



Populist Radical Right Voting Behaviour of Unemployed Individuals During the Great Recession in Europe

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Abstract

Left-wing parties are generally the parties that are best at championing social security issues and more inclusive social safety nets, which is why it is usually argued that those people experiencing feelings of economic insecurity will steer towards a vote for a left-wing political party. Unemployed people, in other words, are expected to vote for a leftist party, as they are experiencing feelings of economic insecurity due to the fact that they find themselves without an income. Furthermore, in times of economic recession or hardship, these feelings of economic insecurity will increase further and will in turn, according to this line of thinking, lead to an increase in left-wing voting. However, over the years scholars have pointed out that instead of a move towards the left, unemployed people have shown a move towards the populist radical right (PRR), including during times of economic recession, because they feel immigrants are taking over their jobs, leading to a vote for an anti-immigration party, an issue championed most often by PRR parties. To investigate this possible relationship between unemployment and PRR voting, this study looks at round 6 of the European Social Survey, focusing on voting behaviour in several European countries during the Great Recession. By focusing on this specific time period, this article will try to study whether those who find themselves unemployed during these times of economic hardship are in fact more likely to vote for populist rightist parties, and whether this likelihood increases with higher unemployment rates.

Keywords

anti-immigration, economic recession, populism, unemployment, voting behaviour

Introduction

In the last two decades, Europe has experienced (in several countries) a move away from mainstream parties to populist parties. People have become more distrustful towards those in power (i.e., the established parties) as they believe them to be the cause of significant impactful events like the Great Recession from 2007/2008, or because they feel these events could have been avoided if those in power were to have acted in the right way, leading to favoring the opposition parties (i.e., populist parties) (Betz, 1993; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000; Nadeau, Lewis-Beck, & Bélanger, 2013).

The populist radical right and its adjoining ideology have been defined in many different ways by many different scholars, Cas Mudde (2007) being one of the most well-known scholars within the field. However, some difficulty arises when trying to define the populist radical right, as not all parties fit into one specific category, making it rather difficult to come up with one definition that includes all populist radical right (PRR) parties. Generally, four main categories can often be distinguished in which most PRR parties fall - nationalism, xenophobia, welfare chauvinism, and law and order (Mudde, 2007). Linked to this is the idea of nativism, which can be defined as “an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (‘the nation’) and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state” (Mudde, 2007, p. 22)(Klandermans & Mayer, 2005; Lubbers, 2001), a definition that is made up of a combination of nationalism and xenophobia. This specific definition is also related both to the protection of national values and traditions, as well as the opposition to immigration in general and Islam more specifically (Backlund & Jungar, 2019). Because of their nativist nature, many PRR parties are seen as anti-immigration (which fits both the nationalist and xenophobic categories) and are usually the parties to champion this specific issue (Dennison & Goodwin, 2015; Carter, 2005; Mudde, 2010; Van Kessel, 2013). In general, the reason behind voting for a PRR party, for most voters, is exactly because of the PRR’s opposition to immigration (Arzheimer, 2008; Eatwell, 1998; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Rooduijn, 2018; Van der Brug, Fennema, & Tillie, 2000; Zhirkov, 2014). More often than not, economics is a topic of secondary importance to these parties. For this thesis, I will define a PRR party as such when it fulfills the nativist category (which includes nationalist and xenophobic characteristics) and when it defines itself anti-immigration. Parties need to fulfill both of these categories to be defined as populist radical right.

Besides political distrust, there are two other main factors that could explain a populist vote - (1) feelings of cultural insecurity (the cultural cause) and (2) feelings of economic insecurity (the economic cause). Generally, feelings of cultural insecurity are linked to immigration and PRR voting - those for whom national identity, culture and traditions are important will feel threatened by immigrants coming into their country, which could spur them towards a populist radical right vote as these are generally the parties advocating against immigration (Achterberg & Houtman, 2006; De Witte & Scheepers, 1999; Lipset, 1959; Stoetzer, Giesecke, & Klüver, 2023). On the other hand, feelings of economic insecurity have usually been linked to left-wing voting - those hit hardest by financial crises or faring economically worse than the general population (as a result of the existing national

economic structure) will be more inclined to vote for a left-wing party as these are the ones advocating for economic issues and favoring redistribution (Bélanger & Meguid, 2008; Gidron & Mijs, 2019). However, in the past few years, scholars have looked at whether feelings of economic insecurity could also be linked to support for PRR parties instead. For example, it could be that instead of feeling culturally insecure, those fearing immigration could feel an increase in economic insecurity as they believe immigrants will take over their jobs or that incoming immigrants will rely so much on the welfare state that they will have to pay more taxes to support them as well. In this case, people believe the cause of their economic insecurity to be found in immigration which would lead to a vote for PRR parties (Arzheimer, 2009; Funke, Schularick, & Trebesch, 2016; Jackman & Volpert, 1996; Rooduijn & Burgoon, 2018).

One big event of which the consequences have been significant on populations of almost all European countries was the Great Recession. With the Great Recession being an economic crisis, its consequences were mostly felt in terms of people's welfare and economic security, which is generally argued to lead to a left vote. However, following above-mentioned investigations, does there also exist a relationship between the effects of the Great Recession and PRR voting? Something that should be considered are the differences in economic insecurity that people are experiencing, and how the same effects could have very different consequences for people's voting behaviour based on the level of economic security they are experiencing. The biggest difference between individuals that can have an influence on their feelings of economic (in)security is whether one is employed or unemployed, as unemployed people tend to experience higher feelings of economic insecurity compared to employed people (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Branton & Jones, 2005; Scheepers, Gijsberts, & Coenders, 2002; Svallfors, 2006).

This thesis will focus on the effects of the Great Recession on PRR voting behaviour, taking into account an individual's employment status. In other words, this thesis will try to answer the following research question - *to what extent can a relationship be found between unemployment and PRR voting behaviour during the Great Recession of 2008-2012?* Round 6 of the European Social Survey (ESS) will be used to answer this question, which was conducted between August 2012 and December 2013, looking at the political party individuals voted for during the last national election, distinguishing individuals as either being employed or unemployed.

This thesis will be structured as follows. First, relevant literature and existing articles will be discussed on populism and the possible relationship between PRR voting and the

Great Recession, as well as between unemployment and (PRR) voting behaviour. Secondly, the analysis of the research design will be discussed, focusing on the specific analyses that will be conducted to answer the research question (including the sample, the measurements of the variables, and the statistical techniques used to measure the found data), after which the results of said analyses will be discussed in more detail. Thirdly, after putting forward the results we will move on to the discussion session, in which the results will be put to the test to see whether and to what extent they are able to answer the research question. Lastly, in the conclusion, the main points and findings of this thesis will be summarized, followed by recommendations for future research. At the end of the thesis, a bibliography and appendix have been included.

Ch. 1. Theoretical Framework

1.1 The Great Recession in Europe - Possible Effects on Unemployment and Immigration

Starting in 2007, Europe went into a period of financial turmoil, including the global financial crisis of 2008 and the Great Recession of 2009-2012 (Mongelli & Camba-Mendez, 2018). It started with tensions within the financial sector and banking systems, but as the crisis continued these tensions spilled into the real economy, which led to the Great Recession. As a result, global economic confidence plunged, which consequently drove down production, investment and consumption in all countries hit by the financial crisis. The Great Recession pushed Europe into stagnation - “trillions of euros were lost, [...] banks were collapsing, [...] millions of people lost their house, their savings or their job, and [...] several European countries were unable to pay or refinance their government debt or bail out their banks” (Zalan & Debeuf, 2020). Even though the effects of the Great Recession varied by EU Member State, there was a general sharp increase in unemployment across the European Union (EU) (Hijman, 2009). The levels of unemployment are usually measured by the unemployment rate of a country, which “measures the proportion of persons unemployed to the total labour force” (Eurostat, 2009), and between 2008 and 2009 this rate increased across the EU. However, as has already been said above, this general rising unemployment was measured at different points in time by different Member States (Zalan & Debeuf, 2020).

Besides influencing the unemployment rates of a country, the Great Recession has also had an effect on Member States’ immigration levels. One theory related to the

relationship between times of economic recession and immigration levels is the *buffer theory* (Böhning, 1972; Böhning & Maillat, 1974; Kuhn, 1978), which posits the idea that “migrant workers will return home when the economy of the host country contracts, thereby freeing up jobs for the non-migration population” (Dobson, Latham, & Salt, 2009, p. 4). In other words, during times of economic recession, following this theory one would expect to see an increase in outward migration of foreign workers while at the same time a decline in the inflow of foreign workers, which would lead to the opening up of jobs.

However, over the years scholars have studied this theory in practice by looking at immigration trends during previous times of recession (Awad, 2009; Castles & Miller, 2009; Global Migration Group, 2009; Sward, 2009) and several have pointed out the failure of migration to respond to times of recession as is suggested by the *buffer theory*. What they generally found is that, during previous times of recession, immigration indeed tended to fall when unemployment rose (Martin, 2009a; Martin, 2009b), with the two main short-term effects of recession on migration being “reduced immigration flows to developed countries in response to fewer job opportunities,” as well as “an increase in the propensity for some migrant workers to return to their homelands in reaction to unemployment or lower earnings” (Herm & Poulain, 2012, p. 146)(Castles & Mark, 2009). However, it was found by several scholars that this trend continued only for a limited period of time. After the initial decrease, immigration actually picked up again before even having seen an improvement in a country’s employment situation. This means that, although somewhat declining, “net migration was still positive in the years following the outbreak of the crisis in many of the major European destination countries” (Giordano, 2014, p. 229), which counters the line of reasoning proposed by the *buffer theory* (Beets & Willekens, 2009; Dobson, Latham, & Salt, 2009; Salt, 1981; White, 1986). For example, even during times of recession, those migrating to another country for reasons of forced migration (i.e., refugees, environmental migrants, internally displaced people, etc.) will continue to come for the simple reason that they have nowhere else to go (Giordano, 2014). When looking at those foreign workers already present in receiving countries that did not leave at the start of the crisis, during the first year of the crisis (2008-2009) several countries showed higher unemployment rates of foreign workers compared to native-born workers. In some cases, this led to an increase in immigrants registered for unemployment benefits and social assistance (Giordano, 2014; Koehler et al., 2010).

This continued increase in immigrants coming to their country, as well as the (in some cases) increase in unemployed foreign workers registering for social assistance led to an

“increased hostility towards migrants on the part of host populations” (Herm & Poulain, 2012, p. 146). As migrants did not leave but actually stayed during times of recessions, native-born workers started to feel that migrants were taking up jobs that were meant to be given to unemployed native-born people, and/or that migrants were taking up social assistance that was also supposed to go to native-born people that found themselves unemployed during (or due to) times of recession.

1.2 Populist Radical Right Voting - Cultural and Economic Causes

Big impactful events like the Great Recession can have different effects on individuals, leading to different reactions. For example, some individuals will continue to support the established parties currently in power, whereas others will move to support populist parties. For all those individuals moving their support to populist parties, different causes can be found supporting their decision. These causes can roughly be distinguished into two main categories - (1) cultural and (2) economic. The cultural causes of populist voting will be discussed first, before moving on to the economic causes.

1.2.1 Populist Radical Right Voting - Cultural Causes

First, the cultural cause of populist voting. When a turn towards a populist vote has a cultural origin, it means that individuals experience feelings of cultural insecurity (for example because they feel threatened by immigrants coming to their country, bringing their own cultures and traditions from home), which in turn leads them to vote for populist parties. This cultural cause is mostly found among voters for PRR parties, as these parties are more focused on feelings of national identity (Stoetzer, Giesecke, & Klüver, 2023), and portray immigrants as threatening the country’s national identity and traditions, invoking feelings of cultural insecurity among those individuals for whom national identity and traditions are important.

Achterberg and Houtman (2006) discuss this cultural explanation for voting behaviour by saying that rightist voting behaviour among the working class cannot solely be explained by the *traditional class approach*, which refers to true class interests steering voting behaviour. The *traditional approach* explains voting behaviour based on economic cues and class, meaning that (when the economy is considered salient) an individual will vote for a party based on their own class and economic situation (Lipset, 1960; Lipset, 1970; Sipma & Berning, 2021). For example, someone from the working class would be more likely to vote

leftist, as these parties generally advocate for the economically weaker of society. However, over the years scholars have found a declining relationship between class and voting behaviour (McKenzie & Silver, 1968; Nieuwbeerta, 1995; Nieuwbeerta, 1996), meaning that the *traditional class approach* can no longer explain voting behaviour of the increasing number of ‘unnatural voters’. Instead of voting for leftist parties, over the years many individuals with a weaker economic position have actually voted increasingly more rightist, which goes against their true class interests. What this shows, as Achterberg and Houtman rightly point out, is that voting does not necessarily have to be driven by economic cues and one’s class, but can instead also be driven by one’s level of cultural conservatism (or authoritarianism) or cultural progressiveness (De Witte & Scheepers, 1999; Lipset, 1959; Middendorp, 1991). Feelings of cultural conservatism, in this case, could stem either from having limited cultural capital or from poor education (Inglehart, 1977; Inglehart, 1990). Cultural capital here refers to the ability of individuals to “recognize cultural expressions and comprehend their meaning” (Achterberg & Houtman, 2006, p. 79)(Bourdieu, 1984) - the higher one’s cultural capital, the less likely they are to “reject different lifestyles and non-traditional patterns of behaviour as deviant, and are more likely to be willing to accept them” (Achterberg & Houtman, 2006, p. 79)(Dekker & Ester, 1987; Gabennesch, 1972).

Generally, the working class, with its weaker economic position, is perceived to hold lower levels of cultural capital, compared to the middle class with their stronger economic position. In other words, members of the working class, resulting from them having a smaller amount of cultural capital (on average), are more likely to adhere to culturally conservative values (also called ‘working-class authoritarianism’), which in turn leads them to vote for PRR parties (Achterberg & Houtman, 2006; Dekker, Ester, & Van den Broek, 1999). So, with an increase in immigrants, an increase in cultural insecurity can be found among those individuals for whom tradition and national identity are important, and/or those individuals who possess a lower level of cultural capital, leading to a possible turn towards PRR voting.

1.2.2 Populist Radical Right Voting - Economic Causes

Beside what has been discussed above, a turn towards a populist vote can also have an economic origin. What this means is that individuals can experience feelings of economic insecurity, for example because they have lost economic security during a period of economic turmoil (either by losing their job or because of a decrease in their wages), which in turn could lead them to vote for PRR parties. Usually, feelings of economic insecurity, also when arising from events like the Great Recession, are linked to voting for left parties, as these are

generally the parties that champion for and have issue ownership over economic issues, and are thus perceived to be better qualified to handle such issues (Bélanger & Meguid, 2008; Budge, Crewe, & Farlie, 1976; Gidron & Mijs, 2019; Petrocik, 1996). For those individuals who economically are not that well off, a change in income or the loss of employment can have severe consequences, leading to an increase in feelings of economic insecurity. Among those hit the hardest by (for example) the Great Recession, some scholars state that we should see an increase in left voting as these parties are seen as the ones championing economic issues. In other words, as the “economic issue would [...] be perceived as more important in times of an economic recession” (Sipma & Berning, 2021, p. 1) those who are economically weaker or insecure would be more likely to vote for left parties (Rooduijn & Burgoon, 2018; Singer, 2011).

However, over the years, several scholars have studied the effects of economic insecurity on PRR voting instead of left voting, stating that economic causes (like economic insecurity in the form of unemployment) actually lead to a vote for a PRR party. They have studied the relationship between unfavorable socioeconomic contexts and how these might “deepen the negative effect of economic well-being on radical right voting” (Rooduijn & Burgoon, 2018, p. 1726). They show that, overall, voting for a PRR party during times of economic recessions has one of two characteristics - either it is a vote against the mainstream parties that are currently in power (making it a protest vote), or it is a vote against immigration. In both cases, it is a vote for the PRR, not the left.

First, one possible reason for individuals favoring populist parties over mainstream parties during (or after) times of recession is because they blame incumbent parties for the times of economic turmoil they are experiencing. This type of voting can also be referred to as *economic voting*, which means that those who are posing an economic vote react to an economic crisis like the Great Recession by “punishing the incumbents and voting in favour of the opposition” (Hernández & Krieis, 2016, p. 203)(Sipma & Berning, 2021), which in many cases are the populist parties (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000; Rooduijn & Burgoon, 2018). Very simply put, with *economic voting*, rational voters “reward the incumbents with their vote when the economy is good and punish them by not voting for them when the economy is bad” (Hernández & Kriesi, 2016, p. 204), and this same pattern has been shown to occur during the Great Recession.

PRR parties actually benefit from unemployment, especially when immigration levels are high (which will be discussed in more detail later on) (Arzheimer, 2009; Jackman & Volpert, 1996; Ramos, Schumann, & Hewstone, 2022; Werts, Scheepers, & Lubbers, 2013).

Several scholars have investigated the political aftermath of financial crises, some even including financial crises from the late nineteenth century up until the Great Recession from 2008 (Funke, Schularick, & Trebesch, 2016). Comparing the financial crises from back then to those of more recent years, Funke, Schularick, and Trebesch found that politics typically takes a hard right turn after financial crises, meaning that far-right, extremist, populist parties usually come out as the winners in elections after the consequences of financial crises have been felt by individuals. They state that with a financial crisis comes a large degree of uncertainty among the electorate about the policies in place and the political parties in power, which could lead to feelings of political distrust. Individuals tend to blame politics and those in power for financial crises, as they perceive it as something that could have been avoided, which in turn leads to a loss in trust in conventional politics and incumbent or mainstream parties (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000; Nadeau, Lewis-Beck, & Bélanger, 2013; Nadeau, Niemi, & Yoshinaka, 2002; Powell & Whitten, 1993). As a result, those experiencing a loss in political trust move on to the more far-right option, as they feel that these are the parties that could have prevented the situation, but also because they no longer trust the mainstream parties as they were incapable of preventing the situation, leading to a vote for a protest party simply to ‘punish’ them for their incapability of dealing with the situation (Anderson, 1996; Hernández & Kriesi, 2016; Knigge, 1998; Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002; Savelkoul & Scheepers, 2017).

Second, another possible reason for individuals favoring PRR parties over mainstream parties during (or after) times of recession is because of immigration and migrant workers participating in the labour market. Generally, when immigration was put forward as the cause for a PRR vote, it was assumed that it was the result of feelings of cultural insecurity or threat attached to an increase in immigrants coming into one’s home country. However, instead of feelings of cultural insecurity, several scholars have pointed out that it is, instead, feelings of economic insecurity that arise with increasing immigration that have led to an increase in PRR voting. For example, in Sweden, as Dehdari (2022) points out, the increase in visibility of immigrants led to an increase in the likelihood that natives supported PRR parties (which they refer to as ‘anti-immigration parties’) due to the economic distress that comes with the increase in immigrants coming to their country. Economic distress, instead of cultural insecurity, is here the cause that fuels PRR voting, showing how the presence of immigration influences the relationship between one’s economic situation and PRR voting.

Generally, this idea of feelings of threat attached to the presence of immigrants in one’s country (especially during times of economic recession) can be explained by several

important theories. First, one possible theory to explain feelings of economic insecurity leading to a vote for a PRR party is the so-called *group threat theory* (Blumer, 1958), which states that “individuals identify with one or more group(s) and that the diverse interests of different groups generate conflicts that, in turn, generate negative attitudes” (Hjerm & Nagayoshi, 2011, p. 817)(Bobo, 1988; Glaser, 1994; Key, 1949). People, in other words, are believed to “make group classifications that will have political and economic saliency in that they are more likely to want to benefit their own group over other groups in the struggle for scarce resources” (Hjerm & Nagayoshi, 2011, p. 817). This theory differentiates between cultural and economic threats, both of which can invoke feelings of hostility among the majority population of a country. Whereas the cultural threats are more linked to the linguistic and social/cultural composition of the immigration population (e.g., whether they speak the same language, or adhere to the same norms and values as the majority population), the economic threats are linked to employment among the immigration population and the proportion of working-class individuals of said population.

How the immigrant population can then be seen as sources of economic threats can be well explained by the second theory, i.e., the *realistic conflict theory*. This theory states that people from different groups do indeed compete for (scarce) resources (including jobs) and that this competition for jobs actually becomes more intense during times of economic recession, leading to people feeling more threatened by migrants or ethnic minorities, or even more likely to blame them for the economic turmoil they are experiencing (Olzak, 1994; Scheepers, Gijsberts, & Coenders, 2002). Those who find themselves in a poor position in the labour market (e.g., because of their low wages) or find themselves without a job will generally not favour (or will even feel hostile towards) immigrants in their country, as they feel that they have to compete with them for jobs. Feelings of economic insecurity, in this case, lead to feelings of hostility towards immigrants, which in turn leads to a preference for parties advocating anti-immigration (Arzheimer, 2009; Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Jackman & Volpert, 1996; Stockemer, 2017; Teney, 2012).

A third, and last, theory that can be linked to this is the *split labour market theory* (Bonachich, 1972; Boswell, 1986), which states that “xenophobia is strengthened when immigrant workers work for decidedly lower wages than the majority populations” (Hjerm & Nagayoshi, 2011, p. 818). Many immigrant workers are willing to take on the jobs that the native population does not want to fill and they are willing to accept lower wages for it. What this leads to, then, is a situation in which “immigrants diminish job opportunities for the majority population as well as undermine the wage standard in the host society - thereby

becoming a threat to the majority population” (Hjerm & Nagayoshi, 2011, p. 818). Furthermore, those with a lower socioeconomic status (including those who are unemployed) tend to hold stronger feelings of antipathy towards immigrants and feelings of racial hostility will arise more easily, as they are more exposed to the competition over scarce resources compared to those with a higher socioeconomic status (Branton & Jones, 2005; Coenders & Scheepers, 2003; Esses et al., 2001; Oliver & Mendelberg, 2000; Scheepers, Gijssbert, & Coenders, 2002; Svallfors, 2006). These feelings of economic threat will only increase during times of recession, as competition will become stronger and more intense, leading to a possible increase in feelings of antipathy towards immigrants.

Generally, in most countries, it is the PRR that holds issue saliency and ownership over the issue of anti-immigration. Especially in times of economic recession, these feelings of economic threat felt by native-born citizens towards immigrants would increase, which in turn would lead to an increase in PRR voting. Financial crises, like the Great Recession, would “induce feelings of political discontent and ethnic threat” and immigrants would increasingly be perceived as a “sensible threat to personal economic resources, such as employment or housing” (Sipma & Berning, 2021, p. 1). So, both with feelings of political distrust as well as feelings of hostility towards immigrants and foreign workers, one would be able to see a rise in PRR voting instead of left voting, as has been argued historically.

1.3 Geographical and Individual Variation in Populist Radical Right Voting

Something that needs to be considered is the variation that exists in the effects of the Great Recession on both a country as a whole (macro-level) as well as on different individuals (micro-level). In other words, not all countries and individuals are hit as hard by the effects of the Great Recession - each country has been hit differently, and within these countries individuals have been hit differently as well. Some countries, for example, show higher populist vote shares simply because they have been hit harder by the Great Recession because they consist mostly of manufacturing jobs, or because they have seen a bigger increase in immigrants residing in their country (Awad, 2009; Essletzbichler, Disslbacher, & Moser, 2018). Both levels should be looked at to gain a general picture of the effects of the Great Recession on both a country and its inhabitants.

On the macro-level, as shown by Hernández and Kriesi (2016), we can see that the punishment of the incumbents is in fact greater in countries that have been hit harder by the Great Recession compared to those countries that have been hit to a lesser extent. In

‘hard-hit’ countries, incumbent parties were significantly more severely punished when the economic conditions of the country worsened while they were in office, and voters were more likely to vote for an opposition party instead of a mainstream party. It should be noted, however, that because the Great Recession has had such diverse effects on all European countries, the voting profile of PRR parties also looks different for each country (Rama & Cordero, 2018). For example, in countries less harmed by the Great Recession, the traditional ‘losers of globalization’ (who are generally portrayed as the main supporters of the PRR) remained the key electoral supporters of the PRR (i.e., older people, those from the working class, and those with lower levels of education), whereas in countries hit harder by the Great Recession, the electoral supporters consisted mostly of younger and higher educated voters.

Besides geographical variation on the macro-level (i.e., between countries), there also exists variation in PRR voting on the micro-level (i.e., between individuals). In several articles it has been stated that those who experience economic difficulties in their lives (such as unemployment or low income) might feel more attracted to those parties expressing radical messages, making them more likely to vote for PRR parties (Rooduijn & Burgoon, 2018). They feel that their desires and demands have not been fulfilled by incumbent parties, making them more distrustful towards politics, which leads to a move away from mainstream parties and towards radical parties, as these are usually the parties that campaign their discontent with incumbent parties. Several scholars have found that those individuals who have been hit hardest by economic changes are the ones among whom we can see a striking increase in their support for right-wing populism. As Gidron and Hall (2017) point out in their article, attitudes of those who voted for PRR parties or candidates show deep concerns about their economic situation, but also about recent cultural developments. They state that “people who see themselves as economically underprivileged also tend to feel culturally-distant from the dominant groups in society and envision that distance in oppositional terms, which lend themselves to quintessential populist appeals to a relatively ‘pure’ people pitted against a corrupt or incompetent political elite” (Gidron & Hall, 2017, p. S59). The feeling of being economically deprived can here lead to a feeling of being culturally distant from the main groups in society, which in turn can lead to feelings of opposition to the mainstream and incumbent parties, and a move towards radical opposition parties who campaign themselves to be the representatives of those feeling opposed to the mainstream way of thinking.

The same idea has been mentioned above, when discussing the economic causes of PRR voting, showing that those who feel economically insecure and those who hold lower levels of cultural capital are both more prone towards PRR voting, both for their own reasons.

Overall, there are several individual characteristics with which PRR voters are often distinguished from other voters, including sex, age, education, social class, employment status, and/or ethnicity (Arzheimer, 2009; Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Bovens & Wille, 2010; Givens, 2004; Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002; Van der Brug et al., 2009; Visser et al., 2014). It is generally believed (and argued) that men, older people, people with a lower education, people from a lower social class, unemployed people, and native-born people are more likely to vote for PRR parties than other people. All of these characteristics and how people fit into these categories can have an influence on their voting behaviour and their propensity to vote for a PRR party.

Ch. 2. Data and Measurements

2.1 Data

The dataset that will be used for the analysis is round 6 of the European Social Survey (ESS) dataset (European Social Survey, 2012). The ESS was founded in 2001, administering in 40 countries to date, and has three main aims for its surveys:

1. “To monitor and interpret changing public attitudes and values within Europe and to investigate how they interact with Europe’s changing institutions (European Social Survey, 2018).”
2. “To advance and consolidate improved methods of cross-national survey measurement in Europe and beyond (European Social Survey, 2018).”
3. “To develop a series of European social indicators, including attitudinal indicators (European Social Survey, 2018).”

Round 6 of the ESS dataset includes questions on a variety of topics that are both repeated from previous rounds of the survey, but also some that are unique and have been developed for this specific round, focusing on personal wellbeing and democracy. With these surveys, conducted over several years, the ESS tries to bring light to the current situation in Europe, touching on topics related to economics, religion, social values, discrimination, democracy, and politics. The data collected with ESS fit the purpose of this thesis as it focuses to a great extent (among others) on politics and the (individual) understanding of democracy. Especially for the topic of politics, many variables are available to study the political situation of the countries incorporated into the survey. This thesis focuses more specifically on voting behaviour during elections, which is one the variables measured in all rounds of the ESS.

However, the reason for using round 6 is because the national elections of the countries included in this round took place a few years into the Great Recession, meaning that any possible influences would have had their effects on the individual population by then, making it the best round to use when wanting to investigate the possible influence of the Great Recession on PRR voting behaviour. Furthermore, as this thesis also studies the differences in the effects of the Great Recession on voting behaviour in different European countries, ESS is one of the best surveys to use as it provides a cross-national survey measurement of Europe, making it the perfect tool to measure possible voting differences between countries.

Round 6 of ESS consists of and holds data on 29 countries¹ (European Social Survey, 2018), however not all countries have been included in this research. First of all, Israel has been excluded because it is not a part of the European continent (which is the focus of this thesis). Second, for each country the parties that participated during the national election measured in this round have been investigated to see whether any of them could be characterized as populist radical right (following the definition and line of reasoning that has been put forward in the introduction). However, some countries did not have any PRR parties participating during the measured national elections, meaning that these countries were excluded as well, as the focus of this thesis is on PRR voting behaviour (which cannot happen if there are no PRR parties running for elections). Furthermore, after deleting missing values, Portugal was excluded as well, as the available data now only included non-PRR parties. After excluding those countries that did not meet the criteria to be included, the sample for this thesis was limited to 17 countries: i.e., Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the Russian Federation, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and Ukraine. These 17 countries' respondents combined added up to a total N of 6161.

The outcome variable used is PRR voting behaviour of respondents, measured as either 0 (non-PRR voting) or 1 (PRR voting) (see Appendix A for a detailed overview of which parties of the 17 countries were labeled as PRR and why, and a list of the countries that were excluded from the analysis). The variable used from the survey is "Party voted for in last national election, [...]" with distinct variables for each participating country. Parties that participated in the national elections were put forward for the respondents, of which they had to choose the party they had voted for themselves. A vote was classified as PRR when the

¹ All the countries included in round 6 of ESS: Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Kosovo, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, and United Kingdom.

party voted for during the election fit the description of the populist radical right used in this thesis. With the main focus being on voting behaviour of unemployed individuals, this specific variable is the best option to study this as it provides us with the percentage of votes for PRR parties and allows us to look at voting behaviour of individuals.

The predictor variable used is a respondent's employment status, measured as either 0 (employed) or 1 (unemployed). The variable used from the survey is "Any period of unemployment and work seeking within last 5 years." In the survey, this variable was posed as a question, to which respondents could either answer 'yes' or 'no'. The variable has been recoded to make interpreting easier and to avoid any misunderstandings - those who answered 'yes' were valued 1 (unemployed) and those who answered 'no' were valued 0 (employed). There are multiple variables included in the ESS survey that focus on employment in specific. The reason this specific variable has been chosen is because with this variable one can measure long-term unemployment as well. This thesis focuses on the effects of times of economic hardship (i.e., the Great Recession) on voting behaviour of those who find themselves unemployed. Whereas this specific variable includes all those who have been unemployed in the past five years (which, when this study was being conducted, includes mostly the Great Recession as well), other variables focus on very specific time periods of being unemployed, meaning that if one found themselves unemployed for a shorter time than indicated in the question, they would not be included even when they had been unemployed for a while. Furthermore, other variables focus on the main activity of the past seven days, including a focus on working or being unemployed, but this is more focused on the short term and again excludes those who have been unemployed in previous periods before that. The variable used for this analysis gives the broadest picture of actual unemployment in the few years before the survey, making it the best option for this analysis.

At the beginning of this thesis, several other variables at the individual level have been discussed that could have a possible influence on voting behaviour as well and that will have to be controlled for. Of these variables, four have been included in the analysis as control variables² - education, ethnicity, age and gender. First, for education the variable "Highest level of education" has been used with which respondents were given a list of different levels and types of education of which they had to choose the highest one that they had completed themselves. This variable has been recoded into the values 0 (no education), 1

² These four variables were chosen as they were pointed out to have the biggest impact on PRR voting, and because these four were more measurable than the other possible control variables like social class and religiosity.

(primary education), 2 (secondary education), 3 (tertiary education) and 4 (other). The distinctions made between these three levels of education were based on the most recent ISCED classification.

Second, for ethnicity the variable “Belong to minority ethnic group in country” has been used. This variable was stated as a question, to which respondents could either answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’. It was recoded so that respondents answering ‘yes’ were given a value of 1 (ethnic minority) and respondents answering ‘no’ were given a value of 0 (native). No distinction was made between the types of ethnic minorities - being part of an ethnic minority group in the country was enough for this analysis.

Third, for age the variable “Age of respondent, calculated” was used, in which respondents had to fill in their own age. This variable has been recoded, pooling respondents together divided into different decades. In other words, respondents from the age 15³ till 19 were pooled into one group, as well as those from the age of 20 till 29, etc. The values given to each group ranged from 0 to 9, with the highest age group being 90 till 99.

Lastly, for gender the variable “Gender” was used, in which respondents were given the option male or female. Those who did not answer this question (for whatever reason) were put down as missing values, which was the same for any of the other variables.

The national unemployment rates will be looked at as well, after the analyses, to see whether any possible effects differ between those countries having experienced stronger increases in or higher general unemployment rates, compared to those countries having experienced no/little increases in or lower general unemployment rates. The unemployment rates have been deducted from the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) (n.d.) and Statista (n.d.).

When looking at Table 1 (below), one can immediately see that in all countries, without looking at the differences between employed and unemployed people, PRR parties are receiving significantly less votes compared to non-PRR parties. Looking at Table 2, then, this table gives a little preview on the possible relationship between unemployment and PRR voting. The total N for each country differs significantly, as well as the N for employed and unemployed people, but in almost all of the cases non-PRR parties seem to be receiving more votes compared to PRR parties, both among employed as well as unemployed individuals. Whether this holds true for the analysis as well will be discussed in more detail in the results section.

³ In the ESS, 15 is the youngest age at which individuals are allowed to participate.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

			Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Germany 1 nonpr/rr	Valid	NONPRR	530	3.3	99.4	99.4
		PRR	3	.018	.6	100.0
		Total	533	3.4	100.0	
Germany 2 nonpr/rr	Valid	NONPRR	536	3.4	99.3	99.3
		PRR	4	.025	.7	100.0
		Total	540	3.4	100.0	
Cyprus nonpr/rr	Valid	NONPRR	124	.8	93.2	93.2
		PRR	9	.1	6.8	100.0
		Total	133	.8	100.0	
Norway nonpr/rr	Valid	NONPRR	193	1.2	83.9	83.9
		PRR	37	.2	16.1	100.0
		Total	230	1.5	100.0	
Italy nonpr/rr	Valid	NONPRR	170	1.1	97.7	97.7
		PRR	4	.025	2.3	100.0
		Total	174	1.1	100.0	
Sweden nonpr/rr	Valid	NONPRR	337	1.2	93.4	93.4

		PRR	24	.2	6.6	100.0
		Total	361	2.3	100.0	
Belgium nonprpr/prr	Valid	NONPRR	370	2.3	94.6	94.6
		PRR	21	.1	5.4	100.0
		Total	391	2.5	100.0	
Bulgaria nonprpr/prr	Valid	NONPRR	488	3.1	97.4	97.4
		PRR	13	.1	2.6	100.0
		Total	501	3.2	100.0	
Denmark nonprpr/prr	Valid	NONPRR	341	2.2	92.2	92.2
		PRR	29	.2	7.8	100.0
		Total	370	2.3	100.0	
Finland nonprpr/prr	Valid	NONPRR	402	2.5	82.7	82.7
		PRR	84	.5	17.3	100.0
		Total	486	3.1	100.0	
France nonprpr/prr	Valid	NONPRR	391	2.5	88.3	88.3
		PRR	52	.3	11.7	100.0
		Total	443	2.8	100.0	
Poland nonprpr/prr	Valid	NONPRR	231	1.5	72.9	72.9

		PRR	86	.5	27.1	100.0
		Total	317	2.0	100.0	
Russian Federation nonprp/prr	Valid	NONPRR	273	1.7	88.6	88.6
		PRR	35	.2	11.4	100.0
		Total	308	1.9	100.0	
Ukraine nonprp/prr	Valid	NONPRR	478	3.0	88.4	88.4
		PRR	63	.4	11.6	100.0
		Total	541	3.4	100.0	
Switzerland nonprp/prr	Valid	NONPRR	79	.5	89.8	89.8
		PRR	9	.1	10.2	100.0
		Total	88	.6	100.0	
Estonia nonprp/prr	Valid	NONPRR	291	1.8	98.6	98.6
		PRR	4	.025	1.4	100.0
		Total	295	1.9	100.0	
Slovenia nonprp/prr	Valid	NONPRR	122	.8	71.8	71.8
		PRR	48	.3	28.2	100.0
		Total	170	1.1	100.0	
Netherlands nonprp/prr	Valid	NONPRR	259	1.6	92.5	92.5

		PRR	21	.1	7.5	100.0
		Total	280	1.8	100.0	
Unemployed yes/no	Valid	EMPLOYED	7118	45.0	45.0	45.0
		UNEMPLOYED	8710	55.0	55.0	100.0
		Total	15828	100.0	100.0	
Age in groups⁴	Valid	15-19	373	2.4	2.4	2.4
		20-29	2722	17.2	17.2	19.6
		30-39	3406	21.5	21.5	41.1
		40-49	3569	22.5	22.5	63.6
		50-59	3300	20.8	20.8	84.5
		60-69	1841	11.6	11.6	96.1
		70-79	512	3.2	3.2	99.3
		80-89	101	.6	.6	100.0
		90-99	4	.025	.025	100.0
		Total	15828	100.0	100.0	
Ethnic minority yes/no	Valid	NATIVE	14371	90.8	90.8	90.8
		ETHNIC	1457	9.2	9.2	100.0

⁴ The ages 100-103 are originally also included in the survey. However, after correcting for missing values, 90-99 was the highest age group. 100-103 is therefore not included in the table here

		MINORITY				
		Total	15828	100.0	100.0	
Education no/pri/sec/ter/other	Valid	NO EDUCATION	218	1.4	1.4	1.4
		PRIMARY EDUCATION	1097	6.9	6.9	8.3
		SECONDARY EDUCATION	10224	64.6	64.6	72.9
		TERTIARY EDUCATION	4247	26.8	26.8	99.7
		OTHER	42	.3	.3	100.0
		Total	15828	100.0	100.0	
Gender	Valid	Male	7500	47.4	47.4	47.4
		Female	8328	52.6	52.6	100.0
		Total	15828	100.0	100.0	

Table 2: Crosstabs country and unemployment variables

		EMPL OYED		UNEM PLOY ED		Total	
		N	%	N	%	N	%
Germany 1 nonprrr/prr	NONPRR	348	99,4%	182	99,5%	530	99,4%
	PRR	2	0,6%	1	0,5%	3	0,6%
Total		350	100,0%	183	100,0%	533	100,0%
Germany 2 nonprrr/prr	NONPRR	352	99,4%	184	98,9%	536	99,3%
	PRR	2	0,6%	2	1,1%	4	0,7%
Total		354	100,0%	186	100,0%	540	100,0%
Cyprus nonprrr/prr	NONPRR	52	89,7%	72	96,0%	124	93,2%
	PRR	6	10,3%	3	4,0%	9	6,8%
Total		58	100,0%	75	100,0%	133	100,0%
Norway nonprrr/prr	NONPRR	145	87,3%	48	75%	193	83,9%21
	PRR	21	12,7%	16	25,0%	37	16,1%
Total		166	100,0%	64	100,0%	230	100,0%
Italy nonprrr/prr	NONPRR	66	94,3%	104	100,0%	170	97,7%
	PRR	4	5,7%	0	0,0%	4	2,3%
Total		70	100,0%	104	100,0%	174	100,0%
Sweden nonprrr/prr	NONPRR	215	94,3%	122	91,7%	337	93,4%
	PRR	13	5,7%	11	8,3%	24	6,6%
Total		228	100,0%	133	100,0%	361	100,0%
Belgium nonprrr/prr	NONPRR	233	94,0%	137	95,8%	370	94,6%
	PRR	15	6,0%	6	4,2%	21	5,4%
Total		248	100,0%	143	100,0%	391	100,0%
Bulgaria nonprrr/prr	NONPRR	172	98,3%	316	96,9%	488	97,4%
	PRR	3	1,7%	10	3,1%	13	2,6%
Total		175	100,0%	326	100,0%	501	100,0%
Denmark nonprrr/prr	NONPRR	223	92,1%	118	92,2%	341	92,2%

	PRR	19	7,9%	10	7,8%	29	7,8&
Total		242	100,0%	128	100,0%	370	100,0%
Finland nonprrr/prr	NONPRR	270	84,6%	132	79,0%	402	82,7%
	PRR	49	15,4%	35	21,0%	84	17,3%
Total		319	100,0%	167	100,0%	486	100,0%
France nonprrr/prr	NONPRR	251	88,4%	140	88,1%	391	88,3%
	PRR	33	11,6%	19	11,9%	52	11,7%
Total		284	100,0%	159	100,0%	443	100,0%
Poland nonprrr/prr	NONPRR	116	72,0%	115	73,7%	231	72,9%
	PRR	45	28,0%	41	26,3%	86	27,1%
Total		161	100,0%	156	100,0%	317	100,0%
Russian Federation nonprrr/prr	NONPRR	160	88,4%	113	89,0%	273	88,6%
	PRR	21	11,6%	14	11,0%	35	11,4%
Total		181	100,0%	127	100,0%	308	100,0%
Ukraine nonprrr/prr	NONPRR	208	88,1%	270	88,5%	478	88,4%
	PRR	28	11,9%	35	11,5%	63	11,6%
Total		236	100,0%	305	100,0%	541	100,0%
Switzerland nonprrr/prr	NONPRR	54	90,0%	25	89,3%	79	89,8%
	PRR	6	10,-0%	3	10,7%	9	10,2%
Total		60	100,0%	28	100,0%	88	100,0%
Estonia nonprrr/prr	NONPRR	139	99,3%	152	98,1%	291	98,6%
	PRR	1	0,7%	3	1,9%	4	1,4%
Total		140	100,0%	155	100,0%	295	100,0%
Slovenia nonprrr/prr	NONPRR	62	72,9%	60	70,6%	122	71,8%
	PRR	23	27,1%	25	29,4%	48	28,2%
Total		85	100,0%	85	100,0%	170	100,0%
Netherlands nonprrr/prr	NONPRR	165	92,7%	94	92,2%	259	92,5%
	PRR	13	7,3%	8	7,8%	21	7,5%

Total		178	100,0%	102	100,0%	280	100,0%
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2.2 Analysis

To study the possible relationship between unemployment and PRR voting, linear probability models (LPM) will be used for the analyses. The same analysis will be performed twice for each specific country, once without the control variables and once with the control variables. First, a linear regression analysis will be performed, with the variable on unemployment as the predictor variable and the variable on voting behaviour as the outcome variable of which each country has its own variable. Then, the same linear regression analysis will be performed for each individual country, adding the control variables as predictor variables.

Ch. 3. Results

With the first set of regression analyses (i.e., without control variables), only Norway and Italy seem to be significant, both with small p values lower than .05; .022 for Norway and .013 for Italy (see Table 3). What this means is that, in the cases of Norway and Italy, the null hypothesis can be rejected. However, in the case of the other 15 countries, the p values were all higher than .05, meaning that the results are generally inconclusive and that no association can be detected between unemployment and PRR voting. The null hypothesis for these countries can therefore not be rejected.

When looking at the coefficients of Norway and Italy, both countries give two very different stories. On the one hand, Norway reported the highest (positive) coefficient of all investigated countries with .123, meaning that unemployed people are 12.3 percentage points more likely to vote for PRR parties compared to employed people. However, in the case of Italy the coefficient is rather low (even negative) with -.057. Contrary to Norway, this means that in Italy unemployed people are 5.7 percentage points *less* likely to vote for PRR parties compared to employed people. So, even though in both cases the analysis shows there to be an association between unemployment and PRR voting, the directions of this relationship go into different directions in these two countries.

Table 3: Results regression analyses 1, without control variables

	Unstandardized Beta (B)	Standard error (Std. Error)	P value (Sig.)
Germany 1	.000	.007	.971
Germany 2	.005	.008	.512
Cyprus	-.063	.044	.151
Norway	.123	.054	.022
Italy	-.057	.023	.013
Sweden	.026	.027	.346
Belgium	-.019	.024	.435
Bulgaria	.014	.015	.365
Denmark	.000	.029	.990
Finland	.056	.036	.122
France	.003	.032	.918
Poland	-.017	.050	.739
Russian Federation	-.006	.037	.875
Ukraine	-.004	.028	.889
Switzerland	.007	.070	.919
Estonia	.012	.014	.367
Slovenia	.024	.069	.735
Netherlands	.005	.033	.870

With the second set of regression analyses (i.e., with control variables), five analyses came out as insignificant, with all p values higher than .05 for any of the predictor variables (see Table 4). As for the other 12 countries, all had at least one p value lower than .05, meaning that they were all significant. However, when looking at the acquired p values for all predictor variables separately (i.e., unemployment, and the four control variables age, ethnicity, education, and gender), we can see that only in Italy there seemed to be evidence for an association between unemployment and PRR voting. (Norway, compared to the first analysis, did not show evidence of a significant association between unemployment and PRR voting). For the control variables age and ethnicity, none of the p values were lower than .05, meaning that none of the countries showed evidence of a relationship with PRR voting. In all other countries besides Italy (excluding the five countries that came out as insignificant for all predictor variables), it was either education or gender that predicted PRR voting. Of these two, education seemed to be the biggest (partial) predictor of PRR voting behaviour, with p values smaller than .05 in eight countries. Gender, on the other hand, predicted PRR voting in five countries. In three of these countries, education and gender both came out as significant. Again, as with the first analyses, the results are generally inconclusive and an association (excluding Italy) cannot be detected between unemployment and PRR voting. The null hypothesis can therefore still not be rejected.

When looking at the coefficient of Italy (the only country in which an association between unemployment and PRR voting was detected with the second analysis), we can see that, compared to the analysis without control variables, the coefficient was one percentage point lower (i.e., more negative). With the first analysis (i.e., without control variables), unemployed people in Italy were 5,7 percentage points *less* likely to vote for PRR parties compared to employed people. With the second set of analysis (i.e., with control variables), this ‘increased’ to -.058, meaning that with the second analysis, unemployed people were 5.8 percentage points *less* likely to vote for a PRR party compared to employed people. Overall, however, the second set of analyses with the control variables showed that (despite there already being little evidence of an association between unemployment and PRR voting), other predictor variables were definitely better able to predict PRR voting than unemployment.


Table 4: Results regression analyses 2, with control variables

	Unemployment			Age			Ethnicity			Education			Gender		
	Unstandardized Beta (B)	Standard error (Std. Error)	P value (Sig.)	Unstandardized Beta (B)	Standard error (Std. Error)	P value (Sig.)	Unstandardized Beta (B)	Standard error (Std. Error)	P value (Sig.)	Unstandardized Beta (B)	Standard error (Std. Error)	P value (Sig.)	Unstandardized Beta (B)	Standard error (Std. Error)	P value (Sig.)
Germany 1	-.005	.007	.514	-.004	.002	.080	-.008	.018	.668	-.008	.006	.245	-.004	.007	.502
Germany 2	-.001	.008	.935	-.005	.003	.060	-.011	.022	.627	-.010	.007	.162	-.008	.007	.270
Cyprus	-.082	.050	.102	-.019	.017	.265	-	-	-	-.009	.029	.764	.037	.044	.410
Norway	.108	.057	.057	-.004	.019	.835	-.108	.092	.240	-.170	.048	<.001	-.085	.047	.074
Italy	-.058	.026	.024	-.001	.009	.950	.005	.107	.965	-.014	.021	.519	.002	.023	.923
Sweden	.028	.030	.348	.001	.009	.895	-.057	.062	.363	-.055	.022	.015	-.022	.026	.401
Belgium	-.027	.025	.265	-.014	.009	.116	-.056	.053	.296	-.036	.017	.038	-.010	.023	.673
Bulgaria	.009	.016	.566	-.004	.006	.449	-.023	.018	.195	-.008	.016	.602	-.019	.014	.186


Denmark	-.007	.032	.812	-.006	.011	.593	-.090	.068	.188	-.079	.024	.001	.015	.028	.609
Finland	.039	.038	.302	-.017	.013	.201	.031	.126	.807	-.089	.028	.001	-.104	.034	.002
France	.003	.034	.936	-.018	.012	.136	-.045	.069	.510	-.111	.025	<.001	-.093	.030	.002
Poland	.031	.054	.568	-.013	.020	.525	-.176	.144	.220	-.095	.061	.119	.029	.051	.563
Russian Federation	-.021	.038	.592	-.013	.012	.267	-.041	.049	.404	-.052	.038	.172	.008	.037	.829
Ukraine	-.005	.028	.859	.001	.010	.927	.062	.061	.315	.033	.025	.195	-.072	.028	.011
Switzerland	-.011	.073	.885	-.012	.025	.628	-.133	.127	.296	-.036	.058	.531	.052	.072	.470
Estonia	.009	.014	.508	-.004	.005	.458	-.016	.019	.391	-.001	.016	.925	.011	.014	.442
Slovenia	.017	.076	.821	-.037	.027	.169	.237	.316	.454	-.052	.076	.499	-.211	.069	.003
Netherlands	-.030	.034	.367	-.033	.013	.011	-.046	.060	.449	-.099	.025	<.001	-.084	.031	.007

As there were only two countries in the first analysis that showed any evidence of an association between unemployment and PRR voting, looking at the unemployment rates of countries to see whether this could have had any influence on this specific relationship would not be as fruitful as one would have hoped. However, this does not mean that it is completely useless, as there could still be potential patterns to be found between the strength of the coefficient and the height of the unemployment rate in a country. To investigate whether the Great Recession has had any influence on any possible increased PRR voting among unemployed people, the coefficients of the second set of analyses (i.e., with control variables) can be put together with the unemployment rates of 2012 of the investigated countries (a time during which most of the national elections included in the survey took place) to produce a scatterplot (see Graph 1) and a bar chart (see Graph 2), and to see whether any correlation pops up between the unemployment rates and the magnitude of the association between one's unemployment status and PRR voting.

Graph 1: Scatterplot, unemployment and PRR voting



Graph 2: Bar chart, unemployment and PRR voting



What both of these graphs show is that barely any correlation can be found between unemployment rates, and the strength of the association between unemployment status and PRR voting. However, they do point towards some interesting patterns. As has been discussed at the beginning, as countries go into times of economic turmoil (here measured as the unemployment rates of a country after several years of economic hardship), PRR voting should increase among unemployed people as feelings of economic insecurity (which are already present amongst them) will only increase further and will then lead to an increase in PRR voting. In other words, countries with higher unemployment rates should show, according to these scholars, higher PRR voting behaviour (here measured in coefficients). This pattern can be found only partially in the graphs displayed above and below. We can see that the countries with lower unemployment rates (except for Norway) have negative coefficients, meaning that if a significant association were to have been found (which is not the case), then unemployed people would have been *less* likely to vote for PRR parties compared to employed people. However, when unemployment rates increase even further, the coefficients turn positive instead of negative, meaning that after the initial increase in unemployment rates, a further (and stronger) increase actually follows the line of argumentation put forward above. As the unemployment rates become higher (in this case

above 7,9%), the coefficients turn positive, meaning that if a significant association were to have been found, unemployed people would have been more likely to vote for PRR parties compared to employed people. At the end we can see that the countries with the highest unemployment rates again have negative coefficients, meaning that here unemployed people are again less likely to vote for PRR parties. So, even though no definite pattern can be found on the relationship between unemployment and PRR voting, some interesting information can be deduced from these two graphs.

Ch. 4. Discussion and Conclusion

The purpose of this thesis was to study the relationship between unemployment and PRR voting behaviour across Europe. Previous research has been very inconclusive in its conclusions. Many scholars have studied the relationship between unemployment and voting behaviour, and found that those who find themselves unemployed will vote for left-wing parties (especially during times of economic hardship like the Great Recession). However, over the years other scholars have investigated this exact same relationship and came to the conclusion that those who find themselves unemployed were actually more likely to vote for PRR parties, not left-wing parties, mainly because they believed themselves to be in competition with immigrants for available jobs, leading to anti-immigrant attitudes and in turn a vote for a PRR party. In other words, it is believed among these scholars that feelings of economic insecurity would increase anti-immigrant feelings as unemployed individuals feel that their jobs are taken over by immigrants, which would make them more likely to vote for a PRR party compared to employed citizens. However, even between scholars studying the relationship between unemployment and PRR voting, results continue to be inconclusive about whether there actually exists a relationship between the two.

This study has investigated whether those individuals who find themselves unemployed during the Great Recession (which were times of economic hardship) tend to be more likely to vote for PRR parties compared to those individuals who find themselves employed, focusing on 17 countries included in round 6 of the ESS. Each country was studied separately, as each country has been hit differently by the Great Recession over the years, meaning that the effects of economic hardship on unemployed individuals could have been different for each country. By studying the relationship between a respondent's employment status (either employed or unemployed) and their voting behaviour during the

last national elections, this study was able to examine whether there exists a relationship between the two. Also, by including control variables in a second analysis, this study was able to investigate whether (in the case that no association was found between the unemployment and PRR voting) there were other variables that were better predictors of PRR voting behaviour than employment status.

The results of this study show that, generally, no evident association can be detected between being unemployed and voting for a PRR party in most European countries under consideration. In the analysis without control variables, only two countries show an association between the two and only in two cases were we able to reject the null hypothesis. However, in the other 15 countries, no such association was found and the findings were generally inconclusive, meaning that the null hypothesis could not be rejected and that it cannot be concluded that being unemployed leads to being more likely to vote for a PRR party, including during times of recession. One possible explanation for the lack of association between being unemployed and voting for a PRR party (in almost all countries) is the fact that there are other variables that can better predict PRR voting behaviour. This line of thinking is actually supported by the second set of analyses, which did include the control variables. In only one country did unemployment pop up as a predictor of PRR voting behaviour. Instead, in the majority of the cases, it was education or gender that came up as the strongest predictor of PRR voting. Age and ethnicity did not show any evidence of an association with PRR voting in any of the countries. So again, in the second set of analyses, except for one country we were not able to reject the null hypothesis, meaning that no true association was found between unemployment and PRR voting. Instead, a stronger relationship was found between education and PRR voting, and gender and PRR voting.

Because no true relationship was found in the first analysis between unemployment and PRR voting in almost all countries (except Norway and Italy), looking at the effects of the Great Recession (i.e., whether a country has been strongly hit or weakly hit by these times of economic hardship in terms of its unemployment rates) were not as fruitful as one would have hoped. However, when looking at the scatter plot and bar chart presented above, one can see that (if the associations were to have been found significant), initially the relationship between unemployment and PRR voting would be negative (meaning that unemployed people would be less likely to vote for PRR parties compared to employed people), whereas after this initial rise, a stronger rise in unemployment rates showed positive relations again, meaning that unemployed people would be more likely to vote for PRR parties.

There are, however, several limits to this study that should be taken into account. This study has not investigated the relationship between unemployment and left-wing voting, which ideally should have been included as well, as this would have given a better image on the relationship between unemployed individuals and their general voting behaviour, and would have provided more insights into the debate whether unemployed individuals are more likely to vote left-wing or PRR. Furthermore, this study only focused on one round of the ESS, whereas it would have been interesting to include either the previous or the next round as well as this would have provided us with more insights into the exact influence of times of economic hardship on voting behaviour. As this study was limited in its size and in time, the option of including a second round into the analysis was too big. However, for future research, including a second round would make the research more credible, as one would be able to better study the influence of times of economic hardship on voting behaviour of unemployed individuals, and whether behaviour of unemployed individuals is in fact different before, during, and/or after times of economic recession. Lastly, this research used a very specific definition of PRR parties in the sense that parties, besides being identified as right-wing populist, had to be anti-immigration as well, as this was very important for this specific research. However, this means that some parties that are generally defined as right-wing populist but not necessarily as anti-immigration were excluded from this analysis. It would be interesting to see whether, when using a different definition of PRR parties and so being able to include other parties into the analysis as well, one would find different results than the ones that were found here.

Despite there being some limits to this study, its findings are still significant and relevant to the discussion surrounding the relationship between unemployment and (PRR) voting behaviour. Even though the results cannot be generalized to all situations (as the focus was on Europe and specifically to the years of the Great Recession), contrary to those scholars stating that unemployment does not lead to left-wing but to PRR voting, this study has actually pointed out (by investigating this exact relationship) that no true evident relationship can be found between the two. Instead, a stronger relationship was found between other variables and PRR voting. In other words, by performing two different types of regression analyses (one without and one with control variables), this study was able to provide more insight into the relationship between unemployment and voting behaviour, and has added to the current debate by finding almost no evidence of an association (in the investigated years and countries) between the two. This does not mean that there does not exist any relationship at all between unemployment and PRR voting, only that in this specific

research and in the years investigated, no evidence of a relationship has been found between the two. Instead a stronger relationship was found between other variables (i.e., education and gender) and PRR voting. However, as has been stated above, future research will still be needed to form a better picture of the relationship between unemployment and PRR voting behaviour, ideally taking into account and focusing on the limits described above.

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Appendix A: PRR Parties for Each Country⁵

Countries with PRR parties partaking in the national elections:

Belgium

NONPRR	PRR
<p>(1) <u>Green!</u> <i>Green, progressive</i></p> <p>(2) <u>Christian-Democratic and Flemish</u> <i>Christian-democratic</i></p> <p>(3) <u>New Flemish Alliance</u> <i>Nationalist, conservative</i></p> <p>(5) <u>Forward</u> <i>Social democratic</i></p> <p>(6) <u>Workers' Party of Belgium (Flanders)</u> <i>Marxist, socialist, radical left</i></p> <p>(8) <u>Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats</u> <i>Conservative liberal</i></p> <p>(9) <u>Humanist Democratic Center</u> <i>Centrist</i></p> <p>(10) <u>Confederate Ecologists for the Organisation of Original Struggles</u> <i>Green</i></p> <p>(12) <u>Reformist Movement</u> <i>Conservative liberal, social liberal</i></p> <p>(13) <u>Socialist Party</u> <i>Social democratic</i></p> <p>(14) <u>Workers' Party of Belgium (Wallonia)</u> <i>Marxist, socialist, radical left</i></p> <p>(15) <u>People's Party</u> <i>Right-wing populist, conservative liberal</i></p>	<p>(4) <u>Libertarian, Direct, Democratic</u> <i>Right-wing populist, strict immigration policy, Eurosceptic</i></p> <p>(7) <u>Flemish Interest</u> <i>Right-wing populist, anti-immigration, nationalist, opposed to multiculturalism</i></p> <p>(11) <u>National Front</u> <i>Far-right, strongly opposed to immigration</i></p>

Bulgaria

NONPRR	PRR

⁵ Numbers before each party are the corresponding numbers attached to the parties in the codebook of ESS survey 6

<p>(1) <u>Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria</u> <i>Conservative, populist, pro-European, centre-right</i></p> <p>(2) <u>Bulgarian Socialist Party</u> <i>Centre-left, social democratic</i></p> <p>(4) <u>Order, Law and Justice</u> <i>Right-wing populist, nationalist, national conservative</i></p> <p>(6) <u>Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union</u> <i>Agrarian</i></p> <p>(7) <u>National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria</u> <i>Far-right, nationalist, national conservative</i></p> <p>(8) <u>Union of Democratic Forces</u> <i>Centre-right, conservative, christian-democratic, anti-communist</i></p> <p>(9) <u>National Movement for Stability and Progress</u> <i>Populist, centre-right, liberal</i></p> <p>(10) <u>United People's Party</u> <i>(Economic) liberal, pro-European, centre-right</i></p> <p>(12) <u>Bulgarian Democratic Union</u> <i>Anti-governmental</i></p>	<p>(3) <u>Attack</u> <i>Right-wing populist, nationalist, anti-immigration, anti-Islam, protectionist</i></p> <p>(5) <u>IMRO - Bulgarian National Movement</u> <i>Right-wing populist, nationalist, anti-immigration, anti-Islam, Eurosceptic</i></p> <p>(11) <u>Party for Common People (PFCP)</u> <i>Christian, right, nationalist, anti-immigration, nationalist</i></p>
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Cyprus

NONPRR	PRR
<p>(1) <u>Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL)</u> <i>Marxist-Leninist communist, nationalist, left-wing, federalist, soft Eurosceptic</i></p> <p>(2) <u>Democratic Party (DIKO)</u> <i>Greek Cypriot nationalist, centrist, pro-European</i></p> <p>(3) <u>Democratic Rally (DISY)</u> <i>Christian-democratic, liberal-conservative,</i></p>	<p>(4) <u>European Party (EVROKO)</u> <i>Right-populist, conservative, nationalist, anti-immigration, anti-Turkish</i></p>

<p><i>pro-European</i></p> <p>(5) <u>The Cyprus Green Party</u> <i>Green, centre-left</i></p> <p>(6) <u>Social Democrats (KS EDEK)</u> <i>Social democratic, centre-left, Greek Cypriot nationalist</i></p>	
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Denmark

NONPRR	PRR
<p>(1) <u>Social Democrats</u> <i>Social democratic, centre-left</i></p> <p>(2) <u>Danish Social Liberal Party</u> <i>Social liberal, centre(-left)</i></p> <p>(3) <u>Conservative People's Party</u> <i>Centre-right, liberal conservative, social conservative</i></p> <p>(4) <u>Green Left / Socialist People's Party</u> <i>Democratic socialist, green, centre-left/left-wing</i></p> <p>(6) <u>Christian Democrats</u> <i>Christian democratic, social conservative, environmentalist, centre(-right)</i></p> <p>(7) <u>Left, Denmark's Liberal Party</u> <i>Conservative liberal, agrarian, centre-right</i></p> <p>(8) <u>Liberal Alliance</u> <i>Classical liberal, right-libertarian, centre-right/right-wing</i></p> <p>(9) <u>Unity List / Red-Green Alliance</u> <i>(Eco-)socialist, anti-capitalist, Eurosceptic, (far-)left</i></p>	<p>(5) <u>Danish People's Party</u> <i>Right-wing populist, nationalist, limit immigration, promote cultural assimilation</i></p>

Estonia

NONPRR	PRR
<p>(1) <u>Fatherland Party</u> <i>Christian-democratic, national conservative</i></p>	<p>(4) <u>Conservative People's Party of Estonia</u> <i>Right-wing populist, nationalist, radical/far-right, anti-immigration,</i></p>

<p>(2) <u>Estonian Centre Party</u> <i>Social liberal, populist, centre-left</i></p> <p>(3) <u>Estonian Reform Party</u> <i>Liberal, centre-right</i></p> <p>(5) <u>Social Democratic Party</u> <i>Social democratic, centre-left</i></p> <p>(6) <u>Estonian Greens</u> <i>Green, social liberal, centre-left</i></p> <p>(7) <u>Party of Estonian Christian Democrats / Estonian Christian People's Party</u> <i>Christian democratic, Eurosceptic</i></p> <p>(8) <u>Estonian Independence Party</u> <i>Far-right, nationalist, populist, Eurosceptic</i></p> <p>(9) <u>Estonian United Left Party</u> <i>Democratic socialist, Russian nationalist, left-wing</i></p> <p>(10) <u>Estonian Freedom Party - Farmers' Assembly</u> <i>conservative</i></p>	<p><i>traditionalist, Eurosceptic</i></p>
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Finland

NONPRR	PRR
<p>(1) <u>The National Coalition Party (NCP)</u> <i>Liberal conservative, centre-right, pro-NATO, pro-European</i></p> <p>(2) <u>The Swedish People's Party of Finland (SPP)</u> <i>Minority party, Swedish-speaking population Finland, (social) liberal, centre</i></p> <p>(3) <u>The Centre Party</u> <i>Liberal, agrarian</i></p> <p>(5) <u>Christian Democrats</u> <i>Christian democratic, centre-right</i></p> <p>(8) <u>Pirate Party</u> <i>Pirate politics, open democracy, big tent, information privacy</i></p>	<p>(4) <u>True Finns</u> <i>Right-wing populist, national conservative, right-wing/far-right, anti-immigration, Eurosceptic</i></p> <p>(6) <u>Freedom Party</u> (Freedom Party - Finland's Future) <i>Right-wing populist, nationalist, far-right, anti-immigration, hard Eurosceptic</i></p> <p>(7) <u>Change 2011</u> <i>Right-wing populist, anti-immigration</i></p>

<p>(9) <u>Senior Citizens' Party</u> <i>Centre-right, pensioners' interests</i></p> <p>(10) <u>Independence Party</u> <i>Eurosceptic, direct democracy, economic democracy, anti-racist</i></p> <p>(11) <u>For the Poor</u> <i>Christian socialist, centre-left, no clear political profile, Christian values</i></p> <p>(12) <u>Green League</u> <i>Green politics, green liberalism, centre-left</i></p> <p>(13) <u>Social Democratic Party</u> <i>Social democratic, centre-left</i></p> <p>(14) <u>Left Alliance</u> <i>Socialist, democratic/eco-socialist, left-wing</i></p> <p>(15) <u>Communist Party</u> <i>Communist</i></p> <p>(16) <u>The Communist Workers' Party</u> (Communist Workers' Party - For Peace and Socialism) <i>Communist, Marxist-Leninist, hard Eurosceptic</i></p> <p>(17) <u>Workers' Party</u> <i>Socialist, left-wing</i></p>	
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France

NONPRR	PRR
<p>(1) <u>New Centre</u> <i>Centre-right, conservative liberal, ordoliberal, pro-European</i></p> <p>(3) <u>Radical Party</u> <i>(Social-)liberal, historical, classical radical, centre</i></p> <p>(4) <u>New Anticapitalist Party</u> <i>Far-left, anti-capitalist, eco-socialist, Eurosceptic, feminist, progressive</i></p>	<p>(2) <u>National Front</u> <i>Right-wing populist, far-right, French nationalist, anti-immigration</i></p>

<p>(5) <u>Workers' Struggle</u> <i>Trotskyist communist, feminist, anti-capitalist, far-left</i></p> <p>(6) <u>Left Front</u> <i>Socialist, communist, left-wing/far-left</i></p> <p>(7) <u>Left Party</u> <i>Democratic-socialist, left-wing populist, left-wing nationalist, left-wing</i></p> <p>(8) <u>Movement for France</u> <i>(National/Social) conservative, soft Eurosceptic, Gaullist French, right-wing</i></p> <p>(9) <u>Socialist Party</u> <i>Centre-left, social-democratic, pro-European</i></p> <p>(10) <u>Union for a Popular Movement</u> <i>Centre-right, liberal conservative, Gaullist French</i></p> <p>(11) <u>Democratic Movement</u> <i>(Social) liberal, Christian democratic, pro-European, centre/centre-right</i></p> <p>(12) <u>Europe Ecology - The Greens</u> <i>Centre-left/left-wing, green, after-globalization, European federalism</i></p>	
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Germany (1 and 2)

NONPRR	PRR
<p>(1) <u>Social Democratic Party of Germany</u> <i>Centre-left, social-democratic</i></p> <p>(2) <u>Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) / Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU)</u> <i>Centre-right, Christian democratic, pro-European</i></p> <p>(3) <u>Alliance 90/The Greens</u> <i>Green, social liberal, centre-left</i></p> <p>(4) <u>Free Democratic Party</u> <i>Liberal, centre-right</i></p>	<p>(6) <u>The Republicans</u> <i>National conservative, Eurosceptic, right-wing populist, anti-immigration, German nationalism</i></p>

<p>(5) <u>The Left</u> <i>Democratic socialist, left-wing populist, left-wing</i></p> <p>(7) <u>National Democratic Party</u> <i>Far-right, extremist, Neo-Nazi</i></p> <p>(8) <u>Pirate Party</u> <i>Pirate politics, e-democracy, transparent governance, social liberal, European federalist, centre-left</i></p>	
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Italy

NONPRR	PRR
<p>(1) <u>Democratic Party</u> <i>Social-democratic, centre-left</i></p> <p>(2) <u>Left Ecology Freedom</u> <i>Democratic socialist, eco-socialist, left-wing</i></p> <p>(3) <u>Civil Revolution</u> <i>Left-wing, anti-corruption, left-wing populist</i></p> <p>(4) <u>Five Star Movement</u> <i>Syncretic populist, green politics, direct democracy, Eurosceptic, environmentalist</i></p> <p>(5) <u>Civic Choice</u> <i>Centrist, liberal</i></p> <p>(6) <u>Union of the Centre / Union of Christian and Centre Democrats</u> <i>Christian-democratic, social conservative, centre(-right)</i></p> <p>(7) <u>Future and Freedom</u> <i>Liberal conservative, national conservative, centre-right</i></p> <p>(8) <u>The People of Freedom</u> <i>Centre-right, liberal conservative, Christian-democratic</i></p> <p>(11) <u>Italian Radicals</u></p>	<p>(9) <u>Northern League / Northern League for the Independence of Padania</u> <i>Right-wing/far-right, populist, conservative, Eurosceptic, anti-immigration</i></p> <p>(10) <u>Brothers of Italy</u> <i>National-conservative, right-wing populist, right-wing/far-right, anti-immigration</i></p>

<p><i>Liberal, libertarian, centre</i></p> <p>(12) <u>Act to Stop the Decline</u> <i>Classical liberal, economic liberal, centre-right</i></p> <p>(13) <u>The Right</u> <i>Neo-fascist, national-conservative, Eurosceptic, far-right patriotic</i></p>	
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Netherlands

NONPRR	PRR
<p>(1) <u>People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy</u> <i>Conservative-liberal, centre-right</i></p> <p>(2) <u>Labour Party</u> <i>Social-democratic, centre-left</i></p> <p>(4) <u>Christian Democratic Appeal</u> <i>Christian-democratic, social conservative, centre(-right)</i></p> <p>(5) <u>Socialist Party</u> <i>Democratic socialist, social democratic, left-wing</i></p> <p>(6) <u>Democrats ‘66</u> <i>Social liberal, progressive, European federal, centre</i></p> <p>(7) <u>Green Left</u> <i>Green, social-democratic, centre-left/left-wing</i></p> <p>(8) <u>Christian Union</u> <i>Christian-democratic, social conservative, centre(-left) (fiscal), centre-left (social)</i></p> <p>(9) <u>Reformed Political Party</u> <i>Conservative Calvinist, Christian right, social conservative, theocratic, right-wing</i></p> <p>(10) <u>Party for the Animals</u> <i>Animal rights, animal welfare, environmentalist, soft Eurosceptic, left-wing</i></p>	<p>(3) <u>Party for Freedom</u> <i>Nationalist, national liberal, right-wing populist, Eurosceptic, right-wing/far-right, anti-immigration, anti-Islam, hard Eurosceptic</i></p>

<p>(11) <u>Pirate Party</u> <i>Pirate politics, privacy, open government, direct democracy, syncretic</i></p> <p>(12) <u>50PLUS</u> <i>Pensioners' interests, populist, soft Eurosceptic, centre</i></p>	
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Norway

NONPRR	PRR
<p>(1) <u>Red Party</u> <i>Communist, democratic socialist, left-wing/far-left</i></p> <p>(2) <u>Socialist Left Party</u> <i>Democratic socialist, eco-socialist, feminist, left-wing</i></p> <p>(3) <u>Norwegian Labour Party</u> <i>Social-democratic, centre-left</i></p> <p>(4) <u>Liberal Party</u> <i>Centrist, liberal, social liberal</i></p> <p>(5) <u>Christian Democratic Party</u> <i>Christian-democratic, social conservative, centre(-right)</i></p> <p>(6) <u>Centre Party</u> <i>Agrarian, economic nationalist, centre</i></p> <p>(7) <u>Conservative Party</u> <i>Liberal-conservative, centre-right</i></p> <p>(9) <u>Coastal Party</u> <i>(Northern) regionalist, agrarian, national conservative, Eurosceptic, centre-right</i></p>	<p>(8) <u>Progress Party</u> <i>Liberal conservative, right-wing populist, anti-immigration, right-wing</i></p>

Poland

NONPRR	PRR
<p>(1) <u>Congress of the New Right</u> <i>Economic libertarian, social conservative, monarchist, traditionalist, reactionist</i></p> <p>(2) <u>Civic Platform</u></p>	<p>(6) <u>Law and Justice</u> <i>National conservative, right-wing populist, right-wing, anti-immigration, anti-Islam</i></p>

<p><i>Liberal conservative, liberal, centre(-right)</i></p> <p>(3) <u>Poland Comes First</u> <i>Centre-right, conservative liberal, Christian democratic, soft Eurosceptic</i></p> <p>(4) <u>Polish Labour Party</u> <i>Left-wing/far-left, democratic socialist, anti-capitalist, Marxist</i></p> <p>(5) <u>Polish People's Party</u> <i>agrarian , Christian democratic, conservative, centre(-right)</i></p> <p>(7) <u>Palikot's Movement</u> <i>Social-liberal, left-wing populist, progressive, pro-European, centre-left/left-wing</i></p> <p>(8) <u>Democratic Left Alliance</u> <i>Social-democratic, pro-European, Atlanticist, centre-left</i></p>	
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Russian Federation

NONPRR	PRR
<p>(1) <u>United Russia</u> <i>Conservative, statist, Russian nationalist, big tent</i></p> <p>(2) <u>Communist Party of the Russian Federation</u> <i>Left-wing nationalist, communist, Marxist-Leninist, Soviet patriotism, left-wing/far-left</i></p> <p>(6) <u>Yabloko</u> <i>Social-liberal, progressive, feminist, pro-European, centre-left</i></p> <p>(11) <u>Fair Russia</u> <i>Social conservative, social-democratic, democratic socialist, Eurasianist, centre(-left)</i></p> <p>(12) <u>Just Cause</u> <i>Liberal conservative, economic liberal, centre-right</i></p>	<p>(3) <u>Liberal Democratic Party of Russia</u> <i>Right-wing populist, social conservative, anti-immigration, Russian ultranationalist, right-wing/far-right</i></p>

<p>(16) <u>Patriots of Russia</u> <i>Statist, democratic socialist, left-wing nationalist, left-wing</i></p>	
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Slovenia

NONPRR	PRR
<p>(1) <u>Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia</u> <i>Pensioners' interests, single-issue, pro-European, centre</i></p> <p>(2) <u>Liberal Democracy of Slovenia</u> <i>Social-liberal, liberal, pro-European, centre(-left)</i></p> <p>(3) <u>New Slovenia - Christian Democrats</u> <i>Christian-democratic, conservative, pro-European, centre-right</i></p> <p>(5) <u>Slovenian People's Party</u> <i>Conservative, agrarian, Christian-democratic, green conservative, pro-European, centre-right</i></p> <p>(6) <u>Social Democrats</u> <i>Centre-left, pro-European, social-democratic</i></p> <p>(7) <u>Positive Slovenia</u> <i>Centre(-left), social-liberal, social-democratic</i></p> <p>(8) <u>Civici List</u> <i>Classical-liberal, centre(-right)</i></p> <p>(9) <u>Zares - Social Liberals</u> <i>Social-liberal, pro-European, centre(-left)</i></p> <p>(11) <u>Party for Sustainable Development of Slovenia</u> <i>Left-wing ecological, socially oriented</i></p>	<p>(4) <u>Slovenian Democratic Party</u> <i>Conservative, Slovenian nationalist, right-wing populist, anti-immigration, right-wing</i></p> <p>(10) <u>Slovenian National Party</u> <i>Nationalist, right-wing populist, anti-immigration, right-wing/far-right</i></p>

Sweden

NONPRR	PRR
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<p>(1) <u>Centre Party</u> <i>Liberal, centre(-right)</i></p> <p>(2) <u>Liberals</u> <i>Conservative liberal, classical liberal, European federalist, centre-right</i></p> <p>(3) <u>Christian Democrats</u> <i>Christian-democratic, conservative, agrarian, centre-right/right-wing</i></p> <p>(4) <u>Green Party</u> <i>Green, ecofeminist, centre-left</i></p> <p>(5) <u>Conservatives</u> <i>Liberal conservative, centre-right</i></p> <p>(6) <u>The Social Democrats</u> <i>Social-democratic, democratic socialist, centre-left</i></p> <p>(7) <u>Left Party</u> <i>Socialist, Eurosceptic, left-wing</i></p> <p>(8) <u>Feminist Initiative</u> <i>Radical feminist, equity feminist, left-wing</i></p> <p>(9) <u>Pirate Party</u> <i>Pirate politics, e-democracy, green liberal, syncretic</i></p>	<p>(10) <u>Sweden Democrats</u> <i>Nationalist, right-wing populist, anti-immigration, Eurosceptic, right-wing/far-right</i></p>
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Switzerland

NONPRR	PRR
<p>(2) <u>Social Democratic Party / Socialist Party</u> <i>Social-democratic, anti-capitalist, democratic socialist, centre-left/left-wing</i></p> <p>(3) <u>FDP. The Liberals</u> <i>Liberal, conservative liberal, centre(-right)</i></p> <p>(4) <u>Christian Democratic Party</u> <i>Christian-democratic, social conservative, centre(-right)</i></p> <p>(5) <u>Green Party</u> <i>Green, pro-European, centre-left/left-wing</i></p>	<p>(1) <u>Swiss People's Party</u> <i>National-conservative, right-wing populist, agrarian, anti-immigration, anti-islam, Eurosceptic, right-wing</i></p> <p>(9) <u>Federal Democratic Union (of Switzerland)</u> <i>Christian right, right-wing populist, national-conservative, Eurosceptic, anti-immigration, right-wing</i></p> <p>(10) <u>Ticino League</u> <i>National-conservative, right-wing populist, anti-environmentalist, anti-immigration,</i></p>

<p>(6) <u>Green Liberal Party</u> <i>Green liberal, centre(-right)</i></p> <p>(7) <u>Conservative Democratic Party</u> <i>(Fiscal) conservative, centre(-right)</i></p> <p>(8) <u>Evangelical People's Party</u> <i>Christian-democratic, social conservative, Stewardship theology, centre-left (fiscal), centre-right (ethical)</i></p> <p>(11) <u>Swiss Labour Party</u> <i>Communist, Marxist, socialist, left-wing/far-left</i></p> <p>(13) <u>Christian Social Party</u> <i>Christian left, social democracy, environmentalist, centre-left</i></p> <p>(14) <u>Alternative Left</u> <i>Democratic socialist, environmentalist, anti-capitalist, left-wing</i></p> <p>(16) <u>Pirate Party Switzerland</u> <i>Pirate politics, freedom of information, liberalism</i></p> <p>(17) <u>Swiss Nationalist Party</u> <i>Neo-Nazi, Völkisch movement, Neue Rechte, Swiss nationalist, far-right</i></p>	<p><i>Eurosceptic, right-wing</i></p> <p>(12) <u>Movement of the Citizens of French-speaking Switzerland</u> <i>National conservative, right-wing populist, anti-immigration, right-wing</i></p> <p>(15) <u>Swiss Democrats</u> <i>Swiss nationalist, Eurosceptic, anti-immigration, right-wing/far-right</i></p>
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Ukraine

NONPRR	PRR
<p>(1) <u>All Ukrainian Union 'Fatherland'</u> <i>Conservative, Ukrainian nationalist, populist, pro-European, centre-right</i></p> <p>(3) <u>Communist Party of Ukraine</u> <i>Communist, Marxist-Leninist, left-wing populist, Russophilia, far-left</i></p> <p>(4) <u>UDAR (Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform)</u> <i>Liberal, civic nationalist, pro-European, centre</i></p> <p>(5) <u>Party of Regions</u></p>	<p>(2) <u>All Ukrainian Union 'Freedom'</u> <i>Ukrainian nationalist, right-wing populist, social conservative, anti-communist, anti-immigration, right-wing/far-right</i></p>

<i>Social democratic, regionalist, Russophilia, Euro-sceptic, catch-all, centre</i>	
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Countries without PRR parties partaking in the national elections and thus excluded from analysis:

- Albania
- Czechia
- Hungary
- Iceland
- Ireland
- Kosovo
- Lithuania (first, second and third vote)
- Slovakia
- Spain
- Portugal⁶
- United Kingdom

⁶ Portugal did have PRR parties participating in their national elections, but was excluded from the analysis after deleting the missing values as no PRR voters remained.

Appendix B: Ethics and Privacy Checklist



CHECKLIST ETHICAL AND PRIVACY ASPECTS OF RESEARCH

INSTRUCTION

This checklist should be completed for every research study that is conducted at the Department of Public Administration and Sociology (DPAS). This checklist should be completed *before* commencing with data collection or approaching participants. Students can complete this checklist with help of their supervisor.

This checklist is a mandatory part of the empirical master's thesis and has to be uploaded along with the research proposal.

The guideline for ethical aspects of research of the Dutch Sociological Association (NSV) can be found on their website (http://www.nsv-sociologie.nl/?page_id=17). If you have doubts about ethical or privacy aspects of your research study, discuss and resolve the matter with your EUR supervisor. If needed and if advised to do so by your supervisor, you can also consult Dr. Jennifer A. Holland, coordinator of the Sociology Master's Thesis program.

PART I: GENERAL INFORMATION

Project title: **Populist Radical Right Voting Behaviour of Unemployed Individuals During the Great Recession in Europe**

Name, email of student: **Floor Herrewijnen, 661759fh@eur.nl**

Name, email of supervisor: **Gabriele Mari, mari@essb.eur.nl**

Start date and duration: **13/02/23, 4 months**

Is the research study conducted within DPAS
NO

YES -

If 'NO': at or for what institute or organization will the study be conducted?
(e.g. internship organization)

PART II: HUMAN SUBJECTS

1. Does your research involve human participants. YES - **NO**

If 'NO': skip to part V.

If 'YES': does the study involve medical or physical research? YES - NO
Research that falls under the Medical Research Involving Human Subjects Act ([WMO](#)) must first be submitted to [an accredited medical research ethics committee](#) or the Central Committee on Research Involving Human Subjects ([CCMO](#)).

2. Does your research involve field observations without manipulations that will not involve identification of participants. YES - NO

If 'YES': skip to part IV.

3. Research involving completely anonymous data files (secondary data that has been anonymized by someone else). YES - NO

If 'YES': skip to part IV.

Part V: Data storage and backup

Where and when will you store your data in the short term, after acquisition?

After acquisition, my data (which will mostly be data from SPSS) will be stored both on my laptop as well as in a back-up.

Note: indicate for separate data sources, for instance for paper-and pencil test data, and for digital data files.

Who is responsible for the immediate day-to-day management, storage and backup of the data arising from your research?

I myself am responsible for the day-to-day management storage and backup of data arising from my research.

How (frequently) will you back-up your research data for short-term data security?

Most likely every few days.

In case of collecting personal data how will you anonymize the data?

I will not be using personal data.

Note: It is advisable to keep directly identifying personal details separated from the rest of the data. Personal details are then replaced by a key/ code. Only the code is part of the database with data and the list of respondents/research subjects is kept separate.

PART VI: SIGNATURE

Please note that it is your responsibility to follow the ethical guidelines in the conduct of your study. This includes providing information to participants about the study and ensuring confidentiality in storage and use of personal data. Treat participants respectfully, be on time at appointments, call participants when they have signed up for your study and fulfil promises made to participants.

Furthermore, it is your responsibility that data are authentic, of high quality and properly stored. The principle is always that the supervisor (or strictly speaking the Erasmus University Rotterdam) remains owner of the data, and that the student should therefore hand over all data to the supervisor.

Hereby I declare that the study will be conducted in accordance with the ethical guidelines of the Department of Public Administration and Sociology at Erasmus University Rotterdam. I have answered the questions truthfully.

Name student: **Floor Herrewijnen
Mari**



Date: **26/03/23**

Name (EUR) supervisor: **Gabriele**



Date: **26/03/23**