

Erasmus School of
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THE EFFECT OF INTERNAL COHESIVENESS ON EEAS AUTONOMY

A study on the EEAS autonomy in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

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a. Summary

The EEAS was created to make the EU a more effective player on the global stage. The member states, however, never gave up their foreign ministries and are free to interact with third parties themselves. This ‘non-exclusive’ delegation raises several questions about how disagreement between the member states affects EEAS autonomy. How strictly do they exercise control over a service that they can bypass? There are several consequences of non-exclusive delegation, such as that member states retain a lot of expertise on foreign policy. The question becomes, how free is the EEAS to pursue its own agenda when member states disagree with each other on a topic of foreign policy? Or formulated as the research question: *what is the effect of internal cohesiveness on EEAS autonomy?* A case study is conducted with several cases within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It reveals that the EEAS can be controlled and held to stick to all the member states positions, but that this effect may go away after a while and it can return to policies more in line with its own agenda.

b. Preface

Dear reader,

In front of you is a thesis titled *The Effect of Internal Cohesiveness on EEAS Autonomy*. The thesis was written as part of my Master in International Public Management and Policy at Erasmus University Rotterdam. I want to thank especially my supervisor, dr. Zhelyazkova, for the care. Beside a great deal of academic insight, she provided me and my fellow thesis-writing students with chocolate when needed. I also want to thank them: the other students in my thesis circle. They took the time to read my parts before meetings and were able to give good and critical feedback. I would like to thank my parents for financial support so that I did not have to work my side-job in the weeks before the deadline, as well as the people in the café where I always sat to write and am sitting right now, for their nice coffee.

I hope you enjoy reading it.

Tijmen Terpstra

Rotterdam, 30 June 2022

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d. List of abbreviations

- CFSP* Common Foreign and Security Policy
- CSDP* Common Security and Defence Policy
- EC* European Commission
- EEAS* European External Action Service
- EP* European Parliament
- HR/VP* High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
- LCD* Lowest Common Denominator
- TEU* Treaty on the European Union
- TFEU* Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
- QMV* Qualified Majority Voting

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Figure 1. Conceptual view of non-exclusive delegation to the EEAS, as opposed to if there had been no delegation or usual, exclusive delegation. Based on Dijkstra (2017) 22

1 Introduction

The European External Action Service (EEAS) is the EU's foreign affairs service. It carries out the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), promoting European values and interests in the world (EEAS, 2021). It serves under the political guidance of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP). It works closely with the foreign and defence ministries of the member states, but also EU institutions such as the European Commission (EC), European Council and the European Parliament (EP), as well as international organisations. While there are many other EU agencies, the EEAS is different. While delegation to the EU usually takes place in the form of exclusive, shared, or supporting competences, delegation to the EEAS is distinctly different from these. The EEAS is the EU's diplomatic service in interaction with third parties, yet member states never gave up their foreign policy and retain full control over it; they can interact with others even after the EU has chosen to do so. The 'parallel' competences mean that when the EU exercises them, member states are not stopped from acting on the same issue at the same time (Eckes, 2015). The phenomenon is called non-exclusive delegation, which is unique to the EEAS due to the fact that it interacts with third parties.

1.1 Objective

The High Representative and the European External Action Service (EEAS) were supposed to mark the beginning of a Union that speaks with a single voice. The EEAS is supposed to assist the High Representative by promoting coherence in EU external action. It has been given quite a lot of autonomy, as this was thought to enable the Service to achieve this goal. Its level of autonomy serves a purpose: a large degree of autonomy is thought to enable the service to present a common position, which is essential for effective foreign policy (Delreux, 2009; Van Schaik, 2016). At the same time, the EEAS concerns itself with issues under the CFSP, where unanimity is usually required and member states retain a large degree of control. This raises questions, such as how well can they control the agent? What this research specifically looks into is, how well can they control the agent when they disagree with each other? Do they need to agree internally in

order to limit EEAS autonomy? More internal cohesiveness is expected to result in higher autonomy, because for example in the context of international agreements, preference homogeneity leaves more room for the negotiator to find compromises (Delaere & Van Schaik, 2012). This research aims to investigate this with the research question: *what is the effect of internal cohesiveness on EEAS autonomy?*

1.2 Relevance

1.2.1 Theoretical relevance

There has been a great deal of research on autonomy of agents in the EU. For non-exclusive delegation of competences to the EEAS, however, this is under-researched. The fact that the member states can bypass the EEAS means that they can be willing to accept common positions they are not fully behind. Alternatively, their interaction with the same actors on the same topics could mean that the informational advantage is used to effectively exercise control over the agent. Existing literature points in both of these two directions, a positive or a negative relationship between internal cohesiveness and EEAS autonomy, therefore this research will address them with an empirical case. This also provides insight into how much autonomy the EEAS has, because it is the question how much it has been able to increase it since it came into existence (Kostanyan, 2016).

1.2.2 Societal relevance

While some countries have already pushed for a European army in the recent past (Marcus, 2018), ‘the war in Ukraine ... is the European Union’s sudden birth as a serious military player’ (Braw, 2022). Member states are increasing their military spending, but according to the EEAS, ‘now the issue is not to spend more, but to spend together – because this is the only way of spending better’ (EEAS Press Release, 2022). It is, however, improbable to see member states fully merging their national defence apparatus, surrendering control on matters of national security. There have to be other ways and we can learn from the lessons of the EEAS, which is a unique phenomenon because when member states decided to delegate foreign policy to the new agent, they continued to carry out their foreign policy themselves. Therefore, it is crucial to know whether non-exclusive delegation could work for this and other policy areas by finding out how it has worked

for the EEAS. Increased activity in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) which falls under the CFSP (Bendiek, 2017), shows that there is a multi-speed Europe actually driving this integration where European security and defence was before thought to be dead. More policy areas where a form of non-exclusive delegation can be applied are therefore possible and current, making research on the internal workings of this type of delegation important.

1.3 Outline

The thesis is structured as follows: after this introduction, in the second chapter, existing literature is reviewed regarding the EEAS and its background, institutional set-up and policy. Third, the most appropriate theoretical approach for such a hybrid institution, principal-agent theory with non-exclusive delegation, is also derived from the literature. Fourth, a theoretical framework is established with the variables of the research question, and rival hypotheses indicate possible relationships between these variables. Fifth, the methodology motivates the selection of the case and events within the case. Sixth, the findings are presented as well as the support for the hypotheses that can be derived from them. Seventh, these are discussed in their academic and practical context. Eighth, the conclusion answers the research question.

2 The EEAS

Roughly a decade before the EEAS came into existence, Christiansen (2001) found that while intra-institutional politics were becoming increasingly fragmented, overall coherence of the EU had not disimproved. Internal coherence, within an institution, had been challenging, but relations between separate institutions had been managed better. He argues that the EU may be better managed with more self-contained institutions. Therefore, splitting off policy areas from for example the European Commission would improve overall EU coherence and will help rather than hinder future integration (Christiansen, 2001). EU agencies can have a role in increasing efficiency, transparency and accountability. They are usually created to fulfil the increased need for information and coordination (Vos, 2000). Indeed, since the 1990s until 2007 the number of autonomous administrative structures went up from two to 25 (Dehousse, 2008). A while later, Christiansen's proposition became a reality for the Union's foreign policy with the creation of the European External Action Service in 2010. However, this was not done only to best enable the service to achieve its goals, but also the result of a compromise between the Council (member states) who preferred to have the EEAS as an intergovernmental structure, and the Parliament and the Commission who would have liked the EEAS to be a part of the Commission (Wouters et al., 2013, p. 18). This compromise came with a rather unusual delegation of competences. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) specifies exclusive, shared and supporting competences for policy areas, and the EEAS falls outside all of these. It sits somewhere between the EU institutions. This section will give a brief background of the CFSP under which the EEAS falls and the Service itself. Then it will set out the institutional context of the EEAS. Finally, it will look at its strategic and policy direction.

2.1 Why it was set up

In the previous century, CFSP was criticised for being slow and unable to act decisively, and it needed consensus between member states for any decision to be made (Sjursen, 2003). Observers said that even the nomination of a High Representative for the CFSP had not helped this (Sjursen, 2003). The at the time High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, was seen as trying to make the

best of it but his position was institutionally weak and he held little powers (Helwig, 2017). When drafting the Constitution for Europe, there were talks of a Union Minister of Foreign Affairs. At the time, the question was whether the Minister of Foreign Affairs, which became the HR/VP, would lead to Europe speaking with one voice, or if they would lead to the Community method in the EU's external relations (Wouters, 2004). Something needed to change, and what became the Lisbon Treaty led to EU integration as an actor on the world stage in a few ways.

To this end, the EEAS was set up in 2010 to promote coherence in European Union external action. It is relatively autonomous in supporting the HR/VP. Europeanisation, in the context of this thesis simply the dealing with issues on the European level instead of the national level, of European foreign policy had been going on for a lot longer, whether institutionalised or not. This development makes sense from a rationalist institutionalist perspective, because member states can pursue their national interest more effectively through foreign policy cooperation (De Flers & Müller, 2012). While this politics of scale was a sensible trajectory for many policy domains, a common policy on foreign affairs, security, and defence was considered unlikely by many people, because they are typical instances of high politics (Sjursen, 2003) as this would mean surrendering sovereignty. Yet the member states found that through politics of scale, they can achieve more influence in world affairs, leading member states to actively project their preferences onto the European level (De Flers & Müller, 2012). Larger member states are often seen as 'shapers' of foreign policy, and the smaller member states as 'takers' (De Flers & Müller, 2012). Hence, the assumption is that the EU impact is bigger on smaller member states, but research has shown that this impact can be big for larger member states too. France, for example, has redefined its interests according to accepted EU norms, goals and principles (Wong, 2005). Neo-functionalism and constructivist research have shown a deepening policy convergence after participation in the CFSP (Wong, 2005). However, the process of Europeanisation of foreign policy is reversible (De Flers & Müller, 2012). National governments have foreign ministries that they can always fall back on if they choose to do so. Nowadays, these tendencies of de-Europeanisation can also be seen in some member states (Dyduch & Müller, 2021). This means that member states renew their own diplomatic efforts that they before put in the hands of the

EEAS. These reversing dynamics can happen in certain countries, but this does not mean that it happens in other member states too. What it does, however, is putting the EEAS in a more awkward position, as will become clear in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in chapter 6.

2.2 The EEAS as part of the CFSP

In order to properly understand the EEAS, it is important to have a good understanding of the CFSP, of which it is an integral part and it is embedded in CFSP policies. Like the CFSP itself, the EEAS was set up in such a way that it reflects the CFSP's setup as distinct from all other policy areas, with the aim to protect it from the EU's integration, so-called 'ring-fencing' of the CFSP (Eckes, 2015, p. 537). The EEAS assists the HR/VP in fulfilling the CFSP and CSDP and ensures consistency between areas of EU external action and between that and other policy areas. Moreover, in the areas of external action it must assist the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission and the Commission (2010/427/EU: Council Decision of 26 July 2010 Establishing the Organisation and Functioning of the European External Action Service, 2010). It must support and cooperate with the diplomatic services of the member states and support and cooperate with other bodies of the EU, especially the EP. There are a few dimensions where CFSP differs from other policy areas. First, in inter-institutional relations, there is a bigger role for institutions where the member state as such is represented (Eckes, 2015). For example, the Council outweighs the Parliament in CFSP decision-making, as the latter is informed and consulted but does not have a formal decision-making role. While, the European Council sets the strategic direction for both CFSP and TFEU policies, in the final decision-making TFEU gives more weight to the Commission and Parliament while the CFSP requires unanimity among member states (Eckes, 2015). Second, the relationship between the EU and the member states is different from TFEU policies in the sense that CFSP competences are parallel competences. This means that 'when the Union exercises its CFSP competences member states are not pre-empted or prevented from taking national action' (Eckes, 2015, p. 539). Even when member states are subject to a duty of sincere cooperation, ensuring compliance with this remains in the political sphere of checks from the Council and the HR/VP, rather than the Commission and Court, making judicial review unlikely (Eckes, 2015). Third, the EU's relationship with individuals is different under CFSP, as CFSP acts are not

directly applicable in the national legal orders (Eckes, 2015). CFSP policies are aimed at coordinating between member states and not at imposing a new policy onto them. There are of course exceptions, where sanctions can have a direct impact on individuals, with the famous recent example of the Commission's sanctions against listed Russian and Belarussian oligarchs (European Commission, 2022).

2.2.1 Decision-making under CFSP

Because the EEAS is not a legislative body, for the decision-making that will affect the EEAS we have to turn to the procedures under the CFSP. Depending on the case, they will impact the EEAS differently. The CFSP is conducted by defining the general guidelines, adopting decisions, and strengthening cooperation. These decisions can be actions to be taken by the EU, positions to be taken by the EU and arrangements to implement the former two decisions (Art. 25 TEU). Decisions adopted by the Council commit the member states 'in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity' (Art. 28(2) TEU). Art. 31 TEU defines the decision-making procedures under CFSP: decisions are taken by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where stated otherwise. The adoption of legal acts is excluded. A member state can abstain from vote and will then not be obliged to apply the decision, but will refrain from actions conflicting with the EU action. Art. 31(2) TEU seems to pave the way for QMV in some areas, but the important catch is that this is to be preceded by a unanimously taken European Council decision. Moreover, when a member state declares that it opposes QMV for 'vital and stated reasons of national policy' (Art. 31(2) TEU), a vote will not be held and it refer the issue to the European Council for a unanimity decision.

The current system is a 'rather unsatisfactory combination of the historical Commission right of initiative, Council practice in developing strategy through Council Conclusions and Guidelines on specific topics, and the attempt to graft onto this a strategic policy service in the form of the EEAS under the leadership of the High Representative' (Cremona, 2015, p. 20). For negotiating and concluding treaties this is different. Usually, under CFSP the procedural rules are as follows, with the exception of monetary agreements that involve the ECB and trade and investment agreements, where for the latter the Commission is always the

negotiator (Cremona, 2015). These normal cases are governed under Art 218 TFEU, which specifies this procedure: the Council authorises the opening of negotiations, adopts negotiating directives, authorises the signing of agreements and concludes them (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2012). Where the agreement concerns exclusively or principally the CFSP, the Commission or HR/VP submits recommendations to the Council, which authorises the opening of negotiations and nominates the Union negotiator (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2012).

In the CFSP, most decisions are taken on the basis of unanimity, which is what the European Commission has said usually works but is increasingly affecting the speed and ability of the EU to act, in an arena where these factors are essential for the EU's speed and credibility (European Commission, 2018). It proposed three concrete areas where qualified majority voting (QMV) would benefit more effectiveness of the EU: positions on Human Rights in multilateral fora, adoption and amendment of sanctions, and civilian CSDP missions (European Commission, 2018). The proposal came at a time where internal divisions on EU foreign policy had worsened, with either failures to reach an agreement or a poor one based on the lowest common denominator (LCD) (Schuette, 2019). These internal divisions have different reasons and concern several policies, that will be elaborated upon in section 2.4.

2.2.2 Control over the EEAS

The EEAS supports the HR/VP in the CFSP. While the member states have a large degree of control over the CFSP, the EEAS is set up as an autonomous body. However, there seems to be still a large degree of control by the member states. *Ex-ante* administrative procedures have established the framework of EEAS action and the instruments at its disposal (Kostanyan, 2016). *Ex-post*, it is monitored and control through police patrol and horizontal checks. Kostanyan (2016) found that this police patrol of the EEAS happens through the European Council, the Foreign Affairs Council, COREPER, the Political and Security Committee, and CFSP-related Council working groups. In addition to this, the member states can do three important things: appoint officials in the EEAS, finance the service and revise its mandate (Kostanyan, 2016). He further concluded that the EU member states sufficiently control the EEAS, but that due to foreign policy challenges the

EU is increasingly facing, 'it remains to be seen whether the EEAS will be able to increase its autonomy and room for manoeuvre *vis-à-vis* the member states over time and on certain issues and geographical areas' (Kostanyan, 2016, p. 48).

2.3 Nature of the EEAS

The EEAS was created in 2009 in support of the new HR/VP, which was a position that was going to serve as both the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) and as the Vice President (VP) of the European Commission. The Service is supposed to represent and pursue European interests and values abroad and by doing this increasing its influence on global issues (Furness, 2013). Its autonomy is therefore important. This is not autonomy in the sense that it can do what it wants when it wants to, because of course foreign affairs will be very constrained by the international context (Furness, 2013). Instead, its autonomy means that it needs to be independent enough to make policy decisions that others will follow. That is true for all the institutions including the Council, as this is necessary for its coordinating role. At the same time, it is not an institution or a policy-making body such as the European Commission (Dialer, 2014). Catherine Ashton, the first to fulfil the HR/VP post, said that 'the EEAS is called a service for a reason. It is there to work for the president of the European Commission and the other European Commissioners, for the President of the European Council and member states, and for the members of the European Parliament too' (EU Press Release, 2010).

The EEAS represented a big step in diplomacy, with ambitious aims of not only representing the EU's policy areas, but also coordinating EU foreign policy and supporting it under the HR/VP (Mai'a, 2011). Diplomacy is an institution that carries a shared logic of appropriateness for states and new states are socialised into these norms and rules by setting up their own diplomatic service and foreign ministries according to them (Bátora, 2013). However, the nature of the EEAS as a diplomatic service is ambiguous for a number of reasons. Its staff comes mostly from other EU institutions, with at the start, around 90 per cent of their staff being officials from EU institutions rather than career diplomats (Bátora, 2013). Now, more of the staff are diplomats, but still less than a third. More ambiguity stems from the fact that crisis management, technical, aid, and defence structures have been incorporated in the EEAS which causes friction between what

approach to take regarding for example communication (Bátora, 2013). However, most importantly for this research, it is unclear who is in charge of representation in diplomatic relations with third countries and the creation of the HR/VP and EEAS remains one of the most controversial outcomes of the Lisbon Treaty. The proposal to create the EEAS showed that the EU's political elite thought that in the post-Westphalian world, there was legitimacy for collective European diplomacy rather than individual national diplomacy (Spence, 2012). However, officials from the EU and the member states did not seem to share this view and observers in the EU member states fear that 'it will eventually undermine national diplomacy' (Adler-Nissen, 2013, p. 658). Now in 2022, diplomats from both the EEAS and member states still co-exist and it has turned out that EU delegations do not substitute, but instead enhance the practices of European diplomatic cooperation abroad (Baltag, 2018). There are, however, a few issues that have caused disagreement between the member states. The next section will discuss what the main sources of conflict among them have been.

2.4 Disagreement between the member states

Diplomats from outside the EU in Brussels have said that it has become easier for them to deal with the EU as now they know whom to contact, with there being a single office (European Parliament, 2012). The complication is, however, that certain large countries do not want to lose their diplomatic impact. Obviously, they had more power than small states, who may see it as a way to increase their power (European Parliament, 2012). Indeed, of the current member states, France and Germany are generally seen as global players (Lehne, 2012). France derives this role from being a permanent member in the Security Council, a nuclear state, influence in its colonial legacy, diminishing but relatively high military capacity and it is known for its diplomacy (Lehne, 2012). Germany does not possess these assets and has a historical trauma which impedes its foreign policy ambitions, instead it derives its role as a global player from its big economy and second largest export economy in the world (Lehne, 2012). Other large countries, such as Italy, Spain and Poland, also are ambitious but focus mainly on regions that they are tied to by their history. What differentiates the bigger countries is that they are capable to act independently, not tied to the EU, and policy drivers. For example, most of the time France and Germany need to agree and that shapes policy, while being also raised by smaller countries.

Cases where there has especially been a lot of internal divisions include migration, the civil wars in Syria and Yemen, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, Nord Stream 2, TTIP, enlargement and ENP, and EU foreign policy towards strategic rivals such as China and Russia (Lovato, 2021; Schuette, 2019). There are different reasons for these divisions. Member states can make conflicting assessments of a problem, as is the case for the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Nord Stream 2 is -or the time of writing, *was*, as opinions changed after the Russian invasion of Ukraine (Marsh & Chambers, 2022)- an example of conflicting national interests, where some countries see economic opportunities and others fear energy reliance. Finally, disagreement can stem from the engagement of third countries that encourage member states to block consensus. For example, when Hungary and Greece, both major recipients of Chinese foreign direct investment, watered down an EU statement on a China-Philippines dispute on territorial claims (Schuette, 2019). The member states can also decide to approach these third actors themselves. This phenomenon will be explained in the next chapter.

3 Non-exclusive delegation

The way the EEAS is organised and functions challenges the grand theories of European integration (Kostanyan & Orbie, 2013). Neofunctionalism stresses the role of supranational institutions and liberal intergovernmentalism the domestic interests of national governments. The EEAS, however, answers to both the intergovernmental Council and the supranational Commission, operating in both community and intergovernmental decision-making (Kostanyan & Orbie, 2013). Therefore, for the analysis of the EEAS we turn to principal-agent theory which provides a better framework than the European integration theories. Principal-agent theory originally comes from economic theory and has since been used in accounting, finance, organisational behaviour, sociology, and also political science (Eisenhardt, 1989). The theory applies when one or more parties, the principal, delegates work to another who performs it, the agent. It views the relationship between the principal and agent as a contract (Eisenhardt, 1989) and in agency theory, the unit of analysis is this contract. Actors are assumed to be self-interested, subject to bounded rationality and risk averse. The main goal of the delegation is efficiency, but there can be a conflicts of goals between participants and information asymmetry between the principal and agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). In political theory, principal-agent theory is concerned with ‘why, how and under what circumstances political actors delegate policymaking and implementation and what the “agent” does with the responsibilities it is granted’ (Furness, 2013, p. 105).

Agent-principal theory classifies the EEAS as the agent. According to agent-principal theory, this is done because the agent can perform the function better or cheaper than the principal itself, in this case the many individual principals that are the member states. The EEAS is thought to be more effective to represent EU interests abroad than the separate member states. The EEAS can be studied using the principal-agent model, but the model can be enhanced to analyse an autonomous EU body as it does not take into account the unique characteristics of the EU (Dehousse, 2008). Most importantly, the EEAS does not have a clearly defined principal, because ‘the European institutional architecture has been carefully designed to avoid any concentration of power’ (Dehousse, 2008, p. 790). The EEAS

supports the double-hatted HR/VP and therefore the Commission as well as the Council, so it could be argued that both are EEAS principals. However, it can also be argued that the Council is the only collective principal (the member states as multiple principals), because there is a contract between the member states and the EEAS in the treaties and not between the Commission and the EEAS. For other research a different conceptualisation can be useful, for example when the aim is to review the influence of different institutions on the EEAS. For this research, this is not the goal but instead the disagreement between member states, leaving the contractual principals. There are even more ways to define the principal-agent relationship: some authors describe the EU's external action as a policy with multiple agents, the European Commission and the HR/VP, and a single collective principal, the member states. These lines of delegation and principal-agent structures are complex, the collective principal have delegated different tasks to supranational and semi-supranational agents (Helwig, 2017). While there are several agents under CFSP, the EEAS is the only agent when considering delegation to the diplomatic service, with its associated tasks.

3.1 'Exclusive' delegation in the CFSP

Exclusive competences differentiate the EU from intergovernmental organisations (Rosas, 2015). Member states have delegated exclusive competences to the EU, meaning the competence has been fully transferred to the EU level. The EU now executes it, and the member states have stopped doing so. For these exclusive competences, the delegation can also be classed as 'exclusive' delegation. This sounds more complicated as it is, as this is regular delegation which is the case for example the internal market. There are no parallel competences. Shared competences are not exclusive, but follow the same logic because after the EU has decided to act, the member states are prevented from doing so, leaving no parallel competences. While this research is focused on non-exclusive delegation, there are also instances of exclusive delegation in the CFSP (Dijkstra, 2017). It is not easy to establish the nature of CFSP competences. CFSP, as well as CSDP, are not listed in the types of competences in Art. 3 TFEU. CFSP rules are not based on legislative acts, but this provision together with the loyalty principle in Art. 28(4) TFEU means that exclusivity in the field of CFSP cannot be ruled out (Wessel & Den Hertog, 2013). While these other areas of CFSP such as international agreements have a more exclusive nature, delegation under the CFSP to

EEAS is non-exclusive, which will be discussed later in this chapter. First an answer to the question: what is the rationale for delegation to the CFSP to occur in other areas?

3.1.1 Rationale

States delegate competences to supranational bodies as a way of reducing the transaction costs of adopting and implementing transnational policies (Dehousse, 2008). Two transaction costs of policy-making are specifically reduced through delegation: *informational transaction costs* and the *problem of credible commitment* (Pollack, 2006). Informational transaction costs arise when principals do not have the necessary expertise to make effective policies in a complex policy environment. The problem of credible commitment arises when legislators want to maintain a certain policy and show to their electorate that a certain promise will go beyond their time in office. Here, a body independent from daily politics and pressures are able to maintain this policy in the future (Pollack, 2006). However, case studies of delegation in EU secondary legislation show that here neither credible commitment and informational transaction cost have explanatory power in these policy areas (Pollack, 2006). These are policy areas such as agriculture and regional policy areas, where the member states already have large bureaucracies and a lot of knowledge. The same can be said for the CFSP, where a large degree of expertise was already held by the member states. All the member states already had a foreign ministry before the EU. Of course, the smaller member states enjoy the additional European expertise, but the larger member states with large foreign ministries and embassies all over the world. In 2018, France had 165 embassies around the world and the EU 140. Even a smaller member states such as Luxembourg with 30 official embassies, has 156 foreign representations worldwide (Baltag, 2018). It is therefore unlikely that delegation to the CFSP happened to reduce informational transaction costs. Credible commitment, of leaders to show that EU foreign policy will continue after their terms, may have played a role. However, what really drives delegation in areas where transaction costs do not explain the act, is the desire for *speed and efficiency*, by moving powers from the slow Council to the much faster decision-maker the European Commission (Pollack, 2006, p. 189). Other reasons include displacing responsibility for unpopular decisions and overcoming regulatory competition (Kassim & Menon, 2003). Regulatory competition is hard to picture in an area like the CFSP,

but to give an example: delegation for sanction regimes can overcome the incentive for member states to treat their own firms more leniently.

3.1.2 Agency problems

The main problems in the principal-agent relationship is that the agent usually has an informational advantage, also known as information asymmetry, and that it is able to engage in ‘hidden action,’ which is behaviour that is independent of and contrary to the will of the principal (Bauer, 2002; Furness, 2013). This phenomenon is called agency slack and once it has happened, the ability of principals to regain control depends on three things: (1) the type of monitoring mechanisms, (2) how fragmented the international organisation is and (3) the availability of credible sanctioning mechanisms the member states can use (Heldt, 2017). While there is a lot more to be said about agency problems in the ‘exclusive’ areas of the CFSP, this research is concerned with the non-exclusive EEAS, so therefore it is time to turn to non-exclusive delegation.

3.2 Non-exclusive delegation to the EEAS

From a rational-choice perspective, ‘we would expect either delegation (when expected benefits trump the expected costs) or non-delegation (if this is not the case)’ (Delreux & Adriaensen, 2017, p. 285). Usually, when tasks are delegated, the principals stop executing those tasks, or, in the case of shared competences, they act unless the EU has decided to do so. In the case of the EEAS, however, member states remained in charge of their own foreign policy. Non-exclusive delegation is the result of the creation of ‘parallel competences,’ which means that when the EU exercises these, member states are not stopped from taking action on the same issue at the same time (Eckes, 2015). Dijkstra (2017) defines non-exclusive delegation as when ‘member states delegate a function to the EU institutions, but (some of) the member states continue to also carry out this function themselves’ (p. 2). Under the CFSP, member states have delegated foreign and security policy to the EU but continue to carry out their own foreign and security policies. This should not be confused with a shared competence, where the member states can act only where the EU has decided not to do so. The EEAS executes three main tasks: it (1) facilitates foreign policy decision-making, (2) plays a role in crisis management and the CSDP, and (3) represents the EU externally (Dijkstra, 2017). The first two are the most easily studied with a traditional

principal-agent model. What distinguishes the third is the involvement of external actors, a core feature of diplomacy. It looks into how an actor represents itself to others and has a formal and substantial dimension (Baltag, 2018). This means that its representation is ‘not limited to protocol, but is conscious of both the practice and the context’ (Baltag, 2018, p. 79). The interaction with for example third countries or international organisations allows for the possibility of non-exclusive delegation, because ‘after delegation of external representation to the EEAS, individual or groups of member states continue to interact with the *same* external actors on the *same* topics’ (Dijkstra, 2017, p. 7). *Figure 1* shows how the interaction with third parties enables non-exclusive delegation.

3.2.1 Rationale

Non-exclusive delegation questions the principal-agent model in several ways. The member states did not delegate for specialisation and efficiency reasons, so why did they? One functional argument that is often made is that member states are relatively too small to alone have their voice heard in global affairs (Dijkstra, 2017). The other argument has to do with the pooling of resources; a more efficient use of money (Dijkstra, 2017). Both reasons are related to economies of




Figure 1. Conceptual view of non-exclusive delegation to the EEAS, as opposed to if there had been no delegation or usual, exclusive delegation. Based on Dijkstra (2017)

scale. By teaming up, member states are able to have a bigger impact in diplomacy while at the same time reducing the diplomatic costs. This is in line with the tendency of Europeanisation of foreign policy (De Flers & Müller, 2012) and is the first reason to delegate also non-exclusive competences. Second, member states fail to reach an agreement due to high costs in the negotiation process between themselves. These are the costs of determining, negotiating and coordinating preferences, but also the costs of member states who do not want to reveal their bottom lines, which may lead to failure of negotiations despite the absence of conflicting interests (Dijkstra, 2009). The EEAS can significantly reduce both these costs by shaping the agenda and being a neutral party in the middle. Third, member states can reduce the risk of non-compliance and incomplete contracting, so a need for a supranational third party that can monitor implementation and reduce compliance costs (Dijkstra, 2009). In reality, the EEAS delegations in other countries have proven to enhance European diplomatic cooperation. The EEAS does not substitute member states' embassies abroad, but increases EU visibility and reduces diplomatic complexity (Baltag, 2018).

3.2.2 Agency problems

There is likely to be a competition for access as both the member states and the EEAS try to access the third countries and organisations (Dijkstra, 2017). Member states can try to bypass the EU. Moreover, the fact that the EU as well as the member states are represented in international fora is particularly problematic for the EU's ability to speak with a single voice, which is to formulate a common position ahead of international negotiations (Moschella & Quaglia, 2016). When in an international forum the EU is represented as well as the member states, this creates 'incentives for differentiation, even when there is a common underlying view' (Moschella & Quaglia, 2016, p. 907). What is lacking compared to a normal exclusive principal-agent relationship is the information asymmetry that occurs when tasks are delegated. Another problem arises from the combination of both representation and policymaking. CFSP policy can take the form of coordination/representation and policymaking/strategic direction. Coordination exists of establishing a joint position and making sure member states adhere to that position, and this is based on a duty of sincere cooperation regardless of whether it concerns an exclusive or shared competence (Cremona, 2015). The subsequent representation in international organisations and fora entails presenting a

coordinated position externally and this is different from the coordination function: ‘there is a tension between the member states’ right, in exercising their own powers, to determine how their collective position should be (re)presented, and the requirements of unity in the Union’s external representation’ (Cremona, 2015, p. 19). This requirement of unity is an important concept for European foreign policy, and is known as internal cohesiveness.

The next chapter will discuss this concept and that of autonomy, on which cohesiveness is expected to have an effect, in more detail. As discussed earlier in the chapter, the EEAS is a common service. One would not expect it to have the power to overrule some of the interests of the member states as is the case with institutions that are granted this formal authority. The question is to what degree agency autonomy exists. In 2002, before the EEAS existed, the academic literature asked this about the European Commission: can the European Commission behave in such a way that the Council loses control and pursue its own goals? (Bauer, 2002). This research is about the EEAS as an agent, as now we can wonder if the EEAS can behave in such a way that the Council loses control and pursue its own goals.

4 Theoretical framework

The independent variable of the research is *internal cohesiveness* and the dependent variable *autonomy*. These two concepts are the ones that will be analysed and measured regarding the EEAS. They do not come out of nowhere, as they originate in a well-known theory of actorness developed by Jupille & Caporaso (1998). This is the most used concept to describe the EU in relation to other parties. It concerns its ‘ability to function actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system’ (Groen & Niemann, 2013, p. 309). While this research aims to review the autonomy and internal cohesiveness of the EEAS and not its actorness, this is still a good starting point for a theoretical framework as the concepts originate there. Quite some research has dealt with European actorness and recently this concept has gotten renewed attention to make it less static and more helpful in its application to the EU’s interaction with third actors (Rhinar & Sjöstedt, 2019). The original dimensions of actor capacity are authority, autonomy, external recognition and cohesion (Jupille & Caporaso, 1998). Instead of defining these concepts here and now, and rather than reviewing the whole concept of actorness, the next section will review the concepts that are useful for this research on the EEAS. First, it will explain why broad definitions that include contextual factors are not useful for this research. Second, it will show why external recognition does not need to be established for every empirical case. Finally, the concepts useful for the research question are elaborated upon: internal cohesiveness and autonomy, where the latter also includes authority.

4.1 External factors

More recently, the concept of actorness has been broadened to include contextual factors such as geopolitics, forum type and also the effect on the addressee (Rhinar & Sjöstedt, 2019). Recent research focuses for example on what conditions permit a high degree of discretion to international negotiations, where discretion is the degree of autonomy of the party negotiating on the EU’s behalf. The data show that compellingness strongly influences the discretion of the EU negotiator (Delreux, 2009). This can be understood as the pressure that the negotiating institution experiences from its environment not to jeopardise the negotiations. This means that the political cost of no agreement is high, which makes

maintaining the status quo so costly that the agent may go beyond the authority it was originally granted. However, such a broad definition of actorness blurs its definition and departs further from its key concepts such as autonomy. Incorporating contextual factors deflects from the explanatory power of the four dimensions as developed by Jupille and Caporaso (1998). For the same reason, including this would not help to address a research question that is concerned with internal mechanisms, rather than effectiveness. Establishing actorness itself does not prove effectiveness either, but it can enable influence (Groen & Niemann, 2013), which does not go as far as saying policies are actually effective. Hence, it is useful to go back to the original notion of actorness. The next section will look into the four dimensions, and explain why they can be narrowed down to two factors that are useful for this research: internal cohesiveness and autonomy.

4.1.1 External recognition

As well as not considering external factors in this research, the requirement of external recognition for actorness is also not included in this research's cohesiveness-autonomy thesis. Of the four actorness concepts, the one of external recognition is not relevant for the research question. While external recognition means that the EU can take part in an international regime that otherwise would be accessible only to states (Pavese & Torney, 2011), the exact importance of establishing external recognition is contested. Even where the EU is not formally recognised, it can still be an important player just as long as it controls the necessary governance resources (Gehring et al., 2013). Also, in the absence of recognition, the EU would not face the international isolation that unrecognised states do. De facto states are significantly constrained by a lack of external recognition and they usually face international isolation (Caspersen, 2009). However, the EU member states themselves are internationally recognised so the question of external recognition becomes less relevant as states are already interacting with them and therefore the EU is not internationally isolated. They can still pursue objectives agreed upon in the CFSP, when represented as countries in for example international negotiations. Still, some form of recognition is a pre-condition for the EU itself to be an actor as such. The EU is formally recognised as an international actor, as well as de facto, given that other parties engage with the EU in international negotiations (Wunderlich, 2012). Therefore, external recognition of the EU as an actor is widely accepted (Pavese & Torney, 2011; Wunderlich,

2012). The fact that this pre-condition is met, means it requires no further elaboration in this research for several reasons. It would be questionable whether recognition is an autonomous factor, given that once recognition is achieved, uncertainty about the reasons of the other party to grant recognition remains (Pavlovsky, 2021). Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that recognition of the EU as an actor comes from its capabilities rather than formal membership. The original definition, the ‘acceptance of and interaction with the entity by entity by others’ (Jupille & Caporaso, 1998, p. 214) is well-established in the case of the EU.

4.2 Internal cohesiveness

Internal cohesiveness means that the EU is able to speak with a single voice. Most authors share the ‘intuitive assumption’ that the EU would be more effective if it was able to speak with a single voice and that this would lead to more external influence (Da Conceição-Heldt & Meunier, 2014). The EEAS is relatively new, but the literature on internal cohesiveness dates back further in the area of conflict settlement. In conflict mediation and settlement, internal cohesiveness is an important factor (Bergmann & Niemann, 2015). This cohesiveness can be measured as the parties’ internal power structure but more often it refers to the nature and number of domestic constituencies (Kleiboer, 1996). Low internal cohesiveness makes it hard to identify the parties, and high cohesiveness is usually regarded as the existence of just one constituency (Kleiboer, 1996). While this definition of internal cohesiveness can be useful in conflict settlement research, it is not for the EU’s external action as by nature it is an actor composed of many member states and even more constituencies. Overcoming that problem was exactly what needed to be solved, in order to ‘speak with one voice’ despite being composed of an array of countries. The concept is also known as preference homogeneity, which is when EU member states have similar preferences (Delaere & Van Schaik, 2012). When they agree on a position, there is more room for a negotiating strategy and for the negotiator to find compromises, which will lead to more effectiveness in diplomacy or negotiations (Delaere & Van Schaik, 2012). This indicates a positive relationship between internal cohesiveness and EEAS autonomy. Indeed, at first most policymakers and academics assumed that a higher degree of internal cohesiveness would correlate with a higher ability for the EU to be effective in external relations (Da Conceição-Heldt & Meunier, 2014). This idea quickly

became criticised, saying that the single voice is necessary but insufficient for the EU to have more strength (Blavoukos et al., 2017). Some have even gone as far as saying that there is no correlation between having a single representative and the ability to speak with a single voice. They argue that the assumption comes from a 'confusion between representation as a procedure and the possibility for the EU to find general agreements and unified positions' (Novak, 2014, p. 69). The fact that there is one representative, the HR/VP, does not translate into more agreement between member states. This agreement is already low, due to the fact that especially in foreign policy there is low legislative productivity in areas that require unanimity and not qualified majority voting (Novak, 2014). The other possibility is that the actor representing the EU externally brings the members closer together and enables them to discover common positions. According to some authors, however places too much confidence in institutions, especially in the field of foreign policy. The member states' histories are particular and they have diverse interests especially regarding energy resources, making it unlikely that they find common stances frequently (Novak, 2014).

While many EU scholars have assumed a single voice to be a necessary and sufficient condition for the EU to be an effective global actor, research has shown that high internal cohesiveness is not a sufficient condition for external effectiveness (Da Conceição-Heldt, 2014). Arguably especially in foreign policy, reaching a common position does not necessarily mean acting that way. In the European Neighbourhood Policy, for example, 'the EU sent one message and spoke with one voice but pursued conflicting goals' (Börzel & van Hüllen, 2014, p. 1034). There are also cases where negotiating in a divided manner can be useful for the EU. When several EU countries are represented on an international negotiation platform, other countries may feel that they have no say when the EU speaks with a single mouth, invoking a negative reaction from negotiating partners and acting as a block can cause irritation (Van Schaik, 2016). When the EU member states suddenly speak with a common voice after divided previous negotiation rounds, this has irritated non-EU countries in the negotiation process as they felt that after that there was no point for them to negotiate anymore (Delreux, 2014). In international bargaining, an EU institution with high internal cohesiveness -quite literally the EU speaking with a single voice- the other party will believe that the offer is indeed the best and is more likely to accept it. This is especially true if the

position was reached after a long internal struggle and is impossible to reopen. They found that when cohesiveness is medium, ‘when member states have a common position but present it externally with multiple voices, for instance because of dual representation’ (Da Conceição-Heldt & Meunier, 2014, p. 973), the other negotiating party may want to bypass the EU and try to get concessions from individual member states. This indicates that non-exclusive delegation makes it more likely that the EU’s position is undermined by other parties, when they approach member states individually about foreign policy issues. If member states had exclusively delegated decision-making authority on foreign policy to the EEAS, this would not have been possible and this would have resulted in less cohesiveness.

This research does not aim to review the relationship between internal cohesiveness and external effectiveness of CFSP so this is not what needs to be established. Instead, the purpose is to look at its relation to agent autonomy, as this is where the literature points at different relationships. This brings us to the dependent variable of the research: autonomy.

4.3 Autonomy

The extent to which the EEAS presents a common position is largely explained by its level of the actor’s autonomy in fulfilling its delegated tasks. In Jupille and Caporaso’s model (1998), autonomy is about the ‘institutional distinctiveness’ that makes a EU institution separate of the member states (Pavese & Torney, 2011, p. 127). The concepts autonomy, discretion and slack are related and often used mixed up, but they have slight differences. Heldt (2017) puts them on a continuum with discretion at the one end, autonomy in the middle and slack at the other. Discretion is defined as the room for manoeuvre that the agent can act in without interference. The authority that it was granted by its principals are its goals, without a delineation of the actions it should take to achieve these goals (Heldt, 2017). This is a rather narrow definition of discretion, since it entails authority as described above but not autonomy, which is here defined the agent’s ability to successfully pursue its own agenda (Heldt, 2017, p. 472) which can either support or go against principal’s preferences. When the agent is able to act in ways that are undesired by its principals, this is agency slack. Some scholars argue that this concept, which comes from organisational and economic theory,

is not always suitable to be applied to regional integration. Bauer (2002) argues that it should not be dropped altogether for studying the EU, but that the analysis skews to controllability and neglects the positive side of deviant agency behaviour (Bauer, 2002). This is done by making a distinction between agency strategies that are directed at the policy process as opposed to the policy outcomes. What is done often to test agency autonomy, is measuring policy outcomes against the initial preferences of the agent. This direct link between the initial preference and the outcome is hard to establish, and therefore independent agency is dismissed as ‘noise’ in intergovernmental interaction (Bauer, 2002, p. 385). Bauer’s (2002) research suggest that supranational agents are more likely to influence EU policy processes rather than targeting policy outcomes.

Autonomy is regarded separate from authority, which refers to the EU’s authority refers to its right to act in a certain policy area, influencing whether it has to act based on a common position (Delaere & Van Schaik, 2012). It is simply put the delegation of competence to the agent (Pavese & Torney, 2011). However, the two are hard if not impossible to separate in practice. Discretion entails both autonomy and authority: the ‘negotiator’s *autonomy* in international negotiations’ (Delreux, 2009, p. 719) is the ‘result of delegation of *authority* by the member states to this negotiator’ (Delreux, 2009, p. 721). In other words, the agent’s autonomy is largely derived from internal features (Rhinard & Sjöstedt, 2019). The former is the discretion conquered by the agent while the latter is discretion granted to the agent by its principals. EU institutions such as the Commission are known to wield discretion in such a way that ‘it was securing *de facto* what it was unable to obtain *de jure*’ (Doleys, 2009, pp. 499–500). The lines are especially blurred for the EEAS, given that it is the outcome of an ‘inter-institutional bargaining struggle’ (Dialer, 2014, p. 47). Therefore, this research does not distinguish between them and when autonomy is mentioned this can also include authority.

Low internal cohesiveness does not always have to lead to the failure of presenting a common position. If the EU has a large degree of autonomy, it can be able to present a common position to the outside world (Delreux, 2009; Van Schaik, 2016). However, more autonomy could also go against the single voice thesis. One reason is that member states can be so concerned about their sovereignty in

regard to foreign affairs that they supervise extra strictly when it has more powers (Van Schaik, 2016). Another reason is that the Presidency instead of HR/VP may want to show how well they can lead the EU, but this reason is only in comparison to how it was organised before the EEAS. Reason three is that member states may oppose the exercise of competence because of opposition from non-EU states who support state-based representation in international organisations. While these would negatively affect EEAS effectiveness, lowered effectiveness does not imply less autonomy, and therefore these considerations are outside the scope of this thesis. Finally, when member states think it will be hard to always agree on a common position they may prefer to stay represented heterogeneously (Van Schaik, 2016).

The relationship between internal cohesiveness and autonomy in the particularities of non-exclusive delegation is under-researched. One can expect that the fact that member states can bypass the EEAS means that they are more likely to accept a stance they are not fully behind and use less *ex-ante* and *ex-post* controls. However, one can also expect that the fact they still reach out to parties makes them less likely to use these control and also non-exclusive delegation significantly reduces an information disadvantage, which they can use to check the agent better. In this case, internal cohesiveness and autonomy are negatively related. These two competing hypotheses will be discussed in more detail below.

4.4 Hypotheses

4.4.1 Hypothesis I: Low internal cohesiveness leads to less EEAS autonomy

When there is no preference homogeneity there is a low degree of internal cohesiveness; member states do not agree on a CFSP issue. All they can agree on, is a low common denominator (Schuette, 2019). An institutional structure that requires unanimity as well as cases that concern high politics, give the member states a large degree of control over the agent and less likelihood to compromise. In other policy areas, member states may not have the knowledge and expertise to effectively exercise this control. However, next to the non-exclusive delegation to the EEAS, member states still interact with third countries and this means that they retain expertise on foreign affairs, enabling them to effectively control the

agent. These controls on the EEAS can take the form of *ex-ante* and *ex-post* control mechanisms, such as authorisation, mandate, precedent, monitoring and ratification (Kostanyan, 2014). It turns out that even for documents that fall under the authority of the Commission and HR/VP, the EEAS seeks approval of the member states to ensure their wishes are reflected (Kostanyan & Orbie, 2013). This limits its autonomy. Its autonomy is further limited by *ex-post* controls such as endorsement by the member states (Kostanyan & Orbie, 2013). The member states have a large degree of control over the agent, limiting the EEAS autonomy. The exercise of this control leads to less autonomy for the EEAS, which show in policy documents that reflect this lowest common denominator. For example, if all countries can agree on *A* but one or more countries oppose *B* and *C*, the EEAS documents will reflect only *A*.

In summary, when member states disagree on foreign policy, there is less room for the EEAS to act. EEAS autonomy is limited because it seeks to reflect the wishes of the member states. *Ex-post*, its autonomy is limited because of the tight controls that the requirement of unanimity places on the EEAS. Both of these controls will be exercised effectively, since due to its non-exclusive nature, there is no information disadvantage for the member states. This results in the EEAS policy outcome reflecting the lowest common denominator between all the member states. Therefore, low internal cohesiveness is expected to result in less autonomy.

4.4.2 Hypothesis II: Low internal cohesiveness leads to higher EEAS autonomy

Again, as with the previous hypothesis, without preference homogeneity and with a low degree of internal cohesiveness, a low common denominator is all that can be agreed upon between the member states. Alternatively, a consequence of this disagreement can be that the member states cannot agree on how to exercise controls on the agent. Here, preference heterogeneity is expected to lead to more agent autonomy, because when member states disagree on a how to control the agent there is more room for the agent to act (Delaere & Van Schaik, 2012). This is a negative relationship between internal cohesiveness and EEAS autonomy. Moreover, the specificities of non-exclusive delegation add to this effect. When member states fully disagree on a topic of foreign policy, aware of the fact that

the CFSP will require unanimity for meaningful policy output, they may decide to pursue their policy goals through their own channels. Their attention shifts to their national foreign policy, relinquishing their control mechanisms and increasing EEAS autonomy. This is regardless of how they actually voted, since member states can choose to still pursue their own foreign affairs policy even if it is alongside contradictory European policy, voting together for the sake of presenting a common position to the outside world. This indeed happens, and member states may value reaching a common position for various reasons such as presenting one message and togetherness to the outside world, while in reality pursuing conflicting goals (Börzel & van Hüllen, 2014). The member states can bypass the HR/VP or EEAS and they will still interact with the same actors on the same topics (Dijkstra, 2017). The EEAS will still pursue its own agenda, because in principal-agent theory, agents have their own agenda, whether they are in line with its principal's preferences or not (Heldt, 2017). Given that the EEAS was set up as a relatively autonomous body, it will have room to pursue this agenda. This means the EEAS can act in ways that do not reflect the lowest common denominator. For example, if all countries can agree on *A* but one or more countries oppose *B* and *C*, the EEAS can still reflect *A*, *B* or *C*, or a combination of those in its statements and declarations.

In summary, delegation to the EEAS is non-exclusive, which means that member states can still pursue foreign policy through their own channels. They decide to make limited use of ex-ante controls in a non-exclusive delegation environment, and they also are less invested in controlling it ex-post or due to low internal cohesiveness they cannot agree on what this ex-post control should look like. The EEAS has its own agenda that it will pursue. Therefore, internal cohesiveness is alternatively expected to negatively affect EEAS autonomy.

5 Methodology

The literature review shows that the EEAS is a unique service which has been delegated non-exclusive competences to conduct EU external affairs. The theoretical framework provides us with internal cohesiveness and autonomy as two interlinked variables that two main contributing factors to for the EEAS to be the actor it was envisioned to be under the Lisbon Treaty. The question is to which extent and how they are related. The research question of this paper is: *What is the effect of internal cohesiveness on EEAS autonomy?* In order to answer this question, a comparative case study of episodes of low internal cohesiveness was conducted. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a divisive issue for the member states and therefore serves as a good case. A qualitative analysis of EEAS statements and declarations related to the conflict was executed, which was compared to sources displaying positions of EU member states such as official government statements, as well as secondary sources in media outlets containing statements by high government officials (e.g., Prime Minister, Foreign Minister or diplomat). Two rival hypotheses were tested: (I) low internal cohesiveness leads to less EEAS autonomy and (II) low internal cohesiveness leads to more EEAS autonomy.

5.1 Research design

The principal-agent model as a study of the EU does not need to privilege the role of an institution or class of actor over others, something which many other theories do (Kassim & Menon, 2003). Hypotheses can be more nuanced than with the theories that have dominated the field. The assumption in this research is not the role of institutions, but the fact that autonomy will be heavily influenced by the design of the control mechanisms, which are in turn related to internal cohesiveness. Consistent with principal agent theory, this research assumes actors to be rational, trying to maximise their preferences that are ordered to their priorities (Braun & Guston, 2003). Because the dependent and independent variable are hard to quantify, this research question is particularly suitable for a qualitative research methodology. While discretion, for example, can be operationalised in numbers (Gastinger & Heldt, 2022), real-world autonomy cannot be derived from treaty provisions. Additionally, the unique characteristics of the EEAS make it suitable for a case study research design. A case study is particularly useful when

there is a need for an ‘in-depth appreciation of an issue, event or phenomenon of interest, in its natural real-life context’ (Crowe et al., 2011, p. 1). Case studies are suitable for rigorous case study research that allows for investigation of theory rather than simply developing theory (Johnston et al., 2000). For this case study research, a systematic research design consists of defining the unit of analysis, systematically selecting cases, collecting data from multiple sources, and evaluating the support for the research hypothesis (Johnston et al., 2000). These requirements are elaborated upon in the rest of this chapter.

5.1.1 Method

One of the techniques of case study methods is the ‘explicit specification and testing of hypotheses and rival hypotheses’ (Yin, 1994, p. 285). The more the findings are in line with one of the hypotheses, the higher the confidence to confirm this hypothesis and refute the other(s). The rival hypotheses of this research, I and II, will be tested on multiple cases rather than a single case to increase external validity. Using multiple events allows for the study to draw on the nature of the case, the historical background, the physical setting, other (political, legal) contexts and other cases (Stake, 2003). A research design that can especially generate inferential leverage of a study of a few cases is the combination of cross-case and over-time (or before-after) case comparisons (Bennett & Elman, 2007). Regarding over-time/before-after comparisons, the cases are selected in such a way that allows for before-after comparisons, where low internal cohesiveness is taken as a point to compare what the EEAS did before it came about and after. Regarding cross-case comparisons, within the EU course on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, cases are selected that constitute individual events that can be compared between each other. In legal impact studies, a time series design takes a series of behavioural observations before and after the enactment of the law being studied: ‘if the behavioural curve shows a sharp change in the predicted direction during the period of the passage of the law, it is hypothesised that the law caused the particular change’ (Lempert, 1966, p. 127). While this is not a legal impact study, it analyses the before and after of EEAS statements, with internal disagreement as a marker of time. In the case of the EEAS, if it is autonomy shows a sharp change before and after a low degree of internal cohesiveness, it can be assumed that these factors are related. Of course, the lack of a control population means that independent confounding variables are hard to account for. Therefore, in

order to increase the leverage, the research design uses a combination of cross-case and before-after case comparisons (Bennett & Elman, 2007). This allows the EEAS to be compared in two different ways: ‘the before case A at T^0 can be compared to the after of case A at T^1 , whereas case A in one or both periods can also be compared to another case B, which might also be divided into two periods’ (Bennett & Elman, 2007, p. 176). These different cases are the different events that display low internal cohesiveness.

5.1.2 Case selection

Given that the European Commission negotiates trade deals and there is smaller role for the EEAS here, it is best to look at diplomatic issues, where it plays the biggest role. As seen in the literature review, of main tasks of the EEAS, external representation of the EU is the most compelling task where non-exclusivity of delegation to the EEAS exists by virtue of the continuation of interaction with third parties. For the selection of the case, it is important that these features are present which means that certain member states continue to interact with the same actors as the EEAS in an area where the EEAS operates. In a qualitative case study, ‘the selection criterion for cases is their particular typology’ (Titscher et al., 2000, p. 43). In other words, the most insightful cases for the research question should be selected. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict was chosen as a case because there is expected to be low internal cohesiveness in several instances. However, there are many cases within this case. There is no distinction between a case and a unit of analysis; the case *is* the unit of analysis (Grünbaum, 2007). Therefore, defining the unit of analysis is essentially defining what the case is (Yin, 2003). In this case study, the variable of interest is the autonomy of the EEAS, which also constitutes the single unit of analysis. European foreign policy, however, is not a single context, as its context varies depending on the issue and time. Therefore, this case study is essentially a multiple-case design, where multiple events constitute a single case and can be analysed individually. Every time there is disagreement between member states, this autonomy may be affected. Therefore, every time there is disagreement between member states on foreign policy, constitutes a unit of analysis. Defining time boundaries is also part of defining the unit of analysis. For the overall case, the conflict, this is between 1 January 2019 and 31 December 2021. They are the most recent complete three years, where tensions in the conflict were rising (UN Security Council, 2019).

5.1.3 Data collection

First, all EEAS statements and declarations between 1 January 2019 and 31 December 2021 that contain the terms Israel and either Palestine or Palestinian territories (both are terms used by the EU) were gathered. A list of them can be found in the appendix. Not all statements are primarily about the Israeli-Palestinian question, but since any statement or declaration where they are mentioned may contain information, they are all included as sources. The United Kingdom left the EU on 31 January 2020, which is why it will be part of the analysis for the first two events but not the last. For this case study, a valuable source of information are documentary materials. However, it must be used with caution as a lot of it has been moderated to reflect a certain image (Johnston et al., 2000). While this is expected to be especially true for statements and declarations by the EEAS, national governments (either as a press release or outed by a minister or ambassador), these documents provide evidence that is objective because it was created outside the influence of the research (Johnston et al., 2000). The official statements are in the appendix.

5.2 Indicators

5.2.1 Internal cohesiveness

Cohesiveness takes two forms: policy cohesion and the unity of international representation. Here, policy cohesion is the ‘cohesion among the positions of the Union and member states’ representatives’ and unity of international representation the ‘unity in the presentation of such positions to the outside world’ (Gatti, 2021, p. 158). This means that internal cohesiveness shows either in coherent positions between representatives or by unified voting in either the Foreign Affairs Council, the UN Security Council or in another forum. For this research, it was important to identify when internal cohesiveness is either low or high, hence this was indicated either by difference of opinion between representatives in for example the media, or by disunity in their voting behaviour. This means that even when member states vote unanimously in the Foreign Affairs Council, the EU’s internal cohesiveness can be low, as in this case they vote similarly but make opposing statements, or vice versa, when divisions are presented in such a way that it downplays internal divisions (Gatti, 2021). The unity of representation was defined as the degree of voting similarly, where a unanimous vote is the

highest degree of internal cohesiveness, decreasing when more states vote contrary to the majority of the member states' opinion. Policy cohesion can be established by assumption, observation or deduction (Da Conceição-Heldt, 2011). The simplest way of assessing preferences is to assume that states attempt to maximise national welfare. The second method of assessing actors' preferences is through observation. These 'revealed' preferences are then used to explain the interaction among states. National preferences are determined by sub-national interests, especially by those powerful groups, such as interest groups, parties or bureaucrats, which are able to set national priorities. Finally, one can fix the preferences of nation states by deducing them using pre-existing theory (Da Conceição-Heldt, 2011; Frieden, 1999). For the purposes of this research, observation of preferences is the best way of measuring internal cohesiveness. Preferences sometimes align with the observable behaviour of states and leaders, but we can never know their true motivations and there is a difference between preferences and strategy (Frieden, 1999). For an assessment of internal cohesiveness, however, it is not as crucial to know whether disagreements come from genuine conflict of preferences or not, fact is that the level of internal cohesiveness is low. There is no way around this problem, because our observations are limited to the behaviour of individuals, groups, or governments, or what they say (Frieden, 1999). Observation is therefore the best way of determining preferences for this research, and if these do not align at all between member states there is no internal cohesiveness, when they are identical this is perfect internal cohesiveness. In other words, low internal cohesiveness was established when there was preference heterogeneity, which could either become apparent through statements or voting behaviour.

5.2.2 Autonomy

Discretion is concerned with the formal authority of powers to the agent. While this can be measured as just that, that is not sufficient as control mechanisms can limit this discretion to a large extent. Even when accounting for these, actual discretion can be different from the desired discretion (Gastinger & Heldt, 2022). The EEAS, however, is set up as an autonomous body, so what is of interest is its autonomy in regard to the member states. This means that it was based on divergence from the lowest common denominator. Since member states need unanimity to agree on matters of foreign policy, this limits its discretion. The EEAS will

display degrees of autonomy, though, by acting in ways that do not reflect what this unanimity is, what all member states agree on. Unanimity is reflected in the lowest common denominator of the member states. Anything that departs from this denominator, is agent autonomy or agency slack, where the latter necessarily is contrary to the will of the member states. This research looks at autonomy, which includes slack as well. For example, when the lowest common denominator of the Foreign Affairs Council is narrow, and the EEAS publishes a statement that goes beyond that. Where decisions are made on the basis of unanimity, it can be expected that EU policies produce lowest common denominator standards. In other words, autonomy can be measured as high when there is a higher misfit between this LCD and the policy output (the common position presented). Some studies have observed a divergence between this LCD and the standards as policy outputs, resulting in a misfit (Zaun, 2016). This misfit indicates a large degree of autonomy for the legislator, or in this case for the EU body being the EEAS. A misfit between the LCD can also be described as deviation from the position of some member states, since every member state would be included in this LCD in unanimous decision-making procedures.

5.3 Limitations

A big limitation of this research is the fact that it had to rely on what information was publicly available. To best see how exactly disagreements between countries affect EEAS autonomy, information is needed both on what these disagreements are and what controls were exercised and how much that limited autonomy. However, in the CFSP, these cases are especially sensitive. Therefore, a lot happens behind closed doors and the real motives for certain actions can be hidden. Another limitation is the possibility of reverse causality between the variables. It cannot be ruled out that a low degree of EEAS autonomy has led to member states disagreeing with one-another. This is, however, an unlikely thesis in an area like the CFSP where the stakes for member states are high and they are expected to have their preferences and interests defined outside the influence of institutions.

6 Findings

Before diving into the divisions between the member states between 2019 and 2021, the section will first set out the EU's position, based on government or government official's statements on several issues relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. That also includes the role of the EEAS in the conflict. It is the starting point for the analysis and testing of the rival hypotheses, which will be done using statements before and after events that displayed low internal cohesiveness.

6.1 The EU and the conflict

The EU had delegations abroad before the Lisbon Treaty, but these were Delegations of the European Commission. In Israel, the EU is present since 1981 as Delegation of the EC (EEAS, n.d.). After entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, these became Delegations representing the EU as a whole, marking the start of an EU 'embassy' in Israel (EEAS, n.d.). Today, the EU pursues diplomatic relations with both Israel and Palestine, but the latter is as a general rule followed by an asterisk (*), signifying that those relations are not to be interpreted as a recognition of a State of Palestine, 'without prejudice to the individual positions of the member states on this issue' (European Commission, n.d.). However, after the Swedish government officially recognised the state of Palestine, resolutions in national parliaments of the member states led to the EP to adopt a resolution supporting in principle recognition of the state of Palestine (Martins, 2015). These events put pressure on the EEAS to follow a similar course, but the EP is not an EEAS principal and therefore these other institutions, while possibly having an impact, fall outside the scope of this study. The focus is on the member states, that a Bulgarian diplomat working for the EEAS described as very diverse, but having common values such as the rule of law, which is the basis of the EU, and that it supports a two-state solution (Palestine Public Broadcasting, 2021).

6.1.1 EU position

While disagreement happens behind closed doors, sometimes it becomes apparent in the media or at international for a through statements made by politicians or diplomats, or through research. The following section identifies issues on which EU member states especially disagreed to determine the official EU

position on these issues. The EU's position on Israel and Palestine are subject to change over time. For this research that covers 2019 until 2021, means that as initial preference January 2019 must be used.

6.1.1.1 Two-state solution and Jerusalem

The first HR/VP, Catherine Ashton, said in 2010: 'We must spare no effort to get negotiations back on track on all final status issues. There is no alternative to a negotiated two state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict' (European Commission, 2010). An important part of the two-state solution is that Jerusalem is to be the capital of both these states. Especially this condition became increasingly contested in the following decade. After the US decided to move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, Hungary blocked a statement a joint EU statement. Czech Republic said it also considered moving its embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem (Irish & Emmott, 2017). Following Donald Trump's decision so closely, this was seen as an endorsement of the American move. However, Frederica Mogherini said that she had been reassured this was definitely not the case (Irish & Emmott, 2017). The HR/VP and EU foreign ministers had an informal breakfast with Israel's Prime Minister Netanyahu, in the margins of the Foreign Affairs Council a few days later. Here, the EU says to have reiterated its 'united and clear messages on the status of Jerusalem as the future capital of two states, the importance of preserving a two-state solution and, in relation to regional issues, on the need to continue implementing the JCPOA (Iran nuclear deal)' (Council of the European Union, 2017, p. 5). In an emergency meeting of the UN General Assembly on 21 December 2017, by lack of a joint opinion, most of the EU countries decided to make a statement on which they all could agree, leaving out member states that did not. This statement contained a continued commitment to a two-State solution, as well as on the status of East Jerusalem. The statement was made by a representative of Estonia, who spoke on behalf of most member states and a few EU candidate countries (United Nations General Assembly, 2017). The countries Croatia, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Romania refrained from this statement. Subsequently, it was these countries except Greece that abstained from a vote in resolution ES-10/L.22. All other EU member states voted in favour of this resolution, rejecting the United States recognition as the capital of Israel.

6.1.1.2 Settlements

In 2010, Israel planned to continue building settlements in occupied East Jerusalem (RFE/RL, 2010). Catherine Ashton, HR/VP at the time, expressed the EU's standpoint: 'We think that the settlements should stop, most importantly we believe the talks should begin' (Illmer, 2010). Later that year former EU leaders, including Javier Solana who fulfilled the post of what is now the HR/VP after the Lisbon treaty, called for the EU to impose sanctions on Israel for settlement building. HR/VP Ashton said in a response that the bloc's approach would not change (BBC News, 2010). She stressed that 'the EU position on settlements is clear: they are illegal under international law and an obstacle to peace. Recent settlement related developments, including in East Jerusalem, contradict the efforts by the international community for successful negotiations' (European Commission, 2010). In January 2019, the EU reaffirmed that it is committed to the two-state solution and an agreement that ends the occupation that began in 1967. It stressed that in recent violence civilians including children were killed on both sides. It acknowledges Israel's legitimate right to safeguard the security of the Israeli people, the 'EU expects the Israeli authorities to adhere strictly to the principles of necessity and proportionality in its use of force and to take steps against the settler violence' (EEAS, 2019). Especially these settlements are condemned: all settlement activity is illegal and goes against the possibility of a two-state solution and peace. Moreover, it stressed that coordination with the Palestinian authorities is essential, and that they need to return to Gaza and intra-Palestinian reconciliation is needed. The EU continues to support Palestinian aspirations for statehood, but it is important that its institutions become more transparent, accountable and democratic. This statement is in line with that the EU's policy of the previous years, with for example HR/VP Mogherini saying in 2017 that 'the only realistic solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is based on two states, with Jerusalem as the capital of both the state of Israel and the state of Palestine' (EEAS, 2017).

6.1.1.3 Recognition of products

In 2015, the EC issued guidelines for the labelling of some products produced in Israeli settlements and on occupied land. In a reaction to this decision, Israel said that it was suspending dialogue with the EU on the peace process (De la Baume, 2015). Israel's foreign ministry said that it condemned the decision. It regretted

that ‘the EU has chosen, for political reasons, to take such an exceptional and discriminatory step, inspired by the boycott movement, particularly at this time, when Israel is confronting a wave of terrorism targeting any and all of its citizens’ (Embassy of Israel in Finland, 2015). Questions in the European Parliament asked whether the Commission introduced the labelling scheme in order to support the BDS (Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions) movement and what its views are on the movement (Parliamentary Questions: Question for Written Answer E-015311-15 to the Commission, 2015). In her answer, the HR/VP said the Commission firmly opposed boycotts against Israel, evident from the fact that Israel and the EU are major trade partners. However, the EU holds the well-known view that it will not recognise changes to Israel’s pre-1967 borders other than agreed by the parties. She added that ‘the EU considers Israeli settlements in occupied territories illegal under international law, a position that is reiterated in several Foreign Affairs Council conclusions’ (Parliamentary Questions: Answer given by Vice-President Mogherini on Behalf of the European Commission, 2016). While other Israeli allies in Europe had accepted the code, the Czech lower house urged the government not to implement the EU settlement labelling guidelines (Rettman, 2015). Hungary simply rejected implementing the labels, calling the tool ‘bad’ and ‘unreasonable’ (Rettman, 2015). At the same time, the HR/VP Mogherini said the European Council unanimously supported the scheme (Rettman, 2015). Ireland went a big step further in 2019, when a bill was passed that aimed to not label, but ban, goods produced in Israeli settlements. On 24 January 2019, [while still not enacted] Ireland’s lower house passed the Occupied Territories Bill, which would ban the trade of goods that come from territories occupied under international law, most notably Israeli settlements (*Control of Economic Activity (Occupied Territories) Bill 2018*, 2019). While this was not a cause for big debate between member states in the media, questions were asked in the European Parliament regarding the Commission’s position on the Bill (Parliamentary Questions: Question for Written Answer P-000081-19 to the Commission, 2019). In a reply to these questions to the HR/VP Frederica Mogherini said that the common commercial policy is the EU’s exclusive competence. It rejects attempts to isolate Israel so does not support this boycott (Parliamentary Questions: Answer given by Vice-President Mogherini on Behalf of the European Commission, 2019). Hungary, however, reiterated its opposition to the EU directive on labelling goods produced in settlements, in line with what they said in 2015 (Ahren, 2019). The

issue was addressed internally, and not reflected externally. For example, the EU said later that month that ‘over the last three months, the situation in the occupied Palestinian territory has continued to deteriorate with no prospect of a clear political horizon. Violence, including terrorist attacks, and unrest have increased in the last months of 2019 in the West Bank and in Jerusalem (EEAS, 2019).

6.1.2 Role of the EEAS

The HR/VP, Commission, EEAS play an important supranational role in the CFSP. The EEAS fills the diplomatic post, taking care of external representation of the EU. In the conflict this is also its role, the service prepares documents after coordinating the EU position, guided by the member states and presents these externally and publishes them on its website. Besides being dependent on the member states, the EEAS can also be impacted by the Commission through the HR/VP, EP, or others. The continuity of EU policy regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict depends on its ability to operate as a unified actor (Lovatt, 2017). An EEAS diplomat said after the Commission published settlement product labelling guidelines: ‘member states let us crash. If member states don’t back us, why should we be fooled again?’ (Lovatt, 2017, p. 12). This refers to their view that, when member states request something, they have to provide the necessary political backing, which is not always the case (Lovatt, 2017).

6.2 Events displaying low policy cohesion

After having established the EU position on the issues of the two-state solution, Jerusalem, settlements and the recognition of products, this next section will identify and evaluate events that displayed a low degree of policy cohesion. The position of the EEAS in these events is based its own statements and declarations, as well as those by the HR/VP or another EU spokesperson, as they are prepared by the EEAS as well and published on their own website. These statements are contrasted with the LCD that follows from the positions of the member states. While several countries can be seen as especially supportive of Israel and others as more critical of it, Hungary has been the most vocal in the recent years. Most attention is paid to these most vocal countries, as they are to be found on the further sides of the division between member states critical and those supportive of Israel. Which countries they are and on which side of the division has been conceptualised before and the deduction of the actor’s positions by Asseburg

serves as a starting point (Asseburg, 2019, pp. 42–43). This shows that the member states most critical of the government of Israel's policies are Sweden and Ireland (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2014; Taylor, 2016; Asseburg, 2019; Rettman, 2021). Those most aligned with the government of Israel's policies are the Visegrad or V4 countries Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia (Asseburg, 2019). The V4 countries had improving relationships with Israel over the past years, with Netanyahu seeing them as his biggest chance of achieving foreign policy objectives of Jerusalem (Molnár, 2019). The prime ministers of the V4 countries and Israel had met, signalling warmed relations and hopes for future cooperation. However, the dynamics changed significantly in February 2019, after a diplomatic incident between Poland and Israel. After Netanyahu said that Poles had cooperated with the Nazi's to kill Jews during Germany's occupation of Poland in World War II, a Visegrad summit that was supposed to take place in Jerusalem did not happen as such (Deutsche Welle, 2019).

The analysis starts in 2019, when Hungary followed this up by opening a diplomatic office in Jerusalem, being the first EU country to do so (France 24, 2019). In November 2019, Hungary blocked a joint EU statement on Israeli settlements on Palestinian territory. The analysis goes until the end of 2021, when after military hostilities between Israel and Palestine, the EU failed to reach a common position after Hungary was the only country not to agree on the text of the statement (Von der Burchard & Herszenhorn, 2021). For each case, first the context and positions of the relevant actors are established. Then, a possible change in statements is analysed. Finally, these two together are weighed for the hypotheses to determine which one better depicts a change in EEAS autonomy.

6.2.1 Hungary opens trade office in Jerusalem

Hungary continued its closer alignment with the state of Israel, making a significant step when it announced that its trade mission to Jerusalem would be a branch of the Hungarian embassy. It was announced by its Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in Jerusalem in February, when he said that he informed the Prime Minister that the Hungarian government decided to open up a trade representation there, 'which will have diplomatic status' (Government of Hungary, 2019). According to Hungary's foreign minister, their positions on the Middle East peace process were in line with those of the EU (Ahren, 2019). He stressed that their

embassy was in Tel Aviv and that there were no plans for changing that. However, this clearly had symbolic value as Israel's Prime Minister in a response said this move was 'important for trade, for diplomacy and for the move that Hungary is leading right now to change the attitude in Europe towards Jerusalem' (Mission of Israel to the EU and NATO, 2019). He thanked Hungary especially for 'the battle against the falsehoods and slanders levelled at Israel in international forums' and their stance against antisemitism (Mission of Israel to the EU and NATO, 2019). Hungarian Foreign Minister urged for a 'tighter, better and more dynamic' cooperation between Israel and the European Union (Mission of Israel to the EU and NATO, 2019).

6.2.1.1 Support for the hypotheses

While this move was contrary to EU policy that regards Jerusalem as the explicit capital of both (future) states, there are only few EEAS documents available from the beginning of 2019, as can be seen in the appendix. After January, there is a gap until mid-April, meaning that an analysis of this case cannot rely on EEAS documents. Nevertheless, the other data available show that while Hungary's move was contrary to the EU position, it presented to the outside world that it was acting fully in line with it. This shows that countries can indeed pursue foreign policy through their own channels, while at the same time agreeing in the EU for the sake of unity or for other reasons, such as a duty of sincere cooperation. This is in line with hypothesis II, which says that states know that unanimity is required for meaningful policy output, and when they cannot get their way there, they can just decide to bypass the EEAS. In this case, Hungary valued presenting a common position, rather than tighter control on the EEAS. This case aligns most closely with that second hypothesis.

6.2.2 EU statement criticising Israel

This time, it was in fact a statement itself that was the cause of further disagreement between the member states. In April 2019, the court upheld a deportation order from the Israeli government against Omar Shakir, the Israel and Palestine director of Human Rights Watch, due to his involvement in the boycott movement (Shakir, 2019). According to himself, Human Rights Watch neither supports nor opposes boycotts of Israel, yet 'the court ruled that Human Rights Watch's research and advocacy on settlement businesses constitute a "boycott" under Israeli

law. The decision effectively means that, if you call on companies to do the right thing and stop contributing to human rights abuses and discrimination by doing business in settlements, you risk being barred from Israel and the West Bank' (Shakir, 2019). The EU called on Israel to not deport the director. In a UN Security Council meeting, the Finnish representative said *on behalf of the EU*: 'We are concerned that, within the current political landscape, those on all sides who seek to bridge the gap between Israelis and Palestinians are undermined,' ... 'In this regard, we urge Israel to allow Mr. Shakir and Human Rights Watch to continue their human rights advocacy work unimpeded' (Landau, 2019). Here, the EU called on Israel to halt the deportation on 30 April 2019. Hungary accused the EU of ignoring its veto on this joint statement in the UN Security Council (Euronews, 2019). After Hungary had vetoed the statement last minute, Finland as a spokesperson read it out anyway on behalf of the EU, however not listing the EU in the list of member states (Rettman, 2019). This is contrary to the way CFSP is conducted on the basis of unanimity. An EU diplomat later said that this had to be done because of the timing of the Hungarian decision to withdraw its approval for the text (Rettman, 2019). Nevertheless, Hungary said that it was 'unacceptable' to read the statement without unanimous agreement, and its foreign minister said 'we made it very clear that we do not agree with the text that was finalised' (Euronews, 2019). According to him, Finland's representative to the UN was right to only name the 27 EU member states that agreed with the statement but was wrong later when he referred to the group as the EU.

6.2.2.1 Support for the hypotheses

The statement concerned was voiced by the Finnish ambassador and as such is not published by the EEAS. It shows, however, the use of control mechanisms by the member states and the consequences for autonomy of the EU as an institution. The case shows that even where unanimity is required and not actually reached, a common EU position can be established and read out in external representation in an international forum. The EU did not present the LCD to the outside world, but went beyond it. This shows that even when controls are officially used, this does not mean that they are thoroughly followed by an EU institution. The timing of the veto may have caused annoyance, but according to the treaties this common position should not have been presented in the absence of unanimity. This case is more in line with hypothesis II, because it means that the EEAS as an

autonomous body is certainly not constrained when the HR/VP or Commission decide to ignore a veto. This suggests a large degree of autonomy for the EEAS, as they would not be any more constrained than the Commission or HR/VP, being functionally autonomous body under the HR/VP. The EU did not reflect the LCD, but went beyond it in line with its own earlier policies. A big difference though with the previous case, is that this time, Hungary did not decide to present a common position to the outside world. This means that non-exclusive delegation does not necessarily lead to abandonment of EU channels in favour of national foreign policy channels, but that this choice is case-dependent.

6.2.3 US Middle East peace plan

On 28 January 2020, the US President Donald Trump presented his Middle East peace plan alongside Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu at the White House, saying that these proposals ‘could be the last opportunity for Palestinians’ (BBC News, 2020). What he presented as a two-state solution to the conflict, some argued was in fact a single-state solution (Oppenheim, 2020); the plan includes Israel’s annexation of a part of the West Bank and with Jerusalem as Israel’s capital (White House, 2020). The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the occupied Palestinian territory said that ‘the Palestinian statelet envisioned by the American plan would be scattered archipelagos of non-contiguous territory completely surrounded by Israel, with no external borders, no control over its airspace, no right to a military to defend its security, no geographic basis for a viable economy, no freedom of movement and with no ability to complain to international judicial forums against Israel or the United States’ (United Nations, 2020). Ireland was one of the EU countries strongly opposing the initiative, expressing ‘grave concern’ (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2020). The Irish government said in a statement that Ireland would support any peace initiative that respects a two-state solution and the aspirations of both peoples, but the announced US initiative does not meet this threshold (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2020). The member states made conflicting statements on the US plan, also between the states that are generally the balancing states, such as France. Soon after, Hungary spoke out in support of the US proposal, saying it would achieve peace in the long term (Kovacs, 2020). From this event onwards, there are EEAS documents available in the archive, statements or declarations, before or after the event.

6.2.3.1 Change in statements

After the announcement of the peace plan, the EU at first came out with an indistinct statement saying it would ‘study and assess’ the proposals put forward (EEAS, 2020b). There was no unanimity between the member states, as some countries such as Austria, France and Poland welcomed the plan, and others like Luxembourg and Ireland were very critical (Oppenheim, 2020). While most did want to reach a common position and put it out, it was Hungary that blocked a stronger common statement by the EU countries (Oppenheim, 2020). Still, a week later, the HR/VP Josep Borell published a statement in his own authority, saying that the US initiative departed from the internationally agreed parameters: ‘We are especially concerned by statements on the prospect of annexation of the Jordan Valley and other parts of the West Bank. In line with international law and relevant UN Security Council resolutions, the EU does not recognise Israel’s sovereignty over the territories occupied since 1967. Steps towards annexation, if implemented, could not pass unchallenged’ (EEAS, 2020c). Later that month, the HR/VP came with statements asking Israel to reconsider settlement construction plans and a after the actual construction of these, called Israel to halt the construction, again (EEAS, 2020d, 2020e). These are similar to the statements that were published before Hungary blocked this common position. The weeks before that, there was another statement on settlements, after the Israeli approval of the construction of almost two thousand housing units in illegal settlements in the occupied West Bank, as well as the removal of existing constructions (EEAS, 2020a).

6.2.3.2 Support for the hypotheses

While several member states had differing opinions on the American Middle East plan, it was Hungary that blocked a joint statement, as other countries valued a common position nonetheless. However, the EEAS documents do not stop after the studying and assessment of the proposal. Instead, they include the HR/VP who decided to speak on his own behalf. This statement was critical of the plan and in line with previous EU policy on the issue. It reflected the trajectory of the EEAS as well as that of most of the member states, but not that of Hungary, with a diverging opinion. Therefore, in this case, the LCD was reflected only right after the publication of the proposal, which was too early for countries to have formed their opinions. When they had, though, there was no unanimity on what this

position should look like. This was followed, as there was no official common position presented to the outside world. However, the EEAS published the HR/VP's opinion on his own behalf. This was not made explicit and he referred to 'we,' leaving questions about how different this is from a statement on behalf of the EU, him being the foreign policy chief. The case shows that the low degree of internal cohesiveness in the EU did not lead to the LCD in the following EEAS statements. The conflicting positions on the US Middle East plan were not reflected in the statements. This supports neither hypothesis I or II, because the EEAS seemed to be negatively nor positively influenced by the low degree of internal cohesiveness. It shows, however, a level of autonomy, because it found ways to continue with its own agenda. This means that a low degree of internal cohesiveness can be permissive of EEAS autonomy. Because it was done on personal title, it is unclear whether this is more in line with hypothesis I or II.

6.2.4 Czech Republic opens diplomatic office in Jerusalem

In March 2021, Czech Republic opened a diplomatic office in Jerusalem (Al Jazeera, 2021). While it was stressed that its official embassy remained in Tel Aviv, it was a sign that the country accepted Jerusalem as Israel's capital (EU Reporter, 2021). On 11 March, the prime ministers of Israel, Czech Republic and Hungary held a trilateral summit in Jerusalem on cooperation in vaccines. Israel's prime minister Netanyahu said at the summit that it was 'a delight to welcome two close friends,' ... 'both close personal friends but also leaders who've made their countries even greater friends of Israel than before. We appreciate the fact that they've opened up missions in Jerusalem and also that they assist us on the international stage as true friends do' (Embassy of Israel in London, 2021). Three years earlier, the Czech president had suggested moving its embassy to Israel altogether, where opening a honorary consulate would be the first step, then followed by other Czech institutions, after which finally the embassy would follow (Janicek, 2018). This plan was not followed through with, as Czech Republic's Prime Minister recalled that the European Union's policy is against opening embassies in Jerusalem (EU Reporter, 2021). Israel has longer been hoping for other countries to move their embassies to Jerusalem, but in 2017 HR/VP Mogherini made clear that 'from the European Union member states this move will not come' (EEAS, 2017). Due to the non-exclusive nature of delegation of foreign policy to the EEAS, it is legally possible for countries to do this, but the fact that

the EU position changed their opinion suggest a big role for institutions here, contrary to for example Novak (2014) who believes this role is not possible for foreign policy. Peter Stano, spokesperson for the EU, said the previous year that ‘there is no EU member state with an embassy in Jerusalem,’ and ‘any diplomatic steps that could call into question the EU’s common position on Jerusalem are a matter of serious concern and regret’ (Deutsche Welle, 2020).

6.2.4.1 Change in statements

After settlement announcements in the beginning of 2021, the EEAS’ position was consistent calling on Israel to end all settlement activity and dismantle its outposts that have been set up since 2001 (EEAS, 2021a). The EU was especially critical of the lack of accountability for both Israeli and Palestinian security forces for the excessive use of force (EEAS, 2021b). In April, it reiterated its strong opposition to Israel’s settlement policy and actions taken in this context (EEAS, 2021c). On 23 April 2020, the HR/VP addressed cooperation on the coronavirus as well as the EU’s position on territories occupied by Israel since 1967 which remained unchanged (EEAS, 2020g). The same day, the Head of the Delegation of the EU to the UN, made a statement, of which he said he had ‘the honour to deliver this statement on behalf of the European Union’ (EEAS, 2020f). Beside a similar call and recalling that settlements are illegal under international law, the EU reiterated ‘its strong opposition to Israel’s settlement policy and actions taken in this context, such as building the separation barrier beyond the 1967 line, demolitions and confiscation - including of EU funded projects - evictions, forced transfers including of Bedouins, illegal outposts and restrictions of movement and access. It urges Israel to end all settlement activity and to dismantle the outposts erected since March 2001, in line with prior obligations. Settlement activity in East Jerusalem seriously jeopardizes the possibility of Jerusalem serving as the future capital of both States’ (EEAS, 2020f).

6.2.4.2 Support for the hypotheses

The case shows that the EEAS opposes the opening of embassies in Jerusalem, as well as other diplomatic steps in that direction. The Czech diplomatic office in Jerusalem constituted such a step. The EEAS documents before and after the event were consistent. They did not relate to opening diplomatic offices, but concentrated on settlements. The LCD as shown in EEAS documents did not change

before or after the vote. This time, however, there was not a vote, the lower policy cohesion became apparent by actions of the member states. That does not mean there was no internal cohesiveness, as it can become apparent through vote or through positions found in the media. It shows again that national foreign policy was pursued through Czech Republic's own channels, bypassing the EEAS. The EEAS was therefore consistent in pursuing its own agenda. This supports hypothesis II, because in non-exclusive delegation the bypassing of the EU leads to a less tight use of control mechanisms. It is unlikely that 'leaders who've made their countries even greater friends of Israel than before' (Embassy of Israel in London, 2021) at the same time want to use strong terms to condemn settlements. Czech Republic, like Hungary, left the EEAS autonomy by turning to other channels of conducting foreign policy.

6.2.5 The 2021 Israeli-Palestinian crisis

On 10 May 2021, there was a big outbreak of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (United Nations, 2021). After days of severe violence and many lost lives in one of the biggest outbreaks of violence in many years. On 18 May, 26 EU foreign ministers called for a ceasefire between Israel and the Palestinian Hama and increased humanitarian aid for Gaza (Siebold & Emmott, 2021). Hungary was the only country not agreeing to this call for a ceasefire by absence, which means the EEAS did not have the required unanimity mandate to call for this ceasefire. Beside Hungary's absence, there was a more general lack of internal cohesiveness between the member states. The Cypriot Foreign Minister said that the EU should have a leading role in defusing the crisis, but it did not have this role, either due to differences between member states or by lack of a strategic approach from Brussels (Siebold & Emmott, 2021). Countries like Ireland took a position critical of Israel's response, while the Visegrad countries supported it. For example, Ireland's Foreign Affairs Minister condemned the firing of rockets from Gaza and the impact on Israeli civilians, but so too should such a brutal response, calling the Israeli response 'completely unacceptable' (Finn, 2021). At the same time, despite not joining Hungary to back the vote against a European call for a ceasefire, Czech Republic waved the flag for Israel. Its Foreign Minister visited soon after, with a visit expressing support for Israel, which 'has every right to protect its citizens against ruthless terror' (Plevák, 2021). Hungary's Foreign Minister condemned the attacks against Israeli cities carried out by Palestinian

terror groups, expressing solidarity with Israel and recognising its right to self-defence; ‘the senseless and indiscriminate violence against our civilians must stop immediately’ (Szijjártó, 2021). Beside a low degree of policy cohesion and therefore low internal cohesiveness between the member states that are usually in different blocks, also a low degree of policy cohesion was visible within the blocks. Contrary to Hungary’s response, the V4 country Poland explicitly called upon both sides, Israel as well as Palestine, to end violence and prevent further loss of life. All actions that led to civilian casualties were condemned (Government of Poland, 2021).

6.2.5.1 Change in statements

Before 10 May, the EU had reiterated that all settlements in occupied Palestinian territory are illegal under national law: ‘the EU will not recognise any changes to the pre-1967 borders, including in Jerusalem, other than those agreed by both sides. The EU renews its call on the Israeli government to halt settlement construction and to reverse these latest decisions as a matter of urgency’ (EEAS, 2021d). Just before the violent outbreak, during an increase in tensions and violence in the occupied West Bank, particularly East Jerusalem, the EU called on political, religious and community leaders on all sides to show restraint and responsibility and try calm down the situation (EEAS, 2021e). On the day of the violence outbreak, the EEAS called the firing of rockets from Gaza against civilian populations in Israel totally unacceptable and said it fed escalatory dynamics (EEAS, 2021f). Again, all leaders and both sides were called on their responsibility to act. Two days later, the HR/VP said that the EU expressed dismay at the large number of civilian deaths and injuries, including children. Now, paying attention to how Israel responded: ‘The indiscriminate launching of rockets from Hamas and other groups towards Israeli civilians is unacceptable. While recognising Israel’s legitimate need to protect its civilian population, this response needs to be proportionate and with maximum restraint in the use of force’ (EEAS, 2021g). On 16 May, the EU again made a similar, more elaborate statement in the UN. It said that it was concerned about the violence and called for a cessation of hostilities (EEAS, 2021h). While the EU called on political leaders to ‘work together through visible actions to contribute to calm and address the underlying causes of the tensions’ (EEAS, 2021h), the statement did not mention anything about a ceasefire. This changed on 20 May, when the EU said in the UN General

Assembly that the priority was the ‘immediate cessation of all violence and the implementation of a ceasefire’ (EEAS, 2021i). The next day, after a cease-fire was agreed, the HR/VP welcomed it, commending Egypt, Qatar, the United Nations, United States, and others who have helped facilitate it (EEAS, 2021j). On 27 May, it reiterated in the UN that the EU has already strongly condemned the launching of rockets by Hamas and other groups on Israeli territory, as well Israel’s right to self-defence, underlining that it must be exercised in a proportionate manner and respecting international humanitarian law (EEAS, 2021k). Despite the lack of unanimity, the EEAS put out a statement two days later in the UN Security Council, on behalf of the European Union. The Finnish ambassador said that ‘the priority is the immediate cessation of all violence and the implementation of a ceasefire, in order to protect civilians, and to provide full humanitarian access to Gaza’ (EEAS, 2021i). The vast majority EU foreign ministers in the foreign affairs council emergency meeting called for a cease-fire between Israel and the Palestinians. Hungary was the one country to disagree to the call for this ceasefire. Its foreign minister explained that he had a general problem with EU statements on Israel: ‘they are usually very much one-sided, and these statements do not help, especially not under current circumstances, when the tension is so high’ ... ‘so if we have already made eight statements, which didn’t make sense, why should we make a ninth one? ... EU diplomacy should not consist only of judgements, negative statements and sanctions’ (Euractiv, 2021). The HR/VP Borrell said that the priority was the cessation of all violence and the implementation of a cease-fire. Since Hungary had opposed an EU statement, HR/VP Borrell made the comments in an effort ‘to reflect the overall agreement’ (Erlanger, 2021). Later that day, however, a ceasefire was agreed, after diplomatic pressure from Germany and France as well as statements by the United States president (Erlanger, 2021). The next day, the EEAS put out a statement by HR/VP Borrell the next day, welcoming the ceasefire (EEAS, 2021j). Borrell called the meeting hoping to create a unified EU position on the hostilities. He said he was quite satisfied with the text of his statement, which received support of almost all countries, but he was frustrated about failing to bring Hungary on board (Von der Burchard & Herszenhorn, 2021). Later in May, Ireland urged Israel to end ‘de facto annexation’ of Palestinian land, which it said was the first time an EU government used this phrase regarding Israel (Reuters, 2021).

6.2.5.2 Support for the hypotheses

In this case, it was Hungary and Czech Republic who were most aligned with Israel in the conflict. They showed support for Israel while condemning Palestinian actions. Especially Hungary was also opposed to calling for a ceasefire, explained by their foreign minister as doing no good. There was no unanimity for a call to a ceasefire, rendering this outside of the lowest common denominator between the member states. Some member states were critical of Israeli actions and other of Palestinian actions and some of both. With not all countries explicitly calling on both sides to cease violence, the lowest common denominator does not even reflect an equal appeal to both sides in the conflict. The first EEAS documents after the outbreak of violence do not reflect a call for a ceasefire, in line with the LCD. However, from 20 May, this changes, and one is already agreed the next day. Based on this, at first there is support for hypothesis I, and a few days later for hypothesis II, suggesting the EEAS follows the LCD at first but later after being subject to more pressures acts either more in the way of the majority or its own agenda. The stronger support for hypothesis II is also shown in the fact that it always called on both sides equally to take action to stop violence, while some countries explicitly blamed one side and not the other. This could, however, also be a compromise between both positions.

7 Discussion

The objective of the study was to see whether the EEAS displays degrees of autonomy in times with low internal cohesiveness. Since theory does not guide us in one single direction, two rival hypotheses were tested. What stands out is that, while all countries like Czech Republic, Hungary, Ireland, Poland, Slovakia and Sweden were expected to play a role in the cases, it was mostly Hungary that played a central role in all of the cases. While it was expected that several more vocal countries would use their veto power more, it turned out that only Hungary exercised this to a high degree. Countries like Czech Republic, Ireland, Poland, Slovakia and Sweden were more willing to agree to a common position. Tendencies of de-Europeanisation can be seen as well, or especially, in smaller member states. This is surprising because the Europeanisation of foreign policy is expected to have the smaller member states as takers of foreign policy (Dyduch & Müller, 2021). It is possible, due to the fact that they are takers, that they must use their own channels, knowing there is little chance for them to achieve their diplomatic goals through the framework of the CFSP and the EEAS. They can choose to either accept a common position and conduct foreign policy through their own channels, or to risk jeopardising European unity. When spokespersons cannot present a certain position because of the lack of unanimity, they sometimes decide to do this on personal title. However, they still represent the EU in some capacity so it is unclear what the implications of this are and what type of autonomy it represents: their own agency or that of the institution.

Across the cases, there was more support for hypothesis II than I. Countries pursued foreign policy through their own channels, while at the same time agreeing within the EU for other reasons. For example, while Czech Republic and Hungary were enhancing the ties with Israel and presenting themselves as friends, the EEAS that also represents them was busy putting pressure on Israel to stop with its settlement activities. They know that unanimity is required for meaningful policy output and they decide to bypass the EEAS. Presenting a common position was still valued. On other occasions, reaching a common position was not valued and they exercised their veto right. When this veto right was exercised, this seemed not to impact EEAS autonomy, displaying mechanisms as found in

hypothesis II. Soon after this, there is more support for hypothesis I, indicating that different mechanisms are true at different points in time after a conflict of opinion in the Council.

7.1 Strengths and limitations

The findings allow for a comparison between cases, which allows for conclusions to be drawn that would not be possible studying a single event. A limitation of this research is that a misfit between the LCD and the policy outcome can also be the result of the involvement of actors that are not within the principal-agent model of delegation, for example the EP. A thorough application of a multiple principals model, taking account of the EP and EC, could show that a certain outcome was not EEAS autonomy in its own right. It could have actually been the effect of control exercised by others. Another limitation is that a misfit between the LCD and the policy outcome can also be a result of deals made behind closed doors. Or, the fact that big countries such as France and Germany are shapers of EU foreign policy and not takers. A final limitation, is that for some events that could have proven useful in the beginning of 2019, the archives had gaps that cannot be explained by external factors. They are likely the result of missing documents in the archive.

8 Conclusion

The EEAS was set up as an autonomous body to enable it to achieve influence for the EU on the global stage. At the same time, however, the service deals with foreign policy which remains unanimity-driven. Non-exclusive delegation causes the member states to have to deal with other agency problems than in other policy areas. These diverging consequences were discovered in the theoretical chapters and put to the test in the findings. The guiding research question was: *what is the effect of internal cohesiveness on EEAS autonomy?* The case study reveals that the EEAS can be controlled by the member states and be bound to all the member states' positions. The effect can go away after some time, when the EEAS can return to policies more in line with its own agenda. At other times, the overall abandonment of EU foreign policy channels by some member states has led to the EEAS being able to continue pursuing its own agenda while member states relinquish control. The cases show that sometimes the EEAS is bypassed. At other times, however, controls are more strongly exercised and this is seen in the EEAS statements immediately following the event. Soon after, however, the EEAS starts to act more in line with its earlier opinions.

The answer to the question is two-fold. The findings reveal that in the long term, low internal cohesiveness has little effect on EEAS autonomy. In the short term, there is more effect of internal cohesiveness on EEAS autonomy. Whether this effect is small or large, depends. When deviant member states decide to pursue policy through their own channels, this effect is minimal, leaving a large degree of autonomy for the EEAS to pursue its agenda. When these deviant member states decide to use their veto power in the Council, this effect becomes much bigger, resulting in less autonomy for the EEAS to pursue its agenda. Again, in the long run, officials often decide to speak in other titles, reducing this effect.

8.1 Recommendations for future research

While this research provides insight into EEAS autonomy, it is hard to say when autonomy can be prescribed to what agent under the CFSP as a whole. A lot of foreign policy happens behind closed doors, so it is often unclear whether a certain shift comes from the HR/VP or from the diplomatic service EEAS, for

example. Therefore, future research would hopefully have access to diplomats within the EEAS, as well as other EU institutions, in order to conduct interviews. The temporal dimension that came forward in the findings is not one that was expected based on a review of the literature. This should be further researched, because it is unclear what changes between an EEAS statement based on the LCD and a later one. Based on the sources used in this research, that is not possible to say. There could be a socialisation process, the power of diplomacy, for member states to eventually agree to a common position behind closed doors, for example. Future research could develop a model to combine member state control over the EEAS with that of horizontal checks, such as of the EP. By highlighting further how the EEAS works and how temporal dynamics play a role, researchers can help to unravel more the complex dynamics at play during the crafting of common positions in European foreign policy.

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10 Appendix

The table below contains the EEAS statements and declarations related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict between 2019 and 2021.

Date	Title	Link
22-01-2019	EU Statement – United Nations Security Council: Debate on the Situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian Question	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement---united-nations-security-council-debate-situation-middle-east_en
25-01-2019	EU Statement: United Nations Security Council: Arria formula meeting on Women, Peace and Security	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement-united-nations-security-council-arria-formula-meeting-women_en
16-04-2019	Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the plenary session of the European Parliament on the US recognition of the Golan Heights as Israeli territory and the possible annexation of the West Bank settlements	https://www-un-org.eur.idm.oclc.org/unispal/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/EUSPEECH_160419.pdf
20-08-2019	EU Statement – United Nations Security Council: Open debate on Maintenance of international peace and security: Challenges to peace and security in the Middle East	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-statement---united-nations-security-council-open-debate-maintenance-international-peace-and_en
02-09-2019	Local EU statement on demolition of Palestinian property in area C of the occupied West Bank	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/palestine-occupied-palestinian-territory-west-bank-and-gaza-strip/local-eu-statement_en

Date	Title	Link
06-09-2019	EU Statement – United Nations General Assembly: High-Level Meeting on the International Day against Nuclear Tests	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement---united-nations-general-assembly-high-level-meeting_en
10-09-2019	HRC 42 - EU Statement: Item 2 - General Debate on HC oral update	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-geneva/hrc-42-eu-statement-item-2-general-debate-hc-oral-update_en
17-09-2019	HRC42 - EU Statement - Item 4: Rights situations that require the Council's attention	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-geneva/hrc42-eu-statement-item-4human-rights-situations-require-councils-attention_en
17-09-2019	Statement by the Spokesperson on the latest settlements' announcements by the Israeli authorities	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/statement-spokesperson-latest-settlements'-announcements-israeli-authorities_en
25-09-2019	Statement by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini delivered on behalf of the EU at the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/statement-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-delivered-behalf-eu-conference_en
25-09-2019	Statement by the Conveners of the UN General Assembly 74th Session High Level Side Event “How are we going to stop the war on children?”	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/statement-conveners-un-general-assembly-74th-session-high-level-side-event-_en
21-10-2019	EU Statement – United Nations 3rd Committee: Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Fundamental Freedoms and Reports of Special Rapporteurs and Representatives	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement---united-nations-3rd-committee-promotion-and-protection-0_en
22-10-2019	EU Statement – United Nations 1st Committee: Thematic Discussion on Other Weapons of Mass Destruction	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement---united-nations-1st-committee-thematic-discussion-other_en

Date	Title	Link
31-10-2019	Local EU statement on the need for legislative harmonization to uphold freedom of expression	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/palestine-occupied-palestinian-territory-west-bank-and-gaza-strip/local-eu-statement-0_en
03-11-2019	Statement by the Spokesperson on the latest escalation around Gaza	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/israel/statement-spokesperson-latest-escalation-around-gaza_en
04-11-2019	Statement by the Spokesperson on latest settlement announcement by Israeli authorities	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/statement-spokesperson-latest-settlement-announcement-israeli-authorities_en
07-11-2019	EU local statement on the arrest of PA minister for Jerusalem Affairs by Israeli authorities	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/palestine-occupied-palestinian-territory-west-bank-and-gaza-strip/eu-local-statement_en
11-11-2019	Statement by the Spokesperson on the case of Human Rights Watch director Omar Shakir	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/statement-spokesperson-case-human-rights-watch-director-omar-shakir_en
11-11-2019	EU Statement – United Nations General Assembly: Fourth Committee, Agenda item 50: UNRWA	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement---united-nations-general-assembly-fourth-committee-agenda-item_en
12-11-2019	Statement by the Spokesperson on the security situation in Israel and Gaza	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/statement-spokesperson-security-situation-israel-and-gaza_en
14-11-2019	EU Explanation of Vote: United Nations 2nd Committee: Permanent	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-explanation-

Date	Title	Link
	sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources...	<u>vote-united-nations-2nd-committee-permanent-sovereignty_en</u>
15-11-2019	EU Statement – United Nations 4th Committee: Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People	<u>https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement---united-nations-4th-committee-report-special-committee_en</u>
18-11-2019	Statement by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini on Israeli settlement policy	<u>https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/statement-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-israeli-settlement-policy_en</u>
20-11-2019	EU Local Statement on the occasion of the Universal Children’s Day	<u>https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/palestine-occupied-palestinian-territory-west-bank-and-gaza-strip/eu-local-statement-0_en</u>
26-11-2019	EU Explanation of Vote: United Nations 2nd Committee: Resolution on Agricultural technology for sustainable development	<u>https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-explanation-vote-united-nations-2nd-committee-resolution-agricultural_en</u>
04-12-2019	Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, Meeting of States Parties 2019 - EU Statement	<u>https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/biological-and-toxin-weapons-convention-meeting-states-parties-2019-eu-statement_en</u>
10-12-2019	Statements by the European Union at the WTO General Council meeting, 9-10 December 2019	<u>https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/world-trade-organization-wto/statements-european-union-wto-general-council-meeting-9-10_en</u>

Date	Title	Link
09-01-2020	Israel: Statement by the Spokesperson on the latest settlement announcements	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/israel-statement-spokesperson-latest-settlement-announcements_en
23-01-2020	Statement by Presidents Michel, Sassoli and von der Leyen on the 75th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz-Birkenau	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/israel/statement-presidents-michel-sassoli-and-von-der-leyen-75th-anniversary_en
28-01-2020	Declaration by the High Representative Josep Borrell on behalf of the EU on the Middle East Peace Process	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/israel/declaration-high-representative-josep-borrell-behalf-eu-middle-east-peace_en
04-02-2020	MEPP: Statement by the High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell on the US initiative	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/mepp-statement-high-representativevice-president-josep-borrell-us-initiative_en
18-02-2020	EU Statement on the occasion of the 54th Session of CTBTO Working Group B, which deals with the examination of verification issues.	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-statement-occasion-54th-session-ctbto-working-group-b-which-deals-examination-verification_en
22-02-2020	Statement by the High Representative Josep Borrell on Israeli settlement announcements	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/statement-high-representative-josep-borrell-israeli-settlement-announcements_en
24-02-2020	Statement by the High Representative Josep Borrell on Israeli settlement announcements	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/pakistan/statement-high-representative-josep-borrell-israeli-settlement-announcements_en

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25-02-2020	HRC 43 - High-level Segment - EU Statement	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-geneva/hrc-43-high-level-segment-eu-statement_en
27-02-2020	HRC 43 - Item 2 - Annual report of the OHCHR and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General - EU Statement	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-geneva/hrc-43-item-2-annual-report-ohchr-and-reports-office-high-commissioner-and_en
28-02-2020	Statement by the High Representative Josep Borrell on the Israeli announcement of construction plans in the West Bank (Area E1)	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/statement-high-representative-josep-borrell-israeli-announcement-construction-plans-west-bank_en
01-03-2020	Sudan: Joint press statement with North Darfur Governor Malik Al Tayeb after High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell visits Zam Zam Camp	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/sudan-joint-press-statement-north-darfur-governor-malik-al-tayeb-after-high-representativevice_en
10-03-2020	HRC43 - Item 4 - Human Rights situations that require the Council's attention - EU Statement [made by Croatian Ambassador Permanent Representative Vesna Batistic Kos on behalf of the EU]	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-geneva/hrc43-item-4-human-rights-situations-require-councils-attention-eu-statement_en
20-04-2020	Local EU Statement on Israel's Holocaust Remembrance Day (Yom Ha'Shoah)	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/israel/local-eu-statement-israels-holocaust-remembrance-day-yom-hashoah_en
23-04-2020	Israel: Statement by High Representative Josep Borrell	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/israel-statement-high-representative-josep-borrell_en

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23-04-2020	EU Statement – United Nations Security Council open VTC: Situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement---united-nations-security-council-open-rtc-situation-middle_en
29-04-2020	“Protect our Children” - Response to the UN Secretary-General’s Call on Countries to Prioritize Children’s Education, Food, Health and Safety amid the COVID-19 Pandemic	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/“protect-our-children”-response-un-secretary-general’s-call-countries-prioritize-children’s_en
30-04-2020	Answering the UN Secretary-General’s Call on Gender-Based Violence and COVID-19	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/answering-un-secretary-general’s-call-gender-based-violence-and-covid-19_en
30-04-2020	“Protect our Children” - Response to the UN Secretary-General’s Call on Countries to Prioritize Children’s Education, Food, Health and Safety amid the COVID-19 Pandemic	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/“protect-our-children”-response-un-secretary-general’s-call-countries_en
08-05-2020	75 years from the end of the Second World War on European soil: Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/chile/75-years-end-second-world-war-european-soil-speech-high-representativevice_en
17-05-2020	Joint Statement to Mark the International Day Against Homophobia, Biphobia and Transphobia (IDA-HOBiT)	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kazakhstan/joint-statement-mark-international-day-against-homophobia-biphobia-and_en
18-05-2020	Israel: Statement by the High Representative Josep Borrell on the formation of a new government	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/israel-statement-high-representative-josep-borrell-formation-new-government_en
21-05-2020	Declaration by the High Representative, on behalf of the European Union,	https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-

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	on the remarks by Iran's Supreme Leader	releases/2020/05/21/declaration-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-remarks-by-iran-s-supreme-leader/
28-05-2020	Local EU statement on demolitions in the West Bank	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/local-eu-statement-demolitions-west-bank_en
02-06-2020	EU Statement on the occasion of the Fifty-seventh Session of Working Group A, CTBTO Preparatory Commission (Vienna, 01-02 June 2020)	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-statement-occasion-fifty-seventh-session-working-group-ctbto-preparatory-commission-vienna_en
26-06-2020	EU Statement on the occasion of the Fifty-Fourth Session of CTBTO Preparatory Commission (25 - 26 June 2020)	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/vienna-international-organizations/eu-statement-occasion-fifty-fourth-session-ctbto_en
21-07-2020	EU Statement -- United Nations Security Council: Open VTC on the Situation in the Middle East	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement-united-nations-security-council-open-rtc-situation-middle-east_en
15-08-2020	Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of European Union on the announcement of a normalisation of relations between Israel and the UAE.	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/japan/declaration-high-representative-behalf-european-union-announcement-normalisation_en
20-08-2020	The EU Missions in Jerusalem and Ramallah condemn death sentence issued in Gaza	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/palestine-occupied-palestinian-territory-west-bank-and-gaza-strip/eu-missions-jerusalem_en
24-08-2020	EU Statement on the occasion of the 55th Session of CTBTO Working Group B on 24 August 2020 in Vienna	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/vienna-international-

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		organisations/eu-statement-occasion-55th-session-ctbto-working_en
26-08-2020	EU Statement – United Nations General Assembly: High-level Meeting on International Day against Nuclear Tests	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement---united-nations-general-assembly-high-level-meeting-0_en
21-09-2020	Joint Statement by Friends of the COVAX Facility (FOF)	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/joint-statement-friends-covax-facility-fof_en
25-09-2020	HRC45 - Item 4 - Human Rights situations that require the Council's attention - EU Statement	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/hrc45-item-4-human-rights-situations-require-councils-attention-eu-statement_en
25-09-2020	Address by President of the European Council Michel at the 75th United Nations General Assembly General Debate	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/address-president-european-council-michel-75th-united-nations-general_en
30-09-2020	“EU needs to be stronger not only for itself, but to contribute to a better world” – Speech by President Charles Michel at the UN General Assembly	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/“eu-needs-be-stronger-not-only-itself-contribute-better-world”---speech-president-charles-michel-at-the-un-general-assembly_en
15-10-2020	EU Statement – United Nations 4th Committee: General Statement	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement---united-nations-4th-committee-general-statement_en
15-10-2020	West Bank: Statement by the High Representative Josep Borrell on Israeli settlement expansion	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/west-bank-statement-high-representative-josep-borrell-israeli-settlement-expansion_en
19-10-2020	The EU Missions in Jerusalem and Ramallah condemn death sentences issued in Gaza	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/west-bank-statement-the-eu-missions-in-jerusalem-and-ramallah-condemn-death-sentences-issued-in-gaza_en

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		<u>high-representative-josep-borrell-israeli-settlement-expansion_en</u>
20-10-2020	EU Statement – United Nations 4th Committee: Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories	<u>https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement---united-nations-4th-committee-report-special-committee-0_en</u>
20-10-2020	EU Statement – United Nations 4th Committee: UNRWA	<u>https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement---united-nations-4th-committee-unrwa_en</u>
24-10-2020	Israel/Sudan: Statement by the Spokesperson on the announced normalisation of relations	<u>https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/israelsudan-statement-spokesperson-announced-normalisation-relations_en</u>
26-10-2020	Joint Statement – United Nations 3rd Committee: Human Rights Situation in Belarus	<u>https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/joint-statement---united-nations-3rd-committee-human-rights-situation_en</u>
26-10-2020	EU Statement – United Nations Security Council: Open debate on the Middle East	<u>https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement---united-nations-security-council-open-debate-middle-east_en</u>
27-10-2020	EU Statement – United Nations 3rd Committee: Interactive dialogue on human rights in the Palestinian territories	<u>https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement---united-nations-3rd-committee-interactive-dialogue-human-0_en</u>
28-10-2020	EU Statement on the occasion of the 58th Session of Working Group A, CTBTO Preparatory Commission in Vienna on 28 - 30 October 2020	<u>https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/vienna-international-organisations/eu-statement-occasion-58th-session-working-group_en</u>

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30-10-2020	Israel: Statement by the Spokesperson on the detention and hunger strike of M. Al-Akhras	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/israel-statement-spokesperson-detention-and-hunger-strike-m-al-akhras_en
05-11-2020	Statement by the Spokesperson on the Israeli demolitions of Palestinian structures	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/statement-spokesperson-israeli-demolitions-palestinian-structures_en
10-11-2020	Statement by the HR/VP Josep Borrell on the death of Saeb Erekat	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/statement-hrvp-josep-borrell-death-saeb-erekat_en
11-11-2020	Joint statement on the occasion of the 13 th EU-Israel high level seminar on combating racism, xenophobia and antisemitism	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/israel/joint-statement-occasion-13th-eu---israel-high-level-seminar-combating-racism_en
11-11-2020	Declaración local de la Unión Europea, Noruega y Suiza, sobre el asesinato del periodista Israel Vázquez Rangel	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/mexico/declaración-local-de-la-uniión-europea-noruega-y-suiza-sobre-el-asesinato-del-0_en
12-11-2020	Egypt/Sinai: Statement by the Spokesperson on the helicopter crash of the MFO team	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/egyptsinai-statement-spokesperson-helicopter-crash-mfo-team_en
15-11-2020	Statement by High Representative Josep Borrell on settlement expansion in Givat Hamatos	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/statement-high-representative-josep-borrell-settlement-expansion-givat-hamatos_en
18-11-2020	EU Statement – United Nations 2nd Committee: Entrepreneurship for sustainable development	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement---united-nations-2nd-committee-entrepreneurship-sustainable_en

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24-11-2020	EU Local Statement on the arrest of the activist Nizar Banat	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/palestine-occupied-palestinian-territory-west-bank-and-gaza-strip/eu-local-statement-2_en
27-11-2020	UfM: Joint statement by the Jordanian and EU co-presidency on the Fifth Regional Forum of the Union for the Mediterranean	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/ufm-joint-statement-jordanian-and-eu-co-presidency-fifth-regional-forum-union-mediterranean_en
11-12-2020	Local EU statement on the imminent risk of eviction of Palestinian families in East Jerusalem	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/palestine-occupied-palestinian-territory-west-bank-and-gaza-strip/local-eu-statement-1_en
11-12-2020	EU Statement – United Nations General Assembly: Resolution on Assistance to the Palestinian People	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement---united-nations-general-assembly-resolution-assistance_en
15-12-2020	EU Statement on the occasion of the 55th Session of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission - Vienna, 14-17 December 2020	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-statement-occasion-55th-session-ctbto-preparatory-commission-vienna-14-17-december-2020_en
16-01-2021	Palestine: Statement by the Spokesperson on launching the preparations for elections	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/palestine-statement-spokesperson-launching-preparations-elections_en
17-01-2021	Israel/OPT: Statement by the Spokesperson on new settlements announcements	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/israelopt-statement-spokesperson-new-settlements-announcements_en
26-01-2021	EU Statement – United Nations Security Council: Situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian Question	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement---united-nations-security-council-situation-middle-east_en

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05-02-2021	Local EU statement on the charges against Palestinian Human Rights Defender Issa Amro	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/palestine-occupied-palestinian-territory-west-bank-and-gaza-strip/local-eu-statement-2_en
09-02-2021	Israel/Palestine: Statement by the Spokesperson on the demolitions of Palestinian structures	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/israelpalestine-statement-spokesperson-demolitions-palestinian-structures_en
23-02-2021	HRC 46 - Biannual High-level Panel on the Question of the Death Penalty Human rights violations related to the use of the death penalty, in particular with respect to whether the use of the death penalty has a deterrent...	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-geneva/hrc-46-biannual-high-level-panel-question-death-penalty-human-rights_en
24-02-2021	HRC 46 - EU Intervention in the interactive Dialogue on the High Commissioner report "Ensuring accountability and justice for all violations of international law in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East...	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-geneva/hrc-46-eu-intervention-interactive-dialogue-high-commissioner-report_en
10-03-2021	Remarks by the President of the European Council, Charles Michel on the vaccination process	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/chile/remarks-president-european-council-charles-michel-vaccination-process_en
15-03-2021	CSW Statement by the European Union, Namibia and Argentina on behalf of the Group of Friends for the Elimination of Violence against Women and Girls	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/csw-statement-european-union-namibia-and-argentina-behalf-group-friends_en
07-04-2021	Local EU Statement on Israel's Holocaust Remembrance Day (Yom HaShoah)	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/israel/local-eu-statement-israels-holocaust-remembrance-day-yom-hashoah-0_en
12-04-2021	STATEMENT by the Chair of the European Parliament Delegation for	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/jordan/statement-chair

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	relations with the Mashreq countries (DMAS), Isabel Santos	<u>europa-parliament-delegation-relations-mashreq-countries-dmas_en</u>
23-04-2021	EU Statement – United Nations Security Council: Security Council Open VTC on “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”	<u>https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement---united-nations-security-council-security-council-open-vtc-“_en\</u>
30-04-2021	Israel: Statement by the Spokesperson on the tragedy at Mount Meron	<u>https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/israel-statement-spokesperson-tragedy-mount-meron_en</u>
30-04-2021	Palestine: Statement by High Representative Josep Borrell on the postponement of the elections	<u>https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/palestine-statement-high-representative-josep-borrell-postponement-elections_en</u>
05-05-2021	Israel/Palestine: Statement by the Spokesperson on settlement expansion and the situation in East Jerusalem	<u>https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/israelpalestine-statement-spokesperson-settlement-expansion-and-situation-east-jerusalem_en</u>
06-05-2021	Israel/Palestine: Statement by the Spokesperson on settlement expansion and the situation in East Jerusalem	<u>https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/97845/israelpalestine-statement-spokesperson-settlement-expansion-and-situation-east-jerusalem_en</u>
08-05-2021	Israel/Palestine: Statement by the Spokesperson on the rise in tensions and violence	<u>https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/israelpalestine-statement-spokesperson-rise-tensions-and-violence_en</u>
10-05-2021	Israel/Palestine: Statement by the Spokesperson on the latest escalation	<u>https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/israelpalestine-statement-spokesperson-latest-escalation_en</u>

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11-05-2021	Israel/Palestine: Statement by the Spokesperson on the latest escalation	https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/98261/israelpalestine-statement-spokesperson-latest-escalation_en
12-05-2021	Israel/Palestine: Statement by the High Representative on the escalation of confrontations	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/israelpalestine-statement-high-representative-escalation-confrontations_en
16-05-2021	EU Statement – United Nations Security Council: “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement---united-nations-security-council-“-situation-middle-east_en
20-05-2021	EU Statement – United Nations General Assembly: Agenda items 37: The situation in the Middle East and 38: The Question of Palestine	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement---united-nations-general-assembly-agenda-items-37-situation_en
21-05-2021	Israel/Palestine: Statement by the High Representative Josep Borrell on the ceasefire	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/israelpalestine-statement-high-representative-josep-borrell-ceasefire_en
27-05-2021	EU Statement: 30th special session of the Human Rights Council on "the grave human rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem"	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-geneva/eu-statement-30th-special-session-human-rights-council-grave-human-rights_en
31-05-2021	EU-Jordan Joint Statement following the 12th meeting of the Association Committee	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-jordan-joint-statement-following-12th-meeting-association-committee_en
10-06-2021	Address by HR/VP Borrell to the UN Security Council	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/address-hrvp-borrell-un-security-council_en

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15-06-2021	Local EU statement on the death sentences issued in the Gaza Strip	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/palestine-occupied-palestinian-territory-west-bank-and-gaza-strip/local-eu-statement-3_en
24-06-2021	EU local statement on the death of activist Nizar Banat	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/palestine-occupied-palestinian-territory-west-bank-and-gaza-strip/eu-local-statement-3_en
01-07-2021	Protect the right to freedom of assembly at 2021 Pride Week in Tbilisi	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/protect-right-freedom-assembly-2021-pride-week-tbilisi_en
05-07-2021	EU Local Statement on the situation in Silwan neighbourhood in East Jerusalem	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/palestine-occupied-palestinian-territory-west-bank-and-gaza-strip/eu-local-statement-4_en
05-07-2021	Joint Statement on violence in Tbilisi	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/joint-statement-violence-tbilisi_en
28-07-2021	EU Statement – United Nations Security Council: the Situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement---united-nations-security-council-situation-middle-east-0_en
07-08-2021	Lebanon: Statement by the Spokesperson condemning the firing of rockets from Southern Lebanon	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/lebanon-statement-spokesperson-condemning-firing-rockets-southern-lebanon_en
16-08-2021	Afghanistan: Joint statement of the international community on the latest developments	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/afghanistan-joint-statement-international-community-latest-developments_en

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24-08-2021	Local statement on the arrests of activists by the Palestinian Authority	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/palestine-occupied-palestinian-territory-west-bank-and-gaza-strip/local-statement_en
29-08-2021	Afghanistan: Joint statement of international partners on evacuation travel assurances	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/afghanistan-joint-statement-international-partners-evacuation-travel-assurances_en
30-08-2021	Afghanistan: Joint statement of international partners on evacuation travel assurances	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/chile/afghanistan-joint-statement-international-partners-evacuation-travel-assurances_en
03-09-2021	Message by European Commission Vice-President Margaritis Schinas on the occasion of Rosh HaShanah	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/israel/message-european-commission-vice-president-margaritis-schinas-occasion-rosh_en
08-09-2021	EU Statement – United Nations: High-level Meeting on the International Day against Nuclear Tests	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement---united-nations-high-level-meeting-international-day-against_en
15-09-2021	The EU Missions in Jerusalem and Ramallah condemn death sentence issued in Gaza	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/palestine-occupied-palestinian-territory-west-bank-and-gaza-strip/eu-missions-1_en
27-09-2021	HRC48 - Item 4 - Group Statement of 26 member states	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-geneva/hrc48-item-4-group-statement-26-member-states_en
08-10-2021	Joint Statement: United Nations 2nd Committee -- Equitable Access to COVID-19 Vaccines to ensure Resilient and Sustainable Recovery	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/joint-statement-united-nations-2nd-committee-equitable-access-covid-19_en

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12-10-2021	EU Statement – United Nations 1st Committee: Weapons of Mass Destruction	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement---united-nations-1st-committee-weapons-mass-destruction_en
19-10-2021	EU Statement – United Nations Security Council: Open Debate on the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement---united-nations-security-council-open-debate-situation-middle_en
20-10-2021	EU General Statement – United Nations 4th Committee	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-general-statement---united-nations-4th-committee_en
25-10-2021	Israel: Statement by the Spokesperson on new settlement expansion	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/israel-statement-spokesperson-new-settlement-expansion_en
25-10-2021	Joint Statement: United Nations 3rd Committee: Situation of human rights in Belarus	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/joint-statement-united-nations-3rd-committee-situation-human-rights-belarus_en
25-10-2021	EU Statement – United Nations 3rd Committee: Interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement---united-nations-3rd-committee-interactive-dialogue-special_en
27-10-2021	EU Statement – United Nations 4th Committee: Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement---united-nations-4th-committee-report-special-committee-1_en
27-10-2021	EU Statement – United Nations 4th Committee: UNRWA	https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement---

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		<u>united-nations-4th-committee-unrwa-0_en</u>
28-10-2021	Israel/Palestine: Statement by the Spokesperson on the listing of six Palestinian organisations as terrorist organisations	<u>https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/israelpalestine-statement-spokesperson-listing-six-palestinian-organisations-terrorist_en</u>
29-10-2021	Israel: Statement by the Spokesperson on further settlement expansion	<u>https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/israel-statement-spokesperson-further-settlement-expansion_en</u>
29-10-2021	EU Statement – United Nations General Assembly: Report of the Human Rights Council	<u>https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement---united-nations-general-assembly-report-human-rights-0_en</u>
09-11-2021	EU Explanation of Vote – United Nations 4th Committee: Israeli practices and settlement activities affecting the rights of the Palestinian people and other Arabs of the occupied territories	<u>https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-explanation-vote---united-nations-4th-committee-israeli-practices-and_en</u>
22-11-2021	Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention - Meeting of States Parties - EU Statement	<u>https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-geneva/biological-and-toxin-weapons-convention-meeting-states-parties-eu-statement_en</u>
23-11-2021	EU Statements at the General Council Meeting, 22-23 November 2021	<u>https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/world-trade-organization-wto/eu-statements-general-council-meeting-22-23-november-2021_en</u>
29-11-2021	EU message on the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People	<u>https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-message-international-day-solidarity-palestinian-people_en</u>
29-11-2021	UfM: Joint statement by the Jordanian and EU co-presidency on the Sixth Regional Forum of the Union for the Mediterranean	<u>https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/ufm-joint-statement-jordanian-and-eu-co-presidency-sixth-</u>

Date	Title	Link
		<u>regional-forum-union-mediterranean_en</u>
01-12-2021	EU General Statement – United Nations General Assembly: after adoption of Item 39 – Question of Palestine and Item 38 – The situation in the Middle East	<u>https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-general-statement---united-nations-general-assembly-after-adoption-item_en</u>
06-12-2021	EU Statement – United Nations Security Council Arria-formula meeting: Protection of Education in Conflict	<u>https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement---united-nations-security-council-arria-formula-meeting-16_en</u>
09-12-2021	The EU Heads of Mission in Jerusalem and Ramallah welcome the partial local elections to be held 11 December 2021 as a step towards national elections	<u>https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/palestine-occupied-palestinian-territory-west-bank-and-gaza-strip/eu-heads-mission_en</u>
10-12-2021	EU Statement – United Nations General Assembly: Presentation of the resolution on Assistance to the Palestinian people	<u>https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement---united-nations-general-assembly-presentation-resolution_en</u>