22 to 1256 homes. CBIs developed their own structure and project management systems. They developed expertise and bridged to specialized CBIs when confronted with projects beyond their capabilities. CBIs were characterised by a close

relationship to the beneficiaries, built on mutual trust and respect. They expanded their outcomes from reconstruction to community building, capacity building, revitalising public spaces, and providing services. While these initiatives recently started growing, they are one step forward towards urban recovery. After the explosion, CBIs grew, and registered as NGOs or CSOs. They developed themselves from grassroots to well-structured organizations, establishing credibility nationally and internationally. CBIs became an immanent part of the community that found in them a rescue from an incapable government.

Within a crisis context, and influenced by the SM, CBIs organized better for disaster recovery. They built internal structure on increased bonding SC where the solidarity of the SM surpassed unfamiliarity and built trust. They built external structure for coordination, based on the shared vision of CBIs and LNGOs. Furthermore, they repurposed the SM online platforms from mobilization of activists to organization and coordination of recovery efforts.

Bridging was intensified by the SM's mistrust and attitude towards the government, where CBIs avoided collaboration with institutions. Moreover, the political atmosphere allowed CBIs to link to international organizations and receive funds. Being activists in the SM, CBIs were able to establish more credibility towards international organizations and expats who refused extending funds to the Lebanese government.

Furthermore, the SM instilled patriotism and activism in the community, motivating the CBIs to emerge and mobilize. It also encouraged volunteers to participate in building back a better city. The SM encouraged better bonding between the CBIs and the beneficiaries. While the explosion was a result of corruption and neglect, CBIs, SM and beneficiaries increased their anti-government attitude. This mindset developed trust and solidarity among them.

Lastly, CBIs were characterised by resourcefulness during a crisis. With a lack of institutional support, CBIs turned to social capital for resources, and depended on motivation for flow of inputs.

Linking back to the literature, the factors influencing performance of CBIs were derived from a framework designed for contexts in the global north where increased SC meant better network strength and better performance. (Edelenbos, et al., 2020) However, a new perspective to linking is introduced in the global south. When in crisis, CBIs linked to international organizations instead of local institutions. Linking SC in this context requires further research where its operationalization can include indicators such as ability to communicate with INGOs and embassies, and the ability to generate credibility on an international level.

Since CBIs emerged as grassroots, their credibility was essential to their performance. This included acquiring donations and resources, as well as establishing trust with the beneficiaries. CBIs depended on the core members personal network, reputation, and referrals. Therefore, personal network of core members can be included as a 4th dimension to social capital.

This framework considered motivation as a contributor to performance of CBIs. While intrinsic motivation focused on values of altruistic nature, disasters in socio-political crisis provoked patriotism as a major motivator. However, this is highly related to the type of crisis in the context. Moreover, it can be noted that in a highly educated society, enhancement is a major motivation. This contributes to higher quality outcomes in terms of CBI performance.

SoP was not a direct motivator to recovery efforts. Humanitarian aid and socio-economic vulnerability were dominant over place attachment. However, SoP motivated volunteers to mobilize. CBIs found new appreciation, emotional attachment, and a sense of identity to the neighbourhoods, community and heritage buildings that they were working to save. SoP, therefore, can be considered as an impact rather a motivator. This requires further research.

With CBIs intervening in the built environment, urban issues were brought to light for a community where public participation in urban development is lacking. More discussion is happening on topics such as preservation of heritage buildings, revitalising neighbourhood activity, bottom-up approaches to urban upgrading projects, and foreseeing the risk of gentrification after the Beirut blast. This also can be studied as an impact of CBIs mobilizing themselves to disaster recovery when the crisis encompasses a lack of participation in urban decisions.

Beirut FER's strategy to coordination initially consisted of dividing the actors over neighbourhoods. This would have been successful if the actors were well-defined organizations with equal opportunities and resources. However, this resulted in inefficient deployment of the CBIs. The CBIs that emerged had unique capabilities. Each CBI was able to formulate its own strategy, acquire certain types of resources, and capitalise on them in its outputs. The specialisation of CBIs increased bridging where the cooperation was complementary. This needs to be taken into consideration when disaster management strategies are designed. The allocation of CBIs should be determined in a bottom-up approach.

The crisis resulted in better resourcefulness of CBIs. Coupled with a diverse and well-educated society, this prompts to look into the Creative Class concept by R. Florida (2019). The Creative class concept focuses on diversity and creativity as the fundamental drivers of innovation and growth. Is the Creative class a contributor to better performance of CBIs in crisis?

In Chapter 2, CBIs were associated with insurgent citizenship as defined by Miraftab (2012). This was evident for CBIs in Lebanon who exerted direct participation and control over the reconstruction of their own city. They refrained from delegating the interventions over to the appropriate institutions, especially when some CBIs did not coordinate with Beirut FER. Moreover, Miraftab linked insurgent citizenship to insurgent planning, where the actors are not limited to authorized spaces of participation, rather they create their own space to practice their citizenship rights. Insurgent planning is when actions aim to disrupt domineering relationships and destabilize a status quo by relying on the past and imagining an alternative future. (Miraftab F. , 2009) The role of CBIs in Beirut was not limited to physical reconstruction. It was a statement that CBIs are taking over the government's job, as it proved incompetent. They are making room for themselves as the alternative future to country's governance. Further research is required on the role of CBIs in disaster recovery and how it can transform into insurgent planning.

As per the above insights and reflections on the literature, Figure 16 represents an updated conceptual framework for this research. Network strength to include personal network of core members. Linking is focused on international entities. Values include patriotism. Enhancement linked to highly educated communities. Sense of place is an impact rather a motivator.

This research is highly contextualised in Lebanon. However, many disasters happen in places that already face challenges and crises. This theoretical framework needs to be applied to other contexts. It would be interesting to compare performance of CBIs in disaster recovery in cities of the global north during the Covid-19 pandemic as a pre-existing crisis. For example, how did the CBIs perform when the floods swept Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium in 2021, amid the covid-19 pandemic?

**Figure 16 Revised Conceptual Framework (by author)**

Based on this research, the following recommendations can be made:

- In the absence of a disaster management plan, institutions in charge of coordinating the efforts need to consider CBIs as major stakeholders. They need to anticipate their formation and simplify procedures at least in disaster relief phases. CBIs lack institutional organization, avoid facing them with complex and bureaucratic procedures, especially in times of emergency.
- In a highly educated context, CBIs are formed by professionals from several fields. They self-organize and distribute tasks relevant to their competencies. It is recommended that the coordinating entity build on that local resource that has made itself available. Such can be done through committees of local experts.
- Each CBI has a different set of resources, different motivation, and therefore, a different operation & strategy. Beirut FER tried to distribute CBI efforts by allocating them to neighbourhoods. For CBIs, it was an inefficient management of their resources. Therefore, coordination with CBIs and distribution of efforts should be capacity based and done from the ground up.
- While the Municipality of Beirut was unequipped with disaster management resources, it is important that the municipality still be present as a moral support to the CBIs. Besides the need to empower and train local authorities for disaster management, the municipality should have a supporting and facilitating role to the CBIs.

In 1992, when Beirut was destroyed in the civil war, a PPP was established between government and private sector, with a top-down approach to the redevelopment of the central district. The community had no role in this post-war reconstruction and its outcomes resulted in major gentrification. During the post-explosion, CBIs applied a different strategy as they involved the community as key leader. How have CBIs transformed this approach to planning?

This research concludes itself one year after the explosion. The crisis in Lebanon worsened since then. The country is currently in shortage of medical supplies, fuel, electricity, and water. CBIs that mobilised for disaster relief of the Beirut port explosion, thought their mission would end within a month. Instead, they are now, one year later, still there, still motivated, and putting out the fires of one crisis after the other.

# Let the bird burn

"I no longer want to be associated with the phoenix.
I no longer want that entwined with the identity of my
country.

Do you know the mythology behind it? Yes, it is about
death and rebirth, but did you know a phoenix prepares
for its death? It scours twigs and boughs, makes itself a
nice nest, sets it on fire, and goes up in flames with it.
It knows and plans for its death.

It is a bird, one dimensional, with a few purposes to
serve. We are not. We are not made of plumage and
talons and wings. We are a nation of millions of people
with intricate lives and thoughts and dreams of a future
where nothing like August 04 will exist ever again.

I refuse the phoenix. I disown it. The word "resilience"
and its synonyms, too. We are tired and we are angry,
and we need more than a mythical bird to lift us out of
this. What we experienced, what we witnessed and felt
that day, will take years to mend within us. The port
will stand like a blistering scar across our history.

We mourn. And will forever mourn. Our children and
grandchildren and every generation to come will know
of this day. Its effects will ripple throughout time, its
impact thudding against walls of the future.

I do not want the future to be a preparation for round
after round of death and rebirth. I want to love and live
well. We all do. We all deserve to. We are a people of
mirth and music. A people of warmth and joie de vivre.

So please, let the bird burn for the last time. Let it lay
to rest so that a new image of Lebanon may rise. One
that involves less turmoil, less agony and loss, and
death and trials to our sanity.

Let the bird burn."

**@nourinwonderland IG, 2021**

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# Annex 1: Research Instruments

*This annex includes the research instruments used to collect data. They include: interview guide for CBIs, Questionnaire for CBIs, Interview Guide for NGOs, Interview Guide for Beneficiaries*

## Interview Guide for CBIs

I am a master's candidate at the Institute of Housing and Urban Studies, in Erasmus University, Rotterdam. I am currently pursuing a MSc in urban management and development.

For my thesis, I am researching the performance of community-based initiatives in disaster recovery. In specific those disasters that occurred in a pre-existing state of crisis. I am considering the Beirut port explosion as a case-study for this research.

With this interview, I am focusing on how community-based initiatives in Beirut organized and performed before and after the disaster hit.

This interview only includes questions about the community's initiatives to disaster recovery and not about the disaster itself or your feelings about it. Moreover, this interview does not address political context, nor does it ask for any political point of view.

This interview will take the form of a semi-structured interview that follows a questionnaire that was sent to you beforehand.

Please be informed that:

- Your identity will remain anonymous.
- The information provided will not be stored or used for any other research.
- The data will only be analysed by myself, as the interviewer, and the conclusion will be shared in the thesis document.

I would like to ask you for consent for audio recording this session.

I would also like to ask you for consent to possibly quote some of your answers in my thesis, anonymously of course.

Please remember that you are always free to avoid / not answer any of the questions that are asked with no justification. You can also stop the interview at any point in time.

Do you have any questions you would like to ask me before we start?

1. Tell me a little bit about your CBI, how and why was it established?

2. Was CBI was active pre-explosion:
   a. What was its activity?
   b. How did you get funding and people?
   c. What motivated you to mobilize/ engage in this initiative?

*About the motivation*

3. Can you briefly tell me what motivated you to initiate your CBI? Why did you choose to work with the built environment?

4. With regards to the work your organization has done in disaster recovery, in which area were you most active and why?

5. Do you want to talk about how important this place is for you?

   a. Do you have any memories of the neighborhood? How often do you visit this neighborhood? Do you have relatives or friends in this neighborhood?
   b. Do you feel proud of the neighborhood look and feel? What makes you and doesn't make you proud?
   c. How dependent were you on this neighborhood before the explosion?

*About the social capital*

6. How would you describe the relationship between the different members of the CBI, how (well) do they work together?

   a. How well do the CBI core members know each other? How long have they known each other? Do they have a personal history with one another?
   b. Were the core members of the CBI part of the social movement?
   c. How well do the CBI core members rely on each other? Have you had large disputes among the members that resulted in breaking relationships?
   d. As a leader of the CBI, do you have to be present all the time on site whenever your CBI is active on site or do your members work together autonomously? Is the work distributed among each other?

7. How would you describe the relationship between the CBI and other, like minded community groups, how (well) do you work together?
   a. Have you coordinated with any other CBI? If so, how did you reach out to one another?
   b. Throughout your initiatives, have you exchanged information, or data with other CBIs working in your area?
   c. Have you exchanged resources with other CBIs? Human, material, financial, or connections?
   d. Have you collaborated with other CBI on projects based on lack or excess of needs?

8. How would you describe the relationship between the CBI and Institutions or International organizations? How (well) do you work together?
   a. Have you coordinated with Institutions or International organizations? If so, how did you reach out to one another?
   b. Have you received financial resources from Institutions or International organizations?
   c. Have you received guidance, advisory or training from NGOs or institutions? Was that helpful?

*About the performance*

9. How do you evaluate your input into these initiatives? (professionals, volunteers, organization, resources)
10. How much do you think social media contributed to your work?
11. Do you think that your interventions in the neighbourhood contributed to recovering the neighbourhood as a whole?
12. Did you manage to do what you wanted to do? Do you think you performed well?
13. What were the successes?
14. What were some challenges you faced?
15. Were there any planned initiatives that you could not complete? Which ones and why?
16. What do you think was the main contributor to the success/failure of your initiatives?
17. If you were to do these initiatives again, what would you change? Would you do things differently?
18. Do you know any other CBI whom you think performed well and you appreciate the work they did? Why?
19. Do you have plans or potential for future initiatives? What kind?

## Questionnaire for CBIs

*This questionnaire was intended to collect numerical and categorical data on the CBIs to reduce time required for the interviews.*

### Performance of Community-based Initiatives following the Beirut Port Explosion

In August 2020, a disaster hit Beirut while the city was already in health, political and economic crisis. Intense community-based initiatives were carried out and were essential to emergency relief and early disaster recovery. This research focuses on the impact of a pre-existing crisis on the performance of community-based initiatives in Beirut. My name is Angie Rizk, an MSc. candidate in Urban Management and Development at the Institute of Housing and Urban Studies, in Erasmus University, Rotterdam.

Thank you for taking part in my research. This questionnaire is comprised of closed and open-ended questions and will take around 15 minutes to complete. This questionnaire is concerned with the activity of community-based initiatives in the disaster recovery of the built environment following the Beirut port explosion.

Please be informed that your identity will remain anonymous. The information provided will not be stored or used for any other research. Confidentiality will be maintained, and data will be deleted within 6 months from completing the questionnaire.

You can find attached a letter of support for my data collection from the Institute of Housing and Urban Studies, Erasmus University. If you have any questions or would like to receive a copy of this consent letter, please contact me on 590202ar@eur.nl

Thank you in advance for your participation!

I agree to participate in the research study. I understand the purpose and nature of this study and I am participating voluntarily. I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time, without consequences.

○ Yes  (1)

○ No  (2)

I grant permission for the data generated from this questionnaire to be used in the researcher's thesis on this topic.

○ Yes  (1)

○ No  (2)

Do you live in Beirut city?

○ Yes  (1)

○ No  (2)

Name of Community-Based Initiative

_____

What is your role in the Community-based initiative

○ Founder/Leader  (1)

○ Core member  (2)

○ Volunteer  (3)

○ Other  (4) _____

When was your community-based initiative established?

_____

What is its main objective?

_____

_____

How many leaders or founders does your community-based initiative have?

_____

How many core members does your community-based initiative have?

_____

General age group of core members

○ less than 18 years old  (1)

○ 18-30 years old  (2)

○ 31-45 years old  (3)

○ above 45 years old  (4)

○ very mixed  (5)

Was your community-based initiative already active in helping out the community before the explosion?

○ Yes  (1)

○ No  (2)

If yes, what were its initiatives, and where were these initiatives located?

_____

_____

What were your initiatives in disaster recovery after the Beirut explosion?

☐ Mental well-being (psychological support)  (1)

☐ Physical well-being (medical, food & water)  (2)

☐ Financial Aid (fundraising, financial support)  (3)

☐ Social services (shelter and legal services)  (4)

☐ Built environment (reconstruction & renovation)  (5)

☐ Supporting volunteers and other initiatives  (6)

☐ Other  (7) _____

What did your initiatives in the built environment include?

- ☐ Cleanup of debris inside homes  (1)
- ☐ Restoration of openings: windows & doors  (2)
- ☐ Restoration of exterior walls and roof  (3)
- ☐ Restoration of interior elements (walls, tiling, electricity)  (4)
- ☐ Restoration of commercial units (shops, bars, restaurants, galleries)  (5)
- ☐ Advocation for the protection of heritage buildings  (6)
- ☐ Cleanup of debris on the streets  (7)
- ☐ Other  (8) _____

Were you satisfied with the area covered by your initiatives?

- ○ Extremely satisfied  (1)
- ○ Somewhat satisfied  (2)
- ○ Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied  (3)
- ○ Somewhat dissatisfied  (4)
- ○ Extremely dissatisfied  (5)

Were you satisfied with the quality of your initiatives outcome?

- ○ Extremely satisfied  (1)
- ○ Somewhat satisfied  (2)
- ○ Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied  (3)
- ○ Somewhat dissatisfied  (4)
- ○ Extremely dissatisfied  (5)

Were you satisfied with the commitment of the members to the initiative?

○ Extremely satisfied  (1)

○ Somewhat satisfied  (2)

○ Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied  (3)

○ Somewhat dissatisfied  (4)

○ Extremely dissatisfied  (5)


○ How many volunteers were you able to gather?  (1)

_____

○ How did you reach out to them?  (2)

_____

Was the number of volunteers enough for your initiative?

○ We had surplus  (1)

○ Yes, it was enough  (2)

○ No, we needed more  (3)

Professionals who volunteered within their expertise

○ Were you able to contact professionals as volunteers? (1)

○ How many professionals?  (2) _____

○ How did you reach out to them?  (3)

_____

Was the number of professional volunteers enough for your initiative?

○ We had surplus  (1)

○ Yes, it was enough  (2)

○ No, we needed more  (3)

**I participated in / organized initiatives in the recovery of the built environment because:**

| | Strongly agree (1) | Somewhat agree (2) | Neither agree nor disagree (3) | Somewhat disagree (4) | Strongly disagree (5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| I believe that in situation of disaster, it is important to put others first (1) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| I enjoy helping others (2) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| I consider this initiative to be part of my religious duties (3) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| i feel a sense of purpose in my community (4) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| I wanted to learn new things (5) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| Being able to help others increases my self esteem (6) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| My friends encouraged me to (7) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| All my friends were doing it and I did not want to be the only one not participating. (8) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| I wanted to be part of a group. (9) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| My house was affected (10) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| I frequent this neighborhood a lot and it is part of the places in my routine (11) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| my friend's/relative's house was affected (12) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

Q39 Were there other reasons why you were motivated to participate in or organize such initiative?

## Interview Guide for NGOs

1. Can you tell me about the work of the NGO in disaster recovery?

2. Where was your work concentrated? Why did you focus on that area?

3. Were there any CBIs working in the same neighbourhood as you? Did the presence of CBIs or NGOs in the neighbourhood impede or support your work?

4. Did you collaborate with CBIs? Why or why not)

5. Can you describe this collaboration?
    a. How well were they working together, were they organized?
    b. What do you think of their ability to manage resources? (human & financial)
    c. Were they able to communicate well with professionals in the field?
    d. How was the quality of their work?
    e. How was their commitment to their initiatives?
    f. Were you able to rely on them with tasks and meeting objectives?

6. What do you think were the strengths of CBIs in post-disaster recovery?

7. What do you think were the weaknesses of CBIs in post-disaster recovery?

8. Do you think the CBIs were able to achieve objectives you could not do?

## Interview Guide for Beneficiaries

1. Which organization took care of reconstructing your home/shop?

2. Were you satisfied with their work?

3. Were you able to depend on them?

# Annex 2: Atlas.ti Code Report

*This annex contains the codes report from Atlas.ti project.*

| ● C: Concept | |
|---|---|
| ● **D: Dimension** | |
| ● I: Indicator | |

| ● **C: CBI** | **information about the CBI** |
|---|---|
| ● D: CBI_Emergence of CBI | how the CBI emerged |
| ● D: CBI_Location of Initiatives | how spread the initiative was, how inclusive |
| ● D: CBI_Predisaster activity | if the CBI had an acivity before the explosion |

| ● **C: Intrinsic Motivation** | **Participating in an activity for the associated satisfaction of performing it** |
|---|---|
| ● **D: IntMot_Enhancement** | **developing psychological well-being and improve self-esteem** |
| ● I: IntMot_Enh_Having a purpose | deploying one's capabilities for good use |
| ● I: IntMot_Enh_wanting to learn | wating to enhance one's skills and knowledge about something |
| ● **D: IntMot_Personal** | **Personal motivations that are relevant to each individual** |
| ● I: IntMot_Pers_Build own house | Own house was destroyed and participate in CBI to fix it |
| ● I: IntMot_Pers_Build own neighb | Own neighborhood was destroyed and participate in CBI to fix it |
| ● I: IntMot_Pers_Help friends or relatives | Friends or family were affected & participate in CBI to help them |
| ● **D: IntMot_Social** | **When volunteers seek acceptance from social groups** |
| ● I: IntMot_Soc_ being part of a community | wanting to be part of a community |
| ● I: IntMot_Soc_ not being an outcast | not wanting to be left out |
| ● I: IntMot_Soc_ peer pressure influence | encouraged by others |
| ● **D: IntMot_Values** | **Expression of the volunteers' humanity compassion, and altruism** |
| ● I: IntMot_Val_helping others | wanting to help others |
| ● I: IntMot_Val_Patriotism | devoting oneself for the country |
| ● **D: IntMot_Political Statement** | **Mobilizing CBI to establish a political statement aliging with SM objectives** |

| ● | **C: Performance of CBI** | the effectiveness and degree to which the objectives were achieved |
|---|---|---|
| ● | **D: Perf_CBIgrowth** | **Development of the CBI** |
| ● | I: Perf_CBIgrowth_ Credibility | establishing trust, reputation, dependability |
| ● | I: Perf_CBIgrowth_ future initiatives | planned/stretegized for initiatives in a future plan |
| ● | I: Perf_CBIgrowth_ Registration of CBI | Registration of grassoot CBI into an NGO, CSO or other formal organizaiton |
| ● | **D: Perf_Challenges** | **Challenges faced by CBIs and how they overcame them** |
| ● | I: Perf_Chall_Beneficiaries | challenges faced with the beneficiaries CBIs were helping |
| ● | I: Perf_Chall_coordination | coordination of initiatives with other CBIs or NGOs |
| ● | I: Perf_Chall_Covid19 | Covid-19 pandemic including lockdown and distancing & protective measures |
| ● | I: Perf_Chall_Data | Lack of national or city data |
| ● | I: Perf_Chall_Financial | lack of access to financial resources |
| ● | I: Perf_Chall_Institutional support | lack of support from the public institutions |
| ● | I: Perf_Chall_Knowhow | lack of knowhow in recosntruction or organization management |
| ● | **D: Perf_Input** | **Resources that supported the recovery initiatives** |
| ● | I: Perf_Inp_Financing | acquiring financing for initiatives |
| ● | I: Perf_Inp_ProfVolunteers | availability of professional volunteers |
| ● | I: Perf_Inp_Volunteers | recruiting volunteers |
| ● | **D: Perf_Outputs** | **The initiatives that were undertaken on the built environment** |
| ● | I: Perf_Output_Architectural Heritage | protection/reconstruction of architectural heritage buildings |
| ● | I: Perf_Output_Management of Resources | whether or not the output matches the amount of resources received. |
| ● | I: Perf_Output_Public Domain | cleaning/intervention on streets and sidewalks / public spaces |
| ● | I: Perf_Output_Restored Buildings | number of restored buildings/retail/homes/apartments |
| ● | **D: Perf_Outcomes** | **The benefits of the intended community that were affected by the disaster** |
| ● | I: Perf_Outcome_ Community Building | initiating activities on community scale |
| ● | I: Perf_Outcome_ Neighborhood activity | reinstating the neighborhood activities (shops, retail, gatherings) |
| ● | I: Perf_Outcome_ Relationship with Beneficiaries | quality of relationship with the beneficiaries |

- **C: SelfOrganized Social Movement**

  - **D: SelfOrg_Context**  **Crisis context of the self-organized SM**

  - **D: SelfOrg_LocalCommunity**  **Qualities of the community that makes up the SM**
    - I: SO_LocalComm_Diversity  ethnic and regligious diversity of the SM
    - I: SO_LocalComm_Exchange of Knowledge  participation in communication & exchange of info in the diverse community
    - I: SO_LocalComm_Social Connections  Increase of one's personal network due to new relationships resulting from SM

  - **D: SelfOrg_SocialMedia**  **Online activism including communication & coordination of initiatives**
    - I: SO_SM_Awareness Campaigns  # of campaigns to spread awareness on topics
    - I: SO_SM_Call to action  # of ways to mobilize initiaitves and activity
    - I: SO_SM_express ideas & demands  # of outlets to express ideas and demands of the SM

  - **D: SelfOrg_UrbanSpace**  **where the SM mobilize for implementing initiatives**
    - I: SO_UrbSpace_initiatives  # of initiatives mobilized in urban space
    - I: SO_UrbSpace_Locations  variety and meaning of the locations of SM mobilization

- **C: Sense of Place**  Individual's attitude towards their experience of place

  - **D: SoP_Attachment**  **emotions provoked from the person's image of the place**
    - I: SoP_Att_frequency of visits  # of visits per week
    - I: SoP_Att_memories  associating good memories with the place
    - I: SoP_Att_Social ties  having social ties (family/friends) in that place

  - **D: SoP_Dependence**  **satisfaction from activities that cater to individual's needs of the place**
    - I: SoP_Dep_Reasons of Visits  having a reason to visit the place
    - I: SoP_Dep_Variety of Activity  variety of activities present in the place (social, cultural, business etc)

  - **D: SoP_Identity**  **physical aspects of place aligning with the individual's values**
    - I: SoP_ID_Aesthetics  appreciation of the place's aesthetics
    - I: SoP_ID_Feeling of pride  feelings of pride to belong to a place

| | |
|---|---|
| ● **C: Social Capital** | **social networking capability of CBIs - vertically and horizontally** |
|    ● **D: SC_Bonding** | **Horizontal ties within members of CBI** |
|      ● I: SC_Bond_engagement | engaged community with no overdependence on leader - dedication |
|      ● I: SC_Bond_familiarity | familiarity between the core members |
|      ● I: SC_Bond_Trust | Trust and maintained relationships |
|    ● **D: SC_Bridging** | **Horizontal ties between CBIs and like-minded organizations** |
|      ● I: SC_Bridg_Collab with other CBI | collaborations with other CBIs (or LNGOs) on projects |
|      ● I: SC_Bridg_Exchange info | exchange of knowledge or data between CBIs (or LNGOs) |
|      ● I: SC_Bridg_Exchange resources | exchange of resources between CBIs (or LNGOs) |
|    ● **D: SC_Linking** | **Vertical ties between CBI & higher levels of power** |
|      ● I: SC_Link_Advisory & training | CBIs receiving advisory &/or training from Governmental institutions or INGOs |
|      ● I: SC_Link_Collaborations with Institutions | Collaborations between CBIs and Governmental institutions/INGOs on projects |
|      ● I: SC_Link_Financial support | CBIs receiving financial support from Governmental institutions or INGOs |
|    ● **D: SC_Personal network** | **personal connections of the core members to benefit CBI** |

# Annex 3: Beirut neighbourhood profiles

## BEIRUT MAP

Anera's Lebanon team conducted an impact assessment to identify and target the most urgent needs facing the victims of the explosion. Based on the data gathered, Anera has prioritized shelter, food, and health as the key areas of focus in our response. We will work in areas of Beirut that are underserved and were already economically vulnerable, and then suffered the most from the blast, such as Karantina, Borj Hammoud, the Zoqaq El Blat and Basta Tahta areas of the Bachoura neighborhood, the Beydoun area of Achrafiye, and Gemmayze and Mar Mikhael.

### Gemmayze & Mar Mikhael

Considered a center of art, youth culture, and nightlife, this is one Beirut's most popular and trendy neighborhoods. It is full of restaurants, galleries, bars, performance venues, and traditional architecture. This area is only 800 meters from the blast site and it suffered terrible damage. Some say the neighborhood may never recover.

### Achrafiye, Beydoun area

Mohammad Beydoun Street is in the Achrafiye neighborhood. It is low income area with a mix of homes and shops. Many families there have few financial resources to make repairs.

### Bachoura, Zoqaq El Blat area

The name of this neighborhood literally means "cobbled alley," because in the 19th century its roads were cobbled. This residential area adjoins Beirut's downtown and blends new highrises with old buildings, noisy thoroughfares and alleyways. The area is not far from the explosion site – just a couple kilometers away – so its structures sustained heavy damage in the explosion.

### Karantina

Karantina is one of Beirut's poorest neighborhoods. It is located just east of the port, which also encircles it from the north. The blasts flattened homes and killed and wounded many in this area that mixes residences, businesses, and industrial enterprises.

### Borj Hammoud

Located in northeast Beirut, Borj Hammoud is very densely populated. It began as a tent camp for Armenian refugees in the 1920s. Now, the neighborhood is a mixed residential, industrial and commercial area that is home to Armenians, Lebanese of Christian and Shi'a backgrounds, and Palestinians. It is also home to guest workers from Asia and Africa. Most residences in Borj Hammoud sustained damage in the explosions.

### Bachoura, Basta Tahta area

This is a working-class neighborhood close to the center of Beirut, not far from the explosion site. Basta is one of Beirut's most bustling and historic areas. It is filled with old buildings and small shops of every variety.

Red indicates destroyed buildings; orange indicates damaged buildings; and yellow indicates possibly damaged buildings.

August 12, 2020

Map source: Copernicus Emergency Management Service-Mapping. File "EMSR452: Explosion in Beirut, Lebanon"

Beirut

**Map 3 Beirut Neighborhood profiles (Anera, 2020)**

# Annex 4: CBI Sample Profiles

| **Bala Wala Shi** *(without anything in return)* | |
|---|---|
| *Description:* A CBI that emerged in the crisis period to support the socio-economically vulnerable communities who were suffering from harsh living conditions. They redirected their efforts to establishing a food drive when the covid-19 pandemic hit. When the Beirut blast happened, members of this CBI redirected their efforts to disaster relief and minor reconstruction efforts. | |
| Date Established | December 2019 |
| Size | 6 core members + 30 volunteers |
| Initiative categories | Financial Aid (fundraising, financial support)<br>Social Services (shelter and legal services<br>Built environment (minor reconstruction and repairs) |
| Initiatives in Built Environment | - Clean-up of debris inside homes<br>- Restoration of openings: windows and doors<br>- Restoration of exterior walls and roof<br>- Restoration of interior elements<br>- Clean-up debris in streets<br>- Providing furniture and equipment to households |
| Type (1 year later) | CBI |
| Interview Duration | 50 minutes |
| Outputs in the built environment | - 22 houses repaired |

| **Baytna Baytak** *(Our home is your Home)* | |
|---|---|
| *Description:* Baytna baytak started as a CBI in march 2020 to secure housing for frontline healthcare professionals during the Covid-19 pandemic. When the explosion happened, Baytna baytak diverted their efforts towards reconstruction while maintaining their previous activity. | |
| Date Established | March 2020 |
| Size | 2 cofounders, 8 board members & 8 core members |
| Initiative categories | - Physical well being of affected communities<br>- Financial aid<br>- Social services<br>- Built environment |
| Initiatives in disaster recovery of Built Environment | - Clean-up of debris inside homes<br>- Restoration of openings: windows and doors<br>- Restoration of exterior walls and roof<br>- Restoration of commercial units<br>- Heritage building protection<br>- Clean-up debris in streets |
| Type (1 year later) | NGO since November 2020 |
| Interview Duration | Interview 1: 60 minutes |

|  | Interview 2: 40 minutes |
|---|---|
| Outputs in the built environment | - 1320 houses repaired<br>- 70 businesses restored |

## Basecamp

**Description:** Basecamp started as a base where 4 CBIs gathered to distribute tasks, coordinate, store supplies, distributed volunteers. With time, Basecamp formed its own identity and mobilized its own initiatives.

| Date Established | August 2020 |
|---|---|
| Size | 20 core members |
| Initiative categories | - Mental wellbeing of affected communities<br>- Physical wellbeing of affected communities<br>- Financial aid<br>- Social services<br>- Built environment<br>- Supporting other initiatives and organizations<br>- SME support |
| Initiatives in the built environment | - Clean-up of debris inside homes<br>- Restoration of openings: windows and doors<br>- Restoration of exterior walls and roof<br>- Restoration of interior elements<br>- Restoration of commercial units<br>- Restoration of heritage buildings<br>- Clean-up of debris in streets |
| Type (1 year later) | NGO (registration process) |
| Interview Duration | 70 minutes |
| Outputs in the built environment | - 45 homes repaired<br>- 21 businesses restored |

## Beirut Heritage Initiative

**Description:** independent initiative of professionals in restoration with the objective of restoring the built and cultural heritage that was damaged by the explosion.

| Date Established | August 2020 |
|---|---|
| How it started | A network of professionals reached out to each other following the explosion and put forward their knowhow into the mission of preserving the heritage buildings. |
| Size | 6 founders & 5 core members |
| Initiative categories | - Financial Aid<br>- Built environment |
| Initiatives in the built environment | - Restoration of openings: windows and doors<br>- Restoration of exterior walls and roof<br>- Restoration of interior elements<br>- Restoration of heritage buildings |

| Type (1 year later) | CBI |
|---|---|
| Interview Duration | 65 minutes |
| Outputs in the built environment | - 15 pitched roofs restored<br>- 17 traditional houses under restoration<br>- 6 online presentations on rehabilitation & conservation methods |

## Frontline Engineers

*Description:* In the aftermath of the explosion, a small group of engineers and architects decided to help with disaster relief. They extended calls to their own networks of professionals and were able to gather 200 professional volunteers. Soon after, frontline engineers registered as an NGO.

| Date Established | August 2020 |
|---|---|
| Size | 3 founders & 25 core members |
| Initiative categories | - Physical well being of affected communities<br>- Financial aid<br>- Social services<br>- Built environment<br>- Supporting other initiatives and organizations |
| Initiatives in the Built Environment | - Clean-up of debris inside homes<br>- Restoration of openings: windows and doors<br>- Restoration of exterior walls and roof<br>- Restoration of interior elements<br>- Restoration of commercial units<br>- Restoration of heritage buildings<br>- Clean-up of debris in streets |
| Type (1 year later) | NGO |
| Interview Duration | 60 minutes |
| Outputs in the built environment | - 7 heritage buildings<br>- 300+ buildings with minor reconstruction<br>- 16 SMEs with women entrepreneurs reconstruction |

## Nation Station

*Description:* Three neighbours affected by the explosion gathered in an abandoned gas station in their neighbourhood. They started with distributing food and redistributing donations. They later established a team to work in reconstruction, a community kitchen, and a clinic. The station now functions like a community centre for the entire neighbourhood.

| Date Established | August 2020 |
|---|---|
| How it started | Neighbourhood initiative |
| Size | 9 core members |
| Initiative categories | - Physical wellbeing of affected communities<br>- Financial aid |

| | - Social services<br>- Built environment |
|---|---|
| Initiatives in Built Environment | - Clean-up of debris inside homes<br>- Restoration of openings: windows and doors<br>- Restoration of exterior walls and roof |
| Type (1 year later) | CSO – June 2021 |
| Interview Duration | 70 minutes |
| Outputs in the built environment | - 86 houses reconstructed<br>- 1184 houses assessed |

## Rise up Lebanon

*Description:* A group of activists noticed a lack of focus on SMEs in the recovery efforts. They decided to form a CBI with a sole focus on SMEs recovery in the reconstruction and as business development.

| Date Established | September 2020 |
|---|---|
| Size | 10 core members |
| Initiative categories | - Financial aid<br>- Social services<br>- Built environment |
| Initiatives in the Built Environment | - SMEs reconstruction and business development |
| Type (1 year later) | CBI |
| Interview Duration | 40 minutes |
| Outputs in the built environment | - 300 businesses recovered |

## Rise Build Beirut

*Description:* 10-15 professionals gathered to help in reconstruction. CBI founder posted a call for action on his social media account and gathered 1200 volunteers in 2 weeks. This initiative brought together professionals, suppliers, and volunteers in a joint effort to manage the reconstruction of damaged buildings in Beirut.

| Date Established | August 2020 |
|---|---|
| Size | 1 founder, 00 core members |
| Initiative categories | - Built Environment |
| Initiatives in the Built Environment | - Clean-up of debris inside homes<br>- Restoration of openings: windows and doors<br>- Restoration of exterior walls and roof<br>- Restoration of interior elements<br>- Assessments |
| Type (1 year later) | Registration for NGO in process |

| Interview Duration | 65 minutes |
|---|---|
| Outputs in the built environment | - 250 houses |

### Beb w Shebbek *(Door and window)*

**Description:** Following the explosion, the two founders were receiving calls from their network of friends and colleagues asking for referrals to people in need or to groups providing help to the affected community. They decided to take action and provide the basic necessity for the affected community to feel safe in their home: they started to close the doors and windows. They developed as an initiative and they were supporting several affected communities and providing support to other CBIs and NGOs.

| | |
|---|---|
| Date Established | August 2020 |
| Size | 2 founders, 27 core members |
| Initiative categories | Built Environment |
| Initiatives in the Built Environment | Restoration of openings: windows & doors |
| Registered | CBI |
| Interview Duration | 40 minutes |
| Outputs in the built environment | - 830 houses completed<br>- 25 houses in progress<br>- 856 houses assessed<br>- 894 in the pipeline |

### Rashet Kheir *(Sprinkle of Goodness)*

**Description:** Rashet kheir was initially born to support families suffering from the crisis of 2019. The founder, along with a group of friends, registered the initiative as an NGO, only 4 months before the explosion. When the explosion happened, the NGO transformed efforts to disaster recovery.

| | |
|---|---|
| Date Established | April 2020 |
| Size | 6 core members |
| Initiative categories | - Social services<br>- Built environment |
| Initiatives in the Built Environment | - Clean-up of debris inside homes<br>- Restoration of openings: windows and doors<br>- Restoration of exterior walls and roof<br>- Restoration of interior elements<br>- Restoration of heritage buildings<br>- Data collection |
| Type (1 year later) | NGO |
| Interview Duration | 45 minutes |

| Outputs in the built environment | - 7 SMEs recovered<br>- 33 apartments recovered (38 in progress)<br>- 2 buildings recovered (11 in progress)<br>- 1 heritage building recovered |
| --- | --- |

## Together Li Beirut *(together for Beirut)*

**Description:** Together Li Beirut is an initiative that is born from the collaboration of 3 NGOs Cénacle De La Lumière, Lebanon Needs, and The House of Christmas.

| Date Established | January 2020 |
| --- | --- |
| Size | 12 core members |
| Initiative categories | - Mental wellbeing of affected communities<br>- Physical wellbeing of affected communities<br>- Social services<br>- Built environment<br>- SME support |
| Initiatives in the Built Environment | - Restoration of openings: windows and doors<br>- Restoration of exterior walls and roof<br>- Restoration of interior elements<br>- Restoration of heritage buildings<br>- Restoration of SMEs |
| Type (1 year later) | CBI |
| Interview Duration | 45 minutes |
| Outputs in the built environment | - 2 heritage buildings recovery<br>- 90 SMEs recovered<br>- Partial recovery of 1 hospital |

## Shaabi Mas'ouliyti *(My people, my responsibility)*

**Description:** active in disaster relief phase

| Date Established | December 2019 |
| --- | --- |
| Size | 8 core members |
| Initiative categories | - Mental wellbeing of affected communities<br>- Physical wellbeing of affected communities<br>- Financial aid<br>- Social services<br>- Built environment<br>- Supporting other initiatives and organizations |
| Initiatives in the Built Environment | - Clean-up of debris inside homes<br>- Restoration of openings: windows and doors<br>- Restoration of interior elements<br>- Restoration of commercial units<br>- Clean-up debris on the streets |
| Type (1 year later) | NGO |

| Interview Duration | 40 minutes |
| --- | --- |
| Outputs in the built environment | - 22 houses reconstructed<br>- 6 businesses reconstructed |

# Annex 5: Secondary Data sources

## Online News Articles

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## Social media

| Social Movement Instagram accounts | Community-Based Initiatives Instagram accounts |
|---|---|
| @Daleelthawra | @balawala.chi |
| @AanHakkakdafeh | @baytna_baytak |
| @ActionLebanon | @basecampbeirut |
| @ImpactLebanon | @beirutheritageinitiative |
| @Mintishreen | @frontlineengineersorg |
| @Hakithawra | @nationstation__ |
| @Uniteddiaspora | @riseupleb |
| @LiveloveBeirut | @bebwshebbek |
| @muwatinlebnene | @risebuildbeirut |
| @ReshapeLebanon | @togetherlibeirut |
| @Thawramap | @rashetkheir |
| | @shaabemasouleyati |

Disaster in context of Crisis: Assessing the performance of Community-based initiatives in urban disaster recovery: A Case study of Beirut Port explosion

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## Annex 6: Stakeholder Mapping

# MAPPING CURRENT RESPONSE STAKEHOLDERS

THE FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF THE TYPES OF STAKEHOLDERS THAT ARE ALREADY CONDUCTING RESPONSE RELATED ACTIVITIES:

| | KEY STAKEHOLDERS | CURRENT ROLES | RISKS |
|---|---|---|---|
| **GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS** | • Ministries<br>• Higher Council for Relief<br>• Governor\Municipality | • Mapping damages and needs<br>• Sporadic responses by various institutions | • Bureaucracy and clientelism<br>• Lack of updated data<br>• Growing negative perception by the general public |
| **ARMY AND SECURITY FORCES** | • Lebanese Army<br>• Internal Security Forces Municipal Police | • Mapping damages and needs<br>• Coordinating bilateral donations through the FER (Army and the Lebanese Red Cross)<br>• Maintaining security | • Centralized decision making<br>• Lack of experience in such response<br>• Security driven approach to response |
| **DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS AND INGOS** | • Donors<br>• UN Agencies<br>• World Bank<br>• INGOs | • Mapping damages and needs<br>• Funding for shelter and humanitarian support<br>• Planning for the recovery phase | • Lack of coordination amongst development partners and INGOs<br>• High operational costs<br>• Less connected with the field |
| **NGOS AND CITIZENS' INITIATIVES** | • Large NGOs<br>• Small NGOs<br>• Civil Society Organizations<br>• Citizens' Initiatives | • Mapping damages and needs<br>• Mobilizing private resources and volunteers<br>• Assisting residents in shelter refurbishment and offering humanitarian support | • Decentralized and uncoordinated<br>• Unsustainable (as it is volunteer based and with private funding)<br>• Lacks the capacity for large-scale mobilizations |
| **PROFESSIONAL NETWORKS** | • Order of Engineers<br>• Bar Association<br>• Syndicate of Restaurant Owners | • Mapping damages and needs<br>• Providing legal support<br>• Attempting to represent interest groups | • Lacks expertise in crisis-response<br>• Polarization between and within some interest groups<br>• Weak financial capacities |

**Table 6 Stakeholder Overview (Beyond Group, 2020)**

# Annex 8: Personal Network

> *The following is a report exported from Atlas Ti. It shows 25 quotations relevant to 12 CBIs, indicating a high ratio of reliance on the founders' personal network. This annex will show only 10 of those quotations*
>
> *Note: names of members and CBIs were omitted to respect anonymity.*

## Project: Performance of CBIs

Report created by User on 7/31/2021

### Report for Query: I: Perf_Inp_Personal network

(10/25) quotations

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### 2:61 Don't forget, [my cofounder] and I already have a lot of connections (9:2635 [9:3300])

**Created** by User on 6/27/2021

Don't forget, [my cofounder] and I already have many connections. Many of our friends had money and were capable, so they were the ones who launched us off. I'll give you the stupidest example. My nieces and nephews, in the US set up a lemonade stand and they raised $2900.

---

### 5:37 I have also, in my network, experienced engineers & architects who ca…… (5:1666 [5:1929])

**Created** by User on 7/29/2021

I have also, in my network, experienced engineers & architects who came to help.

---

### 6:26 Since I'm an architect and I have some connections with people …… (8:563 [8:773])

**Created** by User on 7/10/2021

Since I'm an architect and I have some connections with people who were able to donate some money. I took this initiative and I started working on the reconstruction of the houses.

---

### 6:43 I am working now with […], an itlaian NGO, Uh, I know them through a…… (11:1831 [11:2349])

**Created** by User on 7/10/2021

I am working now with […] an Italian NGO, Uh, I know them through a friend.

---

### 7:3 So the same day at night, we gather some of my friends in the neighbo…… (1:523 [1:943])

**Created** by User on 7/25/2021

So the same day at night, we gather some of my friends in the neighborhood and we try to fix a few of the doors and windows and just to help the people fixing their doors just it was a spontaneous action. And the next day, we were around 10 to 15. Friends, architects and designers, and the idea just popped up. No, I need to create something more organized. And in order to help the houses and the people of Beirut.

---

### 7:15 I do believe that credibility and credibility is something critical. A…… (4:234 [4:721])

**Created** by User on 7/25/2021

I do believe that credibility is something critical. And you have to build credibility throughout years. And thank God, based on my reputation, the market as an architect, so that's why I tried to partner first with my suppliers and with my, with my people to work with the people who trust me, and I trusted them. that was the first step. Since I have credibility in the market, I started approaching the people or the donors, I personally know.

---

### 8:2 So they [the cofounders] had so many connections, and,…… (1:407 [1:1311])

**Created** by User on 7/25/2021

So they [the cofounders] had so many connections, and they had so many people talking to them saying like, we have this money [..] we'd like to give you. who do you know, that we can give this trusted person we can give this money to so they can help. So then [the cofoudners], thought, you know what, let's just do our own thing. We have the connections. We know people, we have the money, let's just do it.

---

### 10:5 And we had donation glass and wood from suppliers I know personally, (1:3009 [1:3076])

**Created** by User on 7/30/2021

And we had donation glass and wood from suppliers I know personally,

### 12:11 In a previous professional life, I've worked in contracting. So I, I k…… (3:1245 [3:1750])

**Created** by User on 7/30/2021

In a previous professional life, I've worked in contracting. So I, I know a lot of people in that field. So I contacted them and my brother as well is an engineer. So I've got a lot of help around.

### 12:23 I've been working in this country for 28 years. So I mean, this is a c…… (6:932 [6:1159])

**Created** by User on 7/30/2021

I've been working in this country for 28 years. So I mean, this is a country where everything you do is by your reputation, then this is how I was able to open a bank account for the NGO.

# Annex 9: Familiarity of CBI members

**Table 7 CBI sample familiarity (by author)**

| Previous Friends | Professional Colleagues | Residents of the same Neighbourhood | Activists in the SM |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | | *unfamiliar on a personal level* |
| | | | X |
| | | | X |
| | | | X |
| | X | | |
| | X | | |
| | | X | |
| | X | | |
| X | | | |
| | X | | |
| X | | | |
| | | | X |

---

*The following is a report exported from Atlas Ti. It shows 18 quotations of the sample CBIs, explaining the level of familiarity of the CBI core members. This annex will show only 10 of those quotations*

*Note: names of members and CBIs were omitted to respect anonymity.*

---

# Project: Performance of CBIs

Report created by User on 7/31/2021

## Report for Query: I: SC_Bond_familiarity

(10/18) quotations

---

### 2:17 So [co-founders] and I were always on the streets together, they'v…… (2:3923 [3:13])

**Created** by User on 6/27/2021

So[co-founders] and I were always on the streets together, they've saved my life more than once. […] So we all met on the streets. And you know, we all fighting for the same cause has the same ideals. Although what's really interesting about us, what's really cool is we do all come from different backgrounds.

---

### 2:20 So we met on the streets, you know, and after, I want to say, you kno…… (3:938 [3:1564])

**Created** by User on 6/27/2021

So we met on the streets, you know, and after, I want to say, you know, five months of standing side by side every single day, there was already a certain level of trust when you're put in those kinds of situations that are life or death situations or very aggressive or hostile situations. And you realize that the people standing by you, you realize, these are the people you can depend on. These are the people you can trust. So we ended up starting this together and it was supposed to be just for then, you know, literally just for then.

### 3:21 Some knew each other, and some, no. Some of them …… (4:1907 [4:2249])

**Created** by User on 7/4/2021

Some knew each other, and some, no. Some of them actually met on the ground while cleaning up and helping people out. Some of them knew each other from before, some of them were already well known.

### 4:7 So mainly those people that have been working on heritage for years, b…… (2:2652 [2:3072]) - D 4: Interview 05 - Beirut Heritage Initiative

**Created** by User on 7/6/2021

So mainly those people that have been working on heritage for years, but not together, only two of them. But the other ones like everyone was dispatched a bits that they started calling each other. And for example, one got a call from the other who got a call from someone else. And it just started circulating as a network. And they just decided, Okay, we should do this. Who's in who's not?

### 5:21 we got to know each other as core members in the Thawra movement. So b…… (4:552 [4:1213])

**Created** by User on 7/8/2021

we got to know each other as core members in the Thawra movement. So basically we started this initiative as two people. We contacted people whom we trusted, people who were concerned about the country. If we didn't have this relationship of trust, our team wouldn't have grown the way it did. so the relationship within the team was really strong.

### 6:39 None of the none of us knew each o…… (10:349 [10:989]) - D 6: Interview 06 - Nation Station

**Created** by User on 7/10/2021

None of the none of us knew each other. […] We knew each other, but we weren't friends like close friends.

### 7:20 Actually we're all friends and colleagues. So on the social media when…… (5:2585 [5:3256]) - D 7: Interview 08 - Rise Build Beirut

**Created** by User on 7/25/2021

Actually we're all colleagues. So on the social media when I when I made a call for volunteers, so I had the hundreds of feedbacks Yes, we want to help you How can we help? how can how can we utilize our experience in this? […] But we just met on this initiative. So it's all happened organically, it was not planned it just happened organically.

### 11:4 And the team that we recruited were very random. (1:1671 [1:1719])

**Created** by User on 7/29/2021

And the team that we recruited were very random. […] The other members were also people whom we've met as volunteers on the ground.

### 12:6 a couple of friends, a couple of friends simply I told them, this is w…… (2:1726 [2:2277])

**Created** by User on 7/30/2021

a couple of friends, a couple of friends simply I told them, this is what I want to do. And they said, okay, we trust you whatever you need. […] And we started working and I started fundraising with other friends and this is how it started.

### 14:1 Our CBI is an initiative that started in December 2019. It w…… (1:197 [1:698]) - D 14: Interview 12 - Shaabi Masouliyti

**Created** by User on 7/30/2021

Our CBI is an initiative that started in December 2019. It was a group of people who came together with the same mindset of making a difference in the community after the 17th of October. We met in the thawra, we didn't know each other. And there's a blind trust. it is very easy to collaborate or work with people that have the same mindset, and the same sense of patriotism and that are catalysts in terms of their personality where they are able to make a difference in people's lives.

# Annex 10: Trust between CBI members

> *The following is a report exported from Atlas Ti. It shows 16 quotations of the sample CBIs, explaining the level of familiarity of the CBI core members. This annex will show only 5 of those quotations*
>
> *Note: names of members and CBIs were omitted to respect anonymity.*

## Project: Performance of CBIs

Report created by User on 7/31/2021

### Report for Query: I: SC_Bond_Trust

(5/16) quotations

---

### 2:20 So we met on the streets, you know, and after, I want to say, you kno…… (3:938 [3:1564])

**Created** by User on 6/27/2021

So we met on the streets, you know, and after, I want to say, you know, five months of standing side by side every single day, there was already a certain level of trust when you're put in those kinds of situations that are life or death situations or very aggressive or hostile situations. And you realize that the people standing by you, you realize, these are the people you can depend on. These are the people you can trust. So we ended up starting this together and it was supposed to be just for then, you know, literally just for then. And when we relaunched in August, it wasn't even full effect of us relaunching

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### 2:49 I've discovered in life when you're put in the worst possible situatio…… (8:1 [8:798]) -

**Created** by User on 6/27/2021

I've discovered in life when you're put in the worst possible situation and there's someone standing by you, you know that person is always going to stand by you. […] After (surviving) the explosion […] You know it's not anyone who's going to understand these things We've already been through together.

---

### 3:32 it's definitely not a secret that at some point, um, maybe around, aro…… (8:1705 [8:2235])

**Created** by User on 7/4/2021

The situation was sort of too many cooks in the kitchen. So, uh, each one of the core members, had a different vision as to what kind of direction the [CBI] should take.

## 5:22 Had there been no trust between our members and the community, our org…… (4:1616 [4:2378])

**Created** by User on 7/8/2021

Had there been no trust between our members and the community, our organization would have not grown this much. today we are expanding beyond Beirut, we are taking in more projects, we don't work for the sake of working. we are working towards deploying the donor's money into places where they have most impact.

## 14:1 We met in the thawra, we didn't know each other. And there's a blind…… (1:197 [1:698])

**Created** by User on 7/30/2021

We met in the thawra, we didn't know each other. And there's a blind trust. it is very easy to collaborate or work with people that have the same mindset, and the same sense of patriotism and that are catalysts in terms of their personality where they are able to make a difference in people's lives.

## Annex 11: Bridging in terms of Collaboration

> *The following is a report exported from Atlas Ti. It shows 114 quotations. 48 of those quotations are derived from primary data (interviews), explaining the collaborations they had with other CBIs or NGOs. 12 of the 114 quotations are shared in this report as well as 8 sources from social media depicting collaborations between CBIs.*
>
> *Note: names of members and CBIs were omitted to respect anonymity.*

## Project: Performance of CBIs

Report created by User on 8/1/2021

### Report for Query: I: SC_Bridg_Collab with other CBI

(12/114) quotations

---

### 3:19 And always, always, always work the initiatives and collaboration wit…… (4:209 [4:518]) – Interview CBI

**Created** by User on 7/4/2021

And always, always, always work the initiatives in collaboration with people, with individuals, with NGOs, with specialized people that know what they're doing. there's no competing, on the contrary, the idea is to collaborate. The idea is to mobilize as many people and NGOs and civic society. I actually made it a point to get in contact with them know, what they were doing, where they are working, you know, who they are assisting so that we don't go and like duplicate the work.

---

### 5:20 We are currently working together with [CBI] on renovating and…… (4:1 [4:498]) – Interview CBI

**Created** by User on 7/8/2021

We are currently working together with [CBI] on renovating and reconstructing a chocolate factory. They are known for heritage and business development. we are known for reconstruction. so now sometimes we are working together on initiatives with shared funds.

---

### 5:23 when the explosion happened, i saw my house and my office and i saw th…… (5:73 [5:827]) – Interview CBI

**Created** by User on 7/8/2021

when the explosion happened, i saw my house and my office and i saw the devastating situation around me. i saw that alone i cannot achieve anything. so we created [CBI] as a colatition of NGOs and initiatives: […] we saw that we were able to work together and we developed our work. we started working with grassroot initiatives or those that were already registered as NGOs. but either way all organizations grew immensely after the explosion. […] we exchanged data, expertise and even donors.

## 8:18 with [CBI], they would be sort of our consultants.…… (4:2597 [4:3110]) – Interview CBI

**Created** by User on 7/25/2021

with [CBI], they would be sort of our consultants. So if we're repairing a heritage building, we know we need experts in restoration in architectural restoration, we don't have that expertise they do. So that's where we collaborate, like we share knowledge. So they would give us their expertise, we have the means to get the job done. So we have the contractors, we have the funding, we have sort of the labor, so we can do it. And they sort of guide, so it's a nice mutual relationship.

## 11:16 We did collaborations, with [CBI], who helped us launch and supported us before we…… (3:881 [3:1069]) – Interview CBI

**Created** by User on 7/29/2021

We did collaborations, with [CBI], who helped us launch and supported us before we got organized an initiated a team. There's also [CBI]; we were exchanging beneficiaries and human resources.

## 12:15 I'm someone who believes in partnership, I don't believe that you can d…… (4:1870 [4:2852]) – Interview CBI

**Created** by User on 7/30/2021

I'm someone who believes in partnership, I don't believe that you can do anything alone. Okay, you can decide on things to do. But whenever you partner with anyone, I mean, chances multiply, provided that the person you're working with is also working with the same currency that you're that you are actually providing. So we actually worked with other initiatives and other NGOs.

## 13:14 We are collaborating now with [CBI] on a vintage chocolate sh…… (2:1835 [2:2055]) – Interview CBI

**Created** by User on 7/30/2021

We are collaborating now with [CBI] on a vintage chocolate shop. We heard so much about them and the work they were doing. Their dedication and transparency. They were recommended to us by international donors.

### 13:15 We are collaborating together because we thing it is necessary to hav…… (2:2128 [2:2377]) – Interview CBI

**Created** by User on 7/30/2021

We are collaborating together because we thing it is necessary to have different organizations working together. Especially that there is no coordinating body and no strategy. We are communicating with each other as organizations and CBIs and NGOs

### 14:6 It was a joint effort with multiple organizations and initiatives. Th…… (1:3030 [1:3216]) – Interview CBI

**Created** by User on 7/30/2021

It was a joint effort with multiple organizations and initiatives. There was no one working alone. Then we started understanding who is there, what they can do, what their expertise is.

### 26:7 UN OCHA has commented on the structured approach to the civil society…… (16:982 [16:1412]) - D 26: ACAPS - Situation Analysis Report - Aug 2020

UN OCHA has commented on the structured approach to the civil society and community response. There is a strong network of local humanitarian actors and organizations collecting and disseminating information on the response through WhatsApp communications. With limited resources due to the economic climate and acute needs, it remains to be seen if the structure of the civil society will be able to coordinate effectively.

### 28:4 Funds allocated to NGOs are not enough to cover the huge consequences…… (8:1 [8:576]) - D 28: Beirut, One Year Later_ People-Driven Reconstruction Efforts Midst Devastated Nation _ ArchDaily

Funds allocated to NGOs are not enough to cover the huge consequences of the blast, especially with the collapse of the economy and the cost of material. Therefore, priorities are given to sheltering people, closing openings, repairing partially, and installing windows and doors. Initiatives have come together in order to push forward reconstruction eforts, as far as possible, given the circumstances, and to divide the workload: from rehabilitating residential and commercial units, especially for lower-income households and small businesses, to full-on renovations.

### 28:7 Coming together is an act of resistance and resist the city shall do.…… (13:1 [13:71]) - D 28: Beirut, One Year Later_ People-Driven Reconstruction Efforts Midst Devastated Nation _ ArchDaily

Coming together is an act of resistance and resist the city shall do.

**Image 27 Baytna Baytak (IG account)**



**Image 28 Basecamp (IG account)**



**Image 29 Rashet Kheir (IG account)**



**Image 30 Together Li Beirut (IG account)**



**Image 31 Rise Build Beirut (IG account)**

**Image 32 Riseup Lebanon (IG account) - series of partnerships**

# Annex 12: Platforms for exchange of resources

*This annex includes platforms that were used to coordinate action and exchange resources between CBIs and LNGOs working on disaster recovery*



**Image 33 Elda3em platform – source https://elda3em.com/**

Elda3em website was created as an initiative to consolidate the services, NGOs, initiatives, companies, and individuals offering help for those affected by the blast. It also included an overview of the organizations/initiatives mapping the reconstruction progress happening.

**References below also sourced from elda3m.com that included other platforms**

## Beirut Explosion Response Map

Beirut Map made for first responders, initiative from de Global Shapers Tijuana Hub, Mexico and Beirut Hub Made with data from HOSM and NASA/JPL. Map author: Carlos Acosta, Vice Curator of the Tijuana Hub, Mexico



## AUB - Shake Up Beirut Map

A detailed map on ArcGIS that shows impacted houses with a questionare filled by the who occupy those houses and spaces. There are multiple layers to this map that you can select to change your view.



## UNHCR - Beirut Blast Operational Zones

This map has been developed to help coordinate and collaborate on relief efforts at the operational level. Level 3 Administrative boundaries in Lebanon 'Cadasters' are too large for operational purposes and hence were divided into Zones. Those zones will be used as a reference to facilitate the data collection for all different aspects of the response. A Zone can be defined as a cluster of built-up plots separated by the road network within the Administrative Level 3 – Cadasters of Lebanon.



## Open Map Lebanon

A detailed map for Ground Actions, Available Beds and Fundraising Efforts put together by Thawra Map.



## Thawra Map

A detailed map for Ground Actions, Available Beds and Fundraising Efforts put together by Thawra Map.

# Annex 13: Impact of SM on Bridging

*The following is a report exported from Atlas Ti. It shows 33 quotations from the interviewed sample CBIs and secondary data, explaining the impact of the organized social movement on the level of bridging among the CBIs. The reported is the co-occurrence of the codes: Self-organizing Social Movement x Bridging.*

*Note: names of members and CBIs were omitted to respect anonymity.*

## Project: Performance of CBIs

Report created by User on 8/2/2021

### Report for Query: DOWN(C: SelfOrganizing) COOC DOWN(D: SC_Bridging)

(5/33) quotations

---

### 1:11 Thawra was the incentives or trigger to our mobilizing of CBI. It cont…… (2:2315 [2:2488])

**Created** by User on 6/23/2021

Thawra was the incentives or trigger to our mobilizing of CBI. It contributed to increasing our network.

---

### 1:29 But with CBIs that were also created following the October 17 revolut…… (4:2424 [4:2998])

**Created** by User on 7/6/2021

But with CBIs that were also created following the October 17 revolution, we had a very good communication, a very good relationship. Why? Bcz the group that we were in and we got introduced to each other from, we were all part of it. [referring to the whatsapp group] We were on very good terms. We were working together and if they or us had a lack, we were supporting each other and exchanging resources. We were all, if not friends, very good acquaintances. So, we were helping each other out.

---

### 2:55 Yes yes, of course [we were exchanging information], but only with people…… (8:2464 [8:2996])

**Created** by User on 6/27/2021, **modified** by User on 8/2/2021

Yes yes, of course [we were exchanging information], but only with people we trust. only with people we trust. like it's people like. I'll give you an example, this person, I've been

friends with him from day one [of the SM]. It had to be people we trust to share the information and people we worked with. For example, that time the port caught fire again. That was a collaboration between us, we knew them from the streets.

---

## 2:71 And don't forget we met in the Thawra, so I am part of many CBIs,…… (7:152 [7:389])

**Created** by User on 7/29/2021

And don't forget we met in the Thawra, so I am part of many CBIs [named 5 CBIs]. I'm in touch with all of them. So it was nice that we could communicate with each other will not overlap each other

---

## 5:23 when the explosion happened, i saw my house and my office and i saw th…… (5:73 [5:827])

**Created** by User on 7/8/2021

when the explosion happened, i saw my house and my office and i saw the devastating situation around me. i saw that alone i cannot achieve anything. so we created [CBI] as a colatition of NGOs and initiatives. Many were active in Thawra. we saw that we were able to work together, and we developed our work. we started working with grassroot initiatives or those that were already registered as NGOs. but eitherway all organizations grew immensely after the explosion. we worked with [named 4 other CBIs], we exchanegd data, exptertise and even donors.

---

## 6:41 when the Thawra happened? I was from the people who were really activ…… (10:3037 [10:4083])

**Created** by User on 7/10/2021

"I was from the people who were really active on the ground during the 'Thawra'. We realized that organizing anything can done can be done very easily. Nowadays with WhatsApp and everything and you have so many tools online to be able to organize yourselves. And skill was acquired in Thawra. For example "There's now a political convoy passing through Ring. You have to go to Ring". So we learned how to organize ourselves remotely. So when we started the [CBI], and when we start to organize ourselves, we had the tools that we used for Thawra like it wasn't the exact tool, but we knew that we can use something online to be able to work remotely together and to organize. So yeah, the Thawra and the situation of the country really helped us out because we had more or less the experience to be able to work remotely and specially with the pandemic. We kind of had this "skill" that helped us out in organizing."

# Annex 14: SM online platforms supporting CBIs

> *This annex contains a report on social media accounts of the social movement collecting resources and supporting CBIs.*



**Image 34 IG posts calling for volunteers and donations (sources: @Daleelthawra @muwatinlebnene)**

# Annex 15: Beirut Forward Emergency Room

"The government, together with the Lebanese Army leadership launched the Forward Emergency Room (FER) to initiate the disaster response. The FER is now acting as the central disaster relief coordinator across all key activities for immediate support, such as food, medical care, renovation works, shelter, cleaning-up, and rebuilding." (beirutfer.com, 2020)



**Image 35 Requirements for Registration with Beirut FER (source: beirutfer.com)**



**Image 36 meeting initiated by Beirut FER (@RamiShamma, 2020)**

# Annex 16: Articles on International Funding

"The World Pledges Help for Lebanese People, not the Government A number of international governments have been working to mobilize resources quickly and respond to the overwhelming challenges confronting Beirut.

Shortly after the blast, French President Emmanuel Macron and the United Nations co-organized a virtual donor summit. More than 30 international leaders and government officials took part in the video conference, including Jordan's King Abdullah II and Egypt's President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi. Key Arab states in the Gulf were represented, as were Britain, China and the United States. As a result of the summit, the international community pledged nearly $300 million in aid, to be routed to the UN, international organizations and non-governmental organizations and delivered directly to the Lebanese people. After the summit, President Macron said "The Lebanese authorities must now implement political and economic reforms demanded by the Lebanese people and which alone will enable the international community to act effectively alongside Lebanon for reconstruction." (Anera, 2020)

"Assem Abi Ali, an adviser to the minister of social affairs who has been working on the government's response to the explosion, acknowledged that local groups have played a key role in responding to the blast, as well as to previous problems. He told TNH that because of "the inability of the government throughout the past years to provide the necessary support to the people, much of the support was given by the civil society… to fill the gap." […] "Following mass protests in the aftermath of the explosion, the entire Lebanese cabinet and its prime minister resigned, but they will stay on in a caretaker capacity. Abi Ali said that given the ongoing financial crisis and the presence of around 1.5 million Syrian refugees in the country, "the Lebanese government definitely needs help and support from the international community and civil society." (Chehayeb & Sewell, 2020)

"After the explosion, humanitarian aid has started flowing. An international donor conference mobilised almost US$300 million to be coordinated by the UN in Lebanon with longer-term support contingent on reform. This situation is both a dilemma and a rare opportunity for Lebanon. While assistance for any country in crisis should normally flow through, or in coordination with, state institutions, in Lebanon most such institutions are deeply mistrusted and not well placed to lead humanitarian assistance efforts. Local civil society must be empowered to manage and monitor the response and the international humanitarian support." (The lancet - Vol 396 October 31, 2020)

# Annex 17: Linking - Lack of trust in Governmental Institutions

*The following is a report exported from Atlas Ti. It shows 8 quotations from the interviewed sample CBIs, explaining the attitude of CBIs towards the government, and how that affected the trust in that relationship. Moreover, it includes a series of social media posts that explain what the situation of emergency means for the social movement. The reported is the co-occurrence of the codes: Political statement x collaborations with institutions.*

*Note: names of members and CBIs were omitted to respect anonymity.*

## Project: Performance of CBIs

Report created by User on 8/3/2021

### Report for Query: I: IntMot_Political Statement COOC I: SC_Link_Collaborations with Institutions

(8) quotations

---

### 3:20 We were the ones holding signs, don't give money to the government…… (4:1263 [4:1906])

**Created** by User on 7/4/2021

We were the ones holding signs, don't give money to the government, give money to the engineers. But I mean, I think we were the first one to actually make that political statement, you know, down from the ground.

---

### 3:33 Keep in mind the biggest, biggest, biggest asset is data. Yeah. You kn…… (9:236 [9:742])

**Created** by User on 7/4/2021

Keep in mind the biggest, biggest, biggest asset is data. That's where the value is. And I do this because we literally have people that are willing to pay for it, but no, this data that we've gathered for the past 11 months is sacred. this is people's lives. The army comes to us a bunch of times, asking for data. No, no, sorry. What are you going to use it for?

---

### 5:32 Moreover, we are apolitical but have immense love to our country. We r…… (6:1301 [6:1431])

**Created** by User on 7/8/2021

Moreover, we are apolitical but have immense love to our country. We refuse to work with politically affiliated NGOs or donors or volunteers.

**7:22 We don't need any donations or we don't need any fundraising from any p…… (5:3861 [6:208])**

**Created** by User on 7/25/2021

We don't need any donations or we don't need any fundraising from any political party so this was this was a key factor for me because I don't want rise build Beirut to be affiliated with any political party.

**8:37 No, no, no, no. Zero. We weren't approached and we wouldn't approach……. (5:2600 [5:2763])**

**Created** by User on 7/29/2021

No, no, no, no. Zero. We weren't approached and we wouldn't approach. We will not work with any entity of the government, not collaborate, not nothing with them.

**13:42 All of us who helped, were against the state and what the government h…… (5:2392 [5:2750])**

**Created** by User on 7/30/2021

All of us who helped, were against the state and what the government has done so far. Even we refused many opportunities of financing from any political entity that wanted to support us. Because we believe this is dirty money that was stolen from the Lebanese people. At many instances we received financial support from politicians but we would refuse it.

**13:43 The diaspora that was funding us made a point that we not be affiliate…… (5:2753 [5:3013])**

**Created** by User on 7/30/2021

The diaspora that was funding us made a point that we not be affiliated to any political entity and that we not be supporting of the current government. It is a failed state, a failed and corrupt state. But we keep our hope, and this they cannot take from us.

**14:8 No no no no. we have nothing to do with the state and we do not commun…… (2:197 [2:629])**

**Created** by User on 7/30/2021

No no no no. we have nothing to do with the state and we do not communicate with the government.

# Annex 18: Intrinsic Motivation – Survey Results

> *The following is data report retrieved from questionnaire sent to CBIs leaders on motivation. (see Annex 1 for full questionnaire)*

**I participated in/organized initiatives in the recovery of the built environment because:**



**Figure 17 Motivation results of Survey (by author)**

# Annex 19: Motivation – Enhancement

> *The following is a report exported from Atlas Ti. This annex shows 10/ 24 quotations from the interviewed sample CBIs and secondary data, explaining how enhancement motivated CBIs to mobilize. The reported is a query for the dimension Enhancement, it includes having a purpose, and wanting to learn.*
>
> *Note: names of members and CBIs were omitted to respect anonymity.*

## Project: Performance of CBIs

Report created by User on 8/3/2021

### Report for Query: DOWN(D: IntMot_Enhancement)

(8/24) quotations

---

### 2:35 We learned also! I don't know anything about engineering or architect…… (5:1558 [5:2095]) - D 2: Interview 02

**Created** by User on 6/27/2021

We learned also! I don't know anything about engineering or architecture when I was a wedding planner. I was surprised by myself the other day I used a sentence with a bunch of technical words that I would have never known before.

---

### 3:39 the third one being the professionals that wanted to apply their skill…… (10:556 [10:901]) – D3 : Interview 03

**Created** by User on 7/4/2021

the third one being the professionals that wanted to apply their skills, their professional skills within the rehabilitation or the help. Um, and these are a bit different, obviously, because they're looking for, you know, very specific things, whether it's in a heritage house or whether it's businesses or whether it's a specific expertise.

---

### 4:9 My final year project for my Masters was about the heritage in Gemmayze…… (3:636 [3:1695]) – D4 : Interview 05

**Created** by User on 7/6/2021

My final year project for my Masters was about the heritage in Gemmayze. So I had a bit of an idea. And I was working before the blast on the heritage mappings. So it was something that was very important for me to be able to join a team like that. And, i mobilized myself to be available and to just to try to help out. And this is something that

happened with every NGO or organization like you had a massive number of people that wanted to volunteer. And, that's actually good because a lot of people got to do a lot of work. Thanks to those volunteers.

### 7:19 In our initiative we are a team of professionals. We try to benefit every…… (5:1621 [5:2475]) - D 7: Interview 08

**Created** by User on 7/25/2021

In our initiative we are a team of professionals. We try to benefit every single volunteer, for example, we approached university architecture students: this is a chance for you to learn how to respond to this. It is good for you as well to know more materials to see how things are happening on site. So to go out of the theory, in design and do more practical ground work. And that's helped a lot because I could see most of the team members in the hub, were fresh grads they were excellent in organizing and responding. And they were so passionate to this because this is the first thing that they're doing.

### 8:30 we all need to grow more professionally, personally, and Beb w Shebbe…… (7:2913 [7:3031]) - D 8: Interview 09

**Created** by User on 7/25/2021

we all need to grow more professionally, personally, and [CBI] was the perfect opportunity to start our career. […] The work we do is so important. It's, I can't begin to tell you how fulfilled I personally feel doing this kind of work.

### 8:38 all of us are only engineers, architects, interior designers like that…… (6:1286 [6:1590]) - D 8: Interview 09

**Created** by User on 7/29/2021

All of us are only engineers, architects, interior designers, you won't find anyone else from another major. So I know we're all mostly fresh graduates. So it's just a learning experience for everybody at once.

### 19:2 even volunteering can be another viable way to challenge the sense of…… (11:740 [11:973]) - D 19: Booz Allen- Reversing the trend of emotional lows- Report sept 2020

**Created** by User on 7/30/2021

even volunteering can be another viable way to challenge the sense of helplessness that often accompanies trauma. By helping others, impacted individuals can recall their main strengths and reclaim their sense of emotional control.

## 29:3 Every day, we are motivated by the knowledge that we will see the frui…… (3:2435 [3:2734]) - D 29: Beneficiary's testimony - « Nation Station », Lebanese youth in action

**Created** by User on 7/30/2021

Every day, we are motivated by the knowledge that we will see the fruit of our efforts and the journey, from the frst cucumber box we unload, to bagging it, to handing it over in person. Helping to put a smile back on the faces of those who have lost everything means so much to us as volunteers.

# Annex 20: Motivation – Values

*The following is a report exported from Atlas Ti. It shows 13/64 quotations from the interviewed sample CBIs and secondary data, explaining the role of values as a motivation towards mobilizing the work of CBIs. The reported is a query for the dimension Values, it includes helping others & patriotism*

*Note: names of members and CBIs were omitted to respect anonymity.*

## Project: Performance of CBIs

Report created by User on 8/3/2021

### Report for Query: DOWN(D: IntMot_Values)

(13/64) quotations

---

### 1:33 We came with no background in what we did. We felt it was a duty, huma...... (5:2255 [5:2922])

**Created** by User on 7/6/2021

We came with no background in what we did. We felt it was a duty, humanitarian, for the community. It's a duty. We cannot not help. Even if we knew nothing. For someone with no experience in charity work and organizations, we were born, and we grew and generated a network of people, of locating underprivileged families, of suppliers, providers, yes we did very well. Of course, we can always be better, but in terms of crisis, we did great.

---

### 1:34 People. Humanity. Willingness to help people. People had the will to h...... (5:2988 [6:178])

**Created** by User on 7/6/2021

People. Humanity. Willingness to help people.

People had the will to help others. There was this unity. Everyone wanted to help. People want to volunteer. I was being called by volunteers every day and they were asking how can we help? It's not me who was calling. I wasn't asking for them. They found me on the streets.

---

### 3:37 The first motivation is the general civic, feel of duty to...... (10:1 [10:295])

**Created** by User on 7/4/2021

The first motivation is the general civic feel of duty to work, helping in a catastrophe, helping your fellow citizen through a catastrophe, which obviously brings a lot of self-satisfaction. You sleep better at night knowing that you did something good for someone.

---

## 5:8 So basically, after the revolution, everyone is motivated to help the…… (2:1 [2:598])

**Created** by User on 7/8/2021

So basically, after the revolution, everyone is motivated to help the country to see the change. […] this was our motivation, to be very honest, to help the country.

---

## 5:30 The team is very dedicated to help Lebanon. In any meeting, we start w…… (6:868 [6:1300])

**Created** by User on 7/8/2021

The team is very dedicated to help Lebanon. In any meeting, we start with a video to remind ourselves why we started and why we are here. We started to help people, we cannot be late with delivering our work, we need to maintain quality and respect the time.

---

## 5:31 We give to [CBI] from all our hearts. We want to help the co…… (6:1433 [6:1811])

**Created** by User on 7/8/2021

We give to [CBI] from all our hearts. We want to help the country. We want the change in the country. In our vision and mission, we work in crisis to support people with socio-economic vulnerabilities.

---

## 7:23 After October 2019, people were more eager to make the change. And tha…… (6:511 [6:1337])

**Created** by User on 7/25/2021

After October 2019, people were more eager to make the change. And that was escalating an environment prepared to do the difference and to be active in the community. The whole nation came to Beirut to clean debris and glass. If thawra wasn't there, we could have seen this flood of people, but in my opinion it wouldn't have been with the same intensity. The overall environment was preparing the people to help each other. Muslims stood by Christians and druze. Maybe it was the first time we felt united and people escaped the cocoon of their political parties and religions and united together as a nation. Thawra in 2019 prepared this environment of solidarity to face the blast.

## 10:19 You will be surprised with the amount of volunteers seeking to help. Th…… (6:29 [6:130])

**Created** by User on 7/30/2021

You will be surprised with the amount of volunteers wanting to help. The blessing of helping others.

## 12:4 I mean, what motivated me, I felt it was like, time to give something…… (1:2396 [1:2539])

**Created** by User on 7/30/2021

I mean, what motivated me, I felt it was like, time to give something back, eventually, more than anything else.

## 12:5 ever since I was young, I've always been helping people. I mean, ever…… (2:238 [2:1663])

**Created** by User on 7/30/2021

ever since I was young, I've always been helping people. I mean, ever since I was like, 10-11 years old, I've always been into any kind of movement or any kind of community activities. So I've always helped, I've always taken care either through activities with elderly or with supporting children in their after school homework. During the war, we used to have a different kind of support, like, humanitarian support, sending boxes of food. So I used to do that I have always been active in the community ever since I was 11 years old, it's not something new to me. But this time, it was different this time, I felt that I should be leading this because I have this experience all through and this time, it was different.

## 14:12 Our motivation was to serve the country. Even before the explosion. Ou…… (2:1159 [2:1318])

**Created** by User on 7/30/2021

Our motivation was to serve the country. Even before the explosion. Our motivation was our patriotism. We emerged because of our patriotism and our humanity. […] I am Lebanese at the end of the day. It is my country and my land. and I am part of this community and this government. So now I want to make a difference and I don't want to sit and watch. There's always something we can do. To be a part of history and to make a change in the community.

## 19:2 even volunteering can be another viable way to challenge the sense of…… (11:740 [11:973]) - D 19: Booz Allen- Reversing the trend of emotional lows- Report sept 2020

**Created** by User on 7/30/2021

even volunteering can be another viable way to challenge the sense of helplessness that often accompanies trauma. By helping others, impacted individuals can recall their main strengths and reclaim their sense of emotional control.

## 29:3 Every day, we are motivated by the knowledge that we will see the frui…… (3:2435 [3:2734]) - D 29: Beneficiary's testimony - « Nation Station », Lebanese youth in action

**Created** by User on 7/30/2021

Every day, we are motivated by the knowledge that we will see the fruit of our efforts and the journey, from the frst cucumber box we unload, to bagging it, to handing it over in person. Helping to put a smile back on the faces of those who have lost everything means so much to us as volunteers.

# Annex 21: Motivation by absence of institutional support

> *The following is a report exported from Atlas Ti. It shows 15 quotations from the interviewed sample CBIs and secondary data, explaining the attitude of CBIs towards the government, and how that affected the motivation as a political statement especially with the absence of support from the institutions.  The reported is the co-occurrence of the codes: Motivation_Political statement x Challenge_Institutional support.*
>
> *Note: names of members and CBIs were omitted to respect anonymity.*

## Project: Performance of CBIs

Report created by User on 8/4/2021

### Report for Query: DOWN(I: IntMot_Political Statement) COOC DOWN(I: Perf_Chall_Institutional support)

(10/15) quotations

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### 2:46 I love seeing how many of us we were. So a that overflow was anger. It…… (7:2157 [7:2248])

**Created** by User on 6/27/2021

I love seeing how many of us we were. So a that overflow was anger. It was a lot of anger [towards the government].

---

### 3:50 if it wasn't for the NGOs, and the city wouldn't have been rebuilt, i…… (5:1125 [5:1252])

**Created** by User on 7/29/2021

if it wasn't for the NGOs, and the city wouldn't have been rebuilt, it's as simple as that the government didn't do anything

---

### 4:34 think that the revolution helped a lot. There was this anger towards t…… (10:2576 [10:2976])

**Created** by User on 7/6/2021

think that the revolution helped a lot. There was this anger towards the government and the whole situation. This created courage to help those who were affected. It wouldn't have turned out the same way without the Thawra, but we still would have had the help.

## 5:9 Then people start talking about the Thawra is doing something for the p…… (2:642 [2:1244])

**Created** by User on 7/8/2021

Then people start talking about the thawra is doing something for the people and not the government.

## :12 After the blast, the inflation, the corona. So many bad things happen…… (5:691 [5:1298])

**Created** by User on 7/9/2021

After the blast, the inflation, the corona. So many bad things happened to the country that the need was growing and people are becoming more dependent on groups like us. But the government is in total absence of anything in the country, like they are not providing anything from medicines from electricity from, from so many different stuff.

## 6:21 And what we are doing is just taking over what the government has to…… (6:1550 [6:2148])

**Created** by User on 7/9/2021

And what we are doing is just taking over what the government has to do. There was no one, any official that came to them to help them. It was only us, or people like us.

## 8:6 The need to help the people, the need to create an initiative to help peop…… (1:3087 [2:752])

**Created** by User on 7/25/2021

The need to help the people, the need to create an initiative to help people, something by the people, for the people, that doesn't rely on a government that doesn't exist. And the government that does exist is completely incompetent. And that's why we're here.

## 13:42 All of us who helped, were against the state and what the government h…… (5:2392 [5:2750])

**Created** by User on 7/30/2021

All of us who helped, were against the state and what the government has done so far

## 3:15 So yes, this is obviously a lot of work that the municipalities are su…… (3:338 [3:845])

**Created** by User on 7/4/2021

So yes, this is obviously a lot of work that the municipalities are supposed to be doing.

---

## 8:37 No, no, no, no. Zero. We weren't approached and we wouldn't approach.…… (5:2600 [5:2763])

**Created** by User on 7/29/2021

No, no, no, no. Zero. We weren't approached and we wouldn't approach. we will not work with any entity of the government, not collaborate, not nothing with them.

---

## 14:8 No no no no. we have nothing to do with the state and we do not commun…… (2:197 [2:629])

**Created** by User on 7/30/2021

No no no no. we have nothing to do with the state and we do not communicate with the government. The municipality nor the police nor the state nor the army came to the ground in the first 3-4 weeks. It was only the civil society. We stayed there for 66 days and we did not see anyone.

---

## 14:20 We took over the job of the government. This area was controlled by th…… (3:578 [3:837])

**Created** by User on 7/30/2021

We took over the job of the government. This area was controlled by the civil society not the state. We ran the show. If it weren't for us, Beirut would have still had rubble in the streets.

---

## 24:4 national and local groups face less security constraints, often have b…… (10:1045 [10:1734]) - D 24: Refugees International - Report March 2021

**Created** by User (3) on 8/10/2021

National and local groups face less security constraints, often have better understanding of local realities, and have demonstrated great capacities in responding to crises. In recent years, Lebanese NGOs, grassroots groups, charities, and volunteers stepped up to fill the vacuum, as governments grappled with successive crises and often failed to offer even basic protection and support to the most vulnerable. At both the national and local levels, organizations and individuals have distributed food, clothing, cash, medicine, and other necessities as needs have significantly increased. CSOs were also the main actors both in the aftermath of the explosion and six months later.

# Annex 22: Impact Lebanon

> *Impact Lebanon is an NGO based in London. It started out as an online initiative to collect financial support to Lebanon during the crisis and to group expats in support of the social movement. Impact Lebanon played an important role in financially supporting the CBIs by gathering funds from the Lebanese diaspora. Below is an overview of its values, initiatives and fund allocation to the CBIs & LNGOs working in the Beirut explosion.*

"At Impact Lebanon, we raise money to support viable initiatives for change and relief in Lebanon and distribute it to trusted and rigorously vetted organisations on the ground. […] Our most important selection criteria for beneficiary NGOs is that they are apolitical and non-sectarian, that they are legally registered, that they have ongoing initiatives to address the crisis and that they've passed an audit test."

**Source: https://www.impactlebanon.org/fundraisers**



Humanitarian solidarity
**Online Fundraising Campaign**
December 15, 2019

Humanitarian solidarity
**Charity Clothes Drive**
December 1, 2019

Capacity building
**Dikkeni Online Concept Store**
May 24, 2020

Awareness activism
**Kelna Ya3ne Kelna Videos**
November 15, 2019

Awareness activism
**Informative Videos**
November 15, 2019

Humanitarian solidarity
**Care for our Carers Fundraiser**
March 30, 2020

Awareness activism
**Seminars and Panel Discussions**
November 15, 2019

Awareness activism
**thawra-chronicles.org**
October 20, 2019

Capacity building
**Food Waste Research**
February 12, 2020

Sustainability
**Environment Academy**
January 9, 2020

Humanitarian solidarity
**Coronavirus Relief Fund**
March 16, 2020

Capacity building
**Mentorship Program**
April 14, 2020

**Image 37 Initiatives by Impact Lebanon to support during crisis period (before the explosion)**

# NGO Allocation Summary

| NGO | Vertical of operation | Amount Allocated | Project Status | Delivery date (*projected) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alfanar | MSMB support | USD 383,500 | Ongoing | June 2021 |
| Al Ghina | Residential rehabilitation, MSMB support | USD 100,000 | Complete | Apr 2021 |
| Al Majmoua | MSMB support, Livelihood support | USD 597,700 | Ongoing | *Sept 2021 |
| Anti Racism Movement | Livelihood support | USD 100,000 | Complete | May 2021 |
| Arcenciel | Residential rehabilitation, Hospitals and medical bodies support | USD 390,282 | Ongoing | *Sept 2021 |
| Basmeh & Zeitooneh | Residential rehabilitation, MSMB support, Livelihood support | USD 499,500 | Complete | June 2021 |
| Baytna Baytak | Residential rehabilitation, MSMB support | USD 181,600** | Ongoing | *Aug 2021 |
| Beb w' Shebbek | Residential rehabilitation | USD 500,000 | Complete | May 2021 |
| Beit El Baraka | Residential rehabilitation, MSMB support | USD 1,420,000 | Ongoing | *Sept 2021 |
| Catalytic Action | Mental health and community support | USD 47,221 | Ongoing | *Aug 2021 |

(*) Projected end date
(**) Baytna Baytak has been allocated an additional USD 95,000 in July 2021, which is not reflected here for consistency.
All metrics are updated as of June 30 2021 (= to date)

| NGO | Vertical of operation | Amount Allocated | Project Status | Delivery date (*projected) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Embrace | Mental Health and Community support | USD 182,415 | Ongoing | *Mar 2022 (long-term project) |
| The House of Christmas | Heritage rehabilitation, Residential rehabilitation, MSMB support | USD 539,200 | Ongoing | *Aug 2022 (long-term project) |
| Lebanese Red Cross *First project funded as unrestricted cash donation, not monitored by M&E* | Hospitals and medical bodies support, Livelihoods support | USD 130,000 | N/A | N/A |
| Lebanon Needs | Hospitals and medical bodies support | USD 400,000 | Ongoing | *Sept 2021 |
| Live Love Lebanon | Residential rehabilitation, heritage rehabilitation | USD 400,000 | Ongoing | * Dec 2021 |
| Nusaned | Residential rehabilitation, MSMB support, Heritage rehabilitation | USD 1,550,000 | Ongoing | *Jul 2021 |
| Rise Up Lebanon | MSMB support | USD 320,000 | Ongoing | *Jul 2021 |
| Rotary Club | Hospitals and medical bodies support | USD 1,089,350 | Ongoing | *Dec 2021 |
| **TOTAL** | | **USD 8,830,768** | | |

**Image 38 Impact Lebanon Fund allocation - Transparency**

Disaster in context of Crisis: Assessing the performance of Community-based initiatives in urban disaster recovery: A Case study of Beirut Port explosion

# Annex 23: Relationship between CBIs & Beneficiaries

> *The following is a report exported from Atlas Ti. The report contains 34 quotations from the interviewed sample CBIs and secondary data, explaining the relationship of CBIs with their beneficiaries. In this annex, 6 out 34 quotations are reported*
>
> *Note: names of members and CBIs were omitted to respect anonymity.*

# Project: Performance of CBIs

Report created by User on 8/7/2021

## Code Report

Selected codes (1)

---

## ● I: Perf_Outcome_Relationship with Beneficiaries

Comment: by User

> *if they have established a relationship with their beneficiaries, if they are satisfied with the work, or if they are involved in the reconstruction activities*

**showing 6/21 Quotations:**

### 2:14 I mean, now that I know them on a personal level, I know which one's…… (1:587 [1:768])

I mean, now that I know them on a personal level, I know which one's mother has cancer, I know which one's father has diabetes, I know which one was going through dialysis or not.

### 5:30 Our value is to remain close to our beneficiaries, and they in return…… (6:868 [6:1300]) - D 5: Interview 04 - Baytna Baytak 2

Our value is to remain close to our beneficiaries, and they in return love us a lot and have an immense amount of respect for us and what we do. The connection is great.

### 6:53 We created this network between us and the beneficiaries. Now, the family is not only…… (13:2092 [13:2835])

We created this network between us and the beneficiaries. Now, the family is not only within the CBI itself, it is also the people who are around us and who are visiting us just to just to say hi or just to sit with us so when we see people smiling in our face and coming to check on us. You feel that treated good in the Community. You feel that we are reaching the point where we can say that we did good in this area.

### 7:30 We built a human relationship. It went more than just fixing their…… (7:1888 [7:2108])

We built a human relationship. It went more than just fixing their homes. We were building emotional relations between the volunteers and the people.

### 13:25 We are very connected to the beneficiaries. We were always available a…… (3:3171 [3:3626])

We are very connected to the beneficiaries. We were always available and we have formed a relationship with them. We were there for them when no one else was, the government I mean, and we have bonded through hardships. We could not have maintained a professional relationship with them, there was a human contact. And most importantly, we were trying to maintain their dignity; because of what they are going through stripped them off their dignity.

### 30:3 . "We really thought we'd stay for just one week. But two weeks on,…… (2:624 [2:790]) - D 30: Civil society stepped in to fill the void left by the state in the port blast recovery efforts — and never left - L'Orient Today

"We really thought we'd stay for just one week. But two weeks on, with the help of volunteers, donors and beneficiaries, we created a community and public space.

# Annex 24: Neighbourhood scale Initiatives



**Image 39 Movie night initiative by Nation Station**



**Image 40 Community kitchen by Nation Station**

**Image 41 Highlighting local SMEs in one of Beirut's neighborhoods (source: Basecamp IG)**



**Image 42 Workshop with students who made a Mockup of their dream school (source: Basecamp IG)**

**Image 43 mapping out community spaces (source: Rashetkheir IG)**



**Image 44 BLAST initiative - Beautiful Lebanese Artists in Strong Times (source: Rashet Kheir IG)**

# Annex 25: Testimonials from Beneficiaries

These testimonials were sourced from Baytna Baytak website.



*"I am happy Baytna Baytak came to repair my house. After the blast my home was not suitable to live in. They repaired everything : the doors, the windows, and now they even repaired the balcony ceiling that was about to collapse." Rene*



*" Two days after the blast I went to Basecamp and met the Baytna Baytak team. I asked them to help me fix my house, little did I know that the restoration work will start just a few days after I met them. Baytna Baytak were very helpful, we worked hand in hand to rebuild and restore the house with love and passion." Caren.*



*"I received a call from Baytna baytak, 15 minutes later they were at my home and fixed all the damages. I now feel safe that my doors and windows were fixed." Souhaila Wakim.*

# Annex 26: An Evaluation of Beirut's Post-war Reconstruction

## Urban Redevelopment – Postwar Beirut

## Assessing Urban a Planning Practice

### Angie Rizk

This paper discusses characteristics of an urban planning framework over its process, outputs, and outcomes. The urban redevelopment of post-war Beirut will be evaluated accordingly drawing conclusions and recommendations.

The process in urban planning is the setting stone for desired outcomes. **In this process, the society should be engaged within a network of equivalence, by practicing coproduction, and organized by a multilevel governance,** to facilitate urban justice and sustainability.

1. Watson(2006) identifies two axes of differences: Intergroup and state-citizen, the latter referring to relationships between political and hegemonic systems. Counterhegemonic movements aim to "construct a counterhegemonic understanding of the city[…] developed collectively by the network in their particular context." (Purcell,2013 p.560). These movements form a **network of equivalence**, based on interdependence and individuality, pursuing the right to the city, defined as the right to inhabit well. Identifying the network of equivalence, in the process of urban planning, provides a platform for collaboration, participation, and identification of context-specific needs, contributing to outputs of socio-spatial analysis and social mixing policies, resulting in outcomes of inclusion, and social justice.

2. **Coproduction** is "an immanent characteristic of strategic spatial planning" (Albrechts,2013 p.48) Coproduction is a collective effort combining needs for public services, provided by the state, and rights of citizens in urban production. It sets equal partnership, where power transmission allows citizens to impact the creation of public policies and influence political processes. When urban planning no longer focuses on procedures and relies on local communities, sociospatial urban qualities develop. Coproduction increases the available resources, allows a customized approach, promotes inclusion, and building resilient communities. Coproduction enhances social sustainability and spatial justice through processes of negotiations, discussion of problems and political strategies through outputs of strategic planning.

3. Even though municipalities' polycentric approach provides tailored and local solutions, and better enforcement, they don't act on sustainability without being incentivized by higher levels of government due to their lack in managerial, fiscal and civic capacities. (Homsy,2015) Therefore, a **multilevel governance** is preferred where a multilevel multifunctional approach paves the way to sustainability in the environment, economy, and society. Some disadvantages of multilevel governance are: failure to promote social learning and top-down implementation. Therefore, another level is added: the civil society level. Multilevel governance results in sustainable neighborhoods.

4. A **sociospatial analysis** helps understand the dynamics of the neighborhood, identify socio-economic characteristics, and develop an urban profile. It highlights the values shared by the neighborhood to understand how to integrate the redevelopment without breaking social

features. Socio-spatial analysis is a process, to understand, and an output, to guide urban development in strategic planning, housing and social-mixing policies; resulting in inclusion and social justice.

The outputs of urban planning processes are **adaptive and incremental strategic plans**, complemented by **housing and social mixing policies.**

5. **Social Mixing** policies are used to counter gentrification, Lees (2008). Policies for integrating different cultures and classes into neighborhoods reduce social divide and socio-spatial exclusion associated with gentrification and spatial injustice. Deprived communities benefit from living among the advantaged, who advocate for public resources. Social-mixing policies aim for economically sustainable neighborhoods, supporting local businesses for employment generation. Socioeconomical mixing provides spatial justice to the different groups and is an economically and socially sustainable tool for the city where different skills and social capital are transferred generating cohesion and inclusion.

6. A **housing policy,** for equal access to housing among social classes regardless of finances, gender and race, is a tool for the right to the city and spatial justice. The policy provides: Available units for all social groups, accessible in strategic locations, affordable with financial subsidies, Acceptable in quality and sociocultural factors, and Adaptable to the social needs and extreme conditions. (Ayala,2019). Housing policies depend highly on government's financial capacity, (Bredenourd,2010); therefore, supplementary tools should be provided like ZEIS plans and market regulation of rent. Through inclusion as an outcome, housing policies contribute to spatial and social justice and social sustainability.

7. The output of urban development should not be a defined masterplan that might become obsolete, rather a **strategic plan that is incremental and adaptive** to dynamic and complex urban contexts. Strategic planning considers the society as a factor for socio-spatial dimension of the city. Albrechts (2013) points out challenges for strategic plans: coping with equity, facing conflict, working with actors inside and outside the system. Therefore, strategic plans should be adaptive to changing circumstances and new knowledge. Incremental plans allow for adaptivity where socio-political contexts are evaluated in different phases. Adaptive and incremental strategic plans are drivers of even development and sustainability.

Based on the processes and shaped by the outputs, the outcomes of urban planning are **even development, inclusion, and sustainable neighbourhoods.**

8. Soja classified spatial justice as process and outcome. As outcomes, spatial injustices can be seen in the form of locational discrimination against populations with identifiable class, gender and race, or within a political organization of space and institutionalized residential segregation. To attain spatial justice. **Even development** eliminates spatial structures of privilege and underdevelopment of neglected areas and supports socio-spatial equality and distributional justice. As Soja and Marcuse both view spatial justice as vessel to social justice, even development contributes to spatial justice and perpetuates into social justice and a more sustainable society.

9. **Inclusion** of the citizens in decision-making relieves full responsibility from the state, decentralizing it to the complementary action of the citizens. Moreover, Marcuse explains six readings to Lefebvre's Right to the City, with a pursual to inclusion:
   - Political: inclusion in what the city is, rather in what it will be.
   - Strategic: inclusion in the existing city and reaping its benefits
   - Discontented: inclusion through being productive and happy in the city
   - Spatial: inclusion in considerations/decision for public spaces
   - Collaborationist: enforce inclusion against inequalities of power
   - Subversive: inclusion of needs of excluded through claims and demands

   Exercising inclusion through citizen participation and the 6 readings results in spatial and social justice.

10. **Sustainable Neighbourhood** development is only achieved through a balance between economic, social development and environmental conservation, to achieve quality of life.(Said,2011). Parsadoust (2018) identified a sustainable neighbourhood agenda which can be used as a general checklist for sustainability; it includes "Sustainable Economy, Community and personal safety, Green spaces and biophilic design, High performance and material quality building design, walkability and public transport, resource management and energy saving, social mix for sustainable community and architecture attractions."



**Urban Planning Framework (by author)**

# Case Study of Beirut postwar Re-development (1091 words)

By the end of the civil war, a public private partnership was established by the government in 1994 to reconstruct Beirut central district (BCD). Solidere s.a.l. became the owner of all properties demarcated in the redevelopment zone. In return, the company would finance and reconstruct the infrastructure and public spaces. Much of Solidere's work was and remains controversial as Solidere's contract has been extended until 2029. The urban redevelopment of BCD will analyzed against the 10 characteristics. The analysis compares Solidere's intentions (based on *Beirut Reborn,*1996) and the actual situation (based on data and academic papers).



**Prewar and Postwar Beirut (source: Projective Cities)**

The weak national and local governments lacked resources to redevelop Beirut. A PPP with private investments provided the capital to reconstruct the city's public domain and infrastructure, and the government supported with policies for resettlement and land rights. This institutional framework provided BCD with a **multilevel governance** that invited the cooperation horizontally and vertically. This PPP set Beirut to compete among the metropolitan region cities. This provoked a higher quality of design and construction and a sustainable development approach. However, the involvement of politicians as shareholders in Solidere created a conflict of interest that resulted lower social sustainability as they lost the support of the public.

Solidere witnessed opposition from counterhegemonic movements of which: landowners and tenants who protested their assets' privatization, squatters forced to move out, and professionals objecting the planning. These movements formed a **network of equivalence**. "But in the end, the opposition did not achieve much."(Makarem,2015). Solidere's conception of **citizenship** was only concerned with the landowners focusing only on settling issue of land rights and Privatization processes. The fight against solidere persists until today with St.George resort that refused privatization, and finally gained, in 2020, right for restoration.



**St. Georges Resort opposing Solidere (source: Sheikh Moussa, 2020)**

This opposition rose from the exclusion of the citizens in **co-production processes**, where institutions did not provide a place to voice their concerns. During the preliminary phases of development, Solidere consultants invited public comment over 30 seminars; however, they were described with an intention to inform not discuss. (Kabbani,1992) It seemed like "the future of the heart of Beirut was decided long before any (official) investment had been made in it" (Makdisi 1997, p.674). Moreover, the privatization of the lands induced the lack of co-production where the landlords were given shares in the company (in the name of partnership) and Solidere focused on efficient production for ultimate capital investment returns.

Solidere promoted interest in maintaining Beirut's identity. Heritage sites and architectural ruins were identified and successfully preserved in the implementation. Solidere also researched collective city memory, sense of place, and remembered places such as the famous old souks. Solidere succeeded, as a process, in identifying patterns of social infrastructure and their relation to urban spaces; however, it failed to come up with a **socio-spatial analysis,** as an outcome, that guides the urban redevelopment further than the preservation of architectural style and heritage sites. Much of the previous public places were dismantled or reorganized, rendering them out of scale and out of context such as martyr's square, and Beirut souks.



Historical map (source: Beirut Reborn)



Souk El Frani [1970] – source: oldbeirut.com

Beirut Sooks [2010] – source: Beiruting.com

**Sooks prewar and Urban mall**

1984 - 1918 Ottoman Era   1984 - 1943 French Mandate   1943 – 1975 Lebanese republic



1975 - 1990 Civil war era   2000s – Beirut Central District

**Martyrs square evolution - photo sources: Elie Saad, medium.com**

Solidere compiled an analysis in **strategic plans** for the redevelopment of BCD including: technical assessment for building restoration, a historical analysis of the archaeological sites and ruins, visual corridors and principal axes, links within the public spaces of the city, and a

landscape framework. (map2) Although the redevelopment occurred **incrementally** in phases and was subject to minor **adaptations**, these changes were more based on financial saving and investment strategies in favor of Solidere rather than based on socio-spatial urban developments.(educated guess). Moreover, the building regulations imposed, for the sake of insuring quality and architectural identity, restrict developing for the purpose of capital investment rather than urban development.



**Visual corridors and principal axes**



**Heritage trails for archeological sites**



**Focus and links to public spaces**



**Landscape Framework**

**Strategic plans (source: Beirut Reborn)**

Solidere acquired real estate assets from 40,000 active owners in return for shares. This privatization became a catalyst for the financialization of property attracting more private capital. "The value of property […] is diverging from the average family income"(Marot,2019). The state failed to provide adequate **housing policies**, and only provided low-interest long-term bank loans that were unaffordable and inaccessible to the former landowners. However, it financially assisted squatters to relocate, outside BCD area.

With the absence of housing policies and with the financialization of housing, market-led real estate prices soared in BCD which became a hub for the rich and gulf investors, and excluding a large section of the population. Seeing the redevelopment as an investment, Solidere should have anticipated the potential gentrification, but failed to create **social mixing policies.** This socio-economic spatial division in BCD was reflected in the Beirut port explosion where vulnerable households and NGOs relief were clearly concentrated in areas outside BCD.



**Price of new residential apartment in beirut, 2014 (source: RAMCO)**

(see *index 1 for maps on Beirut explosion and concentration of NGOs).*

An output of these processes is an **uneven development** of post-war Beirut where the BCD area has been excluded by the clearly defined axes, negating Solidrere's vision: "although clearly defined the central district is not an isolated enclave, it is intricately linked at many levels to its Greater Beirut context" (Gavin,1996 p.38). Uneven spatial development is noticeable visually, contextually, socially, and spatially.



**Unequal development of BCD and opposing Mar Mikhael neighbourhood sources: galeriemagazine.com libshop.pars**

"An outcome of the central area reconstruction will be to re-establish the city centre as the natural arena for all the country's diversified communities. […] the city centre must provide a social arena, drawing people in and enabling all sections of the community to mix and meet." (Gavin,

1996, p.34). Another intended outcome resulted differently because of lack of social mixing polices and housing policies. The absence of sense of **inclusion** is driven by the unaffordability of BCD reasserting the fragmentation of the war effects. Today, BCD is no more than an employment center for the middle-low class working population, where contribution to BCD development is limited to corporate initiatives.

With international professionals working on BCD redevelopment, **environmental sustainability** was asserted in forms of encouragement for green building and infrastructure. Moreover, the replacement of the original souks with an urban mall, local retail is challenged by larger brands leading to low **economic sustainability** and focus on international corporations. With no social mixing and housing policies, lack of inclusion and alienation of a rich social enclave resulted in low **social sustainability**.

## Conclusion

Solidere's redevelopment of BCD stands somewhere in between a solution to post-war economic crisis, and a dilemma to the loss of urban memory. This redevelopment faced challenges that prevented an achievement of sustainability and urban justice, they are:
The pressive need to redevelop the centre and the dire financial situation of the government lead to the formation of a PPP. Seeing redevelopment as investment, Solidere made decisions based on time and cost efficiency, and attractive real estate product. This led to little consideration of counterhegemonic movements and co-production, resulting in absence of social sustainability, spatial justice.
Aiming to set Beirut as an economic centre in the metropolitan area, Solidere needed its own niche of tenants. It is harsh to presume Solidere wanted to drive locals out; however, it is worth highlighting that housing and social mixing policies were not addressed with the privatization. This resulted in uneven development and lack of inclusion in the city, therefore loss of social sustainability and justice.
The multilevel governance challenged Solidere to conflicts of interests where the line between the state and the investors was blurred in terms of redevelopment goals. The large scale of the investment demanded a larger scale economy, and an attractive neighbourhood for tourists and investors. This resulted in using the socio-spatial analysis for tourist storytelling and using sustainable environment approaches for foreign investor incentives. However, this came to a cost in terms of socioeconomic sustainability and urban justice.

The developed theoretical framework is normative and posed as an ideal to be pursued rather than something that can be perfectly accomplished. "Perfectly even development, complete socio-spatial equality, pure distributional justice, as well as universal human rights are never achievable." (Soja,2009, p.3). In practice, theory is faced with political context that sometimes wins over democratic forms of justice and disrupts sustainability goals. In addition, the financial capabilities can be a hurdle, so efficiency and fast decision making takes over processes of coproduction, participation and networks of equivalence that are considered inefficient in time and cost. Theory is also faced with a reality that is different from the well-designed intentions; this is evident in Solidere's plans versus how they were achieved.

The recommendations for the actors involved in BCD redevelopment are:
- Hold PPPs with several entities to avoid monopoly and promote competition in real estate markets
- Agree on clear redevelopment goals.

- Exchanging land for shares seems fair, but not spatially just. Provide Housing to maintain social mix and inclusion and delineate Special Zones of Social Interest part of the strategic plans.
- Efficiency in decision making might save finances, but it will cost social sustainability as outcome. Invest more in participation and co-production; and make room for insurgent planning, because only then, will social justice prevail.

Today, it is hard to deconstruct the reconstruction, but 1994's postwar redevelopment of BCD should be a lesson to 2020's redevelopment of post-explosion Beirut.

## Index 1



**Presence of socio-economically vulnerable households post-explosion - source: mapaction.org**



**Distribution of aid for repair and rehabilitation Source: Interagency coordination**

Disaster in context of Crisis: Assessing the performance of Community-based initiatives in urban disaster recovery: A Case study of Beirut Port explosion

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# Annex 27: Anecdotes from CBI interviews

"After the blast and all the people that came to us, we had this like and then it was like a therapy for us. And we dealt with the problem together and we grew up together. So now we became like a family."

"I live in gemmayze, our house was severely damaged. The next day when we came to check out the damage; there were people waiting outside our door. We didn't know them. They wanted to help us. They told us "hey we are coming from the Bekaa and we are here to help. Do you need us to help?" We were surprised and we looked around and we saw that every house had a group of volunteers waiting for them and they came from all over the country."

"Ever since I was young, I've always been helping people. I mean, ever since I was like, 10-11 years old, I've always been into any kind of movement or any kind of community activities.

So I've always helped, I've always taken care either through activities with elderly or with supporting children in their after school homework. During the war, we used to have a different kind of support, like, humanitarian support, sending boxes of food. So I used to do that I have always been active in the community ever since I was 11 years old, it's not something new to me. But this time, it was different this time, I felt that I should be leading this because I have this experience all through and this time, it was different. Throughout the Thawra, I learned that there were those who wanted to make change, and those benefiting from it. So I thought to myself, I don't know who to trust and who I to work with. So I said, let me do my own thing, because at least I know what I'll be doing."

"The first couple of days I was fixing up my own house and my parent's. After we finished cleaning mine and my parents' home, I stayed one day at home, I couldn't move. So my daughter who was cleaning the streets with her friends. told me stay at home? Get up, do something!
Then I remembered Karantina. Everybody used to forget Karantina. I remembered back in 1988 that it was an area where we used to go distribute food boxes when I was younger. So I thought to myself, let me go there. So then I brought around 500 hot meals. And I told my daughter to come with me to Karantina. She said why? Everybody is in Gemmayze & Mar Mikhael. I told her come with me, this is a forgotten area. Nobody ever thinks about it.

It was back in back in 88. This is one of the places we used to go distribute food boxes. And this is what happened. I went there and I simply introduced myself to the neighborhood. And this is how we started with it. And I got to know the people."

"During the past year, the crisis made me lose hope and I was disappointed in what the country has reached. But when the explosion happened, I went to Beirut to give hope and try to help. But the opposite has happened. It was therapeutic for me, and I was given hope by everyone there. I fell in love with the people living in Beirut, those who were affected but still had hope and were too attached to the country.
I came to the explosion site wanting to give hope to those affected, but they were the ones who gave me hope and the will to stand up for the country."

"I want to tell my son someday, that I was part of what was happening, and I contributed to the change. We were able to make a difference. I am Lebanese at the end of the day. It is my country and my land, and I am part of this community and this government. So now I want to make a difference and I don't want to sit and watch. There's always something we can do."

# Annex 28: IHS copyright form

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