POLITICAL IMPACT OF CONSCRIPTION

Author

Papadakis Iason [659032]

Date

July 15, 2023

Supervisor

dr. Benoit Crutzen

Second assessor

dr. Sacha Kapoor

MASTER THESIS POLICY ECONOMICS

Contents

Abstract

The current war between Russia and Ukraine has ignited preexisting debates about the abolition or reintroduction of conscription in various European nations. This study analyses the relationship between conscription and the possibility of voting for an extreme right-wing party, as well as its association with different ideological traits. The study compares cohorts of men who were conscripted just prior to the abolition of conscription to individuals who reached conscription age after its abolition and thus were not conscripted, in 11 European countries. This study employs a rigorous Regression Discontinuity Design methodology to generate robust findings. The findings indicate that conscription may increase the likelihood of anti-immigrant and pro-authoritarian sentiments which, in turn, may increase the possibility of radical right voting, although this relationship remains complex and varies across countries.

Introduction

"Peace cannot be kept by force. It can only be achieved by understanding."

-Albert Einstein , 14 December 1930[1]-

The political consequences of military conscription have long been a prominent subject of public debates among policymakers, politicians, and scholars (*Goldsmith, 2003; Leander, 2004; Warner & Asch, 2001*). The decision to abolish conscription is purely political and depends on domestic and international factors. Understanding the potential effects of the existence and duration of conscription on political beliefs is crucial for informed decision-making on the matter. The ongoing war between Ukraine and Russia which triggered a massive humanitarian crisis has turned the spotlight on the topic of military conscription. Politicians from different parts of the political spectrum all across Europe have relatively recently mentioned the reintroduction of mandatory military service in their respective countries. Reportedly, in Germany, members from all SPD, CDU & AFD, parties that are traditionally considered center-left, center-right, and extreme-right wing (ERW) respectively, have openly brought back "conscription" as a topic in the political agendas (*Janjevic, 2018)*. The recent reinstatement of military conscription in Russia-bordering European countries, Sweden and Lithuania, only accentuates this effect (*Jakštaitė, & Česnakas, 2015; Oltermann,2017).*

---

[1] From a speech to the New History Society, reprinted in " Militant Pacifism" in Cosmic Religion (Einstein & Shaw, 2012).

Additionally, the rise of extreme-right-wing parties in Europe has gathered significant attention and concern in the academic and political sphere (*Mudde, 2016; Minkenberg, 2017).* The increasing influence of ERW political parties in the 21st century intensifies the need for a more careful approach toward militarization. One of the main arguments behind the necessity of analyzing the rise of right-wing radicalism is the need to defend democratic nations from such parties as they could turn extremely violent and give rise to terrorism, paramilitarism, and organized crime (*Taylor, Holbrook & Currie, 2013; Tsoutsoumpis, 2018).*

If conscription is found to increase the likelihood of individuals voting for ERW parties, this would have a negative "weight" for the cost-benefit analysis of reintroducing conscription in countries that have previously abolished it. Conversely, it would have a positive "weight" for the cost-benefit analysis of European countries that currently have conscription and are considering its abolition (*Jehn & Selden, 2002).* In the scenario that conscription is found to have a non-significant or even a negative effect on the probability that an individual supports an ERW party, an informative message is still sent to policymakers. By no means, such a result could provide support to the idea that policymakers and politicians can safely reinstate, abolish or change the structure of conscription without worrying about the potential political impact, both domestically and internationally. It would just turn any discussion on the matter less ideology-driven and more evidence-based. In conclusion, the answer to the question "*Does conscription promote support for extreme right-wing parties*?" is of substantial interest from a policy-making perspective as the influence of mandatory military service on political attitudes has, or at least should have, a significant impact on any policy decisions related to the topic.

Causality Channels

Examining conscription systems purely as a state's defense mechanism offers an inadequate approach to assessing their implications. The theoretical framework for this research is built on the premise that military conscription can influence political attitudes and behaviors by isolating young citizens from society during a critical period of their upbringing and for a significant amount of time (*Jackson et al., 2012, 271*). Before attempting to empirically address the research question, it is essential to explore why conscription might influence political views, particularly in fostering far-right sentiments. I have identified several channels through which conscription could provide support for ERW parties and some others that could work oppositely. These channels also serve as the primary literature review for this study.

National identity

The main way that military service is linked to the support of ERW parties is through the encouragement of a strong sense of national identity and patriotic beliefs among conscripts (*Janowitz, 1976; Moskos, 1981*). In many cases, conscription is applied as a tool for nation-building as it establishes a common civic identity among compatriots (*Nasr, 2021; Kronsell & Svedberg, 2001*). In times of nationalism, it served as "a great national school" (*Krebs, 2004*). This sense of brotherhood could potentially lead to distrust of outsiders and create an " us vs them" mentality (*Mackie, Maitner & Smith, 2016; Kite, Whitley & Wagner p.67, 2022*). In this case, the outsiders could be immigrants, and as conscripted individuals are more likely to identify with and respect values that existed during their conscription period, maybe they could root for political parties that embrace nationalism.

In general, scholars agree that populist radical right-wing parties share an ideology that emphasizes populism, nativism, authoritarianism, national identity, and security (*Mudde, 2015*; *Hanley, 2008, Rydgren; 2008*). Thus, one could safely assume that individuals who seek the representation of their nationalistic views could provide support to radical right-wing parties.

Institutional Compliance

Any military institution, structured within a hierarchy of obedience, is heavily dependent on the adherence to regulations and commands by the enlisted personnel and conscripts (*Huntington, 1981; Arkin & Dobrofsky, 1978*). Thus, an aspect of conscription involves that the individual submits to the authority, which may lead to a conformist approach in life. This hypothesis aligns with Orak's & Walker's (*2021*) research findings, who argue that military service could potentially turn young adults into more law-abiding and less likely to exhibit delinquent behavior. Individuals undergoing conscription, conditioned towards obedience and respect for authority, could experience a transition into a similar lifestyle after their service. These traits could potentially lead to a higher tolerance for authoritarian and totalitarian regimes and for radical right parties which often embrace authoritarian principles.

Furthermore, conscription has been shown to diminish the relationship between an individual and their government, weakening the rate of institutional trust (*Bove, Leo & Giani, 2022*). Greater focus should be directed toward the behavioral shift of individuals who have experienced a decline in their trust in democratic institutions due to conscription. That could increase support for anti-establishment and anti-status quo rhetoric that is often used by ERW parties as a means to challenge the existing political system.

Education and earnings

Another channel that relates conscription with xenophobia and nationalism is the following: mandatory military service can lead to lower levels of education and reduced lifetime earnings for conscripts, which may, in turn, increase the likelihood of individuals voting for ERW parties. Studies have shown that conscripts have a 4% lower chance of obtaining a university degree and experience a long-term negative effect on their income of 3-4%, even 18 years after their conscription (*Hubers & Webbink, 2015*). Similarly, the abolition of conscription in the UK led to increased earnings and education by a quarter of a year (*Buonanno, 2006*). The second part of the argument is based on evidence that in Western Europe, individuals with lower levels of education are more likely to vote for ERW parties (*Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002*). The authors also argue that unemployed individuals are more likely to vote for ERW parties. Even though there is no clear evidence that conscription leads to higher levels of unemployment, a hypothesis as such is solid as it is well established that education lowers unemployment probability on an individual level (*OECD, 2020*). Thus, the potential negative impact of conscription on educational attainment and income may contribute to increased support for ERW parties among affected individuals. On the other hand, there are channels through which conscription could make individuals less likely to support extreme right-wing parties.

Exposure to diversity

Exposure to diversity through military conscription can foster open-mindedness and promote greater tolerance of others' political and social views. Conscripts in the military are selected randomly from a diverse population, unlike cohorts of colleagues or coworkers in other sectors where randomization is absent. Contact theory, first introduced by Allport (*1954*), suggests that when majority and minority group members interact under suitable circumstances, such as having common goals and tasks, their prejudiced attitudes can be diminished (*Lowe, 2021*). This is confirmed by a more recent study which provides evidence that being randomly assigned to complete military service outside of one's region of residence promotes contact with conscripts from other regions, increasing sympathy towards people from the region of service (*Bagues & Roth, 2020*).

Furthermore, from the mass conscription of Irishmen in the American Civil War to the great involvement of conscripted immigrants in WWI, the conscription of immigrants is not a rare phenomenon historically (*Anbinder, 2006; Mazumder, 2019)*. To this day, Latinos and African Americans contribute greatly to the active military personnel of the U.S.A while most European countries that still have mandatory military service, i.e. Finland and Switzerland, do not make

any exceptions for immigrants (*Lutz, 2008; Act on the Defense Forces, 2007. Finland; Federal Assembly of the Swiss Confederation, 2020).* These kinds of race-inclusive conscription policies are indirectly "forcing" individuals with racist beliefs to socialize with immigrants, potentially leading to the challenging of their prejudices and decreasing support for radical right-wing political parties that promote xenophobic policies.

Shortcomings of hierarchical systems

According to social identity theory, first introduced by Henri Tajfel (*1974*), individuals identify greatly with a group and obtain a sense of pride from that identity. However, if the individual has negative experiences within that group, they may reject the values associated with the group, as they may no longer view those values as representing their own identity (*Hogg & Knippenberg, 2003).* This realization, concerning the inefficiencies in an authoritarian military environment, which shapes social identity could also affect political identity (*Huddy, 2001*). Conscripts with negative experiences could change their beliefs about the positive role of the military and authority as their views are not validated by their experiences and do not represent them anymore.

An alternative psychological mechanism that validates this hypothesis is the legitimacy theory, which suggests not only that authority cannot be imposed by institutions without a certain level of legitimacy but also that an individual's perception of injustice can influence their perception of legitimacy (*Tyler, 2006; Hegtvedt & Johnson, 2000).* Thus, conscripts that perceive their service as oppressive and unfair could, in turn, alter their perception of legitimacy toward authority and order.

In sum, if conscripts experience the deficiencies, oppressiveness, and unjustness of highly hierarchical and disciplinary systems of order, that could lead to the rejection of established authority and diminish support for political groups who advocate for authoritarianism and strict social order. This way, negative conscription experience could lead to a decrease in support of ERW parties.

Data

To establish a robust methodology, it is necessary to integrate and compile various sources of data. The primary dataset used in this analysis is the European Values Survey (EVS), a cross-national survey that explores "basic human values". Specifically, the 5th wave of this survey, conducted between 2017 and 2021, is employed, encompassing 474 different variables on 59,438 cases across 36 territories (*EVS, 2022*). All micro-level characteristics of individuals,

such as nationality, age, political beliefs, various ideological traits, and other control variables used in the analysis, were extracted from this survey. Moreover, data regarding the individuals were also obtained from the same survey. Secondly, the categorization of political parties as extreme right-wing was based on expert assessments, sourced from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey. For this particular analysis, the 2019 survey was utilized, which involved 421 experts evaluating 277 parties across all EU countries (*Jolly et al., 2022*). Thirdly, data about cross-national army structure, conscription age, and the dates of the abolition of conscription were obtained from the Military recruitment data set compiled by Toronto Nathan and the World Factbook compiled by the CIA. (*Toronto, 2017; Toronto, 2005; CIA, 2020*). Finally, data about Armed forces Personnel in each sample country were sourced from the World Bank and the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Methodology

Identification strategy

The study of Bove, Di Leo, and Giani (*2022*) serves as a starting point for the empirical strategy I plan to use. To identify the causal effect of conscription on voting behavior, I will employ a regression discontinuity design (RDD), that has been used not only by Cavaille and Marshall but also by Bove et al. to exploit quasi-random variation due to reforms in schooling and conscription respectively. This approach was first proposed by Thistlethwaite & Campbell (*1960*) as a methodology to estimate treatment effects in a non-experimental setting where the assignment of treatment is determined by whether a particular observed variable surpasses a designated threshold. Frequently designated as the 'silver standard' in the realm of research designs, the RDD is widely recognized as a robust alternative to randomized experiments, its superiority over ordinary least squares regression being well-established. This quasi-experimental method capitalizes on the discontinuity created by the abolition of conscription. Cohorts of men reaching the conscription age just before and after the abolition of conscription will be treated as control and treatment groups respectively. This will allow for the isolation of the impact of conscription on the probability of voting for extreme-right-wing parties while accounting for potential country-specific characteristics.

The model for the regression equation of this analysis will take the following form:

$$Vote_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * D_i + \varepsilon_i, \text{ (with weights } W_i)\tag{1}$$

- The dependent variable is $Vote_i$ and represents whether individual i has voted for an extreme right-wing party. This is a binary variable, where the value 1 indicates a vote for an ERW party and 0 indicates otherwise.

- The independent variable of interest is D_i, which is a proxy of the treatment assignment variable that takes negative values if an individual has been conscripted, and non-negative values if they were not. D_i is calculated by estimating the difference between the year individual 'i' reached conscription age and the year of the conscription reform. If this value is negative, it means that the individual reached the conscription age before the reform while a non-negative value indicates they reached the conscription age after the reform.

- The coefficients β_0 and β_1 are the parameters to be estimated. β_0 is the intercept or the baseline probability of voting for an ERW party when D_i is zero (i.e., at the cut-off). β_1 is the main coefficient of interest and reflects the effect of the reform on the likelihood of voting for an ERW party.

- The weights W_i used are the product of two types of weights: individual and population-size weights. Individual weights are aimed to align certain socio-demographic traits observed in the sample population with the distribution of these characteristics within the target population. These weights have been calculated using the marginal distribution of variables such as Age, Sex, Education, and Region. Population-size weights are used to standardize individual weights, particularly when analyzing data from two or more countries collectively so that the comparison is meaningful. These weights are calculated by using the following formula: target population size/(sample size*10.000).

- ε_i is the error term, accounting for unexplained variation in voting behaviour of the individual.

This model aims to see if there's a discontinuity or "jump" in the likelihood of voting for an ERW party at the cutoff point (i.e., the reform year). The discontinuity would suggest that reaching the age of conscription post-abolition, (i.e. non-negative D_i values), thus not being conscripted, has a different effect on voting behavior compared to reaching conscription age pre-abolition (i.e. negative D_i values), thus being conscripted. If β_1 is statistically significant, it would suggest that conscription has a causal impact on voting for an ERW party.

Independent variable
The prime goal is to compare men conscripted just before the reform took place with those who reached conscription age right after the legislation came into effect. In order to identify the treatment and control group I generate a variable that measures the conscription year of an

individual based on their birth year and the conscription age as mandated by their respective countries. This number is then subtracted from the reform year that legislation came into effect for each country to generate a variable that shows the distance between their conscription year and the year of the reform. In simpler terms, if this number is negative (e.g. D_i = -2 it means that they reached the conscription age two years before the reform came into effect, while D_i = 2 means that they reached the conscription age two years after the reform came into effect). If D_i = 0 the individual reached the conscription age the year the reform came into effect.

In a perfect data world, we would have information about whether an individual was actually conscripted or not but unfortunately, we need to use the birth year as an approximation of whether an individual went in the army or not. The possibility of individuals evading military service poses a significant concern for our identification strategy, which will be discussed in the Discussion-Limitations section. To mitigate this concern, I implement several exclusion criteria based partially on the methodology employed in the original study of Bove et al. *(2022)*. Specifically, I exclude individuals who fall into the following categories: (1) those who self-identify as professional soldiers, as they are typically exempt from conscription; (2) individuals with tertiary education, as this has been observed as a common reason for exemption of conscription, particularly the years exactly before to the implementation of the reform; (3) individuals who are foreign-born and have both foreign-born parents; (4) individuals who subjectively report poor health and/or extreme dissatisfaction with their lives. Additionally, to minimize measurement error, I exclude (5) individuals who did not provide information on their gender, birth year, birthplace, or education level. Furthermore, I exclude (6) individuals who are 18 years old, focusing solely on those who had already reached the conscription age by the time of the interview, and (7) those who were born before 1963, ensuring they were no older than 54 years at the time of the survey, thus avoiding potential bias from old conscription practices that were terminated long before conscription was abolished.

Dependent Variable
The ideal dependent variable would be a binary that checks whether an individual voted for an ERW party. In order to construct such a variable I chose the outcome variable which answers the question "Which political party appeals to you the most ?" from the European Values Survey. The respondent has to pick one of the political parties that are included in a long list of national parties that EVS decided to include for that year's survey. They also have the option

to state that no party appeals to them, that they do not know or they do not want to answer. After removing all the outliers and identifying the voters of the extreme right-wing party, here are the resulting summary statistics:

Table 1: Summary Statistics

(1) Country	(2) Observations	(3) ERW Votes	(4) Percentage of males	(5) Mean age	(6) Reform Year	(7) Observations Pre	(8) Observations Post
Bulgaria	358	33	46.9%	34.7	2008	264	94
Czechia	577	55	41.1%	36.8	2005	431	146
France	485	71	47.4%	37.4	2002	292	193
Germany	345	21	46.4%	29.7	2012	256	89
Hungary	528	248	50.4%	34.1	2005	304	224
Italy	807	129	51.1%	36.4	2005	534	273
Poland	335	127	55.8%	31.2	2009	216	119
Portugal	324	5	42.9%	37.3	2005	209	115
Slovakia	508	94	45.1%	35.6	2005	342	166
Slovenia	274	35	54.4%	33.3	2006	163	111
Sweden	160	11	58.1%	29.6	2011	102	58
Total	4701	829	48.3%	34.9	-	3113	1588

Notes: This table presents summary statistics of the reduced sample used in this analysis. Column (1) provides information about the 11 countries considered in this sample. Column (2) indicates the number of observations per country after applying the criteria described in the Independent variable subsection. Column (3) represents the effective observations, specifically the individuals within the sample who voted for extreme right-wing parties as defined in the section Categorization. Columns (4) and (5) display the percentage of males and the average age of individuals in the sample, respectively, for each country. Column (6) lists the year of conscription abolition for each country. The last two columns, (7) and (8), provide the number of observations before and after the reform year in each country. The final row of the table presents the sum or means of the respective columns.

Causal Inference

Continuity of Covariates

The key element of this design hinges on a sudden shift in the probability of treatment at the designated threshold of the reform year. This creates a variation assumed to be independent of potential confounders, enhancing the reliability of the causal analysis. (*Trochim, 1990; Hahn, Todd, & Van der Klaauw; 2001*). For the identification of potential treatment effects, the approach heavily relies on an assumption called continuity of covariates. In simpler words, the main idea behind the identifying assumption of this regression design is that the individuals who reached conscription age before the reform cut-off are good comparisons to those just above the cut-off. Therefore, in order to test the validity of the RD design, a comparison of the observed baseline covariates is necessary. The assumption is that all other factors that determine the political affiliation of an individual must be evolving smoothly around the cut-off. For this reason, I have run some balance tests on the covariates.

In particular, I have tested the continuity of the following covariates as seen in Table 2: Education, Income, Number of Children, Number of Household Members, Mother's education, father's education, and citizenship status. The scale of Income is an index that includes deciles of the net household income distribution. The highest educational level attained is a harmonized variable using the ISCED 2011 classification scheme: 0-Less than primary, 1-Primary, 2-Lower secondary, 3-Upper-secondary, 4-Post-secondary nontertiary, 5-Short-cycle tertiary, 6-Bachelor or equivalent, 7-Master or equivalent and 8-Doctoral or equivalent. Citizenship status is a variable that denotes whether an individual holds the nationality of the respective country, where the value 1 signifies that the individual stated that they have the nationality of that country while the value 2 signifies that they do not.

The main command used in this analysis is a STATA command called **"rdrobust"**, which offers a range of local-polynomial-based inference methods for mean treatment effects in the RD design. This command implements the bias-corrected inference procedure and allows for fully data-driven inference (*Calonico, Cattaneo & Titiunik, 2014*).

The following holds for all tables and figures that are presented below, including the tables that are displayed in the Appendix, and employ an RDD approach: The order of the local polynomial used to construct the point estimator is 1 (local linear regression). The order of the local polynomial used to construct the bias correction is 2 (local quadratic regression). The kernel function used to construct the local polynomial estimators is triangular. An optimal bandwidth technique is employed which aims to balance the bias-variance trade-off by minimizing the mean squared error.

Table 2: Covariates Balance Test

Dependant Variable	(1) Education	(2) Income	(3) Children	(4) Household members	(5) Mother's education	(6) Father's education	(7) Citizen status
Coefficient	-0.163	0.257	-0.096	-0.051	0.170	0.347	0.081
Std. Error	(0.190)	(0.746)	(0.177)	(0.310)	(0.438)	(0.535)	(0.056)
P-value	0.391	0.731	0.587	0.869	0.698	0.517	0.152
Country	All	All	All	All	All	All	All
Cut-Off	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Donut	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Bandwidth	6.52	4.68	5.17	4.86	3.75	3.53	5.09
Observations	2257	1711	2250	2243	2148	2109	2266

Notes: Table 2 provides regression analysis using an RDD approach to examine the relationship between conscription, and some individual demographic characteristics for men from all countries that are included in the sample around the reform cut-off. Weights are used in all columns.

Appendix Table A.2 provides a robustness check on Table 2 by changing the cut-off to the value -1 and applying a donut-hole approach around this revised cut-off.

**Figure 1: Education Balance Test**

Education

Figure 2: Income Balance Test

Income

Figure 3: Mother's Education Balance Test

Mother's education

Figure 4: Father's Education Balance Test

Father's Education

Notes: Figures 2,3,4, and 5 depict background characteristic checks for male respondents' income and for their education of them, and their mothers' and their fathers', respectively. All countries included.

As anticipated, both the figures and the numbers demonstrate an absence of discontinuity around the cut-off point. All main coefficients outlined in the table are not statistically significant and there is no noticeable "jump" in any of the primary balance test graphs. While this outcome is crucial, it alone is not sufficient to establish the causality of the employed methodology.

Conditional Independence

Another important assumption for identification is conditional independence which "maintains that individuals do not select into treatment on the basis of anticipated gains from treatment" (*Todd, & Van der Klaauw; 2001*). If individuals could have control over being conscripted or not, as they perceive a benefit of not being conscripted, then assignment would not be random and the methodology would not be valid as individuals on the one side of the cut-off would be systemically different from those on the other side. This is partially the case here as manipulation of the assignment of treatment after the cutoff is not possible as conscription was abolished so all individuals were not conscripted. The concern is valid pretreatment as there are many reports that individuals systemically skip conscription (*Efthymiou, 2019; Ahlbäck, 2016*).

Usually, econometricians and researchers, who employ an RDD, test this hypothesis by running a McCrary test, which examines whether there is any discontinuity in the density of the assignment variable at the cutoff point. Such a test would be sufficient to determine whether there is any manipulation of the assignment variable around the cutoff point, as a jump in the density at the threshold could imply sorting (*McCrary, 2008*). In the context of this analysis, such a test is technically feasible but meaningless as the assignment variable is a proxy of the true independent variable of interest and not the exact measure determining treatment or not treatment. Namely, as stated in the [Independent variable](#) section, the running variable is based on the birth year of the individual and there is no clear available information about the certain treatment assignment of the individual, meaning that we are not sure whether the individual was actually conscripted or not before treatment. Therefore, there is a need for alternative techniques to mitigate the concern of conditional dependence which leads to selection bias.

In the concluding years of active conscription programs, it is observed that states often exhibit leniency in enforcing these policies, potentially resulting in a higher likelihood of the final conscripts evading the draft. Furthermore, historically, the abolition of conscription has frequently been utilized in election platforms as a pre-election commitment made by politicians (*Graubard, 1947; Treisman, 1996; Haltiner, 1998; Jehn & Selden, 2002*). In anticipation of forthcoming policy reforms aimed at military abolition, individuals might delay their conscription until the implementation of such policies. To validate these hypotheses within each country included in the sample, I have obtained data from the World Bank pertaining to the active military personnel through the years surrounding the abolition cut-off. These data

help confirm that draft evasion happened prior to the treatment. "Armed forces personnel" comprises all active-duty military personnel, including full-time servicemen and women, conscripts, and paramilitary forces.

Figure 5: Active Military Personnel Graph by Country

Notes: The set of eleven figures demonstrated above illustrates the annual evolution of Active Military Personnel in each respective country. The y-axis represents the quantity of military personnel for each country, while the x-axis denotes the time variable expressed in years. The distinct vertical line denotes the reform year when conscription was abolished.

Each graph contains a distinct vertical line, positioned at the juncture representing the reform year. This line serves as an essential reference to examine any prevailing trends preceding the abolishment of compulsory military service. Although post-abolishment patterns lack clear uniformity, a notable commonality exists in the period before the abolishment.

In all sample countries, a downward trajectory in the number of active military personnel can be observed prior to the treatment, ranging from gradual to stark reductions. This shared decline in active personnel validates the hypothesized trend of individuals avoiding military service.

The absence of a consistent trend in the size of Active Military Personnel post treatment is due to differences among military institutions of different nations. The implications of the concern that military establishments and conscription systems vary systematically will be discussed on the Discussion-Limitations section of this study.

To address potential issues stemming from the pretreatment "dodging conscription" pattern, several steps have been taken. First and foremost, individuals with a high likelihood of evading military service, and therefore not being impacted by the reform, have been excluded from the sample. The specific rationales that an individual may use to avoid conscription vary from one country to another, influenced by both legal and societal contexts. Nevertheless, there are certain common justifications prevalent across a majority of nations. Detailed information about these measures can be found in the section titled Independent Variable.

Another step employed to address this concern involves implementing a 'donut-hole' design within the regression analysis for the final year preceding the reform year. Both intuitively and with the help of the figures and literature review, I hypothesize that the probability of avoiding mandatory military service is higher the year prior to the reform (*Efthymiou, 2019*). By excluding that specific interval, potential manipulation that could occur during this high-risk period can be mitigated.

Categorization of Extreme Right-Wing Parties

Far-right, neo-fascist, radical populist, right-wing extremist, nationalist, ultra-right, authoritarian right. These are all different labels that have been assigned to political parties falling under a similar ideological umbrella. The task of categorizing political parties as extreme right-wing has always been challenging, particularly when certain radical right-wing groups reject such labels or deny any right-wing affiliations (*Sternhell, 1996; Mudde, 1996*). This complexity is exemplified by *Front National* (National Rally / French National Front)

which explicitly declares that it is "neither left, nor right, but French" (*Reungoat, 2015*). It is a demanding objective to pinpoint characteristics that would definitively assign parties to the extreme right-wing category. Ideologies do not have binary nature and not all parties that are considered extreme right-wing share the same values and ideas. Parties that belong to this ideological family may have stronger divergences than similarities. This is a concern that I have tried to mitigate partially in this section and will further elaborate upon as a potential limitation in the section Discussion-Limitations**.**

To support the argument for classifying the selected parties as extreme right-wing (ERW), I attempt to conduct an objective and methodological categorization of political parties by utilizing the data set provided by the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) (*Jolly et al, 2022*). I have opted for all political parties that are included in the list of political parties of EVS and which surpass a designated in specific categories, as ranked by CHES. This means that, while some parties exceeded this threshold, they were not included in the research due to their absence from the survey list. Specifically, three principal aspects were taken into consideration. The first is the overall ideological leaning of the party, which refers to the party's position in a given year on a spectrum that ranges from 0 (extreme left), through 5 (center), to 10 (extreme right). The second factor considered is the party's stance on immigration policy, represented by a scale where 0 signifies a strong inclination towards liberal immigration policies, and 10 denotes a strong preference for restrictive immigration policies. Lastly, the party's position on the nationalism-cosmopolitanism spectrum is evaluated, where 0 indicates strong support for cosmopolitan ideals and 10 signifies strong advocacy for nationalist ideals. Even though, as stated previously, it is not clear which ideological traits are sufficient to define a political party as extreme-right-wing, there is a broad consensus among scholars that most, if not all, such parties share a general anti-immigration sentiment and display a relatively stronger attitude for nationalistic ideas, compared to other party alternatives. These data points and evaluations from experts contribute to our analysis and understanding of the parties' ideological positioning. Following this procedure in all 11 countries that are included in the sample, a total of 21 political parties are identified that qualify for categorization as extreme right wing. These parties are itemized in the table that follows:

Table 3: Categorization of ERW parties

(1) Country	(2) Party	(3) % / Total of Country	(4) L–R scale	(5) Immigration policy	(6) Nationalism
Germany	AfD	4.7%	9.24	9.90	9.68
France	National Rally	7.4%	9.75	9.88	9.63
	France Arise	1.4%	9.00	9.33	9.40
	Other ERW Party[1]	0.3%	-	-	-
Italy	Lega	12.2%	8.79	9.95	9.12
	FdI	1.9%	9.05	9.84	9.76
	CasaPound	0.1%	-	-	-
	Italy to the Italians	0.2%	-	-	-
Portugal	Chega	1.4%	-	-	-
Slovenia	SDS	10.8%	8.64	9.60	8.27
	SNS	1.1%	8.71	9.60	9.27
Bulgaria	BMRO	4.1%	6.90	9.52	9.50
	Ataka	0.8%	6.81	9.76	9.55
	NFSB	0.1%	7.35	9.53	8.84
	Volya	2.2%	5.56	8.06	7.94
Czechia	SPD	5.9%	8.85	9.85	9.74
	DSSS	0.6%	-	-	-
	Dawn National Coalition	0.2%	-	-	-
Hungary	Fidesz	36.4%	8.33	9.93	9.80
	Jobbik	9.0%	7.73	9.13	9.20
Poland	PiS	30.0%	7.55	9.05	9.10
	Liberty-Korwin[2]	1.3%	9.53	9.74	9.79
	Kukiz'15[3]	7.0%	7.11	7.78	7.89
Slovak Republic	LSNS-Kolteba	4.7%	7.44	9.50	9.50
	SNS	5.2%	9.31	10.00	10.00
	We are family- Borris Kollar	5.2%	7.13	9.19	8.38
Sweden	Sweden Democrats	7.7%	8.47	9.76	9.65
Total		**6%**	**8.16**	**9.47**	**9.14**

Notes[23]: Source: CHES (Jolly et al. 2022). Columns (1) and (2) list the country and Name (or abbreviation) of the ERW Political Party. Column (2) displays the percentage of survey respondents who indicated that this party appeals to them the most. The entries in columns (4), (5), and (6) represent the mean of expert responses for each party in relation to the following questions: overall political ideological stance, party's stance on immigration-related issues, and nationalistic ideas.

---

[2] The Overall ideological Stance Grade & Immigration grade is given to "Confederation Liberty and Independence" [Polish: *Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość*], a coalition of far-right parties, in which Korwin's party was a founding member.

[3] The reason behind the relatively moderate rankings of Kukiz'15 (<8) is that after 2016, it took a less radical stand. I include it in my analysis, as the survey was in 2017 and the CHES grading took place in 2019.

Some parties, 7 in particular, that are included in the table and in the analysis are not CHES-rated. CHES does not specify the selection criteria for included parties, but it is likely that parties with a very low percentage of recent election votes or parties that were not officially in existence during the expert assessment are excluded. This could explain the missing information on certain parties. To justify the classification of these parties as ERW, I refer to existing literature.

More specifically, in Portugal, the primary radical right party, known as *Chega*, meaning "Enough" in Portuguese, has been classified as an ERW party. It emerged in 2019 and holds significant influence in the country's political landscape (*Mendes & Dennison, 2021; Fernandes & Magalhaes, 2020; Mendes, 2021; Ramos Antón & Baptista, 2022*). In Italy, in addition to Matteo Salvini's party, *Lega* (League), and Giorgia Meloni's party, *Fratelli d'Italia* (Brothers of Italy), two other parties have been identified as ERW. *Italia agli Italiani* (Italy to Italians) is a coalition far-right party established in 2017, resulting from the merger of two pre-existing far-right parties, *Forza Nueva* (New Force) and *Fiamma Tricolore* (Tricolour Flame) (*Manucci, 2020; Campani, 2015; Cammelli, 2018; Curini & Iacus, 2008*). The second non-CHES-rated ERW party in Italy, included in the analysis, is *CasaPound*, founded in 2003, and widely recognized by scholars as extreme right-wing and neo-fascist (*Froio et al., 2020; Gattinara et al., 2013; Wolff, 2019*). Moreover, in Czechia, alongside SPD (Freedom and Democracy), two additional parties have been categorized as far-right: DSSS and Dawn National Coalition. There is a consensus among scholars and political analysts that both these parties belong to the far-right political spectrum (*Tarant, 2019; Kevický, 2022; Mareš, 2011; Vlachová, 2019*). Lastly, the "Other Extreme Right Wing Parties" in France consist of the *Les Patriotes* (Patriots) and the *MNR* (National Republic Movement), two parties that derived politically from the *Front National* and are widely considered far-right as well. (*Donahue, 2019; Gaussuin, 2022; Saher, 2020; Lorimer, 2017; Mayer & Sineau, 2002; Ivaldi, 2003*). The main reason for including non-CHES-rated parties in the analysis is to reduce measurement error. Excluding these parties would disregard individuals who vote for extreme right-wing parties and identify them as the party that appeals to them the most.

Appendix Table A.1 displays the full name of the party, the year it was founded, the number of experts who rated it, and the family of parties that it belongs to.

Main Results

First Results

In this section, the primary findings of the study will be presented. By utilizing the aforementioned methodology, formula, and data sources I have constructed the subsequent table. The table provides a regression discontinuity analysis that examines the relationship between conscription and the propensity to vote for an extreme right-wing party, collectively for all eleven countries in the sample.

Table 4: Impact of Conscription on ERW Vote

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Conscription	-0.022	-0.091	-0.313	-0.271	-0.041	-0.087	-0.071
Standard error	(0.078)	(0.121)	(0.260)	(0.152)	(0.101)	(0.151)	(0.129)
P-value	0.776	0.45	0.229	0.075	0.685	0.568	0.58
Countries	All	All	All	All	All	All	All
Bandwidth	6.53	4.14	3.11	3.53	7.75	6.06	6.14
Cut-Off	0	0	0	-1	0	0	-1
Donut Hole	No	No	-1	-1	No	-1	-1
Cluster	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Weights	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1709	1709	1656	1656	1709	1656	1656

Notes: Table 4 provides regression analysis using an RDD approach to examine the relationship between conscription, and the binary outcome of voting for an extreme right-wing (ERW) party for all countries that are included in the sample. The columns in the table vary based on the cut-offs, the donut-hole regression approach, the clustering of standard errors, and the use of weights. In Column (1), individuals are not weighted, while in the rest of the columns, they are. The cut-off value is 0 for Columns (1), (2), (3), (5), and (6), and -1 for Columns (4) and (7). A donut-hole RDD approach is applied in Columns (3), (4), (6), and (7), while clustering for standard errors is implemented in Columns (5), (6), and (7).

As seen by the p-values, it is evident that all regression coefficients are statistically insignificant, even at a relatively relaxed threshold of 10%. The main coefficients of the running variable are, as expected, negative, implying that, if significant, the coefficients would provide evidence that conscription increases the probability of voting for an ERW party. I explore various model specifications to establish that the lack of significant results is not due to model misspecification. The non-significance of the result is robust to cut-off changes, the use of a donut-hole approach, clustering of standard errors, and the use of weights. In simpler words,

based on the current analysis, data from the table suggest that conscription does not influence the probability of voting for an extreme right-wing party.

Clustering Results

In order to delve more into the relationship between conscription and radical right voting I have adopted a strategy of grouping the sample countries. The most applicable division is between Central European countries and South European countries. The following map illustrates this division among the sample countries and highlights two more countries that have not been included in either group due to their geographic irrelevance from the identifying criteria of the clusters.

Figure 6: Clusters of Countries

Notes: The Figure includes the countries that abolished conscription after 2000[4]. Central Europe Countries consist of Germany, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia. South Europe Countries consist of Portugal, France, and Italy. Sweden and Bulgaria were not included in any cluster as they do not match politically or geographically with any of the existing clusters. Map was created with the help of Mapchart.net

---

[4] Spain is excluded from the sample because the extreme right-wing party "*Vox*" is not listed in the EVS political parties, and the other parties included are either conservative right-wing (such as "*Ciudadanos*" or "*Partido Popular*") or regionalist (such as "*Galician Nationalist Block*" and "*Basque Nationalist Party*").

After dividing the countries into groups, I repeated the initial regression analysis to determine whether any changes occurred. Thus the following table depicts the impact of conscription on the likelihood of voting for an ERW party, at an individual level, presenting the results distinctly for the group of Central European and South European countries.

Table 5: Impact of Conscription on ERW Vote in Groups of Countries

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Conscription	-0.826*	-0.221	-0.164	-0.063
Standard error	(0.339)	(0.281)	(0.178)	(0.135)
P-value	0.015	0.431	0.356	0.64
Countries	Central Europe	Central Europe	South Europe	South Europe
Bandwidth	2.64	7.55	4.94	5.65
Cut-Off	-1	-1	-1	-1
Donut Hole	-1	-1	-1	-1
Cluster	No	Yes	No	Yes
Weights	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	813	813	664	664

Notes: The table provides a regression analysis using an RDD approach to examine the relationship between conscription and the binary outcome of voting for an ERW party. Columns (1), and (2) focus on Central European countries while Columns (3) and (4) focus on Southern European countries. In all columns, the cutoff of the RDD is -1, and weights as well as a donut-hole approach around that cut-off are used. In Columns (1) and (3) standard errors are not clustered while in Columns (2) and (4), they are.

In all discontinuity regression analyses conducted, the value of the cut-off is set at -1 and a donut-hole approach is utilized. It is observed that, generally, the insignificance of the results remains consistent when considering groups of countries instead of examining all countries together. An exception is found among the unclustered Central European countries, where a statistically significant coefficient -0.826 at a relatively relaxed 10% confidence level, is observed. The interpretation of that coefficient suggests that individuals who have not been conscripted in Central Europe are 83% less probable to vote for an extreme right-wing party compared to those who have been conscripted. Put simply, based solely on these results, conscription in Central Europe increases the chance of voting for a radical right party by 83%. Nevertheless, the significance and robustness of this finding are limited, as the coefficient becomes statistically insignificant when standard errors are clustered within Central European countries.

Although the results obtained so far are not sufficient to establish a causal relationship, they are encouraging as they suggest the presence of a pattern as we delve more into the matter. Therefore, the following section is devoted to a separate analysis of each country and a detailed examination of the relationship between conscription and radical right voting in a more subtle and indirect way.

Causal Mechanisms- Alternative Independent Variables

In this section, the focus of the analysis is shifted from direct voting behavior to ideological change. Below, instead of examining ERW support, the outcome variable is now adjusted to assess any potential change of ideological traits due to conscription. Essentially, the analysis performs a separate regression for each country, aligning them with distinct ideological characteristics that fall broadly into two categories, namely: Immigration-related and Authority-related characteristics. We have already established the relevance of immigration-related ideologies when assessing radical-right parties in the Categorization section and the relevance of authority-related ideologies in the National Identity subsection.

For this analysis, the following model is used:

$$I_i = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 * D_i + \varepsilon_i, \text{ (with weights } W_i\text{)} \tag{2}$$

- The dependent variable is I_i and measures the level of agreement rate an individual i holds towards survey questions related to immigration and authority. Specifically, the categories of I_i that are included in the analysis are Xenophobia, Nativism, Anti-immigration sentiment, Authoritarianism, Obedience, and Autocracy. The subsequent subsection provides a detailed explanation of the definitions and methods of measuring these ideologies.
- The independent variable of interest is D_i, same as before, a proxy of the treatment assignment variable that takes negative values if an individual has been conscripted, and non-negative values if they were not.
- The coefficients γ_0 and γ_1 are the parameters to be estimated. γ_0 is the intercept or the baseline agreement rate on survey questions related to ideologies when D_i is zero (i.e., at the cut-off). γ_1 is the main coefficient of interest and reflects the effect of the reform on the likelihood of altering an ideological trait.
- The weights w_i used are individual weights that have been calculated using the marginal distribution of variables such as Age, Sex, Education, and Region.

- ε_i is the error term, accounting for unexplained variation in ideological change of the individual.

Immigration-Related Ideologies

The immigration-related ideologies include:

a. ***Xenophobia:*** quantifies how much trust the respondent has in people of other nationalities or religions. The scale ranges from 1 to 4, with higher values indicating diminished trust levels.

b. ***Nativism:*** measures the agreement in the belief that employers should prioritize natives over immigrants when jobs are scarce. A score of 1 corresponds to strong agreement, whereas a score of 5 signifies strong disagreement.

c. ***Anti-immigration:*** evaluates respondents' perceptions of immigrants' impact on their country's development. A score of 1 represents the perception that the influence is 'very bad', while a score of 5 signifies that the impact is perceived as 'very good'.

Findings in Table 6 and 7 are centered on the statistically significant results of specific countries in response to particular ideological characteristics, considering the optimal bandwidth. In both tables the cut-off is set at the value -1, a donut-hole approach is employed across that cutoff, and the selected bandwidth is calculated with an optimal bandwidth technique.

Table 6: Impact of Conscription of Immigration-related Ideologies

Variable	(1) Nativism	(2) Xenophobia	(3) Anti-immigration
Conscription	1.539*	-0.843*	1.866**
Standard error	(0.612)	(0.336)	(0.650)
Country	Sweden	Portugal	Hungary
Cut-Off	-1	-1	-1
Donut Hole	-1	-1	-1
Bandwidth	3.23	6.88	3.82
Observations	86	132	251

Notes: The table provides a regression analysis using an RDD approach to examine the relationship between conscription and the individuals' perceptions of immigration. In all columns, the cutoff of the RDD is -1, and a donut-hole approach around that cut-off is used. Columns (1), (2), and (3) measure the effect of conscription on Nativism, Xenophobia, and Anti-Immigration respectively. Individual weights are used.

Table 6 provides several interesting findings. Firstly, in Sweden, the coefficient of 1.539 for the variable "Nativism" is both positive and statistically significant at a 10% level. This coefficient

is economically significant, as well, as it indicates that Swedish individuals who have not undergone conscription express significantly stronger disagreement with the protectionism of locals against immigrants on labor market participation compared to Swedish conscripts. The coefficient corresponds to a percentage increase of approximately 38.5% in the agreement rate towards nativist sentiments between Swedish conscripts and non-conscripts.

Secondly, Portuguese conscripts exhibit 27% less trust toward people of other nationalities in comparison to individuals from Portugal who have not experienced conscription. The coefficient of -0.843 is statistically significant at a 10% level of confidence.

Lastly, Hungarian conscripts consistently score 47% higher on the "Anti-immigration" index. The coefficient of 1.866, which is statistically significant at a 5% level, indicates that Hungarian conscripts tend to believe that immigrants have a more detrimental impact on Hungary's development compared to what their non-conscript counterparts in Hungary believe.

Authority-Related Ideologies

Ideologies related to authority include the following elements:

a. *Authoritarianism*: measures the agreement to the statement that greater respect for authority is a good thing. On a scale of 1 to 3, a score of 1 implies that it is considered a 'good thing', while a score of 3 represents it being seen as a 'bad thing'.

b. *Obedience*: indicates the consensus on the belief that people obeying their rulers is essential for democracy. Here, a score of 1 stands for 'not essential for democracy', whereas a rating of 10 infers it is 'very essential'.

c. *Autocracy* determines the acceptance rate in the statement that: "having a strong leader who doesn't have to bother with elections is essential for democracy''. in this case, a score of 1 corresponds to the perception of this being 'very good', while a score of 4 signifies it is viewed as 'very bad'.

Table 7: Impact of Conscription on Authority-Related Ideologies

Variable	(1) Authoritarianism	(2) Obedience	(3) Obedience	(4) Obedience	(5) Autocracy
Conscription	3.465***	-5.679*	-3.763*	-5.074*	1.634*
Standard error	(0.901)	(2.790)	(1.524)	(2.441)	(0.829)
Country	Czechia	Slovakia	France	Bulgaria	Hungary
Cut-Off	-1	-1	0	0	0
Donut Hole	-1	-1	No	No	No
Bandwidth	2.95	2.34	3.57	3.27	3.55
Observations	203	222	222	158	259

Notes: The table provides a regression analysis using an RDD approach to examine the relationship between conscription and the individuals' perceptions of authority. In columns (1) and (2) the cutoff of the RDD is -1, and a donut-hole approach around that cut-off is used. In Columns (3), (4), and (5) the cutoff of the RDD is 0. Columns (1), and (5) measure the effect of conscription on Authoritarianism and Autocracy respectively while Columns (2), (3) and (5) measure the effect of conscription on Obedience. Individual weights are used.

Table 7 provides noteworthy findings as well. Firstly, in Czechia, the coefficient of 3.465 for "Authoritarianism" shows a very high statistical significance at a 1% level of confidence. This indicates that Czech individuals who have undergone conscription hold a strong belief that greater respect for authority is beneficial, compared to their non-conscripted counterparts. The coefficient implies a substantial increase in the agreement rate for authoritarian views among conscripts. Nevertheless, due to mass points detected in the running variable and a low number of effective observations, the specific estimate of this regression might be unreliable[5].

Furthermore, the coefficients for "Obedience" in Slovakia, France, and Bulgaria are -5.679, -3.763, and -5.074 respectively, all statistically significant at a 10% level of confidence. The negative values of these coefficients suggest that conscripts from these countries tend to believe in obedience to rulers more compared to non-conscripts. The coefficients for Slovakia, France, and Bulgaria, when converted to percentages, correspond to approximately 76%, 53%, and 67% respectively.

Finally, in Hungary, the coefficient for "Autocracy" is 1.634, and is statistically significant at a 10% confidence level. This suggests that Hungarian conscripts have a 21% higher acceptance rate of the idea that having a strong leader who doesn't have to bother with elections could be beneficial for democracy compared to non-conscripts in the same country.

---

[5] The regression coefficient exceeding the maximum value of 3 for the dependent variable's scale may appear incoherent. This seemingly paradoxical result can be attributed to an alteration in the sign of the linear equation's slope, transitioning from positive to negative, in the context of the relationship examined.

It is necessary to ascertain whether the analysis applies solely to men or extends to both genders. The robustness of the results would encourage the argument that the observed ideological discontinuity is attributable to conscription. The Appendix Tables A.3 and A.4 display the robustness of the results presented in Tables 7 and 8 when the gender is changed from male to female.

Impact of Ideologies

The next step is the examination of whether these ideologies influence the probability of voting for an ERW party. A separate regression is conducted for each ideological trait, employing as a dependent variable the binary variable $Vote_i$ to indicate whether the individual voted for a radical right party or not. To isolate the effect of ideological traits on radical right wing voting I considered relevant control variables. The subsequent Table 8 summarizes these findings.

Table 8: Impact of ideological traits on radical right voting

Variable Name	Immigration related			Authority related		
	(1) Xenophobia	(2) Nativism	(3) Anti-immigration	(4) Authoritarianism	(5) Obedience	(5) Autocracy
Running Variable	0.0532***	-0.0541***	-0.0576***	-0.0407***	0.0074**	-0.0347***
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.021)	(0.006)	(0.014)
Scale of incomes	0.01***	0.008**	0.008**	0.008**	0.008**	0.008**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Education	-0.0028	-0.0013	-0.0076	-0.0088	-0.0067	-0.0031
	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.03)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.032)
Age	0.0007	0.0003	0.0008	0.0008	0.001	0.0014
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Sex	-0.0395*	-0.0448**	-0.0434**	-0.0440**	-0.0392**	-0.0378*
	(0.02)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.02)	(0.018)
Children	-0.0002	-0.001	-0.005	-0.0005	-0.0026	-0.0046
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.01)
Mother's education	0.0012	0.0019	0.003	0.0036	0.0012	0.0022
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Father's education	-0.0075	-0.0089	-0.01	-0.0106	-0.0099	-0.0113
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Citizenship status	0.0553	0.0343	0.0659	0.0833	0.0637	0.0681
	(0.075)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.059)
Immigration Status	-0.0941	-0.0822	-0.1016	-0.1029	-0.1257	-0.1281
	(0.098)	(0.081)	(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.092)	(0.088)
Constant	0.1212	0.4072**	0.4422**	0.3344*	0.2659	0.3784**
	(0.185)	(0.179)	(0.201)	(0.193)	(0.204)	(0.189)
Observations	2895	3101	3035	2950	3026	2938

Notes: The table provides a regression analysis using a simple linear regression with controls to examine the relationship between ideological traits and the possibility of voting for an ERW party, on an individual level. Columns (1), (2), and (3) include immigration-related ideologies (Xenophobia, Nativism, and Anti-immigration) while Columns (4), (5), and (6) include Authority-related ideologies (Authoritarianism, Obedience, and Autocracy). All sample countries are taken into account. The controls included are the following: Scale of Incomes, Education, Age, Sex, Children, Mother's Education, Father's Education, Citizenship status, and Immigration status.

Immigration status is a variable that signifies whether the respondent was born in the country where the value 1 signifies that the individual is indeed born in the country while the value 2 signifies that they are an immigrant to the country. The rest of the controls are explained in the subsection Continuity of Covariates.

Given the complexity of human behavior, I did not expect to achieve a high R or R-squared value and so chose not to include it in our primary analysis. The focus of the research question was the relationships between the main running variables and the possibility to vote for an ERW party rather than on the prediction of outcomes.

Observations are smaller as a number compared to summary statistics Table 1, where people state their demographic characteristics but greater than the observations in the original RDD Table 4 where people state which political party appeals to them the most. That is because I do not include observations with missing values. This partially proves that people tend to not report their ideological and political preferences, especially when are specifically asked about political parties. An elaboration of this concern can be found in the Discussion-Limitations section.

The findings of Table 8 highlight a statistically significant relationship at the 1% confidence level between voting for extreme right-wing parties and holding anti-immigrant or authoritarian viewpoints. The only exception is the coefficient of "Obedience" which demonstrates statistical significance at a slightly relaxed 5% level of confidence. These findings have dual implications. First, the findings serve as an empirical validation of the categorization of the selected political parties. The strong correlation between voting for these parties and endorsing values typically associated with extreme right-wing ideologies confirms the accuracy of classifying these parties as extreme right-wing. Second, this relationship is crucial in establishing the main pattern for the conclusion of this analysis.

By consolidating the results obtained from Tables 6, 7, and 8, a clear pattern emerges, indicating the existence of a distinct indirect pathway linking conscription to voting for extreme right-wing parties. This channel operates through the mediation of ideological traits related to either authority or immigration. Notably, the nature of this pathway varies across different countries; however, the primary finding underscores the influence of conscription on individuals within a specific country, resulting in them being more inclined towards anti-immigrant sentiments or more receptive to authoritarian tendencies. These ideological traits, in turn, significantly

impact the likelihood of voting for an ERW party. Given the inherent diversity among nations, it is reasonable to expect varying effects of conscription across different countries.

Discussion - Limitations

Military organizations display considerable variability both quantitatively and qualitatively. These differences span across various factors, such as size, resources allocation, military strength, national resource distribution, armament types, organizational composition, power structures, political influence, level of autonomy, international alliances, and professional standards, and these elements fluctuate significantly among different nations (*Huntington, 1981*).

The process of abolishing mandatory military service can differ greatly from one case to another due to the diverse nature of related reforms. Some of these reforms might announced in the electoral campaigns prior to the reform, and thus anticipated potentially triggering an increase in conscription evasion, while other reforms could be implemented unexpectedly. Furthermore, most abolition reforms are usually paired with accompanying policy changes that could also introduce bias in the results. For instance, certain countries transitioned to the professionalization of their armed forces after the abolition of conscription, while others pursued the path of nationwide demilitarization. These variations clearly could affect the way the abolition of conscription impacted ideological traits and voting behavior. These reasons largely account for the lack of consistent patterns observed post-treatment (after the cut-off of abolition) in the various graphs depicting the number of Active Military Personnel per country.

In order to mitigate these concerns a more extensive analysis is necessary. Due to time limitations, this research could not examine exactly why each result occurs in the country that it does as that would require careful examination of the structure of each army through the years before abolition but also information about each specific legislation that came into effect so that any potential bias could be quantified and thus, accounted for.

Another major concern is the inherent diversity among extreme right-wing parties. Despite the application of the classification made by the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, quantifying political ideologies remains a complex task. For instance, some parties support quasi-militant democracies, while others endorse more progressive policies like pro-abortion (i.e. CasaPound) (*Paret, 1970*). This challenge is further complicated by two factors: firstly CHES does not provide reviews for all parties and secondly, CHES does not provide data about categories that may be more critical for classifying parties as radical right.

Another significant limitation refers to the evasion of military service, which arises due to the absence treatment assignment variable. Significant and meaningful efforts have been made to mitigate this, but it continues to pose the most substantial threat to the identification strategy. The ideal solution would be to have a treatment variable that directly inquires an individual about their conscription experience and its duration.

In addition to the main concerns, this analysis also bears a few minor limitations. One of such is the assumption that women's societal values and electoral tendencies remain unaffected by the cessation of mandatory military service for men. As a robustness check presented in the Appendix, a background test is conducted using the cohort of women around the abolition reform as a control group. In case women are socially or politically influenced by the abolition of conscription for men, the validity of the identification strategy of this analysis may be compromised, introducing bias into the findings.

Furthermore, there exist some data-related constraints that could limit the accuracy and external validity of the findings. Qualitatively, the lack of panel data forces the use of a matching method for the control and treatment groups, which is suboptimal to the use of panel data. The absence of panel data also means that this research only investigates the long-term effects of conscription, thereby overlooking the social or political impact of mandatory military service in the short run. Quantitatively, there is a limitation related to the data set size. Although the total sample across all eleven countries is relatively big when the analysis is executed for each country separately the effective observations of individuals who voted for extreme right-wing parties around the reform cut-off reduce significantly. Even though the concern is partially mitigated with the use of individual and population weights, it is not alleviated fully, hence posing a threat to the extrapolation of the findings.

Policy Implications - Conclusions

The study uncovers intriguing differences between conscripts and non-conscripts across various countries. Conscription shapes ideologies in dual realms: attitudes toward immigrants and perceptions of authority. In Sweden, conscripts exhibit a higher tendency to prioritize locals over immigrants, particularly during periods of job scarcity, as compared to non-conscripts. Likewise, non-conscripted individuals from Portugal show higher trust in immigrants. Hungarian conscripts perceive immigrants as more detrimental to the country's development compared to their non-conscripted counterparts, while also expressing stronger support for an un-elected, authoritative leader. Czech conscripts exhibit heightened respect for authority in

comparison to non-conscripts. Moreover, conscripts from France, Bulgaria, and Slovakia consider obedience to rulers as more crucial for democracy than their non-conscripted peers.

This study presents a model and methodology powerful enough to be applied to different datasets to reevaluate similar research questions related to the various impacts of conscription reforms. This implies a potential policy recommendation for future investigations in similar domains.

Additionally, this study highlights distinct channels in which conscription is related to various social aspects in different countries. It emphasizes the importance of analyzing specific military structures to understand how conscription impacts social life. Importantly, the literature review and quantitative analysis demonstrate the significance of considering the political implications of conscription when conducting cost-benefit analyses on its potential abolition, continuation, or modification.

The research can serve as a solid and valuable foundation for any discourse on modifying the military structure of a nation such as decreasing the duration of conscription, professionalizing it, or transitioning it to a voluntary system. It may also contribute to any debate on maintaining the current structure but incorporating anti-nationalist approaches. After a country-specific examination of how conscription affects ideologies, military institutions could encompass educational seminars to deal with any societal impact of conscription that is considered undesirable. In case this analysis proves challenging, the paper still provides general guidance that anti-xenophobic and pro-authoritarian sentiments are probable to be amplified through conscription.

Acknowledgments

References

Goldsmith, B. E. (2003). Bearing the Defense Burden, 1886-1989: Why Spend More?. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 47(5)*, 551-573.

Leander, A. (2004). Drafting community: Understanding the fate of conscription. *Armed Forces & Society, 30(4),* 571-599.

Warner, J. T., & Asch, B. J. (2001). The record and prospects of the all-volunteer military in the United States. *Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(2),* 169-192.

Mudde, C. (Ed.). (2016). *The populist radical right: A reader. Taylor* & Francis.

Minkenberg, M. (2017). *The radical right in Eastern Europe: Democracy under siege?.* Springer.

Janowitz, M. (1976). Military institutions and citizenship in western societies. *Armed forces & society, 2(2),* 185-204.

Moskos, C. C. (1981). *Institution versus occupation: Contrasting models of military organization.* Northwestern Univ Evanston Il Dept Of Sociology.

Mudde, C. (2015). Populist radical right parties in Europe today. *Transformations of populism in Europe and the Americas: History and recent trends,* 295-307.

Rydgren, J. (2008). Immigration skeptics, xenophobes, or racists? Radical right-wing voting in six West European countries. *European Journal of Political Research, 47(6),* 737-765.

Toronto, N. (2007). Military recruitment data set. *Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Foreign.*

Bove, V., Di Leo, R., & Giani, M. (2022). Military culture and institutional trust:evidence from conscription reforms in Europe. *American Journal of Political Science.*

Hubers, F., Webbink, D. The long-term effects of military conscription on educational attainment and wages. *IZA J Labor Econ 4, 10 (2015).* https://doi.org/10.1186/s40172-015-0026-4

Buonanno, P. (2006). Long-term effects of conscription: lessons from the UK.

Lubbers, M., Gijsberts, M., & Scheepers, P. (2002). Extreme right-wing voting in Western Europe. *European journal of political research, 41(3),* 345-378.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2000*). From initial education to working life: Making transitions work.* Paris: OECD.

Hogg, M. A., & van Knippenberg, D. (2003). Social identity and leadership processes in groups.

Tajfel, H. (1974). Social identity and intergroup behaviour. *Social science information, 13(2),* 65-93.

Huddy, L. (2001). From social to political identity: A critical examination of social identity theory. *Political psychology, 22(1),* 127-156.

Tyler, T. R. (2006). Psychological perspectives on legitimacy and legitimation. *Annu. Rev. Psychol., 57*, 375-400.

Hegtvedt, K. A., & Johnson, C. (2000). Justice beyond the individual: A future with legitimation. *Social Psychology Quarterly, 63(4),* 298-311.

Lowe, M. (2021). Types of contact: A field experiment on collaborative and adversarial caste integration. *American Economic Review, 111(6),* 1807-44.

Allport, Gordon Willard, Kenneth Clark, and Thomas Pettigrew, "The nature of prejudice," 1954.

Bagues, M., & Roth, C. (2020). Interregional contact and national identity.

Anbinder, T. (2006). Which Poor Man's Fight?: Immigrants and the Federal Conscription of 1863. *Civil War History, 52(4),* 344-372.

Mazumder, S. (2019). Becoming White: How Military Service Turned Immigrants into Americans. *SocArXiv. doi, 10.*

Lutz, A. (2008). Who joins the military? A look at race, class, and immigration status. *Journal of Political & Military Sociology,* 167-188.

Nasr, N. (2021). Military Conscription & its Role in Nation-Building.

Finland, Ministry of Defense (2019). Act on the Defence Forces, 2007 (Finland). finlex.fi. Retrieved April 10, 2023, from https://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2007/en20070551.pdf

Federal Act of the Swiss Confederation, T. F. A. (2020). Federal Act Of February 3, 1995, On The Army And The Military Administration. Wipo Lex. Retrieved April 10, 2023, from https://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/legislation/details/20037

Tsoutsoumpis, S. (2018). The Far Right in Greece. Paramilitarism, Organized Crime and the Rise of 'Golden Dawn'. *Comparative Southeast European Studies, 66(4),* 503-531.

Taylor, M., Holbrook, D., & Currie, P. M. (Eds.). (2013). *Extreme right wing political violence and terrorism.* A&C Black.

Jehn, C., & Selden, Z. (2002). The end of conscription in Europe*?. Contemporary Economic Policy, 20(2),* 93-100.

Janjevic, D. (2018, August 6). Germans debate return of military conscription – DW – 08/05/2018. dw.com. Retrieved April 8, 2023, from https://www.dw.com/en/germans-debate-return-of-military-conscription-and-service-for-men-and-women/a-44962067

Jakštaitė, G., & Česnakas, G. (2015). Lithuania's reintroduction of conscription is a clear response to the threat posed by Russia in the Baltics. *LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog.*

Oltermann, P. (2017, March 2). Sweden to reintroduce conscription amid rising Baltic tensions. The Guardian. Retrieved April 8, 2023, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/02/sweden-reintroduce-conscription-amid-rising-baltic-tensions

Kronsell, A., & Svedberg, E. (2001). The duty to protect: gender in the Swedish practice of conscription. *Cooperation and Conflict, 36(2),* 153-176.

Kite, M. E., Whitley Jr, B. E., & Wagner, L. S. (2022*). Psychology of prejudice and discrimination.* Taylor & Francis.

Mackie, D. M., Maitner, A. T., & Smith, E. R. (2016). Intergroup emotions theory.

Hanley, S. (2008). Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. By Cas Mudde. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 404p. 34.99 paper. *Perspectives on Politics, 6(2),* 407-409.

Einstein, A., & Shaw, G. B. (2012). *Einstein on cosmic religion and other opinions and aphorisms*. Courier Corporation.

EVS (2022): European Values Study 2017: Integrated Dataset (EVS 2017). GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA7500 Data file Version 5.0.0

Gedeshi, I., Pachulia, M., Poghosyan, G., Kritzinger, S., Rotman, D., Fotev, G., ... & Mieriņa, I. (2022). European Values Study 2017: Integrated Dataset (EVS 2017)-Sensitive Data. Sternhell, Z. (1996). *Neither right nor left: fascist ideology in France.* Princeton University Press.

Toronto, Nathan. 2005. Military Recruitment Data Set, version 2005.1. *Available from the author at nathan.toronto@us.army.mil.*

Reungoat, E. (2015). Mobilizing Europe in national competition: The case of the French Front National. *International Political Science Review, 36(3),* 296-310.

Toronto, Nathan. 2007. "Why War Is Not Enough: *Military Defeat, the Division of Labor, and Military Professionalization."* PhD thesis. The Ohio State University

Asal, Victor, Justin Conrad, and Nathan Toronto. 2017. "I Want You! The Determinants of Military Conscription." *Journal of Conflict Resolution 61(7):*1456–81

CIA. 2020. The World Factbook. McLean, VA: Central Intelligence Agency

Armed forces personnel, total, International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, MS.MIL.TOTL.P1, ISAD(G), World Bank Group Archives, Washington, D.C., United States.

Jolly, S., Bakker, R., Hooghe, L., Marks, G., Polk, J., Rovny, J., ... & Vachudova, M. A. (2022). Chapel Hill expert survey trend file, 1999–2019. *Electoral studies, 75,* 102420.

Trochim, W. M. (1990). The regression-discontinuity design. *Research methodology: Strengthening causal interpretations of nonexperimental data*, 119-139.

Hahn, J., Todd, P., & Van der Klaauw, W. (2001). Identification and estimation of treatment effects with a regression-discontinuity design. *Econometrica, 69(1)*, 201-209.

Calonico, S., Cattaneo, M. D., & Titiunik, R. (2014). Robust data-driven inference in the regression-discontinuity design. *The Stata Journal, 14(4)*, 909-946.

McCrary, J. (2008). Manipulation of the running variable in the regression discontinuity design: A density test. *Journal of econometrics, 142(2)*, 698-714.

Mendes, M. S., & Dennison, J. (2021). Explaining the emergence of the radical right in Spain and Portugal: salience, stigma and supply. *West European Politics, 44(4),* 752-775.

Fernandes, J. M., & Magalhaes, P. C. (2020). The 2019 Portuguese general elections. *West European Politics, 43(4)*, 1038-1050.

Mendes, M. S. (2021). The rise of Chega and the end of Portuguese exceptionalism. *LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) blog.*

Ramos Antón, R., & Baptista, C. (2022). Populism and social media in the Iberian Peninsula: The use of Twitter by VOX (Spain) and Chega (Portugal) in election campaigning. *international journal of iberian studies, 35(2)*, 125-153.

Manucci, L. (2020). THE SHADOW OF THE AUTHORITARIAN PAST IN THE IBERIAN PENINSULA: FAILURES AND SUCCESS OF RADICAL RIGHT POPULIST PARTIES. *Relações Internacionais.*

Campani, G. (2015). The blurred borders of racism, neo-fascism and national populism. *Casopis Za Kritiko Znanosti, (260),* 19.

Gretel Cammelli, M. (2018). The legacy of fascism in the present:'third millennium fascists' in Italy. *Journal of Modern Italian Studies, 23(2),* 199-214.

Curini, L., & Iacus, S. (2008, September). Italian spatial competition between 2006 and 2008: a changing party system?. In *XXII Congress of the Italian Political Science Society (SISP), Pavia* (Vol. 58, p. 75105).

Froio, C., Gattinara, P. C., Bulli, G., & Albanese, M. (2020). *CasaPound Italia: Contemporary extreme-right politics.* Routledge.

Gattinara, P. C., Froio, C., & Albanese, M. (2013). The appeal of neo-fascism in times of crisis. The experience of CasaPound Italia. *Fascism, 2(2),* 234-258.

Wolff, E. C. (2019). CasaPound Italia:'back to believing. the struggle continues'. *Fascism, 8(1),* 61-88.

Tarant, Z. (2019). Is brown the new green? The environmental discourse of the Czech far right. *In The Far Right and the Environment* (pp. 201-215). Routledge.

Kevický, D. (2022). Where is the populist radical right successful? Spatial analysis of populist radical right parties in Slovakia and Czechia. *Eurasian Geography and Economics, 1-22.*

Skrzypek, M. (2022). Towards quasi-militant democracy?. *Neo-militant Democracies in Post-communist Member States of the European Union,* 147.

Mareš, M. (2011). Czech extreme right parties an unsuccessful story. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 44(4)*, 283-298.

Vlachová, K. (2019). Significant others and the importance of ancestry for Czech national identity. *National Identities, 21(1),* 57-72.

Saher, W. (2020). THE RISE OF THE FRONT NATIONAL IN FRANCE. *magnificat*, 49.

Lorimer, M. (2017). Where does Florian Philippot's resignation leave the Front National?. *LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog.*

Gaussuin, B. (2022). The Cathedral of Citizenship. Forging Architectural Tradition: National Narratives, *Monument Preservation and Architectural Work in the Nineteenth Century, 4,* 21.

Donahue, K. C. (2019). In the Camp of the Saints: Right-Wing Populism in Twenty-First-Century France. *Cycles of Hatred and Rage: What Right-Wing Extremists in Europe and Their Parties Tell Us About the US*, 117-142.

Mayer, N., & Sineau, M. (2002). France: The Front National.

Ivaldi, G. (2003, September*). The Extreme-Right in France. In Conference on The Right in France and Italy*. PSA Italian Politics Specialist Group and PSA French Politics And Policy Specialist Group.

Mudde, C. (1996). The war of words defining the extreme right party family. *West European Politics, 19(2),* 225-248.

Thistlethwaite, D. L., & Campbell, D. T. (1960). Regression-discontinuity analysis: An alternative to the ex post facto experiment. *Journal of Educational psychology, 51(6),* 309.

Efthymiou, S. A. (2019). *Nationalism, militarism and masculinity in post-conflict Cyprus.* Springer.

Ahlbäck, A. (2016). Manhood and the making of the military: Conscription, military service and masculinity in Finland, 1917–39. *Routledge.* 30-35

Graubard, S. R. (1947). Military Demobilization in Great Britain Following the First World War. *The Journal of Modern History, 19(4),* 297-311.

Treisman, D. (1996). Why Yeltsin Won. *Foreign Affairs*, 64-77.

Haltiner, K. W. (1998). The definite end of the mass army in Western Europe?. *Armed Forces & Society*, *25*(1), 7-36.

Jehn, C., & Selden, Z. (2002). The end of conscription in Europe?. *Contemporary Economic Policy*, *20*(2), 93-100.

Jackson, J. J., Thoemmes, F., Jonkmann, K., Lüdtke, O., & Trautwein, U. (2012). Military training and personality trait development: Does the military make the man, or does the man make the military?. *Psychological science*, *23*(3), 270-277.

Krebs, R. R. (2004). A school for the nation? How military service does not build nations, and how it might. *International Security*, *28*(4), 85-124.

Huntington, S. P. (1981*). The soldier and the state: The theory and politics of civil–military relations.* Harvard University Press.

Orak, U., & Walker, M. H. (2021). Military service: A pathway to conformity or a school for deviance?. *Crime & Delinquency*, *67*(6-7), 1046-1069.

Arkin, W., & Dobrofsky, L. R. (1978). Military socialization and masculinity. *Journal of Social issues, 34(1),* 151-168.

Paret, P. (1970). Nationalism and the sense of military obligation. *Military Affairs: The Journal of Military History, Including Theory and Technology*, 2-6.

Appendix

Table A.1 with full names of parties, experts, family, and year founded

(1) Country	(2) ERW Party	(3) Founded	(4) Experts	(5) Family
Germany	Alternative for Germany	2013	21	Radical Right
France	National Rally	1972	8	Radical Right
	France Arise	2008	8	Radical Right
Italy	Lega	1991	19	Radical Right
	Brothers of Italy	2012	19	Conservative
Slovenia	Slovenian Democratic Party	1989	15	Conservative
	Slovenian National Party	1991	15	Radical Right
Bulgaria	Bulgarian National Movement	1999	21	Conservative
	Ataka	2005	21	Radical Right
	National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria	2011	21	Conservative
	Volya	2007	21	Radical Right
Czech-Republic	Freedom and Direct Democracy	2015	27	Radical Right
Hungary	Fidesz	1988	15	Radical Right
	Jobbik	2003	15	Radical Right
Poland	Law and Justice	2001	21	Radical Right
	Liberty-Korwin	2015	21	Radical Right
	Kukiz'15	2015	21	No Family
Slovakia	People's Party Our	2010	16	Radical Right
	Slovak National Party	1990	16	Radical Right
	We are family- Borris Kollar	2015	16	Radical Right
Sweden	Sweden Democrats	1988	17	Radical Right

Notes: This table provides analytical information about all CHES-Rated parties that are used in the sample. Columns (1) and (2) list the country and the full name of the political party. Column (3) displays the year that party was founded. Column (4) represents the number of experts that analyzed and rated this party and Column (5) shows the political family that this party belongs to according to those experts.

Table A.2: Background check with Cutoff -1 and Donut Holes

Dependant Variable	(1) Education	(2) Income	(3) Children	(4) Household members	(5) Mother's education	(6) Father's education	(7) Citizen status
Coefficient	-0.395	0.427	-0.420	-0.201	-0.641	-0.094	0.019
Std. Error	(0.282)	(1.068)	(0.274)	(0.430)	(0.572)	(0.575)	(0.019)
P-value	0.161	0.690	0.125	0.641	0.263	0.870	0.328
Country	All	All	All	All	All	All	All
Cut-Off	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1
Donut	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1
Bandwidth	4.19	4.18	4.28	3.82	3.14	3.15	2.88
Observations	2186	2180	2173	2082	2043	2109	2195

Notes: Table A.2 provides robustness check of the balance test in Table 2. It is a regression analysis using an RDD approach to examine the relationship between conscription, and some individual demographic characteristics for men from all countries that are included in the sample around the reform cut-off of -1. Weights are used in all columns, and a donut-hole approach is employed.

Table A.3: Robustness Check: Impact of Conscription of Immigration-related Ideologies on Females

Variable	Nativism	Xenophobia	Anti-immigration
Conscription	1.000	-0.583	-3.422*
Standard error	(3.502)	(0.923)	(1.427)
Country	Sweden	Portugal	Hungary
Cut-Off	-1	-1	-1
Donut Hole	-1	-1	-1
Bandwidth	2.78	3.74	2.91
Observations	63	177	244

Notes: The table is a gender-based robustness check of Table 6. It provides a regression analysis using an RDD approach to examine the relationship between conscription and the individual perceptions on immigration-related ideologies. The sample consists of individuals who self-register as females In all columns, the cutoff of the RDD is -1, and a donut-hole approach around that cut-off is used. Columns (1), (2), and (3) measure the effect of conscription on Nativism, Xenophobia, and Anti-Immigration respectively. The optimal bandwidth technique is employed in all columns. Individual weights are used.

Table A.4: Robustness Check: Impact of Conscription on Authority-Related Ideologies on Females

Variable	Authoritarianism	Obedience	Obedience	Obedience	Autocracy
Conscription	-0.781	-0.126	-1.668	3.365	-0.836
Standard error	(0.599)	(2.686)	(1.565)	(2.964)	(0.773)
Country	Czechia	Slovakia	France	Bulgaria	Hungary
Cut-Off	-1	-1	0	0	0
Donut Hole	-1	-1	No	No	No
Bandwidth	4.17	2.96	4.94	3.61	4.41
Observations	281	261	245	168	251

Notes: The table is a gender-based robustness check of Table 7. It provides a regression analysis using an RDD approach to examine the relationship between conscription and the individual perceptions on authority-related ideologies. The sample consists of individuals who self-register as females. In columns (1) and (2) the cutoff of the RDD is -1, and a donut-hole approach around that cut-off is used. In Columns (3), (4), and (5) the cutoff of the RDD is 0. Columns (1), and (5) measure the effect of conscription on Authoritarianism and Autocracy respectively while Columns (2), (3) and (5) measure the effect of conscription on Obedience. The optimal bandwidth technique is employed in all columns. Individual weights are used.