



The Human Psyche as Imago Dei a philosophical approach to psychosis.

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1. Introduction

If God would descend from the heavens to the earth, it would be at a psychiatric clinic. As a psychiatrist in training, the preoccupation of patients suffering from mental disorders with religion and with God in particular becomes immediately apparent. This is especially true for people suffering from psychosis. The voice of God metaphorically resonates in the ears of people with psychosis and his image is reflected in their retinas. There are many claiming to be either God himself, his son Jesus or one of his prophets, a manifestation of a delusion that classically has been named megalomania. One of the texts in history in particular, auto-biographically documented by Daniel Paul Schreber (1842-1911), has been scrutinized by many psychiatrists and psychoanalysts. Daniel Paul Schreber was the chief judge of the supreme court of the state of Saxony at a relatively young age of 42 (Funt, 1987, 97). He was the son of a preeminent nineteenth-century German physician who was an authority on child care. Schreber experienced three episodes of psychosis (1884-1885, 1893-1902, 1907-1911) during which he was admitted and treated by dr. Paul Emil Flechsig (1847-1929), chief psychiatrist at the psychiatric hospital of the University of Leipzig and teacher of the father of modern psychiatry, Emil Kraepelin. During Schreber's psychotic episodes, he experienced hallucinations and delusions. Schreber experienced what now would have been called multimodal hallucinations, including simultaneous visual, verbal, somatic, tactile, olfactory, and gustatory hallucinations. Schreber experienced persecutory delusions first directed towards dr. Flechsig, which later became megalomaniac and religious in nature. Schreber believed that he could, through the process of what he called 'nerve-contact', exclusively communicate with God only after his transformation to a female body, which he thought was necessary to sexually satisfy his God (Schreber, 1903, 23-24). To communicate with the lower and upper God, respectively Ariman and Ormuzd, he used a special 'nerve-language', which he described as 'apart from normal human language there is also a kind of nerve-language of which, as a rule, the healthy human being is not aware' (Schreber, 1903, 54). What placed Schreber's case apart was the fact that he extensively documented and published his own experiences in his *Denkwürdigkeiten eines Nervenkranken* or *Memoirs of My Nervous Illness* (Schreber, 1903). This enabled psychiatrists and psychoanalysts to develop and

discuss their theories on psychosis based on Schreber's experience. Analysis of three of them will be discussed in this thesis, namely that of Sigmund Freud, Carl Gustav Jung, and Jacques Lacan. Interestingly, the most used word in Schreber's *Memoirs* is the word 'God', used more than 2000 times by Schreber, which already hints towards the close relationship of his 'nervous illness' with the idea of God itself.

The research question of this master thesis will be '*How does the subject relate itself to God in a psychosis?*' I will examine this relationship based on Daniel Schreber's experience as documented in *the Memoirs*.¹ I will provide a philosophical examination of the relationship between the subject and God in psychosis. The thesis will be philosophical, because I will examine philosophical concepts of Freud, Jung and Lacan based on their essays on what the subject is (philosophy of mind), how the subject constructs and relates itself to external reality (metaphysics - ontology), what this external reality means for the subject and how the subject relates itself to the concept of God (philosophy of religion). It will be an analysis of *The Memoirs*, and not a medical, psychiatric examination, nor an exercise to retrospectively find the right diagnosis or treatment of Daniel Schreber as a psychiatric patient. Such an exercise on a patient lived 100 years ago will not be possible anyway, since it was only dr. Flechsig (and dr. Weber) who psychiatrically examined and treated Schreber.²

In this paragraph, I have provided context for this thesis' subject, I have formulated my research question and described what the focus of my examination will and will *not* be. In paragraph 2.1, I will examine Schreber's psychotic experience including initially the persecutory delusions that later turned into megalomaniac and religious delusions and hallucinations as documented in his *Memoirs*. In paragraph 2.2 I will examine Freud's analysis of the Schreber case with the father complex at its core. In paragraph 2.3 I will explore Freud's theories on the withdrawal of libido and narcissism, which are relevant to Freud's analysis of Schreber as a psychotic subject and his relationship with the external world. In paragraph 3.1 I will examine Jung's

¹ In the final section of this thesis, the generalizability of Daniel Schreber as a typical 'psychotic subject' will be discussed.

² Even Freud, who was alive when Schreber published *The Memoirs*, put a disclaimer that his analysis was based on *the Memoirs* and that he further had never seen Daniel Schreber (Freud, 2003, 3).

critique on the Freudian analysis of Schreber, its relation with the world and with God. Paragraph 3.2 will be an elaboration on the 'second Freud' and the adjustment of his theories mentioned in paragraph 2.2. Paragraph 3.3 will be fully dedicated to Jung's own theories on the intrapsychic structures of the psychotic subject with the ego-consciousness and the collective unconsciousness including the persona, the archetypes of the shadow, the animus and anima, and finally the self as the God-image. In paragraph 4 I will analyze Lacan's theory on the subject and its relation to the external world and to God in psychosis, in which I will mainly be discussing his core theory on the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father. I will examine how from a Lacanian perspective the subject relates itself to external reality through affirmation and symbolization and how a failure of this process due to a total absence of paternity for Schreber has externalized his unconsciousness which resulted in the manifestation of a paranoid, divine, delusional system. Then, I will provide a summarized conclusion to the main question of my thesis, namely '*How does the subject relate itself to God in a psychosis?*' In the last paragraph I will share my own evaluation of the Freudian, Jungian and Lacanian analyses of the relationship between the psychotic subject and God. I will finish with reflections on the conclusions of this thesis and what they may implicate for our current understanding of a person with psychosis in a modern society.

2. Flechsig-Father-God-Sun

2.1 Schreber's Psychosis

'First an analysis of our dear and ingenious friend Schreber.

Because one can guess a good deal in reading the book.

First the father complex: obviously Flechsig-Father-God-sun form a series.'

Sigmund Freud to Carl Jung.

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The father complex plays a key role to interpret the relationship between the psychotic Schreber as the subject and God. Before the deconstruction of the father complex as mentioned by Freud, and before the discussions between him and Jung on the mechanisms of Schreber's psychosis, I will first need to explore the relationship and the experiences of Schreber with his own God, as we read in his *Memoirs*. This exploration will provide context to further analysis of my examination on the relationship between the subject and God in a psychosis.

Schreber's first mental illness started in 1884 at the age of 42 and did not include any religious delusions, in fact, he did not have any psychotic experience at all. Schreber intended a switch in his career and became a candidate for parliament, which he eventually lost. It was a loss that for Schreber was difficult to accept which resulted in a mood disorder (Lothane, 2010, 4). Schreber was successfully treated by dr. Flechsig at the Psychiatric Clinic of the University of Leipzig from autumn to the end of 1885, 'without any occurrences bordering on the supernatural' (Schreber, 1903, 45). Eight years passed happily together with his wife without any mental health issues. In 1893 Schreber became *Senatspräsident* to the Superior Court in Dresden, but already quickly gave up office due to the heavy burden of work. It is after this event that Schreber developed psychotic experiences for the first time. Schreber developed non religious, persecutory delusions in which he thought that unknown external forces were implanting ideas in his head which included the idea of himself having sexual intercourse as a woman (Schreber, 1903, 46). His psychotic experiences gradually incorporate God over time. It is in November 1895 that Schreber notes as 'an important time in the history of my life' (p.163), in which the physical and mental female transformation he experiences became inevitable and

necessary for 'fertilization by divine rays for the purpose of creating new human beings' (p.164). This bodily transformation certainly is a painful process caused by a predatory God in Schreber's experience and interpretation. The term 'God' needs further elaboration. Daniel Schreber Schreber's God differs from the classic monotheistic, Judeo-Islamic-Christian image of God, but does also have some similarities. Schreber describes the characteristics of his God in his *Memoirs* as 'eternal', 'which with all religiously minded people I feel I must accept' (1903, 16). This God has 'infinite and eternal' rays which 'have in particular the faculty of transforming themselves into all things of the created world; in this capacity they are called rays; and herein lies the essence of divine creation' (1903, 21). He 'regulates the weather' (p.21), he 'is able to perceive (man would say: to see) everything that happens on earth and possibly on other inhabited planets', and has 'creative power' (p.23), although he is in a sense passive and does not 'interfere directly in the fate of peoples or individuals', he only passively 'provided continuous warmth of the sun to enable them to maintain themselves and reproduce' (p.23). He only could in special circumstances get in touch with living beings 'to form "nerve-contact with them" as the voices that speak to me call this process' (p.23). This however happens occasionally with purified and blessed individuals, since 'he would not be able to free Himself from them again, and would thus endanger His own existence.', and only regularly with corpses after death (p.24). Schreber's God thus differs from the Christian God and 'was not omniscient and omnipresent in the sense that He continuously saw inside every individual living person' (p.31), 'he saw living human beings only from without; as a rule His omnipresence and omniscience did not extend within living man' (p.40). His God could morally judge the individual only after death, but had the possibility 'to get to know the inner person through nerve-contact, whenever the need arose' (p.31). Another unique characteristic of Schreber's God, in contrast to the monotheistic concept of God, is that Schreber identified two realms of God, namely an anterior and a posterior part. While the former was identified as the 'forecourts of heaven' or the accumulation of blessed, purified soul, he subdivided the latter, thus the posterior part of God, in a lower part, named Ariman and an upper part, named Ormuzd, both having their particular functions, 'The rays of the lower God (Ariman) have the power of producing the miracle of unmanning; the rays of the upper God (Ormuzd) have the power of restoring manliness when necessary' (Schreber, 1903, 61). While Schreber stood in closer contact with Ariman, the lower

part of God, via the voice he heard of him and miracles he experienced, he had a more mystical and distant relationship with Ormuzd, the upper part (Schreber, 1903, 167).³

Schreber's God 'is or was not a being of such absolute perfection as most religions attribute to Him' (p.40). He was convinced that God had developed a dependence on psychiatrist dr. Flechsig's soul through nerve-contact' (p.62). Schreber developed persecutory delusions and was convinced that a plot was laid against himself to commit soul-murder by taking his soul and leaving his body that 'was then left to that human being for sexual misuse and simply "forsaken"' as a prostitute (p.66). Schreber embraced these developments as being his fate 'in which neither on God's nor on my part can there be a question of moral infringement' (p.67) and a process in which 'All attempts at committing soul murder, at unmaning me for purposes contrary to the Order of the World (that is to say for the sexual satisfaction of a human being) and later at destruction of my reason, have failed', 'from this apparently so unequal battle between one weak human being and God Himself, I emerge, albeit not without bitter sufferings and deprivations, victorious' (p.67). Schreber believed that it was through himself and his victory that mankind would gain 'the knowledge of religious truths' (p.68). Schreber's 'holy time' had arrived (p.70); he felt an 'indissoluble connection between God and myself', experiencing individual nerves in the form of 'hundreds if not thousands, as little men' and because of 'immensely increased power of attraction of my nerves' (p.75). His uniqueness became more apparent, experiencing 'a shimmer of light owing to the massive concentration of rays, like the halo of Christ is pictured, but incomparably richer and brighter: the so-called 'crown of rays' (p.80) as the soul communicator or 'the seer of spirits' (p.81). Initially, these experiences were temporary, 'Soon, however, the enormous attraction of my nerves would not allow of any such pauses or interruptions; from then on there were only 'holy times' (p.82).

Schreber thus entered a psychosis in which he experienced his relationship with God through simultaneous visual and auditory hallucinations together with persecutory

³ Schreber often refers to God without making any distinction between Ormuzd and Ariman in his *Memoirs*. For the sake of simplicity, and unless it is relevant for specific context, I will avoid this distinction and follow Schreber in using the general reference as 'God'.

and later megalomaniac delusions, although all this were denied by Schreber itself: 'It seems psychologically impossible that I suffer only from hallucinations. After all, the hallucination of being in communication with God or departed souls can logically only develop in people who bring with them into their morbidly excited nervous state an already secure faith in God and the immortality of the soul' (p.83). This God uses Schreber, to be more precise his body as a corpse, and 'receives the direct impression of the activity of a human being in complete possession of his senses' (p.187), but also desires 'destruction of my reason' (the 'dementia') achieved and the possibility of a withdrawal thus brought about' (p.189). To establish this, God forcefully and painfully transforms every part of Schreber's body into a usable body. Schreber first resisted this transformation, or 'miracles' as he interprets them, including the 'compression-of-the-chest-miracle', the 'head-compressing-machine', changes to his stomach, intestines, pharynx, seminal cord, abdomen, spinal cord, head, muscles and eyes (pp.143-150). Later he interprets his transformation into a female body as serving a higher, divine goal:

I could see beyond doubt that the Order of the World imperiously demanded my unmanning, whether I personally liked it or not, and that therefore it was common sense that nothing was left to me but reconcile myself to the thought of being transformed into a woman. Nothing of course could be envisaged as a further consequence of unmanning but fertilization by divine rays for the purpose of creating new human beings. (Schreber, 1903, 164)

With this fertilization, Schreber starts experiencing a 'generally friendly' and a more 'hostile' God (p.167) and later he even becomes superior to God himself both 'morally and mentally' (p 173). Schreber explains this superiority in terms of knowing the world and other living human beings 'through years of contact with them', a capacity that God, at least for Schreber, lacks (p.173). It is as Schreber revenges God for unmanning him by taking his place and dedivining him. The superiority for Schreber is 'in the most relative sense' since he is at the same time 'acknowledging God's eternal wisdom and goodness in all other respects, particularly in supernatural matters such as the creation and evolution of the world' (pp.173-74). The result of Schreber's fertilization by God is that new human beings come forth, and with this a

state of Blessedness for all other human beings can be established, thereby ending Schreber's main goal in life as a prophet.

2.2 The Father Complex

Freud centralized the father complex in his analysis of Schreber's psychosis. The father complex is 'a male child's feelings of ambivalence towards his father and is one of the aspects of the Oedipus complex' (Roeckelein, 2006, 111). Simon & Blass identify six stages between 1897 and 1938 in Freud's life in which he gradually changes and adapts his theory on the oedipus complex (Neu, 2006, 161). In general, the Oedipus complex is 'associated with the entire range of feelings the child may experience in relation to his parents and interactions he or she may have with them' (Neu, 2006, 161). It is only after 1918s, with the influence of the Schreber case, that Freud gradually develops the classic 'positive' oedipal emphasis 'on instinctual, incestuous wishes in relation to the mother and on hostile ones in relation to the father' (Neu, 2006, 165). Freud starts to recognize the father-complex as an 'inverted oedipus complex', which can be defined as 'the child's sexual desire/love for the same-sex parent and hatred/jealousy of the opposite-sex parent' (Roeckelein, 2006, 111-112). Later in 1923, Freud theorizes that the negative and positive oedipal complex together forms a bisexual 'complete' complex, 'which is twofold, positive and negative, and is due to the bisexuality originally present in children: that is to say, a boy has not merely an ambivalent attitude towards his father and an affectionate object-choice towards his mother, but at the same time he also behaves like a girl and displays an affectionate feminine attitude to his father and a corresponding jealousy and hostility towards his mother' (Freud, 1923, 33). The father complex in the context of Schreber's *Memoirs* and Freud's analysis of it can be understood as an inverted, negative oedipal complex.

In these paragraphs, I will first focus on the earlier writings of Freud, with in particular his essay on Schreber, entitled 'psycho-analytic notes on an autobiographical account of a case of paranoia', published already in 1911 (Freud, 2003). Daniel Schreber recovers from his initial psychotic episode after he got admitted and treated by dr. Flechsig for six months at the Leipzig University psychiatric clinic. Naturally, he

feels much gratitude towards his physician, and he is not the only one, as he mentions in his *Memoir*, 'My wife felt even more sincere gratitude and worshiped psychiatrist and brain anatomist Prof. dr. Paul Flechsig as the man who had restored her husband to her, for this reason, she kept his picture on her desk for many years' (Schreber, 1903, 46). According to the analysis of Freud, Schreber realizes that his wife, Otilie Sabine Behr, does not feel only gratitude, but also love for dr. Flechsig, which causes rivalry in Schreber's mind. This in turn leads to an infantile conflict; Schreber begins to hate dr. Flechsig, but loves him too since he too feels gratitude (214F). Freud's analysis is that a 'tender interpretation for the doctor was left over from this condition [psychic content of the first illness, added by FI] was heightened to the form of an erotic inclination' (Freud, 2004, 33). We read in the *Memoirs* that Schreber has recurring dreams after his first treatment and before his second psychotic episode. Dreams in which sexual feelings manifest itself in the idea that 'it really must be rather pleasant to be a woman succumbing to intercourse' (Schreber, 1903, 46). Schreber gets seized by his unconsciousness in his dreams, feels disgraced by such emotions, externalizes and finally rejects them. The paranoid delusion consisted of the externalization of his unconscious auto-erotic feelings, which manifested as an unknown other implanting these feelings in Schreber's head (Schreber, 1903, 46). In Freud's analysis, it is the process of transference that explains the mechanism of why Schreber had chosen dr. Flechsig as its object-libido. Dr. Flechsig was at the right time, place, and set to be the substitute for his own successful authoritative father, who died long before Schreber's illness emerged (at the age of 42), when he was only nineteen (Funt, 1987). It is not a coincidence that this substituted figure is also a medical doctor. Schreber's father was Gottlieb Moritz Schreber, 'a physician, teacher, nutritionist, anthropologist, therapeutic gymnast, and athlete, and above all, a man of action, of tremendous enthusiasm and endurance' (Niederland, 1959, 166). It is in dr. Flechsig that the lost symbol of the father-image reappeared. The relationship between Schreber and his father in my view needs more close attention. Although Freud elaborates on the father image in detail, the role of Schreber's father had received limited attention by him and his colleague's and its role in understanding Schreber's psychosis has been underestimated till decades after the publication of the *Memoirs*. The relationship between Schreber and his father needs careful consideration, simply because it constitutes the core of the father complex in which, according to Freud, the son has sexual desire or love

for the father. How can Schreber's father complex fully be understood, or hypothesis on the matter be generated, if the biological father remains excluded? It was William Nederland who first highlighted the importance of including Schreber's own father in the analysis, in order to understand Schreber's experience (Nederland, 1960). First, reports of the Sonnenstein asylum (the place where years later his son would be admitted) state that Schreber's father was mentally ill and that he 'suffered from compulsive manifestations with murderous impulses' (Nederland, 1960, 493). Second, Schreber's father advocated verbal and physical punishment of children at a young age for 'all strivings for independence, nonobedience to the rules, passions and bad habits (read: masturbation)' (Nederland, 1960, 496). One of these punishments by father Schreber is described as follows:

It is important to train children of this age [from 2 to 7] to acquire absolutely straight posture ... they should be forced to hold themselves upright and erect. ... This can be achieved by insisting that as soon as a child behaves [sits] in a relaxed or lazy way, he is *made to lie down* [emphasis added by FI], if only for a few moments. (Nederland, 1963, 201)

Although there is no detailed historical reconstruction available on whether father Schreber has applied such punishment to his son, the content of the delusions as described by Schreber certainly points towards this possibility. Nederland (1963) already partly argued this possibility using Schreber's experience what is described as the 'coccyx miracle';

This [the coccyx miracle, added by FI] was an extremely painful, caries-like state of the lowest vertebrae. Its purpose was to make sitting and even lying down impossible. Altogether I was not allowed to remain for long in one and the same position or at the same occupation: when I was walking one attempted *to force me to lie down* [emphasis added by FI], and when I was lying down one wanted to chase me off my bed. Rays did not seem to appreciate at all that a human being who actually exists must be somewhere. Because of the irresistible attraction of my nerves. I had become an embarrassing human being for the rays (for God), in whatever position or circumstance I might be or what ever occupation I undertook. (Schreber, 1903, 151)

As emphasized in the above-mentioned passages, the content of the delusion points towards youth trauma for junior Schreber caused by his father, namely that the forced posture that Schreber had in his delusion, were a representation of his posture *hypothetically* forced by his father. In a letter to Jung, Freud only briefly touches upon the paternal roots of Schreber's delusions with his father's profession as doctor reflected within it, but, in contrast to Niederland, further does not mention any reference to Schreber's traumatic relation with his father in his youth:

Don't forget that Schreber's father was a doctor. As such, he performed miracles, he mirrored. In other words, the delightful characterization of God -that he knows how to deal only with corpses and has no idea of living people- and the absurd miracles that are performed on him are a bitter satire on his father's medical art. (218F)

Niederland thus argues that Schreber's mental illness is rooted in the traumatic relationship with his father Moritz Schreber, a point that is heavily criticized by later thinkers such as Lothane as a myth of 'sadist and child abuser' (Lothane, 1989, 1).⁴

A third aspect that needs further consideration in the father-Schreber relationship is that Schreber junior yearns for his father and seems to literally identify himself with his name Gottlieb. Schreber later develops a sexual relationship with his God later in his psychosis. He first experiences his body changing into a female body in order to sexually please God with his 'soul-voluptuousness'; 'I myself received the impression of a female body, first on my arms and hands, later on my legs, bosom, buttocks and other parts of my body (Schreber, 1903, 163). Schreber yearns to become the 'beloved (*lieb*) of God (*Gott*)', just literally as his father 'Gottlieb' from a Freudian line of reasoning. Freud mentions that through the process of unconsciously projecting feelings towards the other, the process of transference, Schreber projects his feelings towards his father onto his psychiatrist, 'the root of that feminine fantasy which set loose such resistance in the patient would thus be the erotically intensified yearning for father and brother, in the latter case passing by transference on to his doctor, Flechsig' (Freud, 2003, 39). For Freud, the ego of Schreber shows much

⁴ Lothane (2007) criticizes Freud's analysis as being historically and autobiographically limited. He argues that this 'bitter satire' was not directed against his father, but against dr. Flechsig and dr. Weber who were both more concerned with corpses than living beings; the former having a brain museum as a brain anatomist and the latter having written a dissertation on corpses, not living beings, as a forensic psychiatrist.

resistance to his femininity and the intensified erotical yearning of first his father as part of the inverted or negative oedipal complex, later redirected to Dr. Flechsig. Freud interprets this as 'a surge of homosexual libido was, then, the cause of this illness, its object probably from the start Dr. Flechsig, and the struggle against this libidinal arousal produced the conflict from which the manifestation of the illness sprang (Freud, 2004, 33). Schreber's ego sees such homosexual feelings as a disgrace to itself, 'This idea was so foreign to my whole nature that I may say I would have rejected it with indignation if fully awake' (Schreber, 1903, 46). He concludes that these feelings are externally implanted ideas in his head by a force he cannot identify, which are the first signs of his paranoid delusion. The ego of Schreber has only one way out. Emasculation becomes only acceptable if Schreber shows a female attitude toward God. With such 'a sacrifice' in the reality of Schreber called 'the World Order', he manages to satisfy God's soul-voluptuous pleasure as a redeemer through nerve contact with twice a pregnancy as experienced by Schreber, 'by a divine miracle God's nerves corresponding to male seed had been thrown into my body; in other words, fertilization had occurred' (Schreber, 1903, 18). What starts as a sexual feeling, according to Freud, towards the lost father is transferred to Dr. Flechsig and then transformed into a megalomaniac delusion through homosexual and transgender fantasy. The fantasy of being a woman thus becomes acceptable for the ego only on these terms with megalomaniac delusion as a trade-off. The primary delusion of feminine phantasy which started with an idea of sexual intercourse as a female in a dream with Dr. Flechsig as its father-substituted object intensified as delusions and later transformed into a secondary delusion as a megalomaniac redeemer with now God as its object (Freud, 2004, p. 11). The father complex as mentioned by Freud when analyzing Schreber, namely Flechsig-Father-God, ends with the symbolism of the sun. Schreber's description of his delusions and hallucinations is full of references to the sun. In Schreber's experience, the sun speaks to him as a mediator of God in which divine sun rays make a connection with his body, interpreting these rays as God's communicating nerves; 'the sun has for years spoken with me in human words and thereby reveals herself as a living being or as the organ of a still higher being behind her' (Schreber, 1903, 42). and 'I am absolutely certain that God speaks to me through the mediation of the sun and in the same way, creates or works miracles through her mediation' (Schreber, 1903, 227-8). Dr. Guido Weber, Sonnenstein asylum director and forensic

psychiatrist, mentions that Schreber showed feminine behavior, such as him declaring 'that he already had feminine breasts' while admitted to the psychiatric clinic during his second illness (Schreber, 1903, 331). Schreber retrospectively interprets his transgender fantasy as that he necessarily has to transform into a woman to attract God's attention to his woman's voluptuousness as sexual pleasure and consequently bless the world as a redeemer. Dr. Weber also mentions Schreber endlessly repeating the sentence 'the sun is a whore' (Schreber, 1903, 331). Schreber thus projects his own ego-image as 'the whore of God' onto the God symbol of the sun. It is not Schreber that is the whore of God, but the sun as the mediator of God is the whore of God. Freud indeed noticed Schreber's reference to the sun in his analysis, stating 'I will consider the sun, which by virtue of its 'rays' has attained such great importance for the expression or the delusion. Schreber has a quite special relationship to the sun' (Freud, 2004, 41,42). He later dedicated a whole 'postscript' to Schreber's reference to the sun as a mythological symbol of the father figure with a reference to Jung:

'This small postscript to the analysis of a paranoiac may illustrate how well-founded is Jung's assertion that humanity's powers to form myths are not extinguished, but that they created today, in neuroses, the same psychic products as they did in the most ancient times. (Freud, 2004, 60)

2.3 Libido Withdrawal and Narcissism

The fuel of Schreber's delusional transformation for Freud is libido energy. Freud's theory of libido is in this context relevant to discuss since from it theories on the mechanisms of psychosis develop. Freud writes that when a subject loses (sexual) interest in the world, it withdraws its interest from the outer to the inner world, to the subject's ego itself. This attitude leads to a narcissistic personality structure within a person with schizophrenia:

The question arises: What happens to the libido which has been withdrawn from external objects in schizophrenia? The megalomania characteristic of these states points the way. This megalomania has no doubt come into being at the expense of object-libido. The libido that has been withdrawn from the external world has been directed to the ego and thus gives rise to an attitude which may be called narcissism. (Freud, 1914, 4)

It is the discord between Freud and Jung on the libido theory and its role in the development of psychosis that causes a breaking point between the two. For Freud, the withdrawal of object-libido, 'the 'backward flow of the libido ('regression')' is caused by the disappointment of the subject in achieving goals in his lifetime, which is the concept of 'frustration' (Freud, 2004, 52). It is specifically the withdrawal of *erotic* interest from the external world, such as from other people, specific goals, or just material things. In his article 'On Narcissism' Freud characterizes schizophrenia, or paraphrenia as he liked to call it, as 'megalomania and diversion of their interest from the external world-from people and things' (Freud, 1914, 4). 'What happens to the libido which has been withdrawn from external objects in schizophrenia?' Freud asks (Freud, 1914, 4), and he answers that it is directed towards the subject's own ego, which gives rise to narcissism (Freud, 1914, 4-5).

For Freud, two mechanisms come into play that result in either neurosis or psychosis. The former phenomenon manifests itself when the libido attaches itself to objects in phantasies despite frustration. In the case of Schreber's however, libido is released from external objects in the world and projected onto the ego itself, resulting in megalomaniac psychosis. In Schreber's case for Freud, it is the libido from the object of the father, death or alive but in either case lost, resulting in a freed libido projecting onto the ego itself. Following Freud's libido theory this consequently manifest itself, on top of a primary, pre-existent and natural narcissistic attitude of an infant to satisfy its own needs in order to survive, as a secondary narcissism in Schreber (Freud, 1914, 90), and with the resurrection of the father symbol, leads to a psychotic structure with initially dr. Flechsig and later God as its object. Within this mechanism, the feminine fantasy is rejected by the ego with dr. Flechsig as its object and is externalized as a prosecutorial delusion in which 'others' implant these feelings into the head of the subject. In a later stage, it only becomes acceptable to the ego when the feelings are projected onto God. Schreber enters a delusional world, in which the auto-erotic feelings now serve a higher, divine goal via fertilization by God of his female body as a megalomaniac redeemer. Consequently, his auto-erotic feelings and unmaning become not only acceptable to the ego, but becomes even desired in order to create new human beings from Schreber's spirit in order to reinforce Blessedness upon the world. Freud liked to believe that psychoanalysts of his time unanimously agreed that 'the roots of very nervous and

psychic illness are chiefly to be found in the domain of sexual life' (Freud, 2004, 20). However, his core position that loss of sexual libido leads to loss of reality in schizophrenia was objected to by the one who introduced the case of Schreber to Freud himself and the one who he earlier named his 'eldest son', 'my successor and crown prince' (193F) namely Carl Jung:

As for the libido problem, I must confess your remark in the Schreber analysis has set up booming reverberations. This remark, or rather the doubt expressed therein, has resuscitated all the difficulties that have beset me throughout the years in my attempt to apply the libido theory to Dementia praecox. The loss of the reality function in Dementia praecox cannot be reduced to repression of libido (defined as sexual hunger). Not by me at any rate. Your doubt shows me that in your eyes as well the problem cannot be solved in this way. (287J)

In the next paragraphs, I will elaborate on Jung's theory on libido as a reaction to Freud and I subsequently will deconstruct the subject's relation to God in a psychosis as understood by Jung.⁵

⁵ Before proceeding to the discussion between Freud and Jung on the Schreber case, it is important to provide some context to the interpretation of the ideas of both men. Freud had a private clinic in Vienna and his patient population consisted mainly of the higher socio-economic layers of Vienna with their own mental health problems, mainly neuroticism, arising from repressed sexuality. Freud was, however, less experienced in treating patients with schizophrenia (i.e. dementia praecox). Jung, on the other hand, was working in Zurich at Burghölzli, the academic hospital of the University of Zurich, with the chief psychiatrist Eugene Bleuler (1857-1939). Together, they admitted and treated many patients with schizophrenia, hence Freud referring to schizophrenia (a term named by Bleuler in 1909) as 'your' dementia praecox in letters to Jung (225F), thereby acknowledging that his 'experience in this field is meager. In this respect, I shall try to believe you'. (8F)

3. The Ego and the Collective Unconscious in Psychosis

3.1 Jung's critique

This [case of paranoid dementia, added by FI] was the famous autobiography of D. P. Schreber, Memoirs of My Nervous Illness. In his investigation Freud shows out of what infantile drives and forms of thinking the delusional system was built up. The peculiar delusions the patient had about his doctor, whom he identified with God or a godlike being, and certain other surprising and even blasphemous ideas about God himself, Freud was able to reduce in a very ingenious manner to the infantile relationship between the patient and his father. (Jung, 1960, 179)

Although it was Jung who introduced the Schreber case to Freud for the first time, Jung never wrote an essay solely on the analyses of Schreber case, this in contrast to Freud. It is in Jung's essay 'On Psychological Understanding', that he wrote the majority of his text on the Schreber case, in which he summarized Freud's analysis on Schreber as mentioned in the above passage (Jung, 1960, 179). He however, also criticized his analysis.

Jung's first criticism is based on the libido theory, 'I postulate a hypothetical, fundamental striving which I call libido. In accordance with the classical usage of the word, *libido* does not have an exclusively sexual connotation as it has in medicine (Jung, 1960, 190).' For Jung, 'Libido is intended as an energetic expression for psychological values. A psychological value is something that has an effect, hence it can be considered from the energetic standpoint without any pretence of exact measurement' (Jung, 1960, 190). It is the discussion on loss of sexual object-libido leading to loss of reality in Schreber's paranoid psychosis that triggers the discussion between Freud and Jung, which results in a point of break up between them (319F). More important in the context of this thesis however, is that the discussion pushed the development of theories on how the subject relates itself to the external world in psychosis. Jung's criticism is that the afflux of libido solely understood as a flow of sexual energy fails to explain the mechanism of psychosis. 'If the libido were really nothing but sexuality, what would happen in the case of eunuchs?', Jung asks (1967, 134). As Jung remarks, eunuchs do not necessarily develop schizophrenia. Sexuality is an important manifestation of libido, which Jung initially calls psychic energy, but it

is just that; a manifestation of a particular instinct out of many:

This view leads to a conception of libido which expands into a conception of *intentionality* in general. As the above quotation from Freud shows, we know far too little about the nature of human instincts and their psychic dynamism to risk giving priority to any one instinct. We would be better advised, therefore, when speaking of libido, to understand it as an energy-value which is able to communicate itself to any field of activity whatsoever, be it power, hunger, hatred, sexuality, or religion, without ever being itself a specific instinct. As Schopenhauer says: 'The Will as a thing-in-itself is quite different from its phenomenal manifestation, and entirely free from all forms of phenomenality, which it assumes only when it becomes manifest, and which therefore affect its objectivity only, and are foreign to the Will itself'. (Jung, 1967, 137)

Jung's standpoint that the concept of libido should be more generalized and should include more than only sexual instinct is supported by Schreber describing his loss of not only sexual interest, but interest in general such as holding office as a judge (power) or eating food. As we can read in *the Memoirs*, he refused to eat by command of verbal hallucinations with the conviction that 'it was my duty to die of hunger and in this way to sacrifice myself for God' (Schreber, 1903, 64). The term 'energy' for Jung is a pure hypothetical unknowable model that is nowhere to be found in the external world. He later acknowledges the 'mystical aspect' of the term energy and fine-tunes his theory towards a more bio-philosophical theory (Jung, 1961, 124). In the primary, undeveloped stage this libido is predominantly sexual in origin, it is the genetic-biological force behind creating from 'one small organism millions of ova and spermatozoa' and the energy between cell division (Jung, 1961, 125). Libido, for Jung, is not exclusively sexuality and in a differentiated state becomes pure desire and will in general, which is thus rooted in biology and genetics. Jung argues that this, however, is merely a manifestation of libido in objective reality, and the concept of libido as 'thing-in-itself' remains hidden. Indeed, Jung explicitly compares his theory on libido with Schopenhauer's concept of the Will; 'Thus far our conception of libido coincides with Schopenhauer's Will, inasmuch as a movement perceived from the outside can only be grasped as the manifestation of an inner will or desire' (Jung, 1961, 123). If libido for Freud is sexuality, then for

Jung it is *will*.⁶ Jung remarks that not only sexual interest in schizophrenia disappears, but that this will in general, is lost to such an extent that it affects many instinctual forces in life.

When therefore the insane Schreber brought about the end of the world through his introversion (influx of libido, added by FI), he was withdrawing libido from the world about him, thereby making it unreal. Schopenhauer tried in exactly the same way to abolish through negation (the equivalent of holiness and asceticism) the cardinal error of the Primal Will in creating the world at all. (Jung, 1967, 382)

Jung argues that Freud's sexuality only libido theory either reduces reality to sexuality or inflates the definition of sexuality. With the intention to explain everything with sexuality, the concept of sexuality loses meaning and fails to explain anything. Besides, Jung argues that in schizophrenia, it is not uncommon that interests in many domains of life are withdrawn, except for sexual desire (Jung, 1961, 122). Another counterargument of Jung is that following Freud's analysis, the influx of sexual libido either causes neurosis or psychosis. In the case of neurosis, however, the loss of libido does not result in a loss of reality at all, since the loss of reality happens only in psychosis:

In dementia praecox the loss of the reality function is so extreme that it must involve the loss of other instinctual forces whose sexual character must be denied absolutely, for no one is likely to maintain that reality is a function of sex. Moreover, if it were, the withdrawal of erotic interest in the neuroses would necessarily entail a loss of reality

⁶ Libido for Freud was not merely sexuality. Freud further adjusts his libido theory later in 1920 and underlined this by stating: 'In that event we must admit the critics to be in the right who from the first have suspected that psycho-analysis makes sexuality the explanation of everything, or the innovators like Jung who, quickly making up their mind, have used libido' as a synonym for instinctive force' in general. Is that not so? This result was at all events one not intended by us. On the contrary, we took as our starting point a sharp distinction between the ego-instincts (= death-instincts) and the sexual instincts (= life-instincts). We were prepared indeed to reckon even the alleged self-preservative instincts of the ego among death-instincts, a position which we have since corrected and withdrawn from. Our standpoint was a dualistic one from the beginning, and is so to-day more sharply than before, since we no longer call the contrasting tendencies egoistic and sexual instincts, but life-instincts and death-instincts. Jung's libido theory, on the other hand, is a monistic one; that he has applied the term libido to his only instinctive energy was bound to create confusion, but should not have any further effect on us.' (Freud, 1920, Beyond the Pleasure Principle', 42-43) Jung remarked Freud's adjustment as follows: 'The customary use of the term has developed, quite naturally and spontaneously, into a usage which makes it possible to explain Schreber's end of the world simply as a withdrawal of libido. On this occasion Freud remembered his original sexual definition of libido and tried to come to terms with the change of meaning that had quietly taken place in the meantime.' (Jung, 1961, p.120)

comparable to that which occurs in dementia praecox. But, as I said before, this is not the case. (Jung, 1961, 121)

In other words, Jung argues that in psychosis, not only sexual interest towards the external world is withdrawn, but interest in general is lost which results in the loss of reality function. To elaborate further on the question of what the loss of reality function in psychosis means for Freud and Jung, we need to continue on the libido theory within the context of the Schreber case. Jung noticed already that Schreber interprets the world he experiences in his psychosis as the 'end of the world', reality for him literally was ending and he was the main actor as a redeemer and a prophet of God in his newly constructed 'reality equivalent':

He [Schreber, added by FI] thus depicts the loss of reality in a very concrete way. The dynamic explanation is simple: we say that libido has withdrawn more and more from the external world into the inner world of fantasy, and there had to create, as a substitute for the lost world, a so-called reality equivalent. This substitute is built up piece by piece, so to speak, and it is most interesting to see out of what psychological material this inner world is constructed. (Jung, 1961, 120)

What is for Jung the loss of reality principle in the psychotic subject? It is a disappearance of (adaptation to) reality due to loss of general interest in the external world, 'The fact is that in very many cases reality disappears altogether so that not a trace of psychological adaptation can be found in these patients (In these states reality is replaced by complex contents)' (Jung, 1961, 120-21). This state is for Jung characteristic for psychosis "the loss of adaptation to reality, a peculiar phenomenon consisting in the special tendency of these patients to construct an inner fantasy world of their own, surrendering for this purpose their adaptation to reality' (1961, 120), which 'is compensated by a progressive increase in the creation of fantasies, which goes so far that the dream world becomes more real for the patient than external reality. As Jung noted, Schreber found an excellent figurative description for this phenomenon in his delusion about the 'end of the world' (Jung, 1961, 119), which he constructed and rigorously maintained at all cost:

But if we look at the delusional system without prejudice, and ask ourselves what it is aiming at, we see, first, that it is in fact aiming at something, and second, that the patient devotes all his will-power to the completion of his system. There are patients

who elaborate their delusions with scientific thoroughness, often dragging in an immense amount of comparative material by way of proof. Schreber belongs to this class. (Jung, 1960, 186)

In his 'On Psychological Understanding' Jung not only criticizes Freud's libido analysis on the Schreber case, but also formulates his view on the mechanisms behind the development of this new delusional system, the delusional reality equivalent, and the loss of Schreber's reality. Jung interprets Freud's analysis of the Schreber case as an 'analytical-reductive procedure', a reductive method (1960, 179-180). This reductive method, 'having the goal of 'tracing back the complicated system of delusions to its simpler and more general components' and 'pointing out the universally existent foundations' is for Jung a causality based method (1960, 179-180). It is in essence a scientific approach, 'that demands nothing more from an explanation than that it should reduce the unknown to the known and the complicated to the simple' (1960, 181).

When we apply these insights to the psychology of that class of mental patient to which Schreber belongs, we must, from the "objective-scientific" standpoint, reduce the fantasy-structure to its simple, fundamental elements. This is what Freud has done. But that is only one half of the work. The other half is the constructive understanding of Schreber's system. The question is: What is the goal the patient tried to reach through the creation of his system?

Jung proposes an alternative, 'constructive method' to answer this question, which 'elaborates them [fundamental elements, added by FI] into something higher and more complicated' (Jung, 1960, 185), 'up towards an unknown goal' (Jung, 1960, 192). Via the lens of a constructive method, Jung interprets Schreber's delusional system as 'neither infantile nor in itself pathological, but subjective, and hence justified within those limits. The constructive standpoint rejects absolutely the view that the subjective fantasy-formation is nothing but an infantile wish symbolically disguised or an obstinate clinging to the fiction of one's own superiority, in so far as this pretends to be a final explanation. One can judge the subjective mental process from the outside as one can judge everything else' (Jung, 1960, 187). Jung interprets Schreber's delusional system as sudden, coherent 'mythological formations', 'fantasy-structures which, like all such products, are based essentially on the activity of the unconscious' and 'which broke through from the unconscious into

consciousness' (1960, 188). These mythological formations, which Jung later will call archetypes, are universal, inborn figures and convictions such as the concept of devil or God, that confront the ego-consciousness, experienced by an individual as an unexpected thought or emotion. The reality equivalent that is build upon them, a new delusional system, is something that suddenly and thus out of his unconsciousness *happens to Schreber*:

Closer study of Schreber's or any similar case will show that these patients are consumed by a desire to create a new world-system, or what we call a Weltanschauung, often of the most bizarre kind. Their aim is obviously to create a system that will enable them to assimilate unknown psychic phenomena and so adapt themselves to their own world. This is a purely subjective adaptation at first, but it is a necessary transition stage on the way to adapting the personality to the world in general. Only, the patient remains stuck in this stage and substitutes his subjective formulation for the real world—which is precisely why he remains ill. He cannot free himself from his subjectivism and therefore does not establish any connection with objective thinking and with human society. He does not gain any real understanding of himself because he understands himself merely subjectively, and this precludes intelligible communication. (Jung, 1960, 189)

It is thus exactly in this order that the subject experiences a psychosis. Following these lines of Jung's reasoning, it is not that an individual substitutes his reality for a delusional system. The ego of an individual suddenly experiences content from his unconscious in the form of mythical content and the individual attempts to build a reality equivalent in order to assimilate and to make sense of these mythical content. As a tradeoff for this assimilation, the making-sense-of, however, the individual is forced to leave his reality, in which the symbolic content does not make any sense, and embrace his or her reality equivalent, the new delusional system in which the symbolic content makes perfect sense. Although Jung agrees with Freud that the loss of reality results from the inversion of libido, he disagrees that this libido is only sexual in nature (Jung, 1961, 121) or merely 'a gratification in fantasy of infantile wishes'.⁷ Jung is convinced that 'the loss of the reality function in schizophrenia does

⁷ Jung also disagrees with Adler that such fantasies are a 'masculine protest', a means of safeguarding the patient's threatened superiority', which for Freud and agreeable to Jung is just a variation of Freud's infantile wish-fulfillment (Jung, 1960, 1986).

not produce a heightening of sexuality: it produces a world of fantasy with marked archaic features' (Jung, 1967, 139). Initially for Freud, loss of libido results in loss of reality, while for Jung, in schizophrenia loss of will-libido results in loss of reality and consequently, in the substitution of the external world by the earlier mentioned delusional system. Freud later extends his libido theory beyond the limits of a narrow sexuality theory of libido, as Jung remarks:

Freud himself was forced to admit that his original conception of libido might possibly be too narrow when he tried to apply the energetic view consistently to a famous case of dementia praecox—the so-called Schreber case. This case is concerned among other things with that well-known problem in the psychology of dementia praecox, the loss of adaptation to reality, a peculiar phenomenon consisting in the special tendency of these patients to construct an inner fantasy world of their own, surrendering for this purpose their adaptation to reality. (Jung, 1961, 119)

3.2 The Second Freud

To analyze the relationship between the psychotic subject and God as Freud understood it, I will need to examine the relationship between the psychotic subject and the external world in the first place. This seems to be necessary to me, because we always necessarily relate ourselves to others, including God, mediated by the external world. We are in this sense always *inter-esse(d)*. This relatedness for Freud is mediated through the concept of libido. As a result of discussions with the Swiss school (i.e. Bleuler and Jung) Freud adjusts and extends his libido theory on schizophrenia by adding a distinction between ego-libido and object-libido (Freud, 1914, 76). Freud distinguishes between sexual energy, thus object-libido focused on the external world from ego-instinct focused on the subject itself based on 'biology' and 'common popular distinction' between respectively love and hunger (Freud, 1914, 78,79). From this renewed context, Freud understands the ego-libido as pointing inwards to the ego, in other words being merely interest in oneself as an infant, which results in a healthy, pre-existent 'primary narcissism' necessary for the survival of the infant. It is non-sexual in its essence and a part of it later aims towards the external world in the form of sexual libido (Freud, 1914, 75). It is the withdrawal

of this sexual libido and the inversion of it from the external world towards the ego that produces a 'secondary narcissistic' paranoid, megalomaniac state:

The more of the one is employed, the more the other becomes depleted. The highest phase of development of which object-libido is capable is seen in the state of being in love, when the subject seems to give up his own personality in favor of an object-cathexis; while we have the opposite condition in the paranoid's phantasy (or self-perception) of the 'end of the world'. (Freud, 1914, 76)

Freud argues that this secondary narcissistic attitude of a megalomaniac is 'no new creation' and is only a 'magnification and plainer manifestation' of an earlier infantile and primitive stage of mental life in which 'an overestimation of the power of their wishes and mental acts, the 'omnipotence of thoughts', a belief in the thaumaturgic force of words, and a technique for dealing with the external world 'magic' which appears to be a logical application of these grandiose premisses' (Freud, 1914, 75). Freud thus compares the attitude of an individual in the primitive or infantile stage with God to the megalomaniac psychotic relationship with God and with the external world. This comparison could be extended to Schreber's many convictions of the miracles he experienced and applied through actions and words (e.g. nerve-contact and nerve-language).

How does Freud then interpret the loss of reality function of the psychotic subject exactly? The loss of reality for the psychotic subject in relation to God for Freud is a narcissistic stage developed into a megalomaniac state due to inversion of object-libido towards the ego itself. Importantly, it is a regression towards infantile omnipotence, in which the subject overestimates the influences of its own mental thought and acts on the external world via a God in a 'magical' fantasy world (Freud, 1914, 75). In his later paper 'The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis' written in 1924, Freud further develops his reality principle in psychosis⁸, this time via the concept of the Id, this time still concluding that 'imaginary external world of a psychosis attempts to put itself in the place of external reality' and the loss of reality principle is in its essence more importantly an issue of 'substitute for reality' (Freud, 1924, pp 181-188). Although I have limited the inclusion of later Freud's work in this

⁸ and one year later in his short essay 'On Negation' (Freud, 1925), see page 38 of this thesis for a short discussion.

thesis, the introduction of the Id is relevant in this case, because Freud now argues that the reason for the subject to replace reality with an imaginary new one 'serves the desire for power of the id, which will not allow itself to be dictated to by reality. Both neurosis and psychosis are thus the expression of a rebellion on the part of the id against the external world, of its unwillingness—or, if one prefers, its incapacity—to adapt itself to the exigencies of reality, to Ανάγκη [Necessity]' (Freud, 1924, 184). In psychosis, the ego does not repress or withdraws external reality, but attempts to completely replace reality with an imaginary one. When applied to the Schreber case in this context, which Freud did not attempt explicitly in his 1924 paper, I interpret Schreber's psychosis as 'a rebellion' against the powerlessness towards the punishments of his father and his incapacity to deal with this reality. He overcomes this powerlessness by becoming, at times superior, to the most powerful being of all, namely God in his own reality. As Freud acknowledges, the remodeling of external reality in psychosis 'by means of hallucination' 'is carried out upon the psychical precipitates of former relations to it—that is, upon the memory-traces, ideas and judgements which have been previously derived from reality and by which reality was represented in the mind' (Freud, 1924, 124-125). Let us now return and complete the discussion between Jung and Freud, a discussion which needs to be further examined in this thesis, because it leads to theories on libido and together with it, to theories on the relationship between the subject and the external world and God in psychosis. Jung criticized Freud's attempt to apply his sexual libido theory to schizophrenia and concluded that this application is impossible (Jung, 1967, 134). Freud, in turn, finds Jung's interpretation and criticism of his application of the libido theory on schizophrenia 'premature' and provides a counter-reaction to Jung's criticism:

It would, of course, be a different matter if it were proved that the libido theory has already come to grief in the attempt to explain the latter disease [i.e. schizophrenia, added by author]. This has been asserted by C. G. Jung (1912) and it is on that account that I have been obliged to enter upon this last discussion, which I would gladly have been spared. I should have preferred to follow to its end the course embarked upon in the analysis of the Schreber case without any discussion of its premises. But Jung's assertion is, to say the least of it, premature. (Freud, 2004, 9)

Freud thinks that Jung only dictates that the loss of libido insufficiently explains the loss of reality, without providing any argument. Freud further accuses 'the Swiss school' meaning Jung and Bleuler as main actors, that besides the discovery of 'the presence in it of complexes known to us both in healthy and neurotic subjects and the similarity of the phantasies that occur in it to popular myths - the mechanism of schizophrenia is entirely left untouched' (Freud, 1914, 81). The discussion between Freud and Jung finally results in a permanent break up between their relationship as friend and their collaboration as colleagues:

Dear friend: About the libido question, we shall see. The nature of the change you have made is not quite clear to me and I know nothing of its motivation. Once I am better informed, I shall surely be able to switch to objectivity, precisely because I am well aware of my bias. Even if we cannot come to terms immediately, there is no reason to suppose that this scientific difference will detract from our personal relations. I can recall profound differences between us at the beginning of our relationship. (Freud to Jung, 319)

It is not entirely clear to which bias Freud exactly refers to. It is either a personal or a theoretical bias. Zvi Lothane already proposed the question of whether 'the sexual etiology of paranoia in the eye of the beholder' was, referring to Freud with Adler, Fliess, and Jung as its potential erotic transference (Lothane, 1997). Leaving speculation aside, Freud already developed his theory on the homosexual roots of mental illness a couple of years before he analyzed the Schreber case. According to Lothane, Freud's hastily and superficial analysis of the Schreber case is merely a sacrifice of Schreber for his own theory:

This one-sided take on the father, without any biographical data at his disposal or anybody else's since, is due to Freud's zealous sacrificing history to theory: 'One more confirmation of what we found in so many cases when I was in Zurich; that paranoiacs are unable to prevent a recathexis of their homosexual leaning. Which brings the [Schreber] case in line with our theory' (4:358). (Lothane, 1997)

Exactly this 'zealous project' seems to be at stake with Jung questioning the sexual necessity of his libido theory. Jung clearly gets irritated, as can be read in the correspondence, and asks Freud 'to stop playing the father to your sons' and stop treating his pupils like his sons, creating 'either slavish sons or impudent puppies'.

(338J). He cuts his ties somewhat and declares his independence; 'You are a dangerous rival...Yet I think it has to be this way, for a natural development cannot be halted, nor should one try to halt it. Our personal differences will make our work different' (282J).

3.3 From Ego to God

Jung moves forward after the break with Freud in developing his own theories on the relation between the psychotic subject—not merely based on Schreber's case—and God. In these theories, the role of God plays a major role. Jung interprets the ego's megalomaniac state due to influx of libido as an inflation of the ego occurring in relation to the subject's unconsciousness, which results in the loss of reality, hence entering a realm of a new 'reality-equivalent' in which the ego illusionary identifies itself not as a reflection of God, but as God itself. As I will argue in the last paragraphs of this thesis, this psychotic transformation of the relationship between the subject and God starts with the ego's disintegration from its social mask, or the persona. For Jung, the persona is 'a complicated system of relations between the individual consciousness and society, fittingly enough a kind of mask, designed on the one hand to make a definite impression upon others, and, on the other, to conceal the true nature of the individual' (Jung, 1966, 192). Daniel Schreber certainly had a status, a name, a title, and a high function as a judge he executed at a relatively young age. He was a man with prestige, maybe most importantly, the son of the authoritative physician dr. Moritz Schreber, a family member of the famous Schreber family. The ego relates itself to the other via the persona and thereby creates an identity for itself. The ego's formation is thus based on the other through the persona for Jung. This is an important notion that further will be explored when discussing Lacan in further paragraphs. The subject carrying a persona is expected by society to play its role in a flawless manner, which Schreber struggled to do as he mentioned in his Memoir; 'I have already mentioned the heavy burden of work I found there' (Schreber, 1903, 46) and 'It thus happened that after a few weeks, I had already overtaxed myself mentally' (Schreber, 1903, 47). In addition, it was exactly one month after Schreber 'was defeated as a candidate to the Reichstag' (German parliament) that his first mental problems started to emerge and that he started to consult dr. Flechsig in Leipzig (Funt, 1987). I therefore hypothesize following Jung's theory on the persona, that it was Schreber's burnout that started a crack in his

persona as a judge, with the consequence that the content of the unconscious could break into his ego-consciousness. In other words, it was the fragmentation of the persona that triggered a disruptive relationship of the subject with the other, the other as the collective unconscious, as the father-image, but first and foremost as God, as in Schreber's psychosis, and following Freud's line of interpretation, 'the patient transfers the father-imagó to the doctor' (Jung, 1966, 129), 'he draws upon himself an over-valuation that is almost incredible to the outsider, for to the patient he seems like a saviour or a god' (Jung, 1966, 130). Once the veil of the persona falls, the ego-consciousness gets confronted with the content of the collective unconscious. Before continuing to the collective unconscious, it is relevant to state, in order to get a complete idea of Jung's concept of the subject, that Jung distinguished a layer in the unconscious that he called 'personal unconscious'. The materials contained in this layer are of a personal nature insofar as they have the character partly of acquisitions derived from the individual's life and partly of psychological factors which could just as well be conscious' (Jung, 1966, 135-36). The content of the personal unconscious is closer to the ego in the sense that the content has the potential to manifest within the field of consciousness easier when compared to the content within the collective unconsciousness.

To explain what 'the subject' for Jung exactly is and what its relationship with God is in psychosis, I first need to explain what the collective unconscious for Jung is and how it functions in a non psychotic subject in the first place. For Jung, there is a relationship within the human subject between the ego-conscious and the collective unconscious (Jung, 1979, 3). The collective unconscious for Jung is a psychic inheritance of humanity, containing archetypes that are universal patterns (e.g. symbols, images, myths) that can influence the subject in unconscious, subtle ways (Jung, 1979, 8). These archetypes are 'ancient images are restored to life by the primitive, analogical mode of thinking peculiar to dreams. It is not a question of inherited ideas, but of inherited thought-patterns' (Jung, 1966, 138). They are primordial, impersonal, inherited images within the unconsciousness:

In view of these facts we must assume that the unconscious contains not only personal, but also impersonal collective components in the form of inherited categories"or archetypes. I have therefore advanced the hypothesis that at its deeper

levels the unconscious possesses collective contents in a relatively active state. That is why I speak of a collective unconscious. (Jung, 1966, 138)

Within the collective unconscious, Jung identifies the archetypes of the shadow, the anima or the animus and the self. The collective unconscious is organized in this order, layered as an onion, going from the surface of the unconscious to its deepest core. It is also in this order that the archetypes have an increasing potential capacity to influence the ego-consciousness. The collective unconscious contains all the material that has not yet reached the threshold of consciousness. These are the seeds of future conscious contents' (Jung, 1966, 127) and 'the universal similarity of human brains leads to the universal possibility of a uniform mental functioning. This functioning is the collective psyche. Inasmuch as there are differentiations corresponding to race, tribe, and even family, there is also a collective psyche limited to race, tribe, and family over and above the 'universal' collective psyche' (Jung, 1966, 147). Among the archetypes within the collective unconscious, the shadow is 'the most accessible of these, and the easiest to experience', constituting our inferiorities that 'challenges the whole ego-personality' (Jung, 1979, 8). The shadow, and thus the subject's inferiorities and his or her negative side, is often unconsciously projected on 'the other person' (Jung, 1979, 9). Shadow projections are always of the same sex as the subject. In contrast, when the projection is contrasexual 'we meet the animus of a woman and the anima of a man, two corresponding archetypes whose autonomy and unconsciousness explain the stubbornness of their projections' (Jung, 1979, 10). The ego's encounter within the collective unconscious after the disintegration of the persona is directly linked to the archetype of anima. The persona is connected to the anima. The anima influences the ego as an autonomous complex within the unconscious, it is 'the repression of feminine traits and inclinations naturally causes these contrasexual demands to accumulate in the unconscious' (Jung, 1966, 189). The more invisible this unconscious femininity, the more influence it can execute over the ego-consciousness:

The persona, the ideal picture of a man as he should be, is inwardly compensated by feminine weakness, and as the individual outwardly plays the strong man, so he becomes inwardly a woman, i.e. the anima, for it is the anima that reacts to the persona. But because the inner world is dark and invisible to the extraverted

consciousness, and because a man is all the less capable of conniving his weakness the more he is identified with the persona, the persona's counterpart, the anima, remains completely in the dark and is at once projected, so that our hero comes under the heel of his wife's slipper. (Jung, 1966, 194,195)

Once the subject becomes aware of its anima, it floats more on the surface of the unconscious, thus approximating it to the ego consciousness. The anima functions as a 'psychopomp'; a mediator between the ego consciousness and the collective unconscious (Jung, 1979, 8). From this point, the subject is at risk to inflate its ego, thereby transforming the subject's relationship towards the external world as a megalomaniac relationship. The ego is at risk to fall into the illusion that it has mastered the anima with its power of 'mana', transforming into, what Jung calls a 'mana-personality' (Jung, 1966, 227). The ego becomes pathologically inflated within this illusion with 'a new adulteration this time with a figure of the same sex corresponding to the father image' (Jung, 1979, 229). Although Jung does not elaborate on this statement further in the text, it seems to be an Oedipal reference to the father figure after mastering and possessing the mother image through the archetype of anima. The ego enters a megalomaniac delusional state in which it shouts 'I and the Father are one' (Jung, 1966, 229). Jung seems to cross here the mental path of Freud on the father complex. There is however in Jung's interpretation no sexual yearning for the father image, an important contrast with that of Freud. It is not an 'I want to become one with my father' or 'I want to become one with dr. Flechsig *as my Father*' in a sexual sense. It is an 'I am father Gottlieb, the beloved of God' transforming into an 'I am the beloved of God' and finally 'I am father God' (Jung, 1979, 229). For Jung, the father complex is a manifestation of a will for power, a symbol of the authority of a father, but especially his own authoritative father. There is for the subject only one way to escape this delusion, which Jung calls individuation:

In the face of this, our pitiably limited ego, if it has but a spark of self-knowledge, can only drawback and rapidly drop all pretense of power and importance. It was a delusion: the conscious mind has not become master of the unconscious, and the anima has forfeited her tyrannical power only to the extent that the ego was able to come to terms with the unconscious. (Jung, 1966, 229)

Individuation is the process of self-realization, of becoming a unique 'in'-dividual person by synchronizing oppositional⁹ intrapsychic structures such as the persona and anima as I have discussed in previous paragraphs, 'the aim of individuation is nothing less than to divest the self of the false wrappings of the persona on the one hand, and of the suggestive power of primordial images on the other' (Jung, 1966, 174). Through this process, Jung states that the ego escapes the inflation of itself, the process of what Freud essentially called narcissism, 'I would suggest that we speak instead of "psychic inflation." The term seems to me appropriate in so far as the state we are discussing involves an extension of the personality beyond individual limits, in other words, a state of being puffed up' (Jung, 1966, 143).¹⁰ Consequently the ego escapes the transformation to a megalomaniac delusional state and consequently the loss of reality as a state of psychosis. Escaping psychic inflation creates a new balance between the ego-conscious and the unconscious can be established through individuation. The subject now does not identify the center of itself as the ego-consciousness, but as the archetype of the self, indistinguishable from the God-image, a towards the unconscious approximated new center of the subject, 'this accommodation, however, was not a victory of the conscious over the unconscious, but the establishment of a balance of power between the two worlds (Jung, 1966, 229). Jung calls this new establishment the archetype of the self, 'the self is a quantity that is supraordinate to the conscious ego. It embraces not only the conscious but also the unconscious psyche, and is therefore, so to speak, a personality which we *also* are', a concept that reflects the God-image in the collective unconscious (Jung, 1966, 177). This archetype can only be reached in the deepest layers of the unconscious through the process of individuation:

The more numerous and the more significant the unconscious contents which are assimilated to the ego, the closer the approximation of the ego to the self, even though this approximation must be a never ending process. This inevitably produces an inflation of the ego, unless a critical line of demarcation is drawn between it and the unconscious figures. But this act of discrimination yields practical results only if it succeeds in fixing reasonable boundaries to the ego and in granting the figures of the

⁹ Oppositional because it attempts to reconcile in it man- and womanhood, being conscious and unconscious, personal and collective, limited and limitless, physical and metaphysical, man and God.

¹⁰ The crucial difference between the concepts as I read is that while for Freud, narcissism involves an excessive investment of libido in oneself, while for Jung the concept of psychic inflation exceeds the individual in the sense that it is always an ego inflation in relation to archetypal symbols such as that of God.

unconscious—the self, anima, animus, and shadow—relative autonomy and reality (of a psychic nature). (Jung, 1979, 23-24)

What is then ‘the subject’ for Jung exactly and what is its relationship with God in psychosis? Following Jung’s analysis on the subject, on God and the state of psychosis, the latter which he understood as living in a reality equivalent as a substitute for the external world (Jung, 1961, 120), I interpret the subjects relationship to God in a psychosis of this reality substitute mainly as a state of the ego-consciousness in which it attempts to capture God as an object (Jung, 1979, 229), or falls into the illusion that such an objectification and thereby gaining superiority and power over him, is possible in the first place:

However, accentuation of the ego personality and the world of consciousness may easily assume such proportions that the figures of the unconscious are psychologized and the self consequently becomes assimilated to the ego. Although this is the exact opposite of the process we have just described it is followed by the same result: inflation. The world of consciousness must now be levelled down in favour of the reality of the unconscious. (...) room must be made for the dream at the expense of the world of consciousness. (Jung, 1979, 24)

In Schreber’s case this loss of reality, this dream-like fantasy state, manifested itself after his ego-inflation, causing a megalomaniac psychosis in which he declares superiority over God, thereby becoming God itself. Is God then a delusion? It is not an ontological issue that needs to be answered, for Jung such a question cannot be answered anyway, because it is ‘an unknowable essence which we cannot grasp as such, since by definition it transcends our powers of comprehension’ (Jung, 1966, 238).

It is how the subject relates itself to the idea of a God that makes it delusional or not. Following Jung’s analysis, a non delusional, non psychotic subject has to understand itself not as a subject, but as an object of the self as a post-individuated, new center within the subject which he identifies not as God, but as an ‘unknowable and supraordinate subject’ as a merely a God-image (Jung, 1966, 240)¹¹, ‘but it transcends our powers of imagination to form a clear picture of what we are as a

¹¹ Such an interpretation would have interesting metaphysical (monistic) and theological implications, namely that the only existing ‘subject’ is God itself, it falls outside the scope of this thesis to elaborate on this subject in detail.

self, for in this operation the part would have to comprehend the whole' (Jung, 1966, 177). The result of individuation is that an individual achieves the insight that he as the subject is neither ego-consciousness, nor the collective unconscious, but the object of 'an unknown and superordinate subject' (Jung, 1966, 240) who manifests itself in the unconscious as the archetype of the self, a 'unity and totality stand at the highest point on the scale of objective values because their symbols can no longer be distinguished from the imago Dei' (Jung, 1979, 31), which is merely a God-image:

Intellectually, the self is no more than a psychological concept, a construct that serve to express an unknowable essence which we cannot grasp as such, science by definition it transcends our powers of comprehension. It might equally well be called the 'God within us.' (Jung, 1966, 238)

The result, thus, of individuation is the achievement of an individuated ego, which is the main goal in life for Jung. The subject lacking self-knowledge, or to be more accurate in this context ego-knowledge, fails to see its own relative stability and limited existence within the field of consciousness. The ego's existence is only relatively stable, its bases are somatic and psychic for Jung; 'the somatic basis of the ego consists, then, of conscious and unconscious factors. The same is true of the psychic basis: on the one hand, the ego rests on the total field of consciousness, and on the other, on the sum total of unconscious contents' (Jung, 1979, 4). The ego becomes delusional exactly because it thinks it conquered the unconscious. In other words, the subject becomes delusional because its ego identifies itself with the unconscious as the other. In Schreber's case, the other is understood within the father complex by Freud, as God through the symbols of dr. Flechsig, the father and of the sun in a state of a megalomaniac delusion. For Jung, the symbolism of the sun has an important role in describing the relationship between the subject and God. Jung understood the ego as being attached to and revolving around the self as the earth revolves around the sun. The sun is understood as being a symbol of God, the other. Hence, is the analysis that 'The ego is the only content of the self that we do know, the individuated ego senses itself as the object of an unknown and superordinate subject' (Jung, 1966, 240).

The relational dependence of the ego on the other was also noticed by Jacques Lacan, who stated in his analysis that 'the notion of subject is correlative to the

existence of someone', 'this *he* is the guarantor of my being, without this *he* my being could not even be an *I*. The drama of the relationship with the *he* underlies the entire dissolution of Schreber's world, where we see the *he* reduced to a single partner, this God who is asexual and polysexual at one and the same time, kenglobing all that still exists in the world Schreber is confronted with' (Lacan, 1993, 101). Lacan provides an extensive analysis of psychosis with Schreber as its subject (Lacan, 1993) and has in fact elaborated on this subject more extensively than both Freud and Jung. It is therefore relevant for this thesis to discuss his theories on the relationship between the subject and God in psychosis, which he analyzed based on the Schreber case and which I will provide in the next paragraphs.

4. Foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father

4.1 Foreclosure and Reality Testing

Lacan developed many of his ideas over a period of several decades. Vanheule proposes four eras which can be identified in Lacan's work in which he has developed his central concepts on psychosis (Vanheule, 2011, 1-5). In the first era (the 1930s and 1940s) psychosis was analyzed as an imaginary mode of relating to the world. In the second era, covering the 1950s, psychosis is discussed in terms of language-based structures. Importantly, it is in this era that his major work '*the Psychoses, the Third Seminar*' and specifically the Schreber case is discussed to the full extent and the concept of 'the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father' is discussed (Lacan, 1993). I will be mainly discussing the first and second-era theories of Lacan on psychosis since the Schreber case is most extensively deconstructed in this work. In the third era concepts such as objet petit a and jouissance are discussed and in the fourth era the idea of the Borromean knot in which the interaction between the realms of the Real, the Imaginary, and the Symbol is explained. Also, Lacan further elaborates on the concept of the Name-of-the-Father in this era (Lacan, 2013).

Lacan understands psychosis in his first era in terms of an imaginary identification relationship with the mirror stage as a core concept in it. The mirror stage is a phase in the Imaginary realm in which the subject sees itself in a figurative mirror and

understands its fragmented identity as a whole with its body. The mirror stage is characterized by a state in which the subject misrecognizes itself. It is misrecognition because the subject falsely equates itself with an image of an ideal ego which represents wholeness and unity with mental and physical boundaries that the subject's ego chases after. Lacan argues that in case of psychosis this same situation can be identified in relation to the external world '*méconnaissance systématique de la réalité*' (Lacan, 1953, 12). Lacan says that in psychosis, the subject cannot become aware that it forcefully projects its own inner world unto the external world (Lacan, 2006, 140). The ego for Lacan is constituted by the Other's desire, a concept that I will further elaborate a bit later one, which makes it an 'extimacy', or 'intimately exterior, an internal externality' (Johnston, 2023), in Lacan's words:

He [the ego, added by FI] is originally an inchoate collection of desires - there you have the true sense of the expression *fragmented body* - and the initial synthesis of the ego is essentially an *alter ego*, it is alienated. The desiring human subject is constructed around a center which is the other insofar as he gives the subject his unity, and the first encounter with the object is with the object of the other's desire. (Lacan, 1993, 39).

Hence, the ego misrecognizes itself as a subject 'the ego is not only a congealed, heteronomous object rather than fluid, autonomous subject, but also, in its very origins, a repository for the projected desires and fantasies of larger others' (Johnston, 2023). Once the narcissistic image with its mental and physical boundaries has been established, the ego (e.g. in the case of an infant) begins to explore other beings. In the second phase of the mirror stage, Lacan, argues, the concepts of *hainamoration* and *jealossance* are active, both manifested after the subject understands that it is not the sole object of the mother's desire. Hainamoration in the mirror phase is a neologism based on adoration, love (amour) and hate (haine). Jealousance is a neologism based on jealousy and jouissance as pleasure (Vanheule, 2011, 28). Vanheule explains that these couple-affects are associated with imaginary functioning of the infant in relation to the other; they express that when an infant adores, it also hates and when it experiences joy it also jealously hates another being (Vanheule, 2011, 28). Applied to the Schreber case, it

becomes immediately apparent that Schreber expresses an infantile reaction in his relationship with dr. Flechsig. Schreber adores dr. Flechsig, because of his gratitude towards him after his recovery, but possibly also because of his adoration for his father as a physician that Schreber recognizes in dr. Flechsig. As discussed earlier, this adoration transforms initially towards hate and rivalry, but also toward love for dr. Flechsig. Freud explains this transformation in terms of Schreber's developing paranoia, 'Indeed, I do not love him - I hate him, indeed - because *he persecutes me* [emphasized by Freud]' (Freud, 2004, 53). Lacan agrees with Freud and applies his ideas 'uncritically' to his own cases on paranoia and persecution that he studies (Vanheule, 2011, 190). A different concept of Lacan that manifests itself in the mirror stage, namely the intrusion complex, can be applied to the Schreber case as well. As Vanheule states, intrusion, for Lacan, is felt when the ego feels its relation with its ego-ideal feels disrupted and hence, the idea of wholeness is fragmented. (2011, 29). Importantly, for Lacan, within the subject the ego has the function of relating to the external world and precisely this function is distorted in psychotic phenomena such as delusions and hallucinations. Lacan explains verbal hallucinations as the speaking 'strange twin' of the ego, namely the ego-ideal who is speaking to the subject as an external voice 'who echoes the subject's thoughts, who intervenes, spies upon him, names his actions in the sequence in which they occur, and commands them' (Lacan, 1993, 144). The intrusion complex of Schreber was projected to dr. Flechsig after recovery from his first episode of illness. Schreber certainly felt gratitude that he had recovered from his illness and had 'only favorable impressions' of him (Schreber, 1903, 45). From a Freudian analysis, this may even be a feeling of love and adoration as a physician, just like for his father. In any case, it is certainly dr. Fleschig who gave Schreber and his wife President Schreber back, the judge as the perfect ego-ideal. This phase is marked by social interactions and particularly 'rivalry', a struggle 'for pure prestige' (Vanheule, 2011, 28), and it is certainly dr. Flechsig who restored Schreber's prestige as the judge. However, the wife of Schreber was indebted to dr. Flechsig to such a degree that he held a picture of him on her desk and felt even more gratitude than Schreber felt (Schreber, 1903, 45). Whether she was in love with him cannot be historically reconstructed, but Schreber seems to interpret this as his wife loving dr. Flechsig. Thus, Schreber not only felt adoration, gratitude, or from a Freudian analysis even love, but also jealousy, rivalry, and hate. Lacan initially understands psychosis in terms of a

(mis-)identification and imaginary relationship, but in the 1950's his focus on psychosis shifts. At the core of the second-era Lacan's understanding of psychosis lies the foreclosure of the-Name-of-the-Father:

For psychosis to be triggered, the Name-of-the-Father —verworfen, foreclosed, that is, never having come to the place of the Other— must be summoned to that place in symbolic opposition to the subject. It is the lack of the Name-of-the-Father in that place which, by the hole that it opens up in the signified, sets off a cascade of reworkings of the signifier from which the growing disaster of the imaginary proceeds, until the level is reached at which signifier and signified stabilize in a delusional metaphor. But how can the Name-of-the-Father be summoned by the subject to the only place from which it could have come into being for him and in which it has never been? By nothing other than a real father, not at all necessarily by the subject's own father, but by One-father [Un-père]. Yet this One-father must still come to that place to which the subject could not summon him before. For this, the One-father need but situate himself in a tertiary position in any relationship that has as its base the imaginary couple $a-a'$ —that is, ego-object or ideal-reality— involving the subject in the field of eroticized aggression that it induces. (Lacan, 2007, 481)

Two concepts need to be deconstructed in this passage, first the concept of foreclosure, or *Verwerfung*, a non-symbolization, which is a characteristic trait of psychosis for Lacan. The second concept that needs further elaboration is the concept of God in psychosis as the reference of the Name-of-the-Father, and specifically the God of Schreber as understood by Lacan. Thus, respectively two questions need to be answered, as Lacan asked, 'what is the relation of the subject with this God in a psychosis?' and 'what is this God, then, who has revealed himself to him', 'him' referring to Schreber (Lacan, 1993, 125)?

For Lacan, the relationship between Schreber and God is a forsaken relationship. Following Freud, Lacan understands the relationship of Schreber with the other as his fundamental interlocutor, whether this is 'Fechselig, the tested souls, the realms of God with their various meanings, posterior and anterior, upper and lower, and, finally, the ultimate god whom everything appears to be reduced at the end' (Lacan, 1993, 126) essentially as a relationship of ignoring the other. It is a 'liegen lassen', 'laisser

en plan', a 'to let lie', thus a state of ignoring (Lacan, 1993, 127), 'Throughout the entire Schreberian delusion the threat of this being forsaken returns like a musical theme, like the unbroken thread one finds running through a literary or historical theme' (Lacan, 1993, 127). Schreber's God is further 'presence and his mode of presence is the speaking mode' (Lacan, 1993, 125), and it is 'he who is always talking, who is forever talking without saying anything' and 'who nevertheless never stops talking' (Lacan, 1993, 126). As we read in his Memoir, Schreber continuously experiences the voice of God for years, through what he believed to be nerve-contact, and often struggles to make any sense of the content of these voices, 'the talk of the voices had already become mostly an empty babel of ever-recurring monotonous phrases in tiresome repetition' (Schreber, 1903, 152). Lacan interprets the relationship of Schreber with God on two levels, 'an auditory one and another, more mysterious one, that of his presence' (Lacan, 1993, 127) which corresponds respectively to Schreber's lower and upper God. Who is it then, that speaks? To answer this question Lacan first notes that one should start with the ego, 'since the ego in its function of relation to the external world is what breaks down' (Lacan, 1993, 144). This ego for Lacan is always intertwined with a 'strange twin, the ideal ego' (Lacan, 1993, 144), the 'reflected other', 'the imaginary other' (Lacan, 1993, 144). Lacan asks if it is really this ideal ego that becomes a speaking double, as 'the most apparent phenomenology of psychosis tells us' (Lacan, 1993, 145). Lacan's answer is that to find the speaking one, we should look further than the imaginary order and the ego's projection as the ideal ego within it, 'we have the idea that beyond this little other of the imaginary we have to admit the existence of another Other' (Lacan, 1993, 146). It is in fact through the conviction of the existence of the other for Schreber that he experiences his own existence:

It's a fact of which I have the most direct proofs, this can only be God, if the word is to have any meaning. I had never taken this word seriously before, and at the moment at which I experienced these things, I experienced God. The experience is not the guarantee of God, it's God who is the guarantee of my experience. I am speaking to you of God. I must have got it from somewhere, and as I didn't get it from the baggage of my childhood prejudices, my experience is true. (Schreber, 1903, 78-80)

Schreber thus experiences himself only in relation to his experience of God as the other. Lacan, therefore, noted that 'The subject's relationship to the world is a mirror relation. The subject's world will essentially consist of the relationship with that being who is the other for him, namely God himself' (Lacan, 1993, 87). He identifies this other, specifically with a capital O, as speech in the symbolic order and hence as the source of verbal hallucinations in psychosis, 'It's not only because we give it a capital letter that we are satisfied with it, but because we locate it as the necessary correlate of speech' (Lacan, 1993, 146). The voice for Lacan as a concept exceeds the dimension of sound, it is not an acoustic phenomenon. It is through the voice that the other communicates with the subject. The repetitive voices heard by Schreber are the internalization of the other's voice, the other in this case being God and 'heard' in a figurative sense, 'indeed, it is a mistake to take verbal hallucination to be auditory in nature, when it is theoretically conceivable that it not be auditory at all' (Lacan, 2007, 446). Importantly, this phenomenon is not only restricted to the case of psychosis. Already early in childhood, parental voices are internalized as the other, which are manifested in the child as 'inner voices'. 'What part in the subject talks' Lacan rhetorically asks and he answers 'Analysis says it's the unconscious' (Lacan, 1993, 41), 'it doesn't speak only *to* the other, it speaks *of* the other as an object' (Lacan, 1993, 38). This unconscious speech, which every one of us always and continuously experiences, may or may not be repressed by the subject depending on whether the subject finds these thoughts pleasant. In the case of psychosis, however, the voices of the other are experienced as an unexpected, sudden, and external encounter.

This is what presents itself in the phenomenon of verbal hallucination. The moment the hallucination appears in the real, that is, accompanied by the sense of reality, which is the elementary phenomenon's basic feature, the subject literally speaks with his ego, and it's as if a third party, his lining, were speaking and commenting on his activity. (Lacan, 1993, 14).

The voice 'will pass a signifier into the real' when 'a psychotic person is confronted with that which he cannot signify', a condition of foreclosure (vanHeule, 2011b, 99). This brings me to the second main concept within the analysis of psychosis for Lacan, that of 'foreclosure' happening in the order of the Symbolic. Foreclosure

differs from Freud's concept of *Verdrängung*, or repression (Freud, 1915, 147), as Lacan notes in Freud's words 'in which the subject 'did not want to know anything about it in the sense of repression' (Lacan, 2003, 322). Repression typically happens in the case of neurosis, in which content is repressed into the unconscious. Its traits are always traceable in the subject itself, like with a Freudian slip of a neurotic. Importantly, with repression, there is an unconscious acknowledgment that there is something to be repressed, 'in the sense of repression one still knows something about the very thing one doesn't want, in some sense, to know anything about, and the whole of analysis consists in showing us that one knows it very well indeed' (Lacan, 1993, 149). Importantly, repression is still a form of affirmation, repression is affirmation, symbolization, or *Bejahung*, since the repressed, exactly because it is repressed, is also affirmed. Lacan takes this notion of negation and in a way radicalizes Freud's theory with foreclosure in psychosis. Psychosis is not a state of merely repression or negation, but of foreclosure according to Lacan, in which content is not repressed in the unconscious or negated, but totally expelled from the symbolic realm, 'its effect is a symbolic abolition' (Lacan, 2003, 322). Foreclosure is fundamentally different than negating, than a state of 'liegen lassen' or 'forsaken', it is an anti-*Bejahung*, as Lacan states 'In the beginning, then, there is either *Bejahung*, which is the affirmation of what is, or *Verwerfung*' (Lacan, 1966, 82) and 'Verwerfung is exactly what opposes the primal *Bejahung* and constitutes as such what is expelled' (Lacan, 2003, 387). This makes a sudden, unexpected irruption possible of the non-symbolized 'What does not come to light in the symbolic appears in the Real' (Lacan, 2003, 324). In *the Third seminar*, Lacan asks what the psychotic phenomenon is and answers:

It is the emergence in reality of an enormous meaning that has the appearance of being nothing at all -in so far as it cannot be tied to anything, since it has never entered into the system of symbolization - but under certain conditions it can threaten the entire edifice. (Lacan, 1993, 85)

Freud states in his short essay *On Negation (Verneinung)* that 'the content of a repressed image or idea can make its way into consciousness, on condition that it is *negated* [emphasised by Freud]', negation is an 'intellectual acceptance of the repressed' (Freud, 1925). Repression has an important function in reality testing:

the real existence of something of which there is a presentation (reality-testing)—is a concern of the definitive reality-ego, which develops out of the initial pleasure-ego. It is now no longer a question of whether what has been perceived (a thing) shall be taken into the ego or not, but of whether something which is in the ego as a presentation can be rediscovered in perception (reality) as well. (Freud, 1925).

In his later adjusted and further developed hypothesis on the reality principle, Freud includes the two instinctual drives based on love and hate, and argues that with the withdrawal of libido from the external world, on which I have elaborated in more detail earlier on, the instinctual drives of Eros and destruction drive malfunction with respectively *Bejahung* thus affirmation, and *Verneinung* thus negation as a consequence:

Affirmation—as a substitute for uniting—belongs to Eros; negation—the successor to expulsion—belongs to the instinct of destruction. The general wish to negate, the negativism which is displayed by some psychotics, is probably to be regarded as a sign of a defusion of instincts that has taken place through a withdrawal of the libidinal components (Freud, 1925).

The ego does not only seek for objects in the external world that are of benefit for the ego itself from an Eros drive, but also seeks ‘whether it is there in the external world, so that he can get hold of it whenever he needs it’, ‘all presentations originate from perceptions and are repetitions of them’ (Freud, 1925). Freud later adds that the process of thinking enables reality testing ‘by reproducing it as a presentation without the external object having still to be there, ‘the first and immediate aim, therefore, of reality-testing is, not to *find* an object in real perception which corresponds to the one presented, but to *re-find* such an object, to convince oneself that it is still there’ (Freud, 1925). This is in my interpretation why Lacan understands reality basically as an hallucination of what is being desired (Lacan, 1966, 84). Freud provides a partly ‘mythological’ explanation, to state in Jean Hyppolite’s terms (Lacan, 2006, 746), and partly a biological explanation on the physiology of the ego’s reality testing function, ‘The ego periodically sends out small amounts of cathexis into the perceptual system, by means of which it samples the external stimuli, and then after every such

tentative advance it draws back again' (Freud, 1925). However, the psychotic subject does not want to unite with the external object (at least not anymore, e.g. because of frustration), and sends less cathexis 'libido' in order to apply reality testing, it doesn't want to unite, but preferably wants to destroy the external world (it negates the external object) in order to rebuild a new reality that functions on his or her terms.

The question of what this reality then means for Lacan needs to be asked. We saw earlier how Freud and Jung understood the reality principle. For Lacan, reality is constructed piece by piece through affirmation or judgment of existence, thus *Bejahung*, through which 'the subject constructs himself a world and, above all, that he situates himself within it, that is, that he manages to be more or less what he had admitted that he was — a man when he finds himself to be of masculine sex, or, conversely a woman' (Lacan, 1966, 83), and which 'always concerns the refinding of an object' (Lacan, 1966, 84). It is through primal *Bejahung* that something can be experienced as an existence, since it is 'the primary procedure in which the judgment of attribution finds its root, and which is no other than the primordial condition for something from the real to come to offer itself up to the revelation of being, or to employ Heidegger's language, to be let-be', 'it is only afterward that anything whatsoever can be found there as existent [*comme étant*]' (Lacan, 2003, 323). Lacan understands reality as hallucinated by the subject when seeking affirmation of the object of desire (Lacan, 1966, 84). The reality principle for Lacan, which is inspired by the reality principle of Freud¹², consists of the continuous attempt to find the object of desire and the impossibility of finding this object ensures the maintenance of an hallucinatory reality for the subject (Lacan, 1966, 84). Is psychosis as foreclosure then not the awakening of hallucinated reality affirmation, an unveiling of the desire motivated *Bejahung*? In the psychotic subject 'something other than what the subject is led towards by that apparatus of reflection, mastery, and research that is his ego, with all its fundamental alienations, something else that can appear either in the sporadic form of that hallucination that is emphasized' 'as what takes place in the case of President Schreber' (Lacan, 1993, 854). In the Symbolic realm, subjectivity is related to the other via the chain of signifiers, or language. Lacan sees the structures of the unconsciousness of a subject in the Symbolic realm as being

¹² and criticized as a naive conception of the reality principle by Lacan (Lacan, 1953).

externalized as, for the subject, a separate entity operating in the realm of the Real, 'for him [*the schizophrenic added by FI*] all of the symbolic is real' (Lacan, 2003, 327).

4.2 God and the Name-of-the-Father

Foreclosure leaves a gap, a black hole in the signifying chain of the Symbolic realm of the subject. In Schreber's case, this means that the father as a symbol is totally excluded from subjectivity and suddenly reappears in the real that 'comes from nowhere, and which refers to nothing' (Lacan, 1993, 86) It is historically difficult to reconstruct how this exactly happened in Schreber's life. There are however clues in his Memoir that every association with paternity in Schreber's life was absent, as Lacan noticed (1959, 484) and Vanheule underlined:

'What is important is that through such events he was confronted with the absence of an anchor in the Symbolic. Lacan (1959, p.484) argues that Schreber missed 'the signifier of paternity'. This made him vulnerable to events in which paternity was at stake and the foreclosed signifier was summoned.' (Vanheule, 2011, 113).

Indeed, these events include the failure of Schreber to become a father himself and his masculine position as a judge in German society. One of the most important signifiers concerning paternity that was missing in Schreber's life, as I interpret and further not mentioned by Lacan or Vanheule, is the absence of a God as a paternal symbol. Maybe more impactful than any other signifier as mentioned earlier, was the absence of interest in the matters of religion and more specifically God in Schreber's life before his illness. It is not about whether Schreber believed in the existence of a God (he did not), but it seems that Schreber had a total disinterest in such matters as if he had 'foreclosed' such matters:

Nor was I in my youth a truly believing person in the sense of our positive religion. But neither have I been at any time contemptuous of religion rather I avoided talking much about religious matters and I had the feeling that people who had luckily retained in their later years a pious child's belief, should not be disturbed in their happiness. But for my own part, I had occupied myself too much with the natural sciences, particularly with works based on the so-called modern doctrine of evolution,

not to have begun to doubt, to say the least, the literal truth of all Christian religious teachings. My general impression has always been that materialism cannot be the last word in religious matters, but I could not get myself either to believe firmly in the existence of a personal God or to retain such a belief. (Schreber, 1903, 70)

Schreber's foreclosed the matter of paternity with the death of his father in his youth, and together with his religious father, closed the matter of religion in his life in my interpretation. It is known that the sister of Schreber described the family as being 'oriented towards God', which 'all this was finished with the sudden death of our beloved father...the childhood paradise was destroyed' (Niederland, 1963. 203). Of course, the conclusion shouldn't be that ambivalence towards religious matters necessarily results in a psychotic structure in a subject. Nor does someone who has lost his father, or never knew his or her father and suddenly meets him as an adult (as in appearance in the Real order), become psychotic. This also applies to Schreber's own fertility problems to become a father himself, which manifests itself as a delusion in which he *is* able to get children through divine nerve-contact with God, 'probably by using part of my nerves, the attempt was actually made to create a new human world ("new human beings out of Schreber's spirit)' (Schreber, 1903, 113). For Schreber, it was his fertility issues, his paternal place in social relations as a judge, his relation or the absence of it with his successful physician father, and his youth losing God together with his father, all within the theme of paternity that was foreclosed as a signifier in his life. As I understand it, paternity simply didn't mean *anything* for Schreber in which he could identify himself as a subject of it. As Vanheule states, 'paternity was like a black hole in the universe of the Symbolic' (2011, 114). As long as the subject is not confronted with the theme of paternity, thus, as long as the Name-of-the-Father does not reappear in the Real order, the subject does not develop a psychotic structure and even can become a judge with a high position in society. The father symbol, initially as dr. Flechsig later reappeared in 'the external world' as an autonomous unconscious complex confronting the subject via hallucinations and delusions in an attempt to compensate for the absence of the Name-of-the-Father. This thus is in contrast to neurosis, in which contents are repressed in the unconscious, but there unconsciously still exist, although in an inactive state, for the ego-consciousness. The Name-of-the-Father is a signifier, but

a crucial one, because it is a signifier anchoring the subject in the Symbolic order (Lacan, 2007, 465). Lacan scrutinizes Freud's oedipus complex and criticizes as a myth of sexual rivalry (Lacan, 2007, 688). For him, its is a too stringent and literal understanding of the problem and a more symbolic understanding of it is necessary. Lacan broadens the sexual understanding of the oedipus complex; rather than the actual father, the Name-of-the-Father, the name being adopted from the religious concept of the Father as God, represents authority, law, power, and desire in a family in society (Lacan, 2007, 464). He asks, 'What is a Father' and answers, 'It is the dead Father' and Lacan 'takes it up again under the heading of the 'Name-of-the-Father', meaning that the father here just functions as a symbolism, 'the Father may be regarded as the original representative of the Law's authority' (Lacan, 2007, 688). It is the father who makes desire (of the mother) possible, it authorizes the possibility to desire. The-Name-of-the-Father has a religious reference, however, Lacan notes that, in contrast to the God of monotheistic religions, Schreber's God is neither omniscient nor independent, because he 'knows things only on their surface, he sees only what he sees' (Lacan, 1993, 128) and therefore, he needs human contact to be informed about the inner world of humans. Lacan finds such a concept of God paradoxical and argues that 'God being perfect an imperfectible, the very notion of progress through acquired experience is altogether unthinkable' (Lacan, 1993, 126). Due to the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father, the subject is not able to answer the questions 'Who am I?' and 'What do you want from me?' For Lacan, 'the unconscious is fundamentally structured, woven, chained, meshed, by language' and the Name-of-the-Father reveals itself to Schreber in God's speaking mode in his delusion (Lacan, 1993, 119), with its correlate as the big Other in the symbolic order as mentioned earlier. Vanheule argues that a delusion does not 'safeguard the subject against disintegration' because of the external conviction that is involved in the subject's delusion (Vanheule, 2011, 121). He argues that 'the delusional metaphor', in Schreber's case the core element of emasculation, does have a safeguarding function because it stabilizes the delusion from 'within'. However, emasculation for Schreber in this sense cannot be interpreted as 'a delusional metaphor'. As Vanheule states (2011, 103), for Lacan, a delusion starts when a person experiences an 'inmixing of subjects' (Lacan, 1993, 193) at 'the moment the initiative came from the Other' (Lacan, 1993, p193). Vanheule mentions that this moment for Schreber

started during his second admission and illness when Schreber concludes that dr. Flechsig is manipulating him (2011, 103). I interpret that following Lacan's definition and Vanheule's view, that Schreber's delusion already started before his second admission exactly at the moment when he had the idea that 'it really must be rather pleasant to be a woman succumbing to intercourse' (Schreber, 1903, 46). Schreber namely already thought that this idea was implanted in his head by an external unknown force (Schreber, 1903, 46). Thus, what by Vanheule has been interpreted as an 'internal' delusional metaphor, is for Schreber an 'external force' already earlier. As Vanheule also admits, the hypothesis of the delusional metaphor providing an internal stabilization 'did not prove to be stable over time' (vanHeule, 2011, 122). In fact, the question is whether this moment of Schreber's life could be understood as the pivotal point in his psychosis. It is namely exactly at this point that he experiences his unconscious content outside of his own subjectivity within the external world, hence the reappearance of the Name-of-the-Father in the Real.

Although both Lacan and Jung understand psychosis as a problematic relationship between the subject and God, their interpretation of how the subject relates itself to God in psychosis fundamentally differs in several aspects. First, Lacan interprets psychosis as a foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father, which implies that the veiled, desire-affirmed external reality for the subject, by Lacan interpreted as a hallucinatory state, falls with the sudden, overwhelming reappearance of the non-Bejahed, nonsymbolized of the Real. The subject experiences these unconscious contents as being external and attempts to interpret these contents, in the case of Schreber as having some divine messages. For Schreber, this first manifested after his delusion that an external force has implanted the idea in him of having sexual intercourse as a woman, the idea being not repressed since the subject didn't experience the thoughts as being of his own in the first place. In contrast, Jung interprets psychosis as nothing compared to a concept of a foreclosure, but as a confrontation of the subject with its unconscious gets triggered after the social mask of persona falls and as a consequence, libido understood as general will, becomes projected towards the ego itself. This consequently results in the subject acquiring the delusional, megalomaniac idea of mastering the unconscious and becoming God. The psychotic subject as interpreted by Jung in contrast thus does not appear from the outside but comes from the deepest layers

within the unconsciousness of the subject itself. This unconsciousness is collective and in a sense external because of its sharedness with the other, but it operates within the field of subjectivity for Jung. Thus, for Lacan, the subject's relationship to God is an unveiling of a hallucinatory external reality, and consequently, an overwhelming and sudden appearance of non-symbolized content interpreted as having divine messages (i.e. delusion). For Jung, it is the opposite, since the subject's relationship to God is a distancing of reality and a substitution of a reality equivalent in which the subject falls into a delusional and hallucinatory state while interpreting content from the unconscious and as a result, becoming megalomania by the thought of becoming God itself. For Jung, the nondelusional subject (i.e. the individuated ego) has the potential to reflect the psychological concept of the God-image, reflected as the archetype of the Self which represents wholeness, if it acknowledges its own relativity, non-divinity by having a glimpse of wholeness through the synchronization of its own content within the unconsciousness (i.e. the shadow, the anima). Another important difference is that for Jung, the unconscious content in psychosis, i.e. delusions, and hallucinations is interpreted as being an attempt of the unconsciousness to tell the ego-consciousness a story and to provide potential transgenerational, -cultural, mythological, and religious messages in order to steer and influence the subject, or the ego-consciousness to be more precise. Hallucinations and delusions have a meaning that needs to be deciphered for Jung, hence his extensive study of matters such as symbolism, mythology, and dream interpretation. In contrast, Lacanian analysts 'will not focus on deciphering symptoms like delusion or hallucination via free association', no, the aim is 'limiting confrontations with the two questions presumed to be at the basis of symptoms and formations of the unconscious: 'Who am I?' and 'What you want from me?' (vanHeule, 2011, 72) and hallucinations are understood as a recovery attempt. Hallucinations 'sutures the gap that was opened up by the question of subjectivity, thus repairing it' (vanHeule, 2011, 90).¹³ Jung is focused on the content of psychosis, whereas Lacan's focus is on how psychosis is structured.

¹³ It could be compared with the phenomena of 'confabulation', a phenomena seen in patients with Korsakoff syndrome in which patients unconsciously fill the gap in their memory with a fictional event. Patients with Korsakoff syndrome unconsciously lie to make sense of a story that they are confronted with. It seems to me that, from a Lacanian perspective, a person with psychosis unconsciously attempts to fill the gap in the signifying chain with a hallucination, in order to make sense of the experience.

5. Conclusion

5.1 Summary

This thesis examined the relationship between the subject and God in psychosis based on Daniel Schreber's psychotic experience as described in his *Memoirs*. The examination begins with Schreber's own description of his experiences of the external world and his encounter with his unique God. It continues with the analyses of Freud's father complex, which he considers to be central to understanding Schreber's psychosis and his relationship with God. The father complex is a component of the negative, inverted Oedipus complex and refers to, specifically in the context of this thesis, Schreber Junior's ambivalent feelings towards his father Moritz Schreber. I have presented arguments from literature that Schreber's own father, who had mental health issues, and who in all likelihood had an authoritative influence on Schreber's early adulthood, also may have contributed to the development of Schreber's illness. The father complex plays for Freud a significant role in the development of Schreber's psychosis, with initially Dr. Flechsig and later God functioning as a substitute father figure. Freud understands the development of psychosis in Schreber (e.g. paranoia and megalomania) as a consequence of frustration in personal life which results in the subject withdrawing his libido from the external world inwards, toward his ego, resulting in losing touch with the external world. Freud interprets the relationship of the psychotic subject with God as a regression towards infantile omnipotence, where the subject overestimates the power of their thoughts and actions on the external world. He thus sees the psychotic subject's relationship with God as a representation of an earlier primitive stage of mental life.

It was Jung who introduced the Schreber case to Freud and it was due to their fruitful discussions on the Schreber case that both Freud and Jung developed their own theory on the development of psychosis in a subject. Therefore, Jung's criticism of Freud's Schreber analysis was also examined in this thesis. Jung disagrees with Freud's interpretation that the loss of sexual object-libido leads to the loss of reality in Schreber's psychosis. Jung argues that libido should not be limited to sexuality alone, but should be understood as general will. He emphasizes that psychosis

involves a loss of interest in various domains of life, such as appetite, and not just in sexuality. I illustrated how Jung broke up with Freud and how he further developed his own analysis of the relationship between the subject and God in psychosis.

To examine this relationship and to provide context, I first explored the Jungian intrapsychic structures (i.e. ego-consciousness and the collective unconscious). Jung's novel innovation was the concept of the collective unconscious, which contains universal patterns or archetypes that influence the ego-consciousness in subtle ways. The archetypes of the shadow, anima, and self, exist at the inner layers of the unconscious and play a role in shaping human relations with the external world. Importantly, a disintegration of the masculine social mask, or the persona, leads in Jung's theory to the repressed, unconscious femininity (i.e. the archetype of anima) reaching consciousness potentially forcing an individual to declare total authority and divinity (i.e. megalomania). Jung considers God to be an unknowable essence that transcends human comprehension and understands the ego as the only knowable part of an Imago Dei. This is when the ego has a non-problematic relationship with the psychological idea of a God. I have examined Jung's analysis of the subject's relationship with God in the problematic state of psychosis, where the ego either attempts to objectify God or falls into the illusion of superiority and power over God. For Jung, first, the subject loses general interest in external objects, primarily because it cannot identify itself properly with his social mask, or persona, in society anymore. This results in the construction of a reality equivalent, an inner fantasy world, in which the subject prefers to live in and a reality that becomes more 'real' for the subject than the external world. Schreber constructed such a new world for himself with himself first as a redeemer of this new world and later as God. The influx of general interests from the external worlds towards the ego results in, what Jung calls, 'psychic inflation' and megalomania as a consequence. He saw the ego's megalomaniac state as inflation occurring in relation to the subject's unconsciousness, resulting in the loss of reality and an erroneous, illusory identification with God. This is an unconscious process, in which the psychotic subject, his ego-consciousness to be more precise, becomes overwhelmed by a sudden experience coming from his unconsciousness. The ego-consciousness attempts to make sense of this sudden confrontation with unconscious content. To escape the delusion of becoming God, Jung suggests the process of individuation,

which leads to the establishment of this new psychic center within the subject, identified as the archetype of the self. It is the self that Jung identifies as this Imago Dei. This archetype represents a new balance between the ego-consciousness and the unconscious. It is not a delusional identification with God, but rather an understanding of oneself as an object of the unknowable and supraordinate subject. Jung saw potential value in the content of hallucinations and delusions, interpreted as the teleological and subtle attempt of the unconscious to influence the subject's ego-consciousness. This is in contrast to Lacan, who valued the structure of psychosis instead of its content.

Finally, Lacan's ideas were examined in this thesis, which I considered relevant in the context of this thesis, as he extensively wrote and lectured on Schreber's psychosis, on his relationship with God as the other, and on the analysis of Freud's work on Schreber. Lacan gradually adjusted his understanding of psychosis over several decades. In the 1950s, Lacan analyzed the Schreber case in his *Les Psychoses* and elaborates on his main concept of 'the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father' as psychosis. The Name-of-the-Father represents authority, law, and power within the family, but for Lacan much more generally as a representative symbol of law and authority in society, culture, and religion as God. I examined the idea that the absence of a paternal symbol, the Name-of-the-Father as a signifier, leaves the subject unanchored in the symbolic order. The foreclosed signifier reappears in the real as hallucinations and delusions, which the psychotic experiences as a sudden confrontation which it cannot relate and identify itself with. I have finally examined the phenomenon of hearing the voice from Lacan's perspective, who understood the voice not as an acoustic hallucination as in a sound, but as speech of one's externalized unconscious as the other.

5.2 Evaluation

The Memoirs has been named a Rohrschachtest where every reader reflects their own associative interpretation on Schreber's psychosis (Israels, 1990, 75). Schreber's own psychiatrist Dr. Flechsig diagnosed Schreber in his first episode with '(hypochondria) chronic bromide intoxication?' (Lothane, 1992, 38). Freud's and Jung's diagnosis were respectively 'Dementia Paranoides' and 'Dementia

Praecox/Schizophrenia'. Schreber himself rejected the idea of having a psychosis and argued that, in today's terms, suffered from a burnout after the defeat after his candidature for parliament (Schreber, 1903, 44). Decades later, psychiatrists such as Lothane argued that Schreber suffered primarily from a mood disorder (agitated depression), instead of a primary psychotic disorder (Lothane, 1992, 38). *The Memoirs* shows indeed that, especially in the first illness, Schreber suffered from a mood disorder, he did not have any psychotic experience at all, 'I passed the days therefore in endless melancholy' (Schreber, 1903, 49,50). This fact has been overlooked not only by Freud and Jung, but also by his second physician dr. Weber, who even declares to the court that 'It is characteristic of paranoia that delusions develop, frequently in connection with hallucinations and false memories, without the patient's mood being primarily much affected' (Schreber, 1903, 392). From my examination of *the Memoirs*, it seems to me that Schreber suffered neither from a pure mood disorder, nor from schizophrenia, but more likely from a schizo-affective disorder, bipolar type with catatonia (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, 105-106).¹⁴ This disorder typically include symptoms of a mood disorder¹⁵, which Schreber experienced during several episodes of his illness, and symptoms of schizophrenia including delusions, hallucinations and catatonia, e.g. repetitive speech or hypo-activity (Scheber, 1903, 331). Delusions are experienced by patients with a range of psychiatric diagnoses. The question can be asked if Daniel Schreber is a valid representation of 'the psychotic subject'? A recent systematic review and meta-analysis of 123 studies across 30 countries showed among 24,393 patients that patients experienced persecutory (64.5% of deluded patients), reference (39.7%), grandiose (28.2%), control (21.6%) and religious (18.3%) delusions (Collin, 2023, 1). In this sense, it can be concluded that Schreber's psychotic experience with persecution, grandiosity, and religion are common experiences in patients with psychosis, which may suggest that the conclusions of this thesis are generalizable to 'the psychotic patient'.

¹⁴ As mentioned in the introduction paragraph of this thesis and underlined by Freud as a disclaimer of his own analysis, the examination is based on *the Memoirs* and not on Schreber as a psychiatric patient; with the exception of dr. Flechsig and dr. Weber, no *Memoir* reader has psychiatrically examined Schreber.

¹⁵ See *the Memoirs* for depressive episode pages , but also for susceptible manic episodes (p. 183) in which typically a patient sleeps less or is more energetic. 'If delusions occur exclusively during mood episodes, the diagnosis is depressive or bipolar disorder with psychotic features' (APA, 2013, 93), which is not the case with Schreber. The full DSM code of the disorder 'schizo-affective disorder, bipolar type, with catatonia' is '295.70 (F25.0) 293.89 (F06.1)'.

I want to return to Freud's Rohrschachtest in his analysis of Schreber, which I think was already colored before the publication of *the Memoirs*. Freud was already preoccupied with his hypothesis on repressed homosexuality as cause for paranoia (Freud, 2003, 4,5). The Schreber case, as I see it, came as a gift from heaven (from Jung to be more specific) to strengthen this particular hypothesis. As mentioned earlier in this thesis, Freud himself admitted in a letter to Jung that he was biased in his analysis of Schreber (Freud, Jung, 1974 319F).¹⁶ Freud also admitted that he saw not enough patients with schizophrenia in his practice to draw any determined conclusion and that Jung and Bleuler were more experienced when it comes to the analysis of patients with schizophrenia (Freud, 2003, 9). When taking Freud's bias into account, it remains unclear why the father complex constitutes such a prominent place in Freud's analysis of the Schreber case. Freud starts his analysis with the disclaimer that he lacks insight into the causes of Schreber's first illness and that he therefore needs to 'plunge at random into an unknown concentration of circumstances' and that he is able to infer a relation between homosexual desire towards dr. Flechsig and/or the feminine fantasy of having sexual intercourse (Freud, 2003, 42). But again, Freud's plunge is nothing close to random and this plunge shapes the fate of his entire analysis on Schreber.

In my interpretation, Freud does however hint towards a specific direction and encourages to look for causes explaining Schreber's first illness 'a knowledge of which is undoubtedly indispensable for properly elucidating the second and severer illness' (Freud, 2003, 42). As mentioned earlier, many psychiatrists and psychoanalysts generated hypotheses on this matter, but what does the patient himself say? Schreber argues that his mental illness is a 'consequence of mental overstrain' in the first episode due to defeat after candidacy for parliament, and in his second episode by the extraordinary burden of work on taking up office as *Senatspräsident* (Schreber, 1903, 44). I interpret this mental overstrain as being related to Schreber's career, his title as judge, his high position in society and maybe even his transgenerational Schreberian 'high-sounding worldly titles', a family which belonged to 'the highest nobility of heaven' (Schreber, 1903, 35). In other words,

¹⁶ Either a personal bias (as mentioned earlier in this thesis; his own repressed homosexual feelings, Lothane 1997) or a professional bias (earlier hypothesis on the cause of paranoia as I mentioned).

they are linked to Schreber's authoritative and masculine status in society and together with the mental overstrain a disintegration of this social mask or as Jung calls it, the persona. The focus of Freud's analysis has been on the second and more severe episode of his mental illness (as with many other *Memoirs* readers). However, the (period prior to) first illness contains more hints on the possible causes of Schreber's psychosis. There seems to me a link here between the persona and the first manifestation of Schreber's psychosis, manifesting as the conviction of an external supernatural force implementing transgender fantasy having sexual intercourse. I interpret this transgender fantasy as a pivotal point, a first manifestation of Schreber's unconsciousness, and to be more specific, the first manifestation of the archetype of the anima, 'whenever she appears, in dreams, visions, and fantasies, she takes on personified form, thus demonstrating that the factor she embodies possesses all the outstanding characteristics of a feminine being' (Jung, 1979, 13). I elaborated extensively on this matter in paragraph 3.3, but for Jung, the social mask and the feminine unconsciousness of a man, thus respectively the persona and the anima, are two sides of the same coin, 'for it is the anima that reacts to the persona' (Jung, 1966, 194). Jung unfortunately never used his own theory on the persona and the anima to analyze the Schreber case.

This thesis did apply the theory to examine the Schreber case. I conclude that Daniel Schreber's psychotic relationship with reality and with God was not rooted in repressed homosexuality, but in mother identification (i.e. a manifestation of the anima complex) as a consequence of persona disintegration. Schreber loses his masculine social status while running for parliament in his first illness and the burnout he had as a judge resulting in quitting the job in his second illness. Meanwhile, Schreber needs to acknowledge his inability to become a father.¹⁷ It seems to me that due to the disintegration of Schreber's masculine persona, Schreber's unconscious and repressed feminine traits emerged into his consciousness as an anima-complex.¹⁸ Jung argues that as a consequence, the ego

¹⁷ Lothane provided similar alternative (without involving Jungian) explanations of Schreber's psychosis, which argue for 'mother identification', instead of 'towards father homosexual repression', one of them being from Lothane: 'transgender imaginings of becoming a child-bearing woman I regard as stemming from the recurrent disappointments of childlessness, uterus- envy and an identification with mother Pauline and elder sister Anna, both of whom bore many children, or even a wish to comfort childless wife Sabine: you were unable to do it, let me do it for you.' Lothane, 2010, 4.

¹⁸ It is a phenomenon that Jung calls 'the confrontation of the ego-consciousness with the collective unconscious'. An additional remark is that for Jung the mother primarily, and the wife secondary is

gets delusional about mastering its unconscious, and consequently become megalomaniac shouting that it became God. Jung states that the ego identifies itself, as a consequence of the ego-anima confrontation, 'this time with a figure of the same sex corresponding to the father-imagó' 'thus he becomes a superman, superior to all powers, a demigod at the very least, he shouts "I and the Father are one"' (Jung, 1966, 229).¹⁹ I did not encounter any arguments by Jung why and how the contrasexual unconsciousness 'this time' should correspond with 'the same sex' and thus with the father-imagó. It seems to me that Jung in this sense sticks to Freud's story of the father-imagó, but more importantly, attempts to match his theory within the Christian tradition of the father's role as power and authority in a family and society. Following Jung's line of reasoning in his theory of the ego-anima confrontation, the psychotic subject should rather shout 'I and the Mother are one' and identify itself with the mother-imagó (i.e. mother identification), instead of with the father-imagó. The role of the mother in this sense seems to be, just as with Freud, underestimated by Jung.

A second aspect in addition is that the psychotic subject seems to be forced to construct and prefer an alternative reality in which it attempts to reconstruct or regain its lost authority and identity in relation to the other in society. The ego attempts to construct a social mask in the first decades of life (e.g. to get a title through education, to acquire wealth), in which it can relate itself to others in society so as to form an identity. It is not a coincidence that psychotic disorders typically peak in early adulthood, when the construction of a social mask for the subject is at its height and hence when it is potentially sensitive to break apart. Those who do not manage to find a satisfying place in society, those who are denied an identity in society (e.g. through discrimination), those who fail to maintain or improve their desired societal position (i.e. with Schreber's defeat of candidacy for parliament, and his failure to stay at office as *Senatspräsident*) fail to construct or maintain such a social mask. The subject fails to exercise power and authority over its identity, which is always an

always the target of an anima-projection. In the analysis of the Schreber case, neither contemporaries such as Freud, Jung and Lacan, nor later readers of *the Memoir*, seems to mention Schreber's mother, Louise Henriette Pauline Schreber neé Haase (Lothane, 1992, 12) in analyses, she seems to be totally ignored.

¹⁹ Although both Jung and Freud use the term 'father-image' in relatable contexts, they still seem to understand the definition differently. The father-image for Jung extends beyond the Oedipal limits of Freud. Jung understands the father-image as a representation of the collective unconsciousness, a symbol for authority and power.

identity in relation to the other in a society as illustrated in this thesis. The frustrated subject unconsciously is forced to prefer a fantasy life in an alternative reality in which authority, power, and identity successfully *are* regained; a preferable fantasy becomes more real to the subject in a state of psychosis. In other words, once a human being loses interest in the world (e.g. due to disappointments, trauma, other problems and struggles in life) it becomes prone to turn into itself and to develop a psychotic relationship with the world. This manifestation of psychosis is recognized today in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-5* as negative symptoms which include 'diminished emotional expression or avolition', social isolation and apathy, 'such behaviors are often the first sign of a disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, 99).' What role may God have in this psychotic relationship? The concept of God is unconsciously used as a symbol of authority and power, causing an inflation of the ego, a state of megalomania which in a later stage substitutes itself for the image of God itself. Whether seen as an infantile attempt (as with Freud) or not; God seems to be a way out for the psychotic subject who lost power and authority over and in relation to the other, and thus consequently a disintegrated social mask. Consequently, following this line of reasoning, the question is if modern, competitive societies produce psychotic citizens? Is a citizen of a modern society with all its competitiveness and forced social visibility, in which existence is only acknowledged if you matter (e.g. on social platforms such as LinkedIn, Twitter, TikTok, and Facebook) at higher risk to become a psychotic citizen? Then maybe ironically, those who are forgotten, those who are *forsaken*, those who are *foreclosed* by society tend to re-emerge in that same society as a psychotic subject.²⁰

²⁰ There is empirical evidence that those who perceive discrimination in society are at higher risk to develop a psychotic disorder (with paranoia) (Pearce, 2019, 1023). It is as if the foreclosed citizen avenges society by reappearing in society, this time as a psychotic citizen.

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