WSSD Multistakeholder Partnerships for Sustainable Development & Democratic Legitimacy

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Executive Summary

Over the past two decades, world politics has been undergoing a tremendous transformation. Governments and international organisations are confronting new and more complex challenges such as climate change. In order to provide solid policy-solutions new actors such as civil society organisations, private businesses, epistemic communities and international organisations have become increasingly involved in the global and transnational policy-making process. This increased involvement of private actors has formed a foundation for the introduction of new governance mechanisms at the international level. An example of this new governance mechanism is the concept of multistakeholder partnership for sustainable development, introduced at the World Summit for Sustainable Development in 2002 in Johannesburg. These multistakeholder partnerships were intended to speed up the implementation of Agenda 21. However, besides being an implementation mechanism several multistakeholder partnerships can be considered standard-setting mechanisms. By being standard-setting mechanisms their potential impact on contemporary global and regional environmental policy-making reaches beyond the original implementation mandate and larger questions of legitimacy and accountability are raised. This project arrives at the conclusion that the multistakeholder partnerships for sustainable development generally have failed to meet the criteria for democratic legitimacy. Crucial aspects such as the inadequate involvement of private business actors and the lack of partnership websites, accountability mechanisms and effective communication channels constitute barriers for the achievement of democratic legitimacy. However, if these aspects are properly addressed in the designing of upcoming multistakeholder partnerships there are grounds for optimism with regard to their opportunities for achieving democratic legitimacy. This Master Thesis contains 33,505 words.

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Glossary

AFP	Asia Forest Partnership
CIFOR	Centre for International Forest Research
CLASP	Collaborative Labelling and Appliance Standards Programme
CLASP PAC	CLASP Programme Advisory Committee
CLASP TAC	CLASP Technical Advisory Committee
CSI	Cement Sustainability Initiative
ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
GWP	Global Water Partnership
GWP TAC	Global Water Partnership Technical Advisory Committee
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
REEEP	Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership
UN	United Nations
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNCSD	United Nations Commission for Sustainable Development
UNEP	United Nations Environment Program
WBCSD	World Business Council for Sustainable Development
WSSD	World Summit on Sustainable Development

1. Introduction

1.1 Introduction

At the beginning of the 21st century, global politics is facing profound changes. Concepts such as transformation of the state or global change are used to portray the dynamic nature of the past decades (Dingwerth, 2007, p1). The importance of geography has decreased in the organisation of social relations and nation-states are confronted with global environmental issues such as climate change, resource depletion, loss of biodiversity and deforestation (Dingwerth, 2007, p1; IPCC, 2007, p31). The globalization of environmental issues forms new interdependencies among nation-states that require new regulatory institutions and organisations at the global level. These institutions do not remain isolated from interlinking with nation-states, hence a governance architecture has been established, which stretches from local environmental politics to global negotiations and back (Biermann & Pattberg, 2008, p279).

Climate change and global environmental problems are recognised as threats to humanity that can only be addressed effectively if the activities are coordinated at the global level. To respond to these challenges, several commentators call for global solutions and agreements - a broad agreement exists within several political circles that more global governance is required to cope with global environmental problems (Biermann & Pattberg, 2008, p279).

1.2 Global Governance

The concept of global governance is a highly discussed and contested concept within the sphere of international relations. Commentators are divided into two camps, taking opposite stands in the debate on whether democracy, nature, and inhabitants of the globe will benefit from more global governance (Stiglitz, 2006, p8). James Rosenau provides a preliminary understanding of the ontology of global governance in his definition of the concept:

"Global governance is conceived to include systems of rule at all levels of human activity—from the family to the international organization—in which the pursuit of

goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions." (Rosenau, 2006, p121)

Global governance portrays world politics as a forum that is no longer exclusively for nation states, but also characterized by increased participation of actors that were previously only active at the national level (Dingwerth, 2007, p2). Apart from governments, global governance includes private actors such as epistemic communities, civil society organisations, private businesses, governmental agencies, intergovernmental organizations and international courts (Biermann & Pattberg, 2008, p278). Second, the increased participation within world politics has caused the emergence of new mechanisms for cooperation beyond the traditional intergovernmental negotiations. World politics today is often organized in networks or via new mechanisms of public-private and private-private collaboration. An increasing number of private actors such become formally part of standard-setting and standard-implementing institutions and mechanisms within global governance (Biermann & Pattberg, 2008, p280). Third, the evolving global governance system is characterized by a segmentation of various standard-making and standard-implementing levels and clusters, divided vertically between supranational, international, national and local layers of authority and horizontally between several parallel standard-making institutions, which are upheld by different groups of actors (Biermann & Pattberg, 2008, p282).

Within global governance, four different forms of governance can be identified, each with its own advantages and disadvantages. Supranational governance focuses on decision-making within global political communities, where power is transferred to a supranational institution by the national governments. The supranational institutions can thus (via a legal procedure) implement a supranational rule above (supra) the national legal system (Risse, 2004, p14). For example, in supranational organizations such as the European Union, European Community law constitutes the 'law of the land', thus having supremacy over national law. Moreover, within the European Union, supranational governance involves some elements of hierarchy between the European Community and the member states of the European Union (Risse, 2004, p5). Second, within intergovernmental governance, nation-states work together through governments. Nation-states negotiate international agreements such as the

Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer or cooperate in international organisations such as the World Trade Organisation. Intergovernmental governance is often criticised for its democratic performance due to lack of transparency and participation of non-governmental actors (Biermann & Pattberg, 2008, p285). Third, within transgovernmental governance, members of national ministries and agencies, judiciaries and parliaments collaborate across borders to address core policy issues. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is an example of transgovernmental governance with a major political influence. Transgovernmental governance and networks have the potential to achieve good global governance; however, the frequent closed-door policies at meetings and lack of transparency are core points in the criticism of their democratic performance (Dingwerth, 2007, p2). Finally, transnational governance refers to the governance arrangements beyond the nation-state, wherein private actors such as epistemic communities, civil society organisations and private businesses are systematically involved and have a say in the decision-making process. Moreover, one should distinguish between lobbying or influence-seeking activities of private actors on one hand, and their direct participation in standard-setting, standard implementation and service providing activities on the other (Risse, 2004, p3). Traditionally, non-state actors such as religious institutions and private businesses have focused on influencing standard-making initiatives of governments or intergovernmental organisations. More recently, these private actors participate and contribute in the shaping and implementation of their own standards within transnational networks (Dingwerth, 2007, p3). Transnational governance differs from the more hierarchical control models, characterised by traditional relations between governments and private actors. Transnational governance focuses on institutional arrangements beyond the nation-state that have two specific characteristics (Risse, 2004, p4): the participation of private actors in governance arrangements; and an emphasis on non-hierarchical types of steering.

Transnational governance is often criticised for lack of legitimacy and a democratic deficit when compared to intergovernmentalism. Within nation-states, the social order is considered legitimate, because the decision-makers are accountable to the citizens who can participate in decision-making through representation. Here a direct link exists between the decisions-makers and citizens through the mechanisms of

representation. These mechanisms are mostly absent within transnational governance. Hence, several commentators claim that out of the four global governance forms, only intergovernmental governance can overcome the challenge of combining effectiveness with legitimacy (Dingwerth, 2007, p3). However, currently both national governments and intergovernmental organisations are under fire because of their alleged failures to achieve both effectiveness and legitimacy (Dingwerth, 2007, p3).

1.3 Transnational Multistakeholder Partnerships

With the increasing role of transnational governance one witnesses the emergence of new forms of cooperation between public and private actors. An example is the so-called transnational multistakeholder partnerships which include both public-private and private-private partnerships (Biermann & Pattberg, 2008, p289). The concept of multistakeholder partnerships is not a new governance phenomenon at the national scene within developed countries. However, only within the last decades, the concept has been transferred to the international level, for example first being used in the United Nations context in the year 2000 (Borzel & Risse, 2002, p11). According to Backstrand (2006b, p488), multistakeholder partnerships are voluntary, non-binding and often targeting implementation and collaborative problem solving. They represent soft and non-hierarchical modes of steering, and often involve deliberation and persuasion in the standard-making process. Backstrand has developed the following definition of multistakeholder partnerships:

"Voluntary cooperative arrangements between actors from the public, business and civil society that display minimal degree of institutionalization, have common non-hierarchical decision-making structures and address public policy issues" (Backstrand, 2005, p4)

Multiple commentators perceive transnational multistakeholder partnerships as a plausible solution to several global issues such as fulfilling responsibilities under international agreements and minimising the democratic deficit within international organisations (Biermann, Pattberg, Mert & Chan, 2007, p1; Haas, 2004, p2). Proponents states that transnational multistakeholder partnerships will generate more result-based governance due to their decentralized structures and expertise from a

diverse group of stakeholders (Backstrand, 2006a, p293). Moreover, they are claimed to increase the legitimacy of global governance in terms of democratic participation and accountability (Börzel & Risse, 2002, p2). On the other hand, commentators accuse the transnational multistakeholder partnerships of being new neo-liberal regulatory mechanisms dressed in the language of participation that benefits powerful developed countries and actors, and preserves sovereign, capitalist and present power structures (Biermann, Pattberg, Mert & Chan, 2007, p9). Especially within the context of United Nations, the concept of transnational multistakeholder partnerships is the new mantra forming the current United Nations discourse on global development and environmental politics. The term now covers the majority of the interactions between governments and private actors within the United Nations system (Biermann, Pattberg, Mert & Chan, 2007, p2).

Within the literature on transnational and global governance, an ongoing debate concerns the requirement of a transnational demos for achieving legitimacy within global governance. Sceptics argue that democratic legitimacy can only be achieved within the framework of a demos, however most commentators claim that a transnational demos or demoi does not exist. Several commentators (Risse 2002, p269 & Zurn, 2002, p245) argue that a strong moral community and collective identify beyond the state must be developed before a true demos can emerge. However, currently there exists no such transnational collective identify or moral community (Risse 2002, p269).

In the view of Börzel and Risse, the concept of transnational multistakeholder partnerships offers a way out to tackle to tackle the legitimacy issue of global governance by networks, since they do not require a transnational demos in terms of a strong supranational collective identity. Hence, Börzel and Risse claim that governance beyond the nation state does not necessarily need a transnational demos in order to be legitimate (Börzel & Risse, 2002, p16). Transnational multistakeholder partnerships can specifically help to democratize global governance through; the increased participation of private actors in global policy-making; reducing the geographical, functional cultural and human constraints for transnational activity; improving the correspondence between the ‘rulers’ and the ‘ruled’; and contributing to the emergence of an actual transnational demos and solidarity.

Transnational actors potentially involved in transnational multistakeholder partnerships are denoted as the broad range of public and private actors that organize and operate across state borders, including government agencies, international organisations, regional and local governments, non-governmental organizations, advocacy networks, social movements, party associations, research networks, philanthropic foundations, indigenous groups, women and youth groups, industry organisations and multinational corporations. Of particular interest are transnational civil society actors, whose participation in international policy-making increasingly is seen as holding the promise of a democratization of global governance (Bexell, Tellberg & Uhlin, 2008, p2).

1.4 Multistakeholder Partnerships on Sustainable Development

The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 was the beginning of a more inclusive approach to global (environmental) governance. The participation of major groups from the civil society emerged as a cornerstone in Agenda 21[1] and in multiple other Rio agreements[2] (Biermann, Pattberg, Mert & Chan, 2007, p1). The responsibility for monitoring the implementation-progress of Agenda 21 and the dialogue with private actors was given to the United Nations Commission for Sustainable Development (UNCSD). The UNCSD was formed after UNCED as an administrative commission under the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). The call for increased participation was repeated ten years later at the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg in 2002. However, Johannesburg made a significant distinction with regard to how implementation of Agenda 21 should be accomplished. Government and United Nation (UN) officials acknowledged that increased participation alone was insufficient for achieving the required progress towards sustainable development. New mechanisms for implementation should be structured to encourage deliberation and cooperation between actors with a stake in Agenda 21. The outcome of the WSSD intergovernmental negotiations was the

[1] Agenda 21 is a programme run by the United Nations (UN) related to sustainable development. It is a comprehensive blueprint of action to be taken globally, nationally and locally by organizations of the UN, governments, and major groups in every area in which humans directly affect the environment.

[2] Additional agreements reached at the UNCED: Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Convention on Biological Diversity and Forest Principles.

concept of multistakeholder partnerships or 'Type II partnerships'[3] as they were branded (Biermann, Pattberg, Mert & Chan, 2007, p1). Type II partnerships or multistakeholder partnerships aim to complement government efforts in accomplishing the objectives and milestones agreed on at UNCED and are defined by the United Nations as:

"voluntary and collaborative relationships between various parties, both State and non-State, in which all participants agree to work together to achieve a common purpose or undertake a specific task and to share risks, responsibilities, resources, competencies and benefits." (UN, 2003a, p4)

The United Nations invited all partnership-initiators to register the projects within the secretariat of the Commission for Sustainable Development. Eight years after the launching at WSSD, 348 partnerships were registered, divided into 35 sub-groups such as air-pollution and agriculture[4]. The multistakeholder partnerships include a diverse set of thematic focuses, ranging from indoor cooking to energy efficiency and they differ in terms of the planned duration and number and types of actors involved (Biermann, Pattberg, Mert & Chan, 2007, p1). Several multistakeholder partnerships already existed before the WSSD summit in 2002; e.g., the Global Water Partnerships was established in 1995. As mentioned above, the concept of multistakeholder partnerships is considered a cornerstone in achieving the objectives of Agenda 21. Later, multistakeholder partnerships were expected to also focus on the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals[5]. A major objective for UN at the WSSD was to move beyond a sole focus on participation and include new forms of governance and deliberation between governments and private actors (Biermann, Pattberg, Mert & Chan, 2007, p1). The United Nations emphasized with regard to the multistakeholder partnerships that:

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[3] Intergovernmental agreements are usually referred to as Type 1 outcomes. At the WSSD, the intergovernmental negotiations did not lead to any international agreements or treaties.

[4] United Nations Commission for Sustainable Development Partnership Database, http://webapps01.un.org/dsd/partnerships/public/welcome.do, accessed on 13 May 2010.

5 The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are eight goals to be achieved by 2015 that respond to the world's main development challenges. They are drawn from the actions and targets contained in the Millennium Declaration that was adopted by 189 nations-and signed by 147 heads of state and governments during the UN Millennium Summit in New York in September 2000. The eight MDGs break down into 21 quantifiable targets that are measured by 60 indicators**:** Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education; Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women; Goal 4: Reduce child mortality; Goal 5: Improve maternal health; Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability; and Goal 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development.

'the implementation should involve all relevant actors through partnerships, especially between Governments of the North and South, on the one hand, and between Governments and major groups, on the other, to achieve the widely shared goals of sustainable development. As reflected in the Monterrey Consensus[6], such partnerships are key to pursuing sustainable development in a globalizing world'. (UN, 2003b, p2)

According to the United Nations, a multistakeholder partnership is successful if all participants contribute and gain something. Hence, all actors must have a stake in the process and the outcome despite the variation in their individual inputs and interests. Agreements between participants may be formal or informal, or combining both, however they must also contain an obvious understanding of the objective, the role and the responsibilities of each participant (UN, 2003b, p2). In order to structure the partnership-process and registration, the United Nations and its member states agreed on a set of basic guidelines named the Bali Guiding Principles (See Appendix I). These guidelines constitute a set of minimum requirements a multistakeholder partnership must fulfil in order to register within the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development.

1.5 Problem Statement

The overall success of multistakeholder partnerships in relation to the implementation of Agenda 21 depends on both their effectiveness and democratic legitimacy – both aspects are having a significant impact on each other (Biermann, Pattberg, Mert & Chan, 2007, p6). However, critical commentators accuse the multistakeholder partnerships of only being effective and fully democratic within a western capitalistic context, since only Northern governments and civil society organisations have the financial and human resources required for installing proper participation, transparency and accountability mechanisms. Hence, multistakeholder partnerships are claimed not to be suitable for global environmental problems that occur in both the developed and developing world (Biermann, Pattberg, Mert & Chan, 2007, p6).

[6] The Monterrey Consensus was the outcome of the 2002 Monterrey Conference, the United Nations International Conference on Financing for Development. Governments were joined by the Heads of the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization, prominent business and civil society leaders and other stakeholders. Countries also reached agreements on other issues, including debt relief, fighting corruption, and policy coherence. Since its adoption the Monterrey Consensus has become the major reference point for international development cooperation.

Multistakeholder partnerships received democratic legitimacy to a large extent from the intergovernmental negotiations at the WSSD summit in Johannesburg, in 2002 from which they emerged. However, besides implementation of Agenda 21 and the Millennium Development Goals, the objectives of several multistakeholder partnerships also include explicit and implicit transnational rule- and standard-setting. These transnational rules and standards can potentially have an influence on communities and policy-discourses, which is beyond what was intended with the original implementation mandate of Agenda 21 received at the WSSD meeting in 2002. Because their potential impact on contemporary global and regional environmental policy-making reaches beyond their original implementation mandate, larger questions of legitimacy, effectiveness and accountability are raised. Several commentators (cf. Backstrand and Dingwerth) claim that the multistakeholder partnerships are required to live up to certain democratic standards, focusing on participation, transparency, accountability and deliberation. In this context, it is important to mention that fulfilling these standards for democratic legitimacy might not coincide with the objectives of the involved actors in the multistakeholder partnerships for sustainable development. The involved actors may not be interested in democratic legitimacy or may perceive it as a buzzword to get the partnership going, however aiming for other goals. This could particularly be the case for those actors that solely have a professional interest in the multistakeholder partnerships such as consultancies. However, in the view of this project's author, achieving democratic legitimacy is a fundamental requirement for multistakeholder partnerships since they reach beyond the original implementation mandate. Therefore, the actual opinions or objectives of the involved actors concerning the democratic performance will not influence the requirements for achieving democratic legitimacy, the multistakeholder partnerships must fulfil. The objectives of involved actors and their level of interest in democratic legitimacy will undeniably influence the democratic performance of the multistakeholder partnership, especially with regard to the scope of public deliberation. However, due to time and geographical constraints, the opinion of each involved actors concerning the need for democratic legitimacy, cannot be investigated in this project. Instead, this project focuses on under which conditions related to governance and institutional structures, people have good reasons to accept the decision-making process in multistakeholder partnerships as rightful.

This project aims to contribute to the debate on transnational multistakeholder partnerships and their potential for reaching democratic legitimacy. Understanding this potential is important for the current debate on whether multistakeholder partnerships within transnational governance can be considered successful and democratic mechanisms for implementing international agreements such as the Agenda 21 and the Millennium Development Goals. In the view of this project's author, fulfilling the criteria for democratic legitimacy by the multistakeholder partnerships will lead to improved and more informed global policy-making processes and decisions. These improvements in the global policy-making process will in the end result in better implementation of international agreements and broader public support.

An evaluation of five multistakeholder partnerships will provide a deeper understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of their generic governance design regarding issues such as the allocation of responsibility, communication channels and membership rules. Based on the outcome of this evaluation, the potential of the transnational multistakeholder partnerships for reaching democratic legitimacy will be assessed. Moreover, the intention is to provide a set of concrete and operationalizable recommendations for policy-makers and partnership-initiators on the proper design for current and future multistakeholder partnerships within transnational governance.

The evaluation will be based on five multistakeholder partnerships, which explicitly are involved in the development and implementation of global and regional standards. The cases chosen include the Cement Sustainability Initiative; Asia Forest Partnership; Collaborative Labelling and Appliance Standards Program; Global Water Partnership and the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership. These cases represent the diversity in actor involvement, organisational structures, geographical scopes, durations, and a share of the issue areas within the universe of WSSD multistakeholder partnerships for sustainable development.

An extensive literature review showed that the literature on democracy within transnational governance is burgeoning. Among several theories of democracy that attempt to address transnationalism, three distinctive approaches have been identified, namely: cosmopolitan democracy, deliberative democracy and pluralist democracy. David Held (1995 & 2006) has made major contributions to the literature on cosmopolitan democracy focusing on globalization, global governance,

democratization and cosmopolitanism. Within deliberative democracy, James Bohman and John Dryzek (1999, 2006a & 2006b) are the core proponents for deliberative global governance and transnational democratization translated into deliberative terms. Robert Dahl (1989 & 1998) is considered the main academic advocate for pluralistic democracy, especially due to his work on democracy and polyarchies which means that a state is ruled by more than one person. However, these theories are often regarded as being too ideal, typically for providing a realistic guiding light for democracy within transnational governance. This project intends to develop an analytical framework for democracy within transnational governance, which attempts to overcome the ideal typical character of these theories. This is done through the development of a set of highly concrete criteria for the achievement of democratic legitimacy within transnational multistakeholder partnerships.

Only a few aspects of transnational multistakeholder partnerships, as a new phenomenon of global governance, are addressed in the literature. A significant lack of information exists with regard to democratic legitimacy and new forms of cooperation within global governance. Since the concept of multistakeholder partnerships is a relatively new phenomenon at the international level, the debate has lacked studies involving larger comparisons of multistakeholder partnerships with regard to issues such as organisational structure, effectiveness and democratic legitimacy. Only few scholars have systematically analysed the importance of multistakeholder partnerships within global sustainability politics (cf. Klaus Dingwerth, 2007; Andonova & Levy, 2003). A review of the literature shows that the study of transnational multistakeholder partnerships is complicated due to a number of problems: initially there exists no consensus on the definition or label of this object. Several definitions and labels exist; e.g. global public policy, interactive or cooperative environmental management, voluntary cross-sectoral collaborations, or green alliances (Biermann, Pattberg, Mert & Chan, 2007, p3). All of these terms have been developed for different analytical aims and are used in different empirical manifestations. This project aims to contribute to the debate on transnational multistakeholder partnerships and their potential for reaching democratic legitimacy.

1.6 Research Question

The project aims; first, to establish an analytical framework for understanding the democratic legitimacy of multistakeholder partnerships. An evaluation of the democratic performance of the five multistakeholder partnerships constitutes the foundation for the second aim, which is to understand the overall potential for democratic legitimacy within the multistakeholder partnerships. Based on these goals, the following research question is developed:

To what extent have the United Nations Multistakeholder Partnerships for Sustainable Development reached their potential for fulfilling the criteria for democratic legitimacy?

In order to provide a solid answer to this research question, the following sub-research questions have been developed:

a) What criteria for democratic legitimacy must a multistakeholder partnership for sustainable development meet?
b) To what extent are the individual criteria for democratic legitimacy met by the evaluated multistakeholder partnerships for sustainable development?

1.7 Project Structure

The report will proceed in five steps. Chapter 2 will present the methodology chosen for answering the sub-research and research questions. Chapter 3 presents the analytical framework for democracy within transnational governance and will provide an answer to the first sub-research question. An evaluation of each case based on the analytical framework will be conducted in chapter 4 which will also provide an answer to the second sub-research question. The core points from the evaluation will constitute the foundation for the discussion in chapter 5, providing an in-depth and concrete understanding of the democratic performance of multistakeholder partnerships. In addition to the core points, the discussion will rely on literature addressing the democratic legitimacy of the entire universe of multistakeholder partnerships for sustainable development. Combining in-depth and concrete findings from the evaluation, with more general perspective on whole the universe will provide

a solid foundation for understanding the potential for democratic legitimacy within the multistakeholder partnerships. Finally, section 6 will provide conclusions to the overall research question as well as policy-recommendations for future policy-makers and partnership-initiators.

2. Methodology

The ensuing sections will provide an in-depth presentation of the methodological reflections made, in order to present an adequate answer to the research- and sub-research questions. The first section contains a discussion of the project's approach to legitimacy and creation of knowledge. The following chapters will present the reflections made regarding the strength and weaknesses of the theoretical choices, methods of inquiry, selection of cases and finally the data-collection.

2.1 The Approach to Legitimacy

The core topic of the project concerns legitimacy, a concept that has been used in a variety of ways throughout history. An important difference within social sciences is the difference between the sociological and normative understanding of legitimacy. The sociological understanding is primarily concerned with social acceptance of the authority, whereas the normative version focuses more on the social acceptability of the authority (Dingwerth, 2007, p14). In the normative perspective, legitimacy includes social validity, which has a certain quality; thus, it must be normatively justified. The idea of normatively justified validity focuses on both the material and the procedural acceptability of social order. Hence, the concept contains two complementary elements: fundamental norms and decision-making procedures. Together these two components cover the sources of legitimacy (Dingwerth, 2007, p14). Within this project, the chosen criteria for achieving the normative version of legitimacy are considered ideal typical; thus, they represent suitable measures for the design and critique of the multistakeholder partnerships for sustainable development. Since democratic legitimacy is applied as a normative concept in this project, the aim is to evaluate conditions under which people have good reasons to accept the decision-making process in multistakeholder partnerships as rightful.

In this project, the chosen approach to legitimacy focuses on input and throughput legitimacy, rather than assessing the output legitimacy or the quality of the outcome of the multistakeholder partnerships. The chosen approach to legitimacy is supported by the United Nations, who in the WSSD-context strived for the development of multistakeholder partnerships that are structured to encourage deliberation and cooperation between actors with a stake in Agenda 21. The United Nations and its member states developed in 2003 a set of guidelines for the development of

multistakeholder partnerships, named the Bali Guiding Principles (See Appendix I). These guidelines emphasize an input and throughput oriented approach to legitimacy by focusing on concepts such as participation, transparency and accountability. Since the multistakeholder partnerships for sustainable development are voluntary initiatives undertaken by governments and relevant actors, they are not obliged to follow the requirements set out in the Bali Guiding Principles. However, these principles are by the United Nations perceived to constitute minimum standards for good democratic performance, which the involved actors are highly encouraged to adhere to in the designing and implementation of multistakeholder partnerships (UN, 2003a, p4).
The chosen approach to legitimacy will in this project help to determine and guide the structure of the analytical framework applied for measuring the extent of democratic legitimacy within five multistakeholder partnerships for sustainable development (Dingwerth, 2007, p14). Generally, it is important to bear in mind that the ideal of democratic legitimacy and its actual realisation is not a one-dimensional affair. There exist several normatively justified concepts of democracy and of democratic legitimacy. Theories of democracy differ in what they single out as the core characteristics of the democratic process and the significance attached to them. For example, is voting the core characteristic of democratic decision-making or is it only one out of several important characteristics (Peter, 2008, p56-57).

2.2 Creation of Knowledge

Regarding the creation of knowledge, it is believed that knowledge as such, and the eye of the beholder will always influence the creation of knowledge. For example, when looking at a problem and drawing from an analysis, the perspective of the beholder will affect the conclusions he or she will draw. This not only true in the drawing of conclusions and understanding of the question answered, but also in what questions presented and why they are interpreted as they are. This can be avoided and will be the case in any investigation of this kind.

In relation to the considerations on the creation of knowledge, it is important to explain how conclusions are drawn. In this project, the theoretical framework will first be outlined and then applied on the subjects. The project attempts to draw conclusions from a specific situation from some general considerations. This will

mainly be on the basis of case-studies using primarily qualitative data gathered at the multistakeholder partnership's own web domains, information from questionnaires forwarded to contact persons for all five cases and secondary data. It is apparent that the project takes a problem-oriented perspective on the concept of democratic legitimacy within the multistakeholder partnerships, which will affect the direction of the analysis. By assuming that an evaluation can be made of democratic legitimacy, or the possible lack there of, certain aspects of the procedures will be highlighted and others neglected. Moreover, reality in this project is perceived to consist of layers upon layers that have a mutual impact on each other and will influence the outcome of the analysis, e.g. underlying strong institutions in the society will have an impact on the actual behaviour of individuals.

2.3 Analytical Framework

After discussing the project's approach to the creation of knowledge, an adequate theoretical framework for the evaluation of the multistakeholder partnerships must be developed. The multistakeholder partnerships have a diverging character, some work as information dissemination projects; others focus on the development and implementation of new standards and guidelines. However, since public-private and private-private partnerships as mechanisms could develop rules and standards that would have an impact beyond its political mandate, the multistakeholder partnerships must fulfil specific requirements for democratic legitimacy.

The current discourse on legitimacy emphasizes that rule-making bodies must act according to specific democratic principles and be subject to the will of the affected actors in society (Dingwerth, 2007, p15). International rule-making bodies often state that they have a popular mandate to exercise power; however, how this mandate is achieved and carried out differs tremendously from regime to regime. For instance, a classical nation-state democracy receives its legitimacy primarily from elections, whereas in supra and transnational rule-making bodies such as the European Commission and the Forest Stewardship Council, legitimacy is obtained when specific democratic standards and rules such as accountability and transparency are followed (Held, 2006, p305).

The aim with the analytical framework is to take the current debate further, by developing a set of criteria for democracy and democratic legitimacy within transnational governance. The point of departure is the pre-existing literature on democracy, from which fitting criteria for democratic legitimacy are identified with the help of context-adequacy criteria. The criteria for context-adequacy are perceived as being minimum requirements; a model for democracy must follow in order to be applicable for describing democratic legitimacy within transnational governance (see the chapter three for a further discussion on this issue).

Through an extensive review of the literature on democracy a set of relevant approaches to democracy have been identified covering the core input and throughput aspects within the current debate on democratic legitimacy; participation, transparency, accountability and deliberative quality (Dingwerth, 2005, p17). The chosen approaches to be applied in this project are; Cosmopolitan Democracy, Deliberative Democracy and Pluralistic Democracy. These approaches do not necessarily contradict each other; instead, they are complementary, focusing on different important aspects of democracy (Dingwerth, 2005, p17). Moreover, the approaches are chosen because they are regarded as having good opportunities for fulfilling the criteria for context-adequacy (Dingwerth, 2007, p16). However, as mentioned above the ideal of democratic legitimacy and its actual realisation is not a one-dimensional affair. There exist different normatively justified concepts of democracy and of democratic legitimacy, which could potentially have provided this project with a different outcome of the evaluation. An example is liberal-internationalism, which is considered highly antagonistic towards the concept of global governance and transnational democracy advocating instead for a world of liberalisation and unfettered global markets (Held, 2006, p268-269).

Cosmopolitan democracy is categorised as a constitutional approach, which focuses on the possibility for a legal-political organization of the society, based on individual rights (Held, 2006, p305). The academic proponents of cosmopolitan democracy include Immanuel Kant, David Held and Daniele Archibugi. Within the Cosmopolitan Democracy approach, decisions are made by the citizens that are influenced by them, hence avoiding a single hierarchical structure of authority. According to the proponents, any attempt to solve global issues in a globalizing world, would be

considered undemocratic unless involving cosmopolitan democracy (Held, 1995, p228). The concept of pluralism has created the foundation for multiple theoretical approaches that focus on a democratic society. Within a pluralistic democracy, power must be decentralised and dispersed between a large numbers of actors. Moreover, the decision-making processes must be based on interaction either between interest groups or between interest groups and government (Dahl, 1989, p220). Finally, deliberative democracy is a system of political decision-making processes focusing on popular consultation and deliberation to develop policies. Deliberative democracy theorists emphasize that legitimate rule- and standard-making only can arise through public deliberation (Held, 2006, p237).

These three approaches to democracy are often perceived as being too ideal typical for constituting a proper and widely accepted guiding light for the development of democracy within global and transnational governance (Backstrand, 2006b, p293). The cosmopolitan quest to transfer models of domestic democracy to the global level is by several commentators perceived as utopian due to the lack of a transnational demos, a global parliament and clear principle in the international sphere. Deliberative democracy is considered unrealistic since free deliberation could potentially generate a bureaucratic overload and significantly reduce the effectiveness of decision-making processes. A precondition for pluralistic democracy is the equal distribution of financial and human resources between stakeholders, an aspect that is nearly impossible to achieve in reality (Backstrand, 2006b, p293). Moreover, the critique focuses on the inevitable tradeoffs within democratic decision-making between efficiency and deliberation. This project intends to overcome these obstacles through an adaptation of the chosen criteria for democratic legitimacy, to the context of democracy within transnational governance. These adapted criteria are termed; the criteria for context adequacy (Dingwerth, 2007, p16). Based on these criteria for context adequacy, core aspects from all three models of democracy will be extracted and constitute the foundation for a new analytical framework for democracy within transnational governance. The final sections of chapter 3 will present a thorough discussion and adaptation of the chosen criteria for democratic legitimacy.

2.4 Method of Inquiry – Evaluation

For answering the research and sub-research questions, the chosen method of inquiry is an evaluation of democratic legitimacy. An evaluation is chosen because it provides a structured understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the five multistakeholder partnerships for sustainable development. The criteria for the evaluation of the democratic legitimacy have been identified through an extensive review of democracy literature in chapter 3. For upholding the validity of the evaluation, the criteria must comprehend all relevant perspectives of input and throughput legitimacy. Identifying the relevant criteria for evaluation is a complex task; since there exist an infinite number of reasons citizens could perceive a decision to be rightful. For this project, the most important criteria for democratic legitimacy have been selected and divided into three major dimensions; participation, democratic control and finally discursive quality. For achieving democratic legitimacy, each criterion for democratic legitimacy presented in the analytical framework (chapter 3) must be sufficiently addressed by each of the individual multistakeholder partnerships. Finally, understanding how the different groups of criteria for democratic legitimacy impact each other is an important, however complex, challenge. Hence, due to time-constraints this issue will not be addressed in this project.

All five evaluated multistakeholder partnerships are still ongoing, meaning that some case-evaluations have the character of being interim evaluations. An interim evaluation assesses an ongoing multistakeholder partnership, disregarding whether this is an activity of limited duration or carries on for an indefinite period. This could potentially affect the availability of important information and the outcome of the evaluation, since the inclusion of actors and the transparency might improve or worsen over time.

2.5 Empirical Considerations - Case-studies

The case-selection of the multistakeholder partnerships is guided by an aim to obtain a profound understanding of the democratic legitimacy of transnational rule-making/standard-setting processes within multistakeholder partnerships and to evaluate whether and how these particular organizational designs influence the

democratic performance. Moreover, a second aim with the case studies is to obtain profound knowledge on the characteristics of multistakeholder partnerships that determine the potential for democratic legitimacy.

Some multistakeholder partnerships are perceived to be mechanisms for rule- and standard setting and other multistakeholder partnerships focus on service provision and information dissemination. In this project, the focus is on standard-setting multistakeholder partnerships. The concept of standard-setting is in this context considered broader than just rule-making. The former also include soft-rules such as norms and guidelines and whether involved actors intend to fulfill them remains voluntary.

For this project, the choice of cases has fallen on five multistakeholder partnerships for sustainable development which are focusing on issue-areas such as climate change, energy, energy-labelling, water and forestry. The chosen cases are the Cement Sustainability Initiative (CSI), Collaborative Labelling and Appliance Standards Program (CLASP), Asia Forest Network (AFP), Global Water Partnerships (GWP) and the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP). The chosen multistakeholder partnerships vary largely with regard to time-duration, location, scope of participation, lead-partners, funding and objectives. Some multistakeholder partnerships are merely private-private sector initiatives with a few actors, whereas others involve hundreds of actors from all major groups of transnational actors. The high diversity between the multistakeholder partnerships complicates the development of a proper evaluation scheme, since only a minority of them can be directly compared.

A range of criteria has been developed for selection of the five partnerships: geographical scope, standard-setting partnerships, availability of information and a diverse set of issue-areas. Since the project discusses democracy within transnational governance, the first priority was to find multistakeholder partnerships with a transnational (global or regional) scope. Of the 348 multistakeholder partnerships registered within the United Nations Commission for Sustainable Development, 179 had a global scope, 69 had a regional scope and 79 had a sub-regional scope. The rest of the multistakeholder partnerships were working with local or national scopes. By focusing on the global and regional scope, the achievement of democratic legitimacy

becomes more challenging due to increased demands for geographically diverse participation, transparency and efficient channels for communication. The second criteria concerned the objectives of the multistakeholder partnerships, whether they explicitly had objectives focusing on transnational standard-setting. As stated above, multistakeholder partnerships can have several functions such as information dissemination combined with standard-setting. Hence, not all 348 multistakeholder partnerships have an explicit or implicit focus on standard-setting. A standard-setting multistakeholder partnership is described in this project as a private-private or public-private partnership that explicitly tries to establish a general norm or a set of transnational standards within a specific sector or issue-area. Standard-setting is considered a broader concept than mere rule making since is also includes norms and guidelines. The third priority concerned the availability of relevant information on aspects such as participation, the organizational structure and meeting-details from annual meetings, governing board meetings or partners-meetings. All five multistakeholder partnerships have established an independent webdomain for the project, which provides extensive information on members, activities, implementation progress and stakeholder dialogues. The available human and financial capital for the multistakeholder partnerships, the lead partners and the public attention towards the topics evidently influence the availability of information. Some issues areas such as climate change and energy have been under significantly more public scrutiny than the water sector, for example. Finally, a priority has also been to pick multistakeholder partnerships from a diverse set of issue-areas, in order to make the evaluation of democratic legitimacy as representative as possible. Each of the five multistakeholder partnerships comes from a different issue areas, involving the water, energy, energy labeling, forestry and climate change areas.

Since the number of suitable cases have been limited by focusing on standard-setting processes within multistakeholder partnerships, the opportunities for generalising the findings are constrained. For instance, transnational standard-setting within the financial sector may take on a very different shape than standard-setting within global environmental governance. As mentioned above, the high degree of diversity between the multistakeholder partnerships complicates an evaluation, since only a minority can be directly compared. To ensure comparability, the case studies follow a common structure, guided by the three dimensions of the analytical framework: participation,

democratic control and discursive quality. Moreover, the evaluation of the decision-making processes is to a large extent based on the same type of information. All five case studies are based on an evaluation of the primary documents available at the time of writing and on questionnaires forwarded to contact persons within the multistakeholder partnerships. Moreover, the evaluation also involves available secondary sources such as journals and working papers.

2.6 Reflections on Data Collection

The process of data-collection can be divided into two phases. First, identifying the needed information; and second, the gathering of information. The aim of the data-collection is to identify 'how' decision-making is carried out within the multistakeholder partnerships for sustainable development and not just 'what', 'where' and 'when'. This qualitative research approach focuses on data divided into two categories; primary and secondary empirical sources. Moreover, the data-collection has been shaped by the analytical framework, which was divided into three dimensions; participation, democratic control and discursive quality. The required information for discursive quality is considered the most demanding to collect, since understanding, the deliberative process requires specific information on meeting-details, the agendas and the opinions raised by involved actors.

The data used in this project was collected primarily at the independent webdomains of five multistakeholder partnerships and through questionnaires forwarded to contact persons within the five initiatives. The information retrieved from the webdomains consisted mostly of annual reports, information on members, membership rules, meeting-details and various publications. Background documents were available, describing the multistakeholder partnerships and their annual progress. With regard to policy documents, e.g. strategic documents, the information disclosure within the multistakeholder partnerships was poor. Most multistakeholder partnerships provided extensive information online, however only a few of the published reports were authored by external and independent parties.

A questionnaire was forwarded to each of the five evaluated multistakeholder partnerships, which resulted in three replies from CSI, AFP and REEEP[7]. The questionnaires aimed to complement the already available and retrievable information on the webdomains of the multistakeholder partnerships. Moreover, the questionnaires contributed to the filling of the information gaps identified during the preliminary analysis of the democratic legitimacy. The questions were mostly kept open-ended, striving to receive more elaborate and in-depth answers, which could potentially provide a deeper understanding of the democratic performance of the multistakeholder partnerships. On the other hand, open-ended questions also contain the risk of receiving inconcrete and less relevant answers, since the contact persons are provided with a significant freedom with regard to their answers.

The questionnaires were personalized and structured according to the three dimensions of democratic legitimacy; participation, democratic control (transparency and accountability) and discursive quality (decision-making procedures). The intention was to create a questionnaire that was not too extensive. Contact persons or communication managers are often not keen on long questionnaires; they prefer to respond to a very short list of questions that focus on the most important issues, which shows them that the researcher understands what is going on. Therefore, to trigger the contact persons to respond seriously and thoroughly, the number of questions was limited to a maximum of four and the text limited to one page maximum. When the contact person did not respond to the questionnaire, a reminder was sent out with the questionnaire enclosed. The questionnaires were forwarded to core contact points within the multistakeholder partnerships that included communication consultants, project programme assistants, and secretariat coordinators (see Appendix II for further details).

Alternatively, personal and phone interviews could have been conducted. These methods of data-collection could have contributed to an in-depth understanding of the democratic performance of the multistakeholder partnerships. Interviews could help to investigate the motives and feelings that have shaped the development and decision-making processes within the multistakeholder partnership. However, due to financial,

[7] See Appendix II for an overview of all 5 questionnaires

time and geographical constraints, interviews as a method was not applied in this project.

With regard to primary data, there exists a risk for a bias in favour of the multistakeholder partnersips, since their webdomains are the core providers of information. This potential bias might influence the validity of the evaluation, providing a picture of the multistakeholder partnerships that does not hold true in reality. Especially with regard to the deliberative processes, the risk for a bias is high, since each multistakeholder partnership tends to present itself as highly inclusive and willing to listen to external and affected actors. When conducting the evaluation of the five multistakeholder partnerships, the author of this project is aware of this potential bias and intends to use secondary data as a balancing factor.

The secondary data was collected through an extensive online review, primarily retrieved from the United Nations, NGOs and academia. The aim with the secondary data is to balance out a potential bias within the primary data. Moreover, the secondary data will contribute to develop perspectives on the primary data and democratic performance of the multistakeholder partnerships. In addition, United Nations documents have been utilized for understanding the background and emergence of the multistakeholder partnerships for sustianable development.

2.7 Project Constraints & Validity

The project is confronted with significant constraints with regard to both the object under investigation and data availability. Due to time-constraints, the topic had to be narrowed down to a sole focus on the multistakeholder partnerships for sustainable development. A second constraint concerns the analytical framework, in which this project aims to assess the democratic legitimacy of public-private and private-private partnerships as mechanisms. Hence, the focus is lowered on the actual function, outcome and effectiveness of the multistakeholder partnerships. Theoretically, this means that the focus will be primarily on the input- and throughput dimension of legitimacy and to a less extent on output legitimacy. A significant constraint for the project concerns the data availability. As mentioned above, the reliability of the information provided by the multistakeholder partnership’s own websites might be

contested. Especially with regard to the deliberative processes within a multistakeholder partnership, information on meeting-details, agendas and opinions raised is scarce. A final issue, which will not be addressed in depth in this project, are the involved actors' perceptions on the necessity for democratic legitimacy for the proper functioning of the multistakeholder partnerships. Fulfilling the criteria might not coincide with the objectives of the involved actors or they may perceive it as a buzzword to get the action going, however aiming for other goals. However, in the view of this project's author, the opinions of the involved actors will not influence the requirements for democratic legitimacy, which the multistakeholder partnerships must fulfil. The objectives of involved actors and their level of interest in democratic legitimacy will undeniably influence the democratic performance of the multistakeholder partnership. However, due to time and geographical constraints, the opinion of each involved actors about the need for democratic legitimacy, cannot be investigated in this project.

The validity of the project relies largely on the availability of information on the multistakeholder partnerships. For most multistakeholder partnerships, important information is lacking. This can potentially have a negative impact on the quality and validity of the evaluation of the multistakeholder partnerships. The validity of the first two dimensions of the evaluations (participation and democratic control) can be considered high, since extensive and up-to-date information is disclosed on these topics. However, the validity of the evaluation on discursive quality is more ambiguous. The disclosure of information on discursive practices is relatively scarce; hence, this part of the evaluation primarily discusses the potential for a deliberative process rather than the actual deliberative achievements in reality. Overall, the validity of the evaluation and conclusions can be considered medium. The level of transparency and information disclosure on important aspects is considered limited and constitutes a major obstacle for providing a reliable and in-depth analysis of all three dimensions of democratic legitimacy within the five multistakeholder partnerships.

3. Analytical Framework – Democratic Legitimacy & Transnational Governance

The following chapter aims to establish the analytical framework used for the evaluation in chapter 4. The first section will conceptualise democratic legitimacy and highlight which approach to legitimacy this project takes. The second section links transnational governance with a set of criteria for context adequacy. The third section presents three models of democracy: cosmopolitan, deliberative and pluralist. With the assistance of the criteria for context adequacy, the aspects within the three models fitting the idea of democracy within transnational governance will be identified. These aspects will constitute the foundation of the development of a new analytical framework in the final section, which will also provide an answer on the first sub-question for this project.

3.1 Democratic Legitimacy

The concept of legitimacy means rightfulness and provides an order or commands with an authoritative or binding character, hence transforming power into authority (Heywood, 2002, p210). Three aspects are at the core of the concept of legitimacy – input, output and throughput (Dingwerth, 2007, p14).

The input dimension focuses on which actors make decisions and which actors should be represented in the decision-making process. Here, the equal and active participation of all actors in the deliberative processes of decision-making must be secured. A direct mechanism effectively transporting the demands and preferences must be established for actors potentially affected by the decisions (Dingwerth, 2007, p14). The throughput-dimension focuses on the procedural level, i.e. the manner in which decisions are formed and how far decision-makers can be held accountable (Dingwerth, 2007, p15). Output-legitimacy is framed as the fulfilment of a set of goals such as the observable solution of problems. Moreover, output-legitimacy is also the opportunity for institutional arrangements to cause acceptance and to motivate actors to comply with rules (Backstrand, 2006a, p296). This differentiation between the three aspects of legitimacy follows an understanding of legitimacy, which differs between first; the recognition of political orders and the decision-making processes due to normative reasons (legitimacy) and second; their recognition as being rightful (acceptance). Whereas both input- and throughput-legitimacy are based

on the normative conception of legitimacy, the output-legitimacy focuses on the factual, societal approval of rules as problem-adequate, rightful and fair (Dingwerth, 2007, p15). Only the concepts of input- and throughput legitimacy will be applied in this research project. The project aims to assess the democratic legitimacy of multistakeholder partnerships as a mechanism and a process, focusing on participation, transparency, accountability and deliberation. Thereby, the focus is lowered on the actual outcome and efficiency of the multistakeholder partnerships.

3.2 Transnational Governance & Criteria for Context Adequacy

An emerging dimension within the current debate on global governance focuses on the potential for democracy within transnational governance, meaning democracy that transcends national borders. Several attempts have been carried out on developing a framework for democracy within transnational governance. However, none of these attempts has been successful in presenting a grand theory that can comprehend the increasing complexity of participants, networks and institutions within global governance (Dingwerth, 2004, p11). The conditions for democracy within transnational governance differ significantly from the classic ideas of democracies since world politics is moving away from a sole focus on nation-states. With economic, social and environmental globalization, new actors such as multinational corporations, international research networks and global civil society organisations are influencing the political agenda to a larger extent within issue-areas such as international trade and global environmental politics.

For understanding, democracy within the context of transnational governance a set of criteria for context adequacy must be established. These criteria will structure the subsequent discussion on the three approaches to democracy and help identifying relevant aspects for the analytical framework used to evaluate the democratic performance of multistakeholder partnerships. Klaus Dingwerth (2004, p11) emphasizes that the context adequacy must be compatible with the concrete settings of governance beyond the state. Moreover, Dingwerth emphasizes that rules are only legitimate if they comply with broadly accepted democratic principles, appropriately adapted for the context of transnational governance (Dingwerth, 2004, p12).

Dingwerth presents three criteria to assess the context adequacy of theoretical approaches to democracy (Dingwerth, 2004, p12).

- The analytical framework must include both input- and output focused reasoning for legitimation.
- The analytical framework must be applicable to functional instead of territorial separation as the core organising principle of inter- and transnational politics.
- The analytical framework must take into account the fact that inter- and transnational governance is dominated by a horizontal instead of a hierarchical style of interaction.

The following sections will apply these criteria for context adequacy as a baseline for evaluating the usefulness of the cosmopolitan, pluralist and the deliberative approaches to democracy. The presentation of the three approaches will show that they do not necessarily contradict each other; rather they are complementing, emphasizing different aspects of democracy (Dingwerth, 2007, p17). Altogether, the three approaches are covering a significant share of the spectrum of contemporary definitions of democratic governance beyond the state.

3.3 Three Approaches to Democracy

The following sections will introduce three approaches to democracy - cosmopolitan, deliberative and pluralist democracy. Based on aspects from these approaches a new analytical framework for democracy and democratic legitimacy within transnational governance will be established in the final section.

3.3.1 Cosmopolitanism

Immanuel Kant introduced the concept of cosmopolitanism within politics in his 1795 essay *perpetual peace.* Kant outlines in this essay the guiding principle *ius cosmopoliticum,* which focuses on cosmopolitan laws and rights to protect people from war (Kleingeld, 1998, p74). The concept of cosmopolitanism emphasizes that all humans belong to a single moral community and must be protected by international law.

The cosmopolitan approach is moving beyond today's sole focus on nation-states and argues that a truly cosmopolitan identity or demos of global actors will emerge, reducing the importance of national identities. The forming of a global actor's movement would possibly lead to a reform of the current global governance structure, creating the foundation for more democratic global institutions. The new global governance will balance the concepts of irreducibility and subsidiarity when addressing global issues, establishing the foundation for a cosmopolitan political order (Dingwerth, 2007, p17).

3.3.1.1 Cosmopolitan Democracy

Instead of decreasing the scale of the state, cosmopolitan democracy seeks to preserve and develop democratic institutions at regional and global levels as complement to those at the national level. This approach recognises the continuing importance of nation-states, while arguing for a (global) layer of governance to constitute a limitation on national sovereignty (Held, 2006, p305). These new political institutions will take over rule-making from nations-states in clearly defined spheres of activity where those activities have clear transnational and international consequences, e.g. climate change or international trade. Within cosmopolitan democracy, the focus is not only on the formal construction of new democratic institutions, but also on providing broad avenues for civic participation and deliberation in decision-making at the regional and global levels (Held, 2006, p305). Cosmopolitan democracy must be linked to an expanding framework of democratic global institutions and two distinct requirements must be addressed. First, the territorial boundaries of systems of accountability must be reformed so issues that escape the control of the nation state (e.g. financial crisis and climate change) can come under improved democratic control. Second, the role and location of regional and global regulatory and functional organisations must be rethought in a way that they provide a more coherent and effective focal point within world politics (Held, 2006, p308).

3.3.1.2 Principle of Autonomy

David Held states in his theory on cosmopolitanism that a sound account of democracy must acknowledge the significance of fundamental liberal democratic views. Held addresses this issue in his theory of cosmopolitan democracy by introducing the principle of autonomy, which states:

"Persons should enjoy equal rights and, accordingly, equal obligations in the specification of the political framework which generates and limits the opportunities available to them" - (Held, 1995, p147).

The principle of autonomy can be considered the foundation on which public power can be justified and must therefore be thought of as a principle of political legitimacy (Held, 1995, p228). According to David Held, the idea of democracy gets its attractiveness, primarily due to the concept of self-determination. Self-determination means that the members of a political community can freely choose the conditions of their own association and that their choices and decisions form the legitimation of the way the community pursues its needs (Held, 1995, p228). Members of a political community must be able to decide about their life situation under conditions of freedom and equality. Moreover, members must be able to participate in a process of deliberation about public issues open to all on a free and equal basis (Held, 1995, p155). In order to realize this latter condition, the theory of cosmopolitan democracy focuses on a number of legal guarantees.

3.3.1.3 Public Law

The institution of public law forms the foundation for citizens' opportunity to participate as free and equal humans in the political will-creation process. Within cosmopolitan democracy, the individual citizen, not the community, forms the subject. Hence, the principle of autonomy can best be institutionalised in the form of rights for each citizen. According to Held, a perfect democracy is achieved only when the citizens have the actual power to be active as citizens, i.e. citizens having the rights that allow them to demand democratic participation (Held, 1995, p227). Cosmopolitan democratic law will help to create the required conditions for preserving the legitimate political power (Held, 1995, p227). However, appropriate forms and constraints of nation-state action are required to be defined, together with implicit and explicit constraints on nation-state decision-making (Held, 1995, p228). Based on this perception, democracy is conceptualised as the sum of individual democratic rights. Cosmopolitan democracy includes entrenchment of a range of clusters of rights that include obligations such as civil, political, economic and social rights obligations. These clusters of rights are guided by the principle of autonomy

and will assist in forming and constraining democratic decision-making. Moreover, these rights must be incorporated into national constitutions. With Cosmopolitan democracy, the influence of international courts will increase within and beyond political associations. Therefore, groups and actors will have an effective legal organisation, which will support the enactment and enforcement of the clusters of rights (Held, 2006, p309). Moreover, a global legislative institution must be considered supreme and perceived as a framework setting institution of laws and rules (Held, 2006, p309)

3.3.1.4 Principle of Subsidiarity

Concerning collective self-determination, the growing interdependence between various political communities will result in incongruence between those participating in decision-making and those affected by the decisions. Due to the increasing density of links between societies, the idea of collective self-determination is encountering the issue of how to determine the relevant community (or communities) for a specific decision. Other issues concern how to define the boundaries of a political community, the meaning of representation and the proper form of participation (Held, 1995, p235). According to the theory of cosmopolitan democracy, a democracy within a particular community is characterised by democratic relations among communities, which are interwoven and indivisible. Hence, new organizational binding mechanisms are required if democracy is to develop. There exists a clear risk that political authority and decision-making power automatically will move upwards in new transnational democratic institutions. In order to reduce this risk, the principles governing appropriate levels of decision-making must be defined and constantly assessed (Held, 1995, p232). The solution proposed by cosmopolitan democracy includes primarily the principle of subsidiarity. The principle of subsidiarity, in this context means that the nation-state is maintained as a central point of reference. Decision-making centres within transnational governance are regarded as adequate only if national governance levels of decision-making insufficiently address political issues (Held, 1995, p236).

3.3.1.5 Cosmopolitan Democracy & Criteria of Context Adequacy

The cosmopolitan approach to democracy is linked to transnational politics and thus assumed to match with the criteria of context adequacy. However, the approach has

too much emphasis on ideas from traditional national democratic practices such as majoritarian democracy (Dingwerth, 2007, p20). Due to the emphasis on government rather than governance, the cosmopolitan approach to democracy is not regarded as especially context-suitable (Dingwerth, 2007, p21). Second, hierarchical types of decision-making processes are important within the cosmopolitan approach to democracy, thus violating the criteria of context adequacy. However, a focus on self-determination, participation and the need for organized transnational actors, a multiplicity of governance levels, the principle of subsidiarity and sites for common democratic activity are elements that fit the criteria for context adequacy and democracy within transnational governance (Dingwerth, 2007, p21).

3.3.2 Deliberative Democracy

Within international politics, the theory of deliberative democracy has received increasing interest in the past decades. The theory fits with the current focus on the international level at 'governance without government'. It proposes ways in which such forms of governance can be more accountable without requiring new political structures (Hoskyns, 2000, p13).

3.3.2.1 Deliberation

The prime objective for deliberative democracy is to establish the conditions under which political decisions will be seen as legitimate expressions of the collective will of the people. Current societies are characterized by containing a plurality of philosophical, moral and religious groups (Dingwerth, 2007, p23). Within deliberative democracy, democratic legitimacy in complex societies must be achieved through free and unrestricted public deliberation processes on public issues. The democratic aspect of deliberative democracy means in this context collective decision-making where all actors affected by the decision or their representatives can participate (Dingwerth, 2007, p24). The deliberation of actors in the decision-making process is fundamental if decisions should not merely be imposed upon them. Consent or the perception that a decision is rightful is a core characteristic of democracy. Because actors provide themselves with their own laws, the law becomes legitimate and provides actors with reasons for obeying them. James Bohman defines deliberation as:

"A dialogical process of exchanging reasons for the purpose of resolving problematic situations that cannot be settled without interpersonal coordination and cooperation" - (Bohman, 1996, p27)

The core of deliberative democracy can be summarized as a law, which is only legitimate when it is based on the public reasons stemming from an open and fair deliberation process in which all citizens can participate and in which they can continue to collaborate freely (Bohman, 1996, p184).

3.3.2.2 Deliberative Procedure

Collective decisions obtain democratic legitimacy from the decision-making procedures. Deliberative democracy focuses on the concept of an ideal procedure for deliberation and decision-making. The ideal procedure intends to establish a counterfactual thought experiment against which democratic procedures can be assessed in reality (Dingwerth, 2004, p24). The deliberative procedure achieves legitimacy and a discursive nature since citizens receive the opportunity to communicate information and reasons unrestricted in the political will-creation process. Deliberations must be without coercion and shall strive for an argumentative state of communication. Involved actors must provide reasons for their statements and critically judge other actors propositions. Second, deliberations must be inclusive and public, meaning that all actors potentially affected by a decision must have equal opportunities to access and freely participate in the deliberations. Finally, deliberations must focus on reaching consensus, meaning that all actors are required to deliberate openly and aim to reach an agreement accepted by all (Dingwerth, 2004, p27).

3.3.2.3 Ideal Deliberative Procedure

Within the ideal deliberative procedure, actors must test their interests and reasons in a public forum before a decision is taken. Actors are forced to justify their decisions and opinions by appealing to common interests, using reasons that all actors can accept in public debate (Bohman 1996, p5-6). The ideal deliberative procedure emphasizes the importance of arguing and ideal deliberative quality above representation of interests, bargaining and voting procedures (Bohman, 1996, p4-5). According to Bohman, reasons given must primarily meet the conditions of publicity

in order to make decisions more rational. Deliberation improves outcomes when it assists actors in constructing an interpretation of the decision and its consequences (Bohman, 1996, p6).

Bohman has established a formal conception of an ideal deliberative democracy, which contains the following main characteristics; first, all members of an association share the opinion that the appropriate terms of association will form a framework for the results of their deliberation: all members strive to coordinate the will-formation or activities within the institutions that make deliberation possible. For these members, free deliberation among equals must be the basis of legitimacy. In reality, some elements of ideal deliberative democracy must be implemented into existing institutional arrangements within international politics, without having to involve large-scale constitutional reforms (Hoskyns, 2000, p4). Second, an ideal deliberative democracy is a pluralistic association, in which members have different preferences, beliefs and ideals regarding public concerns (Bohman, 1997, p72-73). Third, the ideal deliberative procedure must focus on neutrality and respect in the deliberative process. Because actors must frame their reasons in such a way that other participants will accept them, even self-interested actors are forced to present their positions in terms of the public interest. Moreover, the process of mutual reason-giving is linked to the essential democratic norm that citizens must respect each other as actors with equal fundamental rights and liberties (Bohman, 1997, p72-73). Fourth, participants in democratic association must consider ideal deliberative procedures as the prime generator of democratic legitimacy. Therefore, it is important for members that decisions are not merely a result of their deliberation, but also be marked to them as such. The ideal procedure is linked to the epistemic importance of deliberation and in this context Dingwerth states:

"Deliberative politics acquires its legitimating force from the discursive structure of an opinion- and will formation that can fulfil its socially integrative function only because citizens expect its results to have a reasonable quality" – (Dingwerth, 2004, p20)

Fifth, ideal deliberations must be free from time restraints and must cover all issues that are required to be regulated in the interest of all. In the 'ideal speech situation',

citizens must be able to communicate without hindrances due to discrepancies in resources, power or capabilities. Consequently, actors must expect that deliberations, based on 'the force of the better argument' are leading to the epistemically most optimal agreement. Evidently, in reality, it will be impossible for deliberation processes to meet these extraordinary requirements of rationality. The potential for rationality based on mutual reason giving is an asset for deliberative democracy because it combines components of both input- and output-legitimacy – a requirement for democracy within transnational governance (Dingwerth, 2004, p21). Moreover, the ideal deliberative procedure guides the institutionalisation of discursive designs. For an institutionalisation of deliberative procedures, public arenas are fundamental. In these arenas, citizens have the opportunity to propose issues for the political agenda and participate in deliberation about public concerns. The aim of public arenas within deliberative democracy is to form an institution for free and public deliberation (Bohman, 1996, p5-6).

3.3.2.4 Deliberative Democracy & Criteria for Context Adequacy

Concerning the criteria for context adequacy, the deliberative approach to democracy is attractive for transnational governance because it reduces the issue of geographical borders. Moreover, the absence of an overarching state or a state analogy is perceived as one less obstacle to deliberative democracy. The approach is not dependent on the existence of a strong feeling of community or a transnational demos, however the deliberative procedures themselves have a potential of contributing to the generation of community and solidarity. Finally, the epistemic quality of deliberative democratic decision-making is attractive to democracy in transnational governance filled by complexities (and complex issues such as climate change) and lacking a strong solidarity among citizens. The type of communication is used to evaluate the deliberative quality of the decision-making process, whereas the evaluation of its deliberative democratic quality must also involve aspects such as publicity, universal access, and the linking of collective decisions to public discourses (Dingwerth, 2004, p20). Deliberative democracy sets high standards for participation, which concerns the inclusion of the demos in the decision-making process. The responsibility for upholding standards is placed at the democratic institutions. When involving all actors, the outcome of the deliberation process will be generally accepted.

A recurrent issue for deliberative equality is that actors enter into deliberation with unequal resources, capacities, and social positions. If major enough, these inequalities could potentially affect the decision-making process non-democratically, even with a formal guaranty of one person, one vote. According to Bohman, a core characteristic of the deliberative process includes appropriate conditions for deliberative equality. For example, the opportunities and access to public arenas for the demos are expanded and the threshold conditions required for effective exchange of reasons are established (Bohman, 1996, p36). The participation of the demos would contribute to a wide diffusion of power in the society. If deliberation is going on within representative bodies, it must still include the deliberation of the demos. These bodies remain democratic only if the demos can elect their representatives through participation in public deliberation of public concerns. Moreover, Bohman promotes the educative affect of participation and its capability to transform interests and preferences in order to achieve a shared idea of the common good (Bohman, 1996, p29). Several commentators claim that the participatory ideals of deliberative democracy confront difficulties when applied to today's complex societies: conflicts occur between equality and efficiency, and between institutionalized decision-making processes and informal public opinion. With regard to the criteria for context adequacy, the ideal deliberative quality can provide an essential contribution to democracy within transnational governance. The idea is based on a set of relevant values and rules that contain equal opportunities for rational argumentation based on information, transparency and an open inclusion of the affected actors. Moreover, as mentioned above, the mutual reason-giving is an asset for democracy for transnational governance since it combines components of both input- and output-legitimacy.

3.3.3 Pluralistic Democracy

Pluralistic democracy does not provide the state with a central role within international politics. Instead, the approach focuses on a balanced relationship between societal forces (organised in civil society organisations, political parties, governmental actors and business associations) and the diffusion of power between social actors as the core element of democracy. The most influential modern advocate of pluralist democracy is the American scholar, Robert Alan Dahl. According to Dahl, pluralist democracy must give interest or pressure groups the opportunities to

formulate their opinions freely, and establish trustworthy links between the governors and the governed, and finally channels of communication between the two. These requirements will establish an adequate level of accountability in the democracy, which is a pre-requirement for being democratic (Heywood, 2002, p274).

The term pluralism is often applied in two ways, one narrow and one broad. Narrowly, pluralism can be perceived as an approach for distribution of political power. Within pluralism, political power is widely and equally diffused in the society instead of being concentrated in elite or ruling class clusters. Pluralistic democracy is perceived as an approach of group politics, where individuals are represented primarily through their membership of organized groups. The majority of these groups will have access to public decision-making processes (Heywood, 2002, p79). More broadly, pluralism is considered a normative concept, claiming that diversity is healthy and desirable for the democracy because it ensures individual liberty and encourages dialogue, reasoning and understanding (Heywood, 2002, p79). Pluralistic democracy focuses on associations which are voluntary organizations formed by private citizens, pursuing a shared interest or activity. Associations are required features of democratic political systems since they are crucial for the optimal functioning of the democratic process itself and to political liberty (Dahl, 1989, p221). Normative pluralism considers modern societies as involving a significant extent of social differentiation and a plurality of preferences and interests. In these societies independent associations organisations work as broker institutions through which interests can be formulated and presented.

The role of the state within pluralist democracy is not central in comparison with other approaches to democracy. However, state participation in social and economic affairs should not be ruled out completely. Instead, public law and institutional controls on executive power are considered core elements of a democratic political system. The pluralistic approach to democracy emphasizes that all interests and preferences can be articulated and organised, and a balance between these interests must be obtained. Moreover, the organisation of preferences and interests requires resources and it is expected that all interest associations have roughly same resources. Since this requirement is hardly ever fulfilled in today's societies, the state must establish and secure an equality of resources between interest associations (Dahl, 1989, p332-333). In the pluralistic view, not every citizens aims to have a say in the

decision-making process, instead special interest groups will represent their preferences and interests. Interest associations generally have more knowledge and experience about the procedures of the policy-making process than ordinary citizens do. Therefore, these associations are better suited to channel democratic opinions to the politicians in power. Since pluralistic politics need a foundation of social diversity in order to succeed, a special interest association must exist for almost every different opinion held by the citizens. Policy-makers must aim to satisfy special interest associations, assuming that this will lead to more legitimacy from the citizens. Therefore, public policies will be a complex mixture of ideas promoted by associations with various preferences and interests (Dahl, 1989, p220). According to Heywood, under the ideal conditions pluralist democracy includes the following characteristics (Heywood, 2002, p274):

- There is a wide diffusion of political power between competing interest associations, and, specifically elite groups are absent.
- There is a high extent of accountability, where group leaders of interest associations are accountable to members.
- A neutral governmental system is adequately fragmented to provide interest associations a number of points of access to the policy-making process.

The central idea of pluralistic democracy is that all groups and interests have the potential to organize and gain access to the policy-making process. The political impact of interest associations should be approximately equal to their size and the intensity of their support. For example, political powers must be fragmented in a way that no group or interest can achieve dominance for any period. Group politics within pluralistic democracy is characterised by a rough balance of power.

3.3.3.1 Pluralistic Democracy & Criteria for Context Adequacy

Concerning the criteria for context adequacy, the pluralistic approach to democracy intends to address the concern of identifying relevant constituent groups by connecting the democratic performance to the participation of self-selected interest associations. Moreover, pluralistic democracy focuses on a horizontal style of policy-making, thus does not require a strong governmental system. Power is diffused in the

inter- and transnational arenas and today's transnationalization of private actors proves the importance of bargaining between societal forces in world politics (Dingwerth, 2004, p17). Based on these assumptions, pluralistic democracy addresses most core conditions for democracy within transnational governance (Dingwerth, 2007, p22).

However, pluralistic democracy has two flaws in relation to the criteria of context adequacy. First, pluralistic democracy emphasizes that all interests will be organised to a similar degree. However, in reality some associations are better organised than others are and will hence be better represented in the decision-making process. Pluralism does not provide protection of weaker social interests, neglecting issues of equality and participation. Therefore, the approach becomes to a large extent identical with power politics (Dahl, 1989, p332-333). Second, the procedures within pluralism do not reward the pursuit of moral orientations, nor civilising by generating a development of solidarity and mutual trust between fellow citizens (Dingwerth, 2007, p23). Concerning democracy within transnational governance, the diffusion of power, democratic control and accountability are the most central and relevant ideas in this context.

3.4 Analytical Framework – Democracy within Transnational Governance

In the above presentation of the three approaches to democracy a range of elements suiting the criteria for context adequacy were identified. The following sections intend to develop a set of concrete criteria or institutional requirements for democracy within transnational governance based on the abovementioned elements. These criteria will be applied in the evaluation of the multistakeholder partnerships in chapter 4. Three major dimensions of democratic legitimacy can be identified; participation, democratic control and discursive quality. These dimensions will be addressed in detail in the subsequent sections, aiming to establish more operationalizable criteria for the evaluation of the democratic legitimacy of multistakeholder partnerships and provide concrete answers to the first sub-question of this project: *what criteria for democratic legitimacy must a multistakeholder partnership for sustainable development meet?*

3.4.1 Legitimacy through Participation

The first core criteria identified focuses on democratic legitimacy through participation in the decision-making processes. The concept of participation is a core component within all approaches to democracy. Democratic legitimacy can barely be achieved without the involvement of any actors affected by the decision in the decision-making process. Every decision-making process requires at least some degree of participation. However, for democracy within transnational governance the focus is broader than mere participation. In this context, democratic legitimacy also depends on the extent to which those actors who are affected by a decision have been involved in the decision-making process (Dingwerth, 2007, p28). According to Dingwerth (2007, p28), the concept of participation has two major aspects; the *scope* and the *quality* of participation. The scope of participation refers to the requirement that the actors that are significantly affected by a collective decision must be equal to the actors who make the decision. The scope of participation also address the issue of identifying the relevant actors that must involved in the decision-making process (Dingwerth, 2004, p23). A set of questions for the evaluation of the scope of participation within decision-making processes can be formulated as follows: How are relevant actors defined and identified, and how are these actors selected? What alternative actors are available? Generally, this criterion means that the broader the scope of participation, the more legitimate is the outcome of the decision-making process (Dingwerth, 2007, p28).

The quality of participation focuses on understanding how those actors who are involved in the decision-making process actually participate. The degree of participation can be categorised, ranging from primarily passive participants such as receiving information via radio and television to more active participants such as engaging in the public debate, voting at elections, or representing an interest in a negotiation process (Dingwerth, 2004, p23). Defining a clear criterion for what kind of participation would be optimal is complicated for the decision-making process (Dingwerth, 2004, p23). Each of the three approaches to democracy can contribute to the establishment of criteria for the quality of participation. For example, deliberative democracy emphasizes that those actors who perceive themselves as potentially affected by a collective decision must be able to participate in public deliberation on

the issue. Hence, the quality of participation is linked to the equality of opportunities for actors to participate in the decision-making process. Based on these aspects, a set of questions for quality of participation can be articulated (Dingwerth, 2007, p29); how do those actors who are involved in the decision-making process participate? Are there different qualities of participation and, if so, to what extent do the relevant actors have access to different forms of participation?

3.4.2 Legitimacy through Democratic Control

The second dimension of democratic legitimacy focuses on the concept of democratic control. According to all three approaches to democracy, the decisions of the governors must to a certain extent be subject to the control of the governed. Generally, the concept of democratic control overlaps with the concept of participation. Certain forms of democratic control can be perceived as passive types of participation. Democratic control can be further described by using the concepts responsiveness, accountability and transparency. Responsiveness focuses on the idea that decision-makers must act in accordance with the interests and preferences of their constituencies. This congruence between decision-maker's actions and the preferences of the various groups of actors is regarded as the core goal of democratic control (Dingwerth, 2007, p30). Accountability is often perceived as a means to achieve increased responsiveness, and transparency is a fundamental requirement for the achievement of increased accountability. The concept of accountability is institutionalized, when the requirement to report and the right to sanction are mutually understood and recognised. Accountability often neglects the issue of who can exert control over decision-makers as long as checks and balances are in place and considered sufficient. In this context, democratic control and accountability focus on the existence of monitoring mechanisms and equal access to control mechanisms among actors or groups that have a legitimate claim to control decision-makers (Dingwerth, 2007, p30). The third set of questions for democracy within transnational governance focus yields the following question: which effective mechanisms of accountability are in place in a given decision-making structure?

The degree of transparency is the third aspect of democratic control. This is conceptualised as the extent to which citizens significantly affected by a decision can be informed about the decision-making process. This includes information on the

existence of the decision-making process, addressed issues, structure and status (Dingwerth, 2004, p25). Transparency focuses on the quality and accessibility of information that is provided internally by the decision-making bodies themselves, or externally via media, academia and so forth. A final aspect of transparency is the resources of those whom the information aimed to reach. Do these citizens or groups have the required technical and intellectual capacities as well as financial resources to collect and use the information? The fourth set of questions is formulated: (Dingwerth, 2007, p31): What information is available to the public about the existence, procedure, content and current statue of the decision-making? Which hindrances exist for the public to access, collect, and distribute information about the decision-making process?

3.4.3 Legitimacy through Discursive Quality

Generally, an important characteristic of deliberative-democratic quality within transnational governance is the extent to which actors communicate through arguing instead of negotiating. The practical demands of the deliberative approach to democracy emphasize the needs for universality, rationality, and reciprocity (Dingwerth, 2007, p31). The concept of universality requires that no hindrances exist which systematically exclude actors or groups from deliberations. The scope of actual participation and the scale of political interest among potentially affected actors or groups can also be used as indicators for universality. The concept of rationality focuses on the importance of power and on how consensus is achieved within the deliberative decision-making procedure. Whether an agreement is being based on independent decisions or not can only be answered by the participants themselves. Hence, for assessing the discursive quality of a decision-making process, one must assess whether distortions in the communication and discourses have occurred (Dingwerth, 2007, p32). The concept of reciprocity focuses on the degree to which neutrality and respect is an element of the discourse and the extent to which participants have a consensus-seeking approach to deliberations. The coherence of the participants' reasoning and the recognition of the moral status of opposing perspectives constitute the indicators for reciprocity (Dingwerth, 2004, p28). The fifth set of questions for discursive quality is articulated as: To what extent does the decision-making process involve deliberative components?

3.4.4 Operationalization - Criteria for Democratic Legitimacy within Transnational Multistakeholder Partnerships

The previous sections identified three dimensions through which the democratic legitimacy of transnational governance can be assessed; participation, democratic control (transparency and accountability), and discursive quality. A set of criteria were developed aiming to differentiate between more and less democratic forms of decision-making. In reality, not all decision-making processes need to contain the same high standards of participation, control, or deliberation. Therefore, one must understand what contextual factors can justify a difference in the extent of participation, control and discursiveness of transnational decision-making processes, which is still adequate for democratic legitimacy. The intention of the following sections is to adapt the identified criteria to the context of the multistakeholder partnerships for sustainable development.

3.4.4.1 Participation

In the previous section a range of criteria were identified for the scope and quality of participation.

Scope of participation:

- How are relevant actors defined and identified, and how are these actors selected?
- What alternative actors are available?

Quality of participation:

- How do those actors who are involved in the decision-making process participate?
- Are there different qualities of participation and, if so, to what extent do the relevant actors have access to different forms of participation?

The Bali Guiding Principles, developed by the United Nations and its member states provide extensive background information and guidance on the concept of multistakeholder partnerships and how they must be established. The guiding principles are in line with this project's focus on participation, transparency, accountability and deliberation, arguing that multistakeholder partnerships should be structured to encourage deliberation and cooperation between actors with a stake in

Agenda 21 (UN, 2003a, p4). Since the multistakeholder partnerships for sustainable development are voluntary initiatives undertaken by governments and relevant actors, they are not obliged to follow the requirements set out in Bali Guiding Principles. However, these principles are considered to constitute minimum standards for good democratic performance which actors are highly encouraged to adhere to in the design and implementation of multistakeholder partnerships (UN, 2003a, p4).
Concerning the scope of participation in multistakeholder partnerships, the Bali Guiding Principles are corresponding to the criteria for democratic legitimacy within transnational governance stating that:

"Partnerships should have a multi-stakeholder approach and preferably involve a range of significant actors in a given area of work. They can be arranged among any combination of partners, including governments, regional groups, local authorities, non-governmental actors, international institutions and private sector partners. All partners should be involved in the development of a partnership from an early stage, so that it is genuinely participatory in approach. Yet as partnerships evolve, there should be an opportunity for additional partners to join on an equal basis." (Bali Guiding Principles, 2000, p10)

The Bali Guiding Principles encourage the initiators of multistakeholder partnerships to take an inclusive scope when deciding on whom to include. The need for an active involvement of local communities and civil society organisations in the design and implementation of multistakeholder partnerships is emphasized and the participation must have a sectoral and geographical balance. Another important aspect, which decides whether a multistakeholder partnership has a broad scope, concerns the (intended or actual) scope of the decision's application, that is, whether the decision applies only to the parties who have negotiated it or whether it also has consequences beyond this circle. The more significant the impact of the decision is, the greater the need for democratic legitimation of the decisions and the broader the participation must be (Dingweth, 2007, p30). Within each individual case study in chapter 4, the relevant transnational actors for participation will broadly be identified, thereby providing a foundation for assessing whether all relevant actors have been involved in the respective multistakeholder partnership. Finally, a deciding indicator for the scope

of participation is the extent, which the multistakeholder partnership is open to new actors or whether it is only open to a restricted group of actors.

The quality of participation focuses on how those actors or groups involved in the decision-making process actually participate. As mentioned earlier, different modes of participation exist, ranging from largely passive participants (recipients of information), to more active participants (engaging in the debate or influencing the agenda of a multistakeholder partnership). With regard to the multistakeholder partnerships for sustainable development, the quality of participation is determined by actors' opportunities for participation. These aspects can be evaluated on the basis of meeting documents and agendas.

3.4.4.2 Democratic Control

The second dimension concerns the democratic control of the multistakeholder partnerships, where a range of criteria were identified for responsiveness, accountability and transparency:

Accountability:

- What effective mechanisms of accountability are in place in a given decision-making structure?

Transparency:

- What information is available to the public about the existence, procedure, content and current statue of the decision-making?
- Which hindrances exist for the public to access, collect, and distribute information about the decision-making process?

Within multistakeholder partnerships, mechanisms of accountability are difficult to determine due to their voluntary character. This means that often no direct accountability structure is implemented. All multistakeholder partnerships have appointed a lead partner, which to some extent is perceived as the responsible actor of the initiative. Some lead actors or multistakeholder partnerships are directly accountable to their core donors, primarily governmental agencies. However, there

exists no clear evidence on accountability mechanisms in which multistakeholder partnerships or the involved actors are penalized for not achieving its objectives. On accountability the Bali Guiding Principles state:

"Partnerships should be developed and implemented in an open and transparent manner and in good faith, so that ownership of the partnership process and its outcomes is shared among all partners, and all partners are equally accountable. They should specify arrangements to monitor and review their performance against the objectives and targets they set and report in regular intervals ('self-reporting')." (Bali Guiding Principles, 2000, p9)

The lead actor of a multistakeholder partnership must inform the national focal point for sustainable development of the involved countries about the initiation and progress of the initiative. All actor should bear in mind the guidance provided by governments and must exchange relevant information with governments and other relevant stakeholders.

The second aspect of democratic control, the degree of transparency was conceptualised as the degree to which actors heavily affected by a decision are able to be informed about the decision-making process, including its existence, subject matter, structure and current status. With regard to transparency the Bali Guidance Principles state:

"Partnerships should submit a regular report, preferably at least on a biennial basis. These reports should be made accessible to the public." (Bali Guiding Principles, 2000, p9)

The concept of transparency refers to the quality and accessibility of information that is provided internally by the multistakeholder partnerships themselves, or externally through mass media, internet and academic reports (Dingwerth, 2007, p31). Information provided by external parties will help to increase the quality and validity of the total information available. Concerning the multistakeholder partnerships for sustainable development, they must provide information and reports on the project, meetings, objectives and progress. Regarding accessibility, a minimum requirement is

a specific webdomain dedicated to the multistakeholder partnership, providing all necessary information, overview of members, annual reports, minutes of the meetings and so forth.

3.4.4.3 Discursive Quality

The final of the three dimensions for democratic legitimacy is discursive quality. In the previous section, the following criterion was identified:

- To what extent does the decision-making process involve deliberative components and what is the role of arguments in the decision-making process?

For achieving democratic legitimacy with regard to deliberation, actors must communicate in the mode of arguing rather than negotiating. The communication must emphasize universality, justification and adjustment (Dingwerth, 2007, p32). The concept of universality requires that no hindrances exist which systematically exclude citizens or groups from deliberations. However, most multistakeholder partnerships have developed multileveled organisational structures consisting of a governing board and a general assembly. These multileveled organisational structures can be considered a hindrance for the fulfilment of the universality requirement, since equal access to the core deliberation and decision-making forum – the governing board – in most cases do not exist. On the other hand, an equal access for actors to the core deliberation forum might potentially cause a bureaucratic overload. The multistakeholder partnerships are therefore not expected to include all affected parties in the core deliberation and policy-making forum (governing boards). Instead, the focus in this report will be on the existence of efficient communication channels between the governed (members, partners or affected actors) and the governing boards.

Justification in the context of multistakeholder partnerships for sustainable development means providing reasons for positions taken or proposals made. Adjustment means that involved actors must adopt arguments raised by stakeholders in a forum, either in part or as a whole. Alternatively, there is the adjustment of the agenda, which is when new issues raised by citizens are explicitly designated for future deliberation. Concerns or opinions raised by participants must be incorporated into the multistakeholder partnership's decision or become part of the meeting-agenda.

When evaluating the discursive quality of the multistakeholder partnerships, the primary source will be meeting-documents. These documents generally cluster around core documents such as the agenda under debate. For the evaluation of multistakeholder partnerships, relevant documents are likely to include (Nanz & Steffek, 2005, p378), inter alia: minutes of meetings; draft texts of the final decisions; official motions by the involved participants; non-papers and background documents provided by participants; background information provided by the Secretariat or Bureau; newsletters and other forms of media communication (including websites of the multistakeholder partnerships).

When evaluating the deliberative quality of multistakeholder partnerships, one must be aware of the various types of participation. The opportunities for non-state actors to occasionally participate in symposia or seminars differing significantly from regular participation in deliberation in the governing bodies of the multistakeholder partnerships (Nanz & Steffek, 2005, p376). Three levels of deliberation have been identified; 1) concerns and positions of by involved actors are not discussed at all within the governing bodies; 2) governing bodies justify their proposals with reference to concerns raised by involved actors; 3) the involved actors concerns are incorporated into governing bodies' positions or become part of the meeting-agenda.

4. Evaluation of the Democratic Legitimacy

The following section presents the evaluation of the democratic legitimacy within the five individual multistakeholder partnerships, based on the analytical framework outlined in chapter 3. The analytical framework introduced three major dimensions of democratic legitimacy within transnational governance, namely participation and inclusiveness, democratic control and discursive quality. These dimensions will structure the individual evaluation of the multistakeholder partnerships. The final section contains a summary of the outcomes of the individual evaluations and an answer to the second sub-research question in this project.

4.1 The Cement Sustainability Initiative

4.1.1 Introduction

The Cement Sustainability Initiative (CSI) was established in 1999 by eleven major cement companies under the supervision of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD). The overall objectives of the partnership were: to explore what sustainable development means for the cement industry, facilitate actions that companies can initiate as a group and individually to accelerate the move toward more sustainable practices, and finally to develop a set of general guidelines for sustainable practices for six issue areas. These issue are include: CO_2 and Climate Protection; Responsible Use of Fuels and Raw Materials, Employee Health and Safety, Emissions Monitoring and Reduction, Local Impacts on Land and Concrete Recycling. Within the context of global governance, the CSI is perceived as a standard-setting partnership since it provides uniform standards for a significant share of the cement producing industry. The guidelines for all six issue areas were published in July 2002 in the policy paper; "Agenda for Action"[8]. The run-up to this publication lasted three years including scoping, research and stakeholder consultation. The "Agenda for Action" was presented at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in August 2002, which recognized CSI as a type II Partnership. The actors involved in the partnership have committed themselves to implement the guidelines for the six issue areas into their cement producing facilities.

[8] WBCSD Website, http://www.wbcsdcement.org/, accessed on 9 February 2010

Within the partnership six task forces are formed, each chaired by one or more of the CSI member cement companies. These task forces develop material such as good practice guidelines, tools, and procedures, which are applied by all CSI companies at their operating facilities. The involved actors represent more than half the world's cement production outside China, hence one assumes that the guidelines have become de facto standards[9]. A de facto standard is a custom, convention, product, or system that has achieved a dominant position by public acceptance or market forces. The website of the multistakeholder partnership confirms this assumption:

"The CSI member companies do not speak for the entire cement industry. However, given that we account for more than half of the cement manufacturing capacity outside of China, we are representative of the industry and can therefore hope to affect its thinking and performance by sharing our vision for the future and examples of good practice.[10]*"*

Globally, there exists a global gap of regulations aiming to steer the cement sector on issues such as CO2 emissions and ground pollution, especially in developing countries. The guidelines developed within the CSI partnership are perceived as an industry contribution aiming to reduce this global regulation gap (WBCSD, 2002a, p7).

4.1.2 Participation

The participation of the CSI consists primarily of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development and twenty-one cement-producing companies - eleven core members and ten participating members. The core and participating members are highly diverse, representing fifteen different countries and four continents. The CSI senior advisory group consists of six internationally recognized experts representing key stakeholder groups and geographic regions, e.g. Dr. Mostafa Tolba, former director of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), which chairs the advisory group. The secretariat is hosted is by the World Business Council on Sustainable Development in Geneva, Switzerland.

[9] WBCSD Website, http://www.wbcsdcement.org/, accessed on 9 February 2010
[10] WBCSD Website, http://www.wbcsdcement.org/, accessed on 9 February 2010

In order to influence the policy development of the CSI, one must be a core member. The core members involve only cement producing companies, who are also members of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development; hence, CSI is considered a private-private partnership. The core members manage the initiative, maintain the CSI Charter (which identifies company commitments and responsibilities), help funding the work programmes, and invite new members (WBCSD, 2002a, p18).

Only cement producing firms may become members of CSI. New members or the so-called participating members must, according to the membership requirements, agree to follow the terms of the CSI Charter, implementing identified good practices at their operating facilities[11]. Participating members make a modest contribution to the CSI budget and may (but are not obliged to) participate in individual task forces responsible for elements of the work program. Participating Members are invited to join the CSI by the Core Members. After a preliminary two year period, which is intended for new members to familiarize themselves with the CSI work programmes, participating members then have the opportunity to become a core member or continuing as a participating member[12].

The CSI is characterised by having established a multi-levelled structure for participation. At the upper level, only core and participating members have access to the main governing forum for strategic decision-making within CSI. The lower level focuses on core partners' engagement with relevant third parties in the implementation process of the guidelines. According to the publication 'Agenda for Action' the implementation projects must engage with interested external actors, such as Trade Associations, NGOs and government representatives through stakeholder dialogues. The intention behind the workshops is to receive input for the development of industry-wide guidelines and protocols.

"Understanding the expectations of our stakeholders, and then responding appropriately, is crucial to the industry's ability to do business. Only by earning the

[11] WBCSD Website, http://www.wbcsdcement.org/, accessed on 9 February 2010
[12] WBCSD Website, http://www.wbcsdcement.org/, accessed on 9 February 2010

trust and respect of our stakeholders will we maintain our 'license to operate' in communities across the world. Through constructive engagement we can understand the wider context and implications of our actions, make better business decisions as individual companies, and identify areas where we can work with our stakeholders to achieve common goals." (WBCSD, 2002a, p7)

The CSI's Agenda for Action was formulated in 2002 and based on stakeholder dialogues held around the world. In 2000 and 2001, dialogues were held in Brazil, Portugal, Thailand, Egypt, Belgium, the USA and China.

"These aimed to ensure that the Agenda for Action was as well informed as possible and contained perspectives from a broad variety of stakeholders (suppliers, employees, end-users, NGOs, governments etc), and was a realistic response to any concerns raised by stakeholders. The commitments the CSI member companies have taken in the CSI Charter are based on this Agenda for Action.[13]*"*

Two sessions held in Washington DC and Brussels, focused on the involvement of global environmental interest groups, political organisations and multilateral financial and development organizations. Workshops were held in China with representatives from the Chinese cement industry, local governments and civil society organisations (WBCSD, 2002a, p22). In 2006, CSI commissioned a Perceptions Survey, to better understand the perceptions external stakeholders had on CSI's work, in relation to its own goals set out in the 2002 Agenda for Action, as well as in relation to other industry organizations working on sustainability issues. One consequence was to extend the focus of the CSI's work and to take on the issue of concrete recycling. In 2007, CSI commissioned a stakeholder meeting to discuss options to increase the effectiveness of the CSI and explore potential next steps or future priority areas for the CSI. Organizations such as WWF International, Greenpeace International and Transparency International were represented[14]. Furthermore, the CSI consulted relevant stakeholders from governments, NGOs, academia, other industries, during the process of elaborating specific guidelines or materials, or to work on individual projects.

[13] Questionnaire: Roland Hunziker, Assistant Project Manager, received 13 April 2010
[14] Questionnaire: Roland Hunziker, Assistant Project Manager, received 13 April 2010

The scope and quality of participation is considered inadequate for achieving democratic legitimacy. The membership rules are highly excluding; only letting cement producing companies become core or participating members. The potential social and environmental impact of the CSI is colossal. Hence, a significantly broader range of transnational actors (global civil society organisations and international research networks) should have been involved in the core policy-making process in order to achieve democratic legitimacy. The multistakeholder partnership has organised stakeholder consultations and workshops worldwide, giving key stakeholders the opportunity to present their concerns and expectations on how the cement industry can establish sustainable production facilities. However, consultations with external stakeholders do not guarantee that the concerns raised by affected parties are influencing the outcome of the core decision-making process within the CSI.

4.1.3 Democratic Control

With regard to transparency, a specific webdomain on the WBCSD website has been dedicated to the CSI partnership. This webdomain provides information on the CSI objectives, publications by the partnership, newsletters and an overview of core and participating members. Moreover, the webdomain provides all interested actors with information on meetings, workshops and stakeholder events organised by the CSI[15]. The multistakeholder partnership provides background documents on all six issue-areas as well as policy documents providing information on strategic decisions within the CSI. The availability of policy documents for all interested actors is unique in comparison to the rest of the multistakeholder universe and is positive for the evaluation of democratic legitimacy. Civil society organisations' access to background documents is less critical for the policy-making bodies than access to policy documents. At the CSI webdomain, the Agenda for Action is published together with the CSI Charter, which includes the core principles of the multistakeholder partnership. A formal interim progress report was published in 2005

[15] WBCSD Website, http://www.wbcsdcement.org/, accessed on 9 February 2010

and a final progress report was published in 2007 focusing on the first five years of implementation activities[16].

Concerning accountability, the multistakeholder partnership is coordinated by the core participants who are managing the initiative, maintaining the CSI Charter (which identifies member commitments and responsibilities), helping funding the work programmes, and inviting new members (WBCSD, 2002a, p18). The internal organisation consists of six task forces (each chaired by one or more of the CSI member cement companies); a CSI office hosted by WBCSD and an independent senior advisory group (see figure 1). The independent senior advisory group acts as advisors and reviewers of the initiative's work programme and progress. The Group works as a monitoring mechanism, ensuring that the CSI has the appropriate focus and processes, and critically reviews the quality and balance of the work programme[17]. Core and participating members are expected to report regularly on their sustainable development activities. On accountability, the Assistant Project Manager, Roland Hunziker states in his response to the questionnaire that:

"Companies have four years to implement their commitments, and they report on CSI performance indicators as part of their annual sustainability reporting. Individual companies have their data assured by independent assurance providers. The CSI secretariat supports companies to understand and implement the commitments, and it collects the information regarding implementation from the companies' public reporting as well as directly."[18]

Concerning situations where individual companies do not report or fulfil implementation their obligations, sanctioning mechanisms are implemented. Hunziker states that eventual non-compliance by a member, if not corrected after being reminded of the obligations, could potentially lead to the company's withdrawal, or even its exclusion from the CSI. Any such decision would be taken jointly by the CSI

[16] WBCSD Website, http://www.wbcsdcement.org/, accessed on 9 February 2010
[17] WBCSD Website, http://www.wbcsdcement.org/, accessed on 9 February 2010
[18] Questionnaire: Roland Hunziker, Assistant Project Manager, received 13 April 2010

member companies (not by the secretariat). According to Hunziker, there has been no such case so far[19].

Within recent years, the CSI has been criticized for being non-transparent about core members' actual implementation of the guidelines for sustainable cement production. The consultancy, SGS SA, was commissioned by the WBCSD to carry out an independent assurance of the data supporting progress by members of the CSI for use in the CSI Progress Report 2007. The scope of the assurance, based on the SGS Sustainability Report Assurance methodology, involved the evaluation of the methods for data collection and manipulation methods, internal and external verification, and the final accumulation and reporting of results to the CSI. The information and data provided by the core member companies was verified and considered accurate and reliable by SGS[20].

Figure 1 – Organisational Structure - Cement Sustainability Initiative



[19] Questionnaire: Roland Hunziker, Assistant Project Manager, received 13 April 2010
[20] WBCSD Website, http://www.wbcsdcement.org/, accessed on 9 February 2010

The multistakeholder partnership has fulfilled the criteria for responsiveness or democratic legitimacy. The accessibility of information via the CSI webdomain is extensive, providing progress reports and newsletters on a regular basis. Concerning quality, both background information and strategic policy documents are available for external actors. Both the accessibility and quality of information increases transparency, providing external actors with an opportunity to stay updated about progress and direction of the CSI.

Proper accountability mechanisms have been implemented, where a senior advisory group is responsible for monitoring of the implementation-progress. Non-compliance by a member, if not corrected after being reminded of the obligations, could potentially lead to the company's withdrawal, or even its exclusion from the CSI.

4.1.4 Discursive Quality

The CSI webdomain provides evidence of deliberative elements in the decision-making process. However, the aforementioned multi-levelled participation structure is considered a hindrance for universality and democratic legitimacy since only core and participating members can access the core decision-making forum. On the lower level organisational levels, several issues have required active stakeholder consultations and dialogues with external actors. The CSI has published the document 'Communication and Stakeholder Involvement: Guidebook for Cement Facilities' for cement plant managers, plant operators, facility planners, and communications directors and staff. This guidebook emphasizes the importance of stakeholder involvement as a critical component of communication:

"Through constructive engagement we can understand the wider context and implications of our actions, make better business decisions as individual companies, and identify areas where we can work with our stakeholders to achieve common goals." (WBCSD, 2002a, p7)

The purpose of the guidebook is to assist core and participating members with developing and conducting effective communication and stakeholder dialogues. The guidebook emphasizes deliberative aspects such as mutual learning, common information base, deliberation and equal access to the debate and states that:

"Establishing a common ground can facilitate the resolution of difficult issues." (WBSCD, 2002b, p8)

Multiple civil society organisations have provided expertise to specific task forces on an invitation basis and additional companies were recruited to join in the implementation phase. Moreover, non-industry actors, who could contribute with specific expertise on one of the six issue areas, were encouraged to make their interest known (WBSCD, 2002b, p8). The CSI also established online debate forums, when reviewing and discussing current developments in the design of the guidelines. These online fora create the opportunity for a broader and more inclusive deliberation process, since interested and affected actors in remote areas and with scarce financial resources can participate.

Several CSI publications have dedicated chapters focusing on how to meet the expectations of external stakeholders concerning sustainable cement production. The multistakeholder partnership has, in the Agenda for Action, summarised the core points highlighted by external stakeholders at workshops and consultations. CSI have translated these core points into a set of objectives for the further development of the multistakeholder partnership:

"A proactive approach to sustainable development. There is a widespread perception that business is part of the problem of 'unsustainable development'. We believe that we can and must be part of the solution." (WBSCD, 2002a, p7)

"Greater transparency. Stakeholders want to be able to judge our performance for themselves." (WBCSD, 2002a, p7)

"Evidence of significant actions, leading to real, sustained changes. This is driving demand for new and stronger regulation in many parts of the world." (WBCSD, 2002, p7)

By highlighting the views of the external stakeholders, CSI addresses the deliberative concept of adjustment and shows that it takes the raised concerns serious. The

multistakeholder partnership uses the stakeholder concerns and expectations to justify its own policy proposals. Hence, some external stakeholder aspects, at least on the surface, have been incorporated into the CSI agenda.

Some deliberative elements are implemented at the lower organisational levels, focusing on mutual learning, deliberation, openness and equal access to information. Especially the use of online debate forums will increase the discursive quality of the multistakeholder partnership since they remove obstacles for the participation of less resourceful actors. By highlighting and presenting the views of the stakeholders, the CSI partnership indicates that deliberating and receiving input from external actors are important and appreciated aspects in its policy-development process. However, since only core and participating members can access the core governing body, the CSI has not fulfilled the criteria for universality and democratic legitimacy

4.2 Asia Forest Partnership

4.2.1 Introduction

The Asia Forest Partnership (AFP) was established by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Indonesian Ministry of Forestry and launched publicly as a Type II Partnership at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002 (Sizer, 2007, p1). AFP aims to promote sustainable forest management in Asia through addressing issues such as good governance, control of illegal logging, control of forest fires and rehabilitation and reforestation of degraded lands. The AFP can be considered a standard-setting partnership since a core objective is the establishment and implementation of transnational standards for controlling illegal logging (Glasbergen & Visseren-Hamakers, 2007, p409).

4.2.2 Participation

The AFP includes 45 partners ranging from government agencies to civil society organisations. In total, the multistakeholder partnership is composed of twenty states from four continents (48%), research institutes (18%), intergovernmental organisations (15%) and civil society organisations (8%). A similar representational tendency is observed for partner attendance at AFP meetings. The representation of state actors is somewhat stronger than the average multistakeholder partnership, however the representation of the business sector was consistently low (Glasbergen, 2007, p410). AFP's only business sector partner, Tropbio Carbon Exchange, attended the fourth partners meeting of AFP but was not active thereafter. However, the AFP secretariat coordinator Dr. Efransjah stated in his response to the questionnaire that:

"During the last 3-year period, the AFP annual forum which focused on "good forest governance" including "combating illegal logging and timber trade" had been attracted business sector. No less than five private companies dealing with wood industry and instruments to detect wood chain custody expressed their interest joining AFP. Forest concessionaires association and wood panel association are always attending our forum although they do not declare their membership."[21]

[21] Questionnaire: Dr. Efransjah, AFP Secretariat Coordinator, 10 April 2010.

Concerning the membership of the AFP, all interested parties who support AFP's goal, including governments, inter-governmental organizations, international organizations, business, civil society organizations, indigenous and local communities, and research institutions, are eligible to join the partnership[22]. Eligible actors are invited to become partners by expressing interest and providing relevant information to the Secretariat. By joining AFP, the actor must commit to actively participate in achieving AFP's goal and circulate relevant information from the multistakeholder partnership within their organization. Partners are expected to promote AFP in their country, sector, or networks and strive to secure wider participation by other organizations. Finally, partners must contribute to the cost of work of AFP and the Secretariat.

Partners must contribute intellectually by attending and actively participating in the AFP annual meetings. Each annual meeting gathers approximately 100 participants and, on average, close to half are non-partners. Non-partners that often participate were, among others, the ASEAN Secretariat, Laos, Friends of the Earth Japan, the Japanese Global Environmental Forum, Russia, World Bank, the Indonesian Forest Industry Revitalisation Body and the Forestry and Forest Products Research Institute from Japan. AFP annual meetings are often held parallel or in continuation of other international forest related meetings (e.g. International Tropical Timber Council sessions) to secure a higher participation of partners and non-partners[23]. Moreover, the AFP broadens its exposure to new audiences by organizing back-to-back meetings so that costs and travel time will be reduced. The location of the AFP annual meetings seems to influence the participation of partners and non-partners. Indonesia and Japan have been represented with the most participants at AFP meetings (both partners and non-partners), not only because they established AFP, but also because most previous meetings have been organised in these two countries. The location is especially important for civil society organisations, which are lacking financial resources[24].

Concerning the quality of participation, the AFP organizes annual or biannual general meetings for partners. The general meeting consists of a partner's forum, which is the core decision-making mechanism of AFP and where all partners can attend. The

[22] Asia Forest Partnership Website, www.asiaforests.org, accessed on 21 February 2010
[23] Asia Forest Partnership Website, www.asiaforests.org, accessed on 21 February 2010
[24] Asia Forest Partnership Website, www.asiaforests.org, accessed on 21 February 2010

partners' forum makes decisions on the operation of AFP's goals and activities including development, review and adoption of working plans proposed by partners and the Secretariat. Lead partners assist in facilitating and coordinating the activities of AFP, but do not have any further authority in the partnership. At the AFP general meetings partners can present their work related to AFP focal issues and can submit or collaborate in other partners' work plans. To increase the transparency of AFP, partners agreed that non-partner observers might attend. At the fifth AFP meeting in Yokohama in 2005, the so-called public forum was added to the general meetings. The Public Forum is open to all interested actors and aims to promote the AFP's goals and activities through presentations by partners and non-partners on working panels and their activities (Sizer, 2007, p3). AFP has also established a Steering Committee, which consists of members nominated by each partner, and the Coordinator of the Secretariat. Currently, the Steering Committee comprises five states, two intergovernmental organisations, two civil society organisations, four research institutes and one partnership[25]. The chair and co-chair of the Steering Committee are elected during the Steering Committee meeting, with the co-chair taking over the position as chair after one year.

The AFP is a true public-private partnership involving governments from producing and importing countries, civil society organisations and international organizations. The multistakeholder partnership has fulfilled the participation criteria for achieving democratic legitimacy, however compared to partners from other groups, the private sector is underrepresented. The multistakeholder partnership does not need to involve each group in equal numbers; however, the role these institutions play and the expertise they contribute must be evaluated with regards to AFP's mission and objectives (Sizer, 2007, p15). Membership of AFP is open for all interested parties who adhere to the goals, and the multistakeholder partnership moreover seeks to locate workshops, seminars and conferences in locations favourable for local NGO's and businesses. Finally, with regard to the quality of participation, each partner has equal access to the core policy-making forum and can nominate members of the Steering Committee. The AFP general meetings are open for non-partners, a rather unique characteristic within the universe of multistakeholder partnerships for sustainable development.

[25] Asia Forest Partnership Website, www.asiaforests.org, accessed on 21 February 2010

4.2.3 Democratic Control

Concerning transparency, the AFP provides a partnership webdomain containing a database and systematically organised retrievable information. Information is made available through an online database and publication list with online retrievable links. The multistakeholder partnership provides information on conferences and workshop participation, newsletters and training seminars. In 2007, a number of evaluation reports were published, e.g. 'AFP Final Report AFP Evaluation Working Group: Asia Forest Partnership Phase 1, Assessment and Recommendations for Phase 2' and the 'Announcement on Renewal and Revision of the Mandate, Focus and Operational Modalities of the Asia Forest Partnership for 2008-2015' [26]. For each partners' meeting since 2002, AFP provides extensive information on presentations, research papers and the various debates. 600 subscribers receive newsletters from the AFP Secretariat and are encouraged to participate in the AFP general meetings[27].

The governments of Japan and Indonesia, Center for International Forestry Research, and The Nature Conservancy were collectively responsible for launching AFP and are referred to as the lead partners. As lead partners, their responsibility is to assist in facilitating and coordinating AFP activities and process. However, the multistakeholder partnership states that, with regard to accountability:

"All partners are equally accountable, but with different views interests and resources. The four leading partners had no special authority and others were welcome to join to help lead the partnership"[28]

The AFP has a multi-levelled organisational structure (see Figure 2) consisting of the partners' forum and the Steering Committee. The responsibility of the Partners' Forum is to make decisions on the operation of the AFP's goals and future activities. The Steering Committee tasks include guiding the Secretariat, facilitating communication and ensuring that partners' interests are represented. (Sizer, 2007, p20). The roles of the AFP Secretariat and the Coordinator of the Secretariat include

[26] Asia Forest Partnership Website, www.asiaforests.org, accessed on 21 February 2010
[27] Asia Forest Partnership Website, www.asiaforests.org, accessed on 21 February 2010
[28] Asia Forest Partnership Website, www.asiaforests.org, accessed on 21 February 2010

assisting and advising parties who are interested in joining the multistakeholder partnership and to facilitate information-sharing activities [29]. The Centre for International Forest Research serves as host to the Secretariat for AFP. Besides the review of proposed working plans by the partners at the general meeting, no monitoring mechanism of the implementation progress is in place. According to Sizer, the AFP lacks the financial and human resources required for monitoring the implementation of all working plans. Instead, the AFP should identify a small enough number of priority activities that have a realistic chance of being implemented and monitored (Sizer, 2007, p20). The AFP provides no information on mechanisms aiming to cope with situations where the partners' working plans are not sufficiently implemented.

Figure 2 – Organizational Structure – Asia Forest Partnership



[29] Asia Forest Partnership Website, www.asiaforests.org, accessed on 21 February 2010

Concerning democratic legitimacy, the multistakeholder partnership has not addressed all requirements for responsiveness sufficiently. The AFP has a transparent structure, providing access to extensive information on events, participation, publications and meetings via its website. With regard to accountability, the AFP states that all partners are equally accountable for the success of the multistakeholder partnership. However, a concrete responsibility-description or structure lacks in cases where the implementation of working plans is considered insufficient. Other accountability mechanisms such as a monitoring system and a sanctioning mechanism are also absent.

4.2.4 Discursive Quality

The AFP provides considerable evidence of the inclusion of deliberative elements into the decision-making process. The website of the AFP partnership provides all partners and non-partners with equal access to information on meetings, work plans and summaries of opinions raised at the annual meetings. Moreover, Dr. Efransjah states that:

"In this context AFP reports to all members in the network. The deliberations of its regular/annual forum are being disseminated to all international organizations and relevant bodies through correspondence and the website."[30]

Two forums have been established within the multistakeholder partnership; the partner's forum and the public forum. Since no major hindrances exist for participation in the core policy-making forum, the partners' forum, the AFP fulfils the requirements for universality. Concerning the participation in the partners' forum, the multistakeholder partnership states:

"Diversity of partners adds width and depth to AFP's scope –more partners should be encouraged to join, particularly from civil society, e.g. business sector."[31]

Moreover, a steering committee has been established, being a rather open-ended body. The committee oversees the work of the AFP secretariat and its financial

[30] Questionnaire: Dr. Efransjah, AFP Secretariat Coordinator, 10 April 2010.
[31] Asia Forest Partnership Website, www.asiaforests.org, accessed on 21 February 2010

management. It also gives directives on the themes and dialogues to be considered by partner members and according to Efransjah, the steering committee is:

"a mini representation of the Partners Forum, and therefore reflects the interests of partners including donors in decision making. Since the set up of the steering committee is "open ended" any partner representative can influence the decision of the committee. The decision is always taken by consensus." [32]

The AFP addresses the geographical constraints for active participation by partners, through the establishment of sub-groups based on geographic or topic-related interests (Sizer, 2007, p8). Partners can propose new AFP projects by submitting working plans to the Secretariat. Partners must inform the entire partnership about the work plan for a new project. Other partners are encouraged to cooperate in the development and implementation of the new work plans[33].

The multistakeholder partnership emphasizes the importance of forums in which like-minded actors at the level of both policy-making and implementation on the ground exchange ideas[34]. Concerning these forums, the AFP states:

"The AFP itself is unique as a regional forum on forests in Asia which treats all partners as having equal decision making authority (be they governments or from civil society). Assuming partners who are involved in decision making on the SC and at the annual meetings report to their constituencies (and there are no restrictions on them doing so) it is a highly transparent process."(Sizer, 2007, p12)

The Partner and Public Fora involve public presentations by partners and experts, followed by informal debates on the topics. In these debates, each partner has an equal opportunity for presenting opinions and concerns, hence fulfilling the requirements for justification in the deliberation process. According to the partnership, the benefits are that:

[32] Questionnaire: Dr. Efransjah, AFP Secretariat Coordinator, 10 April 2010.
[33] Asia Forest Partnership Website, www.asiaforests.org, accessed on 21 February 2010
[34] Asia Forest Partnership Website, www.asiaforests.org, accessed on 21 February 2010

"Sensitivities are such that an informal, unofficial forum, such as AFP, allowing open discussion of the issue without the weight of formal diplomatic proceedings, is of potentially great value."(Sizer, 2007, p11)

The comments and questions from the floor are summarised and presented at the partnership's website. These summaries of opinions give the impression that all actors have an equal access to the debate:

"Discussions from the floor following the presentations emphasised the need to build on initiatives with real actions to curtail illegal logging."[35]

Concerning the democratic legitimacy, the AFP partnership has managed to create adequate conditions and deliberative dialogues and thereby increased the democratic legitimacy. The requirements for justification are fulfilled, since all partners and non-partners have equal access to information on meetings, the topics discussed and the opinions of various actors. Concerning justification, the AFP emphasizes the importance of solid reasoning for positions taken by actors, mutual recognition of actor's opinions and decisions taken by consensus in the steering committee. Finally, the dialogues or deliberation process within the multistakeholder partnership is characterised by an informal atmosphere, where knowledge of formal diplomatic proceedings remains irrelevant.

[35] Asia Forest Partnership Website, www.asiaforests.org, accessed on 21 February 2010

4.3 Collaborative Labelling and Appliance Standards Program

4.3.1 Introduction

The Collaborative Labelling and Appliance Standards Programme (CLASP) was launched in 1999 by the International Institute for Energy Conservation, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, and the Alliance to Save Energy. The multistakeholder partnership was registered by the United Nations Commission for Sustainable Development in August 2002 and is expected to be completed in December 2010. CLASP is considered a standard-setting body since its prime aim is to establish a unified set of transnational guidelines and standards for energy efficiency standards and labelling for residential, commercial and industrial equipment and lighting systems worldwide (S&L). The multistakeholder partnership designs and promotes a global and unified approach to cost-effective adoption of standards and labelling (S&L) [36]. In 2005, CLASP transformed itself into an international sustainable development organisation that includes government agencies, funders, implementing partners, and affiliates from around the globe[37].

4.3.2. Participation

The implementation of CLASP's objectives will have a significant worldwide impact on a range of actors such as policy-makers, energy companies, consumer organisations and research organisations. The CLASP partnership provides no information on the total number of actors involved. However, the online presentations of the projects indicate that major actor groups such as civil society organisations, epistemic communities, governmental agencies and business actors have participated. The CLASP has a multi-levelled organisational structure that also defines the opportunities and qualities of participation. The governing board involves members of the Board of Directors and experts, which steer the overall direction of CLASP and supervise national S&L projects. Each S&L project focuses specifically on a single country and the work plan is developed by CLASP in cooperation with the host country. Within the national labelling projects, primarily national actors are involved (Wiel & Mchonan, 2005, p68).

[36] Collaborative Labelling and Appliance Standards Program Website, www.clasponline.org, accessed on 21 February 2010
[37] Collaborative Labelling and Appliance Standards Program Website, www.clasponline.org, accessed on 21 February 2010

The Board of Directors manages the overall direction of CLASP and the ten directors are primarily Americans, with a single Japanese, Chinese and Mexican. The CLASP partnership has established a secretariat based in Washington DC, which is concerned with the daily operations. Finally, the multistakeholder partnership has a worldwide assembly of Sponsoring Partners who fund CLASP activities (Wiel & Mchonan, 2005, p109). Two committees are established, aiming to assist the implementation of the national labeling projects. CLASP's Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) consists of fifteen international experts on energy efficiency standards and labeling. The CLASP TAC provides guidance to CLASP on the technical parts of its work. The Programme Advisory Committee (PAC) consists of representatives for the primary CLASP partners (including country partners and funders). The CLASP PAC provides support in the articulation, implementation and evaluation of country programme and regional initiatives[38].

The participation in the national labelling projects includes national lead agencies, sponsoring partners, country partners and implementing partners. A national lead agency is appointed by CLASP in the initial phase of the national project development. This agency is responsible for balancing the specific interests of the stakeholders. Moreover, the lead agency is recommended to liaise with key government partners, civil society organisations and epistemic communities (Wiel & Mchonan, 2005, p68). CLASP sponsoring partners provide the financial resources funding that allows the multistakeholder partnership to develop S&L tools and support energy efficiency standards and labels practitioners worldwide. The country partners consist of 31 governmental practitioners of S&L who use CLASP's S&L tools and with whom CLASP's implementing partners collaborate. Finally, the implementation partners develop the actual standards within (Wiel & Mchonan, 2005, p67). The implementation partners are selected through a procedure focusing on the quality of service, expertise and adherence to the CLASP's principles.

Concerning the quality of participation, only members of the Board of Directors and the core sponsoring partners can participate in the core strategic decision-making process. However, within the national projects, CLASP opens for participation in

[38] Collaborative Labelling and Appliance Standards Program Website, www.clasponline.org, accessed on 21 February 2010

every stage of the project development and emphasizes the importance of giving all relevant stakeholders a say in the process (Wiel & Mchonan, 2005, p47).

The national lead agency gathers input for project development through a combination of individual meetings with key stakeholders and a structured consultation process with stakeholder committees. In the interaction between the national S&L projects and the partners, CLASP focuses on South-South and South-North interactions involving stakeholders such as governments, business, inter-governmental organizations, and epistemic communities. These groups assist in the design and implementation phase of new standards in the individual countries[39].
CLASP has organised two workshops in Asia and Latin America on the topic of standards and labels and has participated in several others. All workshops have provided room for discussing the overall policy-development of the multistakeholder partnership (Wiel & Mchonan, 2005, p58).

With regard to scope and quality of participation, CLASP has not sufficiently fulfilled the requirements for democratic legitimacy. The multistakeholder partnership has taken a broad approach to participation, involving all stakeholders interested in supporting CLASP's mission and willing to abide by CLASP's published Guiding Principles. However, the multistakeholder partnership has a multi-levelled organisational structure, in which only the members of the Board of Directors and core sponsoring partners can participate in the strategic decision-making. This lack of equal access for all relevant stakeholders to the core decision-making forum is considered a major hindrance for achieving democratic legitimacy. At the lower organisational (national) level, CLASP has taken a more open approach to participation, where all interested actors can participate.

4.3.3 Democratic Control

Regarding transparency, an online CLASP webdomain is maintained, through which information is available on the mission, the organisation and events. Moreover, the webdomain presents general information on standards and labelling tools[40]. The multistakeholder partnership also provides a database of 613 national projects; both

[39] Collaborative Labelling and Appliance Standards Program Website, www.clasponline.org, accessed on 21 February 2010
[40] International Energy Agency, http://www.iea.org/work/workshopdetail.asp?WS_ID=150, accessed on 22 February 2010

those completed and in progress. The database provides extensive information on objectives, participants, funding and label designs. In order to increase transparency, CLASP has published two editions of an S&L Guidebook on the website, all of them translated into Chinese, Korean, and Spanish. The CLASP's publication; 'Energy Efficiency Labels and Standards: A Guidebook for Appliances, Equipment and Lighting' describes in detail each of the process steps in the development of national labelling projects (Wiel & Mchonan, 2005, p47). This Guidebook is readily available and downloadable from CLASP's website.

Regarding accountability, the Board of Directors is responsible for all aspects of the operation of CLASP. The organisational structure (Figure 3) contains a secretariat, which is comprised of an Executive Director and a support staff. The secretariat is the leading partner within this multistakeholder partnership and the full-time Executive Director is responsible for managing the daily operations (Wiel & Mchonan, 2005, p47). Moreover, the secretariat monitors the work of CLASP's implementing partners and tracks the implementation and progress of each bilateral national project and regional initiative. The CLASP Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) will conduct peer-reviews of all CLASP activities. (Wiel & Mchonan, 2005, p48). CLASP does not provide information on a sanctioning mechanism for cases where the implementation of national projects fails or is considered inadequate.

The multistakeholder partnership has not fulfilled the criteria for responsiveness and democratic legitimacy sufficiently. Publications on working tools and guidelines for project development are published, however transparency is lacking in significant aspects such as reporting on the progress of national labelling projects. The disclosure of information from stakeholder consultations or project meetings is also regarded as insufficient. Concerning accountability, the Board of Directors has the overall responsibility for the outcome of CLASP. The Secretariat is responsible for reviewing and monitoring the implementation progress of national labelling projects. However, no information is provided on a sanctioning mechanism for cases where the implementation of national projects fails.

Figure 3 – Organisational Structure - Collaborative Labelling and Appliance Standards Program



4.3.4 Discursive Quality

The CLASP publication 'Energy Efficiency Labels and Standards: A Guidebook for Appliances, Equipment and Lighting' provides recommendations on how to develop a dialogue with relevant stakeholders. The guidebook contains deliberative elements and focuses on universality through equal opportunities for partners to present their positions. The multistakeholder partnership emphasizes that the initial development phase of a label design for any consumer product must begin with a process of public review and deliberation. Furthermore, CLASP emphasizes the need for an open and

transparent process for the programme design[41]. CLASP's online database with national projects contains evidence that the consultations have been organised with relevant stakeholders. On equal access to the deliberation process the multistakeholder partnerships states that:

"Experience to date shows that the more manufacturers, consumer organizations, and other interested stakeholders are involved early in the label-design or standards-setting process, the more effective the resulting labels and standards (i.e., they lead to greater economic efficiency, more product model options, and more appropriate applications of technology) and the greater the rate of compliance by affected manufacturers." (Wiel & Mchonan, 2005, p54)

Government officials responsible for diffusing labelling requirements and standards must find a suitable balance between consensus-building and unilateral government action. The officials must be open and transparent about balancing the different opinions presented about which labelling and standard regime to adopt (Wiel & Mchonan, 2005, p55). This emphasizes the focus on justification in the deliberation process within the national projects, since stakeholders must provide reasons for positions taken. The multistakeholder partnership also illustrates its awareness about the issue of lacking participation in the deliberation process:

"In many developing countries, there is little experience with providing public notice, conducting focus groups and public hearings, interpreting public comments and reviewing and weighing their relevance, and making appropriate changes to balance the expressed interests of many stakeholders. The experience of other countries that are practiced in collecting, acknowledging, and seriously considering public input is sometimes transferable, depending on the democratic tradition and governance style of each country. Assistance is often available for these efforts." (Wiel & Mchonan, 2005, p54)

[41] Collaborative Labelling and Appliance Standards Program Website, www.clasponline.org, accessed on 21 February 2010

Moreover, CLASP stresses that the government's or lead-partner's role is to determine the optimal public good by using information that is often incomplete[42]. Thus, the more input the government officials or lead-partner receive from relevant stakeholders; the more informed the decisions would be. The subsequent statement emphasizes this commitment:

"A beginning standards level is best set based on a compilation and examination of the results of various analyses, tempered by technical and political judgment, which leads to a recommendation that maximizes the long-term public good." (Wiel & Mchonan, 2005, p54)

Interviews and consultations are used to formulate and test the mechanics of how the programme will operate and to address the programme design issue (Wiel & Mchonan, 2005, p119). The lead agency can obtain input through individual meetings with key stakeholders or a structured consultation process with stakeholder committees. For example, a project launched by the Environmental Protection Department of Hong Kong states in a description for the project 'A mandatory Energy Efficiency Labelling Scheme':

"We welcome your views on the proposed mandatory EELS. We will consider all responses before deciding on the way forward."[43]

With regard to discursive quality, the multistakeholder partnership has not fulfilled the requirements for democratic legitimacy. CLASP's publication 'Energy Efficiency Labels and Standards: A Guidebook for Appliances, Equipment and Lighting' contains several deliberative elements, although only for the development of national labelling projects. Only members of the Board of Directors and the sponsoring partners can participate within the core policy-making, a feature that is considered a major barrier for obtaining democratic legitimacy. In the project development phase at the national level, consultations and public hearings are carried out by the national lead agencies. The aim of the consultations is to collect inputs from all relevant

[42] Collaborative Labelling and Appliance Standards Program Website, www.clasponline.org, accessed on 21 February 2010
[43] Environmental Protection Department of Hong Kong, http://www.epd.gov.hk/epd/english/boards/advisory_council/files/ace_202005_AnnexD.pdf, accessed on 22 February 2010

stakeholders, thereby creating better-informed decisions. Moreover, CLASP emphasizes the importance of justification in the deliberation process through equal access and opportunities for stakeholders to present their opinions.

4.4 Global Water Partnership

4.4.1 Introduction

The Global Water Partnership (GWP) was established in response to the worsening water scarcity in the developing world and to the perceived lack of international leadership in water. The GWP was formally created in Stockholm in December 1995, at a meeting of 56 organizations, including governments, development banks, international organisations, civil society organisations, and the business sector (Rana & Kelly, 2004, p5). GWP works with numerous key actors to establish a set of transnational standards for sustainable water management and support action that follows these standards; hence, it can be considered a standard-setting body (Holmberg, 1998, p41). Ten core countries and three international organizations support the initiative financially; and the secretariat is hosted by the Swedish International Development Agency in Stockholm.

4.4.2 Participation

Membership of GWP is open to all stakeholders involved in sustainable water management: e.g. developed and developing country government officials, United Nations agencies, multilateral development banks, civil society organsiations, epistemic communities and private businesses. The multistakeholder partnership currently comprises 13 regional water partnerships and 73 country water partnerships, and includes 2,069 consulting partners located in 149 countries. Moreover, 10 governmental agencies and 3 international organisations are involved[44]. The GWP does not present an overview of the amount of partners per individual group of actors.

The GWP has established a network of 13 Regional Partnerships on five continents. These regional partnerships bring together multiple sectors and actors to identify and discuss common water issues and to develop action plans based on the principles for sustainable water management. The consulting partners are the members of GWP, which meet annually to review reports from the Steering and Technical Committees, and appoint the Chair of the Partnership. The Steering Committee consists of 22 representatives from the five major constituent groups within GWP: developing

[44] Global Water Partnership Website, www.gwpforum.org, accessed on 25 February 2010

country government officials, humanitarian agencies, international organisations, civil society organisations, epistemic communities and private business. The Steering Committee acts as the Board of Directors and meets biannually. The committee members are elected by the Sponsoring Partners of GWP and are appointed for a term of three years[45]. The Sponsoring Partners constitute the countries and international organisations that signed the Memorandum of Understanding establishing the GWP. The Sponsoring Partners appoint the Chair, members of the Steering Committee and the Auditors (Rana & Kelly, 2004, p16). The Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) consists of 12 independent and international experts from various disciplines related to water resource management. The TAC is perceived as the intellectual spearhead of GWP ensuring the scientific and professional quality of its work[46]. The Secretariat supports the Executive Secretary, the Technical Committee, and the GWP regional and country partnerships in areas such as finance, communication and operational management of GWP programmes and administration[47]. The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency host the GWP Secretariat in Stockholm. Relevant external support agencies are brought together biannually by the GWP to provide a forum for information exchange and debate on water resources management.

Concerning the quality of participation, the GWP Partnership is open to relevant organizations interested in sustainable development, management and use of water resources. The GWP provides each partner with an opportunity to contribute to the development of the concept of sustainable water management. In return, partners must co-ordinate its activities with relevant or affected actors. The registered partners of the GWP are represented at the annual Consulting Partners' Meeting. Within these meetings, partners can recommend actions to be taken by the Steering Committee based on the adopted strategic directions and policies. The meetings are open to observers for information exchange and discussions (GWP, 2008b, p22). Each Regional Water Partnership has a Regional Council consisting of partner representatives (from different countries) from the region. The Regional Chair presides over the Regional Council. The extensive network of regional and national partnerships allows GWP to better support and influence national and regional policy-

[45] Global Water Partnership Website, www.gwpforum.org, accessed on 25 February 2010
[46] Global Water Partnership Website, www.gwpforum.org, accessed on 25 February 2010
[47] Global Water Partnership Website, www.gwpforum.org, accessed on 25 February 2010

making. Moreover, the flexible network structure allows partners to focus on local priorities and to empower communities to take their concerns and issues to the national, regional and global policy-making levels (GWP, 2008b, p22). Several external consultations and workshops have been organised e.g. the Southern Africa Development Community multistakeholder dialogue on water in South Africa and the China-YRWP stakeholder dialogue on the Loess Plateau watershed (Rana & Kelly, 2004, p12).

The Consulting Partners of GWP have a broad and geographically diverse composition from multiple groups of actors; developing country governments, aid agencies, international organisations, civil society organisations, epistemic communities and private business. Moreover, regional and country partnerships are established, helping less resourceful stakeholders to participate in the debate on sustainable water management. Membership of GWP is open to all interested parties and active participation is highly encouraged. However, participation in the steering committee, the core governing body, is restricted to only twelve participants and this constitutes a major burden for the quality of participation. Hence, the GWP partnership does not sufficiently fulfil the criteria for democratic legitimacy with regard to scope and quality of participation.

4.4.3 Democratic Control

Concerning transparency, the GWP provides an online website with systematically organised and retrievable information. The website provides extensive information on staff members, policy briefings and background papers from the technical committee, as well as handbooks in several languages on sustainable water management. Annual reports are published since 2000 providing insights into the implementation progress made annually[48]. Furthermore, since 2008, reports from the Consulting Partners meetings have been published. An online library is developed, providing information to stakeholders on best water management practices and case studies[49]. The transparency of GWP is lacking significantly with regard to information on steering committee meetings held, since no information is provided on agendas, discussions or outcomes of these meetings. A financial overview is published in the annual report,

[48] Global Water Partnership Website, www.gwpforum.org, accessed on 25 February 2010
[49] Global Water Partnership Website, www.gwpforum.org, accessed on 25 February 2010

providing extensive information on expenditures and donors. The donor information is broken down into the scale of donations (country donations or funds raised locally), in-kind contributions and programme funding. A separation is made between core, programme and regional donors (GWP, 2008a, p35). In 2008, the GWP published a Global Water Partnership Strategy 2009-2013, outlining the partnership's ambitions with regard to future projects, progress and reforms of the governance structure. The strategy pursues a more decentralised organisational structure with higher responsibility placed on regional and country partnerships (GWP, 2008b, p6).

Concerning accountability, the organisational structure of GWP (see Figure 4) is characterized by flexibility and a minimum of bureaucracy. The Steering Committee is the highest governing body within the GWP, and engages in policy oversight and approving of the annual work plans and budget. The sponsoring partners, comprising the ten founding members of the GWP, appoint the members and chair of the Steering Committee[50]. Letitia A. Obeng, who was appointed in January 2008, chairs the Steering Committee. The Steering Committee also provides management oversight of the GWP, holding the Secretariat, the Technical Committee and the partners accountable for the progress of the multistakeholder partnership (GWP, 2008b, p20). A nomination committee is responsible for nominating the members of the Steering Committee. Moreover, in the appointment process of Steering Committee members, the nomination committee is essential in establishing a consensus between the Sponsoring Partners (who must support the nominations to the Steering Committee), the Regions (who assist in the nomination process of Steering Committee members) and the consulting partners (GWP, 2008b, p22). The Secretariat is the executive body and functions as the 'network hub' for GWP. It helps with the exchange of knowledge, communication and preservation of the coherence across the GWP (GWP, 2008b, p11). The GWP secretariat has a staff of sixteen employees.

In the Global Water Partnership Strategy 2009-2013, GWP states that it intends to establish stronger links within the regional and national partnerships, hence improving the functioning of all GWP governance bodies and ensuring accountability to protect the GWP brand. (GWP, 2008b, p20). The multistakeholder partnership is currently in

[50] Core Sponsoring Partners; Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States.

the process of implementing the Outcome Mapping approach, which is a method to monitor and evaluate the success of the annual work plans. (GWP, 2008a, p21). This approach will help to implement a set of indicators for monitoring and reporting on the progress of GWP projects at various levels (GWP, 2008b, p11). Moreover, the Technical Committee published in 2006 a technical background report on Monitoring and Evaluation Indicators for sustainable water management strategies and plans.

Figure 4 –Organisational Structure – Global Water Partnership



Concerning the responsiveness and democratic control, the GWP has addressed the criteria for democratic legitimacy sufficiently. The multistakeholder partnership is highly transparent providing extensive information on topics such as the staff members, financial details, publications, events and each regional partnership has its own webdomain. Moreover, for the annual consulting partners meetings, information is provided on the agendas, meeting presentations, discussions and opinions raised. Concerning accountability, the steering committee has the overall responsibility for management and direction of the multistakeholder partnership and is accountable to the sponsoring partners. GWP is currently in the process of implementing a monitoring and reporting system, however, the multistakeholder partnership provides no information on accountability mechanisms for cases where the implementation of projects fails.

4.4.4 Discursive Quality

The GWP has a multileveled and decentralised organisational structure and a philosophy of shared responsibilities throughout the entire partnership. The involvement of deliberative elements differs from level to level. The Steering Committee is the core decision-making body, in which decisions are taken by consensus to prevent the political posturing that potentially would result from a formal voting system[51]. Decisions taken within the Steering Committee is based on scientific excellence. The participation opportunities are fulfilling the criteria for universality in the deliberation process, since effective communication channels between governing and the governed have been established. Through the annual Consulting Partners Meetings, partners may provide recommendations for the direction of the GWP; however it is not guaranteed that the steering committee will follow these recommendations. The partnership provides information on stakeholder consultations illustrating that the opinions of the partners have influenced the overall policy-direction of the multistakeholder partnership. An example for the potential of justification and adjustment in the deliberation process concerns the stakeholder consultations on the future strategic goals of GWP:

[51] Global Water Partnership Website, www.gwpforum.org, accessed on 25 February 2010

"A network-wide consultation in 2008 generated four strategic goals that will be pursued by the Partnership during 2009–2013" (GWP, 2008b, p8)

At the regional and local levels of GWP, the deliberative elements and values are more explicit. The GWP emphasizes the aim of empowering, convening and connecting stakeholders and encourages everyone to work together more effectively to manage water resources (GWP, 2008a, p25). Moreover, the multistakeholder partnership presents a number of core values that will guide the future dialogues and project development:

"GWP Partners, and all GWP regional entities, agree to strive for inclusiveness, openness, transparency, accountability, respect, gender sensitivity and solidarity. These are our core values. GWP expects all Partners to apply them, bringing together, as needed, as wide a group of stakeholders as possible in fulfilment of our mission."(GWP, 2008b, p7)

The GWP emphasizes that in countries that have not yet prepared and implemented policies and plans to develop water more effectively, GWP will facilitate multistakeholder participation and dialogues. GWP will share best practices between regions and countries assisting in managing water resources to increase water security (GWP, 2008a, p4).

Regarding the discursive quality of the partnership, the criteria for democratic legitimacy have been fulfilled. The Steering Committee contains deliberative elements such as consensus voting, representation of all major groups and decision-making based on scientific excellence. Moreover, the existence of effective communication channels between the governing and the governed constitutes an advantage with regard to obtaining democratic legitimacy. The regional and country partnerships have taken a strong deliberative approach engaging in deliberation processes with all relevant stakeholders in the area of sustainable water management. These regional and national deliberation processes fulfil the criteria for justification and adjustment.

4.5 Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership

4.5.1 Introduction

The United Kingdom established the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP) in 2002. REEEP aims to be a creator and catalyser of institutional change and is considered a standard-setting body since it focuses on the development of transnational standards for renewable energy and energy efficiency in at least three regions[52]. The United Kingdom, Indonesia and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization made the initial arrangements for the establishment of the multistakeholder partnership in 2002 (Pattberg, Szulecki, Chan & Mert, 2009, p3). The initial phase was finalised during the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002, where the Type II Partnership was officially presented. The founding members of REEEP consist of the governments of Australia, Austria, Brazil, China, Netherlands, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and three other unnamed governments (Pattberg, Szulecki, Chan & Mert, 2009, p7). The first General Meeting of Partners was organised in Bonn in 2004 and the partners approved a long-term programme of work and on the governance structure. Moreover, a set of documents and statutes were developed comprising the REEEP constitution. Finally, in Bonn a Governing Board was formed, scheduled for bi-annual meetings (Pattberg, Szulecki, Chan & Mert, 2009, p7).

4.5.2 Participation

The implementation of REEEP's objectives will have a significant global impact on a range of actors such as energy companies, civil society organisations and government officials. REEEP recognises the importance of working with a diverse group of actors by stating:

"As a leading international sustainable energy partnership catalyzing change across the developing world, REEEP is working with a wide variety of stakeholders to ensure coordination and engagement among policymakers, regulators, financiers and NGOs."[53]

[52] Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership Website, http://www.reeep.org, accessed on 26 February 2010
[53] Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership Website, http://www.reeep.org, accessed on 26 February 2010

REEEP consists of more than 3,500 members, and 250 registered partners. Among its partners, REEEP includes 42 governments, representing 14 percent of the total partners. All the G7 countries and several countries from the developing world have joined REEEP. Civil society organizations accounts for 35 percent of all partners, 35 percent are private businesses, 3 percent are multilateral-organizations and programmes, 5 percent are regional government agencies, 3 percent are research institutes and central government ministries and agencies account for 5 percent (REEEP, 2009, p51).

One third of the governmental partners are European, 23 percent are from Asia, 21 percent are American states, 14 percent from Africa, and two governmental partners (Australia and New Zealand) represent Australia and Oceania (REEEP, 2009, p51). Partners are organisations who signed and adhere to the REEEP Mission Statement and who will provide the partnership with knowledge and tools to make change possible. The 42 governments who are partners of REEEP are cooperating with the partnership to implement international market standards for the increased use of energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies. In order to become a regular partner of REEEP, the candidates must go through a simple application procedure. They must fill in a short application form, where they describe their institutional status, areas of expertise and interest. The candidates must be formally accepted by the REEEP Secretariat and subsequently approved by the Governing Board (Pattberg, Szulecki, Chan & Mert, 2009, p10). The national governments are seen as strategic partners, and their role differs from that of regular partners in term of power since they are core funders. The REEEP also welcomes the 'Friend of REEEP', which is for individuals with an interest in renewable energy and energy efficiency[54]. The 'friends' enjoy access to REEEP's community area and some are considered experts in a particular area of interest. These experts agree to act as consultants and perform specific assignments for REEEP. In the Vienna headquarters, REEEP has eight full-time staff members including Binu Parthan the Deputy Director for Programme Coordination. REEEP has established seven regional secretariats, which aim to achieve REEEPs objectives in the particular regions.

[54] Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership Website, http://www.reeep.org, accessed on 26 February 2010

Concerning the quality of participation, each partner has equal access to the highest governing authority in REEEP; the Meeting of Partners. The Meeting of Partners is held biannually and constitutes a general assembly of all partners and where each partner can participate and has one vote. The core tasks of the meeting of partners involve the adoption of the agenda of the meeting; the appointing of the members of the Governing Board and the appointing of two auditors[55]. The core governing body of the Partnership is the Governing Board, which consists of between six and nineteen delegates from all major groups of actors and preferably from all regions (Szulecki, Pattberg & Biermann, 2009, p20). Although, partners have no direct access to the governing board, they can set the agenda and appoint the members of the governing board. Hence, partners have opportunities to steer, to some extent, the policy-direction of REEEP.

Generally, REEEP intends to involve as wide a range of major groups – governments, research institutes, NGOs – as possible in the project development phase, in order to collect valuable input from experts. The regional secretariats have a core role in organizing local consultations and dialogues with Partners and stakeholders. According to the Communication Consultant of REEEP, Vince Reardon:

"Organising stakeholder consultations and awareness-raising events is an integral part of REEEP's outreach, and happens continuously. In the financial year 2009-10 (ending on 31 March 2010), REEEP organised or gave presentations at total of 120 events with a total direct audience of 25.000 people. Our own events are organised by the Partnership's International Secretariat in Vienna, or by the Regional Secretariats around the world." [56]

Vince Reardon provides furthermore two specific examples on events with a high quality of participation. First, the annual REEEP high-level conference at Wilton Park, which was a private, invitation-only event that brought together 80-100 senior policy-makers, academics and international organization representatives from around the globe to discuss energy efficiency and renewable energy sources. In September 2009, the topic was "Practical strategies for making Copenhagen a success" which

[55] Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership Website, http://www.reeep.org, accessed on 26 February 2010
[56] Answer from Questionnaire: Vince Reardon, Communication Consultant of REEEP, received 30 March, 2010

specifically concentrated on discussions about how to finance technology transfer between developed and developing countries. The second event was linked to the 15. Conference of the Parties (COP15) meeting in Copenhagen in December 2009. COP15 represented a unique opportunity for promoting REEEP, since all key environment ministers and representatives of all key development institutions worldwide were present. Here, REEEP held an official side event entitled 'Accelerating low carbon energy development: REEEP successes in South/South & North/South cooperation'. The event was co-hosted by SouthSouthNorth, a partner NGO that handles access to energy projects in Southern Africa. The event brought private sector players (Scatec from Norway), international development actors (DFID from the UK), and other NGOs together to present examples of clean energy development to an audience of 200 stakeholders attending COP15[57].

With regard to scope and quality of particpation, REEEP has fulfilled the requirements for democratic legitimacy. The multistakeholder partnership has a broad and geographically diverse participation from several major actor groups such as developing country governments, humanitarian organisations, international organisations, civil society organisations, epistemic communities and private businesses. Membership is open to all interested parties who agree to follow the principles of REEEP. The Governing Board, the core governing body, consists of sixteen delegates, who are elected at the annual meeting of the partners. Although access to the governing board is restricted for partners, the delegates can be considered representatives for all major actor groups within REEEP.

4.5.3 Democratic Control

REEEP has a high extent of transparency and provide a website with systematically organised and retrievable information. Information on policies and regulation reviews, case studies and project reports are made available through an online database[58]. The multistakeholder partnership provides information on publications, campaign material, newsletters and stakeholder consulting events. The REEEP toolkit system is downloadable via the website and aims to assist partners in project-development. The online resources range from policy papers and case-studies to presentations that are

[57] Answer from Questionnaire: Vince Reardon, Communication Consultant of REEEP, received 30 March, 2010
[58] Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership Website, http://www.reeep.org, accessed on 26 February 2010

produced by REEEP-funded projects. Annual reports are published since 2005, providing an overview of the annual progress of projects, new partners and decisions taken throughout the year. Moreover, the annual reports provides an overview of core donors, showing that REEEP is financially supported primarily by governments (e.g. Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, the United States and the United Kingdom), and by some donations from the private sector[59]. The multistakeholder partnership's transparency is lacking significantly with regard to information on annual meetings and workshops held. REEEP provides no information on agendas, discussions or outcomes of the annual partner meetings or the governing board meetings.

With regard to accountability, REEEP has a robust and transparent organisational structure with an emphasis on regionalization (See Figure 5). The structure consists of three acting bodies: the Governing Board, the Programme Board and the Finance Committee. The heart of the Partnership is the International Secretariat in Vienna. The functions of the international secretariat include organising and reporting on the meetings of the Governing Board and the Meeting of the Partners, and implementing the decisions of the Governing Board. The seven regional secretariats represent REEEP locally and are independent institutions, which act on the base of an established contract. The functions of the regional secretariats include representing REEEP in key meetings and the organization of regional consultations. The performance of the regional secretariats is evaluated on an annual basis (REEEP, 2009, p56). Regional steering committees are established consisting of partners, relevant regional players and other stakeholders. These committees engage in the process of project evaluation, short-listing and preparing regional priority lists for funding.

Within REEEP, the highest governing authority is the meeting of partners, a general assembly of all the partners that is held biannually. Each partner has equal access to the decision-making process and has one vote. The functions of the Meeting of Partners include approving the agenda of the meeting; presentation of financial accounts, annual reports and auditors' report; approving programme activities for the

[59] Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership Website, http://www.reeep.org, accessed on 26 February 2010

next working period; appointing the members of the Governing Board and appointing two auditors[60].

The Governing Board is the core governing body, which consists of between six and nineteen participants from all the actor groups and preferably also from all regions (Szulecki, Pattberg & Biermann, 2009, p20). The Governing Board has the responsibility for that the conduct of REEEP is in line with the Statutes. Moreover, the Governing Board develops and oversees the key policy-direction of REEEP (Szulecki, Pattberg & Biermann, 2009, p20), which includes targets, timeframes; funding priorities; communication activities and financial status.

The Finance Committee monitors the finances of the partnership and consists of all donors with an annual contribution to REEEP of at least 70,000 Euros. Moreover, the committee aims to provide financial recommendations to the Governing Board regarding the governing structure and work programmes (Pattberg, Szulecki, Chan & Mert, 2009, p20). The governing structure is subject to regular audits conducted by two external and independent auditors selected by the Meeting of Partners.

The regional steering committees consist of participants from epistemic communities, civil society organisations, governmental representatives and private businesses. Their core function is to assist in the development of regional REEEP action plans and in the short-listing of regional projects for funding. They offer guidance to the international secretariat based on the feedback from the monitoring and evaluation of project implementation (REEEP, 2009, p15).

All projects are closely monitored by REEEP's regional secretariats through a combination of both financial and physical reporting methods, which are forwarded to the International Secretariat for final approval. According to Vince Reardon, one of REEEP's strongest points is its robust monitoring systems and he states that:

"The progress of all projects is managed via a web-based Project Management Information System (PMIS), which is the day-to-day management tool for the project leaders, and the mechanism for oversight for the International Secretariat. Up front, each project is contracted to deliver specific outputs to a specific timing. Via PMIS, REEEP has a continuously updated overview of each project, its performance against

[60] Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership Website, http://www.reeep.org, accessed on 26 February 2010

its objectives. After its conclusion, each project is evaluated by a third-party expert. In cases where a project does not deliver a specific output, REEEP asks for clarification why and makes a judgment on what measures to take, and more importantly, what learning should be drawn from the "failure." [61]

REEEP regularly has external assessments of its project activities. An example is the 'Analytical and Synthesis Study of the REEEP Programme' from March 2009, which evaluated how REEEP manages projects and identified its strengths and weaknesses. Generally, partners must contribute to the functioning of REEEP, however the engagement is voluntary, and penalties are not stipulated. The Statutes describe the possibility of expelling a partner in case of a severe violation of the responsibilities; however, a two-thirds majority of the Meeting of Partners must support the expulsion (Pattberg, Szulecki, Chan & Mert, 2009, p19).

Concerning responsiveness and democratic control, REEEP has sufficiently addressed the criteria for democratic legitimacy. The multistakeholder partnership is highly transparent providing extensive information on topics such as donors, publications, members and governance structures. However, a significant lack of information appears when it comes to information on annual partners meetings or meetings within the steering committee. REEEP provides no information on agendas, discussions or opinions raised by steering board member.

The accountability structure is clearly described by REEEP, where the Governing Board has the overall responsibility for the management and direction of the multistakeholder partnership. All projects are monitored and evaluated by REEEP's regional secretariats, who report to the international secretariat. Via a web-based Project Management Information System, REEEP has a continuously updated overview of each project and its performance against its objectives. Partners can be expelled from REEEP in cases where they severely violate their duties; however a two-thirds majority of the Meeting of Partners must support the expulsion.

[61] Answer from Questionnaire: Vince Reardon, Communication Consultant of REEEP, received 30 March, 2010

Figure 5 – Organizational Structure - Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership



4.5.4 Discursive Quality

REEEP has a multileveled and decentralised organisational structure with a philosophy of shared responsibilities throughout the system. Concerning the deliberative character of REEEP, the multistakeholder partnership states that:

"We have tried to structure a community in which members can contribute and exchange their experiences, to encourage and ensure global best practice in the renewable and energy efficiency field."[62]

The multistakeholder partnership organizes annually a REEEP Project Managers meeting with a two-fold objective. The first objective is to provide a forum for deliberation between REEEP project managers, the international secretariat and the REEEP programme donors. The second objective is to asesss the progress towards REEEP's strategic goals and create ideas for how to increase the strategic impact of future work programmes (Szulecki, Pattberg, Mert & Chan, 2009, p20). At the meeting of project managers, approximately thirty projects coordinators will present their respective energy projects. The presentations are followed by discussions and sharing of experiences, thereby creating a forum for mutual learning for partners.

REEEP staff members emphasise that the decision-making process concerning project implementation contain effective communication channels available for all partners (Szulecki, Pattberg, Mert & Chan, 2009, p22). Several partners indicate that the decision-making procedure within reach is a bottom-up process, which is perceived as one of REEEP's most valuable assets (Florini & Sovacool, 2009, p5246). Regarding the access to the policy-making process, the multistakeholder partnership states that:

"Organisations that are particularly proactive within REEEP will also have the opportunity to develop guidance and contribute to the strategic direction of the partnership."[63]

[62] Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership Website, http://www.reeep.org, accessed on 26 February 2010
[63] Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership Website, http://www.reeep.org, accessed on 26 February 2010

Moreover, Vince Reardon emphasizes in his response to the questionnaire that partners and stakeholders are directly involved in REEEP's governance structure and decision-making:

"All key donor countries sit on the REEEP Governing Board, which also includes representatives from other major institutions (e.g. TERI, IETA) private industry (Climate Change Capital) and other NGOs (eg Greenpeace). The Governing Board meets twice yearly and discusses and approves all major decisions regarding the Partnership. REEEP's Programme Board which oversees all project-related matters has a similar mix, and also has representation from the World Bank." [64]

The project-development process begins with regional consultations between REEEP and the major stakeholders. With regard to the participation Florini and Sovacool states that:

"Partners have a direct opportunity to influence REEEP activities through meetings and consultations, and REEEP also prefers to let most partner's micromanage the projects." (Florini & Sovacool, 2009, p5246)

Regarding the discursive quality, REEEP has fulfilled the criteria for democratic legitimacy. Concerning the universality, each partner has equal access to the meeting of partners and has one vote. The meeting of partners constitutes a forum for deliberation, where partners are approving the agenda of the meeting, approving the working plans for the next period; appointing the members of the Governing Board and appointing two auditors. Although REEEP lacks equal access to the Governing Board, the delegates elected can be representatives for all partners hence fulfilling the requirements for universality. The regional project-development process takes a more deliberative approach beginning with regional steering committee meetings involving stakeholders from all major actor groups. The meetings of the regional Steering Committees provide a forum, where partners must justify and adjust their project preferences through objective reasoning, thereby fulfilling the requirements for justification and adjustment. The project development and selection process can be

[64] Answer from Questionnaire: Vince Reardon, Communication Consultant of REEEP, received 30 March, 2010

considered a bottom-up approach, providing partners with a direct opportunity to influence the policy-direction of REEEP.

4.6 Summary

In the previous sections, five multistakeholder partnerships for sustainable development have been evaluated based on the analytical framework for democratic legitimacy developed in chapter 3. Table 1 presents an overview of the core points identified in the evaluation of the five multistakeholder partnerships with regard to the three dimensions of democratic legitimacy; participation, democratic control and discursive quality. The following subsection will provide a more elaborate summary of the core points from table 1 and answer the second sub-research question of this project: *To what extent are the individual criteria for democratic legitimacy met by the evaluated multistakeholder partnerships for sustainable development?* The core findings identified in this summary will lead to the final discussion in chapter five on multistakeholder partnerships and their potential for reaching democratic legitimacy.

Table 1 - Overview of Partnership assessment (- equals negative performance/ + equals positive performance

	Participation	Democratic control	Discursive quality
Cement Sustainability Initiative	- Unfulfilled requirements for democratic legitimacy sufficiently. - Restricted membership is problem due to the CSI's significant influence worldwide. + High degree of geographic diversity among the members. + Consultations where concerned parties can present their positions on sustainable cement production.	+ Fulfilled requirements for democratic legitimacy sufficiently. + High extent of transparency within the partnership, comprehensive website, information on several meetings/publication/guidelines/annual reports. + Proper accountability mechanisms in place. A senior advisory group is responsible for monitoring. With the consent of all CSI members, a company can be expelled from the CSI.	- Unfulfilled requirements for democratic legitimacy sufficiently. + Some deliberative components in the policy-development, which focuses on mutual learning, deliberation, openness and equal access to information. + Use of online debate forums will increase the discursive quality of the partnership.
Asia Forest Network	+ Fulfilled requirements for democratic legitimacy sufficiently. + Broad range of participants, only business is underrepresented.	- Unfulfilled requirements for democratic legitimacy sufficiently. + The AFP has a transparent structure, providing access to extensive information on events, participation, publications and meetings via its website.	+ Fulfilled requirements for democratic legitimacy sufficiently. + All partners and non-partners have equal access to information on meetings, the topics

	+ Open membership rules. + Non-partners can attend and actively participate in partnership meetings.	- No accountability mechanisms such as monitoring or reporting are evident.	discussed and the opinions of various actors. + The decision-making process is based on consensus and the partnership emphasises the importance of mutual recognition of actor's opinions. + Deliberation process characterised by an informal atmosphere, where knowledge of formal diplomatic proceedings remains irrelevant.
CLASP	- Unfulfilled requirements for democratic legitimacy sufficiently. + Open to all organizations and individuals, who have the ability and interest to serve CLASP's mission and are willing to abide by CLASP's published Guiding Principles. + At the national level, the partnership has an open approach and everyone can join if qualified. - Only members of the Board of Directors and core sponsoring partners are involved in deciding the overall policy-direction.	- Unfulfilled requirements for democratic legitimacy sufficiently. - Concerning transparency, no information is available on meetings or workshops organised. + Regarding accountability, the Secretariat is responsible for reviewing and monitoring the implementation progress of the national labelling projects.	- Unfulfilled requirements for democratic legitimacy sufficiently. + CLASP contains several elements of deliberative democracy, e.g. equal access and equal opportunities to present a statement. The importance of an informed national policy-making process is also acknowledged by the partnership. - Overall policy-making process lacks deliberative elements.
Global Water Partnership	- Unfulfilled requirements for democratic legitimacy sufficiently. + Consulting Partners of GWP have a broad and geographically diverse participation from fives sectors; developing country	+ Fulfilled requirements for democratic legitimacy sufficiently. + Concerning transparency extensive is provided on the annual meetings, donors, policies and events. + The steering committee has the	+ Fulfilled requirements for democratic legitimacy sufficiently. + The Steering Committee contains some deliberative elements such as consensus voting, representation of all

	governments, aid agencies, international organisations, NGOs, research institutes and private companies. + Membership is open to all interested parties and active participation is highly encouraged. - Lack of equal access to the core decision-making body; the steering committee.	overall responsibility for management and direction of the partnership and is accountable to sponsoring partners. +/- GWP is currently in the process of implementing a monitoring system. - No sanctioning mechanism is in place for situations, where involved actor is severely violating its tasks.	major groups and decision-making based on scientific excellence. + Effective communication channels between the governing body and the governed. + The regional and local partnerships have strong deliberative governance structures.
REEEP	+ Fulfilled requirements for democratic legitimacy sufficiently. + The Partnership has a broad and geographically diverse participation from fives sectors; + Membership is open to all interested parties who declare to follow the principles of the partnership. + Although access to the governing board is restricted for partners, the delegates can be considered representatives for the major constituent groups and have therefore obtained democratic legitimacy.	+ Fulfilled requirements for democratic legitimacy sufficiently. + The partnership is highly transparent providing extensive information on topics such as donors, publications, members and governance structure. - Lack of information annual partners meetings or meetings within the Governing Board. + The Governing Board has the overall responsibility for management and direction of the partnership. + All projects are monitored and evaluated by REEEP's regional secretariats, who reports to the international secretariat. + REEEP presents a sanction procedure, where partners can be expelled in cases where duties are severely violated.	+ Fulfilled requirements for democratic legitimacy sufficiently. + Concerning the universality, each partner has equal access to the meeting of partners and has one vote. + The regional project-development process takes a more deliberative approach beginning with regional consultations organized between the major stakeholder and players. + The meetings regional Steering Committees provide a forum where partners must justify and adjust their project preferences through objective reasoning.
Total performance	Two of five (40%) has fulfilled criteria for democratic legitimacy with regard to participation.	Three of five (60%) have fulfilled criteria for democratic legitimacy with regard to democratic control.	Three of five (60%) have fulfilled criteria for democratic legitimacy with regard to discursive quality.

Following Table 1, only a minority of the multistakeholder partnerships have fulfilled the criteria for democratic legitimacy with regard to scope and quality of

participation. Since multistakeholder partnerships are considered more than mere implementations mechanisms, a broad and diverse geographical participation in the decision-making process is expected. The multistakeholder partnerships vary to a great with regard to membership rules, which have an explicit impact on the scope of participation. All evaluated multistakeholder partnerships, except the Cement Sustainability Initiative, are open to all interested parties as long as they adhere to the respective charters and missions. The evaluated multistakeholder partnerships often involve hundreds of partners from all major actor groups such as government agencies, international organisations, epistemic communities, civil society organisations and to a lesser extent private business. The Cement Sustainability Initiative is primarily a private-private partnership consisting of cement producing companies, with different membership categories such as Core and Participating members.

Concerning the quality of participation, a significant discrepancy can be detected between the various multistakeholder partnerships. Apart from strict membership rules, the multileveled character of several partnerships is often a burden with regard to equal influence of all affected actors. A multistakeholder partnership often includes a general assembly consisting of all partners and a governing. Only in the cases of REEEP, GWP and Asia Forest Network does the general assembly of partners have a direct influence on the steering committee and the overall policy-direction of the multistakeholder partnership. The sponsoring partners appoint all the members of the Board of Directors within CLASP. Several multistakeholder partnerships have also established regional and local partnerships, where regional secretariats organise dialogues and open consultations in order to receive input from local stakeholders.

With regard to democratic control, a majority have fulfilled the criteria for democratic legitimacy. The transparency within most multistakeholder partnerships is considered extensive, all having a specific webdomain. Via these domains, all multistakeholder partnerships provide retrievable information on guidelines, members, annual and progress reports, events organised and attended, publications, newsletters and membership rules. A major obstacle for the achievement of democratic legitimacy is the extensive lack of information available on minutes, meeting agendas and opinions raised at annual partners meetings and at the meetings of the governing boards. A reason for this specific lack of information is often due to the lack of financial as well

as human resources. The multistakeholder partnerships do generally not have the same financial means as government bodies or international organisations; hence, the same extent of transparency cannot always be expected. On the other hand, the least resourceful of the five multistakeholder partnerships' evaluated, the Asia Forest Network, was alone with providing extensive information from its annual partners meetings. A common reason for the lack of meeting details is due to the fact that (strategic) meeting-details or policy documents are considered too sensitive to disclose by core or sponsoring partners.

Concerning accountability, the organisational structure of all evaluated multistakeholder partnerships is well described and provides a clear overview of responsibilities. The majority of the multistakeholder partnerships have established a Board of Directors or a Steering Committee responsible for the overall performance and policy decisions. Within these multistakeholder partnerships, regular partners only have responsibilities for the project-development and implementation phase. The organisational and accountability structures vary significantly between the evaluated multistakeholder partnerships. For example, the Global Water Partnership and REEEP have a highly decentralised structure, where the responsibility for project implementation often lays at regional secretariats. On the other side, the Cement Sustainability Initiative has a centralised organisational structure consisting of six taskforces. A majority of the multistakeholder partnerships have implemented a monitoring and reporting system, which tracks the progress of projects and initiatives. Within the Cement Sustainability Initiative, a senior advisory group is responsible for monitoring implementation progress, whereas for the monitoring responsibilities within CLASP and REEEP are placed within the secretariats. Via a web-based Project Management Information System, REEEP has a continuously updated overview of each project and its performance against its objectives. The GWP is currently in the process of implementing a monitoring system and no monitoring mechanism is evident within AFP.

The role of core donating partners often remains unclear; although within the Global Water Partnership core sponsoring partners are involved in the appointing of members to the governing body. The Core participants of the Cement Sustainability Initiative are all considered major sponsors, since financial contributions are a prerequisite for membership. Due to financial constraints within most multistakeholder partnerships,

sponsoring partners will have a significantly bigger influence on the policy-direction than regular partners.

Concerning the discursive quality, three out of five multistakeholder partnerships have fulfilled the criteria for democratic legitimacy. Within the multistakeholder partnerships with a multileveled structure, the scope of deliberative elements often varies from level to level. At the regional and local level, dialogues and consultations with partners include deliberative elements such as equal access to the debate and mutual recognition of arguments. However, the deliberative performance within the main governing boards is often considered poor. The core Governing Boards within REEEP and the Asia Forest Initiative take decisions by consensus and focus on scientific excellence. Moreover, REEEP, GWP and the Asia Forest Network are the only multistakeholder partnerships, where the general assembly of partners has a direct influence on the governing body and the overall policy-direction. Several multistakeholder partnerships have created general assemblies or forums where partners have the opportunity to exchange opinions and information.
The information available on meeting-details such as minutes, agendas and opinions raised is often considered inadequate for an in-depth assessment of the deliberative performance of the multistakeholder partnerships. As mentioned above, a reason for the lack of meeting details is that (strategic) meeting-details are often considered too political sensitive for core and sponsoring partners to disclose.

5. Discussion – Multistakeholder Partnerships & Democratic Legitimacy

The following chapter will provide an in-depth discussion of multistakeholder partnerships' general potential for achieving democratic legitimacy. The three dimensions of democratic legitimacy: participation, democratic control and discursive quality will be addressed individually and will lead to the conclusion on the research question in chapter 6. The core points from the evaluation in chapter 4 will constitute the foundation for the discussion, providing an in-depth and concrete understanding of the democratic performance of multistakeholder partnerships. In addition to the core points, the discussion will rely on literature, which addresses the democratic legitimacy of the entire universe of multistakeholder partnerships for sustainable development. Combining in-depth and concrete findings from the evaluation, with more general perspectives on the entire WSSD partnership universe will provide a solid foundation for understanding the potential for democratic legitimacy within the multistakeholder partnerships.

5.1 Participation

Chapter 3 outlined a range of criteria for democratic legitimacy with regard to the scope of participation. These criteria focused on how relevant participants are defined, identified, and selected and what alternatives are available. Concerning the identification of relevant actors for participation in the multistakeholder partnerships, the evaluation in chapter 4 highlighted the importance of membership rules for this issue. According to Aysem, Chan, Biermann and Pattberg (2007a, p11), membership rules or procedures can be either inclusive or exclusive. The majority of the evaluated multistakeholder partnerships have a relatively inclusive approach as long as new members adhere to the Charters, Missions or Principles. With inclusive membership rules, more actors will be involved. An increase in the membership base could potentially lead to enhanced influence of the multistakeholder partnership in national and international policy-making forums. However, with more actors there is also a significant risk for more complicated decision-making processes which could reduce the efficiency of the multistakeholder partnership (Aysem, Chan, Biermann & Pattberg, 2007a, p11). The Asia Forest Partnership and Global Water Partnership are some of the few examples of multistakeholder partnerships whose meetings are open

to non-partners. Other multistakeholder partnerships take a tougher and more exclusive approach requiring new members to have a genuine involvement in the issue-area or belong to a certain (industry) sector. The Cement Sustainability Initiative is primarily a private-private partnership for cement producing companies, with different membership categories such as Core and Participating members. Exclusive membership rules and procedures could potentially bring players that are more ambitious together, who formulate and implement more ambitious policies and programmes. One could expect multistakeholder partnerships with exclusive membership rules to perform better in terms of compliance than more inclusive initiatives. On the other hand, more groups would mean better representation, which then again could increase the democratic legitimacy (Aysem, Chan, Bierman & Pattberg, 2007a, p11). For the multistakeholder partnerships for sustainable development, inclusive membership rules are a requirement for fulfilling the participation criteria for democratic legitimacy. This requirement is sufficiently satisfied by the majority of the multistakeholder partnerships for sustainable development.

Within the literature on multistakeholder partnerships, the scope of involvement of major actor groups has often received strong critique (for a further discussion cf. Aysem, Chan, Bierman & Pattberg, 2007a; Backstrand, 2008). According to Andonova and Levy (2003, p20), multistakeholder partnerships have the potential to connect local norms and global standards via their lean and decentralized organisational structures. At the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 in Johannesburg, several developed countries, private businesses, and some civil society organisations adopted the idea of multistakeholder partnerships. However, sceptic commentators continued to accuse the multistakeholder partnerships for paving the road to corporate environmentalism (Backstrand, 2006a, p298). From the evaluation in chapter 4, it was evident that all evaluated multistakeholder partnerships except CSI and AFP were considered to have a balanced involvement of stakeholders from all major actor groups. Only within CSI, business actors were the dominant group of actors. Generally, the representation within the 348 multistakeholder partnerships is deviating slightly from the evaluation. Within the 348 partnerships registered in 2007, governments were represented with 1978 actors, civil society organisations with 1956, United Nations and other international organisations with

1163, private businesses with 593 actors and local authorities and governments with 263 actors (Aysem, Chan, Bierman & Pattberg, 2007b, p14). It is noteworthy that the participation of private businesses is marginal, given the repeated argument that the multistakeholder partnerships pave the road for environmental corporatism. Private businesses lead only two percent of the multistakeholder partnerships, and are involved in 20 percent. According the Backstrand (2006a, p299), the participation of private businesses is less than expected; because business actors formed their own partnerships with less formalized reporting requirements. Andonova and Levy claim that up to 95 business-lead partnerships announced at the WSSD summit in 2002 in Johannesburg were not registered within the United Nations Commission for Sustainable Development (Andonova & Levy, 2003, p30).

With regard to the quality of participation, the criteria for democratic legitimacy addressed such issues as the encouragement of participation in the decision-making process and examined different modes and qualities of participation. Critical commentators have argued that resourceful and powerful actors dominate the multistakeholder partnerships (Backstrand, 2006a, p299). This critique is based on the perception that due to power differentials, multistakeholder partnerships are not equitable enterprises. Although participants in a cooperative enterprise are formally equal, they are not really equal (Backstrand, 2008, p78). Generally, Northern actors have a core role in the establishment, funding and management of multistakeholder partnerships with the consequence that Southern governments and private actors are systematically underrepresented in the governing bodies. Even when Southern actors are represented in the governing bodies, decision-making power will stay with more powerful Northern actors. In most multistakeholder partnerships, no real decision-making power is given to governments or civil society organizations from the South (Aysem, Chan, Biermann & Pattberg, 2007c, p252). From the evaluation, a significant discrepancy could be detected between the various multistakeholder partnerships with regard to the quality of participation. All evaluated multistakeholder partnerships except CSI, were lead or co-lead by Northern governmental agencies or Northern NGOs. The multileveled organisational structure within several of the multistakeholder partnerships caused a lack of equal access and influence for all participants in the strategic policy-making process. This lack of equal access and influence is considered a major hindrance for achieving a high quality of

participation. All the evaluated multistakeholder partnerships, except CSI, include a general steering committee consisting of nine to twenty members, and a general assembly consisting of all partners. The general assembly only has a direct influence on the steering committee and the overall policy-direction within REEEP, GWP and the Asia Forest Network. The sponsoring partners appoint all the members of the Board of Directors within CLASP.

The financial resources available often determine the quality of participation within a multistakeholder partnership. Governmental actors from the developed countries and private businesses confront no obstacles for attending discussions, preparing material, bringing forward 'experts' and so forth. On the contrary, civil society organisations are poorly funded, and they lack the human resources required to participate on an equal footing. Similar disparities exist between organisations based in different regions - with civil society organisations from developed states being wealthier than those from Southern countries (Meadowcraft, 2007, p197). Several multistakeholder partnerships have established regional or local secretariats to minimise the finance related barriers for representation. The aim with a decentralised organisational structure is to increase the involvement of poorly funded organisations and to improve the implementation of projects. Moreover, the regional secretariats are responsible for the organisation of dialogues and open consultations with regional stakeholders. Within a majority of the evaluated multistakeholder partnerships, members solely participating at the regional or local levels can only expect to influence the project-development and implementation, not the overall policy-direction.

5.2 Democratic Control

In chapter 3, the criteria for democratic legitimacy with regard to transparency focused on what information about the existence, procedure, content and status of the decision-making process is available to the public and which hindrances exist for the public to access, collect, and distribute information about the decision-making process. Transparency and accountability are closely linked, as accountability depends on the availability of information focusing on the status and progress of multistakeholder partnerships (Backstrand, 2006a, p300). According to Backstrand (2006b, p490), three factors can describe the transparency of the multistakeholder

partnerships: a webdomain for public information sharing, a reporting system to share information about the performance and progress of the multistakeholder partnership, and a monitoring mechanism to identify indicators and measures for goal achievement of multistakeholder partnerships (Backstrand, 2006a, p300). Since a vast majority of the multistakeholder partnerships are considered regional and global in scope, the transparency expectations are higher than those for local and national partnerships are. A high degree of transparency is vital in order to maintain cohesion within transnational multistakeholder partnerships. A high extent of transparency is especially important when several regional secretariats have been established, stretching out the organisational structure. Transparency within the five evaluated multistakeholder partnerships is considered extensive, all having a specific and independent webdomain. However, since a criteria for choosing these five multistakeholder partnerships, was the availability of a homepage, a solid transparency performance was expected. On the webdomains, retrievable and systematic information is provided on Charters and Missions, members, annual and progress, events organized and attended, publications and issue reports, newsletters and information on membership procedures. A major obstacle for obtaining democratic legitimacy is the extensive lack of transparency with regard to minutes, meeting agendas and opinions raised from various Annual Partner Meetings, Steering Committee Meetings and so forth. In 2006, Backstrand stated that less than a third of the multistakeholder partnerships have fulfilled all three aspects of transparency, i.e. a webdomain and reporting and monitoring mechanisms. Less than fifty percent of the multistakeholder partnerships have implemented a mechanism for monitoring performance and progress. The relatively weak transparency mechanisms are largely the result of ambiguous guidelines and lack of compulsory reporting requirements within multistakeholder partnerships (Backstrand, 2006a, p300).

Concerning accountability, the criterion for democratic legitimacy focused on which effective mechanisms of accountability are implemented into a given decision-making structure. Accountability within the multistakeholder partnerships becomes increasingly complex since locations of governance are dispersed globally, e.g. through regional partnerships. There are two key aspects of accountability: first, what mechanisms are implemented to monitor representatives of actors groups and second, how are these representatives accountable to their actor groups in terms of a

transparency or responsibility for actions (Backstrand, 2008, p81). Moreover, accountability is linked to the principles of procedural fairness, which focus on balanced participation of diverse stakeholders, non-hierarchical organisational structures, transparency, exchange of information, and monitoring and reporting systems (Backstrand, 2008, p82). Relevant issues concerning multistakeholder partnerships include how decisions are made, who established the rules, whom provides funds for the multistakeholder partnership, to what extent the multistakeholder partnership has been formalized, e.g. have partners accepted to sign a written agreement; has a secretariat been established, and do the multistakeholder partnerships control for progress (Witte et all., 2003, p80). For addressing these issues, Backstrand (2008, p82) suggests a pluralistic system of accountability for multistakeholder partnerships. First, reputational accountability (e.g. naming and shaming) is considered an effective mechanism since public credibility and reputation are critical for several of the actors within multistakeholder partnerships. Second, market accountability can potentially be an important mechanism for partners of the multistakeholder partnerships to reward or penalize the lead actors. Market accountability is important for multistakeholder partnerships that mostly consist of private actors, such as private businesses or civil society organisations, since their directors are not elected, but appointed or self-selected (Backstrand, 2008, p81).

The evaluation in chapter 4 showed that the organisational structure of all multistakeholder partnerships were sufficiently described and provided a clear placement of responsibility. The majority of the multistakeholder partnerships have established a Board of Directors or a Steering Committee responsible for the overall performance and policy-direction. Within these multistakeholder partnerships, regular partners primarily have responsibilities in the project-development and implementation phase. The variation in the organisational and accountability structures differs significantly between the multistakeholder partnerships. For example, the Global Water Partnership and REEEP have a highly decentralised organisational structure, where the responsibility for project implementation often lays at regional partnerships and secretariats. On the other side, the Cement Sustainability Initiative has a rather central organisational structure consisting of six taskforces, which are closely supervised by the World Business Council for Sustainable Development.

Monitoring and evaluation mechanisms have not been important items on the agenda since the establishment of the multistakeholder partnerships for sustainable development in 2002 (Witte, et al., 2002, p78). Only a minority of the evaluated multistakeholder partnerships have implemented a monitoring system, which tracks the progress of projects and initiatives. Within the Cement Sustainability Initiative, a senior advisory group is responsible for monitoring the implementation progress, whereas the monitoring responsibility within CLASP and REEEP is placed within the secretariats. Via a web-based Project Management Information System, REEEP has a continuously updated overview of each project. As mentioned above, less than 50% of all 348 multistakeholder partnerships have a mechanism for monitoring the performance and progress of their activities. Only CSI and REEEP provide information on sanctioning mechanisms, which target partners that severely violate their duties. Within REEEP, two third of the partners must support the expulsion. The need for the implementation of systematic monitoring mechanisms within multistakeholder partnerships has been emphasized at the annual meetings of the Commission on Sustainable Development (Backstrand, 2006a, p300). However, most of the multistakeholder partnerships only contain soft, non-binding and voluntary targets, which complicate the monitoring of progress (Backstrand, 2008, p94). According to Backstrand, the performance of multistakeholder partnerships is generally considered weak with regard to transparency, accountability and monitoring mechanisms (Backstrand, 2008, p96). Backstrand proposes that, in order to realize their full potential, multistakeholder partnerships must improve the links to existing institutions and multilateral agreements, and implement more systematic reporting and monitoring procedures (Backstrand, 2006b, p492).

5.3 Discursive Quality

Concerning discursive quality, the criterion for democratic legitimacy focuses on the extent to which the decision-making processes of the multistakeholder partnerships involve deliberative components. During the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002, multistakeholder partnerships were introduced as a mechanism for operationalizing the principle of participation, and to enhance legitimacy and ownership of decisions made through international and deliberative decision-making processes (Backstrand, 2006, p298). According to Andonova and Levy, an advantage

of the multistakeholder partnerships compared to traditional intergovernmental governance is their ability to facilitate consensus building and agreement through flexible and direct participation of a diverse group of actors located at different governance levels (Andonova & Levy, 2003, p24). Moreover, multistakeholder partnerships can provide opportunities for expanding deliberative processes such as representation of all affected actors. Often multistakeholder partnerships provide a deliberation forum characterised by relative equality between the participants, objective reasoning, and equal rights to be heard, to listen and to debate on the path forward (Meadowcraft, 2007, p200). Commentators have criticized multistakeholder partnerships for moving public decision-making into extended technocratic spheres, where participation is limited to unelected bureaucrats and technocrats who are not directly accountable to the general public (Brinkerhoff, 2007, p74). Within a deliberative procedure, collective decision-making and implementation (instead of just recommending solutions) force participants to take more responsibility for the decisions made through deliberation (Meadowcraft, 2007, p200).

The evaluation in chapter 4 showed that a majority of the multistakeholder partnerships fulfilled the criteria for discursive quality. Within the multistakeholder partnerships with a multileveled organizational structure, the scale of deliberative elements often differs from level to level. At the regional and local level dialogues and consultations with partners involved deliberative elements such as equal access to the debate, forums for deliberation and mutual recognition of arguments. However, the deliberative performance of the core Governing Boards within multistakeholder partnerships is considered poor. Several multistakeholder partnerships have established general assemblies or forums where partners can exchange opinions and information. Within REEEP, GWP and the Asia Forest Partnership, the general assemblies have a direct influence on the policy-direction of the partnerships. The evaluation showed that the multileveled organisational structure of multistakeholder partnerships constitute a major burden for the fulfilment of the criteria for democratic legitimacy. The Asia Forest Partnerships was the only multistakeholder partnership, containing an open and equal access to the core governing forum. In order to obtain democratic legitimacy, multistakeholder partnerships must be based on a voluntary agreement between major and affected stakeholders. Moreover, the multistakeholder partnership must represent a bottom-up and self-evolving deliberative process between private and government actors (Backstrand, 2006b, p482).

6. Conclusion

This final chapter will summarise the core research results concerning multistakeholder partnerships and democratic legitimacy. Based on these research results, conclusions will be drawn to answer the overall research question:

To what extent have the United Nations multistakeholder partnerships for sustainable development reached their potential for fulfilling the criteria for democratic legitimacy?

Over the last decades, world politics has confronted a profound transformation due to increased economic and political globalisation and the development of new information technologies (Biermann & Pattberg, 2008, p279). At the same time, governments and policy-makers are encountering highly complex issues such as climate change. To provide solid public-policy solutions to complex issues, governments are reaching out to private businesses, epistemic communities and civil society organisations for the required expertise. These transformations within internatiomal politics have caused the emergence of transnational governance and new mechanisms for cooperation such as public-private and private-private partnerships. These multistakeholder partnerships are not new phenomenon within the national political scene, however only within the last couple of decades has the idea been transferred to the level of international politics (Borzel & Risse, 2002, p11). Proponents of the multistakeholder partnerships for sustainable development argue that this new global governance mechanism promise more result-based governance due to their decentralized, flexible organisational structure and diverse expertise from all major constituent groups. In sum, multistakeholder partnerships are perceived as a response to functional demands for better governance, in issue areas where governments and international organisations fail.

During the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002, Type II or multistakeholder partnerships were presented as an implementation mechanism of Agenda 21 and the Millennium Development Goals and a way to operationalize the principle of inclusion, increase legitimacy and create broad ownership of decisions in international decision-making and deliberation (Backstrand, 2006a, p298). To date 348 multistakeholder partnerships have been registered within

the United Nations Commission for Sustainable Development. These multistakeholder partnerships often include standard-settings objectives which go beyond the original implementation mandate received at the WSSD summit. Hence, the multistakeholder partnerships must fulfil a set of minimum standards for democratic legitimacy in order to be considered rightful in their activities.

The diversity of the 348 multistakeholder partnerships for sustainable development stresses the fact that there are no one-size-fits-all solutions to successful and democratic partnership management. Critical democratic issues like ensuring transparency and accountability of a multistakeholder partnership, and engaging in systematic monitoring, reporting and evaluation of activities and outcomes cannot be achieved by applying a single recipe (Witte, et al, 2002, p69).

The discussion in chapter 5 showed that inclusive membership procedures within multistakeholder partnerships are a requirement for fulfilling the criteria for democratic legitimacy. The majority of the multistakeholder partnerships fulfil this criterion by having an open approach, where all interested actors can become members as long as they adhere to core principles or charters. Sceptics have challenged the concept of multistakeholder partnerships for paving the road to corporate environmentalism (Backstrand, 2006a, p298), however the discussion showed that the participation of private businesses actors is marginal. The private sector leads only two percent of the multistakeholder partnerships, and is involved in only 20 percent. In the discussion, Backstrand (2008, p90) argued that private sector participation is less than expected, since business actors decided to establish multistakeholder partnerships with fewer formalized reporting requirements outside the realm of the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development. Due to the general lack of business actors, a balanced representation has not been achieved; hence the multistakeholder partnerships have not sufficiently addressed the criteria for democratic legitimacy with regard to participation.

Critical voices claim that resourceful and powerful stakeholders dominate the multistakeholder partnerships (Backstrand, 2006a, p299). The discussion confirms this claim, showing that all evaluated multistakeholder partnerships except CSI, were lead or co-lead by Northern governmental agencies or Northern NGOs. Due to the constant lack of financial and human resources within southern governments and civil society organisations, the Northern domination will be upheld. However, with rapid

economic growth in countries such as Brazil, India and China these power relationships within global sustainability politics could potentially be altered in the coming decades.

The evaluation showed that the scope of transparency of the five evaluated multistakeholder partnerships was considered extensive. However, these multistakeholder partnerships were considered to have a transparency performance above the average of the entire multistakeholder partnership universe. Backstrand indicated that, generally, less than a third of the multistakeholder partnerships have fulfilled the threefold aspect of transparency, i.e. a website and reporting and monitoring mechanisms. The relatively weak transparency mechanisms of multistakeholder partnerships are claimed to be due to ambiguous guidelines and lack of compulsory reporting requirements of the multistakeholder partnerships (Backstrand, 2006a, p300). An important aspect of transparency is the availability of background information, policy documents, and meeting details (minutes of meetings, overview of opinions raised, agendas etc.). Especially with regard to policy documents and meeting details the general information disclosure within multistakeholder partnerships is considered poor, hence becoming a major hindrance for achieving democratic legitimacy. For this project, the lack of information disclosure also constitute a major obstacle for the evaluation of the five multistakeholder partnerships. This could potentially have a negative impact on the validity of the evaluation and conclusions in this project.

Concerning accountability, the performance of multistakeholder partnerships is considered poor. The majority of the multistakeholder partnerships address answerability and responsibility for the overall performance and policy-direction. Only CSI and REEEP present a sanction procedure, where partners can be expelled in cases where responsibilities are severely violated. Generally, less than fifty percent of all multistakeholder partnerships have implemented a monitoring mechanism, which tracks the progress of projects and initiatives. Due to the general lack of specific partnership websites, monitoring systems and sanctioning mechanisms, the multistakeholder partnerships have not sufficiently addressed the criteria for democratic legitimacy with regard to democratic control. To improve democratic performance, the multistakeholder partnerships must concretize their targets and implement more systematic reporting, monitoring and sanctioning procedures

(Backstrand, 2006b, p492). However, the process towards better accountability mechanisms will require significant financial and human resources, something most multistakeholder partnerships are lacking.

In the discussion, Andonova and Levy (2003, p24) stated that an advantage for multistakeholder partnerships is their ability to facilitate consensus building and agreement via flexible and direct participation of major actor groups located at various governance levels. The majority of multistakeholder partnerships have a multileveled organizational structure, consisting of a governing board, a general assembly and often regional partnerships or secretariats. These multileveled organizational structures determine largely the deliberative performance with regard to universality, adjustment and justification. The discussion showed that most multistakeholder partnerships lacked or only contained few deliberative elements in the policy-making process within the governing boards. Due to this lack of deliberative elements, the multistakeholder partnerships have not sufficiently addressed the criteria for democratic legitimacy with regard to discursive quality.
In order to improve the democratic performance, multistakeholder partnerships must establish more open and efficient communication channels. This will secure an improved deliberation process with mutual exchange of arguments between governing bodies and the governed. However, stricter requirements for deliberation and exchange or reasons could potentially reduce their flexible and less bureaucratic character. Hence, the prime benefits for the multistakeholder partnerships in comparison to intergovernmental arrangements could vanish.

To answer the overall research question, this project concludes that the multistakeholder partnerships for sustainable development have generally failed to meet the criteria for democratic legitimacy. The multistakeholder partnerships have not reached their full potential for democratic legitimacy within a single of the three dimensions - participation, democratic control and discursive quality. Crucial aspects such as the inadequate involvement of private business actors and the lack of partnership websites, accountability mechanisms and effective communication channels constitute major barriers for the achievement of democratic legitimacy. However, the multistakeholder partnerships for sustainable development hold some promise for future success. In order to realize their full potential for democratic

legitimacy, multistakeholder partnerships must improve their links to already existing international and national institutions, provide concrete targets and time schedules, increase involvement of private corporations, improve accountability mechanisms, create unambiguous guidelines for reporting and monitoring, and create more effective channels for communication between the governed and the governing bodies. If these aspects are properly incorporated into the design of multistakeholder partnerships, there are grounds for cautioned optimism with regard to their opportunities for achieving democratic legitimacy. With an improved democratic performance, the potential of multistakeholder partnerships will increase concerning changing things on the ground and addressing the implementation deficit of Agenda 21.

6.1 Research Outlook

The subsequent sections will provide a brief of potential future research agendas with regard to transnational multistakeholder partnerships and democratic legitimacy.

Outlook 1 - Large-scale research study on Multistakeholder Partnerships

A research programme on multistakeholder partnerships for sustainable development must apply a research framework, which involves a significant number of cases. The Global Governance Project has established a database containing information of all 348 multistakeholder partnerships for sustainable development; however, the primary focus of the project is an assessment of the organisational structure and effectiveness. The concept of multistakeholder partnership is not a temporary phenomenon; instead it will continue to shape the future global governance architecture and transnational standard-setting. An in-depth understanding of the multistakeholder partnerships with regard to organisational structure, democratic legitimacy and effectiveness is essential in order to identify the partnership design most suitable for contributing to global sustainable development.

Outlook 2 – Comparison between Multistakeholder Partnerships Regimes

A future research agenda should include a comparison of different partnership regimes, for instance between the trade, health and sustainable development regimes. A comparison could provide a deeper understanding of the drivers behind the

emergence of multistakeholder partnerships, their effectiveness and their democratic performance.

6.2 Policy Recommendations

The following section aims to provide a set of concrete recommendations for policy-makers and partnership-initiators concerning the design of transnational multistakeholder partnerships.

Recommendation 1 – Transparency: Partnership Website

Increased focus on transparency is crucial for the future success of the multistakeholder partnerships for sustainable development. As a minimum, a specific partnership must be developed, aiming to create awareness about the project, attract new funding and increase the number of members. Moreover, a website is crucial for the distribution of publications and disclosure of information on meetings and activities.

Recommendation 2 – Effective Communication Channels: Online Forum

Current and future transnational multistakeholder partnerships should emphasize the need for effective communication channels. The design of these communication channels must ensure an equal access for all relevant actors and an unconstrained exchange of information and opinions between the governing board and the governed. Effective communication channels will under optimal circumstances lead to more informed decisions and improved outcomes within the multistakeholder partnerships. An example on effective communication channel within several partnerships is online forums, which constitute effective media for debates, hearings, meetings. An online forum has moreover the advantage that it removes the geographical constraints for participation, giving actors with little financial means an opportunity to be involved.

Recommendation 3 – Accountability: Sanctioning Mechanisms

Future transnational multistakeholder partnerships must focus on the implementation of proper accountability measures such as monitoring, reporting and sanction mechanisms. Unambiguous sanctioning mechanisms and procedures will help to

discipline the members and leadership and hold them accountable for the progress of the multistakeholder partnership.

Recommendation 4 – Make Multistakeholder Partnerships attractive for Private Business

For the future success of multistakeholder partnerships, more business actors must be involved. The multistakeholder partnership would benefit from increased participation of the business actors in terms access to important knowledge and knowledge, new funding and organisational experience. Multistakeholder must improve their efforts in highlighting the long-term benefits participation would generate for business actors, e.g. new knowledge, access to emerging markets and an improved reputation.

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Appendix I – Bali Guiding Principles

Bali Guiding Principles and CSD-11 Decision on Partnerships

The CSD partnerships shall be developed and implemented in accordance with the following criteria and guidelines[65]:

a. Partnerships are voluntary initiatives undertaken by governments and relevant stakeholders, e.g. major groups and institutional stakeholders;

b. Partnerships should contribute to the implementation of Agenda 21, the Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21 and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, and should not divert from commitments contained in those agreements;

c. Partnerships are not intended to substitute commitments made by Governments but to supplement the implementation of Agenda 21, the Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21 and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation;

d. Partnerships should have concrete value addition to the implementation process and should be new - that is not merely reflect existing arrangements;

e. Partnerships should bear in mind the economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development in their design and implementation;

f. Partnerships should be based on predictable and sustained resources for their implementation, include mobilising new resources and, where relevant, result in transfer of technology to, and capacity building in, developing countries;

g. It is desirable that partnerships have a sectoral and geographical balance;

h. Partnerships should be designed and implemented in a transparent and accountable manner. In this regard, they should exchange relevant information with Governments and other relevant stakeholders;

i. Partnerships should be publicly announced with the intention of sharing the specific contribution that they make to the implementation of Agenda 21, the Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21 and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation;

[65] Source: http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/partnerships/csd11_partnerships_decision.htm ACCESSED ON 4 April 2010.

j. Partnerships should be consistent with national laws, national strategies for the implementation of Agenda 21, the Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21 and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, as well as the priorities of countries where their implementation takes place;

k. The leading partner of a partnership initiative should inform the national focal point for sustainable development of the involved country/countries about the initiation and progress of the partnership, and all partners should bear in mind the guidance provided by Governments; and

l. The involvement of international institutions and United Nations funds, programmes and agencies in partnerships should conform to the inter-governmentally agreed mandates and should not lead to the diversion to partnerships of resources otherwise allocated for their mandated programmes.

Providing information and reporting by partnerships registered with the Commission should be transparent, participatory and credible taking into account the following elements:

a. Registration of partnerships should be voluntary and be based on written reporting to the Commission, taking into account the provisions above. Reporting by partnerships should focus on their contribution to the implementation of goals, objectives and targets of Agenda 21, the Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21 and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation;

b. Partnerships should submit a regular report, preferably at least on a biennial basis;

c. The Secretariat is requested to make information available on partnerships, including their reports, through a database accessible to all interested parties, including through the Commission website and other means;

d. The Secretariat is requested to produce a summary report containing synthesized information on partnerships for consideration by the Commission in accordance with its programme and organization of work, noting the particular relevance of such reports in the review year;

e. The Commission, during the review year, should discuss the contribution of partnerships towards supporting implementation of Agenda 21, the Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21 and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation with a view to sharing lessons learned and best practice, to identifying and addressing problems, gaps and constraints, and providing further guidance, including on reporting, during the policy year as necessary.

Appendix II – Questionnaires

Questionnaire – Cement Sustainability Initiative

Name: Roland Hunziker
Position: Assistant Project Manager

Participation

In the Agenda for Action (2002), the Cement Sustainability Initiative states that "understanding the expectations of our stakeholders, and then responding appropriately, is crucial to the industry's ability to do business. Only by earning the trust and respect of our stakeholders will we maintain our 'license to operate' in communities across the world". How often do you organise consultations/dialogues with stakeholders? How are these consultations/dialogues organised? Do you strive to ensure a wide participation involving all major groups (governmental actors, academia and civil society organisations), if yes how?

The CSI's Agenda for Action, formulated in 2002, was based on stakeholder dialogues held around the world. In 2000 and 2001, dialogues were held in Curitiba, Bangkok, Lisbon, Cairo, Washington, Brussels, and Beijing. These aimed to ensure that the Agenda for Action was as well informed as possible and contained perspectives from a broad variety of stakeholders (suppliers, employees, end-users, NGOs, governments etc), and was a realistic response to any concerns raised by stakeholders. The commitments the CSI member companies have taken in the CSI Charter are based on this Agenda for Action.

In 2006, CSI commissioned a Perceptions Survey, to better understand the perceptions external stakeholders had on CSI's work, in relation to its own goals set out in the 2002 Agenda for Action, as well as in relation to other industry organizations working on sustainability issues. One consequence was to extend the focus of the CSI's work and to take on the issue of concrete recycling. In 2007, CSI commissioned a stakeholder meeting to discuss options to increase the effectiveness of the CSI and explore potential next steps or future priority areas for the CSI. Organizations such as WWF International, Greenpeace International and Transparency International were represented. Also in 2007, the CSI published a progress report, which was audited externally (www.csiprogress2007.org).

Since the beginning of its activities, the CSI has constituted an advisory group of external experts. This group provides the CSI with independent advice and feedback on its work program. Current members include former directors of the International Energy Agency (IEA), WWF International, UNEP, among others. The group meets once or twice a year and holds regular conference calls.

Furthermore, the CSI consults relevant stakeholders from governments, NGOs, academia, other industries, during the process of elaborating specific guidelines or materials, or to work on individual projects. Examples:

- Guidelines: Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) Guidelines, the Guidelines for the Selection of Fuels and Raw Materials, and the more recent report on Concrete Recycling
- Partnerships for individual projects: Cement Technology Roadmap 2009 with the IEA, which was circulated with stakeholders of both the IEA and the CSI prior to completion.

More information on further CSI stakeholder dialogues can be found here:
www.wbcsdcement.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=93&Itemid=183

Accountability

Concerning the accountability within the Cement Sustainability Initiative, the individual company is supposed to report regularly on their sustainable development activities. Besides the companies own reporting, how does the Cement Sustainability Initiative monitor the implementation-progress of each

company? In cases where companies do not fulfill their obligations, what are then the consequences for the company/what are the measures taken?

The commitments taken by the CSI member companies are prescribed in the CSI Charter. Companies have four years to implement their commitments, and they report on CSI performance indicators as part of their annual sustainability reporting. Individual companies have their data assured by independent assurance providers. The CSI secretariat supports companies to understand and implement the commitments, and it collects the information regarding implementation from the companies' public reporting as well as directly. Eventual non-compliance by a member, if not corrected after being reminded of the obligations, could potentially lead to the company's withdrawal, or even its exclusion from the CSI. Any such decision would be taken jointly by the CSI member companies (not by the secretariat). There has been no such case so far.

Decision-making procedures

In the Agenda for Action (2002), the Cement Sustainability Initiative states, concerning stakeholder involvement that "through constructive engagement we can understand the wider context and implications of our actions, make better business decisions as individual companies, and identify areas where we can work with our stakeholders to achieve common goals". To what extent are the opinions raised by external stakeholders (government organisations, academia and civil society organisations) influencing (strategic) decision-making within Cement Sustainability Initiative.? If possible, please provide concrete examples on how external stakeholders influence (strategic) decision-making.

See first question above.

Questionnaire – Asia Forest Partnership

Name: Dr. Efransjah
Position: AFP Secretariat Coordinator

Participation
The Asia Forest Initiative includes a wide variety of actors ranging from government agencies to civil society organisations; however it is notable that business sector representation has been consistently low. Does your partnership take measures to attract participants from the business sector, if yes how?

During the last 3-year period, the AFP annual forum which focused on "good forest governance" including "combating illegal logging and timber trade" had been attracted business sector. No less than five private companies dealing with wood industry and instrument to detect wood chain custody expressed their interest joining AFP. Forest concessionaires association and wood panel association are always attending our forum although they do not declare their membership.

Transparency
The Asia Forest Initiative has established a Steering Committee, which currently comprises five states, two intergovernmental organisations, two civil society organisations, four research institutes and one partnership. What are the responsibilities of the Steering Committee? What is the division of (strategic) decision-making power between the Steering Committee and the Partners Forum? Can partners/members directly influence the agenda/decisions of the Steering Committee?

The steering committee is rather open ended body. It serves as the governing body of the AFP as a regional network. The committee oversees the work of the AFP small secretariat and its financial management. It also gives directives on the themes and dialogues to be considered by partner members. The committee is a mini representation of the Partners Forum, and therefore reflects the interests of partners including donors in decision making. Since the set up of the steering committee is "open ended" any partner representative can influence the decision of the committee. The decision is always taken by consensus.

Accountability
The Asia Forest Initiative states that "all partners are equally accountable, but with different views interests and resources. The four leading partners had no special authority and others were welcome to join to help lead the partnership". Concerning accountability how is the progress of Asia Forest Initiative related activities/projects monitored? If Asia Forest Partnership related activities/projects fail to achieve their activities, what are the consequences/what measures are taken by your partnership?

AFP is not an organization in institutional sense. It is a network of various types of organizations. AFP Partners implement its programs and activities based on their respective mandates. In this context AFP reports to all members in the network. The deliberations of its regular/annual forum are being disseminated to all international organizations and relevant bodies through correspondence and the website.

Questionnaire – Collaborative Labelling and Appliance Standards Program

Name:
Position:

Participation
The Collaborative Labelling and Appliance Standards Program (CLASP) is open to all organizations and individuals who have the ability and interest to serve CLASP's mission and are willing to abide by CLASP's Guiding Principles. How many partners/members does CLASP have? If possible, please divide the partners/members into group (governments, civil society organisations, business sector).

CLASP has organised and co-organised several regional workshops on the topics of standards and labels. How often do you organise consultations/dialogues with partners/external stakeholders? How are these consultations/dialogues organised? Do you strive to ensure a wide participation involving all major groups (governmental actors, academia and civil society organisations), if yes how?

Accountability
Concerning accountability, the CLASP Secretariat monitors the work of CLASP's many implementing partners and tracks the implementation and progress of each bilateral partnership and regional initiative. However, in case where CLASP related projects do not fulfill their obligations, what are then the consequences for the involved partners/what measures are taken?

Decision-making procedures
The Board of Directors manages the overall direction and strategic decisions of your partnership and has a worldwide assembly of Sponsoring Partners who fund CLASP activities. Concerning stakeholder involvement, how can partners/external stakeholder influence the overall direction/strategic decisions of your partnership? To what extent are the opinions raised by partners/external stakeholders (government organisations, academia and civil society organisations) influencing (strategic) decision-making within CLASP? If possible, please provide concrete examples on how partners/external stakeholders influence (strategic) decision-making.

Questionnaire – Global Water Partnership

Name:
Position:

Participation
Membership of the Global Water Partnership is open to all organisations involved in water resources management. The partnership currently comprises 13 Regional Water Partnerships and 73 Country Water Partnerships, and includes 2,069 Consulting Partners located in 149 countries. What is the allocation of consulting partners with regard to major groups (private business, governmental agencies, academia and civil society organisations)?

The Global Water Partnership has organised and co-organised several regional workshops on sustainable water management. How often does the Global Water Partnership organise consultations/dialogues with partners/external stakeholders? How are these consultations/dialogues organised? Do you strive to ensure a wide participation involving all major groups (governmental actors, academia and civil society organisations), if yes how?

Accountability
Concerning the accountability, how does the Global Water Partnership monitor the implementation-progress of each project? In cases where Global Water Partnership related projects do not fulfill their obligations, what are then the consequences/what measures are taken by your partnership?

Decision-making procedures
The highest decision-making body within the Global Water Partnership is the Steering Committee, which engages in policy oversight and approves the work programme and budget of the organisation. Concerning stakeholder involvement, how can partners/external stakeholder influence the overall direction/strategic decisions of your partnership? To what extent are the opinions raised by partners/external stakeholders (government organisations, academia and civil society organisations) influencing (strategic) decision-making within Global Water Partnership? If possible, please provide concrete examples on how partners/external stakeholders influence (strategic) decision-making.

Questionnaire – Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership

Name: Vince Reardon
Position: Communications Consultant to REEEP

Participation
The Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership has organised and co-organised several regional workshops on renewable energy and energy efficiency. How often does the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership organise consultations/dialogues with partners/external stakeholders? How are these consultations/dialogues organised? Do you strive to ensure a wide participation involving all major groups (governmental actors, academia and civil society organisations), if yes how?

Organising stakeholder consultations and awareness-raising events is an integral part of REEEP's outreach, and happens continuously. In the financial year 2009-10 (ending on 31 March 2010), REEEP organised or gave presentations at total of 120 events with a total direct audience of 25.000 people. Our own events are organised by the Partnership's International Secretariat in Vienna, or by the Regional Secretariats around the world. There is always the intent to include as wide a range of major groups – governments, academia, other NGOs – as possible.

To take two specific examples:
1. The annual REEEP high-level conference at Wilton Park is a private, invitation-only event that brings together 80-100 senior policy-makers, academics and international organisation representatives from around the globe to discuss an important issue. In September 2009, the topic was "Practical strategies for making Copenhagen a success" which specifically concentrated on discussions about how to finance technology transfer between developed and developing countries.
2. CoP 15 in Copenhagen represented a unique opportunity for REEEP, as all key environment ministers and representatives of all key development institutions in the world were present in one place at one time. Here, REEEP held an official side event entitled "Accelerating low carbon energy development: REEEP successes in South/South & North/South cooperation." The event was co-hosted by SouthSouthNorth, a partner NGO that handles access to energy projects in Southern Africa. The event brought private sector players (Scatec from Norway), international development actors (DFID from the UK), and other NGOs together to present examples of clean energy development to an audience of 200 stakeholders attending CoP15.

Accountability
Concerning the accountability, how do the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership monitor the implementation-progress of each project? In cases where Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership related projects do not fulfill their obligations, what are then the consequences/what measures are taken by your partnership?

One of REEEP's strongest points is its robust systems.
The progress of all projects is managed via a web-based Project Management Information System (PMIS), which is the day-to-day management tool for the project leaders, and the mechanism for oversight for the International Secretariat.

Up front, each project is contracted to deliver specific outputs to a specific timing. Via PMIS, REEEP has a continuously updated overview of each project, its performance against its objectives. After its conclusion, each project is evaluated by a third-party expert.

In cases where a project does not deliver a specific output, REEEP asks for clarification why and makes a judgement on what measures to take, and more importantly, what learning should be drawn from the "failure." In most cases, where projects do not deliver the contracted outputs, it is due to factors beyond the implementer's direct control, such as a change in local government or lack of local stakeholder buy-in.

REEEP regularly has external assessments of its project activities. An excellent example of this is

the *Analytical and Synthesis Study of the REEEP Programme* from March 2009, which evaluated how REEEP manages projects and what its strengths and weaknesses are. This is available for download from the publications section of www.reeep.org – and describes in great detail why REEEP projects are successful and accountable.

Decision-making procedures

The highest decision-making body within the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership is the Governing Board, which engages in policy oversight and strategic decision-making. Concerning stakeholder involvement, how can partners/external stakeholder influence the overall direction/strategic decisions of your partnership? To what extent are the opinions raised by partners/external stakeholders (government organisations, academia and civil society organisations) influencing (strategic) decision-making within the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership? If possible, please provide concrete examples on how partners/external stakeholders influence (strategic) decision-making.

Partners and stakeholders are directly involved in REEEP's governance structure. All key donor countries sit on the REEEP Governing Board, which also includes representatives from other major institutions (e.g. TERI, IETA) private industry (Climate Change Capital) and other NGOs (eg Greenpeace). The Governing Board meets twice yearly and discusses and approves all major decisions regarding the Partnership.
REEEP's Programme Board which oversees all project-related matters has a similar mix, and also has representation from the World Bank.