WHY CAN'T THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM BE REALIZED DESPITE MANY EFFORTS TO THAT END?

An analysis of the "In Larger Freedom" report and the proposal of G4

Master Thesis

by

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SUMMARY

This thesis aims at studying institutional change and why institutions resist change. The United Nations Security Council is chosen as the case study. The Security Council is an unprecedent organization crowned as the only organization that can legitimize use of force and its reform is a long-standing issue. While there are considerable efforts and tremendous public support to realize a reform, initiatives to that end seem to be destined to fail. To understand the nature of these attempts and the reasons of their nonsuccess, path dependency and principal agent theory will be utilized as they are both successful and complementary in understanding change in institutions. Official meeting records of the United Nations General Assembly meetings will be employed as the primary sources of information. With this, how member states justify their positions will be highlighted and matters of contentions will be determined.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Having a background in the field of diplomacy, the environment created by the cooperative soul of international organizations has always amazed me. I, many times, witnessed efforts of people who acted unrequitedly. However, while creating such a virtuous environment, how these organizations are governed has always been a much-discussed matter. This is my motive for writing this paper. I want to contribute to the efforts to make these organizations more understandable. With this, I wholeheartedly believe that good people will continue to try to make this world a good and livable one.

With this occasion, I would like to thank to my professors and fellow students at Erasmus University Rotterdam, especially to Dr. Adrià Albareda Sanz for his supervision and patience during the whole process. His guidance has been invaluable.

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Ahmet Ferda Karadeniz
The Hague, 7 August 2022

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To Gözde, Zeynep and Burak

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Contextual Information on the United Nations Security Council Reform

The United Nations formally came into existence on 24 October 1945, following the ratification process of the Charter of the United Nations that had been signed by 50 states in the United Nations Conference on International Organization. The main target of this newly established organization was to prevent global wars that had the potential to devastate the world (*History of the United Nations | United Nations*, n.d.).

The Charter of the United Nations is a document where the need for concerted action towards "maintaining international peace and security" is officially acknowledged. To realize and operationalize this goal, the Security Council was created (*United Nations Security Council*, n.d.). The Security Council is the only body in the global arena that can legitimately give permission to use of force. And the decisions of the Security Council are binding in nature for all member states. As of August 2022, the Security Council consists of five permanent members (P5) namely China, France, Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States and ten non-permanent members who are elected for two years by the United Nations General Assembly. Each of these fifteen states has the right to summon the Security Council when they see a need for that. According to the Article 27 of the Charter, for a decision to be taken in these meetings on "procedural matters" affirmative votes of nine members are required, and "all other matters" require affirmative votes of nine members including "concurring votes" of all permanent members (*Voting System | United Nations Security Council*, n.d.). Authorization of use of force is one these "all other matters" and it is not possible to adopt a course of action even if only one of permanent members has a negative vote.

The Charter envisages a system where P5 are provided with this privileged position thanks to their significant roles in the foundation of the United Nations and their key abilities and resources in the maintenance global order. Hence, they were given the status of Permanent Membership at the Security Council along with the "right to veto" (*Voting System | United Nations Security Council*, n.d.). Naturally, P5 use this veto power in accordance with their foreign policy agenda. However, the usage of this distinctive tool has made institutional structure of the Security Council a matter of contention for a long time and many United

Nations member states including P5 concur that there is a need for reform in the structure of the Security Council (Binder & Heupel, 2021; Hurd, 2008; T. G. Weiss, 2003).

As like any global organization, the United Nations is constantly gaining new members. This enlargement trend and increasing self-confidence among new members generated a wave of serious criticisms where old structure and procedures of the United Nations are being increasingly challenged. Even just looking at the numbers shows the seriousness of the issue. In 1945, the United Nations had 51 members and as of 2022, it has 193. The number of seats at the Security Council in 1945 was 11, it is now 15. As seen, while there is nearly a four-times increase in the number of total members, there has only been an increase of four at the Security Council, all of which are additions to non-permanency. This imbalance is becoming evident every day and each state is increasingly demanding a structural change.

1.2. Research Question and Problem Statement

The research question of this thesis is as follows: *Why can't the United Nations Security Council reform be realized despite all efforts to that end?*

In 1993, as a response to the increasing voices for reform calls from member states, the United Nations General Assembly decided to establish an open-ended working group (OEWG) to study the Security Council reform taking note of the increase in the total number of members especially of developing countries and the changing nature of the international relations (*UN Documents: A/RES/48/26*, n.d.). Then, OEWG started to prepare and submit yearly reports on the reform issue to discern the developments.

OEGW report of 2007 turned out to be an important step forward in the endeavors of reforming the Security Council. It brought about the idea of intergovernmental negotiation process (IGN) of which aim was to acquire solid developments on reform issue. IGN became operative in 2009 with the target of dealing with five crucial topics: The Security Council membership categories, veto, regional representation, The Security Council working methods, and the interaction between The Security Council and the General Assembly (*UN Documents: Decision 62/557*, n.d.). Despite all these efforts, discussions under IGN have not been fruitful as there is still no document that states can negotiate on.

One of the staunch supporters of the Security Council reform is Kofi Annan who served as the secretary general from 1997 to 2006. In addition to his many official initiatives to that end during his term, he made one of his most important calls for reform in an interview in 2015 after his active duty. It is evident to see the necessity of reform from this interview which is also a thrusting factor for writing on this topic:

> *"I firmly believe that the council should be reformed: it cannot continue as it is. The world has changed, and the UN should change and adapt. If we don't change the council, we risk a situation where the primacy of the council may be challenged by some of the new emerging countries. I think those in privileged positions will have to think hard and decide what amount of power they are prepared to release to make the participation of the newcomers meaningful (UN Security Council Must Be Revamped or Risk Irrelevance, Kofi Annan Warns | The Guardian, n.d.)."*

Kofi Annan is not the only prominent official conceding the indispensability of reform. For instance, as a recent example, Secretary General Antonio Guterres explained on May 5, 2022, that Africa is not represented at the Security Council and it was fair for the continent to ask for a seat (*Africa Live This Week: 2-8 May 2022 - BBC News*, n.d.).

Main driving forces of reform discussions are various coalitions established among member states who gather around similar perceptions and goals. There are groups such as ACT, Arab Group, CARICOM, East Europeans, and L69 who are formed on the basis of same principles and ideas on the Security Council reform. However, within the reach of this paper, I will first concentrate on the "In Larger Freedom" report of Kofi Annan which revitalized reform attempts of these various groups and then study the most prominent groups namely the Group of Four (G4), Uniting for Consensus (UfC) and African Union. G4 consists of Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan. This group envisages six new permanent and four new non-permanent seats. They also propose new permanent members not to exercise veto power for fifteen years (*G4 Sponsored Resolution on Reform | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases*, n.d.). UfC, consisting of various actors like Canada, Italy, Mexico, Pakistan, Spain, South Korea and etc., opposes the idea of increasing permanent seats and offers a twenty-five-member structure with twenty non-permanent seats. According to this group, General Assembly should elect these twenty non-permanent seats in accordance with the contribution of each state to the purposes of United Nations and also geographical distribution ('UfC Introduces text on reform |

Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, n.d.). This group also calls for restraining the use of veto. African Union foresees expansion of both permanent and non-permanent seats. African Group asks for two permanent seats with the right to veto and five non-permanent seats for African countries. Although the African Group opposes the right to veto in principle, they think that members should enjoy that institution as long as it exists (*UN Documents: A/59/L.67*, n.d.)

In addition to different perceptions and rivalries among various states, the way the Charter can be amended itself is another source of deadlock for the Security Council reform. According to the Article 108 of the Charter, for an amendment to be enacted, it should be adopted by two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified by two-thirds of the members of the United Nations, inclusive of all permanent members (*Chapter XVIII: Articles 108 and 109, Charter of the United Nations*, n.d.). As seen, for a reform to be realized, all permanent members should be persuaded to renounce their rights, which has been a futile initiative and left this issue only as a matter of deliberation up to now. The only reform in the structure of the Security Council was undertaken in 1963 and came into force in 1965, where the number of non-permanent seats were increased from six to ten (*Amendments to Articles 23, 27, 61, 109 | United Nations*, n.d.).

1.3. Research Aim

This thesis will employ a qualitative single case study to answer the research question. I will aim at explaining the Security Council reform process with a specific focus on the reasons of disagreement between member states. I will first reflect on the discussions at the General Assembly meetings on the former secretary general Kofi Annan's "In Larger Freedom" report that was introduced in 2005. I will then analyze the proposal of G4 which is a direct and the first official group reaction to that report. With this, I will have the opportunity to determine prominent actors and explain their intentions and perceptions on the matter. I will then further explain the factors that create contradictions between these actors and hinder the reform process.

1.4. Social Relevance

The United Nations was established in the aftermath of a devastating global war with the capacity of enabling legitimate use of force. This prevalence made the United Nations a

respected and at the same time a disputed organization. Especially with the effects of its expansion and global developments, its structure was more and more questioned. Many member states to some degree concur with the idea that the structure of the Security Council needs to be reformed to reinforce UN's legitimacy in global arena (Binder & Heupel, 2021; Hurd, 2008; T. G. Weiss, 2003).

Changing the structure of an international organization is a delicate issue which requires efforts of many different states whose national interests can contradict at some point along the way. This paper, in that regard, will reflect upon the endeavors aimed at changing the structure of the Security Council and key actors and their perceptions in that process. Restructuring the United Nations will also have implications on how member states interact with each other, and how it will handle its initiatives that will require collaboration of various member states. Hence, this study will be beneficial for United Nations member states to understand tenets of different member states and create new proposals accordingly. This research will also be relevant for international governance system. The United Nations is a leading international organization, and it can force member states to set new standards, point out new threats, and shape international politics. The ability of the United Nations to adapt to the dynamics of modern world will be important for its future endeavors. This study will also be relevant for other international organizations since they may require structural changes in accordance with global developments. With the ability to grasp how international organizations adjust their structure in accordance with new developments, threats, and opportunities, other international organizations will be able to better understand the nature of global developments and be prepared for creating possible responses to them. Last but not the least, this study will bring the reasons of non-reform to light and enable the United Nations and member states to develop new initiatives for reform that might be more successful and to the point.

1.5. Theoretical Relevance

This paper aims at contributing to the theoretical understanding of organizational and institutional change within international organizations like the United Nations. Extant literature studying international organizations mainly concentrates on the reasons and motives for the birth of these organizations (M. N. Barnett & Finnemore, 1999; Helfer, 2006). Nevertheless, it is generally disregarded to focus on how international organizations operate after creation and what happens if they diverge from the original path or go out of the predestined way (M. N.

Barnett & Finnemore, 1999; Helfer, 2006). To overcome this, in this paper, I will first focus on historical institutionalism and work towards explaining the Security Council reform from the perspective path dependency as historical institutionalism has the capacity to put forward important developments in international relations that characterize birth of long-term power relations, commonness of indeliberate results, and supremacy of gradual changes over comprehensive modifications (Fioretos, 2011). I will then examine the reform issue on the basis of principal agent relationship, a rational choice approach which will give me the chance to analyze the issue from two different schools. Moreover, this article can be instrumental in understanding sustainability of international organizations as it will try to answer how international organizations like the United Nations can adjust themselves to new developments and create new plans and strategies to remain strong and relevant.

1.6. Outline

In Chapter 1, an overview of the importance the United Nations Security Council was discussed. Also, the focus and the relevance of the study was introduced. The remaining sections of the paper will be structured as follows. In Chapter 2, the overview of the literature on change in international organizations will be presented. This chapter will then focus on the literature on the Security Council reform on the basis of the advantages and disadvantages of reform. In Chapter 3, the theoretical framework will be introduced. This section will discuss historical institutionalism with a specific focus on path dependency and principal agent theory from the perspective of change. In Chapter 4, the research design of the thesis will be outlined by focusing on operationalization, data collection, reliability and validity of the study. Limitations of the study will also be mentioned. In Chapter 5, analysis of the Security Council reform will be conducted and findings of the study will be shared. In Chapter 6, the discussion of the findings will be undertaken in accordance with the research question, theory and the variables. Finally, in Chapter 7, summary and the limitations of the paper will be provided before making recommendations for further studies.

CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter will lay out an overview of the prominent literature on Security Council reform. I will scrutinize various perspectives in the literature regarding the themes on the matter. I will narrow down my scope to the Security Council reform process and see what is primarily being discussed in academia. I will zoom in the papers that delve into analysis reasons of (non-) change in the structure of the Security Council. This will help the reader understand the reasons of unreformability of the Security Council.

2.1. Change in International Organizations

International organizations are an important aspect of globalization and playing a significant role to an increasing extent day by day. Their key abilities to create bonds for international cooperation and solve multinational disagreements, and their flaws that negatively affect lives of many people make them a highly examined subject matter. This dual nature harbored in the character of international organizations make scholars interrogate the issues like how they are established and how they react to certain changes in their environment (Ku, 2001). Theories on change of international organizations suggest that each international organization follows a unique path for reform depending on the circumstances, perceptions of member states, various autonomous initiatives, and bureaucrats of that organization (Helfer, 2006).

However, how these entities are reformed and how they operationalize change in their structures is an "under-examined and under-theorized" issue (Helfer, 2006). This is the main driving force of this paper. With this thesis, I will aim at addressing a theoretical gap which hinders the understanding of non-change in the structure of the Security Council.

2.2. The Security Council Reform

Change in the structure of the Security Council is already happening and the way the council handles its business is so far evolving (Luck, 2005). Pouliot says that an institutional change is already occurring in the Security Council and suggests the term of "gray area" where "political procedures and practices evolve, somewhat tautologically, through evolving political procedures and practices. Unable to amend formal rules, practitioners allow themselves to experiment and innovate, despite the absence of clear and mutually agreed upon guidelines to

do so" (Pouliot, 2021). In accordance with that Harrington suggests that "Council practice is not static" (Harrington, 2017). However, these changes seem to be not strong enough to silence the calls for reform. Then, if there is actually need for change which is already taking place, and there is strong support for a reform, what is blocking the reform process?

Scholars define three important factors as the reasons of the situation. An obvious one is the tools and attitudes of P5 countries (Langmore & Thakur, 2016; Mahbubani, 2014; T. Weiss, 2011; T. G. Weiss, 2003; T. G. Weiss & Young, 2005). Mahbubani gives the example of China. China supports India and Brazil's permanency with the right to veto and at the same time it fosters its dissatisfaction with the veto issue, which creates a dichotomy and hinders consensus. Another factor is the rivalries between countries representing different interest groups. For example, the ideas of G4 are opposed by the UfC whose aim is to prevent rival G4 members becoming permanent members (Bourantonis, 2004; Fassbender, 1998; Hosli et al., 2011; Nadin, 2016; Zacher, 2004). Lastly, the Charter itself is obviously another element that hinders the reform process. The veto system and the two-thirds majority in the General Assembly meetings for amendments in the Charter envisaged by the Charter seem to complicate the reform process and constitute an important component of the hold-up of the reform process (Falk, 1998; Hosli & Dörfler, 2019).

The United Nations reform in general is long standing issue and the reform of the Security Council is one of the United Nation's "greatest challenges wherein all the difficulties and obstacles of wider institutional reform are collected together in a microcosm" (Gareis, 2003) and it requires many factors be taken into consideration (Sievers & Daws, 2015). The Security Council plays a crucial role in international arena and its reform has been one of the prime issues concerning international governance system which can be traced back to the 1950s (Hassler, 2012; Schaefer, 2017). Its unique way of decision-making process made scholars question the fairness of the Security Council and its affinity with democratic values (Goodrich, 1958; MacKenzie & Kelsen, 1951; Millet et al., 1957). Especially with the end of the Cold War, calls for a new institutional structure for the Security Council gained momentum.

Literature on the Security Council reform can be analyzed in two groups. Some scholars support the idea of reform and aim at justifying their reasons for that, some others focus on exhibiting possible drawbacks of reform. I will structure this section according to this division of perceptions.

2.2.1. Reasons for Reform

There are two general arguments in literature of the Security Council reform, one of which supports the idea of reform and the other one objects it. Both of these arguments address the "legitimacy, effectiveness, and efficiency" of this body (Winther, 2020). One of these rationales focuses on the idea that the Security Council should go through an institutional reform process to be more legitimate. According to this perspective, a reform process aiming at strengthening the legitimacy of the Security Council will enable more member states to take part in decision making process and thus enhance effectiveness of the Security Council by making it produce more tailored resolutions by aligning global matters with members' national interests (Winther, 2020). This perspective is based on normative premises and upholds the values of democracy and fairness as the focal subjects (Zacher, 2004). This basically means that the more the number of states included in decision-making the more satisfied the states. Reform supporters to a large extent claim that the Security Council does not represent the realities of modern times and the lack of geographical representation embedded in its structure jeopardizes its credibility (Winther, 2020).

Langmore and Thakur are of the opinion that current structure of the Security Council disparages council's legitimacy and makes people question its primacy (Langmore & Thakur, 2016). Their solution to this problem is an increase in non-permanent seats. Mahbubani also believes that a structural reform is closely related to increasing authority of the Security Council (Mahbubani, 2014). He proposes changes in the structure and number of permanent and non-permanent seats. Some prominent scholars underline that the Security Council is failing to be fair in global affairs and only a structural reform can be helpful in overcoming this problem (Gould & Rablen, 2017; Strand & Rapkin, 2011). They favor the idea of reforming the voting system to increase the functionality of the Security Council.

Supporters of reform also believe that although there is a strong opposition against it, reform is obtainable. Popovski believes that the Security Council reform is bound to happen because it will be to the benefit of all member states (Popovski, 2016). Mahbubani asserts that the reform is inevitable for powerful states if they wish to stay relevant in global arena (Mahbubani, 2014). Fassbender iterates that any change that is not implemented in the Charter will have the possibility of being cancelled in the future due to the changes in the perceptions of powerful

states (Fassbender, 1998). This is again based on the belief that reform issue is a necessity but it is a complex and arduous task to handle.

Knight suggests that the Security Council reform should address transparency and only be related to increase in non-permanent seats since amendments in the right to veto or permanent seats may adversely affect the functionality of the council (Knight, 2001). Bourantonis agrees with Knight in that regard. He also posits that if the Security Council does not keep up with global developments and adjust to the necessities of the modern governance system, detachments, isolations, and further problems may follow (Bourantonis, 2004). Russet et al. believe that amendments in the structure of permanent seats and the right to veto are undesirable (Russett et al., 1996). Like Knight, they think that only the issue of non-permanent seats should be considered as a matter of reform. Similarly, scholars like Blum and Slaughter argue that the Security Council reform should be more about non-permanency rather than the right to veto (Blum, 2005; Slaughter, 2005). They underpin the notion that a more globally representative structure will make it harder for permanent members to use their veto power.

2.2.2. Reasons to Avoid Reform

The other group of scholars suggest that an institutional reform may actually deteriorate the effectiveness and efficiency of the Security Council since decisions can take more time to be taken thanks to the abundance of actors in decision making processes. Supporters of this thought suggest that the idea of structural reform is an unattainable and unrealistic expectation. They posit that the more the number of seats at the Security Council the more the deadlocks between members. Instead of a comprehensive structural reform, they favor a "working method reform" which basically foresees changes in procedural issues and how the agenda of the Security Council is handled. According to them, once the working methods of the Security Council is enhanced, effectiveness and efficiency will eventually follow (Winther, 2020). They basically lean towards being pragmatic.

Some scholars think that expansion of the Security Council will make it more vulnerable and limit its abilities. In that regard, Cox and Nadin suggest, instead of a comprehensive reform, changing the veto system without amending the UN Charter (Cox, 2009; Nadin, 2016). According to them, usage of veto can be restricted with the help of informal agreements between the states who have the right to veto. Hassler is of the opinion that structural reform

has only been a matter of deep-rooted diplomatic discussion. She also discusses that developing states may overwhelm and run into difficulties if they take permanent seats due to unpredictable nature of global developments (Hassler, 2012).

Luck suggests that it is difficult to appease each member state in a structural reform negotiation process adding that if the current council is not considered sufficient enough to represent every member state, then it will be much more difficult to anticipate an enlarged council to do so (Luck, 2006). Blum echoes with Luck in the sense that gaining more members has the potential to turn the Security Council into a cumbersome and ineffective entity. Blum also disapproves the idea of making geographical representation an important aspect of reform issue. She also believes that a failed reform initiative can harm the success of usual operations of the council (Blum, 2005). Wouters & Ruys focus on another aspect of the issue. According to them, accountability and democratic values should be matters of concern for a reform process since adding new members to the Security Council will not entail a more successful body and that these newcomers will satisfy the demands of an arduous global position (Wouters & Ruys, 2005). As an additional support to that, Niemetz advocates a change in the voting system of the Security Council where civil society is also included (Niemetz, 2015). This proposal severely criticizes reform calls and brings a different approach to the table.

2.3. Conclusion

Literature on the Security Council reform seems to be gathering around two ideas. One supporting the reform, one offering "softer changes" instead of a comprehensive reform. Daws summarizes this dilemma clearly and succinctly in one sentence: "There is a risk that the United Nations will be weakened by an expansion of the membership of the UN Security Council. There is an equal risk that it will be weakened by the maintenance of the status quo" (Daws, 2005). This assertion shows us the edginess of the reform issue and necessity of an impartial study of the Security Council reform.

CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1. Introduction

This chapter will aim at presenting pertinent concepts and theories as tools for clarification and forecasting in this paper. Historical institutionalism will be one of the steppingstones for evaluating the developments on the Security Council reform. Path dependency, one of the key historical institutionalism concepts, will be my main vantage point. Also, another important model that is worthwhile in understanding change in international organizations, principal agent theory will be studied to see the reasons of non-reform.

This paper will utilize historical institutionalism since it is a valuable tool for elucidating lethargy in organizations (Fioretos, 2011), a situation that is consummately applicable to the non-reform of the Security Council. Although high level United Nations officials and most of the member states openly acknowledge and assert the necessity of a reform for the Security Council, there has not been any satisfactory progress to that end. Hanrieder suggests that historical institutionalism is "well-equipped" to understand "complex and gradual modes of change" in international organizations (Hanrieder, 2014). However, focusing just on this understanding gives a restricted picture of the situation. That is why I will resort to principal agent theory which will help me delve into rational choice approach more. Principal agent theory envisages a system where principals let an agent act on behalf of themselves on the basis of a contract. According to this perception, principals (member states) have the abilities to control change in agents (international organizations). But there are many criticisms to this simplification mainly because of the relations between principals themselves, which I will elaborate below. I will also discuss in the following sections why historical institutionalism can be a valuable asset to fill this gaps in principal agent relationship that formulates change as "linear and deliberate" (Hanrieder, 2014). In sum, combination of historical institutionalism and principal agent theory will provide a comprehensive insight on the non-reform of the Security Council.

3.2. Institutionalism

Institutionalism has become a commonly used approach in today's academic world. Institutions are scrutinized more and more by academicians who are looking for ways to understand how

institutions affect economic and social developments. International organizations have had their shares of this reality too. International organizations are the tools nation states utilize when they face problems that go beyond their own borders and require international cooperation. For many years, academicians looked for answers to why and how international organizations are established and, in the end, they came up with three main theories: rational choice, neofunctionalism, and historical institutionalism (Helfer, 2006). Each of these theories suggests different explanations for how the actors who found the international organizations try to attain their targets through these entities.

These three institutional theories made social scientists understand and contribute to the accumulation of knowledge on international organizations tremendously. As Barnett and Coleman asserts "We know a lot about the conditions under which states establish international organizations, why states will design them the way they do, and some of the conditions under which states will grant autonomy to international organizations" (M. Barnett & Coleman, 2005). However, some spots still stay in dark. For instance, what happens to these entities or how they change after their foundation is a less studied aspect of international organizations, which hinders better understanding the nature of international organizations (Helfer, 2006). These entities are usually granted with some level of independence during their establishment period. This independence creates an environment where international organizations can generate their own priorities which may be different than the initial goals of founding states. More independence means more power for an organization to change its norms and structures. If we do not have enough information on the level of their independence and how they act after their foundation, reasons, or conditions of change in the structure of these organizations cannot be understood succinctly. Hence, it is important to determine how an international organization acts after its foundation. To be able to discover this missing link, this paper will utilize historical institutionalism as a basis point.

3.3. Historical Institutionalism and Change in International Organizations

Historical institutionalism can be used as a tool to understand how international organizations are born, how they pursue their goals, and how they evolve over time. Historical institutionalism scholars perceive institutions as developing structures being affected by the clash between various actors (Helfer, 2006). It also acknowledges that foundation process of these entities is a complex procedure where multiple actors with different – sometimes

conflicting – perceptions come to a table to negotiate. This interplay of give and take among actors paves the way for various institutional designs and goals that differ from intended ones. Historical institutionalism scholars not only focus on small details but also consider broader picture by studying institutions within their habitat. They examine intersection sets of various institutions instead of focusing on one specific institution as they believe that interaction between institutions make important contribution to possible changes in the environment. These sets carry the potential of generating 'unintended openings' for actors who can prompt changes. And these scholars are skilled in analyzing roles, effects, and stability of institutions (Helfer, 2006).

According to Pierson and Skocpol, historical institutionalism examines organizations by focusing on their general behaviors in the long run and instead of dealing with specific aspects of organizations, it concentrates on broader picture and makes complex and comprehensive issues intelligible (Skocpol & Pierson, 2002). According to them, "the intersection of domestic and international politics, social identities in politics, and the causes and consequences of social movements and revolutions" are important domestic and global matters that were understood precisely thanks to the studies of historical institutionalists (Skocpol & Pierson, 2002). They usually ask questions like why a significant event happened or not happened, how a particular event takes place in certain times and places but not others and etc. In my case, I will ask why the Security Council reform does not take place although there are many actors who ask for some kind of change in its structure by exploiting the capacity of historical institutionalism mentioned above.

Scholars of historical institutionalism believe that change takes place, but they do not jump to conclusions about its route or speed. According to Barnett and Finnemore, enlargement in the size and functions of international organizations are important reasons for change (M. Barnett & Finnemore, 2004). Another study undertaken by Barnett and Coleman perceives reasons of change as the aim of international organizations to "further their mandate, ... protect their autonomy, and minimize organizational insecurity" (M. Barnett & Coleman, 2005). Change may happen slowly or fast and have positive or negative consequences. It can also emerge from inside or outside of the organization or as a result of a combination of both. It can be path dependent where its route is demarcated by feedback emanating from initial decisions (Skocpol & Pierson, 2002). Or it can be more flexible and happen gradually and unexpectedly (Streeck

& Thelen, 2005). It can also appear as adjustments in formal institutional design, informal exercises, or working methods (Skocpol & Pierson, 2002).

Overall, this paper will focus on historical institutionalism as it is helpful in understanding "historical and social contexts in which international organizations are born and in which they must survive" (Helfer, 2006). Historical institutionalism is also of critical importance because it has the ability to apprise of the conditions and the environment an international organization is born into, which is important for making projections and understanding long term relations of founding members. It is also helpful in understanding whether the outcomes of decisions were as expected or not since newly developed regulations may have unmeant effects. Lastly, historical institutionalism will help us compare the impacts of gradual reform with status quo and radical amendment processes (Helfer, 2006; J. G. March & Olsen, 1998).

3.3.1. Path Dependency

One of the characteristic tools of historical institutionalism that is going to be studied in this paper is path dependence. It can be defined as "the dynamics of self-reinforcing or positive feedback processes in a political system - what economists call 'increasing returns' processes" (Skocpol & Pierson, 2002). According to the phenomenon of path dependency, consequences of 'critical junctures' prompt 'feedback mechanisms' that strengthen the possibility of repetition of a specific example in the future. Path dependent procedures make it difficult for actors to revoke or alter their choice once they favor and pick a specific course of action. Choices that once seemed reasonable may come to be lost irreversibly. Therefore, events that happen during or right after the critical junctures play an important role for the future of organizations. Hence for understanding the nature of change.

Path dependency can enable understanding the inactivity and "stickiness" that characterize many features of organizations. They can revitalize scientific studies on power by demonstrating how "inequalities of power" can be inherent part of organizations (Skocpol & Pierson, 2002). They are testament to what Stinchcombe calls "historical causation" and according to him, developments stirred up by a specific incident in history can copy themselves still without the original incident taking place (Stinchcombe, 1987).

During critical junctures, agents choose from many alternatives to move in a specific direction and these selections have considerable effects on the future of organization. Although path dependency seems to resemble being stable, it also suggests that organizations may fall into the trap of being 'locked in' with a specific arrangement (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007). According to them, a critical juncture does not automatically mean change, but it creates the possibility of change. Hence, it can be said that determining critical junctures can be helpful in spotting developments where an interruption occurs in the history of an international organization. This can then enable scholars to study the effects of these selections on the track international organization is following.

Historical institutionalism also suggests that design processes of international organizations are important in configuring their destiny as these moments are critical junctures that have the potential to revitalize organizations (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007). Such critical junctures usually follow power conflicts (Clark, 2005). In conjunction with that, in this paper, I will examine important developments that created tension in power relations and examine whether these events gave rise to debates on the Security Council reform.

Change in international organizations happen no matter what as it is a natural part of any organization. Such that, sometimes even despite unilateral influence or conflicting policies of states on the matter. This inference is important as to understand what Streeck and Thelen suggest: 'path dependent' institutions themselves become transformative as they grow (Streeck & Thelen, 2005). This energetic nature depends on the fact that while institutions empower states, they also need to continue to procure resources from their institutional domain to live. Therefore, these empowered states aim at protecting and reinforcing their advantageous spot within the institution, and at the same time newly emerging non-member strong states show up who can feed the institution and stand against the status quo. These newcomers can challenge the privileged states and look for solutions to change the institutions notwithstanding that they may face impediments like veto of powerful actors as is the case of the Security Council (Hanrieder, 2014).

On the basis of this insights, it can be expected path dependency to form a serious barrier for reform of the Security Council.

3.4. Principal Agent Theory and Change in International Organizations

Principal agent theory defines the relationship between an actor called agent taking action in the name of a different actor called principal. This relationship is constructed upon a contract which sets the conditions and limitations under which the agent is allowed to proceed on behalf the principal. This model envisages a system where there is a potential gap between what principal wants to be done and what agent actually does. Hence, it can be said that principal agent theory is closely interested in whether agents are acting as trustworthy envoys or are they following their own sets of goals and if so, how principals can build structures to keep them in order (M. N. Barnett & Finnemore, 1999).

Ever since international organizations reemerged as an important topic in the field of institutionalism, many academicians have been trying to address their reform. And considerable amount of these studies were centered around principal agent relationship (Hanrieder, 2014). Scholars aimed at answering if and how members (principal) managed change in international organizations (agent). Although this approach succeeded in creating a fruitful scientific arena, it has drawn considerable amount of negative feedback. One of these focuses on the premise of the theory that these organizations are rational actors. For instance, scholars like Weaver consider international organizations as "culture-driven bureaucracies" rather than committed rational agents (Weaver, 2008). Also, academics like Graham assert that fragmentation in the structure of international organizations and bureaucracy weaken the corporate image of them and hinder their ability to act as a goal oriented collective body (Graham, 2014). The principal aspect of the principal agent theory also garnered criticisms. According to principal agent approach, members assign power to international organizations and make new contracts with these agents to reach particular common goals via these organizations. Many scholars criticize this perception of contract between states and organizations. States do not always act as members of a harmonious management committee (Hawkins et al., 2006). They can, without consulting other member states, take one-sided initiatives and try to influence the administration of relevant entity according to their own national interests (Hawkins et al., 2006). This type of one-sided initiatives is especially important when states do not have a common understanding on how to utilize these bodies and cannot make a contract that foresees change. On such occasions, states look for ways to have an impact on them separately and unofficially. For instance, according to Stone, powerful states can discover new methods to influence the decisions of international organizations with

alternative means (Stone, 2011). States having the chance of affecting the decision-making processes of organizations unilaterally contradicts the assumption of principal agent theory that change in international organizations can happen either by agents or, when there is no consensus among states, by bureaucracy or rent-seeking (Copelovitch, 2010). Stone criticizes discretionary power of bureaucracy as well. He thinks this phenomenon creates an environment where powerful states can find spots to impact international organizations (Stone, 2011). Therefore, decision making processes in international organizations are inclined to indulge powerful states who have the capacity and means to influence them. This situation also contradicts with the assumption that principal agent theory is based on "a strictly formal notion of power, which flows through authoritative rule structures specified in constitutions, articles of agreement, or charters" (Nielson & Tierney, 2003). Powerful states may consider themselves disadvantaged because of these formal rules. For instance, the United Nations bodies take decisions on the basis of one state, one vote principle which gives weak states asymmetrical formal advantages. This is actually one of the reasons why the Security Council permanent members do not want to give up on their veto power. While right to veto creates a disproportionate advantage for permanent members, they consider it as a circumvention to formal advantages of weak states that restrict the influence of powerful states in change of the Security Council.

As seen from above, it can be expected not to see a reform for the Security Council thanks to the dynamics created by principal agent relationship.

3.5. Conceptual Model

Based on the theoretical concepts elaborated, below conceptual model was created to steer the direction of this paper:

Figure 1. Conceptual Model

Independent Variables   **Dependent Variables**

- Path Dependency   - Change in the UN Charter

- Principal Agent Relationship   - Non-reform

3.6. Conclusion

This chapter identified prominent theories of relevance to this study. It found that scholars came up with three theories to address international organizations: rational choice, neofunctionalism, and historical institutionalism. For this paper, historical institutionalism was chosen as the vantage point thanks to its ability to depict the broader picture. It was also observed that how entities change stayed as an understudied aspect of international organizations. To address this gap, this paper utilized path dependency. And it was observed that path dependent structure of organizations is a significant handicap to overcome for reform of the Security Council. It was mainly because of the fact that path dependent procedures hinder actors' ability to go back and change their choices once they make a decision. Path dependency was also useful in discerning the lethargy towards change in organizations. For instance, actors who have advantageous positions try to maintain the status quo by relying on the Charter.

Moreover, principal agent theory was found to be valuable in understanding the non-reform of the Security Council. It was found out to be one of the heavily used theories to understand reform in organizations. In principal agent models, what principal wants and what agent actually does may differ and this model is based on the premise that agents are rational actors. Despite many criticisms, principal agent relationship was found to be instrumental in understanding the unilateral initiatives of member states. In the meantime, I had the opportunity to fill the gaps of principal agent theory with path dependence. Because the search for unilateral influence is also a way of breaking the path dependent structure. This interaction between historical and rational approaches paved the way for this paper to be a relevant and contributing one.

Overall, this paper found out that both path dependency and principal agent relationship make the Security Council an organization that has a tendency to favor already strong members.

CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

4.1. Introduction

This study is a qualitative research based on document analysis of a single case. I opted for a qualitative research design as it is useful in giving in-depth analysis of matter at hand. In this chapter, I will explain how this study will be carried out, and which methods will be utilized in the empirical phase of the research. I will start with introducing the case that I base my study upon. Then I will outline the research design, why I chose this particular design, and how I will collect relevant data. Afterwards I will describe how I will operationalize the study and underline its validity and reliability. I will finalize this section by briefing about limitations of the thesis.

4.2. Research Method

For this paper I will be conducting a single case study. Case study research strategy is an abundantly utilized method in public administration field and it requires an in-depth analysis of a single case (van Thiel, 2014). A case study usually comprises of utilizing plentiful qualitative data that is relevant to the case and can be related to a wide spectrum of entities like social formations, countries, events, decisions, or procedures.

There are a couple of compelling reasons for my choice of a single case study. First, case studies entail examining the subject of a research in "real-life setting". In other words, case studies focus on events that are closely related to the contemporary developments on the field and effect daily lives of people or entities. Second, public administration scholars generally elaborate rare or special matters (van Thiel, 2014). And case studies are convenient for dealing with such kind of studies as they focus on single events. Last but not the least, case study research is an applied research and scholars aim at playing a part in the efforts of finding answers to an existing social problem. This actually means that a single case is enough to understand and offer solutions to a problem and that there is no need to elaborate other cases.

In this framework, the Security Council reform process is a suitable social problem that can be investigated with a single case research strategy. Reform of the Security Council is a much-discussed global topic and abilities and power engraved to this body makes it a serious matter

of concern in states' daily operations. Second, the Security Council is the only establishment in the global arena that can give permission to use of force. This trait makes it a unique global phenomenon and studying it with a single case study makes more sense. And lastly, since it is a unique and very relevant matter, studying the Security Council with a single case study will provide me with the opportunity to get into more details and thorough descriptions on the matter.

4.3. Case

The scope of this paper is the case of the Security Council reform. To that end, I will focus on the discussions following United Nations General Assembly fifty-ninth session meeting on 21 March 2005 on the renowned report of Kofi Annan. The report called "In Larger Freedom" was one of the most tempting initiatives of the reform history. As an initiative coming from the top United Nations hierarchy, it made states feel the urge to respond and generated a collaborative environment that was conducive to change. As seen from figure 2, announcements of three critical group proposals were made within twelve days after the report. To this end, I chose to deal primarily with In Larger Freedom report. It stands out as a most likely case since it created an environment more inclined than ever before by galvanizing states and making them feel obliged to take steps and move forward in the reform process. I will then explain the factors that create contradictions between these states and hinder the reform process in the light of path dependency and principal agent theory to see why change does not come out.

The United Nations Charter is the founding document of the United Nations and it enshrined the Security Council as the only body in the global arena that could give permission to use of force. And this distinction makes the entity a focal point in many discussions on global matters. As of August 2022, the Security Council consists of 5 permanent members (P5) namely China, France, Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States and 10 non-permanent members who are elected for two years by UN General Assembly. Representatives of these 15 states can summon the Security Council whenever they see a need for that and bring developments they perceive as significant to the attention other states.

The dichotomy of permanent and non-permanent seats makes the Security Council a controversial entity, and it is the very reason why I want to undertake this study. The Charter envisages a system where P5 are provided with a privileged position because of their significant

roles during the foundation of the UN and their key abilities in the maintenance of international peace and security (*Voting System | United Nations Security Council*, n.d.). They were given the status of permanent membership along with the "right to veto". To give an example, according to the Article 27 of the UN Charter, for a decision to be taken on "procedural matters" nine Security Council members need to have affirmative votes, and "all other matters" require concurring votes of permanent members, provided that abstention is possible (*Voting System | United Nations Security Council*, n.d.). As seen, for important issues, non-permanent members cannot take decisions without the support of permanent members. Naturally, P5 use this veto power in accordance with their foreign policy agenda. The usage of this distinctive tool has made institutional structure of the Security Council a matter of contention for a long time and many member states including all P5 states concur that there is a need for reform in the structure of the Security Council to improve its legitimacy (Binder & Heupel, 2021; Hurd, 2008; T. G. Weiss, 2003).

This case will be helpful in understanding why it is difficult to change or reform international organizations as the United Nations is the most comprehensive global organization. The elaboration of this relatable case carries the potential of widening the research domain on how to improve the efficiency of global organizations in general and shedding light on the causes of inertia.

4.4. Data Selection and Analysis

For this paper, I will resort to content analysis and study on the documents that states officially announce their perceptions on the Security Council reform issue. This will lay the ground for a clearer picture of agreements and disagreements between member states. To that end I will start with extrapolating former secretary general Kofi Annan's "In Larger Freedom" report which was introduced to the General Assembly on 21 March 2005. This is a key development in the history of the reform since it paved the way for members to officially state their positions on the matter and various groups to introduce their proposals to the General Assembly. Figure 2 shows how Kofi Annan's report expedited reform initiatives.

Figure 2. Timeline of reform initiatives

| **G4 Proposal** | African Union Proposal |
| **6 July 2005** | 18 July 2005 |

| **In Larger Freedom** | Uniting for Consensus Proposal |
| **21 March 2005** | 8 July 2005 |

Moreover, proposals introduced by different groups as a response to Kofi Annan's report are key documents since they represent official standings of sponsor states on issues like right to veto, membership to the Security Council, working methods and etc. Therefore, in addition to "In Larger Freedom" report, within the scope of this paper, I will focus on the G4 proposal as it is the first response and considered to be one of the most significant ones (Toro, 2008).

My primary dataset will be consisting of the official United Nations General Assembly meeting notes published at the United Nations webpage. General Assembly meetings play a key role in global affairs as they constitute a common table where states can gather around and share their official standings on specific matters. To that end, I will first analyze the notes of the meetings that took place between 21 March and 7 April 2005 on "In Larger Freedom" report. Then I will be covering the General Assembly meetings on the proposal of G4 that took place 11-18 July 2005.

Last but not the least, I will resort to media analysis as another source of information by investigating the news, articles, and interviews published by media organizations such as Financial Times, Foreign Affairs, New York Times, The Guardian, Times of India and United Press International. These outlets were influential media outlets that published significant amount of news on the matter. Financial Times published two critical interviews with then secretary general Kofi Annan and then president of the General Assembly Jean Ping in the wake of the developments. Foreign Affairs, still the most subscribed magazine on global matters, published an important interview with Kofi Annan. New York Times was the top outlet that published the most news about the Security Council reform. The Guardian again featured an interview with Kofi Annan that can shed light on the debates at the General

Assembly meetings. I will also resort to Times of India, first because of the fact that India is the most discussed state for permanent membership who declined this offer during the Cold War(Harder, 2015). Second, Times of India was one of the top media outlets publishing the most news on the reform issue. Lastly I will make use of United Press International as it is one of the most resorted news agencies in global matters and has a tremendous amount of news on the reform issue. My timeframe will be the period of March-August 2005 to see the immediate effects of various proposals on media. With this, my aim is to widen the horizon of the study and catch what key public figures think about the reform process and how their perceptions echo in the media. This will help me improve reliability of my study. For this, I will appeal to Nexus Uni website which enables media search with various tools. I will utilize the key words of "Security Council reform" within the aforementioned time period to that end.

I will systematically analyze twenty five documents that I found relevant by making use of the variables and the codes that are presented in the next sections.

4.5. Variables and Operationalization

Independent and dependent variables help scholars analyze a situation and enable them to explain relationships between each other. Independent variables are utilized to explain potential effects of a specific event, while dependent variables represent the consequences under study which are perceived to come out as a result of impact of independent variables (Johnson & Joslyn, 2012).

4.5.1. Dependent Variables

Dependent variable for this paper is chosen as change in the structure the Security Council. To operationalize sufficiently I classified 'change' into two categories: change in the UN Charter and non-reform. This differentiation will give me guidance in specifying the units of analysis, what to elaborate and how to measure it.

4.5.2. Independent Variables and Operationalization

Independent variables will be chosen in the light of path dependency and principal-agent theory as mentioned in theoretical framework section.

Critical junctures like crises or turning points can enable change within international organizations by generating shocks to the system (Kapur, 2011). This kind of junctures has the potential to force international organizations to make strategic changes to adapt and reach balance again. On the other hand, path dependent procedures make it difficult for actors to revoke or alter their choice once they favor and pick a specific course of action. Choices that once seemed reasonable may come to be lost for good. Therefore, events that happen during or right after the critical junctures play an important role for understanding the nature of change. Path dependency and critical junctures can make us understand the effects of inactivity and "stickiness" in organizations (Skocpol & Pierson, 2002). In this paper, changes related to critical junctures and thus path dependency will be operationalized by evaluating the moments of crisis or turning points in global arena that is related to the Security Council. In this vein I will make use of the discourse member states resorted to during the General Assembly meetings. With this, I will aim at finding out the effects of the Charter on reform. For instance, I will try to find the effects of Article 108 which envisages that for an amendment to be enacted, it should be adopted by two-thirds of the members of General Assembly and ratified by two-thirds of the members of the United Nations, inclusive of all permanent members.

Principal agent theory predominantly concerns with whether agents are acting as responsible and trustworthy envoys or are they following their own set of goals and if so, how principals can build structures to keep agents in order (M. N. Barnett & Finnemore, 1999). According to principal agent approach, states assign power to international organizations and make new contracts with these agents to reach particular common goals via these organizations (Hawkins et al., 2006). Many scholars criticize this perception of contract between states and entities. States do not always act as members of a harmonious management committee. They can, without consulting other member states, take one-sided initiatives and try to influence the administration of relevant international organization according to their own national interests. This type of one-sided initiatives is especially important when states do not have a common understanding on how to utilize these organizations and cannot make a contract that foresees change. On such occasions, states look for ways to have an impact on them separately. For instance, according to Stone, powerful states can discover new methods to influence the decisions of international organizations with alternative means (Stone, 2011). In this paper I will try to understand the dynamics of this relationship. To that end, I will operationalize principal agent theory by expanding especially on the expectations of powerful states from the

Security Council and their initiatives to steer it to their advantage. I will focus on the veto power and unilateral influence of powerful states to that end. I will also investigate relationships between member states and the United Nations and among various member states to see their effects on the reform.

Table 1. Operationalization of concepts

Concept	Definition	Indicators
Path Dependency	Refers to irreversibility from choices once made.	Formal and informal decisions taken in the past and previous events impede change in the Security Council.
Principal Agent Relationship	Refers to an arrangement in which entities designate another entity to act on their behalf.	Unilateral influence possibility of powerful states makes change difficult. Relationships between member states and the UN and among member states affect the likelihood to create change.

4.6. Reliability, Validity and Limitations

Reliability and validity constitute two important benchmarks for a well-built academic study to that end.

Reliability of a study can be derived from 'accuracy' and 'consistency' of the measurement of the data. "The more accurately and consistently the variables are measured, the more certain it is that results will not be coincidental but paint a systematic and representative picture" (van Thiel, 2014). Accuracy means that the study should be able to grasp the variable to be evaluated as exactly as possible. Consistency is related to obtaining similar outcomes with identical studies. To this end, I created and attached a code tree on the Security Council reform as an appendix that is representative and inclusive. They carry the potential to be applicable to further studies on the matter at hand.

Validity is about the soundness of the conclusions derived from a scientific study. There are two important branches of validity: internal and external. Internal validity aims at answering

the question whether the scholars really measured the results they planned at the beginning. For this, researchers should pay attention to operationalization process as it constitutes a significant step in translating the theoretical concepts to a scientific study (van Thiel, 2014). This will prevent possible confusions and give a clearer direction to the researcher. To fulfill this condition, I aimed at creating a sound operationalization table which will help me become goal oriented in determining the effects of path dependency and principal agent relations on the Security Council reform. External validity concerns with the degree to which the results of a research can be generalized to other studies (Bryman, 2012). To suffice external validity in a study, researcher should pay attention to have a sample that is representative enough of the whole population. However, it is not always easy to generalize findings of a study either because the case is unique or the results can only be applied to specific situation (Flyvbjerg, 2006). However, I believe that this paper is relatable to the reform processes of other international organizations, since I will be covering a specific case from perspectives of two known concepts: path dependency and principal agent theory. The effects of these theories to the Security Council reform processes can be related to other cases in general successfully.

While case studies are considered valuable in contributing to the efforts to develop new theories or ameliorating the extant theories, they have the risk of having low level of reliability and validity (van Thiel, 2014). To overcome this limitation, I will utilize the method called triangulation.

Triangulation is a suitable method to use in case studies, especially in qualitative research, and means to apply more than one method in research to verify the collection of data and results of the research (van Thiel, 2014). In this paper, I will apply triangulation in the data sources I utilize and widen the spectrum of sources to prevent bias. For instance, in addition to analyzing the official General Assembly notes, I will resort to media sources to observe the repercussions of these meetings on media or public domain. Interviews with officials by media outlets propose valuable information to see whether states act according to their public statements in official meetings or not. And by acquiring data from various resources, I will have the chance to cross check and test reliability and validity of the study. If sources contradict at certain points, I will look for more data from different sources to be able to draw dependable conclusions.

One of the reasons why case studies are commonly used in public administration is the "predominantly interpretive approach" in public administration (Riccucci, 2010). However, this "one-sided methodological view" limits researchers' ability to build a personal and independent research. Moreover, case studies require scholars to deal with substantial amount of information for a significant amount of time. While undertaking the study, scholars' strong ties with similar documents may negatively affect their subjectivity and hence reliability of the study (van Thiel, 2014).

Lastly, in order to elaborate the relevance of the theory broadly, I chose to focus on only a handful of events in the Security Council history where I had to disregard many significant global developments. Also, it is impossible to get into details of all theories mentioned within the scope of this paper. To make the thesis more measurable and achievable, I underlined key arguments of relevant theories and implemented it to the significant cases mentioned above.

CHAPTER 5. ANALYSIS

5.1. Introduction

In this section, I will introduce then secretary general Kofi Annan's "In Larger Freedom" report and G4 proposal on the Security Council reform and discuss them. I will study on the official records of General Assembly plenary meetings published on the United Nations' official webpage, since General Assembly constitutes a common table where states can gather around and share their official standings on specific matters. The discussions in the General Assembly meetings have been a cornerstone in the history of the Security Council reform as they were useful not only different interest groups formally submitted their proposals but also all member states had the opportunity to register whether they found relevant proposals legitimate or not (Binder & Heupel, 2020).

5.2. Analysis

This paper is based on qualitative case study analysis and qualitative studies mainly focus on exploring and describing the research topic (Corbin & Strauss, 2012). To this end, I will conduct my analysis in the research situation itself, by utilizing content analysis. I chose this case study and content analysis for their potential value for theory and hope of contributing to the theory. Since the nature of the content analysis required data collection and data analysis processes intertwine; once the moment was reached where an additional data would not be beneficial for the sake of study, the study is finalized.

This research will mainly be based on deductive approach thanks to existence of theoretical knowledge already available but will be open to inductive findings. First, I will focus on explaining the reasons of non-change in the structure of the Security Council and trying to find out the reasons of this phenomenon by producing chain of events and associating cause and effect relations over time. To that end, I will look for structures and matters in the data to be able to compare them with each other and to determine representative codes that can be useful in answering the research question. I will also make use of open coding for this paper. Open coding is "the process of breaking down, examining, comparing, conceptualizing, and categorizing data" (Corbin & Strauss, 2012) and will be helpful in understanding the cause-and-effect relationship analyzed in this paper. Secondly, I will also test the theories in regard

to the developments on the Security Council reform and see whether they validate theory or not.

As an important factor of scientific studies, after collecting necessary documents and papers for this study, I ordered and stored my data in a systematic fashion. I first stored copies of all articles in a cloud based folder. Then I created an excel spreadsheet including information about all articles, with their exact names, their authors, the year they published, how many times they were cited, keywords that attest to for which section I will use that specific article.

In all scientific studies, determining proper codes is always a delicate issue. However, my research question and theoretical concepts discussed above help me sensitize concepts and produce necessary descriptive codes. In that regard, I created a code tree and used an index system that helped me understand and code the relevant sections systematically. In that regard, having read all documents to see the general trend in speeches and articles beforehand, I assigned my first set of codes. Then, I went through all date line by line to catch more codes and be more specific. After that, I categorized my codes according to their fit with my deductive approach. In that regard, according to my inferences from the materials I read, I divided the Security Council reform issue to two main branches as 'reform' and 'non-reform'. Then for reform branch, I determined these codes used in the General Assembly meetings and newspaper articles as an indicator of my dependent variable (change): insufficiency of the Security Council, non-responsiveness of the Security Council, non-representativeness of the Security Council, evolving global nature, necessity for enlargement to stay relevant. And for my other dependent variable non-reform (non-change) branch my codes are effective structure, existing global stability, necessity for consensus, fast decision-making process, regional rivalry, questions on possible candidates. These deductive predefined codes also helped me undertake my study in the light of the themes I was interested in examining.

This deductive approach and open coding will help my paper have a sound basis for a comprehensive analysis. It will also enable this research to contribute to the accumulation of data thanks to its flexibility and ability to be attributable to the context. However, this approach also has some criticisms. First, it is believed that certain level of bias is inescapable when researchers who are already familiar with the content of the study pick codes for their study. And secondly, it is also asserted that since data is based on one specific case, it can be hard to perceive the actual contribution of the study to theory development (Bryman, 2006).

5.3. Findings

In this section, I will present why the Security Council reform did not take place in light of my analysis of relevant documents. I will start with describing the In Larger Freedom report and the G4 proposal. Then, I will present reactions of various actors to these initiatives. In the end, in accordance with my research question, I will furnish why reform did not occur.

5.3.1. In Larger Freedom Report

I will start my analysis with the report of "In Larger Freedom" prepared by then Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi Annan with the aim of getting a better grip of the background of the idea of change in the structure of the Security Council. As a staunch supporter of reform in the structure of the United Nations in general, Kofi Annan's initiative on the Security Council was important in giving the reform issue a formal shape and creating a discussion process where the perceptions of states were heard by scholars and public firsthand.

On March 21, 2005, Kofi Annan revealed his comprehensive reform plan for the United Nations called "In Larger Freedom: Towards development, security and human rights for all" which later became famous as "In Larger Freedom" (*UN Documents: A/59/2005*, n.d.). With this report, Kofi Annan aimed at bringing member states to a common ground for concrete steps towards the reform of the United Nations. He divided this 63-page report to four main chapters and named them as "freedom from want, freedom from fear, freedom to live in dignity" and the last but not the least "strengthening the United Nations". This last chapter laid out his plan to modernize the General Assembly, Economic and Social Council and Security Council.

Having sat at the top of the hierarchy and held the steer wheel of the United Nations for years, Annan was letting the world know that the entity itself was acknowledging the necessity of a change for the Security Council with these words:

> *"...the Security Council has increasingly asserted its authority and, especially since the end of the cold war, has enjoyed greater unity of purpose among its permanent members*

but has seen that authority questioned on the grounds that its composition is anachronistic or insufficiently representative..." (*UN Documents: A/59/2005*, n.d.)*.*

He was also offering two concrete models to steer the reform negotiation process and encourage states to reflect on them for a fruitful discussion. Below is the table taken from the report that includes the details of these two separate models.

Figure 3. Model A and B (taken from "In Larger Freedom" report)

Box 5
Security Council reform: models A and B

Model A provides for six new permanent seats, with no veto being created, and three new two-year term non-permanent seats, divided among the major regional areas as follows:

Regional area	No. of States	Permanent seats (continuing)	Proposed new permanent seats	Proposed two-year seats (non-renewable)	Total
Africa	53	0	2	4	6
Asia and Pacific	56	1	2	3	6
Europe	47	3	1	2	6
Americas	35	1	1	4	6
Totals model A	**191**	**5**	**6**	**13**	**24**

Model B provides for no new permanent seats but creates a new category of eight four-year renewable-term seats and one new two-year non-permanent (and non-renewable) seat, divided among the major regional areas as follows:

Regional area	No. of States	Permanent seats (continuing)	Proposed four-year renewable seats	Proposed two-year seats (non-renewable)	Total
Africa	53	0	2	4	6
Asia and Pacific	56	1	2	3	6
Europe	47	3	2	1	6
Americas	35	1	2	3	6
Totals model B	**191**	**5**	**8**	**11**	**24**

Kofi Annan, in his article written for Foreign Affairs on 25 April 2005, highlighted his motivation for the reform of the Security Council:

> "*No reform of the UN would be complete, however, without Security Council reform. The council's present makeup reflects the world of 1945, not that of the twenty-first century. It must be reformed to include states that contribute most to the organization, financially, militarily, and diplomatically, and to represent broadly the current membership of the UN* (*In Larger Freedom: Decision Time at the UN*, n.d.).*"*

In following discussions in the General Assembly meetings, representatives of states like Luxembourg (spoke on behalf of EU), Jamaica (spoke on behalf of Group 77 and China), Estonia (spoke on behalf of Eastern European Group), Malawi (spoke on behalf of Group of African States for the month of April), Malaysia (spoke on behalf of Non-Aligned Movement), China, UK (*UNGA 59th Session 85th Meeting Official Records*, n.d.), Pakistan, Egypt, Colombia, Brazil, South Africa (*UNGA 59th Session 86th Meeting Official Records*, n.d.), France, Russia, USA, Japan (*UNGA 59th Session 87th Meeting Official Records*, n.d.), Germany and Indonesia (*UNGA 59th Session 88th Meeting Official Records*, n.d.), welcomed the initiative of Kofi Annan and praised the plan as an important step in reform process. While acknowledging the necessity of change and commending a formal endeavor from a such a high-level official, each of these countries also noted their reservations and hesitations down during these meetings. For example, Chinese representative underlined that

> "*...we must not lose sight of the fact that United Nations reform needs to be all-round and multisectoral. It cannot be accomplished overnight or in one go and one must not expect any permanent fix*" (*UNGA 59th Session 85th Meeting Official Records*, n.d.).

Russian representative again pointed out the indispensability of collective action:

> "*... However, the Organization must have the necessary resources at its disposal in order to be more effective and more efficient... That is why decisions on fundamental issues should be based on the broadest possible agreement among Member States and on the bedrock of international law — the Charter of the United Nations*" (*UNGA 59th Session 87th Meeting Official Records*, n.d.).

German representative iterated a similar perception and implied the necessity of cooperation:

> "*We remain open to ideas on many of the reform issues. But we will not make false compromises in order to accommodate the very specific national interests of a very few*" (*UNGA 59th Session 88th Meeting Official Records*, n.d.).

If we look at the news articles published in prominent news outlets, we see the same pattern of hesitations and reservations for the report. A The Guardian article published the same day with the report, while highlighting the importance of reform, criticizes Kofi Annan and accuses him of not bringing any concrete solution to the table:

> "*...as he leaves it [reform of the security council] to member states to decide, preferably by consensus rather than majority vote*" (Annan Proposes Radical UN Shakeup| The Guardian, n.d.).

A New York Times article said that Annan's proposal was a disappointment for India since he was ruling out the possibility of veto right for new members (*Annan Rebuffs India's Hopes for an Expanded UN Role*, n.d.). New York Times drew attention to the criticisms of veto issue as well:

> "*Mr. Annan left it [Security Council] up to the General Assembly to decide... Veto power is coveted by nations seeking permanent status; they are likely to continue to press for it even though both recommendations, as now written, limit the veto to the five original permanent members*" (*Annan to Offer Plans for Change in U.N. Structure*, n.d.).

5.3.2. The Group of Four (G4)

This section will focus on the G4 proposal, yet to give more context, I will present other important proposals advanced around the same time with G4. Table shown below is a brief summary of these proposals. It will be helpful in comparing what states ask for when they mean reform and detecting the matter of contentions among them.

Table 2. Proposals of groups (summarized from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan official website at: https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100059111.pdf)

	Permanent Seats	**Non-Permanent Seats**	**Veto**
G4		- 14 or 15 (4 or 5 additional members)	
	- 11 (6 additional members) - Africa (2 additional members) - Asia-Pacific (2 additional members) - Latin America & Caribbean (1 additional member) - Western Europe & other (1 additional member)	- Africa (1 or 2 additional members) - Asia- Pacific (1 additional member), - Eastern Europe (1 additional member) - Latin America & Caribbean (1 additional member)	The new permanent members shall not exercise the veto-right until a decision has been taken during a review (15 years after the reform).
Uniting for Consensus	5 (status quo)	Up to 21 (11 additional members) increase of non-permanent seats and creation of new category of membership based on longer term non-permanent seats.	Ready to consider formulas on how to best limit its use.
African Union	- 11 (6 additional members) - Africa (2 additional members) - Asia-Pacific (2 additional members) - Latin America & Caribbean (1 additional member) - Western Europe & other (1 additional member)	- 15 (5 additional members) - Africa (2 additional members) - Asia-Pacific (1 additional member) - Eastern Europe (1 additional member) - Latin America & Caribbean (1 additional member)	The veto should be abolished but so long as it exists, it should be extended to all members including the new permanent members.

Formed by Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan, G4 presented its reform proposal to General Assembly as a draft resolution (A/59/L.64) on 6 July 2005 (*G4 Proposal / UN Official Records*, n.d.). This proposal was also co-sponsored by Afghanistan, Belgium, Bhutan, Czech Republic, Denmark, Fiji, France, Georgia, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Kiribati, Latvia, Maldives, Nauru, Palau, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, and Ukraine.

Brazilian permanent representative to the United Nations as the introducer of the G4 proposal to the General Assembly announced the motivation of G4 countries as below. And his

statement can be considered a clear explanation why G4 thought Security Council should be reformed.

> "*Accumulated experience acquired since the founding of the United Nations demonstrates that in the eyes of our peoples, the realities of power in 1945 were superseded long ago... The Security Council, in order to effectively carry out its functions and exercise its powers, needs to undergo thorough reform... Such reform would ensure a better response to the evolving nature and characteristics of threats to peace, as well as more systematic and effective compliance with the Council's decisions*" (*G4 Proposal / UN Official Records*, n.d.).

From the speeches of representatives in general, it can be inferred that G4 members mainly emphasized the importance of performance improvement for the Security Council and placed it to the core of their argumentations. For instance, Japanese, Brazilian and German representatives noted respectively that

> "*We must reform the United Nations into an Organization capable of addressing the realities of the twenty-first century*" (*UNGA 59th Session 111th Meeting Official Records*, n.d.).

> "*The Security Council, in order to effectively carry out its functions and exercise its powers, needs to undergo thorough reform that includes expanding the category of permanent members in order to bring it in line with the contemporary world*" (*UNGA 59th Session 111th Meeting Official Records*, n.d.).

> "... [G4 proposal] *would strengthen the problem-solving capacity of the Security Council. That would be in the interests of everyone, including the permanent five*" (*UNGA 59th Session 112th Meeting Official Records*, n.d.).

Indian representative who wasn't planning to speak during the session took the floor in the face of strong oppositions and briefly explained their argumentation with an extemporaneous speech by mainly touching on performance matters. He also slammed opposing states by adding

"*Our critics... wish to increase the Security Council's efficiency and authority and to improve its working methods, but without breaking the charmed circle of the permanent five... These [efficiency and authority] cannot be achieved without the contribution of new permanent members. And how does one improve working methods without mandating new permanent members to do so and holding them accountable if they do not*" (*UNGA 59th Session 112th Meeting Official Records*, n.d.)*?*

As an additional matter of concern, Japan representative drew attention to the representativeness:

"*... the Security Council must fulfil its role with the maximum cooperation and participation of the international community. For that purpose, the Council must improve its representation to better reflect today's world*" (*UNGA 59th Session 111th Meeting Official Records*, n.d.)*.

G4 proposal envisages six additional permanent memberships for Brazil, Germany, India, Japan and two African countries. It also advocates four new non-permanent seats for Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, eastern Europe and Africa bringing the Security Council to 25 members. When it comes to veto issue, G4 proposes new permanent members not to exercise veto power for fifteen years after the amendment in the UN Charter enters into force until a solution is found in a new conference.

This proposal can be considered as a significant step in the Security Council reform as it is the first full-fledged offer officially brought to the General Assembly by member states. Also, this event revitalized the reform debates and other groups like "Uniting for Consensus" and "African Union" proposed their own offers after this initiative. However, while many representatives who took the stage during the General Assembly plenary session discussions seem to have supported the idea of reform, each had their own solution that differed from G4's. I will discuss them below.

5.3.2.a. Reactions of P5 countries

The attitude of France towards the G4 proposal provides an interesting case for this paper. France, as a P5 state, is one of the co-sponsors of this proposal. French permanent representatives to the United Nations justified their position on G4 proposal with these words:

> *"From the outset, France has maintained that, in order to achieve that aim, the Security Council must be enlarged in both categories of membership: permanent and non-permanent... Four countries — Brazil, Germany, India and Japan — whose individual aspirations we support, have submitted a draft resolution... It was on that basis that France became a co-sponsor"* (*UNGA 59th Session 111th Meeting Official Records*, n.d.).

While enjoying the privileges of permanent membership, France publicly supports an initiative that seems to weaken the status-quo and threaten P5 hegemony.

Permanent representative of China to the United Nations, while stating that they are in favor of a reform, showed that China is reluctant to make any formal changes as China already has an advantage over other members:

> *"China supports the necessary and rational reform of the Security Council... China is firmly opposed to setting an artificial time frame for Security Council reform and rejects a forced vote on any formula on which there still exist significant differences... For several months now, the preparation for the (2005 September World) summit has been almost hijacked by the debate surrounding the enlargement of the Security Council, which has seriously diluted the attention and input given to such other major issues as development, security, human rights..."*(*UNGA 59th Session 111th Meeting Official Records*, n.d.)

Same pattern can be seen in the statements of another P5 state the Russian Federation. Russian delegation implied that any change would endanger their upper hand position; therefore, they try to spread the process over time:

"...they are ready to support any reasonable option for the Council's enlargement if based on the widest possible agreement within the United Nations... The voting in the Assembly should not cause a split among Member States and should not lead, as a result, to the weakening, instead of strengthening, of the United Nations and the Council...Any dilution of the status of the five current permanent members, including the right of veto, was categorically unacceptable" (*UNGA 59th Session 112th Meeting Official Records*, n.d.).

The US delegation substantiated their opposition to the G4 proposal from a historical point of view:

"Instead of choosing between a body that was representative but too large and unwieldy to deal with emergent security issues, or one that was efficient at the expense of representativeness, the founders had created a system with multiple bodies... To deal with security, they had formed a body of countries with demonstrated capability to contribute to international peace and security... The only way to approach Security Council expansion was to ensure that those nations accorded permanent seats met appropriate criteria for the tremendous duties and responsibilities they would assume" (*UNGA 59th Session 112th Meeting Official Records*, n.d.).

The US representative is touching upon the League of Nations here. According to her, what happened to the League of Nations should not happen to its successor the United Nations. She is explaining the practical reason behind the structural rigidity of the United Nations. The League of Nations was a more equitable entity than the United Nations, however it failed to protect global peace and the power balance slid to the advantage of big states. Hesitations of P5 on reform should also be considered from this perspective. They are of the opinion that the Security Council secured once-derailed equilibrium among these big powers and their reciprocal strategic moves keep the global order in shape.

UK was another P5 supporter of the G4 proposal but with a big condition that is hard to rule out. UK representative narrated this condition in his short speech:

"... [UK] will therefore vote in favour of this draft resolution. But... [UK] has never believed that the extension of the veto beyond the current five permanent members is a

necessary feature of expanded permanent membership... Reforming the Security Council is an important aspect of adapting the United Nations to face the challenges of the twenty-first century. But it is only one aspect" (*UNGA 59th Session 112th Meeting Official Records*, n.d.).

He was not only scuppering the G4 proposal with his discourse on veto but also trying to change the center of attention by downplaying the Security Council reform.

5.3.2.b. Reactions of Other Members

According to Binder & Heupel, out of 52 states that expressed opinion during the General Assembly meetings, 18 declared that they were in favor of the G4 proposal. Of the remaining 34 states, 22 not only rejected the G4 proposal but also came up with rival proposals under different groupings like "Uniting for Consensus" and "African Union" (Binder & Heupel, 2020).

Members of the Uniting for Consensus group oppose the idea of increasing the number of permanent seats and offer a twenty-five-member Security Council structure with twenty non-permanent seats. According to them, the General Assembly should elect member states for twenty non-permanent seats in accordance with the contribution of each state to the purposes of the United Nations and also geographical distribution. And their reaction to the G4 proposal should be evaluated within this framework. For instance, representative of one of the Uniting for Consensus states Pakistan slammed the G4 proposal harshly:

> *"An outcome for Council reform achieved by such questionable means is unlikely to be sustainable or to strengthen the United Nations... the proposed resolution is contrary to the principle of the sovereign equality of States... Most of us, when we entered the United Nations, were given no choice regarding the existing five permanent members. But today we do have a choice, and we will not choose to anoint six States with special privileges and stamp ourselves as second-class Members of the Organization..."*(*UNGA 59th Session 111th Meeting Official Records*, n.d.).

Argentinian representative brought about the same concerns:

> *"...we cannot deny, however, that we have felt a certain amount of pressure to discuss a draft text which has not met with any consensus, which sidelines major actors in our organization and which would result in divisions within, and a weakening of, our organization... [the proposal] would create discrimination and artificial hegemonies among regions... by creating a Security Council with an excessive number of permanent members"*(*UNGA 59th Session 111th Meeting Official Records*, n.d.)

Representative of the Republic of Korea drew attention to the accountability of Security Council:

> *"Once selected, the six new permanent members would hold on to their privileged status in perpetuity, regardless of how well they carried out their responsibilities... We should not forget that absolute power is apt to corrupt"*(*UNGA 59th Session 112th Meeting Official Records*, n.d.)

As a member of African Union, Algerian representative briefly explained that

> *"My delegation considers that the draft resolution submitted by the group of four is absolutely unacceptable and incompatible with the legitimate interests and aspirations of Africa..."*(*UNGA 59th Session 111th Meeting Official Records*, n.d.).

And by that he made it clear that it was difficult to tighten the gap between G4 and the African Union. And one week after the first General Assembly discussion on the proposal of G4, Nigeria introduced the African Union proposal (A/59/L.67).

5.3.2.c. Positions of United Nations Officials and other Reactions

Kofi Annan, as the catalyzer of reform discussions, was apparently still expecting an agreement between states as he postponed his deadline for an agreement from September to Christmas saying that

"If they are not able to resolve it before the summit, the issue is not going to die. They will have to pursue it and I hope to resolve it before we all go away for Christmas" (*Annan Acknowledges Delays in UN Council Reform*, n.d.).

However, the tone of then president of the United Nations General Assembly Jean Ping was much more precise:

"... the impasse over Security Council enlargement is posing a significant threat to the success of next month's UN world summit. We are in a situation which is certainly not the best to deal with drastic reform"(*Enlargement Impasse Threat to UN Summit | Financial Times*, n.d.).

It is not difficult to see the reflection of the rift among states on the media as well. While most of the news covered supported the idea of reform, many were pessimistic about a positive outcome due to rivalries between different groups and contentious debates. An analysis written for United Press International depicted a gloomy picture for Security Council reform:

"The outlook for U.N. Security Council reform, to bring the council from the post-World War II years and into the 21st Century, appears to look bleaker by the day, especially for a proposal by the group of four nations aspiring to fill additional seats on the 15-member panel" (*UN Council Expansion Unlikely*, n.d.).

A New York Times article described the stalemate:

"Four countries that have mounted a joint diplomatic offensive to gain permanent seats on the Security Council -- Brazil, Germany, India and Japan -- are facing unexpectedly strong opposition from the United States, the African Union and regional rivals..." (*Plans to Expand Security Council May Be Frustrated for Now*, n.d.)

A BBC and Times of India article was registering the bewail of Indian federal external affairs minister on the attitude of African Union:

"It is a matter of *regret* that the Extraordinary *African Union* summit held in Addis Ababa was unable to endorse an AU/G4 foreign ministers..." (*India Regrets African Union Decision*, n.d.).

5.4. Why Reform Did Not Take Place?

As seen from the findings, each member state has its own set of priorities and comes up with different justifications for their standings. What causes this clash of rhetoric among states and creates a futile negotiation process is the lack of enthusiasm to make sacrifices. There seems to be no possible common point where member states can agree upon. While like-minded states came together to form groups, in time these groups tended to become more rigid. The fact that none of the proposals of groups were voted in the General Assembly can be considered as a sign to the rigidity of groups.

The speeches of two P5 states USA and Russian representatives, provided below respectively, are insightful examples to see the rigidity of states and why the way for reform is blocked:

> "*We need to prepare the way carefully to ensure that whatever we vote for in this body will gain the requisite support of Member States required by the Charter during the ratification process. A vote to lock in a particular mode of Security Council expansion at this stage would interfere with our ability to shape a proposal later that would stand a reasonable chance of securing the requisite ratifications from Member State legislatures*" (*UNGA 59th Session 112th Meeting Official Records*, n.d.).

> "*The Russian Federation is prepared to support any reasonable option for Security Council expansion if it is based on the broadest possible agreement within the United Nations. We believe that such an agreement would entail support for a decision more substantial than simply the legally required two-thirds vote. Voting in the General Assembly should not cause a split among Member States and thereby weaken, rather than strengthen, the United Nations and its Security Council*" (*UNGA 59th Session 112th Meeting Official Records*, n.d.).

The speech of the representative of Spain, a European country without permanent seat, during the same meeting gives us another perception why states can't move forward for reform:

"...we do not believe it would be prudent to move hastily to a vote that can predictably lead to a very serious rift among Member States and that will have unforeseeable and real consequences for the next steps in the process of reforming the Organization as a whole... President of the General Assembly should continue to hold consultations with the groups sponsoring the various proposals, with a view to reaching the broadest possible agreement on reform of the Security Council, thus avoiding division in the Organization" (*UNGA 59th Session 112th Meeting Official Records*, n.d.).

All these speeches show us that reform groups can't convince other individual member states or groups to support their proposal. Even the Brazilian representative acknowledged this fact while presenting the G4 proposal on 11 July 2005:

"I wish to make clear in this regard that we do not seek to impose a vote on this matter before it has been comprehensively discussed by Member States in this debate" (*UNGA 59th Session 111th Meeting Official Records*, n.d.).

As a last and important example why reform did not take place, the US representative draws attention to the practical and formal difficulties stemming from formal arrangements:

"Let me share with the Assembly some of the reasons that have led my government to the position that it cannot support the draft resolution... Under Article 108 of the Charter, expansion of the Security Council requires lengthy constitutional processes in many nations... In our [US] system, for example, the support of two thirds of the United States Senate is needed to pass an amendment to a treaty. We need to prepare the way carefully to ensure that whatever we vote for in this body will gain the requisite support of Member States required by the Charter during the ratification process. A vote to lock in a particular mode of Security Council expansion at this stage would interfere with our ability to shape a proposal later that would stand a reasonable chance of securing the requisite ratifications from Member State legislatures" (*UNGA 59th Session 112th Meeting Official Records*, n.d.).

5.5. Conclusion

Following the analysis of the data, it is notable to see that all states are in favor of some form of reform for the Security Council. It is likewise noteworthy that there is no consensus on how to realize such a reform. As seen from above, some states disagree on who to choose as permanent members, some disagree with the idea of expanding permanent membership, some disagree with right to veto and etc. At the next chapter, I will critically analyze these findings within the framework of concepts explained in theoretical framework section.

CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION

6.1. Introduction

This paper aims at finding answers to the question of why the Security Council reform be realized. Based on the findings above, it can be said that there are various explanations as to what member states have disagreements on. This chapter will critically analyze these findings. With this, I will attempt to reflect on my research question, variables, and findings within the framework of theoretical concepts I used.

6.2. Discussion of Findings

The Security Council has been a prominent body of the United Nations thanks to its duties assigned by the United Nations Charter. However, its stiff structure and resistance to institutional change has been clouding the legitimacy of Security Council for a long time. With this paper, I aimed at reflecting this phenomenon by concentrating on path dependency and principal agent relationship.

6.2.1. Path Dependency

According to the findings of this thesis, path dependency can be perceived as a suitable argument that explains the impasse in the reform of the Security Council. First, powerful states who hold on to status quo created by the founding document the Charter and do not want to lose this privileged position. Second, any change in the structure of the Security Council requires the support of P5 to come into being. Both of these intertwined factors are procured by the conditions of aftermath of WWII and now strengthen the resilience of the Security Council to change.

Stance of France among P5 presents a distinctive case to that end. The formation process of the United Nations and its organs had mainly been shaped by Big Three, namely Russia, UK, and USA by sidelining France. For instance, Soviet Union was perceiving France as a "charming but weak" member (Bosco, 2009). Then US President Roosevelt was defining Soviet Union, UK, USA, and China as the "Four Policemen" of the world (Hildebrand, 1991). When we look at today's conditions, France is an open supporter of reform while other P5

actors are less enthusiastic for such an endeavor. This is mainly because of the fact that other P5 states are exploiting their favored conditions created by early decisions taken during the formation. When these states enjoy the point of equilibrium born as a result of interaction between each other, where France is of the idea that they are excluded, the incentive of change for these powerful states decreases. Also, since there were no threats of a global level war - which makes the Security Council fulfil its duty of maintaining international peace and security- to continue with present 'concert of power model' is more desirable for them. Therefore, they lock in, protect their position, and take a defensive attitude when a threat such as change or transformation comes up. As Skocpol and Pierson puts it "Where the same set of actors who would lose influence as the result of an institution reform must agree to any revision one would naturally expect a higher level of institutional resilience" (Skocpol & Pierson, 2002). This is an explicit demonstration of path dependency on the Security Council reform process.

The discomfort is relevant for all parties who ask for an institutional change but it is more immense for France as a P5 member since inception. Hence it is safe to posit that France can be considered as the most eager P5 state supporting the reform of the Security Council (Bosco, 2009). France, who feels sidelined and excluded in the initial coordination process, now aim to reach a new balance where its preferences are represented more broadly and looks for ways to weaken or break the supremacy of other powerful states. To this end, the focal point for the rhetoric of France in the General Assembly meetings has been the veto issue. French representative made clear that France is in favor of limiting the use of veto. Later on, France even made a declaration for P5 members not to resort to use of veto in the circumstances of mass atrocities for efficient and effective decision-making processes (*Pourquoi La France Veut Encadrer Le Recours Au Veto Au Conseil de Sécurité Des Nations Unies - Ministère de l'Europe et Des Affaires Étrangères*, n.d.). This can all be seen as the quests of France for bringing other powerful states to the terms of France. Although it seems like harming its own position, France is trying to bring other powerful states to the terms of France.

In today's world, it is not rare to see national governments with considerable support having difficulties in producing substantial policy alterations and USA is not an exception to that. The US representative refers to this reality in her speech. Even if a decision on reform is taken by the General Assembly, it may be difficult to convince politicians during the national level ratification processes. Even if they are convinced, ratification may mean a path dependent situation where possible future amendments are blocked. Torfing (2009) relates this to the

downside of politics and institutions: "...the prospect of efficiency enhancing reforms is dim due to the weakness of self-correcting mechanism in terms of competition or learning; the sporadic involvement and short time horizon of the political actors; and the institutional stickiness in politics" (Torfing, 2009).

Another justification of the US representative again calls for path dependency where she implies that the stiffness of the United Nations was created on purpose. When analyzing path dependency of institutions, Hosli and Dorfler argue that "...the creators purposely design institutions in a way that inhibits institutional change either by installing high hurdles for institutional change or equipping certain members with veto rights... In fact, this ensures that the creators are able to prevent any institutional change that will bring them into an inferior position" (Hosli & Dörfler, 2019). They even go beyond and explain that the effects of path dependency: "While designing an institution as change-resistant promises to ensure that a creator will not be worse off in the future, it will also introduce institutional hurdles for the improvement of the position of all other members" (Hosli & Dörfler, 2019). The rhetoric of the US representative can be evaluated on the basis of this observation. She is reminding that the Charter was created this way consciously and change may bring about unintended and unwanted outcomes. The cautious attitude of the Chinese representative not to have an "artificial time limit" also supports US perspective. As a challenger, G4 member Japan representative directs a threat right to the heart of this claim by calling for equal treatment not historical lock-ins.

Indian representative gives valuable insights on path dependency of the Security Council and its consequences. He first highlights the reality of impasse and explains how G4 proposal is a way to overcome this barrier. Then, in conjunction to that, he unfolds that "*President Truman spoke of the noble purposes of the United Nations. But as the records of the Potsdam Conference show, he also inaugurated the cold war*" (*UNGA 59th Session 112th Meeting Official Records*, n.d.). He is challenging the very idea of the US representative here. According to him, who created this path dependent institution does not have to be true all the time. Reform is matter that should be realized since it is a necessity and this path dependent structure is a hurdle in the road ahead.

Mauritius representative complains about the lock-ins too and underlines the inadequate representation of Africa in the Security Council. Africa was not powerful back then but now

many topics of the Security Council agenda is on African continent and there are strong African candidates anymore. His suggestion to fix this and act according to the realities of the current age is a challenge to path dependency.

All these expressions from various delegates confirm that this thesis validates theory in the sense that path dependency creates resistance to change in institutions. Decisions taken at the outset of the endeavors in maintaining international peace are now restricting institutional flexibility of the Security Council. At the same time, creators of this path dependent structure are trying to prevent their opponents to gain more control over decision making processes by exploiting the advantages of the current rigidity.

6.2.2. Principal Agent Relationship

In this section, I will discuss that principal agent relationship creates dilemmas for states and hence it can be perceived as a reason behind the Security Council reform deadlock. To support this, I will focus on the term of "unilateral influence" used by Copelovitch in his study on principal-agent theory in international organizations (Copelovitch, 2010).

According to principal agent theory, change in international organizations can be realized by two actors: Principals' "common agency" or in the cases of lack of agreement between principals "autonomous bureaucratic agency" (Copelovitch, 2010). However, possibility of a "unilateral influence" on the agency confronts with this understanding as it creates a favorable environment for only some of the principals. It is possible to witness such a discomfort in some states during the General Assembly meetings. The main concern of such states is the idea that the image of collective principal is damaged. For example, Jamaican delegate is asking for a just system where each state has the same level of chance to affect change as the principal agent theory envisages. Algerian representative's manner towards veto attests to the same concern with this Jamaican counterpart. He iterates that the ongoing unilateral hegemony of P5 on the Security Council decisions is the main obstacle.

Unequal representation of small/medium states at the Security Council can be considered from this perspective as well. It is actually a topic addressed by all proposals. Many member states consider the Security Council as a table where powerful states come together and shape global affairs unfairly thanks to its rigid structure. They iterate that exclusion of small/medium states

from decision-making process is contrary to the soul of the United Nations and principal agent relationship. As mentioned in the famous article of Barret and Finnemore "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations", UN officials themselves are aware of this perception and are aiming at depicting a picture that shows the United Nations as the representative of the "international community" (M. N. Barnett & Finnemore, 1999).

Indian representative's sarcastic toned response while defending G4 proposal is again another important sign documenting the influence of P5. He mocks ongoing situation and his usage of words proves the discomfort in some principals. As Hanrieder indicates, discourses of states like India on the over-influence of powerful states in policy implementation demonstrate that decisions of international organizations "...tend to be biased in favor of the great powers that circumvent collective decision-making..." (Hanrieder, 2014). And the solution of states who ask for reform is to change the Charter which lays the ground for principal agent relationship in the Security Council case.

Uruguay representative refers to the same problem by quoting the statement of Uruguay's first envoy to the UN in 1952 as: "*Today... there may be a hope that in the near future the veto will become a thing of the past, with the spinning-wheel and the bronze hatchet, and will be no more to the peoples than the sign and symbol of a vanished world based on inequality among States, the privileges of power and the denial of the rule of law and morality*" (*UNGA 59th Session 112th Meeting Official Records*, n.d.). She underlines not only the oldness of the problem but also perceived unequalness of principals then. She clearly states that they see abolition of veto as a means to procure equality between sovereign principals.

Representative of Romania, who complains about the underrepresentation of Eastern European region in Kofi Annan's model A and B, puts his finger on the same principal agent problem by referring to a reform where less powerful agents are looked out for and treated fairly as expected in a principal agent relationship.

When we look at the responses of P5, we can see that they, while of course not giving any hints about unilateral influence, perceive this principal agent structure at least as a tangible solution and advocate search for a joint formula. For instance, then US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Richard Burns communicates that principals are on equal footing, however reforming an effectively functioning agency requires collaboration. He also articulates in the

face of reform calls that there is no conflict of interests between principals and agents. Principals are all in favor of the same goal, having an agent like the Security Council. Where their perceptions diverge is how to make it more effective, an issue that can be addressed with the contribution of all principals (*Press Briefing of Nick Burns, The American Presidency Project*, n.d.).

Overall, this thesis found out that principal agent relationship that forms the logic of policy implementation in the Security Council creates an environment that has inclination to favor the interests of only some principals like P5 rather than the interests of collective principal. Indeed, this exclusion is materialized through the principal agent contract, the United Nations Charter, by which P5 states have the means to enjoy unilateral influence.

6.3. Inductive Findings

According to Schaefer (2016), all fruitful negotiations are positive sum in nature and the Security Council reform is unlikely to happen unless states give up on their self-interests and zero-sum strategies (Schaefer, 2017). I will reflect on this inference from the perspectives of logic of appropriateness and logic of consequences.

In their neo-institutionalist study "Rediscovering Institutions", March & Olsen propose that logic of consequences and logic of appropriateness are two perspectives that contradict each other (J. March & Olsen, 1989). The logic of appropriateness foresees that actions are steered by appropriate regulations. These regulations are cherished because they are perceived as fair, right, and legitimate. On the other hand, logic of consequences means certain actions are preferred by relevant actors after subjective analysis of alternative outcomes.

If these two perceptions are applied to the Security Council reform case, it will be seen that states who do not have a direct interest in question are generally less powerful states and they tend to follow logic of appropriateness. Contrastingly, states who have direct interests in question like winning a permanent seat or losing the right to veto tend to act strategically and decide on the basis of logic of consequences.

For this paper, the attitude of China provides a valuable data to that end. China, as discussed earlier, publicly favors the idea of reform however, its official support for various contradicting

groups makes its intention questionable. China, being a member of Group 77 and the informal observer of less supported "Uniting for Consensus", is accused of "organized hypocrisy". According to Schaefer (2016) China's **"*official rhetoric is not being matched with genuine practice. Although China arguably prefers the status quo over reform, it cannot publicly say so or officially denounce the reform process"* (Schaefer, 2017)**. Chinese representative's assertion that *"China is firmly opposed to setting an artificial time frame for Security Council reform..."* does not seem to fit with a reformist ideology. In that regard, China's manner can be traced back to the dynamics of logic of consequences. As a country whose interests are in question because of the reform initiatives, China is trying to side with the socially accepted norm that the Security Council requires reform not to gain strategic enemies and also aims at creating distractions to stretch out the reform process. Swart summarizes this situation by articulating that "*China's involvement in the Uniting for Consensus coalition is for the sake of hampering the reform process and prevent it from successfully concluding"*(Swart & von Freiesleben, 2013)

On the other hand, the rhetoric of Switzerland shows us a good example of logic of appropriateness in the discussions of the Security Council reform. Swiss representative stresses that *"...it is necessary to find ways and means to allow for compromise on concrete issues, including the notion of permanency, the right of veto and the working methods, in order to enlarge the group of countries that can support the proposed enlargement with conviction"* (*UNGA 59th Session 111th Meeting Official Records*, n.d.). As noticed, Swiss delegates focus is the greater good rather than self-interest and acknowledges that each relevant side needs to make compromises for a fruitful discussion. While it is questionable whether this offer can get the nod from other states, as other proposals, it is a valuable contribution to the reform discussions.

The two logics mentioned above provide an explanatory background for studies on the Security Council reform and future studies on this matter can be enlightening.

6.4. Conclusion

This paper found out that the General Assembly discussions on "In Larger Freedom" report and the G4 proposal validate the theory on path dependence and principal agent relationships. It is also noteworthy that logic of consequences and logic of appropriateness were found to be

two significant theoretical concepts that can be helpful in further understanding the perceptions of various states.

CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION

The aim of this thesis was to analyze the reasons behind the prolongation of the United Nations Security Council reform process. To that end, I studied on the "In Larger Freedom" report of former secretary general Kofi Annan and G4 proposal. The said report was published with high hopes and for some period was successful in creating an environment conducive to change. G4 proposal was the first official response to that report. However both could not create a sufficient momentum that could help states realize the goal of reform.

With the report of "In Larger Freedom", Kofi Annan was planning to bring the reform discussions to an end and formalize this envisaged reform in the 60th anniversary meetings in New York in September 2005. This initiative was planned to not only reinvigorate the deadlocked reform discussions but also be a formal and concrete calendar till the anniversary meetings. While it helped states register their formal stances and see what other states asserted and how they justified their preferences, couldn't be decisive in uncovering a common solution. G4 proposal's importance stems from it becoming the first full-fledged reform proposal brought by states before the General Assembly. Only after that, public opinion could see what states and interest groups officially meant by reform.

This thesis placed path dependence and principal agent theory to its core and analyzed the reasons of impasse from these theoretical grounds. In that regard, path dependence was found to be creating uncrossable barriers for states. Settlements reached at the initial stage made the Security Council locked into predefined positions where it is enormously difficult to change the course of the entity anymore. In addition, big powers who erected this organization in their terms now do not unwind and let other states get the bit they think they deserve. In that vein, it was seen that discussions at the General Assembly meetings centered around the squabble between P5 and other interest groups who are in the table for more share.

Principal agent relationship was also discovered to help powerful states exploit their privileges to the detriment of other member states. Thanks to the conditions set by the principal agent contract, the UN Charter, the Security Council provides with the P5 states advantageous positions. It is no secret that this unilateral influence and hegemony disturbs all member states other than P5. However, it seems difficult to convince any of the P5 states who are also holding the veto card against any kind of reform to their detriment.

It was also observed that powerful states tend to get motivated by logic of consequences and less powerful states by logic of appropriateness. These two logics can be instrumental in understanding the nature of the non-change in the structure of the Security Council. Further studies on these concepts can be helpful to that end.

In this light, this paper can be seen as an academically relevant study as there is no study in the literature that analyzes "In Larger Freedom" report and G4 proposal together from the perspectives of path dependency, principal agent theory, logic of consequences and appropriateness. This paper will create accumulation of knowledge in the domain and pave the way for further studies.

Invasion of Russia of Ukraine in 2022 is a serious test for the Security Council. While international community is expecting a satisfactory response from the Security Council as it is the guardian of the international peace, everybody is all the more aware that it is impossible to pass a decision Russia having a veto power. From this perspective, this paper can be considered as a socially relevant study as well, since it will contribute to the understanding of contemporary clashes between powerful states.

While the usefulness of historical institutionalism, path dependency and principal agent theory in understanding the deadlock in the Security Council reform has been noted previously, it should also be indicated that this study is not immune from limitations. On the one hand, contribution of historical institutionalism to the literature of change in international organizations is less mature. For instance, historical institutionalism perceives some organizations as resistant to reform; others as proactive. This over-simplification makes it easy to classify organizations yet it restrains predictive power of historical institutionalism. Hence, for consistent and reliable results, more research should be undertaken on the effects of path dependency on the Security Council reform. Principal agent theory, on the other hand, falls short in dealing with interaction between formal regulations and power of international organizations. For instance, can the Security Council be considered as an agent or a goal oriented collective body, is a question that should be elaborated and understood well. In that regard, a thorough application of the principal agent theory to the United Nations in general should be undertaken to better understand the dynamics of non-change in the structure of the entity.

The deductive coding I utilized in this paper attracts criticisms too. It is thought that certain level of bias is inevitable in determining codes and making interpretations in such studies, if the researcher is familiar with the topic. In that light, future studies can make use of grounded theory, one of the most utilized methods in public administration studies, and inductive approach to comprehend the reasons of impasse.

Last but not the least, while case studies are successful in developing or strengthening new theories, they may have low level of reliability and validity. To overcome this drawback, further studies can employ quantitative research to better understand the reasons why reform does not take place.

For the Security Council to stay relevant and overcome the era of impasse, it must go through a reform without damaging its effectiveness on which at least majority of the member states agree. I propose that the Security Council should be given the tool to neglect veto decisions if certain level of affirmative majority votes like three-fourths or two-thirds is sustained in the council meetings. With this, the efforts of all states will be concentrated on adding only an article to the Charter instead dealing with various matters of contention like permanent, non-permanent memberships, veto, geographical representation and etc. Such a tool will help taking decisions not only fast but also with a more comprehensive support. If the operability of the Security Council is not enhanced with such an amendment, global arena may be vulnerable to emergence of new organizations that are steered by countries who do not have necessary skills and experience to cope up with global developments. To prevent this and maintain its supremacy, the Security Council needs to reform itself and build a more adaptive skill.

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CHAPTER 9. APPENDIX

Appendix 1. Code Tree