



**Between liberal values and illiberal practices:  
The EU externalisation of migration and border control in Bosnia and  
Herzegovina**

A Thesis Paper

by

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## **Abstract**

This master's thesis explores how the EU uses externalisation methods to influence migration and border governance in Bosnia. The aim of this study is to contribute to a better understanding of EU externalisation as it elaborates on EU practices in areas where externalisation has not been studied as such— namely, a neighbouring country that is an EU member candidate— Bosnia. Additionally, the thesis will also enable a greater level of understanding of the governance of migration and borders in Bosnia.

By using qualitative content analysis of policy documents, reports and interviews, this paper found that the EU applies multiple externalisation methods, such as *conditionality*, *socialisation* and *learning*, in order to reach internal migration policy goal via third-state. In addition, this study contributes to a better understanding of different means through which externalisation can be practised, such as *operational outsourcing*, *indirect coercive learning*, and the *executive component* of *socialisation*. Moreover, the combination of three theoretical frameworks: post-colonial theory, border dimensions and externalisation methods, enabled understanding of the dichotomy between the EU portraying itself as an area of freedom, security and justice and the violent methods it employs indirectly, via third parties outside of its territory, in order to preserve its liberal image. It is in this sense that this study observed post-colonial continuity in the exercise of power hegemony and exclusive liberalism where liberal values are not extended to people on the move, mostly the racialised 'others', in the territory outside of the EU.

**Keywords:** externalisation, post-colonial theory, West Balkan Route

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## **List of Abbreviations**

AFSJ = Area of Freedom, Security and Justice

AVRR = Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration

BVMN = Border Violence Monitoring Network

EU = European Union

Frontex = European Border and Coast Guard Agency

IOM = International Organization for Migration

NNK = No Name Kitchen

PoM = Pople on the move

RP = Research Participant

SIPA = State Investigation and Protection Agency

TRC = Temporary Reception Centres

## 1. Introduction

*“A model of concentric circles of migration policy can be established as a base for a differentiated exterior strategy. For obvious reasons, the most rigorous means of control are currently those of the Schengen states. Their neighbouring states (especially associates and perhaps Mediterranean countries) should be gradually included in an analogue system, which will be continually approximated according to the norms of those, above all with regard to visa policy, border control, and readmission. (...) The states of the third circle (such as the space of the CEI, some Baltic states, Turkey, and North Africa) will concentrate their efforts above all on the transit control and the struggle against networks of illegal immigration and a fourth group (Middle East, China, and Black Africa) in the elimination of those factors that make emigration attractive.”* (Strategy paper on immigration and asylum policy 1998, p. 112 cited in Araújo, 2011, p. 27)

The document cited above offers an image of the world in which more than half of Earth is divided into concentric circles, each circle representing different functional roles in border and migration control towards the European Union (EU) (Stojić-Mitrović, 2021). Hence, already in 1998, the EU tried to adopt techniques of externalisation, or as Araújo (2011, p. 27) called it “government at a distance”. Generally, the externalisation of migration governance is understood as the extension of migration and border controls beyond the so-called ‘migrant-receiving nations’ in the Global North and into neighbouring countries or sending states in the Global South (Stock et al., 2019). In this process, Lavenex (2004, p. 683) noted that “institutional/legal boundary is moved beyond the circle of member states”.

Boswell (2008) identified two types of externalisation policies. The first type focuses on “strengthening border controls, combating illegal entry, migrant smuggling and trafficking, or readmitting migrants who have crossed into the EU illegally” (Boswell, 2008, p. 6019). The second one could be understood as ‘preventive’ as it aims at influencing people’s wish to migrate or their final destination, also known as the ‘tackling root causes of migration’ policy, very often promoted by the EU (Boswell, 2008). This highlights the EU’s goal to tackle migration before people even arrive in the EU. Motivated by the curiosity to learn more about the EU governmentality and taking into consideration Ferrer-Gallardo's (2008, p. 303) remark that “much can be learnt about the centres of powers by focusing on their peripheries”, this paper wants to dive deeper into EU externalisation by focusing on the neighbouring region,

the West Balkans, and particularly the migration and border governance in Bosnia and Herzegovina (henceforth Bosnia).

The latest expansion of the EU into the Western Balkans occurred in 2013, with the joining of Croatia, which marked a new border shift in Europe. The expansion of the EU and the new rebordering process that comes with it is usually described as peaceful, as the territorial border of each country remains the same (Follis, 2012). However, as Follis (2012) noted, rebordering is manifested through a new border purpose. At the places where new EU members touch non-EU members, the boundaries turn into “external EU borders”, and hence those borders become “subject to a whole new order of regulation and policing” (Follis, 2012, p. 1). It is precisely Bosnia that found itself at the external border of the EU and became a new EU frontier.

Bosnia and its border are part of the continental European migration route known as the *West Balkan Route*. After the ‘long summer of migration’ came to an end in 2016, Balkan countries started to close their borders (Tošić, 2017). Despite the closure, the route never ceased to be a passageway for people on the move (PoM) heading towards Germany and Central and Northern Europe (Edmonda, 2018). This resulted in the Balkans being seen as a transit zone (Tošić, 2017). What is particularly interesting regarding the Western Balkan countries is that they are also part of the EU enlargement process. Leutloff-Grandits (2023, pp. 191-192) introduced the concept of “double transit” to emphasise this geopolitical position of Western Balkan countries as the periphery of the EU, entangled in the EU admission processes and hence in institutional transit to become members of the EU (although often stalled), and the situation of migrants who are in “transit” through these countries to reach the EU.

This thesis seeks to further understand the interconnectedness of those two transits and the EU externalisation of the governance of migration and borders since the ‘closure’ of the Balkan route in 2016 up until now (2023). Hence, this paper will examine ***How does the EU use externalisation methods to influence migration and border control in Bosnia?***

Looking at the studies done on the governance of migration and border control in Bosnia, most scholars have focused on examining local governance of migration and borders (see Leutloff-Grandits, 2022; Helms, 2022; Hromadžić, 2020; Stojić Mitrović & Meh, 2015). Moreover, the EU’s externalisation has been mostly researched in the context of the far neighbourhood, such as North and West Africa as well as the Middle East but not in the

context of the immediate neighbourhood (Lavenex & Piper, 2022). Hence, this thesis aims to make a scientific contribution to the empirical and theoretical understanding of the externalisation of the EU's migration policies into its neighbourhood. In addition, by analysing the role of the EU, this thesis will provide new insights into the governance of migration and borders in Bosnia.

This topic is also of high societal importance as NGOs working on the ground describe the situation of migrants and refugees in Bosnia as dire and perilous (see Borrell, 2021; Bierbach, 2021; Oddone, 2021). Hence, by understanding some aspects of the complex governance of the route, this thesis could engage policymakers in creating much-needed solutions for PoM in Bosnia.

The following chapter of the thesis will introduce the theory applied to answer the research question. Chapter three will elaborate on methods of data collection and analysis. Further, chapter four will offer an analysis of the data and a conclusion and discussion highlighting contributions to the theory used. Chapter five will provide an encompassing conclusion and an answer to the research question. In addition, the section will present the limitations of this paper as well as recommendations for EU policymakers.

## **2. Theory**

In order to examine the EU's influence over migration and border governance in Bosnia, this paper will combine post-colonial theory with two theoretical frameworks; one that focuses on migration and border regimes and the other one on externalisation. It is precisely this unique combination of three theoretical lenses that will give us tools through which the EU's influence over migration and border governance of third countries can be studied.

### **2.1. Post-colonial Theory**

The EU externalisation as a method for policy transfer, the topic of this thesis, can be understood through a particular theoretical lens, namely post-colonial theory. The post-colonial scholarship is vast and diverse; it encompasses different issues, points of view, etc. Importantly, *post*-colonial does not indicate that colonialism has ended but is rather a reflection of the continuous presence of colonial power structures in the world today

(McLeod, 2010). Although post-colonialism has been mostly used to explain the continuous power imbalance between former colonies and colonisers, McClintock (1995) argued that postcolonialism is plural, meaning that it can be employed when examining countries that haven't been officially colonised. Filipescu (2016) indicated two different bodies of postcolonial scholarships that suggest that postcolonialism can also be used to examine power relations in non-traditional areas. The first school is concerned with the former Soviet Union, while the second one examines the EU as a supranational colonial power which makes the latter one of particular interest to this thesis (Filipescu, 2016).

So far, researchers have focused on the EU enlargement as a post-colonial project, particularly the fifth enlargement when most of the 'Eastern' European countries joined the EU. Kramsch (2006, p. 292) noted that "in the working of the EU today, a deep and meaningful continuity exists between current practices of European enlargement and a certain mode of colonial governmentality". Filipescu elaborated on this, suggesting that the EU membership requirements create "asymmetrical power relationships similar to the ones produced by *mission civilatrice*" (2016, p. 40).

Many studies have discussed post-colonial theory in terms of EU Enlargement (Filipescu, 2016; Bachmann, 2013; Forsberg, 2011; Huggan, 2008; Hooper & Kramsch, 2007); however, as to writer's knowledge, post-colonial theory has not been used to examine particular policy within broader enlargement policies; such as migration policy. Some authors nonetheless discussed the correlation between migration policy, border regimes and colonialism. Kasli (2023, p. 15), for instance, stated that "post-colonial accounts have recently shed light on the ways in which historical path dependencies and decolonisation processes continue to shape contemporary migration politics". Similarly, Kinnvall (2016, p. 157) noted that different security measures passed by member states that aim at facilitating mobility for some while keeping others immobile, together with prioritising border control, "constitute specific colonial technologies of governmentality and power". Hailing from what the above mention authors stated, it seems not only enriching and critical but also necessary to use post-colonial theory to understand the way the EU projects/wishes to project hegemonic power in Bosnia and the impact that has on the racialised 'others' – mostly black and brown people who wish to transit from Bosnia to the EU. The theory will be used in the Discussion and Conclusion sections in order to offer a nuanced understanding of externalisation as a policy transfer that resembles, to some extent, a colonial power dynamic.



## 2.2. Geopolitical, Functional and Symbolic Dimension of Borders

The post-colonial theory will give us tools to understand the power dynamics between the EU and Bosnia and the EU and PoM. Nevertheless, in order to understand the different ways in which this power dynamic is infiltrated into the EU's governance of border and migration in Bosnia, the thesis will adopt the framework introduced by Ferrer-Gallardo (2008). Ferrer-Gallardo (2008) examined the dynamics between Spain and Morocco to see what characterises the relationship between an EU member state– Spain and a state that is not a candidate but is nonetheless ‘embroiled’ in the EU Neighbourhood Policy– Morocco. In order to comprehend the relationship, Ferrer-Gallardo (2008) presented a ‘tripartite theoretical lens’ which examines (1) geopolitical, (2) functional, and (3) symbolic dimensions of the rebordering process (p. 303). Considering that this paper aims to explore a somewhat similar relationship between the EU as a supranational entity and a candidate country, Bosnia, that is part of the EU Enlargement process, this paper will use and slightly adapt Ferrer-Gallardo ‘s (2008) ‘tripartite theoretical lens’ to examine the EU's influence over Bosnia.

The first lens, the *geopolitical dimension* of the border, refers to the geopolitical significance of the border as the barrier between EU and non-EU states (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2008). Hence, this dimension will be explored by analysing how the EU accession negotiations influence migration and border governance in Bosnia.

When it comes to the *functional dimension* of the border, which refers to a border as a “regulator of people and economic flows” (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2008, p. 305), the paper will seek to understand the EU's role in the way migration and border control function in Bosnia, focusing particularly on the operational side of border and migration control.

Finally, the third aspect is the *symbolic* one. Ferrer-Gallardo (2008) emphasised O'Dowd's (2003) remark about borders having multiple functions as barriers, bridges, resources, and symbols of identity. It is precisely the last function of the border as a symbol of identity that this paper aims to explore. This approach seems useful for the analysis of externalisation as it can showcase how the EU exercises, or does not, the influence over the symbolic meaning of migration and border control in Bosnia and the way that relates to the EU and Bosnian identity.

### 2.3. Externalisation of policies

The previous sections gave us instruments to critically understand the plurality of border and migration governance between the EU and Bosnia. This section will offer a framework through which we can identify particular ways the EU externalises its migration policies through the above-mentioned border dimensions. Hence, this thesis will use Lavenex's (2014) theoretical framework to bridge Ferrer-Gallardo's 'tripartite theoretical lens' and the EU externalisation of migration policies.

Lavenex (2014) identified two dimensions of the EU's externalisation: (1) direct intentional political-administrative rule projection and (2) indirect socio-economic one. These sources of rule projection generate different types of power: command, co-optive, productive, and structural. These different types of power produce different externalisation methods, which are the focus of this paper. Those externalisation methods can be used to understand how the EU manages borders through different dimensions: geopolitical, functional and symbolic, as described in section 2.2.

Command as power is characterised by *conditionality* and/or *legal authority*. *Conditionality* refers to the "threat of sanctions or the promise of rewards in exchange for compliance with a certain demand" (Lavenex, 2014, p. 889). In order for *conditionality* to work, it has to have a material base and the capacity to use the material advantage strategically. In the case of the EU, its material base lies in the attraction of its single market. However, in order to use this material leverage strategically, the EU has to be able to create issue linkages between "trade and non-trade matters, to enforce rules and to act consistently" (Lavenex, 2014, p. 889). *Legal authority* is based on the supranational character of the EU law and the EU's own juridical enforcement through the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), which incentives third countries to align with EU legislation/demands (Lavenex, 2014, p. 890). For example, through European Free Trade Association (EFTA), countries voluntarily abide by the normativity of EU law (Lavenex, 2014).

Co-optive power reveals itself through *learning* and *socialisation*. *Learning* happens when "actors change their beliefs or, in our case, policy preferences in the light of new evidence" (Lavenex, 2014, p. 890). It is a process of "rational, observational deduction" (p. 890). Learning can be both requested by a third country or provided by the EU with no request needed. *Socialisation*, on the other hand, is concerned with 'appropriateness'. It can

be described as “a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community” (Checkel 2005, 804 cited in Lavenex, 2014, p. 890). *Socialisation* usually happens through dialogues, information exchanges, training and capacity-building. These kinds of ties result in familiarisation and gradual involvement in EU policies. Through this horizontal network, the EU offers a venue through which it can “push their vision of sector best practices” (Lavenex, 2014, p. 891).

Productive power is usually exercised through *emulation*. *Emulation* here refers to a situation in which “actors align with EU rules because they perceive them as legitimate or normatively superior” (Lavenex, 2014, p. 891). Lavenex (2014) argued that because of the idea of the EU as a community based on shared values and norms, transnational actors like non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the EU itself advocate for rules which they believe are universal. It is because of this unquestionable ‘universality’ and ‘moral superiority’ that other actors accept the EU’s rules and norms.

Finally, structural power lies in *competition*. *Competition* is defined as “adaptive behaviour triggered by the negative externalities of other actors’ internal policies” (Lavenex, 2014, p. 891). This means that third countries do not align with EU legislation because of a direct EU demand, its legal authority or its socialisation and learning effort, but because of fear that if they do not align with EU legislation, they will face negative externalities. This is because the EU has a superior market size, it has strong enforcement capacity and the “existence of interest groups who translate a functional economic pressure into a political demand” (Lavenex, 2014, p. 891).

To conclude, there are a couple of reasons why combining the three above-discussed theoretical lenses is useful in answering the research questions. First, post-colonial theory will allow us to be critical and original in examining externalisation. Second, three border dimensions will simplify the complexity of different externalisation mechanisms, as explored by Lavenex (2014), by providing focus areas where externalisation can occur, such as geopolitical, functional and symbolic, without sacrificing analytical depth. This together will ensure a nuanced and encompassing answer to the research question.

### 3. Research Design

#### 3.1. Research Question

Based on the theoretical frameworks presented above, this thesis will be structured around three subquestions: each corresponding to one dimension of border governance as introduced by Ferrer-Gallardo (2008) and expectations based on previous research, analogy and Lavenex's (2014) externalisation framework. Hence, in order to answer the research question, ***How does the EU use externalisation methods to influence migration and border control in Bosnia?*** entirely, this thesis will first answer the following sub-questions and verify the subsequent expectations:

SQ1: What externalisation methods does the EU use in order to impact Bosnia's migration and border governance through the *geopolitical dimension*?

E1: Expectations for a geopolitical dimension are based on Guild et al. (2022), who observed that the EU uses a carrot-and-stick approach when it comes to diffusing its policies into non-member states. Carrot represents a reward, while the stick means punishment. Hence, based on Lavenex's (2014) framework, we could expect to observe *conditionality* as a main way of interaction as the EU could threaten with punishment; cut in funds or reward; EU membership, depending on Bosnia's alignment with EU's migration and border objectives.

SQ2: What externalisation methods does the EU use in order to impact Bosnia's migration and border governance through the *functional dimension*?

E2: When it comes to the functional dimension of the border, *socialisation* seems to be the plausible outcome. Lavenex (2014) noted that the EU engages in dialogues, training, etc., with third countries in order for them to adopt EU rules, which constitutes *socialisation*. Considering that the most important body for functional (operational) migration and border control in Bosnia is the police (O Nama, n.d.), it could be expected that the EU offers training to Bosnian police officers in order for them to adopt EU rules for migration and border control.

SQ3: What externalisation methods does the EU use in order to impact Bosnia's migration and border governance through the *symbolic dimension*?

E3: Taking into consideration (1) Ferrer-Gallardo (2008) who noted when examining the symbolic dimension of the Spain-Morocco border that the divide between the EU and non-EU is understood as a divide between ‘us-them’ where us (the EU) likes to perceive itself as culturally and politically superior, and (2) the known dichotomy between Western Europe that is seen as ‘developed’ and the Balkans that are perceived as ‘uncivilised’, it could be anticipated that the EU would rely on *emulation*. By employing emulation, the EU would create a fertile ground for Bosnia to perceive the EU as legitimate or normatively superior, which could encourage Bosnia to align with EU rules.

This set of questions and expectations will enable a multi-perspective understanding of the way the EU influences borders and migration management in Bosnia and hence, offer a holistic understanding of the externalisation, resulting in a fully answered research question.

### **3.2. Operationalisation**

The applicability of concepts and their relationship has been discussed under chapter two, Theory. In order to make those concepts applicable to our analysis, the following two tables present operationalisations of indicators that are the focus of our observation.

Table 1 operationalises the independent variable, which is migration and border control, and offers a systematic way in which this thesis will try to unpack this concept using Ferrer-Gallardo’s (2008) ‘tripartite theoretical lens’. Table 2 operationalises the dependent variable, externalisation, using and slightly adapting Lavenex’s (2014) framework. The aim of this project is to understand which externalisation methods from Table 2 are used in different dimensions of the governance of migration and borders, as stated in Table 1.

**Table 1.** *Operationalisation of three border dimensions*

<b>Main concept</b>	<b>Dimensions of the migration and border governance</b>	<b>Definitions</b>
<p><b>Migration and border governance:</b>  “framework of laws, regulations, partnerships, and policies that national, subnational and international institutions adopt to manage and shape migration and borders across countries...”  (European Commission, 2021, np.)</p>	<b>Geopolitical</b>	Refers to enlargement policy and negotiations between the EU and membership candidate state, Bosnia, and the way migration and border governance is embedded in them.
	<b>Functional</b>	Refers to the way migration and border control are done in practice (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2008). More specifically, the practice involves technical aspects of border and migration control, such as the equipment as well as practices used to directly control people-on-the-move’s ability to stay or leave Bosnia.
	<b>Symbolic</b>	Refers to the way the national and supra-national identity of Bosnia and the EU is negotiated through migration and border policies.

**Table 2.** *Operationalisation of externalisation*

<b>Main Concept</b>	<b>Externalization indicators/mechanisms</b>
<p><b>Externalisation:</b> extension of migration and border controls beyond the so-called ‘migrant-receiving nations’ in the Global North and into neighbouring countries or sending states (Stock et al., 2019).</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>Conditionality:</b> refers to the “threat of sanctions or the promise of rewards in exchange for compliance with a certain demand” (Lavenex, 2014, p. 889).</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>Legal authority:</b> refers to the “supranational character of [the EU] law and its juridical enforcement through the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)”, which incentivises third countries to align with EU legislation/demands (Lavenex, 2014, p. 890).</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>Learning:</b> refers to “actors changing their beliefs or, in our case, policy preferences in the light of new evidence. It is a process of rational, observational deduction. Learning can be both supply (EU teaching activities) or demand driven (at the request of third countries)” (Lavenex, 2014, p. 890).</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>Socialization</b> refers to “the logic of appropriateness and is less choice driven; it is defined as ‘a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community’ (Checkel 2005,p. 804). Across the <i>acquis communautaire</i>, public officials from Commission Directorates General and EU regulatory agencies have engaged into dialogues, information exchanges, training and capacity-building exercises with third country regulators promoting approximation to EU rules” (Lavenex, 2014, p. 890).</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>Emulation</b>; refers to “actors align with EU rules because they perceive them as legitimate or normatively superior” (Lavenex, 2014, p. 891).</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>Competition</b>: is defined as “adaptive behaviour triggered by the negative externalities of other actors’ internal policies...third countries align with EU legislation not because of a direct EU demand, legal obligation, teaching or socialization effort, but because their firms and regulators fear negative externalities from not doing so...Scope conditions for this mechanism are superior market size, regulatory enforcement capacity), and the existence of interest groups who translate a functional economic pressure into a political demand” (Lavenex, 2014, p. 891).</li> </ul>

Adapted from Lavenex (2014, p. 889)



### **3.3. Methods**

This thesis has adopted qualitative research methods; it draws on a combination of policy document analysis and semi-structured interviews as complementary data to understand how the EU governs migration and border control in Bosnia.

#### **3.3.1. Data Collection**

The decision to focus on policy documents stems from the nature of this study which as a focus has the EU governmentality. Considering that most of the decisions and debates that happen at the EU level are documented and available to the public, content analysis of policy documents will provide an in-depth and somewhat encompassing understanding of the EU externalisation in the migration field. However, policy on paper often presents one reality while the situation on the ground or ‘in practice’ might be different. Hence, it was crucial to include the perspectives of the people working on the ground with PoM. This was done by analysing NGO network reports as well as semi-structured interviews with an independent activist and two employees of No Name Kitchen– a grassroots organisation operating in Bosnia. A semi-structured interview was also conducted with a person working for an EU institution to better understand some of the migration and border objectives of the EU. Finally, specific gaps in data were filled by analysing official websites and newspaper articles.

Policy documents were found using the official websites of the EU, Frontex, IOM and Bosnia’s official government archive. Documents were manually screened to see if they relate to “migration”, “border-crossing”, “West Balkans”, and “border security”. Documents that did contain the above-mentioned notions were retained for analysis.

In total, this paper analysed 1 027 pages of written text; see Table 3 for a simplified overview of all the documents analysed, for an extensive list, see Annex A. For an overview of all research participants, see Table 4.

**Table 3.** *List of Document types*

<b>Document type</b>	<b>Amount per type</b>
Report	10
Policy Document	8
Commission Implementing Decision	6
Official Website	7
Newspaper Article	5
Press Release	3
Summit Declaration	2
Programme Statement	2
Agreement	2
Brochure	1
Annex to the Policy Recommendation	1
Working Arrangement	1
Council Decision	1
Policy Proposal	1

Note. See Annex A for the complete list of documents used

**Table 4.** *List of Research Participants*

<b>Research Participant Number</b>	<b>Research Participant Function</b>	<b>Organisation</b>
RP1	Researcher/Activist	non-affiliated with an organisation
RP2	Coordinator of volunteers in Bosnia	No Name Kitchen
RP3	Legal advisor for people on the move in Bosnia	No Name Kitchen
RP4	non-disclosed	an EU institution

**3.3.2. Data Analysis**

This thesis analysed policy documents, reports, official website pages, newspaper articles and interviews using content analysis. Content analysis refers to the “analysis of the content of a text in order to uncover its meanings and intentions” (Halperin & Heath, 2020, p. 386). Hence, considering the different dimensions of this research project and consequent complexity, content analysis seemed the most appropriate way to explore all dimensions while maintaining a systematic approach to data.

The data was analysed using hypothesis coding, which refers to the “application of a researcher-generated, predetermined list of codes onto qualitative data specifically to assess a researcher-generated hypothesis” (Saldaña, 2009, p. 123). This means that the codes are developed using a theory or other form of prediction about what can be expected to be found in the data before the data is even collected or analysed. Both Bernard (2006) and Saldaña (2009) agreed that hypothesis coding is an appropriate coding mechanism for the content analysis of qualitative data. Thus, considering the already set expectations informed by the theory and analogy, this paper uses three dimensions, namely geopolitical, functional and symbolic, as predetermined themes and externalisation methods as codes. However, the

analysis might show that there are more externalisation determinants than what was initially thought. Hence, for inductively found codes during the analysis, see Annex B with an updated operationalisation table.

### **3.4. Ethical Considerations and Positionality**

When conducting the research, a couple of ethical matters were considered. First, interview participants were made aware via information and consent sheet about the purpose of this research, they were given the contact information of the researcher and the institution. They were made aware of their right to confidentiality, anonymity and their voluntary participation. Moreover, I believe I disclosed all relevant data regardless of my beliefs and expectations. I also paid attention not to exaggerate the accuracy or explanatory power of the data collected.

Nonetheless, it is important to note that I am Bosnian-Croatian who lived in the West Balkans for 18 years, meaning that I already have certain ideas about the way institutions operate as well as the EU involvement in the operations of those institutions. Although I tried to be as objective as possible, my life experience as a person from the Balkans might have an impact on the lens through which I understand happenings in Bosnia.

## **4. Analysis**

This section of the paper will offer an analysis of the collected data as well as a discussion and conclusion for each dimension of migration and border governance. Also, please note that highlighted sections of each quote used are highlighted by the author for the purpose of more explicit argumentation.

### **4.1. Geopolitical Dimension**

This part of the analysis will explore *What externalisation methods the EU uses in order to impact Bosnia's migration and border governance through the geopolitical dimension*. The focal point in geopolitical relations between the EU and Bosnia is enlargement negotiations. The negotiations have had a couple of important discussion points, namely: (1) intensifying political and policy engagement, (2) reinforcing security and building resilience against foreign interference, (3) addressing the challenges posed by migration, the fight against

terrorism and organised crime and recently a new point was added that being (4) tackling the consequences of the Russian aggression against Ukraine together (DN1). The third point is what we will explore in the following sections.

#### **4.1.1. Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance**

Bosnia, as well as other countries in the West Balkans, have been supported financially through the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA). The Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) is the program through which the EU is supporting reforms in the enlargement region by providing financial and technical assistance in order for partners to be able to meet the membership requirements (DN5). This includes supporting the fundamental democratic rule of law and economic reforms and alignment with core European values, which in turn foster “solid, sustainable and accelerated economic growth” and contribute to stability, security and prosperity (DN15, p.2).

The first IPA entered into force in 2007 and lasted until 2013, in which migration was a point of collaboration mainly in the domains of trafficking and victim & witness protection due to the Yugoslav Wars (1991-2001) in which ‘border police’ was the main reference to the border management (DN9). IPA II (2014-2020), on the other hand, initially did not have any reference to migration and border management. Its main areas of work in Bosnia were: climate action & energy, transport, competitiveness & innovation, agriculture & rural development and lastly, education, employment & social policies (DN8). However, in 2018 (bearing in mind that the West Balkan Route became active in 2015, one year after IPA II came into force, and was forcefully ‘closed’ by EU member states in 2016), the European Commission added a subsection on migration under the area of ‘transport’. As stated on the European Commission website,

*“In the period 2018-2020, an indicative allocation of € 314.9 million has been earmarked for Bosnia and Herzegovina (including the Civil Society Facility, the Regional Housing Programme and the Special Measure in support to Bosnia and Herzegovina **in managing the migration flows**)”* (DN8, n.p.).

Later, the Special Measure was justified as falling under the sector of Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights, which Bosnian authorities were not able to protect because of their deemed “insufficiency” to manage increasing migration flows of “refugees, asylum seekers

and migrants” (DN10, p.1). Considering Bosnia’s mentioned lack of capacity, the EU decided to ‘provide assistance’ to Bosnia (DN10, p.2) under the IPA II. However, once IPA II was reassessed and the new IPA III (2021-2027) came into force, migration became addressed as “Migration and **Border Management**” and was listed as a high-priority ‘theme’ under the ‘Rule of law, fundamental rights and democracy’ (DN15). ‘The ‘rule of law, fundamental rights and democracy’ is one of the main areas (‘windows’) of requirements the candidate member needs to fulfil in order to be accepted as an EU member. Particularly, in the document ‘Adopting the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA III) Programming Framework for the period 2021-2027’, the EU clearly stated the expectations it has in terms of migration and border management:

*“Cooperation continued through the joint work along the Eastern Mediterranean/Western Balkans migration routes. In this context, the 2016 EUTurkey statement is producing **clear results**, including significantly **reduced numbers of irregular arrivals on this route**”* (DN 15, p.11).

Placing migration and border management as a requirement under the specific accession ‘window’ meant that the EU could financially help Bosnia in fortifying its borders, or in other words, decreasing the number of irregular migrants (people who enter a country without official permission) heading to West Europe. This serves as a clear indicator of the EU’s externalisation of its policy goals in third-country, Bosnia, under cover of financial assistance to aid the accession process.

Next to reducing irregular migration, IPA III as a goal also has “*cooperation in the region and with EU Member States to fight trafficking in human beings and migrants smuggling and an effective implementation of readmission and return policies*” (DN15, p.17). Hence, the following sections will be dedicated to exploring the most relevant aspect of policies financed by IPA III, namely (1) EU’s border management of Bosnia, while other aspects of migration governance, such as returns, will be discussed under the functional dimension of the border, see 4.2.

#### 4.1.2. Strategy for Integrated Border Management

When introducing *Strategy for integrated border management in Bosnia and Herzegovina for period 2019-2023* European Commission stated that a goal of this strategy is to “...reduce the threat to border security and internal security and act to increase the overall level of security in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (DN7, p. 6). Hence, because of this aspect of security, Bosnia has been urged to increase its effort in the “fight against irregular migration and migrant smuggling” (DN7, p. 8). Particularly interesting is this notion of security that the EU is emphasising in relation to migration. In the documents, the EU relates other activities such as “organised crime”, “trafficking”, “smuggling”, and “terrorism” with migration, particularly irregular migration. Hence, it can be said that the borders in the EU documents are presented as an area where high criminal activities happen, which makes them of crucial importance for management and protection, as the following quote confirms:

*“Reinforcing border management along the whole migration route is essential to reduce irregular flows, also considering the evolving modus operandi of smugglers, the increased use of violence, and the risks of firearms trafficking and organised crime”* (DN4, p. 1).

Additionally, the EU emphasises the importance of border management as a step closer to EU accession:

*“By improving capacities for migration and border management and contributing to the fight against organised crime, the Action directly contributes to increased safety and security in regions close to the EU's borders, in line with the EU enlargement policy”* (DN16, p. 4).

From the above-explored remarks, it seems that border management of Bosnia contributes to Bosnia’s security, and Bosnia’s security will lead to Bosnia getting closer to being accepted as an EU member state. However, in the more broad *Neighbourhood and the World Common Foreign and Security Policy* document, the EU stated that:

*“Key challenges include organised crime, terrorism, people smuggling, **migration**, the proliferation of conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, and the rule of law in third countries that may **directly affect the EU’s own security**. It is therefore essential for the EU to support third countries in security sector reform...”* (DN12, pp.11-12).

In addition to this, the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina stated themselves that migration management in relation to border control has been mostly done because of the proximity of Bosnia to the European Union and its aspirations of EU membership (DN11). Moreover, although the Council of Ministers of Bosnia listed a few security threats in relation to border management, namely “smuggling of people, narcotics, goods and weapons” (DN11, p. 17), none of these threats have been directly related to the EU in the way irregular migration has, as the following quote demonstrates:

*“...This applies to the prevention of all forms of cross-border crime with **special focus on suppressing illegal migration** ... As a country that has applied for membership of the European Union, Bosnia and Herzegovina has introduced this concept as a means of **strengthening its positions and demonstrating it continued committed to meeting European standards** in this area (DN11, p. 4) ... When Croatia joined the EU, Bosnia and Herzegovina found itself on the external border of the European Union. **This increased its responsibility in terms of the prevention and control of illegal migration**. Illegal migration mostly concerns **the transit of migrants on their way through Bosnia and Herzegovina to European Union Member States via the so-called Western Balkans route**” (DN11, p. 11).*

Hence, considering the transit nature of the Western Balkan Route, Bosnia can be seen as the EU’s ‘buffer zone’, which is supposed to keep migrants from reaching the EU territories. The EU promoted this under the cover of help for the accession process.

#### **4.1.3. Discussion and Conclusion**

From the analysed documents and highlighted sections, it can be concluded that the EU connects irregular migration with crime which results in the need for better security of the border of candidate members as well as the EU. This security frame that the EU uses is not a new EU policy development. Lavenex (2004, p. 688) noted how “immigration and asylum policies [are] framed together with criminal matters as issues of ‘internal security’ in the European ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ ”. Hence, the EU perceives threats to be coming from outside of the Union, which makes their neighbours, in this case, Bosnia, of crucial importance. What is particularly interesting in the case of Bosnia is that the EU does this through enlargement policies. Therefore, it can be stated that the EU manages the geopolitical dimension of the border through *conditionality*; if Bosnia does manage to stop



irregular migrants from entering the EU, it will fulfil one of the conditions of enlargement under the ‘rule of law, fundamental rights and democracy’ window and consequently be a step closer to being an EU member. However, if it does not do so, Bosnia weakens its chances of ever becoming an EU member state. Although one could argue that conditionality is an integral part of any enlargement process, it is important to note that this is not a regular accession conditionality. Conditionality common for enlargement should not depend on EU internal policy goals but on the betterment of member candidate institutions (DN50). In contrast, the *conditionality* explored here is in a function of policy externalisation, which confirms our expectations.

In addition to *conditionality*, the EU also uses *socialisation*. *Socialisation* refers to “the logic of appropriateness and is less choice driven; it is defined as a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community” (Checkel 2005, p. 804 in Lavenex, 2014, p. 890). Through a particular understanding of ‘security’ in the documents, the EU tries to induce Bosnia to accept the norms and rules of the EU as necessary and beneficial for Bosnia. However, considering the transit nature of the Western Balkan Route, it seems that the EU is trying to practice ‘burden shifting’ rather than ‘burden sharing’ by leaving people on the move ‘stuck’ in transit and consequently under Bosnia’s responsibility.

The EU practices in the geopolitical dimension can be understood through a post-colonial lens as well. The way the EU uses the security frame to justify the EU’s intervention in Bosnia’s internal sphere resembles a colonial structure of governance in which the EU aims to portray itself as caring power that wants to help the less powerful one. During colonialism, Western Europe believed in their duty to ‘help’ other nations reach certain standards of civilisation (also known as ‘the white man’s burden’ in postcolonial literature), but the underlining principle was the exploitation of economic resources by vicious means. Although not comparable in the extent of the destruction, it can be argued that the EU still resembles, at least ideologically, this colonial narrative in which the EU presents itself as having a duty to help protect Bosnia’s security. However, the underlying motive is the use of Bosnia as a ‘buffer zone’ in order to ‘protect’ the EU territory.

All things considered, the set expectations are true; the EU uses *conditionality* as a way to diffuse its policies in Bosnia. However, there is also an additional finding. When observing geopolitical dimensions, it became apparent that the EU also relies on *socialisation*

by using the security-migration nexus to induce Bosnia to align its border and migration approach with the EU needs.

## **4.2. Functional Dimension**

This section of analysis aims to explore *What externalisation methods the EU uses in order to impact Bosnia's migration and border governance through the functional dimension.* What was noted through the research is that the EU works with multiple actors in order to diffuse its migration and border policy objectives in Bosnia. Hence, the analysis will be centred around (1) the EU's relationship with Frontex and Frontex's border and migration governance in Bosnia, (2) the EU's relationship with Bosnia Police Force and their practices on the ground and finally (3) the EU's relationship with IOM and their work in Bosnia.

### **4.2.1. Frontex's work in Bosnia**

Frontex is the EU agency tasked with supporting “EU Member States and Schengen-associated countries in the management of the EU's external borders and the fight against cross-border crime” (DN20). In their own words, Frontex, as an agency that has standing corps, is “an operational arm of the EU” (DN20). Frontex's tasks usually include: border checks, border surveillance, returns, collecting and sharing information, fighting cross-border crime, and coast guard functions, including search and rescue (DN21, p. 25; RP4). Considering Bosnia's geographical position as the country neighbouring the EU, it is perceived by Frontex as a crucial actor in the protection of EU borders (DN20). At the moment, Frontex has a Work Agreement with the Ministry of Security of Bosnia, which was first signed in 2008 but was renewed in 2019. The Work Agreement allows Frontex to coordinate “joint operations” with the Bosnian police force (DN18) “*at applicable borders between EU Member States and Bosnia and Herzegovina or along the illegal migration routes towards the EU*” (DN23, p. 2). There are a few specific areas indicated in which Frontex cooperates with Bosnia, namely: the exchange of information, provision of analytical products, cooperation in the field of training, and technical cooperation (DN11; DN23).

Next to the Work Agreement, the EU is trying to negotiate a Status Agreement between Frontex and Bosnia. The negotiations started on 16 October 2017 and are still

ongoing (DN18). The goal of negotiations is to set up a legal framework that would give power to Frontex to “act immediately” through ‘Operational Plans’ (DN18). Under this Agreement, Frontex would be allowed to deploy its personnel with executive powers for the purpose of carrying out “joint operations and rapid border interventions” (DN18, n.p.). In addition, despite the variety of Frontex’s tasks, in the case of Bosnia, the emphasis was placed on irregular migration:

*“In view of organised crime networks adapting quickly their routes and methods for **trafficking of irregular migrants**, the involvement of the EU is required to improve controls at the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina ... [the agreement] will allow for the deployment of European Border and Coast Guard teams by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency in Bosnia and Herzegovina in case of a **sudden influx of irregular migrants**”* (DN18, np.).

Hence, reaching the Status Agreement between Frontex and Bosnia was and still remains of crucial importance to the EU as the agreement would mean that the EU could directly implement its border policy goals, or in other words, stop irregular migrants from entering the EU via Frontex. Interestingly, in 2020 this agreement was vetoed by Milorad Dodik, at that time a 7th president of Republika Srpska (an entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina) on the fear that Frontex would only make the situation of migrants in Bosnia worse. He believed that Frontex would not prevent migrants from crossing into Bosnia but rather migrants crossing from Bosnia to Croatia (an EU state). He stated that: *“It is a bad decision. Frontex would only go to the border of Bosnia and Croatia, and I think that’s bad; it would seal Bosnia and Herzegovina hermetically, and keep the migrants here”* (DN25, np.).

Thus, it can be stated that the way the EU wishes to externalise its border and migration policies in Bosnia is by outsourcing the operational side of it to its agency, Frontex, while the EU itself is in charge of the agreements. Interestingly, *operational outsourcing* is not addressed in Lavenex’s (2014) operationalisation table that this paper adopted; nonetheless, as the research proves, it is an important vessel the EU uses to diffuse its migration policy objective.

#### 4.2.2. Bosnian Police Force

Next to Frontex, a very important actor in the EU's externalisation process is Bosnia Police Force which the EU supports both financially and technically. Border Violence Monitoring Network (BVMN), as well as IOM, reported that on July 30th, 2021, the EU donated 35 vans and 12 sports utility vehicles for the Border Police worth over 3 million convertible marks (1,5 million euros) and 16 off-road vehicles for State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA), worth over 460,000 convertible marks (230 000 euros), as well as some protective clothing (DN31; DN42). In addition, the EU also donated "unspecified additional equipment" whose aim is to "significantly strengthen police officers' work and enable them to act faster and be more mobile in the field" (DN31, p. 5). This donation was part of a bigger project known as "EU Support to Migration and Border Management in Bosnia and Herzegovina" and was supported through IPA III ( see section 4.1.1.). The donation was organised as a public event in which the EU ambassador to the country, Johann Sattler, symbolically gave keys to the vehicles to the border police (DN42).

Next to technical equipment, the EU also invests in training Bosnian border police. To give an example, on 28th April of 2023, 73 officers completed the EU-funded five-month training program called "Supervision over criminal intelligence work and risk analysis" (DN43). Importantly, this program, although funded by the EU, was led by Frontex and IOM (for more on IOM, see section 4.2.3.) (DN43). The Head of the Central Investigation Office of the Border Police of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Adnan Kosovac, on the occasion of the completion of the training, stated that

*"It's one thing to have people doing their jobs, and another thing to have trainers who can further train personnel in our institution. The Border Police has shown that it is open to all forms of cooperation to improve its work, and we are particularly pleased that through this model we have approached the work of police forces of the European Union, especially the FRONTEX methodology in the field of risk analysis."* (DN43, n.p.)

If we look at *socialisation* as "a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community" (Checkel 2005,p. 804) through "dialogues, information exchanges, training and capacity-building exercises" supported by EU agencies– in this case Frontex (Lavenex, 2014, p. 890), we can conclude that this is precisely what the training "Supervision

over criminal intelligence work and risk analysis” was meant to do and what Kosovac confirmed. Hence, it can be said that the EU uses *socialisation* as an externalisation method in the functional dimension of border governance which confirms our expectations. Additionally, it was also observed that the EU provides Bosnian police with equipment and financial support. This brings new insights into *socialisation*; as in the case of Bosnia, the EU not only induces Bosnian police into the EU norms and rules but also gives police the means to materialise them.

However, to understand the functional dimension fully, it is also important to see how Bosnian border police, supported by the EU, operate on the ground. BVMN reported about an incident at the border between Montenegro and Bosnia:

*“On the 3rd of December 2022 a group of seven people crossed the Montenegrin border and entered Bosnia-Herzegovina. . . According to the respondent, the officers took the interviewee's phone and money and said: "You cannot pass through Bosnia". They were grabbed by the police and beaten with fists and kicked. The respondent was beaten with a baton for about 10 minutes, causing him to be unable to walk. The police officers also threw away his food and water to deter him from coming back. The armed police officers did not allow them to speak rendering them unable to express their wish to apply for asylum. The officers then drove the interviewee and the family for two hours, back over the Montenegrin border” (DN29, p. 9).*

In addition to pushbacks, the Bosnian police’s main task in migration and border governance is evicting people from informal settlements (abandoned houses and factories), which are usually located nearby the Croatian (EU) border, and taking PoM to reception camps located in the midland Bosnia, far away from the border (RP2 and 3). RP2 described one of the reasons for evictions saying:

*“ ...well just to make the journey more difficult and to discourage people to try to move because instead of being in a border town where you have access to many... to the things that you need, so to the shops and to the restaurants and, and, and to the hospital and so on, you are put in an isolated camp in the middle of nowhere, where you are going to have to do a lot of extra kilometres to get where you want to be...”*

RP3 also noted that evictions are usually violent: *“Many times we witnessed the violence also there; so police officers are beating people before taking them out, burning their things, stealing their things.”*

It is a public secret that the Bosnian border police use brutal methods to deter people from reaching the EU (RP2 and 3), which the EU, as to the author’s knowledge, did not publicly condemn. Hence, financial and technical assistance, together with silence, can be seen as approval. All in all, it can be said that the EU is practising *operational outsourcing* by technically and financially sponsoring violent methods employed by Bosnian police.

#### **4.2.3. IOM’s work in Bosnia**

Next to the Frontex and police, The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is an important actor in migration governance in Bosnia. IOM is the UN’s intergovernmental organisation that works with both migrants and states in order to promote *“humane, safe, and orderly migration”* (DN36, p. 1). When it comes to Bosnia, its work is mainly funded by the European Union (DN35, p.4; RP3) and involves the (1) coordination of reception centres, (2) border management and (3) return and reintegration & readmission (DN36). The area of return, reintegration & readmission, usually referred to as AVRR (Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration) is the most important and main area of work of IOM. Under AVRR, IOM provides *“administrative, logistical and financial support”* to those who wish to return to their home countries (DN38, p. 3). The mentioned three roles of IOM in Bosnia are intertwined, which the following section will try to explain.

First, when it comes to reception centres, IOM, funded by the EU, is tasked with providing shelter and food as well as non-food items such as clothes and access to water and sanitation (DN36). However, it is not stated in any official IOM or EU document that IOM is responsible for ensuring that migrants are in the camp. Nonetheless, RP2 and 3 noted that PoM perceive IOM in Bosnia as police because IOM, together with Bosnian police (see section 4.2.2.), engage in evictions. As RP2 noted:

*“From what I seen, uh, in my experience on, on the field, IOM has actively participated in this let's say migration strategy in the line of police and European Union to have people inside camps. So what I saw is IOM officers coming to the jungles and to the squads of the*

*city, counting the people that are around and shortly after IOM comes, police appears and evicts people from the place. . . But when it comes to the management of the people on the move outside of camps, I've seen them act just like police... like trying to have an overview and put people inside camps."*

What is particularly interesting is the reason behind why IOM takes part in evictions and brings people to the camps. As RP2 observed:

*"I think that, uh, ... some people are interested that camps are full of people because there is a whole humanitarian industry, no? And if camps are empty, there is no health, there is no grants, there is no, there is no work, no? So then they build a camp and camp needs people, you know, so let's put the people in camps..."*

Similarly, RP3 noted that the reason why IOM wants to register people in the camps is to prove that giving funds to IOM is a "good investment". Hence, it can be said that IOM is led by its own financial interest in managing migration and borders in Bosnia. Additionally, NGOs on the ground have also questioned IOM's dedication to ensuring that camps are equipped in accordance with respect for human rights. Migrants often complain that the food given in camps is not nutritionally nor quantitatively enough (DN29, p.5; RP2 and 3). In addition to the poor diet, BVMN also reported deplorable sanitary conditions in TRCs stating that many people show signs of scabies after staying in camps with no possibility for adequate treatment (DN 29, p.6). These conditions in the camp and continuous evictions (see the beginning of this section and section 4.2.2), as RP3 observed, are "part of the strategy" to make people tired and hence less likely to try to enter the EU and consequently opt for a return home. As RP3 noted:

*"So they are [PoM], they're in this desperate situation in this camp that many times keeps them in inhuman conditions... And then there is IOM going there and say, 'hey, is it not better to go home maybe?' So that's basically the role that we see them [IOM] playing . . . and then you have conditions in the camp that are linked to the pushback. So you attempt to cross the border and then you're pushedback again and back into the camp and back in those inhuman condition. And I think it's always the same logic behind all that's happening there, also the*

*evictions, like evicting people every two weeks just to make them tired and tired and not willing to try anymore.”*

In Bosnia, in particular, since 2018 up until June 2023, IOM has sponsored 1,358 voluntary returns (DN39), mostly to the Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan and Iraq (DN36).

All things considered, it can be stated that it is not only that the EU uses IOM to diffuse its policies into Bosnia but also that the way IOM operates follows a particular externalisation logic. IOM, supported by the EU, is trying to induce PoM stranded in Bosnia that it is better to return back home. This is a characteristic of *learning* that refers to “actors changing their beliefs. . . in the light of new evidence. It is a process of rational, observational deduction” (Lavenex, 2014, p. 890). However, it is important to note that, in this case, the *learning process* is *coercive* and *indirect*. It is indirect, not because it does not impact PoM directly and physically, but in a way that is meant to create a process of learning through multiple, seemingly unrelated brutal tactics (such as evictions and deplorable conditions in camps). This is done to ‘coerce’ people into ‘rationalising’ that trying to reach the EU is not only futile but also dangerous and that the only option left is to return home. All of this, in the end, is done in order to achieve the EU’s internal policy goal, which is to decrease the number of people trying to cross the border and enter the EU. To summarise, the EU uses *outsourcing* through IOM to achieve a lesser number of irregular migrants trying to reach the EU, and in order to achieve that, the IOM (with the ‘help’ of police through evictions, see 4.2.2.) uses *indirect coercive learning*, underpinned by violence, to incentives people to return to their home countries.

#### **4.2.4. Discussion and Conclusion**

All in all, the analysis confirmed expectations that the EU uses *socialisation*, particularly when examining the Bosnian Police Force. It was concluded that the EU offers training to police to induce them into the norms and rules of the EU. However, the analysis also showed that the EU provides police with the equipment and financial assistance in order to be able to exercise those “norms and rules”, which highlight a new dimension of *socialisation*, namely the *executive element*, which was not discussed in Lavenex (2014).

The equipment and financial assistance are then used by police to employ violent tactics, such as destroying property, physical abuse and degrading treatment through evictions and pushbacks, to deter people from crossing Bosnia to the EU. Hence, it can be said that the



EU outsources violence to the Bosnian police to achieve the internal policy goal: decreasing the number of people entering the EU. *Operational outsourcing* as such has not been explored by Lavenex (2014), but it is an important method the EU uses in Bosnia not only via police but also through Frontex and IOM.

IOM in Bosnia also employs violent practices; it takes part in evictions and maintains deplorable conditions in camps. Hence, Bosnian police and IOM together create a process of *indirect coercive learning* in which PoM are coerced to change their aspirations to try to reach the EU through indirect, violent and seemingly unrelated methods such as evictions, and conditions in camps. Therefore, the analysis deepened our understanding of *learning* as it can happen in an *indirect* but nonetheless *coercive* way.

The use of violence also highlights the EU colonial governmentality. Although not overtly brutal as it used to be, the EU still denies PoM, who are almost all people of colour (DN13, p. 45), hence the racial ‘others’, their basic humanity through physical violence and humiliation. Colonial governmentality is also seen in the relationship between the EU and IOM. The EU is the primary organisation funding IOM’s work in Bosnia, which makes IOM dependent on the EU funds, and thus an EU ‘client’ responsible for diffusing EU policy agendas in Bosnia. This is precisely what Spijkerboer (2022) called a “migration management clientelism”. Hence, because of IOM’s dependency on EU funds, instead of serving the interest of all as a legitimate, neutral and altruistic international organisation, IOM is employed to hide the EU’s continuous neo-colonial need to control foreign territories for its benefit.

All in all, the analysis of the functional dimension confirmed the expectations that the EU uses *socialisation*. Additionally, the study also deepened our understanding of externalisation methods as we noted the *executive* element of *socialisation*, *operational outsourcing* and *indirect coercive* elements of *learning*, which are not discussed as such in Lavenex (2014) but are important tactics the EU uses to achieve internal policy goal via third country.

### 4.3. Symbolic Dimension

This section of analysis aims to explore *What externalisation methods the EU uses in order to impact Bosnia's migration and border governance through the symbolic dimension.* When analysing policy documents, an interesting reference to the EU in the context of migration and border control was noted, namely that the EU is an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). The following section will explain and analyse this in the context of Bosnia. In addition, this chapter will also reflect back on geopolitical and functional dimensions and offer new insights into understanding those dimensions through the symbolic one.

#### 4.3.1. EU an area of Justice, Freedom and Security

In the Communication on EU Enlargement policy to Bosnia, there is a chapter dedicated to “Justice, freedom and security”, which as an element of discussion has migration and border control (DN13). What can be understood from the document is that Schengen, as an area that allows unregulated travel between states which are members of Schengen, has to be protected from the outside as the only borders that the EU has are the external ones (DN13). This need to protect the border in order for Schengen to function properly was also emphasised by the RP4. Hence, to protect and keep the area the way it is envisioned to be, countries neighbouring the EU have to play a part in it (RP4). In addition, the EU emphasised how Bosnia is supported by the EU justice and home affairs agencies *“in the fight against organised crime and terrorism, and on judicial, police and custom matters”* (DN13, p. 37). EU justice and home affairs agencies are tasked with “protecting the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” and include nine agencies: CEPOL, EASO, EIGE, EMCDDA, eu-LISA, Eurojust, Europol, FRA and Frontex (DN44, n.p.). Considering that the task of these agencies is to protect AFSJ rather than assist third countries in protecting their territory, it can be stated that their cooperation with Bosnia serves to ensure that the EU remains the AFSJ.

Additionally, in a subchapter of “Justice, freedom and security”, “Schengen and external borders”, the sole focus is migration. Hence, it seems that when it comes to borders, Bosnia has to ensure that it is strictly migrants that are not allowed to pass from Bosnia into the EU. There is no mention of weapons, drugs and other illicit goods in that section (DN13). The main topics discussed are irregular crossings, supervision of green borders and cooperation with other countries regarding migration management, namely Croatia and Serbia

(DN13). It is precisely this fixation on migration when it comes to Schengen and borders that could challenge a possible counterargument that it is expected from Bosnia to prove it is capable of becoming an EU member state by showing that it could protect potential future EU borders and be part of Schengen. If this argument was to be true, then the “Schengen and external borders” subchapter should not only focus on irregular migrants but also on Schengen’s core principles which are the general movement of people, goods and services (DN49).

Hence, reading from the document, it seems as if Bosnia has to do its part, not in becoming an area of justice, freedom and security itself, as no clear reference to that was presented in the documents. Rather, Bosnia should serve as a territory that is supposed to fortify the EU’s borders and hence, protect the EU’s identity. Therefore, the expectation is not true because the EU, when it comes to migration and border governance, does not explicitly present itself as legitimate or normatively superior in order to encourage Bosnia to align with the EU, a process known as *emulation*. The EU did not negotiate Bosnian identity as such. Instead, the EU uses Bosnia in order to protect its own identity of being an area of freedom, security and justice. The way the EU does so is precisely what the geopolitical dimension analyses, see section 4.1. This brings us to the conclusion that the symbolic dimension is intertwined with the geopolitical dimension. The geopolitical dimension explains *how* the EU wants to achieve its migration policy objective, which is through *conditionality* and *socialisation*, while the symbolic dimension gives insights into *why* the EU prioritises secured borders— because of the protection of the EU identity. Although it could be assumed that these two notions, namely the EU policy goal of decreasing the number of migrants crossing into the EU and the EU preserving its identity as AFSJ are related on a much deeper level, it is out of the scope of this paper to further discuss this.

#### **4.3.2. Liberal EU by Illiberal Means**

This symbolic dimension of the EU as an area of freedom, security and justice while Bosnia is an area that is meant to protect it does not only offer new insight into the geopolitical dimension but also the functional dimension (see 4.2.). Analysing policy documents and interviews, it became clear that the way the EU governs migration and border management in Bosnia through Frontex, IOM and the police is underpinned by violence. However, this violence presented in section 4.2. is in contrast with what analysis of symbolic dimension

showed, namely that the EU portrays itself as AFSJ. This dichotomy can be understood by looking at Neu's (2018) book on *Just Liberal Violence*. In the book, Neu discusses how Western clothing companies, that promote equality and diversity through their clothing campaigns, do not want to follow strict and costly labour laws in Western countries. Hence, clothing companies outsource the production to sweatshops in the Global South, where workers' (mostly women) rights can easily be violated due to the lack of regulations. Hence, consumers in the financially wealthier part of the world can enjoy cheap products whose labour violations are out of sight. It is precisely this logic through which we can understand the outsourcing of violence by the EU. In order for the EU to be seen as free and just, violent acts have to be committed by third organisations outside of the EU territory where they might not be detected nor associated with the EU. The distance of Bosnia from policymakers in Brussels as well as outsourcing violence to third parties involved gives the EU, what Doty (2011) calls, a "moral alibi". Hence, the way the EU ensures the preservation of its liberal image is by tasking third organisations to employ illiberal means in the EU periphery.

This also indicates the EU's continuation of colonial governmentality. The EU presents itself as a liberal institution, an AFSJ. However, this liberalism is exclusive; it follows colonial logic because it does not extend to places outside of the EU territory nor to the racialised 'others', the brown and black PoM.

All in all, although the expectation was not confirmed, the symbolic dimension enabled us to better understand other externalisation methods explored in geopolitical and functional dimensions. Hence, this also attests to the adequacy of the combination of different frameworks this thesis employed to thoroughly understand the EU externalisation of migration and border controls in third countries.

## **5. Conclusion**

This paper researched *How the EU uses externalisation methods to influence migration and border control in Bosnia*. In order to offer a concrete and clear answer to this research question, it is crucial to first reflect on three subquestions this thesis explored.

First, regarding the geopolitical dimension, the analysis confirmed that the EU uses *conditionality* through the promise of EU membership. Additionally, the analysis showed that

the EU also relies on *socialisation* through the migration-security nexus to induce Bosnia to align its migration and border policies with the EU expectations.

When it comes to the functional dimension, the paper found that the EU controls migration and border governance through *operational outsourcing* to three particular institutions, namely the Bosnian Police Force, IOM and Frontex. When it comes to the police, the EU employs *socialisation* through training which validates set expectations. Additionally, it was also noted that the EU aids socialisation through financial support and the provision of equipment, which highlights a new characteristic of *socialisation*, namely the *executive component*. When examining the role of IOM, it became clear that they, together with Bosnian police, create ground for *indirect coercive learning* by making PoM's journey to the EU dangerous and mentally and physically exhausting through evictions and deplorable conditions in migrant camps.

Finally, in regard to the symbolic dimension, the set expectations were not confirmed. Instead of *emulation*, the analysis showed that the EU does not want to shape Bosnia's identity but ensure that Bosnia safeguards the EU identity as an AFSJ. The symbolic dimension of the border also allowed us to understand how different dimensions intersect, which ultimately provides an answer to the research question.

The symbolic dimension highlighted how the EU wishes to portray itself as an 'Area of Freedom, Security and Justice'. As such, the EU wants to ensure that the area can operate as envisioned through Schengen. It is in this regard that Bosnia has to safeguard the EU, which the EU incentivises through conditionality as well as socialisation, as the geopolitical dimension showed. However, the operational aspect of 'protecting' the AFSJ involves violence, which is in striking contrast to the EU's identity as AFSJ. Hence, the EU outsources the operational aspect of migration and border governance to Bosnian police, Frontex and IOM, as the functional dimension showed. In this way, the EU has a 'moral alibi'; it does not have to take responsibility for what happens in Bosnia, a peripheral space, which allows the EU to keep its liberal image.

We can reflect on this through the post-colonial lens and understand the EU's employment of illiberal means, while still trying to preserve its liberal image, as well as the need to control foreign territories and tactics employed to do so, as a reflection of a less brutal but still violent and hegemonic exercise of colonial governmentality.

All in all, the EU uses *conditionality*, *socialisation* through the migration-security nexus as well as *socialisation* through the provision of *executive* elements, *operational outsourcing* and *indirect coercive learning* in a complementing way to diffuse its migration and border policy objectives in Bosnia. Looking at all those methods together, we can conclude that the EU, as a supranational institution, is stretched between what it wishes to be and what it actually is.

### **5.1. Limitations**

Despite this paper offering a complex and nuanced answer to the research question, there are certain limitations to this thesis.

First, when it comes to data collection, this paper would greatly benefit if more interviews with the EU employees could have been conducted. This would bring interesting perspectives on the topic that can't be accessed through policy documents.

Second, in terms of post-colonial theory, it is important to highlight that the exercise of power always meets resistance. Hence, although the paper explored how the EU exerts its power for internal policy goals, it would be contradictory to the theory applied to think that Bosnia does not show resistance or does not use the situation for its own advantage. Hence, further research could reflect on Bosnia as an object of externalisation and not solely as a subject.

### **5.2. Recommendations**

This study explored how the EU impacts or wishes to impact migration and border policy in Bosnia. Hence, after a throughout research, the paper found certain areas in which the EU policy towards Bosnia could be improved. Considering that the EU's internal policy goal is to decrease the number of irregular migrants entering the EU, it would be simplistic to say that the EU should change its entire approach to migration and prioritise human rights over what the EU believes is territorial security. Instead, this section wants to give recommendations on how to achieve internal policy goals in line with respect for the human rights of PoM.

First, if the EU wants to see fewer irregular entries into its territory, it has to enable people to move to the European Union in a regular way by creating opportunities to obtain a

work visa, education visa, start-up visa, etc. These opportunities are currently very limited, especially for people from the global south. Additionally, this will help fight human trafficking and smuggling as the need to enter the country irregularly will decrease.

Second, the EU should support Bosnia in finding solutions for PoM stranded in Bosnia. Considering that Bosnia is an economically poor country, people on the move do not wish to stay there and will continue to try to cross into the EU (RP2 and 3). Hence, all the money given to Frontex, IOM and Bosnian police could be invested in assisting Bosnia in establishing efficient asylum procedures as well as creating opportunities for PoM to integrate into Bosnian society and the job market.

Third, the training of police provided by the EU and IOM should not only focus on the technical aspect of border control but also the destigmatisation of immigration and courses on racism and Islamophobia. People can be prevented from entering a country irregularly without having to be beaten up, humiliated, dehumanised, and their possessions taken and destroyed. Moreover, Bosnian police should also face certain penalties for maltreatment of people on the move rather than more financial funding from the EU, which signals support for the brutal police methods.

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## Appendix

### Annex A. List of documents for the Content Analysis

Document number	Type of document	Date	Title of document	Reference
1	Summit Declaration	6 December 2022	EU-Western Balkans Summit Tirana Declaration, 6 December 2022	Retrieved from <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/60568/tirana-declaration-en.pdf">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/60568/tirana-declaration-en.pdf</a> accessed 22/05/2023
2	Commission Implementing Decision	31 May 2022	Commission Implementing Decision of 31.5.2022 on the financing of the cross-border cooperation programme Serbia – Bosnia and Herzegovina for 2021-2027	Retrieved from <a href="https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-06/C_2022_3651_F1_COMMISSION_IMPLEMENTING_DECISION_EN_V3_P1_1970709.PDF">https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-06/C_2022_3651_F1_COMMISSION_IMPLEMENTING_DECISION_EN_V3_P1_1970709.PDF</a> accessed 22/05/2023
3	Summit Declaration	6 October 2021	Brdo Declaration, 6 October 2021	Retrieved from <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/52280/brdo-declaration-6-october-2021-en.pdf">https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/52280/brdo-declaration-6-october-2021-en.pdf</a> accessed 22/05/2023
4	Policy Document	6 December 2022	EU Action Plan on the Western Balkans	Retrieved from <a href="https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-12/Western%20Balkans_en.pdf">https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-12/Western%20Balkans_en.pdf</a> accessed 22/05/2023
5	Press Release	25 October 2022	EU increases support for border and migration management in the Western Balkans	Retrieved from <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_6276">https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_6276</a> accessed 23/05/2023
6	Annex to Commission	3 August 2018	Annex to Commission Implementing Decision	Retrieved from <a href="https://www.dei.gov.ba/uplo">https://www.dei.gov.ba/uplo</a>

	Implementing Decision		amending Commission Decision C(2014) 9495 of 15.12.2014 adopting the Indicative Strategy Paper for Bosnia and Herzegovina for the period 2014-2020	<a href="https://ec.europa.eu/neighborhood-enlargement/documents/indikativni-strateski-dokument-za-bosnu-i-hercegovinu-za-period-2014-2020_1605007406.pdf">ads/documents/indikativni-strateski-dokument-za-bosnu-i-hercegovinu-za-period-2014-2020_1605007406.pdf</a> accessed 23/05/2023
7	Annex to Commission Implementing Decision	n.d.	ANNEX 1 to the Commission Implementing Decision on the financing of the annual action plan in favour of Bosnia and Herzegovina for 2021 Action Document for “EU4 Migration, Border Management and Mine Action”	Retrieved from <a href="https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-01/C_2021_966_1_F1_ANNEX_EN_V1_P1_1664469.PDF">https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-01/C_2021_966_1_F1_ANNEX_EN_V1_P1_1664469.PDF</a> accessed 03/06/2023
8	Policy Document	n.d.	European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR); Bosnia and Herzegovina - financial assistance under IPA	Retrieved from <a href="https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/overview-instrument-pre-accession-assistance/bosnia-and-herzegovina-financial-assistance-under-ipa_en">https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/overview-instrument-pre-accession-assistance/bosnia-and-herzegovina-financial-assistance-under-ipa_en</a> accessed 03/06/2023
9	Policy Document	2007	Project Fiche – IPA Annual Action Programme 2007 for Bosnia and Herzegovina Assistance to the Ministry of Security, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees and other competent authorities in effectively managing migration	Retrieved from <a href="https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2016-12/ipa_2007_27_migration_management_en.pdf">https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2016-12/ipa_2007_27_migration_management_en.pdf</a> accessed 03/06/2023
10	Commission Implementing Decision	10 August 2018	COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING DECISION of 10.8.2018 adopting a special measure on supporting Bosnia and	Retrieved from <a href="https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2019-11/special_measure_migration_2018_bih_ci">https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2019-11/special_measure_migration_2018_bih_ci</a>

			Herzegovina in managing the migration flows	d.pdf accessed 03/06/2023
11	Policy Document	2019	STRATEGY for Integrated Border Management in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the period 2019–2023	Retrieved from <a href="http://msb.gov.ba/PDF/121020204.pdf">http://msb.gov.ba/PDF/121020204.pdf</a> accessed 03/06/2023
12	Programme Statement	2023	Programm statement DB2023; HEADING 6: Neighbourhood and the World Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)	Retrieved from <a href="https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2022-06/ps_db2023_cfsp_h6.pdf">https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2022-06/ps_db2023_cfsp_h6.pdf</a> accessed 06/06/2023
13	Report	12 October 2022	COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Bosnia and Herzegovina 2022 Report Accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2022 Communication on EU Enlargement policy	Retrieved from <a href="https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-10/Bosnia%20and%20Herzegovina%20Report%202022.pdf">https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-10/Bosnia%20and%20Herzegovina%20Report%202022.pdf</a> accessed 31/07/2023
14	Programme Statement	2023	Programme Statements HEADING 6: Neighbourhood and the World Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III)	Retrieved from <a href="https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2022-06/ps_db2023_ipa_h6.pdf">https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2022-06/ps_db2023_ipa_h6.pdf</a> accessed 10/06/2023
15	Annex to Commission Implementing Decision	2020	Annex to Commission Implementing Decision adopting the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA III) Programming Framework for the period 2021-2027	Retrieved from <a href="https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-01/C_2021_8914_F1_ANNEX_EN_V5_P1_1462290.PDF">https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-01/C_2021_8914_F1_ANNEX_EN_V5_P1_1462290.PDF</a> accessed 10/06/2023
16	Annex to Commission Implementing	2021	ANNEX 1 of the Commission Implementing Decision on the financing of	Retrieved from <a href="https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system">https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system</a>

	Decision		the individual measure to strengthen border management capacities in favour of the Western Balkans for 2022 Action Document	<a href="/files/2022-10/C_2022_7584_F1_ANNEX_EN_V1_P1_2268709.PDF">/files/2022-10/C_2022_7584_F1_ANNEX_EN_V1_P1_2268709.PDF</a> accessed 10/06/2023
17	Policy Document	2019	Roadmap for Cooperation EASO - Bosnia and Herzegovina (2020-2022): Strengthening the asylum and reception systems in line with the Common European Asylum System and EU standards	Retrieved from <a href="https://euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2022-02/BiH_RM_Cover.pdf">https://euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2022-02/BiH_RM_Cover.pdf</a> accessed 29/06/2023
18	Policy Proposal	28 February 2019	Proposal for a COUNCIL DECISION on the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and Bosnia and Herzegovina on actions carried out by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency in Bosnia and Herzegovina	Retrieved from <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52019PC0110">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52019PC0110</a> accessed 29/06/2023
19	Report	June 2019	Western Balkans Quarterly Quarter 4 • October–December 2018	Retrieved from <a href="https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/WB/WB_Q4_2018.pdf">https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/WB/WB_Q4_2018.pdf</a> accessed 29/06/2023
20	Official Website	N/A	Frontex; Who we are, Tasks & Mission	Retrieved from <a href="https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/who-we-are/tasks-mission/">https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/who-we-are/tasks-mission/</a> accessed 29/06/2023
21	Report	2020	Frontex, 2019 In Brief	Retrieved from <a href="https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/General/frontex_inbrief_website_002.pdf">https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/General/frontex_inbrief_website_002.pdf</a> accessed 29/06/2023
22	Council Decision	25 October 2022	COUNCIL DECISION authorising the opening of	Retrieved from <a href="https://www.statewatch.org/">https://www.statewatch.org/</a>

			negotiations on a status agreement between the European Union and Bosnia and Herzegovina on operational activities carried out by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency in Bosnia and Herzegovina	<a href="https://frontex.europa.eu/media/3548/eu-frontex-status-agreement-com-recommendation-bih-14061-22.pdf">media/3548/eu-frontex-status-agreement-com-recommendation-bih-14061-22.pdf</a> accessed 29/06/2023
23	Working Arrangement	3 April 2019	Working Arrangement establishing operational cooperation between the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex) and the Ministry of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina	Retrieved from file:///Users/newcic/Downloads/wa_with_bih.pdf accessed 29/06/2023
24	Annex to the Policy Recommendation	26 October 2022	ANNEX to the Recommendation for a Council Decision authorising the opening of negotiations on a status agreement between the European Union and Bosnia and Herzegovina on operational activities carried out by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency in Bosnia and Herzegovina	Retrieved from <a href="https://www.statewatch.org/media/3552/eu-frontex-status-agreement-com-recommendation-bih-14061-22-add1.pdf">https://www.statewatch.org/media/3552/eu-frontex-status-agreement-com-recommendation-bih-14061-22-add1.pdf</a> accessed 29/06/2023
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28	Agreement	18 September 2007	Agreement between the European Community and Bosnia and Herzegovina on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation - Joint Declarations	<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:22007A1219(04)">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:22007A1219(04)</a> accessed 29/06/2023
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31	Report	23 December 2021	Violence Within State Borders: Bosnia and Herzegovina	Retrieved from <a href="https://borderviolence.eu/app/uploads/IV-BiH5247.pdf">https://borderviolence.eu/app/uploads/IV-BiH5247.pdf</a> accessed 29/06/2023
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48	Official Website	n.d.	Justice, Freedom and Security	Retrieved from <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/chapter/justice_freedom_security.html?root_default=SUM_1_CODED%3D23">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/chapter/justice_freedom_security.html?root_default=SUM_1_CODED%3D23</a> accessed 29/06/2023
49	Agreement	22 September 2000	The Schengen acquis - Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders	Retrieved from <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=cellex%3A42000A0922%2801%29">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=cellex%3A42000A0922%2801%29</a> accessed 30/07/2023
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**Annex B.** *Updated operationalisation table*

<b>Main Concept</b>	<b>Indicators/Mechanisms</b>
<p><b>Externalisation:</b> extension of migration and border controls beyond the so-called ‘migrant-receiving nations’ in the Global North and into neighbouring countries or sending states (Stock et al., 2019).</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>Conditionality:</b> refers to the “threat of sanctions or the promise of rewards in exchange for compliance with a certain demand” (Lavenex, 2014, p.889).</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>Legal authority:</b> refers to the “supranational character of [the EU] law and its juridical enforcement through the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)”, which incentives third countries to align with EU legislation/demands (Lavenex, 2014, p.890).</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>Learning:</b> refers to “actors changing their beliefs or, in our case, policy preferences in the light of new evidence. It is a process of ‘rational, observational deduction’. Learning can be both supply (EU teaching activities) or demand driven (at the request of third countries)” (Lavenex, 2014, p.890). <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Learning can also happen indirectly– actors can change their beliefs because of circumstances purposefully set by the externalising power.</li> <li>○ Learning can also be coercive in a way that the actor does not need to deduct rationally; rather,</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

	<p>the actor changes its beliefs because there is no other choice due to set circumstances.</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>Socialization</b> refers to “the logic of appropriateness and is less choice driven; it is defined as ‘a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community’ (Checkel 2005,p. 804). Across the acquis communautaire, public officials from Commission Directorates General and EU regulatory agencies have engaged into dialogues, information exchanges, training and capacity-building exercises with third country regulators promoting approximation to EU rules.” (Lavenex, 2014, p.890) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Externalising power can also financially and technically (through the provision of equipment, for example) assist actors in applying norms and rules of the given community.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● <b>Emulation</b>; refers to “actors align with EU rules because they perceive them as legitimate or normatively superior.” (Lavenex, 2014, p.891)</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Competition:</b> is defined as “adaptive behaviour triggered by the negative externalities of other actors’ internal policies...third countries align with EU legislation not because of a direct EU demand, legal obligation, teaching or socialization effort, but because their firms and regulators fear negative externalities from not doing so...Scope conditions for this mechanism are superior market size, regulatory enforcement capacity, and the existence of interest groups who translate a functional economic pressure into a political demand.” (Lavenex, 2014, p.891)</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Operational Outsourcing:</b> can be understood as employing international organisations (such as IOM), third-country bodies (such as the police) and/or forming own agencies (such as Frontex) to carry out certain tasks in a third state in order to achieve internal policy goals</li> </ul>

**Annex C. Interview Guide**

**General questions - Introduction**

Could you please tell me about the organisation you work for?

Could you please tell me more about your work? What does your regular day look like?

Could you please describe how your interaction with people on the move looks like? [In which matters do you assist them?]

In your opinion and based on your observations, what would be the reasons some of the people on the move try to reach the EU and not stay in a country such as Bosnia?

**Border/Actors**



Did you have a chance to observe irregular entry or an attempt to irregular entry into or out of Bosnia?

How would you describe this process?

Did you have a chance to interact with or see the way the Bosnian police force operates?

Could you please describe it to me?

Did you have a chance to talk to people on the move and their experience with the Bosnian police? Could you please tell me what people on the move tell you?

Nex to Bosnian police, are there any other actors that play an important role in migration and border governance in Bosnia?

### **Actors (Frontex)**

Did you have a chance to observe the work of Frontex in Bosnia and in the region?

How would you describe Frontex's work in Bosnia?

Do you have any insights into Frontex's financing?

Through your work, were you able to observe any particular relationship between Frontex and the EU? [Is there any particular power dynamic between the two?]

### **Actors (IOM)**

Did you have a chance to observe the work of IOM in Bosnia and in the region?

From your personal experience, what would you say the role of IOM in Bosnia is?

Based on your observations, are there any other organisations IOM works with?

Based on your observations, how would you describe interactions between IOM and the EU? [Is there any particular power dynamic between the two?]

### **Camps**

Did you have an opportunity to see how camps in Bosnia look and operate? If yes, could you please describe it to me?

How do you perceive camps and the conditions in them?

Do you have any insight into who finances the camps?

### **Role of the EU**

Based on your work and observations, what would you say the role of the EU is in border and migration governance in Bosnia?

Based on your observations, do you think the EU has any particular objective when it comes to migration and border governance? [If yes, could you please elaborate?]

Do you have insights into EU financing of border and migration governance in Bosnia?

Are you aware of any particular interactions between the EU and Bosnia? [Is there any particular power dynamic between the two?]

### **Final section**

As a movement/organisation, did you interact with the EU?

If yes, could you please describe what the interactions look like?

***N.B.** Some specific questions regarding research participant 4 cannot be disclosed as it would violate the anonymity requested.*