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Dissecting the elements of collective action to pursue tenure security in Jakarta urban *kampung*: The case of Kampung Kunir

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Summary

The prevalence of eviction in informal settlement has been a significant housing issue in many growing cities, including *kampung* in Jakarta. Urban *kampung* suffered from lack of tenure due to complexity of land system in Indonesia over the years. This led to urban *kampung* becoming vulnerable to eviction under the pretext of urban development, for example, river normalisation. Whereas, living in *kampung* is important livelihood strategy for urban poor to survive in unaffordable city. Therefore, tenure security is a pressing issue for *kampung* dwellers. The struggle to improve tenure security has been carried out by urban poor networks in several urban *kampung*. It reached critical point when they managed to establish political contract with governor candidate, followed by formation of cooperative in each *kampung* for collective action.

This research aims to explain the significance and role of collective action through cooperative in influencing the structure of tenure security of urban *kampung*, using Kampung Kunir, Jakarta, as study case. This research applies qualitative approach to understand the meaning of relationship between the formation of cooperative, collective action, and tenure security in the context of post-evicted urban *kampung*. To enable triangulation, both primary and secondary data collection are used. Primary data was collected through semi-structured interviews with stakeholders, Focus Group Discussion with dwellers, and observation in Kampung Kunir. Meanwhile, secondary data was drawn from government website and stakeholders' archives.

The research finding suggests that collective action organised by cooperative contributes in changing, but not necessarily guaranteed, tenure security in urban *kampung*. The formation of cooperative facilitates the implementation of collective action that engages with socio-political structure. However, *kampung* dwellers' capability to govern themselves only led to cooperative involvement in the struggle concerning Kunir and did not result in their involvement in city-scale issue engagement of urban *kampung*. Collective action contributes to change de jure and de facto security, whereas perceived security is largely constructed by dwellers' awareness of de jure security. It might be suggested that urban poor who have experienced eviction and possess legal knowledge will ground their perceived security based on legal certainty. De jure security in Kampung Kunir is based on the agreement established between cooperative and the government, meanwhile, de facto security is still relying on external acknowledgement. Therefore, although strategies used in collective action succeeded in realising Kampung Kunir redevelopment and bringing some improvement to tenure security, the dwellers still have a long journey to achieve meaningful tenure security gain in the future.

Keywords

Urban *kampung*, eviction, collective action, tenure security, Kampung Kunir

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Foreword

Throughout the years, urban *kampung* had been marginalised in land and housing policy in Indonesia. Urban *kampung* often becoming subject of eviction due to its unclear status and its contestation with pressed need for urban development. Facing this problem, solutions offered by the government for *kampung* dwellers hardly addressed their livelihood needs. While new alternative has been asserted by *kampung* dwellers, NGOs, and urban activist; it's important for the government to actively seek better solution to secure housing right for all.

This thesis seeks to unpack how *kampung* dwellers, NGOs, and urban activist asserted housing right while simultaneously addressing tenure security in urban *kampung*. Through examination of their strategies, this thesis will identify what works to improve de jure, de facto, and perceived security in urban *kampung*.

Abbreviations

ASF-ID	Architecture Sans Frontières - Indonesia
ACHR	Asian Coalition of Housing Rights
BAL	UUPA 1960 / Basic Agrarian Law
CAP	Community Action Plan
DPRKP	<i>Dinas Perumahan dan Penataan Permukiman</i> / Public Housing and Settlement Areas Agency of DKI Jakarta
JERAMI	<i>Jejaring Rakyat Miskin</i>
JRMK	<i>Jaringan Rakyat Miskin Kota</i> / Urban Poor Network
K3PS	<i>Koperasi Konsumen Kunir Pinangasia Sejahtera</i> / Consumer Cooperative of Kampung Kunir
LOCOA	Leaders and Organizers of Community Organizations in Asia
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
ODCB	<i>Objek Diduga Cagar Budaya</i> / Suspected Cultural Objects
RT	<i>Rukun Tetangga</i> / Administrative Neighborhood Unit
SP3L	<i>Surat Persetujuan Penunjukan Penggunaan Lokasi atau Lahan</i> / Letter of Approval for Appointment of Site or Land Use Utilisation
TGUPP	<i>Tim Gubernur untuk Percepatan Pembangunan</i> / Governor's Delivery Unit
UPC	Urban Poor Consortium

Table of Contents

Summary.....	ii
Keywords.....	ii
Acknowledgements.....	iii
Foreword.....	iv
Abbreviations.....	iv
Table of Contents	v
List of Figures.....	vii
List of Tables.....	vii
Chapter 1: Introduction.....	1
1.1 Background	1
1.2 Problem Statement	1
1.3 Research Objectives	2
1.4 Research Questions	2
1.5 Social and Scientific Relevance	2
1.6 Scope and Limitations.....	3
1.7 Significance of The Study.....	3
Chapter 2: Literature Review	4
2.1 Understanding urban <i>kampung</i> in Jakarta.....	4
2.2 The concept of tenure security in Global South.....	6
2.3 Collective action in the struggle for land and housing.....	6
2.4 Cooperative for collective action	7
2.5 Framework of collective action.....	8
2.5.1 Context for collective action.....	9
2.5.2 Action arena in collective action.....	9
2.6 Socio-political networks in collective action	10
2.7 Conceptual Framework	11
Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology	13
3.1 Research Strategy.....	13
3.2 Research Methodology.....	13
3.3 Data Collection Method	13
3.4 Data Analysis Method.....	14
3.5 Operationalisation	15
3.6 Validity and Reliability	17
3.7 Expected Challenges and Limitations	17
Chapter 4: Results, Analysis and Discussion	18

4.1 Description of Kampung Kunir Case	18
4.2 The Formation of Cooperative	20
4.2.1 Socio-economic factors.....	20
4.2.2 Link to politicised movement	23
4.2.3 Capability to self-govern.....	25
4.3 Strategies of Collective Action	26
4.3.1 Strategy I-III: Interaction for resource to fulfil capacity	27
4.3.2 Strategy IV-VIII: Channeling to access, control, or contest policy process.....	28
4.3.3 Strategy IX: Issue engagement for tenure security in urban <i>kampung</i>	31
4.3.4 Strategy X: Socio-political practice to influence decision making.....	31
4.4 Current Structure of Tenure Security	31
4.4.1 De jure: agreement-based security.....	32
4.4.2 De facto.....	35
4.4.3 Perceived Security	36
Chapter 5: Conclusions.....	38
5.1 Conclusion.....	38
5.2 Recommendation.....	40
5.2.1 Practical recommendation.....	40
5.2.2 Recommendation for further research	40
Bibliography	42
Annex 1: Housing Pathway of Kunir Dwellers.....	46
Annex 2: Legal Documents of Kampung Kunir	47
Annex 3: Actor Analysis	48
Annex 4: Division of role and responsibility within coalition	49
Annex 5: Laws and Regulations Related to De Jure Security.....	50
Annex 6: Documentation of Observation.....	55
Annex 7: Research Instruments.....	57
Annex 8: Research Timeline.....	60
Annex 9: IHS copyright form.....	61

List of Figures

Figure 1: Urban kampung policy throughout the period in Jakarta	5
Figure 2: Ostrom's (2005) institutional analysis framework	8
Figure 3: Di Gregorio's et al. (2008) collective action framework	8
Figure 4: Conceptual Framework	11
Figure 5: Triangulation measure.....	13
Figure 6: Kampung Kunir Map	18
Figure 7: Layout of Kunir Vertical Kampung	19
Figure 8: Timeline of cooperative.....	20
Figure 9: Certificate of participation in Jakarta Green and Clean	22
Figure 10: Kampung Kunir coalition group (linkage to politicised movement).....	25
Figure 11: <i>Musyawah</i> in Kunir. Source: ASF-ID	25
Figure 12: Right to Use land is colored green, Kunir squared red	32
Figure 13: Kampung Kunir area, previously coded as P3	34
Figure 14: Kampung Kunir Area, now coded as R1	34
Figure 15: De facto area of Kunir as acknowledged by local community	36
Figure 17: Summary of the study	38

List of Tables

Table 1: Elaboration to the element of context	9
Table 2: Elaboration to the element of action arena.....	10
Table 3: List of resource and research participants	14
Table 4: Operationalisation table	15
Table 5: Findings on socio-economic factors.....	20
Table 6: Findings on linkage to politicised movement.....	23
Table 7: Findings on capability to self-govern	25
Table 8: Analysis on cooperative de jure security	33

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Background

Rapid urbanisation has been followed by informal settlement growth in many cities in the Global South (Smets, 2014). From 2014 to 2015, approximately 75% of the urban population lived in Global South, and 29% of them lived in slums (Smit, 2021; WRI, 2017). Including Jakarta, is now home to 11 million population and approximately 275.000 households, of which 42% of them are categorised as living in slums (CBS, 2019; World Bank, 2019). Although most slum is prevalent in informal settlement, in the Indonesian context, this slum category does not necessarily mean that the neighbourhood has no legal tenure.

The majority of informal settlement in Indonesia—locally coined as *kampung*—has unclear formal land title, including Jakarta. Due to the complexity of inheritance of the colonial system, *adat* (customary) law, and the Basic Agrarian Law (UUPA 1960), *kampung* dwellers may not have had an appropriate land tenure (Adianto et al., 2016; D’sa, 2023; Reerink&van Gelder, 2010). Unfortunately, this condition made *kampung* constantly vulnerable to eviction under the pretext of development, flood mitigation, regularisation, and beautification (Betteridge&Webber, 2019; D’Sa, 2023; Fikri&Herlily, 2021; Rizzo, 2018; Sholihah&Shaojun, 2018). For example, the development for hosting Asian Games in 1962; river normalisation between 2015-2017; and the National Capital Integrated Coastal Development (NCICD) project in 2015.

Therefore, for survival reasons, tenure security was a central issue for *kampung* dwellers (Payne, 2014). Urban poor who resides in the informal settlement was there for livelihood reason in the first place. They have no access to formal housing and land; their employment was located in the city centre and could not risk the money and time to travel from the periphery (Payne, 2014). Without some sense of tenure security, the urban poor would be hindered from building upon their livelihood in the city (Minnery et al., 2013). Bredenoord&vanLindert (2010) further emphasise that tenure security is an “all-important element of housing security”, which should be addressed in housing policy.

1.2 Problem Statement

For many years, slum alleviation has been a focus in Jakarta enacted by national and local government, however, none of them are actually addressing tenure security issues (Reerink&van Gelder, 2010; Werlin, 1999; Winarsih, 2021). Jakarta government had implemented different programs, notably Muhammad Husni Thamrin Project or Kampung Improvement Program (KIP), Kampung Deret Program (KDP), and most recently Community Action Plan (CAP) which launched in 2020 (D’Sa, 2023; Pangeran&Akbar, 2020; Sholihah&Shaojun, 2018). KIP was focused on providing basic infrastructure, KDP on physical house improvement, and CAP, although conceptually supposed to improve the community, it also had been criticised for being biased to physical planning aspect (Pangeran&Akbar, 2020). Government efforts on slum alleviation, unfortunately, did not defy the implementation of frequent forced eviction in every governorship period in Jakarta. Eviction has caused disruption to children’s education, loss of jobs, and often, the dwellers end up living in makeshift housing.

On the other hand, the struggle to improve tenure security has emerged from the community itself. During the heightened period of eviction from 2015 to 2017, several *kampung* under the patronage of Urban Poor Network (JRMK) established a political contract with governor candidate Anies Baswedan to keep their home safe (Sugandi, 2022; Pangeran&Akbar, 2020). Following up on this effort, residents in several *kampung* organised cooperatives with the idea

of collectively owning and managing their settlements. Today, there are 26 active cooperatives owned by both landed and vertical *kampung* under JRMK.

Drawing on several examples in the Global South, collective action had been deliberated by urban poor to defend housing rights (Obaitor et al., 2021; Porio, 2002). Yet, collective action in informal settlements in Jakarta—similar to other cities in Indonesia—had been emerging only under the threat of eviction, in the form of resistance without long-term strategies and clear goal. Through years of experience, Jakarta’s urban poor finally organised themselves at the city level and gained significant support to pursue tenure security over their settlements, beyond resistance. While the explanation on why collective action emerged and how the strategies materialised have been discussed in the literature, specific discussion on collective action for tenure security struggle was still limited in Indonesia context.

Kampung dwellers were finally able to secure their demand for land and/or housing provision from the government with the assistance of supporting networks. Although collective action by *kampung* dwellers in the form of cooperatives was established under the idea to improve tenure security, the realisation progress of tenure security itself was never examined. Thus, this research is focused to address the gap and link the conversation to the progression of tenure security in urban *kampung* in Jakarta.

1.3 Research Objectives

This research aims to explain the significance and role of collective action through cooperative in influencing the structure of tenure security of informal settlement, using the case of Kampung Kunir, Jakarta. As an explanatory research, this study will be guided by existing literature to draw causality relationship between variables (and sub-variables/indicators) in the context of Kampung Kunir. Mainly, this research borrows Di Gregorio’s et al. (2008) framework on the use of collective action to bring institutional change for urban poor. First, it explains the enabling factors of cooperative formation which become the dwellers’ platform for collective action. Second, this research will examine the intersection of collective action strategies employed by the cooperative and its engagement with socio-political networks in the tenure security struggle. Finally, the observation on tenure security condition of Kampung Kunir will be presented following van Gelder’s (2010) tripartite view.

1.4 Research Questions

Main Question:

Whether and how does the collective action organised by cooperatives influence tenure security in Jakarta’s urban *kampung*?

To answer the main question, these sub-questions are required to be answered:

1. What are the factors shaping the formation of cooperative for collective action by urban *kampung*?
2. What kind of collective action strategies are adopted by the cooperative and how do they engage with socio-political structure to achieve tenure security in urban *kampung*?
3. How is the current status of tenure security in urban *kampung*?

1.5 Social and Scientific Relevance

Literature has explored the use of collective action to defend housing rights in the Global South, however, it is still limited in Indonesia context. Most literature related to collective action for land and housing in Indonesia focused on the provision of basic infrastructure and urban poor resistance to eviction (Beard&Dasgupta, 2006; Betteridge&Webber, 2019; Fikri&Herlily,

2021; Rizzo, 2018; Winayanti&Lang, 2002). The case used in this research presented the transgression of eviction resistance to tenure security struggle, locking a meaningful change rather than status quo for *kampung* dwellers. In addition, most discussions of tenure security of informal settlements in Indonesia took the government's slum upgrading as study cases (Minnery et al. 2013; Werlin, 1999). Instead, this study took collective action by the community as a study case for tenure security, which its significance had been discussed in Global South literature but lacked in Indonesian context.

This study focused on the collective action using cooperative to improve tenure security in Jakarta's *kampung*. The use of cooperative for collectively owned and managed a settlement is a new concept in Indonesia. In this case, it stems out from urban poor struggle for tenure security in an unaffordable city where the poor have no access to formal land and housing. On the other hand, it intersects with government's lack of success in addressing tenure security issue within slum upgrading program. Hopefully, this research could generate relevant recommendations for slum upgrading program in Indonesia, especially Jakarta, to incorporate complementary effort in improving tenure security in urban *kampung*. In addition, deciphering the factors and strategies for collective action might be helpful for non-profit organisations to establish struggle for similar cases.

1.6 Scope and Limitations

The scope of this research is within the use of cooperative to perform collective action in pursuing tenure security in urban *kampung* in Jakarta, particularly in Kampung Kunir. Collective action in this study referring to grass-root movement that is upscaled to the city-level. Without undermining other dimensions of collective action, this study chooses to examine urban poor engagement with socio-political structure. This decision was made after observing the nature of the case which was initiated by establishing political contract. This research will not analyse collective action holistically, but instead focus on the indicators which relevant to tenure security attainment.

1.7 Significance of The Study

The result of this study will provide empirical evidence of relationship between the formation of cooperative, collective action, and tenure security. By understanding factors correlated to the formation of cooperative, this study will conclude to what extent those factors could lay foundation for performing collective action. Finally, examining the strategy and its achievement will conclude whether collective action is meaningful to change tenure security condition in urban *kampung*.

Chapter 2: Literature Review


2.1 Understanding urban *kampung* in Jakarta

Kampung in Indonesia, is commonly referred to informal settlement with mostly low-income residents. Meanwhile, present-day urban scholars give it meaning as urban settlement that retains rural characteristics. In Jakarta, urban *kampung* was formed through the perpetuation of development policy enforcement and socio-economic processes since Dutch occupation (Adianto et al., 2016; D'sa, 2023). As a consequence of Dutch-style urban planning and over-canalisation to protect their settlement, informal settlements were pushed away near to bay and rivers outside city border, leading its exposure to water disaster risk, including water-borne disease from stagnant flow of polluted water caused by waste disposal (D'sa, 2023). Due to this condition, *kampung* had been labelled as slum. Post-independence, Jakarta had undergone massive waves of in-migration which exacerbated *kampung* population as affordable housing solution for the poor (Adianto et al., 2016; D'sa, 2023; Supriatna, 2017; Reerink&VanGelder, 2010). Rapid growth of *kampung* had been driven by job opportunities which led to occupation of vacant or abandoned state land. On another side, massive urban development overshadowed older *kampung* by towering apartments and industrial complexes (Winarsih, 2021). These conditions made urban *kampung* portrayed by its poor infrastructure, informality, overcrowded, and unstandardised building (Rizzo, 2018; Savirani&Aspinall, 2017; Supriatna, 2017).

The formal-informal duality of settlement in Jakarta was an old phenomenon since colonial era (Zhu&Simarmata, 2015). Post-independence, there were *kampung* which finally receive land title and become formal settlement (Reerink&VanGelder, 2010). Some *kampung* dwellers received *girik*¹ after they claimed abandoned state land (*tanah garapan*), and even in the recent years, there were *kampung* dwellers who hold taxpayer letter (*Pajak Bumi dan Bangunan*) over their occupied land and building (Zhu&Simarmata, 2015). Reerink and van Gelder (2010) categorised legal tenure in those cases as semi-formal, unfortunately, such dwellers often unable to prove their title (Supriatna, 2017). Nevertheless, majority of *kampung* are exist without proof of ownership. Following its unregulated condition and lack of title, urban *kampung* commonly had low legal standing, which become common reason for eviction. Various policy had been implemented to respond the existence of *kampung* in Jakarta, from on-site improvement to eviction under different reasons, which illustrated in Figure 1.

However, some *kampung* did enjoy control over land and housing after many years of occupation. On post-independence years, urban managers were reluctant to handle land dispute, resulting in laissez-faire behaviour which translated as approval by *kampung* dwellers (Winarsih, 2021). For the dwellers, urban *kampung* represented their livelihood, both in tangible and intangible meanings which had been disregarded by planning policy for a long time (Winarsih, 2021). Its role in supporting formal sector's working class through the provision of affordable rental housing, food stalls, and other informal economic activities had been widely recognised (USF, 2020). Hence after long period, the embeddedness of *kampung* existence into Jakarta's urban fabric is inevitable.

¹ Proof of land taxpayer during colonial era



Source: D'sa, 2023

Figure 1: Urban kampung policy throughout the period in Jakarta

2.2 The concept of tenure security in Global South

The duality of formal-informal settlement is not only prevalent to Indonesia, but also Global South in general. In the Global South context, where informal settlements made up significant housing stock in the city, paradigm for tenure security tended to recognise different aspects of tenure situation; rather than straightly drew a line between formal land tenure and those which are not (van Gelder, 2010). Moreover, literature also pointed out that tenure security does not only depend on legal rights, but also on societal context (Mukoko, 1996; Nakamura, 2017; Reerink & van Gelder, 2010; Robinson & Diop, 2022; Payne, 2014; van Gelder, 2010; Zhang, 2022).

Even so, scholars have diverging alternative views on how to avoid the dichotomy (van Gelder, 2010). Some scholars addressed de jure and de facto in a continuum, revealing the degree of formality and informality (Supriatna, 2017; van Gelder, 2010). Others viewed tenure security from a hierarchical perspective, where claims to land is “stacked” through formal/informal norms and rules (van Gelder, 2010). For example, dwellers gradually improved their settlements to ground de facto security and then finally obtained legal tenure (e.g Kiddle, 2010; Winayanti & Lang, 2002). Meanwhile, legal pluralists believe formal & informal are governed by different systems (van Gelder, 2010), for instance under very weak states or case presented in customary land (Robinson&Diop, 2022). Nevertheless, all perspectives on tenure security had similarity on conceptualisation that tenure security refers to the risk of eviction (van Gelder, 2010).

Van Gelder’s (2010) tripartite view attempted to hold de jure, de facto, and perceived tenure security in composite, avoiding indiscriminate use of each component which confuses the discussion or even program measure on tenure security. He argued that tenure security can’t be measured, only the component can; and without three of them, tenure security would be incomplete. De jure means legal tenure provided by the formal system. De facto refers to the tenure system recognised by the community (how things work) and the factual circumstance of who has control of property (Robinson&Diop, 2022; van Gelder, 2010). Lastly, perceived security in urban informality is related to the perception of eviction probability or losing housing/lands.

However, it should be acknowledged that tenure security is incomplete without legal tenure. In Indonesia, Basic Agrarian Law regulated that the state had the control over land for public interest, which become the most common reason of government eviction. Under the same law, *kampung* dwellers its interpretation as reference to defend their right: a person who physically controls land for a period of 20 years continuously is allowed to own it. However, *kampung* dwellers usually did not register, due to difficult circumstance or unknowledgeable, which become the subject of eviction under the Act of Abandoned Land².

2.3 Collective action in the struggle for land and housing

For many years, collective action had been used in land and housing struggle in the Global South. Among discussions on collective action, urban scholars defined collective action as action taken by a group with common interest for demanding or providing collective goods (Baldassarri, 2011; Mwangi&Merkelova, 2009; Meinzen-Dick&Di Gregorio, 2004). In many growing cities, land and housing struggle had gone beyond the defensive position of anti-eviction to the struggle for secure tenure to end the fear of eviction (Mitlin, 2006). In Manila, land and housing struggle focused on mitigating the impact of privatisation which heavily depended on NGOs/CBOs as representatives for urban poor communities to negotiate with

² Government Regulation No. 20 of 2021

local government (Porio, 2002). In Bangalore, urban poor's collective action was aimed to gain recognition over their occupied land, which in majority lead to individual land rights (Simonneau et al., 2019). In Rio de Janeiro, urban poor settled on abandoned land and collectively claim indivisible right, making use of City Statutes that enable them to own occupied land after certain period without conflict (Simonneau et al., 2019). Even though they able to gain de facto security, this kind of provision was rarely implemented on the ground (*de jure*). In those cases, collective action for land and housing put specific objective rather than broad demands such as "siding with the poor", which then allowed them possible range of concrete gains, such as social housing and property rights.

Land and housing collective action also occurred in Indonesian's urban *kampung* both through open and less-defiance political action. Different forms of open political action were ranging from rallies, protest voting, boycotts, and rebellions (Rizzo, 2018). Legal action also used in the case of Bukit Duri, which the dwellers won the lawsuit after relied on NGO's legal aid and advocacy (Fikri&Herlily, 2021). On another hand, Scott (1985) called less-defiance political action as "everyday forms of resistance", which he considered as the most vital means of political interest manifestation by the poor. These forms of collective action happened a lot both in *kampung* under threat of eviction, such as Bidaracina. Meanwhile, collective action post-eviction found in *kampung* that connected to networks under the believe on probability to reclaim their land such as Kampung Aquarium (Fikri&Herlily, 2021; Rizzo, 2018). Under eviction threat, the dwellers continued to build their settlement incrementally. They returned to debris and ruins of their home, practically lived there and improved their situation. Nevertheless, both open and less-defiance actions are pursuing tenure security, the first one is seeking de jure (recognition of those gains) and the latter seeking de facto (tacit control over property).

2.4 Cooperative for collective action

Urban poor commonly used organisation to involve in the formal process while demanding their rights as a group. This included the use of cooperative to organise collective action in the urban slum (Birchall, 2003; Ganapati, 2010). For a long time, cooperative had been a vehicle for the poor to help each other in dealing with free-market force (Merret&Walzer, 2004). The idea of cooperative itself rooted from voluntary association and business enterprise, which translates to an enterprise owned by its members. International Cooperative Alliance (1995) defines cooperative as an enterprise used to meet common economic, social, and cultural needs. However, Bijman (2016) criticised that modern day cooperative tend to limit itself to economic function, while traditional farmers' cooperative was originally used for collective action and had various social, political, and economic function. Collective action in land and housing struggles pose a dual-challenge that is meeting immediate material needs to maintain mass base alongside political strategies (Mitlin, 2006). Therefore, the use of cooperative allows dwellers to have the means for sustaining collective action, including to provide fund for movement.

In Indonesia, cooperative is the representative of *ekonomi kerakyatan*, an economic system based on people's power (Law No. 25 of 1992 on Cooperative). The regulation³ recognised five types of cooperatives: consumer cooperative; producer cooperative; service cooperative; marketing cooperative; and savings and loan cooperative. Up to 2017, there was zero example of land and housing struggle using cooperative in Indonesia under different form of cooperative mentioned above.

³ Ministerial Regulation No. 9 of 2018 on Implementation and Guidance of Cooperatives

2.5 Framework of collective action

There were two main perspectives that useful to understand how collective action works, the first one is Olson’s (1965) rational-choice paradigm and Ostrom’s (1990) interdependent situation. Olson (1965) argued that individuals in a group act rationally according to personal merit, meanwhile, Ostrom (1990) contended for second paradigm that individuals who are in an interdependent situation can organise and govern themselves (Beard, 2019).

Built upon Ostrom’s (2005) institutional analysis framework, Di Gregorio et al. (2008) proposed a framework to examine how collective action could contributes to a certain change, using the case of poverty reduction. Rather than material gain, they examine whether collective action bring institutional change for the outcome. The framework was divided into “context” section, “action arena” section, and outcome.




Figure 2: Ostrom’s (2005) institutional analysis framework




Figure 3: Di Gregorio’s et al. (2008) collective action framework

Scholars had been crossed different concepts to explain collective action according to their intention to focus on specific aspects (Mwangi&Merkelova, 2009). Likewise, there were various studies that useful to elaborate the elements in Di Gregorio’s et al. (2008) framework which are relevant to grass-root community collective action, as presented through table in each sub-section.

2.5.1 Context for collective action

“Context” represented the socio-economic and political condition shaping the opportunity for possible actions (Di Gregorio et al., 2008). It answers why collective action happened at the first place, what happened to the community, and what influences them to perform collective action. Numbers of literature that align with the concept of context is presented below:

Table 1: Elaboration to the element of context

Element	Di Gregorio’s et al. (2008)	Other scholars
Context	Context includes the condition of asset, risk and shocks, and legal/political structure.	Under the perception of an interdependent future and shared interest for structural change, community manifests the potential for social transformation (Beard&Dasgupta, 2006).
		Social movement is defined as a form of collective action that emerges in a particular historical and political context. Therefore, literature on social movement was used to explain internal as well as external political factors in collective action, including the significance of political opportunities in the emergence of community-scale collective action (Beard&Dasgupta, 2006; Beard, 2019).
		Coalitions with other movement groups, NGOs, and professional support organisations will enhance the existing political opportunities in social movements, and might improve it as well (Mitlin, 2023).
		Collective action might happen if individuals can have agency to create their own agreements, institutions, and system of management (Ostrom, 1990).

Source: Author, 2023 (adapted from literature)

Drawing from other scholars, capability and identity of the group (Beard&Dasgupta, 2006; Ostrom, 1990) and political opportunities (Beard&Dasgupta, 2006; Beard, 2019; Mitlin, 2023) also played important role for the decision to perform collective action.

2.5.2 Action arena in collective action

In contrast from context that had static set of elements, elements in action arena are dynamic. “Action arena” illustrated how different actors make use of situation to change the initial condition of certain service/goods (Di Gregorio et al., 2008). Situation itself was shaped by resource owned by actors, therefore, actors had different position, limits, and opportunities in each situation.

Table 2: Elaboration to the element of action arena

Element	Di Gregorio's et al. (2008)	Other scholars
Action arena	Action arena consisted of series of interaction where each actor employed strategies to each other. They exchange resources, devise new rules, and demand action from other parties.	Claims and demands put forth during interaction sparked episodes of contention and settlement (Beard&Dasgupta, 2006; Fligstein&McAdam, 2011).
		Collective action happened when members pool resources; creating channels by which the poor (or their representative) can access, control, or contest policy processes; engage in political discourses; and identify social and political practices of the poor that can influence decision-making, agendas, policy, and programme implementation (Webster and Engberg-Pedersen, 2002).

Source: Author, 2023 (adapted from literature)

From literature above, it could be concluded that the concept of resource is crucial in collective action, particularly in the examination of its strategies. First, community required access to resource to achieve their goal, which also determines its capacity in performing collective action (Di Gregorio et al., 2008). It is vital for the success and sustainability of collective action. When a group did not have direct access to action resource, they had to access it from other actor by developing positive partnership. Secondly, we should acknowledge that demand of urban poor to the government and private sector is underpinned by the need for resource distribution (Porio, 2002). It means that movement strategies are inseparable from which government actor hold control to the disputed resource. Therefore, critical actors are determined from those who hold important resource to perform collective action and who owns the resources over what they work for (Di Gregorio et al., 2008; Porio, 2002).

2.6 Socio-political networks in collective action

Urban poor had been employed different strategies in collective action, one of them was social movement strategies, means that they engage in politicised mass action (Mitlin, 2006). Urban poor generally engages with socio-political system through a specific objective, and one of most common issue is related to shelter which concerned with dispossession, denial, protection and extension of assets. It should be recognised that land struggle had linkage with political process of electoral success and the commercial process of capital accumulation. Therefore, other than to catalyse their influence over the government, scale of collective action is critical to influence political response of those actors in urban scape.

To achieve a massive scale, urban poor required movement organisations and support organisation to engage in the formal system (Mitlin, 2006). Supporting networks would help urban poor to create and continuously asserted a political space which enable them to negotiate their claim for land and housing from government (Porio, 2002). For urban social movements or other grassroots organisation who lack relations with elite group, they were commonly helped by professional support organisations to build ties and navigate formal state-led process (Gaventa&McGee, 2010).

Further, frequent interactions between urban poor along it supporting networks and the government would form a pattern which constitute the position taken by the government and

coalition group (Mitlin, 2006; Savirani&Aspinall, 2017). Mitlin (2006) classify most common range of possible pattern into: bureaucratic, clientelist, authoritarian, participatory democratic, and co-production. Many collective actions for land and housing in Global South was trapped in clientelist position, in which the government offered personalised benefit to people in group (Mitlin, 2006; Porio, 2002). Other than weakening coalition, clientelist pattern exposed the risk of sustaining traditional line of patronage between urban poor and its supporting organisation (Porio, 2002).

On another side, it is also possible to establish a more programmatic co-production connection. In this case, the coalition group negotiate a specific agenda, while the government support the proposed program group and seek collaborative approach to deliver the program. However, such connection was less likely to happen without support from capable and sympathetic political leadership in the city government (Mitlin, 2023). Through coalition, disadvantaged group experiences at least three processes that represent change in political opportunities: (1) Face-to-face dialogue and deepening engagement built the confidence of group members that it is possible to challenge the system; (2) presented new knowledge and evidence by grassroots group and validated by academics and professional members which contributes in changing individual perception among government officials and establish new approaches; and (3) asserting programmatic solution allowed movement group to protect their autonomy, means that aside from collaborative process, group members stand a chance to oppose the government.

2.7 Conceptual Framework




Figure 4: Conceptual Framework

Source: Author, 2023 (adapted from literature)

Conceptual framework used in this study is adapted from Di Gregorio's et al. (2008) framework. "Context" reinterpreted as "the formation of cooperative" which act as independent variable, since in this case, collective action aiming for institutional change in tenure security was done by forming cooperative. Drawing from Di Gregorio's et al. (2008) elements of context and literature in community collective action, particularly in urban case⁴, this study categorise the factors shaping cooperative into: (1) socio-economic factors; (2) link to politicised movement; and (3) capability of community to govern themselves. "Action arena"

⁴ See Table 1

redefined as “collective action”, to capture it as mediating variable which hold “actors” and “the situation they make use of” as composite. Elaborated from mostly literature in social movement⁵, this study identifies element of collective action as follows: (1) interaction for resource; (2) channeling to access, control, or contest policy process; (3) issue engagement; and (4) socio-political practice to influence decision making. Finally, “outcome” is represented by “change in tenure security”, which is the dependent variable. This study borrows van Gelder’s (2010) tripartite view which consisted of (1) de jure; (2) de facto; and (3) perceived security.

⁵ See Sub-section 2.5.2 and Section 2.6

Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology

3.1 Research Strategy

This research will employ case study to explain the occurrence of collective action through cooperatives, how it is used to pursue tenure security of urban *kampung*, and the condition of tenure security in urban *kampung*. The case study will be using Kampung Kunir, a vertical *kampung* that had been rebuilt in 2022, after being demolished in 2015 due to river normalisation. Kampung Kunir is one of the two *kampung* where the dwellers were previously evicted, and able to obtain new housing in the same area. Both are part of JRMK/UPC network. Considering feasibility, this study takes single-case, and Kunir was selected since it is a newer case, under assumption it's allowing more candid answers from the dwellers compared to other *kampung* which already heavily visited by researchers and to capture more refined strategies.

Adopting case study will allow in-depth exploration from multiple perspective in specific socio-political context (Simons, 2020). This socio-political context will be referring to land and housing struggle in Jakarta throughout the years, which might not be exclusive to Kunir case. Furthermore, using case study is useful to engage people involved in the case to provide rich portrayal of singular unit, particularly in experiential, practical, and presentational way (MacDonald, 1977; Heren, 1992 in Leavy, 2020). Thus, the strength of this study is the positioning of research participants as the one who generate the knowledge of the case.

3.2 Research Methodology

Due to its focus on the behavioral and perspective of research subject, this research uses qualitative technique to understand the meaning behind those in particular context. Qualitative method is commonly used in case study, as it generates large body of qualitative data aiming for depth rather than breadth of unique case (van Thiel, 2014). This study offers underlying process from one variable to another and mechanism that contributes to the phenomena under study.

The use of qualitative case study calls for data triangulation because of data subjectivity and its narrow sample (van Thiel, 2014). Triangulation means using multiple method or resource of data to reach conclusion (Brymann, 2012). This way, researcher is able to cross-check the findings which later contribute to reliability and validity of the research.

3.3 Data Collection Method




Figure 5: Triangulation measure

Source: Author, 2023

Data collection method for this study will both adopt primary and secondary data collection to enable data triangulation (Figure 5). Primary data collection comprises of semi-structured interviews, Focus Group Discussion (FGD), and observations; meanwhile secondary data in the form of documents, recordings, and media publication will complement the findings. Semi-structured interviews are used for all research participants and to collect majority of data. This method might be the most optimal way to collecting an optimal amount of information while maintaining ground to indicators (Brinkmann, 2020; van Thiel, 2014). The interview participants from each organisation are selected after receiving recommendation by each leadership on who hold responsibility of organisation’s involvement in Kunir case. This study prioritises to look at organisation involvement as one entity rather than to capture dynamic within organisation, therefore one representative is deemed sufficient. FGD is used to collect data from *kampung* dwellers, mainly for information that required collective consistency. Kamberelis and Dimitriadis (2020) added that FGD allows memory synergy among participants, which is useful to figure out collective experience. Observations used to confirm and add depths to socio-economic condition, relationship between actors and among *kampung* dwellers in real-life situation. Secondary data requested from participants and accessed through official government website were used to complement primary findings and “concrete evidence” of events. Data collection was done through one and half-months of fieldwork, including 10 days live-in. The table below presents the list of resources and participants of research.

Table 3: List of resource and research participants

Method	Resource	Frequency	Code
Interview	Cooperative representatives	1 person	S1
	Urban Poor Network (JRMK) representative	1 person	S2
	Urban Poor Consortium (UPC) representative	1 person	S3
	Architecture Sans Frontieres (ASF-ID) representative	1 person	S4
	Sejajar Movement representative	1 person	S5
	Representative of DKI Jakarta Provincial Public Housing and Settlement Areas (DPRKP)	1 person	S6
	Representative of Governor's Delivery Unit (TGUPP)	1 person	S7
	Researcher using Kampung Kunir as case study	1 person	R
FGD	Kampung dwellers	10 people	D1 - D10
Observation	Kampung Kunir	10 days	-
Document	Agreements	3 documents	-
	Law and Regulation	11 documents	-
	Statutes and Bylaws	1 document	-
	Study and Recommendation	5 documents	-

Source: Author, 2023

3.4 Data Analysis Method

Qualitative data from interviews, FGD, observation, and documents were analysed to answer all research questions. Data from interview and FGD was recorded and transcribed. Researcher had been keeping research journal to record observations and any kind of information during the live-in period. Including secondary data, each information will be assigned according to operationalisation table, however, indicators in the operationalisation were done in iterative manner throughout the research process as referred to van Thiel (2014). The relationship between variable/sub-variable is examined through the co-occurrence between indicators.

3.5 Operationalisation

Table 4: Operationalisation table

Variable	Definition	Sub-RQ	Sub-variable	Indicators	Type of Data	Method
Cooperative	An autonomous association of people united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly owned and democratically- controlled enterprise (ICA, 1995)	What are the factors shaping the formation of cooperative for collective action by urban kampung?	socio-economic factors	Control, access, and ownership condition over individual and collective asset (Di Gregorio et al., 2008)	Qualitative	FGD
				Perceived risk to community existence (Di Gregorio et al., 2008)	Qualitative	FGD
				Perception of interdependent future and shared desire for structural change (Beard & Dasgupta, 2006)	Qualitative	FGD
			link to politicised movement	Links to support organisations (Mitlin, 2023)	Qualitative	FGD, Interview
				Links between similar group (Mitlin, 2023)	Qualitative	FGD, Interview
				Political opportunity (Beard & Dasgupta, 2006)	Qualitative	FGD, Interview
			capability to govern themselves	Norms used in community to organise/govern themselves (Ostrom, 2011)	Qualitative	FGD, Interview
				Establishment of organisation structure and membership criteria of the cooperative (Birchall, 2003; Pandolfelli et al., 2007)	Qualitative	FGD, Interview
				Establishment of statutes and bylaws (Pandolfelli et al., 2007)	Qualitative	FGD, Interview, Data retrieving
Collective action	Action taken by a group with common interest for demanding or providing collective goods (Baldassarri, 2011; Marshall, 1998; Meinen-Dick & Di Gregorio, 2004)	What kind of collective action strategies are adopted by cooperative and how do they engage with socio-political structure to achieve tenure security in urban kampung?	interaction for resource	Acquired multi-source funding, labor, and knowledge (Di Gregorio et al., 2008; Pandolfelli et al., 2007)	Qualitative	FGD, Interview
				Shared responsibility between actors to manage resources and providing services (Mitlin, 2006; Pandolfelli et al., 2007)	Qualitative	FGD, Interview
			channeling to access, control, or contest policy process	Published verbal and non-verbal demand regarding tenure security in urban kampung (Webster & Engberg-Pedersen, 2002 in Mwangi & Merkelova, 2009)	Qualitative	Interview, Data retrieving
				Documented negotiation (Webster & Engberg-Pedersen, 2002 in Mwangi & Merkelova, 2009)	Qualitative	Interview, Data retrieving
				Established agreement (Webster & Engberg-Pedersen, 2002 in Mwangi & Merkelova, 2009)	Qualitative	Interview, Data retrieving
				Established meeting and discussion (Webster & Engberg-Pedersen, 2002 in Mwangi & Merkelova, 2009)	Qualitative	Interview, Data retrieving

Variable	Definition	Sub-RQ	Sub-variable	Indicators	Type of Data	Method
			issue engagement	Media publication (Chan, 2017)	Qualitative	Interview, Data retrieving
				Published event and discussion related to urban <i>kampung</i> discourse (Webster & Engberg-Pedersen, 2002 in Mwangi & Merkelova, 2009)	Qualitative	Interview, Data retrieving
			socio-political practice to influence decision making	Identified socio-political roadmap related to tenure security in urban <i>kampung</i> (Webster & Engberg-Pedersen, 2002 in Mwangi & Merkelova, 2009)	Qualitative	Interview, Data retrieving
				Aligned plan to socio-political networks (Webster & Engberg-Pedersen, 2002 in Mwangi & Merkelova, 2009)	Qualitative	Interview, Data retrieving
Tenure Security	The security of tenure refers to how confident a property holder is that their property rights will be upheld by and within their community (Sjaastad & Bromley, 2000 as cited in Robinson & Diop, 2022)	How is the current status of tenure security in urban <i>kampung</i> ?	de jure security	Individual legal status over property (Reerink & van Gelder, 2010; van Gelder, 2010)	Qualitative	FGD, Interview, Data retrieving
				Cooperative legal status over property (Reerink & van Gelder, 2010; van Gelder, 2010)	Qualitative	FGD, Interview, Data retrieving
			de facto security	Length of occupation (van Gelder, 2010)	Qualitative	FGD, Interview
				Size of settlements (van Gelder, 2010)	Qualitative	FGD, Interview
				Cohesion level of community (van Gelder, 2010)	Qualitative	FGD, Interview, Observation
				Support from external institutions to the existence of <i>kampung</i> and cooperative (van Gelder, 2010)	Qualitative	FGD, Interview, Data retrieving
			perceived security	Political acceptance to the existence of <i>kampung</i> and cooperative (van Gelder, 2010)	Qualitative	FGD, Interview, Data retrieving
				Individual experience of tenure situation (van Gelder, 2010)	Qualitative	FGD, Interview
				Perception of the probability to lose the asset (van Gelder, 2010)	Qualitative	FGD, Interview

Source: Author, 2023 (adapted from literature)

3.6 Validity and Reliability

The validity and reliability addressed in this research is contextual to its nature as qualitative study. Guba and Lincoln (1994, in Brymann, 2012) proposed alternative to validity in qualitative research: credibility and transferability. Credibility is parallel to internal validity, which refer to whether we really measure what we intended to. This study seeks credibility through triangulation (of diversified method), ensuring the accuracy and truthfulness of the research findings. External validity in case study is tend to be limited because it is difficult to generalise findings (van Thiel, 2014). Using transferability as external validity measure means that the database of research could be used to make judgement whether findings is applicable to other cases, and under what context it would be relevant. Transferability is pursued in this study by keeping research log and provide clear analysis tools. By doing so, the research would be found as replicable and enhance its reliability (Yin, 2009).

3.7 Expected Challenges and Limitations

Conducting this qualitative case study is an intensive process. Delving into community is time-consuming and required mental preparedness when it is done by one person. Even though the study works with small number of samples and participants, the researcher should engage with deep conversations and made decision on how to lead conversation that resulting meaningful data for the study. After frequent interactions, it was growing challenging to keep objective standpoint. Also, there was a risk of subjectivity in the interpretation of observation of interaction and situation in *kampung*.

The shortcoming of case study remains on the subjectivity and limitation of drawing inferences. Means that generalisation of the findings is less possible. Drawing conclusion to causality for broad scientific knowledge also difficult due to small numbers of sample (van Thiel, 2014). This study was highly contextual, any inference should consider number of contexts, such as: small community, affected by eviction, engaged to socio-political networks, polarisation in political space, and other contexts deemed relevant.

Chapter 4: Results, Analysis and Discussion

4.1 Description of Kampung Kunir Case

Kampung Kunir is located at Kemukus Road in Pinangsia District-West Jakarta, a part of Jakarta’s Old Town area. Before the eviction, Kunir is a bustling neighbourhood along a tributary of Ciliwung River which situated within radius of 2 kilometers from the Old Sunda Kelapa Harbour. By 2015 when the eviction happened, Kunir has been around for 36 years. Along those years, Kunir was growing in size due to its economic opportunities from its strategic location. After the eviction, however, the numbers of family were dropped from 77 to 33 who currently living in the new vertical kampung, as informed by cooperative representative.




Figure 6: Kampung Kunir Map


In 2015, the government of Jakarta commenced the river normalisation project, in which Kunir was affected (Sugandi, 2022). The initial plan was to construct a 14 meters wide inspection road along the river, which the whole settlement was included within. From FGD, Kunir dwellers mentioned that they received the first warning letter for eviction in January 2015. The dwellers managed to file request to postpone the eviction for three months until the children finished their current grade in school. Even though the dwellers consistently requesting more time, the eviction was unavoidable in May 2015. As compensation, the government offered rental public housing (*Rusunawa*) in Marunda, around 24 kilometers from Kunir, and took 2 hours to commute. There were people who accepts the deal, but some families insisted to stay.

Afterwards, Urban Poor Network (JRMK), Urban Poor Consortium (UPC), Architecture Sans Frontières - Indonesia (ASF-ID) and their supporting networks were stepping in to help 33 families who resist the eviction. As concluded from their interview results, they support the dwellers to understand their rights and the situation, negotiation, and plan their new settlement.

In 2017, JRMK (including Kampung Kunir as a member) signed a political contract with governor candidate, Anies Baswedan, to secure their settlement and the candidate eventually won the election (Sugandi, 2022). Following up the contract, the Governor was able to impose redevelopment plan of Kunir in Jakarta’s housing program. Socio-political networks and political opportunities have been playing significant role to enable the dwellers and influence the decision making. Amidst the challenges, the new vertical *kampung* was built in 2022 after seven and half years of struggle.

Within those years, the dwellers were setting up a cooperative under the idea to manage and own their settlement, therefore minimise the probability of losing the kampung. Through cumbersome negotiation still ongoing, the new Kampung Kunir is currently managed by the cooperative. Since it was unprecedented, the use of cooperative also entails challenges for both government and the dwellers. On government side, DPRKP mentioned that the bureaucracy and streamlining legal matters would take a long process; meanwhile, on the dwellers side, cooperative and UPC representative admitted that they should ready to generate sufficient income for cooperative to manage the settlement as consequence.

In 2022, Kampung Kunir was built on 860 m² land owned by the government of Jakarta for 33 families who were persisted to live in Kunir after the eviction. The 33 units is divided into four split levels, and the unit came in two types which both are 36 m² in size.



Source: Observation, 2023

Figure 7: Layout of Kunir Vertical Kampung

4.2 The Formation of Cooperative




Figure 8: Timeline of cooperative

Before the existing cooperative, Kampung Kunir had been owned a cooperative under different forms. Looking at the figure above, the first form of cooperative that existed right after the eviction is a savings and credit cooperative to support the dwellers financially. Then, it was reformed to consumer cooperative in 2017 after the political contract. According to the dwellers and cooperative, the reformation was carried out after receiving explanation from UPC/JRMK about the importance of cooperative in their action plan.

“Our supporting networks explained why we should have a cooperative. They said, if in the future we want to manage the kampung by ourselves, then there must be a cooperative. They also suggested that cooperative will act on behalf the dwellers to deal with the government because that will put us on equal footing.”

(FGD, May 2023)

As indicated from dwellers statement, the formation of cooperative was inseparable from their intention to perform collective action for securing their rights in the future. The following subsection will explain what kind of situation the dwellers were in, which encourage the emergence of cooperative for collective action.

4.2.1 Socio-economic factors


Socio-economic factors illustrate the initial condition of Kunir dwellers which influence their decision to perform collective action. It concerns their asset condition, perceived risk of losing community, and what kind of ideals they desired after experiencing eviction.

Table 5: Findings on socio-economic factors

Indicators	Findings
Control, access, and ownership condition over	Similar with any other <i>kampung</i> in urban area, the distinction of the old Kampung Kunir, whether it could be concluded as formal or informal settlement was unclear. In 1979, a group of security watch settled along with their family on state land ⁶ and gradually, each family

⁶ State Land is land that is not attached with any land rights, not Waqf Land, not Customary Land and/or is not an asset of national government and local government (Government Regulation No. 18 of 2021)

Indicators	Findings
individual and collective asset	<p>divided their land into plots and sold them off to workers around the area. In the old Kunir, the dwellers had enjoyed the control over land and its natural resource, hold certain ownership proof, and access to social service.</p> <p><i>“We had additional income from renting out our house before”</i> (D7, May 2023)</p> <p><i>“We paid the land and building tax, although it was subsidised.”</i> (FGD, May 2023)</p> <p>When the eviction befell upon Kunir in 2015, they had to live in precarious condition from losing the house as physical asset.</p> <p><i>“We were practically homeless. We stay in front of shophouses at first.”</i> (D6&D8, May 2023)</p> <p>Eviction and their struggle then cost their time and effort to focus on how to secure their housing, therefore, the dwellers’ become less frequent to attend their job, and left with no option other than to left.</p> <p><i>“My husband almost got kicked out from work because he took too many leaves”</i> (D2, May 2023)</p> <p><i>“My boss gave a warning, but I said to him that I lost my house and I had to fight. I could find another work but finding house was almost impossible, it’s expensive. I got dismissed and only received fifty thousand rupiahs as severance pay.”</i> (D1, May 2023)</p> <p><i>“I had a lot of debt to cover everyday expense and legal advice”</i> (D6, May 2023)</p> <p>Also, their rights to social service were denied because they loss their legal documents in the eviction, and further, had no access to renew it after their addresses were abolished.</p> <p><i>“My son got dengue fever right after the eviction. I didn’t have health insurance (government social service) anymore. We couldn’t pay the hospital expense in full amount, but somehow JRMK helped us to negotiate with the hospital.”</i> (D6, May 2023)</p> <p><i>“Our RT (neighbourhood unit) was erased after the eviction and we had to re-register everything after we live in shelter later on.”</i> (D7, May 2023)</p>
Perceived risk to community existence	<p>In general, the dwellers had realised that Kunir was a potential subject to eviction due to its proximity to the river.</p>

Indicators	Findings
	<p><i>“During the 2012 election, we aware that if candidate number three wins, it would be difficult for us. His vision is to make Jakarta clean, therefore kampung along the riverbanks would be demolished. The program was enacted right after he won. His successor in 2015 was the former vice governor, therefore the program continued and eventually Kunir was evicted.”</i></p> <p style="text-align: right;">(D1, May 2023)</p> <p>However, as the dwellers had enjoyed de facto security over the years, they believe that Kunir was adequately safe from eviction. The fact that Kunir owns neighbourhood administrative unit (<i>Rukun Tetangga-RT</i>), means it formally recognised by the state. They also argued that Kunir was not a slum, because their kampung was neat and clean.</p> <p><i>“We have our own RT before, and Kunir were once chosen to represent the neighborhood for Jakarta Green and Clean”</i></p> <p style="text-align: right;">(FGD, May 2023)</p> <div style="text-align: center;">  </div> <p style="text-align: center;">Figure 9: Certificate of participation in Jakarta Green and Clean</p>
<p>Perception of interdependent future and shared desire for structural change</p>	<p>The dwellers stated numerous times that they want to stay in Kunir under layered reasons, and made effort to avoid the eviction. They desired to reclaim their <i>kampung</i> because they grew up there and believe that they have the rights to do so according to the Basic Agrarian Law.</p> <p><i>“We’ve lived here since we were kids until we have kids. We want to stay”</i></p> <p style="text-align: right;">(D4, May 2023)</p> <p><i>“Our settlement were 4-5 meters away from the riverbank. We offered to cut our house as long as we could stay here. We even measured and drew the line where we should cut the house. However, we were already evicted before the negotiation finished.”</i></p> <p style="text-align: right;">(D1, May 2023)</p> <p><i>“We learned that after 20 years we could claim our right over abandoned land”⁷</i></p> <p style="text-align: right;">(D3, May 2023)</p> <p><i>“This is impossible to achieve unless we do it together”</i></p> <p style="text-align: right;">(D6, May 2023)</p>

⁷ This was interpreted from Basic Agrarian Law

There were complex socio-economic factors behind the dwellers' decision to perform collective action. When eviction occurred, the dwellers suddenly lost their control and access over their asset. From their perspective, they owned the kampung and had the right to benefit from its existence, such as, employment, additional income, natural resource, and social service. Although they acknowledged the risk, de facto security they enjoyed (from government, even), made them believe that the government would protect them or had the power to negotiate if that's happen. When that livelihood and de facto security was taken away from them, they decided to stay to retain the existence of their *kampung*. They concluded that they might had a chance to reclaim their *kampung* if they persevered until the next election. According to dwellers recollection and confirmed by all stakeholders, they kept occupying Kunir for seven and half years, under various form on temporal housing⁸. The dwellers wanted to recover their control over housing asset and diminishing the risk of losing it, which mean, gaining a clear ownership. Beyond resistance to eviction, this was a demand for structural change in the land and housing policy. The dwellers knew that it was impossible to achieve this by one self, therefore they organised themselves to perform collective action.

4.2.2 Link to politicised movement

While socio-economic factors above became their foundation to perform collective action, the decision to use cooperative was influenced by their involvement into politicised movement. Apart from Kunir eviction case, JRMK/UPC coalition group had been advocating marginal group for a long time. By 2015, JRMK had been existing for thirteen years and gaining extended support from activist, NGO, and experts (Savirani&Aspinall, 2017). The integration of Kunir dwellers into this coalition was a critical point for their collective action.

Table 6: Findings on linkage to politicised movement

Indicators	Findings
Links between similar group	<p>As informed by cooperative, and triangulated to UPC, the dwellers were reached out by UPC on the brink of eviction, which later introduced them to JRMK. JRMK consisted of urban kampung who agreed to fight for tenure security and other marginal group, such as street vendors and pedicab riders.</p> <p><i>“Initially, G reached to us and UPC helped us a lot when the eviction happened. They introduced us to JRMK too, and finally being part of it.”</i> (S1, May 2023)</p> <p>S3 explained that UPC members are urban activist who are active in asserting <i>kampung</i> rights, and they created JRMK later. UPC is focal point of ACHR in Indonesia (as triangulated through ACHR website), meanwhile JRMK is connected to JERAMI at national level, and LOCOA at international level.</p> <p><i>“We think that these kampung should learn to be independent to demand their right or provide they needs. Hence, JRMK was formed in 2008, and there was a shift in responsibility later on. UPC used to do advocacy, organising, and network development. Now, we hope that those activities can be done by kampung dwellers themselves through JRMK. UPC's job is enabling and assisting JRMK.”</i></p>

⁸ See Annex 1 for housing pathway of the dwellers

Indicators	Findings
	(S3, May 2023)
Links to support organisations	<p>The cooperative mentioned that their linkage to supporting organisations were initially established on personal basis by UPC member(s). This was confirmed by UPC, ASF-ID, and Sejajar Movement that some key-persons started bring their organisation to involve in Kunir case.</p> <p><i>“Actually, K and I collaborated in different project. When Anies won, I requested him to help designing shelter for Kunir.”</i></p> <p style="text-align: right;">(S3, May 2023)</p> <p><i>“ASF-ID was initially not the part of Kunir case until K (member of ASF-ID) invited me. That was the case for pppooolll⁹ too.”</i></p> <p style="text-align: right;">(S4, May 2023)</p> <p><i>“We met at discussion event about kampung, and G (key-person of UPC) invited Z (founding member of Sejajar Movement) to involve in Kunir project.”</i></p> <p style="text-align: right;">(S4, May 2023)</p> <p>ASF-ID is group of community architects, meanwhile Sejajar Movement was group of community psychologists.</p>
Political opportunity	<p>As mentioned in the previous sub-section, the dwellers recognised the pattern of informal settlement policy in Jakarta that has been a subject to who's in the power during that period. This pattern had been utilised by JRMK/UPC networks through election (Savirani&Aspinall, 2017).</p> <p><i>“We established political contract with previous governor, but that did not work well until the end.”</i></p> <p style="text-align: right;">(S2, May 2023)</p> <p>However, in 2017 election, Anies team had urban activists who help them as policy broker for urban kampung, and finally secured a more specific contract (Savirani&Aspinall, 2017).</p> <p><i>“Political contract was a gate for us to work with government. We structured a detailed legal agreement between each kampung, including Kunir, and Anies.”</i></p> <p style="text-align: right;">(S3, May 2023; confirmed by S1 and S2, May 2023)</p> <p>When Anies won, he created a governor delivery unit (TGUPP), who oversees the implementation of programs stemmed from his political decision; as triangulated from JRMK and TGUPP.</p> <p><i>“We mainly work with TGUPP related to our proposed program”</i></p> <p style="text-align: right;">(S2, May 2023)</p>

Indicated by FGD result and interviews with JRMK/UPC, the idea of using cooperative to perform collective action in each *kampung* was a collective decision of coalition group. In

⁹ Architectural design studio founded by K

Indonesia, cooperative has been long recognised as formal economic entity, in particular for lower income. In order to have a legal power in the course of collective action, establishing cooperative was a feasible decision. Cooperative would be used to represent *kampung* dwellers as legal entity, which gave pragmatically equal footing to negotiate with other stakeholders, especially government. In addition, cooperative bound the dwellers under the same decision, therefore it would be easier for JRMK/UPC to coordinate the *kampungs*.





Figure 10: Kampung Kunir coalition group (linkage to politicised movement)

Kampung Kunir dwellers understood that they need external support to reclaim their *kampung*. Following political opportunity and strategy of their networks, Kunir dwellers’ desire meeting its opportunity to scale up. Prior to joining JRMK and further benefitting from the network, the dwellers had to align their strategy, further setting up a cooperative to perform collective action.

4.2.3 Capability to self-govern

Even though internal foundation and external opportunities are in place, the formation of cooperative and collective action would not happen unless Kunir dwellers had capability to govern themselves.

Table 7: Findings on capability to self-govern

Indicators	Findings
<p>Norms used in community to organise themselves</p>	<p>As informed by researcher, supporting networks, and the dwellers, the norms to make a decision and to act on something collectively in Kunir was partly on leadership basis and discussion (<i>musyawarah</i>).</p>  <p>Figure 11: Musyawarah in Kunir. Source: ASF-ID</p>

Indicators	Findings
	<p>“Before the eviction occurred, Kunir leadership was hold by RT leader, however, around eviction period, there was restructuring of power in Kampung Kunir, it extended to three to four people among the dwellers.” (R, June 2023)</p> <p>They exchange their role informally as “representative” or “ad-hoc leader” during the struggle. They took initiatives and connected to external parties. Meanwhile, the rest of dwellers was informed and gave feedback through <i>musyawarah</i>. Confirmed through observation, the dwellers often refer to <i>musyawarah</i> result as decision that valid and applicable to all dwellers. However, respondent R admitted that in Kunir, the result of <i>musyawarah</i> still could be contested afterwards, which becoming a challenge in organising the dwellers.</p> <p>One example of <i>musyawarah</i> result was conveyed by S1 and S3, regarding the distinction of who could benefit from the fruition of the struggle later. Those dwellers agreed that the previous Kunir dwellers who already took the public rental housing (<i>Rusunawa</i>) offer were prohibited to join the struggle. This distinction was never made in other case, such as Kampung Aquarium, hence the opportunist took the chance to benefit without participated in the collective action. Initially, all the 33 families were supposed to stay in Kunir, but considering there were people who are more vulnerable such as elderly, children, and pregnant women; the dwellers later agreed to allow some people to stay in other places under the condition that they still contribute in the struggle.</p>
Establishment of cooperative structure	As clarified by triangulation from cooperative, UPC, and ASF-ID, the structure of cooperative was formed through combination of <i>musyawarah</i> and small election among the dwellers. The cooperative structure comprises of three board members (leader, secretary, and treasurer), three inspectors, and employees which appointed or volunteered later. The cooperative allows all dwellers to become member, therefore each family could send more than one family member.
Establishment of statutes and bylaws	Later in 2019, the statute and bylaws finally stipulated ¹⁰ along the registration of cooperative to the government agency, in which structurisation of the document was helped by supporting network, as mentioned by S4 and S5.

As suggested by the findings, Kunir dwellers’ ability to govern themselves was not derived from strong leadership, instead rely on who took initiative the most and discussion (*musyawarah*). Nevertheless, through those norms, they managed to define rules, made various effort to resist, integrate with supporting networks, and finally established cooperative for collective action.

4.3 Strategies of Collective Action

Looking back to the formation process of cooperative, cooperative was perceived as a requirement in the course of their struggle and the JRMK/UPC networks as a whole. Supported

¹⁰ See Annex 2 for sample of statute and bylaws document

by the coalition, they employed different strategies to reclaim their kampung and improve tenure situation over their settlement.

4.3.1 Strategy I-III: Interaction for resource to fulfil capacity

Kampung dwellers' linkage to similar group and support organisations enabled them to acquire resources that they previously did not have nor had access to. Becoming part of JRMK/UPC networks allowed them to access those resources, such as knowledge, labour, and legitimacy. Moreover, Kunir dwellers further managed to benefit from role division within coalition.

Indicator
Acquired multi-source funding, labor, and knowledge ¹¹

Strategy I: Gaining legitimacy from being affiliated

As indicated by stakeholders' interview, being part of JRMK/UPC networks gave Kampung Kunir legitimacy over the following projects/programs rolled out by the government related to political contract. This opportunity secured political acceptance of kampung existence by government agencies (de facto).

Strategy II: Obtaining legal and technical knowledge

While all supporting organisations had their parts in delivering knowledge, interaction for knowledge were majorly carried out with ASF-ID. As documented by K3PS and ASF-ID, they learned technical and legal knowledge; such as zoning and building regulation. Through organising collective memories, supporting networks guided the dwellers to understand their land status along with attained rights and built sense of community. All these activities would not be realised unless they agreed on their rule to follow activities held by supporting networks. During transfer knowledge process, ASF-ID emphasised on participatory design to enable the dwellers.

"We didn't want the dwellers to think of us as architects to avoid dependency, so we positioned ourselves as people who didn't know anything. The workshop intended to explore and give insight into what good design looks like."

(S4, May 2023)

Meanwhile, the dwellers obtained cooperative-related knowledge from Sejajar Movement, and JRMK.

"We were learned from Sejajar to do bookkeeping and correspondence. Cooperative leaders in other kampung shared also their tips to build business unit."

(S1, June 2023)

Gaining knowledge about their rights, legal and technical dimension of housing and urban kampung, and cooperative; had built their confidence in collective action. Without that knowledge, it would be impossible for the dwellers to secure all legal requirements for the redevelopment and structured their demands into legal agreements, which contribute to de jure security later on.

"After supporting networks explained to us about our rights, we gained confidence to demand for it. I don't afraid of government anymore."

(D7, May 2023)

Indicator

¹¹ See Annex 3 for the division of resource

Shared responsibility between actors to manage resources and providing services¹²

Strategy III: Assigning role to relevant coalition member

The majority of works on collective action were divided among the dwellers by cooperative, however, there were also works that required professional competency and assigned to supporting networks. From interview, it was recognized that cooperative organised the dwellers to perform negotiation, attend meeting and discussions, and on-site physical labour. This role division proved that the dwellers were capable to govern themselves under cooperative structure.

Yet, on technical works such as architectural design proposal, they need to submit a qualified document to the government, therefore ASF-ID took the work (from interview with DPRKP, ASF-ID, and triangulated by document). S4 explained that ASF-ID also collaborate with a private architecture studio and university to bring more expertise in the project. Therefore, the new kampung was built according to both building standard and *kampung* needs. By assigning role to professional coalition member, therefore, lower the degree of informality in *kampung* settlement.

4.3.2 Strategy IV-VIII: Channeling to access, control, or contest policy process

Beyond interaction between the dwellers and supporting networks, the coalition group needed to unlock finance, land, and approval from the government in order to improve tenure security. Through these strategies, the dwellers along its coalition group interact with government in formal state-led process to change the initial condition of de jure, de facto, and perceived security. The publication of verbal demand, negotiation document; and meeting and discussion records/notes were found in four strategies. Meanwhile, agreement documents were found to secure their demands and lock government's commitment in the negotiation process.

Indicators
Published verbal and non-verbal demand; Documented negotiation; Established meeting and discussion with stakeholders

Strategy IV: Conform to government strategy while demanding

Due to the political contract, redevelopment of Kampung Kunir was obligation on the government side along with other demands. As confirmed by DPRKP, the redevelopment of Kunir was direction from the governor, rather than programmatic proposal from the agency. Respondent S6 explained that the government enacted the redevelopment under Governor Regulation No. 90 of 2018 on the Settlement Improvement, then followed by Governor Decree No. 878 of 2018 on Task Force for the Implementation of Kampung and Community Improvement; both just newly stipulated.

The initial response to the dwellers' demand was to build a shelter in 2018, which were only allowed to be occupied for three years. In the same year, the government rolled out a settlement improvement program namely Community Action Plan (CAP)¹³, which implemented under DPRKP. Yet, CAP was designed to improve physical aspects of a settlement, instead of project development. However, such improvements were meaningless considering current stage at Kampung Kunir, as what supporting networks conveyed. As the cooperative started to demand to rebuild their settlement, the government seek another scheme financed by developer liability

¹² See Annex 4 for the division of role and responsibility within coalition

¹³ Pergub Nomor 90 Tahun 2018; Kεgub Nomor 878 Tahun 2018

funds (SP3L)¹⁴ to develop new vertical kampung. Nevertheless, the government still claimed the development of Kunir as a part of CAP, although there was hardly any contribution to the improvement of tenure security in Kunir.

“Political contract was only a gateway to communication and cooperation with the government. On the government side, it’s not automatic (as to make it happen). After all, the governor has to mobilize the entire bureaucracy, and that’s not easy.”

(S3, May 2023)

Nevertheless, by conforming to government strategy in the formal state-led process, it granted them regulations as umbrella for the development, and acknowledgement from government to address their demands (de facto).

Strategy V: Propose clear request when negotiating site and building type

Despite the objective of dwellers to reclaim their kampung, DPRKP translating that the dwellers were requesting for public housing (*rusun*). As DPRKP hold the authority of housing affairs, such production will be following the efficiency of government budget, as indicated from the interview with S6. With this logic, the cooperative and supporting network took precaution to demand specific location and ASF-ID prepare detailed design of the requested building.

“I think the architect used too much bottom-up approach in designing the building. When we designed rusun, we also had to consider the efficiency. And, sometime, there were design aspect that less essentials, but ended up consuming the budget.”

(S6, May 2023)

The cooperative proposed to use a site owned by local government for their *kampung*. The government was reluctant to change the land-use, which supposedly included as district office area (confirmed through Jakarta 2014 Zoning Regulation). Finally, in 2018, a shelter was built over that land for Kunir dwellers by the government, and previously, it was used as tennis court and parking lot for garbage truck. The negotiation process for site and design took almost three years, and the land-use for the site was changed to residential area (as confirmed by Jakarta 2022 Zoning Regulation).

By proposing clear demand in the discussion and continuously asserting it, Kunir managed to demand the redevelopment of their kampung in the same area, which catering to their needs. Moreover, Kunir finally able to gain legal security over their occupied land on Zoning Plan of DKI Jakarta.

Strategy VI: Involve in the preparation process

The cooperative and supporting networks, mainly ASF-ID, were involved in the preparation process of redevelopment, as informed by ASF-ID and triangulated to DPRKP. This was done to ensure the accordance of project implementation with their demands. In order to meet DPRKP qualification, S4 explained that they seek collaboration with LEMTEK-UI, a consultant firm which later became their umbrella to be a part of the consultant. The cooperative and supporting networks also initiated to build semi-permanent housing (*huntara*) next to as temporary residence during the construction process later on.

One of the main challenges for Kampung Kunir development was its location within Old Town area, as mentioned by TGUPP, ASF-ID, the dwellers, and DPRKP. This made the development should be consulted and approved by cultural heritage expert team: TACB and TSP of DKI

¹⁴ SP3L is an appointment mechanism to provide low-cost flats as liability for the developer who obtain permits to develop areas above 5,000 meters in Jakarta (commonly for building luxury apartments).

Jakarta. TACB identified that the selected site was passed through by the wall of Old Town Batavia. This result made the project undergone a total of three hearing sessions to get the design approved by TACB and TSP¹⁵. The architecture team had to change the design for many times. It also caused retaliation on the dwellers' side, therefore, they attended the hearing under as representative of the cooperative. The cooperative also demanded to excavate the site to prove whether actually there was archaeological object underground. After involving in the excavation, turns out that the objects found was not remnants of the wall of Old Town, and finally identified as suspected cultural object (ODCB).

The cultural heritage case took immense effort, and was not a common case on the DPRKP side. Without the cooperative and ASF-ID involvement in the project, the project would not be locked until 2022, and the dwellers' demands might be less accommodated.

Strategy VII: Seek potential partners in the government side

Collective action in Kampung Kunir was pressured with governor's term that nearing to end. Therefore, cooperative and supporting networks had the intention to speed up the project, meanwhile, the government often tangled up in the bureaucracy or legal issue. In order to obtain government feedback or conveyed demand, the cooperative sent out letters to DPRKP. However, due to DPRKP's slow response in their perspective, the dwellers seek communication to Governor Delivery Unit (TGUPP) instead.

“One of our responsibility is to accelerate governor's program, such as following up the progress of certain program to relevant agencies.”

(S7, May 2023)

It was reported by TGUPP that they had discussion with cooperative and supporting networks, received documents of recommendation, request acceleration on important issues, and mediating communication between the dwellers and government agencies. Confirmed by TGUPP, they would go as far as proposing new regulation to implement the idea. Other than TGUPP, cooperative also reached out to an expert from DPRKP and cultural heritage expert teams to negotiate the handling process of archaeological issue. Obtaining partners in the government side, such as TGUPP, had central impact in completing the redevelopment project, achieve de jure tenure security, and provide sense of assurance in the course of collective action.

Indicator
Established agreements

Strategy VIII: Establish agreement to secure demand

Almost all dwellers' demands were unprecedented, or even situated within legal void, as DPRKP mentioned. DPRKP reported that governor's directive related to the redevelopment of kampung could not be implemented immediately because the regulation should be made or amended beforehand. However, in more complex issue such as the management of new vertical kampung by cooperative, it was difficult to provide legal clarity in short time due to its linkage to ownership issue (rights over the land and building) and utilisation of local government asset. Therefore, the cooperative set up a MoU¹⁶ before the construction activity begun, stating that the utilisation and management of Kampung Kunir would be regulated under further agreement (triangulated by UPC, ASF-ID, and the cooperative). When the construction finished in 2022,

¹⁵ According to the regulation, the development should be approved within three sessions, or either the consultant will be dismissed.

¹⁶ Memorandum of Understanding

cooperative and DPRKP signed an agreement regarding the provision and management of vertical housing in Kampung Kunir. This agreement played significant role in establishing de jure security of new *kampung*, which will be further discussed in Section 4.4.

4.3.3 Strategy IX: Issue engagement for tenure security in urban *kampung*

Indicators
Media publication; Published event and discussion to public

The cooperative, independently, was not actively escalating tenure security issue in the public conversation. However, as indicated by media publication of supporting networks, they did leading some discussions on tenure security and urban *kampung* in Jakarta, although the topic was not necessarily focused to Kampung Kunir. Aside from public discussion, the supporting networks covered Kampung Kunir case by collaborating with mass media¹⁷, as confirmed by UPC. Nevertheless, Kampung Kunir had gained benefit from those engagements, particularly support from external institutions (de facto).

4.3.4 Strategy X: Socio-political practice to influence decision making

Indicators
Identified socio-political roadmap; Aligned plan to socio-political networks

JRMK/UPC networks had involved in electoral politics since 2002, however, only recently they experienced working together with the government. During Anies period, the program and regulation kept rolling on their favor, as suggested by JRMK and UPC interview.

“For evicted kampung such as Kunir and Aquarium, they got new vertical kampung. Meanwhile, for landed kampung, cooperative in each JRMK kampung received collective building permit and acknowledged administratively. We finally had our own RT and had access to social service.”

(S2, May 2023)

Without aligned to JRMK/UPC networks, socio-political practice by Kampung Kunir dwellers remained in the form of protest and would be difficult to benefit from the formal process. The JRMK/UPC network currently preparing for 2024 election (triangulated through JRMK social media, observation, and interview with JRMK and UPC), in which they nominating representatives of JRMK to run for legislative candidacy. As a part of the network, the cooperative will continue to involve in electoral politics to bring institutional change of tenure security in urban *kampung*.

“We use different strategy for the next election, but our goal remains the same, that is to improve tenure security”

(S3, May 2023)

4.4 Current Structure of Tenure Security

Current structure of tenure security in Kampung Kunir is the result of collective action of the dwellers via cooperative along its supporting network. The examination of tenure security is based on van Gelder’s (2010) tripartite view, which consist of de jure, de facto, and perceived security.

¹⁷ Kampung Kunir was featured in “*Hikayat Kunir: Kampung Para Hansip Penjaga Kota yang Bertahan di Reruntuhan*” and “*Belajar dari Rakyat Miskin Jakarta: Membangun Koperasi Mewujudkan Perumahan Kolektif*” in Project Multatuli

4.4.1 De jure: agreement-based security

Cooperative legal status over property

Among other legal documents that stipulated in the course of collective action, agreement contributed significantly in improving de jure security in Kampung Kunir. In the current system, *Kampung Susun* Kunir was included as public rental housing, therefore provincial government was expecting to manage it the same way. The demand of dwellers including cooperative legal ownership over land and building, and its management using cooperative, were difficult to achieve, one of its reasons was regulation issue. Mitigating this issue, an agreement was established between the cooperative and DPRKP as mentioned in the previous section.

Although agreement was used to bridge between the existing regulation and dwellers' demands regarding ownership, it did not fully guarantee complete de jure security in the future. There are three subjects demanded by the cooperative regarding the new kampung: land, building, and management. The demands partly allowed under the current land and housing law¹⁸, however, majority of them was yet regulated which further accommodated by the agreement. Analysed from the document, it turns out that the agreement only addressed three demand subjects partially. Kampung Kunir was built on state land, in which the local government hold *Hak Pakai-HP* (right to use). Regarding land, the cooperative demanded to had clear legal position. While it's possible by changing local government's land title from *HP* to *HPL* (right to manage), then granted *HP* to the cooperative, it was uncommon to do such change and the agreement did not mention any mechanism regarding land. Regarding the building, the cooperative demands ownership, which is not relevant to any regulation, however, the agreement made it possible through grant. Likewise, the management by cooperative also secured through agreement. Among the three subject, legal certainty over the land is likely lower than building and management. Complete analysis is illustrated in Table 8.




Figure 12: Right to Use land is colored green, Kunir squared red

Source: jakartasatu.jakarta.go.id

¹⁸ See Annex 5 for law and regulation relevant to tenure security in Kampung Kunir

Table 8: Analysis on cooperative de jure security

Subject	Demand	Relevant Regulation	Agreements	Current legal status of the subject	Projected legal status of subject	Legal certainty
LAND	The cooperative obtains right to use over the land	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Right to use (HP) is the right to use and/or collect products from land directly controlled by the State or land owned by other people 2. Right to use (HP) within a period is allowed to be granted to a legal entity established under Indonesian law and domiciled in Indonesia 3. Right to use (HP) within a period is allowed to be granted over the land with Right to Manage (HPL) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The cooperative had leasehold rights over the land 2. Future demand regarding land is unmentioned 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Right to Use (HP) hold by Provincial Government of DKI Jakarta, therefore included as PG asset 2. The cooperative hold leasehold rights 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Provincial Government obtain Right to Manage (HPL) over the land 2. Cooperative obtain Right to Use (HP) over Right to Manage (HPL) land. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. PG has to change its property rights from Right to Use (HP) to Right to Manage (HPL) 2. The structure of property rights is allowed under the law 3. However, the discussion on land rights couldn't refer to the agreement
BUILDING	The cooperative owns the building	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Utilisation of national government or local government asset in the form of land for public housing is carried out by lease or cooperation in utilisation 2. Property right to unit in public housing (<i>sarusun</i>) can be done through owned or rented; whereas common land/area is jointly owned 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The cooperative had leasehold rights over the building 2. Building will be granted to cooperative upon fulfilment of requirements 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Building is PG asset after acquisition upon SP3L completion 2. The cooperative has the right to lease after acquisition upon SP3L completion 	Building will be granted to cooperative, hence obtain ownership right	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Right of ownership to <i>sarusun</i> individually is possible under the law, however to cooperative was not accommodated 2. However, grant request is legally protected by the agreement
MANAGEMENT	The cooperative manages the assets	Management of public housing is carried out by local government agency that administer asset in the form of public housing	Cooperative manage the assets	Cooperative manage the assets	The cooperative manage the assets (land, building, and attached infrastructure)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Not accommodated by the law 2. Management using cooperative is legally protected by the agreement

Source: Author, 2023

Other than the agreement, collective action also managed to clear zoning status for their settlement, which is also an important element in de jure security. According to previous zoning regulation¹⁹, the old Kunir was located in the B1-Blue Zone, which could be used only for environmental purpose. Meanwhile, the current land where vertical kampung existed was changed from P3-Local Government Office Zone to R1-Kampung Residential Zone according to new Zoning Regulation (Figure 12 and 13). This change was the result of political contract, which also happened in other kampung, most of them were changed to R1.




Figure 13: Kampung Kunir area, previously coded as P3

Source: jakartasatu.jakarta.go.id

Changed to:




Figure 14: Kampung Kunir Area, now coded as R1

Source: jakartasatu.jakarta.go.id

¹⁹ Local Government Regulation No.1 of 2014 on Zoning Regulation

Individual legal status over property

It had clarified through interview that JRMK/UPC network aimed for collective ownership rather than individual, which become one of their reason to establish cooperative. This was decided to protect the existence of *kampung* as community and avoid the property being released. Therefore, much of tenure security improvement were subject to cooperative, instead of individual. Individual legal status over property, hence, depend on their cooperative membership. As long as they comply to their obligation and improve cooperative performance, their individual tenure also protected.

4.4.2 De facto

Compared to their previous condition, there was significant improvement on de facto security in Kampung Kunir. Currently, as the dwellers had stay in the building, they had access, however, limited control and ownership towards the new kampung. De facto security in Kunir mostly established by external recognition, rather than internal factors, as suggested by interview from DPRKP and the cooperative.

Length of occupation, size of settlement, and cohesion level

Compared to the Old Kunir, the new kampung was only recently built, had smaller population, and low cohesiveness, as suggested by interview with dwellers and researcher. The Old Kunir had been around for 36 years, inhabited by 77 families, with more stable interpersonal bonds. Even so, they still carried out kampung tradition, such as communal praying session (*yasinan*) which becoming means to discuss kampung related issue and sharing food with each other.

“We used to hang out more in the old kampung, and it was very easy to call each other (due to its horizontal layout)”

(D6, May 2023)

Since the eviction, Kunir has been undergoing turbulent times, which at some extent, influence cohesiveness of the community. Muharram (2021), described that during the shelter period, Kampung Kunir had relatively low sense of community. One of the dwellers felt alienated from the majority of dwellers, and other dwellers confessed that it’s getting hard to get the dwellers participated in cooperative activities.

“Now that the house is finished, the people are less united”

(D2, May 2023)

A source from supporting networks mentioned that Kunir had dual leadership, RT and cooperative, which often, lead to polarization among the dwellers as well. Distrust among dwellers was highly caused by financial reason, as they came from lower-income household, and living in Jakarta had shaped them to make familial decision based on economic pressure. The exhibit of social bonding, therefore, does not guarantee cohesiveness as element of de facto security in Kampung Kunir.

Nevertheless, the dwellers had persevered in Kunir for seven and half years after eviction, and still maintain their interaction with surrounding neighborhood during that period. Hence, at some extent, the local community still acknowledged that particular area (Figure 14) as property of Kunir dwellers.




Figure 15: De facto area of Kunir as acknowledged by local community

Source: Author, 2023 (Adapted from GoogleEarth)

Support from external institution and political acceptance

Collective action had become the means for Kunir to gain external recognition, particularly among urban professional. Both vertical kampung, Kunir and Akuarium, have been referred as alternative to community housing. During data collection period, Kunir was visited by Universitas Indonesia and become project host for Indonesia-Dutch designers. Still, significant support came from JRMK/UPC networks (NGOs, professionals) who continuously advocating urban kampung issue.

Even though Kampung Kunir gained political acceptance during 2017-2022, post-Anies governorship period holds different story. Respondent S2 revealed that they used to have open access to the Governor through TGUPP, but nowadays, they can't communicate with the government anymore. Respondent S2, S3, and S4 felt that change in bureaucracy, moreover in the local government agency for the last five years was possible due to leadership pressure. When the leadership change, government acceptance was significantly lower. Nevertheless, meaningful de facto gain, for example, "*kampung*" being acknowledged in urban planning, had already secured.

4.4.3 Perceived Security

Individual experience of tenure situation

When asked about their experience over tenure situation in the current kampung, the dwellers always compared it with their situation in the old kampung and experience during post-eviction period. In the old kampung, they had more control over their property, while today, they have to pay monthly contribution fee to cooperative to pay five years lease to DPRKP. This was due

cooperative's leasehold rights over government property for five years, as stated in the agreement, therefore cooperative have obligation to pay rental fee.

"I have to say that I prefer the old kampung, because I did not have to pay for my own house and we had additional income from renting out our room. But rather than nothing at all, I think it's better like this. I just hope that we could stay without paying the rental fee anymore."

(D8, May 2023)

They implied that it's better to live with current tenure situation rather than experiencing similar tenure situation post-eviction period. Although they constantly occupied Kunir during post-eviction, they had to live in tent which then changed to makeshift housing for four years. In conclusion, the judgement whether they feel improvement in their tenure situation is depending on the referred temporal scale.

Perception of the probability to lose the asset

Kunir's dwellers perception on the probability to lose the asset is related to their perception on cooperative's capability to fulfill its obligations on the agreement. This was because they aware that legal certainty is important to protect their asset, and for them, is based on the agreement.

"The cooperative should accrue some money for the building to be granted. But I'm afraid that would be difficult for us since our cooperative's business units were yet stable and able to provide significant revenue for us."

(D3, May 2023)

It is stated on the agreement that:

- a. Grant in the form of building would be allowed under the condition that the cooperative had fulfil required competencies, including financial competency.
- b. The cooperative should accrue 1 billion rupiahs (app. 66,000 USD) as reserve fund to prove financial competency
- c. The cooperative has to improve their competency in asset management

As suggested by the agreement, sustainability of cooperative hold central position in determining whether their demands will be met at the end. The dwellers felt that there is potential threat for them to lose their rights if cooperative's performance does not meet their expectation.

Chapter 5: Conclusions

5.1 Conclusion

Main Question: Whether and how does the collective action organised by cooperatives influence tenure security in Jakarta’s urban *kampung*?

This study seeks relationship between collective action organised by cooperative and change in tenure security, using the case of Kampung Kunir. Conceptual framework and hypothetical relationship between factors shaping the cooperative, collective action, and change in tenure security urban *kampung* was established from existing study. This relationship then clarified and explained through analysis from FGD result, interviews result, and secondary data.




Figure 16: Summary of the study

Source: Author, 2023

The result of this study confirmed that collective action organised by cooperative contributes to change tenure security in urban *kampung*. As suggested by existing literature (Gaventa&McGee, 2010; Mitlin, 2006; Mitlin, 2023), coalition is important to build transgression from eviction resistance towards tenure security struggle. Coalition will allow the dwellers to engage with socio-political structure, and then make institutional change in tenure security²⁰.

Although strategies used in collective action succeeded in realising the redevelopment of Kampung Kunir and bring some improvement to tenure security, the dwellers still have a long journey to achieve meaningful tenure security gain in the future.

Sub-question 1: What are the factors shaping the formation of cooperative for collective action by urban *kampung*?

The formation of cooperative in Kampung Kunir was influenced by their socio-economic condition post-eviction, linkage to JRMK/UPC movement, and the dwellers’ capability to organise themselves to build the cooperative for collective action.

Due to eviction, the dwellers lost ownership and control over their *kampung*, also access to financial means and social service. This loss was not something they fully anticipated as a risk, since they had enjoyed some extent of tenure security over the years. They felt that their rights were taken away and this collective experience built their desire to reclaim their *kampung*. The finding is aligned with Beard and Dasgupta (2006) that under perception of interdependent future, community manifests the potential for social transformation. This socio-economic

²⁰ Institutional change refers to shift of rules, norms, and practice that constitute tenure security in urban *kampung*.

condition, further, shapes the urgency and dweller's motivation to perform collective action to demand their rights.

Meanwhile, link to JRMK/UPC networks provides means for the dwellers to perform collective action. It confirms that coalition will enhance the existing political opportunities, (Mitlin, 2023), which then encouraged the dwellers to reform their cooperative and using it for collective action.

Lastly, the dwellers' capability to govern themselves served as requirement to integrate with coalition's strategy in the course of collective action. Eventually, the dwellers managed to reform their cooperative and asserting their demands together with supporting networks. However, *kampung* dwellers' capability to govern themselves only led to cooperative involvement in the struggle concerning Kunir and did not result in their involvement in city-scale issue engagement of urban *kampung*. Reflecting this to literature, means that Kampung Kunir's dwellers behavior towards city-scale issue engagement is following Olson's (1965) rational-choice paradigm; as opposed to their behavior towards Kunir redevelopment which consistent with Ostrom's (1990) paradigm of self-govern under interdependent future.

Sub-question 2: What kind of collective action strategies are adopted by cooperative and how do they engage with socio-political structure to achieve tenure security in urban *kampung*?

Strategies employed during interaction for resource, channeling process, and city-scale socio-political practice are able to contribute in changing de jure and de facto security in Kampung Kunir. Key strategies to engage with socio-political structure includes: building confidence; seeking supports from challengers and government's side; and negotiate within formal process. Those rounds of interaction will build public support from certain group and political acceptance among those who holds power. Other than de facto, those effort also resulting in de jure gain, i.e. agreement with government and change in zoning regulation.

Meanwhile, using issue engagement as strategy only relevant to improve external support which is a property of de facto security. This was because issue engagement did not concern with formal process of demanding rights.

Tying the findings together, the strategy of Kampung Kunir cooperative to assert specific demand rather than change in land and housing policy, had managed to gain certain result, which is similar with existing practice in Global South (Porio, 2002; Simonneau et al., 2019).

Sub-question 3: How is the current status of tenure security in urban *kampung*?

Coming from van Gelder's (2009) perspective, tenure security can only be measured through its component. Compared to situation in the Old Kunir, there is change in tenure security, but does not necessarily improve in all components. The change in de jure and de facto security is the result of collective action, while perceived security is highly constructed by the dwellers' awareness of de jure security.

De jure security in Kampung Kunir mainly constituted by agreement between the cooperative and the dwellers. Based on the agreement, the cooperative currently hold collective leasehold right over the land and building; in which the building is potentially to be granted in later stage. As for the land, the agreement did not state anything regarding the possibility of more powerful right (compared to leasehold) in the future.

Currently, de facto security still relying on external acknowledgement, rather than internal components. Support and acceptance continuously established through all sub-variables in collective action. However, component of cohesiveness in de facto security can't be explained by any sub-variables and indicators in collective action. Although able to perform collective

action in the past, Kunir's dwellers has low cohesiveness. But, lack of cohesiveness might hinder the cooperative performance which is essential to de jure and perceived security.

Referring to the requirement of building grant in the future which largely based on cooperative performance, the current structure of tenure security would be retained or improved only if the dwellers had willingness and capacity to improve the performance of cooperative.

5.2 Recommendation

5.2.1 Practical recommendation

For the government: Although the case presented in this thesis was stemmed out from dwellers' retaliation towards government policy, it also taught us that other alternative to eviction might be existed if the government allows itself to collaborate with the civil society organisations and the dwellers. First, compensate the dwellers with public housing (*rusunawa*) might not be the best solution, as it did not really commensurate tenure security they had enjoyed and livelihood which they had built over the years in their *kampung*. Secondly, it is important to address tenure security in the framework of CAP as slum upgrading program in DKI Jakarta. As for *kampung* that currently does not have RT, it is advised to guarantee the establishment of RT if the *kampung* is willing to improve their condition under CAP. The establishment of RT will indicate significant improvement in their tenure security which is central issue for urban poor, and increase their willingness to involve in CAP. Furthermore, the presence of urban professionals within their network is useful in bridging the gap between government's capacity and the community's needs. Lastly, collaboration with civil society networks might also offer alternative to address housing right when faced contestation with pressed need for urban development.

For other collective action in land and housing struggle: The dwellers' involvement in formal state-led process is important to change tenure security institution for their settlements. In order to do this, the dwellers had to own linkage to socio-political networks, particularly urban professional and policy broker in the government side. It is advised to build dwellers' confidence through knowledge, hence the dwellers can advocate for themselves. However, it is also important for urban professional to confirm directly to the government that their proposed idea is valid. Further, balancing between conforming to government strategy and asserting demand are important throughout the process. Securing any gain through agreement is effective, under the condition that the dwellers ready and have plans to fulfil their obligation. Finally, network manager in collective action should consider how to improve dwellers' cohesiveness during the collective action process, because it will affect tenure security condition in the future.

5.2.2 Recommendation for further research

For Indonesia case, it is recommended to examine whether collective action also bring change to tenure security in different spatial and temporal scale. This includes the examination in landed *kampung* as well. It should be distinguished that for vertical *kampung*, the dwellers already experience eviction, as opposed to the landed one. This difference might indicate different form of collective action under cooperative, and different perception of tenure security. In addition, it is also recommended to examine the change of tenure security in other temporal scale, for example, five years or ten years later. First, it is considering that de jure security in *kampung* under JRMK is built over an agreement which depends on cooperative performance in the later years. Secondly, as this research findings suggest the significance of Jakarta socio-political structure for the success of collective action (i.e. leadership); the progress of tenure security in these *kampung* might be different under different political opportunities.

Considering the context-specific nature of this study, it is recommended to clarify whether relationship between variable/sub-variable as suggested in this study is relevant to other informal settlement in different place. Moreover, it might be useful to unfold what are the meaning behind those relationship in other land and housing struggle, and how it differs compared to urban *kampung* in Indonesia.

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
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Annex 1: Housing Pathway of Kunir Dwellers



Annex 2: Legal Documents of Kampung Kunir



ANGGARAN DASAR DAN ANGGARAN RUMAH TANGGA KOPERASI KONSUMEN KUNIR PINANGSIA SEJAHTERA (K3PS)

Jl Kunir No.1 RT 04 RW 06, Kelurahan Pinangsia,
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Statutes and Bylaws



PERJANJIAN KERJA SAMA
ANTARA
PEMERINTAH PROVINSI DAERAH KHUSUS IBUKOTA JAKARTA
DAN
KOPERASI KONSUMEN KUNIR PINANGSIA SEJAHTERA
TENTANG
PENYEDIAAN DAN PENGELOLAAN HUNIAN VERTIKAL DI KAMPUNG KUNIR

NOMOR : 3703/RE.02.01
NOMOR : 021/K3PS/2022

Pada hari ini, Jumat tanggal Empat Belas, bulan Oktober, tahun Dua Ribu Dua Puluh Dua (14-10-2022), yang bertanda tangan di bawah ini :

- I. **SARJOKO** : Kepala Dinas Perumahan Rakyat dan Kawasan Permukiman Provinsi Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta, berkedudukan di Jl. Taman Jatibaru Nomor 1, Kelurahan Cideng, Kecamatan Tanah Abang, Kota Administrasi Jakarta Pusat.
Dalam hal ini menjalani jabatannya tersebut dan untuk menandatangani Perjanjian Kerja Sama ini berdasarkan Surat Kuasa Gubernur tanggal 14 Oktober 2022, oleh karenanya sah bertindak untuk dan atas nama Pemerintah Provinsi Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta
Untuk selanjutnya disebut sebagai **PIHAK KESATU**.
- II. **MARSHA CHAIRUDIN** : Ketua Koperasi Konsumen Kunir Pinangsia Sejahtera, berkedudukan di Jalan Kunir No. 1, RT 004 RW 06, Kelurahan Pinangsia, Kecamatan Tamansari, Kota Administrasi Jakarta Barat, Provinsi DKI Jakarta, Koperasi yang disahkan berdasarkan Keputusan Menteri Koperasi dan Usaha Kecil dan Menengah Nomor AHU-0000368.AH.01.26.2019 dan Akte Pendirian Koperasi Konsumen Kunir Pinangsia Sejahtera Nomor 10 dalam hal ini bertindak untuk dan atas nama Koperasi Konsumen Kunir Pinangsia Sejahtera.

PIHAK KESATU	PIHAK KEDUA

Agreement between Cooperative and DPRKP

Annex 3: Actor Analysis

Critical Actors

Actors	Important Resource	Degree of Substitutability	Dependency	Critical Actors
National Land Agency (ATR/BPN)	Legitimacy	low	low	no
Governor of DKI Jakarta	Competency	low	high	yes
Governor Delivery Unit (TGUPP)	Legitimacy	low	high	yes
Cultural Heritage Expert Team (TACB)	Competency	low	high	yes
Restoration Council Team (TSP)	Competency	low	high	yes
Building Expert Team (TABG)	Competency	low	low	no
Housing and Settlement Agency of DKI Jakarta (DPRKP)	Competency, Financial, Production	low	high	yes
Asset Management Agency of DKI Jakarta (BPAD)	Competency	low	medium	no
Municipality of West Jakarta	Competency	low	low	no
Cooperative of Kampung Kunir / Dwellers	Production, Financial	low	high	yes
Urban Poor Network (JRMK)	Legitimacy	low	high	yes
Urban Poor Consortium (UPC)	Legitimacy	low	high	yes
Architecture Sans Frontières Indonesia (ASF-ID)	Production, Knowledge	low	high	yes
Sejajar Movement	Knowledge	medium	high	no
Architect of Urban Kampung (AKUR)	Knowledge	high	medium	no
Activist and Experts onboard	Knowledge	medium	medium	no
Other NGOs onboard	Knowledge	high	low	no
Legal Aid Institute Jakarta (LBH)	Knowledge	medium	medium	no

Division of resource within coalition

Actors	Legitimacy	Financial	Competency	Production	Knowledge
Kampung Kunir Dwellers		√		√	
Urban Poor Network (JRMK)	√	√	√	√	
Urban Poor Consortium (UPC)	√		√		√
Architecture Sans Frontières Indonesia (ASF-ID)				√	√
Sejajar Movement					√
Architect of Urban Kampung (AKUR)					√
Activist and Experts onboard	√				√
NGOs onboard	√				√
Legal Aid Institute Jakarta (LBH)	√				√

Annex 4: Division of role and responsibility within coalition

Role and responsibility of critical actors within coalition

Actor	Role	Responsibility
Cooperative of Kampung Kunir	Representative of Kunir dwellers for collective action, member of JRMK/UPC networks	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Organising dwellers in collective action 2. Negotiating demand to government stakeholder related to redevelopment 3. Improving the performance of cooperative (responsibility of members) 4. Carrying out JRMK activities assigned by the leader
Urban Poor Network (JRMK)	Focal point of collective action	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Supporting Kunir post-eviction period 2. Advocating Kampung Kunir demands
Urban Poor Consortium (UPC)	Network manager	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Assisting JRMK and kampung dwellers on their tenure security struggle 2. Connecting JRMK and kampung dwellers to other supporting networks 3. Facilitating knowledge transfer for kampung dwellers
Architecture Sans Frontières Indonesia (ASF-ID)	Architecture team in the supporting network	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Making architectural concept for proposed solution of the new kampung 2. Completing design and technical requirement for the building 3. Delivering knowledge about building regulation and design to the kampung dwellers 4. Leading participatory design process 5. Assist kampung dwellers in the negotiation process related to design and building regulation

Annex 5: Laws and Regulations Related to De Jure Security

Law	Level	Relevant Regulation
Legal basis of land system		
Article 33, Clause 3 of the 1945 Constitution	National	“... the earth, water and natural resources contained therein are controlled by the state and used for the greatest prosperity of the people”
Civil Code, Law No.5 of 1960 on Basic Agrarian Law	National	<p>Article 2</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The right to control (HMN) gave the state authority to: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Regulate and organize the allotment, use, supply and maintenance of land b. Determine and regulate legal relationship between people and their legal acts to the land 2. The right of control of the state (HMN) may be delegated to local government and customary law communities. <p>Article 4</p> <p>Land rights can be granted to and owned by persons, either alone or jointly with other persons and legal entities.</p> <p>Article 16</p> <p>The rights to land are as follows:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. right of ownership (HM), b. right to cultivate (HGU), c. right to build (HGB), d. right to use (HP), e. right to lease,... <p>Article 41</p> <p>Right to use is the right to use and/or collect products from land directly controlled by the State or land owned by other people</p> <p>Article 43</p> <p>For land directly controlled by the State, the right to use can only be transferred to another party with the permission of the authorized official</p> <p>Article 44</p> <p>A person or a legal entity has the right to lease land, if he is entitled to use the land-owned by another person for building purposes, by paying the owner a sum of money as rent.</p>
Government Regulation No. 18 of 2021 on Right to Manage, Land Rights, Strata Titles, and Land Registration	National	Article 1

Law	Level	Relevant Regulation
		<p>Right to Manage (HPL) are control rights from the state whose implementation authority is partially delegated to the holder of Right to Manage.</p> <p>Article 5</p> <p>Right to Manage (HPL) originating from state land are granted to:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. National Government agencies; b. Local Government; c. state-owned enterprises or regional-owned enterprises; d. state-owned legal entities and regionally-owned legal entities; e. Land Bank Agency; or f. Legal entity appointed by National Government. <p>Article 7</p> <p>The Holder of the Right to Manage (HPL) is authorized to:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Plan the land use and utilisation of the land in accordance with the spatial plan b. Use and utilize all or part of Right to Manage for its own use or in cooperation with other parties; and c. Determine the tariff and/or annual mandatory fees from other parties in accordance with the agreement. <p>Article 8</p> <p>Land subject to Right to Manage (HPL) which utilisation of all or part of the land for cooperation with other parties may be granted Land Rights in the form of Right to Cultivate (HGU), Right to Build (HGB), and/or Right to Use (HP) over Right to Manage (HPL) to:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. The holder of Right to Manage (HPL) to the extent stipulated in the Government Regulation; or b. other parties, if Right to Manage (HPL) is cooperated through an agreement. <p>Article 10</p> <p>Right to Manage (HPL) originating from State Land or Customary Land are determined by a Ministerial Decree.</p> <p>Article 12</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Right to Manage (HPL) cannot be used as collateral for debt encumbered by a mortgage 2. Right to Manage (HPL) cannot be transferred and assigned to another party

Law	Level	Relevant Regulation
		<p>3. Right to Manage (HPL) can only be relinquished in the event that the Right of Ownership (HM) is granted, released in the public interest, or other provisions stipulated in laws and regulations.</p> <p>4. In the event that the Right to Manage (HPL) relinquished is an asset of national government agency or local government, the relinquishment of the Right to Manage (HPL) shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of laws and regulations.</p> <p>Article 13</p> <p>Land Rights over Right to Manage (HPL) that are cooperated with other parties may be encumbered with mortgage rights, transferred, or released.</p> <p>Article 49</p> <p>1. The right to use (HP) consists of:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. right to use with a period of time; b. right to use during its use. <p>2. Right to use (HP) with a period of time shall be granted to:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Indonesian citizen; b. a legal entity established under Indonesian law and domiciled in Indonesia; c. d., e., ... <p>3. Right to use (HP) during its use shall be granted to:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. National Government agencies; b. Local Government; c. d., ... <p>Article 51</p> <p>1. Land that can be granted with Right to use (HP) with a period of time includes:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. State land; b. Land with right of ownership (HM) c. Land with right to manage (HPL) <p>2. Land that can be granted with Right to use (HP) during its use includes:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. State land; b. Land with right to manage (HPL) <p>Article 52</p> <p>1. Right to use (HP) on State Land and over land with Right to Manage (HPL) with a period of time, granted for a maximum period of 30 (thirty) years, extended for a maximum period of 20 (twenty) years, and renewed for a maximum period of 30 (thirty) years.</p> <p>2. Right to use (HP) during its use is granted for an indefinite period during use and utilization.</p> <p>Article 53</p>

Law	Level	Relevant Regulation
		1. Right to use (HP) on State Land is granted by Ministerial Decree. 2. Right to use (HP) over land with Right to Manage (HPL) is granted by Ministerial Decree according to the consent of Right to Manage (HPL) holder.
Governor Regulation No. 31 of 2022 on Zoning Regulation of DKI Jakarta (RDTR)	Provincial	Kampung residential zone defined as residential area designated by the government as preserved or maintained areas that have distinctive and historic characteristics and are part of the city. (See picture for Kunir)
Legal basis of public housing		
Law No. 20 of 2011 on Vertical Housing	National	Article 17 Vertical Housing can be built on land: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. with the right of ownership; b. with right to build (HGB) or right to use (HP) on state land; and c. right to build (HGB) or right to use (HP) over Right to Manage (HPL). (See picture for Kunir) Article 18 Vertical public housing can be built through: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. utilization of national government or local government asset in the form of land b. utilization of waqf land. Article 19 Utilization of national government or local government asset in the form of land for public housing is carried out by lease or cooperation in utilization. Article 45 Property right to unit in public housing (<i>sarusun</i>) can be done through owned or rented. Article 46 Property rights to unit in vertical housing (<i>sarusun</i>) are individual and separate from the joint rights to the common parts, common objects, and common land. Article 47 Letter of ownership over <i>sarusun</i> (SHMSRS) issued as a proof of ownership in vertical housing unit that build on land as referred in Article 17 Article 48

Law	Level	Relevant Regulation
		<p>Certificate of building ownership (SKBG) issued as a proof of ownership in public housing unit on land as referred in Article 18</p> <p>Article 56</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The management of vertical housing must be carried out by a legal entity, except for public rental housing, special housing, and state housing. 2. Specifically for DKI Jakarta, the legal entity must register and obtain a business license from the Governor.
Government Regulation No. 13 of 2021 on The Operation of Public Housing	National	<p>Article 15</p> <p>Public housing built using national/local government budget (APBD) included as are national/local government asset.</p> <p>Article 75</p> <p>Management of vertical housing is the eligibility of Association of Owners and Residents of Vertical Housing Units (PPPSRS). PPPSRS is allowed to appoint legal entity to carry out managerial activities.</p> <p>Article 76</p> <p>Management of public housing is carried out by Ministry/Local Government Agency that administer national/local government asset in the form of public housing.</p>
Governor Regulation No. 540 of 1990 on Guidelines for the Implementation Granting of SP3L	Provincial	<p>Article 2, Point 6</p> <p>For the requested land with an area of 5,000 sqm or above the applicant is required to finance and build low-cost public housing along with facilities equivalent to 20% of the area, and or other provisions determined by the Governor of DKI Jakarta.</p>

Annex 6: Documentation of Observation



Open Space in Kampung Kunir, designed to accommodate habitus in *kampung*




Kampung Kunir built in the same area of the old *kampung*. Front view: Tributary of Ciliwung River (behind riverbank wall), new Inspection Road which become the reason of eviction in 2015



Left: Shophouses and de facto area of Kunir; Right: Temporal housing (*huntara*)



Left: Small shop in the building. Right: Small shop catering for shophouse workers



Daily activities. Right: The dwellers dismantle *huntara* due to an agreement with DPRKP



Left: JRMK activity in Kunir. Right: *Yasinan* (communal prayer) in Kunir

Annex 7: Research Instruments

Focus Group Discussion Guidelines

Opening

Good evening,

My name is Nida An Khofiyya, a student at Erasmus University Rotterdam. First of all, thank you for taking your time to join this conversation for a while. Currently, I'm conducting research about your experience in asserting your right to build this *kampung*²¹. In addition, I would like to know your perspective on the difference between living back then in the old *kampung* and the current vertical *kampung*. This discussion will take maximum of one hour, and please make yourself comfortable as there are no wrong answers. Everyone here is welcome to respond. Your response will be recorded, and your name won't be disclosed. The whole conversation is confidential and will only be used for academic purposes only. (After receiving consent), shall we start?

Discussion

Condition in the old <i>kampung</i>
<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. How long had you stayed in the old <i>kampung</i>?2. How did you get the land and building here in Kunir before?3. How is the physical condition of the Old Kunir?4. Did you ever receive eviction warning before the 2015 eviction?5. Did you ever have land conflict with external parties before?6. How did the government acknowledge the old Kunir?
Condition post-eviction
<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. When did you first receive eviction warning and what did the dwellers do to response?2. Where did you stay after the eviction happened?3. How does eviction affect your daily activities and livelihood?4. Did you receive any support from any organisation?
Formation of cooperative and collective action
<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Why did you decide to build a cooperative?2. How did the dwellers make decision to build cooperative?3. What are the activities you've done through cooperative?
Current condition in vertical <i>kampung</i>
<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. What is your current ownership of this new <i>kampung</i>?2. How is your satisfaction to the current condition of the new <i>kampung</i>?3. Did you feel secure living in the new <i>kampung</i>?

Conclusion and Remarks

() Thank you for joining me, may you have a good rest for today.

²¹ I avoid using the term "tenure security" and try to explain it in common language

Interview Guidelines (for coalition)

Opening

Good morning/afternoon,

My name is Nida An Khofiyya, a student at Erasmus University Rotterdam. First of all, thank you for taking your time to participate in this interview. Currently, I'm conducting a search about tenure security in urban *kampung*, particularly in your organisation involvement in the struggle to improve tenure security condition in Kampung Kunir. In addition, I would like to know your perspective about the condition of Kampung Kunir dwellers and cooperative during the period of collective action. This interview will take maximum of one hour, and please make yourself comfortable as there are no wrong answers. Your response will be recorded, and your name won't be disclosed. The whole conversation is confidential and will only be used for academic purposes only. (After receiving consent), shall we start?

Questions

1. How was your organisation involved in the process of discussion, formulation, advocacy, and negotiation of fulfilling the demands of Kampung Kunir's dwellers with the government in the post-eviction period until the construction of Kampung Susun Kunir?
 - a. The beginning of involvement
 - b. The process of post-eviction assistance, the formation of cooperatives, to the construction and management of Kampung Susun Kunir
 - c. Division of responsibilities with partner organisations in providing assistance
2. How do you see the political situation in Jakarta that became opportunities to perform collective action?
3. How is the progress of tenure security conditions in the urban *kampung* of DKI Jakarta, particularly in Kampung Kunir after the political contract established?
4. How does your organisation engage in the discussion of urban *kampung* issue in Jakarta, particularly in advocating issue about Kampung Kunir?
5. How is the process of cooperative formation in Kampung Kunir?
 - a. How was your organisation involved in the process?
 - b. How was the dwellers' response?
 - c. How does the cooperative develop their activities?
6. What is the direction of movement (future plans) of JRMK/UPC networks to realise the security of living in urban villages in Jakarta?
7. How is the current socio-political conduciveness in Jakarta to perform collective action?
 - a. Acceptance of government and political actors
 - b. Views of the general public
 - c. Academic and professional support
 - d. Support from local, national and international organisations
8. How does your organisation perceive the shift in policies related to urban *kampung* along with the changing period of governorship in DKI Jakarta?
 - a. Changes in slum upgrading policy
 - b. History of urban village evictions in DKI Jakarta, including around Kampung Kunir

Conclusion and Remarks

- (). Thank you for sharing your experience and perspective. Do you have anything to add?

Interview Guidelines (for government)

Opening

Good morning/afternoon,

My name is Nida An Khofiyya, a student at Erasmus University Rotterdam. First of all, thank you for taking your time to participate in this interview. Currently, I'm conducting a search about tenure security in urban *kampung*, particularly in the progress of tenure security in Kampung Kunir after the redevelopment. In addition, I would like to understand your role in the process of redevelopment and your perspective on the collective action of Kampung Kunir dwellers. This interview will take maximum of one hour. Your response will be recorded, and your name won't be disclosed. The whole conversation is confidential and will only be used for academic purposes only. (After receiving consent), shall we start?

Questions

1. How is the division of responsibilities on the government side for the redevelopment of Kampung Kunir?
2. How was your agency involved in the negotiation process with the dwellers and supporting networks?
 - a. Regarding the redevelopment of Kampung Kunir
 - b. Regarding the ownership status of Kampung Kunir?
3. What are the government programs and regulation that serves as the legal basis for the redevelopment of Kampung Susun Kunir?
 - a. Link with Community Action Plan (CAP)
 - b. Linkages with other programs and regulations
4. What are the financing sources used for the redevelopment of Kampung Kunir?
5. Had your agency ever received recommendation documents from Kampung Kunir dwellers or supporting organisations related to urban kampung and tenure security?
6. Have there been any discussions on urban kampung and tenure security organised by the government or other parties involving the government?
7. What is the current ownership status of the land and buildings in Kunir Vertical Kampung?

Conclusion and Remarks

- (). Thank you for sharing your experience and perspective. Do you have anything to add?

Annex 8: Research Timeline

No	Process	April				May				June				July				August			
		I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Fieldwork Preparation																					
1	Proposal Submission																				
2	Discussion with experts																				
3	Connecting with stakeholders																				
4	Go or no go decision																				
5	Structuring survey tools																				
Data collection																					
6	Pilot survey																				
7	Survey & Interview																				
8	Data clarification (if needed)																				
Data Analysis																					
9	Structuring preliminary result																				
10	Data Analysis																				
Thesis Writing (Coherently)																					
11	Refining Introduction - Chapter 1																				
12	Literature Review - Chapter 2																				
13	Research Design & Method - Chapter 3																				
14	Research Findings - Chapter 4																				
15	Conclusion & Recommendation - Chapter 5																				
16	Overall																				
17	2nd Draft Submission																				
18	Revision & Finalisation																				
19	2nd Final Submission																				

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Your Signature(s) : 

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