Self-interests, values or rules, which one drives the EU's CSDP missions?

A congruence analysis of the EU's CSDP decision-making process

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I.   Abstract

Increasing global tensions, like those between the West and Russia constitute a change from the post-Cold War period. This means that it is ever more necessary for the member states of the European Union (EU) to collaborate on a global strategic level. Consequently, this makes the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSDP) an even more significant field of policy than before. Notwithstanding, the CSDP is still a relatively new EU policy. As a result, it has been the subject of academic research since its conception in the late 2000s. Over the years there has been much academic debate on its decision-making-process, though until recently there was a lack of research with theoretical focus.

The goal of this thesis is to utilise a congruence analysis to create more theoretical knowledge on this topic and increase the focus of the current academic debate. Three theories from the field of international relations, namely realism, constructivism and institutionalism, were chosen to serve as the theoretical framework of the analysis. A total of seven propositions were distilled from these theories and were analysed by means of a case study. This study used policy documents from decision-making processes surrounding the EUNAVFOR Atalanta and EUCAP Somalia missions to create data. These documents were gathered from a number of EU member states, who participated in these missions. Both took place in the same region and around the same time, which ensures a number of control variables. However, the difference between EUNAVFOR Atalanta being a military mission and EUCAP Somalia being a civilian one does allow this research to study both kinds of CSDP missions. Sensitising concepts, axial coding and selective coding were used for the coding. The codes were utilised to answer the propositions.

The data indicated that the theory of institutionalism provides the most relevant explanation to the functioning of the decision-making process of the CSDP. This was shown in both cases. As a result, historical events, the institutional structure of the CSDP and path-dependency elements such as long-term policies impact the decision-making of the EU member states the most in these cases. This means that aspects such as veto right and long-term strategic frameworks should be considered by policy makers. Nevertheless, other theories influence this process as well, but to a lesser extent.

As the current geopolitical situation seems to become ever more tense, the salience of the EU's role as a guardian of Western values increases. In practice, this means more CSDP missions. These findings will provide some food for thought for those in favour of further streamlining the decision-making process of the CSDP. An example of this is the recommendation to implement Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in the CSDP decision-making process. This would increase the EU's role as an autonomous strategic actor on the global stage.

II.   Acknowledgements

III.   List of abbreviations

CIVCOM	Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
CMC	Crisis Management Concept
CMPD	Crisis Management Planning Directorate
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
COREPER	Committee of Permanent Representatives
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CWG	Council Secretariat
DEF	Defense
EC	European Commission
EDA	European Defence Agency
EEAS	European External Action Service
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
EUBAM	European Union Border Assistance Mission
EUCAP Somalia	European Union Maritime Capacity Building Mission to Somalia
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
EUNAVFOR Atalanta	European Union Naval Force Somalia - Operation Atalanta
EUR	Erasmus University Rotterdam
EUTM Somalia	European Union Training Mission in Somalia
FA	Foreign Affairs
HQ	Headquarters

HR/VP	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
IMP	International Public Management and Policy
IR	International Relations
MPCC	Military Planning and Conduct Capability
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OPLAN	Operations Plan
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation
PSC	Political and Security Committee
QMV	Qualified Majority Voting
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UN WFP	United Nations World Food Programme
US	United States

Table of contents

IV. List of tables

V.   List of figures

1. Introduction

1.1 Context and problem statement

"Our CSDP missions and operations are the most tangible example of our commitment to a stable and secure international environment. They work for a better world, and a safer Europe."

(Borrell Fontelles, 2020).

This quote by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP) Josep Borrell illustrates the importance of the EU's contribution to ensuring security throughout the world. At the time of writing, the war between Ukraine and the Russian Federation grips the entirety of Europe (Jackson, 2022). This means that the need for the EU to provide security seems more urgent than ever. This apparent need for a coordinated defence and security policy by the member states of the EU originated as a reaction to the conflict in the Balkans during the '90s. Frustrated by their inability to respond to it without support from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and specifically the United States (US), several European governments decided a proper reaction was needed (Hofmann, 2010).

The response came in the form of the 1998 St. Malo Declaration, signed by France and the United Kingdom (UK). It laid out the EU's ambition to have the capability to decide and act autonomously in international crises and its aim to have the military capacity necessary to do so (Hofmann, 2010). It placed security and defence policies on the agenda, despite the declaration merely being the actions of two individual EU member states. This declaration ultimately led to the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which would later be succeeded by the CSDP (Hofmann, 2010; Koutrakos, 2013).

The CSDP was created as part of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. A few changes were made compared to its predecessor. One of which was the scope of the missions, as countering terrorism, and advisory missions, amongst others, were added to its previous tasks (Blockmans & Wessel, 2009; Koutrakos, 2013; Zajączkowski, 2020). Another change was the creation of the HR/VP. This EU official was tasked with leading both the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Defence Agency (EDA) as well as coordinating the EU crisis management and its related missions. The final major change in the Lisbon Treaty was the establishment of the 'clause of the willing', the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the EU battlegroups. All of these were meant to enable the rapid formation and deployment of troops on behalf of the EU in situations of crisis management (Blockmans & Wessel, 2009; European Parliament, 2021; Hynek, 2011; Koutrakos, 2013). As a result, the CSDP was expected to improve coherence in this policy field. Coherence both amongst member

states and EU institutions and between the member states and the EU itself. Next to this, the decision-making process was streamlined (Hynek, 2011). Both measures were expected to make the CSDP more efficient and would allow the EU to play a larger role on the international stage.

Unfortunately, the general agreement amongst scholars is that the EU had once again fallen into the expectations-capabilities gap concerning the CSDP. They do note that the CSDP had managed to launch quite a few missions, who mostly reached their targets and enhanced the EU's image as a global actor (Haesebrouck, 2015; Zajączkowski, 2020). However, the two main problems that plagued the ESDP still existed. Firstly, decisions must still be made with unanimity, meaning that the decision-making process on both the nature and scope of the mission can often drag on for a long time. The CSDP remains heavily dependent upon the political will of all the member states to conduct missions as a result. Secondly, the EU's major players, France, and Germany, have often had different stances regarding the CSDP and its future (Bakker, Biscop, Drent & Landman, 2016; Koutrakos, 2013; Zajączkowski, 2020).

This first issue is directly linked to the second one. No large or medium scale military operations have been conducted since 2008, because of the lack of consensus and political will. The ones that are undertaken, are significantly smaller in number, lack ambition and are mostly of a civilian nature. This stands in stark contrast with the strategic goals set out by the EU. Additionally, the current security situation in the world demands more from the EU. Just crisis management seems to be insufficient to reach this (Bakker et al., 2016; Koutrakos, 2013; Zajączkowski, 2020). Finally, there is still a lack of coherence amongst the involved actors. The creation of the EEAS as a solution to this has never truly been effective (Koutrakos, 2013; Merket, 2012).

To conclude, the CSDP has not lived up to the expectations that accompanied its creation in 2009. With the recent increase in tension on the European continent and beyond, such as the current war in Ukraine, the EU will need to make decisions concerning its foreign and defence policy. Hard and long-lasting decisions that are both local and global need to be made within the CSDP. The aim of this research to look into a theoretical explanation of the decision-making process of the CSDP through a study of this process in the EU military missions European Union Naval Force Somalia (EU NAVFOR) - Operation Atalanta (From now on referred to as EUNAVFOR Atalanta) and the EU Maritime Capacity Building Mission to Somalia – EUCAP Nestor, later renamed to EUCAP Somalia (From now on referred to as EUCAP Somalia). Achieving a theoretical understanding of the issue can enable future CSDP policy makers to get more insight into the workings of this procedure within CSDP in a time where it is ever more relevant. In the following paragraphs, the research question and both the scientific and societal relevance are discussed. Finally, a research outline is presented.

1.2 Research question

The increasing relevance of the CSDP, brings forward a couple of questions. How can the functioning of the CSDP in practice be explained through a theoretical approach? What does the current decision-making process of the CSDP mean for its future prospects? In order to answer these questions, this study will use a congruence analysis. This is a type of research that utilises academic theory to formulate several propositions. These are tested by using a case study that provides empirical data, which in turn can be analysed to see whether the propositions were right (Blatter & Haverland, 2014). This study uses theories from the field of International Relations (IR) such as realism, institutionalism and constructivism.

The goal of this research is to use these theories and see which one can provide the most relevant explanatory framework for the decision-making process of the CSDP. However, it is often the case that theories provide complementary insights and do not exclude each other (Blatter & Haverland, 2014). This could very well be the case in this research, as this has happened before in theoretical analyses of the CSDP (Piechowicz & Szpak, 2022). To reach the research goal, the subsequent research question has been formulated:

"Which theory can provide the most relevant explanation of the decision-making process of the CSDP, as can be seen in the CSDP missions EUNAVFOR Atalanta and EUCAP Somalia".

Additionally, there are some other questions that this research aims to answer. Which elements of the theories of realism, constructivism and institutionalism can be found in the EUNAVFOR Atalanta and EUCAP Somalia missions? What can be learned from the presence of these elements? And what does this tell us about the future of the functioning of the CSDP? The following paragraphs discuss the scientific and societal relevance of this research question and this study in general.

1.3 Scientific relevance

A topic is generally regarded as scientifically relevant when it contributes to the existing academic debate in a meaningful manner. This can be done by combining theories into a new framework or applying a theory to a new field of study (Lehnert, Miller & Wonka, 2007). However, it should be noted that merely attempting to fill a gap in the literature is insufficient to justify the relevance of a study. Some gaps exist with a good reason and sometimes do not need to be filled (Gustafsson & Hagström, 2017). This study is not looking for a gap but aims to answer the call for extended research by fellow researchers. They have recommended future study into the CSDP due to several reasons. First, the CSDP is a novel field of study (Duke, 2016). This means that doing research on this topic is not filling gaps for the sake of it but contributing to a further understanding of it. In

particular, there are still relatively few studies that looked at the CSDP from a theoretical framework (Haesebrouck, 2015). This research therefore aims to contribute to that shortage by utilising a congruence analysis approach. This provides theoretical insights to the current academic debate concerning the decision-making process of the CSDP.

It should be said that these sources were written a couple of years ago and research on a theoretical framework for the functioning of the CSDP has been done in the meantime. However, this study is justified due to a few characteristics that differentiate it from those previous research. While some studies conduct a congruence analysis, such as Haesebrouck (2015) and Piechowicz and Szpak (2022), few use a case study to draw theoretical data from. This research aims to use this method and therefore answers the recommendation for future research on individual CSDP missions (Duke, 2016). The insights of this study are used to provide recommendations that can contribute to the creation of circumstances under which the functioning of the CSDP can be better understood from a theoretical point of view. This answers the call for future research that both Bakker et al., (2016) and Hofmann (2010) put forward.

1.4 Societal relevance

Apart from being scientifically relevant, this topic is also relevant for society. The scientific literature provides several criteria that show whether a topic can be described as such. These are: the extent to which people care about the subject and the degree of which it affects them. Especially in social sciences, a study is relevant for the people who can gain insights from the findings and for whom it has practical implications (Lehnert et al., 2007). In this case, the societal relevance is mainly for other researchers and policymakers.

Despite the criticisms from scholars, CSDP missions have had tangible results. For example, the CSDP mission in Kosovo, allowed for the safeguarding and implementation of EU values such as the rule of law, by training judges and policemen amongst others (Fiott, 2020). Adding to its value, the CSDP is seen as highly relevant for both the EU and its partners. It is recognised as a key element to the EU's crisis management and the most tangible evidence of the EU's commitment to its values (Borrell Fontelles, 2020; European Court of Auditors, n.d.). Not only the EU, but also actors such as the United Nations (UN) recognise the importance of the CSDP. They emphasise the importance of future cooperation between the two bodies as a result (United Nations, 2020). As such, research into the functioning and future of the CSDP is highly relevant for the EU and by extension its citizens.

This has been further emphasised by the war on the border of the EU between Russia and Ukraine (Jackson, 2022). Unfortunately, this is part of a larger trend of an increasing frequency in the number of conflicts all over the world (United Nations, n.d.). Even worse, a vast majority of the

conflicts that exist are worsening or unchanged rather than improving (Council on Foreign Relations, n.d.). This means that the demand for CSDP missions will grow ever higher. However, at this moment the CSDP has only declined in both scale and scope since its creation in 2009 as part of its decision-making process (Haesebrouck, 2015). Therefore, insights about the functioning of this process and its future implications become ever more relevant given the grim geopolitical prospects.

1.5 Research outline

The rest of this paper has the following structure. Chapter 2 consists of an overview of the relevant literature on the CSDP decision-making. The third chapter consists of the theoretical framework that elaborates upon the theories selected in the second chapter and creates the propositions. This is followed by chapter 4, which discusses the research design. Chapter 5 contains the analysis of the data. This results in chapter 6, which covers the discussion of the findings of this study. The final section, chapter 7, contains the conclusion of the study as well as several policy recommendations.

2. Literature review

This chapter covers an overview of the existing literature regarding the decision-making process of the CSDP. The first section of this chapter provides a definition of this concept. The second part covers the academic debate concerning the decision-making process of the CSDP and how its current functioning can currently be explained through an empirical lens. The final paragraph builds upon these findings by justifying which theories will be discussed in the theoretical framework later onwards.

2.1 Defining the CSDP decision-making

Before covering the academic debate on the CSDP decision-making process, this term needs to be conceptualised. In this study, this process covers the entire decision-making process from the initial start at the working groups of the Council Secretariat (CWG), through the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and the Political and Security Committee (PSC) until the final decision by the Council about the goals and scope of the missions (Koutrakos, 2013). This covers the political-strategic dimension of the decision-making process and will exclude the practical decisions that the military leadership makes on the ground (Simón, 2011). More details about this process are presented in the research design in section 4.1.2

2.2 Overview of the CSDP literature

This paragraph discusses the academic debate concerning the functioning of the CSDP decision-making process. While some of the CSDP's achievements are recognised, the general consensus amongst scholars is that the CSDP has not achieved the expectations that existed at the time of its creation in 2009. This is even admitted by the EU itself in an evaluation of the CSDP by the European Parliament (EP). They too point at the decision-making process as one of the bottlenecks (Meyer, 2020). This section covers both what went right and wrong and the empirical explanation for it.

Nevertheless, the CSDP has achieved some tangible goals and its missions have made a positive impact in the world. A total of 34 missions have been launched since the conception of the ESDP in 1999, the current ones can be seen in Figure 1. This is a sign of progress compared to the EU's behaviour in the last decades of the 20th century (Meyer, 2020). The fact that such a framework, which allows this number of missions to happen, exists is perhaps the most remarkable feat of the CSDP, according to Haesebrouck (2015).

Figure 1

An overview of the current CSDP missions (European External Action Service, 2019)

Additionally, the stereotype that countries within the CSDP merely squabble amongst each other does not do justice to the hard work and collaboration that is done by their representatives in the earlier stages of the decision-making process. Several scholars note in Howorth (2012) that there is a consensus-seeking spirit throughout the organisation, ranging from the working groups until the PSC and the COREPER. The CWG is staffed by EU officials, while national representatives take place in the other two. All are acutely aware of the fact that collaborating with each other and trying to work out national differences is the only way to ensure the effectiveness of the CSDP. They show a true pan-European spirit and often try to convince their ministers to accept the consensus that the representatives have reached (Howorth, 2012). While this means little in the end, due to the institutional setup of the CSDP, it does show that results can be achieved.

While this does provide a slimmer of hope for the future, the reality is that CSDP decision-making limits the EU from fulfilling its potential. The required unanimous decision-making has led to a shift towards mostly low-risk and small-scale civilian missions. These have a technical and apolitical nature, which means that it is easy to agree on them (Haesebrouck, 2015). Academics such as Bakker et al., (2016), Haesebrouck (2015) and Zajączkowski (2020) state several interrelated explanations for the decision-making bottleneck of the CSDP, which can be combined into four factors. These are: differing interests, the institutional setup of the CSDP, the lack of a cohesive strategic culture and the lack of political will. It should be noted that these do not exist in a vacuum but impact each other.

The first factor that limits the decision-making process in the CSDP is the differing interests amongst the member states. This often leads to member states having different priorities. While the Eastern European members would like to focus more on countering the increasing Russian

aggression, countries in Southern Europe believe that the CSDP might be more of use in Africa (Bakker et al., 2016). This means that there are different preferences concerning the areas in which a CSDP mission should take place. As this makes it more difficult to agree by consensus, this often leads to missions with the lowest common denominator. To prevent other countries from not taking their preferences into account, countries are unwilling to change the decision-making procedure into one with QMV. As a result, CSDP decisions only get taken if the major players such as France and Germany agree on it. This usually means that the mission has to serve their national interests, relegating the CSDP as a tool to achieve that (Zajączkowski, 2020). The functioning of the process of decision-making and planning, and the role of diverging interests, can be observed through the case of the creation of a permanent European Headquarters (HQ). This was blocked by the UK for a long time, due to their fear that this would lead to supranationalism within the CSDP and tensions with NATO. Since both were not in its interest, it preferred for the decision-making process to stay the same (Hynek, 2011; Fiott, 2013).

The issue of the permanent HQ is also tied to the second factor, the institutional setup of the CSDP in general. As explained in the previous section, the manner in which the CSDP was created had severe consequences on its decision-making. The most obvious aspect of the procedure is the unanimous decision-making in the Council. This coupled with the aforementioned differing interests leads to a long and inefficient decision-making procedure. This issue is made worse by the fact that member states themselves must provide the necessary resources for a CSDP mission and can hinder this process if it does not suit them. As there is no reinforcement mechanism or rule to ensure member states provide troops to CSDP missions, there is little that other member states and the EU can do other than go into further discussion (Fiott, 2013; Zajączkowski, 2020).

Additionally, the EU has limited itself by stating that it prefers to only act upon request, or a mandate provided by the UN (European Parliament, 2020). This needs to be done by the Security Council, which too is often the victim of a political deadlock and therefore the decision-making process is drawn out even longer (Meyer, 2020). Additionally, the fact that the EU still has no permanent HQ, where it can sufficiently coordinate the numerous actors that are involved, also hinders the planning process and thus the decision-making as well (Hynek, 2011; Mattelaer, 2010). While the role of the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) as a supporting organisation is a step in the right direction, it is still not a permanent HQ (Reykers, 2019).

The third factor that impacts the CSDP decision-making is the existence of multiple 'strategic cultures' amongst member states. This means that their attitudes towards the CSDP are divided, and their vision of its future is so as well (Zajączkowski, 2020). While there is consensus on several things,

such as the need to prevent civilian casualties and the adherence to international law, the EU strategic culture is largely lacking and reactive in the aspects in which it exists (Simón, 2011; Zajączkowski, 2020). The member states all have different opinion on whether the CSDP should be a part of, or exist next to NATO, whether supranational decision-making is acceptable and whether the CSDP should solely be focused on safeguarding Europe or also play a global role (Bakker et al., 2016; Zajączkowski, 2020). This often leads to a long process of discussions before any decisions can be made and thus limits the decision-making process.

The final factor can be described as the lack of political will amongst member states to commit to the CSDP. Especially due to domestic political reasons, member states often prefer the CSDP mission to be low-cost, apolitical, and civilian to avoid any political controversy. In order to keep control, they prefer to have unanimous voting. Additionally, they often refer to the preservation of their sovereignty to avoid committing to the CSDP and avoiding a possible domestic backlash (Bakker et al., 2016; Zajączkowski, 2020). This lack of commitment leads to a slower decision-making process in general as these kinds of preferences need to be considered.

Though these factors are mentioned separately, it should be noted that all of them are intertwined into each other. The case of the European HQ and the objection of the UK to this serves as an example. This case shows that the UK's decision is not solely based up on national interest (to avoid supranationalism within the EU), but also the values that are important to the UK (to retain some independence from the EU), as well as a preference for different institutions (NATO over the EU in this case) and a possible lack of political will (fearing criticism from Eurosceptic parties). This shows how both interests, values, institutions and politics are all closely interconnected.

2.2 Selection of theories

The next paragraphs will shortly cover which IR theories were selected for the theoretical framework, based on the literature review. These three theories are realism, constructivism, and institutionalism, as their characteristics correspond the most with the factors that impact the CSDP decision-making.

Realism is one of the primary IR theories and has often been used to analyse the CSDP. The core assumption of realism is the central role of the state and its interests. States strive towards the protection of their interests above anything else. This pursuit happens in a state of 'anarchy' amongst states. The latter means that there is an absence of a higher authority that looks over the states and enforces rules and obligations. This lack of a higher authority is used by realist scholars to argue that international organisations have no use and only serve as a tool for the individual interest of states (Haesebrouck, 2015; Piechowicz & Szpak, 2022).

This theory has been selected as it provides a suitable explanation of the decision-making process of the CSDP. One of the factors that hinders the decision-making in the CSDP is the differing interests amongst member states. Additionally, the fact that some view it as merely a tool and will only commit to it when it serves their (inter)national interests is also highly reminiscent of a realist perspective. Finally, the lack of a reinforcement mechanism is a classic example of realist theory in practice (Bakker et al., 2016; Zajączkowski, 2020).

The second theory is constructivism. The core assumption of this theory is the role that intangible constructs such as culture, norms and values have in the policy process. These differ amongst actors and could lead to differing interest, opinion, and notions of what is desirable and acceptable. Likewise with realism, this theory is selected as it seems to provide a suitable explanation for the practical decision-making process of the CSDP (Haesebrouck, 2015; Pohl, 2013). This too can be tied to the empirical findings that were discussed above. The existence of differing national norms and strategic values significantly impacts the decision-making process in the CSDP. (Bakker et al., 2016; Simón, 2011; Zajączkowski, 2020).

The final theory that is used in this study is the theory of institutionalism. While this theory as a whole stresses the influence of institutions on the policy and decision-making process, it can be divided in both historical institutionalism and rational-choice institutionalism. This study uses the first one, which stresses the impact of 'path-dependency' on decision-making and explains that there is only a limited amount of policy drift possible due to these paths. As a result, it is somewhat difficult for countries to switch from a consensus type of decision-making to one based on QMV as this would signal a major shift from the current paths (Piechowicz & Szpak, 2022).

The empirical findings within the literature review show that institutionalism could provide a suitable explanation for the functioning of the CSDP decision-making process. Especially the institutional arrangement of the unanimous voting is often cited as one of the main obstacles in the decision-making process. Additionally, the lengthy decision-making process with its many actors also play a role in this. Finally, the condition to only conduct missions based on a UN mandate also hampers the process. (Fiott, 2013; Meyer, 2020; Zajączkowski, 2020).

Having discussed the literature surrounding the CSDP and justified the selection of certain theories, the next chapter covers the theoretical framework of the study in which several propositions will be distilled from these theories. Afterwards the case selection and research methods are covered.

3. Theoretical framework

This chapter builds upon the literature review by providing a theoretical background to the empirical findings that were discussed in the previous chapter. This is done in the following manner: the chapter contains three separate sections that each cover one of the theories previously selected To repeat, these theories are realism, constructivism, and institutionalism. Each section firstly covers the origins and characteristics of the theory in question. Once this is done, the theory is linked to the CSDP. This will in turn produce a couple of propositions for each theory, which will be analysed later onwards.

3.1 Realism

Realism is perhaps the oldest and most frequently used theory within the realm of international relations. One can argue that the realist tradition dates back to ancient Greece with Thucydides' accounts of the Peloponnesian wars. Despite its rich history, which includes the likes of Hobbes and Machiavelli amongst others, realism still plays an essential role to this day in the field of IR (Galston, 2010). Nowadays, realism can be divided into two main theoretical streams. The oldest of them being classical realism and the newer being structural realism, also known as neo-realism (Burchill et al., 2005). While this study will primarily rely on the theoretical concepts of neo-realism, it is still valuable to shortly cover classical realism as well, since both share a couple of core concepts.

Classical realism starts with the effect that human nature has on the world. Wars and conflicts do not exist in a vacuum, but are unavoidable due to the nature of mankind. Man is described as an egotistical being that will do anything in order to survive. Classical realism sees humans as initially living in a world in which there is no (social) state; a state of anarchy thus exists. This can only be stopped by the creation of a state that leads to the cessation of that anarchy (Burchill et al., 2005).

Though similar in outcome, neorealism's conceptual foundations differ clearly from those of classical realism (Burchill et al., 2005). Neo-realism does not start from human nature, but from the international structure in which states exist. It uses states as units and strips them of everything, except their abilities to project power. Similar to classical realism, these states exist in a state of anarchy, meaning that there is no higher authority to enforce rules or correct injustices (Galeano, 2015). This version of realism was popularised by Kenneth Waltz and his seminal work *Theory of International Politics* in 1979. Since then, other authors such as John J. Mearsheimer have added to this to make neorealism the dominant version of realism (Burchill et al., 2005).

There are several assumptions that stand at the core of neo-realism. First of all, states interact within a state of anarchy, and because of the absence of a higher authority, need to fend for

themselves (Burchill et al., 2005). This is especially important due to the second assumption. Namely, that the primary goal of the state is to survive, which is done by being as powerful as possible by any means possible. This means that 'relative power', or the difference in power relative to the other states should be maximised. This stands in contrast with the notion of 'absolute power', which focuses upon the maximisation of the total amount of power for one state. The third assumption covers the means of the state to increase their power. These are usually coercive of nature, such as military force or economic pressures. The fourth assumption is that states are rational actors and thus make a cost-benefit analysis before using their means. As a result, a state will only act if it thinks that it will benefit from it. The final assumption is that states are uncertain about the intentions of the others, meaning that they always must be 'realistic' and expect the worst (Galeano, 2015; Mearsheimer, 1994).

What are the consequences of these assumptions concerning the functioning of the CSDP? Taking the characteristics of realism into account, one could argue that realists view the CSDP as a tool to survive. The combined power of the EU's member states ensures the safety of individual members against fellow states. Additionally, the CSDP allows them to pursue their own national interests by using the resources of others. Therefore, the CSDP is also a tool to achieve the maximum amount of relative power. The behaviour of EU member states through the realist perspective could be summarised as such: since states are rational actors, it seems likely that they will only be in favour of a CSDP mission if it furthers their own interests. If this is not the case, they are more likely to withhold support for a mission.

Another one of these realist characteristics that could impact the CSDP's decision-making process is the low amount of trust that realists have in international law and organisations. They are not opposed to them in principle, but they are highly sceptical of their ability to fulfil their roles. Since there is no overarching authority to enforce international law or the will of organisations, states can ignore them if it suits their interests (Burchill et al., 2005). As a result, a realist is hesitant to cooperate, due to the fear that others will take advantage of them and increase their power without them being able to prevent this. Therefore, realists regard international law and organisations as merely a tool to further one's own agenda and will only cooperate and participate if it furthers their own interest (Galeano, 2015; Mearsheimer, 1994). As a result, the process of decision-making within the CSDP could be hindered by the lack of cooperation amongst states. This could prove especially impactful since a unanimous decision is required in order to launch a mission.

To conclude, realists argue that the individual interests of states are their main motivation. A clash of interests could strain the process as a result since member states are less willing to agree to

a decision from which they do not benefit. Additionally, realists state how a lack of trust hampers the cooperation within international organisations. Since decisions within the CSDP need to be made unanimously, a lack of trust would have a detrimental effect on the level of cooperation and thus the decision-making process and render it less useful. This theoretical framework leads to a couple of propositions concerning the CSDP decision-making process:

1a. If this theory applies it can be expected that the CSDP decision-making process will be characterised by a high degree of member states prioritising their individual interests.

1b. If this theory applies it can be expected that CSDP decision-making will be affected by a low degree of cooperation in the international arena.

3.2 Constructivism

Constructivism differs in some characteristics from the classical theories such as realism. Central to this theory is the concept that actions do not matter because of the increase in power or wealth that they provide, but rather the meaning that is attached to them by others via ideas, values, and norms. As a result, states might not act according to a rational cost-benefit analysis, but rather let the ideas, norms and values weigh in during the decision-making process (Galeano, 2015). For example, if a western country sees things through a constructivist lens, they may refrain from trading with another country due to the human rights violations that take place in this state. While this does not make sense from a purely cost-benefit perspective, the notion of upholding human rights is important to the western state and as a result influences the decision-making process.

As a result, constructivists focus more on explaining the influence that these notions have on the behaviour of states, instead of studying the impact of the behaviour itself. It is also important to realise the constructivists argue that these norms are 'mutually constituted'. This means that they influence actors and are influenced by them in return (Wendt, 1992). Positivist, or rationalist theories, such as realism and liberalism state that interests come to actors in an exogenous way. This is taken for granted by these theories and they primarily focus on the behavioural impact of this on states. So, while these theories see self-interest as a given, constructivism focuses on what factors shaped the state's notion of self-interest rather than just focus on its effects (Wendt, 1992). The fact that constructivism differs so starkly from both realism and liberalism in this aspect, has sparked major academic interest in this perspective

Constructivism can explain actions and actors within the CSDP in several ways. The first way is the 'strategic culture' of states. This is the political perception of states regarding what they feel is desirable and how they can reach this (Burchill et al., 2005). A liberal-democratic state will often refer to international law or conventions when justifying their actions for example as part of their

strategic culture. Nearly all EU member states are liberal democracies, who share these values. However, these shared values are not the only component of their strategic culture. Other factors such as national culture more broadly and laws play a role as well, and this results in differing strategic cultures amongst countries within the EU. One example of the differences in the strategic culture of EU member states is about NATO. Specifically, whether to let the EU or NATO be the key actor when it comes to the military missions launched by the Western world (Bakker et al., 2016). While a country like France is eager to let the EU play a more central role, the UK has traditionally opposed this. Another example of this is the discussion about the regions the EU should deploy its CSDP missions. Member states in Eastern-Europe such as Poland or the Baltic states are in favour of EU operations in Eastern-Europe to safeguard this flank against Russian aggression. However, countries such as France or Spain might be more in favour of deploying a CSDP mission in Northern-Africa or the Middle East in order to create stability there and decrease the number of refugees that flee to these countries (Bakker et al., 2016).

While a part of a strategic culture, values can also influence the CSDP by themselves. An example of this is the constraining power of values. Since states might refrain from showing certain behaviour, if they go against the established norms (Burchill et al., 2005). The EU itself has a number of values which lay at the very heart of the Union. These are: respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights (European Union, 2007). If the objectives of a proposed mission go against these norms or the interpretation of these by a member state, it would seem more difficult for the EU countries to launch a CSDP mission. Especially since different member states prioritise different values, this might prove an obstacle in the process (Mix, 2013).

The final aspect that could influence the CSDP is the role of 'policy entrepreneurs', in this case the EU officials. This is due to the fact that according to constructivists, actors are often much more fluid in their ideas and values. (Hopf, 1998, Wendt, 1992). This is often the case with national civil servants who start working in Brussels. Through their stay in Brussels, the behaviour of these officials changes into a more pan-European perspective, rather than just their national one (Howorth, 2012). Consequently, it does not seem unlikely that civil servants who come to work for the EU itself will put the EU's own interests before the ones of their country of origin when creating policies. This is in line with the constructivist perspective, which regards international organisations as autonomous actors. They do not merely serve the interests of the states, but also pursue their own interests (Galeano, 2015). An example in the CSDP decision-making process could be the role of an EU official in the form of the HR/VP. This official chairs the Council meetings and is thus in a prominent position to influence the process with the EU's own values and interests in mind.

As a result, based on the theoretical framework above a constructivist explanation for the functioning of the CSDP decision-making process would include the following. First, that the existence of multiple strategic cultures could hinder the decision-making process as this makes it more difficult for member states to come to a unanimous decision. Secondly, constructivism emphasises the importance of values and their influence. As a result, a disconnection between the values of the mission and the ones of the EU and its member states would lead to a more drawn-out decision-making process. Thirdly, the effect of working in Brussels seems to influence the stances of civil servants and could prove a factor of influence. This theoretical framework leads to a couple of propositions concerning the CSDP decision-making process:

2a. If this theory applies it can be expected that the CSDP decision-making process will be influenced by a high degree of differing strategic cultures amongst member states.

2b. If this theory applies it can be expected that a CDSP mission experiences a more difficult decision-making process if a high degree of conflict with EU norms and values is present.

2c. If this theory applies it can be expected that the CSDP decision-making process will be influenced by a high degree of interference from the EU and its officials.

3.3 Institutionalism

The third theory that is discussed in this chapter is institutionalism. It shares most of the assumptions that realists have concerning the international system. Institutionalists and realists alike perceive states as rational, self-interested actors who are uncertain about the intentions of other states. As a result, they try to survive by accumulating power. However, institutionalists differ from realists concerning their perception of international cooperation. They believe that institutions can provide the circumstances in which rational actors will willingly cooperate with each other, as it will benefit them (Galeano, 2015).

Institutionalism can be divided into three broad sub-theories, these being 'rational-choice institutionalism', 'sociological institutionalism', and 'historical institutionalism' (Fioretos, 2011). The most relevant one is historical institutionalism, due to its focus on events and institutional structures. Its key characteristic is the focus on the effect that the timing and sequence of events have on the political process. Actions and events create and change the constraints, and opportunities that political actors face. As a result, earlier events shape the way future events play out (Fioretos, 2011; Schmidt, 2010). The terms 'historical efficiency' or 'path dependency' are usually used for this notion. Path dependency argues that historical 'sunk costs' do matter. Sometimes it makes sense from a rational perspective to change rules or institutional structures, but then historical efficiency factors in (Fioretos, 2011). This means that once a specific decision is taken, it is often easier to continue the

chosen path rather than track back and reverse course. This is usually due to several elements. One of which is the adopted legislation and policies that are in place. Another one is the existing distribution of resources within the civil service and their current priorities (Peters, Pierre & King, 2005). As a result, major changes in course and structure do rarely occur as they requires a lot of political will and costs to do so (Fioretos, 2011; Schmidt, 2010). An example of this could be the possible changing of veto powers of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). It would be extremely difficult to change the current setup and therefore it is left alone.

Both the historical background and the path-dependency elements seem to be part of institutionalism's explanation for the functioning of the decision-making process within the CSDP. For example, a European Security Strategy was launched in 2003. It indicates where the EU will primarily focus its foreign missions, what could trigger the launch of such a mission and what the long-term strategic goals of the EU are. Especially the latter is a relevant example of the way in which previous policies are likely to shape the decision-making process, as the involved actors would want the mission to take these long-term goals into account.

As stated before, institutionalists share the same assumptions with realists concerning the nature of actors. Where they differ is in their perspective on the role that institutions can play in facilitating international cooperation amongst states. Institutionalism claims that institutions can counter the uncertainty that plagues states and in realism ensures that they won't cooperate (Galeano, 2015). To prevent this, you need a set of rules, norms, and decision-making processes. According to institutionalist theories, institutions do this in three ways. First, they introduce the 'shadow of the future', this means that states have an incentive to adhere to the rules. If they don't the others will retaliate, leaving all states involved in a worse situation. Therefore, it becomes beneficial to stick to the agreements. Doing so also improves their reputation and makes the punishment a more credible threat. Secondly, institutions allow states to gather information about each other's behaviour. Additionally, institutions often have the means to punish states for not following the rules. These factors decrease the uncertainty amongst states, which prevented states from cooperating to begin with. Finally, institutions provide the possibility to lower 'transaction costs' with their predetermined set of rules and procedures. This ensures that decisions can be made quickly and therefore make it an attractive option for rational actors (Galeano, 2015).

The EU and its already existent structure are an example of this. For example, most of the negotiations and preparations are already done by lower-level civil servants in several bodies and committees (Reykers, 2019). As a result, little time is wasted in the meetings of the Council or the

Commission itself since everybody has already agreed on the process itself regarding the decision-making. Therefore, the structure of the CSDP could help shorten the decision-making process.

The CSDP, according to the framework of institutionalism, would function in the following manner. First, as the decision-making process of the CSDP is already determined, this would ensure a relatively quick decision as there is no need to establish new rules or procedures. Second, historical events and treaties influence the behaviour of people and open some options, while closing others. As a result, the CSDP decision-process will be profoundly influenced by these kinds of path-dependency elements. This description of the theory of institutionalism leads to two propositions concerning the CSDP decision-making process:

3a. If this theory applies it can be expected that the CSDP decision-making process will function without major delays due to the high degree of predetermined rules and norms concerning the decision-making process.

3b. If this theory applies it can be expected that historical events and path-dependency elements are one of the primary factors influencing the CSDP decision-making process.

These last few pages have provided an in-depth analysis of the three selected theories and have put forward a set of propositions. These will be used in the analysis to study the cases and determine which theory can provide the most relevant explanation for the current functioning of the CSDP decision-making process. Before this is discussed, the next chapter will first cover the methodology of this study. This includes a discussion of the research design and the selected cases.

4. Methodology

This chapter covers the methodology of this study and consists of four main sections. It starts off with a description of the overarching perspective on this research, namely the congruence analysis. The second section provides additional information concerning the CSDP decision-making. This is followed by the section, which contains a description of the two EU missions that were analysed in this study. The final paragraph of this segment justifies the selection of both cases for this research. The fourth section focuses on the research design and the data selection.

4.1 Research design and additional context

4.1.1 Congruence analysis

A congruence analysis is a research design that is characterised by the usage of a small number of case studies to deduce empirical observations. These observations are subsequently compared to the previously established theoretical propositions. Based on analysis, a researcher can state which theory provides a more relevant explanation for a certain phenomenon or behaviour (Blatter & Blume, 2008; Blatter & Haverland, 2014).

The explanatory nature of the congruence analysis approach can be divided into two subtypes. The first one is the perspective that different theories contest with each other to provide the most relevant explanation. This means that there is one dominant theory that can produce the best explanation, while the other theories are only mentioned as peripheral ones. The second perspective calls for a more holistic approach, in which multiple theories supplement each other and together ensure that a satisfactory explanation can be given for a case (Blatter & Haverland, 2014).

The congruence analysis differs from other small-N research designs due to several characteristics. For example, studies that utilise a congruence analysis apply multiple theories more frequently to explain the case. Secondly, congruence analysis uses more abstract and theory-based propositions compared to the more rigid independent and dependent variables, and the relationship between these two. Finally, a study with a congruence analysis puts more emphasis on both the theoretical framework and the propositions which are drawn from that framework, due to the more theoretical and abstract nature of this kind of research design (Blatter & Blume, 2008).

4.1.2 The CSDP decision-making process

Before giving an overview of the selected cases for this research, it is worth discussing the decision-making procedure itself. This is because it has several stages and the actors involved play an essential part in its functioning. A summary of this process can be seen in Figure 2. The process itself starts in the CWG, a supporting body to the European Council. The groups host 'pre-meetings', where civil servants from the member states discuss whether an emerging crisis should be put on the

agenda of the PSC (Howorth, 2012; Mattelaer, 2010). While these are national civil servants, it should be noted that a certain degree of socialisation takes place amongst them. This in turn often results in a more consensus-seeking form of negotiations rather than blindly following the interests of their own governments (Howorth, 2012). The PSC, which includes representatives of the European Commission (EC), the EP and the member states, then decides whether EU action is required or not. When action is necessary the second phase of the process starts (Howorth, 2012; Mattelaer, 2010; Reykers, 2019).

A Crisis Management Concept (CMC) is prepared and sent to the PSC. This document sketches the possible outlook and goals of the mission and is created by the civil servants of the EEAS, in particular from the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD). Depending on the type of mission, whether it is civilian or military, either the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) or the EU Military Committee (EUMC) provides technical advice to go alongside the decisions of the CWG's (Howorth, 2012; Koutrakos, 2013; Reykers, 2019).

The PSC discusses the proposals and tries to resolve any remaining issues, before passing it onto the COREPER. This body handles the last phase of negotiations before the proposal is submitted to the Council. At this time, most of the issues are already solved via backroom-negotiations and only the final points of discussion are left for the ministers to decide upon. The Council then unanimously decides the financial framework of the mission and whether it will be military or civilian of nature (Howorth, 2011; Koutrakos, 2013; Reykers, 2019). This research will study both a civilian and a military mission to gain the broadest possible understanding of the CSDP decision-making process.

Figure 2

The CSDP decision-making process (Reykers, 2019)

Once this decision is made, two separate processes start. The EUMC then gives the order to the MPCC to start elaborating on the CMC and creates both a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and an Operation Plan (OPLAN). These documents respectively cover the course of action for the mission and the resources that are necessary to accomplish this. These again need to be approved by the SCP and the Council (Reykers, 2019). However, it should be noted that this research will not focus upon this specific part of the process. At the same time, the process of force generation initiates, in which

member states promise to provide a certain amount of personnel, material or resources for the mission. The length of this process is highly dependent on the political will of the member states to provide these resources (Koutrakos, 2013). Once these processes are completed, the mission is ready to proceed. The following paragraphs will cover why the two cases were selected for this research and provide some context concerning these cases.

4.2 Case description and selection

4.2.1 Case selection

The selection and justification of cases has always been a balancing act between academic ideal types and practical constraints such as the scope and scale of a research. This study is no exception to this. As a result, the explanation for both the selection and justification of the cases is rooted in these two factors.

From a theoretical point of view, there are two aspects that have been taken into consideration when selecting a case that allow researchers to justify their choices. The first one is called the 'thickness' of the cases, which is the extent to which there is enough material to develop a deep understanding of the case. This allows for many observations about the case, which in turn can be applied to the theoretical propositions (Blatter & Blume, 2008). Since a congruence study only uses a couple of cases, this criterion is even more important to this study. The selection of the following cases: EUNAVFOR Atalanta and EUCAP Somalia is justified since a large number of documents can be accessed and therefore this criterion is met. This is important for the generalisation of the case.

However, this is also the point where theory meets practical reality. In order to ensure a sufficient number of sources to analyse, the study limits its case selection to the CSDP mission in which the Dutch government actively participated (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 2021). This is because the author of this study is Dutch and therefore could access reports, letters, and other policy documents from the Dutch government. The Dutch government participated extensively in both missions and therefore provides a lot of documentation. Additionally, both missions take place within a similar timespan and region. This allows the study to account for most control variables. However, the missions are of a different nature, with EUNAVFOR Atalanta being a military one and EUCAP Somalia being a civilian one. This allows the study to draw conclusions on this aspect as well.

The second theoretical aspect relates to the notion of 'crucial cases', 'most-likely cases', and 'least-likely cases'. A most-likely case means that a case is most likely to be explained by (usually the dominant theory in that field of study) a certain theory. Respectively, a least-likely case is a case where a theory (usually the peripheral theory in that field of study) is unlikely to provide a relevant

explanation. These two concepts are combined in a crucial case. A crucial case means that the dominant theory is most-like to be the relevant explanation, while a minor theory is least-likely to provide an answer (Blatter & Blume, 2008; Blatter & Haverland, 2014).

The cases were selected since both could be seen as crucial cases. The EUNAVFOR Atalanta case seems to show how security and domestic interest were the primary driving factors for the decision-making process in the EU (Palm, 2018). As a result, a dominant theory like realism would seem to provide the most relevant explanation. The other two theories, constructivism and institutionalism are present, but do not feature as prominently (Riddervold, 2014). EUCAP Somalia showcases a different configuration of theories, whereby constructivism seems to be more dominant, due to the mission's focus on supporting the notion of the 'rule of law' in the region (Council of the European Union, 2012). As a result, the other two theories seem to be least likely to provide a relevant explanation for the decision-making process.

Both practical and theoretical reasons have led to the selection of the cases and both these reasons ensure that this choice was justified. However, this does mean that this selection leads to certain limitations for this study and its generalisation. These will be covered more extensively in chapter 6 when this study and its findings are discussed.

4.2.2 Case descriptions
EU NAVFOR Atalanta

Having discussed the selection of the cases, this section provides more context concerning the creation and nature of both missions. The foundation of EU Naval Force Somalia – Operation Atalanta, lies in the continuous instability and lawlessness that had plagued the African country of Somalia for the last three decades. Most states shied away from interaction with the Somalia government during that time, especially after the failed UN intervention in the country from 1992 until 1995. However, the EU remained involved in the country (Holzer, 2008).

It was not until the middle of the 2000's that the results of the unrest in Somalia started to affect the rest of the world. This was especially due to Somalia's geographic position near the Gulf of Aden and the essential Suez Canal. Somali nationals started to attack both commercial vessels and UN's World Food Programme (WFP ships providing humanitarian aid to Somalia and holding their crews for ransom. As a result, the entire world and especially the Somali population felt the consequences of this (Riddervold, 2014; Palm, 2018). The financial and humanitarian consequences of this led to the UNSC's adoption of Resolution 1846. The resolution called upon the international community to act in order to solve the two aforementioned issues (United Nations Security Council, 2008b).

Spain first put the issue on the agenda within the Council of the EU in April 2008. This eventually led to the launch of EUNAVFOR Atalanta in December 2008. Both the Council decision regarding the creation of the operation and the UNSC Resolution 1846 stressed that the two main goals of the mission were to ensure the safety of the WFP convoys to Somalia and the prevention and repression of acts of piracy in the waters near Somalia (Council of the European Union, 2008e; United Nations Security Council, 2008b).

EUCAP Somalia

The EU's activities in Somalia were supplemented in July 2012 by the creation of the European Union Mission on Regional Maritime Capacity Building in the Horn of Africa, known at the time of its creation as EUCAP Nestor (Council of the European Union, 2012). It was meant to augment the European Union military mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces (EUTM Somalia), and EUNAVFOR Atalanta. Contrary to EUNAVFOR Atalanta, which was directly involved with EU Member State forces, EUCAP Nestor was a more hands-off mission. Its main tasks were: To advise, support and facilitate the local maritime authorities; and to ensure the capability of the African countries involved to execute a long-term anti-piracy policy and take over the role of EUNAVFOR Atalanta (Glume & Rehrl, 2015; Tejpar & Zetterlund, 2013). At first, several countries in the Horn of Africa would get this help. But in 2016, it was decided to rename the mission into EUCAP Somalia and solely focus upon strengthening Somalia's capability to combat piracy (EUCAP Somalia, 2019).

4.3 Research method and data selection

4.3.1 Research method

Within the overarching research approach of a congruence analysis, the research method of a case study was used to conduct the research. A case study is characterised by the intensive and methodical analysis of one or a small number of cases. As a result, researchers who employ such a research method are more focused on gathering an in-depth understanding of a case rather than acquiring knowledge of a large number of cases (Bryman, 2012; Van Thiel, 2014). A case study is generally categorised as a form of deductive research, as its purpose is to test propositions that provide insights that could lead to the formation of new theories (Bryman, 2012). This also aligns with the purpose of a congruence analysis and is the primary reason this method was chosen.

4.3.2 Data collection, selection, and analysis

In order to collect the data for the analysis, the research strategy of desk research was used. This is a strategy which makes uses of already existing sources and analyses them for the specific purpose of a study. Desk research was chosen as the main strategy of this research due to the limited

time for and scale of this research. (Van Thiel, 2014). Additionally, it ensures the validity and reliability of the research. This is because the data was not subject to interference by the researcher, as can be the case in research strategies such as observation, surveying or interviewing (Van Thiel, 2014). Within desk research, there are a couple of different methods that can be employed in order to gather and analyse data sources. These are: 'content analysis', 'secondary analysis', and 'meta-analysis'. In this research, content analysis was used for the selection and analysis of the sources. This is due to the fact that the goals of this method align with the goal of this study. Namely, to analyse the content of the existing document and gather the message it tries to convey (Van Thiel, 2014).

The data selected for the content analysis were subject to the following criteria in order to make them relevant for this study. First, the documents were primary sources. This means that the data was produced for non-research purposes (Van Thiel, 2014). Secondly, the sources were produced by national governments, in particular the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (FA), Defence (DEF) and Foreign Aid, or their officials and ministries or international organisations such as the UN, EU. Most documents that were used for the analysis were letters from ministers to the parliament. In these letters, they provided a window into the decision-making process and the justification for their choices and interests. Another type of documents that was often used were reports by parliaments and ministries who reflected upon the decision-making process. The final type of documents were press statements or webpages. These sources and types of documents were selected because they are from the relevant actors in the cases of this research and are authentic. An authentic and relevant source is the second criteria (Bryman, 2012). Furthermore, all sources were either written Dutch or English or have been translated into one of those languages to be properly analysed. All the quotes that were used in this study have been translated into English. Finally, the majority of documents for the EUNAVFOR Atalanta case, which launched in late 2008, were written between 2008 and 2010. The sources for EUCAP Somalia, which launched in the summer of 2012, were primarily written between 2011 and 2013.

In order to analyse the data, a deductive approach was used. A deductive approach starts by establishing a theoretical framework, which is based upon already existing scientific theories. This framework combines the theories with the research question in order to create hypotheses or propositions that can be tested. This can be done by multiple means, such as interviews, observations or coding and analysing data sources (Van Thiel, 2014). This study used coding as a method of analysis. This was done in three ways that build upon each other. 'Sensitising concepts' are often used as the first step in the coding process. These concepts are broadly defined and serve as the base of the analysis (Bowen, 2006). By using sensitising concepts general categories are

established. These categories are usually refined during the 'axial coding' process. This process builds upon the foundation of the sensitising concepts. As part of this phase, new categories are added, redefined as a subtype of another category, or removed. In short, new codes are created and categorised in more specific groups. The final stage is 'selective coding'. This process emphasises picking out the most prevalent and relevant codes that will be used for the analysis and interpretation of the data. On the other hand, codes that seem irrelevant or do not contribute to the final results in any other way are removed during this stage. (Bryman, 2012; Van Thiel, 2014).

Table 1 displays the different concepts related to each proposition and a definition of the concept that was measured. These concepts were measured by using the same approach as Warntjen (2011). This research measured similar concepts by gathering documents such as press statements, policy documents, reports, and legislation from both the EU and national governments. Once these were gathered it reviewed the manner in which actors, in this case mostly member states, mentioned or referred to the measured concept. This was done by coding the objectives that were stated in the documents. While the frequency in which certain concepts were discussed is not strictly measured, it was taken into consideration during the interpretation of the data.

Additionally, annex B contains Figure 3, which is a more detailed overview of the coding process. It has a coding tree which shows the different (sub) categories that were used for coding. At first, the codes were divided amongst the three different theories. Later, these codes were further categorised based on the individual proposition they were related to. Finally, the codes that related to each proposition were divided into several sub-categories to be analysed. This resulted into three main pillars, based on the theories. These combined had a number of seven propositions with a number of 33 sub-categories containing 329 quotations from 65 documents.

Table 1

Operationalization of the propositions

Proposition (main theme)	Definition
1a. (National interests)	*"The perceived needs and desires of one sovereign state. . ."* (Nuechterlein, 1976, p. 247)
1b. (International cooperation)	*"the process of working with another company, organization, or country in order to achieve something."*(Cambridge Dictionary, 2022)
2a. (Strategic ideas)	*Strategic culture consists of the socially transmitted, identity-derived norms, ideas, and habits that are shared among the most influential actors and social groups within a given political community, which help to shape a ranked set of options for a community's*

	pursuit of security and defense goals. (Meyer, 2011, p.677).
2b. (EU norms and values)	"*The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities*." (European Union, 2007, p.13).
2c. (The role of EU and its officials)	Agencies and officials involved with the CSDP, such as the HR/VP, the EEAS and the European Union Military Committee and their influence (Rehrl & Glume, 2015).
3a. (The structure of the CSDP)	The setup of the CSDP as outlined in the Treaty of the European Union via part 2, articles 42 till 46 (Rehrl & Blume, 2015).
3b. (Historical events and path dependency elements)	Historical events and path-dependency elements such as political priorities, administrative resources, and policy inheritance at a (inter)national level (Peters et al., 2005).

4.3.3 Validity, reliability, and generalisation

An important aspect of scientific research is the validity, reliability, and generalisation of a study. The amount of validity indicates whether the concepts that are utilised in the study capture what they were meant to measure. A high validity ensures the integrity of a study. Related to this is the reliability of a study. This shows whether a study will produce the same results if it is done multiple times. Finally, the generalisation of a study stipulates whether the findings of this study can be used as a contribution to new theories or can be applied to other cases (Bryman, 2012).

To ensure the validity of this study, several measures were taken. The first of all was the usage of 'triangulation'. This means that different kinds of researchers, methods, operationalization, or sources were used in order to increase the validity of a study (Van Thiel, 2014). Due to the scope of this research, it was decided to utilise triangulation in sources to reach a sufficient amount of validity. This has been done by using sources from different authors such as national governments and other international organisations. This research used documents from six different EU member states as well as the EU itself. Additionally, different kinds of sources were used. These documents themselves ranged from press statements and letters of ministers to policy reports and government legislation. This research used 25 letters of government, 14 press statements, nine pieces of EU legislation, eight reports, three UN resolutions and 2 long-term policy frameworks. Four other sources were categorised as other kinds of sources. Secondly, the measurement validity, also known as the 'construct validity', concerns itself with whether the used concept or code covers the subject that it is supposed to measure (Bryman, 2012). This was covered due to the extended usage of academic material when constructing the codes that were used for the data analysis.

Likewise, actions were taken to make sure that the research had sufficient reliability. One way this was done was through the creation of Table 2 and Table 3, which are an overview of all the sources that were used in the document analysis (Van Thiel, 2014). This can be found in annex A and contains the name of the document, the authors, and a link to the original document itself amongst others. Besides this, this chapter contains a description of the data selection and analysis (paragraph 4.3.2), which also increases the reliability of the study (Van Thiel, 2014).

Finally, the generalisation of a research depends upon the matter in which it can be applied to other, similar studies. However, within case study research, this is of secondary importance. This is because case studies do not use a random sample and therefore are restricted in the manner in which finding can be generally applied. It is not the intention of a case study to have a high amount of generalisation (Bryman, 2012). What is important however is the notion of 'analytic generalisation'. This is related to the extent in which theoretical insights can be drawn from the observations that the study made. These can in turn be used to build a new theory, based on these findings (Bryman, 2012; Van Thiel, 2014). Though this study only researches a limited number of cases, the validity of this research would ensure the integrity of the findings. This means that they could be used for future theories concerning the decision-making within the CSDP. However, it should also be noted that each mission takes place in a different context and thus could yield different results. The results of the analysis of these cases are discussed in the chapter below.

5. Analysis of the results

Chapter 5 describes the results that were obtained via the empirical analysis of policy documents. This section has the following outline. The propositions are divided amongst the theories which they belong to. Within each proposition, The data for both cases is analysed within each proposition. The results are presented in such a manner as to avoid repetition within the findings. During the discussion of every proposition, a number of quotations that were found in the policy documents is stated to ensure that convincing empirical evidence for these interpretations is provided. A total number of 65 documents, containing 755 (366 pages for words EUNAVFOR Atalanta and 398 pages for EUCAP Somalia) pages in total. This resulted in 45 different codes and an overall amount of 329 quotations.

5.1 Realism

5.1.1 National interests

Proposition 1a states the following: "*If this theory applies it can be expected that the CSDP decision-making* process *will be characterised by a high degree of member states prioritising their individual interests.*". Within the case of EUNAVFOR Atalanta national interests seemed to be an important factor in the decision-making process. This is both the case amongst the EU in the form of the Commission and member states themselves. For example, a letter from the German government to the Bundestag (the German parliament) justifying its decision to participate in EUNAVFOR Atalanta stated the following: *"Germany has a particularly great interest in safe trade routes, ... In addition, ... several thousand German tourists travel through the Gulf of Aden on cruise ships every year."* (Bundesregierung, 2008, p.5). Several other documents, such as ones from the Spanish, and Dutch governments also mentioned their concerns regarding the safety of their commercial shipping due to the Somali pirates (Gobierno, 2009; Olofsson, 2009; Verhagen, van Middelkoop & Koenders, 2009). The member states mentioned earlier emphasised the threat to their citizens and commercial interests as a justification to participate in EUNAVFOR Atalanta. Sweden however, underlines that its national interests are mostly of a humanitarian kind. It emphasised this as its primary reason to participate by stating:" *Particular focus will be given to the task of protecting the UN World Food Programme's (WFP) humanitarian aid consignments, which are of central importance to the Somali population.*" (Olofsson, 2009, p.12). Having said this, both the German, Spanish and Dutch governments mention humanitarian grounds for their decision (Bundesregierung, 2008; Gobierno, 2009; Verhagen, van Middelkoop & Koenders, 2009). Nevertheless, these statements do show a difference in the importance that is given to the several interests between the involved actors and how this could influence the set-up of the mission. For example, by focussing more on the protection of WFP convoys or commercial ships.

Likewise, the Commission itself had a vested interest in Somalia, due to their active participation in the region during the previous decades. This is underlined by the following quote: "*The EU is not without clout. … the European Commission's Somalia Unit, which is based in Nairobi, is in fact a major actor in determining responses to the political and humanitarian issues facing the country.*" (Holzer, 2008, p.2). This means that an EU mission in Somalia would retain the EU's influence in the country. As a result, it can be interpreted that both the mentioned member states and the EU had individual motives that influenced them in the decision-making process of the mission.

The data that was gathered for the analysis of proposition 1a in the EUCAP Somalia case is less convincing in its support. National interests were mentioned in fewer documents. This does not mean that interests were not at play during the decision-making process, but they did not feature as prominently in the data compared to EUNAVFOR Atalanta. The main interest of this mission seems to be the following: "*Ultimately, the RMCB mission* [This refers to EUCAP Somalia] *would offer an exit strategy of operation Atalanta through a gradual takeover of the responsibilities for maritime security by regional states themselves.*" (European Union, 2012a, p.4). The data from the analysis does not seem to indicate that there were significant national interests present amongst the member states that decided the process.

5.1.2 International cooperation

The second proposition related to the theory of realism, namely 1b, argues that: "*If this theory applies it can be expected that CSDP decision-making will be affected by a low degree of cooperation in the international arena.*". The analysis of the documents shows little to no evidence to suspect that there was a lack of cooperation between the member states in the case of EUNAVFOR Atalanta. Consequently, the data does not support this statement and suggests the contrary. Member states and the EU alike did stress the need for cooperation and acted in this manner. This cooperative spirit was present during the decision-making process of EUNAVFOR Atalanta, as can be seen in the following quote: "*The EU decided on 15 September [2008] to establish a light coordination structure ("EU NAVCO") to support possible national operations by EU Member States off the coast of Somalia. This is in anticipation of a possible future ESDP maritime operation in the area*." (Verhagen, van Middelkoop, Koenders, 2008c, p. 5). Even before this, countries such as France, the Netherlands and Denmark were coordinating their efforts in Somalia in March 2008. Which further underlines the degree of cooperation amongst member states at the time of the decision-making process (Verhagen, van Middelkoop, Koenders, 2008a). This is underlined by a quote from a Dutch report evaluating the Atalanta operation, which states: "*The Netherlands has urged the EU to further improve mutual cooperation, where possible and relevant*." (Ministerie van Defensie,

2016, p.23). The cooperative spirit within the EU was further emphasised by a statement of the Council, as it welcomes other third-party states to cooperate as part of the EUNAVFOR mission (Council of the European Union, 2008a; 2008b).

The answer to proposition 1b in the case of EUCAP Somalia is double-sided. On the one hand, the decision-making process was not hindered by a lack of cooperation amongst the EU member states. Similar to EUNAVFOR Atalanta, there seemed to be an emphasis on international and European cooperation during the decision-making process. This is exemplified by the following quote from a letter of government concerning a CSDP conference that was held just a week after EUCAP Somalia was launched: "*European cooperation in security and defence is intended to enable joint action to prevent and combat conflicts and threats.*" (Hillen, 2012, p.1). Similar words were said by the Dutch foreign minister Frans Timmermans and his colleagues in a letter to the Dutch parliament concerning EUCAP Nestor:*"… the European Council endorsed the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) of the … (EUCAP Nestor) mission. The decision of the European Council is supported by UN Resolution 1851. This resolution encourages international cooperation between states and organisations in the fight against piracy."* (Timmermans et al., 2013, p.1). It must be said that both quotes primarily discuss the political climate regarding the decision-making process rather than the process itself. However, given how both are stated by relevant actors in the time of the decision-making process, they seem to give a credible insight concerning the level of cooperation.

On the other hand, there was a lack of cooperation between the EU and the possible African recipient countries during the decision-making process. Several reasons are given to explain this. One of them is mentioned in this statement: "*Some interviewees in Brussels suggested that the three years of discussions and planning had raised concerns in potential recipient countries that the EU was not serious about its plans to deploy an RMCB mission.*" (Tejpar & Zetterlund, 2013, p. 18). The fact that countries such as Kenya and Tanzania were already receiving similar support from other countries or the lack of the necessary maritime administrative infrastructure, such as a separate coast guard, to collaborate within the EU are stated as other reasons (Tejpar & Zetterlund, 2013). As a result, there is no sufficient evidence to fully support or reject this proposition and therefore the conclusion is indecisive.

5.2 Constructivism
5.2.1 Strategic culture

The first proposition related to constructivism, 2a, is as follows: "*If this theory applies it can be expected that the CSDP decision-making process will be influenced by a high degree of differing strategic cultures amongst member states.*". The data from the analysis of EUNAVFOR Atalanta does not seem to indicate that differing strategic cultures proved influential in the decision-making

process. Nevertheless, this does not mean that there were no differences in strategic culture. For example, the Dutch government preferred the mission to be on EU level (Tweede Kamer, 2008). Contrary to the Dutch, the UK government was more in favour of closer cooperation with NATO. This organisation was also active in Somalia during that period with their own anti-piracy operation (called Ocean Shield). It expressed its preference by saying: *"The UK welcomes the progress made by the Czech Presidency on improving relations between the EU and NATO. …This step is again welcomed by the UK as key in increasing transparency as well as reducing duplication between the two organisations."* (European Scrutiny Committee, 2009, p.3). However, this preference does not seem to have impacted the decision-making process.

The most important aspect of the strategic culture seems to be the Western values, as both the member states and the EU itself stated their concerns regarding the lack of rule of law and disastrous humanitarian situation as the main grounds for their participation (Bundesregierung, 2008; Council of the European Union, 2008d; Gobierno, 2009; Olofsson, 2009; Verhagen, van Middelkoop & Koenders, 2009). However, for some countries this is a more important part of their strategic culture than for others. A country such as Sweden justified their participation in the mission almost solely on the dire humanitarian situation, only mentioning their commercial interests in a single sentence (Olofsson, 2009). Spain however, while too stressing the horrific circumstances in Somalia at the time, did dedicate a whole paragraph of their justification of the mission to their civilian and commercial interests (Gobierno, 2009). Their primary reason to be involved was stated as: "*Spain, … by virtue of the commitment of Spanish society to the defence of international legality and security, must become involved in the processes that seek the improvement of such a serious situation."* (Gobierno, 2009, p. 2). That could be explained by the fact that a Spanish vessel was taken hostage by Somali pirates and several other attempts were undertaken against other Spanish ships (Gobierno, 2009). Which resulted in the Spanish government putting more emphasis on the aspect of security, as it was something that affected them more compared to Sweden. This shows that, while there were differences in the strategic culture of the member states, they did not significantly hamper the decision-making process as their common values outweigh this in their decision to decide upon the launch of EUNAVFOR Atalanta.

Proposition 2a cannot be supported by the data gathered from the analysis of the EUCAP Somalia case. The main strategic culture from the EU regarding this mission was centred around the increase of the rule of law by training of maritime police forces in the Horn of Africa in order to fight piracy and ensure the presence of justice for the people by itself (European Union, 2012b). This is repeated by a number of EU member states, which underlines a consensus rather than a clash concerning strategic cultures (Auswärtiges Amt, 2015; Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2014; La

Moncloa, 2014; Timmermans, 2013). This is exemplified in a letter from the Dutch minister of Foreign Affairs to the parliament, which stated: "*The Netherlands supports the overarching EU Strategy for the Horn of Africa. … the civilian mission EUCAP NESTOR that will focus on regional maritime capacity-building from early 2013 onwards, allows for an integrated approach to the problems in Somalia*…" (Timmermans, 2013, p.1). As a result, the evidence points to the contrary of the proposition, as there was a low degree of different strategic cultures in the decision-making process.

5.2.2 EU norms and values

The second proposition (2b) argues that: "*If this theory applies it can be expected that a CDSP mission experiences a more difficult decision-making process if a high degree of conflict with EU norms and values is present.*". That seems to be the case within EUNAVFOR Atalanta. There was no conflict between the objectives of the mission and the values of the EU, so the launch of the mission was quickly decided. Rather than a conflict, a consensus could be found that the EU values that were at stake. Values such as: human dignity, rule of law and human rights are of the utmost importance to the European Union and its members (European Union, 2007).

Especially the value of human dignity seems to have propelled the states to take action. An example of this can be seen in the justification by the German government to get involved in the mission: "*The EU-led Operation Atalanta aims to combat and deter pirates operating off the coast of Somalia. On the one hand, Atalanta is intended to secure humanitarian aid for the suffering Somali population, which is endangered by pirate attacks*." (Bundesregierung, 2009, p.5). The Swedish government states similar reasons for the need to be involved in Somalia (Olofsson, 2009). Countries who agreed that these values were at risk and that action should be taken, took an active stance in order to speed up the decision-making process. For instance, the Netherlands played an active role in pressing the EU to act due to the dire circumstances in Somalia. A policy document stated: "*The Netherlands has also on a number of occasions explicitly drawn the attention of the EU to the situation in Somalia.*" (Verhagen, van Middelkoop & Koenders, 2009, p.3.). This example shows if there is a match between EU values, a mission is more likely and faster to be launched.

The data gathered from the analysis of the EUCAP Somalia case points in the same direction as the EUNAVFOR Atalanta mission. The main value of this mission is the creation and enforcement of the rule of law in Somalia and its neighbouring countries. This stable and safe environment would also allow for the upholding of human rights and democratic values (European Union, 2012b). Values such as the rule of law, human rights and democracy are at the hearth of the EU (European Union, 2007). This means that the values associated with EUCAP Somalia are in line with the general EU values. The overlap between these values can be seen in a statement by the EU's HR/VP Catherine Ashton while visiting Somalia. *The EU is the biggest donor to Somalia … Out of it, €500 million have*

been invested for development aid through the European Development Fund (EDF), in order to
support effective governance, rule of law, education and stimulating economic development.
(European External Action Service, 2012, p. 2).

Having shown that there was compatibility between the mission's and the EU values, the decision-making process had two faces. On the one hand, the first part of the decision-making process was lengthy. This can primarily be explained by the unwillingness of the African countries to host the mission, rather than a lack of commitment by the EU member states. This is further underlined by the fact that once agreements had been signed with the African countries, things went rather smoothly given the more challenging circumstances of the mission. The following excerpt stresses this point: "*It took nine months from the adoption of the CMC to the deployment of the first mission personnel. This length of time compares well with previous civilian CSDP missions, but those other missions were established in single countries while EUCAP NESTOR must address five countries simultaneously.*" (Tejpar and Zetterlund, 2013, p. 24). As a result, it can be concluded that the proposition is supported by the evidence provided by both missions

5.2.3 EU officials

The final proposition related to the theory of constructivism (2c) is as follows: *"If this theory applies it can be expected that the CSDP decision-making* process *will be influenced by a high degree of interference from the EU and its officials.".* The results of the analysis do not provide convincing evidence to support this proposition in the case of EUNAVFOR Atalanta. The data primarily mentioned the role of the EU as a coordinating factor during the implementation of EUNAVFOR Atalanta, rather than during the decision-making process. This is underlined by a statement of the Dutch Ministry of Defence, which notes: "*The political control and strategic direction of EUNAVFOR "Atalanta" rested with the Council of the EU; in day-to-day practice with the PSC. Operational command was exercised by the EU Operation Commander at Northwood* [The place of the EUNAVFOR Atalanta HQ]. (Ministerie van Defensie, 2010, p.17) This is repeated in another policy document by the Dutch government (Rosenthal & Hillen, 2011). The low presence of EU officials in the decision-making process of EUNAVFOR Atalanta is best exemplified by a document discussing the information strategy of the EU concerning Atalanta. It mentions that the most senior EU FA official, the HR/VP Javier Solana, would only make two statements during the period leading up to the Council decision to launch the mission (Council of the European Union, 2008d).

The data too suggests that EU officials had little or no influence on the decision-making of the EUCAP Somalia mission. In fact, the opposite seems to be the case when interpreting the following quote from a report: "*The CPCC did not have sufficient in-house capacity, in particular maritime or coastguard expertise, to plan the RMCB mission. It therefore requested support from the EU Military*

Staff (EUMS) and asked some EU member states to provide additional experts." (Tejpar & Zetterlund, 2013, p. 13). The CPCC deployed a Technical Assessment Mission to the Horn of Africa a month later (Tejpar & Zetterlund, 2013). While the source does not say whether national civil servants were part of this mission, it suggests that additional expertise was provided. As such, the data seems to indicate that civil servants from the individual member states were more actively involved in the planning and decision-making process compared to the EU officials themselves.

5.3 Institutionalism

5.3.1 The CSDP structure

One of the two propositions derived from the theory of institutionalism (3a) states that: "*If this theory applies it can be expected that the CSDP decision-making* process *will function without major delays due to the high degree of predetermined rules and norms concerning the decision-making process.*"*.* As no delays were explicitly mentioned in the data concerning EUNAVFOR Atalanta, this could be attributed to the structure of the decision-making process. The specific aspect of the institutional structure that allowed for a fast-paced decision-making process was UNSC resolution 1816. This resolution explicitly called upon member states to: "*… to increase and coordinate their efforts to deter acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea in cooperation with the TFG* [This abbreviation refers to Transitional Federal Government of Somalia];" (United Nations Security Council, 2008a, p.2).

This call was repeated in UNSC resolution 1846 They called upon member states to actively participate in the combating of piracy in Somali waters (United Nations Security Council, 2008b). The EU cannot launch a CSDP mission without a mandate of the UNSC and as such these requests by the UNSC seem to have played vital a role in member states willingness to launch the mission. This is reflected by several governments in their justification, as they emphasise the importance of the UN explicitly requesting them to intervene and giving them a mandate to do so (Olofsson, 2009; Verhagen, van Middelkoop & Koenders, 2009). For example, the German government states the following when discussing its participation in the mission: "*Up to 1,400 soldiers may be deployed as long as a mandate of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), a corresponding decision of the Council of the European Union and the constitutive consent of the German Bundestag are available, …* ." (Bundestag, 2008, p. 1).

Another part of the CSDP structure, next to a UN mandate, is the decision whether to deploy a civilian or military mission. While this does play a part in the other case, the sources do not mention this aspect in the case of EUNAVFOR. This might have to do with the fact that at that time the main issue was subduing the violent piracy attacks as soon as possible, which left little to no other options than an armed intervention. To conclude, the CSDP structure does influence the EU

decision-making as this structure requires a UN mandate, and several member states would not have been in favour of this mission without a mandate. Thus, the structure of the CSDP did influence their behaviour during the decision-making process.

Regarding the relationship between proposition 3a and the EUCAP Somalia mission, the following can be concluded. It took some a while, approximately nine months for the EUCAP Somalia mission to actually start (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2014). However, the political decision-making process itself took six months from start to finish (Tejpar & Zetterlund, 2013). None of the sources mention any significant delays in that section of the process. What could have played a role was the financial aspect of the CSDP structure. Missions of a civilian nature are paid for by the CSDP budget, while military missions are primarily funded by the members that participate in them (Tejpar & Zetterlund, 2013). As a result, the decision to make EUCAP a civilian mission might have been influenced by the financial set-up of the CSDP structure. This suggestion is underlined by the following statement with a report in the name of the Swedish Ministry of Defence:" A *couple of interviewees suggested that the decision to launch a civilian mission might have been influenced by financial considerations."* (Tejpar & Zetterlund, 2013, p.36). As a result, it can be concluded that the CSDP structure did influence, perhaps not definitively, the decision-making process of EUCAP Somalia.

5.3.2 Historical events and path-dependency elements
The final proposition related to institutionalism (3b) argues that: "*If this theory applies it can be expected that historical events and path-dependency elements are one of the primary factors influencing the CSDP decision-making process."*. This proposition is supported by the data from the EUNAVFOR mission. Examples of events that influenced the decision-making were the several attempts by Somali pirates to hijack Spanish vessels. This led the Spanish government to say the following in their justification for their participation in EUNAVFOR Atalanta:" On *the other hand, the hijacking of the fishing boat "Playa de Bakio", on the 20th of last year, … created serious concern in the government and have shown that piracy in Somali waters is a serious problem."* (Gobierno, 2009, p.2). The Dutch government was swayed by other events, as stated in a letter of government:" *The Security Council resolutions, Ban Ki-moon's appeal and a concrete request from the WFP to the Netherlands are reasons to send a Dutch frigate again*." (Tweede Kamer, 2008, p. 10).

Apart from such individual events, the decision-making process was also influenced by path-dependency elements. The most noteworthy of these was the existence of both national and EU-level long-term strategies for the Horn of Africa. The EU's "Strategic framework for the Horn of Africa" has the aim: "*… mitigating security threats emanating from the region; promoting economic growth, and supporting regional economic cooperation*." (European Union, 2012a, p.1). Combatting

piracy would align with these objectives. In the case of the Netherlands, their Africa policy did lead them to become involved in the EUNAVFOR Atalanta mission as there is an overlap between the objectives of the policy and the mission (Verhagen, van Middelkoop, Koenders, 2008c). Another of such overlapping policy objectives can be found in a letter from the Swedish government. This states how: "*Swedish participation in the operation would, in accordance with the national strategy for Swedish participation in international peace and security promotion activities … .*" (Olofsson, 2009, p.14). Since the issue of piracy aligns with both the EU's and the national member states' policies for the region, it influenced the decision-making process and allowed for a decision to act upon the request by the UN. These two examples show how both events and path-dependency elements influenced the decision-making process of EUNAVFOR Atalanta.

Both a historical event and a path-dependency seem to have influenced the decision-making process of the EUCAP Somalia mission. As such, this proposition can be accepted. The historical event was the acceptance of UNSC resolution 1851, which called upon member states to cooperate in preventing piracy. In particular, to work together to increase the ability of the states in the Horn of Africa to combat piracy themselves and ensure the rule of law (United Nations Security Council, 2008c). As mentioned earlier, a mandate or request by the UN is an unofficial requirement for the EU to enact a CSDP mission, and thus this resolution did allow member states to decide upon launching EUCAP Somalia. This importance is exemplified by a section of the letter from the Dutch minister of Foreign Affairs to the Tweede Kamer:" The *European Council's decision is supported by UN Resolution 1851. This resolution encourages international cooperation between states and organisations in the fight against piracy*." (Timmermans, 2013, p1.).

Secondly, the EUCAP Somalia mission was influenced by a path-dependency element. Namely, the existent policy on that topic. In this case, the EU's Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, which was adopted about half a year before the launch of the mission. This framework focussed on the development of the region and the EU's involvement in crisis management (Tejpar & Zetterlund, 2013). The mission can be regarded as part of the implementation of the EU's long-term policy in the region. This seems to be the case as it is mentioned as the first preambular clause in the Council's decision to launch EUCAP Somalia and the objectives of the strategic framework corresponding with the tasks of the mission. These include the development and training of the maritime law enforcement capacity of the countries in the region and the enforcement of the rule of law (Council of the European Union, 2012). As a result, it can be concluded that both the historical event and the path-dependency element influenced the CSDP decision-making process.

Having interpreted the data for all the propositions for all two cases, the next chapter will discuss the conclusion that can be drawn from this and interpret this conclusion in relation to the theory. Furthermore, the discussion of the study covers an answer to the research question, covers the limitations of this study, and provides suggestions for future research.

6. Discussion

This chapter discusses the findings presented above in relation to each one of the three of the theories that were tested for the two case studies. Furthermore, it also considers the consequences of the findings for the research question. In addition to this, the results are put into a broader and theoretical context in order to explain these findings. The final part of this chapter covers the limitations of this research and adds suggestions for future research in order to combat these limitations in new studies.

6.1 Discussion of the results

6.1.1 Realism

In general, realism does not seem to be the most relevant explanation for the decision-making process of the EU in the cases of EUNAVFOR Atalanta or EUCAP Somalia. The theoretical framework suggests that actors (the member states in this case) would solely pursue their own national interests and would shy away from cooperation to achieve their goals (Burchill et al., 2005; Galeano, 2015) This would leave the EU paralyzed and unable to function. While national interests were pursued in the case of EUNAVFOR Atalanta, this did not mean that the member states were unable to come to a compromise and collaborate to deploy the mission. This means that national interests did play a role in the decision-making, but they did not dominate the process as realists would suggest. The EU can therefore be categorised as more than simply a tool for member states to pursue their own national interests. This could be attributed to an (increasing of an) overarching European identity and its related values, as the latter did play a role according to the data. This can be seen in the finding of the EUNAVFOR case, where a mixture of interests and values played a role.

Likewise, other aspects of the theory of realism were absent from the data. For example, realists argue that states aim to increase their relative power at the expense of others (Burchill et al., 2005). However, this did not seem to be the case in either missions. On the contrary, the missions of EUNAVFOR Atalanta and EUCAP Somalia aimed to help the states in the Horn of Africa by securing the WFP aid convoys and lending a hand in the establishment of a sufficient local maritime law enforcement presence (EUNAVFOR Somalia, n.d.). Doing this would not have made sense through the realist perspective, which would have exploited this weakness instead of lending a helping hand.

Adding to these arguments, signature characteristics of the realist theory are the absence of a higher authority and the lack of cooperation (Galeano, 2015). However, a higher authority and a spirit of cooperation were found in this case, meaning that other aspects of realism were missing as well. While the UN itself does not have the capability to act as a higher authority in general, one could argue that it did act as one in the setting of the CSDP. Since a UN mandate is necessary for the EU to launch a mission, the UN is able to influence the member states in this regard (European

Parliament, 2020). Similarly, there seemed a spirit of cooperation amongst states in both missions. While this was only partly the case in EUCAP Somalia, it was not as significant as realist theory had predicted. As such, this underlines the conclusion that institutionalism (and to a certain length constructivism) rather than realism provided the most relevant explanation for the decision-making process.

This conclusion does not mean that realist theory can be discarded. However, foreign policy experts should cease to see states as purely rational and power-hungry actors. States do certainly keep their own interests in mind, but do not let this get in the way of pursuing the values that they hold dear. What does this mean for the realist theory? If realism is used in a sensible manner, which keeps in consideration the values of actors and institutional context of the case, then it can certainly be an insightful explanatory theory.

6.1.2 Constructivism

Similarly to realism, constructivism does not provide the most relevant explanation for the decision-making process. For example, in both cases the proposition that a difference in strategic culture would hinder this process could not be supported.

This could be due to the fact that while every EU member state has to agree with the launch of a CSDP mission, not everybody has to participate. In the case of EUNAVFOR Atalanta, countries like France, Spain, Germany, the UK, The Netherlands, Sweden, and Greece did actually participate in the mission (Ministerstvo na Otbranata, n.d.). With the exception of Sweden, most have been NATO members for decades, and likewise all have been members of both the EU and the UN for a considerable time. This could mean that amongst the participating countries, who probably were the most vocal during the decision-making process, there was little apparent difference when it came to their strategic culture as these have been synergized after such a long time of cooperation. However, further research is necessary to substantiate this, as this was not covered by the scope of this study.

Another important characteristic of constructivism is the impact of values. In both cases this proposition could be justified. The theoretical framework concerning constructivism argues that ideals, values, and norms also weigh in when a country makes decisions, besides the rational cost-benefit approach (Galeano, 2015). This does seem to be the case in the EUNAVFOR Atalanta mission and EUCAP Somalia alike. In both cases, values such as human dignity and the rule of law played a central part in the justification of the missions. Another value that did impact the process was legitimacy. This is connected to the argument in the previous section about the UN being a higher authority. Since this is the case in the CSDP context, this does mean that a mandate from the UN

provides the missions with legitimacy. This is of great importance for the EU. This is an example where both institutional and constructivist theory provide an intertwined explanation.

Yet another aspect of the theory of constructivism is the role of policy entrepreneurs (Galeano, 2015). As mentioned in the results section, EU officials do not seem to have played such a role in the process in both cases. The low interference of the EU's officials within the process could be explained by the set-up of the CSDP decision-making process. While EU officials are involved in the preparation and execution of the mission, the primary decision-making organs, like the PSC, the COREPER and the Council itself are staffed by the member states themselves (Reykers, 2019). This means that EU civil servants are unlikely to be involved in the CSDP process to begin with. While this could have been different for the HR/VP, as this official acts as the chair of the CSDP meeting, the case of EUNAVFOR Somalia points out how the HR/VP did not seem to be actively involved in the process (Council of the European Union, 2008c). This result therefore shows an example where constructivism is unable to provide an explanation, but where institutional theory is able to do so.

While EU officials were not heavily involved themselves, it was worth researching this aspect. This is due to the fact that certain organisations within the CSDP decision-making process, such as the EUMC, view themselves as neutral European security experts and not necessarily as ambassadors of their own member state (Howorth, 2012). This could have played a role in the process, but this did not turn out to be the case.

To conclude, the values and ideals amongst member states did seem to play a role in the EUNAVFOR decision-making case. However, the other aspects of constructivism theory, such as the differing strategic cultures of the member states and the influence of the EU and its officials as policy entrepreneurs did not (Galeano, 2015; Wendt, 1992. As such, the theory of constructivism does not provide the most relevant explanation of this process. But as in the case of realism, this does not diminish its explanatory power. Values do seem to play an important role in the process of decision-making for example. However, other theories do seem to provide additional explanations regarding other aspects that constructivism is unable to do so itself.

6.1.3 Institutionalism

The final propositions are related to the theory of institutionalism. This theory seems to have been the most relevant in explaining the functioning of the CSDP decision-making process. In both cases the structure of the CSDP as well as historical events and path-dependency elements seem to have influenced the decision-making process in the CSDP.

A central part of the theory of institutionalism is the structure of the institutions. In this case, the institutional structure of the CSDP did play a significant role in the decision-making process for

both missions. However, in each case, a different aspect of the structure influenced the process. Concerning EUNAVFOR Atalanta, the UN mandate played a crucial role in the decision to launch the military mission. This is because the EU has limited itself to only act upon a mandate provided by the UNSC (European Parliament, 2020). As a result, the UNSC motions 1816 and 1846 played an essential role in allowing the EU and its member states to launch the mission. This is also evident in the data, where the mandate is mentioned by several notions in their justification to participate in the mission (Bundestag, 2008; Olofsson, 2009; Verhagen, van Middelkoop & Koenders, 2009). Such examples show the impact of this characteristic of institutionalism on the decision-making process.

Another aspect of the structure that influenced the member states' choices surrounding EUCAP Somalia, was the financial structure related to CSDP missions. Since a civilian mission is funded by the EU to a large extent, this is a beneficial option for the member states. This does seem to explain the civilian nature of the EUCAP Somalia case. The ongoing European debt crisis at that time was causing significant financial issues amongst member states. Additionally, EUNAVFOR Atalanta already covered the military part of the EU's anti-piracy approach. Therefore, it made sense to give EUCAP Somalia a civilian nature. This deliberation is even mentioned in interviews that were done as part of a report by the Swedish ministry of Defence (Tejpar & Zetterlund, 2013). However, future research should look more into this aspect as this was outside the scope of this research.

Furthermore, institutionalists argue that both historical events and/ or path-dependency elements in fact influenced the decision-making process. Once again, in both cases there has been evidence that these factors did indeed influence the decision-making for the member states. Like the previous proposition, different aspects played a role in each case. For example, in the case of EUNAVFOR Atalanta it seemed that several events moved the member states to launch the mission. Examples of these are the hijackings of Spanish vessels and the request by the UN Secretary-General to the Dutch government (Gobierno, 2009; Verhagen, van Middelkoop & Koenders, 2008b). Events such as these probably led to public pressure on the governments to "do the right thing" and safeguard both its citizens and the Somali people. This is underlined by a news article at that time, which mentions that public pressure created the political will to launch the mission (Holzer, 2008).

When looking at the case of EUCAP Somalia compared to EUNAVFOR Atalanta, it was not a couple of events, but rather the other institutionalist factor of path-dependency that influenced the decision to launch the mission. This mission was influenced by the objectives of the EU's long-term Strategic Framework of the Horn of Africa. Part of this framework was to enhance the maritime law enforcement capability of the nations in that region (Council of the European Union, 2012). This mission was therefore influenced by the EU's path-dependency on its earlier policies.

To conclude, the theory of institutionalism seems to have had a large influence on the decision-making process of both these cases. Both aspects such as the influence of earlier events on current policy and the unlikeliness of public administrators to diverge from the planned course seem to have been present in the minds of the decision-makers during these two missions (Fioretos, 2011; Galeano, 2015). Additionally, institutionalism was able to explain aspects that both the realist (why there was a higher authority contrary to realist theory) and constructivist theory were unable to (why policy entrepreneurs did not play a significant role).

In general, it seems that all three theories have a degree of explanatory power in this study. But institutionalism is able to provide the most relevant explanation compared to the other theories. Due to the voting structure of the CSDP, another institutionalist aspect, the UN mandate was absolutely vital to the decision to launch the mission. Additionally, events such as the hijacking of both WFP and commercial ships played an important role. However, the other two theories are able to further explain the objectives and motivation of the member states. The fact that national interests and their values were at stake pushed the countries to take action and agree upon launching the mission.

6.2 limitations and suggestions for future research

The scope and the scale of this study mean that some limitations need to be taken into account when reviewing the results. These limitations do not make the findings of this research less meaningful, but do put them into perspective. The limitations of this study cover several aspects of the study, such as the case selection, data analysis and theoretical framework, amongst others.

First, the cases that were analysed in this thesis are related to the Horn of Africa region and the country of Somalia. This does mean that a number of other control variables could be accounted for. On the other hand, the findings might prove less useful in order to formulate a general set of expectations concerning the CSDP decision-making process. As a result, a suggestion for future research would be to conduct similar research with cases from different regions such as the EUCAP Sahel missions in Niger and Mali, or the European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in Moldova and Ukraine.

Similarly, the policy documents that were analysed in the study originated exclusively from either the EU or member states such as the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, the UK and to a lesser extent from Spain and France. These member states were chosen due to the extensive availability of their policy documents in either Dutch or English. However, since most of these countries share a long cultural, political, and social history, future research could provide different insights by utilising documents mainly from Eastern and Southern-European member states. In addition, other kinds of

sources such as speeches, even those from the countries that were chosen in this research, could provide different insights as well. This too could be done in future research.

Another limitation, related to the methodology of this research, is the method of analysis. This study used a document analysis to conduct this research. However, a disadvantage of this method is the fact that policy documents are to a certain extent 'sanitised' for the public. This means that only the outcome is discussed, and not necessarily the often complex process that led to the decision. While documents often only show the surface of a decision, interviews provide better insights behind the scenes. Due to the time and scope of this research, it was not possible to conduct interviews with the relevant actors. However, studies such as those conducted by Tejpar and Zetterlund (2013), Palm (2018) and Riddervold (2014) did use interviews with relevant civil servants and gained insight into the process. A future study could combine these two methods and compare their outcomes.

Building upon the previous limitations, the selection of the theories is a limitation of this research. It only uses three of the main theories within the field of IR. However, these were carefully selected based upon their applicability to the cases. But, if other theories were to be used, they could have provided different insights into these cases. Similarly, other aspects of the utilised theories could have been used for propositions. This too would have made a difference, as other propositions yield different results. A recommendation for future research would thus be to repeat this study, but use different propositions based on unused theories or different aspects of the already used theories.

This chapter has discussed the findings of this research and put them into perspective both in theoretical and societal point of view. Similarly, the limitations of the research were covered and suggestions for future research have been provided in order to mitigate these limitations in new studies. The final chapter, chapter 7, will answer the research question and summarise the findings of this research. Additionally, policy recommendations will be provided for policy makers and civil servants to fully optimise the findings of this study.

7. Conclusion

This final chapter consists of two sections. The first section provides an answer to the research question of this study. In addition, the main findings of the analysis are summarised. This is followed by the second part of this chapter, which covers several policy recommendations based on the findings of this research. These recommendations are mainly focused on civil servants and other public administration officials both within the EU and national governments.

7.1 Answering the research question and summary of the results

The research question of this study is as follows: "*Which theory can provide the most relevant explanation of the decision-making process of the CSDP, as can be seen in the CSDP missions EUNAVFOR Atalanta and EUCAP Somalia*". From the data that was gathered from the analysis, it can be concluded that the theory of institutionalism provides the most relevant explanation for the CSDP decision-making process in the case of the EUNAVFOR Atalanta and EUCAP Somalia missions.

This is due to the fact that in both cases the propositions related to institutionalism seemed to impact the decision-making process the most. In the case of EUNAVFOR Atalanta, the necessity of a UN mandate as part of the CSDP structure and events such as the request by the WFP or the hijacking of commercial vessels proved to be able to influence member states to take the decision to approve and launch EUNAVFOR Atalanta. Similarly, the financial structure of the CSDP influenced the decision of the member states to make it a civilian mission and approve it. Additionally, this mission was launched as a next step in the execution of the EU's Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa. This proved that institutionalist aspects such as path-dependency also influenced the decision-making process.

Having said that, it should be noted that this research argues for a 'complementary theories approach'. This means that the theory of institutionalism provides the most relevant explanation and is the most dominant theory to explain the process of decision-making. However, it does not exclude the other theories outright. Instead, it argues that, while these provide less relevant explanations and are less dominant in providing insights into the CSDP decision-making process, the insights are still useful and should be taken seriously (Blatter & Haverland, 2014). As stated in the discussion, all three theories provide necessary insights into the case and combining these only increases the value of the analysis.

The case of EUNAVFOR Atalanta is an example of this. The analysis showed that the UN mandate and the incidents with piracy were both major factors in the decision-making process. Both of these can also be seen through a realist and constructivism perspective. The piracy attacks were related to the national interests of countries, and the humanitarian situation in Somalia was closely

linked to the EU's values and these influenced the decision-making process as well. However, other aspects of these theories, such as the lack of international cooperation, the role of EU officials, or the difference in strategic culture, did not significantly impact the process of decision-making amongst the member states. Nevertheless, as mentioned in section 6.2, it might be the case that these factors did play a role in the process behind the scenes, which represents a potentially valuable topic for future study .

The relevancy of these findings can be found in the increasing geopolitical tensions in the world. This is the case at the EU's borders, with the war in Ukraine raging on, but also on the other side of the world with the increasing agitation between the US and China over their spheres of influence in the Pacific (Blackrock, 2022). These issues won't disappear overnight and as a result, geopolitical and security matters will be one of the main topics on the EU's agenda in the future. Therefore, these findings could help national and international policy makers to gain more insights into the functioning of the CSDP decision-making process.

7.2 Policy recommendations

The goal of this thesis and these recommendations are to help the EU to become a stable, autonomous, and strategic player in a global environment that is becoming ever more unpredictable due to climate change, increasing tensions with both Russia and China and an ever more internally divided US. In this sea of chaos, the EU should be the beacon of stability, universal values, and sustainable policy. The following recommendations should therefore be seen through this perspective. While this study aims to provide theoretical insights by its nature, it too wants to make concrete and practical recommendations to EU officials and national civil servants alike. These recommendations are based upon the most relevant findings from the analysis.

The first recommendation builds upon the conclusion regarding the role theories have in providing a relevant explanation. Here it was concluded that, while the theory of institutionalism provides the most relevant explanation, the other theories also add to the understanding of the decision-making process. Therefore, the recommendation of this research is for future scholars to keep this in mind and to strive towards a multi-faceted theoretical explanation, instead of one where a phenomenon can only be explained by a single theory.

The second recommendation is based upon the need for a unanimous decision amongst the member states within the CSDP. As a result, the national interest of a single member state can lead it to take the entire process hostage if its national interests are not sufficiently protected by the proposal of a CMC. The data in the analysis showed that the Spanish government put a heavy emphasis on the protection of its commercial vessels and its citizens. They urged for this to become a

second point of focus for the EUNAVFOR Atalanta mission (Gobierno, 2009). It even went as far as to refuse to vote in favour of this mission if this demand was not met (Palm, 2018). This instance shows an inherent weakness of the CSDP decision-making structure. As a result, the EU and its member states should consider other voting options such as QMV. This would prevent member states to simply take the other members hostage and obstruct the entire process.

The third recommendation has to do with the EU's obligation to get an UNSC mandate or request to launch a mission (European Parliament, 2020). With the growing tensions between West and Russia over the war in Ukraine (Jackson, 2022), a unanimous decision in the UNSC seems to become ever more unlikely to happen. As the analysis showed, an UN mandate was often an essential requirement for member states to be in favour of the EUNAVFOR Atalanta mission (Bundestag, 2008; Olofsson, 2009). Therefore, the EU should seek out alternative means of approval by the international community in order to justify its missions. Instead of a motion in the UNSC, a motion within the General Assembly could be considered, or a request by the Secretary- General.

The final recommendation is related to the second one, in the sense that it is a warning to not be overly compliant to a single member state's wishes. The data showed how the EU's long term strategic frameworks and policies can influence its decisions to launch a mission and its objectives. This was especially the case in the EUCAP Somalia mission where the EU's Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa was often mentioned as the foundation of the mission's objectives (Council of the European Union, 2012; Tejpar & Zetterlund, 2013). As a result, the content of such long-term strategic policies should be carefully considered and not be part of a policy of appeasement in order to satisfy a single member state. While not a long-term policy in itself, Hungary's refusal to accept the 5th EU sanction package should be taken as a warning to not let one country decide the course of the EU in the long-term (Herszenhorn, Barigazzi & Moens, 2022). In order to prevent this, the EU could decide to look into a different voting method for its long-term strategy. This will ensure the capability of the EU to be a relevant and decisive actor in global politics for the foreseeable future.

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Annex A

Table 2

Sources used for the content analysis of EUNAVFOR Atalanta

Name	date	Author	#pages	summary	Link
UNSC Resolution 1846	02-12-2008	United Nations Security Council	5	Supports the creation of Atalanta	http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1846
EU NAVFOR op Atalanta mission launch	9-12-2008	EU Naval Force - Somalia	2	Press statement creation of Atalanta	https://eunavfor.eu/news/eu-navfor-op-atalanta-mission-launch
Council adopts joint action on an EU military op against acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast	2-12-2008	EU Naval Force - Somalia	3	Press statement on Council decision on the creation of Atalanta	https://eunavfor.eu/news/council-adopts-joint-action-eu-military-op-against-acts-piracy-and-armed-robbery-somali-coast
Kamerstuk 29521, nr. 53	5-03-2008	Verhagen, Van Middelkoop & Koenders (Dutch ministers of FA, DEF and Foreign Aid)	1	Letter concerning a request by the World Food programme for the Dutch government to act in Somalia	https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-29521-53.html
Kamerstuk 29521, nr. 55	7-03-2008	Verhagen, Van Middelkoop	7	Letter concerning the investigation by the Dutch	https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-29521-55.html

		& Koenders (Dutch ministers of FA, DEF and Foreign Aid)		government to act in Somalia	
Kamerstuk 29521, nr. 62	10-04-2008	Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal	11	Q/A between the Committees on FA and defence and the ministers of FA, Defence and Foreign Aid.	https://zoek.officielebekend makingen.nl/kst-29521-62.html
Kamerstuk 29521, nr. 77	1-07-2008	Verhagen, Van Middelkoop & Koenders Verhagen, Van Middelkoop & Koenders (Dutch ministers of FA, DEF and Foreign Aid)	2	Evaluation on the Dutch government's actions in Somalia concerning countering piracy	https://zoek.officielebekend makingen.nl/kst-29521-77.html
Kamerstuk 29521, nr. 82	3-10-2008	Verhagen, Van Middelkoop & Koenders Verhagen, Van Middelkoop & Koenders (Dutch	1	Letter concerning a request by the World Food programme, the EU, and the UN SG for the Dutch government to act in Somalia	https://zoek.officielebekend makingen.nl/kst-29521-82.html

		ministers of FA, DEF and Foreign Aid)			
Kamerstuk 29521, nr. 84	10-10-2008	Verhagen, Van Middelkoop & Koenders Verhagen, Van Middelkoop & Koenders (Dutch ministers of FA, DEF and Foreign Aid)	8	Letter informing the Tweede Kamer that the Dutch government will deploy forces in Somalia, possible within a CSDP mission	https://zoek.officielebekend makingen.nl/kst-29521-84.html
Kamerstuk 29521, nr. 88	10-10-2008	Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal	8	Q/A between the Committees on FA and defence and the ministers of FA, Defense and Foreign Aid.	https://zoek.officielebekend makingen.nl/kst-29521-88.html
Kamerstuk 29521, nr. 90	19-12-2008	Verhagen, Van Middelkoop & Koenders Verhagen, Van Middelkoop & Koenders (Dutch ministers of FA, DEF and	12	Letter informing the Tweede Kamer that the Dutch government will deploy forces in Somalian waters as part of a CSDP mission	https://zoek.officielebekend makingen.nl/kst-29521-90.html

		Foreign Aid)			
Eindevaluatie inzet in antipiraterijoperaties Atalanta en Ocean Shield van juli 2010 tot juni 2011	16-03-2012	Rosenthal & Hillen (Dutch ministers of FA, DEF)	29	A report by the ministries of FA and DEF concerning deployment of forces in Atalanta from July 2010-june 2011	https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2012/03/16/eindevaluatie-inzet-in-antipiraterijoperaties-atalanta-en-ocean-shield-van-juli-2010-tot-juni-2011
Eindevaluatie inzet operatie Atalanta eerste helft 2010	07-01-2011	Rosenthal & Hillen (Dutch ministers of FA, DEF)	30	A report by the ministries of FA and DEF concerning deployment of forces in Atalanta from February 17 until June 29 2010	https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2011/02/11/eindevaluatie-deelname-atalanta
Evaluatie Nederlandse bijdrage aan missies en operaties in 2015	18-05-2016	Ministerie van Defensie	44	An annual report by the ministry of Defence concerning deployment of forces in Atalanta in 2015	https://www.eerstekamer.nl/eu/overig/20160525/evaluatie_nederlandse_bijdrage_aan/document
inzet Hr.Ms. Evertsen in operatie EUNAVFOR "Atalanta" voor de kust van Somalië, 13 augustus – 18 december 2009.	31-10-2010	Ministerie van Defensie	27	A report by the ministry of Defence concerning deployment Hr.Ms. Evertsen as part of Atalanta in 2009	https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/blg-68886.pdf
Operatie Atalanta – ontwerp-conclusies van de Raad	10-06-2009	PSC	1	The PSC has accepted the proposal for Atalanta and moves it to the COREPER for acceptance	https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10739-2009-INIT/nl/pdf

Council Joint Action on a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention, and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast (ATALANTA)	4-11-2008	General – Secretariat of the Council	3	A text by the PSC to the COREPER to further work on this issue	https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15064-2008-INIT/en/pdf
COUNCIL DECISION on the launch of a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention, and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast (Atalanta)	27-11-2008	European Council	6	Council decision to launch Atalanta	https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15376-2008-INIT/en/pdf
COUNCIL DECISION on the launch of a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention, and repression of	1-12-2008	European Council	6	Council decision to launch Atalanta	https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15376-2008-REV-1/en/pdf

acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast (Atalanta)					
Council Decision concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the Somali Republic on the status of the European Union-led naval force in the Somali Republic in the framework of the EU military operation Atalanta	17-12-2008	European Council	23	Council decision on the agreement between the EU and Somalia concerning Atalanta	https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16954-2008-INIT/en/pdf
Preliminary draft reply to written question	12-01-2009	General Secretariat of the Council	3	A written question about the chain of command within Atalanta	https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5178-2009-INIT/en/pdf
COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2008/749/CFSP of 19 September 2008 on the European Union military coordination action in support of UN	19-09-2008	European Council	4	The decision of the Council to launch Atalanta	https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32008E0749&from=EN

Security Council resolution 1816 (2008) (EU NAVCO)					
COUNCIL DECISION 2008/918/CFSP of 8 December 2008 on the launch of a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast (Atalanta	8-12-2008	European Council	2	Further decision on the launch of Atalanta	https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32008D0918&from=EN
Blowing the Horn of Africa	19-12-2008	Georg-Sebastian Holzer	10	News article on the launch of Atalanta	https://www.politico.eu/article/blowing-the-horn-of-africa/
PRESS RELEASE 2864th and 2865th Council meetings	29-04-2008	Council of the European Union	30	Press release council meeting of General Affairs and External Relation concerning Atalanta amongst others	https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/bg/PRES_08_105
PRESS RELEASE 2879th Council meeting General Affairs and External Relations	16-06-2008	Council Of The European Union	18	Press release council meeting of General Affairs and External Relation concerning Atalanta	http://www.eu2008.si/en/News_and_Documents/Council_Conclusions/June/0616_GAERC-pr-EXTR.pdf

COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008 on a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention, and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast	12-11-2008	The Council Of The European Union	5	Council decision on Atlanta	https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32008E0851&from=EN
Presidency Report on European Security and Defence Policy	16-06-2009	European Scrutiny Committee	12	Report by the House of Commons on Atalanta	https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmeuleg/19-xxi/1910.htm
UNSC Resolution 1816	02-06-2008	United Nations Security Council	4	Call for action against piracy	http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1816
EU Presidency Statement - United Nations Security Council: debate on the situation in Somalia	20-03-2009	Petr Kaiser, on behalf of the European Union	6	Statement by the EU on the situation in Somalia at the Security Council Debate	https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/eu-presidency-statement-united-nations-security-council-debate-situation-somalia
Remarks by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, at the informal	12-03-2009	Javier Solana (HR/VP)	6	An update on several CSDP missions, amongst which EUNAVFOR Atalanta	https://reliefweb.int/report/bosnia-and-herzegovina/remarks-javier-solana-eu-high-representative-common-foreign-and

meeting of EU defence ministers in Prague					
Joint statement on Somalia by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, and Louis Michel, European Commissioner for relations with Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific, and for Development and Humanitarian aid	19-12-2007	Javier Solana and Louis Michel (HR/VP)	1	A statement on the situation in Somalia	https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/joint-statement-somalia-javier-solana-eu-high-representative-cfsp-and-louis-michel
Council conclusions on Somalia - 2839th General Affairs Council meeting	10-12-2007	The Council Of The European Union	4	Press statement about the conclusions of a Council meeting on Somalia	https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/council-conclusions-somalia-2839th-general-affairs-council-meeting
Council conclusions on Somalia - 2796th External Relations Council meeting	23-04-2007	The Council Of The European Union	3	Press statement about the conclusions of a Council meeting on Somalia	https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/council-conclusions-somalia-2796th-external-relations-council-meeting
Drucksache 16/11337	10-12-2008	Bundesregierung (The German government)	8	Proclamation of participation of Germany in Atalanta	https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/16/113/1611337.pdf
Drucksache 17/179	09-12-2009	Bundesregierung (The German	8	Renewing Germany's participation in Atalanta	https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/17/001/1700179.pdf

		governmen t)			
095/000003	19-01-2009	Gobierno (The Spanish governmen t	2	Proclamation of participation of Spain in Atalanta	https://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L9/CONG/BOCG/D/D_136.PDF#page=1
Regeringens proposition 2008/09:108	29-01-2009	Olofsson (on behalf of the Swedish governmen t)	17	Proclamation of participation of Sweden in Atalanta	https://www.regeringen.se/49b733/contentassets/cd73c645f84b4bbea9739b4490d0986b/svenskt-deltagande-i-europeiska-unionens-marina-insats-utanfor-somalias-kust-prop-200809108

Table 3

Sources used for the content analysis of EUCAP Somalia

Name	date	Author	#pages	summary	Link
UNSC Resolution 1851	16-12 -2008	United Nations Security Council	4	Resolution on international cooperation against piracy in the Horn of Africa region	http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1851
Kamerstuk 32706 nr. 40	18-03-2013	Timmermans, Hennis-Plasschaert, Opstelten & Ploumen Verhagen, Van	4	Explaining the setup of EUCAP Nestor and the Dutch involvement	https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-32706-40.html

		Middelkoop & Koenders (Dutch ministers of FA, DEF, Justice and Foreign Aid)			
Kamerstuk 21501-28 nr. 87	29-11-2012	Hennis-Plasschaert (Dutch minister of DEF)	3	Report concerning an informal meeting of the EU's defence ministers	https://zoek.officielebekendm akingen.nl/kst-21501-28-87.html
Kamerstuk 22831 nr. 88	13-06-2013	Timmermans (Dutch minister of FA)	3	Report to the Parliament on the results of a global Somalia conference	https://zoek.officielebekendm akingen.nl/kst-22831-88.html
Meerjarig Strategisch Plan Hoorn van Afrika 2014 - 2017	01-2014	Rijksoverheid (The Dutch governement)	25	The Dutch strategy for the Horn of Africa region for the period of 2014-2017	https://zoek.officielebekendm akingen.nl/blg-288676
Beleidsdoorlichting Bescherming kwetsbare scheepvaart nabij Somalië	08-08-2014	Ministerie van Defensie	46	Overview of the Dutch anti-piracy policy in Somalia	https://zoek.officielebekendm akingen.nl/blg-364855
Kamerstuk 29521 nr. K	14-11-2014	Koenders, Hennis-Plasschaert & Ploumen (Dutch ministers of	10	Extending the involvement in Atlanta and the participation of EUCAP Somalia	https://zoek.officielebekendm akingen.nl/kst-29521-K.html

		FA, DEF and Foreign Aid)			
Kamerstuk 29521 nr. 291	22-05-2015	Ministerie van Defensie	46	Annual evaluation of the involvement of the Dutch military 2014	https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/blg-515155
Kamerstuk 29521 nr. 291	22-12-2015	Koenders, Hennis-Plasschaert & Ploumen (Dutch ministers of FA, DEF and Foreign Aid)	10	Annual letter announcing the Extension of involvement in Atlanta and the participation of EUCAP Somalia	https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-29521-307.html
Kamerstuk 29521 nr. Q	18-12-2015	Koenders, Hennis-Plasschaert & Ploumen (Dutch ministers of FA, DEF and Foreign Aid)	10	Annual letter announcing the Extension of involvement in Atlanta and the participation of EUCAP Somalia	https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-29521-Q.html
Kamerstuk 29521 nr. 291	25-05-2016	Ministerie van Defensie	44	Annual evaluation of the involvement of the Dutch military 2015	https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/blg-752818
Kamerstuk 21501-02 nr. 1155	24-05-2012	Rosenthal & Knapen (Dutch ministers of FA, DEF)	5	A letter to the committee on FA	https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-21501-02-1155.html

Kamerstuk 29521-82-82	21-09-2012	Hillen (Dutch minister of DEF)	3	A letter from the minister concerning an informal meeting of the EU defence ministers	https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-21501-28-82.html
Council decision 2012/389/CFSP	17-07-2012	Council of the European Union	4	Legislation establishing the EUCAP Nestor	https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32012D0389&from=EN
EUCAP Nestor Trying to Steer Out of the Doldrums	10-2013	Försvarsdepartementet (Ministry of Defence) written by J. Tejpar and K. Zetterlund	52	A report by the Swedish ministry of Defense on EUCAP NESTOR	http://hlo-daktari.de/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/EUCAP-NESTOR-Tejpar-and-Zetterlund-FOI-R-3721.pdf
Council decision 2012/173/CFSP	23-03-2012	Council of the European Union	3	Legislation concerning the framework of EUCA Nestor	https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32012D0173&from=EN
Council conclusions on the Horn of Africa	14-11-2011	Council of the European Union	12	The EU's strategy on the Horn of Africa	https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/126052.pdf
EUCAP Nestor – STRATEGIC REVIEW	30-10-2014	Foreign & Commonwealth Office	49	A UK report concerning EUCAP Nestor	https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20220308064810/https://europeanmemoranda.cabinetoffice.gov.uk//files/2014/03/30_Oct(_FCO)_Horn_of_Africa_Min_Cor_17_March_2014_Lidington-Cash_attachment.pdf

Catherine Ashton travelled to Somalia	27-08-2012	Catherine Ashton (HR/VP)	2	Remarks by Catherine Ashton on her visit to Somalia	https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/catherine-ashton-travelled-somalia
The EU fight against piracy in the Horn of Africa	21-02-2012	European Union	6	Remarks by the EU on their fight against piracy in the Horn of Africa	https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/eu-fight-against-piracy-horn-africa
The EU joins hands to tackle instability in Somalia	07-02-2012	EUNAVFOR Atalanta	3	Press statements on the effort of the EU against piracy	https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/eu-joins-hands-tackle-instability-somalia
Council conclusions on Somalia	31-01-2013	Foreign Affairs Council	3	Conclusions by the Foreign Affairs council meeting on Somalia	https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/council-conclusions-somalia-1
Information report Deposit By the European affairs committee	25-07-2012	Assemblée Nationale (The French parliament)	18	Announcing the participation of France in EU Somalia	https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/europe/rap-info/i0129.asp
Speech by Minister of State for Europe Michael Roth to the German Bundestag on the continued participation of armed German troops in the European Union military mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces (EUTM Somalia)	19-03-2015	Auswärtiges Amt (The German Ministry of Foreign Affairs)	3	Speech on Germany's involvement in Somalia	https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/150319-stmr-eutm-somalia/270246
Drucksache 18/1326	06-05-2014	Bundesregierung (The German	12	Q&A regarding Germany's involvement in EUCAP NESTOR	https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/18/013/1801326.pdf

		government t)			
Turning the Tide on Piracy, Building Somalia's Future: Follow-up report on the EU's Operation Atalanta and beyond	24-07-2012	European Scrutiny Committee	12	A report on British involvement in the anti-piracy actions in Somalia	https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201213/ldselect/ldeucom/43/4304.htm
Defensa	31-12-2014	La Moncloa (The Spanish cabinet)	7	Overview of Spanish involvement in the CSDP	https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/espana/historico/eh14/defensa/Paginas/index.aspx

Annex B

Figure 3

The coding tree