ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL:
The Transform Programme and NGOs in Uganda

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List of Acronyms

AAIU  Action Aid International Uganda
CAFOD  Catholic Fund for Overseas Development
CDRA  Community Development Resource Association
CDRN  Community Development Resource Network
INTRAC The International Non-governmental Organisation Training and Research Centre
KDFA  Kalangala District Farmers Association
MURDA  Mutunda United Rural Development Association
NGOs  Non-Governmental Organisations
INGOs  International Non-Governmental Organisations
LNGOs  Local Non-Governmental Organisations
SNGO Southern Non-Governmental Organisation
TP  Transform Programme
ODC  Organisational Development Consultancy
OT  Organisation Transformation
WUS UK  World University Services – United Kingdom
Relevance to Development Studies

Issues of capacity building and organisational strengthening for non-governmental organisations both in the North and the South are of paramount importance to the field of development studies given that practice in this field is not yet aligned and informed by theory. It is still a grey area to practitioners.

Keywords

Capacity Building, Non-Governmental Organisations and Organisational Strengthening.
Dedication

To Alex and Joshua the two men in my life, I love you both.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Capacity Building became an issue with Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in the 1990s (Lewis 2007: 19). By the 1980s, the NGO sector had grown in both size and significance. Donors were looking to it as a provider of social services such as education and health in the South, the state having withdrawn from their delivery in the context of structural adjustment policies prescribed by the major international financial institutions, namely the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (Agg 2006: 9 and Wallace and Lewis 2000). In the 1980s and early ‘90s, NGOs were seen as a force in their own right in the field of development---as necessary and cost-effective, as having strong contacts (and being more responsive to their contacts) in local communities, and with a reputation for reaching the poor, which the state had failed to do. They were considered innovative and value-driven, with committed staff and volunteers---in marked contrast to governments that were ‘bureaucratic, inherently inefficient and possibly corrupt’ (Agg 2006 and Hailey 2001: 12)

The result was a sharp increase in the volume of development assistance channelled to NGOs in both the North and the South. Funds were withdrawn from the state and directed to and through Northern NGOs (Wallace and Lewis 2000). Some donors were beginning to fund Southern NGOs directly, and the period was marked by changes in the relationships between NGOs in the North and their Southern counterparts. Northern NGOs were gradually shifting away from implementing projects themselves, transferring resources and skills to the South, and were instead building structures for self-reliance and sustainability in the communities in which worked (Lewis 2007). They were also working ‘in partnership’ with Southern NGOs. With increased funds in the South, Southern NGOs took on expanded roles and new expectations, seeing themselves as a ‘countervailing power to the state in democratisation processes’ (James 1998: 1), as ‘private service deliverers’ (Sahley 1995, cited in Lewis 2007: 206), or as ‘strengthening people's ability to hold public servants and politicians accountable for their (in)actions and to foster democratic change by expanding social pluralism’ (Fowler et al. 1992: 7)

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1 For the purposes of this research, the term ‘South’ refers to the developing countries of the world excluding Australia and New Zealand.
2 For purposes of this research, the term ‘North’ refers to a group of rich countries that used to be generally referred to as ‘developed’.
In such a context, there was considerable pressure on the organisational and management capacities of these NGOs and donors were encouraging them to invest in building up their organisational capacities so they could cope more effectively (Edwards and Hulme 1992; Smillie 1995; Fowler 1997; and Eade 1998 as cited in Hailey 2001: 166). Northern NGOs were also coming under pressure from their own funders who were demanding more accountability and sustainability of development work in addition to other conditions and demands—such as effective service delivery; rapid disbursement and utilization of funds and assurance that funds were being handled and spent honestly (Carroll 1992). Northern NGOs began to see their own effectiveness in terms of the development, performance and accountability of their Southern partners, and they found many were lacking the organisational and managerial capacity to deliver the results they needed and expected either effectively or efficiently. Many Southern NGOs lacked administrative, structural, leadership, strategic, and other capacities (Davidoff and Kaplan 2004: 9).

As a result, the idea of “capacity-building” emerged in the context of a felt need on the part of NNGOs and donors to improve accountability and to strengthen relevant capacities in SNGOs. Different donors and NNGOs tackled the task in different ways, using a range of strategies and approaches (as we shall see in the next chapter). However, one group, comprising Oxfam International, Christian Aid, Catholic Fund for Overseas Development (CAFOD) and World University Services (WUS, UK) formed a consortium and, together with capacity-building NGOs in both the North and South, set to work on building up the organisational capacity of southern partners (P. Wilson 2004: 6). This saw the birth of an NGO capacity-building programme that is now called “The Transform Programme” (abbreviated as TP).

**The Transform Programme - History and Background**

The Transform Programme was a pre-designed training programme that used a process consultancy approach to organizational development (often referred to as organisational development consultancy (ODC) to strengthen the capacity of Southern NGOs. It focused on Africa, and was implemented by a network of training NGOs and consultants who were based in the region ---The Community Development Resource Network (CDRN) in Uganda, Iceberg Consultants in Kenya, Development Associates in Zimbabwe, Community Aid and Small Enterprise Consultancy (CASEC) in Tanzania, Development Organisation for People’s Empowerment (DOPE) in Zambia, Programme Régional de Formation et d’Échanges pour le Développement (PREFED) in Rwanda, AfriConsult (AFRICON) in Gambia and Association for Rural Development (ARD) in Sierra Leone. The coordinating office of Transform Africa was in the United Kingdom (Wilson 2004).

For a number of years, the World University Service (WUS) ran an African NGO leadership training programme in the United Kingdom, but it soon concluded that it would be more appropriate and more cost-effective to
transfer it to Africa. With the help of INTRAC (the International NGO Training and Research Centre), it developed a proposal and a programme content. These were seen by a number of Northern NGOs (NNGOs) such as Action on Disability and Development (ADD), the Catholic Fund for Overseas Development (CAFOD), Christian Aid and Oxfam International, all of which were working in partnership with Southern NGOs (SNGOs) in Africa. They expressed interest and they signed—up because they wanted capacity building services to be provided to their SNGO partners. The NNGOs, together with WUS, formed the consortium and, on the latter's behalf, WUS submitted the proposal it had developed to the European Union and (in January 2003) to the Overseas Development Agency (ODA) of the UK government (now the Department for International Development or DFID). The latter agreed to fund the programme for five years from October 1993 to September 1998 (Wilson 2004:6).

Up to 1994, INTRAC had been contracted to design and deliver a 6-week strategic management course to participating SNGOs. However, this gave way to a new approach to capacity building. Contact was made with African training organisations that specialised in helping to strengthen the work of NGO and Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) within the region. They included CDRN in Uganda and Iceberg in Kenya. Six trainers from these organisations were trained, employed by the programme manager to run courses, and hired by participating NGOs to provide in-house consultancy and training support. As the programme took on more of an organizational development consultancy (ODC) training approach in 1995, the manager began to call it “Transform”—the Transform Programme (TP). From 1998 to 2000, staff from training organisations in three countries---CDRN in Uganda, Iceberg in Kenya and Development Associates (DA) in Zimbabwe---were brought together and programme activities were implemented in Uganda, Kenya and Zimbabwe. These training organisations together formed a network—the Transform Network. TP became a fully registered charity in the UK with its head as the programme director, full-time staff and a board of directors. In 2000, it expanded its activities to Rwanda, Tanzania and Zambia and in 2003 to Gambia and Sierra Leone (Wilson 2004).

1.2 Justification

This research paper focuses on capacity building through the Transform Programme for KDFA and MURDA in the period 2002-2004. It hopes to contribute to the existing literature on capacity building and organisational strengthening and thus to be relevant to international donor agencies, NNGOs, SNGO, training institutions and organisational capacity building practitioners who are grappling with issues of this kind. The TP has been pointed out as a programme that has moved beyond the rhetoric of capacity building towards radical organisational support and change (Lewis 2007: 208). The programme brings together a number of NNGOs operating in Uganda to fund capacity building activities for their SNGO partners in a systematic way to enable SNGO partners to become self-determined, self-sustaining and less dependent on NNGOs and other northern resource channels.
1.3 The aims of the study

This research paper looks at the way the Transform Programme worked between 2002 and 2004 as implemented in Uganda by CDRN, a member of the Transform Network. It tries to identify factors that shaped the result of the exercise in two organisations that are taken as case studies, to interpret what happened in these cases, and to try to draw lessons from it. It is not a study of the impact of the Transform Programme on their operational efficiency so much as an attempt to understand and explain the different experiences. It analyses the ODC intervention approach that the Programme uses, and asks what determined the outcomes.

1.4 The research question

The central question the study addresses is: “What factors explain the outcome of organisational capacity building programmes in the two case studies that are selected and what lessons can be learned from these experiences with regard to the broader Transform Programme?”

Sub-Research Questions

The research agenda can be made more explicit with a number of sub-questions:

- What was the outcome of the Transform Programme in the two case areas?
- What were the underlying assumptions about change (or the underlying theory of change) on which the programme was based?
- How were they reflected in the logic and structure of the programme and how far were they appropriate?
- How far do the strengths or weaknesses revealed in the exercise explain the eventual outcome?

1.5 The central hypothesis

The working hypothesis behind these questions is that there are underlying assumptions and body of theory behind the Transform Programme are far too general, have not been made sufficiently explicit, and are not always internally coherent or well thought-through. As a result, there has been too quick a focus on developing fund-raising skills and accountability because streamlining seemed to be essential from the standpoint of donors. There was too little concern with being effective, developing leadership in the community and successfully accomplishing their mission.
1.6 Research Methodology

The Transform Programme was chosen as the focus of this study because of its importance in its field and its widespread use. It is one of the oldest surviving pre-designed training programmes, it has been well packaged and it is implemented by a chain of Southern NGOs in several African Countries. It is said to enable SNGOs to become self-determined and less dependent on NNGOs and other northern resource channels because, while it was started by NNGOs, it is now fully owned and implemented by SNGOs in Africa. This gives it importance. CDRN was chosen because it is an organisation that is highly regarded, not only in the Ugandan NGO sector but internationally. It has contributed significantly to the strengthening of the capacity of NGOs and CBOs involved in community development through the use of participatory techniques and methodologies. Looking at the TP as it has been implemented through CDRN, it is believed to offer a not-untypical picture of what has been happening.

The research itself employs a case-study method, looking at the Transform capacity building programme in two SNGOs between 2002 and 2004. Both are partners of Action Aid Uganda (an NNGO), removing the possible impact of donor differences. They are also both located in rural Uganda. The organizations are Kalangala District Farmers Association (KDFA) in Kalangala District in Lake Victoria and Mutunda Rural Development Association (MURDA) in Masindi District, 136kms north of Kampala on the Kampala-Gulu highway.

KDFA and MURDA were selected because they participated in the TP during the same period, both were Action Aid partners, both received approximately the same amount of funding for the programmes, both were located in rural Uganda, and both were membership organisations.

In-depth interviews and discussions were conducted with the following people and groups:

- The Consultant/trainer with CDRN---who had been engaged on the TP since its inception with CDRN (in 1998)
- The coordinator of KDFA
- 3 board members of KDFA
- The Coordinator of the Action Aid Masindi Area Programme
- The head and board members of MURDA.

A review was also carried out of CDRN organizational documents about the TP, including proposals, evaluation reports, review reports, planning papers, policy documents, strategic thinking documents, training designs and manuals and other documents relating to KDFA and MURDA.
1.7 Limitations of the study

Collating information from CDRN was constrained by the fact that it had ceased its involvement in the Transform Network before this research was initiated and that the staff who had been working on the programme had by that time left. Similarly, in KDFA and MURDA, there was little documentation to be consulted given a poor culture of documentation and information management and the lack of modern information storage facilities. There was also a problem of attribution because they were not operating in a vacuum. Many internal and external factors influenced their operation and in turn caused them to change. Attributing change to the TP alone was therefore not easy.

Limitations also followed from other developments internal to KDFA, such as the fact that it experienced a high staff turnover after the end of the TP and that the skeleton staff that remained was busy looking for funds. Action Aid, who had been their longest funder, had stopped its funding and the organization was barely surviving. KADFA had also participated in other training workshops offered by Action Aid in Kalangala and so it was often, again, difficult to isolate outcomes were the result of the TP as against other training programmes. On the other hand, the fact that CDRN left the TP and that Action Aid funding came to an end, leaving KDFA struggling, is not incompatible with a hypothesis to the effect that streamlining its internal organisation was not the kind of capacity building that was to prove most needed.

1.8 Structure of the paper

The paper contains five chapters. The next chapter presents the conceptual framework on this paper is based and starts with a brief about the NGO context in Uganda; moves to present concepts and terms used in the paper; explores relationships between NGOs and donors and between NNGOs and SNGOs; explores the field of capacity building and how it has been evolving, and ends with a theoretical framework that theorises and analyses the transform programme. Chapter three sets the scene through its presentation of CDRN---its history and location within the transform programme; details the transform programme and how it was implemented in our case-study organisations and ends with providing information about the case-study organisations---KDF and MURDA. Chapter four is a presentation of achievements of the Transform Programme within KDF and MURDA and analyses the assumptions on which TP was based and the strengths and weaknesses of those programme based on those assumption. The last chapter is a brief conclusion.
Chapter 2
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 The NGO context in Uganda

The NGO sector in Uganda is relatively young, most organizations having been founded after 1986, when the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government came to power. During the colonial period, and from then until the 1980s, welfare and charitable organisations operated under the auspices of the church, having been founded by missionaries. They acted as philanthropic intermediaries providing welfare services to the poor and as such were early precursors of the non-governmental organizations that were to rise to prominence in the late 1990s (Thue et al. 2002). The 1990s witnessed the emergence of a vibrant NGO sector involved in service delivery, following the government’s agreement to an Economic Recovery Programme (essentially a structural adjustment programme) in May 1987. It led to retrenchment of the civil service, and saw large numbers of unemployed professional Ugandans opting to form NGOs to make a difference, access resources and as a means of employment and survival. The result was a proliferation of local ‘brief case NGOs’, prompting the government to regulate and manage the sector by means of a registration system that was established under the 1989 National NGO Registration Act.

Under the Act, it became mandatory for all NGOs to register with the NGO Registration Board under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, enabling the government to monitor their activities (UNDP 2007). Some NGOs that were advocating that the government should be held accountable for its in/ action found it hard to register because the government considered them to be under the influence of the opposition. This is still the case for NGOs associated with opposition politicians and personalities in as far as the government restricts NGO activities to service delivery by sub-contracting them to deliver services such water, health and education, redirecting them away from other roles expected by the donor community such as challenging the power of the state or demanding a greater degree of accountability. NGOs with such mandates are forced to cease operating because the environment—of which the government is an important part—is for them harsh and intolerant.

The NGOs as a group, however, are in no sense homogenous. Their constituencies, interests, methods of work and objectives are indeed diverse. Nevertheless, they do seem to agree on a number of common issues and concerns such as human rights, the need to resolve conflict and the rehabilitation of war victims, the need for service delivery and poverty eradication, to fight corruption, act on debt issues, and for civic education and election monitoring. A study commissioned by the Norwegian embassy in Uganda, published in 2002, revealed that the character and the role of most
NGOs in Uganda was influenced by four major factors: the availability of funds and the interests of funders/donors; the country’s political history and the contemporary political environment; socio-economic conditions prevalent in the country; and the character and objectives of the founding personalities. However, the majority of these NGOs are dependent on external donor funding and the interests of donors often determine their objectives. The NGO-donor link is therefore a crucial one and it has been argued that it has often undermined their independence and the sustainability of their programmes and of core activities. Below we look at the different categories of NGOs that are commonly encountered and that play a role in this research.

2.2 Categories, Concepts and Terms

**Non-governmental organisations (NGOs)**

NGOs are organisations that are not state-run but nevertheless engaged in development and poverty reduction work at local, national and global levels around the world. Their roots lie in the United Nations system that was established after the Second World War where the designation ‘non-governmental organisation’ was introduced to denote international non-state organizations that were to be given consultative status in UN activities (Lewis 2001). They are formally constituted, non-governmental (implying that they should be autonomous and independent from the state, though in practice that is rarely achieved), self-governing, not for profit, with some degree of voluntary involvement and serving others (James 1994). They work in various areas such as development, human and civil rights, social change, environmental conservation, welfare, relief, HIV/AIDS, lobbying and advocacy etc. NGOs also operate at different levels, international, regional, national and grass root.

**Northern Non-Governmental Organisations (NNGOs)**

Also commonly referred to as International NGOs (or INGOs), NNGOs have their origins in industrialised countries of the North and operate in more than one country or region outside their country of origin (B. Lipson 2006). In this study, we are concerned with the way they relate to their Southern partners—in implementing their development programmes through Southern NGO partners or by funding development programmes of the latter. Action Aid International Uganda, for example, combines both roles in its partnership with KADFA and MURDA. An implication of funding the development programmes of Southern partners is that it can raise distinctive problems of accountability.

**Local Non-Governmental Organisations (LNGOs)**

Local Non-Governmental Organisations (LNGOs) is a term that is sometimes used interchangeably with service, local intermediary or indigenous
NGOs. For the purposes of this research, LNGOs refer to NGOs that have their origin in the developing countries of the world (Fowler et al. 1992: 8), that are not membership based, but are independent of NNGOs (in the sense that their sustainability is not based on a partnership relationship with a Northern NGO, though they may receive funds to work with SNGO partners). They are seen as self-sustaining, with paid staff on salaries comparable to those of NNGO branches in the same country. The fact that they are not membership based means that they are not set up or controlled by the beneficiary groups that they aim to serve and not directly accountable to them. CDRN is an example of a local NGO.

**Southern Non-Governmental Organisations (SNGOs)**

SNGOs are seen as membership based organisation set up by their members to provide services to their community. They are usually small in terms of both staff numbers (with paid staff but also a considerable number of volunteers) and their area of operation (with sub-county or district coverage). They are often dependant on a single donor agency, usually an NNGO that funds programme activities and administration (core costs such as salaries and other monthly bills) to keep the organization operating—a kind of working relationship that is often referred to as “a partnership”. Though they may have paid staff, their salaries do not compare well with LNGOs. They may be registered as NGOs with the NGO Board in Uganda and acquire NGO status but in reality they are often CBOs. Their NGO status gives them access to outside funds, but funding guidelines mean that they require a Board registration certificate, a move designed to weed out brief case NGOs. Examples include KDFA and MURDA. SNGO partners are used by NNGOs not only to serve the community, but to further their own interests and those of their external constituencies (Gubbels and Koss 2000: 182). A partnership between an SNGO and an NNGO, as understood in this research, can be illustrated best by Eade’s (2007: 631) experience as the editor of Development in Practice:

“---my job security depending initially on a trickle of one–year grants (with the plug likely to be pulled at short notice), being evaluated by managers with no particular expertise in journals publishing, chasing funding applications that had languished in someone’s in-tray for months, having to meet reporting requirements that bore no relation to the needs and rhythms of the project and so on.”

Such is the experience of Southern NGOs such as KDFA and MURDA.

**Community–Based Organisation (CBO)**

Gubbels and Koss (2000: 181) define a CBO as “an inclusive type of organisation created and controlled by local people for their own benefit. They usually start as groups, designed to help members meet their basic needs and further their common interests. Examples include self-help groups, savings and credit groups, village development committee, etc”. For the purpose of this research CBOs are defined as “grassroots organisations set up by those
belonging to a specific geographical community, and usually the members are of the same ethnic group. The size of their operation is relatively small scale; they work in the local communities where they are based; they are membership-based; and they are frequently not legally registered” (Wright-Revolledo 2007: 6).

In Uganda, CBOs have rules, regulations, bye-laws and constitutions that guide them and these are formulated by the members. They are also registered at the district level with the Department of Community Development and at the sub-counties level (where they operate) with the Office of the Development Assistant. CBOs are therefore recognised at sub-county and district level, even if not at the national level. Members volunteer to take on the role of mobiliser, treasurer or secretary as they cannot afford to employ professional staff to organise activities. They mobilize resources through membership subscription fees, by charging non-members for services rendered or by accessing funds externally from donor agencies, especially NNGOs. They often do not have offices as they cannot afford rent. CBOs have potential for growth into fully fledged NGOs and many do graduate. MURDA, for example, started as a CBO and progressed to NGO status.

2.3 The relationship between NGOs and Donors

In the 1950s and 1960s, NGOs and official donors (multilateral institutions and bilateral donors) pursued different development agendas and were largely disinterested in each other’s activities. Occasionally they were suspicious of each other’s agendas (ODI 1995). NGOs were seen as organizations that were useful in emergency work rather than serious actors in development work. Bilateral donors began to support NGO programmes in the 1970s, beginning with Canada and Norway, and this trend accelerated in the 1980s – the reflection of a recognition by donors that they could contribute to official aid objectives in poverty reduction, environmental conservation, provision of social services and the “new policy agenda”.

“This was a period of heightened profile for NGOs. NGOs were identified as suitable vehicles for two new related areas of policy impetus within development policy: the idea of good governance in which NGOs were viewed as public actors with a key role in supporting democratic processes in the political sphere and “economic liberalization” in which the private aspect of NGOs was emphasised and NGOs were seen as important new market-based actors with the potential to deliver services more efficiently than the state” (D. Lewis 2001: 32).

The period was also characterised by a much reduced role for the state in development policy (Wallace and Lewis 2000), NGOs being favoured as more cost-effective and better at reaching the poor (Agg 2006). The flow of
development funds to NGOs increased but, as scale increased, so did the concern with oversight and accountability among NGOs.

2.4 The changing relationship between NNGOs and SNGOs

By the late 1990s, NNGOs were operating in an increasingly complex environment which was affecting them in three ways. First, they were steadily shifting from direct implementation of projects and programmes in the South to enabling SNGOs to implement them. Second, donors were increasing direct funding to SNGOs, by-passing the NNGO channel. Third, donors were emphasising emergency relief at the expense of longer-term development which was the core of the NGOs’ work. Northern NGOs were facing an ‘identity crisis’ and found themselves caught between different demands which gave them a hybrid character. Carroll (1992), gives a number of demands or conditions made by donors to NGOs: effective service delivery; rapid disbursement and utilization of funds, assurance that funds would be handled and spent honestly, and fostering a sense of ownership among beneficiaries to increase sustainability. After more than a decade promoting NNGOs as channels for international aid to the South, they were faced with criticism about their accountability and the sustainability of the work they were sponsoring. Observers such as Carroll (1992) and Fowler (1998) were suggesting that NNGOs should emphasize capacity building and the viability of services and not just routine services. Similarly, Brown and Korten (1989) argued that NNGOs needed to develop the capacity of SNGOs to replace them.

Around 1990-1992, the term “capacity building” began to be widely used by donors. By then, NGOs in Africa had grown in number and diversity. With this expansion, concerns about the effectiveness of their programmes and projects and meeting donor accountability requirements was growing. Donors and NNGOs increased their efforts to build SNGO capacity and to build structures for self-reliance and sustainability within communities. A DFID funded NGO capacity building programme by Action Aid Kenya and a CBO strengthening programme by CDRN in Uganda is discussed in this light by Wilson (2004), raising the notion of ‘partnerships’ with SNGOs (Lewis 2007).

A report by Chapman and Wendoh (2007: 31) reveals that SNGOs in their partnerships with NNGOs valued, among other things, their access to NNGO support to build up their capacity. NNGOs continued to invest in it as many partners were beginning to judge their own effectiveness in terms of their growth and performance (though controversy about their content and approach was still persisting). Much lip service was given to the need for SNGOs to “become autonomous, powerful, strategic and creative shapers of their own destiny and the destiny of their respective communities and countries” (S. Davidoff and A. Kaplan 2004). However, the capacity building work at the time was focused on staff skills to meet the planning and reporting requirements of donors. NNGOs were stimulated to “regionalise” and to focus on certain countries to be closer to the ground and better able support the growth of organisational development (OD) and capacity building service providers. With
capacity building came the expectation that stronger southern NGO partners would enable NGOs to fulfil their mission more effectively and reduce the workload of their staff---many of whom felt over-stretched by large portfolios of difficult and time-consuming partners (James 1998). Whether this has been achieved or not is not yet known as few impact assessment studies have been undertaken.

2.5 Capacity-building to strengthen the capacity of Southern NGOs

Capacity building was a term that was originally used in relation to the public sector but it started to be used in relation to NGOs/SNGOs relationships in the 1990s (Lewis 2001; Hailey and James 2003). A number of writers acknowledge that there is no one, universally accepted definition of capacity building (Sahley 1994; Eade 1997; James 1998; Lewis 2001; Smillie and Hailey 2001; James 2002 as cited in (Hailey and James 2003: 1). It is a broad term that has been used to refer to diverse situations. Hailey and James (2003) quote Lewis (2001:11) as saying that “it is a term beset by conflict and confusion” and open to different interpretations. “At one level, it is concerned with building the organisational capacities of NGOs to survive and fulfil their mission and, at another, with building the capacity of civil society in its broadest sense, strengthening the ability of key stakeholders (communities, families and individuals) to participate in the political and social arena” (Eade 1997: 35 as cited in Hailey and James 2003).

Kaplan (1999: 19) takes the view that capacity building is used by development organisations and donors when they look at their Southern partners, though it is also used by NGOs in the south to address their own needs and constraints. He clarifies further, that the meaning of the term depends on who is using it--an NGO or a SNGO. NGOs use it with regard to SNGOs as local delivery vehicles for plans and policies developed in the north. In this sense, the purpose of capacity building is to enable the SNGO to deliver specified outputs efficiently and cost-effectively. For the SNGO, the aim is to build itself up as a robust and sustainable entity with its own focus and direction, capable of strategising and innovation, responding with flexibility and adaptability to changing contexts and circumstances and bringing about social transformation. In this sense, NGOs are seen as autonomous entities that can engage actively and independently with their communities and their NGO partners and other donor agencies.

In this research, capacity building is seen from an NGO standpoint as “an explicit outside intervention to improve an organisation’s performance in relation to its mission, context, resources and sustainability” enabling it to function as resilient, strategic and autonomous entity (Kaplan 1999: 20). It aims to develop a more effective, efficient, viable, resilient, strategic and autonomous organisation by creating conditions in which change can take place from within (ibidem). It entails a self-managed process of organisational
change, in which stakeholders (leaders, staff, members and beneficiary groups) learn to diagnose their organisational strengths and weaknesses, identify critical issues, devise, apply and assess solutions. Because this cannot be done easily by stakeholders alone, an external facilitator or consultant is usually called in to direct the process. Different approaches and strategies have been used by donors and by NGOs to strengthen the capacity of their NGO partners, but it has led to confusion and conflict because of the question of power and autonomy that is inherent in such partnerships.

A 6-month INTRAC research project provides a useful overview of the range of approaches that can be entailed under the umbrella OD capacity-building for NGOs:

- Giving NGOs partners increased power in the relationship – leading to a more equitable ‘partnership’;
- Institutional funding to NGOs – where NGOs grant a sum of money for a number of years to cover agreed institutional costs and programmatic activities;
- Management training for NGOs in the form of short courses conducted by the NGO partner or other individuals and institutions in the north or south entailing training in personnel management; financial management or strategic planning; as well as exposure training through exchanges; south south visits and/or linkages; secondments and visits to NGO partners;
- Distance learning and information dissemination through newsletters;
- Staff attachments – where a staff member or volunteer from an NGO or agency is seconded to an NGO partner on a full-time basis for a period of time; or

Organisational development consultancy (ODC)

Source: James (1994)
Training-based strategies and SNGO strength

Training is the most popular and traditional approach to strengthening SNGO capacities. It has been found effective for introducing new ideas, but far less so when it comes to getting people to let go of old ways of doing things—itself a vital dimension of organisational change. Training is usually outside the organisation and people then face the problem of re-entry into an untrained organisation. This enables it to avoid taking responsibility for addressing deeper issues such as its identity, values, beliefs, culture, motivation and underlying theory of development (James 1998: 2). Training usually focuses on individual actions, and yet Baser and Morgan (2008: 24) acknowledge that “working with individual people does not have the immediate linear, causal relationship with overall organisational capacity as assumed in some interventions.” As a result, it is argued, that training is seldom effective in improving an organisation's functioning if it is not part of an overall OD programme. Training is offered to key people in an organisation. It is usually management training directed towards managers with a view to improving their competence and performance and that of the organisational environment with the ultimate goal of raising the standards of organisational performance (Kubr and Prokopenko 1989).

Between 1993 and 2001, TP used this approach taking two managers from each organisation to a selected venue away from their organizations and training them for five days, for example, in monitoring and evaluation, in fundraising etc. At the end of the workshop, they were expected to bring about change in their organizations by implementing what they had learnt. When it failed to produce the expected results, TP turned to organizational development.

Organizational Development

Diversity and innovation lie at the heart of OD, though various influences have shaped it, making it a diverse discipline with a variety of definitions (R. James 1998: 8). For Hailey (1994), it is about developing a more effective, viable, autonomous and legitimate organization by creating the conditions in which change can take place from within the organization while, for Gubbels and Koss (2000), it as a way of strengthening the capacity of organizations enabling them to be more autonomous and effective. It requires helping organizations to identify the combination of system, structure, style and environmental factors that limit performance. It also entails helping the organization select the right mix of tools, methods and strategies to overcome limiting factors. Fowler et al. (1992) view it as an on-going process that optimizes an organisation's performance in relation to its goals, resources and environment.

CDRA (2008) define OD as a process-oriented approach that stresses the importance of human and organisational qualities such as resourcefulness, identity, resilience, innovation, collaboration, adaptiveness, courage, imagination and aspiration. It is said to represent ‘process as outcome’ as
opposed to the ‘product as outcome’ approach of other approaches. It was also used to put the human element into capacity development strategies, given the failure that resulted from an emphasis on financial and material resources and on training staff away from their own environment and context. It was also realised that resources on their own could not bring about sustained capacity within organizations if the people or human resources were not taken through a process that made them think seriously about the way they were working or doing things (organizational culture) and the influence from the environment and context within which the people operated. The OD strategy combines approaches such as external facilitation, consultancy and support and techniques such as team building, participation and cultural change (Baser and Morgan 2008: 52).

OD is normally defined as a set of activities directed to increasing overall organizational effectiveness and health, based on the concepts and approaches of behavioural science (Beckhard and Harris 1987). It focuses on issues such as organizational climate, information sharing, communication, team-building, collaborative relationships between units etc. and special attention is paid to the identification and change of values, attitudes, interpersonal relations and organizational processes. It is seen as one of seven interventions or solutions in developing managers and improving organisational performance, the others being management education, management development, management training, experiential learning, improvement in organization systems and practice and management consulting. OD is defined in this context as a ‘process of planned and purpose oriented development of the human side of organizations as well as their norms, culture and psychological climate using behavioural science to improve the general organizational performance’ (Kubr and Prokopenko 1989). Its objectives are to improve organizational performance, integrate organizational and individual objectives, and introduce positive organizational changes to achieve organizational goals (Kubr and Prokopenko 1989). CDRA says that OD should strive to increase an organization’s capacity to ‘listen with deep interest and empathy to clients, context and one’s own organizational impulse; become conscious of and capable of self-reflection on the principles, values and conceptual framework out of which work is done as well as the implications of them’ (Kaplan 2003: 18).

Consultancy on OD came to be considered a key approach in the field of NGO capacity building and it was prioritised as a key development strategy by a number of major NNGOs such as The Netherlands Organisation for International Development (NOVIB), HIVOS, BILANCE, Oxfam International, Norwegian Church Aid, Dan Church Aid etc (James 1998: 1). It offers a process-oriented approach to the capacity of an organization to diagnose its own problems and develop its own solutions (ibidem). It has underlying values of participation, empowerment and working together. These are exhibited in TP which is the main focus of this research and we will look at how this works in practice.
2.6 The Theoretical Framework

Despite many references to the working environment of CBOs, one of the underlying assumptions of the TP, and of OD consultancy that lies at the heart of it, is that the most fundamental problems to be faced are internal to the organization—that if it is streamlined, better focussed and better led, then it will be more effective, more independent and self-contained, better able to secure its funding from a range of sources with activities that are more transparent and more readily accountable. It will be better equipped to prioritise problems and to plan its approach to them and, as a result, not only more efficient but also more effective. This section looks at these theoretical underpinnings and some of the assumptions behind them.

In the TP model, capacity building assumes that outside interventions will improve an organization’s performance if they focus on its internal life (‘TO BE’); its external relationships and linkages ‘TO RELATE’, and what it does and how it works or performs in its responsibilities (‘TO DO’). The way it relates to its environment—-to its local community and to other higher level actors—is a function of its organization and the way it operates. The thinking involved makes use of systems theory along the lines of Figure 1 (Chen 2005: 4, Kaplan 1999: 20). Systems theory conceptualizes a programme intervention as having five components—an input, transformation, an output, a feedback and an environment. Each will be looked at separately based on Chen (2005) to bring out some of the underlying assumptions of this line of thinking.

**Inputs** are seen as resources that are received from the organisation’s environment that can include finance, technology, facilities, equipment, personnel, clients etc. They form and sustain a programme but they cannot work unless they are systematically organized, and they usually require an implementing organization to secure and manage them effectively. Strategic interests, priorities and expectations on the part of other actors in the environment are assumed to be constructive and benign and therefore of marginal significance.

**Transformation** is the process by which a programme converts these inputs into outputs. In the context of TP, it begins with an initial intervention to improve the way the organization operates so that, in a later stage, it can provide better services to its clients. Transformation is a sequence of events that are necessary to achieve desirable outputs. The underlying assumption here is that the process automatically leads to the predicted results or outputs.

**Outputs** are the result of that transformation, crucial being the attainment of the programme’s goals and objectives. The assumption here is that the organization’s ability to attain its goals is simply a function of its capacity to use inputs effectively.
Environment refers to any factors lying outside the programme that can foster or constrain---such as social norms, political structures, the economy, funding agencies, interest groups etc. The importance of the environment is therefore recognised, but internal factors are considered more important than external ones and the relationship between the two is not explicitly theorised.

Feedback is necessary for a programme to correct or to adjust its activities so they are more effective. It needs information on inputs and outputs, transformation and the environment’s responses to them and it then helps the organisation to gauge whether inputs are adequate and adequately organized, interventions implemented appropriately, target groups reached, clients receiving quality service, goals being achieved and meeting expectations of funding agencies and stakeholders.

Figure 1: A Systems View of a Programme

The general thrust of the underlying model is that processes internal to the organization are the central issue. Links to the external environment are implicit, not explicit (there are no lines between input-transformation-output-feedback and the environment for example), and the implication therefore is that internal changes are what really matters.

2.7 Assumptions and Reality

A major area of concern with this approach is that it plays relatively little attention to the operating environment in which relatively small CBOs and SNGOs work and that it makes their relationships with other actors peripheral to the need for internal reorganisation and streamlining. It is simply assumed
that more efficient internal organisation will make it more effective. This will then be reflected in an enhanced capacity to deal with others. Clearly, how efficient an organisation is internally is relevant for performance and does influence outcomes, but this paper will argue that the reality of Africa is such that size, context and external pressures are as (if not more) important. It will also argue that CDRA, in its implementation of TP, reached the same conclusions, and it will ask why then the TP took the line it did.
Chapter 3
THE SETTING AND THE CASE STUDIES

3.1 The Community Development Resource Network (CDRN).

CDRN is an INGO in Kampala, Uganda (see Appendix 1 for a map of Uganda) and is registered by the NGO Board under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. It was founded in 1994 by a small group of Ugandan professionals engaged in community development at a time when donor funding of Uganda was on the increase. However, the capacity of local organisations to use these resources did not increase commensurably. There was considerable waste, their approach was top-down, with little or no involvement of local recipient communities, and much use was made of expatriate personnel and other external support. The creation of CDRN reflected a desire for change---for effective community development through participatory techniques, enabling the organizations involved to become more effective (CDRN 1997: 4). By the 1990s, Uganda had embarked on a structural adjustment programme. Privatisation was causing widespread unemployment and, with an increased flow of development assistance to NGOs, CBOs and NGOs were being started with very limited capacities.

CDRN was initially intended to make them more effective. However, it now places more emphasis on influencing the policy environment in which these civil society organizations are situated. As we shall see in later chapters, it has become more focused on context. It is strongly committed to righting social injustice in Uganda which it sees arising from gender and other forms of inequality, poor governance, limited empowerment and the denial of rights. It is governed by a board of directors that is responsible for providing strategic direction and giving advice on strategic matters that affect the organization and it employs full-time staff. It has implemented a number of donor-funded programmes aimed at enhancing and strengthening the effectiveness of community-based organisations and NGOs involved in community development work. It is involved in organizational support, networking and research activities. CDRN is not a membership organisation. It does not have its own geographically located projects or programmes, it seeks a long-term relationship with partner organizations to whom it provides “training”. It is financed through donor grants for long-term training and organisational development programmes and through user charges and fees levied on services provided such as research and consultancy. It envisages ‘a well-governed and just society where all women and men live in dignity and harmony’ and it exists to ‘contribute to the growth of a vibrant and self determined Civil Society that defends the rights of the poor and promotes peace, justice, democracy and social equity’.

CDRN first came in contact with the TP in 1995, when the latter hired it to provide consultancy and training support to two NGOs who were taking part in its programme—the Foundation of People with Disabilities (FPD) in Bushenyi and the Gulu Disabled People’s Union (GDPU). In 1996, it participated in other activities of
the TP—curriculum development and the delivery of a strategic management course for 9 large NGOs from Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda; consultancy support and follow-up visits to NGOs from Sudan, Kenya and Uganda; a strategic management course for FPD in Bushenyi and developing a training plan with Karagwe Development Association (KARADEA) in Tanzania (Norton 1997). It then became a member of the Transform Network, it saw TP as very relevant, and it implemented the TP from 1998 to 2004 for thirty NGOs spread throughout Uganda.

### 3.2 The Transform Programme

**Organization**

The TP is organised in three levels or layers as illustrated in Figure 2. The first is composed of NNGOs that recommend and fund their SNGO partners to participate in TP through Transform Africa UK.

![Figure 2: The organisation of Transform Programme](image-url)
The second layer is composed of the Transform Network partner organizations (LNGOs and consultancy firms) that implement the TP in each of their countries under the coordination of Transform Africa UK. The third layer is made up of SNGOs that participate in the TP for two years, 10 from each country.

**Selecting Southern NGOs**

For SNGOs to participate in TP, they go through a selection process that uses criteria developed by the network partners:

- The SNGO should be involved in development work that is poverty focused, or aim at combating poverty and its causes in some way;
- It should have a positive commitment to the TP process;
- Be non-profiting making;
- Have leadership with potential;
- Be beyond the stage of immediate formation;
- Have between 3-20 full-time staff;
- Be willing to promote management aspirations of both women and men;
- Have a clear boundary around the organisation; and
- Have the potential to develop significantly and have a good idea of where it is going as an organisation be able and willing to make a contribution to the cost of the process.

**Delivery**

**The Building Blocks for Change Course (BBs)**

In year 1 of the TP, the organizations are taken through what is called ‘the BB course’. This concentrates on internal issues or elements which, according to the TP, are crucial if any organization is to be effective, efficient and sustainable. It involves the development of identity, attitude, values, vision, mission, strategy, systems, structures, procedures and policies as well as skills and abilities for looking into material and financial resources of the organization. The latter is expected to master these elements by undergoing a number of activities such as internal workshops that involve all stakeholders; workshops for leaders, exposure visits, learning events and other practical sessions. Since 10 organizations are enrolled, each has on average 25 contact days with CDRN in which it is expected to develop the crucial elements or at least show signs of developing them.

During this period, the organization is also expected to undergo 4 modules referred to as ‘Building Blocks’ (BB). They are chosen out of 7—Strategy, Gender,
Governance, Fundraising, Finance Management, People Management, Project Planning Monitoring and Evaluation. It is given in-house\(^3\) support and training by CDRN and its leaders/managers attend 3 common-workshops.\(^4\) Values of self-determination, gender equity and diversity, working in partnership, positive impact of NGO work on communities, the politics of poverty and social justice are said to run through all the seven BBs.

**a) The pre-visit**

The selection process starts with a visit from CDRN, referred to as the ‘pre-visit’, to all partner organizations recommended by NNGOs. The objective is to introduce the TP, carry out a mini-assessment of the organization and share expectations. CDRN also collects basic information about the organizations’ history, background, activities, organizational structure, staffing, location, beneficiaries, achievements etc to enable it to judge if it meets the selection criteria. The pre-visit gives CDRN an impression of what the organization is and what it does without getting into too much detail.

**b) Induction and organizational self assessment**

This is the first activity that is undertaken by the organization selected. It is a 3-day in-house activity. The purpose is to introduce the TP and facilitate an internal assessment of the organization against the 7 BBs. By the end of the 3 days, the organization should have identified and selected 4 BBs out of the 7 for support by CDRN. A plan is then drawn up by the organisation for the support that is needed.

**c) The first Common Workshop**

This is a three day workshop bringing together managers of the 10 organisations to equip them with skills to alter the existing donor relationships; to enable them to implement projects that are responsive to needs of their communities; to take on advocacy as a way of empowering communities; and create a bond with other participating organizations with a view to becoming ambassadors for change and raising awareness of factors in the operating environment that affect NGO effectiveness. The event is also used to identify other issues that the NGOs feel are of interest to their work. They are then asked to monitor the impact of the identified factors and issues on their organization’s effectiveness.

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\(^3\) In-house means that the support and training is given to all the stakeholders (staff, board/executive members, members if the organisation is a membership organisation and community members if the organisation is not a membership organisation) of that organisation, delivered within the organisation’s operating context and environment and expenses are met from a grant to the organisation from the transform programme.

\(^4\) Common workshop means learning events that involve the participation of only two leaders/manager from each organisation with the aim of sharing and learning from each other; providing support to each other and networking.
d) The funder event

This brings together NNGOs who are funding their partners of the TP with the organizations selected to share and discuss issues that are of relevance to their partnership. Prior to the event, there are consultations to identify key issues for sharing and discussion.

e) The second Common Workshop

This has two objectives: to assess the level of achievement in each organization in relation to the four BBs/plan developed during induction and organizational assessment and to report back on the way factors and issues identified in the first common workshop have affected their organizations and to come up with an action plan to address them. This plan then forms part of the follow-up support at the end of the BB course.

f) Follow-up support

A CDRN facilitator spends one day with each organization to provide support in relation to their needs as identified above.

Organizational Transformation (OT)

Year 2 of the TP is called Organizational Transformation (OT) and builds on foundations laid by the BBs in year 1. It concentrates on issues such as organizational culture and leadership and it addresses the internal context of the organization in relation to its external operating environment---relationships with donors, government, networks and other NGOs etc. It also concentrates on impact issues of the organization. On average, CDRN spends 36 days with each organization. OT focuses on transformational change in the participating organizations and offers leaders and their organization an opportunity to increase the impact of their work. The aim is to enable them to achieve their purpose, create a new and ambitious dream and, with support from CDRN, to work at achieving it.

The process starts with a diagnosis of the status of the organization in terms of its leadership, culture and impact-making processes. OT is said to help the organization be more vibrant, self determined and effective. Diagnosis is followed by a common workshop (called a leadership event); in-house workshops (looking internally, consulting externally and developing a vision), common events (2 days each) and a ‘funders’ event (1 day) for leaders to deal with issues that emerge during diagnosis. Throughout OT, participating organizations have an opportunity to explore underlying values important for NGO effectiveness.
Figure 3: Flow diagram illustrating layout/design of Year 1: the Building Blocks for change

Source: Transform Programme Document

Figure 4: Organisational Transformation (OT) implementation layout

Source: Transform programme Document
3.3 The case study organizations

In November 2002, CDRN approached a number of NNGOs with country offices in Uganda who work with and through Action Aid International, Care international, Dan Church Aid, CAFOD, Water Aid, DANIDA, MS International etc with TP information---on its goals, design, curriculum, cost, benefits, duration, delivery etc. These organisations then proposed and recommended partners they thought could benefit from such a programme. AAU, for example, proposed more than five partners, but since the programme could only take on 10 NGOs for a two year period, it was limited to five to give an opportunity to partners of other NNGOs. CDRN then visited each of them.

At the end of all the visits, 10 SNGOs were selected for the TP process and in 2003-4 Kalangala District Farmers Association (KDFA) and Mutunda United Rural Development Association (MURDA) were selected, funded by Action Aid International. We will now turn our focus KDFA and MURDA, our case study organizations.

Kalangala District Farmers Association (KDFA)

KDFA is an SNGO based in Kalangala district. It is a membership organization, founded and is governed by its members. By the time this research was carried out (July 2008), it had only 3 staff (the Coordinator, Accounts Assistant and 1 field staff) to carry out day-to-day activities, programmes and projects. Founded in 1992 as a branch of Uganda National Farmers Association (UNFA) in Kalangala district, it became autonomous in 1998 after the decentralisation of UNFA branches as district farmers’ associations. It operates throughout the 84 islands that make up Kalangala district with its secretariat in Kalangala Town Council on the main island, Bugala. The Secretariat is charged with implementation of KDFA programmes and projects. It is governed by the District Executive Board elected by a Farmers’ Assembly comprised of all delegates’ member organizations and groups and individual members. The organization’s main source of funding is DANIDA through one of its programmes, the Agricultural Sector Programme Support. It also gets funds from Action Aid for its sponsorship programme and members’ subscriptions and fees. It is a member of the Uganda National Farmers’ Federation (the national umbrella organization for farmers associations in Uganda) and Kalangala District NGO Forum. It has a good working relationship with Kalangala District Local government (K DFA 2006).

KDFA’s vision is: organised groups of self-sustaining farmers (women, men, girls and boys) in Kalangala district and its mission is to work with groups of farmers to sustainably increase their household incomes and improve food security. Its objectives include:

- building the capacity of farmers in improved production skills and natural resource use through skills trainings and provision of advisory services to improve the quality and increase quantity of produce and consequently improve household incomes and food security;


• Continuously improving farmer’s access to markets and market facilities by carrying out market research and dissemination of market information to farmer groups;

• empowering marginalised farmers in the production sector to be able to lobby and advocate for their cause; and

• Mobilizing and organise the marginalised farmers in organised self-sustaining groups to build a strong KDFA.

KDFA’s activities include the provision of agricultural advisory services, training of farmers, lobbying and advocacy for agricultural policies, marketing and market information dissemination, procurement and distribution of farm inputs to members, REFLECT\(^5\) facilitation and the mobilization of children for photograph updates and message collection.

When KDFA entered the TP it had 6 staff—a Coordinator, Extension Advisor, 2 Extension Field advisors, an Accounts Assistant and Secretary (the last two positions being filled by women) and it saw its challenges as ‘turning fishermen and women into farmers. It had inadequate staff, transport facilities to cover the whole district, poor performing board members and dependence on donor funds’. In the first year of the TP, KDFA selected and underwent 4 modules on the building blocks course: Gender, Fundraising, Strategy and Project Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation.

**Mutunda United Rural Development Association (MURDA)**

Mutunda United Rural Development Association (MURDA) is an NGO in Masindi district. Its offices are located in Diima along the Kampala Gulu highway. MURDA was born in 1997, after NORPARK (a Norwegian Company that wanted to generate electricity at Karuma) asked the local population to mobilize so that they could buy shares in the new company. The local population realised they could not raise money and decided to establish a CBO to generate income, leading to the formation of MURDA. It became an NGO in 2005. The organization implements programmes in education, agriculture and

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\(^5\) REFLECT is a literacy methodology pioneered by Action Aid in Uganda as a way of equipping people with the skills and knowledge in writing, reading and doing numeracy work. A reflect circle refers to a group of people who come together to learn these skills.
the health and has been collaborating with Action Aid Uganda through the Masindi Action Aid project since 1998. Its activities, programmes and administration are carried out by volunteer staff and executive members are a monthly allowance but are not paid a salary (MURDA 2003).

MURDA envisages *A Just and Empowered Community Where All People Lead a Dignified Life* and works towards enhancing the capacity of poverty stricken men, women and children of Mutunda sub-county so that they can meet their needs on a sustainable basis through training and advocacy for effective service delivery. It values Gender Equity, Sustainability and Quality Work and its strategic objectives are to improve the nutritional status and the purchasing power of the community of Mutunda sub-county; to enhance the capacity of the community to cope with HIV/AIDS and its challenges and to increase community awareness on issues of education and sustainable environmental management. Its projects are focused on agriculture (with activities in diversification, sustainable organic farming and an animal traction scheme), education (with activities in literacy using the reflect approach, promoting of girl child education and community conscientisation and HIV/AIDS) and cross-cutting issues relating to gender and the environment (MURDA 2003).

When MURDA first came in contact with CDRN in the context of the TP, its aim was to mobilise for development; identifying needs and solutions with the use of participatory techniques and creating awareness on human rights and gender roles. Its activities included community mobilisation, awareness and training to raise incomes; literacy training; reduction in infant mortality through supporting and advocating for government health programmes and environmental protection. By then, it had received support from AAU for four years and been promised continued support for another three years. Some of its achievements included the construction of three valley tanks benefiting 21,000 people; construction of 18 classrooms benefiting 1,620 children and the provision of ox-ploughing to farmer groups. However, while it had achieved a lot, MURDA was struggling with financial accountability to her donor and partner (AAIU) due to lack of technical know-how; bad working relations between the Executive and staff members; a lack of strategic direction (it had no strategic plan, no organizational vision, mission, values or objectives); did not know how to raise funds or mobilize funds and depended on AAIU for guidance and direction on what to do.

By the end of CDRN’s first contact with MURDA, it had gained an impression of a very active, small organization whose immediate needs could be met by marketing itself, image enhancement and exposure visits but that was too weak to continue without AAIU support. Given these challenges, it was selected and went through 4 modules: Strategy, Governance, Financial Management and Project Planning Monitoring and Evaluation.
Chapter 4
STUDY FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

4.1 The Transform Programme and the case study organizations

KDFA

Several policies were developed by KDFA in the context of the TP and they are indicative of the direction the support was taking. They included the following:

First, a gender policy that was begun after gender training approved in 2005 at its Annual General Meeting and then in general use, to refer to when it came to staff recruitment. It entailed a push to get women to join its staff or to become members, given the fact that KDFA is a membership organisation. Based on this, it was able to recruit a female field staff member (who unfortunately did not serve for long) and granted one female staff member maternity leave and time off during the day to breast-feed the baby. During the gender workshop, KDFA reviewed its vision, mission and objectives to make them gender sensitive.

Second, a strategic plan was developed for the first time after the strategy workshop that KDFA chose this work as another of its four modules. At first, a two-year plan was developed, then a three-year and currently a five-year plan (January 2007 to December 2011), to be reviewed annually to draw up annual plans. The coordinator reported that earlier TP, DANIDA and AAIU (their donors) had demanded different plans in relation to their respective priorities which varied from year to year, making it difficult to produce a comprehensive long-term plan. DANIDA, for example, had required management plans in line with its own funding and policy priorities while AAIU had required annual plans with no guarantee that they would fund the plan as presented.

Third, there was a financial policy developed, still in draft form but work on it was on-going. The coordinator attached importance it, saying that KDFA had in the past approached donor agencies who had asked them to present their financial policy so they could assess whether they would be in a position to use funds efficiently and effectively and this had presented problems. It was a way of holding the organization accountable to the donor agency for funds released and, in the past, they had lost out because of their lack of capacity in this area. During the fundraising training, KDFA had acquired knowledge and skills in writing fundable proposals and concept papers and had written a profile of the organization—something donors requested. It was also able to give partial answers to a question that had always puzzled them – “why are our funding proposals unsuccessful?” They had been using technical jargon that
many funders could not make sense of and which they themselves had not explained in their proposals.

All these developments were internal. However, the Coordinator acknowledged that the TP had contributed more to the personal growth and development of those who participated than it had to the organization. When people then left without transferring the skills and knowledge they had acquired into the organization, then the latter lost. Better internal organization had come from training, but it had not necessarily been translated into greater effectiveness.

**MURDA**

According to the Treasurer of MURDA, it had gained several things from the TP, including the following:

First, it had developed a strategic planning document from which it draws annual plans. Getting the document in place had begun as a result of the strategy module MURDA chose as one of its 4 modules. That module also enabled it to make its identity more explicit and to develop new organizational vision, mission, values, objectives, giving focus to its activities.

Second, it had introduced a financial management system and now kept 6 books of accounts (cash book, bank book, petty cash book, cash analysis book and ledger) instead of only two—though why this was necessarily an advantage was never clear. CDRN had given them skills and knowledge in finance management, together with hands on training, which had enabled MURDA to develop the system. The Treasurer reported that he now knew how to balance books of accounts (which the auditors appreciated) and that, of all Action Aid partners in the Masindi Area Programme, only MURDA was able to use cash analysis. Before it had taken part in the TP, there had been a lack of transparency in the organization; there had been rumour-mongering and finger-pointing because there was no forum for members to express dissatisfaction and seek clarity. After the organizational assessment process, monthly meetings were introduced and everybody started to talk openly about problems, to find solutions immediately and follow-up the issues. There was a change of attitude towards the organization to the extent that organizational problems began to be viewed as a problem for everybody, not an individual’s problem.

Third, as a result of the skills acquired in the project planning, monitoring and evaluation module, staff wrote concept papers and proposals on girl-child education and agriculture which were important projects within MURDA.

Fourth, members’ commitment to the organization—to its vision, purpose and programmes—increased after the TP as shown by their response when a meeting was called. Few would previously have attended and, when they did come, they would just look on silently. They now attended and participated actively.
Fifth, it enabled MURDA to develop as an organization. When it first made contact with CDRN and the TP, MURDA was a CBO. Since, as a result of the TP, it has acquired the status of an NGO. MURDA still seeks CDRN help, even though the TP has ended, and they have worked together to develop the HIV/AIDS policy and budget. They are also integrating HIV/AIDS issues more generally into their programmes and organization. Completion of the TP was therefore in a sense the beginning of a revolution for MURDA and they have now reviewed their constitution because they understand better the world in which they work. During the governance module in Year 1, MURDA also developed a new organizational structure (though it is not yet functional), and clarified the roles and responsibilities of executive members and staff which had been an area of conflict. The TP also, again, contributed to personal growth, development and change amongst those who participated in the TP. The Treasurer of MURDA was to report “I am now doing a certificate in project planning and management; I have a personal vision, mission and objectives and I will retain my children in school since have experienced the difficulties of not going to school. Managing my home is no longer a problem to me”. People consult her now on issues concerning the development of the community.

In this case, therefore, there were both personal and organisational gains from participation in the TP programme but, again, they were more to do with skills internal to the organisation than with its effectiveness in achieving its goals in a complex external environment.

4.2 Underlying assumptions about change, how they were reflected in the Transform Programme, and their appropriateness

This section is concerned with assumptions that underpin the TP, how they were reflected in its logic and structure and whether they were appropriate. Basic to the discussion is the central issue as to whether internal change in an organization is sufficient to produce greater effectiveness. However, there are also several more detailed assumptions bundled into this statement.

First, there was an assumption that change was linear and rational, with a logical order of what came first and what followed next. This was reflected in the design and programme layout as in Figures 3 and 4, which is how the TP was implemented over two years in K DFA and MURDA (though at different dates). For a long-term process like the TP, beginning with an organizational assessment was a good start, creating a bond or a relationship of trust between CDRN and K DFA/MURDA, building rapport and an atmosphere within which K DFA and MURDA could open up. The way the assessment was structured enabled this to happen. Discussions were structured around a questionnaire with which K DFA and MURDA assessed themselves. However, it also produced a closed and in some ways inappropriate process in
that, by concentrating on the questionnaire, felt needs and issues of the organization did not necessarily come out.

It was also inappropriate in as far as facilitators were distracted from listening and observing the organizational dynamics because they had to concentrate on the need to explain the content of the questionnaire. Because the programme was designed in advance and presented as a package, facilitators followed the design and difficult issues that the organizations were struggling with got lost or blurred because they simply did not fit in the design. For example, looking at a report written after MURDA’s in-house culture and leadership workshop in June 2004 (the second year of the TP), revealed that its identity as an organization was still not clear. Participants were wondering if it was a membership organization or not and the fact that it had started up to generate incomes for members. Now it was an NGO serving everybody. This was an issue which could have been resolved during the organizational assessment but it did not fit the questionnaire, but if that was not clear, how relevant could subsequent discussions of its internal organization and operation have been in practice? Such issues could not easily come out in the structured assessment used in the TP.

A second assumption of the exercise was that change was predictable. Underlying the TP was the assumption that it knew what elements of organizational life were important for the organization in question and that these elements were the same in every case. This was illustrated in the 7 building blocks—where TP assumed that Strategy, Gender, Governance, Fundraising, Finance Management, People Management, Project Planning Monitoring and Evaluation were the key issues for every organization. Each participating organization (including KDFA and MURDA) had to select 4 elements for which they were given support by CDRN. TP assumed that once they had received training in these fields (plus other designer modules in the first and second year), they would be well on their way to change. This takes us back to the theoretical framework and to a systems view whereby transformation is automatically translated into outputs. This was not an appropriate assumption as it limited and confined participants to thinking in a box (or thinking the Transform Programme way) which meant that, even if they participated actively in the process, they would not be able go beyond the set limits of the programme. One wonders, if the process had been left open, if the discussions and subsequent outcome of the process with KDFA and MURDA might not have been different.

A third assumption underlying the TP was that hard issues of the organizational life such as identity (vision, mission, values), strategy, policies, procedures, systems, skills, resources and others were paramount to the organization’s effectiveness, efficiency and performance. This was reflected in TP’s concentration of such issues in the first year---the 7 modules.
A fourth assumption was that change could be achieved in a given time. This was reflected in the time limit of two years of the programme and the days allocated to each component of the programme. Two years was seen to be a long-term process for both KDFA and MURDA (requiring, on average, 61 days of face to face contact with CDRA plus communications to build trust and to forge a relationship). This enabled them to address a number of organizational issues over a period of time. The coordinator of KDFA was to say that: “The Transform Programme was a unique thing – we had never had anything like it before. Action Aid had given us a number of trainings delivered by consultants before in strategic planning, gender, etc together with all the other NGOs in Kalangala that it supports, but there would be no follow-up. They were just one-off training events and that was it. But the Transform Programme was unique, with follow-up of every event—both in-house and common events.” On the one hand, like any other programme or project there was a time frame, constrained by the resources that were available.

Arguably, the two year period was appropriate but the way in which it was structured was inappropriate in that it did not enable CDRN to penetrate the day-to-day practice of either organization so as to understand them or to help deal with the deeper issues that could not be resolved in short periods of contact. The fact that each component was allocated so little time—three days each for the four modules—meant that that there were very definite limits on what could realistically be accomplished. Is three days long enough to internalize relevant materials on financial management and then apply them to an organization and develop an action plan?

A fifth assumption was that whatever participants acquired during the training workshops (whether in-house or common-workshops) would be automatically translated into individual and organizational change. The development of action plans after each component and reporting on progress in the next component were developed with this in mind and, with KDFA and MURDA’s participation in the TP process, it was assumed that what was learnt would change their behaviour for the better. A further linked assumption was that the staff involved would remain with the organization or that, if they left, their acquired knowledge would have been assimilated in the organization. As we have seen in the case of KDFA, this was not the case.

A sixth and final assumption was that ‘one size fits all’. The TP was designed to suit any organization regardless of its environment, its phase of development or its context and timing. The TP structure, logic and implementation process that KDFA and MURDA went through even though they were very different and at different phases of development, operating in different environment and contexts. Kaplan (1995) has argued that any intervention to build the capacity of an organization should take account of its phase of development (see appendix 2 on phases of organizational development) and adjust time horizons accordingly (CDRA 1995).
4.3 Strengths, weaknesses and outcomes

A strength of the TP was that it enabled KDFA and MURDA to meet requirements that donor agencies make as prerequisites for the release of funds to SNGOs. These included policy documents, systems and procedures, plans, proposals etc., but having them does not mean that the organization is able to perform more effectively and efficiently. MURDA, for example, has a financial system in place with six finance accounts books to meet different donor needs, but that does not mean that it will perform better than KDFA which does not have those books. What is acquired is a capacity vis-à-vis a donor agency which means that, if the latter is faced with a choice of who to fund, it is more likely to come down in favour of the one with a good financial system.

A second strength was the use of a participatory methodology and participatory techniques. It saw KDFA and MURDA as organizations owning the programme that they themselves developed. A participatory methodology was used throughout the process, involving all or some of the stakeholders (for example, involving all staff, volunteers and board members in the choice of dates for each activity of the programme and in the development of policy documents and plans for the organization). Both KDFA and MURDA found it to be very empowering in contrast to other service providers who would meet with the organization and then develop a strategic plan or policy document for them.

A third strength was that, in both KDFA and MURDA skills, knowledge, insights and understanding acquired in the programme were translated into individual and organizational tangibles such as organisational visions, missions, values etc, though it is less clear that they brought about any changes at all in the organization. It is not clear that KDFA, by just reviewing it vision and mission, translated its policy ideals into gender sensitive practice in its operations or made it more effective and efficient. Nor is it clear that MURDA, by having a vision for the first time, changed its practices and became more efficient and effective.

The contribution to personal growth and development was a definite strength of the programme, but (as we have already noted) the high staff turnover experienced by KDFA where four of its six staff who participated in the programme left for greener pastures raises questions as to whether the organization had actually benefited. Indeed, it could well have been that the career opportunities that opened up were a direct result of the increased skills and capacities they had acquired from the TP. We have to ask ourselves why the turn-over became so high in such a short time. Were there issues in KDFA that the TP had not been able to address that could have caused this mass movement? Were there questions of staff dissatisfaction, leadership, management conflicts, a clash of personal and organizational cultures or other unfavourable conditions in the organization? Or was it that a small organization like KDFA could offer no real prospects for staff who were better trained and more capable?
The second year of the TP---on organisational transformation---was a strength of the programme, designed to deal with issues of leadership, organizational culture and the operating environment of NGOs. However, it also became a weakness later when it was not translated into practice. Arguably, it did not do more than touch the surface of these problems. Penetrating organizations and understanding them cannot be done in training sessions alone however long they last. Other methods should have been employed to probe more deeply into questions of leadership, culture and other issues, given the fact that organizations and the way they relate to their operating environments are usually complex and distinctive. This is where creativity and innovation on the part of the programme designers could have reaped rich rewards.

One of the main weaknesses of the TP lay in the design and implementation of its organizational assessment. Comparing the challenges facing KDFA and MURDA at the time of the pre-visit and the different outcomes, it is clear that they were totally different. This was largely because the initial assessment was a highly structured procedure where participants responded to a questionnaire to prioritise what were, in effect, already decided issues---that Strategy, Gender, Governance, Fundraising, Finance Management, People Management, Project Planning Monitoring and Evaluation were the things that mattered. They raised standardised issues, but that did not mean they were felt or real needs that the organizations were struggling with. Any organizational issues or other needs had to fit in or conform to one or more of these boxes. And yet there are issues that organizations struggle with that they themselves cannot understand and that cannot be reduced to or explained by the 7 areas that were mentioned above. For example, conflicts amongst strong-willed staff or how to manage the culture or political realities of the community in which it operates can be crucial for the survival a small organization but they do not fit easily into standardised presentations that are of a more general nature.

A related weakness of the TP, which underlay much of this, was it ‘one size fits all’ approach. Pre-designed modules frequently failed to meet the needs of of the organizations that were participating. Many issues could only really be understood in the context of local realities and these differed. There was need for flexibility, for the facilitator to listen and to adopt a module to a particular organization to meet its need at a particular time, but this required a highly skilled and experienced organizational development facilitator.
Chapter 5
Lessons and Conclusions

This paper has provided insights into the broader Transform Programme during the period 2002 to 2004 by describing the experiences of KDFA and MURDA. According to the findings and analysis as seen above, a number of factors can be given as explanations for the outcome of the Transform Programme in KDFA and MURDA:

First, there were a number of underlying assumptions about change that were not made sufficiently explicit, were far too general and not always coherent and well thought through. As a result, the implementation focused on developing fundraising skills and accountability as well as organising and preparing the organisation to be able to respond to donor conditions thereby fulfilling donor missions.

A second factor was that methods and approaches that were used in the Programme were not responsive to the needs of the two organizations because they were far too general – they failed to adapt them to KDFA and MURDA’s context and operating environment and instead they were the same in both cases.

A third factor was that the programme concentrated on the internal life of the organization, isolating it, making it inward-looking and more dependent on external resources rather than creating linkages with other actors in its context and environment.

In the case of KDFA and MURDA, the underlying assumptions behind the Transform Programme were far too general, insufficiently explicit and not always internally coherent and well-thought through. As a result, there was too quick a focus on developing fund-raising skills and accountability because streamlining was essential from the standpoint of donors. Confronted with pressures on themselves to be more accountable, it seemed only natural to assume the same concerns were relevant when it came to their Southern counterparts. The result was a preoccupation with ‘risk management’ and too little concern with the effectiveness of the SNGOs and CBOs that they dealing with, with developing leadership and effective linkages in their community and with successfully accomplishing their mission. The findings are thus in agreement with the paper’s hypothesis.

Given that KDFA and MURDA were nominated and funded to participate in TP by Action Aid (their Northern NGO partner), it could be assumed that Action Aid had recognised certain weaknesses in these organizations that could be dealt with by the programme, such as delayed financial accountability, or limited impact in their communities and insufficient
value for money; financial dependence on external sources of funds, difficulties with adhering to reporting formats; late and poor quality of reports; power struggles in management and leadership; lack of structures, systems and procedures etc. Weaknesses, it was assumed, had been identified and skills were to be developed to meet what Action Aid needed in their partnership but, at the same time, to make KDFA and MURDA better prepared to secure funding from other donor agencies and what Eade (2007:632) has bluntly referred to as “pulling-yourself-up-by-your-bootstraps”. Hence the emphasis on organizational issues rather than building relationships and linkages with other actors such as government departments, NGOs etc. that shaped MURDA’s and KDFA’s effectiveness and efficiency.

The lessons that can be drawn from KDFA and MURDA’s experience with the TP, can be summarised as follows. First, it would seem that, for organizational capacity building processes or interventions to be effective, they need to respond to an organization’s needs at that point in time, to its specific phase of development and to its context. KDFA and MURDA were very different and they needed different interventions to build their respective capacities in keeping with their stage of development. Second, it would seem that while pre-designed and pre-packaged capacity building programmes are appealing to most donors, Northern NGOs and even Southern NGOs, they can have severe limitations. They are logically laid out and well thought-through, and a lot of work is put into producing them. However, to have the desired effect, much more is often needed on the part of implementers to make them practical and relevant. Flexibility, innovation and adaptation to the given context, time, environment and culture is also an important prerequisite. A third lesson would seem to be that each organization is unique, with its own problems and issues, and that no organizations are the same even if they are operating in the same environment a stone’s throw from each other. Different factors are likely to hinder their effectiveness, efficiency and capacity to achieve their missions. Those who ignore such differences do so at their peril.

Clearly, therefore, the facilitators of capacity building programmes need to be highly skilled and experienced to be able to implement them effectively, a point that often seems to have been glossed over quickly in a desire to replicate and expand. There is also need to think more critically about the ‘why’ and ‘how’ question, to help organizations come out of capacity-building interventions looking, feeling and smelling as described below:

“That organisation is directed and focused; that is, it has a clear sense of its own identity in terms of its own strengths as well as in terms of its intended impact in its relationships with others and with its context. It focuses on its sources of inspiration. It is able to strategise and to prioritise, and it is able to adapt its strategies with flexibility and foresight. It does not complain about the many unfavourable external conditions which impact on it, but rather takes full responsibility for its own circumstances and believes that it can impact and affect those circumstances. It is self-critical and self-reflective,
attributing any problems it may have to its own lack of strategic coherence, or management competence, or focused vision, or evaluative stance, rather than on outside factors beyond its own control. It concentrates on what it can do, rather than lamenting what it cannot do. It takes the time to learn from its successes and failures. It takes the time to understand itself, to evaluate honestly, to become aware of its strengths and weaknesses, to hone its methodology and sharpen its strategic edge, rather than spending all its time on constant activity in the field. It takes the time to develop its staff; not simply to ensure that they are trained, but to encourage them to develop inner resourcefulness, creativity and a self-critical appreciation of their organisation’s practice - and it rewards such creativity and self critique” (Kaplan 1999: 21)

The transform programme has made valuable contributions to KDFA and MURDA---putting in place policies, systems, procedures, vision, mission and value statements, strategic plans and contributing to personal growth and development. They were also a benefit to the Northern NGO--Action Aid, enabling it to smooth out the recipient-donor relationship with KDFA and MURDA and to present a picture of control and accountability to its own northern funders. These results were produced by the Transform Programme, but they did not always result in the outcomes that were expected. A major reason for this has been seen to lie in its underlying assumptions which are considered far too general, insufficiently explicit and not always internally coherent or well thought-through. As a result, it has been too quick to focus on developing fund-raising skills and accountability. Streamlining seemed to be essential from the standpoint of donors and there was too little concern with being effective, developing leadership and other linkages in the community that were arguably as (if not more) important when it came to successfully accomplishing their mission. This experience of the Transform Programme further confirms Baser and Morgan’s (2008) finding that most efforts at capacity building are influenced to some degree by external ideas, influences and pressures, that few are completely autonomous, and that practitioner lack interest in theories and abstract terms related to capacity building.
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Appendix 2

Figure 5: five stages of organisational development

Stage 1 Embryonic
At the Embryonic stage, the tree is a vulnerable seed trying to penetrate the soil. At this stage, an organization is just beginning to form and to define itself.

Stage 2 Emerging
At the Emerging stage, the tree has broken through the soil to benefit from the sunlight. However, it is still vulnerable, and its roots are not deep.

Stage 3 Growing
At the Growing stage, the tree is becoming stronger and develops deeper roots. An organization at this stage can protect itself from many threats, although it is still vulnerable to significant negative forces.

Stage 4 Well Developed
When a tree (or an organization) is in the Well Developed stage, its roots (capacities) are strong and deep, fruit (results) starts being produced, and it can withstand all but the most extreme threats.

Stage 5 Mature
A Mature tree (or organization) is able to continually bear large quantities of fruits (or results). Due to its capacity building efforts, an organization at this stage has become a viable and permanent local institution.