

Understanding West Papuan's Political Reaction from Below amid Development of Agrarian Capitalism

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List of Acronyms

OPM	Organisasi Papua Merdeka
TPNPB	Tentara Pembebasan Nasional Papua Barat
MIFEE	Merauke Integrated Food and Energy Estate
LEMASA	Lembaga Masyarakat Adat Suku Amungme
AFC	Act of Free Choice
HTI	Hutan Tanaman Industri
NES	Nucleus Estate Scheme

Abstract

This research aims to capture the variegation of political reactions from below of West Papuans amid the development of agrarian capitalism in the region. Specifically, this research explores how social identities shape and differentiate West Papuans' politics through three ideal types of resistance. The first typology of resistance appears to engage to a more “mundane” and “predictable” kind of reaction from below: struggle against capitalism. Despite numerous studies have attempted to depict the tendency of locals to resist capitalism, I aim to further explore the underlying factors enabling the resistance. Drawing upon two cases of indigenous communities who seek the recognition via legal avenue, this research illuminates the interplay between the state-society dimension society, examining how interactions between state actors and institutions, social classes, and movements can result in political transformations that support the demands of resistance groups. The second type engages in struggles for and within capitalism. Spanning from the demand of Indigenous landowners to be incorporated in contract-farming scheme in palm-oil plantation to the demand of fair competition among contractual workers in timber plantation, this part deals with the emergence of uncommon and under-studied response by so-called “local community” and “indigenous people” in the context of agrarian capitalism in West Papua. It explores how landed classes benefit from alliances with the environmental justice movement to advance the demand and the role of *illusive inclusion* as the underlying mechanism in shaping their politics. The third type of resistance outlined in this chapter involves the conflicting political reactions of pro-independence groups. By examining the alliances between the liberation groups of the armed movement and the rural classes, the chapter aims to demonstrate that the struggle against capitalism takes a unique and complex form: it is a struggle against Indonesian or foreign-perpetuated agrarian capitalism, and it is also influenced by the groups' intersection of identity as West Papuans and their classes. The research will rely on primary materials collected during fieldwork in West Papua since 2019, and will combine these with secondary data and literature.

Keywords

Political Reaction From Below, Agrarian Capitalism, West Papua

Acknowledgement

While I am writing this, thousands of Palestinians have died, suffered, injured, and millions have been disposed of from their own land due to genocide by Israel. There were moments in the night where I was trying to stay awake to work on this paper but ended up crying and felt so weak, wondering what kind of world I am living in. Kept wondering why we, as human beings outside Gaza, could carry on our lives as if nothing were happening. Alone, I feel hopeless. However, Gaza will never be alone, comrades all over the world demand, resist, organize, demonstrate, talk, do, move, whatever... We know to whom we should rely on: not to those boneless leaders, not those fancy lobbyists in the most useless organization in the world, the UN, or not even in universities? Gaza is not the only place where extinction happens. In Indonesia, in its easternmost island, West Papua suffers from capitalism and occupation too. However, people are not silent, and they fight and resist. In the last few years, I have started to involve comrades in this region: the indigenous, women, workers, students, and academics. I would like to extend my respect for them. Some of them were passed away too soon; for Bernard Agapa, the first West Papuan I met. May you rest in power. Thanks to my comrade and chairman Bang Angky Samperante for his genuine support, for Bang Emil Ola Kleden for your input, and my colleges in Pusaka : Tigor, Arif, Lia, Amel, Kaka Amros, Ayu, Mahru Also. I have missed our time in the field. My interlocutors who shared their stories and who accepted me in their home, Alm. Vitalis Gebze, Rikarda Maa, Mama Valentina, Kaka Lidia, Kaka Agus Tomba, Kaka Paulus, all the Subur and Aiwat's people. For Vertenten's colleges in Merauke: Kaka Bet, Kaka Harry, Kaka Tri, Mas Heru, Kaspar, Paman Neles, Kak tok, Suster, Adik Marlin, Adik Eti and Obet. Thank you for helping me and telling me a lot of MOP.

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Chapter 1 - Introduction

The purpose of this study is to understand the variegation of political reactions from below of West Papuans amid the development of agrarian capitalism in their region. This chapter focuses on the role and dynamics of social identity in shaping their political beliefs and actions. Initially, this study engages in theorizing resistance, which serves as a foundation for the research direction, followed by a historical analysis of the local context in West Papua, and an examination of the historical legacies that have shaped the development of agrarian capitalism in the region.

1.1 Problem Statement

Numerous classical studies have demonstrated the linkages between changes in agrarian structure and the emergence of social revolution, peasant movements, and everyday resistance (Marx, 1852; Skocpol, 1979; Wolf, 1969; Scott, 1976). Marx, in his classic work of *18th Brumaire*, analysed how peasantry, mostly rural smallholders, became a significant force in supporting the bourgeoisie revolution of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte's rise to the throne (Marx, 1852). Another attempt to theorize rural conflict from a class perspective was carried out by Paige (1978), Moore Jr. (1967), and Skocpol (1979), who contended that how revolutionary and non-revolutionary outcomes are seen as products of differing agrarian class structures, relations, conflict, and alliances with a particular focus on the rural domain, predominantly within the agricultural sector. Moreover, the study of resistance in the tradition of the 'moral economy' is also integral to gaining a profound understanding of peasant agency (Scott, 1976). Moreover, the prominent classic work of Scott illustrates how in a society with high levels of political repression, most of the peasant resistance is manifested through a form of "covert" and day-to-day struggle or known as everyday form of peasant resistance (Scott, 1985).

Nonetheless, the resistance against contemporary development of agrarian capitalism – where the process of primitive accumulation in which people are dispossessed from their means of production is global imperative – seems to manifest in a more diverse and intricate fashion from the ground, which differentiates them from historical precedents (Harvey, 2005). The rising attention towards environmental, gender, and other social identities, the prominent intervention of the state through policy and legal frameworks due to the neoliberal turn, the active role of broader civil society organizations, etc (Borras, 2009; White *et al.*, 2012; Hall *et al.*, 2015), to some extent, challenged the notions of resistance and rural politics itself. While both class-based agrarian politics and everyday forms of peasant resistance remain pertinent, they may not offer a sufficient framework for comprehending contemporary resistance to agrarian capitalism. Therefore, it could be advantageous to incorporate another analytical tool, one of which is to employ identity politics into discourse to unveil how the intersection of social identities (class, caste, gender, ethnicity, etc.) has contributed to mediating resistance (Veltmeyer, 1997).

However, in most public discourse, including media, academia, and social movement advocacy, the prevailing narrative often portrays rural communities as inherently resistant to agrarian capitalism. In particular, "locally impacted communities" are typically assumed to exhibit homogenous politics (Hall *et al.*, 2015). On the ground, the resistance from below as a response to capitalist development is indeed more varied and complex. Hall *et al.* (2015) attempted to reveal the variegations in rural agrarian politics in several significant sites of capitalist development in the world. It extends the conversation beyond resistance per se by

highlighting the different ways in which people react to it. Some studies explore the possibility of resistance driven by identity-based, class-based and cross-class alliances (Pattenden, 2023), whereas others contribute to a completely different type of reaction, such as the struggle for and within the economy, as shown by Mamonova's work on Ukraine's smallholders (Mamonova, 2015). This Research Paper collection invites further questions regarding how the intersection of various local dynamics with global political and economic phenomena surrounding agrarian capitalism leads to variegated reactions.

Similarly, this study aims to contribute to the understanding of how agrarian capitalism, when intersecting local complexities, gives rise to a diverse array of local political responses. Over the past six decades, rural Indonesia has experienced quite fast changing in relation to agrarian structure (Bachriadi and Wiradi, 2011), control over land by state and enterprises for large-scale land-based businesses, such as forestry, mining, plantations and agriculture, has created extraordinary inequality (ibid), which then situates a rural Indonesia as "the site of numerous organized local protests against displacement, peasant occupations..." and many other forms of contentious politics (Anugrah, 2015; White, Graham and Savitri, 2023). Global political economy holds a prominent position in catalysing the transition in local periphery. For example, the calamitous 2008 food and energy crisis led to the phenomenon of global land rush targeting marginal land in the global south (Peluso and Lund, 2011; White *et al.*, 2012). The rapid expansion of palm oil plantations (and smallholdings) in Indonesia over the last two decades, which is assumed to be a crisis resolution, has become an obvious proof of the imperative of the global agrarian political economy, and not only induces a very significant change in the rural environment, economy, and livelihoods (Hall, 2009).

Global commodity production and export-oriented industries, such as commercial crops, rice cultivation, and timber activities have become the primary causes of forest degradation in Indonesia (Tsujino *et al.*, 2016). Among the affected islands, Sumatra and Kalimantan, which are home to intact forest and peatland areas, have experienced some of the most significant impacts (Miettinen *et al.*, 2012; Austin *et al.*, 2019). Consequently, West Papua, the easternmost island of Indonesia, remains an important frontier for rainforest and biodiversity, maintaining a large area of primary forest amounting to 83% (Parsch *et al.*, 2022). Regardless of its role as a forest frontier, many pressures over the land by states and business actors have positioned it as a commodity frontier (Stott, 2021; Chao, 2022b). Gold and copper mining, liquid natural gas extraction, forest business, palm oil plantations, state's initiatives, and large-scale food agriculture and energy estate have penetrated, changed, and shaped the face of rural West Papua since 1960s. Similar to other extraction sites in Indonesia, resistance from below in West Papua has taken various forms: violent conflicts, covert and overt protests, mobilization efforts, legal advocacy, social-cultural resistance, everyday struggle, and a wide array of politics have coloured public discourse. The entry of palm oil plantations into rural Papua, along with its labor regime and land deals, has likely transformed the region to some degree (Chao, 2022b). As the region also differentiates along lines of class, ethnicity, gender, and other social identities, it is assumed that the "locals" have different politics from below. Indigenous landed classes may have different reactions to non-landed classes or even to indigenous women, with some potentially resisting capitalism as they rely on available resources, while others may strive to be incorporated within capitalism as it offers more promise for improvement or change of their livelihood through a new form of labor relation as it is in contract farming. Moreover, the unaddressed political question of West Papua since its annexation in 1969, which led to the persistent struggle of pro-independence groups, has also contributed to bringing up a nuanced context for understanding the struggle of capitalism. How they articulate it in their politics and, in what way, becomes an interesting part to be questioned.

Given the complexity of West Papua's resistance, it is reasonable to inquire about the factors contributing to its nuanced nature, particularly in the context of rural resistance movements. The face of agrarian capitalism in West Papua, in my opinion, captures a very interesting and distinct local setting, if compared to other rural Indonesia: (1) West Papua's position within the context of post-colonial politics of newly independent Indonesia and Dutch empire, (2) an unsettled political question stemming from Indonesian annexation, initiated through a conditioned referendum in 1969, leading to the rise of liberation movements and persistent violent conflicts until now, (3) Capitalistic and extractive model of economic development in its rural frontier carried out after Indonesian takeover, (4) tribally organized land tenure and social organization system, and (5) ethnically diverse and fragmented society. The complexities of the local context in West Papua, including intersections, linkages, and dynamics, make it a suitable location to study diverse political reactions from below against agrarian capitalism. The different layers of this complex setting are examined in this paper by presenting a historical analysis and explanation.

1.2 Background and Historical Analysis

This section unfolds the historical root and legacy of West Papua's tension, grievances, conflict, and liberation resistance, which were strongly related to the colonial politics of Dutch administration and later Indonesian annexation in 1969. This is followed by an analysis of how agrarian capitalism in West Papua is strongly intertwined and embedded in this constellation of political questions.

1.2.1 The identity-making and emergence of West Papuan Nationalism

Ondawame (2000) attempt argues that the attempt to understand the identity-making process is to reveal the evolution of West Papuan nationalism; the emphasising on evolution is to denote how it has transformed, changed, and intensified from one form to another. He argues that the sense of nationalism has changed from ethnicity-driven nationalism to Papuan nationalism (Ondawame, 2000, p. 32). The former most carried more ethnic resistance against colonial powers in the past, while the latter was initially formed and influenced by the decolonization politics of the 1950s to 1960s, where West Papuans were encouraged to demand the rights to self-determination and to become an independent country by the Dutch colonial government.

This evolution and identity-making of West Papua is historically grounded in the peak story of Indonesian decolonial movements against prolonged Dutch colonialism for centuries. Hence, the most prominent liberation figures, such as the first Indonesian president, Sukarno, strongly opposed it as colonial politics to hinder their sovereignty and decolonialization. Both parties, the Dutch Empire, and Indonesia, were then involved in a series of attempts to assert the rightful claim over West Papua, involving diplomatic roundtable discussions (roundtable conference in Den Haag) and military aggression (known as the Trikora operation by Soekarno). The Dutch argued that West Papua, which they referred to as the Netherlands New Guinea, was not part of the East Indies territory that needed to be returned. They also pointed out the ethnic and racial differences between Indigenous Papuans and the broader Indonesian society. Indonesia contended that West Papua fallen under its jurisdiction due to the historical inclusion of West Papua in the territory of the Netherlands East Indies, as well as the embrace of racial diversity between Indonesians and Papuans (Viartasiwi, 2018).The tension to gain the claim of West Papua was intensified. In August 1962, mediated by the United States, known as the New York Agreement, the Netherlands was willing to transfer control of West Papua to Indonesia, under the condition that

Indonesia would hold a referendum, known as the "Act of Free Choice" (AFC), for the Papuans to determine their fate.

However, West Papuans started to construct their own story of struggle within this historical constellation between the Netherlands and Indonesia. Gault-Williams (1987, p.34) described the frustration of West Papua as an object of dispute “*after the Dutch left West Papua in 1962, political activities spread gradually to all parts of the country, to Kotabaru (now Jayapura), Biak, Manokwari, Sorong, Paniai, Fakfak, and Merauke.*” (Gault-Williams, 1987, p. 34). This transition period transformed into collective grievances and led to the rise and consolidation of West Papuan Nationalism and liberation struggles. It then became conducive to the emergence of (Organisasi Papua Merdeka – Free Papua Organization (OPM) and its armed-wing movement, (West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB), and the growth of non-violent support groups, both at the national and international levels (MacLeod, 2015; Webb-Gannon, 2023; Woodman, 2023). This explanation reveals how West Papuan Nationalism, which ultimately leading to the establishment of the OPM, originated in the struggle between Dutch colonial power and the newly decolonized state of Indonesia.

1.2.2 The Political Economy of Occupation

In 1969, the Act of Free Choice (AFC) of referendum, as mandated by New York Agreement, took a place. 1,025 traditional leaders from West Papua “voted” to remain part of Indonesia instead of pursuing their own independence. From a legal perspective, the referendum marked the conclusive status of West Papua as an integrated part of Indonesia. However, for West Papuans, the AFC, which argued to be undemocratic nature in its process, had undermined their political aspirations (Chauvel, 2005). As West Papuan’s founding fathers had previously declared independence in December 1961, the AFC was considered to have negated their sovereignty claim. Consequently, after the AFC, two interests are always contested throughout the trajectory of the development of West Papua: West Papua as occupied land to keep seeking political justice as an independent country through resistance and Indonesia as occupation power to pursue their legitimation and accumulation, in which one of it through a decade of agrarian capitalism.

Scholars have worked to elucidate the “political question” of West Papua : occupation, colonialism, failure of integration, and demands for the right to self-determination, as the central roots underlying the face of the prolonged conflict and the growing resistance against it (Ondawame, 2000; Chauvel, 2005; MacLeod, 2015). Ondawame, a respected West Papuan scholar cum former liberation commander, argued that political imperatives remained central, and the failure to respect it would lead to a non-permanent solution. He further pointed out that if we address the issue in West Papua solely as an economic and poverty-related problem, it would ill only result in a short-term solution, such as an approach that focuses on development and welfare. Nonetheless, this approach could never effectively tackle the underlying political question, as emphasized by most pro-integrationist academics (Ondawame, p.36, 2000).

However, as an occupation power, the Government of Indonesia has attempted to gain legitimacy and accumulation in the region, mainly through economic development (*pembangunan*). From the Suharto authoritarian regime to the emergence of the democratic and reform era until now, West Papua has become a site of expanded resource plunders that perceived the marginalization and impoverishment of the people. The issue referred to as the “economic question” of West Papua is seen as a fundamental factor contributing to Indonesia’s occupation. Eichhorn (2022) explained how colonialism and racism are perpetuated through the exploitation of indigenous natural resources. Anchoring the term industrial racism, the author presents a case on how capitalist activity has paved the way towards the institutionalization of racial prejudice, which leads to an entrenched system of oppression.

Using a case of mining exploration and the establishment of palm oil plantations, it unpacks the environmental impact, such as deforestation, incurred by indigenous populations, resulting in constant conflict and contention.

Hence, the separation of political and economic aspects when examining West Papua would lead to missing a bigger picture of oppression, exploitation, and resistance. It is important to note that the historical context of the emergence of West Papua's resistance is linked to a broader political economy situation in that period, such as Indonesia's decolonization and the Cold War. Soon after Sukarno, Indonesia's first president, who was heavily influenced by communist ideology and played a significant role in the effort to integrate West Papua to Indonesia, was dismantled from his power due to the "failed coup of communist party", Suharto, a military general supported by the United States, came to power and carried out a mass murder of suspected communists, known as the 1965 incident¹. This dramatic historical transition of Indonesia was benefitted by Suharto to "take care of" West Papua's issues and build a strong tie with the US. Months after the "coup," Freeport has secured "the preliminary agreement" on Ertsberg mining in West Papua through a lobby in Jakarta (Rifai-Hasan, 2009, p. 132). In 1967, Freeport-McMoRan, a US-based company, officially signed an agreement for exploration rights over gold and copper mining in West Papua, making it the first foreign company in the new authoritarian regime. Another two years, in 1969, West Papua was officially annexed through a referendum. It represented a perfect spatial-temporal sphere of occupation. Not only Freeport, after the takeover, various industries, such as mining, natural gas extraction, timber plantations, and palm oil expansion, have been actively operating (Stott, 2021, pp. 17–20). It was supposed to be an obvious and solid material foundation to argue that occupation in West Papua was initially and would always be driven by capitalist extractive the interests of political economy, both at the national and global scales. Consequently, resistance and political reactions from grassroots should be situated in the interplay between these complexities.

1.2.3 Variegated Political Reactions From Below Against Agrarian Capitalism

As Freeport was a symbol of Indonesia's occupation, it would always be a centre or hotspot of resistance in West Papuans. This site has become a persistent target of attack by the liberation guerrilla since 1977 (Osborne, 1990; Ondawame, 2000). They believe that Freeport had no right to exploit Papua's resources. The resistance is not only coming from pro-independence groups but also from local affected communities, such as the Amungme and Kamoro indigenous people, whose land has been leased. In 1991, LEMASA (Traditional Consultation Council of the Amungme) was established as authoritative body to represent the interests of the Amungme and Kamoro landowners to negotiate with Freeport regarding their demands. The LEMASA aimed to address the issues of land dispossession of indigenous people, environmental impact due to mining activities, problems of employment and participation, and compensation as general. However, during a specific period, a group consisting of armed-wing factions of indigenous peoples' movement (OPM), indigenous landowners, and indigenous laborers decided to jointly attack the mining company, with each group having different interests and motives. This triggers a question to be addressed: How can we understand the alliance - in the form of violent acts—between guerrilla and rural elites and how can they negotiate and deal with different interests?

However, Freeport is not the only episode of capitalist development, as mentioned earlier; the entry of large-scale agribusiness, such as palm oil and timber plantations, has also

¹ See the recent work of Vincent Bevin (2020) "The Jakarta Method: Washington's Anti-Communist Crusade and the Mass Murder Program that Shaped Our World".

encouraged the formation of new classes in rural spheres (Pye, 2010). The “smallholders empowerment program” smallholder empowerment program of Nucleus-Plasma in palm oil plantations, for instance, has become the primary means by which palm oil is introduced to socially differentiated local communities (ibid). Thus, it is important to investigate how these mechanisms of inclusion and incorporation shape the attitudes of rural people. Moreover, as a society dominating by subsistence-economy and relying on the agrarian resources such as in West Papua (Chao, 2022a; Eichhorn, 2023), capitalist development has become a threat to their livelihood (McDonnell, 2021; Chao, 2022a), which presumably will shape their natural tendency of countering the “land fictitious commodification” as argued by Polanyi. This diverse mechanism of how capital is penetrated in rural areas, the social differentiation of rural dwellers, which leads to the variegation of their interests, is then becoming a background to begin with this research.

1.4 Justification and Relevance

The existing literature on the topic primarily focuses on understanding the root of tension and conflict in West Papua from a socio-historical perspective. Works such as Philpott (2018), Leadbeather (2015), MacLeod (2015), Chauvel (2005), and Elmslie (2003) have engaged in conversations about how West Papuan nationalism emerged and bundled the struggle against Indonesian occupation. These works also demonstrate how this nationalism gave rise to the formation of liberation movements, represented by the OPM and its armed-wing TPNPB-OPM. These types of literature are important for seeking a historical description of the conflict and tension between West Papua, the Netherlands, and Indonesia, which this study also takes advantage of. However, these studies seem more static in front of social change and transformation as the imperative of the time and space movement of West Papua. Consequently, it portrays resistance from below West Papuans in a single and binary fashion and only conforms to the socio-historical setting.

The second dominant literature tries to unfold how the trajectories of racial politics or ethnicity in West Papua, which lead to identity-based oppression, are embedded in developmental policies and institutions (Gietzelt, 1989; Elmslie, 2003; Chauvel, 2005; Kirsch, 2010; Chao, 2022a; Eichhorn, 2023; Webb-Gannon, 2023). It mostly starts by explaining the legacy of development carried by Suharto’s authoritarian regime. Starting from the role of the settlement program (*Javanese transmigrations*), which has resulted in the marginalization of the economy, society, and culture of West Papuans by Javanese settlers and the subordination of West Papuan identity, it explains how the resistance and sentiment against non-Papuans has become the currency of struggle. Moreover, it demonstrates how racialized the process of the development of capitalism itself. Eichhorn (2022), for instance, emphasizes the role of racial prejudice in maintaining extractive industries in West Papua. These studies are also beneficial for understanding the interlinkages between capitalism and the identity-making of West Papuans. However, the main gap is how it still depicts the society that differentiated along the class, gender, race, and other social identities react in the same fashion.

Third, some analysis on the state or business-driven capitalist development bring about impacts on the socio-ecological realm of indigenous people (Chao, 2022b, 2022a, 2023; Eichhorn, 2023). This is emerging scholarship in the context of West Papua and agrarian capitalism. Its analytical and descriptive richness on the impact of agrarian capitalism is will be employed in this study, especially to present the story of resistance against capitalism. By promoting the notion of indigenous people, it is possible to clarify the motives, drivers, and aspirations of resistance. However, it fails to capture the differentiation between the category of indigenous people and other relevant reactions, such as the struggle for and within capitalism.

The existing literature does not accommodate the possibility of other types of resistance and reactions from below-West Papuans against the complexities of the socio-historical setting embedded in its agrarian capitalism. Hence, there is a need to comprehend and seize more dynamics of resistance and political reactions from below-West Papuans amid the development of agrarian capitalism, as it assumes that it varies with the differentiation of social identities. This study is willing to fill this gap in the literature.

1.2 Research Question

The research question is as follows:

To what extent are the variegated political reactions from below of West Papuans shaped and driven by the social identity-centered frame in relation to the development of agrarian capitalism?

Chapter 2 - Analytical Framework and Methodology

This chapter covers a main analytical framework of this study, literature review on topic related to the study, and also methodology.

2.1 Theorizing Resistance and Political Reaction from Below

In the contemporary study of rural resistance and its relation to agrarian change and transformation, two mainstream approaches are dominant: first, those who underscore the significance of hegemony and domination in bundling collective and overt resistance, and second, those who advocate everyday forms of covert resistance, or moral economy. Turner and Caouette traced the foundational thinkers of these approaches in an extensive work that revisited contemporary resistance in Southeast Asia. The first one is greatly influenced by the classical work of Gramsci's counter-hegemony and Polanyi's countermovement, while the second is strongly based on the work by James Scott and his primary collaborators, such as Benedict Kerkvliet, as well as by Eric Wolf (Turner and Caouette, 2009).

In prison, Gramsci (1971) explores the capacity of bourgeoisie in selling their narrow interest (through consent) to subordinated masses, known as *hegemony*. Miliband (1970) explains the process in which dominant classes asserting their hegemony through indoctrination, production of false consciousness and ideological mystification. This project of hegemony is always resisted by another form hegemony to achieve the socialist revolution. Overt resistance, in this situation, is needed and always in an opposition to the state and dominant class. Moreover, Polanyi's concept of *embeddedness*, which he introduced in his magnum opus "The Great Transformation" (Polanyi, 1975) provides a framework for understanding how the economy is inextricably tied to social relations. Any attempt to disembedding the economy from its social context will result in countermovement. While Polanyi's notion of countermovement is directed at resisting the deepening of market capitalism and the development of industrial capitalism and goes beyond the role of the state and dominant classes, it also favor the form of overt resistance (Turner and Caouette, 2009). While Scott's is a proponent of covert, day-to-day, and hidden resistance. He is focusing to explain the micro level politic of every life, rather than explaining the broader structure of exploitation, which aims to show the circumstances of the everyday resister exercise their agency individually or collectively.

These approaches have been throwing critiques. Those who emphasize the larger political economy structure and overt fashion of resistance is criticized by its minimal attention to the resource distribution and allocation politics happening in non-state entities (Tria Kerkvliet, 2009, p. 229), while the advocate of structural view is criticizing everyday resistance for its "negative manifestations of power rather than the question of how peasants can exercise positive political power" (White, 1986, p. 50), which only be possible to achieve through dismantling exploitative system and peasant-driven elaboration of new system. However, in the contemporary rural resistance, the work of Turner and Caouette has demonstrated how the growing literatures are now trying to transcend beyond the two mainstreams school by looking at "toward contextual elements such as local politics and culture, democratic space and transition, and identity politics." (Turner and Caouette, 2009, p. 957)

In addition, Borrás (2019, p. 21) also coins another relevant framework to understand the current trend of rural politics, namely through the state-society lens. This will enable us to look at the interaction of various institutions and actors that might lead to the political transformation "within state, in society, and within state-society channels of interaction". By merging the conventional "state-centered" perspective which favoring the explanation of the

role of institution and actors, and “society-centered” view which advancing an analysis of the role of societal actors, including social movement and social classes, this framework would enhance the explanatory power, notably when inserting the everyday forms of politics in the analysis (Borras and Franco, 2013). As a result, these cutting-edge literatures on resistances have opened many possibilities of overlapping and intertwined kinds of resistance, which make the categorization of overt, and covert is something inapplicable, or to say that resistance is now variegated.

The current theorization of resistance is also deeply influenced by the dynamics of the literature on the contemporary development of capitalism. In recent decades, precisely started since 2007, there has been a “rush” in the literature on global land politics, which coincides with the growing interest in land investment, commonly referred to as land grabbing, land rush, land deals, and so on (Oya, 2013). Although there is no fixed and agreed definition, it is generally associated and discussed within the frames of scale (more than 200 hectares), actors (big corporation with state support), produced commodities (food and non-food crops), and purpose (domestic and global supply or investment) (Akram-Lodhi, 2015).

However, what this flux of literature tells has not been sufficiently told, especially in relation to the broader classical debate on agrarian questions and the development of capitalism in the contemporary world (Oya, 2013; Akram-Lodhi, 2015). Oya argues land grabbing, portrayed as caricature of agrarian capitalism, is often oversimplified in simple binaries of contestation, between “goodie” and “baddie,” “the grabber” vs “victim,” “major global agribusinesses” vs “affected communities.” Meanwhile, the development of capitalism itself is always uneven, conflictual but “might go hand in hand with conflict”, carrying,” carrying its own contradictions (contradictions (Oya, 2013, p. 1537). This oversimplification also implies a single assumption of rural people’s reactions that moral economy-driven type of resistance is the only inherent consequence against land grabbing, or how they are assumed to have less capacity to adapt and coexist with newly emerging economies (Mamonova, 2015, p. 607). While empirical evidence shows the complexities and variegation of rural politics, indicating that resistance is not the only options (Hall et al. 2015).

Therefore, a nuanced understanding of land grabbing as a “routine and predictable part of the process of capitalist development,” instead of a unique and distinct event, is needed. One approach, as suggested by Oya, connects it to the broader debate on the agrarian question of labor by examining how rural laborers are being proletarianized or semi-proletarianized through dispossession, rather than being integrated as wage employees in new capitalist agriculture setups. This problematization of land grabbing into broader literature in agrarian capitalism will provide insights into the challenges of how to understand the struggle to be incorporated into the capitalist economy by disposed rural laborers.

With regards to theorizing the resistance and political reactions from below in the context of agrarian capitalism, I am mindful of the ongoing discourse, as I have previously elaborated. In addition to recognizing the broader structure, I also seek to provide a space for agency to understand the drivers, motives, and opportunities of their politics. Additionally, the state-society dimension would also be instrumental in understanding how the role of social movement, particularly in relation to land rights advocacy and struggle for recognition, plays a pivotal role in shaping political reactions. Finally, this paper contributes to the broader literature on the intersections of land and labor by exploring the question “what happens when the land is needed, but labor is not’ (Li, 2011), as a way to engage and understand the struggle for and within capitalism.

I also propose to see to see the ‘how’ in the contemporary story of capitalist development in West Papua, which manifested mostly to the transition from semi-subsistence-based economy to large-scale corporate land-business, different groups are related to land, but linked to land differently, and shared different impact and variegated reaction to it (Borras and Franco, 2013). They do not conform to the general assumption on land deals arguing

that homogeneous affected local communities always share homogenous interests, social identities, and aspirations for the future (ibid). In theorizing the variegation of political reactions from below, I will engage with Borras and Franco's overview of four broad areas of contention in global land grabbing: 1) struggles against expulsion; 2) struggles for, and within, terms of incorporation; 3) struggle against land concentration and/or for redistribution and/or recognition; and 4) struggles across overlapping/intersecting geographic and institutional spaces, and could also be incorporated with three types of reactions framed by Hall et al. (2015) as: (1) resistance, (2) acquiescence, and (3) incorporation.

In doing so, three different but relational cases will be employed to understand the variegations: (1) indigenous peoples' movements through recognition and legal politics and their struggle against capitalism and (2) indigenous demand to be incorporated into contract farming will examine processes and tendencies in the struggle for and within capitalism, and (3) Pro-independence groups illustrate issues related to political contentions and alliances.

2.2 Methodology and Positionality

This study employs a qualitative methodology that enables researchers to explore meanings and insights in a given situation (Mohajan, 2018). This methodology allows the construction of an ideal type of variegation of political reactions through three distinct but relational cases. The first type of resistance, a struggle against capitalism, illustrated in this paper demonstrates how the concept of indigeneity is used to amplify their voices and consolidate power against the corporate occupation and Indonesian legal regime. Centering on the role of social movements, such as local organizations and NGO, it explains the dynamics, challenges, and opportunities that surround the differentiation and fragmentation of the local community and the critics of the Masyarakat Adat notion. The second type engages in the struggle for the incorporation of West Papuan into capitalist development. Spanning from the demand of Indigenous landowners to be incorporated in contract-farming scheme in palm-oil plantation to the demand of fair competition among contractual workers in timber plantation as part of large-scale food and energy project (MIFEE) in Merauke. This part deals with the emergence of uncommon and under-studied response by local community and indigenous people in the context of agrarian capitalism in West Papua, which assumes to inherently resist to it. The third one draws upon reactions, as shown in the case of the liberation movement of the OPM and its armed struggle. It uses documentation showing how liberation troops benefit from mining taxes surrounding big mining corporations. The demand of LEMASA, combining the quest for environmental rights and economic integration of local people to corporate activities in Freeport McMorran, will also be used to explain these variations of political reactions from below (Ondawame, 2000)

The data comprised of both secondary and primary sources. Secondary data are gathered through literature review to unveil the existing knowledge of related topics, such as the historical analysis of West Papuan Nationalism and Identity making, trajectory of development in West Papua, dynamic of liberation movement, dynamics of violent conflict, tenurial system, etc. In addition, in presenting the case of the liberation movement, I also draw upon secondary data. However, I encounter a significant challenge in the process of data collection, as the internal reliable access to this movement is very limited (of course) and the flux of fake and mislead presentations in Indonesian media, which described them as terrorist and separatist groups. To address this issue, I relied on three sources. First I turn to exiting literatures which centre the research question in the internal dynamic of this OPM (and its armed-wing, TPNPB), Otto Ondawame's PhD's dissertation is one of the main sources in understanding this movement, as this is based on his anecdotal and hands-on experience as former guerrilla fighter for seven years from 1969 to 1976 and decades of political activist in exile. His work sheds light on the internal dynamics of OPM, its fragmentation and strategy,

and political aspirations. This allows me to understand how social identities are being contested and shaping their politics. Second, the literature from foreign researchers, which contains detailed information on OPM trajectories, also benefitted, along with the documentation of global and national NGOs and prominent journalists. Online sources were used to complete the data and information. The investigation of famous and committed human rights journalists in uncovering the tragedy of “OPM’s attack in Freeport zone” is used to illustrate the case. Some interviewees and online videos with spokespersons of the armed group, such as online news from credible platforms, have benefitted from enriching the empirical data.

The primary data presented in this paper were collected and compiled from my three-year fieldwork (2019-2022) as a researcher at Yayasan Pusaka Bentala Rakyat, an NGO focused on indigenous land rights in West Papua, particularly Merauke, Boven Digoel, Sorong, and Sorong Selatan. The data are gathered to support land advocacy at both the local and national levels against the expansion of large-scale business, with a particular focus on the socioeconomic impact of such expansion in rural West Papua. As an "advocacy NGO," my responsibilities included providing an analysis to support the advocacy document. The period of my fieldwork is varied (depending on the "programmatic framework," which for sure is a part of accountability to the donor agency), but I spent 10 to 14 days on every fieldwork at every visit. Within a year, I must visit a field once a month or every two months. However, for the whole year in 2020, I spent time in Merauke and had intense fieldwork with the community. I collected the data by conducting a participatory observation of their everyday life, followed by their customary forest to gather food and extract sago starch, as well as their temporary hut (Bevak) in the timber plantation field. Deep interviews with selected interlocutors and FGD in small groups comprising 6-to-10-person gender-based selected were also carried out. Beyond that, as I have still been given access to my NGO’s data, documents, reports, field notes, and every relevant material, I use some of them to enhance the data. While writing my thesis, I have reflected various aspects that are relevant to guiding and shaping the focus of my research. As an Indonesian, it is essential to examine the relationship between my experiences in West Papua and the social and political landscape there. I have included in the Appendix for further clarification of my relational positionality.

Chapter 3 Struggle Against Capitalism

In this chapter, I explore the struggle against agrarian capitalism through the recognition of the West Papuans. Using two cases of indigenous communities, Gelek Malak Kalawili Pasa, who gained legal recognition from The Regent by enclaving 3.247 ha of customary land from palm oil concessions, and Wambon Tekamerop, who resists timber plantations owning 206.800 ha of their customary land, this paper highlights how the highly criticized notion of Masyarakat Adat (Indigenous People, Indigeneity) is strategically used to resist the expansion of power. This paper focuses on the state-society dimension and examines how the interaction between state actors and institutions (embedded in legal regime), social classes (indigenous landed classes, tribal organization), and movements (civil society organizations) can lead to political transformation that supports the demands of resisters.

3.1 Gelek Malak Kalawili Pasa – first recognition case through regent's decree

Gelek Malak Kalawilis Pasa, a subclan within the Moi tribe, is a significant indigenous group residing in the southern region of the island (birdhead area). The clan currently comprises 52 members, primarily residing in Sayosa Village and Malalilis Village, which are located within the Sorong Regency of the West Papua Province. The main sources of livelihood are small-scale cultivation activities, sago processing, and animal hunting in their customary forests. These yields are primarily used for household consumption, with a surplus sold in the nearby markets. The rights of ownership and control of customary territories are passed through male lineage with mutually agreed-upon territorial boundaries. Additionally, they agree on the use rights of forests and land, which are mostly for non-commercial purposes, such as taking wood for household needs, cultivating certain medicinal plants, opening small plots for gardening, and hunting, if this happens under the consent of landowners.

In the 1990s, the forest area belonging to the Moi tribe (including the Malak Clan) was included in the concession of PT Intimpura Timber Co, a subsidiary of PT Kayu Lapis Indonesia Group (KLIIG), which has a concession area of 330,000 hectares. KLIIG was part of a business owned by the richest and closest crony to Suharto, Liem Sioe Liong. Mackie (1991) traces the impact of the nationalization of Dutch colonial assets under the leadership of socialism with Sukarno's characteristic in 1957-1958 on the emergence of the Chinese business empire. However, as the nationalized enterprises were fully controlled by the state, private enterprises, including Chinese businesses, did not benefit significantly until the New Order regime took over in 1965-1966. During Suharto's presidency, Indo-Chinese entrepreneurs were provided with a great opportunity to expand their business, compared to Indonesian businessmen.

In the late 1990s, as the Suharto regime neared its end, which also led to the decline of the timber and logging industry, Liem began to consider an alternative to maintaining his empire in different sectors. The palm sector, which experienced growth in the late 1990s, became a perfect choice to bet investment. Prior to the expiration of its permit, the KLIIG redirected and developed its investment in the palm oil industry. Through its subsidiary, Hendrison Inti Persada (HIP), since 2006 the company has been working to meet all licensing requirements in Sorong, Papua. They managed to obtain Cultivation Rights for 22,000 acres of land spread across three subdistricts: Klamono, Sayosa, and Makbon. The concession also included customary land belonging to the Malak Clan.

Since the customary territory of the Malak Clan was converted into a timber concession by Intimpura Timber Co. in 1990, the Clan has consistently opposed the company by refusing to grant it permission to carry out any activities. This attitude is understandable since they primarily rely on the direct their own forest to provide food and to engage in petty trading in traditional market. They use their forest to hunt wild boar, cultivate banana, cassavas. Their economy is mostly semi subsistence, land is then less commodified (Polanyi, 1975). Moreover, when the logging business permit was transferred to an oil palm plantation by the HIP, the Malak Clan again objected and reiterated their resolve to remain outside the realm of economic activities. Herman Malak, the landowner and clan leader, played a crucial role in the resistance against palm oil expansion and in consolidating his clan members. Since the company's entry, Herman Malak has consistently rejected offers to submit his land rights. However, he became aware of the potential risks of losing land because of his limited knowledge of the law and regulations. He took the initiative to contact local areas, focusing on the struggle for customary rights as well as consulting with local customary institutions. The demand for the Malak clan was simple: the enclave of their land from the plantations' concession. Herman Malak also realized that he might not be able to influence other clans who had or would hand over their land, his aspiration is limited to make his clan customary territory enclaved from the HIP concession.

The Malak clan, facilitated by national and local NGO, conducts participatory mapping over customary land. Tilley's use of the term "counter-mapping" to describe the utilization of cartographic tools of states and corporations by the indigenous groups to assert land rights and also challenge to these established claims. Building on her case in indigenous people in Indonesia, she argues that these tools have been benefitted by indigenous communities to defend their rights against extractive expansion by state and corporate actors by claiming territorial rights and demanding legal protection. (Tilley, 2020, p. 1449).

Through this process, it was found that their traditional territory covered an area of 3,247 ha, characterized by natural forest and hilly terrain. A customary map equipped with a profile (history of their clan, land inheritance, tenurial, and traditional knowledge) was used to advance advocacy, demanding the enclave of their land from palm oil's concession. They specifically targeted the local government, as the Regent known to have a political propensity to favor the rights of the West Papuan indigenous people.

In December 2021, the Regent of Sorong, John Kamuru, issued a decree acknowledging the community's rights to 3,247 acres of customary land belonging to the Malak clan. This issuance of recognition statements also coincided with an ongoing policy shift in Indonesia towards sustainable palm oil governance, commonly referred to as the palm oil moratorium. This moratorium was initiated by the president in 2018 and involves a halt in the issuance of new permits for palm oil companies. Its purpose was to enhance the accountability of companies that obtained permits but failed to carry out the required business activities such as the establishment of a plantation field. In the same year, in addition to recognizing Malak's customary land, the Regent of Sorong, John Kamuru, also revoked the permits of four palm oil companies for violations identified through evaluation and assessment documents. This permit revocation was challenged by the companies themselves, leading to legal action being taken against The Regent by the three companies. Social movements then utilized it to gain public sympathy by framing it as a case against "a good will to save the forest of indigenous people." NGOs then started a campaign to "save the figure of the regent, " who was seen as standing for the rights of the indigenous peoples.

The formal recognition of land rights belonging to an indigenous community, through a "regent's decree," marked a significant milestone in the history of Indonesian legislation regarding the recognition of indigenous rights, primarily in facing the pressure of capitalist development. In this case, the subjectivity of indigenous people in justifying their claim is based on the narrative of unjust through collective action (counter-mapping is one of

them), and social movement is something important to be noticed (Lund, 2022). In a broader situation in Indonesia, we might see the competing narrative of one claim, sometimes between indigenous people, transmigrants, or labor (ibid). All the claims might have its logic and base, however as Lund (2022) argues that “the context and timing are crucial for the success of any such narrative,” and also the way it is organized is also a matter. The recognition of Gelek Malak is the a combination of these context, timing, and mobilization tools: (1) the national policy momentum of sustainable palm oil plantation governance, (2) the political commitment of local leaders, (3) the persistent resistance (and convincing leadership) of indigenous landed owners, enhanced by the advocacy of NGOs and other social organizations, and (4) the persistent claim of injustice of through an indigeneity narrative (counter-mapping), all of which contribute equally to the success of their struggle against capitalism. Considering the increasing pressure on their land and resources due to development projects such as palm oil plantations, it is deemed a positive precedent for the recognition pathways of indigenous peoples.

3.2 Wambon Vs Timber Plantation - Exclusion as Inherent Nature of Indigeneity's claim

In 1998, amidst the Asian monetary crisis and critical period of Indonesia's political transformation, PT Maharani Rayon Jaya (MRJ) was granted a 206,800-hectare concession for a Pulp Industrial Plantation Forest (HTI) in Merauke, Papua. The MRJ was managed by the Texmaco group, which was founded and owned by Sinivasan Marimutu, a long-standing national capitalist in Suharto's cronyism. Marimutu started his business in the textile sector in 1958, and later expanded into the heavy equipment and machinery industry. He was known as an influential businessman and a crony in Suharto's business dynasty. This timber concession granted to him should be understood and situated in the political economy of resource allocation politically during Suharto's era. Warburton traces the political economy of nationalism in Indonesian's resources sectors and how it benefits the local capitalist. She argues that in Suharto's era, the logging industry “was an archetypal example of how the New Order political economy functioned” (Warburton, 2018, p. 107). It was a moneymaking sector and a source of patronage for Suharto to tame the loyalty of military officers and national capitalists.

Although the permit of the MRJ in 1998 was revoked on three occasions, specifically in 2007, 2013, and 2014, it was successfully reinstated by the Supreme Court ruling in 2017. It allows the MRJ to continue a plan to convert natural forests into pulp plantations by planting salomon and sengon teak, which will encroach on the land of the Wambon indigenous people residing in the Subur, Aiwat, and Kaisa villages in Boven Digoel, Papua Province. The concession was planned to be in close proximity to an oil palm concession owned by the Korindo Group, which since the 1990s has been carrying out oil palm business on customary land belonging to the Wambon tribe community. Despite Korindo's commitment to improving the local economy, landowner groups affected by the company consistently expressed grievances with unfulfilled promises. Ongoing protests, which encompassed customary blockades, demonstrations seeking compensation, and calls for economic rights, have yet to end the massive dissatisfaction.

Korindo's experience has shaped the way rural dwellers perceive the promise of corporations and has resulted in resistance to the MRJ's expansion plan. Indigenous landowners from Subur village (comprising seven clans) and Aiwat village (two clans) are mainly vocal about mobilizing demand. Referring to the prior encounter with Korindo, they learn that this economy could never benefit them, as there was low labor inclusion in the plantation, limited opportunities for local people to be hired as full-time or temporary workers in the

field or in the office, inadequate compensation for the land, an unfulfilled corporate social responsibility, and, additionally, an environmental crisis, which has led to their ongoing grievances. "We will always be a spectator in our land," stated by one landowner.

Driven by these grievances, they attempted to mobilize resistance. In 2019, the land-owning classes in two villages, Subur and Aiwat, started to approach and contact local NGO. Participatory mapping facilitated by environmental agrarian NGO is used to support and build the foundation of resistance. It was carried out by including the elderly and landowners to deliver the traditional knowledge and wisdom related to their tenurial system. Obviously, male landowners dominated discussions regarding tenure boundaries, leading to the exclusion of indigenous women groups from the class of landowning themselves or as general. However, women managed to mobilize their own demands and strategies in the movement. They trusted that participatory maps should reflect their roles and stories as those who supported the reproduction of communities. This meant that the map should feature the story of the spaces that served as their livelihood sources, such as the place to get food and fetch water, the place to sustain the health of the community and family (traditional medicines), the place where they socialized the children, and etc (Malinda, 2022). Equipped with this gendered map and profile, they began lobbying, visiting, and exerting pressure on local governments to revoke the business permit or stop the company's operation from destroying their rural economy.

Blocked by the resistance of indigenous landed classes in Subur and Aiwat, the MRJ benefitted from the fluidity of the indigeneity narrative. They knew that land ownership in the clan was fixed, but the use rights were characterized by its commonality. In the past, clan Enigugop in Subur village decided to separate because of religious differentiation. Some of the clan members converted from Catholics to Christians and moved to another village, Kaisa. This religious differentiation led to the separation of land rights. Those who moved to Kaisa, were not granted ownership rights over customary land, only the right to use it. This history was used by the company to further its agenda. Due to resistance in Subur and Aiwat, the company turned to the dwellers of Kaisa, notably Enigugop's subclan. They approached and opened up the possibility of deals and negotiations to acquire consent. Realizing this "division politics," the landowning clan of Subur's Enigugop then started to assert their power by excluding this subclan by threatening to impose customary sanctions and the revocation of use rights to Kaisa's Enigugop, if they continued to participate in the negotiation. These strategies were quite convincing to prevent the subclan from acting on behalf of the landed classes. To date, the permit has yet to be revoked, but it is highly unlikely that this company will be operational in the near future because of the inability to obtain consent from landowners. While landowners are now trying to advocate for the recognition of their customary lands at the regency level, for a total cover of 260.391 Ha (75.445 Ha in Aiwat and 184.946 Ha in Subur), almost exceeding the total concession granted to the MRJ.

3.3 On A Theoretical Note – Mobilizing Adat

I present the two cases above to point out (1) the interaction between actors in the dimension of state-society mediated by indigeneity (Adat) discourse in shaping the political reactions from below, and (2) how the identity of West Papuans is not the only source of resistance; the social identities differentiated along classes (in relation to land ownership), gender, and other relevant categories (in this case, religious differentiation) might contribute to dynamizing resistance against the development of agrarian capitalism. The exclusionary nature of the indigeneity narrative is a contested zone between actors: indigenous landed classes, indigenous non-landed classes, indigenous women, corporations and business actors,

local leaders, and social movements. It becomes a zone of intersection of all interests to resist agrarian capitalism.

In her work titled “Adat in Central Sulawesi: Contemporary Application”, Tania Li discusses the paradoxical nature of indigeneity narratives (Li, 2007). These narratives involve asserting the purity or authenticity of something on the behalf of a certain group. Adat, which is seen as an inherent aspect originating from within the community, are simultaneously vulnerable to external influences and are considered fragile and in decline. Consequently, efforts have been made to strengthen, safeguard, and restore it. This paradoxical nature allows discourse on indigeneity to be appropriated by various actors in their own interests. Li also highlights how it is utilized as a tool for ethno-territorialization and is susceptible to manipulation by elites for political gains. Indigeneity has also become a contested arena for political discourse among stakeholders in West Papua (Kusumaryati, 2020). She demonstrates how the formation of the Papuan Customary Council, for instance, became a battleground between the Indonesian state, aiming to assert a sense of nationalism and development, and the Papua Liberation Movement, aiming to advocate for self-determination and independence. This tug-of-war further emphasizes that the discourse surrounding indigeneity is not simply a binary division of strong versus weak or state versus grassroots. It transcends such simplistic categorizations.

Adat advocacy will never be a complete discussion without acknowledging the role of NGOs’ global movement. In the past decades, they have successfully benefited from the notion of indigeneity as a counterbalance to land grabbing in the periphery through legal advocacy (Arizona, Wicaksono and Vel, 2019, p. 488). The self-recognition of indigenous identity becomes the initial stage in enhancing their entailed rights such as land and resources. In Indonesia, as highlighted by Van Der Muur et al, after the collapse of authoritarian regime of Suharto, Adat national advocacy and project have gained distinguished achievement contesting Indonesian legal form, such as “Adat Forest, Adat Villages, Adat recognition, and etc” aiming to provide communities with rights to their collective territory, natural resources, and culture (Van Der Muur *et al.*, 2019). After living under an authoritarian regime for more than 30 years, which limits their resistance and mobilization of expression, traditional and ethnic groups are expressing their demands to be recognized by the state overtly and sometimes violently. The quest to implement and recognize customary law, in addition to positive law, is strongly articulated in their movement. In 1999, in a congress organized by Jakarta-based and regional activist under the group named AMAN (Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara – Archipelagic Alliance of Adat Communities) conveyed a powerful, provocative yet historical statement regarding their existence “If the state will not acknowledge us, then we will not acknowledge the state”. In sum, the fall of Suharto, in this case, opened a variety of possibilities for social transformation and resistance channeling in the realm of social movement.

In addition, the two cases illustrated above are also linked to the broader picture of the trajectory of capitalist development in Indonesia, and even on a global scale. As mentioned in the introductory section, how the power transition from Soekarno, a left-leaning president, to Suharto, an authoritarian and US-friendly president situated in the middle of the Cold War, involved the trade-off of West Papua’s gold and mining reserves. Soon after, Suharto ran his long-standing power for 32 years; this region still stands as an extractive site, as shown by the expansion of its timber business. However, as capitalism has developed unevenly (Harvey, 2019), the thesis of “crony capitalism,” which was proposed by many political scientists to analyze the fall of Suharto, lacks an explanation. Johnson argues that the East Asian crisis reflects the different ways in which capitalism is practiced in the region (Johnson, 1998). Its evenness could be beneficial in explaining the pace of different transitions in Indonesia, as until now, we might find a subsistence characteristic of the dominant economy in the region practiced by indigenous communities such as West Papua. Given the history of timber

plantation expansion in the Sumatra and Kalimantan Islands during the Suharto regime, which resulted in various socio-environmental issues (Miettinen *et al.*, 2012; Tsujino *et al.*, 2016; Austin *et al.*, 2019) the industry's focus has now shifted to West Papua, which serves as a reserved zone for its continuation. Therefore, although the regime has fallen along with the crony, capital development is ensuing and continues to expand its spatial reach in the remaining regions (Harvey, 2001, p. 24). This unevenness of capitalist penetration thus also shapes a choice of resistance in West Papua as society is still tribally organized and sharply differentiated along the class (with regard to land ownership), gender, ethnicity, religion, and so on. The notion of customary, Adat, indigeneity, and indigeneity is becoming a viable option for channeling resistance against capitalism.

However, this differentiated and fragmented society also implies the variegation of their politics; thus, resistance is not always an inherent characteristic. In the next chapter, another political reaction from West Papuans, which remains under exploration in the literature, will be demonstrated, namely, the struggle for and within capitalism.

Chapter 4 - Struggle For Incorporation

While the prevailing literature commonly portrays indigenous people as inherently resisting dispossession, leading to agrarian conflicts against both state and corporate entities, this chapter aims to highlight an under- explored variegation of political reaction from below, namely, a struggle to be incorporated or struggle for and within capitalism. By bringing up two cases: (1) a struggle to engage in contract arrangements fairly and empowering in the case of palm oil plantations, and (2) a demand to have equitable competition among contract laborers in timber plantation companies, this chapter will accomplish two points: first, to depict the dynamics between actors in the state-society dimension in negotiating their interest, as shown by the interaction between indigenous landed classes and environmental-agrarian justice alliances, and second, to problematize the illusive inclusion as the driver struggle for incorporation.

4.1 Demand to be fully incorporated in contract farming arrangement in the palm oil

Bio Inti Agrindo (BIA), a subsidiary of the South Korean business group POSCO Dae-woo, has owned a palm oil plantation concession covering 39,000 ha in Ulilin District, Merauke, Papua Province, which belonged to the Marind Anim indigenous people since 2007 (*Mightyearth*, 2017). It has provoked various responses from national and international civil society organizations, primarily from South Korea. A weekly south-korean magazine, Sisa IN², conducted investigations into the social and environmental impacts experienced by indigenous Papuans in the company's concession areas. However, despite the strong accusations of environmental activists and organizations, BIA asserted that their business operates on the ethical principles of local empowerment and sustainable business practices. They claimed to follow a no-harm policy for peatlands and has empowered local communities through the Nucleus-Plasma arrangement. As of 2021, they declared that they allocated 6,867 ha of land for Plasma development.

However, what is the nucleus-plasma arrangement, and why does it become vital for a company's reputation and image so that they need to fulfill it? During Suharto's regime, there was a heightened focus on agricultural development, which was argued as a means of curbing the development of agrarian radicalism (Rock, 2003, as cited in McCarthy, 2010). This political strategy led to the introduction of several policies aimed at promoting state-driven agribusiness, particularly in sectors, such as palm oil plantations. One such initiative was the PIR-Trans or Nucleus Estate Scheme (NES) program. As palm oil was associated with the Sino-Indonesian tycoon of Suharto's crony, the state mobilized all the forces to sustain the business. An NES was represented as a state-sponsored partnership between state-owned companies and rural smallholders. It involved the settlement of Javanese transmigrants to a less densely populated area as part of the mobilization of the labor force (smallholders) to work on this scheme. In addition to providing labor, the state financed and provided access to the land market in rural areas. Globally, this scheme coincided with the prescription of the World Bank in agricultural policy to adopt more contract farming (McCarthy, 2010).

However, along with the shifting of global political economy and regime of power in Indonesia (the fall of Suharto, read), the palm oil sector which used to be dominated by state-owned, is currently now dominating by private companies which also implies the

² <https://n.news.naver.com/mnews/ranking/article/308/0000021553> (In Korean' language)

transformation of this “empowerment” or “partnership with local community” program. Since the 1990s, along with the wave of neoliberalism, the World Bank has also encouraged the reduction of the state’s subsidy to this market and let the market rule the palm oil sector. It then gave a birth to the transformation of “partnership” program between private companies and, known as ‘Primary Cooperative Credit for Members’ (Koperasi Kredit Primer untuk Anggota, or KKPA) covered the period 1995–1998 (McCarty, 2010), or sometimes referred as Nucleus-Plasma arrangement. This arrangement, which is also recognized as a form of contract farming system in the Indonesian palm industry (Cahyadi and Waibel, 2013), facilitates the formation of partnership agreements between private or publicly owned companies and local communities, where the company is granted or acquires customary land to establish a nuclear palm oil plantation. As part of the agreement, villagers are allotted certain acres of land, either individually or collectively, as a group of smallholders to cultivate their own crops (Pye, 2010). Nucleus plantations play a crucial role in providing support and assistance to contract-smallholders throughout the process (Cahyadi and Waibel, 2013, p.74). Furthermore, this is part of the compulsory empowerment program mandated by the state for the local community, which directly answers the question posed in the previous paragraph. The plasma arrangement also helps enhance a company's reputation.

In 2016, a written agreement regarding the establishment of a plasma plot was achieved between the affected communities and the BIA four years after their first land-clearing activity. The smallholder cooperative named "Mandob Sejahtera, " whose management consisted of five representatives of landowners’ clans and BIA’s officers, was established as a medium of partnership. The parties then came to an agreement to develop plasma through the One Roof Management Partnership, meaning that all managerial activities controlled by the company and smallholders would only receive a share of net revenue. There are three prevalent models that are mostly used for the nucleus-plasma partnership of the palm oil industry in Indonesia: the first is managed by a cooperative, the second is a company, and the last is direct farmers. These three partnerships have different characteristics, in terms of advantages and disadvantages. An agribusiness study comparing these three patterns shows how smallholder-managed plasma is more economically prospering for local people than those who are involved in company management (Agus Lukman, 2019). It highlights the distinction between contract farming and plasma supply agreements. The former offers the potential for technology and skill transfer as well as additional income, while the latter is more passive in nature. In practical terms, the smallholder cooperative Mandob Sejahtera has been established, but BIA exercises complete control over their plasma. Landowners are expected to be passive, avoiding any involvement in preparation, production, policymaking, management, and other processes. McCarthy argues that KKPA/cooperative model provides a smart solution to overcome difficulties in acquiring land near infrastructure and increasing number of land disputes by engaging more acquiescent landowners (2010, p. 831)

Although the company has made efforts to incorporate these practices into the contract system, the impacted community, particularly indigenous landowner groups, have not been sufficiently considered. They consistently demanded changes during the plot construction process and organized themselves to advocate for modifications to the arrangement. They believe that the current management structure, which gives the company almost absolute power over everything under the plasma plot, will not bring prosperity to their lives and hinder their full integration into the smallholding economy. One of the instruments the plasma owner uses to mobilize the demand is coalition building with the civil society organization. Realizing the sharp international scrutiny, especially NGOs in South Korea, in the context of the deforestation case of the BIA, indigenous landowners realize the opportunity to advance their interest and strive to be included in the plantation economy.

Koja (pseudonym) one of the landowners and plasma cooperative administrators in one of internal meeting with coalition of INGOs and NGOs aiming to draft the demand to POSCO, insisted a change in the practice of plasma cooperation implemented so far: "We have to be involved in it, not only as passive owner, but as manager." This internal meeting was part of the follow-up of the investigations and reports by several environmental organizations, revealing the continuous deforestation of rainforests in POSCO concessions. Another indigenous plasma owner, Jeki (pseudonym), also voiced the collective ambitions for the desired collaboration model. He expressed disappointment with certain aspects, such as the company's limited provision of technical training without any inclusion of native workers in the actual plantation activities. According to Jeki, rather than including the local in field jobs, companies prefer to mobilize and employ workers from outside the village and non-Papuan:

"We were trained and given certain skills related to palm oil plantations by the company. However, after that, where should we go to practice the acquired skills if they do not give us any job opportunity in the company, not even to manage our plasma plot?"

Fearing of risking the reputation, POSCO opted to respond by implementing a moratorium on land clearing in January 2018, No Deforestation, No Peatland, No Exploitation (NDPE) policy in 2020, followed by other efforts to fulfill the promise of local communities, which was one of the key issues discussed in this process.

Local demand was often demonstrated through blockades, which were prevalent among indigenous Papuans. These blockades involved the use of wooden barriers, known as "palang," which recognized by all parties on the land. Palang was derived from the Indonesian word "memalang," which meant to bar something with wood. The practice was an expression of protests and an invitation to discuss a problem in a customary manner. The barrier cannot be opened or broken because of the sacred value attached to its enactment. Therefore, anyone who dared to break it must pay customary fines that are compulsory. The indigenous landowners whose land was being leased by the company and would like to negotiate something mostly use *palang* to convey the demand. The practice of *palang* can be harmful to the company as it may disrupt the plantation activity on a daily basis, as posited by Pye that whatever the strikes in palm oil will have an immediate effect in the industry since "ripe fruit should be processed in mills within 48 hours to prevent any interruption in production" (Pye, 2021, p. 821)

From this story, I would like to highlight several points before jumping into main arguments that (1) contract farming arrangements through inti plasma has become "*key mechanism by which palm oil is introduced to these socially differentiated landscapes*" (Pye, 2010, p. 855), (2) and how the encounter between this differentiate landscapes and contract mechanism thus creates a "*multiple and ambiguous social formations and is affecting different classes in different ways*" (ibid). If most of the literature and documentation depict indigenous people as a resistant force without appreciating the differentiation and intersection of social identities, this chapter aims to explore another route by looking at politics from the newly formed social formations and classes that emerged driven by this economy.

Indigenous landed classes who decided to lease their land and be incorporated into contract arrangements (company-managed plasma) see no opportunity for their improvement of the economy, as the agreed management system limits their participation. They are not considered smallholders who manage their own plasma plot or plantation wage laborers who are paid monthly or daily by the company to work in the plantation, while at the same time their access to their land and resources has been limited. They seem to be disconnected from

any social formation, and thus also a struggle in the plantation. Pye's (2010) work sheds light on the varied interests and groups involved in palm oil transnational resistance, including environmental agrarian movements, indigenous peoples, plantation workers, and stakeholders. Each of these groups advocates for a distinct set of demands: alliances between environmental-agrarian movements and indigenous peoples primarily seek justice for social and ecological systems, plantation workers focus on issues such as wages, working conditions, and the right to organize, and smallholders who face debt, price fluctuations, and inadequate infrastructure demand for new "terms of incorporation." The distinction between struggles for land and struggles for labor is quite pronounced in contemporary rural movements, and there has been an attempt to connect conflict interests. However, cross-alliances between groups are rarely observed (Borras, 2010; Borras, McMichael and Scoones, 2010).

This story would then like to show another worth-noticing new social formation because of the penetration of the contract system, which has the possibility of new alliances in plantation settings: indigenous people landowners demand to be fully incorporated as smallholders or workers in plasma. As described previously, indigenous people benefit from the global- and local-scale environmental-agrarian coalition to advance their interest. In the same way, environmental movements provide a platform for more diverse demands, not limited to entitled issues, including economic empowerment. By this, I would argue that the development of agrarian capitalism in West Papua, which has sharpened and mediated the formation of new social classes, also provides more opportunities for alliances and struggles in the rural realm. As environmental movements and indigenous landowners advocate for their respective causes, the potential for alliances arises from abandoning a binary perspective on land acquisition and instead asking broader questions such as how it affects the formation of new rural classes, the long-term impact on livelihoods, and the political reactions from below and their potential alliances.

4.2 To Get Better and Fair Working Condition – A Case From Leles Worker in Merauke

In 2009, Selaras Inti Semesta Ltd (SIS), which was part of the Medco Group, received permission to manage a large area of forest (169, 400 hectares) as part of the MIFEE project. This project was planned by the Indonesian Government to deal with a global food and energy crisis. The purpose of this study was to improve the local and national economies by increasing income in the Merauke region and reducing the need for the government to buy food from other countries. The plan included 36 large companies, and they wanted to use the land for rice farming (50%), palm oil (20%), and sugarcane (30%). SIS assured the people of Zanaegi village that this project would improve their lives, increase funding for education, create employment opportunities, and bring numerous other benefits. However, the reality in the field spoke differently. MIFEE, as shown in many studies, has been considered to trigger a multifaceted crisis in the socio-ecology of the Marind Anim .

One of the emerging job opportunities driven by this investment in timber plantations in Zanegi Village was **Leles**, defined as casual work opportunities within the Medco Group's Industrial Plantation Forest, in which the main task was to clean up leftover branches and small wood pieces after larger logs have been cut down. The job was mostly available during the process of clearing natural forests or harvesting eucalyptus wood. According to the local community, because of their requests to company this kind of job was provided, as they expressed:

"We asked the company to let us be part of their workforce. Previously, these small logs were considered worthless and merely trash. The company focused only on large logs that were handled by external contractors. We cannot compete with these contractors. This is the best we can do."



Figure 1 Big logs from the intact forest after land clearance, typically cut down by heavy machine. Personal Doc.

Previously, small logs were considered as waste by contractors because they are employed to manage the land clearing process of the big trees of a natural forest. However, for the locals, as they would not be able to benefit from clearing natural forests or harvesting timber from the plantations and are unable to compete with contractor companies equipped with heavy machinery, they see the small logs as an opportunity. The groups of landowners, whose land had been cleared and open for the timber commodity of *eucalyptus pelita*, demanded SIS to create a job field for collecting small logs. Demand was addressed by the company. However, presumably, the prevailing business interest in SIS is the main driver of this job creation. Between 2017 and 2018, Medco and the State Electricity Company joined to build a BioMass Power Plant (PLTBm) in Wapeko Village, a village located next to Zanegi. This power plant needed a supply of wood chips to be able to operate, but the contractors were not a good idea to take over this job, since it required a manual workforce instead of heavy machinery. Thus, employing cheap workers in a wage-and-casual relationship was preferable to deal with the supply of wood chips.

This job was conducted within a group: one acted as a foreman and the remaining member as a worker. Anyone who was interested in applying for work should sign up directly to the foreman instead of the company. The relationship between the foreman and the temporary worker was built on wage and workload, meaning that workers were paid based on how much wood they might collect in each 15-day period. According to the locals, SIS bought wood from the Foreman for 85,000 rupiah (\$5,4) per cubic unit. The workers received 60,000 rupiah (\$3,8) per cubic unit, while the remaining 25,000 rupiah (\$1,6) went to the foreman. Within a 15-day period, most workers in a group of three to four people can gather up to 100 cubic units, earning them six million rupiahs (\$ 387). However, this money needed to be

shared evenly among other laborers and has not been used to pay off debts for 15-days groceries. Food expenses made up the biggest part of their spending, especially for laborers who must bring their whole family to Bevak (temporary hut). It was reasonable to assume that during a working period, a small family could spend 500,000–1 million rupiah (\$ 32 – 64) on basic food.



Figure 2 Small Logs done by local workers (Leles Workers), mostly cut down manually

Outlined in its Annual Work Plan, SIS intended to clear a total of 922.13 hectares of forest within the territories of Marfa Mahuze and Balagaize Sub-Ndimarze in 2022. Land clearance has been in progress since 2021. During this period, a customary protest was staged through customary blockade by landowners. Their grievances encompassed several demands directed at the company, including the provision of timber transporter truck unit, along with the opportunity to manage big logs. The latter was aimed at fostering competitiveness against external contractors. The landowners' rationale behind these demands comes from their belief that earnings from *Leles* activities are not adequate, as presented by harvesting timber with voluminous cubic dimensions. However, a significant impediment lied in the absence of the necessary capital to acquire production tools such as machinery, wood-cutting vehicles and truck transport. Consequently, landowners were unable to access the contractual engagements of this mechanism.

The decision was reached, and the clan was granted the right to manage large timber and access to capital to buy trucks. However, the company did not give the truck away for free but as a loan of 100 million rupiah (\$6451), which would be deducted from the sale of the timber itself. The landowners were also tied to in written agreement that they would not block the company again with a customary portal in the future unless they faced some legal consequences. Michael (pseudonym) indigenous landowner expresses:

"We feel that this agreement is good and mutually beneficial. Because we really need this truck for starting our business in HTI as well. It is just that maybe in the future, the company can increase the value of the timber cubic".

Michael had already secured initial capital to purchase a truck, estimated to be between 50 to 70 million Rupiah, and required an additional loan of 100 million Rupiah to establish his business. He considered this to be a mutually beneficial arrangement, as the truck enabled

him to operate as an independent contractor on customary land. This independent contractor status was similar to that of other contractors described earlier. Assuming this role, Michael has the potential to significantly increase his income compared to that of an ordinary *Leles* worker.



Figure 3 Contractor to clear the intact forest (mostly from outside of the village and non-Papuans). Personal doc.

What makes these two stories connected under the title "struggle for incorporation"? I present how both cases involve a situation referred to as *illusive inclusion*. I cite Mamonova's (2015) work on Ukrainian farmers' tolerance and the peaceful acceptance of large-scale agricultural development. She believes that illusive inclusion plays a significant role in shaping the attitudes of Ukrainian peasants toward land deals. The government's strategy of illusive inclusion is carried out via a land titling program that formalizes household support. However, the program mostly targets elderly peasants who are unable to cultivate the land, but it allows the right holders to lease the land to Large Farm Enterprises (LFE) through a share mechanism. In sum, this formalization ensures the inclusion of (elderly) smallholders but leaves them with the preferred option to lease their land to large enterprises with a relatively small share. It means that inclusion "*is ensured but the outcome is not different from that of being excluded. To the extent that those included hardly derive any benefit inclusion is illusive.*" (Joseph, 2014, p. 75). However, this strategy has shaped their reaction towards land deals, as it also promises to improve their economy through land titling and engagement with LFEs.

Mamonova's work challenges how general perceptions of rural dwellers are similar and inherently against land grabbing, as she might prove the nuanced struggle to be incorporated into the capitalist economy. It also inspires this paper to understand these two cases in which "terms of inclusion" influences the attitude of local people. The *Nucleus-Plasma* mechanism in a palm oil plantation has effectively engaged indigenous landed classes by incorporating them into the contract farming system as cooperatives, albeit with a limited function. The same applies to timber plantations, where indigenous landed classes are employed as daily casual laborers to collect small wood (*Leles Worker*). However, these inclusions are illusory because of their deceptive nature, as their involvement in company-managed plasma does

not bring significant benefits for indigenous landowners, such as limited opportunities for skill and knowledge transfer, the possibility of being trapped in debt and earning a small portion of share, and limited participation in decision-making at the company level. *Lele workers* are incorporated as cheap labor with poor working conditions, protection, and wages. However, this term of inclusion initially shaped their attitude towards this capitalist project: being adaptive but also continuously demanding. The struggle is then directed to transform the character of illusive inclusion to be more empowering, fair, and just by adapting more strategic tools: alliances with other movements, overt demonstrations and grievances, and negotiations (as shown in indigenous *elite* workers).

The same applies to timber plantations, where indigenous landed classes are employed as daily casual laborers to collect small wood (*Leles Worker*). They are incorporated as cheap labor with poor working conditions, zero security and protection, and low wages. Inclusions are illusory due to their deceptive nature, as involvement in company-managed plasma does not bring significant benefits for indigenous landowners, such as limited opportunities for skill and knowledge transfer, the possibility of being trapped in debt and earning a small portion of share, and limited participation in decision-making at the company level, as well as the possibility of improving their economy. However, this term of inclusion initially shaped their attitude toward this capitalist project: being adaptive but also continuously demanding. The struggle is then directed to transform the character of illusive inclusion into more empowering, fair, and just by adapting more strategic tools: alliances with other movements, overt demonstrations, grievances, and negotiations.

After exploring two different types of struggles from below West Papuan amid the development of agrarian capitalism, which primarily contrasted with one another—against and within capitalism—I would like to present the third struggle involving a conflicting, ambivalent, and contentious relationship of West Papuans, in this case specifically referring to those who are involved in the demand for independence toward agrarian capitalism.

Chapter 5 - Conflict and Contention: Understanding the politics of pro-independence West Papuans in relation to Agrarian Capitalism

The West Papua region has become a contentious site for various actors representing diverse interests, including transnational companies, local communities, social and political movements, and state actors. Thus, this building upon complexity, this chapter aims to understand the variegated politics of West Papuans' pro-independence group (non-violent group and armed struggle wing) toward agrarian capitalism in this region. It concerns with the volatile reactions by West Papuans to one of the largest and longest sites of mineral extraction in the region, Freeport McMoran. Capturing the moment of alliances between liberation group of OPM and rural classes, this chapter attempts to clarify that (1) the struggle against capitalism by OPM takes a very specific and nuanced form: struggle against Indonesian or Foreign-perpetuated agrarian capitalism, (2) also with LEMASA who represents a rural classes of landowners and laborers, their political reaction to Freeport is built upon their intersection of identity as West Papuans and classes.

5.1 Trajectory of OPM as liberation movement.

OPM (Free Papua Organization)⁴ is a form of grassroots resistance as a West Papuan nationalist to respond Indonesian' settler occupation (Gault-Williams, 1987; Woodman, 2023). As an umbrella organization of all struggles for independence, OPM is not only fluid in nature but also an integral part of the identity and ideology of West Papuans. Viktor Kaisepo (as cited in Kirksey and Roemajouw, 2002), an influential West Papuan nationalist, describes OPM as “desire of divine salvation, equitable development, environmental sustainability, and political independence.”

There is no clear agreement on the day of establishment of the OPM, according to Osborne (1985) the first OPM action occurred on July 25, 1965, and was founded by Arfak people who received training in the Papuan Volunteer Corps by the Dutch administration. Otto Ondawame (2000, p. 116), a former guerrilla and international lobbyist for the OPM, has backed up the claim of OPM's establishment. He argues that the Manokwari uprising on July 26, 1965, where 14,000 militia attacked the Kebar military and police posts and declared an independent Papuan State, was the first OPM-associated activity. This uprising was a result of the long-standing grievances held by indigenous people, who have been subjected to disputes, discrimination, and oppression.

The Manokwari uprising was subsequently followed by other attacks in several regions: Makbon (1967, 1968), Erambu (1969), and Enarotali, Monemani, Epouto, Wagete, and Mapia (1969) (Ondawame, 2000, p. 95-100). However, Indonesian military (ABRI) managed to tame the movement through a conventional counter insurgency approach which leads to the setback of OPM's resistances in the region (Ondawame, 2000, p. 121). In addition, the collapse of this initial resistance, which occurred between 1965 and 1970, was also caused by internal and external factors, such as the lack of an organizational structure, committed leadership, political programs, and military leadership from unqualified personnel (ibid).

From 1971 to 1976, the OPM established connections with rural elites, including landowners. During this period, a spirit of resistance grew, particularly among rural communities

⁴ It has armed-faction known as : TPNPB-OPM , or West Papua Liberation Army – Free Papua Organization

where many villagers joined the OPM and controlled forests around the PNG border (Widjojo, 2001). However in the period after that, OPM experienced a leadership split and fragmentation between two biggest guerilla basecamp: base of “VICTORIA” led by Seth Rumkorem and the base of “PEMKA” by Jacob Prai (Osborne, 1990; Ondawame, 2000; Elmslie, 2003). The reason for this fragmentation, which happened between 1977-1987 remains unclear. However, some scholars argue that it has nothing to do with the differentiation of political ideology and approaches. West Papua political scene does not support the explanation, as Ondawame argues “*there has not been any conservative party representing the interests of a bourgeoisie or landlords, nor a communist party that ideologically represents the interests of a working class or peasantry*” (2000, p. 117). Elmslie (2003) provides a logical explanation. He argued that different personalities and leadership are possible drivers of the split.

During the period between 1980-1983, this division intensified, and Osborne (1985, p. 84) noted that the two factions, PEMKA and VICTORIA, were attacking one another during this time. The reason was driven by traditional loyalty, which for Osborne was quite odd in that the Indonesian government did not benefit from this factionalism motivated by primordial reasons. He argues that this failure to politicize the division led to the solidity of OPM: “They are hostile to each other, but united in opposing their common enemy” (ibid). Although the dispute was resolved in 1987, the two parties agreed to rejoin and prioritize broader political interests through the Port-Villa Declaration. This is a significant moment in OPM's history, demonstrating their commitment to the national interest over personal interests and solidifying their legacy as a liberation movement. Beyond this ethnic tension within their bodies leading to factionalism, the idea of nationalism has played a role in transcending emerging as the ground of a solid political agenda (Tilly, Tarrow and Mcadam, 2004)

5.2 Mapping and Understanding the Politics From Below around Freeport.

In 1976, one faction of OPM, PEMKA attempted to arrange their own documents explaining the OPM's political program along with their organizational structures. There are 10 points of programs and visions, two of which encompass a question of resources and economy: (1) OPM seeks equal distribution of wealth and resources for people's well-being, ensuring economic and social progress and political stability, and (2) OPM advocates for a mixed economy with individual economic freedom and collective responsibility for the nation's citizens (Ondawame, 2000). 149). The two points are situated within the context of West Papua's development under Suharto's authoritarian regime, where large-scale resource exploitation led to the enrichment of national capitalist and crony at the expense of the local inhabitants of resource-rich regions such as Sumatra, Kalimantan, Riau, and West Papua. Not only did OPM express their opinions on capitalist development in their political statements, but their actions and strategies also reflected this stance. Historically, they consistently targeted economically significant areas, such as logging and mining companies, dating back to their early days.

One of the vital fighting hotspots of the OPM's guerrilla activity throughout history is Freeport McMorran in Tembagapura, as it is considered a symbol of the entrance of Indonesian colonialism to West Papua (Eichhorn, 2023). Freeport also signified the interplay between the local political power transition from a socialist-leaning president to an authoritarian US-friendly regime, a global political economy of the Cold War. Freeport obtained a concession for 10,000 acres of land owned by Indigenous Amungme and Kamoro for 50 years in 1967. This company was the first foreign investment company (PMA) in the country and earned millions of dollars from the resources of the Amungme and Kamoro indigenous

people. It is estimated that US\$300 million is earned annually from the extraction of 32 million tons of gold and copper.

OPM has been prepared to establish the guerrilla's post surrounding the Freeport area since 1975 (Ondawame, 2000). This proposal was motivated by grievances and anger due to the continuous extraction of Papua's natural resources by the Suharto regime. They believe that violence is the only solution, as expressed in their correspondence, and our aim is to force all foreign businesses, including Indonesia, to leave our country (Osborne, 1985, p.260). The first attack was carried out two years later, on June 22, 1977, where *"trucks, bridges, factories and the airport were destroyed and pipelines, which transferred tons of partly processed minerals 109 km from the Ertsberg mine to Amamapare on the coast, were dynamited"*(Ondawame, 2000, p. 176).

Surprisingly, this was the first joint operation between several parties: indigenous laborers in the mining company, indigenous landowners, and the OPM's guerrilla forces. The attack lasted until August, when thousands of central highlanders of West Papuans joined the forces with the OPM. It was also caused by several problems between local communities and Freeport McMorran: lack of recognition and respect for their rights, as well as their right to compensate for the loss of their land and resources for indigenous landowners, fewer economic opportunities for locals, environmental problems, human rights abuse, etc. Freeport was reported to have lost US\$ 11 million during the week of the attack (ibid). However, through counter insurgency, the Indonesian military managed to defeat the resistance, according to a regional report by the OPM. According to Osborne (1985), approximately 3,000 Papuans fled to Papua New Guinea via the Central Mountain route as a consequence of this war.

After the turmoil, resistance against Freeport was conveyed in a different fashion, but with similar demand and more contested actors. Previously, it was Freeport McMorran versus everybody, but more actors came into the scene. One of these is the LEMASA or Traditional Consultation Council of the Amungme, which was established in 1991. This was led by Tom Beanal, one of the local intellectual who was vocal of the national liberation's issue. This customary institution aimed to represent the interests and demands of Amungme and Kamoro in dealing with any matter related to Freeport McMorran. Ondawame even equalized this institution as "local" OPM with regard to the nature of its influence and scale. LEMASA was established as one of the non-violence strategies in the non-violent form of struggle in order to advance their demands, thus making it the only legitimate body who could speak on behalf of the Amungme and Kamoro indigenous people and landowners. In 1998, for instance, LEMASA sued Freeport in the USA for crimes against humanity and environmental destruction (Ondawame, 2000., p. 303). This body also worked together with Nemang Kawi commander of the OPM, Kelly Kwalik (which also an Amungme) to draft a document containing 23 demands of indigenous people regarding land, labor and political rights to be directed to Freeport. It would be obvious to argue that since beginning LEMASA had always be conscious about the vision of West Papua's liberation, proven by its continuous involvement with pro-independence group.

Local landowners and indigenous laborers in West Papua were not only involved in the non-violence strategy through LEMASA, but it was also reported that they used violence by allying with the OPM, as Tilly argues that the establishment of a representative political institution, in this case LEMASA, would not necessarily cease the violence act of ordinary people (1978, p. 3). Almost July 1977 two decades after the first attack, they disrupted a mining operation by burning down oil tanks and cutting off the pipeline. In the years following, one of the largest overt and violent demonstrations took place in March 1996. Approximately 6,000 West Papuans have destroyed company offices and airport facilities, resulting in an estimated loss of US\$1 million. Again, this was encouraged by the unaddressed demands of these people. The indigenous landowners brought the issues of compensation for the past land deals and the improvement of term of employment for local communities—

which also became a concern of indigenous laborers. Ondawame noted, most highlanders West Papuans such as Amungme and Kamoro earned low wages compared to unskilled Indonesians and expats, or even coastal Papuans. Moreover, the low local labor absorption is also put into the scene of demand, emphasizing how only 17% of West Papuans were employed in Freeport (Ondawame, 2000). 278). In this constellation of political reactions from below, indigenous landowners and laborers are struggling to be incorporated into this extractive economy, while simultaneously joining forces with the national liberation movement, which has nuanced resistance against it.

It is obvious that many contested actors have mobilized the different demands surrounding this extractive mining company, as illustrated below. Liberation groups, indigenous landed classes, indigenous laborers, social movements, and state forces. Except for state forces, the remaining group of interest embraces the identity of West Papuans and “local impacted communities.” However, the demand is differentiated according to the embedded classes. As an OPM, they have a clear motive to take over the mining industry for national liberation. They pursue wealth redistribution and advocate for a mixed economy, which considers the individual and collective roles. They aspire to expel Indonesian or foreign businesses from their land, especially in Suharto’s regime, which was dominated by Chinese tycoons and local capitalists. In the recent generation of TPNPB-OPM is reported to have involve in illegal and remote gold mining, such as in the Paniai, Intan Jaya, Yahukimo (*The Current Status of Papuan Pro-Independent Movement*, 2015; Paramita Sandi, 2021; Puji, 2021). Based on police investigation, the remote location of the mining site makes it difficult for the police to control illegal mining activities, which provides an opportunity for TPNPB-OPM to exploit the situation and use it as funds generated to purchase firearms and ammunition (ibid).

I would argue that they are not necessarily struggling against agrarian capitalism as it is agrarian capitalism, but rather against Indonesian and foreign-perpetuated agrarian capitalism. The identity of West Papuans here – which share a similar oppression due to Indonesian occupational forces—has then activated their boundaries (Tilly, 2004) from non-Papuan entities in their strategy of violent form of actions : attacking Chinese-owned timber business, US-based mining company and Javanese settlement area, kidnapping the non-Papuan hostages, etc. (Osborne, 1990). However, in their political trajectory, it also shows their involvement in the struggle for and within capitalism, as shown by LEMASA and the landowners, or in the recent example of the OPM’s involvement in taxing and benefitting from local mining. How do we understand this phenomenon? Neoclassical economists are likely to emerge as the most possible and typical argument of “greed vs grievance,” that the existence of lootable primary commodities will cause the emergence of violent act and rent-seeking behavior. It will argue that “powerful material interests are clearly significant in shaping the conflicts and in their causation’ (Cramer, 2002, p.1849). This tends to reduce the explanation of how the greed of Homo economicus will lead to individual rational calculation where violence or participating in war sounds profitable and promising to benefit directly from material gain.

However, the neoclassical approach would never provide any satisfactory explanation to understand the variegation of politics from below by the relevant actors surrounding Freeport. Despite the fact that West Papua is considered to have abundant lootable primary commodities (Elmslie, 2003; Stott, 2021), which makes it an ideal site to gain direct material profit. However, empirical evidence has shown that motives and interest in participating in war and conflict might vary across individuals and groups. OPM, at least shown throughout their historical trajectory of fragmentation-unification-fragmentation, is clearly represented a nationalist movement which has a clear political agenda, rather than just ethnicity group (Tilly, Tarrow and Mcadam, 2004, p. 232). Their involvement in alliances with rural classes, such as local landowners and indigenous laborers (not general laborers), also shows the

persistence of identity mobilization as West Papuans struggle against Indonesian-led capitalist development. In addition, the involvement of rural landed classes and working classes in the violence attack with OPM, rather than leading to the profit maximization of the commodities, instead possibly cost them many as in the previous attack two decades ago. Therefore, neoclassical explanations have completely ignored the possibility of mobilization which driven by “ideology or promises of change (including change in material conditions of employment or production)”(Cramer, 2002, p. 1850).

The work of Bundy on how the liberation movements in South Africa , initially tended to ignore the rural classes, but gradually began to engage and link to rural struggles and conflict has shed a light to understand this type of resistance. He argues that one of the drivers to this engagement was because since 1920s, there was a rise in rural unrest in South Africa. It then gave a birth to the conscious and concern of liberation movement to address the grievances and win the support of rural communities. They systematically built alliances with rural groups and mobilized their grievances around issues of class conflict (Bundy, 1984). I would argue that, either OPM or LEMASA’s (with its represented classes of landowners and laborers) political reaction to Freeport, either through violence and non-violence means, has always been driven by the intersection of their West Papuan’s nationalism and identity, and classes. Along with the capitalist development which led to the conflict in West Papua, OPM also redirected his strategy to advance their demand that was by engaging with rural classes through violence (joint-attack) and non-violence means (joint-drafting).

Chapter 6 - Conclusion

While classical theories of resistance and its relationship with rural agricultural dynamics have given some inherited legacy and continue to inspire the study of agrarian politics, contemporary resistance seems to have an intricate nature that transcends it. The emergence of identity politics, global economic shifts, and the complex interplay of local and global dynamics challenge these conventional narratives and theories. The richness of its history of communist movement, peasant rebellion and social movements, and also amplified with the background of political transition from authoritarian to democratic, Indonesia is a promising site to be investigated on the topic of contemporary rural politics (Anugrah, 2015; White, Graham and Savitri, 2023). However, as capitalist development is unevenly produced and reproduced (Harvey, 2005a), the processes also differ in the realm of Indonesia, leaving West Papua – the easternmost island of Indonesia- as one of interesting to be investigated on the topic of resistance and capitalist development. Its intricate socio-historical landscape, marked by its post-colonial history, unresolved political question, and capitalist development model, signifies the need for a nuanced understanding of the resistance or political reactions from below amid the development of agrarian capitalism. As resistance from below takes diverse forms, encompassing violent conflicts, protests, legal advocacy, and everyday struggles, there is an urgency to understand how it is shaped and by what drivers.

This research attempts to understand the political reactions below the West Papuans amid the development of agrarian capitalism in the region. To address the main question of how the variegated political reactions from below West Papua have been shaped and driven by the social identity-centered frame in relation to the development of agrarian capitalism, I explore three different but relational empirical cases that represent three types of resistance. Benefitting from the typology of politics from below in relation to global land grabbing, developed by Borras and Franco (2013) and Hall et al. (2015), this study contributes to the existing literature on rural resistance by providing fresh and nuanced examples of West Papua's case.

The first type of resistance might seem a “mundane” and “predictable” kind of reaction from below: struggle against capitalism. As Oya argues that there is a “rush” on the literatures of land grabbing which mostly present the case in binary view, which also imply to the simple depiction of reaction from people: locals tend to resist (Oya, 2013). However, this kind of presentation loses its attractiveness due to ignorance in explaining “what is really happening in the below which makes it possible for the people to resist the capitalist development?” I decided to engage in this further question. Through the two indigenous communities, I depict how the interaction between actors in the dimension of state-society mediated by indigeneity (Adat) discourse, policy momentum, and political opportunity has strongly shaped and enabled the political reactions from below to resist the capitalism.

The second typology focuses on the underexplored kind of resistance—those who struggle to be included within and for capitalism. This finding highlights the mechanism or term of inclusion of local people in emerging economies (McCarthy, 2010; Mamonova, 2015), which shapes their reactions from below. The two cases are illustrated: a struggle to be fully included in contract farming arrangements, and a demand to be included in fair competition and better working conditions. Considering the context of large-scale agriculture and forest business, it pinpoints two things, first (1) the development of agrarian capitalism in West Papua, which has reshaped social class formation, gives an opportunity for alliances in rural politics. For instance, the demand for inclusion in contract farming by indigenous land classes is achieved by allying with the global environmental movement. Second (2) the illusory nature of inclusions shaped the direction of the resistance from below. The case of *Leles*

Workers in timber plantations, which initially used to be included as casual workers with poor working conditions, might explain the driver of their demand and negotiation.

The third resistance engages in a more nuanced local socio-historical setting of the national question of West Papua. It examines the variegation of politics within the pro-independence groups of West Papuans, particularly the non-violent and armed struggle wings in relation to agrarian capitalism in the region. Narrowing the case to one of the contentious and long-standing gold and copper mining sites, it depicts the moment of violence and non-violence alliances between the liberation group of the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM) and the rural landed and working classes and how it represents their diverse and variegated demands and interests, which goes beyond the neoclassical analysis of greed and grievances. This chapter seeks to clarify several key points: first, that the struggle against capitalism by OPM takes a unique and nuanced form, specifically targeting Indonesian or foreign-perpetuated agrarian capitalism; and second, their political reaction to Freeport is built upon their intersection of identity as West Papuans Nationalist and classes. In this chapter, the role of social identities as oppressed West Papuans is prominent in mobilizing resistance and maintaining its persistence over the last few decades.

Finally, I contend that all these findings have attempted to reveal and conform to the initial question on the prominence of social identities in shaping resistance from below. I recognize the obvious shortcoming of this research, that I attempt to depict agrarian capitalism in its scale-logic: (1) as something spectacular, (2) a large-scale project, and (3) mostly involve state-corporate actors. Despite my understanding of the unevenness character of capitalist development (which not necessarily entitled to the scale logic), I have attempted to qualify the selection cases by explaining how these extractive sites—Freeport, Timber, and Palm Oil Plantation - are connected to the local and global political economies. I have also transcended the existing literature that separates the economic and political explanation in West Papua's context by advancing a more integrated way of looking at it. However, many areas need to be explored in future research, which might be related to this topic.

Implication for future research

Not only large-scale land deals could drive the capitalist development in West Papua, but there are also many factors, which mostly situated from “below,” contributes to shape and reshape its rural realm. In-migration flux to West Papua since six decades ago through demographic engineering via state-sponsored settlement program (*Javanese Transmigration*), spontaneous-migration by other ethnicities (from outside of West Papua) which currently dominating the informal economy and forming (petty)traders classes in rural-urban sphere, or labor-mobilization to extractives site driven by this capitalist economy, it would be intriguing to ask after six decades of in-migration flux, which presumably has transformed the rural West Papua, what are the contemporary dynamics of social formation surrounding land and labor relation emerged in rural sphere, and how it determines and shapes the politics from below against agrarian capitalism. In sum, it is important to examine the interactions of newly emerged social classes in shaping the direction of the agrarian structure and its politics and potential alliances. It might be an important political project to examine the possibility of crossing the boundaries of identity politics in addressing the national question of liberation and agrarian capitalism simultaneously, in the context of West Papua. Moreover, for policy research, building upon the practice and tradition of participatory counter-mapping developed as a result of longstanding grassroots mobilization between agrarian-environmental movement and indigenous people, it needs to encourage the state policy to incorporate it in their rural spatial planning. More holistic approach (not only in local/provincial level, but national policy) is needed in this case.

Appendix 1 – Relational Positionality

I am an Indonesian, a part of state which occupies and colonizes West Papua. My view on this region has transformed for the last years. When I was in high school, I was told that West Papua and Aceh were the land of separatist and terrorist who would like to go against the sovereignty of Indonesia. I was quite nationalist back then and influenced by that narrative. However, I had a huge interest, respect, and love to this region. As I knew that it was one of the poorest provinces in Indonesia and was willing to “do” something. Then I decided to apply for one-year program by a local education NGO as a teacher in Papua (because I studied my bachelor’s in teaching training and education), got in the interview stage but did not manage to get selected. Then, when I finished my degree, my interest in agrarian and land issues is started through my encounter with agrarian research NGO, Sajogyo Insitute. This institute was the one which introduced me to the realm of agrarian studies, to the problem of rural development, and to any structural situation surrounding land and other resources. Since then, my interest has been shaped.

In 2019, I had a chance to visit West Papua for the first time due to my new work in PUSAKA as field researcher. First place that I visited was the northern part of West Papua, Sorong to do a fieldwork in a village surrounded by palm oil. The last three years, I managed to visit many places which is mostly impacted by the large-scale land acquisition project. As an NGO advocacy, I always have to see the situation in the field – in relation to land grabbing project - precisely like what Oya (2013) said, in a binary lens. I must prioritise the story of people who want to oppose this, to be documented in my research report and a material for legal and non-legal advocacy. Are they many of them? Yes, many indigenous people in West Papua are opposing large-scale project for several reasons, but one thing that strike me is that they know, the emerging economy will have no place for them. However, what I understand is that many of them are also expressing their longing for so-called “development” and “better future for the children”. As they know that relying on forest is no longer becoming viable options for their household, as it could not provide the fast fresh cash for their daily basis, and also because the economy in their place has been favouring certain layers of society, which is mostly non-Papuans. It makes them, sometimes, engaging in the struggle for incorporation. However, this type of struggle is rarely as “desirable” to be campaigned by NGO or INGOs, as it contradicts to their environmental and social justice vision. They view this vision as an aspiration for a capitalist economy, which is supposed to be opposed.

When I engage in the literatures which try to criticize the rush of land grabbing literatures, it touches upon personal. I mostly engage in a lot of debate with my colleague in environmental-agrarian NGO that how we have made a big gap with labour movement by undermining their struggle to be incorporated. However, they believe that we need to have a priority. It is more important to be a “friend” of those who struggle for their land, rather than a “friend” who demand for compensation or working condition. The former is considered to be purely driven by the broader vision of agrarian-environmental justice, while the latter is perceived to be opportunistic and has no sense of vision itself. The former is assumed to be last longer than the latter. This reflection does not intend to compare between realm: academic or activism, or to play a judge on the morality. I do not also think it is needed, since we have an option of working together. However, it is always important to be critical, nuanced and visionary. To understand that capitalist development is not a moral imperative, instead a totality construction of our life.

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