Graduate School of Development Studies

Community-Based Fishery Management In The Post Conflict Situation
A Case Study in Coastal Villages North Maluku-

A Research Paper presented by:

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(Indonesia)

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for obtaining the degree of
MASTERS OF ARTS IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

Specialisation:
**Rural Livelihoods and Global Change
(RLGC)**

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The Hague, The Netherlands
December, 2008

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DEDICATION

To my son 'Afif Daffa Baldwin' who taught me how to be a good mother for only 14 months. You strengthened me more than I thought. I always love you son.

To Taufik my beloved husband, for sharing all the sadness and happiness; and to my family for all their sacrifices.

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List of Acronyms

BAPPEDA	: Regional Development Planning Board office
CARDI	: The Consortium for Assistance and Recovery towards Development in Indonesia
CBFM	: Community-based fishery management
CBNRM	: Community-based natural resources management
CPR	: Common property resources
FAD	: Fish aggregating device
INGO	: International non governmental organization
IDEA	: Institute for democracy and electoral assistance
KESBANGLINMAS	: Government Board in charge for INGO/NGO Coordination
UNDP	: United Nation Development Program

Abstract

The paper uses a case-study of the coastal villages in North Maluku, Indonesia that is in the process of reconciliation between the Muslim and Christian. The paper attempts to contribute to the understanding of the use of Community Based Fishery Management (CBFM) in facilitating the reconciliation process in the post-violent conflict. The paper begins by examining catalyzed factors contributing to the use of CBFM in the post violent conflict period. Subsequently, the paper continues by exploring the outcomes of CBFM and its affect in rebuilding relationships. The paper ends with briefly analyses to the sources of tension which perhaps come out from a control over fishery resources and unequal power relations between the Muslims and the Christians. This study found that it is possible for CBFM to facilitate the reconciliation with respect to two factors. Firstly, shared rules and cultural values promote cooperative behavior and enhance solidarity. And secondly, the role of the community leader as a mediator of community allows disputes to be settled in relatively fair and amicable manner. It is hoped that a lesson from this study can be applied to provide an understanding of the traditional community-based management and its dynamic role in helping to facilitate the reconciliation.

PROPOSED DIVISION OF DISTRICTS OF NORTH MALUKU PROVINCE

	North Halmahera
	West Halmahera
	Central Halmahera
	South Halmahera
	East Halmahera
	Ternate Municipality
	Sula Island
	Tidore Kepulauan

Toniku

8

Chapter 1 <u>Introduction</u>

The incidence of violent social conflict seems, if anything, to have increased in the last two decades. The Rwanda genocide woke the global community to the fact that it can break out between close communities with the same geographic, cultural and religious identities. In my observation with regard to the North Maluku case, the effect of violent conflict can be complex when the conflicting parties are living together in the same area, use the same natural resources and are highly interdependent both socially and culturally. Arguably, we have to go back to the community and to the way it works to find solutions, re-building trust and respect and creating or using institutions through which they can deal with their own problems.

This research is concerned with such a situation. It tries to understand how a local reconciliation effort in the form of communal fishery management can contribute to the healing process and complement a reconciliation process. It will ask if communal fishing can help to bridge the differences between conflicting parties, assess how far it can go in facilitating and strengthening the reconciliation process.

The study comprises five chapters. The first chapter provides a background presentation of the research problem, explains the methodology adopted and the choice of the study area. Chapter two lays out the theoretical and analytical framework and Chapter three introduces the research locations, and also provides a social history of the reconciliation process in North Maluku. Chapter four analyses research findings of the factors contributing to the use of community-based fishery management (CBFM) in the post violent conflict and how the CBFM can contribute to relationship building. Chapter five presents the reflection on reconciliation and brief identification of the precondition of conflict potency. Chapter six contains conclusions.

1.1 Background

In the violent conflict that occurred between Christians and Muslims in North Maluku, Indonesia, in 1999 and 2000 around 2,400 people died. A further 3,000 were injured, and approximately 200,000 were internally displaced. The violence only lasted a short time, but it destroyed the social and economic fabric of the communities involved. Trust evaporated. Around 80% of the basic infrastructure was totally destroyed, including houses, schools, health centres, water and sanitation facilities and community buildings. It had a devastating effect on the lives of the local people (Brown et al, in a UNDP report: 'overcoming violent conflict', 2005; based on interview data with the Social Welfare Office of the North Maluku Province). The intensity of the conflict over time can be seen in Figure 1.

Figure 2: Conflict intensity in North Maluku by Month, April 1999-December 2000

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Source: UNSFIR Conflict Database.

     As so often, the cause of the conflict is difficult to pin down, but there were at least three inter-related factors[1] involved-a decentralisation process, competition for resources, and religious sentiments. Each will be looked at in turn.

(1) Decentralisation

Indonesian political reform included a process of decentralization and the creation of several new provinces, one of which was North Maluku which had earlier been part of Maluku. It officially acquired provincial status on 14 October 1999. This gave local elites an opportunity to capture state authority at the local level and it triggered-off hitherto latent competition in an effort to capture the new position of Governor. It was widely envisaged in North Maluku that the Sultan of Ternate, a local leader with loyal Muslim and Christian followers, would be asked by the Golkar[2] political party to be one of the candidates. Other local politicians, however, had the same idea and they moved silently, but aggressively, to put themselves in the forerun. The result was a highly contested process as politicians used their structural or traditional power to pursue their political interests, and even resorted to force.

(2) Competition for resources

There was, at the same time, competition between the people of Kao and Malifut in North Halmahera-North Maluku, to have the Gosowong-Australian

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[1] This conclusion is based on the Brown et al, (2005), the interviews with government officials: in Kesbanglinmas office (in charge for NGO/INGO coordination), the Social Welfare Office, INGO CARDI staffs, UNDP staffs, local NGO staffs and my observation in the field when working in the conflict and post violent conflict situation.

[2] Golkar was the former political vehicle of President Soeharto which has reinvented itself as a significant electoral force in the post-new order period

gold mining company in their administrative area. The Kao people are predominantly Christians, though a minority is Muslim, and they are the native people of Kao. They are also culturally very loyal to the Sultan. In contrast, the Malifut are immigrants from Makian Island who moved to Kao as part of a transmigration program in the 1970s when Makian was devastated by a volcanic eruption. The Makianese are a strong Muslim community and dominate the local bureaucracy. The local government planned to divide Kao into two new sub districts, Kao and Malifut, but this was strongly rejected by the Kao as it removed Gosowong from their control. Geographically, Gosowong was closer to Malifut but it was traditional land of the Kao. There were also mounting tensions and resentments over these developments.

(3) Religious sentiment

Religious sentiments were triggered off by conflict in Ambon Maluku. In January 1999, conflict broke out between Muslims and Christians, leading to the exodus of many Muslims and Christians to neighbouring islands throughout the first half of 1999, including to North Maluku. Their arrival triggered contradictory sentiments. There was sympathy for people of the same religion who had been forced to emigrate, but it also meant that the differences of Kao and Malifut were politicized as ethnic/religious issues.

The combination of these three factors[3] was to prove disastrous. Conflict flared up first in August 1999 between two villages: Sosol (Kao) and Tahane (Malifut). This heightened existing tensions between the Malifut and Kao and led to the outbreak of violence on a much larger scale in the ensuing month, forcing (Muslim) Malifut people to flee from their villages. That inflamed religious sentiments and the violence took on religious overtones rather than a conflict over resources. This spread to attacks of Christians by Muslims in Tidore Island. The Sultan of Ternate intervened to bring about a brief peace, using his traditional political power to protect the Christian community in Ternate. However, it only led to rumours that the Sultan was pro-Christian and anti-Muslim and to the circulation of inflammatory propaganda claiming that the church was calling Christians for a holy war. This led to clashes between the Sultan's supporters (who were both Muslims and Christians) and other Muslim groups. It is not clear who circulated the propaganda[4]. However, the conflict forced Christians to flee to safe Christian areas like Tobelo- North Halmahera, Jailolo, Sahu and Ibu-West Halmahera. In December 1999, the worst violence erupted between Muslims and Christians in Tobelo and from there the conflict spread.

So, while the underlying sources of the conflict were not religious, the conflicting parties were effectively segregated according to their religious identity and other national/cultural/ethnic identities became effectively

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[3] The conflict chronology is again based on the Brown *et al. op.cit.*, and interviews with government officials.

[4] The circulated propaganda included a pamphlet purportedly signed by the synod chairman of the Maluku Protestant church/GPM calling on Christians to join in a holy war.

meaningless. It was an accepted dogma that any threat to one's belief was a threat to all who shared it. This made the conflict complex, particularly for local civilians who had been living in mixed neighbourhoods. They blindly claimed that the violent conflict was a holy war to protect their religion. There was widespread human rights violation, mass murder and mutilation when the conflict was most intense from December 1999 to the middle of 2000. Most victims were killed in their villages or in towns, often by their neighbours and fellow villagers. The people then lived separately as Muslims fled to "majority Muslim areas" and Christian to "safe" Christian areas.

By the middle of 2001, things had calmed down and in the same year, the local government embarked on a reconciliation program, called 'the returnees program', aimed to return Muslims and Christians to their original villages. This started from the middle of 2001 and lasted to 2005. Reconciliation programs have been successfully implemented and, since 2001, there has been no serious clash between Muslims and Christians in North Maluku. The reconciliation returnees program is discussed in Chapter 3.

Though the situation has become stable, the government and NGOs continue to promote reconciliation programs to strengthen social cohesion and encourage people to learn from their past experience. Most communities in rural areas (and most people in those communities) are still recovering. They are in the process of rebuilding their lives and learning to rebuild relationships of trust with other communities. Violent conflicts can have long-term psychological impacts, because, the victims are also the witnesses. This makes the reconciliation process difficult, dynamic and complex. Importantly, it does not only help them to rebuild, survive and interact but, crucially, to empower them to deal with their differences peacefully. I argue that if local civilians have conflict-handling capacities, there will be less chance of violence in future. The reconciliation process has been promoted through informal activities that allow conflicting parties to meet regularly and to grow together on a day-by-day basis, rebuilding relationships naturally. It is with this in mind that, in this research, I try to understand how far local reconciliation has worked in coastal communities, using the CBFM.

In North Maluku, CBFM was intended to help communities employ productive resources together as a means of rebuilding their communities. In particular, it was to be a way of enrolling and integrating Muslims and Christians on the basis of common (local) cultural values and rules. However, the role of CBFM in post-conflict situations is dynamic and multifaceted. On the one hand, it emerged as an activity that could foster or create an environment for dialogue, extensive interaction and negotiation. On the other hand, fishing is important for livelihoods and it is associated with power and control over resources. Communities inherited and enflamed conflict but they were also vulnerable to the eruption of conflict, especially when power is not equally distributed and when the powerful dominate the powerless. In the post-conflict period, they had to carry out their affairs with these risks in mind.

This study focuses on the role of CBFM, though it was only one element in a wider effort to facilitate a reconciliation process between the different communities. Nevertheless, it is hoped that it can contribute to a better understanding of the potential in facilitating the reconciliation.

1.2   Relevance and Justification

'One of the main factors that sustained the conflict in North Maluku after [it] broke out was a desire for revenge' (Brown et al: 2005: 34-35). This was especially so amongst those who had witnessed murder and other violations against their families and relatives. When it was all over, a big challenge had to be faced by the reconciliation program was how this fear, desire for revenge, and the effects of traumatic experiences could be replaced with trust and rebuilt relationships between Muslims and Christians. This was particularly so when violators were known and the social context was intimate, sharing the same small area and common natural resources. The North Maluku government did not believe that the idea of separating the communities was a meaningful long-term strategy and emphasizes was placed on achieving tangible and mutual beneficial by building strong foundations, re-constructing inter and intra community relationship. This was to be the critical first step in a reconciliation process that was always of considerable human significance in areas that are so affected (field observation during the working time in the period of 2000 to mid 2007).

Assefa argue that reconciliation has to be a 'voluntary initiative of the conflicting parties to acknowledge their responsibility and guilt through new relationship that emerges as consequence of the process' (Assefa, in Mark: 2007:13). In this sense, reconciliation is a dynamic process that has to be constructed through the conscious intentions of the conflicting parties to accept their differences and to learn to live together. As an outcome of conflict transformation process, it has to help them to be more tolerant and cooperative in maintaining their relationships. 'The reconciliation process needs to be grounded in the local context and driven by local actors' (Mark, 2007:9).

Community-based natural resources management (CBNRM) is often considered appropriate when it comes to managing natural resources that are physically indivisible and unbounded, as is the case with fisheries. It requires people to work together for a collective goal and to cooperate (Mc Kean, 1996:226). Logically, if the different groups have a strong commitment to work together, CBNRM can help the community to survive and, in the process, re-build contacts and assist and strengthen the process of reconciliation.

There has been exponential growth in studies of the commons and communal resource management since the late 1990s, especially on forestry and water management but also on fisheries (Laerhoven and Ostrom, 2007:7). With local users participating in the decision-making and implementation that is involved in the management of communal resources, CBNRM has been considered an effective management strategy when it comes to the conservation of resources, benefiting the community, local government through decentralization, and the poor in particular (Danida, 2007:2-3). However, little has been written about its potential in the context of a post-conflict reconciliation process.

Community-based fishery management (CBFM) is nevertheless an instrument that has been used to bring about the reconciliation in North Maluku where the parties to the earlier conflict share common natural

resources. CBFM in Eastern part of Indonesia involves a form of local management that is not commonly found in many other places (Nikijuluw, 1996:96)

Finally, A lesson learnt from the Northern Ireland peace building process is that three main elements are required to sustain it: (1) the involvement of civic society in resource allocation and the design of appropriate policies; (2) a psycho-cultural approach that aims to define and develop the relationship between conflicting groups through contact and cooperative possibilities; and (3) the reframing of problems through negotiation and mediation (Mari Fitzduff, 1999:98-99). CBFM offer these possibilities.

It is hoped that this study will contribute to the literature on common property management by examining its use as a tool in a post-conflict reconciliation process. Rebuilding relationships between the conflicting parties is not easy. It takes a long time and it can be undermined by power relationships and political interests. However, this study will explore its role in enhancing cooperation, reducing tension and rebuilding lives.

1.3   Research Objective and Question

This study attempts to understand how and to what extent community-based fishery management can facilitate the reconciliation process between community groups in a post conflict situation based on the case of North Maluku, a poor and relatively undeveloped economy. It asks how it worked and what it has contributed to the reconciliation process.

1.4   The Methodology

The CBNRM examined in this research is limited to community-based fishery management in selected villages. The focus is on two villages (Toniku in West Halmahera District and Maidi in Tidore Kepulauan Municipality), both in North Maluku province. They are considered indicative of the kinds of problems faced and to be in this sense representative. The reasons for choosing them were threefold. First, Tidore Kepulauan and West Halmahera were both hot spots during the conflict and in both communal fishing activities are carried out by mixed groups (Muslim and Christian). At the same time, they present very distinctive dimensions of the reconstruction problem. In the case of Maidi, the community receive the fishery equipment (*rumpong*) from the government and an International non governmental organization (INGOs) after the conflict. In contrast, in Toniku, people had owned already fishery equipment (*bagan)* earlier but it had been totally destroyed. Second, both villages are religiously and ethnically heterogeneous, both are typical of mixed villages in North Maluku where the question of reconciliation is a real issue. Third, they both caught small pelagic fish and were therefore typical of the local fishermen in North Maluku, but with differing degrees of commercial specialisation, bringing out valuable contrasts. In Toniku, communal fishing is commercially-oriented, using expensive boat-operated lift nets (or *bagan*) and a combination of fishing and farming is the main source of livelihoods. In Maidi, in contrast, it is very much a secondary livelihood source, supplementing

farming, and the community used fishing aggregate device (or *rumpong*) which is relatively cheaper. In addition, the CBFM in both villages used a traditional community-based system where the fishery resources management was operated in accordance to culturally shared values and rules and through reciprocities and solidarity principles. The concept of traditional community-based system will be discussed in chapter 2.

In substantiating the analyses and answering the research questions, the study relies on both secondary and primary data. The latter came from observations, interviews, life stories and group discussions in the study areas. Observation helped contextualize and understand the situation on the ground, especially when it came to nuances and sensitive issues that were not easily addressed by questioning. Interviews were conducted using a structured format based on a pre-determined set of questions and by using an unstructured format in in-depth interviews to follow up on questions that emerged during an interview. Focus group discussions were used to cross-check the information received in the interviews and to build clearer picture of the situation.

As the research relies on qualitative methods, I have used purposive snowball sampling. First I looked at 'the Key Informants (KI)' data as a guide to help identify respondents. Key informants comprised local government officials, village authorities, community leaders (religious and/or traditional leaders) and the UN/INGO staff. KI also provided additional primary data that could not have been drawn from interviews with respondents. Secondary data comprised published and unpublished studies, including government and NGO reports, internet documents and library material. Data collection included work on the historical process of CBFM; patterns of interaction between community groups in general and within CBFM in particular; existing CBFM arrangement; power relations within community and its effect on CBFM arrangement; forms of negotiation and mediation within CBFM and how such factors influence the relationship building or reconciliation process.

The fieldwork was conducted over one month in July 2008. First, I visited the Fishery and Marine Office North Maluku Province and government boards in charge of specific issues such as the regional planning offices at province and district levels; UNDP North Maluku, a local NGO-Elsil Kie Raha and the fishery faculty at local state university-Khairun Ternate. These institutions helped me gain a clear picture of the situation in the field before finalizing my selection of research locations. The latter are small villages chosen to contrast different dimensions in a short period of time. Group focus discussions were conducted for two groups in Toniku and two in Maidi. I also visited interviewees individually and in small groups usually consisting of two to four persons. Informal conversation proved necessary and invaluable in developing themes during field work, especially in relation to traumatic conflict experiences.

In total, I conducted four group discussions each consisting of seven to ten persons, 14 small group discussions involving two to four persons, 60 individual interviews with local people in Toniku and Maidi and the neighboring villages of Rioribati and Tewe. I met 15 government officials,

fishery faculty academics, 3 UNDP staff, 2 IRC/CARDI INGO staff, and 7 local NGO staff.

Discussion of conflict experiences between Muslims and Christians has taken place frequently and openly in North Maluku and this provided relatively easy access to both communities (Muslim and Christian) in research data collection, though discussions were obviously less open as they became more sensitive and less amenable to group work. I was also aware that my own identity could influence the answer of respondents and I tried to minimize the possibility.

Finally, additional information could be contributed by the author, having had 8 years experience working with the community in the post-conflict situation in North Maluku. This had both advantages and disadvantages; advantages because provided knowledge of the concrete situation on the ground, but also disadvantages because it could involve preconception and bias. A conscious attempt has been made to present an academically balance analysis.

1.5. Limitations of the Study

This study is based on a brief period of field research, and it only looked at communal fishing arrangements in two villages, in West Halmahera District and Tidore Kepulauan municipality-North Maluku Indonesia. They are believed to be indicative of the locality; they do not necessarily represent experiences of Indonesia as a whole. Additionally, the model of CBFM in this study area is very unique and specific only to coastal villages in North Maluku. This research can not therefore be said to present the whole picture of conflict in North Maluku or its effects to the people's lives. This is important because what happened in the conflict and personal and group reflections on and responses to the conflict in North Maluku varied from place to place. They are complex, and they could only be explored more fully through a long period of research. Lastly, as a local people, my own identity helped me to understand sensitive (often semi-hidden) issues within these communities. However, I was not a conflict victim, nor did I lose relatives, friends or property, which at times made it difficult to appreciate fully the depth of the traumatic experiences of those who did.

Chapter 2 <u>The Theoretical Framework</u>

To explain the contribution of CBFM practices to the rebuilding of the relationship between Muslims and Christians, several theoretical concepts have been used in this study. The following section provides an overview.

2.1 Theoretical Concept

1. Common property resources (CPR)

In this research, common property resources management (CPR) is understood as an 'institutional arrangement or a set of rules that people make to control their use of the natural environment' (Bromley, 1989, cited in Hanna and Jentoft, 1996: 35). In practice, this concept is translated as how to govern the common pool resources through the use of institutions within the community. As Agrawal (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999:8) has noted, 'institutions can be seen as sets of formal and informal rules and norms that shape interactions of humans with others and nature'. The idea of CPR has become a dominant model of development worldwide. One element is community-based natural resources management (CBNRM) which has become very popular in the natural resources management. CBNRM is 'a partnership by which two or more relevant social actors collectively negotiate, agree upon, guarantee and implement a fair share of management functions, benefits and responsibilities for a particular territory, area or set of natural resources' (Feyerabend, in Danida, 2003:2).

However, the CPR concept was practiced by local people in managing their resources long before it came into mainstream development discourse. Many coastal communities in Asia-Pacific regions have been using the community-based system in managing the fishery resources for a long time (Kenneth Ruddle, 1996). Hence, Johannes (cited in Kenneth Ruddle, 1996:168) has criticized the way 'Western-trained administrators are now striving to design community-based system where many Oceanian societies had practiced it.' Similarly, Nikijuluw has highlighted the fact that 'community-based fishery management in Eastern Indonesia is basically vested in traditional authority or varies according to social organization' (Nikijuluw, 1996:88). Rules as to the types of fishing gear that are allowed, the method of fishing, the schedule for using certain kinds of equipment, fishing targets or the size of catch that is permissible have been widely applied by the community traditionally (Ibid). This system may not work the same way as CPR in the contemporary model, where organizer (usually outsiders) organize the community or users within organizational structure, such as meeting with specified division of tasks. Traditional community-based system uses a collective mechanism for decision making that has been socially, culturally and structurally built into the community.

In such situation, it is only possible to understand how the system works if we understand the logic behind it. In the course of this research, it is hoped to show how traditional CPR system can induce users to share resources equitably among themselves. Understanding the indigenous

knowledge, values and practices that lie behind it can only, however, be unearthed through a local lens and not from the broader context which can be very western-centric. Toniku and Maidi have been applying a traditional-community based system as described by Nikijuluw.

Common theorists (Wade, 1988; Ostrom, 1990; Balland and Plateau, 1996), maintain that 'membership of a small groups is essential to make the CPR work sustainably'. They view-although not always, the community is homogeneous. It is assumed that a small community has a homogeneous identity sharing common norms and rules, that is closely interdependent, and that it is likely to benefit as a whole from common management arrangements.

However, for all their small size, most of these communities are not homogeneous but often very heterogeneous. 'Most resources are managed by groups divided along multiple axes, among them ethnicity, gender, religion, wealth, and caste' (Agrawal and Gibson cited in Agrawal, 1999:121). Communities are mesh of interwoven social, cultural and political relations, as a result of which the implementations of CPR becomes dynamic, complex and very challenging. Bardan and Johnson (2002), argue that the CPR also can present 'a collective action dilemma' where heterogeneity has a negative impact on cooperation and common management; it can weaken the cohesive effect of social norms and weakens sanctions to enforce cooperative behavior and collective arrangements'. On the other hand Wade (1987) shows that 'cultural forces can also resolve a collective action dilemma. In his view, cultural forces can shape collective action by providing convention or norms. Hence, according to Rao (2003) 'people who belong to the community both have a preference to abide by rules of the community-because they internalize its ideology, but also face sanction if they violate the rules'.

Arguably, communal fishing activities (CBFM) present advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, working together in common resources under shared value, norms and rules, it can enable users to rebuild relationships, and it can help to strengthen the social cohesion (as pointed out by Wade). On the other hand, the communities are religiously and ethnically diverse and they have inherited conflict, they are learning to co-exist under new and very different circumstances. In this context, CBFM could also weaken cooperative behavior, as noted by Bardan and Johnson (2002). It is hoped that this study can provide broader insights into the potential role of these common arrangements in facilitating reconciliation.

Lastly, to understand the role of CBFM, it is important to know the dynamics behind the way people participate in this joint exploitation of a common resource base. Participation and power are important elements in this context and the next section examines them to gain a better understanding of their relevance for the reconciliation process.

2. Participation

"Participation" is widely used by agencies like the World Bank or the UN as a key notion in development and terms like "community participation", "community development" or "a participatory approach" are used synonyms that are positive and inclusive and therefore "good". However, the pervasive reference to this notion of participation has given rise to a complex mesh of very different meanings. "Participation" is translated and applied by social actors in different ways, defined according to the perceived needs of a particular context or of a given problem. As a result, although it is used widely, it is quite controversial (Mansuri and Rao, 2003:8). The World Bank (*World Bank Participation Sourcebook,* 1996) defines participation as "a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives and the decisions and resources which affect them". In CPR management, it is interpreted as local users regulating the self-management of resources (Ostrom, 1996 cited in Jeffrey and Vira, ({1998}, 2001). Participation in this study means local users regulating communal fishery through accepted rules and norms, and it is examined in terms of the way they affect relationship-building between Muslims and Christians.

Participation in this sense takes place through the interaction of individuals with a view to achieving specific outcomes with regard to common resources. This interaction can be standard and accepted, or it can be negotiated and contested because individuals have different attitudes and interests, belong to different social groups, are women or men, rich or poor, Muslims or Christian etc. This complexity influences the level and the pattern of participation within CPR, and one of the complexities relates to power relations. Spaces for participation are not neutral, but they are shaped by power relations (Cornwall, 2002). This means that power relations play an important role in the process of regulating the self-management of resources, particularly in cases where communities are heterogeneous and where divisions are sharp.

3. Concept of Power

The meaning of power and how it should be conceptualised is a contentious issue. The orthodox concept of power has been inherited from Dahl. He regarded power as a nexus of oppression and resistance. Power exists when 'A' makes decision and it affects 'B'. Max Weber defined power as a zero-sum game, where one actor gained and the other lost. Both regarded power as an attribute of actors, some of whom are powerful and others powerless. Others, like Foucault, saw it intrinsic in social norms and standards associated with the way people perceived themselves and related to others (Masaki, 2007:19). In this sense, power can affect everyone, with no single actor holding all of it. From a structuralist viewpoint, power is embodied in social interaction and enables social actors to form their agenda and to achieve their goals (*ibid*).

Power relations also have several dimensions. Actors have 'power over' people, which relates to how the powerful can affect the action and thought of the powerless. This kind of power is seen as a win-lose kind of relationship. They also have 'power to' do things, the capacity to act, to exercise agency and to realize the potential of right. It also provides possibilities for joint action. 'Power within' means gaining self-identity, confidence and awareness and usually exists as pre-condition for action. 'Power with' can emerge through

partnership and collaboration with others (Gaventa, 2005:9; Miller and Veneklasen, 2007:45). The concept of power relations will be used to analyse the existing power within communities and its effects on to relationship-building between the sides in a conflict.

4. Interaction, Mediation and Negotiation

Interaction between different parties through direct engagement can provide support for power sharing through negotiation and mediation. Negotiation and mediation are efforts to reach mutually-agreed arrangements or joint decisions to accommodate the opposing preferences or needs of different groups. The difference between the two is that negotiation is a bargaining relationship between opposing parties and mediation as a process of negotiation that facilitated by a third party. When different community groups voluntarily initiate work collectively in the common space or common institution, they set out with the intention of managing their internal conflict through compromise solutions.

However, power relations can influence the process of negotiation and mediation. Powerful actors can control and dominate the decision-making process, in which case power sharing is an important precondition for collaborative management. Without power sharing, it is impossible for the different parties to reach any arrangement that is mutually acceptable. Fair negotiation and mediation among the group members will create a power sharing mechanism.

Looking at the form of negotiation and mediation amongst CBFM members, I will refer to "the motivational orientation" in a negotiation process as pointed out by Carnevale and Pruit (1992:9). They distinguish four types of motivations on the part of the negotiator that can affect to the negotiation process: (1) an individualistic orientation, where the negotiator is exclusively concerned with his or her personal interests; (2) an altruistic orientation, exclusively concerned with other parties interests; (3) a cooperative orientation, concerned with both parties' interests; and (4) a competitive orientation, a "desire to do better than the other party (*op.cit*:9).

These four forms of motivations will be used to analyse how CBFM members interact collectively in decision-making process and to help figure out the motivation behind the process of negotiation and mediation between the powerful and powerless to arrive at mutual agreements that are acceptable to everyone.

5. Reconciliation

Reconciliation is a multidimensional issue. It is a unique process in that an approach that can work well in one place may be completely wrong in another. It can only therefore be understood in the concrete context in which people live. Reconciliation can go up and down, back and forth and it can very messy. It 'is a theme with deep psychological, theological, sociological, philosophical, and profoundly human roots---nobody knows how to successfully achieve it'
(Mark, 2007:6).

In analyzing the reconciliation process, I will therefore turn to both reconciliation theories and empirical evidence. However, as most reconciliation scholars (Lederach, 2001; Assefa, 1999; Mark, 2007) have emphasized the

essence of reconciliation is relationship-building between the conflicting parties. The most prominent theories in the field of peace-building and reconciliation have been categorized in three parts (Mark, 2007:10-15)

(1) Reconciliation as peace building paradigm.

Lederach (2001) has argued that 'reconciliation represents a space or place where the conflicting parties meet'. Thus, in supporting reconciliation, there is need to identify a place or space that people use to build new relationships, and to share their perceptions, feelings and experiences with the goal of creating new perceptions and a new shared experience (*ibid*). This concept is applicable to a local reconciliation platform in the context of CBFM. CBFM is built and maintained by the local people and it is used as a place where the two sides in the conflict meet and interact regularly and naturally. Cornwall has pointed out that 'working together in the formed group will perceive a context for learning'. The process of interaction that takes place will frequently somehow enhances self-understanding. People also will learn through reflection on their actions and learning is oriented towards changes in practices (Cornwall, 2004:5-6). At the same time, changes in understanding and behavior are more likely to occur where the learning process takes place through iteration of action, reflection, conceptualization and practice (Kolb, 1985, in Peter Taylor, 2006:34).

(2)Reconciliation as a conflict handling mechanism

This draws on the idea of Assefa (1999) perceives reconciliation as a proactive form of conflict-handling mechanism where reconciliation not only tries to find solutions to the issues underlying the conflict but works to alter the adversaries' relationship from resentment and hostility to friendship and harmony. He adds that the essence of reconciliation is the force of change behavior and that, more importantly, this force must be voluntarily initiated by the conflicting parties rather than externally imposed.

(3) Reconciliation as relationship building process

IDEA (the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance) in Mark 2007, has indicated that reconciliation after violent conflict is the long, broad and deep inter-communal building process that constitutes by four components: healing, truth-telling, restorative justice and reparation. These four components work together to construct the three stages of the reconciliation process: *a first stage* in which fear is replaced by peaceful co-existence; *a second stage* building confidence and trust; and *a third stage* that has to work on understanding and empathy.

Theories will be used to shed light on the role of CBFM and its dynamics in facilitating the reconciliation process between Muslims and Christians in the context of North Maluku.

2.2 Analytical Framework

Figure 3: Analytical framework for Communal Fishing Management

(1)

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┌──────────────────┐
│ Catalyzed factors│
│ contribute to the│
│ use of CBFM in   │
│ the post violent │
│ conflict?        │
└──────────────────┘
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(3)
Participation
Power Relations
Negotiation & Mediation

(2)
CBFM : Muslims & Christian

Maidi

Source: Author's synthesis

The analytical framework will help me analyze the scope and dynamics of CBFM in facilitating reconciliation in North Maluku. It will help to explore (1) the catalysts behind the idea of using CBFM in a post-conflict situation; and (2) how CBFM is jointly managed by Muslims and Christians. A central question will be how it can facilitate the reconciliation process, a role that will be examined using three main analytical components, namely, participation, the dynamics of power relations, and the outcome in terms of the mediation and negotiation among users. Finally, I will ask how far CBFM can go in facilitating reconciliation processes.

Chapter 3 Introduction to the case study

This chapter presents a brief overview of social condition in North Maluku and of the reconciliation process. It then provides a brief profile of the research locations and their community-based fishery management.

3.1 Brief Overview of North Maluku

North Maluku (Maluku Utara) is situated in the eastern part of Indonesia (see figure 1). It has a population of 919,160 in 2007 of whom 723,566 (or 77%) were Muslims and 214,295 (or 23%) were Christians. The region has a total land area of 140.366 sq km. Ternate is the temporary capital of the province though it will in time be transferred to Sofifi. It comprises six districts (West, North, South, East, Central, Halmahera and Sula Island) and two municipalities (Ternate and Tidore). North Maluku consists of 84 sub districts and 988 villages (North Maluku in figures, 2007).

Historically, the region was led by four ancient Islamic sultanates. As a result, in terms of their cultural characteristics, four cultural geographical zones can be identified: Ternate, which includes Ternate, North Halmahera and Sula Island; Tidore, including Tidore and Central Halmahera; Bacan, which includes Bacan, Obi and Makian; and Jailolo which includes West Halmahera (Yusuf Hasani, 2004).

By the 17thcentury, the only sultanates that remained were in Ternate and Tidore. They were powerful, and the rivalry between them was strong because the island was at that time the world's single largest producer of cloves. The first contact with Europeans had been in the 15th century with Portuguese, then the Spanish until the Dutch took over from 18th century and then the Japanese from 1942 to 1945. By the 18th century, the Ternate sultanate was the sole power in the region (official website of Ternate Municipality office). Historically and culturally, Christians were also loyal to the Sultan and, under his authority, there was no enforced conversion to Islam from either primitive or Christian beliefs. Meanwhile, the Muslim community was highly fragmented, and Muslims loyal to the Sultan were to be found mainly in Ternate, West and North Halmahera. Regardless of religious identity, people worked together in communal activities such as *Jojobo* (a traditional revolving fund system), *Bari* (building house) and *Lilian* (helping others for weddings or funerals). There was a long tradition and culture of cooperation that remains in the rural areas (Regional Development Planning Board, Maluku Utara, 2007).

3.2 Violent-Social Conflict and the Reconciliation Process in North Maluku

Since the time of the conflict in 1999, the peace process in North Maluku has been dynamic, involving multiple stakeholders and various conflict-handling strategies. What follows is a chronology from 1999 to 2008.[5] The process started towards the end of 1999 in the aftermath of violence. To prevent further escalation, the central government sent the military to North Maluku to restore peace and stability in the area. The deployment of the army was effective in reducing the intensity of violence but the incidence of attacks in towns and rural areas continued. As a result, the central government declared a civil emergency, authority and control to the national military and it was in place from June 2000 to May 2003.

Reconciliation initiatives were initiated by the central government under the auspices of the Minister for Social Welfare and the two sides were brought together around on the same table. It did not reduce the tension significantly but the local government nevertheless set up a local reconciliation team in collaboration with military authorities at the local level. It comprised an equal number of religious, traditional, and youth leaders from both sides of the conflict and it was tasked to facilitate negotiation and dialogue at the local level, and to promote the safe return of those who been displaced. The local reconciliation teams were active in promoting the peace process. When a rumor spread within the community, community representatives who were team members would quickly clarify the situation to diffuse the potential for conflict.

As a result, people returned. The army nevertheless continued to standby around the border of villages, accompanying people when they were working on the land or in interaction with the other group. In total, around 150 local, national and international agencies were also working in North Maluku from 2000 to 2005 (interview data with Kesbanglinmas North Maluku, 2008), providing additional assistance-rebuilding livelihoods, in construction, health, education and capacity and peace building (*ibidem*).

The main reason people accepted the idea of living together again was because they were motivated by the positive evidence they saw in the field, where the local reconciliation teams were seriously protecting them, acting fairly in treating both sides, and always using non-force approaches (field observation during my work in the area from 2000-2007).

The return of displaced people was not implemented everywhere simultaneously, mainly because its success was heavily dependent on the prevailing security situation in the area and acceptance of the receiving

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[5] The chronology and social history of this reconciliation is based on the Brown *et al. op. cit*, and interviews with government officials in the Kesbanglinmas office in charge of NGO/INGO coordination, the Social Welfare Office, INGO CARDI staff, UNDP staff, local NGO staff and personal observations in the field over a sustained period of time.

community. It started in places that were categorized as safe, continued in time to those that were considered moderately safe, and only finally to high places with a high potential for conflict. Even so, the reality on ground is complex. Sometimes, a community would reject the idea of people returning even though the village was categorized as safe or moderately safe. This made the returnees program an uneasy process to implement.

Around three quarters of the 200,000 displaced people in North Maluku had returned home by April 2004 (Brown et all, 2005) and the local government estimated that approximately 95% were back by 2008. Some returned individually and did not report or register with the local authorities, others moved to live permanently in other places (interview data with Social Welfare Office North Maluku, 2008).

In maintaining the peace situation, the local government of North Maluku imposed four measures: (1) it kept the Malifut sub-district under the authority of Malifut and Kao; (2) it established and supported traditional communal groups with an equal number of Muslims and Christians; (3) it conducted regular discussions which inter-religious groups, traditional leaders, and youth representatives; and (4) it promoted regular peace messages through the use of mass media such as radio, television, and newspaper (interview data with Social Welfare Office and KESBANGLINMAS Office North Maluku, 2008).

An indication of the success of the reconciliation process was the direct and relatively peaceful election of the six District Heads and two Municipality Mayors between 2004 and 2007. The election of Governor in 2008 was quite tense, particularly between supporters of two governor candidates. However, it did not affect the security situation in general. Lastly, though there was no segregation of Muslims and Christians or between ethnic groups, the reconciliation program still needs to be addressed to strengthen conflict handling capacities.

3.3   The Village Settings

Toniku: Village Background

Toniku is situated in West Halmahera District, bordered by a Christian village, Rioribati, to the east and a mixed village, Tewe (where Christians and Muslims were living together) to the west. Besides differences in religion, the people are also ethnically diverse. The majority of Muslims come from Ternate, Tidore, Makian, and Jailolo, while Christians come from Jailolo. However, they have been living together in Toniku since the 1940s (since independence). Toniku has the richest fishing grounds and is comprised mainly of mangrove forest. Currently, Toniku is the biggest producer of anchovies (*teri*) in North Maluku (Interview data with Marine officials).

It comprises 104 households, 84 of which are Muslims and 20 Christian. The population was 759 in 2008 of whom 49% are women. Petty trading and fishery are the main sources of livelihood. Muslims are both farmers and fishermen whereas the Christians are mostly farmers. The community maintains that income that can be gained from fishing is greater than that from crop farming.

During the conflict, Christians left the village and they returned in late 2001. The village head and his staff, together with Imam, were key actors in the reconciliation process. For instance, when there was youth fighting linked to the religious sentiments, Muslim and Christian leaders approached the two sides and resolved the problem amicably. This practice reduced the tension and villagers slowly came appreciate their level of interaction in their regular activities.

In Toniku, The village head and the Imam have the power to impose rules and to influence the communal decision-making process. When there is a serious problem between or within communities, the people and leaders in the surrounding areas of Tewe and Rioribati usually consult it with those in Toniku. They also have crucial role in mediating disputes and dissatisfaction within the community regarding the *bagan* activities (see box and photo) as well as inter-communal contacts.

Bagan

Bagan is a boat-operated lift net for catching anchovies. It consists of a horizontal netting panel from which lifted nets are hauled out by rope. After having been left to soak at the required depth for sometime, the net is lifted out of the water; fish are attracted by an electrical under-water lamp, installed in the lift net. The *Bagan* only operates during the night. The *Bagan* is located about 1 mile from the coast.

The fishermen (non *bagan* members) usually fish close to the *bagan* on the sea. They can catch fish easily because the fish densities are higher there.

Characteristic of CBFM in Toniku

The local community uses *bagan* which are either owned individually or by groups. A *Bagan* is relatively expensive and only affordable to the rich. Toniku has 16 *bagan* which have been newly built since the conflict. In total, 15 people own *bagan* individually and only 1 bagan is owned by a group. However, they involve 160 workers.

In its operation, the owner employs ten people (five women and five men). Men are directly responsible for the boat, and women for cleaning and drying the fish after the catch. It involves a share system, the owner receiving 50% of the harvest and rest being shared among the group members. The latter are allowed by the owner to control his operational cost. In practice, the owner and his group members have to keep an expenditure note, and they

crosscheck their notes before sharing the net income. This creates transparency and fairness among the parties.

The *bagan* is on the sea for 20 days a month after which it goes back to the shore for maintenance. During its operation, it moves around Toniku and Tewe to look for anchovies. The harvested fish are removed from the nets, placed on a smaller boat and transported to the coast. Villagers usually help to take the fish from the boat even if they are not *bagan* members. Fish other than anchovies can be taken for free by any villager including people from Rioribati. Often, if one *bagan* finds a fertile fishing ground it alerts the others to the fact so that they can join.

Operating the *bagan* is basically in accordance with the following communal rules:

1. when one *bagan* operates in a particular fishing spot and catches many fish, other *bagan* are also allowed to fish there;

2. the *bagan* uses an underwater electrical lamp to attract the anchovies for harvest. To ensure equal opportunities, the owners must have lamps of the same wattage;

3. *bagan* owners allow other fishermen, whether from Toniku or outside, to fish in a *bagan* spot where fish are attracted by the light. These fishermen (non-*bagan* members, including Christians from Tewe) take anchovies from the *bagan* boat and use them as bait to catch small pelagic fish. Usually, after fishing, fishermen (whether *bagan* member or non-*bagan*) sleep in the *bagan*. Sometimes non-*bagan* members (including Christians from Tewe) help *bagan* members to haul up the lifted net.

4. *bagan* owners only get anchovies: other kinds of fish can be taken by members and other villagers;

5. when villagers or other neighbours need fish for communal events (such as weddings or funerals), they can barter the fish for cassava, banana or other things.

The way in which rules are made, applied and enforced within communities is discussed in chapter 4.

The *bagan* is also a place where the community gathers together. When it needs to be repaired, all villagers are required to come to help the owners, this traditionally having been a communal task irrespective of whether or not those who were involved were *bagan* members. Likewise, during storms and bad weather, villagers voluntarily help to protect the *bagan*.

It has been my observation that most Christians in Toniku are not directly involved in fishing activities, except for repairing the *bagan*. They are unused to fishing though, before conflict, some Christians owned *bagan* (most of them outsiders living and working in Toniku). Unlike the ones in Toniku, Christians in Tewe preferred to fish with a small boat or canoe. When consulted individually, some openly expressed their dissatisfaction with the way the Toniku *bagan* operated in front of their village, despite the fact that they could get fish for free during the *bagan* harvest and enjoy the *bagan* facilities. Moreover, they still expected to have their own *bagan* at some point in the future, though their lack of capital and the absence of government assistance make it extremely difficult. In Rioribati, few of them fished regularly, most

people being farmers.

The users of *bagan* in Toniku can be divided into three groups:

1) *Bagan* owners who have direct access to, receive benefit from, and take the most risk when it comes to *bagan* fishing activities. They receive the most benefit, but they are also the most affected when fishing yields less. Even if stocks of fish diminish, the *Bagan* owner still need to cover cost, in particular fuel costs. They can influence the decision-making process regarding *bagan* operations via the sharing of revenue and they accept that people take fish for free during the main harvest season, even if they sometimes forbid it when the catch is low. They are in a much better position to dominate and control resources than any other groups;

2) *Bagan* workers have access to the *bagan* but receive less benefit than the owners. However, they are entitled to make joint decisions about *bagan* management. Owners are often expected to consult and discuss with the workers who may allow villagers to take fish from the *bagan* and the owners have to accept it. Most interviewees said that internal arrangement of *bagan* operation is decided by both the owners and the workers.

3) Non-*bagan* workers and non-fishermen can access the *bagan* by fishing close by or getting fish during the *bagan* harvest. Though they are not decision-makers when it comes to the way the *bagan* operates, they can indirectly influence decision-making. When they are unsatisfied with a particular communal arrangement concerning the *bagan*, they can talk to the village elite and in many cases their voices are heard.

Communal fishery offers multiple benefits to the local community in terms of income and the conservation of fishery resources. In the past, most of them cut mangrove trees for their fuel and for sale in the market. Now this has stopped because they understand that fish stocks are dependent on how well they maintain the mangrove forest. Some villages in North Maluku who had the highest levels of anchovy production in the 1980s and '90s experienced depleting fish stocks after (both legal and illegal) gold mining started to operate. Anchovies have a short life span which makes them highly sensitive to changes in their environment or to any increase in pollution. Toniku village could also potentially be affected by pollution because its geographical position is near the new capital of North Maluku province-Sofifi, hence the increased concern.

Maidi: **Village Background**

Maidi is located in Tidore Kepulauan District and it has abundant species of small pelagic fish such as sardine and mackerel. It comprises 359 households and it had a total population of 819 in 2007 of whom 83% were Muslims and 49% women. The majority of these Muslims come from Tidore, Makian and Kayoa, while Christians come from Tobelo and Jailolo. They had lived together since 1950s and today Muslims live in Maidi village and the Christians in Tafaga, around a kilometre away from it. Administratively, Maidi and Tafaga are under Maidi village. The majority of (Muslim and Christian) adult men (18-55 years old) of are engaged fishing activity (field data). However the intensity of fishing varies because besides fishing, the community also works on

agriculture.

The initial conflict had effectively destroyed Tafaga village it had led to the exodus of the Christians in 1999 and they then returned home again in 2002. Christians in Maidi had many kinship relations with Muslim people and the latter were more accepting of their return then Muslims in neighbouring villages who would not even allow Christians to enter the surrounding areas. Inter-marriage played an important role in their allowing Christians to return. In Maidi, the village head was also powerful enough to influence communal decision-making and the Imam was only involved in religious affairs.


Picture 1: Canoe

Picture 2:   new *rumpong* (not operated yet)

Picture 3: *Rumpong* location on the sea   Picture 4: harvest with purse seine

Rumpong is fish aggregating device (FAD) man-made floating objects (flotsam) placed (anchored or free floating) in the sea to attract and concentrate certain pelagic fish. It is made from bamboo, wood, ropes, floatation, and anchor (picture: 2). Once *rumpong* is on the sea, it is left there permanently; *rumpong* is located at the required depth of 50-100 meter of water (picture: 3). Technically, this system is meant to attract fish as naturally fish comes to play in the *rumpong*. The fishers hang coconut leaves in the *rumpong* (which is put under water). Fishermen then use hand line to catch fish manually (picture 3). The fishermen do not need to feed the fish because *rumpong* is located in the sea about less than 1 mile from the coast. All the fishers can access it by small boat/canoe. When people harvest with *purse seine,* the boat will come to *rumpong* spot, and hand off the nets (picture: 4).

Characteristic of CBFM in Maidi

The community use the *rumpong*, which can be owned individually or

collectively, as a communal fishing ground. Currently, there are eight *rumpong*, six distributed by INGOs and the government. As in Toniku, the use of both individually and collectively owned *rumpong* is managed through a community-based system.

Initially, there was one *rumpong* owned individually by one person in Maidi, who was also known as a cash crop product retailer. He built his own *rumpong* to generate more income for himself but he allowed the villagers to fish in it. He only harvested with *purse seine equipment* when fish densities were high. INGO and the Government distribute *rumpong* and provide basic management skills, but the way they are managed is basically in accordance with the shared rules.

The following communal rules are used in the operation of the *rumpong*:

1. every fisherman can fish in the *rumpong* at any time;

2. groups of individuals can fish together in the same *rumpong* when fish densities are higher;

3. all fishermen must use the same equipment (traditional fishing hand lines) for regular/daily fishing activity, and the use of medium gear is prohibited. They say that in their experience the medium gear will not catch fish of all sizes and thereby injure the fish. This makes the fish disappear and it takes

time to get them back;

4. maintaining and patrolling use of the *rumpong* is a collective responsibility. Villagers are responsible for its maintenance on a voluntary basis, for example, automatically replacing the bamboo and the coconut leaves;

5. the community only allows the owners (who owned *rumpong* individually) to harvest with *purse seine* when the fish densities are high. This keeps fish stocks stable because harvesting with *purse seine* catches fish of all sizes, including juveniles. The fish stocks are largely concentrated seasonally, particularly during the east monsoon (which usually occurs between May and October). Monsoons occur with varied intensity throughout the year;

6. because disputes have occurred over the accountability of financial management of *rumpong* that are owned collectively, the community has decided that no one should harvest fish in the *rumpong* owned collectively with *purse seine* equipment.

They find the *rumpong* beneficial for several reasons. First, the fishermen do not need to be far from the village, which would be more expensive in terms of time, energy and money. It was more difficult to catch fish in the past, because they had continually to be looking for fishing grounds, whereas they can now fish three to four times a day very near at hand. Similarly, the poor can also use canoes to get out to the *rumpong* and it is also used as a place where the fishermen can meet regularly during fishing season. Christians confirmed that they are learning from Muslims how to fish in *rumpong* and it is also accessible to neighbouring villagers should they wish to use it. The users of the *rumpong* can be divided into group owners and non-owners. However, most respondents agreed that the returns for owners and group members were almost equal. The individual fisherman could only receive more income if he fished more regularly than the owner, who would only harvest seasonally.

Uses of the *rumpong* in the coastal villages of North Maluku have increased in the post- conflict period. This system, introduced by the government and the INGO aims to make fishing easier and it can only be operated in the specific coastal environment that occurs locally. The common principle of the use of *rumpong* is that 'it is accessible to all fishermen within the community or outside, as long as they use the same equipment as other local people' (Interview data with Marine Officials). Technically, the *rumpong* is very sustainable, the fishermen do not need to feed fish or to purchase maintenance materials, they do not need to move far from the coast, and it involves no expenditure (for example, there is no fuel required). At the same time, they are also able to catch fish daily. The *rumpong* can also be used for two to three years (*ibidem*). Scientists have found that the FAD/*rumpong* attracts fish because larger fishes are attracted to food in the form of smaller forage fish and plankton that gather around the buoy, shelter reproductive spawning substrate and act as a station where fishes can have parasites removed by cleaner fish (www.fishingisland.hawai.com).

Lastly, although the arrangements of CBFM in the study areas are not formal or quasi-formal arrangement, they are nevertheless arrangement that fit the CPR category. Almost all issues that characterize arrangement of mainstream CBNRM can also be identified in this study. These include share rules and norms which are aim at giving opportunity to users to have equitable access to and benefit from the resources, whilst ensuring their conservation.

Chapter 4 CBFM and the Post- Conflict Situation

This chapter looks at the use of CBFM and its role in the post-conflict situation. It discusses the CBFM practices and their effect on relationship-building between Muslims and Christians and analysis the dynamic of local power relations within community and its effect. Lastly mediation and negotiation will be discussed in relation to participation and power relations.

4.1   Why CBFM used as a tool for reconciliation in the post conflict context?

The study found that the use of CBFM in the aftermath of violent conflict in North Maluku was catalyzed by several factors.

First, fishing had been practiced for centuries by the coastal inhabitants of North Maluku. *Funae* was a traditional fishery activity that would generally involve all the members of the community. They would fish together and share the harvest among themselves (Regional Development Planning Board, Maluku Utara, 2007:20). Although the *funae* system no longer exist, fishery having increasingly become a commercial activity, the cultural values of working together continue to play a crucial role in these coastal communities. There was already considerable potential when it came to cooperative activities.

Second, as noted earlier, North Maluku was rich in fishery resources. In general, its fishing activities fall into two categories. On the one hand, there is fishing for big pelagic fish such as tuna or skipjack, normally performed by commercial fishermen who own big boats with inboard engines and sufficient financial capital and who catch fish that are very profitable both in the local market and for the foreign export. On the other, there is the capture of small pelagic fish like Scads, Indian mackerel, anchovies, Indian oil sardinella, Yellow strip and Needlefish (Fishery and Marine Affairs Office North Maluku, 2006). The majority of fishermen in North Maluku fished for small pelagic fish which could be sold commercially in the local market. It did not require much time and it needed relatively little capital. It was therefore accessible to coastal inhabitants who worked both as farmers and fishermen. In addition to this commercial potential, fish were a staple in the local diet and they offered important nutritional potential. Research of the North Maluku government had found that, geographically, the fishery potential of North Maluku could be divided into three main locations. Zone 1 was for coral fish, mainly located in Sula island, Bacan and Obi-South Halmahera and Tobelo North Halmahera; Zone 2 was for demersal and small pelagic fish, mainly located in the Ternate and Tidore fishing zones including Toniku and Maidi; and Zone 3 was for big pelagic fish that were to be found in deep sea areas (Regional Development Planning Board, Maluku Utara, 2007).

Third, CBFM was consciously used as part of the economic recovery effort in the post-conflict situation, exploiting the potentials that have been indicated. Conflict had increased the vulnerability of local people because it had disrupted their livelihoods (in addition to the widespread destruction of

basic infrastructure) Fishery activity, particularly the capture of small pelagic fish, was seen as the most viable economic initiative available in the post-conflict context. The advantages were that it required little investment, used simple equipment, and provided regular income. In contrast, most farmers were petty-trading farmers who were selling more or less the same commodities, and whose income fluctuated seasonally. Most of the affected rural communities were poor, solely dependent on common natural resources, and in such a context the development of small-scale fishery offered them the possibility of recovery much more quickly. UNDP, for example, remarked that 'one of components to support ongoing reconciliation process in North Maluku is economic recovery….including fishery (Brown *et al.*, 2005). Driven by the need to integrate people, (local, national and international) agencies were struggling to bring Muslims and Christians together in the same activities either through livelihood assistance or by means of projects for post-conflict reconstruction. The local fishery sector fitted their need ideally.

In general, there were three levels to the CBFM intervention strategy. First was the distribution of fishing equipment; second, following up on this, was the provision of short basic courses in management and skill training; third, agencies accompanied the community for a period of between 6 months and 2 years (interview data with Marine Officials, Social Welfare Officials and INGO staff). Communal fishing management was arranged on the basis local rules and norms that had evolved over time and were accepted socially and culturally within the community.

4.2 How did CBFM affect the relationship between Muslims and Christians?

Findings show that there were two main factors in CBFM arrangement that were particularly appropriate when it came to the process of relationship-building. They meant that the community shared resources equitably, promoted cooperate behaviour, and strengthened solidarity. These two factors were the existence of shared rules or norms and the role of village leaders.

Shared rules and norms

Toniku and Maidi, being small traditional communities, had seen people living closely together with shared cultural and social norms reflecting the same values and common behaviour. A set of communal rules, like their fishing rules, had been used to manage their community and to share their fishery resources equitably and to resolve disputes between community members over particular common arrangements. Once made, these rules became common rules that were used to govern behaviours.

They regulated these common rules based on four conditions. The first was that rules were made through negotiations among the fishermen groups. For instance, in Toniku, rules were made and enforced that all the *bagan* had to have electricity-lamps of the same wattage to attract fish. This decision was made as a result of compromise agreement among the owners of *bagan* that there should be equal use of equipment. In Maidi, rules are imposed that no

one should harvest with *purse seine equipment* in *rumpong* owned collectively. This decision came out as a result of a compromise arrived at by the community members to benefit from resources fairly.

The second was that the outcome of disputes was to be mediated by the village head. This too became a rule. Disputing parties let their grievances be known by the village head who would mediate when they are unable to solve the problem themselves. In some cases, the Imam (mostly found in Toniku) would be invited to play a role in resolving the case. Basically, the Imam kept out of communal arrangements unless the people wanted him to mediate. The respondents explained that the role of the village head/the Imam was to facilitate the resolution of a dispute, not that of a decision maker. After a decision had been made, it would be adopted as a rule that should apply in future, dictating common rules/behaviour. Morally, people had to adhere to these arrangements that they have made themselves.

Third, common rules like access to harvested fish or fishing grounds had been used as a pattern of reciprocity for a very long time. This practice not only applied to fishing but also to agricultural harvesting. For example, when somebody was harvesting vegetables or fruit, others could take some for free. Since this was a common rule it applied to everyone and they adjusted their behaviour and their reactions accordingly.

Fourth, the village head could impose restrictions-for example, restrictions on the cutting of mangrove trees in Toniku. He only allowed people (including people from Rioribati) to cut mangroves selectively (for example, to choose the old branches) and only located away from the river or the sea. This was enforced to ensure the sustainability of mangrove vegetation, serving needs of the people while at the same time maintaining fish stocks and conserving the vegetation for future benefit.

The community took responsibility for enforcement of the rules. As the respondents explained, 'it is difficult for them to violate common rules'. In the first place, people are worried about social isolation and they also want to show their moral responsibility to abide by the internalized rules. They said:

> 'Sometimes, we think, it is not fair that we invest more money, and others only get fish for free, but if we did not allow them to do so, they will isolate us' (a *bagan* owner).

> 'I feel ashamed, if I did not help to replace bamboo or change the leaves in the *rumpong* because I know other fishermen do the same (*rumpong* fishermen).

> 'I fished with medium gear at the *rumpong* because I wanted to have more fish. But then I felt guilty because other fishermen friends told me that I just think of myself and not others. I can make fish disappear and then nobody can catch fish' (Muslim fisherman in Maidi and Christian in Tafaga).

In such a context, social and moral enforcement were a powerful means of maintaining cooperative behaviour. Communities with shared norms consider the needs of others and not just individual and self-centred needs (Agrawal and Gibson, 1996:6). People feel forced to behave in accordance to common rules, and this adherence to a hierarchal ideology and norms could be one potential

reason to facilitate cooperative behaviour (Fachamps 1992, cited in cited in Bardhan & Johnson, 2003:89).

Regardless of differences in religion, wealth and ethnic background, the people of Toniku and Maidi had the same cultural roots and this cultural homogeneity helped to cushion their heterogeneity on other criteria and, in the process, contributed to the rebuilding of social cohesion and to a sense of solidarity. In Toniku, a barter system still exists, though they can sell fish commercially in Ternate/Sofifi. They still prefer to practice it despite the commercial potentials that they have at their disposal for their fish. From Maidi, regardless of ownership status, all members have equal access to the *rumpong,* regardless of class, religion or ethnicity. 'People from collective cultures see themselves as interdependent with other people and behave cooperatively' (Kopelman et all, 2003:120).

When consulted individually, some Christians said that 'sometimes, other fishermen act arrogantly when we are fishing together, but our Muslim friends will usually be on our side'; Muslim friends of the insulted Christian would argue with the offender; or report the incident to the village head who would automatically caution the offender. Such efforts helped forestall stop any negative action that could result in a dispute. Culture played a role in innovating home-grown tools in support of the reconciliation process (IDEA, 2003:46).

As has been observed, cooperative behaviour can reduce the desire for competition among users and create an environment for people to learn and to share knowledge. For example, in Toniku, *bagan* owners have to use the same wattage for their under-water lamps. The aim behind it was to minimize competition and share resources equitably. Similarly, in Maidi, all fishermen had to use the same equipment and harvesting fish with *purse seine* was only permitted in the high season when fish stocks were large. Such rules enable all people to benefit from the resources fairly. As Agrawal and Gibson (2003: 6) have indicated, internalized norms or behaviour among members of the community can guide resource management outcomes in desired direction.

When consulted individually and collectively on how they share knowledge or learn from each other, it was found that those who had expertise in a new useful technique would voluntarily share it with others, examples being the instalment of electric under-water lamps and building a *rumpong* (Christians have learnt from Muslims how to build *rumpong* and now they can now do it by themselves).

The equal access and having to employ the same equipment minimizes the conflict. As seen from the Maidi case, disputes among the community members over *rumpong* that were owned collectively did not lead to major conflict because they still had the same access and still received the same benefits. In contrast, in Toniku (Toniku and Tewe), differential access and benefits from fishing led to dissatisfaction amongst the Tewe people, who could not afford to employ the equipment that others could.

Because the communities were relatively small and closely interdependent, cooperative behaviour took root in them. But, as several respondents indicated, there were always two sides to it:

'Our group members cannot work alone to protect the *bagan* during bad weather, we need others to help us' (*bagan* owners)

'The fishermen care and jointly maintain my rumpong because they also use it. If I use it alone, nobody will help me when the bamboo is broken (the bamboo has to be changed regularly) or if it gets destroyed during a storm' (individual *rumpong* owner).'

Interdependence in livelihood activities (in this case fishing) creates an environment in which they had no option to work individually. People will share their power and resources with others because they see it as instrumental to meeting their own needs in an interdependent relationship (McClelland, 1975 in Colleman, 1996).

Another positive feature is women's participation in communal fishing activities. Generally in North Maluku, fishing activities was recognized as a male activity and women just participated in fish-food processing. However, in Toniku, the community also involved women in fishing activities and women had a great chance to participate in CBFM. Unlike Toniku, field observation shows that less than 1% of women in Maidi were involved in fishing. They worked as fish retailers, usually selling fish to neighbouring villages.

Finally, Borini et al (2004), noted that there are three fundamental features of CPR which can either result in its success or cause conflicts. They are: the rules of enforcement, equity and fairness in access and the change of rule as effect of social and political dynamics'. In Toniku and Maidi case, the rule enforcement was effective, and people shared resources fairly, showing that established practices can adapt to social and political changes brought about by violent conflict. They were remained useful and they facilitated the relationship-building process in as far as it fit with cultural values, rules and norms. The role of community leaders will be discussed in the next section.

4.3   Power relations and their effects

In analyzing the dynamics of power relations, I discuss the concepts of 'power relations' (power to, power with, power within and power over) interchangeably. The reason is that power relations in this study are closely interrelated, despite being a bit complex.

As hinted in chapter 3, the power hierarchical structures in the communities of Toniku and Maidi are structured both formally and informally. The formal structure refers to elected officials (the village head and his staff) and the informal refers to the role of religious leaders. Following decentralization, the village head is directly elected by the villagers and there is strong competition between candidates for this position. Sometimes it results in serious disputes between contesting parties.

One candidate in Toniku, who had recently lost an election explained, 'it is difficult for me to accept this failure, but being part of the community, I still have to cooperate with my rival party in undertaking communal work'. This shows that communal work can be used to facilitate better interaction amongst community members it rests on and in turn serves to consolidate communal rules and norms and to strengthen social cohesion. In Maidi, the situation was different: one of the contesting candidates who had lost an

election was seen as 'a man who always makes trouble' (for both Muslims and Christians). He had not been cooperative since he had lost his position as the village head. It was clear that the power to do things was a function of the position and not of the individual's wealth or influence.

When it came to the informal structure, the Imam and the Priest were recognized as informal leaders. The Imam, in Muslim communities, was a person legitimized by the people as a leader for religious affairs. He was chosen two criteria: he had highest Islamic knowledge, and consistently practiced Islamic basic rules (praying 5 times a day, fasting etc.). The Imam's position could only change as a result of sickness or death and the position could not be inherited. Becoming an Imam was an extremely tough process. The 'power to' that was held by Imam was useful under any conditions, but particularly in helping to settle disputes (as was found mostly in Toniku). Basically, every man within the community had a possibility of becoming the Imam (although not women) but had not taken it and the fact that he had generated respect. How involved the Imam was in mediating disputes depended on the community. In Toniku, the Imam would automatically be contacted by the villagers when a serious dispute could not be dealt by the village head alone. In Maidi, he was respected but rarely involved in communal arrangements or disputes.

Unlike the Imam, the Priest is appointed by the church; he/she is usually an outsider but has committed him/herself to live with the community. In general, Christian leaders (elected officials and priest) were not confident enough to deal with disputes between Muslims and Christians. Instead they brought them to Muslims leaders (the village head or the Imam) for him to mediate. He or she was generally powerful enough to impose rules within the Christian community, but not for Muslims. 'Power to' held by the Priest was given by the church and the power of the priest could only exist amongst those who shared the same belief and not for other groups. In contrast, the Imam was powerful and able to influence communal rules for both Muslims and Christians, especially in Toniku. Culturally, even before the conflict, both Muslims and Christians adhered to the Imam's decisions. So unlike the priest, the influence of the Imam is not restricted to his community.

Through in-depth interviews, some Christians explained often they choose to be silent rather than resist when they have serious disputes with Muslims. Usually they will inform the head of villages/Imam (particularly in Toniku) about that dispute or other Muslim friends will voluntarily do the same. In many cases, their voices are heard and solution is reached.

From the above case we can see that the power (dominance and individualism) of some Muslims has contributed to the insecurity of the Christians. Christians were in the minority and they saw themselves as powerless (and hence chose to be silent). However, 'power with' (solidarity) some other Muslims like those who reported disputes to the village leader helped to maintain the relationship. The 'power to' held by the village leaders was useful in enabling Christians to exercise their right and to benefit like Muslims. As Deutsch (in Colleman, 1996:10) regards, 'disputants who share the cooperative orientation attempt to minimise the power differences and work together to achieve their shared goals'.

The relationship of Muslims and Christians is definitely intricate. It identifies that individuals and groups of Christians in Toniku and Maidi have different perceptions and responses over security threats. In Maidi, some of Christians fear and distance themselves from the offender whilst in Toniku, it does not have the same effect. The summary below presents brief analyses of the differences in the responses to security threats.

	Maidi	Toniku
Kinship Relationship	Maidi have kinship relationship (extended[6] families) with Tafaga Christians (field data)	Toniku Muslims have kinship relationship (extended families) with Rioribati and a few of them with Christians Tewe (field data)
Experiences of the conflict (Christians)	-All the houses of Christians were destroyed. -One Christian was killed in Maidi by Muslims who come from outside the village. -Muslims helped the Christians to safely escape from the attacks of Muslims from outside during the conflict.	- All the houses of Christians were destroyed. -One Christian was killed in Toniku by Muslims who come from outside the village. -Muslims helped the Christians to safely escape from the attacks of Muslims from outside during the conflict.
Responses to post conflict security threats and its effects on patterns of interaction	Some of the Christians of Tafaga were afraid to fish with the man (who lost an election for the position of head of village) after he threatened them. Consequently, some of the Christians chose to fish in their *rumpong* to avoid any interaction with that man though majority of Muslims (including the head of village) defended them from that man. This case shows that the individuals have different responses to security threats and it affects their pattern of interaction (i.e. distancing themselves from the offenders).	The Christians (Tewe and Rioribati) and Muslims (Toniku) sometimes have serious problems (youth fighting). However, Christians of Tewe feel safe to sleep with Muslims in *bagan* after such incidences; and in Rioribati they do not feel scared to come to get harvested fish. This shows that security threats do not affect the pattern of interaction between Muslims and Christians.

The above cases tell that the trust of the Christians to the Muslims varies from one group to the other, because individuals and groups respond differently to what they may deem as threats on their lives and properties. As a relationship between people easily develop and change, the nature of trust and distrust may coexist in the same relationship (Lewicki and Wiethoff, 2000, 86-107). Hence it can be said that a reconciliation process is very complex and multifaceted.

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[6] Extended families refer to the family group that consisting of the nuclear family (the parents and their children), the grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousins, and more distant relatives.

It is also noticed that trust of the Christians for the Muslim leaders made them feel secure. Currently, they feel that conflicts will not recur due to the Muslims within the communities but that it could perhaps be sparked off by Muslims from outside. They said the following:

Christians in Maidi:

> 'We don't think we have problems with Muslims because we trust the village head will keep his promise except if the Muslim outsider-pasukan jihad comes and forces them'.

Christians in Toniku:

> 'We feel safe because the village head and Imam will be there for us but we don't know about other Muslims outside'.

These statements imply that the trust in the leaders is a precondition for rebuilding the relationship. Christians depend heavily on the power held by Muslim leaders in that it is because of the latter that they are able to exercise their rights and to co-exist with the Muslims in their community.

It was also found that the people of Maidi and Toniku seemed to have developed greater resilience to the possibilities of conflict. Both Maidi and Toniku normally used familial relationships in dealing with the problem in, for instance, disputes over agricultural land borders and other common arrangements. They first deal at the individual level. If the matter is unresolved, they try to work through family relationships to mediate it. And, if that still fails, the head of village/Imam will be asked to facilitate a solution.

They strongly avoid bringing a communal case to the police, for anything other than criminal cases. First, they are worried because taking a case to the police could affect communal relationships.

As they expressed:

> 'why should we go to the police, they do not know us well. They will divide us between right and wrong and it is not good for our relationship. We have to go back to the village and live together again'.

Second, a decision made in the village is always gainful for both sides because it allows them to discuss the matter together.

> 'the head of village cannot make decisions. Until we are both satisfied, he has to just facilitate our discussion. That is the reason why even after having problems, we are still friends'.

By providing a positive environment for the mediation of disputes, village leaders play a vital role in helping the community to interact fairly. This enhances trust in the community because they do not need an outsider to solve their problems. That, in turn, makes people aware and makes them consider the value relationships over individual welfare. As Deutsch (2000, 21-41) indicates: 'People's adherence to the norms of cooperation can provide constructive conflict resolution'.

Chapter 5 CBFM and reconciliation

This chapter examines the contribution of CBFM to the broader healing process and briefly discusses preconditions for potential conflict within the community.

5.1 Reflection on reconciliation as a natural healing process

IDEA (2003:84) highlights, supporting the healing process can be done through the use of self help group support where the conflicting parties can build relationship and companionship. Community-based fishery management (CBFM) has created an environment an environment in which conflicting communities can engage jointly in livelihood activities and which, at the same time, is a forum for friendship, companionship and emotional support.

Below is a statement that captures local attitudes derived from in-depth interviews:

> 'we can chat to our friends or neighbours more frequently when we are fishing. While waiting for the fish to be caught, we chat, share and laugh with others. Often we talk about our experiences during the conflict. If we are farming, everybody has to work on their own, we rarely meet each other as our gardens are separate and we have to work from early morning to late afternoon. It is natural that sometimes we have problems and get angry with our friends (Muslims and Christians). But then other fishermen friends make fun of us saying that we are like children. This makes us enjoy fishing, not just for the money or the fish but because it makes us relax. Even during elections for the head of district/BUPATI and the governor that took place in the period from 2006 to mid 2008, we sometimes argued and even fought over the best candidate. But then it was also funny because others would laugh and say that the governor is not our business, our business is to catch fish.'

This statement shows that communal fishing (CBFM) has helped Muslims and Christians rebuild their relationships in a natural process. By working together, they interact intensively on a daily basis. People who are live together in small-localized places do interact regularly and separate locations and different working hours mean it is difficult to regularly meet. And since intensive interaction and communication is a necessary precondition for reconciliation, arrangements that bring the two sides to the conflict together in personal contact and sharing is a way of reducing tension (People Building Peace, 1999). CBFM has enabled them to act more positively, and 'fishing as relaxing', suggests that there have been significant improvements. It is in marked contrast to the situation during or just after conflict, when people showed intense anger, anxieties, hostility and desire for revenge (as described in chapter1). Getting them to a situation where they feel relaxed and can joke together when they are engaged in livelihood activities has been a very valuable development. Rather than organizing them in psychosocial recovery counselling or training (which are both very formal and at times hypocritical), fishing provides an atmosphere for spontaneous and genuine interaction. Reconciliation must not be limited to communications alone

but should also engage people in self-reflection on how they can transform their behaviour and the pattern of their relationships from something that is negative to something that is positive (Assefa, 1999) and an activity like fishing (as described above) can be very useful in the healing process, in getting over the sense of loss and separation caused by conflict. The healing process has to allow people to grieve in a constructive way so that they are able to deal with the impact of the conflict (IDEA, 2003:78). By sharing their conflict experiences, they express their dissatisfaction about the past which helps to heal psychological wounds.

However, the supportive conditions that have been created by the reconciliation process imply different things for different people. For some women in particular, traumatic feelings still remain and they have not passed yet. When they share their conflict experiences, they still express fear when they recall how they escaped from the village. They repeatedly recount how Muslims occupied their land and made money from it and the bitterness shows that physiological wounds are deep and that the trauma of their ordeal is engraved deeply in the memories of victims. It will take for effects of the violent conflict a long time to heal completely. As IDEA (2003: 31, 60) has remarked, time does not heal all wounds because the sense of loss does not simply disappear with time. In particular, women's experience of trauma differs from that of men (*ibidem*).

In my opinion, re-building relationships is a human process; it can only take place when people know and trust each other, and it takes a long time. As a result, reconciliation is not a linear process, but it is a dynamic one.

Remarks of people interviewed during fieldwork brought this out clearly. Christians, for example, said that

> 'though, we lost property and almost our lives during the conflict, we still want to return to our villages, the place where we were born and grew up. We don't feel comfortable to live in other places, even if we can afford it. We also believe that we can live together with Muslim people, as we did in the past'.

Muslims similarly said that:

> 'It was so sad when I remember how Christians escaped from the villages. See them when they returned for the first time and looked at their burned houses, it made me realize how cruel the conflict was. They are like me, people, who deserve to live in these areas. We have lived together before and why should we not live together again'.

If people are intent on building a new relationship, it has to come from both sides, as pointed out by Assefa (Mark, :2007:13). Another important factor is a sense of trust in community leaders and the government. This is a precondition that is profoundly important in making the reconciliation process work in North Maluku. However, behind it all there has also to be an honest but self-critical learning process. Reconciliation is not limited to getting people to live together, it is also important they learn from past experience in dealing with their own problem. Strong cultural traditions have contributed greatly and have continued to guide villagers' attitudes. They reflected a continuing intention of the community to keep the dynamics of the healing process within their own community.

5.2. Preconditions for potential conflict

The reconciliation process that is described above shows a community that is increasingly living in relative harmony. This does not mean, however, that conflict cannot break out again if its root causes are left unaddressed. There are two factors in particular that could possibly create tension.

5.2.1. Contestation over fishery resources

As mentioned already, fishery can provide a good income compared to farming. Fluctuations in the prices of cash crops compounded with unstable climatic conditions have reduced the willingness of people to work on the farm. This could lead to competition for and contestation over fishery resources with close villages like Toniku and Tewe. Economic inequality, along with an inability to deal with the supremacy of Toniku, could lead to conflict. In North Maluku tensions around competing claims over land ownership have created localized conflicts and it is clear that traditional communities such those described in this study can be very prone to these pressures. Rose (2002: 253) has pointed out that 'CBNRM practices are sometimes highly adaptive to natural change but less adaptive to the commercial change'. Increased market demand is eyed positively by people because they can directly benefit from the income, but meeting increased commercial demand can also lead to the excessive extraction of resources and more competition between users to capture the most from them. Traditional resource management practices in the Asia-Pacific have been weakened or destroyed by interaction with the external market that has undermined their moral authority (Kenneth Ruddle, in Hanna and Jentoff, 1996:48). It is obvious that economic interests can shape people's behaviour.

5.2.2 Power dominance versus religious sentiment

A major obstacle to sustained peace could in the end be the dominance of Muslims over Christians. Muslims have always justified their historical dominance with the view that they are superior. This does not necessarily affect the pattern of day-to-day relationship negatively, but physiologically the powerless lose the confidence to deal with them. Christian leaders lack confidence in dealing with disputes between Christians and Muslims. Unequal power relations do not at the moment have immediate consequences when it comes to people's security, but that may not always be the case in the future. Such factors could trigger an eruption of conflict and CBRM is likely to have very little capacity to hold it back.

Chapter 6 : <u>Conclusion</u>

My interest in this research was motivated from personal experiences, witnessing the social conflict that erupted in North Maluku, Indonesia. This research has presented a case-study of how a local reconciliation effort and process, in the context of communal fishing activity (CBFM) can facilitate the reconciliation process between conflicting communities (Muslims and Christians) in a post conflict environment.

Though most of commons scholars recognize that small groups, shared rules, institutional arrangements and external factors can all be critical to the success of a community-based system, little, if any attention has been paid to its potential in the context of a post conflict reconciliation strategy. Similarly, scholars of the reconciliation processes have tended to look at the reconciliation process and have been less inclined to go into in-depth discussions on how to achieve it successfully through natural day-to-day processes. One reason is because reconciliation is a multidimensional and multifaceted process. Every community has a different way of living and reconciliation is understood and takes place differently according to its context. The difficult part of this study was how to link theories on communal management with those on reconciliation because they remain very separate.

The study found that the use of CBFM in the post-conflict situation in North Maluku involved a number of complementary but important factors: fishery resources potency, cultural values and traditions, economic livelihood activities and (introduced exogenous) developmental activities. Joint fishery management provided an everyday forum in which traditional values could play out in important ways. Two factors were important in facilitating the reconciliation process: moral commitment to a shared set of rules and the mediating/dispute-settling role of community leaders. Shared rules enhanced cooperative behaviour, minimized the desire for competition and enhanced solidarity. They encouraged people to behave for the common good, and to consider other people's needs and interests as well as their own. Community leaders helped to bridge the gap between the powerful and powerless (or between Muslims and Christians) when conflict or potential conflict arose over access to resources. These values/norms/practices were essential in getting the process of reconciliation to grow naturally and CBFM was a relaxed, everyday process in which it worked particularly well.

At the same time, for all its advantages, fishing has the potential to weaken the same social cohesiveness of these communities. The case studies were of relatively undeveloped traditional communities. If the commercial demand for fish continues to increase and incomes from farming continue to fluctuate or even fall, larger commercial markets could undermine the moral authority of traditional leaders and, at that point, CBFM may no longer help to keep an increasingly differentiated and heterogeneous community together. Unequal power relations and powerlessness of the weak can provide the potential for more conflict. However, this study has been about reconciliation in the wake of past violence and in that context its contribution has been invaluable.

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Appendices

Appendix 1   Guiding Questions for respondents

1. Which kind of livelihood activities are you engaged in? (Farming/fishing or both)?
2. Can you explain communal fishing arrangements in this village?
3. Is communal fishing important for you and the community?
4. How do the fishing activities benefit you and the community?
5. Who makes the rules and why are the rules there?
6. How are these rules enforced within the community?
7. What are the consequences if you/others disobey the rules?
8. Which kind of problem do you usually have with other fishermen or other people?
9. How do you solve such problems?
10. What happens if the problem is unsolved?

The answers to the above questions generated numerous follow up questions.

Appendix 2 Guiding Questions for pattern of interaction and conflict experiences

Considering that the questions on patterns of interaction between Muslims and Christians and their conflict experiences are very sensitive and personal, the author chose to conduct it in unstructured forms.

Appendix 3 Interviewing Government officials and other Key informants (K1)

The interview with the key informant (K1) was unstructured.