Land Tenure Security and Unsecured Livelihoods: POST LAND REFORM DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES

A Research Paper presented by:

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(Philippines)

in partial fulfilment of the requirements for obtaining the degree of
MASTERS OF ARTS IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

Specialisation:
Rural Livelihoods and Global Change
(RLGC)

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November, 2008
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List of Acronyms

AFLLA-Agro Forest Farm Lease Agreement  
AGP-Annual Gross Product  
BSMC-Busco Sugar Milling Corporation  
BUSCO-Bukidnon Sugar Company  
CADT-Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title  
CDA-Cooperative Development Authority  
CARP-Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program  
DA-Department of Agriculture  
DAR-Department of Agrarian Reform  
DENR-Department of Environment and Natural Resources  
DOLE-X-Department of Labour and Employment-Region 10  
DSWD-Department of Social Welfare and Development  
FIBSWARB-First Bukidnon Sugarcane Workers Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries  
FGD-Focus Group Discussion  
FPIC-Free Prior Informed Consent  
IFI-International Financial Institution  
IMF-International Monetary Fund  
IPRA-Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act  
LBP-Land Bank of the Philippines  
LMR-Land Market Reform  
LRGPR-Land Policy for Growth and Poverty Reduction  
LRPP-Land Reform Policy Papers  
NCIP-National Commission on Indigenous Peoples  
NGO-Non government organization  
PAHRD-Partnership for Human Rights and Development  
PARO-Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer  
QUEMTRAS-Quezon Manobo Tribes Association  
RLR-Redistributive Land Reform  
SAP-Structural Adjustment Program  
SESWMPC-South East Sugarcane Workers Multi-Purpose Cooperative  
SFPI-Southern Fresh Products Incorporated  
TESDA-Technical Education and Skills Development Authority  
VOS-Voluntary Offer to Sale  
WB-World Bank
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Blessed be the Almighty Father: The Wisdom and Greatest Lover.
I wish to express my heartfelt gratitude to the following who supported, assisted and inspired this significant journey:

The International Fellowship Program (IFP) of the Ford Foundation, New York, my scholarship benefactor for the extraordinary opportunity of granting me a graduate studies in the Institute of Social Studies (ISS), The Hague;
Director Maria Luisa Lucas-Fernan and Ms. Dada Doble, IFP-Philippine partner, for the relentless kindness of fostering the fellowship;
The land reform communities of Quezon, Bukidnon: leaders and members of SESWMPC and FIBSWARB Cooperatives and the QUEMTRAS Manobo who were benevolent buddies in life’s struggle;
The Diocese of Malaybalay, the Bukidnon Clergy, Fr Bling, Fr ReyRals and Bishop Honesto Pacana, SJ, DD for all the prayers and the kind understanding of allowing me to study;
The Partnership for Human Rights and Development officers and staff, an inspiration for the unceasing commitment to the rural poor;
The Puntian Academy faculty and staff;
My RLGC friends of ISS, The Hague;
My friends and buddies Borgee and Ella, Dodong, Ian, Tess, Robin, Terry and Lelet, Cel, Fe and Arjan, Rose and Jan, Dely, Jinjin, Papo, NC, BebieQ, Banjing, Karen, Datu Miguel, Ging, Jimboy, Rman, Banban, Nelson and Liza, Roger;
My supervisor: Dr Max Spoor, whose guidance facilitated the research process more challenging and enriching, and Professor Ben White, RLGC Convenor and my Reader, whose rural bias inspired me to think beyond the visible;
ISS Pinoy buddies, Marivic, John, Myke, Liza, Adel and Chris and the new Pinoy batch of MA 08-09, whose blissful friendship and support will be graciously reminisced;
To Inang, Tatang, Inday, Bong and Lingling and Fred and Margie buddies of life who shared inspirations and prayers.
Introduction

“to create thousands of small farms,
without providing them with ancillary
services of credit and extension and
marketing, is like putting newborn kittens
upon a snowy mountain-top and
expecting them to fend for themselves”

(Lipton 1974: 296)

Does secured land tenure guarantees secured livelihoods, provide income and
hence, ensures food for the rural poor? A riddled question long debated had
crafted different actors of rural development and consequently, shaped their
perspectives and strategies on land policy reforms. With the increasing food
prices squeezing up the poor at the start of 2008, rural development theories
are challenged imperatively to resolve the pressing issue.1 A witty but
insightful epigraph from Lipton captures, 34 years after, significant similar
elements studied by this paper: the trajectory of landowners shortly after
securing their land titles.

It is generally argued that land policy reforms precondition the rural
development in the developing countries. Over the century redistribution of
lands engrossed most land reforms programs. Substantial literature on land
policy reforms supported such study for the past two decades (Akram-Lodhi
2007, Binswanger and Deininger 1997, Borras, Kay et al. 2007, El-Ghonemy
2007, World Bank 2003). Pursued at contending perspectives; accentuated by
social, political and economics reasons, land reform was carried out by the
state, market and the civil society interaction. Recent research compared the
approaches undertaken by 10 countries’ implementation of land policy
reforms, its impact on poverty and inequality with the rural poor (Borras, Kay
et al. 2007). A general observation was perfectly grasped by Ghimire (2001: 17)
that “beneficiaries are increasingly losing access to land they had secured under
2003). Similar critical studies on land policy reforms were undertaken (Kopeva
et al. 1994) on Bulgaria and (Spoor 2007) in Armenia have documented the
prevalence of land transactions (sales and rentals), where “ownership” or
“control” over land created changes in the post land reform implementation.
Furthermore, in Latin America countries, studies uncovered that “only 60% of
land reform beneficiaries were actually found tilling their land” (Deininger and

Analogous but moderate studies in the Philippine context examined
similar issues. Thinly investigated were changes on the livelihoods of
beneficiaries after land alienation in a post land redistribution period. Putzel’s
(2002: 220) analysis on the peasants’ trajectory argued that “a more detailed
research is required to assess the transformative impact of reform in these
situations”. Land policy reforms re-emerged as crucial rural development
strategy in the Philippines. It was characterized as an outcome of convergent
struggle of social mobilizations and bureaucratic reforms during the past two decades (Borras, Carranza et al. 2007, Putzel 2002). Envisaged to correct the societal inequalities, but on the contrary, rural poverty instead had aggravated for decades (Borras, Carranza et al. 2007). For instance, studies disclosed that politically driven land reform accordingly waned after social crisis subsided, hence failing to achieve its goals (Deininger and Binswanger 2001). For this reason, it is imperative to examine and analyse the impact and the causal factors of uncontrolled land ownership in post land reform.

Property rights, through titling and land registration, secured land tenure to the landless sugarcane labourers and Manobo tribe in Quezon, Philippines. A few years later the hard-won secured land slipped beyond the control of beneficiaries and have leased out. It is generally argued that the rural poor's access to land is constitutive to their livelihood and welfare; anticipating to reverse the impoverish conditions (Deininger and Binswanger 2001). Thus with optimism, this study is motivated to examine the complex processes which Putzel referred to as the “transformative impact of reform in [such] situation” (Putzel 2002: 220); where land alienation jeopardizes the livelihoods of beneficiaries. It further hypothesizes that abrupt land leasing participation of beneficiaries at unrealistic prices can drive them back to similar destitution before redistribution; unless favourable opportunities are available and successful capital trade-offs exceed the advantages of land owning.

This paper focuses on the role of land market transactions i.e. land leasing and usufruct mortgage, and its impact on the livelihoods in a post policy reforms in the Philippines. A case study was undertaken with the Manobo tribe and landless sugarcane labourers in the villages of Quezon, Bukidnon (Philippines). They invested on acquired lands but failed to sustain it, instead, were induced to land market participation. Livelihood insecurities are explored which highlight its eroding and enhancing (Rigg 2006) outcomes from participating in the land transactions (Ellis 2000, Rigg 2006, World Bank 2003). The main inquiry is focused on: what are the impacts of land markets, i.e. lease and usufruct mortgage participation of the beneficiaries of land policy reforms, to their livelihoods shortly after securing it? Subsumed questions confront the reasons why they participated and opted to rent out their lands after securing it? What are the local determinants and mechanisms of land transfers in the area? How do schemes of land market transaction work in Quezon? And finally, what were the changes and effects on the livelihood conditions of the new landowners?

Despite the World Bank’s influence, land policy strategies’ varies and are contingent among countries’ implementation. In the Philippines, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) was approved in 1988 and consequently, the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) was legislated in 1997. Both land policies were legislated purposely to correct the country's unequal distribution of wealth that caused poverty to agricultural labourers, landless peasants and indigenous peoples (Borras 2006, Putzel 2002). The sugarcane labourers were the landless peasants who benefited land through CARP; while the Manobo tribe reclaimed back lands through the IPRA. Both laws processes land ownership in similar ways through titling and registration. While it was directed towards improving the social and economic well-being of
the beneficiaries, there is a need to explore the investment-efficiencies extended by the beneficiaries to their land as well as the social, economic and institutional factors which have possibly caused land disposals. Thus, the degree of control, land productivity and its alienation can be inferred to indicate the level of CARP and IPRA’s failure or accomplishment.

This study aims to understand the basis of the beneficiaries’ participation in the land markets and the processes of market integration of land resources (World Bank 2003) in the context where land policy reforms were subsumed by the consequent institutional policy in the country (National Economic and Development Authority 2004b). Besides, the efficiency and equity objectives of land redistribution were assumed to improve the poor’s economic conditions by reducing rural poverty. The increasing food prices phenomenon underscore the significance of land as a contingent mechanism to food security of the poor. Current food insecurities threatened the poor and are challenging the governments in the developing countries, like the Philippines, but mostly were crippled to procure and satisfy the peoples’ food needs; thus, placing land policies under scrutiny. Borras (2007) argued that food inadequacy problems demonstrate an enduring poverty and lingering marginalization of the poor on access to productive land.

Furthermore, while land reform program is currently debated in the Philippines, this study can provide insights; where, instead of indulging on budget and redistribution extension controversies, a well-intentioned intervention need to resolve the underlying causes of land alienations and define policies appropriate to the current livelihoods of land beneficiaries, hence, addressing rural impoverishment. The issues of land market (lease, sales and usufruct mortgage) restrictions and land payments embedded in the policy necessitated rethinking if rural development is pursued. Research indicated that “farmers invented ingenious ways to circumvent [these] restrictions” (Deininger and Binswanger 2001: 420) and are “forced to substitute more inefficient arrangements (like usufruct mortgage and the associated use of wage labour contracts) to gain access to credit”(Ibid. :427). Although, it is prematurely improper to reckon the gains of land reform, the unprotected livelihoods of the beneficiaries after land tenure security, exacted rethinking.
Chapter 1  Analytical Framework & Methodology

1.1 Analytical Framework

This section presents the analytical framework and methodology undertaken by the study. It utilizes the concepts linked with rural development strategy on land reform where land use, rural livelihoods and land beneficiaries are cohesively interlinked. These concepts were drawn from the literature on land policy, such as the influential policy of the World Bank (WB), the Land Reform Policy Paper (LRPP) in 1975 and the Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction (LPGPR) in 2003 which explains land markets and land policies while livelihood concept was taken from Ellis (2000). The elements of land markets, land policies and livelihoods provide a framework of addressing the research questions. It is postulated that these concepts are linked by land’s transferability and the schemes of land markets as determine by institutional, social and economic environment and the resulting changes critical to the livelihoods of the newly settled landowners in post-redistribution.

1.1.1. Land tenure security and investments to land

Exploring the schemes of beneficiaries’ access to land and the various mechanisms of land market participations facilitate an analysis on the changes affecting the livelihoods of the new landowners in post redistribution. Elements of these concepts were cited in the WB’s LPGPR in 2003 (World Bank 2003). Earlier policy was formulated in 1975, the LRPP, where it defined land-related interventions to developing countries and promoted market institution for land redistribution with the objective of “sustainable poverty reduction and economic development” (Deininger and Binswanger 2001: 407). Consequently it modified its emphasis, although retaining its key principles, based on its experiences and lessons-learned from policy advice and interventions with partner countries (Deininger and Binswanger 2001, World Bank 2003).

This study uses the definition of land policy as “the broad system of the rule of law, established institutions that can enforce property rights to land” (World Bank 2003: 7). Kopeva, (1994: 379) et al cited that:

“property rights structure can best be viewed as a system for efficient conveyance of information regarding who has the decision-making power over the use and disposal of the resource. The test of the system lies in its capacity to create security of expectations regarding the rights of owners and users to receive rewards from investments of labour and capital that may take time to mature.”

The WB policy argued that the “key justification for secure property rights is that they provide incentives for investment in land” (World Bank 2003). Property rights ensured the land tenure to beneficiaries of land reform policies.
Moreover, this study investigates and analyse the magnitude of expenditures and variable investments to land, including labour and cash outlays (World Bank 2003) extended by the beneficiaries. The magnitude of investment is crucial to their decision because it exhibits, a) the degree of efforts and investment which are evidence of productivity outcomes and short-term or long-term land utilization (Roth and Smith 1995), b) the land productivity-potentials, c) an articulation of land acquisition motivations; and d) the causal factors affecting their decision to participate in land markets.

Further research of Roth and Smith (1995) on land issues in Zambia provides a guide to determine endogenous factors linking to beneficiaries’ investments on land. Thus, five possible categories can be examined which facilitate or limit their investments to land. First category is the landowners’ motivations and capability, second is the “non-tenure factors” composed of expenditures and variable investments (Ibid :166) prior to land acquisition: the status of income-generation; age, educational level and farming skills of beneficiary, size of household, land size, farm implements and draft animals and the distance to sugar mill and market. Thirdly, the previous functional status, cropping patterns and quality of land acquired (World Bank 2003), and finally, the complementary support of the state to land policies (Borras, Kay et al. 2007, World Bank 2003) and current institutional policies affecting land reform program, like the “budgetary cuts in public expenditure” (El-Ghonemy 1999: 16) influenced by social, economic and political forces.

1.1.2. Market and non-market land transferability

Examining the evolution of land transfers help identify and situate the context of the beneficiaries of the land reform policies and the dominant perspectives operating during its formulation and implementation in the country.

Advancement of land transferability can be drawn from the various interactions of development actors and the shifting objectives and strategies of development overtime; pressured by the different social, political and economic forces (El-Ghonemy 1999). In the research of WB, land transfers were associated with the “evolution of property rights, from the nomadic existence of hunter-gatherers to haciendas and highly mechanized farms” (World Bank 2003: 8). Thus, earlier transmission of lands were purely a generation-affair and was intended for stable use based on the system of “informal collective action through customary arrangements” (World Bank 2003). Subsequent accounts of colonial intervention restructured indigenous land arrangements with the help of local people with divergent effects. Once more reassigning of lands took place after the independence of most developing countries. Wide-ranging social, economic and political grounds compelled independent states to correct the polarizing effect of the past land structures and society’s unequal wealth distribution (El-Ghonemy 1999, World Bank 2003). El-Ghonemy (1999) noted such particular action as the derivation of state-driven redistributive land reform (RLR).

El-Ghonemy (Ibid.) argued that significant changes emerged with the economic policy reforms enforced by the international financial institutions (IFI) to indebted developing countries in the 1980s. Enclosed with its package
of reforms was referred to as structural adjustments which promoted land reform based on “the formal credit market and on landed property transfer, freely negotiated in the open market” (Ibid. :1). This scheme was the institutionalization of land market reform (LMR) which became the major shift of rural land reform strategy dominating the state-led land policy. The advocacy of LMR brought changes in the objectives and emphasis of rural development. While RLR or state-led was primarily concerned with developing the capabilities of the beneficiaries and poverty reductions, the LMR underlines the productive-efficiency goal and the reallocation of resources through land markets to promote agricultural export as an component to economic growth (Ibid.). Embedded in the structural adjustment programmes (SAP) by the WB and the IMF (International Monetary Fund) were the budgetary cutting to public services which had consequences on the lives of rural poor who depended mainly on agriculture. The current economic climate squeezed up programs of land reforms which can have impacted on beneficiaries’ decision to participate in land markets.

Compounded with the current changes of migration and non-agricultural opportunities, conveying of land through sales and rentals became widespread (Deininger and Binswanger 2001). The WB policy was convinced that land sales and rentals are an efficient means of resource reallocation. Although it recognizes that land transferability is dependent on many conditions because of its peculiar characteristic compared with other tradable products. It even pursued an earlier position on the viability of land sales as more advantageous compared to land rentals (Ibid.). A key reason was based on the theory that lands bought ensured the owner of long-term possession, it allow the owner to access credit for capital by its collateral use. It considers that with the different arrangements, land rentals, like share tenancy contract, reduced the investments effort on land because “tenants receive only a share of their marginal product” (Ibid. :428).

However, later research findings from different countries, the WB reverse its policy because land sales practices were impossible for the poor but efficient-producer to buying lands. Land prices soared by its transaction costs; including notary fees, transfer fees, registration and survey costs, formal registration and subdivision expenses are normally integrated (Deininger and Binswanger 2001, World Bank 2003). As a result, the bank reverted position arguing that land rentals was more favourable because of its zero transaction costs, possible gradual land acquisition and enhancing agricultural skills on condition that “better contract terms and the higher incentives [they] convey efficient agricultural production” (Deininger and Binswanger 2001: 428).

The WB policy provides elements of exploring and analysing the mechanisms, the market and non-market determinants of land transfer activities as a means of identifying the driving forces that underlie a participation of beneficiaries in land markets. Its main policy mechanisms of land transferability is referred to as market driven; either through sales or rentals (Borras, Kay et al. 2007, El-Ghonemy 1999, Putzel 2002, World Bank 2003), which was also referred to as LMR mode (El-Ghonemy 1999). Land tenure security is argued by the policy, not only an incentive to invest in land,
but enhances the land owner's capacity to dispose it to efficient productive farmers (World Bank 2003).

The study of Kopeva on the land market phenomenon in Bulgaria cited that land markets are governed by the “collection of institution and rules which participants agree” (Kopeva et al. 1994: 379). Institutions, based on North’s (North 1990) definition are set of rules constructed in society which determine and guide human interactions in particular context. Hence, the WB argued that where land rights are product of social constructs, land trading is bound to individual desirability and is disposable by unified consensus, thus, land is responsive to social and economic changes (World Bank 2003).

On land transfer activity mechanisms, four areas for analysis can be drawn; a) the land leasers: what links them with the beneficiaries and the arrangements, b) the type of land markets they are involved in; its context, the dominant perspective, its influence and why the beneficiaries engaged only in land leasing and usufruct mortgage instead of land sales (Ibid.), c) the reasons why beneficiaries chose to lease out formally or informally their land and its implications to their livelihood, and d) the significant outcome of land markets it delivers on the reduced land sizes of beneficiaries (Roth and Smith 1995). A precondition to land markets is the land tenure security through titling and registration facilitating its transferability (World Bank 2003). The WB (2003) policy underscored that land markets facilitates reallocation for equity and efficiency goals. Elements of land market concept help distinguish the contrast between advantage and disadvantage of the land sale or land rental schemes assumed by the participants that either indicates welfare or destitution.

Based on its findings, the WB also uncovered widespread “inefficient arrangements” (World Bank 2003), the informal land alienation, practiced in the developing countries. Kopeva (1994) referred that enforcement of informal approach depended on the “personal honesty and community norms” (Kopeva et al. 1994: 379). The most apparent informal transfers is usufruct mortgage as avenue of accessing credit (World Bank 2003). But it was considered by the WB (Ibid.) as an outcome of administrative restrictions imposed to avert land sales and rentals by the landowners and dismissed as counter productive.

Determinants of land transfers activities cited by the WB (Ibid.) may be clustered as market and institutional based. Market based land transfers consisted of the “efficiency-enhancing transfers to better and more efficient users” (Deininger andBinswanger 2001: 407), secondly, the “exchange of lands as off-farm economy develops”(World Bank 2003) and thirdly, the “use of land as collateral to access credit markets where the conditions for doing so exist” (World Bank 2003). The policy indicated the importance of productive-efficient land users but was specifically undefined. Off-farms economy developments are options for landowners who prefer temporary jobs outside farming while the collateral utilization of land titles can assists land owners diversify income generation. The institutional factor is referred as the state restriction policy, like land moratorium.

There is a considerable assumption of the WB (2003) policy that participation in land markets contributes to the productivity and efficiency of the participants because they can exchange their land for other assets. It
further disclosed that credit constrained landowners are motivated to rent out lands instead of cultivating it because insufficient capitals can cripple production. Notwithstanding these landowners have options to engage in non-farm income generation like migration, or other self-employment schemes where income is possible (World Bank 2003).

While the WB provides a dogmatic market-based model of land transfers, market-confined basis of land utilization outcomes and market-determined land alienation, the studies of Mackintosh (1990) in differentiating abstract markets from the real markets, otherwise, furnishes concepts of real market factors that may clarify land beneficiaries’ undertakings (Mackintosh 1990). Land reform beneficiaries are heterogeneous and argued to function not as unitary mass but characterized by diverse motives and decisions. Moreover, endogenous factors either inhibit or empower them to rebound on varying social, economic and institutional pressures that challenge their survival. Beneficiaries are considered to create dynamic positions in vulnerable conditions to establish the most viable options. Hence, production-inefficiencies are unuttered benchmark to losing effective land control by the beneficiaries (Mackintosh 1990).

Other issues explored in land markets participation of beneficiaries include land market information schemes. It is argued that information system is essential to “reduce transaction costs and improve information about land prices and the functioning of land markets” (Deininger and Binswanger 2001: 426). The study of Kovepa (1994:382) on the land market institution in Bulgaria, pointed up that “lack of appropriate and abundant land market information is a serious handicap in land market development”. Land valuation issues were raised wherein the absence of information appraising the exact worth of land; land prices exploitation reduce the expected landowners’ welfare (Kopeva et al. 1994). Thus, information asymmetries coupled by the absence of land market regulatory agency extremely impair land market participants’ welfare.

1.1.3. Securing livelihoods: capital trade-offs and assets adjustments

This section examines and analysis the changes on the livelihoods of the participating beneficiaries on land leasing after a few years of land cultivation. It utilizes valuable concepts on livelihoods, livelihood strategy and livelihood diversification of livelihood based on the works of Ellis (2000).

Ellis’ (2000) define livelihood as those “comprises the assets (natural, physical, human, financial and social capital), the activities, and the access to these (mediated by institutions and social relations) that together determine the living gained by the individual or household” (Ellis 2000: 10). Although it has considerable link, the meaning exceeds beyond income-bounded perception of livelihood because recent studies specified income are sourced out from various activities undertaken; based on different utilization of assets, either for consumption or production, bestowing the households’ welfare (Ellis 2000).

Haan and Zoomers (2005) accounted that livelihood approach evolved from discovering the poor’s survival strategies of confronting daily poverty
situations; distinct from the “interventionist” and “ready-made” policy-based approached to poverty reduction (Appendini 2001: 24, Haan and Zoomers 2005: 30, Zoomers 2008). It argued that the original intended meaning of sustainable livelihoods was the security and income of the poor households but later was dominantly coloured by sustainable-related concepts based on the 1987 Bruntland Report’s on environmental sustainability issues (Haan and Zoomers 2005). However, the concept evolved in the development studies because its approach focuses on people as agent and are practical in their access to capitals which form the basis of their livelihood strategy (Zoomers 2008). Moreover, Zoomers (Ibid.) cautioned the limitations of livelihoods approach, the assumption that poor people can directly cope up with income-related crisis and the postulation that they can immediately access to different assets. Notwithstanding these, the elements of livelihood concepts help distinguish the access-activities-assets components build up by the participant beneficiaries before the land acquisition, the period of securing their lands and the land leasing and usufruct mortgage regimes. Investigated are “the links between assets and options people possess in practice to pursue alternative activities that can generate the income level required for survival” (Ellis 2000: 7).

An area of analysis includes the following: first, the comparison and the related changes brought by their access to land as natural capital to the household’s other assets and its related income-activities before and after post redistribution period. It was referred to by the WB (2003) as portfolio adjustment of different capitals, consisting the skills to manage (World Bank 2003) and their ability to modify the cropping patterns and capabilities of marketing. Zoomers (2008) further cited that “rural livelihoods cannot be understood without opening the black box of the households. Within the family, members are selectively involved in the decision making, and are occupied in different activities, each having their own negotiating power” (Zoomers 2008: 149). Households’ priorities and objectives undoubtedly further influenced land market participations of beneficiaries.

Second, it shall explore the trade-offs of assets (Ellis 2000) and its “flexible combinations and trade-off between all capitals” (Zoomers 2008: 148) and the opportunities and constraints of “avenues of accumulation” (Rigg 2006: 124) which can facilitate “livelihood eroding and enhancing” (Rigg 2006: 131) schemes as an outcome of land leasing participation.

Thirdly, it will examine the opportunities and constraints conveyed by land leasing, like employment and other services which either enhance or reduces their capitals. A crucial point is the availability and the opportunities of success these options offer to the landowners. And finally, an investigation on the beneficiaries livelihood (in)securities based on their income level and stability; the seasonality of non-farm and off-farm activities and the degree of risks taken by landowners (Ellis 2000: 30). Security of livelihoods suggest sustainability which is “the maintenance or enhancement of the productivity of resource on a long-term basis; it only exists when it also provide sustainable livelihood for the next generation” (Zoomers 2001: 15). In his study of land reform, Rosset (2006) also argues that a measurement of secured livelihood is the extent of food security to the rural poor.
Land redistribution program assumed the beneficiaries of “farming of [the] land in such a way as to spread the benefits of the man-land relationship more widely than before the takeover” (Lipton 1974: 269), thus “create[ing] purposive change that can result in the improvement of the situation of landless and land-poor peasants and rural workers” (Borras 2006: 73). While it is claimed by Deininger and Binswanger (2001), that land generates livelihoods and improves the household’s wealth, on the other hand, Borras (Borras, Kay et al. 2007) goes further and instead argued that “effective control over productive resources, especially land, by the rural poor is crucial to their capacity to construct rural livelihood and overcome poverty” (Borras, Kay et al. 2007: 1). Consequently, there is a significant relationship between lands and the livelihoods of the beneficiaries considering that livelihood is the object of land redistribution strategy of the developing countries (Adams 2008).

Loosing of effective control arising from land leasing may be viewed from other perspectives wherein Zoomers’ (2001) studies in rural life cited rural livelihood as gradually changing from traditionally bounded land farming income-generation activity to a multiple range of income-sourcing activities. A key explanation was the related transformation in the social and economic environment wherein peasants were unable to compete with international production system which offers cheaper prices of food (Appendini 2001). Thus, it affected “people in the rural areas and have opted for a development path characterized by multitasking and income diversification” (Zoomers 2008: 149). Anticipating the status of beneficiaries participating land markets, the WB (2003) advises that “equity outcomes achieved in land rental markets will still depend on the parties’ outside options” (World Bank 2003); suggesting that re-establishing the livelihoods and the adjustments of asset portfolios are the beneficiaries’ burden relegating the state’s accountability.

Livelihood framework “may also serve a useful purpose for tracing local level impacts of macro policies” (Ellis 2000: 28). It can be regarded that such policies, like public goods, are some of the mediating instruments on asset accessing which may either facilitate or restricts the enhancement of the beneficiaries’ livelihoods. Thus, it cannot be overemphasized that the actual outcomes of the beneficiaries’ land control and utilization is juxtaposed with the apparent targeted goal of land redistribution policies. Thus, while modest studies are pursued on livelihood securities in the post land redistribution, Putzel (2002:220) challenges the necessity of embarking “a more detailed research [is] required to assess the transformative impact of reform [in these] situations”.

1.2 Methodology

This section presents the data collection procedure, the issues to be addressed and the justification of study site selection. Data gathering was based on triangulation method of inquiry referred on the study of Grix (2004) which uses different methods in investigating a phenomenon to uncover its different angles. Hence, primary data was gathered through semi-structured interview, semi-structured focus-group discussion complemented by site visits, observations and the collection of community and individual documents to investigate beneficiaries land market participation and its impact to their
livelihoods. The field work was conducted from July to August 2008 in the three villages of Quezon municipality, northern part of Bukidnon province, where sugarcane production dominated the households’ income for years. Aply July and August were waiting periods for the main crop’s harvest while some peasants started selling peanuts, root crops and vegetables they produced.

The three villages were chosen purposely to represent a diverse level of information base on cross-case technique where regardless of group differences, dominant similarities shape common patterns and themes are demonstrated or having a “mode of agreement” based on the research questions and each evidence gathered confirm the validity and reliability of data (Eisenhardt 2002). Respondents of this study consisted of randomly selected members and officers from the three villages, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) and the project coordinator of a non-government organization (NGO), one of the supporters of land claims. Initial engagement with the informants was done through a formal letter, informing them of the purpose of the study, then a subsequent site visits and negotiations to conduct data collection on July 14-18, 2008. Positively it was accepted resulting to an arrangement for schedule and engagement after preliminary explanations were given.

The study area is located in the municipality of Quezon, southern part of Bukidnon, 189 kilometres from Cagayan de Oro City (Mindanao).

Figure 1 Land Distribution of Crops

(Bukidnon)

Source: Bukidnon Provincial Planning and Development (2007)
The graph above illustrates the land distribution of Bukidnon showing the five major crops dominating land utilization of the provincial area of 829,378 hectares. The information confirms that 77% of its population are employed in farming. Rainfalls take place from June to October (Bukidnon Provincial Planning and Development Office 2007).

Moreover, the chart above shows the different educational level attained by the provincial population. Lower educational achievements explain why the majority of its population are confined on farming works.
Quezon has an area of 40,941 hectares, a provincial centre of sugarcane plantation where the sugar mill is located. Its population comprises of 82,567 individuals in the latest statistic record (Bukidnon Provincial Planning and Development Office 2007).

The villages selected are 5 kilometres away from the sugar mill. Aside from sugarcane, minor crops planted include sweet potatoes, cassava, banana and vegetables for consumption. Most households raised livestock for farm work and consumptions, like swine, goats and chickens. Villages of FIBSWARB (First Bukidnon Sugar Workers Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries) and SESWMPC (South East Sugar Workers Multi-Purpose Cooperative) represent the new landowners who were former sugarcane labourers of the company. They secured their lands through CARP law; simultaneously in 1999 and 2000. FIBSWARB had 66 coop members and each got a share of 2.74 hectares while those of SESWMPC had 52 members, each owned 2.19 hectares.

On the other hand, the Quezon Manobo (Quezon Manobo Tribes Association or QUEMTRAS), having required by law, organized and legally registered its organization in 1993. Their village is located 2 kilometres from the sugar mill adjacent to the SESWMPC village. Land was restored to them in 2001 through the IPRA law. Most of them resided from marginal areas after displacement in the 1970s with the establishment of the sugarcane regime in the province. The Quezon Manobo gained back only 2,093 hectares from an original claim of 12,350 hectares (Vidal 2004). A Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) released in 2002 established their ownership of land and
small plots were informally assigned to 572 Manobo households and the village is divided into four clans.

The three villages selected acquired their land based on different land policies but secured the same land area formerly owned by a sugarcane plantation company. Former sugarcane labourers obtain their land through voluntary-offer-to-sale (VOS) mode, had long experience in sugarcane crops while the few Manobo members had seasonal experience on sugarcane farming. While the sugarcane workers pay their land premium, the Manobo were not obliged to because it was a reclaimed land. Although, they possess varied characters, the villages studied had established a social network where mutual supports were extended during their struggle of securing their lands. Secondly, accessed lands were adjacent controlled formerly by one company. Thirdly, most of them had become either regular or seasonal workers of the land before. Fourth, these were taking place within a sugarcane regime where the socio-political and economic environments were practically ruled by the sugar industry system. This further affected the lives of the new landowners even in the post land reform. And finally, the current changes on land utilization and land market participation dominated the villages. The overarching institutional policy’s recent promotion of agribusiness intensified the demand for land supply.

The interviews were rather informal despite structured questions were prepared. A causal conversation treated the participants, providing a friendly atmosphere with some alternate irrelevant questions on study. General questions were asked, eventually leading more specific inquiries on their present situation and the issues targeted in the research questions. Moreover, informal conversation outside the interviews provided additional information. The first village interviewed was FIBSWARB an irregularly functioning cooperative. Its members were former sugarcane labourers having accessed land through CARP, a MLR scheme of land redistribution. Random selection of respondents was chosen for semi-structured interview on July 25-30, 2008, as suggested by the coop chairperson. Consisting of 8 respondents, the first group lived outside the area having settled in Maramag, an adjacent municipality of 18 kilometres. The second group lived within their land. A total of 24 interviews were conducted to participating beneficiaries (9 women and 15 men). Two widowed women represented their deceased husband; another 4 had seriously sick husband while the 3 represented their husband working. Purposely, the selection was intended for varied information and observations.

The discussion ranges from household-beneficiary profile, their current status; health, the education attained, family members, farming skills, land owned complemented with present social and economic activities, like income-access-activity related. Accounts of livelihoods and comparisons highlighted the discussions. The conversations on land expenditures, labour extended to land, utilization and production inevitably led to a sensitive topic on the land market transactions. Exchanges regarding land transactions were mostly avoided because it reminded them on accountability and land policy restrictions. But still most of them were very open and trusting considering that the interviewer assisted them for a time in securing their land. Leased and usufruct mortgaged lands, the mechanisms and processes they experience were
the gist of the conversations. Issues of asset trade-offs emerged conveying how they rebuild their livelihoods. Household decisions and needs were shared and wittily even on some deceitful results of migration attempts by households’ members that wasted income from lands leased. The respondents also shared significant land transaction outcomes; for instance reduced land sizes, the exchanges for paddy area and the unfulfilled agricultural support promises, which oftentimes confused and depressed them.

Secondly, the group to be interviewed were some members and tribal leaders of QUEMTRAS on August 1-2, 2008 and August 5, 2008. The village consisted of 4 clans administered by 4 tribal councils. Four men and 3 women respondents were particularly selected because they were considered to represent the community. They secured their land rights through IPRA in 1997, a redistributive land reform which restored claims of the indigenous lands (Borras, Kay et al. 2007). QUEMTRAS was one of the historically disenfranchised group because of an “arbitrary allocation of their land to individuals” (Deininger and Binswanger 2001: 432) in the 1970s as sugarcane regime started in the province. It can be argued that such case is justifiable because “it involved the redistribution of property rights on land under existing cultivation and alters a country’s overall ownership distribution of land” (Ellis 1992: 197). The discussions take account of the family and community profile, the current economic activities, the current status of their land and some land-related and social issues in the community. The Manobo land represented the transition from assigned individual plots to the members having entered informal credit arrangements thru usufruct mortgage and informal leasing towards an aggregate leasing. Two clans leased their whole area of 552 hectares recently to DAVCO and possibly, the other two clans will be leasing their 428 hectares with the BUSCO Sugar Mill Company, as contract was already arranged.

Two agencies were interviewed as the third group. The Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) is in charge of the land reform program representing the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) office in the province and the project coordinator of non-government-organization (NGO), the Partnership for Human Rights and Development (PAHRD). PAHRD supported both the sugarcane labourers and Manobo tribe during their struggle to claim the land. Discussed with the DAR officer were the problems and issues encountered on implementing the land reform program, current monitoring activities in post land redistribution period and its response to the uncontrolled leasing of lands. Comments the implications on restrictions and moratorium relevant with the current situation of the land beneficiaries were also inquired.

On the other hand, discussions with the officer of PAHRD were focused on their role during the land claims, the supports extended with land beneficiaries and the historical accounts of the communities. Respondent was also asked on opinion about the current situation of land alienation issues of the villages.

Information collection was also done through the semi-structured focus group discussion (FGD) to supplement data gathered and to cross check evidences overlooked from the interview. Participants of the FGD were
selected from the community of SESWMPC based on the suggestion of the coop officers. They also accessed their land through CARP law in 2000. The FGD was conducted in August 8, 2008 and 22 participants came (8 women and 14 men); the 3 widows were proxy of the deceased husband-beneficiaries. Among the participant only one was not involved in leasing land but accepted leased land from fellow beneficiaries, hence expanding his area.

A friendly atmosphere was facilitated by introducing personal profile, like their names, families, work, and education and followed by a short orientation on the activity. Two assistant facilitators were selected to sustain the group discussion helping the writing activity. The group was divided into two and a free-flowing discussion was done on every question after which a representative reported in the plenary. Following was the second session in the afternoon. A review was done in the big group, a period of questions and clarifications were given before the further discussions. The focused of the discussion was mainly on 5 areas of their livelihood: a review on the changes brought by securing their land, land investments and production, the participation in land markets, security of their livelihoods and the current households’ concerns.

The discussions captured the livelihood trends of the beneficiaries, the motivation of choosing to participate in land redistribution, the benefits they gained from land used and how they maintain land productivity. Underscoring were the comparison of assets, like natural (land), human (capability) and social (networking and relationship) and how they perceived its role on their livelihoods. Sugarcane production took dominant discussions while some men intermittently discussed the advantages of other crops. The land leasing topic was very depressing for them because it reminded of three things: land premium payments, their accountability on the moratorium attached, and the changes and the impending land risks to their livelihoods. Despite the roughness of the topic, the discussion proceeded on the current security and insecurities issues of their livelihoods, primarily on income stability, the opportunities for alternative asset-accessing-activities and more particularly the food security.

Data collection was complemented by site visits and observations on the location of the beneficiaries. Some community and individual documents were also photocopied. The documents consisted of land titles where the sales and lease moratorium was explicitly revealed, land tax payment receipt, unofficial receipts of land leases and mortgages, receipts of payments to land premium, and voucher receipts of sugarcane sale to sugarcane planter as exhibits. The author’s practical knowledge based on prolong work with the villages can be both an advantage and source of potential problem. Having worked and supported the three communities during the past 10 years was a source of wealth of information and first hand observations. On the other hand, the writer recognized that biases can be unconsciously incorporated into the presentation. However, with apt intention the author tried to maintain an academic objectivity and responsiveness through a critical and unbiased presentation and analysis.
Chapter 2 Infused Investments to Lands and Induced Land Market Participations

This chapter presents the findings conducted from the 3 villages in Quezon illustrating the beneficiaries’ trajectory of land reform. Utilizing the elements of property rights and land market concepts from the WB’s land policy, it analyses the investments to land and land market participation of the beneficiaries shortly after securing land titles. The findings enlighten the inquiry on the significance of investments to land and beneficiaries’ land leasing participations altering their livelihoods. In Zepeda’s (2001) study on the relationship of agricultural investment and productivity in the developing countries, the concept of investment is elaborated. In contrast to common understanding as “the change in the physical capital stock, that is physical inputs that have a useful life of one year or longer, like equipment, machinery and storage facilities” (Zepeda 2001: 3), this study, draws on the broader definition of investment as the “comprehensive agricultural investment … include improvements in land, development of natural resources and development of human and social capital in addition to physical capital formation” (Ibid. : 3). Thus, variable investments, like labour and expenditures on inputs as well as the human and social capital constitute the beneficiaries’ investments to lands. Furthermore, it is argued that investments crucially relied on the motivation and capacity of the new landowners. With equal importance are the support services of state complementing land policies. The extent and effectiveness of such investments are critical to land productivity which either generates effective land control or gradual land alienation.

In addition, the capabilities of the beneficiaries are explored including pressures that affected land utilization at the outset. Moreover, beneficiaries’ land market participations are illustrated by investigating the evolution of local land markets; its mechanisms and other relevant factors.

2.1 Land policy objectives

As a preliminary, this study considers the redistributed land as the unit of analysis, its alterations by the state, the beneficiaries and the leasers. Land acquisition and alienation processes imply reconsideration of land policies’ objectives. The term beneficiaries and landowners are use interchangeably referring to person who gained a land title from CARP or IPRA. These Philippine land policies were significant during the past decades. Intended to improve rural lives, it redistributed lands propelling social and economic activities of land-related livelihoods (Republic Act No. 6657 1988,Republic Act No. 8371 1997). Based on the principles of social justice and peoples’ welfare, it ensured the property rights to the Manobo of Quezon and the landless sugarcane workers of FIBSWARB and SESWMPC cooperatives.

The WB’s (2003) land policy influenced the country’s policy (Borras, Carranza et al. 2007,Putzel 2002) postulating tenure security as incentive to invest on land and assuming rural livelihoods creation and poverty reduction.
However, the assumption suggests a market-model presuming complete market operation that complements the necessary factors in agricultural production. In contrast, Appendini’s (2001) studies on land and rural livelihood contends that land ownerships and the assumed incentives to production are contingent on various conditions like the degree of income gained in farming and the competitiveness of its products. These factors either improve the lives of the poor by accumulation of wealth or further impoverish them (Ellis 2000).

2.2 Non-tenure factors: expenditure and variable investments to land

The motivations of beneficiaries are explored as perceived to effect their decisions on land cultivation. Characterized by heterogeneity, the households possessed varied goals and priorities and different human and social capitals. During the redistribution productive land utilization was undoubtedly expected from the beneficiaries. Hence, the beneficiaries’ motivation can have a positive impact on the outcome of effective control of land and its utilization.

2.2.1. Motivation and capability

The studies on livelihoods and land policies assumed land as important asset for the rural poor deriving income from agriculture (Deininger and Binswanger 2001, Ellis 2000). Thus, implying that beneficiaries’ motivation and capability (Zoomers 2001) are crucial. Beneficiaries’ motivations can be undisputed but their capability is critical which include households’ labour, capital inputs and the favourable conditions of profitability. The Pender (1999: 282) study on tenure security and land investment, it suggested that “land investments assumed to depend upon several households’ characteristics, including the household demographic make-up, the number of household members and the fraction of adult members; primary occupation of head, like farmer, and the household human capitals, like age and education”.

Interestingly enough, in my fieldwork, during the FGD on August 8, 2008 with the SESWMPC members, landowners recalled the grounds convincing them to land reform participation. First, they desired a better life apart from forever sugarcane labourers and from landlessness all through their generation. A landowner shared that “ang titulo sa yuta nag-ila sa akong katakus sa pag-ugmad sa yuta, nag-libre gikan sa akong pagka-ultimo nga mang-gunahay sa tubo pwes nag hatag sa akog dignidad” (“the title recognizes my ability to till the land, freed me from just a lowly weeder of sugarcane, thus it enhances my dignity”). Secondly, they perceived to gain better income from farming and to prosper from land-related activities, like food and livestock raising; thirdly, they were confident of state support as stipulated in the land policies. Finally, the land owners foresaw the incessant value of land as legacy to their descendants.

They admittedly summoned and persuaded by the DAR and the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) as the rightful land beneficiaries. The opportunity challenged them otherwise land was handed to other
beneficiaries (Bureau of Agrarian Reform Information and Education 1995). Accordingly, the government agencies and the NGOs assured them support.

Moreover, IPRA (Republic Act No. 8371 1997) defined land restitution and the obligation of the Manobo tribe. Lands fraudulently taken were bound for restoration and that “they have the rights to control, manage, develop, protect, conserve and sustainably use [the] land”(Republic Act No. 8371 1997, Rule III, Part II, Section 2). Separately, CARP characterizes qualification of land beneficiary as landless agricultural labourer who has “willingness, aptitude and ability to cultivate and make land as productive as possible” (Bureau of Agrarian Reform Information and Education 1995, Republic Act No. 6657 1988, Chapter 7, Section 22).

2.2.2. Variable investments to land: non-tenure factors

Information in the subsequent table shows the non-tenure factors referred by Roth (1995) critically affecting the beneficiaries’ land utilization. These factors were identified in Ellis’ (2000) study of livelihoods as assets; human, natural and physical capitals. Identified were the different current households’ assets (Ellis 2000) when lands were secured. Moreover, Peder (1999) contended that investments to land are contingent on households’ capitals. FGD participants have described their earlier conditions prior to lands owning as difficult and complicated.

Table 1. A summary of the non-tenure factors and assets from the 3 villages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-tenure factors to land investments</th>
<th>Quemtras</th>
<th>FIBSWARB</th>
<th>SESWMPC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Age range of landowners</td>
<td>35-60 years old</td>
<td>45-55 years old</td>
<td>46-59 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Level of education attained</td>
<td>Below elementary/most did not have formal schooling</td>
<td>Elementary and secondary school level</td>
<td>Elementary and secondary school level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Average household members</td>
<td>7 members</td>
<td>5 members</td>
<td>6 members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Farming Skills</td>
<td>Some experienced seasonal sugarcane laborers; others are subsistent farmers; few were skilled in maize, root crops and rice production</td>
<td>Experienced sugarcane work for 15 years; some are skilled in maize production</td>
<td>Experienced sugarcane work for 10 years; some are skilled in maize production; others in rice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Farm Implements and bullock</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PAHRD documents from the three villages studied in Quezon (Bukidnon)

Respondents separately interviewed from FIBSWARB and SESWMPC villages with ages ranging from 45 to 59 years old has worked for 10 to 15 years as sugarcane labourers in the company. They claimed of extensive experience in sugarcane production. Some were retiring during land acquisition. They said that usually the company retained its regular workers and
hired seasonal labourers because of excessive obligations for regular workers like health and pensions expenses thru the Social Security System. The Manobo beneficiaries had similar ages but with limited experiences of sugarcane. They practiced tribal farming on small plots after isolated from their eviction.

A majority of the Manobos reached elementary level while some have no formal schooling. In contrast, the FIBSWARB and SESWMPC members attained secondary level of education. Lower educational achievement of beneficiaries suggested minimal role of social institutions on enhancing their human capital. Despite having a good number of households, only 3-4 members were capable of maintaining the ratoon sugarcane. There were others who were younger but insufficiency of household provisions hindered labour endurance on their lands. The inadequacy of bullock and necessary farm equipments further constrained them of efficiently farming considering their land sizes.

2.2.3. Expenditures and land yields

The new landowners were immediately confronted by inputs issues on the ratoon sugarcanes after accessing land. They recalled of arranging loans with the informal credits. They got fertilizer loan from the sugarcane planters’ association. Joint-venture schemes were also arranged for cash loans. Hence, they invested fertilizers on their land at initial farming. The coop members secured a loan of $650 (PhP 30,000). Despite the small budget for a two-hectare of sugarcane requiring abundant fertilizers and additional labours, they were satisfied of having loaned. Some Manobo members negotiated loans from neighbouring richer farmers for fertilizers.

Informal credits dominated and were easily accessed as guaranteed by the land title. The sugarcane plants also ensured the lenders because they surveyed the areas. The landowners admitted of establishing links with the rich planters. Gaining lower incomes, the new landowners settled their first debts. They noted, however, that increased fertilizer prices changed the credit arrangements of ensuing seasons. The lenders, who were also sugarcane planters, modified a joint-venture sharing. Mindful of the possible neglect of sugarcane ratoon, landowners accepted the arrangements.

Some landowners accessed fertilizers instead of cash. They availed 12 bags of fertilizer-loan for every hectare from the planters association. This constrained them of hiring additional labour because cash was demanded on sugarcane maintenance. Hence, they were pressured to utilize available household labours. Moreover, other landowners preferred cash up to $670 (PhP 30,000) despite its soaring interest because they can hire additional labourers.

The discussions with the SESWMPC participants and interviews with some Manobo leaders implied that land policy restrictions inhibited them from accessing credit from financial institutions, suggesting that it affected their farming productivity. Nevertheless, the landowners maximized their social assets of establishing a network with the informal credit markets (Zepeda
2001). These can be counted as essential element of investment to land as argued by Zepeda (2001) in the broader view. The fertilizer expenditures extended by the beneficiaries accessed through credits are also accounted as investments to lands stimulating the potential productivity of their lands. In fact a portion of income generated from sugarcane harvests was reallocated back as fertilizer expenditures to their sugarcanes.

Other related issues shared during the FGD concerned on flawed arrangements mostly experienced in informal credits. A landowner discovered her credit accounts were doubled on the second cycle of loan and had to spend additional cash for a lawyer to clear the problem. Informal joint-ventures also dominated the next seasons wherein the lenders took over the production of sugarcanes. The landowners supplied the labour and got the 3rd portion of income. They said the arrangements was both advantageous and had drawbacks. Favourable as it freed them from other burdens, like inadequate capital for maintaining the sugarcane wherein older ratoon sugarcanes needed abundant fertilizers. It saved them from financing the harvesting costs, on cane cutting, loading and transporting. Lately, they realized that the share was unfair with the households’ labours.

Another issue was the lenders’ direct accessed to quedan from the mill. Inexperienced on sugarcane marketing, landowners received only the deducted sugar income without knowing the sale of their sugarcane. They later realized that it was included in the agreement they signed.

Furthermore, some FGD participants disclosed common households’ practiced on cash loan diversions. They said of spending budgets for hiring additional labour on consumption for survival. Instead they relied on households’ labour for the weeding and brushing the whole sugarcane area, although they admitted of resulting to lesser sugarcane yields. It had also repercussions on their links with the lenders because of yield outcomes. Some think the diversions resulted to mistrust consequently getting fertilizers loans only instead of cash.

A Manobo said that tribe-members having spent their labour on the sugarcane were unable to wait for long. They adopted an arrangement called “standing-crop” sale. Some rich farmers preferred to buy the standing sugarcane crops in lower prices. And all the harvesting was done by the buyer. The Manobos gained income from these arrangements at an earlier period. It was also practical for them because insufficient cash for harvesting. Having small plots, they gained $ 800 (PhP 36,000) for a one-hectare from standing-crop sale.

Compared to the earlier farming seasons most landowners said to have reinvested their income to sugarcane production but after the last years of ratoon decided to lease their lands because of the bigger financial demands in replanting the canes.

2.3 Land functionality and cropping patterns

Apart from fertilizer expenditures and labour investments to land, the earlier land functions and cropping patterns determine the extent of investments to land. Research findings of the WB (2003) considered prior land status to affect
the degree of investments to land and its efficiency and productivity. Beneficiaries from the three villages claimed extensive experience on sugarcanes. Some worked during harvests seasons while the others had more than 15 years of extensive experience. However such experiences did not guarantee them efficient land production. Taking advantage of the sugarcane ratoon, many of them retained the land function and its cropping patterns. It allowed them to harvests the succeeding 3-4 years but of lesser yields.

Originally the land they acquired was suited to sugarcane crops and functioning with highly mechanized machines. Manual works were done by the workers on maintaining the weeding and grass brushing. The study of Tadem (1992) on Mindanao economy cited the “the bias of agribusiness corporations for extensive monocropping agriculture dependent on high levels of chemical applications causes depletion of soil nutrients” (Tadem 1992: 24). With profitability objectives, agribusiness normally invested abundant chemical inputs without sufficient consideration on the long term soil fertility outcomes. Thus, when the new landowners acquired their land they were helpless on the soil chemical demands. Some respondents could have preferred the rice fields having skills in paddies but were unable to modify their cropping because of unavailable irrigation. However some successfully modified their lands because it held-up water during rainy seasons causing poor yields of sugarcanes. The CARP beneficiaries were also troubled because the land amortization was based on the AGP of land prior to acquisition. Hence, the greater value of land implied an increased payment demanded (Bureau of Agrarian Reform Information and Education 1995).

The beneficiaries had also limited knowledge and skill on management and entrepreneurial skills related to sugarcane production. Although the agencies of Cooperative Development Authority (CDA), Department of Labour and Employment- Region X (DOLE) and Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) provided them entrepreneurial trainings it differed compared practical and longer experience. Thus, the farming decisions of the new landowners were constrained by inadequate technical and appropriate agricultural knowledge.

2.4 State support to land policy

The state support to landowners was another crucial factor as they started reconstructing livelihoods. The land reform literature we have reviewed in chapter 1 (Borras, Kay et al. 2007,El-Ghonemy 1999,Ellis 2000,Putzel 2002,Rosset 2006,World Bank 2003) present the overwhelming importance of complementary support to land beneficiaries as a guarantee of protection to implemented land policies. The extent of state support affects the investment efforts of the new landowners and could have yielded a different outcome on their livelihoods, if appropriately implemented.

Based on the interviews and the FGD, it was found that the landowners received minimal supports from the state after occupying their lands. They got technical support during the preparatory years before land claims. The agencies assigned on their cases conducted series of meetings and negotiations. Various education courses and trainings developed and enhanced their organizations.
However, in the post redistribution they hardly saw the presence of the agencies who promised them support. Respondents said that even production information on sugarcane farming were unavailable; instead they learned practically sugarcane planters and from the sugarcane association.

The Manobo recalled that after occupying their land in 2001, the Department of Agriculture (DA) local office provided some maize seeds and fertilizers but few families benefited. Some services extended by the DA were livestock checking as suggested by DOLE office. When asked for comment on beneficiaries’ status, the provincial officer of DAR said that insufficient budget and limited personnel prevented them from monitoring the beneficiaries’ conditions. He said to sympathize with the land beneficiaries but was helpless because of budget constraints.

Unknown to the new landowners was that the overarching agricultural policy formulated by the new administration in 2004 (National Economic and Development Authority 2004b) which overruled land reform policy. The Medium Term Philippine Development Plan (MTPDP 2004-2010) program significantly affected the fate of the new landowners. Its socio-economic and political strategy promoting the conversion of 2 million hectares into agribusiness farms for export suggest a compromise of the small farms. It further aggravated an earlier policy of cutting agricultural subsidy to the small farmers arising from the structural adjustment programs (Borras, Kay et al. 2007). In fact, the MTPDP never mentioned support strategy to land reform beneficiaries in the country.

2.5 Adversities subsumed in landownership

Various factors pressured the new landowners when they secured their lands. First, the households were unprepared for productive land utilization because of the numerous household demands they dealt with during land acquisition. Based on their experiences, financial insufficiency hindered them to procure the basic household needs while reconstructing their livelihoods. They said the support of the NGOs (non-government organization), the Catholic church and the cooperative sustained them. Food needs were extended to them by organizations mentioned.

Secondly, they felt having treated as squatters by the company while some of their relatives ostracized them for choosing the land reform program. For them it was a crucial decision because they rejected the company’s offer for joint-venture arrangements. Almost half the number of company sugarcane workers during that time opted to remain and accepted the company’s negotiation. Initially they received the $ 555.00 (PhP 25,000) offered for the joint-venture arrangements but respondents said it was the only amount extended. Nevertheless those who agreed on a contract remained with the company benefiting privileges like, credit assurance, health and emergency assistance, and a school bus for the children. It is noted that such strategy was the sugarcane company’s resistance to land reform.

Thirdly, they were troubled by inadequate financial capital for land production. The only asset they have during land acquisition was their labour.
The sugarcane ratoon complemented their inadequacies. Respondents shared that practically they had nothing when they occupied their lands.

The other pressures were the annual land payments by SESWMPC and FIBSWARB members. But both beneficiaries from the three villages were restricted by the policy to use the land title collateral on credits. The basis of land payment was the AGP or land yields computed during the process of valuation before “lands were awarded to the farmer-beneficiaries as established by the DAR and the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)” (Bureau of Agrarian Reform Information and Education 1995: 93). It implied that the yields produced by the new landowners are not considered for land payment adjustments. The clustering of ownership title pressured them on property tax payments. Some landowners gave lesser importance on taxes; thus, when the local government claimed the payments they had trouble collecting from other beneficiaries.

2.6 Induced land markets participation

The preceding section presented the input expenditures and variable labour investments of beneficiaries to lands for efficient production. Hindered by various factors failing effective land control they were induced to land market participations. The following section demonstrates the context of land markets mechanisms which provoked the new landowners to participate. For a short period the landowners were remunerated for the labours and cash investments to land.

2.6.1. Land market mechanisms

Mutual interests among the beneficiaries and the leasers stimulated the land market activities. Initial networks were established when the landowners obtained credits from the richer farmers during the first year of farming. Respondents mostly associated land transfers activities to business people, politicians and professionals who granted them informal credits. They said these farmers, who were also sugarcane planters continuously expanded sugarcane farming for the last 10 years and mostly were informal credit lenders to small farmers. Land policy restrictions prevented landowners from accessing credits to financial institutions. Informal loan agreements subsumed the obligations of both parties, including the stipulation of loan interests and the possible forfeits arrangement in cases of non repayment.

The studies of Tadem (1992) on the political economy of Mindanao alluded that land market activities was established in the island because of its huge area and soil fertility. Local and foreign corporations invested in agribusiness to pineapple, sugarcane and banana during the past 40 years supported by state policies (Tadem 1992). Other studies of Vidal (2004) cited similar activities resulting to the disenfranchisement of the Manobo in Quezon who practically owned the area. Land openings consequently lured in-migration (Tadem 1992, Vidal 2004) and subsequent, agricultural policies underlining exports in the 1970s established the sugar regime in Quezon (Tadem 1992). The establishment of the Bukidnon Sugar Mill, now BUSCO Sugar Milling Company (BSMC), had caused, not only to the eviction of the
Manobo tribe, but also change the agrarian structures and the shifting from subsistent farming to sugarcane monocropping. For instance, the state’s declaration of land ownership imbibed an authoritative arrangement to lease lands. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) accommodated the agribusiness needs for sugarcane areas. Portions of land were successfully arranged and titled; while other segments were set up for Agro-Forest Farm Lease Agreement (AFFLA) contracts to private companies (Vidal 2004).

Increasing sugar prices and its profitability stimulated the demand for lands in the province. In 1984 sugarcane land accounted only to 23,000 hectares mainly concentrated in Quezon (Tadem 1992) but expanded to 65,000 hectares of sugarcane in 2007 (Bukidnon Provincial Planning and Development Office 2007). For instance, one capitalist farmer was identified to have leased 350 hectares out of its 1,104 sugarcane area of the Manobo village. These small plots assigned to Manobos were taken over after repayment failures credit penalties. The same person took over some SESWMPC farms as repayment penalties.

2.6.2. Land market networks and participations

Most land owners from the three villages admitted to have been gradually integrated into informal land markets participation since 2004. The explanation given by the landowners can be clustered into three major determining factors which eventually lost control of their lands. First, was their incapacity to sustained farming; secondly, their gradual connection with rich sugarcane planters; and thirdly, the emergence of agribusiness promotion affecting the province.

After 3 years of sugarcane production the land owners from the three villages noticed its declining yield. The major factor was the low inputs provided on the sugarcane. Supposedly, abundant inputs results to sugarcane increase yields until its fifth year before replanting. They attributed their inefficiency to the limited loans, the increasing costs of fertilizers; inabilities to cope up the labour maintenance and the various households’ demands. Some expressed the issues of uninsured crops where undeveloped sugarcanes were burned and inhibiting landowners to regain expenses.

The participating beneficiaries’ on land rentals undoubtedly may have diverse reasons. Notwithstanding the policy restrictions, they relinquished land utilization shortly after acquisition. Such decisions demonstrated their dynamic capacity as agency whose actions are influenced by internal and external interaction of the household with the social, political and economic forces. (Allen 2004, Appendini 2001, Zoomers 2001).

Secondly, land beneficiaries’ association with the lenders, who were sugarcane planters and readily loaned cash, kindled the relationship. Land leasing arrangements followed where landowners were financially squeezed up and unable to replant sugarcanes. Land leasing was favourable with the rich farmers; like dismissing risks linked to land ownership, such as tax fees and other property rights obligations. Negotiations for land leasing were the last option undertaken by the landowners. Local pricing practices of land rentals
range from $130 to $220 (PhP 6,000 to 10,000) per hectare contingent to area location and the remoteness of the sugar mill. A respondent leased his land for 5 years expecting a substantive gain enough satisfy the household needs. Lately he realized that the 2.5 hectare rental income was attainable in two-harvests of the sugarcane.

Moreover, some optimistic farmers decided to lease their land only for 2 years anticipating of redeeming back after a few years. But they found that income from land leasing was insufficient; thus, land owners were driven for further cash credits which eventually resulted to usufruct mortgage. For instance the two Manobo clans having 428 hectares leased out the 359 hectares but gradually ended having to have it mortgaged. Despite these most landowners anticipated to redeem their land in the future.

On the other hand, the rich farmers confidently risked their cash as shown in the informal document they signed. Respondents admitted that in 2006 most lands in the three villages acquired through CARP and IPRA were governed by usufruct mortgages. Land lease prices was unregulated but the local practices allowed landowners to mortgage from $ 2,200 to $4,400 (PhP 100,000 to PhP 200,000) per hectare depending on mutual agreement; i.e. the urgent cash needed and the cash availability of the mortgagee. Some land owners received the payment through instalments. No terms were stipulated in the contract signed by the barangay officers. Informal contracts were done at the barangay level signed attested by the any available barangay officials with two witnesses. Unofficial document was preferred to deviate from policy implications of land leasing restrictions, as the beneficiaries had moratorium on land transfers.

Rich farmers were said to benefit much from usufruct mortgage, hence, lands offered even at higher price were accepted. They were assured of income from sugarcane; their cash secured and the unredeemed lands ensured them prolong farming and utilisation. The location, landscaped and aggregation of their lands were favourable complemented by the huge income because of the increasing demand and soaring sugar prices in the country. Thoroughly maintained earlier by the company, the area was convenient for machine operated implements and the sugar mill accessibility rewarded the lenders. Possessing almost complete farm machineries, adequate farm labourers and having accessed to commercial banks for capital and inputs ensured them further favourable outcome.

A respondent lamented but considered the land mortgaged decision much better than leaving the land unutilized and idle. Unlike the Manobo who retained practically their residential lots, most members of SESWMPC and FIBSWARB managed to hold a half or one hectare for cultivation, except for two members who retained the whole portion of their land for farming. In fact one of them accepted the leased from a fellow land owner and during the interview was grateful to expand his area into 5-hectare sugarcane.

Asked on the agency’s awareness of the trend in the land reform communities, the DAR provincial officer lamented on the present status of their project. He alluded to limited monitoring activities of the office because of inadequate personnel and insufficient funds and the limited support system for
the new landowners. Furthermore he indicated the supposed role of DA to the new landowners on technology was critical but the agency had similar limitation.

It can be argued from Mackintosh (1990) study on abstract and real markets that landowners participation in the land markets were responses to varied social, economic and institutional conditions that affected them. This provide enlightenment on the assumed direct inefficient-productivity outcome referred to by the WB (2003) as caused by distortions on market policies that failed most land reform programs. Moreover the WB’s policy perceived the beneficiaries as homogenous households operating as one entity to undertake the models it promoted. Furthermore, while its policy recognized the necessity of “complementary investment, training, technical assistance and provision of resources” (Ibid.: 152) for land reform to succeed, its outcome in the end are measured by its efficient-productivity views. On the other hand the studies of Appendixi (2001) on rural livelihoods pointed important considerations on the on-going transformation in the rural communities and the complexity of rural households where landowners can be investigated beyond the abstract markets but the varying context where they participate in land markets (Mackintosh 1990).

2.6.3. Aggregate leasing

Apparently another opportunity reached the villages with the entry of agribusiness corporations in the province on 2005. The influx of the corporations was strongly supported by the local officials. A respondent mentioned that some adjacent municipalities accommodated the demand by negotiating land for pineapple, palm oil, jatropha and banana plantations. Such trend can be associated with the recent agricultural policy in 2004 where the demands for land doubled in the province underscoring the “expansion of production base [that] involves the breaking out from subsistence agriculture by increasing and diversifying the marketable surplus of the farm” (National Economic and Development Authority 2004a). An overarching state policy seeking the “transformation of farmlands into agribusiness enterprises” (National Economic and Development Authority 2004b: 30) by “develop[ing] at least two million hectares of new agribusiness lands ….in order to create at least two million jobs”. (National Economic and Development Authority 2004a: 29). It prioritizes on “high-value crops, vegetables and fruits [with] have much higher-yields and income potential than the traditional staple crops of rice and corn” (National Economic and Development Authority 2004b: 29).

Implementation of the new policy totally changed the landscape of one area in the Manobo lands. At the start of 2008, the other two Manobo clans were offered by pineapple company to lease in the total area of 552 hectares. For the leaders it was an opportunity considering that it was impossible to redeem lands that were individually mortgaged by their members. A successful leasing negotiation concluded a contract with the Southern Fresh Products, Inc. (SFPI) an agribusiness company producing pineapple from Davao City, on February 2008. They said the deal was a community decision. The respondent shared that the NCIP (National Commission on Indigenous Peoples) provincial office facilitated the “free, prior and informed consent” (FPIC)
requirement based on IPRA. Company lease price was $300 (PhP 15,000) per hectare and compared with the lower pricing of sugarcane planters. They agreed to lease their land for 15 years. Thus, lands individually leased and mortgaged to sugarcane planters and lenders were redeemed by the company. In addition other loans and credits incurred by the clan members were paid-off by the company. A leader from the other clan also disclosed of some fraudulent decisions and practices of unfair sharing among its members. The same respondent confided an alleged rent-seeking provincial official even cashed out a share of $67.00 for every hectare transacted.  

Supposedly, according to a member, the $184,000 (PhP 8,500,000) income from lease was enough for capital to some village income-generating activity. However, little was left when their lands were traded in because some leased incomes were paid on land settlement redeemed from individual leasers allowing land use by the pineapple company. Nevertheless, the company complemented them by extending some favourable services, like school bus services for the Manobo children, health assistance and employment opportunities. They were promised on water and electricity services once the company stabilizes its operation. Other possible income generating projects for the elderly were promised. During the site visit it was observed that the land was modified with initial 89 hectares planted with pineapple by the 50 Manobo employed. The clan leader had arranged an infrastructure contract with the company by supplying materials like cement culverts and labour for the farm canals. Asked on some document of the agreement she replied it was kept by the NCIP provincial office.

2.6.4. Emerging trends

During the interview with the other Manobo clan, it was learned that a processing of contract documents was also taking place for an aggregate leasing of their lands with the BSMC for similar price with the pineapple company. On the other hand, leaders of the cooperatives had preliminary meeting and negotiations with SFPI Company for a possible aggregate land leasing. It was observed during the interviews, that a follow up visit of an SFPI agent with the cooperative leaders took place. The FIBSWARB final decision was requested as precondition to a settlement and final arrangements. The SESWMPC leaders had also initial meetings with the company’s representative.

Currently they were contemplating on resolving the issues related to the land policies of CARP. Specific issues which troubled them were the possibility of the LBP on deducting their land premium from the land lease income; and whether the DAR office will allow them the arrangement. Accordingly, the leaders were still bargaining for a higher lease price because, knowing the agribusiness’ demands for lands, despite having a limited land area compared with the Manobo village, they have more an advantageous location near the national highway. They were anxious if the LBP intervenes and instead negotiates directly with the company; a deduction from unpaid land premium may occur, hence, losing a speculated income. They supposed that when beneficiaries failed to pay the land premium for 8 years and each year requires $267 (PhP 13,000); a total of $2,100 (PhP 94,500) is incurred with the LBP. And if the pineapple company rented their land for $340 (PhP 15,000) per
hectare for 10 years, they expect to gain $3,400 (PhP 150,000); but when deducted by the unpaid premiums of $2,100 (PhP 94,500), only $1,200 (PhP 55,000) is left with them. Currently the members of the two cooperatives were in dilemma on how they will confront the issues.
Chapter 3  Unsecured Livelihoods: Formation and Deterioration

Having established the significance of expenditures and variable investments to lands extended by the landowners from the 3 villages and the induced participation in land markets, this chapter present and analyses the findings on the main question of this study: what are the impacts of land market participations, through lease and usufruct mortgage on the livelihoods of landowners shortly after securing a land title? Substantial social, economic and institutional determinants squeezed the landowners into land market participation, exposing not only the inadequate outcome of land redistribution reforms in the country, but the distressing effects on the unprotected land-related livelihoods of the beneficiaries.

This section explores the livelihood changes and trends of the three villages applying the elements of livelihoods and livelihood diversification. The analysis progresses within the three significant periods: pre-redistribution stage, land tenure security period and the land leasing and usufruct mortgage regimes. Three critical elements of livelihoods are demonstrated in every period: the composition of households’ assets, income-related activities and the conditions of households consumption (Ellis 2000).

The country’s land redistribution policy aimed to improve the rural lives through social and economic activities related to lands. Improved life is characterized by the households’ satisfactory reallocation of income to human needs, like food, education and health (Janvry et al. 1999). Whatever outcomes generated by the households’ participation to land markets, either livelihood enhancing or eroding (Rigg 2006) significantly affect the lives of beneficiaries. Livelihood eroding factors threaten not only the aim of land redistribution policy but eventually jeopardizing the new landowners’ livelihoods apart from obtainable positively enhancing opportunities.

3.1 Changes and trends in livelihoods

This preliminary study employs the households’ definition by Poate (1993) and Bryceson’s (2000) characterization of peasant family. The term household and family are interchangeably use because it captures some conditions of the group studied. Household is defined as a "group of people who live together and form an economic decision-making unit, the group of people who live together and have common financial arrangements for the day to day living expenses. It usually refers to a group led by one person, the household head, who is the decision maker for the household” (Poate and Daplyn 1993: 81).

And the peasant family is defined as “the internal organization based on family labour, whereby the family serves as the unit of production, consumption, reproduction, socialization, welfare and risk-spreading” (Bryceson 2000: 2). It shall also adopt the terms on farming and community where farming is an which means “agricultural livelihood which combines
subsistence production with commodity production” (Ibid: 2) and community as the “village settlement and traditionalist conformists attitude and outlook” (Ibid.).

3.1.1. Inadequate livelihoods: 1st period: (1993-2001)

Livelihoods definitions of Ellis (2000) consisted of the assets, activities and access of the rural households’ capability to live. Data collected from the three villages featured the landowners’ accounts shortly before securing their lands. The pre-land redistribution period was on 1993-2001; a preparation stage of the three villages through community organizing activities, document processing and negotiations with government agencies. The Manobo of Quezon, composed of four clans, organized themselves in 1993. They temporarily settled in unutilized one-hectare area in Nabangunan, Quezon adjacent to the land reclaimed. Similarly, the sugarcane labourers living in different estates were assisted by DAR and partner NGOs in the cooperative formation as required. Thus, FIBSWARB and SESWMPC organized themselves and processed their land claim in 1995. Simultaneously working with the plantation company, leaders intermittently met with DAR personnel.

Burdened by different factors, during such period the three communities had limited social and economic activities. The Manobo household head was said to be fortunate if it gained an income of $ 800 annually seasonal labour participation in nearby sugarcane farms. The sugarcane milling from November to May provided them a weekly income of $ 22 from sugarcane cutting and loading jobs. An addition of $ 180 is sourced out from sugarcane weeding and grass brushing from June to October. Most families practically had their labour, household members and a few kitchen wares as assets. During lean months they secured foods from relatives, organizations and with those who sympathized with them.

On the other hand, the FIBSWARB and SESWMPC were landless households drawing their income from the company. Majority had worked more than 15 years in sugarcane plantation and lived in the bunkhouses gaining $ 1000 annually. Family members with secondary education worked in semi-urban employed in trade-related labours. They benefited from the company services including water, electricity, assistance on health related problems and school transportation for children.

3.1.2. Lands and Livelihoods formation: 2nd period (2001-2004)

This period features the livelihoods creation and assets accumulation of the new landowners. Although Ellis (2000) and Zoomers (2001) argued in their studies on rural livelihoods that farming income is diminishing as the main source of rural households’ supports, an opposite view was demonstrated by the land ownership outcomes of the beneficiaries. A few years after securing their lands the beneficiaries initially established their livelihoods. Each households endeavoured efforts of consumption and production farming, hence, marketing their surplus (Bryceson 2000). They developed, enhanced and expanded human, physical, financial and social capitals practically from land production. Hence, it can be argued from the studies of Ghimire (2001: 2) on
land reform and peasant livelihoods that “with access to land, the rural poor have the possibility of access to shelter, food, employment and improved livelihoods”.

Table number 2 illustrates some evidence of gradual livelihoods organizing by the new landowners in contrast to prior land redistributions indicated in figure 1. The enhancements of these capitals allowed the households’ of social and economic activities. Assigned household lands were varied. The Manobo with 572 members allocated an average 0.75 hectare for each member while the leaders had 2 hectares from an aggregated land title. In contrast, both FIBSWARB and SESWMPC members had more than 2 hectares each and a clustered ownership on land title. They utilized marginal areas for root crops, maize and vegetables for food. Despite the several constraints, they evoked that the sugarcane ratoon complemented them during their first harvests. The incomes were used for acquiring farm implements and working animals, settled their debts and the children’s schooling. These livelihoods enhancing activities even permitted them the opportunity of another two season’s sugarcane harvests.

Table 2. Summary of developed and enhanced households’ capitals of the 3 villages (2001-2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Livelihood factors</th>
<th>QUEMTRAS (572 households or HH)</th>
<th>FIBSWARB (66 HH)</th>
<th>SESWMPC (52 HH)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Household Asset</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Human Capital</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Educational level of HH (households) members</td>
<td>Secondary, Technical courses taken</td>
<td>Secondary, Technical and College level</td>
<td>Secondary, Technical and College level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. New skills developed</td>
<td>Few numbers on construction works (carpentry and masonry), trade labors</td>
<td>Many on construction works, some have vehicle for public passenger, drivers, fishing</td>
<td>Few on construction works, motorcycle use for public transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Natural Capital</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Average land owned (hectares)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>2.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Average land cultivated (hectares)</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financial Capital &amp; substitute</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Livestock holdings</td>
<td>Many HH owned livestock (including goats, swine, cattle)</td>
<td>Most HH owned livestock (including goats, swine, cattle)</td>
<td>Most HH owned livestock (including goats, swine, cattle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Few HH owned working oxen/bullocks for farm work</td>
<td>Many HH owned working oxen/bullocks for farm work</td>
<td>All HH owned working oxen/bullocks for farm work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Capital-build up in cooperative &amp; its incentives</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>All HH heads had shares invested in the coop</td>
<td>All HH heads had shares invested in the coop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Physical Capital</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Housing quality</td>
<td>Many had semi-permanent shelter (GI sheets, lumber and cement)</td>
<td>Mostly had semi-permanent shelter (GI sheets, lumber and cement)</td>
<td>Mostly had semi-permanent shelter (GI sheets, lumber and cement)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
b. Access to water (pipeline) | None | None | None
---|---|---|---
c. Access to Electricity | None | None | All HH have access
d. Farm machine and implements | Few HH | Most HH owned farm equipments | Most HH owned farm equipments
e. Transport Vehicle/motorcycle | Few HH owned motorcycle and jinney | Few HH owned motorcycle and jinney | Few HH owned motorcycle
f. Small store/non-farm self-employment | Many HH participated | Many HH participated | Many HH participated

5. Social Capital

a. Cooperative Membership | None | All are coop members | All are coop members
b. Access/Partnership with government agencies | NCIP/DSWD/DA/DepEd/LGU/DOLE | DAR/LGU/CDA | DAR/LGU/CDA/DOLE

Source: Documents from PAHRD and community provided during the Fieldnotes

The following table demonstrates one significant outcome of farming activity of the landowners, the sugarcane income. Sugarcane production was considered as a critical asset for the beneficiaries furnishing their main source of income for years. Land tenure security granted them opportunities of capitalizing the sugarcane ratoon.

Table 3. A sample Record of Gross Income statement from sugarcane production

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Planter (SESWMP C members)</th>
<th>Sugarcane production (Hectare)</th>
<th>Cane Loads (12 tons per truck load)</th>
<th>Can e Net Weight (ton)</th>
<th>Quedan (% of cane sucrose as basis of production sale)</th>
<th>Sale of Sugar @ PhP 500 (Philippine currency) per LKG</th>
<th>Molasses sale (in Philippine currency)</th>
<th>Trucking Allowance (in Philippine currency)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Felix Bones</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>69.6 26</td>
<td>85.41</td>
<td>40,145.00 ($ 892.11)</td>
<td>1,605.3 8</td>
<td>2,645.7 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norma Cadelina</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>34.8 95</td>
<td>41.10</td>
<td>20,550.00 ($ 456.66)</td>
<td>1,103.8 6</td>
<td>977.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Weekly Planters' Report and Check Voucher & Quedan Liquidation Statement (refer to Appendix 1 & 2)

Information on table 3 was extracted from SESWMP members' 2006 record of sugarcane income. They retained and farmed a portion of their sugarcane land. Data shows both planters harvested sugarcane from corresponding farm, like 0.5 and 1 hectare and each produced 6 and 3 cane loads separately based on a 12-ton average weight per truck load. Sugarcane processing output is called the quedan which is weighted in LKG equivalent to a 50-kilogram bag, described as the raw sugar milling recovery. Although, sugar prices fluctuated, conforming local price during the processing is $11 (PhP 500) per LKG or 50-kilogram of sugar and both planters had their corresponding income. They got additional cash from molasses sale and trucking allowance. The planter’s record demonstrates other information like the quality sugarcane yields, for instance, a hectare of sugarcane with enough fertilizer inputs and effectively maintained normally yields 12 truck loads at a maximum of 20 tons per load.
Table 3 further illustrates a poor quality of sugarcane, thus, a lesser income. Planter’s record also manifests the sharing between the mill and the planter; 64% of sugar for the planter while the mill takes the 36%. Sugarcane income permitted the landowners for livelihood diversification and improved their living during those years. Although sugarcane farming is prolonged, its periodic income is enormous compared with other crops. Some respondents admitted of learning households’ budgeting from delayed sugarcane harvests. Favourably, the bulk of income, allowed them to buy important households and farm equipments as well as working animals. Some respondents shared that higher level of education were gained by family members through sugarcane income. They ascribed their assets and capitals, like houses, children’s education, livestock, households’ equipments; cooperative capital shares, vegetable seeds and fertilizers inputs to sugarcane income. However, negatively it also drives the households into series of debts unless they maintained their livestock, vegetables and root crops farming for consumption and other needs.

Respondents admitted of profiting not only from cash but augmented human and social capitals. They established networks with sympathetic agencies, like the Manobo members requesting the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) for additional shelter materials, because of lesser income, and participated in technical training provided by TESDA on masonry and carpentry. On the other hand, FIBSWARB and SESWMPC had engaged with CDA on cooperative management and DOLE office for income-related projects. They linked with the DA but insufficient budget constrained its support with landowners.

Exposed to various social and economic activities, the landowners developed and enhanced their income-generating potentials. Consequently, many allocated sugarcane income for non-farm self-employment activities like tending the store, raising ducks for egg production, livestock raising, vegetables and root crops selling within the sugar mill areas. FGD participants acknowledged that land tenure freed them from livelihood uncertainties and burden associated with landlessness. Some Manobo women complemented households’ lesser sugarcane income from small stores and livestock while attending to household works. Root crops and vegetables growing not only supplied them food but developed their basic skills in selling, hence an additional household income. A leader disclosed that during lean months younger family members work to semi-urban for construction-related jobs, store-tending and domestic labours to support the family needs. El-Ghonemy (2007: 40) cited in his studies that land reform is also measured in terms of landowners’ “incremental income and their command over their households food needs”.

Moreover, networking facilitated household members to work in the sugar mill during the off-milling season. Usually the company prepares its machines for annual milling from June to October, simultaneously waiting for the sugarcane harvests. During this period, they work either as machines cleaners or in the arrastre-related work which transport limes use for milled white sugar. A day’s earned of $ 5 (PhP 220.00) contributed to family income.
A combination of factors must have influenced the consequent trend of land alienation among the landowners but the 3 years of sugarcane farming, undoubtedly, provided significant livelihood enhancing changes from landlessness. Some factors are associated with unmodified cropping patterns caused by unavailable irrigation and the insufficient reinvestments to sugarcane. The absence of state supports aggravated further their conditions gradually threatening their livelihoods (Ellis 2000). Notwithstanding these, the landowners employed social capitals by integrating with the land market participations. It can be argued, however, from Ellis’ (2000) view that the process either drive them to wealth accumulation or further impoverishments.

3.1.3. Land alterations and livelihood withdrawals: 3rd period (2005-2008)

Land leasing and usufruct mortgage regimes stimulated further livelihood diversification (Ellis 2000) among the former landowners; notably changed asset set-up, shifted income-related activities and modified strategies in accessing other capitals. Proceeds gained critically dominated households’ decisions on perceived livelihoods. Ostensibly, the social and economic local conditions remained crucial on their options and reinforced either success or failure of their pursuit. It is argued from Zoomers’ (2001: 15) view that such changes were landowners’ “adaptation to ever-changing internal and external circumstances”. Apparently land alienation reduced their holdings; the Manobo households mostly retained their residential lots while the FIBSWARB and SESWMPC members ingeniously held either 0.5 or 1 hectare. During the site visits it was observed that a number of houses were abandoned. A respondent commented that some households left their houses while some Manobo houses were rented by migrant non-tribal.61

Landowners accessed diverse assets and organized different activities not only because of the dissimilar amount gained from leased and mortgage but have demonstrated households’ heterogeneity (Zoomers 2001) in survival strategies. They significantly remembered 2005 as the start of land alienations. Despite these, they were conscious of its imminent problems, like losing land utilization and land size reduction implying a forfeited income from sugarcane. They were also anxious of the restrictions entailed on land policy and the premium payments to LBP. On the other hand, they realized their helplessness and inability to effectively control the lands.

Four respondents living in outside the village disclosed of securing paddy field in exchange for sugarcane lands. They said that rice fields were more manageable; its soil required lesser inputs, despite its laboriousness it ensured them consumption in few months. Compared with sugarcane income they admitted to slight difference with rice growing. The absence of irrigation prevented them from converting their cane lands because earthworks was beyond their capacity (Roth and Smith 1995).

Leasing incomes of beneficiaries were invested on physical capitals like paddy machine cultivators and small stores. Some households engaged in non-farm self-employments, like producing and trading household accessories. Some bought livestock as working animals while others spent on
hospitalization and marriage of household members. The others supported household members' bid for urban and foreign employment while others opted for motorcycles-related self-employments. Alluding to anticipated returns, some households considered migration as means of fulfilling family goals and priorities (Zoomers 2001), as they perceived from workers abroad. Some beneficiaries accessed motorbikes through low instalment payments offered by commercial stores. Motorcycles are locally hired for transportation as popularly practiced in the municipality. They said its income promptly provided households’ daily needs. But most household allotted cash for education, paid their land premium with the LBP, settled pasts credits and loans while the others had improved their houses. The beneficiaries however admitted of ineffective utilization of land lease incomes into secured livelihoods. They said of spending on unproductive assets or ‘dead investments’ like cell phones, televisions and unnecessary household accessories.

3.1.3.1. Changes in consumption trends
Landowners who earlier utilized marginal areas for vegetables and crops had converted into maize production as land sizes reduced. They further anticipated a larger income from maize because of increased demands by poultry raisers. Agribusiness establishments in the province had increased food demands, like meat and eggs because plantation workers with regular income had also increased. Thus, households’ who retained their areas shifted to monocropping but they said to experienced harvest failures because of price fluctuations, increasing input prices and the absence of appropriate maize storage. Untreated maize was easily damaged during rainy seasons. Moreover most households shifted their consumption patterns. They admitted of relying on commercial foods. They failed to realize that vegetables and root crops farming, despite its small income, ensured the households food.

3.1.3.2. Livelihoods risks and vulnerabilities
Securities of livelihoods according to Ellis (2000) are indicated on the income level and its stability as well as the sustainability of non-farm and off-farm activities tackled and the degree of overcoming livelihood risks and vulnerabilities. Furthermore, secured livelihoods can refer to “the maintenance or enhancement of the productivity of resources on a long-term basis” (Zoomers 2001).

Observations noted during the FGD and site visits unveiled apparent livelihood insecurities by former landowners, despite not having articulated. Insistent and quick negotiations for aggregate land leasing by the three villages demonstrated an evident livelihood difficulties currently experienced by landowners. They were taking advantage on the opportunity of current land demands by the agribusinesses. Respondents disclosed that preliminary meetings between the pineapple company and the SESWMPC and FIBSWARB leaders were held. The competition for land supply pressured the BUSCO sugar mill company to negotiate with the other Manobo clans. The available 428 hectares ensures the sugar mill of sustained operation otherwise
the speedy land conversions of sugarcane lands to banana, pineapple and jatropha, force them to shut down.

Except for those landowners who leased in rice lands, most landowners presently experienced unstable and unsecured livelihoods. During the FGD and the interviews, the options for self-employment, non-farm works and its seasonality admittedly were not providing better opportunities and oftentimes denied the households’ needs. A landowner shared her unfortunate fate on buying motorcycle. Paid through instalments her inability for succeeding payments forfeited the ownership by its confiscation. They realized that many of them fall into such trap of motorcycle company’s instalment offers. Inadequate entrepreneurial skills also failed those who initiated on non-farm self-employment trading. Two other respondents confided that attempted foreign jobs ended up deceived by recruiters and were pressured for additional credit to support members awaiting employments. Social and economic local conditions affected the livelihoods strategies in post leasing regimes. Zoomers (2001) also argued that strategy outcomes undertaken by landowners critically depended on “the family’s goals and priorities” (Zoomers 2001: 15). Moreover, the widespread promotion and sale of technology in the country influenced the economic decisions of the landowners.

Comparing their earlier livelihoods, most respondents considered sugarcane production more desirable than current livelihoods. When they learned of the opportunities from the aggregate leasing of the two Manobo clans, the other village members also negotiated for aggregate leasing with agribusinesses. First, they contend that aggregate leasing with the company is advantageous by the redemption of lands mortgaged. Second, they said that whatever arrangements planned by the bank on premium deduction, they still expect some possible income. Thirdly, while employments are probable, they anticipated more on regaining lands back after lease expiration with the agribusiness. Finally, with the agribusiness competition and demands of lands, they speculated a better lease price. This is, in the end, an interesting outcome, as in the first instance we expected a more negative consequence.

The support and assistance through assessment and regular monitoring of DAR and the NCIP agencies during these periods essentially could avert possible failure of the landowners’ recreation of future livelihoods. While the landowners had their plans, enlightened direction were necessary on the success and its overcoming of risks and vulnerabilities.
Conclusion

A deep concern about rural development in the Philippines and the challenges of post land reform outcomes accorded the background which motivated this study. The transformative outcomes in the post land reform period are illustrated from the preceding chapters. The findings uncovered the experiences of land beneficiaries from the three villages of Quezon by utilizing land policy and livelihoods concepts as framework. Land policy objectives of CARP and IPRA were partially attained when beneficiaries secured land ownerships. Unprepared but motivated beneficiaries successfully gained their land titles. It demonstrated that the rural poor are undoubtedly determined in making their lives better beyond the status of landless. Despite the limited and short preparation, and relying mainly on their labour capitals they cultivated their lands as pursuing the opportunities expected from land tenure towards changing their lives.

Human and social capital facilitated the new landowners in accessing loans from informal credit markets despite soaring interest rates, and fertilizer inputs invested into newly acquired lands. The land inputs complemented their labour efforts of exploiting the existing sugarcane ratoon. Insufficient but available households’ capital manifested the beneficiaries’ potential capacity to productively utilize their lands. However, in contrast to dominant assumptions, these land titles did not guarantee incentives for landowners to invest in lands because land policy restrictions inhibited them of accessing the needed credits from formal financial institutions. Notwithstanding these, the partial investments to land produced a positive outcome through their income from sugarcane production. Early income from sugarcane allowed the new landowners of reorganizing their livelihoods. The security of tenure improved the family welfare like food security, construction of houses, acquiring farm implements and working animals, supporting education of children and reinvesting inputs to lands. Thus, beneficiaries' livelihoods were partially established.

Indeed, the state agencies and NGOs successfully facilitated the organization of a cohesive community among the land beneficiaries. However, initial livelihoods started by the landowners were confronted by rather insecure social, economic and institutional factors. After three years of sugarcane production landowners failed to raise the substantial amount needed for the next sugarcane replanting. The beneficiaries’ situation was aggravated by the deficiency of state support to production which was crucial of attaining the land reform objectives. Unavailable training services on appropriate farming, loan and credit guarantees and market insurance of products failed to complement the livelihoods of the land reform beneficiaries. It was made difficult by the insufficient state budget and inadequacy of personnel hindering the monitoring of beneficiaries and land conditions. Moreover, agricultural policies implemented such as within the structural adjustment program and the recent MTPDP subsumed the underlying importance of rural livelihoods and poverty reduction goals of land redistribution. The complementary state
support was supposedly protecting the livelihood organization of beneficiaries from land redistribution, but in reality did not at least not sufficiently.

Furthermore, economic forces and competition for land supply dominated the landowners’ conditions failing to secure newly organized livelihoods. The lenders who were also sugarcane planters indeed delivered fertilizer and financial credits to the beneficiaries but they were more interested on the sugarcane land of the beneficiaries. Furthermore, the influx of various agribusinesses in the province increased the demands for lands. Strongly supported by the recent MTPDP state policy the initial livelihood gains of the beneficiaries were undermined. These factors facilitated the gradual integration of landowners in land markets.

Moreover, with the determination to survive the landowners took advantage of their land through leasing and mortgaging usufruct. Despite losing control of their lands the income from land leasing allowed them to diversify their livelihoods through non-farm self-employment opportunities. Land transfer incomes were allocated to access alternative capital perceived to generate income, like paddy land, small stores, livestock raising, motorcycle transporting and migratory employment. The majority allotted their income to consumption, education and other household accessories. Beneficiaries land exchange with other capital in an earlier stage allowed them to adjust their income-generating activities. Some had enhanced their human, financial and physical capital. However, the livelihoods adopted by the beneficiaries failed to sustain the households’ incomes and gradually losing some of their assets. The situation pushed the beneficiaries to take advantage of the current agribusinesses demands for land by leasing aggregately their area. The shift towards immediate negotiations on aggregate leasing demonstrated the beneficiaries’ insecurities of their current livelihoods.

In conclusion, similar elements observed by Lipton, after 34 years, re-emerged in the trajectories of land reform beneficiaries in Quezon. Beneficiaries gained lands and regained other assets during land alterations. The new landowners profited from land market participations by reorganizing their livelihoods. But the continuing absence of state monitoring failed to facilitate appropriate interventions which could avert imminent livelihood vulnerabilities of the beneficiaries. The current livelihood conditions of the beneficiaries underscore the state’s rural development perspective. Unprotected livelihoods initially organized by land reform beneficiaries demand rethinking of the land redistribution objectives. The enduring deficiency of appropriate state interventions on the trajectory of land reform beneficiaries implies further marginalization of the rural poor in the development efforts of the country, if the post-land reform position of beneficiaries in highly insecure market is not fundamentally revisited.
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Endnotes:

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2 David, Randy. (2008) PDI, Philippines
http://opinion.inquirer.net/inquireropinion/columns
4 VOS land acquisition under CARP: voluntary-offer-to-sell scheme encourages landlord cooperation by giving them incentive when they voluntarily cooperate with the program, i.e. additional 5% in cash portion of the payment
5 Antonio Floriendo Sr., owner of TADECO, a supplier of fruits currently expanding pineapple plantation in Bukidnon province.
http://www.philsol.nl/A02a/Borras
6 Focus Group Discussion (FGD) was done on August 8, 2008 at SESWMPC with 22 participants, while 24 FIBSWARB participants were interviewed from July 25-30, 2008 and the interview with 7 Manobo members was on August 1-2, 5, 2008 in Quenstras village
7 Fieldnotes: FGD, Renato Abante
8 Fieldnotes: FGD
9 Philippine private companies pay its workers’ security and pension through the SSS
10 Fieldnotes interview: Romeo Cancellor, FIBSWARB on Sugarcane Growers’ Association of Bukidnon, Inc (SGABI)
11 Exchange rate used $1=PhP 45 (Philippine currency)
12 Fieldnotes: FGD
13 Fieldnotes: FGD, Estrella Benos
14 Fieldnotes: FGD
15 Sugar sale based on sucrose percentage
16 Fieldnotes: FGD, Antonio Caingles
17 Fieldnotes: FGD, Salvador Verbo
18 Fieldnotes interview: Rosita Alugan, QUEMTRAS
19 Fieldnotes interview: Vicky Tuazon, QUEMTRAS
20 Fieldnotes interview: Julito Dura, FIBSWARB
21 Fieldnotes: FGD
22 Fieldnotes: FGD
23 Fieldnotes: FGD
24 Fieldnotes: FGD
25 Fieldnotes: FGD
26 Fieldnotes interview: Vicky Tuazon
27 Fieldnotes interview: Norberto Amora, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer, August 11, 2008, Malaybalay
28 Fieldnotes interview: Teodoro Quilongquilong, FIBSWARB
29 Fieldnotes: FGD
30 Fieldnotes: FGD
31 Kiokong was earlier the Manobo name of Quezon

32 Fieldnotes interview: Datu Carlito Anglao, QUEMTRAS lead-claimant

33 Fieldnotes interview: Datu Conrado Suminao, QUEMTRAS

34 Fieldnotes interview: Rosita Alugan

35 CARP and IPRA laws prohibit the sale or renting of awarded land

36 Fieldnotes: FGD

37 A lease arrangement on land with moneylenders in exchange for loan

38 Fieldnotes interview: Datu Sawan Subog, QUEMTRAS

39 Fieldnotes: FGD

40 Fieldnotes interview: Pedro Puerto, FIBSWARB owner of 1 hectare sugarcane usufruct mortgaged with Mr Boeh for $2,300 (PhP 100,000)

41 Fieldnotes: FGD

42 Fieldnotes: FGD

43 Fieldnotes: FGD, Danilo Cagaanan, SESWMPC

44 Fieldnotes interview: Norberto Amora, DAR

45 Fieldnotes interview: Emmanuel Salapang, FIBSWARB

46 Refer to Figure 1: provincial land distribution

47 Fieldnotes interview: Datu Carlito Anglao

48 Fieldnotes interview: Datu Conrado Suminao

49 Fieldnotes interview: Datu Lataran Manahan, QUEMTRAS

50 Fieldnotes interview: Ole Manahan, wife of Lataran

51 Fieldnotes interview: Datu Carlito Anglao

52 Fieldnotes: FGD

53 Fieldnotes: FGD

54 Fieldnotes from PAHRD documents, August 22, 2008, Valencia City

55 Fieldnotes from PAHRD

56 Fieldnotes interview: Vicky Tuazon

57 Fieldnotes: FGD

58 Raw sugar milling recovery (LKG)– is a measure of raw sugar production yield in bags http://www.pse.org.ph/html/ListedCompanies

59 Fieldnotes: FGD

60 Fieldnotes interview: Salvador Dione, FIBSWARB

61 Fieldnotes interview: Vicky Tuazon

62 Fieldnotes: FGD

63 Fieldnotes: FGD

64 Fieldnotes: FGD, Teresa Sipora,

65 Fieldnotes interview: Felipe Branzuela, Regina Manguardia, FIBSWARB

66 Fieldnotes: FGD