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***Reformasi in a Javanese (de)forest(ed) Village:
Moving Toward Greater Social Differentiation?***

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Table of Contents

Table of Contents	3
List of Tables	4
Keywords.....	5
Chapter 1 Introduction.....	6
1.1 Working Title	6
1.2. Problem Statement	6
1.3. Justification of the Research.....	8
1.4. Research Questions and Research Objectives.....	10
1.5. Research Methodology.....	10
1.5.1. Selection of Village	11
1.5.2. Research Process and Limitation	12
1.6. Proposed Chapter Outline.....	13
Chapter 2 Analytical Framework and Explanatory Concepts	14
2.1. Reform and Devolution of Power.....	14
2.2. Partnership and Participation	16
2.3. The Notion of Community and Social Differentiation in Agrarian Communities	19
Chapter 3.....	22
Teak Forest, Perhutani and Furniture Industry in Jepara.....	22
3.1. Teak, Industry and Monoculture Forest in Colonial History	23
3.2. Post-Colonial (Teak) Forest Management	26
3.3. The Teak and Furniture Industry in Jepara	28
Chapter 4.....	31
Wonorejo in the Pre-Reform Era	31
4.1. “Green Revolution” and Production Relations among Villagers.....	34
4.2. Forest and Villagers' Livelihood	36
4.3. Teak Looting	39
Chapter 5.....	45
The Village under Forest Reform.....	45
5.1. Economic Transformation of the Village	46
5.2. Nemer and Organizational Practice of LMDH in Wonorejo...48	
5.3. Perhutani: Bringing Back the Control in the Village.....	52
5.4. Spirit of Sharing?	55
5.5. PHBM: Is it a Success or Failure?	56
Conclusion.....	58
References	60
Notes.....	60

List of Tables

TABLE 3.1 Perhutani's Organizational Structure

TABLE 4.1 Classification of Wonorejo Villagers based on Occupation 2002

TABLE 5.1 Social Background of LMDH Board Members

Abstract

After massive teak looting in early 2000, Perhutani, state-owned forest company introduced a joint forest management program in Java. Unlike previous forest management policy, this program gives a legal foundation for forest villages to gain access both to timber and non-timber resources. Overall, this program aims to improve community's welfare and encourage their participation in forest management. However, looking at the practice of the program in a Javanese village in Jepara, the implementation of the program proved to serve different purposes. Instead of realizing those aims, the program practice does not really mark a shift from previous security paradigm to prosperity paradigm as it claims. It tends to extract more villagers' labours for the sake of timber/hardwood growth than share responsibilities for forest sustainability and economic development. Plan of distributing profit sharing from the joint forest management will also likely deepen the existing social differentiation from Javanese agrarian since it no longer extract landless villagers' labour for one particular patrons but also for village elites and state enterprise.

Keywords

Joint forest management, Java, Perhutani, Social Differentiation

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Working Title

Reformasi in a Javanese (de)forest(ed) Village: Moving toward Greater Social Differentiation?

1.2. Problem Statement

The Soeharto regime collapsed in 1998, It is widely believed that the *reformasi* movement launched Indonesia's transition to democracy. Democratisation and democratic deepening were signaled by the passage of several laws considered important for the transition to democracy. These included laws guaranteeing freedom of speech, media, and political activity,. There were also laws establishing independent political parties, setting procedures for fair and free elections, and shifting authorities and funding from central to local government.

At the practical level, it was generally believed that, Suharto's fall opened space for more political participation. Masses could be involved and mass movements could influence politics. In this atmosphere, protests, demonstrations, and looting became more common, including in the forestry sector. The loss of state legitimacy and state confidence along with the new image of the state as we invited the emergence of people's power translated into massive looting of teak forests. In 2000, in Central Java alone, massive illegal logging resulted in the deforestation of 103,000 hectares (*Suara Merdeka*, 10 February 2004).

With these concerns, Perhutani, a state owned forest company operating in Java, proposed a new formula for forest management called Joint Forest Management (*Pengelolaan Hutan Bersama Masyarakat/PHBM*) in 2001. This proposal was to replace the old style of forest management in which security of the forest relied on the state and company's resources to catch and punish

anyone that threatened Perhutani's interests.

The existing system did not give forest villagers any legal access to forest resources or land cultivation. Perhutani's website¹, notes that this new program was proposed as a manifestation of the paradigm change in Perhutani's forest management from timber management to forest resources management and from state based forest management to community based management. The decree of Perhutani's monitoring board on PHBM stated that this new proposal tries to achieve at least two main goals in forest management; (1) Increase forest dwellers' participation in forest conservation and (2) Empower forest dwellers, especially in economic terms. It is expected that through this new proposal, Perhutani does not only give a legal chance for forest villagers/dwellers to use its forest land for agricultural purposes, but also try to build partnership with forest villagers in preserving its resources. As a result of this partnership, the society (forest villagers) will have a profit share from Perhutani's forest products, both from timber or non-timber products.

To gain a share of the forest profit, communities adjacent to forests are required to found a legal communal body called Forest Village Community Institutes or *Lembaga Masyarakat Desa Hutan* (LMDH). This body is acts on behalf of the concerned community in making legal sharing agreements with the state-owned forest company. For supporters of this forest management reform, the agreement not only represented a shift from the security paradigm to a prosperity paradigm in which the welfare of forest communities is taken into account in forest management, but also a transformation of forest company-community interaction and thus a transformation state-society relations. On the other hand, some critics argue that, after scrutinizing the terms under which the new forest reform is introduced, the Perhutani initiated reform does not really make the community the foundation of the new forest management. For this group, partnership with community exists only to reassert the state company's authority over (de)forest(ed) land and forest management. Furthermore, this group suggests that the terms of agreement

between Perhutani and forest community were already decided *apriori* by Perhutani and the state, and thus do not really transform state-society relations. By analyzing the practice of the new forest reform in local level in a village in Central Java, this study aims to contribute to critical perspectives on the reform. Supported by field research and documents of agreements between Perhutani and village community, it would like to show that those legal agreements, while formally recognizing forest communities as forest stakeholders are a device to help restoring order on Perhutani land and bring an end to teak looting and anarchy. In practice, the order itself is needed to help restoring Perhutani's power and authority over the post-teak looting occupied land. Secondly, contrary to the claim of reform supporters, this study will suggest that the reform does not really mark a paradigm shift in forest management from a security to prosperity approach. Looking at the structure of community forest body and practice of reform in the village, the security paradigm is continuously reproduced in forest management. In fact, instead of being diminished, the security paradigm has been boosted since it is now not only carried out by the state but also by the society itself. In this case, security is interpreted more in a limited sense where the importance of timber stands are continuously stressed more than prosperity and equality among villagers. Thirdly, since the reform was introduced to deal mainly with state-society relations, this study suggests that the question of inequality among villagers has not been taken as an important concern in the reform. Local practice of reform show that the benefits of reform are strengthening the position of village elites, leaving small and landless peasants with the least benefits as well as the heaviest burden in the reforestation program. Finally, as this unequal share of benefits and responsibilities contributes to creating a deeper gap between villagers, this forest management reform is likely creating another mode of surplus extraction from small peasants which at the same time potentially leads toward greater social differentiation.

1.3. Justification of the Research

There are many books and articles already written about politics of forestry in

Indonesia. Some are written before the introduction of reform, most of them were written after the reform. Those written before the reform dealt a lot with the history of forest management and took a critical position toward state based forest management (Peluso, 1992; Simon, 1993). Meanwhile, those written after the reform have different positions in regard to the introduction of reform. Some clearly support it (Ramadhan 2007), some propose technical improvement within forest reform management and suggest improving capacity building within village forest body (Santoso, Awang et. Al 2008; Awang 2003), while some others critically assess the reform and consider it as a part of ongoing power struggle between Perhutani and forest communities (Kusumanto and Sirait [no date]; Lucas and Bachriadi 2002; Contreras-Hermosilla and Fay 2005; Nomura 2008; Schiller and Fauzan 2008). Despite these different political positions, one issue increasingly significant in most of those studies is the stress on people's access to forest resources as a precondition to sustainable forest management.

However, being predominantly occupied with issue of state (with Perhutani as its representative)-society relations, those studies tend to locate the issue of power as a struggle only between Perhutani and forest communities. By doing so, they tend to neglect the fact that power exists not only among both parties but also within each party. Further, they overlook the notion that power is produced as well as reproduced by all groups belonging to the state or to the society to gain control over others. In addition to this, few of those studies involved ethnographic research methods. Many of them chose to focus more on discourse level and thus prevented from collecting ethnographic and field based data. I would contend that the use of ethnographic methods is likely to contribute to the understanding of social phenomenon in a more nuanced way. The notion of power mentioned above might be a direct result of the absence of these methods existing in those studies.

Bearing these weaknesses in mind, this study would like to contribute to the debate on forest reform in Java in three ways. *Firstly*, this paper analyzes the

practice of reform through the employment of field research and ethnographic methods of data collection. It is hoped that those methods will result in a more nuanced account of the practice of forest reform. *Secondly*, by taking only one Javanese village as the case, That is expected to provide a wider perspective somewhat closer to that of the plurality of local actors.. By focusing the research at the local level, it hopes it analyze the much-discussed discourse of reform in a specific socio-political context. *Thirdly*, through ethnographic reports in a specific context, it would like to highlight that, instead of ceasing as a result of reform, unequal continue to take place. In fact, the practice of reform potentially lead to greater social differentiation since surplus or labour of one group of community is extracted for the interest of the other groups.

1.4. Research Questions and Research Objectives

The research should be guided by the following questions:

How is forest management reform practiced at the local level?

How are the goals of joint forest management achieved in its implementation?

In addressing these questions, this study would like to explain the following context and dimensions of reform at local level:

- 1) Socio-political context of the introduction of the recent forest reform policy
- 2) Socio-economic transformation of the village before and after the forest management reform
- 3) Organizational practice of LMDH
- 4) Perspectives of local actors about the current forest management reform

1.5. Research Methodology

Realizing that social sciences are pursuing different paths to conceive the reality, Alfred Schutz proposed a conceptual framework which later known as the foundation of ethnography as qualitative alternative methodology. In his well-known defence against Nadel, he sketches several methodological arguments in support of that alternative. While he agrees with Nadel's idea that

empirical knowledge involves discovery through processes of controlled inference and must be stated in verifiable and propositional form, Schutz argues that such rule of verifiability is not necessarily understood in a sensory meaning. Differs from the way natural sciences to pursue the understand of reality in natural and sensory terms, he suggests that primary goal of social sciences is to obtain organised knowledge of social reality.²

Following the methodology of social sciences proposed by Schutz, this study will try to pursue an organised knowledge around forest management reform through employment of qualitative research methods. Reflecting its exploratory nature, qualitative research puts stress more on the in-depth understanding of reasons behind various aspects of behavior, and thus more likely ask questions such as *why* and *how* to analyze phenomenon. As Marshall and Rossman suggest, qualitative research typically relies on four methods of gathering information, which are (1) participation in the setting, (2) direct observation, (3) in depth interviews, and (4) analysis of document and materials (Marshall and Rossman 1998). Though sometimes making use of quantitative data, those four methods above will mostly be employed in this study to understand “social reality” on the forest reform.

1.5.1. Selection of Village

As mentioned earlier, this study will focus on one Javanese village located in Jepara district, Central Java province. There are two main reasons for choosing the village. The first is practicality and familiarity. I did a study in the village in 2003. Because of limited time I had to conduct this research, this decision is particularly important since I did not start from zero to complete this study. This allows me not only to use some previously gathered data, but also to maintain existing contact persons for access to village data as well as for further interviews. Secondly, apart from its legal status as a forest village in which forest management reform is being practiced, this village was selected because it is located in a district which is known for its furniture industry Jepara. That industry has allegedly become market for looted teak timber, some

of which comes from the village.

1.5.2. Research Process and Limitation

Initially, I had chosen other topics for this paper. But due to reasons beyond my control, I needed to change the previous topics into something else which allowed me to balance academic and private life. As a consequence to this late change, I had very limited time to conduct the research. Having only two weeks to spend in the research location, I realized I did not have time to conduct a village survey which has been almost a requirement for anthropological research on agrarian differentiation. In fact, the specific focus on agrarian differentiation came much later in the finalization of this draft after reflecting all relevant information collected in this research. The idea on agrarian differentiation in the village is borrowed from White (1989) and two anthropological studies done by Husken (1989) and Martin-Schiller (1984, 1986, 1989) in Muria-mountain areas which are located only 30km and 15 km away from the village researched in this paper. In the absence of a village survey, apart from borrowing information from the last two researchers, arguments for this rural differentiation are supported by interview results collected in the later part of this research process. Bearing these weaknesses in mind, this study does not attempt to give a comprehensive answer to the problems of rural differentiation and forest management reform. Additional fieldwork and further analysis would be needed to make that claim.

Due to family circumstances, the study village data collection for this research was done in several stages. Most of demographic data and some interviews were collected during my earlier visits to the village in 2003 and 2006. The rest of the field data was collected during the last week of July and early August 2008., I also conducted some supplementary interviews in early November 2008.

In those interviews, I sought information on social experience of forest management reform among different local actors with different background.

I interviewed villagers (both those who cultivate Perhutani land [*pesanggem*] and those who do not), village officials, leaders of LMDH (*Lembaga Masyarakat Desa Hutan*/joint forest management board at village level), local Perhutani officials, local NGO activists and officials from the local district office (*Dinas Kebutuhan Jepara*). Those interviews were conducted as much as possible in an informal way and individually. This was done not only to allow source persons to speak in more comfortable manner but also to allow them to feel a sense of privacy. The latter is significant in order to allow them to speak more freely, especially in the case of sensitive information which involves other parties. However, in order to ensure that sensitive “private” information was trustable and reliable, a mechanism for checking was needed. To conduct such check mechanisms, I employed several strategies for checking . Those strategies include asking the same sensitive questions to different actors, to understand their point of view and possibly contesting opinion; checking doubtful answers from particular source persons with villagers who know more about the related persons and their social background; and comparing answers to written documents in related matters.

Finally, to protect source persons' identities, all names mentioned here are made anonymous. Names made anonymous are not only names of interviewed individuals but also the village name.

1.6. Proposed Chapter Outline

Chapter 1	Introduction
Chapter 2	Analytical Framework and Explanatory Concepts
Chapter 3	Teak, Perhutani and Furniture Industry in Jepara
Chapter 4	Wonorejo in Pre-Reform Era
Chapter 5	The Village under Forest Reform
Chapter 6	Conclusion

Chapter 2

Analytical Framework and Explanatory Concepts

This chapter outlines the analytical framework and explanatory concepts needed to understand the practice of forest reform studied in this paper. Theories and concepts are needed as a bridge through which we can understand the connectedness of the seemingly unconnected empirical facts gained from field research. As Grix mentioned (Grix 2004), *“the purpose of the theoretical part of dissertation, doctorate or project ... is precisely to give a sense of order to the empirical section, so that the two parts need to be inextricably linked”* (p. 102). The theoretical/analytical framework itself is necessary *“to assist in both selecting and prioritising certain factors over others and in showing relationships between certain concepts at an abstract level”* (p. 103).

In understanding the nature of forest reform and inequalities in a Javanese village, I would like to explore several concepts which as a whole function as an analytical framework for this paper. Some important concepts that I consider useful to understand scattered empirical facts and their relationship to forest management reform and inequalities are reform and devolution of power, partnership and participation discourse, and the notion of community and social differentiation in agrarian communities. The presentation of these concepts comprises this chapter.

2.1. Reform and Devolution of Power

There has been some shift in the dominant discourse on power management in many countries, from heavy reliance on central governments to local governments. Usually, the shift toward decentralization is attributed to three important factors; namely (1) the drive for change coming from within governmental faction itself, (2) pressure from international donors, and (3) demands from local actors. At the global level, this change can be seen in the number of countries currently implementing decentralization programs. That now amounts to more than 60 countries. According to Larson (2004), the implementation of this decentralization usually takes one of these two forms:

administrative decentralization (deconcentration) or democratic decentralization. While deconcentration is authority transfer to local governments or to local government institutions held responsible to the “upward”, democratic decentralization is authority transfer to local actors assumed to represent local communities and held responsible to “the downward”. The latter is assumed to be an ideal type of decentralization provided with the existence of discretionary power with which they could make autonomous representing local interests. Some main goals commonly pursued by this decentralization program are to improve public services (efficiency), to increase people’s welfare, to develop democratic climate, and to promote equality and equity (Larson 2004).

Along with the shift of power management discourse, there is some shift in the discourse of natural resource management as well. Apart of being a reaction to the failure of exclusionary conservation which neglects the determining role of social and economic factors for the success of conservation, there is a shift towards “community-based conservation”. This shift reflects the dominance of now widely-spread ideas assuming that conservation and development could be simultaneously achieved, so it is not impossible to reach both ends. This fashionable concept now makes it difficult to find conservation projects which do not claim to be community-based (Berkes 2004). It is believed that centralization of resource management in the long run has produced two bad outcomes, which are loss of incentives for long-term community management and unregulated encroachment on state forest (Webb 2008: 27). The rising discourse on community-based conservation, which stresses the role of local community, is assumed to be parallel with the aims of decentralization that aims at localizing power.

The shift from centralization to decentralization or local based resource management itself did not take place in an empty space. Agrawal and Ostrom suggest that there are four important factors behind this shift. *First*, many national government in the developing world have fiscal problems and they

need to reduce costs and become more efficient. *Second*, decentralization is an obvious and convenient mechanism to transfer costs to others. *Third*, international donors provide significant funds that support the creation of new mechanisms of cooperation and governance which call local actors into partnership. *Fourth*, many national government have begun to accept the view that protecting resources does not necessarily require exclusively private property arrangements or government ownership and management (Agrawal and Ostrom 2008: 45-46).

In the case of Indonesia, the discourse shift to decentralization and local based resource management was made easy by the fall of Soeharto. The post Soeharto period has been marked by major decentralization legislation which were then extended to forestry issues. Following Soeharto's fall, critics condemned the state forestry regime on two grounds. *First*, the state regime had failed to tackle the issue of equity: Instead of giving benefit to local communities, the forest management regime transfers the costs to these communities and only private interests and networks of "corruption, cronyism and nepotism" (*Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepotisme* or KKN) have enjoyed its benefits. *Secondly*, instead of reducing ecological problems, the regime had in fact created many ecological problems, such as forest fires and deforestation (McCarthy 2000: 116). It was noted that centralized forest management under the New Order failed to maintain forest cover and led to forest degradation, from 150 million hectares in 1960 to only 90 million hectares in 2000 (Yonariza and Shivakoti 2008: 128). With this background, a "new forestry paradigm" was then called upon for people's welfare.

2.2. Partnership and Participation

General idea about the dependence of forest dwellers on forests, which is strengthened by the discourse shift towards reform and devolution of power, calls for the involvement of forest dwellers in forest resource management. "*It is generally expected that the involvement of actors living in closer proximity to the forest than those in central government provides an incentive to preserve the forest and manage it on a*

sustainable basis, while offering better opportunities for local participation and poverty alleviation” (Ros-Tonen, Hombergh et al. 2007: 15). This provides the context where the discourse about partnership is included.

Ros-Tonen, Hombergh et.al define partnership as “*more or less formal arrangements between two or more parties from various sectors (government, civil society, and/or private sector) around (at least partly) shared goals, in the expectation that each part will gain from the arrangement*” (p. 5). The goals of partnership could be related with forest conservation, responsible forest use and/or sustainable production of forest and timber resource products. Essential to this kind of forest management is the idea of sustainability, which is expanded from only securing supplies of timber and other forest products before the 1970s to the preservation of diverse biodiversity and social-cultural attachment of forest dwellers to the forests in the current setting (p. 9).

However, there are several weaknesses in the currently abundant praise for the idea of partnership by both civil society and industries. It suggests that the parties involved are assumed to be interacting upon equal terms. It further masks power asymmetry and exploitative relationships and it might be captured as a powerful symbol for the strong to show their benevolent action in favor for the weaker parties (p. 5). The proposal for partnership can also carry some dangers and pitfalls as it can be appropriated as a means to obscure power imbalances, it can potentially exclude particular community groups for efficiency reasons, it can contribute to the creation of a disabling policy environment if partnership is conceived as the retreat of the state, and it tends to generalize that there is only one single shared purpose pursued by participating actors. The danger of partnership lies in its limits of managing complexity (p. 26).

Genuine success of partnership is generally believed to rest upon the nature of participation with local communities. Furthermore, the ideas of “participation” and “partnership” are both buzzwords in current development discourse.

However, participation can be interpreted differently by different actors. Pantana, Real et al (2004) note that participation have three different meanings: (1) it may refer to a process in which information about a planned project is made available to the public and in which a dialogue ensues regarding project options; (2) participation might include project-related activities other than mere information flows, it may involve labor contribution or long-term commitments by local groups to manage services and facilities or planning for future use; (3) participation rests on people own initiatives and these could fall outside the scope of project agenda (Pantana, Real et al. 2004: 2).

As it is the case with the meaning of partnership, arguments for participation also vary. There are at least three kinds of arguments in favour of participation. Participation can be proposed as an end in itself, as a means to ensure quality, appropriateness and durability of improvements, or as a means to increase efficiency and cut costs by mobilizing communities own contribution in terms of time, effort and often money (Berner and Phillips 2005). With these diverse arguments, participation might not only be a better mode of governance but can also be a new tyranny due to its potential failure to bring its promises in reversing a top-down approach and promoting people's empowerment (Cooke and Kothari 2001).

In practice, the success or failure of participation in resource management reform usually implies the presence of some kind of incentives for the people. Quoting Gibson et al. from their study on the outcomes of international development aid, Dung and Webb define incentive as both external stimulus and internal motivation (Dung and Webb 2008: 271). Generally based on the idea of incentives for the people, Wily (2001) identify two approaches to participation and involvement of community in forest management. First, is the model which conceive communities as forest users. In this model which he called joint forest management initiative, cooperation with communities is secured by granting them legal access to certain products or a share in forest-derived benefits. The second model which conceives communities as

forest managers is more concerned with how a forest is managed and aims to deliver cheaper, more effective and more sustainable regime. This model looks at forest-local communities as potential managers or co-managers and devises arrangements which gives them varying degrees of authority. Wily suggests that, while the former strategy shares access rights and benefits to advance forest conservation, the latter shares power to achieve it. It is believed that the latter transform state-people relations and the regime of management itself (Wily 2001: 5).

2.3. The Notion of Community and Social Differentiation in Agrarian Communities

However, communities with whom a state-enterprise work in partnership tend to be located in a simplistic context where they are understood as unitary, static and harmonious units within which people share common interests and needs (Guijt and Shah 1998). In fact, forest dwellers themselves “*do not come in standardized homogenized forms; rather they comprise complex hierarchically structured groups and ...manifest internal stresses and frictions arising from inequalities in power, status and economic strength*” (Doornbos, Saith et al. 2000: 7). While community becomes more and more important concept in development discourse, “*community is still often understood at least implicitly in reductionist terms; as socially, politically and economically homogenous, masking a whole range of internal imbalances of interests and power, including gender interests*” (Doornbos, Saith et al. 2000: 8).

In Javanese context, some studies in 1950s had already shown the heterogeneity of rural communities by exploring problems of land concentration, absentee ownership, the poor and often declining terms of landlord-tenant relations, competition and the absence of mutual assistance as the basis of rural social structure, and the chronic indebtedness of small peasants, tenants, and landless workers. In the pre-New Order era, the focus on heterogeneity and social stratification of rural communities reached its peak when the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) commissioned a “participatory” research which identified *tujuh setan desa*, seven devils who suck the blood of

the peasants (White 2005). However, later in New Order period, much attention was then shifted to the idea on homogeneity of Javanese rural communities with the publication of Clifford Geertz's much acclaimed *Agrarian Involution* (1963). Rather than throwing lights to the problem of inequality and social stratification, Geertz preferred to shed a light on the idea of poverty sharing which it was believed led Javanese rural societies into its agrarian involution.

The idea on social stratification reappeared in the discourse on Javanese agrarian societies following the effects of green revolution. Departing from Marxist views on agricultural societies, many later studies on Javanese wet-rice producing societies showed that the introduction of modern rice production mechanisms tended to exacerbate existing social inequalities within communities. Instead of importing western style-rational-contractual relations into these societies, green revolution led to greater social differentiation since it extracts more surplus and labor from the peasants while in the same time still maintain exploitative character of landlord-peasant relations.

Agrarian or rural differentiation itself is defined as “*a dynamic process involving the emergence or sharpening of differences within the rural population, but it does not itself consist of (and in some cases, at least in short term may not even involve) increasing income inequalities*” (White, 1989: 19). Being defined not necessarily in terms of income inequality made this concept as a reference more to the changing kinds of relations between peasants rather than to the problem whether or not some peasants are richer than others. Put in this context, differentiation thus “*involves an accumulative and permanent (i.e., non-cyclical, which is not to say that it is never reversible) process of change in the ways in which different groups in rural society—and some outside it—gain access to the products of their own or others' labor, based on their differential control over production resources and often, but not always, on increasing inequalities in access to land*” (ibid., p. 20).

With this notion of social differentiation, numerous studies on Javanese rural

communities managed to show that many forms of surplus extraction could coexist in the same community and even in the same individual, either in the context of a stagnating, expanding or declining rural economy (ibid., p. 20). This coexistence of different surplus extraction modes later moved the contemporary Javanese agrarian societies to much more complex realities, not necessarily leading to two-class polarization toward consolidation of holdings under capitalist relations of production as expected by classical Marxists. Employment of social differentiation analysis allows us to see that, although it may be an easier social unit to define, the concept of community is of little use as a unit confining analysis (ibid, p. 22) since it does not capture the reality of inequality within its spatial border. And this notion is particularly important to bear in mind in the context of joint forest management which is going to be analyzed in the following chapters.

Chapter 3

Teak Forest, Perhutani and Furniture Industry in Jepara

Although it seems very clear to most of us, “forest” may actually have different definitions from different groups of people. In the general meaning, as quoted from Webster online dictionary, forest can be understood as “*trees and other plants in a large densely wooded area*”. Similar to Webster, another free-online dictionary website suggests that it is “*a dense growth of trees, plants, and underbrush covering a large area*”. However, for conservationists and organizations concerned with the conservation issue, forest refers to something which is technically more complicated than the presence of trees or plants in wooded area. The FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization) defined forest as “*land with tree crown cover (or equivalent stocking level) of more than 10% and area of more than 0.5 hectare, with trees should be able to reach a minimum height of 5 meter at maturity in situ*” (quoted from <http://www.edugreen.teri.res.in/explore/forestry/what.htm>). At some other point, FAO also mentioned that even if trees are gone, “forest” does not stop being a forest. It is said, “*while that may be so, it is important to understand how the disappearing green cover and the resultant threat to habitats and to human life fits into the bigger picture of life on the planet*” (quoted from http://www.panda.org/about_wwf/what_we_do/forests/about_forests/index.cfm) It is also common to speak of forests as plantation or natural forests. Natural forests are forests composed mainly of indigenous trees not deliberately planted, while plantations are forest stands established by planting or seeding for the goal of afforestation or reforestation. The former's existence considered important for natural conservation or biodiversity, while the latter's is usually for production and more profit oriented. Driven by the interest of revenue earning, forests in latter form are planted with homogenous vegetation or plant species which are profitable in the world market.

The Indonesian government also has its own definition of forest. Although it shares the idea of the required presence of trees for forest, its insertion of a political decision into the definition of forest made it strikingly different from

other common forest definitions. Article 1 Law No 5/1967 on Forestry Principles (Pokok-Pokok Kehutanan) defined forest as “an area covered by trees which, as a whole, forms a living unity between bio-nature and environment and which is defined by government as forest”³. Though it no longer explicitly mentions government's political authority to define whether or not some areas can be defined as forest, in its article One on definition of forest, the new Law No. 41/1999 on forestry still provides a political space for the state in defining the forest. However, unlike the previous Law which gave an explicit authorization of management of all state forest under the will-be Perhutani, Law No. 41/1999 identifies local states (both at provincial and district level) as the authorized officials for state forest management. It is this shift of authorities in state forest management that triggered conflict between some local governments and Perhutani. The latter is clinging to its power under the Old Law, while, along with decentralization wave, some local governments build their claim for forest authority over land within their borders on the New Law (Pikiran Rakyat, 18 January 2003).

This chapter will deal with history of teak plantation in Indonesia, particularly in Java. It then describes about development of Perhutani, state-owned company in charge of Java forest, after the independence. Finally, this chapter will end with the description on furniture industry in Jepara with which teak can hardly be separated and with which teak looting and village economy in research can be better understood.

3.1. Teak, Industry and Monoculture Forest in Colonial History

In Javat, the oldest plant species strongly connected to plantation is teak. Its plantation began because historically teak played an important role for commerce and industrial growth, supplying wood for ship-building and construction. Considering teak's strategic role, soon after its establishment, Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC), a Dutch colonial company, decided to be involved in teak trading. At the time, there were centers of

ship-building manufacturing spread along the north coast of Java, starting from Tegal, through Jepara, Juwana, Rembang, Tuban, Gresik and Pasuruan. These enterprises were already international in ownership since they were not only owned by local people, but also by Chinese and even by Dutch companies (Raffles quoted from Simon 1993).

In the beginning, teak exploitation had been only around these centers. And since it had been thought that teak trees were still abundant, supply sustainability had never been questioned. Teak exploitation intensified through the 17th and 18th century when colonial industrial needs had been growing to the peak. The concern for teak reforestation did not emerge until the end of 18th century when it was realized that massive deforestation had taken place across Java. In early 19th century when Daendels was appointed as Dutch Indies General Governor, deforestation was already considered to be threatening the ship-building industries. The Dutch government ordered Daendels to improve teak forest management in Java in order to secure teak supply for the ship-building industries (Peluso, 1989: 26).

To fulfill the mission, Daendels introduced several strict policies to stop deforestation. Those were the establishment of *Dienst der Boschwezen* (Forest Service) under which all forests are authorized, Boschwezen's monopoly rights to collect forest resource, and prohibition of wood commerce by the private sector. These regulations were then known as the preliminary concept of modern forest organization in Java (Soepardi quoted from Simon, 1993). While those regulations looked authoritative, its actual enforcement met strong resistance from both within bureaucracy and industry circles.

From within the colonial bureaucracy, those policies were poorly enforced due to the lack of institutional and personnel capacity in the colonial apparatus to implement forest management along modern lives. Industrial interests saw, those policies as contradictory to the spirit of *cultuur stelsel* (cultivation system)⁴ which sought profit extraction. During this time, instead of being protected

from deforestation, the forest was under more severe stress. In the time when a lot of industries were burgeoning, wood was not only needed for ship-building but also for the construction of sugar factories, warehouses, settlement for factory/plantation workers, and fuel for transportation industries (Simon 1993).

Weaknesses within the colonial government body led the colonial government to hire a Germany professional forester, Mollier, to prepare for a more systematic forest management. Based on his report, the first law on forestry in Java and Madura was passed in 1865. Five years later, regulation on *domeinverklaring* was also introduced. Considered as British governor Raffles' legacy, the regulation stated that any land which was not individually owned belong to the State. Under this legal context, the State was given much stronger power to manage forest resource. This regulation emerged as a reaction to the expansion of settlement to which threats to forest conservation were attributed rather than to industrial exploitation. It was the first law to introduce a limitation of people's access to forest resources (Simon 1993, page 62). This law later provided a political foundation for the New order state (and its companies, both *Perhutani* in Java and *Inhutani* outside Java) to occupy more than 70% of Indonesian total land.

Following these regulations, several policies were undertaken. Among others were the inclusion of non-teak forest under the state's forest authority, division of Javanese forests into 13 forest authority areas⁵ which are in charge of managing 70-80 thousand hectares of teak forest and more than that scale for non-teak forests each, and further division of these authorities into management units in which plots (*petak*) and their boundaries were made. Under these forest authority areas the planning units called *boschafdeling* (forest divisions) were also introduced. With 4-5 thousand hectares, in practice this planning unit actually functioned as the smallest management unit. It was based on this *boschafdeling* that, to allow stricter monitoring and better nurturing, later Dutch colonial forest authorities developed the concept of

Houtvesterij, the forerunner of the current concept of *Kesatuan Pemangkuan Hutan* (KPH/forest management unit).

Underlying these organizational improvements was a policy of forest intensification which then led to further division between teak and non-teak forest management. Under the 1927 forest law, it was decided that non-teak forest management would fall under the authority of *Dienst der Wildhoutbossen* and teak forest under *Djatibedrijf* (Teak [State] Company) which was founded three years later. *Djatibedrijf* was established to promote efficiency and extract more profit from the teak forests. However, this company lasted only for 8 years before colonial government decided to close it on the reason that it was only bothered with profit, not conservation. In 1940, teak forest was handed over again to government's forest office (*Boswezen*) up to 1942 when Japanese army started to occupy Indonesia.

After few months in chaos following power transition from Dutch to Japan, another model in forest management was introduced. In June 1942, Japan colonial government set up a forest service called *Ringyo Tyuoo Zimusyo* (RTZ). However, almost alike previous Dutch forest management, this new forest management was predominately profit-oriented and leave behind all visions of reforestation. This condition got worse when RTZ's jurisdiction was moved under department *senkyoku* (ship) which was in turn part of department of warfare. Instead of being reforested, rate of deforestation was even faster because teak was needed to build warships. This management lasted until the end of Japanese occupation in 1945.

3.2. Post-Colonial (Teak) Forest Management

Few months after Japanese's surrender to the Allies, Indonesian government created a new institution on forest management called *Jawatan Kehutanan* which, adapting Dutch colonial system of forest management unit, was divided into 5 inspectorates. According to Simon (1993), apart from being based on administrative authorities, the establishment of these inspectorates were based


in accordance to their productivity and quality of their timber production. Inspectorate II and III (covering areas currently in the Central Java province) were the most productive teak forest, while the other three inspectorates were either less productive teak forests or non-teak forests.

Due to economic reasons, in 1963 forest management in Central Java and East Java province (which included Inspectorates II-IV) were merged into the State Owned Company (*Perusahaan Negara/PN*) called Perhutani. To promote better management and more profit orientation, the status of this company was “elevated” from *Jawatan* to *Perum* (*Perusahaan Umum*/general enterprise) in 1972. This status change was done to give more space to Perhutani to seek profit while at the same time promote reforestation as one of its mandated tasks. With this change, division of forest authorities no longer followed administrative borders, but went back to colonial *houtvesterij* border which is now called *Kesatuan Pemangkuan Hutan* (KPH). Forestlands in West Java had been under independent authority of West Java forest service until 1977 when they were finally handed over to Perhutani as well. According to the latest Government Regulation No 30/2003, Perhutani is in charge of managing 2.426 million hectares.

In Perhutani's structure, under each unit there are KPH (forest management district), BKPH (*Bagian Kesatuan Pemangkuan Hutan*, sub-forest district), and RPH (*Resort Polisi Hutan* or forest ranger) (see **graph 3.1**). In total, there are 20 KPHs, 150 BKPHs and 595 RPHs in Unit I; 23 KPHs, 178 BKPHs, and 663 RPHs in Unit II; and 14 KPHs, 110 KPHs and 381 RPHs in Unit III. These bureaucracies follow Perhutani's management system which divides forest timber resources into two categories called “company class” (*kelas perusahaan/KP*) teak (KP Jati) and non-teak (KP Rimba). KP Jati accounts for more than half of Perhutani's areas (1,240,558 ha), the rest is *rimba* which varies from mahogany, acasia, *sengon* (*paraserianthes falcataria*) and other plants (website Perhutani, accessed 30 October 2008). However, following the massive wood looting in early 2000s, many of these Perhutani's lands are now

deforested.

TABLE 3.1 Perhutani's Organizational Structure



3.3. The Teak and Furniture Industry in Jepara

As mentioned earlier, Jepara has been familiar with teak-related industry since the 17th century. If in those era, teak related industry had been more related to ship-building, after Jepara's harbor no longer played important role for trade in the archipelago, teak had been more and more utilized for domestic use such as furniture manufacture and handicrafts. Unlike the ship-building industries which were quite well-known worldwide, Jepara's furniture manufacture and handicrafts were not well known until the early 20th century. When Kartini, a daughter of the Jepara Regent or District Head, and a pioneer of women's education and now a female heroine from Jepara, now seen as in her letters to her Dutch friends, who started to promote local woodcarving traditions to the outer world. Despite various efforts to introduce local wood

industry to world market, the woodcarving and furniture industry did not provide support for much of local economy until the era 1980s.

The government's deregulation policies and promotion of non-oil exports lead the wood furniture industry to grow as burgeoning industry. Begun as suppliers to Bali wood industry through which it gained wider markets, Jepara started to record small-scale direct exports in 1986. Within 10 years, exports grew more than four fold in value. And over the next 10 years, the volume increased again more than 50 fold with 400 fold increase in value (Schiller and Martin-Schiller 1997; Alexander and Alexander 2005).

This expansion of the furniture industry changed Jepara's local economy., One of the poorest regencies in Central Java in 1970s it became one of the richest by the mid 1990s. Since the second half of 1990s, the numbers of Mecca pilgrims (*jamaah haji*)⁶ from Jepara has been always among the top three in the province. One result of the furniture boom is that local people has become more familiar with exposure to foreign culture with the presence of foreign buyers and their local gathering spots such as european restaurants and bars. Local wages rose, there was more immigration, and house rentals were said to be higher than in the provincial capital (Schiller and Martin-Schiller 1997). For some researchers, this success is attributed to flexible specialization in the industry (Alexander and Alexander 2005), while some others attributed the success to the burgeoning of local (*pribumi*) businessmen able to compete with the chinese dominated business in the country (Schiller and Martin-Schiller 1997).

During the financial crisis in the late 1990s, instead of collapsing, local economy become one of few Indonesian regions benefiting from it. Weakening of rupiah exchange rate to dollar made the returns from furniture exports really significant for local economy. It led not only to sharp increases in the rupiah export value, but also to further expansion of the industry. Although many locals now claim that its boom is now over due to tighter

competition in the world market, furniture was championed by local people as the only significant sector in local economy. Previously concentrated in Central Jepara, furniture industry began spread up to North and South Jepara. In their research on local furniture business cluster, Roda et. al. (2007) recorded that most of the current 15,000 furniture business units with more than 170,000 employees were founded after the crisis and especially during early 2000s. During this time, furniture exports were believed to be dominated by garden furniture. Apart from having a simpler process of production which allows people without much woodcarving skill to start a business, the garden furniture business was relatively easy to promote because there has been an abundant supply of teak. Many believe that most of these teak supplies were obtained from teak looting, either within or outside Jepara.

Chapter 4

Wonorejo in the Pre-Reform Era

Jepara has 13,620-hectares of state forests, which fall under the control of PT Perhutani KPH Pati. More than fifty percent of Jepara's state forest (6898 hectares) is under the management of BKPH (*Bagian Kesatuan Pemangkuan Hutan*) Surowono which is located in the northern part of this district. The state forest in this BKPH is spread over in 19 villages of 4 different sub-districts. And one of these villages is Wonorejo.

From the center of the town of Jepara, Wonorejo can be reached in about one hour by public bus. Wonorejo has the largest area of any village in Keling sub-district (2858 hectare). However, only 25% of this area belongs to the village or villagers, while the rest belongs to PTPN IX Nusantara (state-owned rubber plantation company) and Perhutani. PTPN IX owns more than 1470 hectares of land in this village, whereas Perhutani's land forest occupies more than 675 hectares. The rubber plantation and Perhutani's forest surround Wonorejo, as if serving as a fort for the village isolating it from neighboring villages. The rubber plantation recruited their *penyadap* (the tappers who extract latex from its tree) mostly from three of Wonorejo's hamlets (Ngandong, Ndenok, and some from Nggendu), while villagers from the other 7 hamlets (Krajan, Jaten, Sumbang, Sekelor, Dermayu, Beji, and Kalisuru) are engaged in other activities for their livelihood.

When I visited this village for the first time in 2003, there were hardly any images of a fisher folk community in Wonorejo, though it borders with Java Sea. Compared to the infrastructure leading to the north Muria road linking Jepara with the town of Pati, the infrastructure connecting the village to its coastal area was very minimal. A pot-holed road leads to its quay and fish auction station. This made me suspect that fishing was not a major occupation in this village. The quay was located quite away from residential area; only a few houses and *warung* (food stalls) stood in this area at the time.

My thoughts were confirmed by village statistics which did not specifically record the numbers of people working as fisher folk. Even some of those who work in fisheries consider this job as secondary after agriculture. In 2002, Wonorejo's total population was 6,940. It had 2097 households, most of whom were engaged in agriculture as their main occupation (see table 4.1).

Table 4.1. Classification of Wonorejo Villagers based on Occupation 2002

Occupation	Number (persons)	% of Total Labour Force (2577)
Peasants/farmers	1324	51%
Farmhands (<i>burub tani</i>)	842	32%
Mining	31	1%
Manufactures	59	2.2%
Trade	116	4.5%
Construction	32	1%
Transportation	51	2%
State Employees/Army	63	2.3%
Retired	32	1%
Others (services)	27	1%

Source: Sub-District in Figures 2002

Of the 25% of the village area that does not belong to the state rubber plantation or to Perhutani, rice field constitutes 250 hectares (8% of total village area), *tegalan* (dry field) 298 hectares (10%), and the rest is residential area (5%) and other social uses such as cemeteries, mosques, sports fields, and the village square etc.

Land ownership is not equally distributed among villagers. This appears to be

quite similar to Husken's research (1989) in a neighboring sub-district (but administratively a part of Pati district) and Martin-Schiller (1986) in a different village from the same sub-district. Both anthropologists identified three social classes based on land ownership, Wonorejo's population also consists of a substantial group of landless peasants, a large mass of peasants with rights to land and with heavy tributary and corvee obligations attached to those rights, and a group of villagers who have still more land, enough for capital accumulation. While those peasants who have up to 1 hectare of land dominate the picture of land ownership in the village (more than 50% of total peasants/farmers), there is a substantial number of landless peasants who constitute 38.8% of the agricultural labour force (842 persons out of 2166). On the other hand, the group of villagers who own more than 1 hectare of land, numbered 184 persons (Wonorejo, no date).⁷ Included in the latter group are village officials who in addition to their own holdings had control of a large proportion of village lands as salary land (*bengkok*).

Since government does not provide technical irrigation services in the village, those who have rice field have to collect water on their own for the irrigation. They must collect water on their own, usually by digging wells if their fields are located in low land, while those located in relatively higher places but close to river, pump water from the river, using pumps rented from their fellow villagers. The machines are rented for 15,000 rupiahs (about 1.10 euro) per hour, excluding gasoline to run the machine. Villagers could rent pumps from fellow villagers who own the machine, Some of these villagers no longer rely on agriculture for their livelihood and purchase pumps as a way to earn additional income. Drilling wells was even more expensive. The costs could reach a million rupiahs (about 75 euros) (interview with Parjan, 4 November 2008). Since both methods were quite expensive (compared with the daily waged labor income

per person was about 15,000 rupiahs), not every peasant who had land could afford to do this.

This affordability determined the yield farmers gained from the field, and this, in turn leads to further cleavage among land owners. During the dry season, those who cannot afford pumps or wells can only plant *palamija* (non-rice crops, such as cassava, ground nuts, or corn) which normally yields less than rice. These farmers can only plant rice during rainy season. Meanwhile, landless peasants, they do not have anything from which they can earn living but their labors. They were the group that was most affected by the development of agricultural technology commonly called the green revolution.

4.1. “Green Revolution” and Production Relations among Villagers

By early 1970s, change of production technology in rice planting started to enter the village. Some villagers told me that the change was started by an outsider from the town of Pati who came to the village after marrying a local women. He was the first one who owned a motorcycle (which local children used to run after), and he was the one who introduced the usage of new harvest technology which turned out to be negatively affecting landless peasants more than any other peasants, and especially poor women. Traditionally, the method of harvesting was very labour intensive and mostly done by women. From this harvesting women from poor and landless families could earn a relatively higher return to their labor [which was not necessarily paid in cash, but also in kind]. With the introduction of high yielding varieties promoted by the government, there was a shift to use sickles, at least partly because those varieties are harder to cut with *ani-ani* (traditional small blade to cut rice) (Martin-Schiller 1986: page 123). As happened in the village where Martin-Schiller was doing her research, harvesting with sickles became a man's job and thus replaced a large number of women. Some women were still hired though, but usually only those who were physically strong (so landholders could save some money by asking her to do more) and who are close kin and neighbours. Being faced with this condition, poor families and especially poor

women were trying to harvest as often as they could, all over the village, and if needed, also elsewhere.

During approximately the same period, other technological developments were also introduced such as mechanical threshers and rice hullers or small rice mills which further reduced the amount of labour needed and thus affected women most. With later thresher technology, threshing (*ngedos*) was more efficiently done in the field by male harvesters replacing female harvesters who used to do it at the landowners' house. The latter technology was even more quickly spread since of its 'magic' in hulling rice more efficiently and cheaply than hulling by hand. Again, it affected women most since hulling rice was traditionally done by them.

Another non-technological factor which affected working opportunities for landless villagers related to the tradition of *tebasan* which is a harvesting practice in which crops are sold to *penebas* (harvest contractors) just before harvest time. While this practice frees farmers/peasants from harvesting chores and details (such as looking for harvesters to hire, providing meals for harvesters, and other technical things which require more labor and money), This practice further limits access by landless villagers to a share of the harvest. This badly affects women since buyers usually prefer to hire male harvesters who can work faster and will accept lower pay. If the entrepreneurs/buyers come from outside the village, they usually hire male harvesters also from outside the village. Thus, *tebasan* practice not only shifts the risk of harvesting and marketing away from the farmer, reduces the costs of harvesting that had been covered by landholders, but it also reduces work opportunities for poor women and sometimes for landless villagers as a whole.

Apart from being land-ownership based, crop production practices can also be based on *gadai* (pawning), *sewa* (rent), or *bagi hasil* (sharecropping). *Gadai* refers to a practice where landowners pawn their lands to others in return for money they lend. Crop production on the land will be the rights of the money lenders

until the money is returned (usually plus quite high interest). *Sewa* refers to a practice where cultivators gain rights to cultivate after paying certain amount of money for rent fee for certain period to the landowners. *Bagi hasil* refers to a practice where both cultivators and landowners give their specific share for crop production, each of which would gain return based on shares they contribute. Among those three practices, *bagi hasil* has been the most common one, especially among marginal and landless peasants, since it requires less capital on the part of cultivators and share risks to landowners. Quite similar to sharecropping practices in sub-district of Tayu where Husken (1989) did his research, returns from crop harvest is shared on the principle of *morotelu*. However, unlike the Tayu case, it seems there is more flexibility in this practice in Wonorejo, especially related to the share. If sharecroppers cover all cultivation labors (whether they do it with their own unpaid family members or hire waged labors) and cultivation expenses (for fertilizers, irrigation etc.), they will earn two third of the harvest, and the rest will go to the landowners. While if the landowners cover some agricultural expenses, the return shared by the two parties can be even (interview with Parjan, 6 November 2008).

However, relations between sharecroppers and their landholders are often extended to reproduction relations and far from being limited by contractual relations. As Husken (1989) noted, It is not uncommon for sharecroppers to provide free labour services (*remang*), in which their wives and children often have to join, for their landlords not only for simple household jobs (such as cleaning house, drying rice, guarding landlord's house and crop at night) but also especially if the latter have festivities (*duwe gawe*) where these people usually are the first to be called for help and have the longest hours of work. While doing these unpaid labor services is considered to be a proof of loyalty to a patron (Stoler quoted from Martin-Schiller 1984), “*it may therefore prevent those who perform it from taking advantage of other opportunities to earn money elsewhere*” (Husken 1989: 319).

4.2. Forest and Villagers' Livelihood

Before the introduction of joint forest management, forest management had been principally based on two basic ideas inherited from Dutch government under Daendels; (1) forest areas was determined as state territory (*landsdomein*) and managed for the sake of state profit, (2) the enforcement of prohibition to forest villagers to get benefit from forest products (especially timber). Those ideas were supplemented by penalties for those who broke those rules (Peluso 1992: 32). Within such a fortified forest management, there were consequently little forest benefits left for villagers.

Those benefits were small branches fallen from the teaks or cut off the teaks by villagers on purpose which then used for fuel wood, non-teak products for household consumption such as banana, jengkol (pithecollobium Jiringa), and other non-teak plants for income generation such as falling *kapok* (silk cotton tree or ceiba pentandra). It is poor and landless women who mainly do the collection of these forest products. In local term, the way to collect them is called *ngasak* or *ndadab*, whose meaning literally refers to an action of collecting what is left unused or wasted in the forest. If these women are not hired to be waged labor for seeding, harvesting or any other activities, they usually do this twice a day: several hours in the morning, and few more hours in the afternoon. These forest products such as *kapok* were then sold to *bakul* (local trader), 300 rupiahs (about 2 cents in euro) per *wilangan* (1 wilang consists of 5-6 pieces of *kapok*). While for *blarak* (dried coconut leaves), they make brooms out of them and sell them to another dealer for 2,000 rupiahs/piece (14 cents). Meanwhile, for landless male villagers, the low return from agricultural practices and limited opportunities from the forest there usually only give them two choices. One is to migrate (mostly to Jakarta) to work as construction workers or carpenters. In early 2000s, some younger generation started to migrate beyond national borders to work in Taiwan and South Korea. The other choice is cultivate riverbanks and transform them into *paddy* field.

In the absence of access to forest resources and having no land to plant, many

villagers found promising land for growing rice on the banks of the Wonorejo River. They call this land that borders on Perhutani's forestland *lambiran*. For the landless, this land was a rare opportunity to earn additional income without having to own land titles or spend much money on irrigation. Most of this land is part of the river, but the villagers manage it in such a way that it is no longer drowned by the river and separated from Perhutani's forestland. Being not categorized as 'official' agricultural land, I could not obtain official statistics/records that shows how big this *lambiran* exactly is. However, some officials from the village government estimate that in total this *lambiran* may exceed 100 hectares with more than 400 peasants working the land (interview with village officials on 5th October 2004). The large numbers of people working on this land and the 'unclear' status of the land had gradually triggered conflict between Perhutani and the villagers.

For Perhutani, this *lambiran* is actually part of river bordering forest area which had been purposively eroded by local villagers to extend their cultivation (interview with previous head of BKPH Surowono, 7 August 2003). Because of the increasing number of villagers working on *lambiran*, Perhutani was worried that it would lead to further land erosion which would eventually reduce forestlands. It was Perhutani's suspicion of *lambiran* status and their need to show power to those who work on *lambiran* that led villagers to believe that Perhutani did not respect them. This disrespect was often demonstrated by Perhutani's decision to cut teak trees and fell them down on the *lambiran*. They did not inform the villagers in advance which would have given them a chance to harvest their paddy before it was destroyed.

Even so, Perhutani's field workers (*mantri*) and forest rangers (*polisi hutan*) enjoyed benefits from *lambiran*. If villagers succeeded in harvesting the rice field on this *lambiran*, they were expected to leave 5 percent of the total harvest production, which they called *pipil* fund, on the spot to be picked up by Perhutani employees. Some villagers thought that Perhutani deserved to have that 5 percent because they had given them the chance to work *lambiran*. But

some others think that Perhutani had no rights to take that *pipil* fund not only because Perhutani has no legal foundation to enforce that *pipil* fund, but also they think *lambiran* land does not belong to Perhutani. Moreover, all of those villagers believed that *pipil* fund went into the personal pocket of Perhutani employees. They felt that Perhutani employees had been using them to enrich themselves.

The closure of villagers' access to forest resources, which was worsened by the attitude of Perhutani's employees in *lambiran* issue, had intensified villagers' resentful feeling against Perhutani. The villagers always contrast the attitudes of Perhutani's employees to the attitudes of employees of the Nature Reserve (*Cagar Alam*) who *were* monitoring a 65-hectare conservation forest in this village. All of the interviewed villagers agreed that employees of Nature Reserve were more "friendly" to them. In the eyes of the villagers, those Nature Reserve employees really did their job in conserving the nature; whereas Perhutani employees only protected forest for the sake of their individual interest.

4.3. Teak Looting

According to some villagers, that teak looting in Wonorejo was previously triggered by the action of looters coming from other villages (interview with Hendri, 12 August 2003). Knowing that some forest outside the village had been looted, villagers at first tried to blockade the entrance to the village against strangers, who could carry off the timber. . But, the blockade did not work. The village would also have no access to outside world since the entrance which was intended to blockade was the only main road to other villages. Instead, the attempt to prevent outsiders from looting the woods in Wonorejo resulted in outsiders' blockading the exit point (interview with Jamari, 11 August 2003). Facing the threat of isolation put forward by the outsiders insisting to loot the teak woods in Wonorejo, the villagers had no choice but to let them in. The wave of looting was then inevitable.

Many villagers believed that most of those outsiders were from a neighbouring village known for their hefty bodies (“*jeger*”), bravery, and their networks to *preman* and state security officers. In fact, their insistence to loot the teak woods in Wonorejo provided a stimulus for the villagers to take part in the looting. They thought that, as the people living next door to the forest, they have more rights than the outsiders to loot the woods (interview with Jamari). Economic difficulties, which they had been wrestling with, had a share in pushing them to be involved in the massive looting. Being involved in it, they hoped to have life as enjoyed by ‘high ranking government officials’ (*orang-orang atas*) (interview with Mardi, 10 August 2003). The economic crisis made the villagers’ will to have a better life grow stronger. This economic problem that merged with the hatred against Perhutani was just like gasoline easily ignited by gossip and rumors.

And villagers say this is what actually happened when the villagers heard the rumors that a person had been tortured to death by Perhutani employees in another village. Though the villagers had never met the victim personally, the story of Perhutani torture and death was enough to mobilize the village to voice their protest against despotism of Perhutani and of the state in a blunt way.

As a kind of protest against the despotism of Perhutani and the state, the villagers together with the outsiders went into the teak forest in a noisy group to loot the woods. At that time, this kind of protest took place in “relatively non-violent way.” It might be compared with similar protests in other villages that involved setting fire to Perhutani’s office cars, monitoring posts, offices and houses (*Suara Merdeka*, 18 August 2000) and in the form of kidnapping police officers (*Suara Merdeka*, 10 August 2000). One of the leaders in this “protest” described this teak looting as a people’s protest which he called *demo kayu* (timber protest). Most of villagers were involved in this *demo kayu*, the looters intimidated those who did not participate. Poverty and people’s hatred of the state and state company shaped them to be village

bandits (Suhartono 1993).⁸

This banditry, which was perhaps initiated as a form of resistance against perceived unfairness in the forest management by Perhutani. It was then expanded beyond villagers' interests. The looting was to be on the agenda of many actors (Santoso 2001). The job division among the looters indicated the presence of non-villager actors; some cut down the trees, others carried the wood to the trucks, and there must be someone who paid all of the workers (interview with Karyanto, 12 August 2003). The growing furniture industry in the same district provided markets for the illegally logged timber. According to one of looters, they sold most of the looted teak wood to furniture businessmen in Jepara. To meet the wood demand from this industry, the looters were ready to work day and night at sawmills in the forest. "It was so noisy as if planes were flying over and over again above this village," said one of villagers describing the 'noise pollution' (chain saws) coming out from the looting activities (interview with Sudarsono).

The massive looting put Perhutani and the state apparatus in a difficult position. Perhutani employees tried to personally approach villagers in order to stop the looting or prevent the teak looting from spreading to other villages. One of Perhutani's employees tried to persuade villagers to preserve Perhutani's forest by allowing them to cut down several teak trees to fulfill their daily needs. Instead of preserving Perhutani's teak forest, the villagers invited their relatives from other villages to cut down all the teak trees along with them (interview with Karyanto, 12 August 2003). The sub-district head (camat) made a similar effort by promising the villagers not to prosecute previous looters, if they stopped but he finally admitted that he failed to persuade them to stop the looting (*Suara Merdeka*, 12 August 2000). In short, as one of the looters, put it there was no state at that time (interview with Mardi).

The state was not respected due to the abundant cases of KKN (*korupsi, kolusi, nepotisme*) practice within the state structure, which were not followed by legal

prosecutions (Rama Astraatmadja, no date). In the eyes of the villagers, the involvement of state apparatus (police army officers, government officials or Perhutani employees) in the chain of illegal timber trade was common. Some looters felt that police officers continuously tried to blackmail looters. Some source persons even recognized that the police officers were directly involved in the chain of illegal timber trade either by being a broker of the looted timber or by being a driver in charge of transporting illegal woods to the customers (the provision of a police identity card, was usually considered to guarantee freedom from security examinations). Forest police officers, as part of Perhutani's security arm were not left behind either in this chain. Along the journey to the buyers of illegal timber, the truck drivers needed to save money to bribe them in order to evade seizure (interview with Basuki, 12 August 2003).

For some villagers, the looting activities provided fast cash. Village records showed a sharp increase of expenditures among its inhabitants. The increase could be seen in the ownership of cars and motorbikes which increased threefold from 23 four-wheel vehicles and 216 motorcycles in 1997 to 79 four-wheel vehicles and 683 motorcycles in 2000.

The increasing wealth also funded a boom in house construction. In 1997, there were 'only' 32 A-type-houses (permanent/made of bricks); 427 B-type-houses (semi-permanent); and 972 C-type-houses (totally made of bamboo/woods). In 2000, the numbers of A-type-houses drastically rose to 342 houses; B-type-houses rose to 418 and C-type-houses decreased to 597 houses (Village data comparison between 1997 and 2000).

In 2000, the funds collected from the villagers for financing development projects (*dana swadaya*) in their own village reached 170 million rupiah (BPS 2003). With only few exception, most villagers who were involved in the looting spent their money more on consumer goods than on capital investment. The easy money available during the looting changed the

villagers' drinking habit from drinking natural water to soft drinks such as *Sprite* (a product of Coca-Cola company). In a villager's language, the abundance of money made *Sprite* drinks function only for washing villagers' faces (interview with Sarpan, 11 August 2003). Fast cash and the way it was spent was in fact benefited men more than women. A local female villager told me that the number of polygamy cases also increased during the looting time. In her own neighborhood, she counted that at the time there were at least three men (all of them involved in *demo kayu*) who took a second wife (interview with Titin, 15 July 2008).

After the looting exhausted all the mature teak, leaving only a few younger teaks in a small number of *petak* (plot) unlooted, this 'success story' seemed to come to an end. Villagers started to find difficulties to get fast cash. Village records showed a sharp decrease in villagers' financial contribution to development projects (*dana swadaya*) suggesting that villagers' income was not as much as before. While most villages in Keling sub-district were able to increase their *dana swadaya*. Wonorejo's self-reliance fund sharply decreased from more than 170 million rupiah in 2000 to 80 millions in 2002 (BPS 2003). In the following year, Wonorejo's self reliance fund decreased again to only 39 million rupiahs (Wonorejo no year).

In a time of no alternative livelihood, villagers saw deforested land as potential land to cultivate. Several months after the *demo kayu ended* leaving previously teak covered area deforested, some villagers started to occupy those deforested lands and begin its cultivation. However, not all villagers would do the same thing. It took courage to occupy land belonging to a company whom people believed would prosecute illegal loggers and occupants. Besides, it took very hard physical work to clean residues of *demo kayu* activities, especially teak roots, in the deforested land. The cleaning was so hard that they needed to hire workers to help them. If they didn't hire workers, they could only clean less than 50 square meter of land in a week. In local terms, this deforested land on which they started to cultivate is called *nemer*. It is those who cultivated *nemer*

that later became members of the LMDH (*Lembaga Masyarakat Desa Hutan*/Forest Village Society Institution), a village organization with whom Perhutani is working under its forest management reform.

Chapter 5

The Village under Forest Reform

The “reformasi” period after the fall of Soeharto saw the emergence of numerous forestry conflicts during the reform, especially in 2000. Based on news articles, CIFOR recorded that the number of forestry conflicts increased 11 fold in 2000 compared to 1997, a year before Soeharto’s downfall. The conflicts continued to happen in 2001 and 2002, though the frequency was decreasing, but still double the number of cases in 1997 (Wulan, Yasmi et al. 2004). Almost 25% of those forestry conflicts took place in Java (West, Central and East Java) where Perhutani operates. These conflicts, which mostly took the form of teak looting, did not only leave forest coverage reduced to only 11% of total Java area (a sharp decrease from 23.3% in early 2000) (Antara 2006), but also a mean a huge loss for Perhutani. Perhutani reported that in 2001 it lost 1.5 million its wood stands whose value reached 227 billion rupiahs (16 million euros).⁹ Under this situation of economic loss, accompanied by pressure from some non-governmental organizations¹⁰, in 2001 Perhutani introduced joint forest management (*Pengelolaan Hutan Bersama Masyarakat*) in which forest community legally represented by forest village community institute (*Lembaga Masyarakat Desa Hutan/LMDH*) is given access to both timber and non-timber resources in the forest as a return for their partnership in forest management.

In Central Java, the new policy is supported by Governor Decision Letter No. 24/2001. Defined as PHBM goals, the governor decree mentioned that implementation of PHBM seeks to improve community's welfare, increase role and responsibility of among parties in forest resource management, and increase forest resource quality, productivity and forest security. The decree was then followed by another decision letter from Head of Perhutani’s Unit I No. 2142/KPTS/2002 which deals more about technical guidance of PHBM Implementation. Both decrees stress that the program implementation must be based on “spirit of sharing”, either in land use, time use, or forest resource

(article 2, governor decree). Those decrees become an umbrella for the legal cooperation between Perhutani and 1,879 of 1,968 forest villages in Central Java with 2,466,894 household heads to run the PHBM program.¹¹

This chapter would like to examine whether or not those PHBM's goals are already achieved, how they are achieved, and what kind of effects the goal achievement does to social differences in the village of Wonorejo.

5.1. Economic Transformation of the Village

Similar with what happened in other Javanese forest village, teak looting had caused wide deforested land.¹² As the land become deforested, in the time when the state was in collapse, forest villagers in many areas started to occupy and cultivate those deforested land.¹³ Villagers in Wonorejo were no exception.

According to villagers, the land occupation itself did not happen in abrupt way. At first, some few villagers started to occupy *nemer*, local term for the occupied forest land. After some time no action was taken on the part of Perhutani to these occupants, many villagers were then following their fellow villagers in occupying *nemer*. However, not all of Wonorejo villagers were dared to occupy the land, and therefore left the deforested land to be occupied by other people from neighboring villages (interview with Sodikun, 7 August 2003).

Nemer occupation itself was usually following residential area. Villagers usually only occupy land which is close to their houses, so they can save time and labour to go back and forth for watching their crops. This is particularly the case for landless villagers, who need to save time and labour to allow them to do several other things, such as doing waged labor for other villagers or to do income generating activities in their own house (making mats from dried coconut leaves, raise chickens, etc.). Besides, these villagers usually only occupy small plot of *nemer*, usually less than 0.20 hectares, since occupying and cultivating wide *nemer* requires not only more labour but also money for

cultivation expenses. Having not enough resources to be put into *nemer* also lead them to cultivate cheap crop with easier treatment but also with less returns. Never cultivating rice, these villagers often choose to cultivate cassava which require no water and no complicated treatment (interview with *Kemijah*, 5 August 2008). Those who can afford to put more resources in their *nemer* and occupy larger area of *nemer* are usually those who have other spare income, both from their previous main occupation or income from growing fishing activities in the village.

According to local fishermen, fishing economy has gained more significance in the last 4 years since the village has their own *juragans* (fish dealer). Before the teak looting, fishermen had to sell their catch to *juragans* in other villages and even in other sub-district. This practice was not advantaging Wonorejo's fishers since these *juragans* often bought their catch at low rate on the reason of their less fresh quality. This situation changed when a villager, used to be a food stall owner at Wonorejo's fish auction place (*Tempat Pelelangan Ikan*), started to lending a lot of his money to their fellow fishers and to be called the first *juragan* in the village.¹⁴ It was a public secret that he had a lot of money during teak looting period for being transporter of theft timber through boat he provided to downtown Jepara. After some few years, another local *juragan* came up. This new *juragan* is a local villager that had just come from Taiwan as a migrant worker for about 6 years. For local fishermen, the emergence of new *juragan* has been making fishing more profitable. “*At least we will not depend only on one juragan, and this makes the selling price will likely be better,*” says Salim (interview 5 August 2008). The fishing activities become livelier with district government's development aid to dredge harbour (*pengerukan pelabuhan*) in order to allow boats to get close to the village. The development of fishing activities did succeed to attract some migrants to come back to the village, like the chairperson of the fishers' organization who used to work as construction worker in Jakarta. However, more people are going out to work abroad, especially young women.

Village secretary said that currently there are about 200 villagers working abroad, mainly to Saudi Arabia (interview 7 August 2008). Most of them are young women and work as domestic workers, like Nur, Salim's daughter in law. For Nur, who wants to go back to Saudi for 2nd term, it is better to work as domestic worker abroad than working in agriculture. “*In agriculture, we can not save money. When we are about to plant, we would borrow money. After the harvest, we pay back our debt,*” she says (interview 4 August 2008). For another local villager, who is used to hire waged labours, young female villagers like Nur will not be hired (*ora payu*) as waged labours. “Landowners would prefer (physically) strong female labour”, he said (interview 4 August 2008). When they are abroad, their children are usually left under the care of their parents or parents in law. In Nur's case, her child was under her parents in law, with biggest responsibilities falling to the side of mother in law who often simultaneously bear responsibility to take care *nemer* when her husband go fishing.

Engaging in fishing is primarily a privilege for villagers living in the hamlet of Sumber Rejo and Sekelor. These two hamlets are the closest to the sea. Most of those working as *migrant workers* are also coming from both hamlets. “*Those two hamlets are the exporter of women migrant worker (Tenaga Kerja Wanita),*” says the Village Secretary (interview 7 August 2008).¹⁵ Income from these two income generating activities are usually transferred into ownership of “eye catching” goods such as jewellery or motorcycles.¹⁶ Meanwhile, the other hamlets, especially on the northern east of the village which cover hamlet of Krajan and Jaten, seem do not change much, and still largely depend on agriculture and *nemer*.

5.2. Nemer and Organizational Practice of LMDH in Wonorejo

As mentioned earlier, it took courage and resource to occupy *nemer*. Since there is no rule in such *nemer* occupation, those who have more resource can have wider area of *nemer*. This made *nemer* distribution is quite unequal. From more or less 380 *pesanggem* (=peasants working on Perhutani's deforested land) in 18 land plots with 188,6-hectar lands which belong to RPH Jlegong and is directly

managed under LMDH Wonorejo, only half of them are Wonorejo villagers; the rest come from neighboring villages (List of *Pesanggems* in LMDH Wonorejo). Theoretically, each of them is given legal rights of land using on 0.25-hectare land, but on these land plots there are at least 15% of those 380 *pesanggem* working on more than that share; some of them even work on more than 2 hectares *nemer*. There are about 40 Wonorejo villagers (21%) that work *nemer* on different plots exceeding ‘normal share’ defined by Perhutani. Compared to numbers of Wonorejo landless peasants as recorded in sub-district data (BPS 2003), this livelihood opportunity seems to open only to limited population. It is these *pesanggem* working on *nemer* that become members of LMDH. Regarding this unequal distribution of *nemer*, head of BKPH Surowono stated that it is beyond their responsibility and it is LMDH's domestic affairs (interview 8 August 2003). He said paying respect to LMDH's capacity to solve problems within community is part of agreement between Perhutani and LMDH.

Under the agreement between Perhutani and LMDH Wonorejo, it is agreed that 221.2 hectares of Perhutani's land will be under the “management” of LMDH. This area is divided into 6 *petak* (plot) numbered 151 to 156. These *petaks* are further divided into 27 blocks, in which *pesanggem* (those who cultivate state's land) are organized into groups, with area coverage ranges from 1 hectare to 22.9 hectares. From all those blocks, blocks number 151b and 152 b are not cultivated. Those two blocks can no longer cultivated since they are already covered by big teak plants [*tectona grandis*] (151 b, planted in 1997) and *sonokeling* [*dalbergia latifolia*] (152b, planted in 1995), the only plants left unlooted in the whole BKPH Surowono area during 2000. Teak is the most important variety for Perhutani in this area, and mostly planted, followed by *sonokeling* and *accacia mangium*.

LMDH in Wonorejo was legally founded in the end of 2002 based on the decision of Villagers' Meeting. To make it more legal to represent villagers and entitled to profit sharing, this organization was then registered to a local law

registrar (notaris). In its organizational structure, a chairperson with assistance from a secretary and a treasurer leads LMDH. Equal to the position of LMDH chairperson, there is a monitoring board led by BPD chairperson. LMDH has four departments; which are, department of security, of general affairs, of exploitation, of plantation and coordination, with 5 members each.

Apart from those formal departments, LMDH also has “unofficial” department whose leaders are called as “*pendamping*” (advisor). There are two *pendampings*, both which come from Perhutani. One is *mandor tani* (Perhutani’s employee in charge of seeding and plantation), the other is Polisi Hutan (forest police). The former is called by LMDH Leader, Parjan, as “*pendamping teknis*” (technical advisor), while the latter as already shown by its name is advising on security matters. According to him, community could not select which people they want to be their advisors more because it was Perhutani’s proposal (interview with parjan, 30 October 2008).

Tabel 5.1. Social Background of LMDH Board Members

Name	Position at LMDH	Occupation	Residence (hamlet)
Parjan	Leader	School Principal	Jaten
Sutikno	Secretary 1	Village Secretary	Ngandong
Senti Kudiwanto	Secretary 2	Kabayan	Jaten
Mustajab	Treasurer	Furniture businessman	Jaten
Usup	Security Dept	Security Officer	Jaten
Suyanto	Security Dept	Forest Police (Perhutani)	Krajan
Abdul Jamal	Security Dept	Police Officer	Krajan
Djohan YS	Security Dept	Army Retired	Krajan
Yoso	Security Dept	<i>Makelar</i>	Sumber Rejo

H. Suciato	Dept of General Welfare	Head of fish auction in Bandungharjo	Jaten
Mulyadi	Dept of General Welfare	contractor	Jaten
Subari	Dept of General Welfare	Transport businessman	Krajan
Sudarno	Dept of General Welfare	Furniture businessman	Krajan
Sutrisno	Dept of General Welfare	Farmer	Krajan
Ali Irfan	Dept of Production	Furniture businessman	Krajan
Suyono	Dept of Production	Government religious officer	Krajan
Sutejo	Dept of Production	State employee	Jaten
Nur Ali	Dept of Production	Religious teacher	Jaten
Kaslan	Dept of Production	Farmer	Jaten
Sukidjan	Dept of Nursery	Coconut dealer	Jaten
Darman	Dept of Nursery	Farmer	Jaten
Sarwi	Dept of Nursery	Farmer	Jaten
Surono	Dept of Nursery	Landless peasant	Jaten
Surani	Dept of Nursery	Farmer	Jaten
Rikno	Dept of Coordination	Perhutani's employee	Jaten
Mukri	Dept of Coordination	State employee	Krajan
M. Yusuf	Dept of Coordination	Furniture businessman	Krajan
Tosin	Dept of Coordination	Religious teacher	Krajan
Sintarjo	Dept of Coordination	Transport businessman	Krajan

Source: interview with LMDH leader, 3 August 2008.

The table above shows several points. Most of the board members, which were

chosen in the come from the same hamlets, either Krajan or Jaten, while some other hamlets which directly border to (used to be) forest and whose some of their population depend a lot on forest resources are not well-represented. Its limited geographical representation shows that board membership tends to include only those living around the residence of LMDH leader. The only non-Krajan/Jaten board member is Sutikno whose membership was more likely based on his occupation as the village secretary. *Secondly*, the board membership was dominated by big landholders and those whose main income source come from non-farm employment. Most of farmers, and the only landless peasant, are appointed only for department of nursery which is responsible for making sure that all hardwoods planted grow well. In fact, it is this nursery which bears most of costs with regards to replantation/reforestation since it requires regular monitoring and checks. *Thirdly*, the presence of security department and the social background of its members show that physical security paradigm is still dominant in the way this organization work.

According to Parjan, the LMDH chairperson, it is only the security department that has been active so far. It may be understood considering the need to secure teak stands in the plot 151, which are the oldest teak stands in BKPH Surowono. To fulfill its main function in preventing teak looting in the village, villagers with “hefty bodies” and having wide network in “security affairs” were specially chosen to be the members of this department. *Fourthly*, security paradigm in limited sense in the way LMDH works is strengthened by the fact that all LMDH board members are males. For the village head, who is acting as *Pelindung* (protector) of this LMDH, women are “supporter” (*mendukung*) but not involved as LMDH board members. For him, being board members mean being able and willing to be involved in security tasks and doing patrol at midnight. “*Can women do patrol and secure forest at night?*” he said.

5.3. Perhutani: Bringing Back the Control in the Village

An organization may be a medium through which people can be united, but it

can also be a medium through which control can be done more easily. It looks like the latter is the case with LMDH Wonorejo when it deals with legal agreement between Perhutani and villagers. As part of requirements to be members of LMDH, villagers cultivating on Perhutani's land are required to sign an agreement whose draft is written by Perhutani without any consultation. Through LMDH, Perhutani proposed a draft of agreement on the nature of land cultivation to every local farmers which are represented by a leader of *blok*. The draft listed 6 rules and regulations which farmers must obey. They are (1) not allowed to expand the land they cultivate; (2) not allowed to exchange the land to any other parties with any other means; (3) willing to nurse and maintain the quality of plants belong to the company located around the land; (4) willing to obey rules of profit sharing between Perhutani and LMDH; (5) in case, Perhutani will use the land for plantation, they are willing to leave the land at any time without demanding any compensation; (6) and they are willing to bear sanctions from Perhutani and LMDH in case they are found guilty of breaking the agreement. Those 6 articles soon invited protest and resistance from local farmers, especially related with rule number 5. But, after some explanation from Perhutani, all the resistance and protests were shut down without any changes to the content of the agreement (interview with Parjan, 8 August 2008).¹⁷

Perhutani's effort to regain control was also reflected through its policy to apply limitation to kinds of plants allowed to be cultivated in its land. Concerning with the maintainance of teak quality as they had before the *demo kayu*, Perhutani asked LMDH leader to announce that *pesanggem* are not allowed to cultivate plants such as cassava. Cassava is considered bad for Perhutani's plants since it exhausts so much land minerals required for the growth of teak or other Perhutani's main plants. While, for local *pesanggem*, cassava is often considered as the most feasible plant to cultivate in time of poverty since it does not require a lot resource and energy. Realizing that the announcement will put himself into danger, Parjan decided not to channel Perhutani's interest. On another occasion, Perhutani also asked him to persuade *pesanggem* to give

the land back to Perhutani since this company wanted to plant cane sugar. According to Parjan, to persuade him, Perhutani officials often offers him some rewards, either in the form of money or buffalos etc. In shorter term, in the absence of teak to harvest, plantation of sugar cane will definitely give more financial benefits to Perhutani's employees than letting the land be cultivated by *pesanggem*. But traditionally, sugar cane will potentially exclude poor and landless women to participate in its harvest (Martin-Schiller, 1984). LMDH leader finally declined Perhutani's request, more because he knew that it will trigger anger among his fellow villagers (8 August 2008).

For ordinary *pesanggem*, relations between them and Perhutani has been always one way-direction, from Perhutani to villagers. Other than safeguard Perhutani's teak stands, LMDH Wonorejo does not have any specific activities but socialization of Perhutani's programs. Meetings between Perhutani and villagers usually take place only to discuss about nursery and how to preserve *tanaman pokok* (main plant, in this case teak) to be a good commodity. According to one of villagers, LMDH meeting in his plot only took place twice in the last 7 years (interview with Sukardi, 7 August 2008).

For LMDH leader, minimal activities within LMDH is attributed more to financial difficulties it has. Having no profit yet from the forest profit sharing made this institute have no money to run the organization. Beyond this financial problem, the absence of support and advocacy program from non-governmental organization in the village can also be mentioned in regards to the inactivity of LMDH, and particularly to its acceptance to terms of agreements set by Perhutani. Unlike in some forest villages in South Java where many NGOs on forestry are working, Wonorejo villagers has no NGO to work with (interview Parjan, 8 August 2008). There was a Christian NGO from town of Pati which tried to organize villagers, but this NGO was rejected by many villagers since it was believed to run "evangelism" in this moslem dominated village (interview with Khudori, 5 August 2008). Even Schiller and Fauzan (2008) mentioned that Wonorejo is the least organized village among

their three village studies in Jepara.

5.4. Spirit of Sharing?

Six years after the establishment of LMDH, it was said that hundreds of hectares of Perhutani's land in northeast of Wonorejo are again covered by quite mature¹⁸ hardwood stands (interview with Parjan, 4 November 2008). According to him, the growth of those wood stands was made possible because *pesanggem* take part in securing them. While they were nurturing or cultivating *nemer*, they would be simultaneously watching teak or any other hardwood stands nearby. It happened several times when they were doing their *nemer*, they saw some people acting suspiciously near mature timber stands. If that is the case, they would usually ask those people to give impression that some villages are watching over the stands, or report the suspicious action to him or to Perhutani. If needed, Parlan and some other LMDH board members from security department came to the field and asked those people to go away.

The well growth of hardwood stands does not only mean that forests are now more secured but, also, especially for *pesanggem*, mean decreasing possibility to cultivate the land since the tree coverage prevents their crop from gaining sunlight to grow. *Pesanggem* who used to cultivate these *nemer* are now back to be waged labor (*balik jadi kuli*) to earn living (Parjan, 8 November 2008). Meanwhile, working in some other *nemer* which is still not covered by mature hardwood stands¹⁹ is not always profitable, especially during rainy seasons, the right time for rice planting. For *pesanggem* working on *nemer* located along river streams, in the last few years they always had harvest failure since their field was flooded by rivers. A *pesanggem* said that, since there are no more big trees along the river, water erode the land and finally changed the water streams (interview with Jumari, 4 August 2008).

Even though there is a recognition for *pesanggem's* contribution to the growth of hardwood stands, their contribution does not necessarily mean bigger or higher return for their labour in watching the wood stands. Board of LMDH,

which according to the agreement of joint forest management is entitled to have 25% share²⁰ of the teak harvest, has in fact different plan. The board agreed to divide that 25% share into 5 allocations: (1) for members of LMDH board, (2) village revenue, (3) social funds (*pengajian*, mosques, youth organization etc.), (4) LMDH's revenue, (5) LMDH's administration costs (to serve guests, transport expenses for LMDH representatives etc.) with 5% each. In relation to first allocation, financial rewards to LMDH board members, it is agreed to share it flat, regardless position and responsibilities that each member has. Looking at this distribution scheme, it is unlikely that *pesanggem*s who are not members of LMDH board, who contributed to securing wood stands, and who are now, as Parjan said, “*balik jadi kuli*” get an appropriate share to their labours. Their labours in securing wood stands are potentially extracted for the profit of members of LMDH board, and much larger for the profit of Perhutani.

5.5. PHBM: Is it a Success or Failure?

After some years of implementation, PHBM was considered successful basically by measuring two parameters. Under PHBM, probability of hardwood plant growth is increasing from 80 to 94%. The other parameter of success, which Perhutani believed to be the most manifest (*paling nyata*), is the continuous decline in volume and value of theft wood from 1,5 million stands (227 billion rupiahs) looted to 7 thousand stands with 1 billion rupiahs in value (up to July 2008)²¹. Being the simplest parameter to measure, the latter parameter is present in evaluation of PHBM implementation in all levels of Perhutani's structure, including in Wonorejo village. In Perhutani's standardized document of evaluation whose title is “effects of security and activities in forest security in the village of joint forest management” (*dampak keamanan dan kegiatan bidang pengamanan hutan desa model PHBM*), Head of BKPH Surowono stated that as of July 2004, wood theft decreased from 6,529 cubic meter before the agreement (*akta perjanjian*) to 1,105 cubic meter after. In the column of remark, he mentioned that the decrease was achieved because of community's self initiated security (*pengamanan swakarsa*) which involved

LMDH's security department and local leaders (BKPH document, 2004).

However, if PHBM is evaluated in the context of improvement of community's welfare, as mentioned in Governor's Decision Letter above, there are a lot of things that remain to be seen. A new Asper, head of BKPH Surowono, acknowledged that there is no welfare yet delivered by the forest reform to the community (interview 6 November 2008). With regard to level of activity and capability in raising profit, the Asper considered LMDH Wonorejo as a failure.²² However, he considered this LMDH Wonorejo as a success since it protects and secures the stands of planted hardwood. Inequality of *nemer* distribution, decreasing opportunity to cultivate land where hardwood plant grows well, harvest failure in *nemer* cultivation due to environmental problem are among indicators that suggest continuing problems of livelihood among villagers. In such a condition, there is nothing that district government can do to bring economic improvements to *pesanggem* in Wonorejo. Often, it is simply because district forest service (*dinas kehutanan*) think Wonorejo is a forest area where Perhutani is in charge (interview 2 November 2008). Instead of having their income raised, *pesanggem* whose *nemer* can no longer be cultivated because planted hardwood trees are growing faster than their own life potentially see their labours extracted for the profit of Perhutani and for the additional income of some village elites.

Conclusion

In 2001, facing an uncertain political landscape and huge financial losses due to Reformasi-inspired demonstrations and looting—which forest villagers called *demo kayu* (timber demonstrations)—Perhutani initiated a joint forest management (PHBM) program in 2001. Its stated aims were to improve community welfare, increase the role and responsibility of villagers in forest resource management, and increase forest resource quality, productivity and forest security. It is also stressed in those regulations that the implementation of the program must be based on the “spirit of sharing”, in land use, time use, or forest resource.

The practice of joint forest management reform in Wonorejo, Central Java, proved to show something different. The promise of improvement of people's welfare brought by the forest reform does not seem to take place. If there is economic improvement among some villagers (which does not necessarily lead to equal sharing of burden across sexes), it was because of their connection to outside world, not from the joint forest management program. Instead of promoting the increase role and responsibilities among parties involved in the program, its practice in Wonorejo shows that the increasing responsibilities are only realized by the part of the “community” which plays a more active role in securing and policing the hardwood stands. Further scrutiny of who this community really is uncovers that it is *pesanggem* that pay the greatest share of the cost of this forest policing since they are morally requested to keep an eye on the “forest” in return for cultivation “rights” they gained. As a consequence of “their success” in policing hardwood stands, these *pesanggem* lost the right to cultivate the land on which those stands grow well. With the loss of these opportunities, they can now only go back to being “*kuli*” (waged labour) and rely on their land owning fellow villagers to earn a living.

Instead of being materially rewarded for their success in policing “the forest”, these *pesanggem* will likely lose the profit sharing that the program promises to bring. The share distribution plan decided by the LMDH Board suggests that

most of the profits will be for covering organizational expenses which are mostly spent by elites of the LMDH board and equally distributed to all board members as a reward for their participation in the board, regardless how much or small their contribution is. Thus, if it is implemented, the plan will take labour or surplus created by these *pesanggem* away from them and reallocated for the village elites and the state-owned forest company. In this case, social differentiation as White (1989) suggested, will likely happen, even to a greater extent since the surplus extraction will not only go to a particular patron but also village elites as a group and the state.

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www.perumperhutani.com

http://unit1-perumperhutani.com/teks/kelolaphbm_01.htm

http://www.perumperhutani.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=407&Itemid=2

Regulations

Law No. 5/1967 on Forestry Principles

Law No. 41/1999 on Forestry

Provincial Government Regulations No. 32/2002

Decision Letter of Head of Perhutani's Unit I No. 2142/KPTS/2002

Notes

¹ www.perumperhutani.com (accessed on 10 August 2008)

² What he meant as social reality is “*the sum total of objects and occurrences within the social cultural world as experienced by the commonsense thinking of men living their daily lives among their fellowmen, connected with them in manifold relations of interaction*” (Schutz 2004). In this sense, he argues that, “*we, the actors on the social scene, experience the world we live in as world both of nature and culture, not as a private but as an intersubjective one ... (which) involves intercommunication and language*” (Schutz 2004).

³ “*suatu lapangan pertumbuhan pohon-pohon yang secara keseluruhan merupakan persekutuan hidup alam hayati beserta alam lingkungannya dan yang ditetapkan oleh pemerintah sebagai hutan*”

⁴ Cultivation system is “*forced cultivating of export crops by peasants for delivering at fixed prices and or against remission of land rent to the colonial government*” (Husken and White 1989: 238)

⁵ These 13 smaller forest authorities are Karesidenan Banten and Cianjur; Karesidenan Priangan, Kerawang, and Cirebon; Karesidenan Tegal and Pekalongan; Karesidenan Semarang; Karesidenan kedu, Bagelen and Banyumas; Karesidenan Jepara; Karesidenan Rembang and Blora; Karesidenan Rembang, Karesidenan Tuban and Karesidenan Bojonegoro; Karesidenan Surabaya, Madura and Pasuruan; Karesidenan Probolinggo, Besuki and Banyuwangi; Karesidenan Kediri; Karesidenan Madiun; and Kabupaten Ngawi and Karesidenan Surakarta (Simon, 1993).

⁶ The increasing number of pilgrims is often used by local government to claim success of development, a claim which has existed since in the colonial time (Majid 2008). Overall, these pilgrims indicated the emergence of Moslem elites. On the part of society itself, it does not only signify piety but also social

prestige. By understanding it in this way, it is not surprising that many people do whatever they can to become pilgrims, including taking out loans and selling their land.

⁷ As happened in many villages, these latter group's ownership of agricultural land is not limited to land within village borders. It is not uncommon if some landed people have rice fields in neighbouring villages.

⁸ It seems likely that easy access to high priced teak, and to nearby markets in Jepara, the economic crisis, and inflation as well as the low risk of being caught, encouraged villagers to join the crowd.

⁹ http://unit1-perumperhutani.com/teks/kelolaphbm_01.htm (accessed 1 November 2008)

¹⁰ Interview with Irak, a activist from Javlec (Java Learning Center), 4 November 2008. Apart from outside pressure, Nomura (2008) mentioned that the introduction of joint forest management was also driven by “reformist” employee within the enterprise itself.

¹¹ http://unit1-perumperhutani.com/teks/kelolaphbm_01.htm (accessed 1 November 2008)

¹² *Kompas*, nation-wide daily newspaper, reported that there were 70,000 hectares of deforested land in Central Java after the teak looting (*Kompas*, 7 December 2001).
<http://www2.kompas.com/kompas-cetak/0112/07/JATENG/hekt25.htm>

¹³ Perhutani Unit III West Java called these villagers who occupied state forest as “wild occupants” (*perambah liar*). UNIT III estimates that numbers of forest land under its authorities occupied by these villagers since 2004 reached 20,000 hectares. “Up to now, related authorities in charge of forest saving are

conducting various actions to free forest from looters. Slowly we succeed to free forest from looting. We ask community to be involved in the joint forest management (in order to free forest from looters)” (*“Hingga saat ini, instansi-instansi yang terkait dengan penyelamatan hutan sedang berusaha melakukan berbagai upaya untuk membebaskan hutan dari penguasaan para penjarah. Secara berangsur kami berhasil membebaskan hutan dari aksi penjarahan. Kami mengajak masyarakat untuk ikut serta dalam program pengelolaan hutan bersama masyarakat atau PHBM”*), says Head of Public Relations of Perhutani UNIT III.

http://www.perumperhutani.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=407&Itemid=2

14 Like landholder-landless peasants relations, relations between fishers and *juragan* also lead to social differences. For the context of social differences in Jepara's fishing communities, see Mubyarto (1984).

15 This is so because a company from neighboring village which recruits migrant labor employs a villager from Sekelor with a reward 1 million rupiahs per person recruited. According to Village Secretary, most of recruited are not being trafficked since their family know how they are doing. However, a local feminist activist said that women trafficking cases mostly happened in the subdistrict keling which Wonorejo belongs (interview with Hindun, 6 August 2008).

16 These goods can in fact be used as guarantees for asking loans from a *bank thitbil* (a small credit bank, usually with high interest) coming from Pati. Loan availability from this bank which can be done in a quick time avoid villagers to deal with big commercial banks or their rich fellow villagers.

17 Such a strong tone of agreement is not uncommon in an agreement between Perhutani and villagers. This is particularly the case in forest villages which build no advocacy and support from non-governmental organizations. Personal communication with Martua Sirait, a researcher from International

Council for Research in Agroforestry (ICRAF), 2 November 2008.

18 Diameter of those stands are 20 cm at average.

19 Apart from technical failure of the seeds to grow well, some local villagers believed that Perhutani's seeds (*bibit*) was killed by *pesanggem* to prevent it from being bigger (interview with Khudori, 8 August 2008).

20 This share is calculated based on wood price estimated by Perhutani, not by market price.

21 http://unit1-perumperhutani.com/teks/kelolaphbm_01.htm (accessed 1 November 2008).

22 He was comparing LMDH Wonorejo with LMDH in other villages, such as Cepogo, which succeeded to raise billions of rupiahs for their cooperatives. He blamed the weakness of leadership in LMDH Wonorejo as the cause of its failure (interview 4 November 2008)