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*Denial of Development/Basic services to the people of
the state: Who is responsible?*

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DEDICATION

This research paper is dedicated to the Innocent, Peace Loving,
Honest, Hardworking AND "Development Starved/Seeking"
People of the State of Himachal Pradesh

ACRONYMS

AMG	Annual Maintenance Grant
ANM	Auxillary Nurse Midwife
ASHA	Accredited Social Health Activist
AWW	Angan wari Worker
AYUSH	Ayurveda, Yoga and Naturopathy, Unani. Siddha, and Homoeopathy
BJP	Bhartiya Janata Party
BNY	Bharat Nirman Yojna
BSY	Balika Samridhi Yojna
BIS	Bureau of Indian Standards
BRGF	Backward Regions Grant Fund
CAG	Comptroller and Auditor General
CAPART	Council for Advancement of People's Action & Rural Technology
CAZRI	Central Arid Zone Research Institute
CBO	Community based Organization
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CHC	Community Health Centre
CPRs	Common Property Resources
CRIDA	Central Research Institute for Dry Land Agriculture
CSC	Community Service Centre
CSS	Centrally Sponsored Scheme
CSWCRTI	Central Soil & Water Conservation Research & Training Institute
DAP	District Action Plan
DDP	Desert Development Programme
DoLR	Department of Land Resources
DP	District Panchayat
DPAP	Drought prone area programme
DPC	District planning committee
DPR	Detailed Project Report
DRDA	District Rural Development Agency
DWDC	District Watershed Development Committee
DWDU	District Watershed Development Unit
FRU	First Referral unit
GIS	Geographic Information System
GOI	Government of India
GP	Gram Panchayat
GPS	Global Positioning System
GS	Gram Sabha
HMC	Hospital Management Committee
HSC	Health sub centre
ICAR	Indian Council of Agricultural Research
ICDS	Integrated Child Development Scheme (of Welfare Department)
I COS	Integrated Community Service Centres
ICRISAT	International Crops Research Institute for Semi-Arid Tropics
IEC	Information, Education and Communication
IIFM	Indian Institute of Forest Management

INR	Indian National Rupee
IPHS	Indian Public Health Standards
IRMA	Institute of Rural Management, Anand
IT	Information Technology
IWDP	Integrated wastelands Development Programme
JFMC	Joint Forest Management Committee
JNNURM	Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission
LHV	Lady Health Visitor
MCH	Maternal and Child Health
MM	Mahila Mandal (Women Club)
MPW	Multi-purpose worker
MO	Medical Officer
MoRD	Ministry of Rural Development
MOU	Memorandum of understanding
NABARD	National Bank for Agriculture & Rural Development
NAEP	National Afforestation & Eco-development Project
NDC	National Data Center
NFBS	National Family Benefit Scheme
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NPRE	Non Plan Revenue Expenditure
NRAA	National Rainfed Area Authority
NREGA	National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
NREGS	National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
NRHM	National Rural Health Mission
PHC	Primary Health Centre
PIA	Project Implementing Agency
PIP	Project Implementation Plan
PMGSY	Pradhan Mantri Gramin Sarak Yojna
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
PRI	Panchayati Raj Institution
RCH	Reproductive and Child Health
RKS	Rogi Kalyan Samiti
ROP	Record of Proceedings
SAU	State Agriculture University
SBA	Skilled Birth Attendant
SC	Scheduled caste
SDC	State Data Centre
SGRY	Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojna
SGSY	Swaranjayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojna
SHG	Self Help Group
SIRD	State Institutes of Rural Development
SOP	Standing Operating Procedure
SLPSC	State Level Project Sanctioning Committee
ST	Scheduled Tribe
SVO	Support Voluntary organization
SLNA	State level Nodal Agency
SSA	Sarv Shiksha Abhiyaan
SWAN	State Wide Area Network

TSC	Total Sanitation Campaign
UG	User Group
UIDSSMT	Urban Infrastructure Development Scheme for Small and Medium Towns
VO	Voluntary Organization
WC	Watershed Committees
WDF	Watershed Development Fund
WDT	Watershed Development Team
YM	Yuvak Mandal (Youth Club)

Table of Contents

Table of Figures

Table of Tables

Chapter -1
Introduction

On the one hand state does not have adequate resources of its own to undertake massive development requirements to ensure quality public services and better living conditions to its people, on the other state is continuously failing to spend huge funds available under centrally sponsored schemes. It is a "Puzzle" and paper seeks to explore as to what is wrong? and who is responsible?.

1.1   Need for GOI funds

Himachal Pradesh, though better off on development front as compared to few other states in the country like Uttar Pradesh or Bihar, but even then, it has very poor development and economic indicators owing to its difficult hilly terrain and adverse climatic conditions. State faces disadvantages and constraints peculiar to special category hill states of the country such as; higher cost of living, limited scope for attracting private investments, weak resource base, higher debt repayment liabilities and higher costs of development and administration.

Since states own resources are inadequate due to very high NPRE; 87.3%, state is fully dependant on GOI transfers through finance commission allocations, plan support through planning commission and centrally sponsored schemes initiated by different ministries of the GOI.

1.2   Background and dynamics of Centrally Sponsored schemes

Centrally sponsored schemes are formulated and funded by different ministries of the Government of India and the implementation of these schemes is entrusted upon state governments with full autonomy, but certainly under the broad frame work of guidelines issued for each scheme. However the guidelines provide broader framework and states generally have the liberty to be innovative and creative in order to respond to local needs.

For each scheme state governments are required to contribute specified scheme specific matching grants. In certain cases such as NRHM, GOI provides 100% grant but in most of the schemes, matching grant generally ranges between 10-50%.

Initially Centrally sponsored schemes were formulated by the Government of India only when any National objective such as poverty alleviation was to be fulfilled. However the number of CSSs is increasing over a period of time and currently there are more than 400 centrally sponsored schemes of different Ministries of the Government of India. Although this multiplicity of CSSs is an implementation constraint but states have opportunity to avail GOI resources for their development needs.

Himachal Pradesh has however failed on both fronts, i.e. in claiming available or already sanctioned funding under different schemes and also in spending funds available. According to data collected for few major schemes, the funds to the tune of more than 10000 Million INR are lying unspent with different implementing agencies or remain unclaimed from GOI against the sanctioned schemes.

The paper looks at pattern of handling GOI funds available to the state under CSSs in order to understand roles of different stakeholders in under-spending in CSSs. For this purpose paper analyses implementation of two major CSSs, NRHM of Ministry of health and family welfare and watershed Programme (IWDP, DPAP and DDP) of Ministry of rural Development of the Government of India.

Government of India launched massive participatory Watershed Development programme (IWDP/DPAP/DDP) in the year 1994-1995 with an aim to achieve holistic development of rural areas through active community participation by following watershed development approach. Himachal Pradesh, since the inception of the programme is suffering from the problem of massive under-spending.

The project period (of 5 years) of the projects sanctioned prior to 2004 has expired but certain projects are still running on extension at snails pace. After 2004 GOI has sanctioned watershed projects (under all three programmes; IWDP, DPAP and DDP), worth 1684 Million INR but the state has incurred an expenditure of 484.5 Million INR, which is just 28%.

Similarly, GOI initiated an ambitious programme, NRHM (2005-12) to significantly improve the health care facilities in the country. Himachal Pradesh with weak health indicators is a special focus state with other 17 States. The aim of the programme is to provide effective healthcare to rural population throughout the country with special focus on 18 states, which have weak public health indicators and/or weak infrastructure. Himachal Pradesh is one of these 18 states (NRHM Mission Document). Since its inception in 2005, Government of India has approved PIPs of the state for 4229 Million INR but state has availed just 2863 Million INR and out if this (less) released amount, State has spent just 32% of the approved PIP and unspent balances worth 1472.5 Million INR are still lying with the State.

This non expenditure of funds on the one hand leads to reduction in allocation of funds to the state on the other GOI imposes cuts on approved allocation. The paper therefore explores as to who among major stakeholders are responsible for this failure; politicians, bureaucrats, people themselves or NGOs as they are responsible for implementation of CSSs in the state.

1.3   Justification and Relevance

It is evident from the launch of variety of development programmes by GOI, it becomes apparent that the country is on its pursuit to development and there is an intention to ensure quality public services and better living standards to its people in a time bound manner. The time frame fixed for NRHM; for example is 2005-2012. The onus of

claiming and spending development funds under these schemes, as in case of all other centrally sponsored schemes, rests with the state governments. If the state government fails to either claim available funds or spend funds sanctioned under different schemes, the people of the State would be denied legitimate right to better public services and quality living standards without any fault on their part. So the problem calls for focussed research into the factors leading to such failure and exploration of remedial measures to check the causes of further damage.

1.4   Research Objectives

The problem of under-spending in CSSs is not restricted to Himachal Pradesh only; many other states are victim of such lethargy. The objective of the research is to therefore contribute towards better understanding of the causes of non – implementation or extremely poor implementation of Centrally Sponsored Schemes at all levels of implementation and that too in light of roles played by different stakeholders involved in implementation. Since the research digs deep into the implementation dynamics, it could be useful for not only for Himachal Pradesh but other states too; who are interested in understanding causes of poor implementation and under-spending in CSSs..

1.5   Research Questions

Firstly, the research ascertains the magnitude to the problem by answering the following questions.

1.5.1 What was the magnitude of funding that state could avail under NRHM and IWDP since their inception?

1.5.2 How much funding the State has actually availed so far; how much expenditure has actually been incurred and how much funds are lying unspent with different implementation agencies?

1.5.3 How much funds the State has missed so far due to non-claiming and non-expenditure and consequently non Implementation, since the inception of these schemes?

After ascertaining the magnitude of the problem, the research proceeds to probe into the handicaps, constraints and role of different stakeholders and tries to answers the following questions.

1.5.4 What are the exact procedures and processes within Central and State Government of Himachal Pradesh for the flow of funding and implementation?

1.5.5 What types of constraints and obstacles are hindering the State Bureaucracy from claiming funds under different CSSs available and utilization of funds that has already been sanctioned or provided by GOI for ensuring much needed basic services to the people of the State?

1.5.6 If the implementation of these schemes would be expected to provide political

mileage to the political executive, then why it does not ensure implementation? What are the handicaps, constraints and the roles of political executive in poor implementation of CSSs?

1.5.7 People of the State desperately need basic services and development, then why don't they demand and ensure proper implementation of CSSs? What are the constraints, obstacles and the role of the people of the State in non implementation?

1.5.8 The guidelines of almost all CSSs provide for implementation through the involvement of NGOs. Why and where civil society/NGOs are failing to participate or put pressure on the Government for proper implementation of CSSs?

Based upon the findings of the research, policy recommendations are suggested to address the problem

1.5.9 What are the implementation gaps in present implementation system and how these gaps can be filled to address the problem?

1.6   Research Methodology

Although there are more than 400 CSSs covering almost all areas of development, only two CSSs, covering core areas of development namely health (NRHM) and rural development (IWDP) are examined for the research purposes. Since the fund claiming performance and implementation on ground remains same for almost all CSSs, the outcome of the research certainly reflects upon general pattern of handling GOI funds by the State.

In order to draw meaningful conclusions, the research examines both qualitative and quantitative data collected/gathered through primary as well as secondary sources. The quantitative information is collected mainly through secondary sources and is analysed to ascertain the magnitude of problem by replying to the questions 4.1-4.3, as to how much was the potential of the State to avail GOI funding through the centrally sponsored schemes under observation, how much funding the State could actually avail, what is the expenditure level and how much funds are lying un-spent with different implementation agencies. Secondary information is collected form websites of GOI and concerned Directorates as well as implementation agencies responsible for implementation in the State. The secondary data includes GOI guidelines, reports and returns, GOI letters, evaluations, Vidhan Sabha[1] questions and minutes of various review meetings.

The qualitative analysis to trace out the obstacles, constraints, capacities and the root causes of failure is done by using primary data, that was collected during the field work and secondary data collected as mentioned above. The primary information to ascertain the role of political executive in non-implementation has been gathered through semi-structured personal interviews of ex-Chief Ministers, Ministers as well as ex-Ministers, and few MLAs selected through appropriate sampling.

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[1] Legislative Assembly

Role and responsibilities of the bureaucracy at all levels has been explored through analysis of secondary data and personal interviews.

1.7   Scope and Limitation:

Due to limited time available and limits imposed upon length of RP (In words), the research confined itself to causes and roles of different stakeholders in under-spending and non implementation of CSSs. It did not look into other dynamics related to handling of CSSs in the state such as: Corruption and Centre-state Relations.

Chapter -2

Theoretical and Analytical Framework

2.1 Theoretical Perspective

The research seeks to explore the causes and responsibilities of different stakeholders in extremely poor implementation of centrally sponsored schemes and under spending of huge funds available under these schemes in the state of Himachal Pradesh and thus denying the much desired development to the people of the State. The people of the state are the central stakeholders; for whose benefit these schemes are meant. Although their role in implementation is central because all centrally sponsored schemes such as IWDP, NRHM, SSA, JNNURM, TSC etc call for planning by the community, execution by the community and maintenance of the assets created under the schemes by the community, their extent of participation and role depends upon (political) space provided by other two stake holders namely; politicians (in power) and the bureaucracy; which actually manage the schemes as well as funds. Since the people-the constituents of the politicians want development through implementation of CSSs; the politicians become second major stakeholders and they can be seen as highest gainers after the people of the State, if the huge funds provided by GOI under different CSSs are spent for providing quality services or raising socio-economic standards of their constituents; their chances of re-election would improve manifold. So it can be assumed that politicians desperately want development through proper implementation of CSSs but they are dependant on bureaucracy. After all, bureaucracy is actually responsible; to claim funds available under CSSs, to implement these schemes on ground as per guidelines and also to innovate to address local issues arising out of local conditions or aspirations of the people. Hence the puzzle is all about behaviour of; self interested voters (the people), politicians – the representatives of the ultimate principals and bureaucrats, level of political control-the control of Principals over bureaucrats-the Agents, capacities of different stake holders to effectively implement CSSs and level of "pressure from below" i.e. the role of Civil society

2.2 Public Choice Theory

The first issue under research is to explore as to what interest different stake holders have in implementation of CSSs. It would be therefore better to understand the behaviour of the major stake holders in the puzzle i.e. political executive (Politicians), bureaucracy and people of the state and I would do so in the light of Public Choice theory.

Public choice theory attempts to look at functioning of the governments from the perspective of the bureaucrats, voters and politicians and political society is composed of organized interests which are concerned with obtaining access to public resources, Turner,M and Hulme D. 1997, p 66.

The public choice theory studies the behaviour of voters, politicians and government officials as mostly self-interested agents. It maintains that voters, politicians and

bureaucrats, all pursue their own self – interest; they pursue their individual gains, not the public good. Public as per the theory is composed of the individuals who pursue their private interests and these interests become the priorities for the political decisions. And since the politicians are assumed to have re-election as their sole aim, the best political system is therefore the one which best forces the politicians to respond to majority views, Mackintosh, M (1992). The proposed research seeks to examine the causes for denial of political decisions by politicians (in power) in favour of their own self-interest- the re-election, as well as genuine self interest of the people who desperately need development and better quality of life. So the research would try to understand and co-relate the non fulfilment of self interest of people/voters and politicians themselves with conflicting self interests of bureaucrats.

The behaviour of Public sector bureaucrats is at the heart of the Public Choice Theory. While they are supposed to work in the public interest, putting into practice the policies of the government as efficiently as possible, public choice theorists see bureaucrats as self-interested utility maximizers, motivated by such factors as: "salary, prerequisites of the office, public reputation, power, patronage……and the ease of managing the bureau." Niskanen, WA. (1973). At the same time rational actor model shares with public choice the belief that actors, whether persons, government or other agencies, behave as rational choosers between alternate courses of actions, Turner, M and Hulme D, (1997), p. 67, in order to maximize their benefits at minimum cost. The research would try to look at the behaviour of politicians, bureaucrats and voters with this perspective.

2.3 Principal – agent Model/Theory

The Principal Agent model is derived from the accounting, law and economics and is essentially a theory about contractual relationship between buyers (owners or the people giving orders) – the Principals and sellers – the agents. Physician-patient, defendant-lawyer and insurance company – insured relationships are the classical examples of the Principal-agent relationship. In terms of Administration/public sector; people are the Principals who expect services from the agents i.e. bureaucracy through their constitutional representatives – the Politicians, who then act as Principals on the behalf of people.

This important theory has been successfully made use of by different scholars to study; the relationship between politicians (political executive) as principals and bureaucrats as agents, as well as political control over the bureaucracy. Lane, (2000); Stiglitz, (1987), and Walsh, (1995) in Batley, R. (2004) p 38, examine the organizational relationship as a tension between the 'Principal' (political executive) who demands service and the 'agent' who provides it. They assume that all actors, both principals and agents are motivated with their self-interests Batley, R. (2004).

In public sector interaction between Principal and Agent, Agent typically works for the principal and it is the principal who bears the full responsibility for it. The Agent is paid for his services. The principal is the owner and the ultimate initiator and goal setter. The agent gives advice, suggest means and take alternative action to promote the goals of the principal, for which he/she is compensated by means of payments of salary of some sort.

The principal agent interaction can be analysed from the point of view of risk, as any attempt to produce something carries a certain probability of failure. Under the principal agent framework it is the principal who assumes the main burden of risk, being risk neutral, where as the agent is basically risk avert Lane, Jan Eric (2000).

In terms of governance, the people elect politicians who then are the agents of the people and act as principals on behalf of the people – the ultimate Principals. In the post election scenario, politicians - the principals in the government need agents to get the job done. Here we can speak of a contractual relationship between the political executive and the Bureaucracy. Government will pay for the services of the agents contributing to the achievements of the Government. (Lane. Jan Eric, 2000)

Goal conflict and information asymmetry are two spark plugs that power the Principal agent Theory. Politicians and bureaucrats do not share similar goals and both are rational utility maximizers. Politicians tend to maximize the chances of re-election where as the bureaucrats tend to maximize the budgets. Politicians thus have the interest in policies that benefit their constituents but the bureaucrats develop separate interests through institutionalization and changing external relationships. Waterman and Meier, (1998).

The behaviour of the bureaucrat is best understood by assuming that bureaucrat "is 'chooser' and 'maximizer' and in contrast to his part in the characteristic method of sociology, not just a 'role player' in some larger social drama" (Niskanen (1994), in Waterman 2004, 43). Bureaucrats are more likely to work in agencies where rewards are more consistent with their own preferences. Waterman et al (2004) 43) Information asymmetry is the claim that agents possess greater information than principals. Because there is a goal conflict between Principal and agents, agents have incentive to shirk or engage in other non –sanctioned actions. The information asymmetry, in turn gives bureaucrats the ability to be unresponsive to the Principals (Waterman and Meier 1998).

In most of the studies, the Political control over the bureaucrats has been explained while assuming information and goal conflict as constants that make them static and not dynamic but in actual practice these are not constant but variables, Waterman et al, (2004).

Information asymmetry is simply the claim that Agent's possess greater information about the service in question than Principals. In a sense the assumption is the combination of two variables: information possessed by the principal and information possessed by the agents.

Goal Conflict

As pointed out by Waterman, R et al (2004), goal conflict can be viewed as variable rather than constant and it is more so with respect to relationship between Politicians and Bureaucrats or in case of political control over the Bureaucracy. The situations of cooperation rather than conflict do exist. When goal is combined with the information as suggested by waterman (2004), eight situations emerge; four situations when there is goal conflict and four situations when there is goal consensus between the principals and agents as under: The research would try to explain non implementation of CSSs by

locating the situation of goal consensus or conflict between principals and agents by using this useful model suggested by waterman et al (2004)

Goal Conflict

Figure 1

		PRINCIPAL'S INFORMATION LEVEL	

<table>
<tr><td rowspan="2">A G E N T'S</td><td></td><td colspan="2" align="center">MUCH</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">L I T T L E</td><td>4

Patronage System</td><td>3

Advocacy System</td><td rowspan="2">M U C H</td></tr>
<tr><td>I N F O R M A T I O N</td><td>1

Bumper-Sticker

Politics</td><td>2

Principal-Agent

Model</td></tr>
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
Figure 1 Combining Goals and Information and there is goal conflict between Principals and agent (Waterman et al, 2004: 25)

Case 1: **Bumper-Sticker Politics:** In this case both politicians and bureaucrats lack information and there is a goal conflict too.

Case 2: **Classical Principal-Agent Model:** Goal conflict and agents have information advantage over the Principals.

Case 3: Advocacy coalition: Goal Conflict and both Principal as well as Agent have information.

Case 4: Patronage System: Goal conflict, principals have information but the Agents do not.

Goal Consensus

Figure 2

PRINCIPAL'S INFORMATION LEVEL

MUCH

AGENT'S INFORMATION LEVEL

LITTLE

8
Plato's Republic

7
Policy Sub-system

MUCH

5
Theocracy

6
Politics-Administration Dichotomy

LITTLE

Figure 2 Combining Goals and Information and there is goal consensus between Principals and agent (Waterman, 2004: 25)

Cases 5: Theocracy: In this situation there is a goal consensus but both Principal as well agents lack information.

Case 6: Politics – Administration Dichotomy: There is goal Consensus but Information Asymmetry Favours agent.

Case 7: **Policy Subsystem**: An ideal and desirable situation for proper implementation; this is the scenario in which there is goal consensus and both principals and agents have substantial information.

Case 8: Plato's Republic: Situations with goal consensus where principals have information but agents do not, are most likely to occur in polities with little administrative capacity (waterman et al 2004).

Hence if the information asymmetry and the Goal conflict are viewed as variables as suggested by waterman et al and which actually are; many different relationships between principals and agents can exist in implementation of government programmes such as centrally sponsored schemes.

Bureaucratic Strategy – Cheating[2]

Agency theory is premised on relationships between strategic principals and strategic agents. When principal demands performance from agents, agents have a wide variety of strategic actions they can take in response (Meier, J Kenneth and Bohte John). In any contractual arrangement between principal and an agent, the agent must decide how to respond to the incentive and the potential monitoring of the principal. The range of bureaucratic options goes from outright defiance to enthusiastic compliance and plethora of steps in between (Meier J Kenneth). A bureaucracy facing resource constraint is interested in responding enough to make the principal happy but not so much as to jeopardize other agency activities. As in the doctor-patient case that is used to explain principal agent model, doctor might be interested in treating patient's symptoms rather than disease itself in order to make him feel better in the short run. The bureaucracy could follow the similar strategy by determining what indicators political institutions use to judge bureaucratic behaviour and focussing its efforts on those indicators to the exclusion of others. When there is the classical case of information asymmetry and goal conflict, agents have opportunity to use this strategy effectively.

2.4 Capacity

In order to understand the puzzle of non implementation of CSSs and non expenditure of development funds by the State Governments it is indispensable to understand the capacities or incapacities of action environment, task networks, various stakeholders and organizations, Grindle M (1995) responsible for implementation because the capacity is an ability to perform functions, solve problems and set and achieve objectives in a sustainable manner (Fukuda Parr et al 2002) or capacity is an ability to perform appropriate tasks effectively, efficiently and sustainably; Grindle, M and M E Hilderbrand, (1995). If the stakeholders and organizations responsible for implementation do not possess required capacities; the implementation is likely to suffer even if there is a determined will and desperate desire.

Action environment, that includes economic, political and social conditions prevailing in the state, affects the overall efficient performance of public sector tasks. *Until the basic condition of economic capability, political commitment and social empowerment/acceptability are put in place; little can be done on other dimensions that*

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[2] Meier J Kenneth and Bohte John, 'Inside the Bureaucracy: Principals, Agents and Bureaucratic Strategy' http://teep.tamu.edu/pubs/cheating2.pdf

would contribute to improving public sector performance but it is a long time process; Grindle, M and M.E. Hilderbrand (1995).

Institutional context refers to rules, procedures, guidelines and salary/incentive/reward structure put in place to facilitate efficient implementation of public sector tasks. Efficient or inefficient Institutional mechanisms do have the bearing upon the success or the failure of public sector tasks. Further, Implementation of CSSs or any other public sector task involves coordinated and inter dependant actions of a set of organizations who are classified by Grindle, M and M. E. Hilderbrand (1995) as primary; the organizations that have central role in implementation, secondary; the organizations that are essential to the work of primary organizations and support organizations; that provide important services or support that enable a task to be performed. The effectiveness in performance of the public sector task depends upon; presence or absence of efficient and coordinated action by primary, secondary and support organizations in task network. The organizations are the building blocks of task network. The structure, processes and management styles of organizations affect how they establish goals, structure work, define authority relations and provide incentive structures Grindle M and M E Hilderbrand (1995) for achievement of the development goals. The overall efficiency of all other four dimensions described above depends upon the attitude and capabilities/capacities of human resources deployed in the process of implementation.

2.5   Community Participation

Participation can be defined as a process that facilitates dialogue among all actors, mobilizes and validates popular knowledge and skills, support communities and their institutions to manage and control resources, and seeks to achieve sustainability, economic equity and social justice while maintaining cultural integrity, Renard. Y and V. Krishnarayan (2000).[3] Participation thus is the process by which the people (especially the disadvantaged) are informed of and involved in implementation or benefits of a development activity. Participation process has four levels of participation; in first level information is disseminated to public, a second level people are involved in project related activities, at third level people are able to negotiate or bargain for decision with PIAs and at the fourth level people take own decisions and initiatives independently Ebrahim, A (2003).

2.6   Accountability

Accountability "is a complex and dynamic concept. It may be defined not only as a means through which individuals and organizations are held responsible for their actions but also as a means by which organizations and individuals take internal responsibility for shaping their organizational mission and values, for opening themselves to public or external scrutiny, and for assessing performance in relation to goals Ebrahim, A (2003).

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[3] Paper presented by Renard.Y and Vijay Krishnarayan at the regional conference 'Managing space for sustainable living in small island development States Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago on 16-17 Oct 2000.

2.7 Analytic Framework

The gross under-spending in implementation of CSSs in Himachal Pradesh can be understood and roles of different stakeholders can be ascertained by analysing; (a) capacity/incapacity of multidimensional aspects of implementation environment comprising of; Action Environment, implementing institutions, implementing organizations, the Task Network and human resources, Grindle M S (1995), (b) level of community participation in implementation and community ownership of the scheme, (c) status of political control over implementing bureaucracy and (d) existence/absence of pressure from below, that is pressure from people-the ultimate principals, civil society/NGOs and press/media.

The responsibility of implementation of centrally sponsored schemes completely rests with bureaucracy that is meant and paid for it. For this purpose funds are provided by Government of India (as central share) and State Government (as State share). For every scheme, Government of India issues elaborate guidelines for implementation with a scope for state specific modifications/innovations within the basic framework stipulated by GOI in its guidelines. Since preliminary evidences expose gross under-utilization of funds available under CSSs, it can be presumed that bureaucracy has failed to implement the schemes but it is not safe to assign the responsibility of failure to bureaucracy alone; this failure needs to be analysed in light of implementation environment in which bureaucracy operates to implement CSSs and roles of other stakeholders in the process as bureaucracy does not act in vacuum to implement CSSs. Its actions are influenced by several factors such as its capacity to implement, community ownership and participation, political control by the principals and pressure from below.

2.7.1 **Bureaucratic Implementation Capacity:** The capacity of Bureaucracy to implement the CSSs can be viewed along five dimensions suggested by Grindle M (1995) as follows:

- **Conducive action environment** is precondition for qualitative implementation of CSS and this includes; level of political commitment, effectiveness of PRI institutions, level of politicization of appointments and placements, capabilities of the people of the state to participate in decision making and economic capabilities of the state. Nothing can be done on other dimensions unless proper action environment is put in place (Grindle M (1995).

- **Institutional capacity** factors that can facilitate or constraint implementation of CSSs include; salary structure, incentives/rewards for good performance and punitive actions for non performance, placement patterns based upon performance/seniority or patronage and monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.

- **Task network** involved in implementation of CSSs include GOI, State Government, Directorates, PIAs, PRIs, NGOs and CBOs. Weaknesses in task networks that can constrain performance of public sector tasks come from two sources: absence of organizations to fill the needed roles for any given task or inadequate performance of these roles and lack of effective interaction among organizations in the network (Grindle, M (1995).

23

➕ **Organizational culture of organizations** involved in implementation of CSSs has a far reaching impact on performance. Organizations that are committed to their mission, organizational goals and result oriented performance can perform better despite constraints at other dimensions Grindle, M (1995).

Figure 3

Analytic Framework

Political Control from Principals

Capacity
- Action Environment
- Institutional
- Organizational
- The Task Network
- Human Resource

Grindle M S (1995)

Implementation of Centrally Sponsored Schemes By Bureaucracy

Community Participation

Pressure From Below By:
- Ultimate Principals
- Civil Society/
- NGOs
- Press/Media

OUTCOME
SUCCESS /FAILURE OF CENTRALLY SPONSORED SCHEMES

Source: own construction with Grindle M (1995) Capacity framework

➕ **Human resource Capacities:** Implementation of CSSs involve specialised skills such as management capabilities, HRM skills, planning aptitude, skills and temperament to work with communities, commitment to team work and optimistic aptitude. Initial orientation of the human resources deployed in implementation of CSSs and their on-job skill up-gradation is indispensable for achieving desired results while working in project mode.

2.7.2 Role of Community

Besides five dimensional capacities, role of community is central to implementation of CSSs. Decentralization and participation can increase the project success but lack of political commitment, bureaucratic resistance and inadequate resources have contributed to often disappointing results, Turner, M and Hulme D (1997) . Community can influence implementation in two ways; by participating in planning, decision making and executing the tasks assigned to it under different schemes and by exerting pressure (from below) on implementing bureaucracy to implement. The role of community however depends upon (a)availability of "Invited space"; invited spaces offer one important vehicle through which development intervention can support more transformative participation Cornwall, A (2004) 76 , (b) levels of awareness and (c) empowerment.

2.7.3 Political Control over Bureaucracy

Strategic Bureaucracy is a "Black box"; it produces outputs but its internal processes, political skills, resources, cohesion and other factors (Meier J Kenneth and John Bohte)[4] are generally ignored while assessing its relations to strategic politicians trying to control bureaucratic actions. In presence of basic assumptions of Principal-Agent model; goal conflict and information asymmetry, strategic bureaucrat has a tendency to shirk and may resort to *organizational cheating (as a form of shirking) that allows bureaucrat to meet the demands of political principals by maximizing desired outputs, while at the same time engaging in behaviours inconsistent with the spirits of guidelines established by political principals, The strategic bureaucrat has a choice to manipulate the output measures strategically and it may use three options; lying, cutting corners (a way to generate positive numbers to please principal) and generating biased samples (conscious selection of cases that generates the most positive result-a sophisticated way of cheating where organization simultaneously works and shirks)* (Meier J Kenneth and John Bohte).

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[4] Meier J Kenneth and John Bothe, 'Inside the Bureaucracy: Principals, Agents and Bureaucratic Strategy' (http://teep.tamu.edu/pubs/cheating2.pdf.)

Chapter -3

Overall contextual description with respect to the State of Himachal Pradesh

3.1 Himachal Pradesh at a Glance

Himachal Pradesh is a hilly North Indian State with the area of 55,673 Sq Km and is inhabited by 6.076 M (2001 Census) people. 90 % of the population is rural that lives in 20,188 villages and only 10% of the population are urban. The economy of the state is agricultural. Administratively, the State is divided into 12 Districts, 51 Administrative Sub-Divisions and 75 development blocks. Local grass root Governance is provided through 28 Nagar Panchayats[5] and 3243 Gram Panchayats.

3.2 Himachal Pradesh' is completely dependant on Central Funding for Development

Himachal Pradesh is resource and funds starved state because it faces all the constraints and disadvantages faced by the Special Category Hill States. Himachal Pradesh is already facing an acute debt situation and future fiscal stress due to interest payments that have to be paid to service its past high debt. Himachal Pradesh Government until 2008-09, was reeling under huge fiscal problem of total outstanding debt of Rs. 2, 29,300 Million INR (22930 Crore). This debt commits state to annual repayment liabilities of almost Rs. 30,000 Million INR (3000 Crores) per annum (Budget speech of Chief Minister Himachal Pradesh 2008-09). Besides this, state continues to have very high Revenue Expenditure as a percentage of total expenditure. It was 87.32% of the total expenditure in 2006-07. The reason for the high levels of NPRE are the committed liabilities of the Government on account of Salaries, Interest Payments, Pension expenditure, Maintenance expenditure and Grants-in-Aid to educational institutions and local bodies. NPRE as a percentage of total expenditure continues to be high in the State as in most Special Category States, which are categorized by a weak Revenue Base and high costs of development and administration. This way, the state has negligible finances at its disposal to undertake massive development activities to fulfil the aspirations of the people. Under these circumstances state government has complete dependence on Government of India funding of the following three kinds for the development of different sectors.

✦ Non Plan funding

Vertical and horizontal imbalances are common features of most federations and India is no exception to this. In an explicit recognition of vertical and horizontal imbalances, the Indian Constitution embodies the following enabling and mandatory provisions to address them through the transfer of resources from the centre to the states.
1.   Levy of duties by the Centre but collected and retained by the States (Article 268)

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[5] Municipal Councils/committees

2. Taxes and duties levied and collected by the Centre but assigned in whole to the States (Article269)

3. Sharing of the proceeds of all Union taxes between the Centre and the States under Article 270.

4.   Statutory grants-in-aid of the revenues of states (Article 275)

5.   grants for any public purpose (Article 282)

6.   Loans for any public purpose (Article 293)

Indian Constitution provides for an institutional mechanism to facilitate such transfers. The institution assigned with such a task under Article 280 of the Constitution is the Finance Commission, which is to be appointed at the expiration of every five years or earlier.

➕ Plan funding

Second source of development funding for the Government of H.P is planned funding made by planning commission of India and state has the plan size of 27000 Million INR for the year 2008-09. State had a plan size of 18000 Million INR for 2006-07, 21000 Million INR for 2007-08, and 24000 Million INR for 2008-09. This planned funding is then allocated by the State for the development of different sectors.

➕ Centrally Sponsored schemes

The funds retained by Government of India and allocated to different ministries of the Union Government are also made available to the states by way of different centrally sponsored schemes and these funds are the major source of funding for the states for the development of various sectors. In all there are more than 400 centrally sponsored schemes in vogue at present. Huge funds under these initiatives of the Government of India are available to the states for the development of different sectors and ensuring better living conditions and quality life to the people – the ultimate Principals.

3.3 Procedure of claiming funds by State under CSSs

Procedurally, states are required to claim funds through submission of proposals as per guidelines provided by GOI and once the proposal is approved, the funds are provided to State Government in instalments and there on, it is the responsibility of State Government to Implement these schemes. Each programme and scheme has detailed guidelines for implementation but in almost all the cases, States have discretion to make necessary innovations/modifications suiting to their requirements and local conditions. Once the

project/scheme is approved / sanctioned and funds are provided by the Government of India, the State government is required to contribute its stipulated share, which is different for different scheme. There after, it is the responsibility of the State bureaucracy under the overall guidance and supervision of political executive to implement CSSs through active involvement and participation of the community. Political executive has a decisive role to play and it is due to this reason that for almost every scheme sanctioned by Government of India, guidelines provide for apex committee under the Chairmanship of Chief Minister and the few relevant ministers are included in it.

Chapter – 4

Case Study I - NRHM

4.1   Selection of the projects for Case Study:

National Rural Health Mission and Integrated Watershed Development programme (IWDP/DPAP/DDP) are two major CSSs launched by Government of India. NRHM promises quality health services to the people residing in every nook and corner of the State, whereas Watershed Development Programme promises holistic socio-economic economic development of rural areas. Both these schemes; show the evidences of huge under-spending, call for the implementation through active community participation and community empowerment, follow (almost) same procedure for claiming funds from Government of India and even the stake holders are more or less same as any other CSS in vogue. Thus the roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders in these two representative case studies would reflect on patterns of implementation of CSSs in the State.

4.2   Status of Health services in H.P: Does Himachal Pradesh need NRHM?

Himachal Pradesh has weak public health indicators and infrastructure and due to this reason Himachal Pradesh, among 17 other states of the country, is high focus state under NRHM[6]. Health services to the people of State are being provided through 2071 HSCs, 452 PHCs, 109 CHCs and 51 civil Hospitals. Out of these institutions, 800 HSCs, 165 PHCs and 1 CHC do not have their own buildings and are functioning either in rented or rent-free accommodations, State PIPs (2006-2010)[7]. Most of the health institutions in the State, especially in difficult and remote tribal areas generally face shortage of technical staff such as doctors, nurses, lab technicians etc[8], and hence people residing in these areas do not have access to basic health care what to talk about quality health services (The Tribune, 'Himachal Plus' 25 Nov. 09). State Government spends about 4.5% of its total budget on health sector, out of which 82% goes towards salaries, PIP (2007-08) page 6[9]. Hence there is fund scarcity, there is general lack of infrastructure and people have very limited access to quality preventive, diagnostic, curative and speciality health services in the State.

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[6] NRHM Vision Document, Government of India
http://mohfw.nic.in/NRHM/Documents/NRHM%20Mission%20Document.pdf

[7] NRHM Website, Government of India, http://mohfw.nic.in/NRHM.htm

[8] State health profile Government of H.P.
http://mohfw.nic.in/NRHM/State%20Files/hp.htm#sp

[9] PIP 2007-08, submitted to GOI by State of H.P. http://mohfw.nic.in/NRHM.htm

4.3 Opportunities available to the State of H.P. under NRHM – What the State can achieve?

The National Rural Health Mission was launched by Hon'ble Prime Minister of India on 12th April 2005 for a period of seven years (2005-2012), to enhance comprehensive primary health care services especially for the poor and vulnerable sections of the society. Himachal Pradesh, with its weak health indicators and poor health infrastructure, has an opportunity to avail GOI funding under NRHM and ensure quality health services to the people of the state as depicted in table 1. NRHM caters for almost all components required for putting in place a qualitative health service delivery system for the rural population of the state. Not only this, the States are encouraged to try out innovative and creative solutions to the State – Specific problems. *"No Government programme was as meticulously prepared or planned as NRHM since independence. It seems that before planning NRHM, the target of meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), of which India is a signatory, were also kept in mind as the goals under NRHM are similar to what has been envisaged in MDGs"* (Laharia.C et al 2009); pp 1 (Abstract)[10].

Table 1
Opportunities Available under NRHM (2005-2012)

Sl No	Component of NRHM	Time line	What State can achieve through NRHM funds?
1	IPHS standards		State can provide access to quality health services in every nook and corner of the state through establishment of IPHS in every health institution; HSC, PHC, CHC, and DH/RH
2.	ASHA		State has opportunity to select, train and deploy 7000 ASHAs, each with a drug kit in 3243 gram Panchayats to provide basic health services to the rural people and provide sustainable link between rural communities and state health delivery system.
3.	Strengthening of HSCs		• Provide IPHS quality health services at HSC level • Construct new buildings for 800 HSC that are running either in rented or rent-free buildings with the cost of 0.66 Million INR (each) out of NRHM funds • Ensure 2 ANMs in every HSC
4.	Up-gradation of PHCs to IPHS & 24X7 health service delivery		• Can upgrade all PHCs in the state to IPHS level for providing 24X7 services to people of the state. • Deploy 2 Doctors and provide building with residences for doctors and nurses, in every PHC
5.	Upgradation of CHCS to IPHS		• Ensure fully functional 30-bedded CHCs with whole range of facilities of IPHS, 7specialists and 9 staff nurses to provide round the clock specialty service to entire population.
6.	Doctors and technical		• Orient MOs to attain multi-skill capabilities • Provide second doctor in PHC

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[10] Laharia. C, H. Khandekar, J.G. Prasuna and Meenakshi: 'A Critical review of National Rural Health Mission in India'. *The internet Journal of health.* 2007 Volume 6 Number 1.

	manpower		• Provide extra remuneration and incentives to specialists posted in remote and tribal areas of the state.
7.	**District Health Plan** **(Important as funding would be on the basis of DAPs)**		• Formulate realistic District Health Plan based upon facility survey and village health plans prepared through VHSC; keeping in view community needs • Opportunity to undertake this massive exercise by engaging organizations having expertise in community led planning.
8.	• **RKS** • **VHSC**		• To set up sustainable community based management system in every health institution from HSC to District Hospital in the State leading to better health service delivery and people's satisfaction.
9.	**Maintenance Grant**		• Improve and maintain health infrastructure in the state through annual maintenance grant to every health institution
10.	**Untied Funds**		• State can provide untied funds to every institution of the state to facilitate community led management of Health delivery system
11.	**MMUs**		• State can provide specialty services in every nook and corner of the state especially difficult, remote and tribal areas.

Source: Table constructed through analysis of NRHM guideline

In order to achieve goals set out under NRHM, GOI provides guidelines and promise funding for setting up adequate institutional as well as organizational mechanism too.

At the state level, it envisages establishment of; State health Mission headed by Chief Minister and co-chaired by Minister of Health and family welfare, State health society headed by chief secretary and State programme management and support unit (SPMSU) to be headed by Executive Director/Mission Director. The state health mission is required to meet once in every six months and provide overall leadership, inter-sectoral coordination, advocacy measures required to promote NRHM visibility and oversee progress of implementation. State Health Society too is required to meet once in six months to approve annual state action plan, consider proposals for institutional reforms, review implementation of annual action plans and review progress on decisions taken at State Health Mission. The SPMSU comprising pool of skilled people such as MBA, CA and consultants for RCH (Reproductive child health) and other national disease control programmes, is to act as secretariat to the State Health Mission and State Health Society.

At District level NRHM caters for District Health Mission headed by Chairperson Zila Parishad, co-chaired by District Collector and Chief Medical Officer as its Mission Director, integrated district health society headed by District collector/District Magistrate/CEO Zila Parishad and District Health Society Secretariat.

At Gram Panchayat/HSC level, NRHM makes a provision of VHSC (Village health and Sanitation Committee) and at village level ASHA acts as a link between village

community and health system. This way NRHM not only makes provision for different components to improve health service delivery in rural areas but it also provide elaborate guidelines and funds to make it practically possible.

4.4 Implementation Failure: Himachal Pradesh has failed to draw benefits under NRHM.

National Rural Health mission not only promises states to provide funds to put in place a highly qualitative (IPHS level) health facilities for its people in general and poor in particular right from village to state head quarter level but it also provide funds for; creation of strong institutional and organizational mechanisms to implement NRHM components, extensive capacity building of all involved in implementation, hiring expert manpower/agencies to carry out specialized tasks where state has little capacity and elaborate guidelines on every component. In spite of it, state has failed to draw any benefit for its people under NRHM. People are agitating for deteriorating health services in rural areas, media is highlighting this failure but nothing seems to improve, a leading newspaper, The Tribune reported on 25 November, 2007:

> 'Government has not only failed to utilize funds sanctioned under National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) but also the annual budget has been lapsing year after year due to its non utilization. This has exposed state's inability to work even when ample funds are available'.

4.4.1   Under-spending – the denial of quality health care to the people

Right from the beginning, irrespective of political party in power; the performance of NRHM is same. The State started with poor implementation and the trend is continuing even today. The State had Congress party led Government from April, 2005 to December 2007 and BJP led Government from January 2008 till date i.e. 27 November, 2009. So period under research is shared by both the parties equally.   The first two years expenditure under NRHM as on 30.09.2007 is depicted in table 2.

The information above reveals that implementing bureaucracy completely ignored; preparation of DAPs, providing outreach health services to un-served or underserved areas through commissioning of MMUs, community management by holding untied funds and maintenance grant for HScs, RKSs and PHCs respectively and appointment of ASHAs for basic health service delivery in villages. Not only this, no effort was made to constitute PMUs required for better implementation.

Thus out of total releases of 463.1 Million INR from GOI until Sept, 2007, state could spend just 108.5 Million INR (23.5%) and 354.6Million INR (76.5%) remained unspent.

Table 2: Component wise Break-up of expenditure under NHRM as on 30.09.2007

in Millions

Sr. No.	Component	Funds received	Expenditure	Balance
1.	Untied funds sub centers	39.2	18.9	20.3
2.	Up-gradation of 65 CHCs/CHs @Rs 24 lakhs (October, 2005)	**156.0**	**31.7**	**124.2**
3.	Medicines	99.3	54.8	44.5
4.	Swasthya Mela	6.4	3.1	3.3
5.	**DAP**(District Action Plans) @ Rs 10 lakh/District	12.0	**NIL**	12.0
6.	**Mobile Medical unit** (October, 2006)	53.2	**Nil**	53.2
7.	**Untied funds for PHCs** (December, 2006)	10.9	**Nil**	10.9
8.	**Annual Maintenance Grant for PHCs**	21.9	**NIL**	21.9
9.	**ASHA** (accredited social health activist) for about 7000 villages	36.0	**NIL**	36.0
10.	**Block PMUs**	18.0	**NIL**	18.0
11.	**Rogi Kalyan Samiti**	10.2	**NIL**	10.2
12	**Total**	**463.1**	**108.5**	**354.6**

Source: Reply to question asked in legislative Assembly in Dec, 2007

4.4.2 People of the state are losing millions of rupees every year due to bureaucratic lethargy

Table 3 highlights the impact of unspent balances on annual releases in subsequent years. Under-spending in NRHM started in the very first year and state at the end of first year had unspent balances of 134 Million INR; since it was the first year, GOI did not impose any cut and entire amount of approved PIP was released to the state.

During 2006-07, state did not improve its performance and at the end of the year, state had unspent balances of 395.79 Million INR and GOI imposed the cut of 568.2 Million INR, more than the unspent balances of first and second year (some hidden unspent balances might have surfaced later). 2006-07 onwards total annual receipts started gradually decreasing vis a vis approved PIP due to extremely poor financial and physical performance. GOI released; 779.4 Million INR against approved PIP of 834.5 million INR during 2007-08, 972.5 Million INR against approved PIP of 1231 Million INR during 2008-09 and just 374.7 Million INR against approved PIP of 1433 Million INR during 2009-10 (upto 30.09.2009). the unspent balances of every year starting from 2005-06 were deducted during the subsequent year out of the total approved PIP. Figure 5

shows unspent amount of previous year deducted from total releases approved by government of India.

Table 3

Table depicting impact of unspent balances and resultant cuts in annual GOI releases

Year	PIP approved by GOI	Funds received from GOI		Total Reciept	Unspent Balance
		Unspent Balances	Actual Reciept		
2005-06	309.6	0	181.31	181.3	134
2006-07	421.4	134..0	421.7	555.7	395.79
2007-08	834.5	568.2	211.2	779.4	492.1
2008-09	1231.0	492.1	373.9	972.5	271.3
2009-10	1433.0	271.3	103.4	374.7	179.4
Total	4229.6	1331.6	1291.51	2863.6	1472.59

Source: NRHM Directorate

Figure 5

Bar graph developed on the basis of data collected from NRHM Directorate

People of the state thus incurred financial losses due to bureaucratic lethargy on two accounts; they incurred heavy losses due to adjustment of unspent amount in next years releases and also cuts in PIP approved due to extremely low expenditure and resultantly poor performance.

Although these figures show huge under-spending but actual spending is still lower because payments released by NRHM directorate keep lying unspent with executing agencies in the districts and further down at Gram Panchayat level. For example; figure 5 shows NRHM funds lying unspent at district HQ of Una district of the state:

Figure 6

| ■ Series1	Funds received	Expenditure	Balance
	24.82	14.14	10.68

Source: Bar Chart constructed on the basis of Data collected from CMO Office Una

This way, actual expenditure is still lesser than what has been reported by NRHM Directorate to GOI and this research has depicted above. Since two major political parties have shared the implementation period equally and performance of spending remains same throughout, it seems that politicians do not make any difference and they are not playing any role in implementation.

4.4.3 Funds now have virtually stopped coming to the state due to huge unspent balances

Since the state has huge unspent balances under most of the activities, the state is not getting funds from GOI now and this is very clear from the table 4, depicting funds received by the State under NRHM during 2009-10. Against approved PIP of 1433 Million INR, GOI has released just 216.09 Million INR and for certain activities such as; VHSC, link workers, DAPs, workshops, resource centres, constructions, Swasthya Mela (Health festivals), communication facility, procurements, EMR&T, management training, AYUSH, AIDS and Up-gradation, government of India have not released any funds due to previous unspent funds available with the state under these heads.

Table 4

Funds received by the State under NRHM during 2009-10

Sl No	Activity/component	Amount in PIP	Amount Released by GOI	Expenditure
1	Sub centre - untied funds	20.71	20.69	3.06
2	Sub centre - AMG	20.71	20.69	2.17
3	VHSCs	32.43	0	0
4	RKS	112.35	69.62	74.22
5	link workers	6.00	0	0.019
6	DAPs	3.00	0	0.012
7	workshops	1.50	0	0
8	Resorce centres	15.00	0	0
9	incentives to MOs	19.61	81.53	85.66
10	Construction	270.00	0	0
11	Swasthya Mela	3.20	0	0.64
12	Communication Facility	1.45	0	0
13	Mobility Support	4.08	4.80	0.68
14	Procurements	50.00	0	0.86
15	EMR&T	180.00	0	1.21
16	Repair and maintenance of laproscopes	1.32	0.3	0
17	Management Training	5.00	0	0
18	Institutional dev/mgt costs	12.25	4.47	2.93
19	PMUs	9.13	0.38	4.63
20	flexi pool	0	7.5	0.56
21	Ayush	0	0	13.4
22	AIDS	0.00	0	3.26
23	Dental Health	0.00	6.11	10.4
24	Up-gradation	0.00	0	22.67
	Total	**767.74**	**216.09**	**226.381**

Source: NRHM Directorate

4.5. What is ailing NRHM in Himachal Pradesh.

4.5.1. Non(almost) Existence of Implementing Agency

During my extensive field visits and investigations I virtually failed to ascertain as to who is implementing NRHM in the state as I could not locate any implementing agency functioning on ground except for Principal Secretary (H&FW), and Mission Director guided and prompted by the Principal Secretary. Rest of the implementing machinery was either dormant or working in confusion for the want of clarity and direction. One of my respondents who is a senior bureaucrat at the state level, supported my observation;

> "I fully agree that there is huge under-spending in implementation of CSSs and to me, first and foremost reason is lack of implementing agency for almost all centrally sponsored schemes. Tell me who is implementing CSSs in the state? How expenditure or qualitative implementation is possible when there is no implementing agency? "

Political leadership at the state level is out of scene as only two meetings of State health Mission have held during five years of implementation, although State health mission is required to meet once in six months. State Health Society was not even notified until December, 2008 and it met for the first time in July, 2009; after the lapse of four years of the total project period of seven years. In the name of SPMSU, state is dragging the mission with only one chartered accountant. The responsibility of organizing the meeting of state health mission, constitution of State health Society and putting in place State Programme Management Support unit falls in the domain of state level bureaucracy, hence can be held responsible for keeping Chief Minister, Health and family welfare Minister out of the scene and denying expert led SPMSU to the mission.

At district level, District health Mission, District health Society and district health society secretariat were found to be either non-existent or where ever I could locate them, were dormant. Although District Health Mission is to be headed by Zila Parishad Chairpersons, but District level Politicians have been intentionally excluded from the Mission by handing over the chairperson ship of the District Health Mission to Deputy Commissioners-contrary to NRHM guidelines. MLAs and MPs being members of District health Mission can have the access to NRHM activities and implementation progress but they remain out of it because the meeting of District health Mission seldom takes place. One Zila Parishad Chairman interviewed by me was clueless about existence of district health mission; he says:

> 'I don't know about District health Mission but I was chairman for one health committee and one meeting was held under my chairmanship. After that deputy Commissioner was made Chairman and myself member under Deputy Commissioner. Bureaucracy is very bad'.

Similarly MLAs, Chief Parliamentary Secretaries and MPs interviewed by me, were ignorant about NRHM provisions and opportunities available therein. Some of them even requested me during the interview for information about NRHM guidelines and funds available for their constituencies.

NRHM is non existent below district level too and PRI members as well as community leaders know nothing about NRHM guidelines or its components; their knowledge about NRHM is confined to NRHM advertisements that they watch in electronic media. Village health and sanitation committees have been formed at certain places and some Presidents of Gram Panchayat were aware of it but they disclosed that they are not involved in any kind of decision making but ANMs get their signatures on the cheques for making different payments out of untied funds and maintenance grants. Says one Female President of Gram Panchayat during Focus group meet:

> 'I have joint account with ANM and ANM gets my signatures on the cheques for making different payments. I know nothing about VHSC or its meetings.'

4.5.2   Lack of Implementation Capacity:

Viewed along five dimensions suggested by Grindle M (1995), state completely lack capacity to implement such a massive and complicated programme where in several

stakeholders such as people, PRI institutions (from all the three tiers), street level bureaucracy, middle level bureaucracy, top level bureaucracy, medical professionals and politicians are required to work in an integrated and cohesive manner to achieve highly technical goals of achieving very high Indian Public Health Standards (IPHS), throughout the State.

Firstly implementation is taking place in adverse action environment comprising of absolute lack of political will because of complete ignorance/lack of awareness among politicians. It was heartening to note during interview of politicians including MLAs, MPs, Ministers, ex- Chief Minister and even Chief Minister, that they have keen desire to provide better facilities in the health sector to their constituents, admittedly for, self interest of re-election but this desire is unable to become determined will for the want of information. It can be easily concluded that strategic Bureaucracy has very tactfully excluded politicians (at all levels) from NRHM implementation by; keeping Chief Minister and Health Minister away from NRHM by not holding the meeting of State health Mission during the entire period of implementation (only two meetings of State health Mission have taken place during five years of implementation), excluding Zila Parishad Chairmen from chairpersonship of District Health Missions, excluding MLAs and MPs from mission by allowing District Health Missions to be dormant. When asked if there is lack of political will, says one lower level official in NRHM Directorate:

> 'There is absolutely no political interference. No Politicians such as MLAs, MPs and even ministers desperately want to utilize NRHM funds in their constituencies and they telephone me directly for finding out opportunities in health sector for their constituencies under NRHM'.

Another disclosed:
> 'I was called by Chief Minister in his office and he persuaded me to ensure maximum funds for the state under NRHM………..I want to meet present and need just five minutes to apprise him about what is happening in NRHM and how state is losing opportunity'.

When asked about political interference in implementation of NRHM, he says:
> 'No there is absolutely no political interference, rather there is excessive bureaucratic interference from the top level; they distort guidelines and centralize everything. See how the concept of ASHA and MMU is changed. On the other hand politicians are keen to implement NRHM activities in their constituencies. They telephone me quite often to find out opportunities'.

Almost all politicians whom I interviewed looked so desperate that they requested me to pass on guidelines and detail of components of NRHM to them. Data collected during the field work further revealed that action environment is heavily constrained by non-effectiveness of PRI institutions and general (Absolute) lack of awareness among people. PRI members were found to be clueless about NRHM. Although NRHM caters for funds for capacity building at all levels but as is evident from the data; the funds are not being spent by implementing bureaucracy.

Besides heavily constrained action environment, lack of institutional capacity is further constraining implementation. Institutional constrains noticed during the field work include; lack of incentive or reward for good work, lack of accountability or punitive action for non – performance and placements motivated by political patronage. During last five years of implementation, NRHM Directorate has seen nine Mission Directors belonging to Himachal Pradesh Administrative Services; even one IPS officers also found his way to this administrative post with the help of political patronage. Resultantly there is a struggle among different services to grab the post of Mission Director NRHM and now doctors are staking claim on this post. A local news paper, Amar Ujala (Chandigarh Edition), on 13th November 2009 wrote:

> 'Government is doing different experiments in NRHM by trying out officers of different cadres such as IAS, HAS and even IPS and NRHM has seen nine mission directors during four years of implementation. As a result mission has neither been able to achieve its objective nor has the benefit reached to the rural areas'.

There is a serious bureaucratic lapse in not spending funds available but there is no evaluation, monitoring or provision for punitive action against the defaulting officers. On the other hand there is no reward either for the good work. During my field work I came across two Chief Medical officers who are doing good work against all odds; one of them even submitted detailed report on initiatives taken by him under NRHM and proposal for streamlining NRHM in the state, to Chief Minister, Health Minister, Education Minister, Principal Secretary Health, Director Health, Mission Director NRHM and many others but he was disheartened and said:

> 'Only Chief Minister and Education Minister have written back to me. My Health Minister, Secretary and Mission Director did not even acknowledge the receipt of report. I will however continue with my work against all odds prevailing in the system'.

During my fieldwork, my findings coincided with findings of Grindle, M (1995), and I found that implementation of NRHM is being constrained by two weaknesses in task network; firstly there was conspicuous absence of organizations such as Panchayati Raj Institutions (due their intentional exclusion coupled with lack of awareness), NGOs and CBOs; mainly due to lack of awareness and secondly, inadequate performance by almost all organizations involved in the implementation.

In the name of organizational culture, I could find diverse culture and commitment to mission, organizational goals and result oriented performance, throughout the organizational hierarchy. One of my interviewees, who was a top level bureaucrat (IAS Officer) responsible for steering NRHM in the state, out rightly rejected the design, planning and complete concept of NRHM scheme as a whole, says he:

> 'There is under-spending and the reason is very clear. The design is bad, planning is bad and implementation is not there. NRHM is not a good idea as far as planning is concerned'.

When asked about failure of the state in appointing ASHAs and preparing District Action Plans based upon village health plans prepared by VHSC, he says:

> We have discarded the idea of ASHA, it is not applicable in H.P. Planning is annual plan and this plan needs to be modified annually. Tell me what village people are to plan? Do you think village people really need to plan about health services or they are capable of planning at all?

During my extensive field work I could not notice any type of commitment in any organization involved in implementation of NRHM except for coming across few highly committed officers and individuals who are striving for excellence at their level alone but they expressed their resentment that they are unable to make a difference due to excessive interference and centralisation from the top level bureaucracy.

Although NRHM programme lays emphasis on capacity building of different stakeholders at all levels; state, district, block and even village, for better implementation and therefore makes provision of adequate funding but financial performance shows that state has failed to make any effort for capacity building of stake holders and this major lapse on the part of implementing bureaucracy has contributed significantly in under-spending of NRHM funds.

4.5.3   Dormant Community

During my extensive field work, two revealing facts came to light; first people of the state desperately need improved health care facilities in the state and second, they completely lack information about NRHM, its components and opportunities available there in. Says one Gram Panchayat President during focus group interview:

> 'Tell me why people would not want improved health services and why we would not want improved health services in our Panchayats; it will improve our election prospects if it happens during our tenure? What can we do if no one tells us? It is for the first time that we are hearing so much about NRHM, no one ever told us about opportunities and funds available. There may be some GP Pradhans who do not take interest, that is there in government sector too, but majority of Pradhans (Presidents) are keen on development '.

When asked why people do not demand, he says:

> 'What people can demand if they do not know what is available? When we are not aware how do you expect people to be aware of NRHM'?

Hence people of the state are not able to contribute and perform their role in NRHM due to absolute lack of awareness what to talk about empowerment. The political space is completely denied to the people/communities in the state.

4.5.4   Level of Political Control Over Bureaucracy

The above discussion brings out revealing information about relations between two major stakeholders; politicians and bureaucrats, fully responsible for providing quality health care services to the people of the state. Former are elected and granted legitimacy by the people to act as principals on their behalf in order to ensure fulfilment of their interest and later is paid out of their money to work in their interest. The political control over bureaucracy in implementation follow three situations in waterman, (2004) framework; case 2 in figure 2 exists in case of top level bureaucracy and cases 5 and 6 in figure 3, in case of bureaucracy below state level. At the top level, bureaucrats do not share goal with politicians and there is information asymmetry that favour bureaucrats-the agents. In this case, since politicians-the principals lack information, bureaucrats are free to act as 'Rational Actors' with 'bounded rationality' (Turner, M and Hulme D (1997); to make decisions by rule of thumb or on personal whims with limited search on ground realities and information about needs of the state and its people. Policy implementation therefore is just 'Muddling through' Turner, M and Hulme D (1997). Since political principals lack information, political control over bureaucrats is almost non existent and bureaucrat is left free to muddle through the implementation of important scheme like NRHM.

In case 5 (theocracy), Waterman 2004), with respect to bureaucracy at all levels below state level, research found strong evidences of goal consensus between politicians and bureaucrats/officials; bureaucrats and technocrats share goal of providing better services to the people of the state with politicians but both politicians and bureaucrats lack information about NRHM hence bureaucrats/officials act as supportive cheer leaders, Waterman (2004) p 28.

In case 6 (politics-administration dichotomy), Waterman, (2004) there is goal consensus between politicians and bureaucrats and information asymmetry favour agents; but since there is distortion of NRHM provisions on the whims of top bureaucracy, bureaucrats/officials find themselves helpless and prefer to act as cheer leaders. In both cases politicians remain in search of correct information and since there is time constraint they are not able to do much.

Chapter 5

Case Study II (Watershed Development Programme. IWDP/DDP/DPAP)

5.1   Introduction Historical background of watershed projects in India

A watershed is commonly defined as an area in which all water drains to a common point. From a hydrological perspective a watershed is a useful unit of operation and analysis because it facilitates a systems approach to land and water use in interconnected upstream and downstream areas (John Kerr and Kimberly Chung, 2001). Watershed Development Projects of Rural Development Department are being undertaken in different parts of the country under three major programmes; the Integrated Wastelands Development Programme (IWDP) mainly in rainfed areas, the Drought Prone Area Programme (DPAP) in dry arid areas and the Desert Development Programme (DDP) in both hot and cold desert areas.

Watershed development programme is under implementation since 1989-90. Until 1994-95, watershed programme was implemented by line departments; mainly by forest department and thrust was on plantation without the involvement of community. The results remained unsatisfactory and desired aims were far from the achievement. As a result Government of India appointed in 1994, a technical committee under the chairmanship of Prof Hanumantha Rao to assess the Desert Prone Area Programme (DPAP) and Desert Development Programme (DDP) with a purpose of identifying weaknesses and suggesting improvements. The Committee, after careful appraisal, opined that the "*programmes have been implemented in a fragmented manner by different departments through rigid guidelines without any well-designed plans prepared on watershed basis by involving the inhabitants. Except in a few places, the achievements have been sub-optimal.* (Hanumantha Rao Committee, 1994). Against this backdrop, the Committee made a number of recommendations and formulated a set of guidelines that brought the DDP, the DPAP and the Integrated Wastelands Development Programme (IWDP) under a single umbrella.

1994 guidelines, that came into force on 1st April 1995, made a major shift in implementation and now onwards all watershed projects were to be implemented through active community participation wherein community was to plan, execute and maintain the assets created under the project. These guidelines thus shifted the planning, implementation and management from "bureaucratic approach" that had failed to produce desired results to completely "decentralized community led planning and implementation approach", (Prof. Hanumantha Rao Committee report) and these guidelines also catered for community empowerment through capacity building and extensive community organization to enable communities perform this responsibility effectively.

5.2 Implementation strategy envisaged under 1994 guidelines

The guidelines provided broad framework for implementation of massive watershed projects. First step of implementation is community organization through awareness, entry point activities for rapport building, exposure visits to successful watershed

projects, organization of community into watershed association, watershed committees, self help groups and user groups, selection of watershed development team members to give technical inputs in implementation etc, and 5% of the overall outlay of the project is provided for this purpose. Once the community is organized and WDT (watershed development team) members are in place, next step is the selection of watershed committees that is actual implementing agency at the village (watershed) level and this committee is to be elected by (empowered) watershed association itself.

Since watershed implementation envisaged holistic development of selected watershed areas and multifarious development activities are to be taken up through the involvement of different stakeholders at all levels up to users, programme has made explicit provision of 5% funds for the empowerment of all stakeholders through the training of all involved in the implementation at all levels i.e. the members of watershed association and watershed committees, user groups, PIA/DRDA functionaries, PRI members, PIA (project implementation agency) functionaries, watershed development team members and all officers/officials involved with implementation at all levels. First two years of implementation is dedicated for empowerment through capacity building of communities and all stakeholders whereas work component is kept at minimum. It is to give room for community based planning through the application of advanced planning processes such as baseline/bench mark surveys, transact walks and PRA by empowered communities under the technical guidance of WDT members/expert institutions and facilitated by PIA.

Now onwards, the implementation is to be carried out through user groups led by watershed committees elected by aware and empowered watershed association; under the guidance of trained watershed development team members and overall process facilitated by government functionaries at all levels. Not only this, even management of assets created under the project is also entrusted upon (empowered) watershed communities led by watershed committees under the overall supervision of Gram Panchayats.

5.3 Overall performance during last 14 Years of implementation in the country

The last 14 years of implementation has seen three revisions of the original 1994 guidelines; in 2001, 2003 and 2008 for the same scheme and the implementation has been evaluated by several expert agencies such as ICAR institutes, State Agriculture Universities, NRSA (National Remote Sensing Agency) and impact assessment studies have been carried out by Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Rural Development, planning commission, ICRISAT (International crop Research Institute for Semi-Arid Tropics) and technical committees constituted by DoLR (GOI Watershed Guidelines 2008. pp 5). The guidelines admit that:

"These studies support the observation that in several watersheds, the implementation of the programme has been effective for natural resource conservation by increasing the productivity of the land, bringing additional area under agriculture, employment generation and social upliftment of beneficiaries living in the rural areas. But these successes have been **sporadic and intermittent**. The over all impact at the state and national levels has generally been inadequate."

Similarly, several researches carried out by noted researchers to evaluate the progress/impact of the watershed programme in India are in harmony with admissions of Government of India in 2008 guidelines as enumerated above. Since the watershed programme in India is envisioned to be participatory in GOI guidelines, adherence to the guidelines widely vary in different parts of the country but participatory projects perform better than their more technocratic, top down counterparts, and that a combination of participation and sound technical inputs is likely to perform the best of all, (John Kerr et al 2002) Overall performance of watershed project in India during last 14 years points out that all is not well (watershed guidelines, 2008) and Government of India efforts to transform rural India through watershed development approach are failing to produce desired results at least in Himachal Pradesh. The problem is not rooted in the Watershed guidelines but in implementation of the guidelines due to lack of implementation capacities (DFIDI 1998)[11] and lack of community participation (Kerr, John et al 2002)

5.4 Watershed Programme in Himachal Pradesh-a Fiasco

Watershed development programme started in Himachal Pradesh with rest of the country in the year 1989-90. Until 1994-95 it was implemented by forest department with the main focus on plantation. After 1994-95 it is being implemented under the new guidelines following participatory approaches. Out of the total 12 districts, 8 rain fed districts namely Chamba, Hamirpur, Kangra, Kullu, Mandi, Shimla, Sirmaur, Solan (only four development blocks mamely Nalagarh, Solan, Kandaghat & Dharampur), and Kinnaur (only two development blocks namely Kalpa and Nichar) are covered under IWDP, 3 desert prone districts of Una, Bilaspur and Solan (only two blocks namely Kunihar and Dharampur) are covered under DPAP and two cold deserts tribal districts of Lahaul & Spiti and Kinnaur (only Pooh Block) are covered under DDP. The financial achievement of all the three types of watershed projects indicates that watershed programme has completely failed so far in Himachal Pradesh to produce desired results and people of the state residing in the rural areas are being deprived of the possible development and improved quality of life.

5.4.1   Undre spending in IWDP Projects

At the outset it would be pertinent to mention here that in order to avail GOI funding under IWDP, concerned district is required to submit proposals based upon its area intended to be covered where as in case of DPAP and DDP, proposal is not required to be submitted and Government of India sanctions projects based upon past implementation progress and level of expenditure. Data collected from the Directorate of Rural Development high lighted the fact that state has failed to avail funding under IWDP due to non submission of the proposals and also due to poor expenditure. It is evident from the fact that the Government of India has sanctioned just 2013.4 Million INR for Eight districts under IWDP, whereas it has sanctioned projects worth 1023 Million INR for two

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[11] A report commissioned by the DFIDI Rural Development Office, New Delhi at the request of the Ministry of Rural Development Government of India in the year 1998.

and half DPAP districts and 1272 Million INR for only one and half DDP districts. This fact was corroborated by one of my respondents who happened to be Secretary to Government of India for Rural Development and he handled watershed projects for quite some time. Implementation of project is still worse as the project period (of five years) for the projects sanctioned by Government of India in the years 2000, 2001, 2003 and 2004 came to an end in 2005, 2006, 2008 and 2009 respectively but they are still under implementation through extension granted by Government of India and in some cases as many as three out of total seven instalments are yet to be claimed.

Table 4: Under-spending in IWDP Projects

Sl No	Project Period	Project Cost	Fund Released by GOI	Expenditure	Expenditure % of project cost
1	2000-2005	586.95	531.1	530.2	90.3
2	2001-2006	282.6	230.2	214.22	75.8
3	2002-2007	0	0	0	
4	2003-2008	258.0	219.4	185.8	72.0
5	2004-2009	90.0	67.5	39.3	43.7
6	2005-2010	561.5	295.8	198.8	35.4
7	2006-2011	234.4	123.6	85.9	36.6
8	Total	2013.45	1467.6	1254.22	62.3

Source: Directorate of Rural Development

The impressive figures of 90.3%, 75.8% and 72% expenditure for projects sanctioned during 2000-01, 2001-02 and 2003-04 respectively are misleading figures and are the examples of bureaucratic manipulation of numbers amounting to bureaucratic cheating, (Meier J Kenneth and John Bothe), with an attempt to make overall percentage look impressive to Political Principals; here 62.% in this case. This camouflaged situation is entirely different than what it looks. The project period of these projects ended long time back but none of these projects have claimed all 7 instalments so far. This picture further becomes clear from the Bar Graph depicted as Figure 6 below

Figure 6

STATUS OF ACTUAL RELEASES AND EXPENDITURE AGAINST SANCTION (IWDP)

Bar Graph is based upon information collected from Dorectorare of RD, Government of H.P

Graph highlights significant information of failures in IWDP implementation in H.P such as: though the project period is just five years but projects sanctioned between the year 2000 and 2004 are still continuing and unspent funds are there even now, during the year 2002 state did not get sanction for any project mainly, either due to non submission of proposals or low level of expenditure in projects previously sanctioned, projects sanctioned during 2004, 2005 and 2006 are approaching its end but claim and expenditure levels are drastically low and people of the state are bound to loose.

One more bureaucratic cheating strategy surfaced during analysis of data collected by me; the expenditure figures reported by strategic bureaucracy most of the times are the transfers made by PIA to watershed committee or Gram Panchayat where actual implementation takes place and therefore does not takes into account funds lying unspent at this level. This also makes expenditure figures look impressive. For example, in Haroli Development block of Una district, only 29.5 Million INR out of 45.8 Million INR was transferred to GP/WC and 16.3 Million INR was lying unspent with PIA (BDO). Out of 29.5 Million INR transferred to GP/WC, 4.4 Million INR was lying unspent with GP/WC which was not considered while reporting expenditure. Similarly, 5.3 Million INR was lying unspent at GPs/WCs level in development block Una.

### 5.4.2   Under spending in DPAP Projects:

The table below shows still serious under-spending in DPAP projects. Out of total 1023 Million INR sanctioned by GOI, state have claimed 624.4 Million INR and expenditure is 483.5 Million which is just 47.3% of the total projects cost as depicted in figure 7. Here too manipulation of figures is same as IWDP projects.

Table 5: yearwise release of funds by GOI and expenditure incuured by the state

Project Period	Project Cost	Fund Released by GOI	Expenditure	%age of project cost
2000-2005	231	173.2	152.6	66.1
2001-2006	120	79.2	70.9	59.1
2002-2007	150	101.2	81.7	54.5
2003-2008	120.0	90	64.4	53.7
2004-2009	120.0	54	37.9	31.6
2005-2010	141	63.4	49.9	35.4
2006-2011	141	63.4	26.1	18.5
Total	1023	624.4	483.5	47.3

 Source: Directorate of RD, Government of H.P

Figure 7

Gross Underspending in DPAP

	Project Cost	Expenditure	Percent
■ 2000-2009-10	1023.0	483.5	47.2

Bar Graph based upon information collected from Directorate of RD, Government of H.P

Figure 8

Status of releases and expenditure against sanction by GOI

☐ Project Cost ■ Fund Released by GOI ☐ Expenditure

As shown in figure 8, sanctioning of projects, releases by GOI and expenditure status is following a uniform pattern of decline since the year 2000. As in case of IWDP projects, DPAP projects have similar elements of camouflaged reporting, gross under spending and manipulation of numbers.

5.4.3   Under spending in DDP projects:

Although under-spending in DDP projects depicted in table 6 looks more serious but it could be due to adverse geographical and climatic conditions prevailing in the areas of implementation. Areas covered under DDP in both the districts of Lahaul Spiti and Kinnaur are cold desert areas with very limited working season. Hence overall implementation and expenditure status of DDP projects is more or less same to its counterpart IWDP and DPAP projects in other parts of the state.

Table 6

Release of funds by GOI and expenditure incurred by the state

Project period	Project Cost	Fund Released by GOI	Expenditure	Percent of Project cost
2000-2005	225.0	183.2	179.9	80.0
2001-2006	285.0	163.1	151.8	53.3
2002-2007	219.0	93.6	87.2	39.8
2003-2008	147.0	21.2	15.9	10.8
2004-2009	114.0	32.0	19.7	17.3
2005-2010	138	19.5	18.5	13.4
2006-2011	144	21.6	8.4	5.8
2000-2009-10	1272	534.2	481.4	37.8

Source: Analysed data based upon information collected from Directorate of RD, Government of H.P

Figure 9

Figure 9 shows decline in project sanctioning and massive decline in releases of funds by government of India. The expenditure is almost negligible throughout the implementation

period of 10 years. This dismal performance can not be attributed to adverse climatic factors alone because during my field wok I came across other factors too. Frequent transfer of implementing officers, posting of officers to this difficult area on political punishments and natural calamities are other added reasons for extremely low expenditure.

Figure 10

Gross Underspending in DDP

	2000-2009-10
■ Project Cost	1272
□ Net Expenditure And % age	481.4
▨ Percent	37.8

5.5 What is ailing watershed projects in Himachal Pradesh

The success and failure of watershed projects depends upon level of adherence to the guidelines as good performance of participatory watershed projects bodes well for projects under ministry of Rural Development's 1994 guidelines that are modelled after approach taken by some of the better NGOs, Kerr, John (2002). During my extensive field work, interaction with focus groups comprising of PRI leaders, watershed chairpersons, and interview with politicians and bureaucrats of all levels, I found that like NRHM, Himachal Pradesh is not following GOI guidelines for implementation of watershed projects too and almost all of them were not even aware of the guidelines, its concept, and provisions contained therein. It was notices during the field work that top bureaucracy has a tendency to distort GOI guidelines as per their whims without taking into consideration the ground realities and needs of the people of the state. GOI guidelines provide broad framework for implementation and provide adequate room for PIAs to respond to local needs but top bureaucracy continuously issues supplementary guidelines restricting initiative and creativity at PIA level. When asked about need of supplementary guidelines, a senior IAS officer who was responsible for watershed implementation in the state says:

'Yes we issue supplementary guidelines and they are in line with GOI guidelines'.

It came to light during my field work that senior level bureaucracy has issued certain instructions to PIA which are in conflict with watershed concept itself, such as: PIA should not initiate micro planning at their level as some organization is being engaged at state level to prepare DPR for entire state, each PIA in the state should select two entry point activities in each watershed area without even initiating community organization process, instead of watershed committees state will assign implementation to gram Panchayats throughout the state, PIA will be selected at state HQ and norms for selecting WDT will be finalized at state HQ. If this much task is done at state HQ by few top level bureaucrats, PIA would have nothing to do in the field. Common Guidelines for watershed Projects, (2008).

Lack of adherence to participatory implementation; that is at the heart of implementation strategy envisaged in the guidelines, is major bottleneck for poor performance and lack of expenditure under watershed projects in Himachal Pradesh. A senior politician of ruling BJP party appeared helpless when he says:

'There is total mismanagement of implementation of different schemes. No meeting takes place, there is no involvement of PRIs and DRDA technical wing is weak ……….it is complete organizational and institutional failure'.

Non adherence to guidelines alone contributes significantly to lack of institutional, organizational, and human resource capacities especially at District, block and village levels because state has not made use of 10% funds meant for training and community organization (5% each) (watershed guidelines, 1994 & 2001) on which depends the success and failure of watershed programme as a whole. Says one senior level bureaucrat responsible for watershed implementation in the state:

'I agree lack of awareness and training is there and it contributes to non-implementation and under-spending. In order to overcome this handicap, we are making an elaborate plan and we have identified specialized training institutions and Block level training facilitators to manage training at all levels'.

Another senior bureaucrat at the State level helplessly admitted non expenditure of training and community organization funds. He says:

'We continuously keep writing to BDOs to raise expenditure on training and community organization but they do not act what we can do'?

The implementation is taking place in adverse action environment. There is a (hollow) political will as politicians have a keen desire of proper implementation of government schemes but are unable to convert their desire to political will for the want of information. I, during my field work availed an opportunity to attend one development officers conference chaired by Rural Development Minister and it was heartening to see that Rural development Minister spent two days (from 10AM to 8PM everyday) to understand and monitor progress in Rural Development Department. While discussing non expenditure of money available with BDOs for constructing Rural Haats (rural markets meant for the sale of rural goods), he looked helpless and remarked:

Money is lying unspent with us but local MLAs are not even aware. It is difficult to get money from GOI, but it is unfortunate that money available is not spent…………..I have spoken to MLAs but they are not even aware of this money. It is very unfortunate. I spoke to Bilaspur (one of the twelve districts of H.P) MLA on this issue and the work has started, so kindly let local MLAs know about funds available, don't keep it lying unspent.

Like NRHM, strategic bureaucracy has very tactfully excluded Politicians at all levels from implementation of watershed programme too. At district level, DRDA headed by ZP Chairperson is empowered to approve watershed action plans but in actual practice DC has usurped these powers and all watershed works are being sanctioned by him/her. Approval of DRDA is ridiculed to mere formality. DRDA Chairperson when asked about it, said

What should I do when information about schemes, its guidelines and procedures is not available to me? Bureaucracy is very bad; they don't tell us anything. How do we come to know?

Similarly Panchayati Raj Institutions, NGOs, CBOs (MM,YM) and press that can facilitate watershed implementation are handicapped due to absolute lack of awareness. One GP President, during focus group explained action environment very well when he said (others supported him):

'There are so many schemes; it is difficult to remember names. How can we know about schemes when no body tells us about them? It is for the first time we came to know what watershed means and what is available in NRHM. I am Pradhan (President) since last 15 years but I know nothing about these schemes except for their names, -------we are given trainings but they are a formality and cover issues such as what is Panchayati Raj Act and what are our power or responsibilities; there is no training about components of different schemes and how can we give benefit to our people through these schemes'.

Besides weak action environment, implementation of watershed projects is affected by feeble institutional capacity, crippled task network, lack of favourable organizational culture and large pool of incapable human resource. Institutional capacity is weakened by lack of accountability, lack of incentives or rewards for good work, Political patronage to SLB for transfer and postings; they constitute 0.25 Million strong vote bank for the politicians, and lack of qualitative monitoring.

Similarly task network is crippled by; absence and inadequate performance of organizations to fill needed roles in watershed implementation and also lack of effective interaction among organizations in the network. Among primary organizations, Grindle M, (1995) p 447, SLWC is non existent; its role in the state is left to IAS Secretary. DRDA headed by ZP Chairperson is crippled by usurpation of all powers by Deputy Commissioner relegating role of DRDA Governing body and its chairperson to mere expenditure approval authority to legitimize expenditure; it is the requirement of watershed guidelines. BDOs are designated as PIA for all watershed projects in their development block, and watershed programme for them is one of the several CSSs of RD

Department they are implementing. Hence it is a part time job for them; it is against watershed guidelines. Top level handicaps have adversely affected capacities of village level organizations such as GP, WA and WC. These actual implementation organizations are fully paralysed due to lack of awareness and empowerment. Among secondary organizations, GOI seems to be helpless to render any assistance to state under watershed programme due to under spending of funds already provided. Elaborating GOI considerations in release of funds to the states under CSSs, a senior retired IAS officer, who happened to be secretary in Rural Development Department of GOI and handled watershed projects himself, said:

'The sanction of projects and release of instalments purely depend upon efficient implementation and level of expenditure. If expenditure is low, further releases are affected adversely'

When further asked about political consideration in sanction of projects and release of instalments, he explicitly clarified:

'No absolutely not. There is no such consideration. Yes, sometimes certain active and knowledgeable political leaders such as MLAs and MPs forcefully pursue their case and such cases are given priority; keeping in view their commitment and not political considerations or party they belong to'.

Other secondary organizations are playing negligible role in watershed implementation. Line departments are not involved as SWDC and DWDC are either non existent or dormant. Development of NGO movement in the State is in its initial phase and not many qualitative NGOs are available to support watershed implementation especially in rural areas. Asked as to why you don't involve NGOs in watershed implementation, one project officer of DRDA said:

'We are keen to involve NGOs but there is no NGO in the district that has any experience of working in watershed projects'

Other project officer said:

'Handing over the watershed projects or activities to NGOs is not safe as some influential and politically sound people have formed NGOs to earn money but they do not have any capacity'.

CEO of a reputed NGO, that does not avail government funding but runs on voluntary donations, narrated the status of NGOs in the state, he says:

'Some people have formed the NGOs in the state as a business. They avail government funding and focus on highlighting their progress through false stories supported by attractive presentations but do not sincerely work for the cause of poor. Such activities have spoiled the reputation of NGOs in the state. As a result, people do not look at NGOs with respect'.

The above discussion clearly indicates that state is not moving with any mission or organizational goal with respect to implementation of watershed programme in the state and the organizational culture is dominated by adhocism and lack of work culture.

Further, it is also clear from discussion above that state is neglecting human resource management that is crucial for the success of watershed programme. Watershed is a participatory programme hence needs special skills for working with the communities but state has no policy of providing orientation programme for people working on such special assignments. Says one project officer:

> 'It has become difficult to implement watershed programme because Deputy Commissioners is CEO and ADC/ADM is Project Director and both generally have little knowledge of watershed concept. There is no orientation programme for these officers to enable them do justice with such assignment'

.
In this context another project officer says:

> 'Quality in watershed management in the state is not possible as our PIAs lack capabilities to work in participatory mode. Moreover 50% BDOs are promoted from the clerical or extension officer cadre and there is no provision of induction training or even orientation of these officers to handle the tasks of greater responsibility'.

5.6   Dormant Civil Society

From the discussion above it is clear that community is not playing any role in watershed management. There is absolute lack of awareness and people do not have political space to perform their role, assigned to them in watershed concept or guidelines. There was an opportunity in the state to empower people as under IWDP, DPAP and DDP combined, 215 million INR (5% of total sanctions) were available in the state for community organization and similar amount (5%) was available for training of different functionaries at all levels but state has failed to empower communities through utilization of these funds. Hence there is no role of the community in under-spending of funds or poor implementation. However data indicates that community has a keen desire and desperate need for spending huge funds available under watershed programme. However NGOs movement in the state is in its initial phase and there fore no role in the failure could be assigned to them so far.

5.7   Lack of political control over bureaucracy

In case of watershed management politicians at two levels are required to exercise control over implementing bureaucracy; at state level and at the district level. At state level chief Minister and Rural Development Minister are required to exercise control and at District level DRDA Chairman is mandated by GOI guidelines to exercise control over implementing bureaucracy for watershed management in the district. Political control at both levels fall in case 6 of figure of Waterman (2004) framework where in there is goal conflict and information asymmetry that favours bureaucrats-the agents.

At the state level situation is exactly similar to as in case of NRHM and further elaboration would be repetition of what has been concluded earlier and political control is non existent. The policy/programme implementation is just muddling through. At district level situation is even worse and here the role of Politicians-Principals has been usurped by bureaucrat-agents (Deputy Commissioner). Based upon discussion above Deputy Commissioner in reality acts as Principal and Zila Parishad (District level Local Body) Chairman who is the chairman of DRDA; agency responsible for watershed implementation in the District, has been relegated to the position of titular head of DRDA with respect to watershed programme in the district. Interestingly, in case of both case studies I could not find much evidence to conclude that corruption in Himachal Pradesh is hindering implementation or it is leading to under-spending except for in DDP projects in Pooh Sub-division of Kinnaur District and some minor isolated incidents here and there.

Chapter 6 Conclusion

6.1 Who is Responsible?

By now it is established that there is huge under-spending in implementation of centrally sponsored schemes. As a result, flow of funds from GOI to the state of Himachal Pradesh is diminishing year after year on the one hand, and on the other, state is losing money through cuts on sanctioned projects due to under-spending. The two representative case studies have indicated that this loss runs into several Millions of Rupees every year, rather funds spent are as good as not spent; it is so meagre. It is surprising that such a major lapse is going unnoticed and state is slipping back on development front.

The paper looks at the role of four major stakeholders; politicians, bureaucrats, People/community and Civil society, who are directly responsible for implementation of CSSs in the state.

Firstly I analyse the role of people of the state who are the central stakeholders in my analytic framework as they are the ultimate gainers or losers if development funds are spent or not spent, respectively. Analysis of case studies brings out that people of the state desperately need development through proper utilization of CSSs but they suffer from a major handicap; absolute lack information or awareness. If we have a look at NRHM, watershed or any other CSS; concepts, guidelines, and procedures involved in implementation are so complicated that it can not be imagined from any stretch of imagination that people can understand them unless they are empowered enough through capacity building and training, for which, provision is there in every scheme. Even for this, people are dependant on bureaucracy and bureaucracy at all levels has failed, rather intentionally denied political or Invited spaces' through which people can participate in implementation to perform role assigned to them in the scheme, Cornwall. A (2004), by not utilizing funds meant for community organization, capacity building or training under different schemes. Hence no responsibility can be assigned to people till they are empowered enough to take on responsibilities assigned to them under CSSs.

> Politicians are the second stakeholders who are affected gainfully or adversely with implementation or non implementation of CSSs. Primary Data collected trough field work and analysis thereof reveals that politicians are desperately running from pillar to post (informally approaching lower level functionaries for information) to gather information about opportunities available to them under CSSs for pursuing development in their constituencies; after all it is the matter of their survival in power, they do not enjoy security of tenure like bureaucrats and they need to go back to people after five years with account of their success or failures. But they too suffer major handicap, similar to people; lack of information. After all they too come from amongst the community without any initially prescribed qualification and even after election, they do not have any induction training or orientation programme.

As a result politicians at all levels are unable to control actions of strategic bureaucracy. Although politicians lack information that restricts their ability to ensure proper

implementation of CSSs but their position is different than people who are at the mercy of bureaucrats for information. Politicians are not a helpless lot; they have legitimacy so they can call for whatever information they need.

A strange incident came to my notice during field work; a ruling party MLA applied for information about development schemes under RTI because legislative assembly session was not due and he wanted to know about development schemes in his constituency. Their inability to gain information and resultant lack of control over implementing bureaucracy therefore can not be overlooked and they are responsible for denial of development to their constituents who have reposed faith on them by electing them to power. It is evident from the reply of one minister, when he was asked as to why politicians are unable to control bureaucracy:

> 'No I can not say politicians are unable to control bureaucracy, it depends upon politician to politician. When I came to know about huge unspent funds with BDO and tourism funds with municipal committee, I called a meeting with block level functionaries and pulled them up. Now expenditure is picking up and my constituency is doing well'

Hence politicians have only one handicap; lack of information. Once they have information, they are capable of exercising effective control over bureaucracy. Here they are held responsible because they have no constraint what so ever to gain information from any officer or any agency in the state. Further, the case studies described by Klitgaard (1988) leave little doubt that a powerful and determined outside monitor (principal) can reduce corruption and improve delivery of services by his bureaucratic agents, Rauch, James E and Peter Evans (1999)

Third stakeholder in my framework is bureaucracy; bureaucracy at state level, district level and at grass root level or street level. In fact implementation of CSSs is official responsibility and duty of bureaucrats at all levels; they do not need any kind of supervision from either politician or people or civil society; they are paid for it.

Ideally speaking; street level bureaucracy is actual implementing agency, District level bureaucracy is facilitating agency and state level bureaucracy is monitoring and evaluating agency. Research supported by primary data reveals that roles have reversed in Himachal Pradesh and State level bureaucracy is trying to take decisions on implementation issues that essentially fall in the domain of project implementation agencies situated at the grass root levels. Success of CSSs depends upon sincerity with which schemes are implemented as per guidelines; with of course suitable modifications suiting to local conditions for which guidelines provide adequate room. State level bureaucracy is however not concentrating on monitoring, review, facilitate PIA in implementation or ensuring adherence of PIAs to guidelines but is itself distorting the guidelines as per their whims without caring for ground realities or needs of the people of the state. In this context, Duggal. Ravi (2009), while evaluating NRHM, rightly points out in his commentary in Economic and Political Weekly:

> 'Those who deliver care, who understand and know the situation and hence can plan and budget the resources, have no role in decision making and those who

govern from the state and national capitals take all decisions without having a clue to what ground realities are. This is the reason why NRHM has failed to make architectural corrections that it wanted to make. It is clear that unless radical changes in budgetary and financing mechanisms are put in place by granting full autonomy to those who directly run the public health system, the NRHM flagship will continue to sink'.

The impact of such behaviour was noticed to be unimaginable. With just one instruction; may it be contrary to watershed or NRHM guidelines, and even if it is not in the interest of the state or its people, implementation in entire state deviates from GOI guidelines overnight. Since the politicians as well as people lack information, there is no one to check such "Muddling through, Turner, M (1997). This is evident from the magnitude of unclaimed or unspent funds in both NRHM and watershed project.

In present case one can easily blame PIAs for massive under-spending but research exposed constraints and handicaps of implementing agencies; there is wrong selection in case of watershed projects and incapable PIA in NRHM for the want of information. The guidelines do not permit more than 10-12 micro-watersheds to one independently acting PIA but here one PIA is handling 40-50 micro-watersheds that too along with all other rural development schemes.
Thus it is concluded that it is the top level bureaucracy that deserves major share of responsibility in massive under-spending in implementation of cSSs and denial of basic services and better quality life to the people of the state.

The role of civil society is negligible as it is almost non existent and not involved in implementation.

6.2 Recommendations

In conclusion implementation of CSSs is being adversely affected due to muddling through at the top level by bureaucracy and the major problem noticed is absolutely negligible control over top level bureaucracy either from politicians or through the "Pressure from below"; from people themselves or through civil society. A senior MLA, when asked about lack of political control over bureaucracy remarked;

> 'I don't understand that why they (Senior Politicians) are scared of bureaucracy, it is the Government who is to run the State, not bureaucracy'

Hence it is very well within reach to solve this problem of under-spending and ensure proper implementation of CSSs, if goal consensus is achieved between politicians and bureaucracy and information asymmetry is reduced to bare minimum, if not zero. Case 7: Policy subsystem of waterman (2004) model figure 2, adopted in this research for analysis is ideal situation for proper implementation of CSSs (even other development schemes). Once it is achieved there can not be any "muddling through" Turner, M and D. Hulme (1997); there is goal consensus, and guidelines will be followed and schemes can be implemented efficiently. Not only this, people of the state will be empowered to take part in implementation and also to exert pressure from below; it is already happening in watershed projects being implemented by good NGOs such as Ralegaon watershed

under the leadership of Sh Anna Hazare, Tarun Bharat Sangh led by Rajinder Singh in Rajasthan etc.

As it surfaced during analysis, implementation is severely hampered by lack of institutional, organizational, task network and human capabilities. This is not a difficult task for the state because expertise is readily available and state has funds for it; there are massive funds available under CSSs itself.

Active civil society is an asset for developmental process. NGOs and CBOs have been assigned a leading role in almost all CSSs. State is therefore required to frame specific policy to give a boost to NGO movement and also play a facilitating role in their growth.

All this is possible but only requirement to make it possible is strong political will. Himachal will not be the first state to do it; it has already been accomplished in Georgian police reforms, East Asian Miracle and many more success stories are there to learn.

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