

Does satisfaction always matter for political trust?

A study to the importance of satisfaction with governmental Covid-19 policies for political trust in national governments and how the importance of satisfaction varied between different socio-demographic groups within the EU.

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Erasmus University Rotterdam

Student: Cornelis Boon, 602712

Supervisor: Dr. Asia Zhelyazkova

Second Reader: Prof. Dr. Markus Haverland

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Abstract

The Covid-19 pandemic forced national governments to implement painful Covid-19 policies, without a definite end in sight. This asked a lot of both national governments and citizens. For national governments, it has been crucial to attain that citizens followed the rules. It was crucial that citizens trusted their national governments in order to enhance the successful implementation of Covid-19 measures. If citizens trust their national government, they are more likely to follow the nationally implemented policies. This study investigates whether the most crucial determinant of political trust, satisfaction with governmental performance has been influential on levels of political trust in national governments during the pandemic. In addition, it is investigated whether this relationship is mitigated by personal factors like the age, social class and political attitude of EU citizens. As a result it is measured whether different social groups within European societies reacted on their (dis)satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures by expressing political distrust. Dissatisfaction does not necessarily lead to political distrust and vice versa, but it depends on the amount to which governmental policies impact personal lives or whether citizens think that policies are justified. In this study it turns out that satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures indeed strongly effected political trust in national governments within the EU. In addition, personal factors like the age and social class of respondents enhanced trust in the national governments. EU citizens who were 65 years and older and EU citizens who belong to the upper class of society were more likely to trust their national government. This study did not find any evidence for moderation of the personal factors age, social class and political radicalism. Though it has been expected that increased susceptibility for Covid-19 would increase reactions on (dis)satisfaction with nationally implemented Covid-19 measures in the form of political (dis)trust in the national governments amongst vulnerable socio-demographic groups, this study finds no evidence for this type of moderation on the EU-level. On the other hand, when zooming into separate countries, this study finds sometimes results that are interesting or unusual. Therefore it is recommended to investigate the relationship between satisfaction with governmental performance during the Covid-19 pandemic and political trust in national governments on the country-level.

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Hereby I present my Master Thesis. First of all, I want to provide some background about the process. It was for me a period in which I learned a lot and which I really enjoyed. This was for me the first time that I did a quantitative study, so the process to become familiar with this type of research was a long and time consuming activity. There were some hurdles, but due to the help of my supervisor and fellow students, I was able to overcome these hurdles. I want to thank them for their special support and want to mention especially some persons.

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1. Introduction

During the Covid-19 pandemic, national governments had to make extensive restrictions on civil rights to withhold the spread of the virus. However, the success of nationally implemented Covid-19 measures was highly dependent on abidance of citizens. This study investigates whether satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures enhanced political trust in national governments. Though satisfaction could have enhanced political trust in national governments, the relationship could vary amongst different socio-demographic groups with European societies. Therefore, this study evaluates whether relevant personal factors like age, social class and political radicalism strengthened or weakened the relationship between satisfaction and trust. As a result, it is investigated whether the relationship between the predictor and outcome depends on these personal factors. Besides that this study investigates on the EU-level, results are checked on the country-level and some robustness checks are carried out in which countries are clustered, based on different stages of development. In this introduction, the motivation, problem definition and the research question for the study are provided. Furthermore, the social and theoretical relevance of the study are professed.

1.1 Problem definition

Many scholars observed that political trust in national governments has been declining in almost all established democracies during the last decades. In the United States and Western Europe (Hetherington M. , 2005) this trend began in the 1960's (Chanley, Rudolph, & Rahn, 2000), but in recent years, even relatively new democracies encountered a decline in political trust in national governments. The Covid-19 pandemic radically changed this long-term trend. During the pandemic, indicators recorded increasing levels of political trust in national governments (Belchior & Pequito Teixeira, 2021; Devine, Gaskell, Jennings, & Stoker, 2020; Edelman, 2020; Goldfinch, Ross, & Gauld, 2021; Schraff, 2020). Unfortunately, the increase in political trust in national was short-lived, since levels eroded at an accelerating pace the longer the pandemic endured (Belchior & Pequito Teixeira, 2021; Edelman, 2021; European Commission, 2021b; Gozgor, 2021; Schraff, 2020). The decline of political trust in national governments had major consequences for governments during the pandemic. It triggered reactions in the form of protests and even forms of civil disobedience (Kowalewski, 2021) counteracting national governments in implementing measures successfully. And especially the successful implementation, according to the governmental intention was crucial during the pandemic, since nobody knew how successful measures looked like. Civil disobedience thus resulted in less national capacity to fight the extension of Covid-19 (Guglielmi, Dotti Sani, Molteni, Biolcati, & Chiesi, 2020; Vardavas, et al., 2020).

1.2 Research Question

So, the loss of political trust in national governments had major consequences for the successful implementation of governmental policies during the pandemic. Then it is very relevant to explore what determines political trust in national governments in order to enlarge levels of political trust in national governments. In literature there has been a lot of debate about the crucial determinants of political trust in national governments. There is agreement that satisfaction with governmental performance has been crucial for long-term patterns in levels of political trust in national governments (Catterberg & Moreno, 2006; Christensen & Læg Reid, 2005; Goldfinch, Ross, & Gauld, 2021). However, whereas all scholars argue that satisfaction with governmental performance matters, an increasing number of scholars focus on exogenous factors, outside the political sphere, influencing perceptions of individuals about governmental performance. This has also been applicable to the pandemic context. Some socio-demographic groups may have been satisfied with certain Covid-19 measures and other socio-demographic groups may have been dissatisfied with exactly the same measures. This is related to the way in which their lives have been impacted by the consequences of the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures. Moreover, since the consequences of nationally implemented Covid-19 measures differed for different socio-demographic groups within societies, reactions in the form of political (dis)trust may have varied between different socio-demographic groups within societies, dependent on their susceptibility for Covid-19 and their perceptions of threat (Christmann & Torcal, 2021; Rieger & Wang, 2021). Given these assumptions, this study investigates the following research question:

To what extent has individual satisfaction with governmental responses on the Covid-19 pandemic influenced levels of political trust in national governments within the EU?

In order to assess whether personal factors like age, social class and political radicalism moderated the relationship between satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures and levels of political trust in national governments within the EU, the following sub questions are additionally asked:

Sub question 1: To what extent has the age of citizens influenced the relationship between satisfaction with nationally implemented Covid-19 measures and political trust in national governments within the EU?

Sub question 2: To what extent has the social class of citizens influenced the relationship between satisfaction with nationally implemented Covid-19 measures and political trust in national governments within the EU?

Sub question 3: *To what extent has political radicalism influenced the relationship between satisfaction with nationally implemented Covid-19 measures and political trust in national governments within the EU?*

1.3 Societal relevance

As discussed earlier, these questions are highly relevant to study. Political trust in national governments is crucial for democracies to implement policies successfully. First of all, high levels of political trust in national governments facilitate the functioning of democratic institutions itself (Hetherington M. , 1998; Wang, Dalton, & Shin, 2006). It increases the legitimacy of national governments (Hetherington & Husser, 2012), improves the implementation of policies (Chanley, Rudolph, & Rahn, 2000; Hetherington & Husser, 2012) and increases compliance once policies are implemented (Guglielmi, Dotti Sani, Molteni, Biolcati, & Chiesi, 2020; Marien & Hooghe, 2011; Vardavas, et al., 2020). In contrast, political distrust in national governments result mainly in public withdrawal of governmental support, less willingness to comply with governmental decisions and even the legitimacy of a democracy may be called into question (Easton, 1975; Hetherington M. , 2005; Parry, 1976). Especially democracies are reliant on the compliance of their citizens in implementing measures successfully, since it is critical for them to commit resources in order to attain societal goals without that they can use coercion (Gamson, 1968; Hetherington & Husser, 2012; Tyler, 1990). Though political trust in national governments has always been relevant, political trust became even more crucial during the Covid-19 pandemic as it fostered compliance in case of the restrictions (Cairney & Wellstead, 2020). Within the pandemic, national governments had to implement extensive restrictions with an unpredictable impact on the national public-health situation (Berger, et al., 2021; Gostin, Hodge, & Wiley, 2020) and without a definite end in sight (Zahariadis, Petridou, Exadaktylos, & Sparf, 2021). Given the insecure circumstances, political trust in national governments was crucial to implement the measures according to the original intentions (Devine, Gaskell, Jennings, & Stoker, 2020; Guglielmi, Dotti Sani, Molteni, Biolcati, & Chiesi, 2020; Vardavas, et al., 2020), whereas distrust resulted in civil disobedience towards the restrictive measures (Devine, Gaskell, Jennings, & Stoker, 2020; Lalot, Heering, Rullo, Travaglino, & Abrams, 2020). This study provides policymakers with insights whether satisfaction with governmental performance has been related to political trust in national governments in case of the Covid-19 pandemic and whether it differs amongst different social groups within societies. Policymakers in the EU could build upon this analysis in order to develop tools to increase political trust in national governments amongst different social groups, resulting in a tailored approach for every socio-demographic group. When satisfaction with governmental performance has

been more responsible for a decline in political trust in national governments amongst one social group than under another, then governments can generate public trust amongst that social group by responding prompt and effectively on their specific priorities (Hetherington M. , 1998; Mishler & Rose, 2001). Since the Covid-19 pandemic is not over yet and given the risk of future epidemics, it is very relevant to study this causal mechanism in order to know how to handle in case of future crises and .

1.4 Academic relevance

Since the Covid-19 pandemic is a relatively new phenomenon, this study contributes to scientific knowledge by assessing whether satisfaction with nationally implemented Covid-19 measures impacted political trust in national governments and to what extent these perceptions were moderated by personal factors during the recent Covid-19 pandemic (Belchior & Pequito Teixeira, 2021). Within the relatively new situation of the pandemic this area of debate has not been duly studied. Whereas some studies do research the relationship between the actual stringency of the measures on levels of political trust in national governments, it is currently understudied whether perceptions of governmental performance influenced levels of political trust in national governments and whether this effect was moderated by personal factors such as age, social class and political radicalism (Belchior & Pequito Teixeira, 2021; Fancourt, Steptoe, & Wright, 2021; Goldfinch, Ross, & Gauld, 2021; Gozgor, 2021; Lalot, Heering, Rullo, Travaglino, & Abrams, 2020; Rieger & Wang, 2021; Vardavas, et al., 2020). In addition, almost all recent studies measuring perceptions of governmental performance make use of data gathered by Fetzer et. Al. (2020), but this study uses other data arranged from Eurobarometer (Fetzer, et al., 2020; Gozgor, 2021; Rieger & Wang, 2021).

2. Literature review

This literature review provides an overview about the main concepts used in the field of research about political trust in national governments. Furthermore an overview is provided about several types of studies in this field of research analyzing the main determinants of political trust in national governments. By investigating previous research, this study is embedded in literature and it provides direction for the further analysis.

2.1 Definition of political trust in national governments

From an institutional perspective, trust implies that '*subject A trust object B to do x*' (Van der Meer T. , 2010). Adding the political component, trust means that citizens trust their national government to implement policies successfully (Van der Meer T. , 2017; Zmerli & Newton, 2017). Some authors emphasize that political trust in national governments implies the belief of citizens that the political system produces preferred outcomes. Thus political trust would refer to the responsiveness of national governments towards citizens. As a result, political trust in national governments may be understood as the confidence citizens have, that the state is likely to fulfil the promises made to the citizens (Leach & Sabatier, 2005; Shi, 2001).

2.2 Academic field of political trust

Within the study of political trust in national governments there are two focus areas (Devine, Gaskell, Jennings, & Stoker, 2020). The first type of studies focuses on the political relevance of political trust for national governments (Hetherington M. , 1998). A second type of scholars searches to the origins of political trust in national governments. This question concerns the crucial factors determining levels of political trust in national governments (Belchior & Pequito Teixeira, 2021; Torcal, 2014). Where early research focused on whether declining levels of political trust in national governments reflected citizens' dissatisfaction with the political system or political leaders (Citrin, 1974; Miller, 1974), recent research focuses on different political, economic and socio-cultural factors responsible for changes in political trust in national governments (Nye, 1997). Currently, there are especially two angles in this field of research. First, institutional theory emphasizes that individual evaluations of governmental performance are based on rational calculations of material interests which would determine perceptions of governmental performance and in turn define trust or distrust in the national government. Secondly, cultural theory emphasizes that political trust in national governments is not solely based on rational calculations of material interests, but that perceptions of governmental performance are influenced by exogenous factors such as national culture, but also by personal factors like age and gender. It is important to note that a lot of today's studies in political trust combine the two views. The institutional and cultural theories do not necessarily exclude each other, but enrich

each other. Whereas political trust in national governments would be largely based on public satisfaction with governmental performance, there are indeed some personal- factors that may enhance or decrease political trust in national governments and even influence the relationship between public satisfaction with governmental performance and political trust in national governments. At the same time, all studies suggest that personal evaluations of governmental performance, whether they are influenced by governmental performance itself or personal factors, largely determines political trust in national governments (Belchior & Pequito Teixeira, 2021; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Van de Walle & Bouckaert, 2003).

	Cultural and/or Exogenous Theories	Institutional and/or Endogenous Theories
Macro theories	National culture	Government performance
Micro theories	Individual socialization	Individual evaluations of performance

Figure 1: Competing theories about the origins of trust and their explanatory emphases (Mishler & Rose, 2001: 34).

2.3 Institutional theory

Within a institutional framework, governmental performance is considered as the critical determinant for political trust in national governments (Christmann & Torcal, 2021). Governmental performance relates to the results of governmental activities in relation to the purposes being pursued (Currstine, 2005). These policy outcomes entail a bunch of indicators, typically related to increased effectiveness, more efficiency and enhancing citizens’ satisfaction (HumanMetrics; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017). Following institutional theory, political trust in national governments would be based on rational individual evaluations of governmental performance and personal calculations of material gains and losses (Mishler & Rose, 2001; North, 1990). As long as a government runs well and public services are at a sufficient level, citizens would be satisfied with policies and tend to trust their governments, whereas impotent political institutions generate skepticism and distrust (Christmann & Torcal, 2021; Torcal, 2014; Van de Walle & Bouckaert, 2003). Consequently, governments are able to influence the level of political trust in national governments among citizens by their handlings (Berger, et al., 2021; Christensen & Lægheid, 2005; Christmann & Torcal, 2021; Foster & Frieden, 2017; Torcal, 2014; Van der Meer T. , 2017).

2.4 Evidence for institutional theory

Institutional theory achieved a lot of scientific support, with most evidence within the economic field. Several studies find that economic circumstances highly influenced the approval of presidential job performance. In times of a flourishing economy, approval rates increased significantly in the US (Citrin

& Green, 1986), but also in East-Asian countries (Kim, 2010; Lee, 1994). This assumed relationship between economic performance and political trust in national governments is also confirmed by findings in studies about the 2008 economic crisis. Especially the worst affected countries were confronted with stark declining levels of political trust in national governments (Christmann & Torcal, 2021; Hetherington M. , 1998). Besides economic performance, some authors link the present welfare state retrenchment and the experience of unemployment with declining levels of political trust in national governments, proving that social conditions matter as well for levels of political trust in national governments (Christmann & Torcal, 2021; Kumlin & Haugsgjerd, 2017; Polavieja, 2013). In addition, a lot of today's scholars pay attention to policy responsiveness as the crucial factor to enhance political trust in national governments (Mishler & Rose, 2001). Contrary, policies that are perceived as ineffective, harmful, corruptive and unresponsive are important contributors to declining levels of political trust in national governments (Christmann & Torcal, 2021; Fiske & Dupree, 2014; Torcal, 2014; Van der Meer T. , 2010). A lot of scholars proved that corruption, self-enrichment and political radicalism are clearly linked to declining levels of trust (Catterberg & Moreno, 2006; Della Porte, 2000; Doig & Theobald, 2000). So, governments should promote responsive policies with which citizens are satisfied with. As a result, citizens receive what they request (Christmann & Torcal, 2021; Torcal, 2014; Van de Walle & Bouckaert, 2003; Williams, 1985).

2.5 Cultural theory

At first stance, the direct link between governmental performance and political trust in national governments seems simple. However, from an empirical perspective this relationship is way more complicated. First of all, there are major hurdles to measure institutional performance in an unbiased way. Indicators are sometimes highly political and data is not always available. But even when unbiased performance indicators are available, individual evaluations of governmental performance are often influenced by a lot of exogenous factors, originating outside the political sphere (George, Verschuere, Wayenberg, & Zaki, 2020; Van Ryzin, 2007; Van de Walle & Bouckaert, 2003). As a result, perceptions of governmental performance cannot always explain for variance in levels of political trust in national governments. Institutional theory takes the causality between governmental performance and citizen satisfaction for granted. However, it may be that evaluations of governmental performance are mitigated by exogenous factors, influencing the way in which citizens perceive governmental performance (Van Ryzin, 2007; Van de Walle & Bouckaert, 2003). This is where cultural theory comes into place. In contrast to institutionalists, culturalists argue that it is not actual performance that matters solely for levels of political trust in national governments, but that individual perceptions sometimes override collective material interests (Godefroidt, Langer, & Meuleman, 2017; Mishler & Rose, 2001). Culturalists emphasize that perceptions of governmental performance are shaped by

different orientations, assigning meanings and values to certain events (Christensen & Lægheid, 2005; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Wang, Dalton, & Shin, 2006; Wong, Hsiao, & Wan, 2009). Those different orientations and normative preferences, shape demands of individuals and are influenced by exogenous factors originating outside the political sphere and thus not related to governmental performance itself. Exogenous factors are based on cultural values, picked up through socialization and earlier experience and are expressed both on the collective level as well as the personal level (Christensen & Lægheid, 2005; Godefroidt, Langer, & Meuleman, 2017; Mishler & Rose, 2001).

2.6 Personal factors

Most of the cultural studies focus on personal factors related to social demographics (Hetherington & Husser, 2012; Hetherington M. , 1998; Hetherington M. , 2005). However, where culturalists argue that personal ideas shape different demands, rather than material interests (Christensen & Lægheid, 2005; Krouwel, Kutiyski, Van Prooijen, Martinsson, & Markstedt, 2017), it is also argued from an institutional perspective that individual material interests differ per socio-demographic group. Different socio-demographic groups in society would respond differently on governmental performance (Anderson, 2010; Bish & Michie, 2020; Brouard, Vasilopoulos, & Becher, 2020; Christensen & Lægheid, 2005; Christmann & Torcal, 2021; Hooghe, Marien, & De Vroome, 2012). This is also confirmed in studies done within the pandemic context (Bish & Michie, 2020; Brouard, Vasilopoulos, & Becher, 2020; Christmann & Torcal, 2021). A lot of studies argue that personal wellbeing enhances satisfaction with governmental policies. However, personal wellbeing is not always based on governmental performance. Sometimes it might be that a better societal position allows it to overcome and accept conditions easier in which material interests are harmed by governmental performance (Easterbrook, Kuppens, & Manstead, 2016; Van der Meer T. , 2018). In addition, there are sometimes individual ideas formed through socialization and earlier experience, that may override material interests (Godefroidt, Langer, & Meuleman, 2017; Mishler & Rose, 2001), In this study, it is therefore argued from both an institutional and a cultural perspective that personal factors influence political trust and may have moderated the effects of satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures on levels of political trust in national governments. In the following sections, several potential personal factors are discussed that might be related to political trust.

Personal wellbeing

First of all, a lot of studies argue that personal wellbeing enhances political trust in national governments. However, this is not always linked to governmental performance. Personal wellbeing is first of all based on the socio-economic position of individuals. Scholars argue that those who gained a higher socio-economic status are more likely to trust institutions that provided them their status (Anderson, 2010; Bish & Michie, 2020; Brouard, Vasilopoulos, & Becher, 2020; Christensen & Lægheid,

2005; Christmann & Torcal, 2021; Hooghe, Marien, & De Vroome, 2012), no matter how these institutions further perform. The political trust in national governments of those who gained a higher social status would be less dependent on their satisfaction with governmental performance, since they can afford it to overcome painful measures (Lee, 1994; Williams, 1985). However, not only the financial position matters for personal wellbeing, but also the level of accessible services and welfare in the broad sense. A number of scholars argue that political trust in national governments is associated with the living area of individuals. Rural residents would feel to be socially excluded, expressed by the worse level of rural development (Akkus, 2017; Mitsch, Lee, & Morrow, 2021; Peters, 2020). Especially during the pandemic, residents in rural areas had to deal with less financial resources, less accessible health services and social loneliness confronted them more than urban residents (De Luca, Tondelli, & Åberg, 2020). However, it is questionable whether rural areas were hit harder by the Covid-19 pandemic, since a high number of wealthy urban residents flocked to rural areas during the pandemic bringing their wealth to the countryside (McKay, Jennings, & Stoker, 2021). In addition, poor urban residents had to deal as well with a worse health status, a high number of Covid-related deaths, increased social vulnerability and the worse economic effects of the lockdowns (Peters, 2020). However, personal wellbeing is not always linked to material things, but also to a flourishing life in general. Some authors argue for instance that marital status may indicate an increased governmental support, since marriage or living with household members would indicate an increased family support, decreasing risks of social isolation and enhancing personal wellbeing especially during lockdowns (Rump & Zwiener-Collins, 2021). However, other studies argue that having children, increases levels of stress, risks of conflict and domestic violence in households. This was especially a risk during the lockdowns in the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic (Van Bavel, et al., 2020). As a result it is questionable whether marital status enhances personal wellbeing and in turn enhances political trust in national governments.

Socialization

Secondly, some authors stress the importance of socialization for political trust in national governments. Socialization would occur through experience, exchange of ideas and a learning process (Anderson, 2010; Christensen & Lægreid, 2005; Marien & Hooghe, 2011). Socialization through earlier experience is related to 'age' of citizens. A bunch of studies prove that elderly show more confidence in governmental decisions (Christensen & Lægreid, 2005; Hooghe, Marien, & De Vroome, 2012). This is most attributed towards a more collective-oriented way of life amongst elderly, resulting in more interpersonal trust. Moreover, elderly would be less responsive towards setbacks and except these as basic characters of life. As a result, (dis)satisfaction with national policies would be less related to levels of trust amongst elderly than under young people. Elderly let political trust in national governments less rely on their satisfaction with governmental performance primarily, but tend to trust their

governments more on the basis of interpersonal trust (Christensen & Lægreid, 2005; Zhao & Hu, 2017). Socialization through exchange of ideas becomes clear when it comes to political radicalism. Since political radical persons commonly live in a bubble of ideas of their own group, both far-right and far-left supporting citizens are likely to distrust their national government (Krouwel, Kutiyiski, Van Prooijen, Martinsson, & Markstedt, 2017; McLaren, 2012; Rieger & Wang, 2021). Especially conspiracy beliefs, political cynics and criticism would foster political distrust among radical persons. Though they might be satisfied with certain governmental policies, political distrust is considered as a basic character trait amongst those who have radical political beliefs (Karić & Međedović, 2021; Krouwel, Kutiyiski, Van Prooijen, Martinsson, & Markstedt, 2017). Socialization through education is another way in which political trust might be shaped. Some authors argue that education enhances trust in institutions (Anderson, 2010; Hetherington M. , 1998). Education would improve cognitive skills to form accurate and rational beliefs about government performance and provides cognitive abilities to expect painful governmental decisions (Eichengreen, Saka, & Aksoy, 2021). Less-educated would be more likely to question the legitimacy of national governments and feel more distance towards governmental institutions (Anderson, 2010; Bish & Michie, 2020; Brouard, Vasilopoulos, & Becher, 2020; Christensen & Lægreid, 2005; Christmann & Torcal, 2021; Hooghe, Marien, & De Vroome, 2012). However, findings about education are a little bit mixed. A notable number of scholars argue on the other hand that higher levels of education would reduce levels of political trust in national governments for the reason that higher educated have a more critical outlook on governmental performance (Gronlund & Setala, 2007; Zhao & Hu, 2017). Socialization is also about the mindset of persons. Some scholars argue that femineity enhances political trust in national governments (Bish & Michie, 2020; Brouard, Vasilopoulos, & Becher, 2020; Christensen & Lægreid, 2005; Christmann & Torcal, 2021; Gozgor, 2021; Hetherington M. , 2005). As a result of femineity, women would be driven in their judgements by the perception that leaders care for citizens, whilst men's judgements are more driven by competence judgements (Willis, Smith, & Devine, 2021). However, other studies find opposingly that males trust more their governments when it comes to specific policies, for instance in the field of information technology (IT). So results are less clear when it comes to gender (Kim, 2010; Tolbert & Mossberger, 2006).

2.7 Collective factors

Besides the large group of culturalists focusing on personal factors, a second group of culturalists focus on collective factors that may enhance or decrease political trust in national governments. Some of these studies focus on the national culture within countries. This study does not focus on collective level factors that may have influenced the relationship between satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures and political trust in national governments, since the EU member

states are not really different when it comes to national culture. However, in the robustness checks this study checks whether results hold for countries on different levels of democracy and different stages in case of the stringency of the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures. As a result, this study considers some collective-level factors that may have influenced the relationship between the predictor and outcome especially looking at the pandemic context.

Democracy and autocracy

By far the most decisive collective level factor defining a national culture and determining levels of political trust in national governments, has been the level of democracy within countries. Especially the aspect of individual freedom and expression within democratic cultures result in completely different reactions of citizens towards governmental performance. A recent study by Shi (2017) proved that Chinese citizens tend to trust their government no matter how it performs. Since hierarchy plays an important role in the Chinese political culture, Chinese are willing to sacrifice personal interests and sustain social harmony, even if the government fails to respond on societal needs (Shi, 2001). Hierarchic trust is very important in authoritarian regimes, since individuals fear to indicate personal displeasure with governmental decisions due to a political culture of non-expression (Wang C.-H. , 2016; Wang, Dalton, & Shin, 2006; Wong, Hsiao, & Wan, 2009). Within democracies, group identification becomes more relevant than hierarchic trust, since group identification enhances interpersonal trust. A shared identity with political authorities would provide more confidence in governmental institutions (Brewer & Silver, 1978; Tyler & Degoe, 1995). In addition, if citizens share a religion or party affiliation, they tend to trust political institutions even when policies are not directly in their interest (Fitzgerald & Wickwire, 2012; Hetherington M. , 2005; Hunt, Iyer, & Jimenez, 2019). The reason is that people tend to trust institutions ran by insiders and tend to distrust political institutions ran by strangers (Fitzgerald & Wickwire, 2012). In addition, strong national identities would foster political trust in national governments and less cultural diversity would foster levels of mutual trust (Godefroidt, Langer, & Meuleman, 2017). However, some studies argue that democracy itself enhances political trust in national governments as well. If there are higher levels of civil liberties and political rights, people think they are able to affect government policies in their interest. Therefore, democracy and political rights are positively associated with political trust in national governments (Levi & Stoker, 2000; Nye, 1997). In democracies, media is another factor that has a strong role in determining levels of political trust in national governments. Especially high levels of media freedom would negatively influence how individuals assign institutional performance and counteract the positive effects of democratic decision making. A lot of studies prove a trend towards less news and greater journalistic interpretation in Western news and link these circumstances to growing political distrust. Some research concluded that especially media's negativity led to a growing distrust in

national governments in past years (Avery, 2009; Patterson, 1993; Robinson, 1976). Especially negative news claims impacted individual evaluations of institutional performance more than positive news claims (Johnston, Hagen, & Jamieson, 2004). However, other scholars argue the other way around. Norris (2000) claims that the ease of access to a variety of free media engenders political trust in national governments. Greater knowledge about politics would increase civic engagement and in turn political trust in national governments (Norris, 2000). So, though the findings of several researchers are a little bit mixed, they generally agree that the increase of strategic frames in the news media, increases political skepticism among citizens (Avery, 2009).

Covid-related factors

Since this study focuses especially on governmental performance and trust during the Covid-crisis, it is also necessary to discuss some collective-level factors that are clearly related to the Covid-19 pandemic and may have influenced the relationship between satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures and political trust in national governments. Though the Covid-19 pandemic is relatively new, a number of scholars already studied the relationship between governmental performance in light of the pandemic and whether it affected levels of political trust in national governments. Within these types of studies, especially two factors seem to be strongly related to levels of political trust in national governments: the stringency of the Covid measures and the number of Covid-related deaths. During the Covid-crisis, EU member states did not have homogenous Covid-policies. Some countries implemented strict policies while other countries were quite relaxed in implementing countermeasures (Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, 2022; Gozgor, 2021). Given the aspect that some groups in society may have gained by stringent measures whereas others will have suffered (Gozgor, 2021), it might be that the stringency of the measures influenced the way in which different groups in society perceived certain governmental policies. Stringent measures may have been positively evaluated by older people and younger people may have evaluated them as worse (Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, 2022). Related to this is the number of Covid-related deaths. Some groups within society may have felt more fear when a high number of Covid-related deaths was in place. Especially groups that were vulnerable for the health-related consequences of an infection would be reacting more actively on their dissatisfaction with Covid-19 measures (Brouard, Vasilopoulos, & Becher, 2020).

2.8 Most important factors

As a conclusion, we could argue that a lot of factors might have been related to political trust in national governments within the pandemic context. However, findings on specific factors are sometimes contrary as displayed in table 1. This study therefore includes only the most important factors that are potentially the most clearly related to political trust in national governments within

the EU. In particular since this study investigates the relationship between satisfaction with governmental performance and political trust in national governments during the Covid-19 pandemic, some factors might be more decisive in determining levels of political trust in national governments. As visualized in table 1, the factors that are most clearly associated with increasing or decreasing political trust in national governments are governmental performance and the personal factors age, social class and political radicalism. In chapter three, these factors are shortly discussed and the direction of influence is hypothesized.

Table 1: Most important determining factors of political trust and their effect on political trust in national governments according to previous research.

	<i>Positive effect on political trust</i>	<i>Negative effect on political trust</i>
<i>Institutional theory</i>		
<i>Economic performance</i>	(Christmann & Torcal, 2021; Citrin & Green, 1986; Hetherington M. , 1998; Kim, 2010; Lee, 1994)	
<i>Social responsiveness</i>	(Catterberg & Moreno, 2006; Christmann & Torcal, 2021; Della Porte, 2000; Doig & Theobald, 2000; Fiske & Dupree, 2014; Kumlin & Haugsgjerd, 2017; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Polavieja, 2013; Van der Meer T. , 2010)	
<i>Cultural theory-personal factors</i>		
<i>Age</i>	(Christensen & Lægheid, 2005; Hooghe, Marien, & De Vroome, 2012; Mishler & Rose, 2001)	
<i>Social class</i>	(Anderson, 2010; Bish & Michie, 2020; Brouard, Vasilopoulos, & Becher, 2020; Christensen & Lægheid, 2005; Christmann & Torcal, 2021; Hooghe, Marien, & De Vroome, 2012; Lee, 1994; Williams, 1985)	
<i>Political radicalism</i>		(Karić & Mededović, 2021; McLaren, 2012; Rieger & Wang, 2021; Krouwel, Kutiyski, Van Prooijen, Martinsson, & Markstedt, 2017)
<i>Education</i>	(Anderson, 2010; Bish & Michie, 2020; Brouard, Vasilopoulos, & Becher, 2020; Christensen & Lægheid, 2005; Christmann & Torcal, 2021; Hetherington M. , 1998; Hooghe, Marien, & De Vroome, 2012)	(Gronlund & Setala, 2007; Zhao & Hu, 2017)
<i>Gender</i>	(Bish & Michie, 2020; Brouard, Vasilopoulos, & Becher, 2020; Christensen & Lægheid, 2005; Christmann & Torcal, 2021; Gozgor, 2021; Hetherington M. , 1998)	(Kim, 2010; Tolbert & Mossberger, 2006)
<i>Marital status</i>	(Rump & Zwiener-Collins, 2021)	(Van Bavel, et al., 2020)
<i>Cultural theory-collective factors</i>		
<i>Democracy</i>	(Levi & Stoker, 2000; Nye, 1997)	(Shi, 2001; Wang C.-H. , 2016; Wang, Dalton, & Shin, 2006)
<i>Shared identity</i>	(Brewer & Silver, 1978; Fitzgerald & Wickwire, 2012; Godefroidt, Langer, & Meuleman, 2017; Hetherington M. , 2005; Hunt, Iyer, & Jimenez, 2019)	
<i>Media freedom</i>	(Norris, 2000)	(Avery, 2009; Patterson, 1993; Robinson, 1976)

3. Theoretical Framework

In this theoretical framework, the broad concepts of political trust in national governments and governmental performance are described in light of the Covid-19 pandemic. Additionally it is written whether theory provides a potential explanation for the loss of political trust in national governments during the Covid-19 pandemic. The hypotheses are derived from both institutional and cultural theory, since it is argued from both sides that satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures would differ between socio-demographic groups in societies. Satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures might be based on rational calculations of material interests, but also on individual perceptions formed through socialization or influenced by personal wellbeing in general. In this study, the number of potential personal factors that may have influenced the relationship between the predictor and outcome, has been restricted to the age, social class and political radicalism. Otherwise, the analysis would be far too broad and these personal factors are most clearly expected as potential moderators for the influence of satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures and political trust in national governments. The hypotheses included in this chapter, do not include hypotheses for collective factors, since these factors are used only in the robustness checks which are discussed in the fourth chapter.

3.1 Political trust during the pandemic

In the context of this study, an institutional framework is followed in which the level of political trust in national governments refers to the extent to which *EU citizens* (A) trust their *national governments* (B) to *manage the Covid-19 pandemic* (x) (Belchior & Pequito Teixeira, 2021; Hetherington M. , 1998; Miller, 1974). During the pandemic, levels of political trust in national governments developed in an unordinary way. After decades of decline, several indicators recorded increasing levels of political trust in national governments in the early days of the pandemic (Belchior & Pequito Teixeira, 2021; Devine, Gaskell, Jennings, & Stoker, 2020; Edelman, 2020; Goldfinch, Ross, & Gauld, 2021; Schraff, 2020). Several psychological mechanisms have been accountable for this temporal increase. First of all, research suggests that during crises, people search for government leadership and guidance. This effect is called the rally-effect (Mueller, 1970). A feeling of anxiety in the face of an external threat, would promote levels of political trust in national governments in the short-term (Belchior & Pequito Teixeira, 2021; Mueller, 1970; Schraff, 2020). Secondly, being collectively affected by a crisis generates a feeling of common fate, which increases cooperation and trust within a group to address the specific situation (Rabbie & Horwitz, 1969; Kramer & Brewer, 1984). However, psychological effects are only temporary. During prolonged crises, the public is likely to start scrutinizing governmental actions more closely and political trust in national governments often drops to pre-crisis levels within some months

(Mueller, 1970). The same has been applicable during the pandemic. After a short-term increase in trust countries saw levels of political trust in national governments dropping even at an accelerated pace (Edelman, 2021; European Commission, 2021b; Fancourt, Steptoe, & Wright, 2021; Gianmarco, Martinangeli, Passarelli, Sas, & Windsteiger, 2020).

3.2 Governmental performance during the pandemic

Governmental performance in the Covid-19 context, relates to the strategy and policies of national governments in implementing measures to counteract the Covid-19 pandemic. The more stringent restrictive measures were, the better it has been to limit the number of Covid-related deaths. However, the environment governments were operating in, has been highly influential on the effectiveness of policy measures. An aged population as well as a densely populated country counteracted governments in implementing measures successfully, since it helped spreading the virus (Martins-Filho, 2021). As a result, outcomes were influenced by governmental policies as well as the environments governments were operating in (George, Verschuere, Wayenberg, & Zaki, 2020). Additionally, perceptions of good governmental performance may have been different per individual (Christensen & Lægreid, 2005; Christmann & Torcal, 2021; Hetherington & Husser, 2012). Some might have preferred a low number of Covid-related deaths over an opened society, whereas others might have preferred a situation in which the society has been kept open for business and leisure, despite a higher number of casualties. Therefore it makes sense to measure governmental performance in terms of satisfaction with governmental performance (George, Verschuere, Wayenberg, & Zaki, 2020; Mouter, Hernandez, & Itten, 2021). As a result, governmental performance is measured based on personal evaluations of governmental performance.

3.3 Hypotheses

In the following section, the hypotheses which are tested in this study are discussed and grounded in theory. First of all, the main predicting variable is discussed which is based on institutional and cultural theory. The additional moderating variables are based on both cultural and institutional theory. In table 2, the expected hypotheses which are tested in this study are displayed. In figure 2, the expected relationships are visualized to provide additional clarity. The figures are presented behind the explanation of the hypotheses.

3.4 Satisfaction

According to institutional theory, institutional performance itself influences levels of political trust in national governments. When citizens perceive their national government acting responsively on the pandemic, that would promote positive perceptions of governmental performance. Positive perceptions of governmental performance would in turn increase the level of political trust in national governments among citizens (Christmann & Torcal, 2021; Mishler & Rose, 2001; North, 1990).

However, perceptions of governmental performance are based on numerous factors and are not always based on pure rational calculations of material interests. According to cultural theory those perceptions are not only based on actual governmental performance, but moreover on individual perceptions which are influenced both by personal wellbeing and socialization. As a result, this study assumes that individuals expressed their perceptions of governmental performance by the level of satisfaction with Covid-19 measures by the national governments. By measuring satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures instead of actual governmental performance, this study combines the institutional approach with the cultural approach. This study still considers governmental performance as the decisive factor for political trust in national governments, but governmental performance is measured based on individual perceptions that might have been influenced by governmental performance itself, but also by personal factors such as age, social class and political radicalism (Becher, et al., 2021; Berger, et al., 2021; Devine, Gaskell, Jennings, & Stoker, 2020; Rieger & Wang, 2021). Hence the hypothesis is stated:

Hypothesis 1: *Satisfaction with governmental performance during the Covid-19 pandemic had a positive effect on levels of political trust in national governments in the EU.*

3.5 Personal factors

In this study is additionally focused on whether personal factors like age, social class and political radicalism influenced the relationship between satisfaction with nationally implemented Covid-19 measures and political trust in national governments. Other personal factors such as living area, gender, the level of education or marital status are less clearly associated with political trust in national governments, for which they are excluded in this analysis. This study focuses on personal factors instead of collective factors. Since EU member states are quite similar in terms of national culture, cultural differences on the collective level are more or less absent. However, responses on governmental performance still differed between demographic groups in the EU (Brouard, Vasilopoulos, & Becher, 2020; Su, Su, & Zhou, 2021). This study therefore includes a robustness check on EU member states at different stages when it comes to the strictness of the Covid-19 policies. Several studies proved that during the Covid-19 crisis, personal factors such as age and socio-economic status influenced levels of political trust in national governments within the EU. In addition, certain socio-demographic groups responded more strongly on governmental measures than others, since the measures had a larger impact on their individual material interests (Brouard, Vasilopoulos, & Becher, 2020; Gozgor, 2021). This could be due to reasons adjacent to institutional theory, such as rational evaluations of gains and losses which were different for socio-demographic groups within society when

it comes to the same measures. However, this could also be due to cultural-related factors such as personal wellbeing in general or personal values formed through socialization.

3.6 Age

The first relevant exogenous factor likely to have influenced political trust in national governments during the Covid-19 pandemic is the age of citizens. Age has for long been considered as positively associating with more political trust in national governments in general (Christensen & Lægreid, 2005; Hooghe, Marien, & De Vroome, 2012; Mishler & Rose, 2001). During the pandemic, the effect of age on political trust in national governments became even more important, since elderly gained most by Covid-19 countermeasures. The perception of increased threat would promote the adoption of protective behavior and would increase positive perceptions when protective governmental measures were put in place (Brouard, Vasilopoulos, & Becher, 2020; CDC Covid-19 Response Team, 2020; Gozgor, 2021). Since it has been expected that especially elderly gained by the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures, it is expected that age had a positive effect on political trust in national governments within the EU. In addition, especially young people were affected by the negative consequences of the Covid-19 measures. Feelings of loneliness, worse school results and other mental problems were much higher amongst young people than under elderly (Nederlands Jeugdinstituut, 2021). Since personal wellbeing of young people was especially affected by the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic and elderly positively perceived governmental Covid-19 measures, it is expected that:

<p><i>Hypothesis 2A: Age positively influenced political trust in national governments within the EU.</i></p>

However, it is not only expected that age has been positively associating with political trust in national governments itself, but it is also expected that age positively moderated the effect of satisfaction with nationally implemented Covid-19 measures and political trust in national governments. Since the risk of being affected by Covid-19 was substantially higher amongst elderly than under young people and since elderly were confronted with a higher risk for being affected, the successful implementation of Covid-19 measures was highly critical for their personal health situation (Abrams & Travaglino, 2018; Brouard, Vasilopoulos, & Becher, 2020; Gozgor, 2021). Though elderly generally would have more interpersonal trust and would accept setbacks as a basic character of life (Christensen & Lægreid, 2005; Zhao & Hu, 2017), it is expected that the feeling of threat abolishes this effect, since feelings of threat commonly generate strong reactions fueled by emotion (Belchior & Pequeto Teixeira, 2021; Schraff, 2020). Thus, since the lives of elderly especially depended on governmental Covid-19 measures, it is expected that the (dis)satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures had a stronger effect on political trust in national governments amongst elderly than under young people. Young people's lives were also less dependent on the successful implementation of Covid-19 policies and

therefore it were especially young people who did not comply with the nationally implemented Covid-19 rules (Reniers, 2021). Given the aspect that the personal health situation of elderly was much more dependent on the successful implementation of Covid-19 measures than the personal health situation of young people, the hypothesis is stated:

Hypothesis 2B: Age strengthened the effect of satisfaction with nationally implemented Covid-19 measures on levels of political trust in national governments within the EU.

3.7 Socio-economic status

In addition to age, a lot of studies find positive effects of the socio-economic status of citizens on political trust in national governments (Anderson, 2010; Bish & Michie, 2020; Brouard, Vasilopoulos, & Becher, 2020; Christensen & Læg Reid, 2005; Christmann & Torcal, 2021; Hooghe, Marien, & De Vroome, 2012). Since economic prosperity enhances personal wellbeing, those who have a higher socio-economic status would more easily express their trust in the institutions that arranged them that high status (Lee, 1994; Van der Meer T. , 2017; Williams, 1985). Moreover, in the context of the Covid-19 measures, higher educated had better opportunities to work from home and the loss of essential earnings was relatively low compared to those belonging to the workers class, providing them a better position (Koma, et al., 2020; Shibata & Duval, 2020). On the other hand, especially those with a low socio-economic status suffered by the Covid-19 measures, since low-skilled workers had a much more significant chance of job loss and loss of essential earnings due to the measures. Therefore it is expected that they evaluated the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures worse than high-skilled workers or upper class residents (Koma, et al., 2020; Shibata & Duval, 2020). Since the personal wellbeing of upper class residents was less affected by the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures than personal wellbeing of workers class residents, the hypothesis is stated:

Hypothesis 3A: A higher socio-economic status positively influenced levels of political trust in national governments within the EU.

The upper class has not only been also impacted by the consequences of the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures. Moreover, their whole state of wellbeing was less dependent on the successful implementation of Covid-19 measures. Upper class residents were first of all less impacted by the health-related consequences of the pandemic. The health-related threats and consequences were substantially lower under upper class resident than under workers class residents. Therefore it is expected that workers class residents cared less about the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures than workers class residents (Koma, et al., 2020; Shibata & Duval, 2020). Especially workers class residents were confronted with higher numbers of Covid-related deaths and had to deal with less accessible health services in case of a Covid infection (De Luca, Tondelli, & Åberg, 2020). Therefore,

personal wellbeing of workers class residents was not only affected by the implementation of Covid-19 measures, but it also depended more on the successful implementation of Covid-19 measures, whereas the position of upper class residents was less dependent on the successful implementation of Covid-19 measures. Given this aspect, it is expected that (dis)satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures much more affected levels of political trust amongst workers class residents than under upper class residents. Hence the hypothesis is stated:

Hypothesis 3B: *A higher socio-economic status weakened the effect of satisfaction with nationally implemented Covid-19 measures on levels of political trust in national governments within the EU.*

3.8 Political radicalism

Within the pandemic context, several studies proved that political radicalism, both far-left and far-right, were highly critical on governmental performance leading to dissatisfaction with governmental performance (Krouwel, Kutiyski, Van Prooijen, Martinsson, & Markstedt, 2017; Krouwel, De Vries, Van Heck, Kutiyski, & Etienne, 2021). Lower levels of satisfaction were expressed by anti-hygienic mobilizations and less engagement with wearing face masks and holding social distance in public (Karić & Međedović, 2021; Rieger & Wang, 2021; Vieten, 2020). Since political radical persons were highly critical on governmental measures, it is expected that both radical far-left, and far-right radicalism eroded levels of political trust in national governments. Hence the hypothesis is stated:

Hypothesis 4A: *Political radicalism decreased political trust in national governments in the EU.*

It is a common pattern that political radical persons distrust their national government. Regardless of individual satisfaction with specific governmental policies, political radical persons are likely to distrust their governments (Krouwel, Kutiyski, Van Prooijen, Martinsson, & Markstedt, 2017). This is especially the case, when radical parties are in the opposition and not one of the governing parties. Since their political viewpoints are completely opposite to the viewpoints of their political majors, radical persons cling strongly on their existing viewpoint and agreement with specific governmental policies would not change their dismissive attitude towards their national government (Anson, Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2009). Therefore it is expected that if one has political radical ideas, he or she is less likely to react on their (dis)satisfaction with nationally implemented Covid-19 measures, since political distrust simply reflects a basic character trait of those having far-left or far-right political radicalism (Karić & Međedović, 2021; Krouwel, Kutiyski, Van Prooijen, Martinsson, & Markstedt, 2017). Hence the hypothesis is stated:

Hypothesis 4B: *Political radicalism weakened the effect of satisfaction with nationally implemented Covid-19 measures on levels of political trust in national governments within the EU.*

Table 2: Hypotheses.

Satisfaction with national governmental Covid-19 measures (Predictor)	Political trust in national governments
Satisfaction with Covid-19 measures implemented by the national governments	+*
Dissatisfaction with Covid-19 measures implemented by the national governments	-*
Personal factors (Moderators)	
Age	+*
Socio-economic status (low-high)	+*
Political Radicalism	-*
Age*Satisfaction	+*
Socio-economic status (low-high)*Satisfaction	-*
Political radicalism*Satisfaction	-*

*. Represents a significant effect, minimal at the 0.05 level.




Figure 2: Conceptual diagram of the hypothesized causal mechanism.

4. Research design and methods

In this chapter, the methods and data are discussed. First, a general outline about the analysis is provided. Furthermore, information is provided about the data and how the different concepts are measured. After that is explained how the data analysis is conducted. After all, information is provided about the internal and external validity of the study.

4.1 Study Design

This study is designed as a quantitative study, since it makes use of survey data in which attitudes of individuals from the EU are evaluated in a quantitative way. The data is analyzed by assuming a relationship between the predictor (satisfaction with nationally implemented Covid-19 measures), which is moderated by the personal factors (age, socio-economic status and political radicalism) on the outcome (level of political trust in national governments). This study tests for moderation by using bivariate logistic regression analysis, since the dependent variable is binary. In addition, the independent variable and the moderating variables are all categorical on an ordinal scale or have only two categories. Every variable increases by equal steps on an ordinal scale. Since the variables are ordinal, they are not defined as purely categorical in SPSS but are treated as continuous variables (Field, 2009, 3th edition; Neuman, 2014, 7th edition). For bivariate logistic regression, the following assumptions need to be met. First of all, the dependent variable needs to be measured at the nominal level. In addition, the independent and moderating variables need to be measured at the continuous, ordinal or nominal level. Thirdly, observations need to be independent. Fourth, there should be no multicollinearity between the predicting variables. Lastly, there needs to be a linear relationship between the predictors and the outcome. The first two assumptions are already met. The last three assumptions are tested in the analysis (Field, 2009, 3th edition).

4.2 Data

For this study, data is used from Standard Eurobarometer 95.3. The data is collected between 14 June and 14 July 2021 (European Commission, 2021b). Standard Eurobarometer are a regular means to monitor public opinion within the EU. Data gathering has been done by Kantar Public, on behalf of the European Parliament and Commission (Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, 2022). The data covers all EU Member States and is gathered by asking participants from all EU member states, aged 15 and above (European Commission, 2019). For each Standard Eurobarometer, new and independent samples are drawn by using random probability sampling. Sampling is based on a selection of respondents after stratification by the distribution of national populations by metropolitan, urban and rural areas, proportional to the population size of the country and the population density. As a result, countries like Germany and France have a higher number of respondents than Luxembourg. Data is

analyzed from 26517 respondents in total. The total number of cases included in the dataset is larger, but in this study only cases are included in the sample which are residing in EU member states and all missing cases are excluded. The data used in this study is sampled by using face-to-face communication (Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, 2022). For the robustness checks is data derived from different sources shortly discussed in paragraph 4.6.

Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the indicators.

Variable	Indicator	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard deviation
Outcome	Political trust in national governments	26517	0	1	0.405	0.491
Predictor	Satisfaction with Covid-19 measures	26517	1	4	2.57	0.902
Moderators	Age	26517	1	6	4.02	1.628
	Social Class	26517	1	5	2.51	0.952
	Political radicalism	26517	0	1	0.85	0.36

4.3 Dependent and independent variable

In table 2, the descriptive statistics of this study are displayed. In this paper, the dependent variable is *‘Political trust in the national government’*. This indicator captures the response from the question: *‘How much trust do you have in certain institutions? The (NATIONALITY) Government’*. Answers are 0 *‘Tend not to trust’* or 1 *‘Tend to trust’* (European Commission, 2021b). The mean of political trust in national governments has been 0.405, meaning that 40.5% of respondents within the EU tended to trust their national government in July 2021. The independent variable measures satisfaction with the Covid-19 measures. This is measured by asking: *‘In general, how satisfied are you with the measures taken to fight the Coronavirus pandemic by the (NATIONALITY) government?’*. Answers include 1 *‘Very satisfied’*, 2 *‘Fairly satisfied’*, 3 *‘Not very satisfied’* and 4 *‘Not at all satisfied’*. The mean satisfaction has been 2.57. The division of all answers about satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures in the EU is provided in figure 2.




Figure 3: Descriptive statistics about the satisfaction of EU respondents with the Covid-19 measures implemented by their national governments ranging from 1 (not at all satisfied) till 4 (very satisfied).

4.4 Moderators

The moderating variables are included in the model, based on their hypothesized order of importance. This study first considers the age of participants measured in six categories based on the number of years. The youngest respondent has been 15 and the oldest 98. The mean age category is 48. Furthermore, the distribution of persons over age is more or less equally




Figure 4: Descriptive statistics about the age of respondents.

distributed, as displayed in figure 6. However, in this study a recoded dummy variable has been used in which respondents are recategorized into two categories, one category containing those who are 65 years and older representing 25.3% of all respondents and another category containing those who are less than 65 years old representing 74.7% of all respondents. This is done, since this study expects that especially being older than 65 years old, had a significant effect on levels of political trust and that potential moderation effects have been in place for those who are 65 years and older. Secondly, the social class of respondents is measured through asking: 'Do you see yourself and your household belonging to...?'. Answers are 1 'The working class of society', 2 'The lower middle class of society', 3 'The middle class of society', 4




Figure 5: Descriptive statistics about the social class of EU respondents ranging from 1 (workers class) till 4 (upper class).

'The upper middle class of society' and 5 'The higher class of society'. Category 4 and 5 are combined in one category, since there are only a few who considered themselves as belonging to the higher class of society. 51.2% of the respondents consider themselves as belonging to the middle class of society, a significant part considers him- or herself to the lower classes and only a limited part considers himself to the higher class of society. Thirdly, both the left- and rightwing political dimension is considered ranging from 1 till 5, with 1 representing radical leftwing support and 5, meaning radical rightwing support. This variable is transposed into a dummy variable representing only political radicalism and nonradical perceptions. Those who have radical perceptions are transposed from category 1 and 5 and are recategorized in a dummy variable in category 1 and represent 15.3% of the respondents. Those

who have centrist perceptions are from the categories in between and are represented in the dummy variable by category 0 representing 84.7% of the respondents. As a result, the recoded variable represents political radicalism, better than the original variable that only represented left- or rightwing support (European Commission, 2021b).

4.5 Robustness check

As discussed in the literature review, there are also potential collective-level factors which may influence the relationship between the predictor, the moderators and the outcome. However, since the EU consists of member states which are comparable when it comes to national culture, this study does not check for country-level differences associated with the national culture. However, this study includes robustness checks to measure whether the effects hold for countries on different stages when it comes to the stringency of the Covid-19 response. As discussed earlier, the stringency of Covid-19 measures strongly differed between EU member states. Some countries were really strict in their policies with long lockdowns, shop and school closures. Other countries were quite relaxed in their countermeasures (Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, 2022; Gozgor, 2021). Given the aspect that socio-demographic groups in society differently responded on the Covid-19 measures (Gozgor, 2021), this study includes a robustness check which is focused on the specific situation with respect to the Covid-19 countermeasures. The stringency of the governmental Covid-19 response is measured by using the Oxford Coronavirus Government Response Tracker; an index recording the national policies during the Covid-19 pandemic. The mean is taken from over three months (14 March till 14 June 2021), since perceptions about governmental performance with respect to the measures are formed by experiences about national governmental performance over a longer period of time. Outcomes range from 0 till 100, with 100 meaning ‘very strict’ (Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, 2022). For the robustness check, the countries are divided into separate units to conclude whether the coefficients of the analysis are robust for different conditions on the country-level. The overall stringency index takes the stringency of all measures taken to fight the coronavirus into account on the national level. This study divides countries in three separate parts: one ranges in ‘strictness’ from 0-60, expressing ‘not so strict Covid-19 policies’, one ranges from 60-70 expressing ‘moderate strict Covid-19 policies’ and one ranging from 70 and above, expressing ‘strict Covid-19 policies’ on the national level.

Table 4: Descriptive statistics about the Covid-19 Stringency Index used for the robustness check.

Covid-19 Stringency Index (mean over last 3 months till 14 July 2021)				
Strictness of policies	Strictness of policies	Number of countries	Mean satisfaction	Mean political trust
Very strict	70+	8	2.64	0.45
Quite strict	60-70	10	2.58	0.40
Not so strict	60-	10	2.53	0.38

Table 5: Operationalization.

Variable	Indicator	Source
Outcome	Political trust in the national government	0 = Tend not to trust, 1 = Tend to trust. (European Commission, 2021b)
Predictor	Satisfaction with Covid-19 measures by national governments	1 = Very satisfied, 2 = Fairly satisfied, 3 = Not very satisfied and 4 = Not at all satisfied. (European Commission, 2021b)
Moderators	Age	In categories of numbers of years. 1 = 15-24 years old, 2 = 25-34 years old, 3 = 35-44 years old, 4 = 45- 54 years old, 5 = 55-64 years old, 6 = 65+ years old (European Commission, 2021b)
	Socio-economic status	1 = Working class, 2 = Lower middle class, 3 = Middle class, 4 = Upper class. (European Commission, 2021b)
Robustness check	Political Radicalism	0 = Nonradical, 1 = Radical. (European Commission, 2021b)
	Overall government response index (mean over 3 months)	Overall stringency of the governmental response varying from 0 – 100. No measures at all till completely restricted (mean per week over the last three months till July 14 2021). (Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, 2022)

4.6 Data analysis

The empirical model estimated in this study is:

Political trust in national governments within the EU = ‘constant’ + ‘effect satisfaction with nationally implemented Covid-19 measures’ + ‘effect moderators’ + ‘moderation effect’.

In this study, the effect of satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures refers to the direct effect of the predictor on political trust in national governments within the EU. ‘Effect moderators’ refers to the direct effect of the moderating variables on political trust in national governments within the EU if the predictor ‘satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures’ is held constant. ‘Moderation effect’ refers to the moderation effect of the moderators, estimated on the relationship between the predictor and outcome. In order to enhance the interpretation of the interaction term, variables are sometimes mean-centered. Centering only makes sense when variables are not dichotomous and do not contain a meaningful zero-value. The only indicator qualified for centering in this study is ‘satisfaction with Covid-19 measures implemented by the national government’. The outcome variable ‘trust in the national government’ and the moderators are not centered. Furthermore, the interaction terms are calculated by multiplying the moderators with the centered predictor ‘satisfaction with the Covid-19 measures implemented by the national government’. In this study SPSS is used for the analysis. In addition, this study uses Process macro designed by Hayes to run moderated regression. Process macro has the benefit that it holds automatically account with categorical variables and that it has a function to mean-center independent variables. In addition, the interaction term is automatically provided and the probability of an effect is automatically visualized in a scatterplot (Hayes, 2022). The data analysis is conducted as follows. The single effects of satisfaction with nationally implemented Covid-19 measures on political trust in the national government are entered in model 1 by conducting bivariate regression analysis with X

predicting Y. In model 2 the moderators are entered and the direct effects of the moderators on the outcome are tested. In model 3 till 5, the interaction effects between the X and the moderators are tested each time for only one moderator. In order to confirm if there is a moderation effect on the relationship between X and Y, the nature of this relationship must significantly change once the moderator changes. In other words, moderation occurs when the direction and strength of the relation between the independent and a dependent variable is affected by a moderator. The analysis is first carried out for the entire EU. In addition the results are controlled per country and at last, a robustness check is conducted for countries on different stages when it comes to the stringency of the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures. This is done, since country-level checks are not always providing significant coefficients, whereas the N is too low and for the reason that Covid-19 policies really varied between EU member states. In figure 6 is visualized how the analysis is conducted.




Figure 6: Statistical diagram visualizing the method of data analysis.

4.7 Validity and reliability

This study measures whether satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures can explain levels of political trust in national governments and whether this effect is moderated by personal factors. The predictor and moderators included are deeply rooted in theory and based on rational expectations. The predictor ‘satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures’ captures the evaluations of citizens of governmental performance with respect to the Covid-19 measures, since it considers personal evaluations. The moderators capture exactly the concepts that need to be measured. To be sure about the found effects, a robustness check is carried out to check whether results hold for countries at different stages when it comes to the stringency of the Covid-19 measures. This study also uses random sampled data to be sure that there is no confounding variable. To make sure that multicollinearity is limited in the analysis, this study uses standardized independent variables and in the analysis is tested, by tolerance and VIF statistics, whether multicollinearity occurs between the independent variables (Neuman, 2014, 7th edition; Field, 2009, 3th edition). For the

external validity of the study, it is important to note that the data comes from all EU Member States and that every EU member state and region is equally represented (Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, 2022). This quantitative study has some limitations to take in mind. First of all there are sometimes low response rates (Neuman, 2014, 7th edition). The low response rates might cause distortions in measuring political trust in national governments, since citizens who are most critical of the EU tend to be less inclined to participate in an interview about the EU. On the other hand, in order to avoid those biases, responses are not told before the interview, that the interview is carried out for an EU-institution (Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, 2022).

5. Results and analysis

In this part, first descriptive statistics are provided about satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures and political trust in national governments within all EU countries. Secondly, bivariate logistic regression is professed and it is tested whether the personal factors age, social class and political radicalism moderate the effects of the predictor on the outcome on the EU-level. After that, bivariate regression is professed on the country-level and it is checked whether results varied between EU member states. The analysis ends with a robustness check for all EU member states on the level of stringency of the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures in order to check whether the results hold for countries on different stages of stringency with respect to the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures.




Figure 7: Political trust in national governments within the EU over time.

5.2 Descriptive statistics

Figure 6 displays how political trust in national governments developed over time within the EU (European Commission, 2019; European Commission, 2021b). As supported by previous research, this study found a short-term increase from 38.6% to 42.9% in political trust in national governments in the early pandemic. This could be due to the earlier discussed rally-effect (Belchior & Pequito Teixeira, 2021; Schraff, 2020). However, the longer the pandemic endured, the more citizens tended to distrust their national governments, since levels of trust decreased till 40.5% trusting their national government in July 2021. However, responses strongly varied between countries within the EU from 22.1% trusting their national government in June-July 2021 in Slovakia, till 70.4% trusting their national government at the same time in Luxembourg.




Figure 8: Satisfaction with Covid-19 measures compared with the level of political trust in national governments in EU member states displayed from low to high.




Figure 9: Scatterplot displaying the level of political trust in national governments in the EU, set off against the mean satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures within EU member states.

Figure 7 displays that there is correlation between satisfaction and political trust in national governments. Directly besides the name of the countries, the percentage of people who trust their national government is provided. In the figure it is visualized, with zero as a reference, how much people were satisfied and dissatisfied with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures. In the scatterplot in figure 8 it is visualized what the relationship between satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures and political trust in the national governments was. On the horizontal axis, the mean level of political trust in national governments is visualized. On the vertical axis, the mean level of satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures is displayed. It is clear that both variables correlate, since there is a clear direction from the bottom left side till the top right. Though there are sometimes outlying member states like Denmark and Cyprus, it is simple to conclude that if EU residents were satisfied with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures, they were also more likely to trust their national governments.

5.2 Logistic regression: testing assumptions

Since it seems that satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures correlates with political trust in national governments, it is time to examine this relationship and investigate whether the personal factors age, social class and political radicalism influence political trust in national governments. In addition, this study checks whether these personal actors strengthen or weaken the effects of satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures on political trust in national governments. This study uses bivariate logistic regression, but first three assumptions need to be met before starting the analysis.

Linearity, independence of errors and multicollinearity

First of all, there has to be a linear relationship between the outcome and the predictors. Since this study has to deal with a categorical outcome, this assumption is violated. Linearity is therefore tested by looking whether the interaction term between the predictor and the logit of the outcome variable is significant. To test this assumption, logistic regression is run including the predictors that are the interaction between each predictor and the log of itself (Field, 2009, 3th edition). However, this type of analysis could only be done for continuous variables or categorical variables with more than 4 categories. The only variable in this study that could be analyzed is 'age'. To measure whether there is linearity of the logit, the interaction term has not to be significant. If there is a significant interaction term, that indicates that the main effect violates the assumption of linearity of the logit. The significance of the interaction term $\text{age} * \ln(\text{age})$ is 0.603, indicating that the assumption of linearity has been met for the predictor 'age'. The second assumption that needs to be met is the independence of errors: cases of data should not be related (Field, 2009, 3th edition; Neuman, 2014, 7th edition). This assumption is met, since the respondents selected in each sample for Eurobarometer are

independently drawn with respect to the sample used in the former Eurobarometer (European Commission, 2021b). Thirdly, there should not be multicollinearity: too high correlation between separate predictors. This assumption is checked by using tolerance and VIF statistics. It goes too far to dive deeply into these statistics, but it is enough to know that a tolerance value less than 0.1 indicates serious collinearity problems and that a VIF value greater than 10 indicates a cause for concern as well. As displayed in table 6, the predicting variables used in this study are clearly not related, since the tolerance values are really high and the VIF statistics are really low. Since there are clearly no collinearity problems with the predictors, this study does not look further into collinearity diagnostics such as eigenvalues, condition indexes and so on. Those diagnostics are namely typically used to detect which predictors most attribute to a multicollinearity problem and in this study none of the predictors could seriously attribute to multicollinearity (Field, 2009, third edition).

Table 6: Collinearity diagnostics for the predicting variables.

<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Tolerance</i>	<i>VIF statistics</i>
<i>Satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures</i>	0.978	1.022
<i>Age</i>	0.984	1.016
<i>Social class</i>	0.984	1.017
<i>Political radicalism</i>	0.996	1.004

5.3 Logistic regression: EU-level

Though the scatterplot provides valid reason to determine that there is correlation between satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures and political trust in national governments within the EU, it cannot explain the exact probability of political trust in national governments by the predictor and how the moderators influence this relationship. Logistic regression provides that option by estimating the probability whether citizens ‘tend to trust the national government’ by the estimated model and whether a predictor enlarges this probability. In table 6 and 7, the results of bivariate logistic regression on the EU level are displayed. Under ‘model 1’ the direct and simple effects of the level of satisfaction with Covid-19 measures is provided. Under ‘model 2’ the direct effects of all the personal factors are included. In the rows 3 till 5 the separate interaction terms are entered. The coefficients are provided in table 7. These are the natural logits of the odds ratio that displays whether a factor positively or negatively influences whether respondents trust their national governments. A positive coefficient declares a positive relationship and vice versa. However, since odds ratios are simpler to interpret, this study also displays the odds ratios in table 8. The odds ratio provides the change in odds that some ‘tends to trust the national government’ for a one unit change in the level of satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures. The predictor variable ‘satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures consists of four units, namely ‘not at all satisfied’, ‘not very satisfied’, ‘fairly satisfied’ and ‘very satisfied’. If the satisfaction with the

nationally implemented Covid-19 measures of a person increases by one unit, for instance from 'fairly satisfied' till 'very satisfied', the probability to trust the national government increases by a factor 4.022, which seems a quite high number. This is for the reason that the variable 'satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures' is treated as a continuous variable. Since it is measured as a continuous variable with only four categories, the coefficients and odds ratios are more fluctuating and the interpretation is much more difficult. The coefficients and odds ratios for the outcome are mean taken for every unit increase in the predictor variable. However, not in every step, the probability 'to trust the national government' increases with the same amount as displayed in table 8. It is therefore more useful to know the exact probabilities that someone 'tends to trust the national government' per one unit increase in the level of satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures. Therefore the exact probabilities are provided for every personal factor in paragraph 5.3 (Field, 2009, 3th edition). In the following parts, the fit of the model and the found results are discussed.

Table 7: Coefficient results of logistic regression of the predictors on the level of political trust in national governments within the entire EU.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	1.392** (0.021)	1.379** (0.021)	1.374** (0.021)	1.379** (0.021)	1.361** (0.023)
Age		0.209** (0.035)	0.217** (0.037)	0.209** (0.035)	0.209** (0.035)
Social class		0.139** (0.017)	0.130** (0.016)	0.133** (0.016)	0.131** (0.016)
Political radicalism		0.055 (0.044)	0.054 (0.044)	0.056 (0.044)	0.074 (0.046)
Age*Satisfaction			-0.040 (0.047)		
Social class*Satisfaction				-0.016 (0.021)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					0.103 (0.056)
Constant	-0.436** (0.016)	-0.547** (0.042)	-0.549** (0.042)	-0.547** (0.042)	-0.564** (0.044)
Country-level dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Additional Chi-square		104.913**	0.701	0.587	3.581
Chi-square model	6732.049**	6836.962**	6837.663**	6837.548**	6840.542**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.336	0.341	0.341	0.341	0.341
Correctly classified observations	72.2%	71.9%	71.9%	71.9%	71.9%
N	26517				

** . Represents a significant effect on the 0.05 level.
* . Represents a significant effect on the 0.01 level.

Table 8: Odds ratios of logistic regression of the predictors on the level of political trust in national governments within the entire EU.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	4.022** (0.022)	3.970** (0.022)	3.952** (0.021)	3.972** (0.021)	3.901** (0.023)
Age		1.232** (0.035)	1.242** (0.037)	1.232** (0.035)	1.232** (0.035)
Social class		1.139** (0.016)	1.139** (0.016)	1.142** (0.016)	1.140** (0.016)
Political radicalism		1.057 (0.044)	1.056 (0.044)	1.057 (0.044)	1.077 (0.046)
Age*Satisfaction			1.057 (0.022)		
Social class*Satisfaction				0.984 (0.021)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					1.109 (0.056)
Constant	-	-	-	-	-
Country-level dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Additional Chi-square		104.913**	0.701	0.587	3.581
Chi-square model	6732.049**	6836.962**	6837.663**	6837.548**	6840.542**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.336	0.341	0.341	0.341	0.341
Correctly classified observations	72.2%	71.9%	71.9%	71.9%	71.9%
N	26517				

** . Represents a significant effect on the 0.05 level.
 * . Represents a significant effect on the 0.01 level.

Fit of the model

First of all, the results in table 7 and 8 display that all models fit the data well. Chi-square compares the likelihood ratio of the estimated model with the likelihood ratio of a model with only a constant (without intervention) and represents the difference between these two likelihood ratios. As a result, a single Chi-Square has to be compared with other Chi-Squares in order to argue how much a separate model or factor adds to the whole model. Chi-Square for model 1 is 6732.049**. Adding the personal factors age, social class and political radicalism to the model, increases the fit of the model by a significant 104.913**, meaning that the introduction of these factors significantly influenced political trust in national governments. However, satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures remains more exhaustive in determining levels of political trust in the national governments, since the Chi-Square of model 1 is larger than the Chi-Square of model 2. Entering the separate interaction terms does not significantly contribute to the model as displayed by the insignificant and small Chi-Squares. Though logistic regression does not measure a proportion of explained variance in R-Square, there are several pseudo R-Square measures which are comparable to the R-Square from linear regression analysis. This study uses Nagelkerke's R-Square since this is the only measure of explained variance that can reach an absolute value of one (Field, 2009, 3th edition). In this study Nagelkerke's R-Square is 0.336 in model 1, meaning that 33.6% of the variance in the level of political trust in the national government is explained by the level of satisfaction with the Covid-19 measures. When entering model 2, Nagelkerke's R-Square increases to 0.341, meaning that 34.1% of the variance in the level of political trust in national governments in the EU is explained by the level of satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures and the personal factors. When entering the

separate interaction terms in model 3 till 5, the level of explained variance does not increase. A third factor to measure the fit of the model, is the number of correctly classified cases. In model 1, 72.2% of all cases included in the analysis, are correctly classified by the model in the two categories of the outcome variable and this number decreases in the following models to 71.9%, but even this number is fairly high. This study does not make use of Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit test, since there are multiple problems for which scholars do not recommend it (Glen, 2016).

Results

The fit of the model explains that only the predictor 'satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures' and the personal factors contribute to the model and have a significant impact on levels of political trust in national governments. As displayed in table 6 and 7, all five models indicate that satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures significantly positive relates to political trust in national governments ($\beta = 1.392^{**}$). If one is more satisfied with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures, he tends to trust his national government more. In addition, the personal factors age ($\beta = 0.209^{**}$) and social class ($\beta = 0.139^{**}$) are positively related to political trust in national governments. Those who are 65 years and older and those belonging to a higher social class tend to have more political trust in their national governments. However, this study is not only interested in the direct impact of personal factors on levels of political trust in national governments, but moreover focuses on the way in which personal factors may strengthen or weaken the effect of satisfaction with the Covid-19 measures on levels of political trust in national governments. As discussed earlier, vulnerable groups in society might react stronger on their personal dissatisfaction with Covid-19 policies since it threatens their personal wellbeing or personal values significantly. In order to examine whether there is any influence of the moderators on the relationship between satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures and political trust in national governments, the relationship between the predictor and outcome must significantly change. As displayed in table 7 and 8, the strength of the relationship between satisfaction and political trust in national governments is reduced when the interaction terms age*satisfaction and most importantly political radicalism*satisfaction are entered. However, since the coefficients and odds ratios are insignificant, this study concludes that there is no evidence for any moderating influence of the personal factors on the relationship between the predictor and the outcome.

5.3 Probabilities of the predictor and moderators

Though the relationships of the interaction terms were nonsignificant, it still makes sense to look how different socio-demographic groups react on their (dis)satisfaction with the nationally imposed Covid-19 measures. Since it is fairly difficult to discuss the real nature of the relationship by using coefficients and odds ratios, the probabilities that someone 'tends to trust the national government' are displayed

and visualized in this paragraph. If there is any interaction, the probability whether a group more or less trusts the government would be stronger positive or negative for one group of respondents vis-à-vis another group of respondents, varying between different categories of satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures. The visualized lines will then diverge from each other. As said earlier, there are four different categories in which respondents potentially could be classified: 1 represents 'not at all satisfied', 2 represents 'not very satisfied', 3 expresses 'fairly satisfied' and 4 'very satisfied'. The results per category are displayed in the tables 9 till 12 and visualized in the figures 10 till 12.

Satisfaction

The probability that someone tends to trust the national government for different levels of satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures are visualized in table 8. The numbers in the first row display the probability that someone tends to trust the national government and the numbers displayed in the second row are the direct opposites: that someone tends not to trust the national governments. In table 9, personal factors are not taken into account. In the table it is clearly visible that those who are more satisfied with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures are more likely to trust their national government and vice versa. Those who are not at all satisfied with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures have a probability of 6.1% to trust their national government, whereas those who are very satisfied with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures have a probability of 76.5% trust their national government. It is noteworthy to mention that it seems that satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures not always led to more trust in the national governments. When one is very satisfied with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures, there is still a probability of 23.5% that someone does not trust their national government. On the other hand, if someone has not at all been satisfied with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures, there was a very little probability of 6.1% to trust the national government. As a result, it seems that dissatisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures has a lot more influence on political trust in national governments than satisfaction, since satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures did not always lead to more political trust in national governments. However, dissatisfaction almost always led to political distrust in national governments. In addition, satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures not always led to higher levels of political trust in national governments.

Table 9: Probability percentages that respondents trust their national governments for different levels of satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures.

<i>Trust in national government</i>	<i>Not at all satisfied</i>	<i>Not very satisfied</i>	<i>Fairly satisfied</i>	<i>Very satisfied</i>
<i>Tend to trust the national government</i>	6.1%	18.4%	56.7%	76.5%
<i>Tend not to trust the national government</i>	93.9%	81.6%	43.3%	23.5%
<i>N</i>	26517			

Age

Secondly, figure 10 displays the probability that respondents trust their national governments for different age categories. The corresponding percentages are provided in table 10. The variable 'age' represents two categories of respondents: those who are younger than 65 years old and those who are older than 65 years old. Results show that those that are 65 years and older tend to have higher levels of political trust in national governments vis-à-vis those that are younger than 65 years old, regardless their satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures. Results vary for those who are not at all satisfied with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures from 5.5% for those who were younger than 65 years old till 7.1% for those who were older than 65 years old. For those who are very satisfied with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures, results vary from 74.2% for those who are younger than 65 years old till 80.9% for those who are older than 65 years old. In the third row, the difference between the two age categories is displayed. This might indicate a moderation effect. That is to say that the effect of satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures becomes stronger under those who are older. However, since coefficients for the interaction term were insignificant in table 7 and 8, this study concludes that there is no moderation.

Table 10: Probability percentages that respondents trust their national governments for different levels of satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures and different age categories.

Trust in national government	Not at all satisfied	Not very satisfied	Fairly satisfied	Very satisfied
65 years and older	7.1%	20.0%	58.4%	80.9%
Less than 65 years old	5.5%	17.3%	54.3%	74.2%
Difference between categories	1.6%	2.7%	4.1%	6.7%
N	16517			




Figure 10: Probability percentages that respondents trust their national governments for different levels of satisfaction and different age categories.

Social class

Table 11 and figure 11 display that belonging to a higher social class increases political trust in the national government. As displayed in the table and figure, the working class and the lower middle class tend to have lower levels of trust in the national government, no matter what their satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures was. Probabilities vary for those who are not at all satisfied with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures between 3.4% for those who belong to the lower middle class till 5.9 percent for those who belong to the upper class. For those who are very satisfied with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures, the probabilities to trust the national government are varying between 73.8% for the working class, compared with 84.3% for the upper class. To assess whether there is a moderation effect of the social class of respondents on the relationship between the predictor and outcome, it is important to look whether the lines, displayed in figure 11, diverge from each other. As visualized, there is some divergence till 3 (fairly satisfied with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures), but then further divergence is absent. As a result, there seems to be insufficient evidence to conclude whether there is a moderation effect.

Table 11: Probability percentages that respondents trust their national governments for different levels of satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures and different social classes.

Trust in national government	Not at all satisfied	Not very satisfied	Fairly satisfied	Very satisfied
The working class	4.3%	14.3%	52.1%	73.8%
The lower middle class	3.4%	16.2%	50.7%	78.0%
The middle class	4.6%	18.6%	56.8%	76.7%
The upper class	5.9%	22.6%	61.9%	84.3%
Difference between categories	2.5%	8.3%	11.2%	10.5%
N	16517			




Figure 11: Probability percentages that respondents trust their national governments for different levels of satisfaction and different social classes.

Political radicalism

Table 12 and figure 12 display the probabilities that persons trust their national government for different levels of satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures and political radicalism. There seems to be a slight moderation effect, since those that are politically radical tend to react extremer on their (dis)satisfaction with governmental measures. This is visualized in figure 12, where the lines cross each other. However, since the coefficients in the EU-level analysis were insignificant there is not sufficient evidence that political radicalism moderates the relationship between the predictor and outcome. It is noteworthy that the probabilities to trust the national governments are not so different for those who have radical political perceptions and those who have non-radical political perceptions. For those who are not at all satisfied with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures, the probability is 3.5% to trust the national government for someone who has non-radical political perceptions and 4.7% for someone who has radical political perceptions. If someone is very satisfied with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures, the probability to trust the national government is 79.0% for someone who has non-radical political perceptions and 77.7% for someone who has radical political perceptions. It surprises that political radicalism seems to have no effect on political trust in national governments.

Table 12: Probability percentages that respondents trust their national governments for different levels of satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures and political radicalism.

Trust in national government	Not at all satisfied	Not very satisfied	Fairly satisfied	Very satisfied
Politically nonradical	3.5%	16.3%	56.3%	79.0%
Political radical	4.7%	18.4%	56.4%	77.7%
N	16517			




Figure 12: Probability to trust the national government by respondents divided between being politically radical or not.

5.4 Logistic regression: country-level differences

So it seems that the predictor 'satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures' and the personal factors 'age' and 'social class' positively influence political trust in national governments within the EU and that there is no moderation effect of the personal factors on the relationship between the predictor and outcome. However, since the EU is not a homogenous group of countries and the Covid-19 policies strongly varied between the countries, it is necessary to control on the country-level whether the results hold for all EU member states. The results of logistic regression for all the EU member states are provided in appendix A for the reason that it includes a lot of tables. In this part of the analysis, only some surprising results are highlighted and it is concluded whether the results remain significant or not for EU member states.

Descriptive statistics

The relevant descriptive statistics for each country included in the analysis are displayed in table 14. The countries are divided, based on their geographical location. As displayed in table 14, residents from Nordic member states score higher in their levels of satisfaction and political trust in national governments and in the level of democracy. Eastern European member states provide another view. They score far worse than Nordic countries on all categories. On the other side, it is interesting to see that the mean stringency of the Covid policies was quite low in these countries. Southern member states provide a varying image. These countries score very different when it comes to the numerous factors. When it comes to levels of satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures as well as levels of political trust in national governments results strongly vary in Southern EU member states. The North/Western member states are a different story. Levels of satisfaction and trust are highly fluctuating as well as the strictness in Covid-19 policies.

Results: direct effects

As visualized in the tables in appendix A, the relationship between satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures and political trust in national governments has been significantly positive in all EU countries, though results strongly varied between countries. The strongest effect is measured in Finland ($\beta = 2.210^{**}$) and the least strong effect in Romania ($\beta = 0.871^{**}$). This is completely in line with the effect that was found on the EU-level ($\beta = 1.392^{**}$) that has been more or less the mean between the two extremes that were found in the country-level analysis. For the personal factors, the coefficients for a lot of countries were not significant due to the small sample sizes (N). However, it still makes sense to discuss the findings, since the coefficients that were found may strengthen the proof for a relationship between the personal factors and political trust and may indicate a moderation effect of the personal factors. Age had a significant positive effect on the whole EU-level ($\beta = 0.209^{**}$). On the country-level, six countries recorded significant positive effects of being

older than 65 years old on political trust in national governments (Belgium $\beta = 0.503^{**}$, Germany $\beta = 0.324^{**}$, Spain $\beta = 0.570^{**}$, Ireland $\beta = 0.459^{**}$, Latvia $\beta = 0.739^{**}$ and Poland $\beta = 0.777^{**}$). Surprisingly, the effects in the Nordic EU member states of Sweden ($\beta = -0.362^*$) and Finland ($\beta = -0.467^{**}$) were both negative. The effects of social class on political trust in national governments has been significantly positive on the EU-level ($\beta = 0.139^{**}$). The effect of social class has been significant in twelve member states and the effects were positive in every EU member state (Belgium $\beta = 0.272^{**}$, Germany $\beta = 0.353^{**}$, Greece $\beta = 0.308^{**}$, Spain $\beta = 0.228^{**}$, France $\beta = 0.312^{**}$, Ireland $\beta = 0.397^{**}$, Italy $\beta = 0.187^{**}$, The Netherlands $\beta = 0.372^{**}$, Sweden $\beta = 0.281^{**}$, Estonia $\beta = 0.391^{**}$, Latvia $\beta = 0.361^{**}$ and Slovakia $\beta = 0.362^{**}$). Thirdly, the effect of political radicalism on political trust in national governments provides a varying image. On the EU-level, the results are already not significant ($\beta = 0.055$). In addition, the results on the country-level are varying. In four countries (Germany $\beta = 0.478$, France $\beta = 0.863$, Portugal $\beta = 1.181$ and Sweden $\beta = 0.557$), political radicalism significantly influenced political trust in national governments positively. However, in four other countries (Greece $\beta = -1.057$, Cyprus $\beta = -0.849$, Slovenia $\beta = -0.505$ and Romania $\beta = -0.392$) political radicalism significantly influenced political trust in national governments negatively. As visible, coefficients are really high in all member states where coefficients were significant, meaning a strong effect. However, since the relationship between political radicalism and political trust in national governments really differs per country, it seems that the effects are really context-dependent, if there is a relationship.

Results: moderation effects

When it comes to the moderation effects of the personal factors, it is worthwhile to mention that no significant moderation effect has been found on the EU-level (age*satisfaction $\beta = -0.040$, social class*satisfaction $\beta = -0.016$, political radicalism*satisfaction $\beta = 0.103$). Taking a closer look to the interaction term age*satisfaction, it is noteworthy that this interaction term had only six times a significant effect on the relationship between satisfaction and trust on the country-level. In two countries (Germany $\beta = -0.487^*$ and Slovakia $\beta = -0.904$) the effect weakened the relationship between satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures and political trust in the national governments and in four member states (Greece $\beta = 0.552^{**}$, Spain $\beta = 0.393^{**}$, Czech Republic $\beta = 0.715^{**}$ and Romania $\beta = 0.597^{**}$) the relationship was strengthened by entering the interaction term. So this interaction term really provides a varying image. The interaction term social class*satisfaction significantly influenced political trust in national governments in only three countries (Italy $\beta = 0.314$, Bulgaria $\beta = 0.306$ and Romania $\beta = -0.189$), providing too little evidence for any moderating effect of social class. The interaction term political radicalism*satisfaction has only four countries a significant impact on the relationship between satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures and political trust in national governments. However, again it seems to be quite context-dependent

what direction the effect has. In most countries the effect was strongly positive (Germany $\beta = 0.883$, Greece $\beta = 1.778$ and Slovenia $\beta = 0.795$), but in Portugal ($\beta = -1.064$) radicalism strongly affected the relationship negatively. In short it is noticed that this study cannot conclude that there is any moderating influence of the personal factors, since coefficients on the country-level are available for only a limited number of member states and coefficients show quite contrary results. At the same time it is important to notice that a lot of coefficients are not significant for the reason that the country-level analyses include small sample sizes (N). Almost all countries included in this analysis have less than 1000 cases and some even less than 500, causing a lot of insignificant coefficients.

5.5 Logistic regression: robustness checks

Since results sometimes strongly differ between countries and a lot of coefficients in the country-level checks are insignificant, it makes sense to carry out a robustness check. In a robustness check, countries are divided in clusters of countries that are comparable when it comes to a specific feature. This brings the advantage of a larger sample size and it controls whether the find effects hold when a potential variable that could influence the relationship between the variables, is brought in the analysis (Lu & White, 2014). In this study, robustness checks are carried out for the EU member states, clustered on different stages when it comes to the stringency of the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures. The division of countries is displayed in table 13. The robustness check is conducted for countries that are at the two extremes; countries with strict Covid policies (70+) or countries with less strict Covid policies (60-), since it is expected that if any significant difference in findings arise it should be at one of the two extremes.

Table 13: Country division used for the robustness check on different levels of democracy.

Countries with strict Covid policies (70+)	Countries with medium strict Covid policies (60-70)	Countries with less strict Covid policies (60-)
Greece	Denmark	Romania
Italy	Sweden	Bulgaria
Cyprus	Czech Republic	Finland
The Netherlands	Slovakia	Slovenia
Ireland	Portugal	Estonia
Germany	Hungary	Croatia
Austria	Spain	Lithuania
	Malta	Latvia
	Poland	Belgium
	France	Luxembourg

The results for EU countries on different stages in strictness of Covid policies are provided in the tables in appendix B. This study divides countries in categories of strict, medium strict and less strict Covid policies as displayed in table 13. The results show that the influence of satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures on levels of political trust in national governments is robust for member states on different stages when it comes to the strictness of the Covid policies. $\beta = 1.183^{**}$ for member states with strict Covid-19 policies and $\beta = 1.354^{**}$ for member states with less strict

Covid-19 policies. In addition, the positive influence of age ($\beta = 0.243^{**}$ for member states with strict Covid-19 policies and $\beta = 0.189^{**}$ for member states with less strict Covid-19 policies) and social class ($\beta = 0.285^{**}$ for member states with strict Covid-19 policies and $\beta = 0.202^{**}$ for member states with less strict Covid-19 policies) on political trust in national governments holds for countries on different stages of strictness in Covid-19 policies. This is exactly in line with the main analysis as carried out on the EU-level. Results for political radicalism ($\beta = -0.007$ for member states with strict Covid-19 policies and $\beta = -0.052$ for member states with less strict Covid-19 policies) and the interaction terms age*satisfaction ($\beta = -0.101$ for member states with strict Covid-19 policies and $\beta = -0.022$ for member states with less strict Covid-19 policies), social class*satisfaction ($\beta = 0.002$ for member states with strict Covid-19 policies and $\beta = 0.061$ for member states with less strict Covid-19 policies) and political radicalism*satisfaction ($\beta = 0.193$ for member states with strict Covid-19 policies and $\beta = 0.080$ for member states with less strict Covid-19 policies) is always insignificant, indicating that these variables do not have any moderating influence. It is further interesting to see that the influence of satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures on political trust in national governments is much stronger ($\beta = 1.354^{**}$) in countries with less strict Covid-19 policies than in countries with strict Covid-19 policies ($\beta = 1.183^{**}$). On the other hand, the influence of personal factors on political trust in national governments is much stronger in countries with strict Covid-19 policies ($\beta = 0.243^{**}$ for age and $\beta = 0.285^{**}$ for social class) than in countries with less strict Covid-19 policies ($\beta = 0.189^{**}$ for age and $\beta = 0.202^{**}$ for social class). So it seems that in countries with less strict Covid-19 policies, satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures has been more exhaustive in determining political trust in national governments than in countries with strict Covid-19 policies. In countries with strict Covid-19 policies, the age and social class of citizens have been more important in determining political trust in national governments than in countries with less strict Covid-19 policies.

6. Discussion

In this chapter, the implications of the findings are discussed and explained. It is explained what the findings actually mean and how they could be explained in their own context. Furthermore, answers are provided on the different hypotheses.

6.1 Influence of satisfaction on trust

In short, satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures had a strong positive influence on levels of political trust in national governments in all analyses. Even in all country analyses, all results indicated a significant positive influence of satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures on political trust in national governments. This is in line with previous research done in both the pandemic context (Becher, et al., 2021; Berger, et al., 2021; Christmann & Torcal, 2021; Devine, Gaskell, Jennings, & Stoker, 2020; Rieger & Wang, 2021) as well as outside the pandemic context (Mishler & Rose, 2001; North, 1990). This study thus concludes that satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures remained important for political trust in national governments within the pandemic context. The hectic of the pandemic did not alter this relationship. Therefore this study confirms hypothesis 1: *'Satisfaction with governmental performance during the Covid-19 pandemic had a positive effect on levels of political trust in national governments in the EU'*.

6.2 Influence age on political trust

Besides satisfaction, this study found that age had an important positive effect on political trust in national governments. This strengthens proof for earlier findings outside the pandemic context. A high number of previous research found that the age of respondents increased political trust in national governments (Brouard, Vasilopoulos, & Becher, 2020; Christensen & Lægheid, 2005; Gozgor, 2021; Hooghe, Marien, & De Vroome, 2012). Thereby comes that in the pandemic context, elderly had to fear more for the health-related consequences of a Covid-19 infection and thus were more dependent on the successful implementation of Covid-19 policies. As a result it was expected that political trust was substantially higher under elderly than under young people (Abrams & Travaglino, 2018; Brouard, Vasilopoulos, & Becher, 2020; Gozgor, 2021). Significant positive results of age on political trust in national governments has also been found on the country-level. In almost all countries were significant results were found, results were positive. However, in the Scandinavian countries of Sweden and Finland, results were significantly negative. This is quite surprising, since previous studies done in the Scandinavian context proved that young people's trust in political institutions has been substantially lower than political trust amongst elderly (Lieberkind & Bruun, 2021). The pandemic might have changed this pattern. As supported by research, political trust has been sustained in Scandinavian countries during the pandemic. This would be due to the open way of governmental communication

in which all socio-demographic groups were involved (Pedersen Dahlen & Skirbekk, 2021) and less restrictive measures like hard lockdowns (Askim & Bergström, 2022). However, especially the point that Scandinavian countries like Sweden and Finland opted for less restrictive countermeasures might have decreased political trust amongst elderly in Sweden and Finland. Though it was clear that elderly were more susceptible for Covid-19, most Scandinavian countries lacked measures to protect these socio-demographic groups (Pierre, 2020). This lack of protective measures created a storm of criticism amongst scientists and vulnerable groups like elderly, since death tolls were unprecedentedly high (Vogel, 2020). Though unsubstantiated by scientific research, this might have been influential on satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures and in turn political trust in national governments in Scandinavian countries opting for less restrictive Covid-19 measures. However, further research needs to be done to the EU member states of Sweden and Finland to investigate whether political trust has been eroded amongst elderly due to the less restrictive measures. Given the findings, with the notable exception of Sweden and Finland, this study accepts hypothesis 2A *'Age positively influenced political trust in national governments within the EU'*.

6.3 Influence social class on political trust

This study also finds that social class had a positive effect on political trust. Besides the significant positive effects found on the EU-level analysis, this study also founds significant positive effects of social class on political trust in national governments on the country-level. All countries in which significant effects were found, effects indicated a positive relationship between social class and political trust in the national governments. Moreover, the results have been robust for countries on different stages when it comes to the strictness of the Covid-19 policies. The findings of this study are in line with a lot of previous research done outside the pandemic context. A lot of studies confirm that belonging to a higher social class improves political trust in national governments (Anderson, 2010; Bish & Michie, 2020; Brouard, Vasilopoulos, & Becher, 2020; Christensen & Lægred, 2005; Christmann & Torcal, 2021; Hooghe, Marien, & De Vroome, 2012). Given the fact, that all analyses indicate that social class strong and positively influenced political trust in national governments, this study confirms hypothesis 3A: *'A higher socio-economic status positively influenced levels of political trust in national governments within the EU'*.

6.4 Influence political radicalism on political trust

This study finds no signs that political radicalism influences political trust in national governments. First of all, the EU-level analysis found no significant result. In addition, no significant results were found in the robustness check. This is not in line with previous research who suggest that political radicalism is characterized by a characteristic of institutional distrust (Anson, Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2009; Krouwel, Kutiyski, Van Prooijen, Martinsson, & Markstedt, 2017). In addition, this study finds

contrary results on the country-level. In Greece, Cyprus, Slovenia and Romania results were, as expected, significantly negative. Being politically radical, reduced levels of political trust in the national government. However, results were significantly positive in Germany, Portugal, France and Sweden. This is particularly interesting since radical voting behavior has been associated with lower amounts of political trust in Germany (Campbell, 2019; Riedl, 2021) and France (Cole, Pasquier, Fox, & Stafford, 2018). A potential explanation for France is that radical left supporting citizens are also included in the pool of radical persons, which is used in this analysis. Most studies suggest that radical left has been the political group most likely to trust the national government in France (Vox Populism, 2022). However, for Germany there is not a sufficient explanation. Almost all recent studies in the German context indicate that radical voting behavior is correlated with lesser amounts of political trust in national governments (Braun & Trüdinger, 2022). For Portugal, there is a simple explanation. Since the governing party is considered as a radical left socialist party, that could explain the improved levels of political trust in the national government (Ames, 2021). As argued earlier people tend to trust persons they are ideologically associated with (Fitzgerald & Wickwire, 2012; Hetherington M. , 2005; Hunt, Iyer, & Jimenez, 2019). When it comes to Sweden, earlier studies already failed to prove that political radicalism has been associated with lesser amounts of political distrust in Sweden, providing an explanation for the positive coefficients found in this study (Krouwel, Kutiyski, Van Prooijen, Martinsson, & Markstedt, 2017). Given the insignificant and sometimes contrary findings of this study, hypothesis 4A '*Political radicalism decreased political trust in national governments in the EU*' is rejected.

6.5 Influence of moderators

When entering the interaction terms this study finds no strong evidence for any interaction term. In addition, results are not robust for countries at different stages when it comes to the strictness in Covid-19 policies. The moderation results are also quite contrary when it comes to the country-level checks. Age*satisfaction had a positive moderating effect on the relationship between satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures and political trust in national governments in Greece, Spain, Czech Republic and Romania. Elderly reacted significantly more on their (dis)satisfaction with the nationally implemented measures by expressing political (dis)trust than young people. However, in Slovakia and Germany it was the other way around. A potential explanation could be the worse consequences of the Covid-19 measures on young people (Nederlands Jeugdinstituut, 2021). The stricter the Covid-19 policies were, the more especially young people were confronted with social loneliness and other mental-health related consequences (Jones, Pincock, Alheiwidi, & Yadete, 2021). However, countries like Germany and Slovakia did not implement stricter Covid-19 policies than surrounding countries (Financial Times, 2022), so there still lacks a plausible argumentation for the

found effects. In addition to age, this study find no evidence for any moderation of social class on the relationship between the predictor and outcome. In both the EU-level analysis as well as the robustness check, results were insignificant. In the country-level checks, only three countries recorded significant results. In Romania, results were just in line with the expectations negative, but in Italy and Bulgaria, those belonging to a higher class were more likely than workers class residents to react on their (dis)satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures by expressing political (dis)trust in their national government. This is quite surprising, but a plausible argumentation lacks almost for the found effects. When taking a closer look to political radicalism*satisfaction, it seems that there is a moderation effect visible in figure 11. However, all the findings are insignificant providing no evidence for any moderation of political radicalism. Only in four countries, significant effects were found. In Portugal, findings were in line with the expectation. However, in Germany, Greece and Slovenia political radical person were surprisingly more likely to react on their (dis)satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures by expressing political (dis)trust in their national governments than political centrists. Given the absence of evidence for any moderation effect, this study rejects the hypotheses 2B: *'Age strengthened the effect of satisfaction with nationally implemented Covid-19 measures on levels of political trust in national governments within the EU'*, 3B: *'A higher socio-economic status weakened the effect of satisfaction with nationally implemented Covid-19 measures on levels of political trust in national governments within the EU'* and 4B: *Political radicalism weakened the effect of satisfaction with nationally implemented Covid-19 measures on levels of political trust in national governments within the EU.*

7. Conclusion and reflection

In this paper is investigated whether and to what extent satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures influenced political trust in national governments within the EU and how this effect has been moderated by the personal factors age, social class and political radicalism. In this chapter, the results of this study are shortly summarized and an answer is provided on the research question. Furthermore, the implications of the findings are discussed and this chapter provides some recommendations for policymakers and recommendations for further research. This chapter ends with the limitations of this study.

7.1 Results

The central question for this study has been:

To what extent have individual satisfaction with governmental responses on the Covid-19 pandemic influenced the level of political trust in national governments within the EU?

This study observed that satisfaction had a very important role in determining levels of political trust in national governments. Those that were not satisfied with Covid-19 measures were also less likely to trust their national government. Moreover, significant positive results were found in all EU member states and the results were robust for countries on different stages when it comes to the stringency of the national implementation of the Covid-19 measures. Additionally, the following sub questions has been asked in this study:

To what extent has the age of citizens influenced the relationship between satisfaction with nationally implemented Covid-19 measures and political trust in national governments within the EU?

To what extent has the social class of citizens influenced the relationship between satisfaction with nationally implemented Covid-19 measures and political trust in national governments within the EU?

To what extent has political radicalism influenced the relationship between satisfaction with nationally implemented Covid-19 measures and political trust in national governments within the EU?

This study found convincing evidence that age increased levels of political trust in national governments. When someone has been 65 years or older, he or she was substantially more likely to trust the national government. These results were robust for countries on different stages when it comes to the strictness of Covid-19 policies. In the country-level checks only the Scandinavian countries of Sweden and Finland indicated contrary results. On the other hand, this study found no convincing evidence that the relationship between satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures and political trust in national governments altered, once the age of respondents

increased. Additionally, the socio-economic status of citizens had a very important positive influence on political trust in national governments. Moreover, the importance of this personal factor in enhancing political trust has been robust for countries on different stages of economic development and different stages when it comes to the strictness of Covid-19 policies. However, no convincing evidence has been found for any moderation effect of the socio-economic status on the relationship between the predictor and outcome. Thirdly, political radicalism has no significant influence on political trust in national governments. In addition, political radicalism seems to have no moderation effect.

7.2 Implications

The results of this study underline the importance of public satisfaction with policies for levels of political trust in national governments. Public satisfaction remained as the critical determinant for political trust in national governments during the Covid-19 pandemic. At the same time, governments must consider that levels of political trust in national governments vary between different social groups within societies. Within the EU, it is clear that being older and belonging to a higher social class corresponds to improved levels of political trust in national governments. Thus age and personal wellbeing enhances political trust in national governments. However, there is no sign that different socio-demographic groups responded differently on their (dis)satisfaction with governmental performance during the pandemic. Feelings of threat and increased dependence on successful implementation of the Covid-19 measures did not enhance political trust in the national governments if satisfactory Covid-19 measures were put in place and vice versa. That means that successful policymaking regarding Covid-19 measures was not especially critical to enhance political trust among certain groups within the societies. It is important to know for policymakers that satisfaction with policies in general means an improvement in political trust in national governments, but that there is no difference among different socio-demographic groups in how susceptible they react on satisfaction with the implementation of policies. Vulnerable groups that were especially confronted with the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic, did not react harder on their (dis)satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures than the stronger groups within societies in the EU.

7.3 Recommendations

The findings of this study suggest that national governments must try to cater to societal demands for different social groups. Especially some groups in society may have been effected more by the pandemics consequences and it is necessary for national governments to satisfy social demands of every socio-demographic group in society in order to enhance political trust in national governments. This study suggests that political trust has to be improved under those belonging to the workers class of society and amongst young people, since political trust in national governments is lower amongst

these groups. Future governmental policies should be especially focused on enhancing societal demands of these groups that prove to be less satisfied with governmental performance. So this study suggests that political trust in national governments could be enhanced by implementing satisfactory policies. For all groups within society applies: the more satisfied persons are with policies, the more they tend to trust the national government. The Covid-19 pandemic did not change this pattern. This study recommends also further scientific research. First of all, further research needs to be done in the form of case studies on the country-level. As this study suggests, there are major differences between countries when it comes to the personal factors determining political trust in national governments. In addition, this study finds strong evidence for a negative effect of age on political trust in national governments in Sweden and Finland. This is a surprising effect, which has never been explored before and needs some further investigation.

7.3 Limitations

This study has its limitations. First of all, there is sometimes a low response rates in Eurobarometer. As argued by several scholars, those who are reluctant to the EU are less likely to participate in the Eurobarometer polls. This would provide a low response rate but would also lead to an overestimation of trust in political institutions. This would effect a bias with respect to the outcomes. Participants in Eurobarometer polls would be far more politically active and would share a far more positive view about the EU, which does not reflect the real attitudes of EU citizens towards the EU (Bennike, 2019). This about the limitations of the data used in this study. Secondly, this study has an important limitation when it comes to the methodology. This study searches for an interaction effect of personal factors. It is argued that due to enlarged perceptions of threat and dependence on the successful implementation of Covid-19 policies, some groups in society might react stronger on their (dis)satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures than other socio-demographic groups. This enlarged (dis)satisfaction would be expressed by greater variances in political (dis)trust amongst these socio-demographic groups. However, it might be that vulnerable socio-demographic groups just expressed more (dis)satisfaction, dependent on how the nationally implemented Covid-19 policies were perceived by residents vulnerable socio-demographic groups. The enlarged (dis)satisfaction might have led to enlarged political (dis)trust in the national government. Last of all, this study has the limitation of a chance on reverse causation: those that already distrusted the national government, were less likely to be satisfied with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures. Since it is super hard to filter out the potential of reverse causation, this implies an important limitation of this study. Nevertheless its limitations, this study still points towards a fitted approach in which national governments try to figure out who are hit the hardest by the pandemic consequences. This study argues that vulnerable groups during the Covid-19 pandemic did not express

greater public distrust when they were not satisfied with governmental policies. However, national governments must still consider that it is their social virtue and duty to listen to the people.

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Appendix A: Country-level tables

In this appendix, the coefficients and odds ratios on the country-level are presented for each EU member state. In table 14, an overview is provided about the descriptive statistics for each EU member states when it comes to levels of satisfaction with the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures, the levels of political trust in national governments and the mean stringency of the nationally implemented Covid-19 measures. Additionally, the results of bivariate logistic regression are provided for each individual EU member states. In each first table, the coefficients of bivariate logistic regression are represented. In each second table, the odds ratios of bivariate logistic regression providing the odds to trust national governments are provided. It is further important to note that a lot of coefficients are not significant, due to the small sample sizes (N).

Table 14: Descriptive statistics about the country-level factors. The stringency of the government response is mean taken from 14 March till 14 June 2021.

Country	N	Mean satisfaction	Mean political trust	Mean stringency
<i>Nordic EU member states</i>				
Finland	1001	2.91	0.57	51.84
Denmark	1006	3.36	0.66	61.00
Sweden	1015	2.68	0.50	64.58
<i>Eastern EU member states</i>				
Hungary	1021	2.69	0.45	65.19
Slovakia	1011	2.11	0.22	63.52
Lithuania	1000	2.50	0.41	51.38
Slovenia	1027	2.26	0.27	58.64
Czech Republic	1087	2.27	0.28	65.78
Latvia	1044	2.08	0.22	55.50
Estonia	1021	2.60	0.49	52.16
Bulgaria	1032	2.50	0.26	54.03
Romania	1048	2.44	0.34	56.98
Poland	1017	2.52	0.30	67.47
<i>Southern EU member states</i>				
Portugal	1000	2.68	0.59	68.29
Greece	1015	2.30	0.26	73.86
Spain	1006	2.29	0.24	65.86
Croatia	1022	2.38	0.22	47.12
Italy	1026	2.51	0.40	75.04
Cyprus	504	2.71	0.34	70.49
Malta	502	2.95	0.52	65.76
<i>North/Western EU member states</i>				
Germany	1535	2.56	0.53	74.10
Ireland	1017	2.85	0.52	71.56
Belgium	1007	2.74	0.45	59.69
France	1003	2.42	0.29	65.48
Luxembourg	513	3.18	0.70	48.53
Netherlands	1033	2.91	0.50	71.10
Austria	1004	2.70	0.49	72.88

Belgium

Table 15: Coefficient results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Belgium.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	1.269** (0.103)	1.239** (0.104)	1.254** (0.115)	1.267** (0.120)	1.261** (0.113)
Age		0.503** (0.157)	0.535** (0.167)	0.502** (0.157)	0.503** (0.157)
Social class		0.272** (0.088)	0.272** (0.088)	0.287** (0.094)	0.272** (0.088)
Political radicalism		0.006 (0.224)	0.003 (0.224)	0.005 (0.224)	-0.030 (0.230)
Age*Satisfaction			-0.121 (0.223)		
Social class*Satisfaction				-0.058 (0.124)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					-0.157 (0.289)
Constant	-0.390** (0.076)	-1.398** (0.348)	-1.406** (0.349)	-1.436** (0.365)	-1.373** (0.349)
Additional Chi-square		19.846**	0.291	0.138	0.222
Chi-square model	213.447**	233.293**	233.583**	233.431**	233.515**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.260	0.281	0.281	0.281	0.281
Correctly classified observations	66.5%	68.1%	68.1%	68.1%	68.1%
N	987				

Odds results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Belgium.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	3.557** (0.103)	3.451** (0.104)	3.505** (0.115)	3.551** (0.120)	3.529** (0.113)
Age		1.654** (0.157)	1.707** (0.167)	1.652** (0.157)	1.655** (0.157)
Social class		1.312** (0.088)	1.312** (0.088)	1.332** (0.094)	1.312** (0.088)
Political radicalism		1.006 (0.224)	1.003 (0.224)	1.005 (0.224)	0.970 (0.230)
Age*Satisfaction			0.866 (0.223)		
Social class*Satisfaction				0.943 (0.124)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					0.855 (0.289)
Constant	-	-	-	-	-
Additional Chi-square		19.846**	0.291	0.138	0.222
Chi-square model	213.447**	233.293**	233.583**	233.431**	233.515**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.260	0.281	0.281	0.281	0.281
Correctly classified observations	66.5%	68.1%	68.1%	68.1%	68.1%
N	987				

Denmark

Table 16: Coefficient results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Denmark.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	1.531** (0.111)	1.586** (0.115)	1.568** (0.119)	1.571** (0.121)	1.509** (0.120)
Age		0.001 (0.171)	-0.274 (0.252)	-0.002 (0.171)	0.006 (0.171)
Social class		0.010 (0.079)	0.008 (0.079)	-0.023 (0.112)	0.005 (0.079)
Political radicalism		0.441 (0.229)	0.441 (0.229)	0.441 (0.228)	1.074* (0.433)
Age*Satisfaction			0.368 (0.252)		
Social class*Satisfaction				0.044 (0.109)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					0.715 (0.397)
Constant	-0.438** (0.110)	-0.824** (0.233)	-0.821** (0.233)	-0.811** (0.235)	-1.405** (0.416)
Additional Chi-square		3.674	2.210	0.144	3.570
Chi-square model	271.747**	275.421**	277.631**	275.565**	278.991**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.334	0.338	0.340	0.338	0.342
Correctly classified observations	75.3%	76.0%	76.0%	76.0%	76.0%
N	982				

Odds results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Denmark.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	4.622** (0.111)	4.884** (0.115)	4.799** (0.119)	4.811** (0.121)	4.522** (0.120)
Age		1.001 (0.171)	0.760 (0.252)	0.998 (0.171)	1.006 (0.171)
Social class		1.009 (0.079)	1.008 (0.079)	0.977 (0.112)	1.005 (0.079)
Political radicalism		1.554* (0.229)	1.555 (0.229)	1.554 (0.228)	2.928* (0.433)
Age*Satisfaction			1.445 (0.252)		
Social class*Satisfaction				1.045 (0.109)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					2.045 (0.397)
Constant	-	-	-	-	-
Additional Chi-square		3.674	2.210	0.144	3.570
Chi-square model	271.747**	275.421**	277.631**	275.565**	278.991**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.334	0.338	0.340	0.338	0.342
Correctly classified observations	75.3%	76.0%	76.0%	76.0%	76.0%
N	982				

Germany

Table 17: Coefficient results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Germany.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	1.346** (0.081)	1.310** (0.083)	1.373** (0.089)	1.378** (0.084)	1.316** (0.086)
Age		0.324* (0.133)	0.322* (0.130)	0.323* (0.133)	0.328* (0.133)
Social class		0.353** (0.067)	0.355** (0.067)	0.352** (0.067)	0.358** (0.067)
Political radicalism		0.478* (0.221)	0.486* (0.223)	0.480* (0.223)	0.501* (0.223)
Age*Satisfaction			-0.487* (0.168)		
Social class*Satisfaction				-0.042 (0.088)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					0.883* (0.378)
Constant	0.227** (0.061)	-1.324** (0.282)	-1.319** (0.285)	-1.324** (0.283)	-1.368** (0.305)
Additional Chi-square		40.419**	8.142*	0.199	7.139**
Chi-square model	384.607**	425.026**	433.167**	425.224**	432.165**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.314	0.345	0.350	0.350	0.350
Correctly classified observations	73.3%	73.7%	73.3%	73.4%	73.7%
N	1429				

Odds results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Germany.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	3.842** (0.082)	3.706** (0.083)	3.966** (0.089)	3.729** (0.084)	3.467** (0.086)
Age		1.382* (0.133)	1.380* (0.130)	1.381* (0.133)	1.388* (0.133)
Social class		1.424** (0.067)	1.426** (0.067)	1.423** (0.067)	1.431** (0.067)
Political radicalism		1.613* (0.218)	1.626* (0.219)	1.616* (0.217)	1.650* (0.247)
Age*Satisfaction			0.615* (0.168)		
Social class*Satisfaction				0.959 (0.088)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					2.419* (0.378)
Constant	-	-	-	-	-
Additional Chi-square		40.419**	8.142*	0.199	7.139**
Chi-square model	384.607**	425.026**	433.167**	425.224**	432.165**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.314	0.345	0.350	0.350	0.350
Correctly classified observations	73.3%	73.7%	73.3%	73.4%	73.7%
N	1429				

Greece

Table 18: Coefficient results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Greece.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	1.908** (0.148)	1.914** (0.151)	1.969** (0.161)	1.973** (0.152)	1.771** (0.154)
Age		0.014 (0.116)	-0.113 (0.120)	0.015 (0.116)	0.029 (0.116)
Social class		0.308** (0.118)	0.340** (0.121)	0.300* (0.123)	0.338** (0.121)
Political radicalism		-1.057** (0.348)	-1.151** (0.316)	-1.057** (0.348)	-1.066** (0.344)
Age*Satisfaction			0.552** (0.161)		
Social class*Satisfaction				0.037 (0.169)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					1.778* (0.797)
Constant	-1.014** (0.105)	-0.819 (0.429)	-0.815 (0.430)	-0.802 (0.436)	-0.860 (0.518)
Additional Chi-square		14.681**	12.019**	0.048	7.888**
Chi-square model	308.073**	322.753**	334.773**	322.801**	330.642**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.465	0.483	0.497	0.483	0.492
Correctly classified observations	79.1%	82.1%	80.8%	80.8%	80.8%
N	795				

Odds results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Greece.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	6.739** (0.148)	6.780** (0.151)	7.165** (0.161)	6.800** (0.152)	5.879** (0.154)
Age		1.014 (0.116)	0.893 (0.120)	1.016 (0.116)	1.029 (0.116)
Social class		1.360** (0.118)	1.405** (0.121)	1.349* (0.123)	1.402** (0.121)
Political radicalism		0.348** (0.344)	0.316** (0.359)	0.348** (0.344)	0.344** (0.354)
Age*Satisfaction			1.736** (0.161)		
Social class*Satisfaction				1.038 (0.169)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					5.918* (0.797)
Constant	-	-	-	-	-
Additional Chi-square		14.681**	12.019**	0.048	7.888**
Chi-square model	308.073**	322.753**	334.773**	322.801**	330.642**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.465	0.483	0.497	0.483	0.492
Correctly classified observations	79.1%	82.1%	80.8%	80.8%	80.8%
N	795				

Spain

Table 19: Coefficient results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Spain.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	1.607** (0.130)	1.570** (0.130)	1.565** (0.133)	1.523** (0.130)	1.600** (0.145)
Age		0.570** (0.214)	0.539* (0.223)	0.565** (0.215)	0.566** (0.214)
Social class		0.228* (0.090)	0.241** (0.091)	0.245** (0.091)	0.229* (0.090)
Political radicalism		-0.370 (0.254)	-0.391 (0.255)	-0.377 (0.253)	-0.391 (0.252)
Age*Satisfaction			0.393** (0.132)		
Social class*Satisfaction				-0.203 (0.123)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					-0.160 (0.323)
Constant	-0.905** (0.093)	-1.236** (0.325)	-1.220** (0.324)	-1.278** (0.330)	-1.220** (0.323)
Additional Chi-square		12.531*	8.994**	2.754	0.237
Chi-square model	238.976**	251.500**	260.501**	254.261**	251.745**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.362	0.378	0.390	0.382	0.379
Correctly classified observations	78.5%	79.8%	80.3%	79.6%	80.3%
N	846				

Odds results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Spain.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	4.989** (0.130)	4.806** (0.130)	4.783** (0.133)	4.586** (0.130)	4.954** (0.145)
Age		1.768** (0.214)	1.715* (0.223)	1.760** (0.215)	1.761** (0.214)
Social class		1.242* (0.090)	1.260** (0.091)	1.260** (0.091)	1.260* (0.090)
Political radicalism		0.691 (0.254)	0.676 (0.255)	0.686 (0.253)	0.677 (0.252)
Age*Satisfaction			1.481** (0.132)		
Social class*Satisfaction				0.816 (0.123)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					0.852 (0.323)
Constant	-	-	-	-	-
Additional Chi-square		12.531*	8.994**	2.754	0.237
Chi-square model	238.976**	251.500**	260.501**	254.261**	251.745**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.362	0.378	0.390	0.382	0.379
Correctly classified observations	78.5%	79.8%	80.3%	79.6%	80.3%
N	846				

France

Table 20: Coefficient results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of France.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	1.507** (0.120)	1.488** (0.124)	1.484** (0.124)	1.509** (0.128)	1.508** (0.132)
Age		0.160 (0.183)	0.181 (0.190)	0.159 (0.184)	0.157 (0.184)
Social class		0.312** (0.084)	0.314** (0.084)	0.335** (0.089)	0.312** (0.084)
Political radicalism		0.863** (0.283)	0.857** (0.284)	0.869** (0.284)	0.824** (0.289)
Age*Satisfaction			0.089 (0.125)		
Social class*Satisfaction				-0.110 (0.127)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					-0.164 (0.370)
Constant	-0.641** (0.083)	-2.379** (0.358)	-2.386** (0.358)	-2.451** (0.372)	-2.346** (0.364)
Additional Chi-square		28.800**	0.551	0.766	0.190
Chi-square model	249.974**	278.773**	279.285**	279.539**	278.963**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.335	0.368	0.368	0.369	0.368
Correctly classified observations	70.1%	74.1%	74.1%	74.1%	74.1%
N	984				

Odds results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of France.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	4.513** (0.120)	4.428** (0.124)	4.409** (0.124)	4.524** (0.128)	4.516** (0.132)
Age		1.173 (0.183)	1.198 (0.190)	1.173 (0.184)	1.170 (0.184)
Social class		1.366** (0.084)	1.369** (0.084)	1.397** (0.089)	1.366** (0.084)
Political radicalism		2.371** (0.283)	2.355** (0.284)	2.386** (0.284)	2.279** (0.291)
Age*Satisfaction			1.093 (0.125)		
Social class*Satisfaction				0.896 (0.127)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					0.849 (0.370)
Constant	-	-	-	-	-
Additional Chi-square		28.800**	0.551	0.766	0.190
Chi-square model	249.974**	278.773**	279.285**	279.539**	278.963**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.335	0.368	0.368	0.369	0.368
Correctly classified observations	70.1%	74.1%	74.1%	74.1%	74.1%
N	984				

Ireland

Table 21: Coefficient results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Ireland.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	1.364** (0.102)	1.326** (0.106)	1.297** (0.108)	1.329** (0.107)	1.305** (0.109)
Age		0.459** (0.174)	0.410** (0.198)	0.457** (0.174)	0.453** (0.174)
Social class		0.397** (0.077)	0.400** (0.077)	0.405** (0.087)	0.397** (0.077)
Political radicalism		0.340 (0.280)	0.354 (0.280)	0.340 (0.281)	0.428 (0.322)
Age*Satisfaction			0.128 (0.246)		
Social class*Satisfaction				-0.022 (0.108)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					0.275 (0.420)
Constant	-0.307** (0.080)	-1.865** (0.334)	-1.867** (0.334)	-1.889** (0.353)	-1.941** (0.365)
Additional Chi-square		39.322**	0.278	0.045	0.446
Chi-square model	271.395**	310.717**	310.995**	310.762**	311.163**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.319	0.355	0.356	0.355	0.355
Correctly classified observations	71.9%	73.8%	73.8%	73.8%	73.8%
N	993				

Odds results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Ireland.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	3.911** (0.102)	3.764** (0.106)	3.657** (0.108)	3.779** (0.107)	3.688** (0.109)
Age		1.582** (0.174)	1.507** (0.198)	1.580** (0.174)	1.573** (0.174)
Social class		1.487** (0.077)	1.492** (0.077)	1.499** (0.087)	1.487** (0.077)
Political radicalism		1.405 (0.280)	1.425 (0.280)	1.404 (0.280)	1.534 (0.280)
Age*Satisfaction			1.137 (0.246)		
Social class*Satisfaction				0.978 (0.108)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					1.317 (0.420)
Constant	-	-	-	-	-
Additional Chi-square		39.322**	0.278	0.045	0.446
Chi-square model	271.395**	310.717**	310.995**	310.762**	311.163**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.319	0.355	0.356	0.355	0.355
Correctly classified observations	71.9%	73.8%	73.8%	73.8%	73.8%
N	993				

Italy

Table 22: Coefficient results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Italy.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	1.182** (0.095)	1.157** (0.096)	1.158** (0.096)	1.120** (0.097)	1.207** (0.107)
Age		-0.078 (0.176)	-0.066 (0.173)	-0.059 (0.176)	-0.075 (0.175)
Social class		0.187* (0.090)	0.187* (0.090)	0.193* (0.089)	0.181* (0.090)
Political radicalism		-0.150 (0.250)	-0.153 (0.250)	-0.182 (0.250)	-0.116 (0.242)
Age*Satisfaction			-0.248 (0.216)		
Social class*Satisfaction				0.314** (0.107)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					-0.289 (0.245)
Constant	-0.264** (0.073)	-0.658 (0.354)	-0.651 (0.354)	-0.683* (0.344)	-0.683* (0.344)
Additional Chi-square		5.315	0.168	8.264**	1.315
Chi-square model	208.897**	214.212**	214.380**	222.476**	215.528**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.261	0.273	0.273	0.273	0.273
Correctly classified observations	71.1%	70.9%	70.9%	71.3%	70.8%
N	965				

Odds results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Italy.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	3.261** (0.095)	3.179** (0.096)	3.185** (0.096)	3.065** (0.097)	3.342** (0.107)
Age		0.925 (0.176)	0.936 (0.173)	0.943 (0.176)	0.927 (0.175)
Social class		1.205* (0.090)	1.205* (0.090)	1.212* (0.089)	1.199* (0.090)
Political radicalism		0.861 (0.250)	0.858 (0.250)	0.834 (0.250)	0.891 (0.248)
Age*Satisfaction			0.780 (0.216)		
Social class*Satisfaction				1.369** (0.107)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					0.749 (0.245)
Constant	-	-	-	-	-
Additional Chi-square		5.315	0.168	8.264**	1.315
Chi-square model	208.897**	214.212**	214.380**	222.476**	215.528**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.261	0.273	0.273	0.273	0.273
Correctly classified observations	71.1%	70.9%	70.9%	71.3%	70.8%
N	965				

Luxembourg

Table 23: Coefficient results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Luxembourg.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	1.339** (0.182)	1.370** (0.188)	1.437** (0.197)	1.329** (0.189)	1.317** (0.196)
Age		0.385 (0.349)	-0.143 (0.509)	0.392 (0.351)	0.394 (0.351)
Social class		0.149 (0.154)	0.169 (0.155)	0.026 (0.162)	0.150 (0.154)
Political radicalism		-0.102 (0.465)	-0.039 (0.475)	-0.160 (0.478)	0.162 (0.618)
Age*Satisfaction			0.897 (0.187)		
Social class*Satisfaction				0.321 (0.185)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					0.505 (0.680)
Constant	0.026 (0.153)	-0.519 (0.678)	-0.494 (0.684)	-0.173 (0.688)	-0.788 (0.691)
Additional Chi-square		2.121	2.715	3.028	0.691
Chi-square model	79.326**	81.447**	84.162**	84.475**	82.138**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.291	0.297	0.313	0.306	0.299
Correctly classified observations	74.0%	74.0%	73.4%	74.0%	74.0%
N	335				

Odds results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Luxembourg.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	3.814** (0.182)	3.934** (0.188)	4.209** (0.197)	3.778** (0.189)	3.730** (0.196)
Age		1.470 (0.349)	0.867 (0.509)	1.480 (0.351)	1.482 (0.351)
Social class		1.151 (0.154)	1.184 (0.155)	1.027 (0.162)	1.161 (0.154)
Political radicalism		0.903 (0.465)	0.962 (0.475)	0.852 (0.478)	1.175 (0.618)
Age*Satisfaction			1.520* (0.187)		
Social class*Satisfaction				1.379 (0.185)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					1.658 (0.680)
Constant	-	-	-	-	-
Additional Chi-square		2.121	2.715	3.028	0.691
Chi-square model	79.326**	81.447**	84.162**	84.475**	82.138**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.291	0.297	0.313	0.306	0.299
Correctly classified observations	74.0%	74.0%	73.4%	74.0%	74.0%
N	335				

The Netherlands

Table 24: Coefficient results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of the Netherlands.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	0.957** (0.090)	0.950** (0.093)	1.027** (0.114)	0.889** (0.108)	0.916** (0.097)
Age		-0.130 (0.143)	-0.087 (0.162)	-0.121 (0.144)	-0.132 (0.143)
Social class		0.372** (0.079)	0.362** (0.079)	0.339** (0.083)	0.374** (0.079)
Political radicalism		0.057 (0.227)	0.059 (0.227)	0.049 (0.227)	0.124 (0.244)
Age*Satisfaction			-0.107 (0.189)		
Social class*Satisfaction				0.106 (0.101)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					0.346 (0.330)
Constant	-0.300** (0.073)	-1.531** (0.344)	-1.530** (0.344)	-1.421** (0.355)	-1.594** (0.355)
Additional Chi-square		23.727**	1.641	1.081	1.196
Chi-square model	139.558**	163.285**	164.926**	164.366**	164.481**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.168	0.204	0.205	0.205	0.205
Correctly classified observations	63.5%	63.5%	63.5%	63.7%	63.9%
N	1034				

Odds results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of the Netherlands.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	2.604** (0.090)	2.585** (0.093)	2.794** (0.114)	2.433** (0.108)	2.499** (0.097)
Age		0.878 (0.143)	0.917 (0.162)	0.886 (0.144)	0.877 (0.143)
Social class		1.450** (0.079)	1.436** (0.079)	1.404** (0.083)	1.453** (0.079)
Political radicalism		1.058 (0.227)	1.061 (0.227)	1.050 (0.227)	1.132 (0.244)
Age*Satisfaction			0.899 (0.189)		
Social class*Satisfaction				1.112 (0.101)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					1.413 (0.330)
Constant	-	-	-	-	-
Additional Chi-square		23.727**	1.641	1.081	1.196
Chi-square model	139.558**	163.285**	164.926**	164.366**	164.481**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.168	0.204	0.205	0.205	0.205
Correctly classified observations	63.5%	63.5%	63.5%	63.7%	63.9%
N	1034				

Portugal

Table 25: Coefficient results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Portugal.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	2.006** (0.152)	1.877** (0.154)	1.892** (0.159)	1.852** (0.193)	2.077** (0.176)
Age		-0.284 (0.191)	-0.291 (0.189)	-0.281 (0.192)	-0.259 (0.193)
Social class		-0.132 (0.097)	-0.131 (0.097)	-0.132 (0.096)	-0.107 (0.098)
Political radicalism		1.181** (0.247)	1.181** (0.248)	1.177** (0.248)	1.268** (0.237)
Age*Satisfaction			-0.373 (0.321)		
Social class*Satisfaction				-0.032 (0.153)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					-1.064** (0.369)
Constant	0.551** (0.085)	-0.537* (0.229)	-0.539* (0.230)	-0.535* (0.229)	-0.606** (0.217)
Additional Chi-square		27.866**	0.158	0.044	7.564**
Chi-square model	245.329**	273.195**	273.353**	273.239**	280.759**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.351	0.388	0.388	0.388	0.388
Correctly classified observations	78.7%	78.2%	78.2%	78.2%	79.3%
N	830				

Odds results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Portugal.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	7.431** (0.152)	6.532** (0.154)	6.629** (0.159)	6.373** (0.193)	7.981** (0.176)
Age		0.747 (0.191)	0.753 (0.189)	0.755 (0.192)	0.772 (0.193)
Social class		0.876 (0.097)	0.877 (0.097)	0.876 (0.096)	0.898 (0.098)
Political radicalism		3.257** (0.247)	3.259** (0.248)	3.244** (0.248)	3.554** (0.237)
Age*Satisfaction			0.688 (0.321)		
Social class*Satisfaction				0.968 (0.153)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					0.345** (0.369)
Constant	-	-	-	-	-
Additional Chi-square		27.866**	0.158	0.044	7.564**
Chi-square model	245.329**	273.195**	273.353**	273.239**	280.759**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.351	0.388	0.388	0.388	0.388
Correctly classified observations	78.7%	78.2%	78.2%	78.2%	79.3%
N	830				

Austria

Table 26: Coefficient results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Austria.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	0.796** (0.085)	0.792** (0.085)	0.790** (0.085)	0.789** (0.085)	0.849** (0.095)
Age		0.283 (0.182)	0.233 (0.191)	0.283 (0.182)	0.282 (0.183)
Social class		-0.118 (0.087)	-0.120 (0.087)	-0.123 (0.087)	-0.119 (0.087)
Political radicalism		-0.248 (0.211)	-0.246 (0.211)	-0.248 (0.211)	-0.330 (0.213)
Age*Satisfaction			0.262 (0.218)		
Social class*Satisfaction				0.045 (0.094)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					-0.304 (0.211)
Constant	-0.125 (0.076)	0.345 (0.319)	0.361 (0.319)	0.359 (0.318)	0.420 (0.319)
Additional Chi-square		5.653	1.498	0.236	0.420
Chi-square model	103.987**	109.640**	111.138**	109.876**	111.566**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.157	0.163	0.164	0.164	0.164
Correctly classified observations	66.1%	65.8%	64.9%	65.9%	65.8%
N	828				

Odds results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Austria.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	2.217** (0.085)	2.208** (0.085)	2.204** (0.085)	2.202** (0.085)	2.338** (0.095)
Age		1.327 (0.182)	1.263 (0.191)	1.327 (0.182)	1.326 (0.183)
Social class		0.889 (0.087)	0.887 (0.087)	0.884 (0.087)	0.888 (0.087)
Political radicalism		0.780 (0.211)	0.782 (0.211)	0.781 (0.211)	0.719 (0.213)
Age*Satisfaction			1.299 (0.218)		
Social class*Satisfaction				1.046 (0.094)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					0.738 (0.211)
Constant	-	-	-	-	-
Additional Chi-square		5.653	1.498	0.236	0.420
Chi-square model	103.987**	109.640**	111.138**	109.876**	111.566**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.157	0.163	0.164	0.164	0.164
Correctly classified observations	66.1%	65.8%	64.9%	65.9%	65.8%
N	828				

Sweden

Table 27: Coefficient results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Sweden.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	1.108** (0.089)	1.182** (0.094)	1.175** (0.094)	1.151** (0.096)	1.136** (0.103)
Age		-0.362* (0.167)	-0.345 (0.178)	-0.369* (0.167)	-0.356* (0.167)
Social class		0.281** (0.075)	0.280** (0.075)	0.261** (0.076)	0.285** (0.075)
Political radicalism		0.557** (0.179)	0.563** (0.180)	0.545** (0.179)	0.606** (0.191)
Age*Satisfaction			-0.064 (0.245)		
Social class*Satisfaction				0.105 (0.089)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					0.236 (0.242)
Constant	-0.076 (0.070)	-1.254** (0.268)	-1.256** (0.245)	-1.174** (0.270)	-1.320** (0.278)
Additional Chi-square		35.995**	0.294	1.373	1.000
Chi-square model	204.609**	239.861**	240.155**	241.234**	240.861**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.239	0.281	0.202	0.202	0.202
Correctly classified observations	69.3%	69.9%	69.6%	69.6%	69.9%
N	1034				

Odds results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Sweden.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	3.029** (0.089)	3.259** (0.094)	3.239** (0.094)	3.161** (0.096)	3.115** (0.103)
Age		0.696* (0.167)	0.708 (0.178)	0.692* (0.167)	0.700* (0.167)
Social class		1.324** (0.075)	1.323** (0.075)	1.299** (0.076)	1.329** (0.075)
Political radicalism		1.745** (0.179)	1.756** (0.180)	1.724** (0.179)	1.833** (0.191)
Age*Satisfaction			0.938 (0.245)		
Social class*Satisfaction				1.111 (0.089)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					1.267 (0.175)
Constant	-	-	-	-	-
Additional Chi-square		35.995**	0.294	1.373	1.000
Chi-square model	204.609**	239.861**	240.155**	241.234**	240.861**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.239	0.281	0.202	0.202	0.202
Correctly classified observations	69.3%	69.9%	69.6%	69.6%	69.9%
N	1034				

Finland

Table 28: Coefficient results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Finland.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	2.210** (0.151)	2.252** (0.153)	2.277** (0.166)	2.245** (0.153)	2.192** (0.168)
Age		-0.467** (0.182)	-0.399 (0.215)	-0.470** (0.183)	-0.462* (0.182)
Social class		0.032 (0.080)	0.032 (0.080)	-0.036 (0.089)	0.036 (0.080)
Political radicalism		0.176 (0.222)	0.178 (0.222)	0.145 (0.224)	0.273 (0.263)
Age*Satisfaction			-0.183 (0.315)		
Social class*Satisfaction				0.223 (0.138)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					0.301 (0.398)
Constant	-0.368** (0.094)	-0.462** (0.210)	-0.466** (0.210)	-0.431** (0.211)	-0.541** (0.242)
Additional Chi-square		9.810*	0.169	2.575	0.607
Chi-square model	459.499**	470.590**	470.759**	473.164**	471.197**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.495	0.503	0.503	0.505	0.504
Correctly classified observations	79.3%	79.3%	79.3%	79.3%	79.3%
N	997				

Odds results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Finland.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	9.111** (0.151)	9.505** (0.153)	9.750** (0.166)	9.438** (0.153)	8.953** (0.168)
Age		0.627** (0.182)	0.671 (0.215)	0.625** (0.183)	0.630* (0.182)
Social class		1.033 (0.080)	1.033 (0.080)	0.965 (0.089)	1.037 (0.080)
Political radicalism		1.192 (0.222)	1.195 (0.222)	1.156 (0.224)	1.314 (0.263)
Age*Satisfaction			0.833 (0.315)		
Social class*Satisfaction				1.250 (0.138)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					1.351 (0.398)
Constant	-	-	-	-	-
Additional Chi-square		9.810*	0.169	2.575	0.607
Chi-square model	459.499**	470.590**	470.759**	473.164**	471.197**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.495	0.503	0.503	0.505	0.504
Correctly classified observations	79.3%	79.3%	79.3%	79.3%	79.3%
N	997				

Cyprus

Table 29: Coefficient results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Cyprus.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	1.048** (0.153)	0.977** (0.157)	1.048** (0.177)	0.953** (0.160)	0.766** (0.190)
Age		0.460 (0.270)	0.542 (0.304)	0.472 (0.271)	0.505 (0.273)
Social class		0.184 (0.127)	0.193 (0.127)	0.221 (0.141)	0.173 (0.128)
Political radicalism		-0.849** (0.275)	-0.822** (0.276)	-0.858** (0.276)	-0.621* (0.313)
Age*Satisfaction			-0.189 (0.330)		
Social class*Satisfaction				-0.092 (0.146)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					0.587 (0.345)
Constant	-0.710** (0.142)	-0.778* (0.379)	-0.821* (0.388)	-0.865* (0.411)	-0.913* (0.402)
Additional Chi-square		14.367**	1.142	0.400	3.048
Chi-square model	61.030**	75.397**	76.539**	75.797**	78.481**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.240	0.290	0.294	0.291	0.300
Correctly classified observations	68.3%	69.9%	69.9%	69.6%	70.5%
N	312				

Odds results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Cyprus.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	2.851** (0.153)	2.657** (0.157)	2.853** (0.177)	2.594** (0.160)	2.151** (0.190)
Age		1.583 (0.270)	1.719 (0.304)	1.603 (0.271)	1.657 (0.273)
Social class		1.202 (0.127)	1.213 (0.127)	1.247 (0.141)	1.189 (0.128)
Political radicalism		0.428** (0.275)	0.439** (0.276)	0.424** (0.276)	0.537* (0.313)
Age*Satisfaction			0.828 (0.330)		
Social class*Satisfaction				0.912 (0.146)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					1.798 (0.345)
Constant	-	-	-	-	-
Additional Chi-square		14.367**	1.142	0.400	3.048
Chi-square model	61.030**	75.397**	76.539**	75.797**	78.481**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.240	0.290	0.294	0.291	0.300
Correctly classified observations	68.3%	69.9%	69.9%	69.6%	70.5%
N	312				

Czech Republic

Table 30: Coefficient results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Czech Republic.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	1.599** (0.111)	1.597** (0.113)	1.572** (0.114)	1.592** (0.116)	1.582** (0.121)
Age		0.271 (0.190)	0.122 (0.216)	0.271 (0.190)	0.271 (0.190)
Social class		-0.062 (0.099)	-0.065 (0.100)	-0.063 (0.100)	-0.061 (0.100)
Political radicalism		0.468 (0.254)	0.487 (0.257)	0.467 (0.254)	0.500 (0.277)
Age*Satisfaction			0.715* (0.316)		
Social class*Satisfaction				0.021 (0.125)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					0.113 (0.344)
Constant	-0.760** (0.082)	-1.015** (0.389)	-1.011** (0.391)	-1.012** (0.388)	-1.052** (0.406)
Additional Chi-square		6.993	4.518*	0.028	0.111
Chi-square model	335.594**	342.962**	347.480**	342.990**	343.073**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.388	0.395	0.400	0.396	0.396
Correctly classified observations	75.8%	77.3%	77.3%	77.3%	76.8%
N	1063				

Odds results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Czech Republic.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	4.949** (0.111)	4.938** (0.113)	4.818** (0.114)	4.916** (0.116)	4.866** (0.121)
Age		1.311 (0.190)	1.130 (0.216)	1.311 (0.190)	1.311 (0.190)
Social class		0.940 (0.099)	0.937 (0.100)	0.939 (0.100)	0.941 (0.100)
Political radicalism		1.596 (0.254)	1.628 (0.257)	1.595 (0.254)	1.649 (0.277)
Age*Satisfaction			2.045* (0.316)		
Social class*Satisfaction				1.021 (0.125)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					1.119 (0.344)
Constant	-	-	-	-	-
Additional Chi-square		6.993	4.518*	0.028	0.111
Chi-square model	335.594**	342.962**	347.480**	342.990**	343.073**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.388	0.395	0.400	0.396	0.396
Correctly classified observations	75.8%	77.3%	77.3%	77.3%	76.8%
N	1063				

Estonia

Table 31: Coefficient results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Estonia.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	1.052** (0.098)	1.045** (0.099)	1.047** (0.099)	1.059** (0.101)	1.065** (0.108)
Age		0.232 (0.158)	0.237 (0.158)	0.242 (0.159)	0.231 (0.158)
Social class		0.391** (0.077)	0.387** (0.077)	0.396** (0.078)	0.389** (0.077)
Political radicalism		0.304 (0.211)	0.305 (0.211)	0.315 (0.212)	0.308 (0.209)
Age*Satisfaction			-0.090 (0.237)		
Social class*Satisfaction				-0.116 (0.114)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					-0.131 (0.272)
Constant	-0.029 (0.067)	-1.442** (0.298)	-1.448** (0.299)	-1.476** (0.303)	-1.442** (0.296)
Additional Chi-square		28.721**	1.334	1.055	0.228
Chi-square model	141.542**	170.262**	171.596**	171.317**	170.490**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.173	0.206	0.207	0.207	0.206
Correctly classified observations	66.6%	67.1%	67.1%	66.6%	67.1%
N	1016				

Odds results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Estonia.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	2.862** (0.098)	2.844** (0.099)	2.849** (0.099)	2.882** (0.101)	2.901** (0.108)
Age		1.261 (0.158)	1.267 (0.158)	1.273 (0.159)	1.260 (0.158)
Social class		1.478** (0.077)	1.473** (0.077)	1.485** (0.078)	1.476** (0.077)
Political radicalism		1.355 (0.211)	1.356 (0.211)	1.370 (0.212)	1.361 (0.209)
Age*Satisfaction			0.914 (0.237)		
Social class*Satisfaction				0.890 (0.114)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					0.877 (0.272)
Constant	-	-	-	-	-
Additional Chi-square		28.721**	1.334	1.055	0.228
Chi-square model	141.542**	170.262**	171.596**	171.317**	170.490**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.173	0.206	0.207	0.207	0.206
Correctly classified observations	66.6%	67.1%	67.1%	66.6%	67.1%
N	1016				

Hungary

Table 32: Coefficient results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Hungary.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	1.812** (0.120)	1.824** (0.121)	1.807** (0.122)	1.905** (0.136)	1.728** (0.131)
Age		0.104 (0.193)	0.105 (0.210)	0.096 (0.192)	0.109 (0.193)
Social class		0.073 (0.090)	0.078 (0.090)	0.032 (0.093)	0.071 (0.090)
Political radicalism		-0.101 (0.220)	-0.110 (0.221)	-0.095 (0.220)	-0.076 (0.264)
Age*Satisfaction			-0.003 (0.283)		
Social class*Satisfaction				0.190 (0.125)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					0.546 (0.353)
Constant	-0.405** (0.085)	-0.602 (0.309)	-0.602 (0.310)	-0.502 (0.309)	-0.761 (0.342)
Additional Chi-square		1.639	0.000	2.381	2.906
Chi-square model	418.259**	420.323**	420.323**	422.704**	423.229**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.468	0.469	0.469	0.471	0.472
Correctly classified observations	77.8%	77.9%	77.9%	77.9%	77.9%
N	970				

Odds results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Hungary.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	6.122** (0.120)	6.198** (0.121)	6.094** (0.122)	6.720** (0.136)	5.627** (0.131)
Age		1.110 (0.193)	1.111 (0.210)	1.101 (0.192)	1.115 (0.193)
Social class		1.075 (0.090)	1.081 (0.090)	1.032 (0.093)	1.074 (0.090)
Political radicalism		0.904 (0.220)	0.896 (0.221)	0.909 (0.220)	1.079 (0.264)
Age*Satisfaction			0.997 (0.283)		
Social class*Satisfaction				1.210 (0.125)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					1.727 (0.353)
Constant	-	-	-	-	-
Additional Chi-square		1.639	0.000	2.381	2.906
Chi-square model	418.259**	420.323**	420.323**	422.704**	423.229**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.468	0.469	0.469	0.471	0.472
Correctly classified observations	77.8%	77.9%	77.9%	77.9%	77.9%
N	970				

Latvia

Table 33: Coefficient results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Latvia.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	1.428** (0.115)	1.432** (0.117)	1.433** (0.118)	1.439** (0.118)	1.503** (0.129)
Age		0.739** (0.232)	0.732** (0.237)	0.750** (0.232)	0.724** (0.233)
Social class		0.361** (0.096)	0.360** (0.097)	0.370** (0.097)	0.359** (0.096)
Political radicalism		0.134 (0.309)	0.137 (0.311)	0.134 (0.310)	0.212 (0.298)
Age*Satisfaction			-0.042 (0.296)		
Social class*Satisfaction				0.115 (0.120)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					-0.465 (0.306)
Constant	-0.769** (0.089)	-1.905** (0.381)	-1.905** (0.381)	-1.930** (0.380)	-1.974** (0.374)
Additional Chi-square		19.256**	0.009	0.909	2.146
Chi-square model	215.749**	235.005**	235.014**	235.914**	237.151**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.310	0.335	0.335	0.336	0.337
Correctly classified observations	79.1%	80.0%	80.0%	80.4%	80.1%
N	948				

Odds results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Latvia.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	4.171** (0.115)	4.185** (0.117)	4.189** (0.118)	4.218** (0.118)	4.494** (0.129)
Age		2.095** (0.232)	2.080** (0.237)	2.117** (0.232)	2.063** (0.233)
Social class		1.434** (0.096)	1.433** (0.097)	1.448** (0.097)	1.432** (0.096)
Political radicalism		1.143 (0.309)	1.147 (0.311)	1.144 (0.310)	1.237 (0.298)
Age*Satisfaction			0.959 (0.296)		
Social class*Satisfaction				1.122 (0.120)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					0.628 (0.306)
Constant	-	-	-	-	-
Additional Chi-square		19.256**	0.009	0.909	2.146
Chi-square model	215.749**	235.005**	235.014**	235.914**	237.151**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.310	0.335	0.335	0.336	0.337
Correctly classified observations	79.1%	80.0%	80.0%	80.4%	80.1%
N	948				

Lithuania

Table 34: Coefficient results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Lithuania.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	1.563** (0.112)	1.562** (0.113)	1.584** (0.116)	1.563** (0.113)	1.577** (0.128)
Age		0.207 (0.181)	0.240 (0.182)	0.208 (0.181)	0.210 (0.181)
Social class		0.112 (0.091)	0.111 (0.091)	0.102 (0.091)	0.112 (0.091)
Political radicalism		-0.327 (0.210)	-0.313 (0.210)	-0.325 (0.210)	-0.333 (0.209)
Age*Satisfaction			-0.233 (0.275)		
Social class*Satisfaction				0.125 (0.122)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					-0.069 (0.271)
Constant	-0.312** (0.076)	-0.468 (0.324)	-0.465 (0.325)	-0.441 (0.320)	-0.463 (0.323)
Additional Chi-square		5.584	2.060	1.022	0.064
Chi-square model	308.694**	314.277**	316.337**	315.299**	314.341**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.359	0.364	0.366	0.365	0.365
Correctly classified observations	74.4%	74.4%	74.4%	74.3%	74.4%
N	994				

Odds results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Lithuania.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	1.4.773** (0.112)	4.767** (0.113)	4.874** (0.116)	4.775** (0.113)	4.838** (0.128)
Age		1.230 (0.181)	1.271 (0.182)	1.231 (0.181)	1.233 (0.181)
Social class		1.119 (0.091)	1.118 (0.091)	1.107 (0.091)	1.119 (0.091)
Political radicalism		0.721 (0.210)	0.732 (0.210)	0.722 (0.210)	0.716 (0.209)
Age*Satisfaction			0.792 (0.275)		
Social class*Satisfaction				1.133 (0.122)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					0.933 (0.271)
Constant	-	-	-	-	-
Additional Chi-square		5.584	2.060	1.022	0.064
Chi-square model	308.694**	314.277**	316.337**	315.299**	314.341**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.359	0.364	0.366	0.365	0.365
Correctly classified observations	74.4%	74.4%	74.4%	74.3%	74.4%
N	994				

Malta

Table 35: Coefficient results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Malta.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	1.508** (0.172)	1.525** (0.173)	1.485** (0.175)	1.563** (0.184)	1.351** (0.183)
Age		0.145 (0.274)	-0.013 (0.313)	0.146 (0.275)	0.183 (0.277)
Social class		0.005 (0.162)	0.001 (0.162)	0.093 (0.211)	0.031 (0.162)
Political radicalism		-0.417 (0.356)	-0.473 (0.364)	-0.398 (0.358)	-0.055 (0.471)
Age*Satisfaction			0.472 (0.400)		
Social class*Satisfaction				-0.161 (0.238)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					1.325 (0.697)
Constant	-0.472** (0.142)	-0.174 (0.575)	-0.095 (0.577)	-0.443 (0.719)	-0.536 (0.658)
Additional Chi-square		2.021	1.169	0.473	5.448*
Chi-square model	116.242**	118.264**	119.432**	118.736**	123.711**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.365	0.370	0.373	0.371	0.384
Correctly classified observations	75.3%	75.0%	74.5%	75.5%	74.7%
N	364				

Odds results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Malta.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	4.519** (0.172)	4.596** (0.173)	4.416** (0.175)	4.771** (0.184)	3.861** (0.183)
Age		1.156 (0.274)	0.987 (0.313)	1.158 (0.275)	1.201 (0.277)
Social class		1.005 (0.162)	1.001 (0.162)	1.098 (0.211)	1.032 (0.162)
Political radicalism		0.659 (0.356)	0.623 (0.364)	0.671 (0.358)	0.946 (0.471)
Age*Satisfaction			1.604 (0.400)		
Social class*Satisfaction				0.852 (0.238)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					3.762 (0.697)
Constant	-	-	-	-	-
Additional Chi-square		2.021	1.169	0.473	5.448*
Chi-square model	116.242**	118.264**	119.432**	118.736**	123.711**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.365	0.370	0.373	0.371	0.384
Correctly classified observations	75.3%	75.0%	74.5%	75.5%	74.7%
N	364				

Poland

Table 36: Coefficient results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Poland.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	1.472** (0.117)	1.412** (0.118)	1.408** (0.119)	1.391** (0.119)	1.390** (0.134)
Age		0.777** (0.208)	0.733** (0.223)	0.773** (0.209)	0.773** (0.209)
Social class		-0.054 (0.080)	-0.054 (0.080)	-0.035 (0.083)	-0.054 (0.080)
Political radicalism		-0.424 (0.225)	-0.419 (0.225)	-0.420 (0.226)	-0.398 (0.241)
Age*Satisfaction			0.188 (0.306)		
Social class*Satisfaction				-0.108 (0.111)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					0.095 (0.286)
Constant	-0.864** (0.085)	-0.399 (0.281)	-0.399 (0.280)	-0.451 (0.290)	-0.417 (0.289)
Additional Chi-square		32.382**	0.173	0.947	0.358
Chi-square model	241.812**	274.195**	274.367**	275.142**	274.307**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.321	0.358	0.359	0.359	0.358
Correctly classified observations	72.1%	75.5%	75.5%	75.5%	75.5%
N	926				

Odds results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Poland.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	4.358** (0.117)	4.102** (0.118)	4.087** (0.119)	4.021** (0.119)	4.014** (0.134)
Age		2.174** (0.208)	2.082** (0.223)	2.166** (0.209)	2.167** (0.209)
Social class		0.947 (0.080)	0.948 (0.080)	0.966 (0.083)	0.947 (0.080)
Political radicalism		0.654 (0.225)	0.658 (0.225)	0.657 (0.226)	0.672 (0.241)
Age*Satisfaction			1.207 (0.306)		
Social class*Satisfaction				0.898 (0.111)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					1.099 (0.286)
Constant	-	-	-	-	-
Additional Chi-square		32.382**	0.173	0.947	0.358
Chi-square model	241.812**	274.195**	274.367**	275.142**	274.307**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.321	0.358	0.359	0.359	0.358
Correctly classified observations	72.1%	75.5%	75.5%	75.5%	75.5%
N	926				

Slovakia

Table 37: Coefficient results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Slovakia.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	1.912** (0.150)	1.845** (0.150)	1.915** (0.159)	1.849** (0.150)	1.907** (0.169)
Age		-0.154 (0.239)	-0.158 (0.228)	-0.158 (0.240)	-0.149 (0.239)
Social class		0.362** (0.105)	0.356** (0.105)	0.361** (0.105)	0.362** (0.105)
Political radicalism		-0.304 (0.268)	-0.331 (0.269)	-0.303 (0.269)	-0.296 (0.261)
Age*Satisfaction			-0.904** (0.308)		
Social class*Satisfaction				-0.048 (0.157)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					-0.314 (0.363)
Constant	-0.791** (0.097)	-1.479** (0.381)	-1.455** (0.381)	-1.477** (0.382)	-1.490** (0.376)
Additional Chi-square		14.479**	8.022**	0.080	0.776
Chi-square model	281.912**	296.391**	304.414**	296.471**	297.167**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.415	0.434	0.438	0.434	0.434
Correctly classified observations	78.8%	82.5%	82.5%	82.5%	82.0%
N	879				

Odds results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Slovakia.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	6.767** (0.150)	6.330** (0.150)	6.789** (0.159)	6.356** (0.150)	6.732** (0.169)
Age		0.857 (0.239)	0.854 (0.228)	0.854 (0.240)	0.861 (0.239)
Social class		1.436** (0.105)	1.428** (0.105)	1.435** (0.105)	1.436** (0.105)
Political radicalism		0.738 (0.268)	0.718 (0.269)	0.739 (0.269)	0.744 (0.261)
Age*Satisfaction			0.405** (0.308)		
Social class*Satisfaction				0.954 (0.157)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					0.731 (0.363)
Constant	-	-	-	-	-
Additional Chi-square		14.479**	8.022**	0.080	0.776
Chi-square model	281.912**	296.391**	304.414**	296.471**	297.167**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.415	0.434	0.438	0.434	0.434
Correctly classified observations	78.8%	82.5%	82.5%	82.5%	82.0%
N	879				

Slovenia

Table 38: Coefficient results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Slovenia.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	1.717** (0.130)	1.712** (0.133)	1.697** (0.138)	1.722** (0.134)	1.533** (0.146)
Age		-0.158 (0.216)	-0.171 (0.226)	-0.155 (0.215)	-0.140 (0.218)
Social class		0.132 (0.107)	0.131 (0.107)	0.106 (0.107)	0.120 (0.107)
Political radicalism		-0.505* (0.237)	-0.505* (0.237)	-0.488* (0.238)	-0.488 (0.268)
Age*Satisfaction			0.057 (0.279)		
Social class*Satisfaction				0.176 (0.131)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					0.795* (0.364)
Constant	-0.869** (0.101)	-0.751* (0.368)	-0.747* (0.368)	-0.701 (0.360)	-0.825* (0.389)
Additional Chi-square		5.795	0.128	1.766	5.767*
Chi-square model	303.554**	309.350**	309.478**	311.115**	315.117**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.454	0.461	0.461	0.463	0.468
Correctly classified observations	80.0%	80.9%	81.1%	81.2%	81.3%
N	803				

Odds results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Slovenia.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	5.568** (0.130)	5.539** (0.133)	5.460** (0.138)	5.595** (0.134)	4.631** (0.146)
Age		0.854 (0.216)	0.843 (0.226)	0.856 (0.215)	0.869 (0.218)
Social class		1.141 (0.107)	1.140 (0.107)	1.112 (0.107)	1.127 (0.107)
Political radicalism		0.604* (0.237)	0.604* (0.237)	0.614* (0.238)	0.684 (0.268)
Age*Satisfaction			0.837 (0.279)		
Social class*Satisfaction				1.193 (0.131)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					2.215* (0.364)
Constant	-	-	-	-	-
Additional Chi-square		5.795	0.128	1.766	5.767*
Chi-square model	303.554**	309.350**	309.478**	311.115**	315.117**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.454	0.461	0.461	0.463	0.468
Correctly classified observations	80.0%	80.9%	81.1%	81.2%	81.3%
N	803				

Bulgaria

Table 39: Coefficient results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Slovenia.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	0.908 ** (0.106)	0.918** (0.107)	0.966** (0.112)	1.137** (0.140)	0.873** (0.123)
Age		-0.032 (0.205)	0.028 (0.204)	1.005 (0.205)	0.966 (0.205)
Social class		0.082 (0.083)	0.078 (0.083)	0.050 (0.085)	0.082 (0.083)
Political radicalism		-0.063 (0.212)	-0.046 (0.213)	-0.059 (0.214)	-0.045 (0.217)
Age*Satisfaction			-0.432 (0.235)		
Social class*Satisfaction				0.306** (0.109)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					0.186 (0.254)
Constant	-0.941** (0.085)	-1.128** (0.278)	-1.136** (0.279)	-1.086** (0.277)	-1.138** (0.281)
Additional Chi-square		3.555	4.804*	8.259**	0.553
Chi-square model	87.272**	91.105**	95.909**	99.364**	91.658**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.151	0.157	0.164	0.170	0.158
Correctly classified observations	71.0%	71.0%	71.6%	71.6%	71.0%
N	789				

Odds results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Slovenia.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	2.479 ** (0.106)	2.505** (0.107)	2.628** (0.112)	3.119** (0.140)	2.393** (0.123)
Age		0.968 (0.205)	1.028 (0.204)	0.005 (0.205)	-0.034 (0.205)
Social class		1.085 (0.083)	1.081 (0.083)	1.051 (0.085)	1.085 (0.083)
Political radicalism		0.939 (0.212)	0.955 (0.213)	0.943 (0.214)	0.956 (0.217)
Age*Satisfaction			0.649 (0.235)		
Social class*Satisfaction				1.358** (0.109)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					1.205 (0.254)
Constant	-	-	-	-	-
Additional Chi-square		3.555	4.804*	8.259**	0.553
Chi-square model	87.272**	91.105**	95.909**	99.364**	91.658**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.151	0.157	0.164	0.170	0.158
Correctly classified observations	71.0%	71.0%	71.6%	71.6%	71.0%
N	789				

Romania

Table 40: Coefficient results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Romania.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	0.871** (0.084)	0.860** (0.086)	0.859** (0.089)	0.891** (0.088)	0.777** (0.095)
Age		0.171 (0.217)	0.180 (0.233)	0.181 (0.219)	0.177 (0.218)
Social class		0.100 (0.082)	0.089 (0.082)	0.089 (0.084)	0.102 (0.082)
Political radicalism		-0.047 (0.184)	-0.055 (0.185)	-0.042 (0.184)	-0.055 (0.191)
Age*Satisfaction			0.597* (0.279)		
Social class*Satisfaction				-0.189* (0.096)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					0.416 (0.225)
Constant	-0.588** (0.074)	-0.882** (0.295)	-0.862** (0.296)	-0.836** (0.301)	-0.875** (0.299)
Additional Chi-square		2.032	5.284*	4.074*	3.718
Chi-square model	126.749**	128.781**	134.065**	132.856**	132.500**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.175	0.177	0.182	0.182	0.182
Correctly classified observations	68.8%	68.8%	69.0%	68.8%	69.4%
N	934				

Odds results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Romania.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	2.390 ** (0.084)	2.363** (0.086)	2.448** (0.089)	2.437** (0.088)	2.176** (0.095)
Age		1.186 (0.217)	1.197 (0.233)	1.199 (0.219)	1.193 (0.218)
Social class		1.105 (0.082)	1.093 (0.082)	1.093 (0.084)	1.107 (0.082)
Political radicalism		0.954 (0.184)	0.947 (0.185)	0.959 (0.184)	0.947 (0.191)
Age*Satisfaction			1.817* (0.279)		
Social class*Satisfaction				0.828* (0.096)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					1.517 (0.225)
Constant	-	-	-	-	-
Additional Chi-square		2.032	5.284*	4.074*	3.718
Chi-square model	126.749**	128.781**	134.065**	132.856**	132.500**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.175	0.177	0.182	0.182	0.182
Correctly classified observations	68.8%	68.8%	69.0%	68.8%	69.4%
N	934				

Croatia

Table 41: Coefficient results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Croatia.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	0.985** (0.099)	0.990** (0.101)	0.975** (0.101)	0.989** (0.101)	1.030** (0.118)
Age		-0.196 (0.228)	-0.131 (0.227)	-0.195 (0.229)	-0.203 (0.229)
Social class		-0.064 (0.079)	-0.064 (0.079)	-0.057 (0.080)	-0.064 (0.079)
Political radicalism		-0.392* (0.179)	-0.387* (0.179)	-0.392* (0.179)	-0.408* (0.179)
Age*Satisfaction			-0.340 (0.270)		
Social class*Satisfaction				-0.082 (0.098)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					-0.157 (0.226)
Constant	-1.210** (0.079)	-0.634* (0.262)	-0.652* (0.263)	-0.647* (0.265)	-0.621* (0.261)
Additional Chi-square		6.789	1.273	0.721	0.475
Chi-square model	121.920**	128.709**	129.982**	129.430**	129.185**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.165	0.174	0.175	0.175	0.174
Correctly classified observations	76.7%	76.8%	77.1%	76.8%	76.6%
N	1072				

Odds results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in the national government of Croatia.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	2.678** (0.099)	2.690** (0.101)	2.652** (0.101)	2.677** (0.101)	2.801** (0.118)
Age		0.822 (0.228)	0.877 (0.227)	0.823 (0.229)	0.816 (0.229)
Social class		0.930 (0.079)	0.931 (0.079)	0.937 (0.080)	0.930 (0.079)
Political radicalism		0.676* (0.179)	0.679* (0.179)	0.676* (0.179)	0.665* (0.179)
Age*Satisfaction			0.712 (0.270)		
Social class*Satisfaction				0.921 (0.098)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					0.855 (0.226)
Constant	-	-	-	-	-
Additional Chi-square		6.789	1.273	0.721	0.475
Chi-square model	121.920**	128.709**	129.982**	129.430**	129.185**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.165	0.174	0.175	0.175	0.174
Correctly classified observations	76.7%	76.8%	77.1%	76.8%	76.6%
N	1072				

Appendix B: Robustness check tables

In this appendix, the coefficients and odds for the robustness check are presented. The division of countries is displayed in table 13. In each first table, the coefficients of bivariate logistic regression are presented. In each second table, the odds ratios of bivariate logistic regression are presented. In table 42, results are provided for countries with strict Covid-19 policies. In table 43, the results are displayed for countries with less strict Covid-19 policies.

Countries with strict Covid-19 policies

Table 42: Coefficient results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in national governments in countries with strict Covid-19 policies.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	1.183** (0.037)	1.154** (0.037)	1.161** (0.039)	1.154** (0.038)	1.128** (0.040)
Age		0.243** (0.064)	0.265** (0.066)	0.244** (0.064)	0.245** (0.064)
Social class		0.285** (0.033)	0.285** (0.033)	0.285** (0.034)	0.287** (0.033)
Political radicalism		-0.007 (0.093)	-0.006 (0.093)	-0.007 (0.093)	-0.024 (0.097)
Age*Satisfaction			-0.101 (0.081)		
Social class*Satisfaction				0.002 (0.039)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					0.193 (0.113)
Constant	-0.277** (0.029)	-0.387** (0.089)	-0.391** (0.089)	-0.387** (0.089)	-0.414** (0.089)
Additional Chi-square		89.245**	1.564	0.011	3.042
Chi-square model	1405.659**	1494.904**	1496.468**	1494.915**	1497.946**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.272	0.287	0.288	0.287	0.288
Correctly classified observations	70.4%	70.2%	70.2%	70.2%	70.2%
N	7134				

Odds results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in national governments in countries with strict Covid-19 policies.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	3.264** (0.037)	3.171** (0.037)	3.194** (0.039)	3.170** (0.038)	3.090** (0.040)
Age		1.276** (0.064)	1.304** (0.066)	1.276** (0.064)	1.277** (0.064)
Social class		1.330** (0.033)	1.330** (0.033)	1.330** (0.034)	1.332** (0.033)
Political radicalism		0.993 (0.093)	0.994 (0.093)	0.993 (0.093)	1.025 (0.097)
Age*Satisfaction			0.903 (0.081)		
Social class*Satisfaction				1.002 (0.039)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					1.213 (0.113)
Constant	-	-	-	-	-
Additional Chi-square		89.245**	1.564	0.011	3.042
Chi-square model	1405.659**	1494.904**	1496.468**	1494.915**	1497.946**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.272	0.287	0.288	0.287	0.288
Correctly classified observations	70.4%	70.2%	70.2%	70.2%	70.2%
N	7134				

Countries with less strict Covid-19 policies

Table 43: Coefficient results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in national governments in countries with less strict Covid-19 policies.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	1.354** (0.034)	1.339** (0.034)	1.334** (0.034)	1.338** (0.034)	1.324** (0.038)
Age		0.189** (0.059)	0.193** (0.061)	0.188** (0.059)	0.190** (0.060)
Social class		0.202** (0.028)	0.201** (0.028)	0.193** (0.028)	0.202** (0.028)
Political radicalism		-0.052 (0.069)	-0.052 (0.069)	-0.053 (0.069)	-0.041 (0.070)
Age*Satisfaction			-0.022 (0.080)		
Social class*Satisfaction				0.061 (0.034)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					0.080 (0.088)
Constant	-0.505** (0.026)	-0.991** (0.095)	-0.989** (0.095)	-0.968** (0.095)	-1.000** (0.096)
Additional Chi-square		62.091**	0.076	3.152	0.917
Chi-square model	2334.394**	2396.485**	2396.561**	2399.637**	2397.402**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.317	0.324	0.324	0.324	0.324
Correctly classified observations	70.8%	71.9%	71.9%	71.9%	71.9%
N	8786				

Odds results of logistic regression for the predictors on the level of political trust in national governments in countries with less strict Covid-19 policies.

Indicator	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Satisfaction	3.874** (0.034)	3.816** (0.034)	3.797** (0.034)	3.810** (0.034)	3.757** (0.038)
Age		1.208** (0.059)	1.213** (0.061)	1.207** (0.059)	1.209** (0.060)
Social class		1.224** (0.028)	1.223** (0.028)	1.213** (0.028)	1.224** (0.028)
Political radicalism		0.950 (0.069)	0.949 (0.069)	0.948 (0.069)	0.960 (0.070)
Age*Satisfaction			0.978 (0.036)		
Social class*Satisfaction				1.063 (0.034)	
Political radicalism*Satisfaction					1.083 (0.088)
Constant	-	-	-	-	-
Additional Chi-square		62.091**	0.076	3.152	0.917
Chi-square model	2334.394**	2396.485**	2396.561**	2399.637**	2397.402**
Nagelkerke's R-square	0.317	0.324	0.324	0.324	0.324
Correctly classified observations	70.8%	71.9%	71.9%	71.9%	71.9%
N	8786				

