Instagramming the Elysée?
A Quantitative Visual Content Analysis of Emmanuel Macron's and Soazig De La Moissonnière's Instagram Posts Through the Lens of Personalisation

Student Name: Mona Daelen
Student Number: 650500

Supervisor: Dr. Ofra Klein

Master Media Studies - Media & Business
Erasmus School of History, Culture and Communication
Erasmus University Rotterdam

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Abstract

To remain relevant in an increasingly digital world, politicians had to embrace the emergence of social media and learn how to strategically use these platforms to capture the audience's attention and approbation, hoping to secure its support at the ballot box. This research investigates the extent to which Emmanuel Macron's visual self-presentation on Instagram is personalised. Personalisation strategies are examined by comparing Macron's personal account (@emmanuelmacron) to his official photographer's account (@soazigdelamoissonnière) and electoral periods to routine times. To better capture the nuances in the French president's visual presentation, this research differentiates between "personalisation", "individualisation", and "privatisation", acknowledging the multi-layered character of the phenomenon. Through a quantitative visual content analysis, Instagram posts from Macron's and De La Moissonnière's accounts, issued between 2016 and today, are examined. In total, 890 pictures were coded to identify general, personalised, individualised, and privatised visual features, aiming to uncover patterns in how the French president presents himself on the platform. The findings reveal that Macron's visual self-presentation is more personalised on De La Moissonnière's account and during electoral periods. However, in terms of individualisation and privatisation, no significant differences were found, neither between the two accounts, nor the two periods. Overall, Macron's visual self-presentation on Instagram can be deemed highly personalised. The Instagram posts convey primarily a formal image, depicting the president's official and professional duties and, to a much more limited extent though, an informal image, revealing comparatively few private aspects of his life. These findings align with what previous research found, namely that there seems to be an established genre of politicians' presentation on Instagram, consisting of presenting essentially the image of a professional leader in its work environment, occasionally complemented by more private content, with the leader in a role other than the one of politician. This thesis confirms the necessity of differentiating between personalisation dimensions, both theoretically and in practice. It emphasises the essential role of visuals for politicians' self-presentation strategies on social media and validates the suitability of Instagram as a platform for online image management. Finally, it reiterates the importance of considering both electoral and non-electoral periods when examining politicians' communication and invites us to devote closer attention to the role of personal photographers in politicians' visual storytelling and image management.

KEYWORDS: *Emmanuel Macron, personalisation, Instagram, visual self-presentation*

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Introduction

"The conquest of cyberspace": this is how Elishar-Malka et al. (2020) described the new era of political communication we recently entered. This latest phase is characterised by politicians' increasing use of social media to establish direct contact with their audiences (Elishar-Malka et al., 2020). Today, more than a willingness to exploit these new communication channels, political actors are almost pressured to share content online and engage with the public on these platforms (Strömbäck, 2008; Balmas & Sheafer, 2016; Wolfsfeld, 2011). Indeed, these do not only represent a new avenue but also a real strategic tool for political actors, enabling them to shape their image to the outside world. Mastering their self-presentation, not only through their verbal communication but also their visual exposition, is a crucial yet challenging task. Social media's speed of access and ease of use, coupled with the proliferation of cameras, smartphones, and smartphones with cameras, make politicians, like any other kind of celebrity, more visible than ever (Messaris, 2019).

Alongside this mediatisation of politics, an increased political personalisation has also been pointed out (Driessens et al., 2010; Van Aelst et al., 2011) and is considered a critical development of politics in the 21st century (McAllister, 2007). Personalisation designates the transition towards candidate-centred politics, emphasising a shift of focus from parties and policies to a candidate, but also the greater attention devoted to a candidate's personal and private facets (Van Aelst et al., 2011). Once perceived as a phenomenon driven by news media and passively experienced by political actors, the personalisation of politics is now increasingly recognised as a proper communication strategy, even deemed "indispensable" or "generalised" by some (Metz et al., 2020; Farkas & Bene, 2020). Once again, social media have played a part in the acceleration of this phenomenon, as they offer the ideal platform for such personalisation strategies, providing politicians with an opportunity to communicate with their audience instantaneously and directly through a personal Facebook page, a Twitter account, or an Instagram profile (Enli & Skogerbo, 2013). By establishing their presence on those platforms, political actors hope to stimulate engagement and generate interactions with their electorate, to positively influence their opinion and, ultimately, attempt to secure their support at the ballot box.

Instagram, Emmanuel Macron, and the persuasive potential of visuals

Although the importance of visuals in political communication is now widely recognised, the area remains under-explored, with most studies focusing on verbal and textual elements (Schill, 2012; Grabe & Bucy, 2009; Muñoz & Towner, 2017; Steffan, 2020). This

approach is problematic as it neglects the fundamental function of images in politicians' branding and impression management (Schill, 2012; Farkas & Bene, 2020). It is even more concerning now that politicians-citizens interactions increasingly occur on these social media platforms, many of them being (increasingly) centred on visuals, thus reinforcing the crucial role images play in political communication (Bucher & Schumacher, 2006; Gupta, 2013). However, Instagram, despite its growing use for consuming news (i.e. doubled between 2018 and 2020) (Newman et al., 2020) and having been characterised as "an optimum social network for online self-presentation and impression management", especially for politicians, remains an under-researched platform (Gordillo-Rodriguez & Bellido-Perez, 2021, p. 131; Muñoz & Towner, 2017; Ulucay & Melek, 2021).

Furthermore, while Emmanuel Macron's (President of France) communication strategies (Wharton, 2018), political speeches (Labbé & Savoy, 2020), and use of Twitter during the Covid-19 crisis (Drylie-Carey et al., 2020) have been examined, no research so far investigated his visual self-presentation. Macron is a particularly interesting case as the French president has often been labelled the "media candidate" by the press and in pre-election polls (Bénilde, 2017; Schneidermann, 2017; Le Point, 2017). Back in 2017, the candidate was the darling of several French newspapers (e.g. Libération, Le Monde, L'Express), which mentioned him as many times (i.e. 8 000 articles) as three other candidates combined, leading some observers to claim that Macron was overexposed in the media (Ortiz, 2017). Consequently, by focusing on the president's visual self-presentation on Instagram, how he manages this professional-private balance on the platform, and to what extent he exposes a personalised image of himself, this research aims to fill those gaps and contribute to the flourishing literature about personalisation and politicians' use of social media.

Given the impact that visuals may have on public judgment and beliefs (Rosenberg et al., 1986; Schill, 2012), investigating visual-based communication is more than relevant, not only for political communication professionals but also for the general population. As remarked by Brands et al. (2021, p. 2017), "in today's information-overloaded society, visuals may be the one avenue that still has the potential to grab attention". If images are to become (or have already become) as relevant as words in (political) communication, then how political actors employ those is a matter of particular concern. Furthermore, the choice of examining Instagram is by no means random: the platform remains one of the most popular social networks, with more than 1.478 million users (Statista, 2022), and has also been found to be the politicians' preferred platform for self-presentation during election campaigns, before Twitter and Facebook (Steffan, 2020).

Research question, sub-questions, and outline of the research

The research question guiding this thesis is: "To what extent is Macron's visual self-presentation on Instagram personalised?". To supplement the analysis, two sub-questions are developed. Firstly, "To what extent is Macron's visual self-presentation on his official Instagram account (@emmanuelmacron) different from the one on his personal photographer's account (@soazigdelamoissonnière)?". This sub-question aims to uncover potential similarities or differences in how Macron and her personal photographer visually portray him. Secondly, "To what extent does Macron's visual self-presentation differ during routine versus election periods?". Here, the objective is to compare two distinct but equally essential periods so as to expose potential similitudes or variations between them in Macron's image management.

To answer those questions, a quantitative visual content analysis was conducted based on the personalisation of politics as a theoretical framework. More specifically, Instagram posts issued on @emmanuelmacron and @soazigdelamoissonnière accounts between 2016 and today are examined. Every visual is analysed individually, with the help of a codebook elaborated for this research. Through the analysis of these Instagram posts, this research aims to unravel the way(s) the French president presents himself on the social media platform and whether this self-presentation tends to be (highly) personalised. Furthermore, this research also intends to identify potential patterns or divergences in self-presentation and personalisation between Macron's and his personal photographer's accounts, as well as between "routine" and "elections/campaign periods".

The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. The second chapter (Theoretical Framework) starts with a literature review of self-presentation, social media's impact, and visuals' crucial role in this process. It also introduces the theoretical framework used for this research, namely the personalisation of politics. Lastly, the hypotheses guiding this research are developed based on a discussion of politicians' visual self-presentation on social media, including Instagram. The Methods chapter describes the selected method (i.e. quantitative visual content analysis) and clarifies the different methodological choices. It then continues with an explanation of the data retrieval and collection processes and the operationalisation of "personalisation of politics". Next, questions of validity and reliability are addressed, and the data analysis process is further detailed. The fourth chapter (Results) includes a detailed description of the statistical tests' results as well as the confirmation/refutation of hypotheses. Eventually, the last chapter (Conclusion) concludes with a summary of the main findings, a discussion, and an overview of the research limitations and suggestions for future research.

Theoretical Framework

Before introducing the theoretical framework guiding this research (i.e. personalisation of politics), it is first helpful to understand how political figures visually present themselves, both offline and online. Therefore, this chapter starts by elaborating on the importance of politicians' visual self-presentation in political communication, the impact of new technologies, social media platforms' ever-growing importance, and the crucial role played by visuals in the process. Then, this chapter continues with a presentation of personalisation, highlighting the concept's multi-dimensional character and the different existing strategies, as well as reiterating the critical role of visuals and social media. Finally, based on a discussion of previous research and existing literature about the personalisation of politics on social media, the hypotheses are formulated.

I.   (Visual) Self-presentation (on social media)

Self-presentation: An integral part of political communication

Self-presentation theory, in short, outlines humans' attempt to create and control the impression they form of themselves, to maintain social status, or achieve specific goals (Goffman, 1959). Self-presentation is a ubiquitous and everyday phenomenon, yet of primary importance in political communication (Schütz, 1993). Since the development of this theory, scholars have pointed out its critical role in politics, as noted by Schütz (1993, p. 469), who remarked that "more and more, it is not the issues that are the heart of electoral combat, but the self-presentation of the political candidates". In this era of political marketing, self-presentation is, if not a necessary practice, a powerful tool for politicians to influence voters' opinions (Papagiannidis et al., 2012). Indeed, Balmas and Sheafer (2010) found that a positive perception of the candidate's "most salient attribute" positively impacted voting intention and vice versa, emphasizing the importance of the candidate being seen favourably.

Furthermore, self-presentation may help politicians enhance the electorate's trust, subsequently increasing voting intentions (Enli & Rosenberg, 2018). Finally, if politicians present themselves in a more approachable way, voters might be better able to identify with them, and the "psychological distance" existing between the two may be reduced (Filimonov et al., 2016; Jackson & Lilleker, 2011). Politicians' self-presentation is therefore of interest not only to them, who may make use of various tactics to influence their constituents, but also to the public itself, for which politicians' self-presentation represents a window to the candidate's (political) ideas, intentions, and qualities.

Self-presentation: The impact of social media

In this modern political era, politicians are constantly required to watch their words and actions, but also their appearance and image: they are under scrutiny more than ever before. Indeed, with the arrival of television, the popularization of photography, and the emergence of smartphones, politicians, as any other public figures, had "to deal with a loss of control over the stream of information" (Elishar-Malka et al., 2020, p. 8). While traditional media had already blurred the line separating politicians' "front stage" (i.e. what is visible to an audience) and "backstage" (i.e. what is hidden from an audience), the emergence of social media platforms finished erasing it, impacting political communication practices and affordances (Goffman, 1959, Steffan, 2020).

Indeed, with the arrival of social media platforms, the historical and usual politicians' reliance on traditional media outlets for communicating with their audiences was suddenly disrupted. Of course, politicians did not suddenly become independent from these channels, nor did they completely cease to resort to them. Nevertheless, those new platforms did provide a means to communicate with the electorate directly, bypassing the usual filter imposed by more traditional media (Dahmen, 2016). In fact, Elishar-Malka et al. (2020) remark that, whether willingly or unwillingly, politicians had to learn how to use those platforms and to adapt themselves to this new media logic (Balmas & Sheafer, 2016).

Politicians' social media accounts rapidly became a new political communication arena, and this phenomenon gathered scholars' attention. One strand of the literature focused on how political actors could verbally communicate with the public. For instance, Engesser et al. (2017) investigated how politicians could use Facebook and Twitter to propagate a populist ideology, concluding that these platforms gave populist political figures the freedom to spread their ideas. Besides propagating an ideology, scholars also studied how politicians could use social media during electoral campaigns in different contexts and places (Criado et al., 2012; Stier et al., 2018; Enli, 2017).

Aside from verbal communication, visual communication, and, more precisely, how social media platforms represent new areas for building, shaping, and managing one's image also received some attention. Among other things, scholars investigated politicians' online image management, visual self-presentation, and posting habits, including on Instagram (Lalancette & Raynauld, 2019; Bast, 2021; Ekman & Widholm, 2017; Russmann & Svensonn., 2017; Filimonov et al., 2016). Indeed, one may argue that today's social media platforms, especially visual-centred ones like Instagram, can be used as strategic tools for

politicians, not only to mobilize supporters or broadcast election messages but also to manage their image.

Self-presentation: The crucial role of visuals

In the last decades, more than self-presentation, it is visual self-presentation that has gained prominence in the field of political communication. While images have always been integral to it, they have become increasingly important recently (Farkas & Bene, 2020). The role of visuals is now considered central, even foundational, to political communication. Schill (2012) went so far as to declare that "political campaigns and governing now takes place in a mass-mediated democracy dominated by images", where words and texts might even become secondary (p. 133). Although most scholars recognize the crucial role of images, research has primarily focused on textual elements, and visual aspects remain overlooked (Steffan, 2020; Grabe & Bucy, 2009; Barnhust & Quinn, 2012; Graber, 1996; Farkas & Bene, 2020).

Nonetheless, further evidence of visuals' persuasive potential, combined with the proliferation of technological advances and, most recently, social media, seem to have revived scholars' interest in visual aspects of political communication. Even prior to the creation of social media platforms, the commercialization of cameras and the adoption of smartphones, shortly after with front cameras, also largely influenced how visuals were produced. Everyone was then capable of generating images easily and rapidly, embedding these even more in the functioning of society.

In politics, the well-known phrase "a picture is worth a thousand words" might not be as cliché as usually perceived (Muñoz & Towner, 2017; Mattan & Small, 2021). While investigating different aspects of visuals, previous research unanimously pointed out images' persuasive potential. For instance, visuals tend to override other messages when processed simultaneously (Noller, 1985; Posner et al., 1976) but also to be more easily remembered and believed (Grabe & Bucy, 2009). Images were also found to "garner more attention and illicit more emotive responses than text" (Muñoz & Towner, 2017, p. 292). As explained by Blair (2012), visual elements in any kind of advertising are "enormously powerful influences on attitudes and beliefs" (p. 205), a phenomenon known as the "picture superiority effect" (Paivio et al., 1968; Stenberg, 2006). Applied to political communication, this means that a single image can significantly impact a voter's opinion, attitude, or judgment of a specific candidate, hence potentially influencing his/her electoral decision (Rosenberg et al., 1986; Schill, 2012; Muñoz & Towner, 2017). Those findings reflect the decisive role of visuals in

politicians' self-presentation and the importance of effectively and strategically making use of images to shape their audience's perception.

Given their persuasive power, visuals should not only be considered a research topic in political communication but also a strategic tool purposefully used by political actors, rather than a mere communicative element. Visual symbols may fulfil various functions in politics, one of them being "image-building", as images are one of the main ways citizens get acquainted with political figures (Schill, 2012). In this context, politicians can use those visual elements to refine their image, and arguably even more today, where politics is increasingly 'going online'. The many pictures, easily taken by whoever possesses a smartphone, are now readily posted on platforms such as Facebook or Instagram and shared with thousands of other users. This ability for political figures to shape their online image, employing visuals, also allowed for the acceleration of another phenomenon that, so far, was passively taking place but in which politicians now actively participate: the personalisation of politics.

II.   Personalisation of politics

Definition, manifestations, and relevance

Personalisation of politics is not a new phenomenon: it is deemed to be as old as politics itself (Balmas & Sheafer, 2016). Nevertheless, political researchers are unanimous in declaring that it has gained particular momentum in recent years (Van Aelst et al., 2011; Garzia, 2014; Strömbäck, 2008; Driessens et al., 2010), especially with the emergence of social media-based political communication (Farkas & Bene, 2020; Ekman & Widholm, 2017).

To date, no consensus exists on the exact definition of personalisation, yet there are a few common points that most agree on. Generally, scholars agree that personalisation (among other things) describes a process whereby individual politicians become the primary actors of the political arena at the expense of other entities, such as parties or parliaments (Adam & Maier, 2010; Karvonen, 2010). In the literature, this aspect of personalisation is also referred to as "presidentialisation", defined by Langer (2007) as "a shift in the distribution of power towards leaders and an associated increase in leaders' overall mediated visibility" (p. 373). Additionally, political researchers concur that personalisation also reflects an increased focus on politicians' personal characteristics and private life (Van Aelst et al., 2011; Balmas & Sheafer, 2016; Rahat & Sheafer, 2007). This component of personalisation is what others have called the "politicization of private persona" (Langer, 2007) or "intimisation" (Van Zoonen, 1991), describing the "increased emphasis on traits originating in the private sphere

that contribute to portraying leaders not as a representative of an ideology, a party, or as statesmen, but as 'human beings'" (Langer, 2007, p. 373). Ultimately, while the exact definition and delineation of personalisation's different aspects are still debated, everyone seems to agree that personalisation of politics, as a phenomenon, includes multiple dimensions.

Personalisation of politics can occur at different levels and can impact various actors involved, more or less closely, in political life. First, it can be observed in voters' behaviour, who may base their evaluations, perceptions, or electoral decisions, on politicians' individual attributes rather than a party's ideology (Balmas & Sheafer, 2016). Indeed, Garzia (2014) discovered that a leader's personality impacts the leader's evaluation, which has a direct effect on an individual's vote, while Costa and Da Silva (2015) found supporting evidence for the personalisation of politics theory by proving the relevance of leader's warm personality traits. Second, personalisation can be manifested in media coverage, where increasing attention is devoted to a candidate (compared to his/her party), as well as his/her personal life, compared to his/her political party or program (Holtz-Bacha et al., 2014). Third, personalisation is also apparent in politicians' and parties' communication and presentation (Metz et al., 2020). Social media has greatly facilitated this last manifestation of personalisation, which provides parties and politicians with the ideal tool to shape their image. This process, which has been receiving more attention from academia recently, is the one investigated in this thesis.

While personalisation seems to be a trending phenomenon, one may ask why politicians tend to post more personalised content and whether this is actually beneficial for them in any way. Accurately measuring the effect of personalised political self-presentation is a complex undertaking as many factors, besides the personalisation degree or type, may influence an individual's perception. Consequently, very few studies attempted to examine the potentially existing relationship between personalisation and viewers' evaluation and/or behaviour (Otto & Maier, 2016). Only one experimental study conducted by Kruikemeier et al. (2013) investigated the issue: they found that personalised online communication did increase citizens' political involvement. Nevertheless, other studies were recently published, this time examining the impact of personalised content on users' engagement on different social media platforms (Larsson, 2019; Peng, 2021). Larsson (2019), examining Norwegian parties and party leaders, found out that "individual politicians emerge as successful (i.e. received a higher number of likes and comments) when providing more personalised content" (p. 1105-1106), while Peng's (2021) computer's vision analysis of US politicians' Instagram

posts revealed that several "self-personalisation strategies in visual media generally increase audience engagement" (p. 158). Of course, as emphasized by Larsson (2019), the number of likes and comments is only and solely a measure of users' engagement. It is, therefore, indicative neither of the viewer's sentiments towards the post nor its impact on the viewer's evaluation or perception of the politician at hand. Nevertheless, it might be argued that generating more reactions could represent one of the reasons why politicians (want to) present themselves in a more personalised way.

Strategies and tactics of personalisation

As highlighted in previous research, political actors resort to different strategies to construct a personalised image on social media platforms. Liebhart and Bernhardt (2017), focusing on Alexander Van der Bellen's campaign for the 2016 Austrian presidential elections, called this process "strategic self-presentation" and defined it as "the intentionality of selection and presentation routines on Instagram" (p. 16). One of the strategies they identified in the candidates' self-presentation is the "biographical strategy", encompassing posts highlighting their personal traits, skills, and experiences. Indeed, to personalize their image, political figures try to present themselves as ordinary humans. As explained by McGregor (2017), by revealing facets of their private lives, politicians allow their audience to identify with them more easily. For instance, political actors may share about their relatives, posting pictures having a great time with them, or their hobbies, with shots depicting them playing sports or practicing a leisure activity (Metz et al., 2020; Gordillo-Rodriguez & Bellido-Perez, 2021). Apart from these glimpses into their personal life, scholars also distinguished face disclosure as a personalisation tactic (Peng, 2021). Instagram posts displaying a human face have been proven to generate more engagement (Bakhshi et al., 2014). Hence, Peng (2021) argued that politicians' showing their face, regardless of the context (i.e. professional or private), may help politicians to strengthen their relationship with their audience, while Ekman and Widholm (2017) argued that face close-ups might convey a sense of intimacy.

Besides disclosing this private persona, politicians also attempt to position themselves as "professionals who hold individual qualities and individually exert political tasks and activities" by exposing their political achievements or day-to-day duties and tasks (Metz et al., 2020, p. 1482; Ekman & Widholm, 2017; Hermans & Vergeer, 2013). These different strategies, although all aiming at constructing a more personalised image, do so by emphasizing different aspects of the politician's life, reflecting the multi-dimensional aspect of personalisation. This important distinction is also considered for this research.

In these personalisation strategies and tactics, visuals play an essential role. Indeed, while an opinion may be easily expressed in a Tweet, a picture of a politician in his/her private sphere, for instance, spending time with relatives, might be the easiest way to share a glimpse of his/her intimacy with the public. Just as visuals are crucial for politicians' self-presentation, they are also the ideal support to build a more personalised image of themselves. It is especially true given the growing popularity of social media platforms as a channel of political communication. Farkas and Bene (2020), after examining Hungarian politicians' image-based communication on Facebook and Instagram, concluded that "personalisation can be considered as a general feature of social media visual communication" (p. 137), while Ekman and Widholm (2017), studying Swedish politicians' posting habits on Instagram, characterized them as the strategic construction of "self-managed galleries" in which both professional and private aspects of their life are displayed (p. 29). In the end, it may be argued that the use of visuals for politicians' self-presentation is reinforced by the growing presence of such content on social media platforms. These platforms, in turn, represent the ideal tool for political actors to shape their image and present a more personalised version of themselves to their audience, always aiming to develop a relationship with the public and assert their legitimacy and credibility as (potential) leaders.

Theoretical framework: Three dimensions of personalisation

To construct the theoretical framework guiding the rest of this research, Van Aelst et al.'s (2011) conceptualization and Metz et al.'s (2020) interpretation of personalisation are used. First, in their article, Van Aelst et al. (2011) present a model for examining politicians' personalisation in the press, based on a review of previous literature and existing research on the topic. The authors distinguish between two dimensions of personalisation: individualisation and privatisation (Van Aelst et al., 2011). On the one hand, "individualisation" refers to the idea that "individual politicians have become more central in media coverage, while parties and government institutions have become less relevant", highlighting a shift of focus from parties to politicians (p. 206). On the other hand, "privatisation" reflects the "rising importance of the politician as 'ordinary' person", "portrayed as a private individual", marking a shift of attention from the public to the personal (p. 206). Van Aelst et al.'s (2011) framework was initially designed to analyse personalisation in media coverage. However, this framework can be (and has been) adapted to social media visual self-presentation (Farkas & Bene, 2020; Peng, 2021). Van Aelst et al.'s (2011) conceptualization of personalisation has been selected as a theoretical framework for this research as it aligns with most other conceptualizations, acknowledging that personalisation is

a multi-layered concept. Indeed, if scholars had to agree on only one point, it would be that both in theory and in practice, personalisation encompasses multiple dimensions, like individualisation or privatisation (Holtz-Bacha et al., 2014; Van Aelst et al., 2011; Balmas & Sheafer, 2016). Furthermore, this conceptualization has already been used in previous research, notably by Farkas and Bene (2020), who investigated Hungarian politicians' image-based communication on Facebook and Instagram, a similar study to this one.

Second, to analyse German parliament members' Facebook posts, Metz et al. (2020) re-interpreted the personalisation dimensions established by Van Santen and Van Zoonen (2010). In this thesis, the "professional personalisation" and "private personalisation" dimensions are used to complement Van Aelst et al.'s conceptualisation. On the one hand, "professional personalisation", defined by Metz et al. (2020) as "qualities and individual activities related to the official office" (p. 1483), may be associated with the "individualisation" dimension from Van Aelst et al. (2011). Indeed, by "professional personalisation", Metz et al. (2020) refer to "a reference to professional activities", and "professional audience appeal"[1] (p. 1487). On the other hand, "private personalisation", described as "intimate information about the private persona", perfectly reflects the "privatisation" dimension of Van Aelst et al. (2011) (Metz et al., 2020, p. 1483). Indicators of the former are "private information" (i.e. information concerning the politician behind the official office), "private impression" (i.e. depiction of the intimate impression of the politician's surrounding), and "personal thought"[2] (i.e. politician uses opinion verbs) (Metz et al., 2020, p. 1487). Metz et al.'s (2020) interpretation of personalisation dimensions is helpful in that they clarify the distinction between individualisation and privatisation, making the theoretical framework more precise. Furthermore, it also helped further in the research process when those dimensions are operationalized. Figure 2.1 provides a synthesized representation of the theoretical framework detailed above.

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[1] This last indicator is not applicable to this research as it concerns verbal content of the Facebook post, an element that is not examined in this thesis.
[2] See [2]

Figure 2.1: Theoretical Framework

Personalisation A process whereby politicians become the main anchor of interpretation and evaluation in the	
Individualisation A focus on individual politicians as central actors in the political arena, including their ideas, capacities, and policies (similar to "professional personalisation") →Focus on qualities and individual activities	**Privatisation** A focus on the politician as a private individual, as a person distinct from their public role (similar to "private personalisation") →Focus on intimate information about the

(Based on Balmas & Sheafer (2016), Van Aelst et al. (2011), and Metz et al. (2020))

III.   Hypotheses

To answer the research question about Macron's visual self-presentation on Instagram and guide the analysis, several hypotheses were developed. Their formulation, based on the existing literature and previous research about the personalisation of politics on social media, is further detailed in this section.

First and foremost, as explained earlier, though personalisation is "nothing new", there seems to be a strong consensus about its ever-growing presence in politics (Balmas & Sheafer, 2016; Van Aelst et al., 2011; Karvonen, 2010). More specifically, scholars investigating politicians' (visual) self-presentation on social media found that political actors increasingly present themselves in a personalised way (Lalancette & Raynauld, 2020; Metz et al., 2020). On Instagram, both parties' (Filimonov et al., 2016) and politicians' (Farkas & Bene, 2020) image management is leaning toward personalisation. Furthermore, these findings obtained from an analysis of political actors' social media accounts may be confirmed by studies relying on interviews with communication managers/specialists (Mossberg, 2021) or politicians themselves (Driessens et al., 2010). Whereas Driessens et al. (2010) acknowledged that politics is becoming more personalised, Mossberg (2021) affirmed that personalisation plays an essential role in the way Instagram is used, providing further evidence for the growing personalisation of politics, including on social media. Therefore, it can be expected that:

Hypothesis 1 (H1): Macron's visual self-presentation on Instagram is highly personalised.

Whereas scholars seem to agree on the development and consolidation of personalisation of politics, they appear more divided regarding the prevalence of personalisation's two dimensions, individualisation, and privatisation, in the way political figures present themselves on social media. Some argue that politicians' presentation on Instagram is increasingly informal and focused on their personal attributes and private interests (Farkas & Bene, 2020; Liebhart & Bernhardt, 2017). For instance, Farkas & Bene (2020) found that pictures posted on Instagram are more often spontaneous and that the platform is used to demonstrate the "human side" of the politician, as opposed to the "professional side". Nonetheless, other scholars maintain that the content shared on politicians' accounts remains mainly formal and professional, with only some glimpses of the politician's private life (Bast, 2021: Ekman & Widholm, 2017; Filimonov et al., 2016). Therefore, while Macron's self-presentation will probably be "privatised" to a certain extent, he will likely disclose parts of his personal life and intimacy sparingly, instead concentrating on presenting his formal and professional persona. Hence:

Hypothesis 1a (H1a): Macron's visual self-presentation on Instagram is more 'individualised' than 'privatised'.

Regarding potential differences in Macron's depiction between his personal account and that of his photographer, hypotheses were formulated based on two main assumptions. First, the content shared on @emmanuelmacron and @soazigdelamoissonnière likely differs since the two accounts would otherwise not be used independently to shape Macron's presentation on Instagram. Indeed, Macron could be using De La Moissonnière's pictures on his personal account and simply tagging the photographer in the post. However, instead, they appear to use their accounts independently, though they both focus on depicting the French president. In fact, while De La Moissonnière was previously also sharing her other projects on her account, she is, since 2017, only posting about Macron, reflecting her role as his official photographer. Therefore, while both Macron himself and De La Moissonnière appear to participate in the French president's image management and visual self-presentation, one may expect that they, on their respective Instagram accounts, adopt a different perspective and do not portray him in the exact same way. Consequently:

Hypothesis 2 (H2): There is a difference in the degree of personalisation between @emmanuelmacron account and @soazigdelamoissonnière account.

Second, one might also expect that De La Moissonnière's account will be primarily focused on depicting Macron in a professional and formal context, as even though the

photographer has privileged access to official and semi-private events, De La Moissonnière is less frequently present in the private life of the politician. Therefore, it is predicted that:

Hypothesis 2a (H2a): Macron's visual self-presentation on Instagram is more 'individualised' on @soazigdelamoissonniere account than on @emmanuelmacron account.

Hypothesis 2b (H2b): Macron's visual self-presentation on Instagram is more 'privatised' on @emmanuelmacron account than on @soazigdelamoissonniere account.

Concerning the electoral versus routine periods' comparison, it should be noted that little research about the personalisation of politics took such a comparative perspective (Van Aelst & De Swert, 2009; Ceccobelli, 2018). Indeed, most research has focused on politicians' visual self-presentation during election campaigns, while more day-to-day communication has been neglected (Steffan, 2020; Liebhart & Bernhardt, 2017; Filimonov et al., 2016). Given the lack of comparative research, it is difficult to form clear directional hypotheses about the degree and type of personalisation of Macron's self-presentation. Nevertheless, based on previous literature, formulating some assumptions may still be possible.

First, with the emergence of social media, the notion of "permanent campaigning", the idea that "politicians need to think about their daily endeavours in relation to media coverage as if the election campaign period never ends", may be becoming a closer reality (Vasko & Trilling, 2019, p. 344; Blumenthal, 1982; Larsson, 2016). Assuming that the line between elections and routine periods is becoming blurred would imply making no distinction between those periods and, therefore, considering that politicians' communication and self-presentation are similar during those times. However, as argued by Peeters et al. (2023), the two time periods differ considerably in terms of issues for the key actors, including politicians, for whom there is more at stake as the elections approach (p. 5). Indeed, during the electoral campaign, one of the candidates' primary goals is to be seen by their electorate, and perhaps even more in a presidential system, in which citizens directly elect their political leader (as opposed to a parliamentary system) (Kriesi, 2012). Furthermore, there is also strong evidence that differences exist, between electoral and routine periods, in the way politicians act (Walgrave & Van Aelst, 2006) but also use social media, such as Twitter (Vasko & Trilling, 2019; Stier et al., 2018) or Facebook (Larsson, 2016; Ceccobelli, 2018). Consequently, it is expected that:

Hypothesis 3 (H3): There is a difference in the degree of personalisation in Macron's visual self-presentation between elections/campaign and routine periods.

When it comes to personalisation's dimensions, arguments could be made in both directions. On the one hand, one could argue that during elections/campaign periods, politicians may want to appear more "professional", emphasizing their political capabilities and activities. In that way, they could enhance their credibility and legitimacy to those who will have to choose their future leader (Metz et al., 2020). On the other hand, however, it could also be defended that politicians might want to present themselves in a more personal/private way, making them appear more approachable, like a "normal person", so as to establish a closer relationship with their audience (Lalancette & Raynauld, 2019; Schill, 2012). Once again, it is complex to formulate directional hypotheses regarding Macron's visual self-presentation and the extent to which it might be individualised or privatised. However, as explained above, differences will likely exist between those periods. Therefore, it is expected that:

> **Hypothesis 3a (H3a)**: There is a difference in the degree of individualisation in Macron's visual self-presentation between elections/campaign and routine periods.

> **Hypothesis 3b (H3b)**: There is a difference in the degree of privatisation in Macron's visual self-presentation between elections/campaign and routine periods.

Methods

In this chapter, the research design is presented, and the different methodological choices are outlined. First, the chapter introduces the selected method: a quantitative visual content analysis. Second, the chapter elaborates on the case selection and data collection, including the choice of Macron, the choice of Instagram as a platform of study, the timeframe selection, and the relevance of considering both Macron's account and De La Moissonnière's account. Then, the chapter describes the operationalization of personalisation and how the different dimensions are made measurable for the subsequent analysis. Next, the main methodological limitations are identified, and issues of reliability and validity are discussed. Finally, the coding process and statistical tests are further described. In that section, the creation of three new variables used for the subsequent statistical tests is also detailed.

I.   Quantitative visual content analysis

To better comprehend Macron's visual self-presentation, to what extent it is personalised, and how it differs across accounts and periods, a quantitative visual content analysis of Instagram posts was conducted. Throughout the thesis, units of analysis are referred to as "Instagram posts". However, it must be noted that only the visual content of each post is examined (i.e. the image). Posts' caption, likes and comments were not considered for this research.

Quantitative visual content analysis can be defined as "a systematic observational method used for testing hypotheses about how the media represent people, events, situations, and so on" (Bell, 2004, p. 14). Indeed, this research aims to observe and quantify patterns emerging from the data (i.e. Instagram's visuals) in a systematic manner and test the previously established hypotheses about Macron's visual self-presentation (Coe & Scacco, 2017; Franzosi, 2004). A quantitative approach was selected because, compared to a qualitative method, the former allows for processing large amounts of data, consequently making generalizable predictions possible (Bock et al., 2011).

Furthermore, a quantitative analysis method was also most suited to the visual framing approaches adopted in this research. Indeed, this thesis primarily follows a denotative approach, supplemented with a few elements of the stylistic-semiotic approach (Rodriguez & Dimitrova, 2011). The former "refers to the persons or objects and discrete elements actually depicted in the visual" (Steffan, 2020, p. 3099). In contrast, the latter "refers to the stylistic choices (e.g. camera angle, camera distance) and pictorial conventions (e.g. social distance) in the visual" (Steffan, 2020, p. 3099). Similar to Steffan's (2020) study of political candidates'

visual self-presentation on different social media platforms, the analysis of visual metaphors (i.e. connotative approach) or latent meanings of visual frames (i.e. ideological approach) is left out in this thesis, as those would require a more qualitative approach. In this case, the content analysis performed primarily aims at identifying manifest and easily perceivable visual elements rather than detecting more implicit features with underlying meanings, hence the choice to employ a quantitative approach.

Examining what appears in Macron's Instagram posts and determining to what extent his visual self-presentation is personalised can only be done if the relatively abstract concept of "personalisation" is turned into measurable variables. However, before further developing the operationalization, the rationale for choosing Emmanuel Macron on Instagram as a case study must be clarified.

II. Case selection & data collection

In this research, the units of analysis consist of Instagram posts (i.e. visuals) issued between the 16th of November 2016 and the 28th of February 2023, retrieved from two different accounts: @emmanuelmacron and @soazigdelamoissonniere. Before further detailing the data collection and retrieval process, it is important to underline the relevance of several research characteristics: the choice of Emmanuel Macron as a case study and Instagram as the platform examined, the timeframe delineation, and the pertinence of considering two Instagram accounts.

Emmanuel Macron

Emmanuel Macron is a French politician and current President of France. At the head of his own political party, "En Marche", he was first elected in 2017, succeeding François Hollande, and re-elected in 2022, defeating, for the second time, Marine Le Pen in the second round. Therefore, Macron has occupied France's executive head of state position for more than six years. He has become a well-known political personality, not only to French citizens but also to international audiences. This growing "popularity" may also be observed in academia, where articles and studies about him have been flourishing. Among others, scholars have investigated Macron's communication strategies (Wharton, 2018), political speeches (Labbé & Savoy, 2020), and the use of Twitter during the Covid-19 pandemic (Drylie-Carey et al., 2020). Nonetheless, no research has investigated the president's visual self-presentation on Instagram. Closing this gap in the literature is all the more pertinent since Macron has multiplied his presence on various social media platforms, such as Snapchat, YouTube, or,

more recently, TikTok, while also becoming increasingly active on others, like Twitter and Instagram.

Instagram

Instagram, the free photo and video-sharing app initially released in 2010, counts over 2 billion monthly active users today (Statista, 2023a). In France, the platform has a user base of 23 million, of which 18.1 of them use it on a daily basis (Statista, 2023b; Médiamétrie, 2023). Increasingly, social media platforms are used as a source of political information, and one is today quite likely to encounter, (in-)voluntarily, political content on these social networking sites (Amsalem & Zoizner, 2022; Newman et al., 2020; Nanz & Matthes, 2022). This greater use was confirmed by interviews with Instagram users who consider the platform "a key news source to stay current on issues and candidates" (Parmelee & Roman, 2019, p. 7). In addition to citizens' growing use of social media to access political news, politicians themselves also seem to be increasingly present on those platforms: in 2017, more than 70% of United Nations member states' leaders had a personal profile on Instagram (Burson-Marsteller, 2017).

Compared to other popular social media platforms, such as Twitter or Facebook, Instagram is image-centred, meaning that all posts must contain some visual content (Russman & Svensson, 2016; Farkas & Bene, 2020), consequently creating a "strong visual-oriented culture" (Kanaouti, 2018, p. 51). It is, therefore, particularly suited for visual self-presentation and may be considered an "ideal political marketing platform" (Muñoz & Towner, 2017, p. 291; Steffan, 2020). However, while Instagram seems to represent the most appropriate platform for studying politicians' visual self-presentation, only a few studies investigated the matter on this specific platform (Uluçay & Melek, 2021; Lalancette & Raynauld, 2020; Muñoz & Towner, 2017; Peng, 2021). Furthermore, concerning personalisation, previous research has shown that visual communication on Instagram is used as a tool "to exhibit the 'human' sides of politicians", and that the content shared was more personalised than on other platforms (i.e. Facebook) (Farkas & Bene, 2020, p. 134). Along the same lines, Filimonov et al. (2016) found out that Swedish political parties used Instagram as a "virtual billboard", displaying personalised yet professional pictures of political candidates (p. 8). Therefore, the platform represents a pertinent case study for examining politicians' personalisation in the digital age.

Two Instagram accounts: @emmanuelmacron and @soazigdelamoissonnière

The decision to examine Soazig de la Moissonnière's account, Macron's official personal photographer, in addition to Macron's account, is also a question of relevance. Indeed, while the photographer's account counts significantly fewer followers than Macron's (i.e. 210 000 versus 3.2 million), it does play an essential role in Macron's self-presentation and image management, as pointed out by *Le Monde*: "Soazig de la Moissonière, a cornerstone of Emmanuel Macron's storytelling" (Marteau, 2022). Moreover, given the importance of (visual) self-presentation offline as much as online, politicians often employ an entire team of professionals to "construct, maintain and reinforce a positive public image" (Mattan & Small, 2021, p. 478). Therefore, it may be argued that pictures posted on De La Moissonnière's account form an integral part of Macron's strategic self-presentation, a practice in which "politicians employ personal photographers who have privileged access in official and semi-private situations" (Liebhart & Bernhardt, 2017, p. 16). A prime example of politicians' strategic self-presentation is Pete Souza, the American photographer in charge of the official coverage of Barack Obama, who played a crucial role in the former US president's visual storytelling (Pucci, 2009). Lastly, yet importantly, no study has ever referred to this De La Moissonnière's Instagram account, reinforcing the pertinence of examining this social media page.

Timeframe

The timeframe considered for this research starts on the 16th of November 2016 and ends on the 28th of February 2023. This timeframe was selected to enable a comparison between election periods and more "day-to-day" communication, as reflected in the second sub-question, "To what extent Macron's visual self-presentation does differ during routine versus election periods". Indeed, research in political communication usually focuses on electoral periods, while routine periods are often ignored and remain under-investigated (Metz et al., 2020; Peeters et al., 2023). However, as remarked by Lilleker and Veneti (2023), today's politicians are constantly campaigning, making it essential to also examine their everyday self-presentation, including on social media. Nevertheless, it should be noted that not every single post issued within this timeframe was included in the analysis, as the resulting sample would have been too consequent for a master thesis project. Therefore, specific periods were selected for the subsequent analysis, keeping in mind the aim of obtaining a representative sample. The selection process is summarized in Table 3.1 and further detailed below.

On the one hand, for the elections period, two time-intervals were considered. Firstly, posts issued between the 16th of November 2016, the day Macron officially announced his candidacy for the 2017 presidential elections, and the 10th of May 2017, three days after the second-round results' announcement (and Macron's victory), were included. From this period, 89 posts from Macron's account were collected, while none were retrieved from De La Moissonnière's account since she was not the (future) president's official photographer yet. Hence, during this period, she posted content unrelated to Macron, elections, or politics in general, therefore considered irrelevant for this research. Secondly, for the 2022 presidential elections, posts issued between the 3rd of March 2022, the date on which Macron officially announced that he would run for a second mandate, until the 27th of April 2022, three days after the second-round results (and Macron's second victory), were included. From this period, 16 and 19 posts were respectively retrieved from Macron's and De La Moissonnière's accounts.

It should be noted that the two periods selected differ in one main aspect: duration. Indeed, the 2017 interval (175 days) is relatively longer than the 2022 one (51 days). It is because, for the 2017 elections, Macron's presidential campaign started considerably earlier than in 2022; as for the former, he announced his candidacy more than five months before the first round, while for the latter, he did so just over a month beforehand. Therefore, although the length of the two periods differs significantly, they both have been carefully selected to represent election time as accurately as possible.

On the other hand, five intervals of two months have been selected for the routine period. For every "non-election year" (i.e. 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, and 2023), all posts issued between the 1st of January and the 28th/29th of February were retrieved. These periods were chosen first because they do not intersect with campaign/elections time, but also because they seem to reflect "day-to-day" politics well. Indeed, except for 2021, when Covid-19 was still relatively high on the agenda, the other periods were relatively "calm" and "business as usual". For instance, in 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2023, Macron attended the *Salon de l'Agriculture de Paris*, the largest agricultural fair in France and a momentous event that the president attends yearly. Joining these types of events is part of the president's official duties and constitutes a good reflection of the head of state's day-to-day activities. It appears that Macron carried out his professional responsibilities and attended regular events during the two-month period, without any significant incidents or crises. This suggests that the chosen timeframe is a good representation of how Macron presents himself in routine times.

Instagram posts from the two accounts, 182 from @emmanuelmacron and 115 from @soazigdelamoissonniere were manually collected (i.e. screenshots), resulting in a final sample of 297 posts. From these, a total of 890 pictures were retrieved for the subsequent analysis. In the end, as indicated in Table 3.1, 62% of the pictures analysed (i.e. 556 pictures) concern routine periods, and 38% refer to election periods (i.e. 334 pictures). This percentage accurately reflects that routine times take up more time than election periods in a politician's life (in terms of duration).

Table 3.1: Data collection

	Routine	Elections/campaign	Total
Macron	77 posts (204 pictures)	105 posts (160 pictures)	182 posts (364 pictures)
De La Moissonnière	96 posts (352 pictures)	19 posts (174 pictures)	115 posts (526 pictures)
Total	173 posts (556 pictures)	124 posts (334 pictures)	297 posts (890 pictures)

The discrepancy that one may observe between the number of posts and the number of pictures is due to the (recurring) use of carousel-type posts, allowing users to include up to ten pictures in a single post (i.e. one post might equate to ten pictures). While some previous research decided to consider only the first picture of these kinds of posts, with the argument that this is the visual the viewer is most likely to see (Bast, 2021), it was decided for this thesis that the complete carousel would be considered. While this last argument is perfectly valid, excluding pictures part of carousel posts, in this case, might diminish the overall data representativeness. Indeed, De La Moissonnière relies a lot on this function and fully exploits it to depict Macron's everyday life as France's president. For instance, she often posts carousels with a caption such as "a day at the Elysée with Emmanuel Macron in 10 pictures", portraying him in different situations and contexts, resulting in a series of very varied pictures. Consequently, given the diversity of shots in one Instagram post, not including every visual would result in a less comprehensive picture of Macron's self-presentation.

The inconsistent post/picture ratio from Macron's and De La Moissonnière's accounts may be explained similarly. Indeed, while 182 posts were retrieved from the former, only 364

pictures were analysed, whereas from the 115 posts collected from the latter, 526 pictures were examined. This is due to the photographer's repeated use of carousel posts and explains why the number of pictures analysed originating from her account is significantly higher than from Macron's one, while she actually counts fewer posts than him.

For methodological reasons, videos were excluded from this analysis, as they are of a "different visual nature" and would require another coding scheme (Farkas & Bene, 2020, p. 121). Furthermore, Instagram stories were also excluded, as they are not easily retrievable.

III.   Measurements

To analyse the Instagram posts, the theoretical framework of this research (i.e. personalisation of politics) had to be operationalized. This operationalization resulted in a table (Appendix A) and a codebook (Appendix B), helping "to standardize the decisions that are made during the coding process" and enhance the research's validity, as the coding scheme was elaborated based on previous literature and existing research (Coe & Scacco, 2017, p. 4).

Operationalization: The personalisation of politics

For this research, personalisation is operationalised following primarily Farkas and Bene's (2020) own operationalisation, who, as several other scholars, distinguish between two main dimensions of personalisation: individualisation and privatisation. Indeed, as reflected in the different hypotheses formulated in the last chapter, this research not only aims at determining to what extent Macron's self-presentation on Instagram is personalised but also to assess the "degree of individualisation" and "degree of privatisation". To do so, the aforementioned notions must be translated into measurable elements.

In their research about Hungarian politicians' visual communication on Facebook and Instagram, Farkas and Bene (2020) describe individualisation as "an application of visual tools that highlight candidates in a rather formal way (e.g. settled image, official clothes)", and privatisation as "employing visual tools that help depict candidates informally (e.g. spontaneous images, casual clothes" (p. 123). Basically, they associate the individualisation dimension with "formal features" of politicians' self-presentation, while privatisation is tied to more "informal features" apparent in social media posts. Besides these two categories of features, they also identified two additional types of features: personalised features and general features (Farkas & Bene, 2020). The former is built upon two indicators, "ownership" and "politician's presence", while the latter refers to visual elements that do not convey a more formal/informal image of the politician but are rather usual characteristics of his/her

visual self-presentation. The authors relied on a combination of inductive and deductive content analysis to determine which elements fit which category. They coded ten per cent of their sample to formulate their coding scheme before their principal analysis.

The codebook guiding this research is similarly structured to theirs in that visual elements are classified into the same four categories: general feature, personalised feature, formal feature, and informal feature. An element-based approach was chosen as it is evident that, for instance, formal and informal items may be present simultaneously in the same image. This means that images are not categorically classified as "individualised" or "privatised" but rather that the different features relating to those dimensions are looked for in each image. Therefore, in practice, a single visual may display both "formal" and "informal" features, only "general" features, or all four. For instance, Macron could be pictured reading documents at his desk in a "formal" context, yet wearing a hoodie and a pair of jeans, an "informal" attire. This approach should allow for a contrasted assessment and, eventually, a more accurate depiction of Macron's visual self-presentation on Instagram.

Operationalization: Personalisation's dimensions

Personalisation. In line with Farkas and Bene (2020), personalisation was operationalised into two variables: ownership of the post content and Macron's presence in the picture, and they correspond to the category of "personalised features" (Figure 3.1). On the one hand, if the producer of the visual (i.e. "photograph") is Macron himself or anyone else from his staff, then the visual is categorised as personalised. To determine "ownership", the entire Instagram post was considered: the image as well as the caption[3]. Here, considering the caption helps only to determine with greater certainty whether an image is Macron's or De La Moissonnière's own content. As stated before, the aim is not to analyse the content or the meaning of the caption. The post was only coded as "not own content" if Macron or De La Moissonnière clearly specified that the image was taken from another source (e.g. another politician, media, …) or if it was a re-used image. On the other hand, concerning Macron's presence, if he is pictured in the visual (i.e. we can see Macron in the picture), the post is also considered to be personalised. These two variables, "ownership" and "politicians' presence", constitute the two indicators of personalisation for this research.

Individualisation. Features relating to the individualisation dimension of personalisation are the following: official/campaign/policy-related content, campaign flyers,

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[3] Considering the caption here only helps to determine with greater certainty whether an image is Macron's or De La Moissonnière's own content. The aim is not to analyse the content or the meaning of the caption.

at work/campaign context, another politician (s)' presence, campaign clothing, party symbols/colours, and settled pictures (Farkas & Bene, 2020; Bast, 2021; Van Aelst et al., 2011). A detailed explanation, as well as examples, are provided in the codebook (Appendix B). Each of these features points to an "individualised" portrayal of the politician and constitutes the "formal features" category (Figure 3.1).

Privatisation. Features associated with the privatisation dimension of personalisation are the following: past life/domestic life/leisure time-related content, selfie, non-professional context, presence of family members, casual/sport clothing, pop culture references, and spontaneous pictures (Farkas & Bene, 2020; Bast, 2021; Van Aelst et al., 2011). A detailed explanation, as well as examples, are provided in the codebook (Appendix B). Each of these features suggests a more "privatised" presentation of the politician and constitutes the "informal features" category (Figure 3.1).

Finally, all other elements that are not considered "personalised", "formal", or "informal" are classified as "general features" of visual communication (Figure 3.1). It means they do not specifically indicate a more personalised, individualised, or privatised self-presentation of Macron. For instance, "official clothing" (i.e. suit, shirt, tie) is considered a usual attire for a politician and is therefore categorised as a "general feature". The complete list of these features can be found in Appendix A. In Figure 3.1, the operationalisation of the personalisation dimensions has been added to the personalisation dimensions defined and used for elaborating the theoretical framework presented in the previous chapter. This figure illustrates the allocation of the four categories of visual communication features to one of the personalisation dimensions (or none for the "general features").

Figure 3.1: Integration of the operationalization into the theoretical framework

Personalisation
A process whereby politicians become the main anchor of interpretation and evaluation in the political arena
In visuals, looking for **personalised** features of the politician's self-presentation

Individualisation	Privatisation
A focus on individual politicians as central actors in the political arena, including their ideas, capacities, and policies (similar to "professional personalisation")	A focus on the politician as a private individual, as a person distinct from their public (similar to "private personalisation")
→Focus on qualities and individual activities related to the official office	→Focus on intimate information about the private persona
In visuals, looking for **formal** features related	In visuals, looking for **informal** features related to the politician's personality and

+

General features of politicians' self-presentation (see Appendix A)

IV.   Validity, reliability, and limitations

Quantitative content analysis, like every other research method, presents some limitations. First, while choosing a quantitative approach allows for the identification of patterns in a larger data sample, the latter focuses on manifest meanings; hence more latent meanings may be overlooked. In this case, the analysis will reveal to what extent/how personalised visual features are used in Macron's self-presentation on Instagram. Nonetheless, it will neither uncover the implicit meaning behind those features nor the reason why the president or his photographer decides (not) to display such features. Furthermore, although the timeframe was selected to obtain the most representative data sample possible, it remains that this sample might not be one hundred per cent indicative of the entire 2016-2023 period.

When conducting quantitative research, one must pay particular attention to two concepts assessing the quality of the study. On the one hand, validity, "whether a study's measures are assessing the correct phenomena" is critical in quantitative research (Coe & Scacco, 2017, p. 7). In this research, validity is ensured by the reliance on previous research for operationalising the variables and constructing the codebook. Indeed, Van Aelst et al.'s (2011) theoretical framework provided a comprehensive theoretical background for the

research, and Farkas and Bene's (2020) operationalisation of personalisation helped in establishing a pertinent and extensive codebook.

On the other hand, reliability, which refers to the replicability of the results, is of crucial importance, particularly since this research relies on human coders (Coe & Scacco, 2017). To ensure reliability, several measures are taken. First, besides the main coder (i.e. me), another coder was appointed to code a fragment (i.e. ± 10%) of the dataset. This enabled the calculation of a reliability measure, namely the Krippendorf Alpha, to test to what extent we, the coders, agree on the variables (Zhao et al., 2013). Before conducting the final reliability analysis, the codebook was first pre-tested on a small data sample (i.e. 27 pictures) by the main coder and the second coder. Per cent agreement and Krippendorff's alpha were calculated for the pre-test (see Appendix C). As explained by De Swert (2012), the minimum value accepted for Krippendorff's alpha is often set at .67, while any value above .8 is considered satisfactory. In practice, it means that six variables were found to be "not reliable" for the pre-test. Consequently, after a discussion with the second coder to gather some feedback, the codebook was revised. The updated codebook was made as clear as possible, providing "clear definitions, easy-to-follow instructions, and unambiguous examples" to increase the likelihood that "all coders will code the same item the same way, or that a coder will code the same item the same way at different points in time" (White & Marsh, 2006, p. 32). For instance, visual examples of what was meant by "close-up", "medium shot", and "long shot" were added to the codebook to exemplify the "shot type" variable. Further descriptions and examples were added to the other variables to ensure a better understanding of the latter and a higher intercoder agreement for the following analysis.

After the revision of the codebook, the latter was re-tested by the main coder and the second coder on 10% of the data (i.e. 89 pictures), and reliability measures were calculated once again, computed in Table 3.2. From the six variables that were deemed "unreliable", four of them obtained a < .8 Krippendorff's alpha, "cultural/political references" now exceeds the minimum of .6, and only the variable "feature" does not meet the criteria (i.e. .66). Nevertheless, it should be noted that the per cent agreement for this variable is 98.7%, which may be considered satisfactory (Kassarijan, 1977). The reason why the Krippendorff's alpha value is relatively low while the per cent agreement is quite high is because of the "prevalence" of the category, namely that the "settled" feature is so rare that if the coder does not notice the latter, this significantly impacts the Krippendorff's alpha value (De Swert, 2012).

Table 3.2: Reliability analysis – Revised codebook

Variable	Per cent agreement	Krippendorff's Alpha
Period	100%	1
Account holder	100%	1
Carrousel post	100%	1
Ownership	100%	Undefined*
Politician's presence	100%	1
Type of post	100%	1
Shot type	96.2%	.94
Content & context	88.5%	.85
Appearance of Macron	96.1%	.89
Other people pictured	88.6%	.87
Cultural/political references	92%	.74
Feature	98.7%	.66
Gaze	100%	1

Note *Krippendorff's Alpha is undefined for this variable due to invariant values (i.e. "ownership" always had a value of 1 = "Yes" as an answer to the question "Has the picture been taken by Macron himself or his staff?")

V.   Data analysis

Each picture was coded according to the codebook, and the data was collected in Qualtrics to be easily retrieved from the platform and processed in SPSS. To answer the research question, the two sub-questions, and test the eight hypotheses, various statistical tests were performed. A summary of the data analysis process is provided in Table 3.4. Nonetheless, before being able to proceed to this statistical analysis, three new variables had to be created: "degree of personalisation", "degree of individualisation", and "degree of privatisation".

Creation of the three new variables

In order to test the eight hypotheses and be able to evaluate and compare the degree of personalisation, individualisation, and privatisation of Macron's visual self-presentation, three new variables were created. Initially, only the frequencies for each individual feature were available (as presented in Table 4.1). Although these provide valuable insights, an aggregate

measure for each dimension was lacking. Indeed, creating these variables allowed to determine the overall average degree of personalisation, individualisation, and privatisation of Macron's visual self-presentation on Instagram (H1 and H1a). Furthermore, it also enabled a comparison of these between the two accounts and across both periods (H2, H2a, H2b, H3, H3a, and H3b).

All features pertaining to one dimension were computed into one new continuous variable to create these new variables. This computation was performed in SPSS, where individual features were added together to form the three new variables. As presented in Table 3.3, features related to "personalisation" were computed to create the "degree of personalisation", features of "individualisation" were computed to construct the "degree of individualisation", and features tied to "privatisation" were computed to form "degree of privatisation". As a result, three continuous variables were obtained, indicating "how many personalised/individualised/privatised features" were visible on the pictures. As explained earlier in this chapter, the features were grouped according to Farkas and Bene's (2020) own classification. This classification was not arbitrarily or randomly decided by the authors; instead, they performed a content analysis on ten per cent of their sample (n = 386) (Farkas & Bene, 2020). They relied on a combination of inductive and deductive coding and designed their coding scheme based on these results. This preliminary analysis enabled them to group the visual features present in the Instagram posts in the most appropriate and relevant way. As Farkas and Bene's (2020) study shared many similarities with this research, it was decided that their classification would be replicated.

Table 3.3: Degree of personalisation, individualisation, and privatisation

Dimension of personalisation	Computed (existing) variables	New variable	Explanation
Personalisation	"Ownership" and "Politician's presence"	Degree of personalisation	Score ranging from 0 to 2, representing the number of "personalised" feature visible on a picture
Individualisation	"Campaign flyer", "Political/professional: official", "Political/professional: official visit/event", "Political/professional: campaign", "Political/professional: policy representation", "Other politicians, Member(s) of Macron's team", "Campaign clothing", "Party symbol/name", and "Party colours"	Degree of individualisation	Score ranging from 0 to 10, representing the number of "individualised" feature visible on a picture
Privatisation	"Selfie", "Non-political/non-professional: leisure time", "Non-political/non-professional: past life", "Non-political/non-professional: domestic/private life", "Family members", "Macron's own pet", "Casual clothing", "Sport clothing", and "Popular culture"	Degree of privatisation	Score ranging from 0 to 9, representing the number of "privatised" feature visible on a picture

As one can observe, the "feature" category, consisting of the elements "settled" and "spontaneous", was intentionally left out. Initially, these features respectively pertained to the

"individualisation" and "privatisation" dimensions. On the one hand, the "settled" feature suggests that the picture was pre-planned, or in other words, that the politician was posing for the picture and was considered to convey a more formal image (Farkas & Bene, 2020). On the one hand, the "spontaneous" feature indicates that the examined picture did not seem pre-planned, hence considered to reflect a more informal depiction of the politician (Farkas & Bene, 2020). Even though this variable is a relevant aspect to consider when investigating individuals' visual presentation, the distribution of results for this variable was particularly uneven. Compared to the share of visuals with a "settled" feature, the share of "spontaneous" pictures was far too substantial, creating an impression that "all posts had at least one privatised feature". Therefore, while this result is kept in mind for the final interpretation of results, the "feature" variable is excluded from the subsequent statistical analyses to avoid a distortion of the results in the "degree of individualisation" and "degree of privatisation". Once these new variables were created, it was then possible to determine "how personalised/individualised/privatised" was Macron's visual self-presentation.

Statistical tests and measurements

The various statistical tests performed to test the hypotheses are summarised in Table 3.4, yet a description of these and justification for their selection is provided below. First, Paired Samples t-Tests were performed to determine whether there were significant differences between the number of pictures presenting individualised/privatised features in Macron's visual self-presentation (i.e. considering both accounts' and both periods' posts). A Paired Samples t-Test was selected because the pictures compared are the same, both for "degree of individualisation" and "degree of privatisation" (i.e. one single picture can display both individualised and privatised features).

Second, Independent Sample t-Tests were conducted to compare the means for the degree of personalisation, individualisation, and privatisation between the two accounts and the two periods. These statistical tests "tell the researcher whether there is a statistically significant difference in the mean scores for the two groups or not" (Gerald, 2018, p. 51), which, in this case, are the two Instagram accounts and periods: @emmanuelmacron versus @soazigdelamoissonnière and elections versus routine. To perform such a test, a categorical independent variable and a continuous dependent variable are required. While the former was already existing (i.e. "Account owner": Emmanuel Macron or Soazig De La Moissonnière / "Period": "Elections/campaign" or "Routine"), the latter had to be created. As explained above, three new continuous variables were thus created, "degree of personalisation", "degree

of individualisation", and "degree of privatisation", with which Independent Samples t-Tests could ultimately be performed.

Third, Chi-Square Tests of Independence were performed to determine and examine which individual visual feature accounted for the most significant difference between the accounts/periods. Chi-Square tests were chosen as they allow to "analyse group differences when the dependent variable is measured at a nominal level", as is the case here (McHugh, 2013, p. 143). Finally, Phi association coefficients were calculated to assess the strength of the association between the variables.

Table 3.4: Analysis process – Hypotheses and statistical indicators/tests used

RQ – Sub-RQ	Hypothesis	Statistical measurements/tests	Variables
"To what extent is Macron' visual self-presentation on Instagram personalised?" *	H1: Macron's visual self-presentation on Instagram is highly personalised	Frequency percentages	Ownership, Politician's presence, Degree of personalisation
	H1a: Macron's visual self-presentation on Instagram is more 'individualised' than 'privatised'	Measures of central tendency (i.e. mean, range)	Degree of individualisation, Degree of privatisation
		Paired Samples t-Tests	Degree of individualisation, Degree of privatisation
"To what extent is Macron's visual self-presentation on his official Instagram account different from the one on his personal photographer's account?"	H2: There is a difference in the degree of personalisation between @emmanuelmacron account and @soazigdelamoissonnière account	Independent Samples t-Test	Account owner, Degree of personalisation
		Chi-Square Tests of Independence + Phi Association coefficients	Ownership, Politician's presence
	H2a: Macron's visual self-presentation on Instagram is more 'individualised' on @soazigdelamoissonnière account than on @emmanuelmacron account	Independent Samples t-Test	Account owner, Degree of individualisation
		Chi-Square Tests of Independence + Phi Association coefficients	Every individual feature pertaining to "degree of individualisation" (see Table 3.3)

RQ – Sub-RQ	Hypothesis	Statistical measurements/tests	Variables
	H2b: Macron's visual self-presentation on Instagram is	Independent Samples t-Test	Account owner, Degree of privatisation
	more 'privatised' on @emmanuelmacron account than on @soazigdelamoissonnière account	Chi-Square Tests of Independence + Phi Association coefficients	Every individual feature pertaining to "degree of privatisation" (see Table 3.3)
"To what extent does Macron's visual self-presentation on Instagram differ during routine versus election periods?"	H3: There is a difference in the degree of personalisation in Macron's visual self-presentation between elections/campaign and routine periods	Independent Samples t-Test	Period, Degree of personalisation
		Chi-Square Tests of Independence + Phi Association coefficients	Ownership, Politician's presence
	H3a: There is a difference in the degree of individualisation in Macron's visual self-presentation between elections/campaign and routine periods	Independent Samples t-Test	Period, Degree of individualisation
		Chi-Square Tests of Independence + Phi Association coefficients	Every individual feature pertaining to "degree of individualisation" (see Table 3.3)
	H3b: There is a difference in the degree of privatisation in Macron's visual self-presentation between elections/campaign and routine periods	Independent Samples t-Test	Period, Degree of privatisation
		Chi-Square Tests of Independence + Phi Association coefficients	Every individual feature pertaining to "degree of privatisation" (see Table 3.3)

Note *Both accounts and both periods are considered for these tests.

Results

In this chapter, the results of the statistical tests are presented. The chapter is structured as follows. First, a descriptive summary of the general features of Macron's visual self-presentation on Instagram is provided. Second, the first two hypotheses, related to Macron's overall visual self-presentation, are tested. Third, the statistical tests aiming at comparing Macron's and De La Moissonnière's accounts are performed, and their results are interpreted to confirm/refute the three related hypotheses. Finally, electoral and non-electoral periods are compared in terms of personalisation, individualisation, and privatisation.

I.   General features of Macron's visual self-presentation: Descriptive statistics

Before discussing "personalisation", "individualisation", and "privatisation", a general overview of the French president's visual self-presentation on Instagram is provided. In this section, the occurrence (or not) of "general features" is discussed. In Table 4.1, frequencies for every feature included in the codebook are computed, including the overall percentage, presence on @emmanuelmacron account, @soazigdelamoissonnière account, during elections/campaign periods, and routine periods. These results are further described below.

First of all, regarding the "type" of content, it can be observed that "pictures" (i.e. still images taken by a camera), with 94.6%, account for a large majority of the posts examined. The second-most observed post type is the "only text" (i.e. although uploaded as an image, only text is visible) with 2.4%. However, this content type was primarily used by Macron (5.5%) and only minimally by De La Moissonnière (.2%). Indeed, these "only text" visuals were often discussing new policies or (inter-)national events, such as the "carbon tax" or the Russia-Ukraine war and aiming at informing the public about those.

Besides Macron, other people are also pictured in the Instagram posts. The most often visible category is "ordinary citizens/crowd", who are visible on one-third of the posts (34.3%). Interestingly, in almost one-fourth of the pictures (24.7%), Macron is the only person visible (i.e. "none of the above" feature). Although not considered as such in this research, picturing the politician alone, rather than surrounded by other people, could also be considered to convey a more "personalised" image, placing emphasis on the candidate at the expense of other (political) actors.

Concerning the French president's appearance, he most often wears "official clothing", meaning a suit, a shirt, and a tie (77.8%). As explained earlier, Macron wearing a suit does not convey a more formal or informal image of the president per se, as political

figures are most often pictured in such outfits. In the rest of the posts, Macron is either wearing "outdoor clothes" (10.3%) or, in 10.5% of the cases, if Macron was not fully visible, it was not possible to ascertain his outfit (i.e. "unclear").

Cultural and political references are also incorporated in Macron's visual self-presentation. The French flag was identified on 16% of the posts, slightly more than the European flag, visible on 10.6% of the pictures. From the open codes, "other flags" were spotted multiple times (4.3%), as well as symbols of remembrance (e.g. candle for remembrance of WW2 liberation, Shoah Memorial Paris).

When examining the "shot type", Macron is most often portrayed in a "long shot" (i.e. portrayal of the politician in full length, including the surrounding area) (40.7%), followed by "medium shot" (i.e. portrayal of the politician from knees to head or in full length, excluding the surrounding area) (35.2%), and finally in "close-up" (i.e. portrayal of the politician from shoulders to head or anything closer than that) (24.1%). Finally, when examining Macron's "gaze", it can be concluded that eye contacts are rare, accounting only for 2.2% of the posts. There is usually no direct address between Macron and the viewer (i.e. "no eye contact" = 97.5%). Even though these features were not considered to convey a particular image of Macron, some interpreted them as having a specific social meaning, such as fostering intimacy, personal relationship, or public distance (Rodriguez & Dimitrova, 2011).

Although considered "general", these features still offer valuable insights into Macron's presentation strategy as they may shape, or help him shape, his public image and convey specific messages to his audience. In the following sections, features of "personalisation", "individualisation", and "privatisation" are further examined in relation to the hypotheses.

Table 4.1: Patterns of Macron's visual self-presentation on Instagram

Group of categories	Category	% Overall (N)	% @emmanuel macron (N)	% @soazigdelamoi ssonnière (N)	% electoral periods (N)	% routine periods (N)
	Ownership (Picture taken by Macron/his team)	98.7% (890)	97% (363)	99.8% (527)	98.8% (334)	98.6% (556)
	Politician's presence (Macron is visible on the picture)	81.5% (890)	70.8% (363)	88.8% (527)	86.2% (334)	78.6% (556)
Type	Photo	94.6% (890)	87.1% (363)	99.8% (527)	91.3% (334)	96.6% (556)
	Image macro	1.1% (890)	2.8% (363)	0% (527)	1.5% (334)	.9% (556)
	Campaign flyer	1.1% (890)	2.8% (363)	0% (527)	3% (334)	0% (556)
	Only text	2.4% (890)	5.5% (363)	.2% (527)	3.3% (334)	1.8% (556)
	Montage	.1% (890)	.3% (363)	0% (527)	0% (334)	.2% (556)
	Social media post	.1% (890)	1.1% (363)	0% (527)	.9% (334)	.2% (556)
	Selfie	.4% (890)	.3% (363)	0% (527)	0% (334)	.2% (556)
	Cartoon	.1% (890)	.3% (363)	0% (527)	0% (334)	.2% (556)
Shot type*	Close up	24.1% (725)	16.7% (257)	28.2% (468)	22.9% (288)	24.9% (437)
	Medium shot	35.2% (725)	54.1% (257)	24.8% (468)	43.4% (288)	29.7% (437)
	Long shot	40.7% (725)	29.2% (257)	47% (468)	33.7% (288)	45.3% (437)
Content & context*	Political/professional: Official	20.1% (725)	14.8% (257)	23.1% (468)	9.7% (288)	27% (437)
	Political/professional: Official visit/event	40.4% (725)	59.9% (257)	29.7% (468)	19.1% (288)	54.5% (437)
	Political/professional: Campaign	22.1% (725)	17.9% (257)	24.4% (468)	54.9% (288)	.5% (437)
	Political/professional: Policy representation[4]	2.6% (890)	6.1% (363)	.2% (527)	3.3% (334)	2.2% (556)

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[4] The sample size is different for this category (i.e. 890 instead of 725 for all other categories of this variable). This is because pictures where Macron was not visible (i.e. no "politician's presence") could still be coded as "policy representation". This kind of pictures add up to "policy representation" posts where Macron is visible.

Group of categories	Category	% Overall (N)	% @emmanuel macron (N)	% @soazigdelamoi ssonnière (N)	% electoral periods (N)	% routine periods (N)
	Non-political/non-professional: Leisure time	5.2% (725)	3.9% (257)	6% (468)	4.5% (288)	5.7% (437)
	Non-political/non-professional: Past life	.1% (725)	0% (257)	.2% (468)	.3% (288)	0% (437)
	Non-political/non-professional: Domestic/personal life	3.2% (725)	1.6% (257)	4.1% (468)	3.1% (288)	3.2% (437)
	Unclear	15.7% (725)	10.5% (257)	18.6% (468)	15.3% (288)	16% (437)
Other people pictured	Other politician(s)	16% (890)	13.5% (363)	17.6% (527)	9% (334)	20.1% (556)
	Family member(s)	3.8% (890)	4.1% (363)	3.6% (527)	5.1% (334)	3.1% (556)
	Ordinary citizen(s)/Crowd	34.3% (890)	40.8% (363)	29.8% (527)	47.3% (334)	26.4% (556)
	Celebrity(ies)	.9% (890)	1.7% (363)	.4% (527)	.3% (334)	1.3% (556)
	Pet(s)/Animal(s)	3.3% (890)	3.9% (363)	2.8% (527)	.9% (334)	4.7% (556)
	Macron's pet (i.e. Nemo)[5]	.7% (890)	0% (363)	1.1% (527)	0% (334)	1.1% (556)
	Child(ren)	4.8% (890)	6.3% (363)	3.8% (527)	5.7% (334)	4.3% (556)
	Member(s) of Macron's team[6]	12.4% (890)	4.1% (363)	18% (527)	13.5% (334)	11.7% (556)
	Military	7.4% (890)	7.7% (363)	7.2% (527)	.9% (334)	11.3% (556)
	Security	11% (890)	5% (363)	15.2% (527)	15% (334)	8.6% (556)
	Other	6.3% (890)	5.8% (363)	6.6% (527)	6.6% (334)	6.1% (556)
	None of the above	24.7% (890)	10.2% (363)	6.1% (527)	7.2% (334)	8.1% (556)
	Unclear	7.8% (890)	23.7% (363)	25.4% (527)	23.4% (334)	25.5% (556)
Appearance of Macron	Official clothing	77.8% (725)	75.5% (257)	79.1% (468)	85.4% (288)	72.8% (437)
	Campaign clothing	0% (725)	0% (257)	0% (468)	0% (288)	0% (437)
	Casual clothing	1.1% (725)	0% (257)	1.7% (468)	1% (288)	1.1% (437)
	Sport clothing	0% (725)	0% (257)	0% (468)	0% (288)	0% (437)

[5] Added from the open codes list
[6] Added after the pre-test

Group of categories	Category	% Overall (*N*)	% @emmanuel macron (*N*)	% @soazigdelamoi ssonnière (*N*)	% electoral periods (*N*)	% routine periods (*N*)
	Outdoor clothing	10.3% (725)	14.8% (257)	7.9% (468)	6.9% (288)	12.6% (437)
	Unclear	10.5% (725)	9.3% (257)	11.1% (468)	5.9% (288)	13.5% (437)
	Other	.3% (725)	.4% (257)	.2% (468)	.7% (288)	0% (437)
Cultural/pol itical references	Popular culture	.7% (890)	1.1% (363)	.4% (527)	.9% (334)	.5% (556)
	Party symbol/name	3% (890)	2.8% (363)	3.2% (527)	7.8% (334)	.2% (556)
	Party colours	1.6% (890)	.6% (363)	2.3% (527)	4.2% (334)	0% (556)
	French flag	16% (890)	16.8% (363)	15.4% (527)	17.4% (334)	15.1% (556)
	European flag	10.6% (890)	9.1(363)	11.6% (527)	9.9% (334)	11% (556)
	Other	16% (890)	23.1% (363)	11% (527)	15.3% (334)	16.4% (556)
	None of the above	70% (890)	63.1% (363)	74.8% (527)	65.6% (334)	72.7% (556)
Feature	Spontaneous	97.5% (725)	96.1% (257)	98.3% (468)	97.6% (288)	97.5% (437)
	Settled	1.5% (725)	3.1% (257)	.6% (468)	2.4% (288)	.9% (437)
	Unclear	1% (725)	.8% (257)	1.1% (468)	0% (288)	1.6% (437)
Gaze	Eye-contact	2.2% (725)	3.9% (257)	1.3% (468)	3.8% (288)	1.1% (437)
	No eye-contact	97.5% (725)	96.1% (257)	98.3% (468)	96.2% (288)	98.4% (437)
	Unclear	.3% (725)	0% (257)	.4% (468)	0% (288)	.5% (437)

II.   Personalisation of Macron's visual self-presentation: The overall picture

In this section, the first two hypotheses (i.e. H1 and H1a), related to the personalisation of Macron's visual self-presentation on Instagram, are tested. In Table 4.3, frequencies of the number of personalised/individualised/privatised features visible in Instagram posts are computed. To construct this table, cross-tabulations with the three newly created variables and the "account owner"/"period" variables were performed.

Hypothesis 1

First, to determine "how much personalised" Macron's visual self-presentation was, on both accounts and over both periods, one can look at the frequency percentages for two variables: "ownership" and "politician's presence". Indeed, as explained in the previous chapter, those two variables pertain to the "personalisation" dimension. The frequency of pictures taken by Macron or his team (i.e. "ownership) and whether he is actually visible (i.e. "politician's presence") are reported in Table 4.1. Of the 890 pictures analysed, 98.7% ($N =$ 878) were taken by Macron/his staff, with De La Moissonnière being considered as part of Macron's team, while Macron was visible on the 81.5% ($N = 725$) of pictures. Overall, 81.3% ($N = 725$) (see Table 4.3) of the pictures satisfy both conditions and contain the two personalised features: Macron/his team's own content and Macron is visible. Therefore, H1, stating that "Macron's visual self-presentation on Instagram is highly personalised", may be accepted.

Hypothesis 1a

Second, to verify H1a, namely "Macron's visual self-presentation on Instagram is more 'individualised' than 'privatised', one can start by looking at the measure of central tendency for the overall "degree of individualisation" and the "degree of privatisation". First, it can be observed that the mean for "degree of individualisation" ($M = 1.22$) is significantly higher than for "degree of privatisation" ($M = .16$). This means that, on average, a picture contains 1.22 "individualised" feature and .16 "privatised" feature. Besides this, it should also be noted that the value range differs between the two variables: in a single picture, zero to two "privatised" features could be identified whereas up to five "individualised" features could be spotted. It suggests that, although the number of posts counting four or five individualised features is small, a single picture, in general, could display more individualised features than privatised ones at once.

Furthermore, as mentioned in Table 4.2, the results of the Paired Samples t-Tests indicate that significant differences exist in the number of features per picture between the

"individualisation" and "privatisation" dimensions. Significant average differences were found between pictures with zero individualised or privatised feature (t (889) = -31.22, $p <$ .001); with one individualised or privatised feature (t (889) = 18.27, $p <$ .001); with two individualised or privatised features (t (889) = 12.45, $p <$ .001); and with three individualised or privatised features (t (889) = 6.72, $p <$ .001). Moreover, a significant difference was also found between the average number of individualised features (M = 1.22, SD = .82) and privatised features per picture (M = .16, SD = .73); t (724) = 29.52, $p <$ .001. Lastly, one can note that while 83% (N = 767) of the posts display at least one individualised feature, 87.4% (N = 634) of them do not contain any privatised feature.

Hence, it becomes clear that privatised features are a lot less likely to appear on Instagram posts, hence being much rarer in Macron's visual self-presentation overall. Considering these results, H1a, stipulating that "Macron's visual self-presentation on Instagram is more 'individualised' than 'privatised'" might be accepted.

Table 4.2: Paired Samples t-Tests – Overall degree of individualisation and privatisation

Number of features	% pictures with n individualised feature	% pictures with n privatised feature	p (Paired Samples t-Test)
0	17%	87.4%	.000 ***
1	51%	9.5%	.000 ***
2	25.5%	3%	.000 ***
3	5.9%	0%	.000 ***
4	.4%	0%	.083
5	.1%	0%	.318
Mean (average n of feature per picture)	1.22	.16	.000 ***

Note *** p<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05

Based on the above discussion, it can be concluded that Macron's visual self-presentation on Instagram is highly personalised and, to a certain extent, more "individualised" than "privatised". Nevertheless, notwithstanding the validity of this claim, two critical remarks should be made. Firstly, it should be recalled that "personalisation" is a multi-dimensional concept, meaning that it does not only consist of the politician owning the content he/she posts or being visible on the picture. While assessing (the degree of)

"personalisation" based on these two variables is not inherently wrong, taking into account the "individualisation" and "privatisation" dimensions of the concept is essential to get a more comprehensive understanding of "personalisation". Secondly, in the same vein, further examining the degree of "individualisation" and "privatisation", not only in general but also individually on @emmanuelmacron and @soazigdelamoissonnière as well as during "elections/campaign" and "routine" periods, is also essential to gain a more accurate picture of Macron's visual self-presentation. This is why the rest of the analysis focuses on determining the overall degree of individualisation and privatisation but also checking for potential similarities or differences between the accounts or periods.

Table 4.3: Number of "personalised", "individualised" and "privatised" features – Frequencies

	Number of features	% Overall (*N*)	% @emmanuelmacron (*N*)	% @soazigdelamoissonnière (*N*)	% Elections/campaign periods (*N*)	% Routine periods (*N*)
Personalisation (degree of)	0	1.2% (890)	2.8% (890)	.2% (890)	.9% (890)	1.4% (890)
	1	17.4% (890)	26.7% (890)	11% (890)	13.2% (890)	20% (890)
	2	81.3% (890)	70.5% (890)	88.8% (890)	85.9% (890)	78.6% (890)
	Total	100% (890)	100% (890)	100% (890)	100% (890)	100% (890)
Individualisation (degree of)	0	17% (725)	8.9% (725)	21.4% (725)	14.6% (725)	18.5% (725)
	1	51% (725)	64.2% (725)	43.8% (725)	55.6% (725)	48.1% (725)
	2	25.5% (725)	20.6% (725)	28.2% (725)	23.3% (725)	27% (725)
	3	5.9% (725)	5.8% (725)	6% (725)	5.6% (725)	6.2% (725)
	4	.4% (725)	.4% (725)	.4% (725)	.7% (725)	.2% (725)
	5	.1% (725)	0% (725)	.2% (725)	.3% (725)	0% (725)
	Total	100% (725)	100% (725)	100% (725)	100% (725)	100% (725)
Privatisation (degree of)	0	87.4% (725)	89.1% (725)	86.5% (725)	87.5% (725)	87.4% (725)
	1	9.5% (725)	9.3% (725)	9.6% (725)	9.7% (725)	9.4% (725)
	2	3% (725)	1.6% (725)	3.8% (725)	2.8% (725)	3.2% (725)
	3	0% (725)	0% (725)	0% (725)	0% (725)	0% (725)
	4	0% (725)	0% (725)	0% (725)	0% (725)	0% (725)
	5	0% (725)	0% (725)	0% (725)	0% (725)	0% (725)
	Total	100% (725)	100% (725)	100% (725)	100% (725)	100% (725)

III.   Personalisation on @emmanuelmacron vs. @soazigdelamoissonnière

This section aims to answer the sub-question: "To what extent is Macron's visual self-presentation on his official Instagram account (@emmanuelmacron) different from the one on his personal photographer's account (@soazigdelamoissonnière)?".

Hypothesis 2

Firstly, to determine whether the difference in the degree of 'personalisation' between Macron's and De La Moissonnière's accounts was significant (H2), an Independent Samples t-Test was conducted. The test revealed a statistically significant difference between the degree of personalisation on @emmanuelmacron ($M = 1.68$, $SD = .52$) and the degree of personalisation on @soazigdelamoissonnière ($M = 1.89$, $SD = .32$), $t (551) = -6.75$, $p < .001$ (two-tailed). The average degree of personalisation on De La Moissonnière's account was .21 higher, 95% CI [-.27; -.15]. These results suggest that, on average, De La Moissonnière posts are more "personalised" than Macron's ones.

Then, to examine this difference further, a series of Chi-Square tests were performed for the two variables relating to personalisation (Table 4.4). The first Chi-Square indicates that the difference in "ownership" between Macron's and De La Moissonnière's accounts is significant $X2$ ($2, N = 890) = 14.1$, $p = .001$. Nonetheless, the Phi coefficient suggests that this statistically significant difference is weak $\Phi = .13$, $p = .001$. It means that De La Moissonnière uses slightly more often her own content compared to Macron, who more often shares images which cannot be clearly identified as belonging to him (i.e. "unclear"). The second Chi-Square shows that the difference in "politician's presence" between Macron's and De La Moissonnière's accounts was significant as well $X2$ ($1, N = 890) = 46.1$, $p < .001$. Nevertheless, like "ownership", the Phi coefficient suggests that this statistically significant difference is weak $\Phi = .23$, $p < .001$. In other words, Macron is slightly more often visible on De La Moissonnière's posts than on posts from his own account.

Table 4.4: Chi-Square Tests – "Degree of personalisation" x "Account owner"

Category	% @emmanuel macron	% @soazigdela moissonnière	p (Chi-Square)	Phi coefficient
Ownership (The picture has been taken by Macron/his team	97%	99.8%	.001 ***	.13
Politician's presence (Macron is present on the picture)	70.8%	88.8%	.000 ***	-.23

Note *** p<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05

As evidenced by the t-test result, there is a significant difference in the degree of personalisation between Macron's (70.5%) and De La Moissonnière's (88.8%) accounts. Furthermore, significant differences were found for both variables of "personalisation": "ownership" and "politician's presence". Therefore, H2, stating that "there is a difference in the degree of personalisation between @emmanuelmacron account and @soazigdelamoissnnière account", can be accepted. More than that, based on the above results, it can be concluded that De La Moissonnière's presentation of Macron is more personalised than the French president's self-presentation in that she owns most of the content she posts, and that Macron is more often visible in her posts.

Hypothesis 2a

Secondly, to determine whether the difference in the degree of 'individualisation' between Macron's and De La Moissonnière's accounts was significant (H2a), an Independent Samples t-Test was also conducted. The test revealed a statistically non-significant difference between the degree of individualisation on @emmanuelmacron ($M = 1.25$, $SD = .71$) and the degree of individualisation on @soazigdelamoissonnière ($M = 1.21$, $SD = .88$), $t (622) = .60$, $p = .552$ (two-tailed). These results suggest that, on average, Macron's posts are not more "individualised" than De La Moissonnière's ones.

Then, to examine this relationship further, a series of Chi-Square tests were performed for the variable values of the individualisation dimension (Table 4.5). Despite the non-significant result for the average level of individualisation, Chi-Square tests revealed statistically significant differences between the two accounts for seven variable values (see Appendix D for a detailed description). However, these differences between Macron's and De

La Moissonnière's accounts did not all occur in the same direction. For instance, while posts on @emmanuelmacron depicted the French president almost twice as much in an official visit/event context (@emmanuelmacron = 59.9%) compared with De La Moissonnière's posts, (29.7%), member(s) of Macron's team were visible on 18% of the photographer's pictures but only on 4.1% of Macron's posts. Although these percentages differ significantly, the first observation supports the idea that Macron's account is more "individualised" and conveys a more formal image of the president, while the second result reinforces the opposite, that De La Moissonnière's account is more "individualised".

Table 4.5: Chi-Square Tests – "Degree of individualisation" x "Account owner"

Category	% @emmanuelmacron	% @soazigdelamoissonnière	p (Chi-Square)	Phi coefficient
Campaign flyer	2.8%	0%	.000 ***	-.13
Political/professional: Official	14.8%	23.1%	.008 **	.10
Political/professional: Official visit/event	59.9%	29.7%	.000 ***	-.30
Political/professional: Campaign	17.9%	24.4%	.045 *	.08
Political/professional: Policy representation	6.1%	.2%	.000 ***	-.18
Other politician(s)	13.5%	17.6%	.097	.06
Member(s) of Macron's team	4.1%	18%	.000 ***	.21
Campaign clothing[1]	0%	0%	/	/
Party symbol/name	2.8%	3.2%	.687	.01
Party colours	.6%	2.3%	.042 *	.07

Notes *** p<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05

[1] Never observed in the sample

In sum, despite several significant results for some specific individualised features, no significant difference in the average level of individualisation could be found between Macron's and De La Moissonnière's accounts. Consequently, H2a, stipulating that "Macron's visual self-presentation on Instagram is more 'individualised' on @soazigdelamoissnnière account than on @emmanuelmacron account", must be rejected. De La Moissonnière's

depiction of Macron is not more individualised, more formal, than Macron's own presentation.

Hypothesis 2b

Finally, to determine whether the difference in the degree of 'privatisation' between Macron's and De La Moissonnière's accounts was significant (H2b), an Independent Samples t-Test was once again conducted. Like the previous test, this one revealed a statistically non-significant difference between the degree of privatisation on @emmanuelmacron ($M = .12$, $SD = .38$) and the degree of privatisation on @soazigdelamoissonnière ($M = .17$, $SD = .47$), t (630) = -1.52, $p = .129$ (two-tailed). Nonetheless, it is still interesting to note that, contrary to what was expected, these results suggest that, on average, pictures posted on @soazigdelamoissonnière exhibit more "privatised", informal features than those on @emmanuelmacron.

Then, to examine this relationship further, a series of Chi-Square tests were performed for the variable values relating to the privatisation dimension (Table 4.6). Chi-Square tests revealed significant differences between the two accounts only for two variable's values: "Macron's own pet" $X2$ (1, $N = 890$) = 4.2, $p = .041$ and "casual clothing" $X2$ (1, $N = 725$) = 4.4, $p = .035$. However, the Phi coefficient suggests that these relationships are very weak, respectively $\Phi = .07$, $p = .041$, and $\Phi = .08$, $p = .035$. No significant difference was found for the six other variable values (see Appendix D for full description).

Table 4.6: Chi-Square Tests – "Degree of privatisation" x "Accounts"

Category	% @emmanuelmacron	% @soazigdelamoissonnière	p (Chi-Square)	Phi coefficient
Selfie	.3%	0%	.228	-.04
Non-political/non-professional: Leisure time	3.9%	6%	.227	.05
Non-political/non-professional: Past life	0%	.2%	.458	.03
Non-political/non-professional: Domestic/private life	1.6%	4.1%	.066	.07
Family members	4.1%	3.6%	.687	-.01
Macron's own pet	0%	1.1%	.041 *	.07
Casual clothing	0%	1.7%	.035 *	.08
Sport clothing[1]	0%	0%	/	/
Popular culture	1.1%	.4%	.196	-.04

Notes *** p<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05
[1] Never observed in the sample

Regarding the average degree of privatisation, a non-significant difference was observed, and this difference occurs in the opposite direction than what was initially expected. Therefore, H2b, stating that "Macron's visual self-presentation on Instagram is more 'privatised' on @emmanuemacron account than on @soagidelamoissonnière account", must be rejected. Although to a limited extent, De La Moissonnière exhibits more privatised, informal features in her posts than Macron does on his account. For instance, several of De La Moissonnière's posts portrayed Macron playing with his dog Nemo or in more casual attire. This might seem counterintuitive, as we would not expect De La Moissonnière to have access to "private" moments and to present such an image of the president.

IV. Personalisation during "elections/campaign" vs. "routine" periods

This section aims at answering the sub-question: "to what extent does Macron's visual self-presentation differ during routine versus elections/campaign periods?".

Firstly, to determine whether the difference in the degree of 'personalisation' between "elections/campaign" and "routine" periods was significant (H3), an Independent Samples t-Test was conducted. Similar to the accounts' comparison, the test revealed a statistically significant difference between the degree of personalisation during "elections/campaign" periods ($M = 1.85$, $SD = .38$) and the degree of personalisation during "routine" periods ($M = 1.77$, $SD = .45$), $t(794) = 2.77$, $p = .006$ (two-tailed). The average level of personalisation during "elections/campaign" periods was 0.08 higher, 95% CI [.02; .13]. These results suggest that, on average, Instagram posts issued during "elections/campaign" periods are more "personalised" than those published in "routine" times.

Then, to examine this difference further, a series of Chi-Square tests were performed for the two variables relating to personalisation (Table 4.7). The first Chi-square reveals that the difference in "ownership" between the "routine" and "elections/campaign" periods was not significant $X2 (2, N = 890) = 0.9$, $p = .955$. This means there is no significant difference in the number of pictures taken by Macron or his team between periods of routine and periods of elections/campaign. However, the second Chi-square shows that the difference in "politician's presence" between "elections/campaign" and "routine" periods was significant $X2 (1, N = 890) = 8.0$, $p = .005$. The Phi coefficient, nonetheless, suggests that this relationship is very weak $\Phi = .10$, $p = .005$. Hence, that means there are slightly more pictures with Macron visible posted during "elections/campaign" periods than in "routine" times.

Table 4.7: Chi-Square Tests – "Degree of personalisation" x "Time periods"

Category	% electoral periods	% routine periods	*p* (Chi-Square)	Phi coefficient
Ownership (The picture has been taken by Macron/his team)	98.8%	98.6%	.955	.01
Politician's presence (Macron is present on the picture)	86.2%	78.6%	.005 **	.10

Note *** p<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05

As indicated by the t-test, a significant difference in the degree of personalisation was observed between elections/campaign and routine periods. Consequently, H3 (i.e. "there is a difference in the degree of personalisation in Macron's visual self-presentation between

elections/campaign and routine periods") can be accepted. Moreover, while only a very minor difference exists in "ownership" of the post, one can notice a significant difference in "politician's presence". Indeed, it can be concluded that Macron is more frequently visible in pictures during electoral periods than in routine times.

Hypothesis 3a

Secondly, to find out whether the difference in the degree of 'individualisation' between "elections/campaign" and "routine" periods was significant (H3a), an Independent Samples t-Test was also conducted. The test did not reveal a statistically significant difference between the degree of individualisation during "elections/campaign" periods ($M = 1.23$, $SD = .82$) and the degree of individualisation during "routine" periods ($M = 1.22$, $SD = .82$), t (618) $= .28$, $p = .778$ (two-tailed). These results suggest that, on average, Instagram posts issued during "elections/campaign" periods are not more or less "individualised" than those published during "routine" periods.

Then, to examine this relationship further, a series of Chi-Square tests were performed with the variable values of the individualisation dimension (Table 4.8). Chi-square tests revealed significant differences between the two periods for seven variable values (see Appendix D for a detailed description). Similar to what could be observed for the Chi-Squares' results comparing the degree of individualisation between accounts, the percentages for most "individualised" features differ significantly. For instance, the Phi coefficient (logically) indicates a strong difference in the frequency of pictures where Macron is portrayed in a campaign context: 54.9% of the posts during "elections/campaign" periods for only .5% during "routine" periods $\Phi = .64$, $p < .001$. Likewise, the Phi coefficient suggests a moderate difference in the frequency of posts where Macron is pictured in the context of an official visit/event: 54.5% during "routine" periods versus 19.1% during "elections/campaign" $\Phi = .35$, $p < .001$.

Logically, one can observe that "political/professional: official" and "political/professional: official visit/event" contexts are more frequently depicted in routine times, as these refer to the politician's day-to-day activities and duties. Along the same lines, the "political/professional: campaign" context is, in all logic, way more frequently pictured during electoral periods. However, once again, these relationships go in different directions: the first one provides evidence for Macron's visual self-presentation being more individualised during *routine* periods, whereas the second one supports the exact opposite, namely Macron's visual self-presentation being more individualised during *electoral* periods. The fact that variables from the same scale (i.e. degree of individualisation) go in opposite

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directions may point to an issue in the scale construction. This observation is further discussed in the limitations section.

Table 4.8: Chi-Square Tests – "Degree of individualisation" x "Time periods"

Category	% electoral periods	% routine periods	p (Chi-Square)	Phi coefficient
Campaign flyer	3%	0%	.000 ***	-.14
Political/professional: Official	9.7%	27%	.000 ***	.21
Political/professional: Official visit/event	19.1%	54.5%	.000 ***	.35
Political/professional: Campaign	54.9%	.5%	.000 ***	-.64
Political/professional: Policy representation	3.3%	2.2%	.301	-.04
Other politician(s)	9%	20.1%	.000 ***	.15
Member(s) of Macron's team	13.5%	11.7%	.434	-.03
Campaign clothing[1]	0%	0%	/	/
Party symbol/name	7.8%	.2%	.000 ***	-.22
Party colours	4.2%	0%	.000 ***	-.16

Notes *** p<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05
[1] Never observed in the sample

In brief, despite multiple significant Chi-square results for single "individualised" features, no significant difference in the average level of individualisation was observed between elections/campaign and routine periods. Therefore, H3a (i.e. "there is a difference in the degree of 'individualisation' in Macron's visual self-presentation between elections/campaign and routine periods") must be rejected. It can be concluded that Macron's visual self-presentation on Instagram is not more formal in routine times than during the elections/campaign period or vice versa.

Hypothesis 3b

Finally, to find out whether the difference in the degree of 'privatisation' between "elections/campaign" and "routine" periods was significant (H3b), an Independent Samples t-Test was once again conducted. Like the previous test, this one did not reveal either a statistically significant difference between the degree of privatisation during

"elections/campaign" periods ($M = .15$, $SD = .43$) and the degree of privatisation during "routine" periods ($M = .16$, $SD = .44$), t (723) $= -.15$, $p = .878$ (two-tailed). These results suggest that, on average, pictures posted during "elections/campaign" and "routine" periods are equally "privatised".

Then, to examine this relationship further, a series of Chi-Square tests were performed with the variable values relating to the privatisation dimension (Table 4.9). Chi-Square tests indicated that none of the variable's values differed significantly between the two periods (see Appendix D for a complete description of the results).

Table 4.9: Chi-Square Tests – "Degree of privatisation" x "Time periods"

Category	% electoral periods	% routine periods	p (Chi-Square)	Phi coefficient
Selfie	0%	.2%	.438	.03
Non-political/non-professional: Leisure time	4.5%	5.7%	.476	.03
Non-political/non-professional: Past life	.3%	0%	.218	-.05
Non-political/non-professional: Domestic/private life	3.1%	3.2%	.953	0
Family members	5.1%	3.1%	.126	-.05
Macron's own pet	0%	1.1%	.057	.06
Casual clothing	1%	1.1%	.897	.01
Sport clothing[1]	0%	0%	/	/
Popular culture	.9%	.5%	.527	-.02

Notes *** p<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05

[1] Never observed in the sample

Considering these results, it appears clear that H3b, stipulating that "There is a difference in the degree of 'privatisation' in Macron's visual self-presentation between elections/campaign and routine periods", must be rejected. On the one side, the t-test indicated a non-significant difference between the two periods. Conversely, the Chi-Square tests revealed significant differences for none of the "privatised" features (taken individually).

Conclusion

The emergence of social media provided politicians with an opportunity to communicate more directly with their electorate, yet, they also had to learn how to strategically exploit these new channels to shape their image and promote it to their audience. In this context, scholars devoted much attention to political actors' social media usage, focusing, for instance, on rhetorical strategies or issue framing, however often overlooking visual aspects of communication. In parallel, research has been flourishing about news media's contribution to personalisation politics, its impact on voters' perceptions, and the acceleration of the phenomenon in general. In this research, personalisation is understood as a strategic communication tool that political actors can actively use rather than a phenomenon passively occurring.

By examining Instagram posts, focusing on their visual component, and investigating to what extent Macron presents a personalised image of himself on the platform, this thesis aimed to contribute to the existing research about politicians' self-personalisation strategies and how these are used "visually". Nonetheless, by comparing Macron's to his photographer's account as well as electoral with non-electoral periods, this research does more than simply propose another case study of political personalisation. It highlights how an Instagram account, other than that of the politician itself, may contribute to its visual self-presentation, reveal different facets of his/her persona, and shape his/her public image. In addition, it demonstrates the importance of considering not only election periods when examining politicians' image management, especially in this context where they are increasingly required to create and maintain a presence on social media platforms.

In this final chapter, results from the quantitative visual content analysis of Instagram posts are first summarised. Then, these findings are reflected upon and compared with existing research and evidence. Finally, the thesis limitations are addressed, and avenues for future research are presented.

I.   Summary of results

Comparing accounts: @emmanuelmacron vs. @soazigdelamoissonnière

First, this thesis compared how Macron is pictured on @emmanuelmacron and @soazigdelamoissonnière pages. It was found that the average degree of personalisation differs between the two accounts. While both Macron and De La Moissonnière own the vast

majority of the content they post (97% and 99.8%, respectively), the French president is more often visible on his photographer's account (88.8%) than on his own account (70.8%).

Second, concerning individualisation, some significant differences could be observed. Among others, in terms of "content & context", Macron posts more pictures depicting him during an official visit/event or policy representation, while De La Moissonnière tends to portray the president in his official work environment or a campaign context. However, despite these differences, the average degree of individualisation does not differ between the two accounts. Both feature as many visual elements conveying an individualised, formal image of the French president, just different ones.

Finally, the average degree of privatisation does not differ either between the two accounts. Despite that, it is intriguing to notice that De La Moissonnière still tends to present a more privatised image of Macron on her account.

Comparing periods: elections/campaign vs. routine

Second, this thesis compared how Macron presents himself in electoral and non-electoral times. Like the accounts' comparison, it was found that the average personalisation degree differs between the two periods. In fact, Macron's self-presentation is more personalised during electoral periods, and the president is visible more often in pictures during these times (86.2%) than during routine periods (78.6%).

Regarding individualisation, significant differences were found for individual features. For instance, in terms of "political references", "party symbol/name" were, logically, way more frequently visible during elections (7.8%) than during routine periods (.2%). The same is true for "party colours", which were only visible in electoral times. However, once again, the average degree of individualisation was not proven to differ significantly between the two periods. It can be ascertained that individualised elements are equally featured during both periods, but different elements take more prominence at different moments.

Lastly, it was found that the average degree of privatisation does not differ between the two periods. Not a single significant difference was found in the presence of privatised features in Instagram posts. Hence, it can be concluded that Macron does not present himself more informally during routine than in election periods or vice versa.

Macron's visual self-presentation on Instagram

To sum it all up, it can be ascertained that Macron's visual self-presentation on Instagram is highly personalised in that the vast majority of pictures are Macron/his teams (including De La Moissonnière) own content and that he is visible on most of these images. Furthermore, it can be affirmed that posts issued from De La Moissonnière's account and

published during electoral periods are more personalised than Macron's own posts or those shared during routine times. However, it should be kept in mind that personalisation is a multi-layered concept; hence, the two sub-dimensions investigated in this research, individualisation and privatisation, are just as essential. In these respects, it was established that Macron's visual self-presentation on Instagram is, on average, more "individualised" than "privatised". Further, it looks like Macron and De La Moissonnière present an image of the French president that is equally individualised and privatised. Likewise, Macron's image does not seem remarkably different during electoral and non-electoral periods. Indeed, both formal features, conveying a more professional image of the president and, although to a lesser extent, private features, disclosing a more private side of his persona, are present in Macron's Instagram posts. Overall, Macron presents himself on Instagram in a personalised and individualised, formal way, more than in a privatised, informal manner.

II.   Discussion

First of all, the conclusion drawn at the end of the research, asserting that overall, Macron's visual self-presentation on Instagram is highly personalised, is aligned with most of the previous research conducted about political personalisation (Farkas & Bene, 2020; Filimonov et al., 2016; Metz et al., 2019; Ekman & Widholm, 2017; Larsson, 2019). Indeed, scholars investigating political actors' image management on social media, including Instagram, found that politicians are generally visible on their own posts and make extensive use of a "self-centred style" of communication (Ekman & Widholm, 2017, p. 25; Poulakidakos & Giannouli, 2019; Brands et al., 2021; Filimonov et al., 2016). Additionally, while comparing Facebook and Instagram for political (visual) communication, Farkas and Bene (2020) determined that on Instagram, 90% of the posts were "original content" owned by the politician himself/herself, while more than two-thirds of the visuals pictured him/her. Consequently, in line with their conclusion, it may be accepted that personalisation represents a key characteristic of politicians' visual presentation on social media. Nevertheless, it is imperative to put this affirmation into perspective because "personalisation", if not correctly defined, may mean everything and nothing. Once again, it should be remembered that "personalisation", conceptually and practically, goes beyond the politician's presence on a visual. As rightly pointed out by Grussel and Nord (2020) in their research about Swedish leaders' Instagram posts, "if personalisation is simply defined as a focus on photos of the party leader, then Instagram can surely be described as a personalised arena" but if it is characterised as "a stronger focus on politicians and their personal, non-political

characteristics, the answer is no" (p. 12). This quote perfectly illustrates the reason why distinguishing "personalisation" from "individualisation" and "privatisation" is crucial when investigating that phenomenon. Therefore, by individually assessing each dimension and comparing their prevalence, this research reiterates the necessity of avoiding using "personalisation" as an umbrella term for the various self-presentation strategies and tactics political actors employ on social media.

Second, the idea that Macron's visual self-presentation does not significantly differ between elections and routine periods, and remains highly personalised, confirms the findings of one of the few studies investigating a non-electoral period. Metz et al. (2020), in their study of German parliament members' Facebook posts, found that "self-personalisation is much applied in regular government periods" and suggested that "self-personalisation is more than an election campaign strategy" (p. 1492). Hence, this research reaffirms the need to more systematically consider both electoral and non-electoral periods when investigating the phenomenon of personalisation.

Furthermore, while scholars tend to agree in saying that social media have reconfigured political communication and that politicians are more active on these platforms during (pre-)elections periods, less is known about whether both periods differ significantly in terms of how political actors use social media, what content they share and for what purpose (Peeters et al., 2023). Indeed, based on scholars' arguments stating that, during the campaign, political actors act differently on social media, differences in the degree of individualisation and privatisation of Macron's visual self-presentation between elections and routine periods were initially expected (Ceccobelli, 2018; Vasko & Trilling, 2019). The fact that this research invalidated these assumptions may be explained in two ways.

First, in 2022, while few doubted that Macron would run for a second term, the international political context, more than tense at the time, undoubtedly disrupted the course of the French presidential elections and the candidates' campaign. Indeed, Russia's invasion of Ukraine in late February 2022 prompted European leaders to meet and address the issue, shifting priorities and disrupting political agendas. This was reflected in the content Macron and De La Moissonnière shared at the time, as a significant share of their Instagram posts were focused on the situation in Ukraine, the conflict resolution, and all the official and political duties that came with it. Consequently, this particular period, being more likely to resemble "day-to-day" politics, might explain why substantial differences in Macron's self-presentation could not be identified.

Second, and probably more importantly, these findings could indicate that "permanent campaigning" may also apply to politicians' representation of themselves on social media. Joathan and Lilleker (2020) pointed out that our modern communication landscape "emphasises a need for, while also facilitating, permanent campaigning" (p. 70). Following this idea, one may argue that since politicians constantly need to present and maintain a positive image, to gain and sustain public approval, their behaviours on social media would not considerably differ between electoral and non-electoral periods. This research provides evidence in favour of this argument, and therefore supports this notion of "permanent campaigning".

Next, when considering De La Moissonnière's account, the photographer's posts primarily portrayed Macron in an individualised fashion, depicting the politician in an official, working context and featuring predominantly formal elements. Leaving aside any political discussion, abstaining from taking a stance, or commenting on current policies, De La Moissonnière's account acts as a visual diary of Macron's life. However, rather than the personal and private facets, this diary relates the professional and formal aspects: Macron is portrayed as the President of France, exercising his functions as a politician, and performing his head of state's duties. This depiction of the president is very similar to other politician's portrayals on social media where, as explained by Grussel and Nord (2020), "we meet a hard-working professional politician" and get a sense of "the everyday life of a (party) leader" (p. 12). The spontaneous character of these visuals, mostly without eye contact between the subject and the viewer, confirms that these posts are aimed at presenting the politician "at work" in his role as a "leader" (Grussel & Nord, 2020; Filimonov et al., 2016: Gordillo-Rodriguez & Bellido-Perez, 2021). As illustrated by the "a day with the President in 10 pictures" series, this professional and formal image of Macron is the one primarily exhibited on De La Moissonnière's account, which, added to the political- and work-oriented Macron's own presentation, reflects the dominant individualisation of the president's presentation on Instagram.

The observation that De La Moissonnière presents a more "privatised" image of the president than Macron himself, was surprising yet intriguing (even though this difference was not proven significant). Indeed, it was expected that the photographer, due to restricted access to the more private setting of Macron's life, would only very occasionally capture these personal/intimate moments. Although the depiction of privatised features remains relatively rare, especially compared to the frequent occurrence of individualised ones, the former certainly plays a role in Macron's image management and may be part of the broader visual

branding strategy of the French president. While existing research on the privatisation dimension of personalisation often focuses on how the politician him/herself makes use of specific visual features to convey a more informal image, few investigated the work of their official photographers and their role in the politician's public representation. One of the most well-known examples is Obama's official photographer, Pete Souza, whose coverage of the former American president took place at two levels, the official and the informal (Pucci, 2009). As described by Pucci (2009), the pictures falling into the second category depicted Obama, for instance, "in a hurry, just like the average man", in "informal moments in between two official events" and "between the lines, the labour of being president" (p. 43). The same kind of visuals could be found on De La Moissonnière's account, where one could see Macron running up the stairs to a meeting or petting his dog Nemo, in his office at the Elysée, after a long day of work.

However, this "privatised" image of the president remains far less prominent in Macron's visual self-presentation overall. In contrast to what Farkas and Bene's (2020) concluded from their platforms' comparison, namely that Instagram's visual communication is more closely tied to the privatisation component of personalisation, this thesis aligns with most of the results from research about political personalisation on social media (Filimonov et al., 2016; Grussel & Nord, 2020; Gordillo-Rodriguez & Bellido-Perez, 2021; Metz et al., 2020; Peng, 2021). That is, Macron's visual self-presentation remains primarily professional, falling into the traditional "politics-as-usual" form of communication, but is occasionally complemented by glimpses into his personal and private lives. Therefore, in this regard, this research supports Grussel and Nord's (2020) proposition that there seems to be an "established genre" for politicians' presentations on Instagram.

Assuming this later argument to be true, a crucial question logically arises: is this image management strategy effective? Or, in other words, does that help political actors stimulate users' engagement, generate interactions with their audience, and, eventually, positively influence their electorate's opinion or perception? In that regard, "personalised" content was found to increase users' engagement on politicians' social media posts (Farkas & Bene, 2020; Ulucay & Melek, 2021). For instance, Brand et al. (2021) noticed that a post garnered 1.13 times more likes when a politician was visible than when he/she was not. However, beyond "personalisation", scholars also investigated the influence of "individualisation" and "privatisation" as visual communication strategies on viewers (Metz et al., 2020; Peng, 2021; Gordillo-Rodriguez & Bellido-Perez, 2021). There, Metz et al. (2020) revealed a paradox: professional personalisation (i.e. individualisation) is most

frequently employed by politicians yet has little (or no) impact on users' engagement, whereas private personalisation (i.e. privatisation) is rarely used, although it was found to drive users' engagement. In other words, it seems that what politicians currently present on social media does not correspond with what viewers expect or like to see. In their research on the personalisation of political actors on Instagram, Parmelee et al. (2022) interviewed Gen-Z social media users about what they wish to see on politicians' accounts. Participants expressed interest in getting more insights into the politician's job, official duties, and work-related activities. Yet, they also insisted they wanted them to be less formal on the platform, posting more about their personal interests, hobbies, and family life (Parmelee et al., 2022). As reported by Peng (2021), the "social nature of social media platforms" may explain why users' preference for more intimate, person-related content (p. 159). Therefore, while Macron's visual self-presentation already provides insights into his private life via De La Moissonnière's account, these remain pretty limited. By sharing a little more about these whilst continuing to present this personalised, formal yet spontaneous image of him, Macron may generate more engagement from his audience and that, perhaps, might positively impact its image among its electorate.

III.   Limitations & future research

As is the case with any research, it is essential to recognise the limitations inherent to this thesis and identify avenues for future research. Firstly, regarding the theoretical framework, choosing a multi-dimensional conception of political personalisation was not only adequate but necessary. Indeed, it was found that all three dimensions, personalisation, individualisation, and privatisation, were manifested in different ways and to varying degrees in Macron's visual self-presentation. In agreement with others (Van Aelst et al., 2011; Holtz-Bacha et al., 2014; Van Santen & Van Zoonen, 2010), this research confirms that personalisation should be regarded as a multi-layered concept and reiterates the need for examining each layer individually in future research. Nonetheless, beyond these three dimensions, scholars recently argued that an additional facet, known as "emotionalisation", which focuses on the "disclosure and expression of emotions", should receive closer attention (Peng, 2021, p. 145; Van Santen & Van Zoonen, 2010; Metz et al., 2020). Furthermore, emotional content, positive or negative, was proven to generate more user engagement (Gerodimos & Justinussen, 2015; Bene, 2017; Metz et al., 2020). Hence, given visuals' potential for depicting human sentiments, examining Macron's expression of emotions could be a relevant complement to this research.

Secondly, scales' construction, namely the way individual visual features were grouped to form the three new variables (i.e. degree of personalisation, degree of initialisation, and degree of privatisation), should be discussed. The grouping of variables in this thesis replicated Farkas and Bene's (2020) categorisation, which was built upon a prior content analysis of Instagram posts. The authors relied on a combination of inductive and deductive methods, which is "consistent with the recommended strategy for the creation of new measures" (Morgado et al., 2017, p. 9). Therefore, Farkas and Bene's (2020) classification was expected to be coherent and compatible with this thesis. Applied to this research, however, this way of grouping the individual visual features into three new continuous variables was perhaps not the most adequate. Indeed, the relationships of the various variables, which were combined in one scale, repeatedly went in opposite directions. For example, when comparing the degree of individualisation between electoral and routines periods, it could be argued that the difference in "party colours" supported the idea that Macron's self-presentation during *elections* periods is more individualised[7], while the difference in "other politicians" attests the opposite, that the French president posts are more individualised in *routine* times[8].

While this does not invalidate that comparing time periods or accounts is relevant, it emphasises the need for (more) careful scale construction. Therefore, this thesis should be considered a first attempt to establish new scales for measuring the overall degree of personalisation in visuals, yet there is still much room for improvement. Future research should pay particular attention to the specificities of their case to avoid issues similar to those encountered in this research, for instance, concerning the "degree of individualisation" scale, which included both routine- and elections-related variables. Besides adapting the scales, more robust reliability testing should be performed to assess scales' internal consistency.

Furthermore, future research may also try to include additional variables such as "gaze" or "shot type", which have not been included in the aforementioned scales. Indeed, some scholars attempted to explain how the type/angle of shot or the fact that the politician establishes an eye-contact with the viewer may instil the distance between the politician and their audience (or reduce it) or convey a more approachable and personal image (Grussel & Nord, 2020; Bast, 2021; Sampietro & Sanchez-Castillo, 2020). Therefore, these visual aspects may represent relevant additions to the personalisation, individualisation or privatisation scales.

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[7] ($\Phi = -.16, p < .001$)
[8] ($\Phi = .15, p < .001$)

Thirdly, concerning the method, quantitative visual content analysis can be considered appropriate as it allows for the analysis of a relatively large number of pictures and, consequently, for the comparison of the two accounts and periods. Relying on a quantitative analysis was particularly relevant and appropriate given this research's comparative approach. Indeed, with a more limited sample, it might not have been feasible to make these kinds of generalisations about one of the account's content or specificities related to one of the periods. Nonetheless, by relying on this quantitative approach, the underlying meanings of particular visual elements might have been missed. Furthermore, focusing exclusively on the visual content of the posts implies that other crucial elements, such as the posts' captions or users' reactions (i.e. likes, comments, and shares), have been left out. Indeed, this research attempted to investigate the impact of (personalised) self-presentation strategies neither on users' engagement nor on voters' perceptions of Macron. However, given the powerful tool social media represents for politicians, the primary importance of their image management, and the persuasive potential of visuals, one can only agree that investigating viewers' responses to such strategies is essential. A few scholars have already expressed their interest in this process (Parmelee et al., 2022; Lindholm et al., 2020; Metz et al., 2020), yet further investigations through experimental studies for instance, would be desirable.

Lastly, and more practically, this research is also limited in terms of time frame selection and data format. On the one hand, the fact that not every single post issued between 2016 and today was considered inevitably affects the sample's representativeness and, hence, the generalizability of findings. On the other hand, while this research did not include video and stories in its analysis, Macron has used both formats relatively frequently in the last months. Moreover, besides the fact that Instagram has become increasingly video-focused (Clark, 2021), Macron also now owns a Tik Tok account and a YouTube channel. Therefore, given the growing interest in and popularity of video formats, future research could investigate how personalisation is manifested in this type of content, and whether these are used to convey a more formal or informal image of political actors.

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Appendix A: Conceptualization of categories

Group of categories	Category	Interpretation	Type of feature[9]
Ownership	Macron's own content	The picture has been taken by Macron himself or his staff.	P
	Not Macron's own content	The picture has not been taken by Macron himself or his staff.	G
Politician's presence	Macron's presence	Macron is pictured on the image	P
	Macron's absence	Macron is not pictured on the image	G
Type	Photo	Still image taken by a camera.	G
	Image macro	Image with text, but without party symbol/reference.	G
	Campaign flyer	Image with text and presence of party symbol/reference.	F
	Only text	Although uploaded as an image, only text is visible.	G
	Montage	An image consisting of several photos.	G
	Social media post	Screenshot of another social media post (e.g. a Tweet).	G
	Cartoon	Drawing/comic	G
	Selfie	A picture that someone has taken of oneself.	I
Shot type	Close up	Portrayal of the politician from shoulders to head or anything closer than that, e.g., portrayal of body parts (eyes, hands, …).	G
	Medium shot	Portrayal of the politician from knees to head or in full length, excluding the surrounding area	G
	Long shot	Portrayal of the politician in full length, including the surrounding area	G

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[9] (G) = General visual communication feature, (P) = Personalisation in general (relating to personalisation), (F) = Formal feature of personalisation (relating to individualisation), (I) = Informal feature of personalisation (relating to privatisation).

Conte nt & contex t	Political/ Professional	Official	Shows Macron at work at his desk, during regular work activities (e.g., consulting), or while reading documents.	F
		Official visit/event	Shows Macron visiting a place/institution/organization or attending an event for professional purposes	F
		Campaign	Shows Macron attending a campaign event/activity/visit	F
		Policy representation	Visual representation of policies/ideas	F
	Non-political/ Non-professional	Leisure time	Shows Macron during leisure/recreational activity (e.g. doing sports, reading a book, eating out, …)	I
		Past life	Shows Macron's personal background/upbringing	I
		Domestics/per sonal life	Shows Macron's private and personal moments with his relatives	I
Other people pictured		Other politician(s)		F
		Family member(s)	Brigitte Macron (wife), Jean-Michel Macron (father),	I
		Ordinary citizen(s)/Cro wd		G
		Celebrity(ies)		G
		Pet(s)/Animal (s)		G
		Children		G
		Members of Macron's team		G
		Military		G

	Security		G
Appearance of Macron	Official clothing	Suit, shirt, tie	G
	Campaign clothing	T-shirt, coat, or cap with party logo	F
	Casual clothing	Jeans, t-shirt, hoodie	I
	Sport clothing	Sportswear clothes	I
	Outdoor clothing	Coat (not clear what he wears underneath)	G
Cultural/political references	Popular culture	Movies, pop music, sport	I
	Party symbol/name	Official logo of "En Marche" "Renaissance", "La République en Marche"	F
	Party colours	Official colours of "En Marche"	F
	French flag	Any appearance of the French flag	G
	European flag	Any appearance of the European flag	G
	Open codes	Other cultural or political references pictured	G
Feature	Spontaneous	Not pre-planned	I
	Settled	Pre-planned	F
Gaze	Eye-contact	Gaze directed at viewer (direct address)	G
	No eye-contact	Gaze not directed at viewer (indirect address)	G

Appendix B: Codebook

<u>General post's information</u>

1) **Post ID**
   - IMG_XXXX
2) **Screenshot of the post**
3) **Which account is the post issued from?**
   - 0: Emmanuel Macron (@emmanuelmacron)
   - 1: Soazig de la Moissonnière (@soazigdelamoissonnière)
4) **Date of the post**
   - dd/mm/yyyy
5) **Period (mutually exclusive)**
   - 1: Elections (16 November 2016 to 10 May 2017 OR 7 March 2022 to 27 April 2022)
   - 2: Routine (Any post not part of 'elections')
6) **Number of likes**
7) **Is the picture part of a carousel post? (i.e. multiple pictures in one post) (mutually exclusive)**
   - 1: Yes
   - 2: No
   - 3: Unclear

<u>Personalisation</u>

1) **Has the picture been taken by Macron himself or his staff? (nb. Soazig is considered part of Macron's staff) (mutually exclusive)**
   - 1: Yes
   - 2: No
   - 3: Unclear
2) **Is Macron present on the picture? (Select "Yes" even if Macron is not fully visible (e.g. only his hands are visible)) (mutually exclusive)**
   - 1: Yes
   - 2: No
   - 3: Unclear
3) **Type of picture (mutually exclusive)**
   - 1: Photo = Still image taken by a camera

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- 2: Image macro = Image with text, but without party symbol/reference
- 3: Campaign flyer = Image with text and presence of party symbol/reference
- 4: Only text = Although uploaded as an image, only text is visible
- 5: Montage = An image consisting of several photos
- 6: Cartoon = Drawing/comic
- 7: Selfie = A picture that Macron has taken of himself
- 9^{10}: Social media post = Screenshot of another social media post (e.g. a Tweet)
- 8: Unclear

4) **Shot type (mutually exclusive)**
- 1: Close-up = Portrayal of the politician from shoulders to head or anything closer than that (e.g. portrayal of body parts such as eyes, hands, …)
- 2: Medium shot = Portrayal of the politician from knees to head or in full length, excluding the surrounding area
- 3: Long shot = Portrayal of the politician in full length, including the surrounding area
- 5: Unclear

5) **Close-up picture: Which body part is portrayed? (mutually exclusive)**
- 4: Face
- 5: Eyes
- 6: Hands
- 7: Other
- 8: Back

6) **Content and context (preferably select only one answer - if necessary, select two e.g. Macron and Brigitte having a discussion just before one of his campaign's speech: select "political/professional: campaign" and "non-political/non-professional: domestic/personal life") (non-mutually exclusive)**
- 1: Political/professional - Official = Macron at work (e.g. at his desk), during regular work activities (e.g. consulting, meetings, reading documents, …)
- 10: Political/professional - Official visit/event = Macron visiting a place/institution/organization or attending an event for professional purposes

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[10] Because the codebook was first pre-tested and then revised, some of the answer options were modified/added/deleted. Therefore, those are not always chronologically ordered, or some values might be missing.

- 2: Political/professional - Campaign = Macron attending a campaign event/activity/visit
- 11: Political/professional - Policy representation = Visual representation of policies/ideas
- 4: Non-political/non-professional - Leisure time = Macron during a leisure/recreational activity (e.g. doing sports, reading a book, eating out, …)
- 5: Non-political/non-professional - Past life = Macron's personal background/upbringing (e.g. childhood pictures)
- 6: Non-political/non-professional - Domestic/personal life = Macron's private and personal moments with his relatives
- 8: Unclear
- 9: Other

7) **Where was the picture taken? (e.g. Elysée, European institution, …) (Write "na" if "not applicable" or "un" if "unclear/unknown")**

8) **In one verb, what is Macron doing on the picture? (e.g. walking, talking, discussing, reading, running, …)**

9) **Other people pictured (multiple answer possible) (non-mutually exclusive)**
- 1: Other politician(s)
- 2: Family member(s) (e.g. wife, father, step-daughter, …)
- 3: Ordinary citizen(s)/Crowd
- 4: Celebrity(ies)
- 5: Pet(s)
- 9: Children
- 10: Member(s) of Macron's team
- 11: Military
- 12: Security
- 6: Other
- 7: Unclear
- 8: None of the above

10) **Appearance of Macron (mutually exclusive)**
- 1: Official clothing = Suit, shirt, tie
- 2: Campaign clothing = T-shirt, coat, or cap with party logo
- 3: Casual clothing = Jeans, t-shirt, hoodie
- 4: Sport clothing = Sportswear clothes

- 7: Outdoor clothing = Macron is wearing a coat (i.e. not clear what he wears underneath that)
- 5: Unclear
- 6: Other

11) Cultural/political references (non-mutually exclusive)
- 1: Popular culture = Movies, pop music, sport, …
- 2: Party symbol/name = "Renaissance", "En Marche", "La République en Marche"
- 3: Party colours = Marine blue, white, yellow
- 4: French flag
- 5: European flag
- 6: Other
- 7: Unclear
- 8: None of the above

12) Feature (mutually exclusive)
- 1: Spontaneous = Picture does not seem pre-planned
- 2: Settled = Picture seems pre-planned (i.e. Macron is posing for the picture)
- 3: Unclear

13) Gaze (mutually exclusive)
- 1: Eye-contact = Macron's gaze directed at the viewer (direct address)
- 2: No eye-contact = Macron's gaze not directed at the viewer (indirect address)
- 3: Unclear

Appendix C: Reliability analysis – Pre-test

Variable	Per cent agreement	Krippendorff's Alpha
Period	96.2%	.92
Account holder	100%	Undefined*
Carrousel post	100%	1
Ownership	100%	Undefined*
Politicians' presence	100%	1
Type of post	100%	1
Shot type	82.4%	.64
Content & context	64.7%	.55
Appearance of Macron	94.1%	.65
Other people pictured	73.1%	.63
Cultural/political references	80.8%	.60
Feature	94.1%	0
Gaze	100%	Undefined*

*Krippendorff's Alpha is undefined for this variable due to invariant values

Appendix D: Detailed results Chi-Square Test of Independence

H2: There is a difference in the degree of personalisation between @emmanuelmacron and @soazigdelamoissnnière accounts

The first Chi-Square indicates that the difference in "ownership" between Macron's and De La Moissonnière's accounts is significant $X2$ (2, $N = 890$) = 14.1, $p = .001$. The second Chi-Square shows that the difference in "politician's presence" between Macron's and De La Moissonnière's accounts was significant as well $X2$ (1, $N = 890$) = 46.1, $p < .001$.

Table 4.4: Chi-Square Tests – "Degree of personalisation" x "Account owner"

Category	% @emmanuel macron	% @soazigdela moissonnière	p (Chi-Square)	Phi coefficient
Ownership (The picture has been taken by Macron/his team	97%	99.8%	.001[a] ***	.13
Politician's presence (Macron is present on the picture)	70.8%	88.8%	.000 ***	-.23

Notes
[a] 3 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.22.
*** p<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05

H2a: Macron's visual self-presentation on Instagram is more 'individualised' on @soazigdelamoissnnière account than on @emmanuelmacron account

The Chi-Square tests revealed statistically significant differences between the two accounts for seven variable's values: "campaign flyer" $X2$ (1, $N = 890$) = 14.7, $p < .001$; "political/professional: official visit/event" $X2$ (1, $N = 725$) = 62.9, $p < .001$; "political/professional: policy representation" $X2$ (1, $N = 890$) = 29.4, $p < .001$; "member(s) of Macron's team" $X2$ (1, $N = 890$) = 38.3, $p < .001$; "political/professional: official" $X2$ (1, $N = 725$) = 7.1, $p = .008$; "political/professional: campaign" $X2$ (1, $N = 725$) = 4.0, $p = .045$; and "party colours" $X2$ (1, $N = 890$) = 4.1, $p = .042$. However, the difference in "other politician(s)" $X2$ (1, $N = 890$) = 2.8, $p = .097$ and "party symbol/name" $X2$ (1, $N = 890$) = 0.2, $p = .687$, have not proven statistically significant.

Table 4.5: Chi-Square Tests – "Degree of individualisation" x "Account owner"

Category	% @emmanuelmacron	% @soazigdelamoissonnière	p (Chi-Square)	Phi coefficient
Campaign flyer	2.8%	0%	.000[a] ***	-.13
Political/professional: Official	14.8%	23.1%	.008 **	.10
Political/professional: Official visit/event	59.9%	29.7%	.000 ***	-.30
Political/professional: Campaign	17.9%	24.4%	.045 *	.08
Political/professional: Policy representation	6.1%	.2%	.000 ***	-.18
Other politician(s)	13.5%	17.6%	.097	.06
Member(s) of Macron's team	4.1%	18%	.000 ***	.21
Campaign clothing[1]	0%	0%	/	/
Party symbol/name	2.8%	3.2%	.687	.01
Party colours	.6%	2.3%	.042 *	.07

Notes
[1] Never observed in the sample
[a] 1 cell (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.08.
*** p<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05

H2b: Macron's visual self-presentation on Instagram is more 'privatised' on @emmanuemacron account than on @soagidelamoissonnière account

The Chi-Square tests revealed significant differences between the two accounts only for two variable's values: "selfie" $X2$ (1, N = 890) = 1.5, p = .228; "non-political/non-professional: leisure time" $X2$ (1, N = 725) = 1.5, p = .227; "non-political/non-professional: past life" $X2$ (1, N = 725) = 3.4, p = .066; "non-political/non-professional: domestic/private life" $X2$ (1, N = 725) = 4.0, p = .045; "family members" $X2$ (1, N = 890) = 0.2, p = .687; and "popular culture" $X2$ (1, N = 890) = 1.7, p = .196.

Table 4.6: Chi-Square Tests – "Degree of privatisation" x "Accounts"

Category	% @emmanuelmacron	% @soazigdelamoissonnière	p (Chi-Square)	Phi coefficient
Selfie	.3%	.1%	.228[a]	-.04
Non-political/non-professional: Leisure time	3.9%	6%	.227	.05
Non-political/non-professional: Past life	0%	.2%	.458[b]	.03
Non-political/non-professional: Domestic/private life	1.6%	4.1%	.066	.07
Family members	4.1%	3.6%	.687	-.01
Macron's own pet	0%	1.1%	.041[c] *	.07
Casual clothing	0%	1.7%	.035[d] *	.08
Sport clothing[1]	0%	0%	/	/
Popular culture	1.1%	.4%	.196[e]	-.04

Notes
[1] Never observed in the sample
[a] 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .41.
[b] 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .35.
[c] 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.45.
[d] 1 cell (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.84.
[e] 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.45.
*** p<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05

H3: There is a difference in the degree of personalisation between elections/campaign and routine periods

The first Chi-square reveals that the difference in "ownership" between "routine" and "elections/campaign" periods was not significant $X2$ (2, $N = 890$) = 0.9, $p = .955$. The second Chi-square shows that the difference in "politician's presence" between "elections/campaign" and "routine" periods was significant $X2$ (1, $N = 890$) = 8.0, $p = .005$.

Table 4.7: Chi-Square Tests – "Degree of personalisation" x "Time periods"

Category	% electoral periods	% routine periods	p (Chi-Square)	Phi coefficient
Ownership (The picture has been taken by Macron/his team)	98.8%	98.6%	.955[a]	.01
Politician's presence (Macron is present on the picture)	86.2%	78.6%	.005 **	.10

Notes
[a] 3 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.13.
*** p<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05

H3a: There is a difference in the degree of 'individualisation' in Macron's visual self-presentation between elections/campaign and routine periods

The Chi-square tests revealed significant differences between the two periods for seven variable's values: "campaign flyer" $X2$ $(1, N = 890) = 16.8$, $p < .001$; "political/professional: official" $X2$ $(1, N = 725) = 32.2$, $p < .001$; "political/professional: official visit/event" $X2$ $(1, N = 725) = 90.2$, $p < .001$; "political/professional: campaign" $X2$ $(1, N = 725) = 298.7$, $p < .001$; "other politician(s)" $X2$ $(1, N = 890) = 19.4$, $p < .001$; "party symbol/name" $X2$ $(1, N = 890) = 41.0$, $p < .001$; and "party colours" $X2$ $(1, N = 890) = 23.7$, $p < .001$. However, the difference in "political/professional: policy representation" $X2$ $(1, N = 890) = 1.1$, $p = .301$ and "member(s) of Macron's team" $X2$ $(1, N = 890) = 0.6$, $p = .434$, have not proven significant.

Table 4.8: Chi-Square Tests – "Degree of individualisation" x "Time periods"

Category	% electoral periods	% routine periods	p (Chi-Square)	Phi coefficient
Campaign flyer	3%	0%	.000[a] ***	-.14
Political/professional: Official	9.7%	27%	.000 ***	.21
Political/professional: Official visit/event	19.1%	54.5%	.000 ***	.35
Political/professional: Campaign	54.9%	.5%	.000 ***	-.64
Political/professional: Policy representation	3.3%	2.2%	.301	-.04
Other politician(s)	9%	20.1%	.000 ***	.15
Member(s) of Macron's team	13.5%	11.7%	.434	-.03
Campaign clothing[1]	0%	0%	/	/
Party symbol/name	7.8%	.2%	.000 ***	-.22
Party colours	4.2%	0%	.000 ***	-.16

Notes
[1] Never observed in the sample
[a] 1 cell (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.08.
*** p<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05

H3b: There is a difference in the degree of 'individualisation' in Macron's visual self-presentation between elections/campaign and routine periods

The Chi-Square tests indicated that none of the variable's values differed significantly between the two periods: "selfie" $X2$ (1, $N = 890$) = 0.6, $p = .438$; "non-political/non-professional: leisure time" $X2$ (1, $N = 725$) = 0.5, $p = .476$; "non-political/non-professional: past life" $X2$ (1, $N = 725$) = 1.5, $p = .218$; "non-political/non-professional: domestic/private life" $X2$ (1, $N = 725$) = 0, $p = .953$; "family members" $X2$ (1, $N = 890$) = 2.3, $p = .126$; "Macron's own pet" $X2$ (1, $N = 890$) = 3.6, $p = .057$; "casual clothing" $X2$ (1, $N = 725$) = 0, $p = .897$; and "popular culture" $X2$ (1, $N = 890$) = 0.4, $p = .527$.

Table 4.9: Chi-Square Tests – "Degree of privatisation" x "Time periods"

Category	% electoral periods	% routine periods	p (Chi-Square)	Phi coefficient
Selfie	0%	.2%	.438[a]	.03
Non-political/non-professional: Leisure time	4.5%	5.7%	.476	.03
Non-political/non-professional: Past life	.3%	0%	.218[b]	-.05
Non-political/non-professional: Domestic/private life	3.1%	3.2%	.953	0
Family members	5.1%	3.1%	.126	-.05
Macron's own pet	0%	1.1%	.057[c]	.06
Casual clothing	1%	1.1%	.897[d]	.01
Sport clothing[1]	0%	0%	/	/
Popular culture	.9%	.5%	.527[e]	-.02

Notes
[1] Never observed in the sample
[a] 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .41.
[b] 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .35.
[c] 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.45.
[d] 1 cell (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.84.
[e] 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.45.
*** p<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05

Appendix E: Statistical tests results – SPSS Output

Patterns of Macron's visual self-presentation on Instagram (Table 5)

% total

"Ownership"

Has the picture been taken by Macron himself or his staff? (nb. Soazig is considered part of Macron's staff)	N	%
Yes	878	98.7%
No	3	0.3%
Unclear	9	1.0%

"Politician's presence"

Is Macron present on the picture? (Select "Yes" even if Macron is not fully visible (e.g. only his hands are visible))	N	%
Yes	725	81.5%
No	165	18.5%

"Type of picture"

Type of picture	N	%
Photo = Still image taken by a camera	842	94.6%
Image macro = Image with text, but without party symbol/reference	10	1.1%
Campaign flyer = Image with text and presence of party symbol/reference	10	1.1%
Only text = Although uploaded as an image, only text is visible	21	2.4%
Montage = An image consisting of several photos	1	0.1%
Cartoon = Drawing/comic	1	0.1%
Selfie = A picture that Macron has taken of himself	1	0.1%
Social media post = Screenshot of another social media posts (e.g. a Tweet)	4	0.4%

"Shot type"

Is Macron present on the picture?
(Select "Yes" even if Macron is not fully visible (e.g. only his hands are visible)) * Shot type Crosstabulation

% within Is Macron present on the picture?
(Select "Yes" even if Macron is not fully visible (e.g. only his hands are visible))

		Shot type			
		Close up = Portrayal of the politician from shoulders to head or anything closer than that (e.g. portrayal of body parts such as eyes, hands, ...)	Medium shot = Portrayal of the politician from knees to head or in full length, excluding the surrounding area	Long shot = Portrayal of the politician in full length, including the surrounding area	Total
Is Macron present on the picture? (Select "Yes" even if Macron is not fully visible (e.g. only his hands are visible))	Yes	24.1%	35.2%	40.7%	100.0%
Total		24.1%	35.2%	40.7%	100.0%

"Content & context"

$Contentandcontext Frequencies

		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
Content & context^a	Dummy Con: Official	146	18.8%	20.1%
	Dummy Con: Official visit/event	293	37.7%	40.4%
	Dummy Con: Campaign	160	20.6%	22.1%
	Dummy Con: Policy representation	2	0.3%	0.3%
	Dummy Con: Leisure time	38	4.9%	5.2%
	Dummy Con: Past life	1	0.1%	0.1%
	Dummy Con: Domestic/personal life	23	3.0%	3.2%
	Dummy Con: Unclear	114	14.7%	15.7%
Total		777	100.0%	107.2%

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Dummy Content & context: Policy representation combined

	N	%
NOT Policy representation/informative post	867	97.4%
Policy representation/informative post	23	2.6%

"Other people pictured"

$Otherpeople Frequencies

		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
Other people pictured^a	Dummy People: Other politicians	142	12.0%	16.0%
	Dummy People: Family	34	2.9%	3.8%
	Dummy People: Citizens	305	25.7%	34.3%
	Dummy People: Celebrities	8	0.7%	0.9%
	Dummy People: Pets/animals	29	2.4%	3.3%
	Dummy People: Children	43	3.6%	4.8%
	Dummy People: Members of Macron's team	110	9.3%	12.4%
	Dummy People: Military	66	5.6%	7.4%
	Dummy People: Security	98	8.3%	11.0%
	Dummy Other people pictured: Nemo (Macron's dog)	6	0.5%	0.7%
	Dummy People: Other	56	4.7%	6.3%
	Dummy People: Unclear	69	5.8%	7.8%
	Dummy People: None of the above	220	18.5%	24.7%
Total		1186	100.0%	133.3%

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

"Appearance of Macron"

Crosstab

% within Is Macron present on the picture?
(Select "Yes" even if Macron is not fully visible (e.g. only his hands are visible))

		Appearance of Macron - Selected Choice					
		Official clothing = Suit, shirt, tie	Casual clothing = Jeans, t-shirt, hoodie	Unclear	Other	Outdoor clothing = Macron is wearing a coat (i.e. not clear what he wears under that)	Total
Is Macron present on the picture? (Select "Yes" even if Macron is not fully visible (e.g. only his hands are visible))	Yes	77.8%	1.1%	10.5%	0.3%	10.3%	100.0%
Total		77.8%	1.1%	10.5%	0.3%	10.3%	100.0%

"Cultural/political references"

$Culturalpoliticalref Frequencies

		Responses		Percent of Cases
		N	Percent	
Cultural/Political references[a]	Dummy Cultural/pol symbols: Pop culture	6	0.6%	0.7%
	Dummy Cultural/pol symbols: Party symbol/name	27	2.6%	3.0%
	Dummy Cultural/pol symbols: Party colours	14	1.3%	1.6%
	Dummy Cultural/pol symbols: French flag	142	13.5%	16.0%
	Dummy Cultural/pol symbols: European Union flag	94	9.0%	10.6%
	Dummy Cultural/pol symbols: Other	142	13.5%	16.0%
	Dummy Cultural/pol symbols: None of teh above	623	59.4%	70.0%
Total		1048	100.0%	117.8%

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

"Feature"

Crosstab

% within Is Macron present on the picture?
(Select "Yes" even if Macron is not fully visible (e.g. only his hands are visible))

		Feature			
		Spontaneous = Picture does not seem pre-planned	Settled = Picture seems pre-planned (i.e. Macron is posing for the picture)	Unclear	Total
Is Macron present on the picture? (Select "Yes" even if Macron is not fully visible (e.g. only his hands are visible))	Yes	97.5%	1.5%	1.0%	100.0%
Total		97.5%	1.5%	1.0%	100.0%

"Gaze"

Crosstab

% within Is Macron present on the picture?
(Select "Yes" even if Macron is not fully visible (e.g. only his hands are visible))

		Gaze			
		Eye-contact = Macron's gaze directed at the viewer (direct address)	No eye-contact = Macron's gaze not directed at the viewer (indirect address)	Unclear	Total
Is Macron present on the picture? (Select "Yes" even if Macron is not fully visible (e.g. only his hands are visible))	Yes	2.2%	97.5%	0.3%	100.0%
Total		2.2%	97.5%	0.3%	100.0%

% @emmanuelmacron versus % @soazigdelamoissonnière

"Ownership"

Which account is the post issued from? * Has the picture been taken by Macron himself or his staff? (nb. Soazig is considered part of Macron's staff) Crosstabulation

% within Which account is the post issued from?

		Has the picture been taken by Macron himself or his staff? (nb. Soazig is considered part of Macron's staff)			Total
		Yes	No	Unclear	
Which account is the post issued from?	Emmanuel Macron (@emmanuelmacron)	97.0%	0.6%	2.5%	100.0%
	Soazig de la Moissonnière (@soazigdelamoissonniere)	99.8%	0.2%		100.0%
Total		98.7%	0.3%	1.0%	100.0%

"Politician's presence"

Which account is the post issued from? * Is Macron present on the picture? (Select "Yes" even if Macron is not fully visible (e.g. only his hands are visible)) Crosstabulation

% within Which account is the post issued from?

		Is Macron present on the picture? (Select "Yes" even if Macron is not fully visible (e.g. only his hands are visible))		Total
		Yes	No	
Which account is the post issued from?	Emmanuel Macron (@emmanuelmacron)	70.8%	29.2%	100.0%
	Soazig de la Moissonnière (@soazigdelamoissonniere)	88.8%	11.2%	100.0%
Total		81.5%	18.5%	100.0%

"Type of picture"

Which account is the post issued from? * Type of picture Crosstabulation

% within Which account is the post issued from?

		Type of picture								Total
		Photo = Still image taken by a camera	Image macro = Image with text, but without party symbol/reference	Campaign flyer = Image with text and presence of party symbol/reference	Only text = Although uploaded as an image, only text is visible	Montage = An image consisting of several photos	Cartoon = Drawing/comic	Selfie = A picture that Macron has taken of himself	Social media post = Screenshot of another social media posts (e.g. a Tweet)	
Which account is the post issued from?	Emmanuel Macron (@emmanuelmacron)	87.1%	2.8%	2.8%	5.5%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	1.1%	100.0%
	Soazig de la Moissonnière (@soazigdelamoissonniere)	99.8%			0.2%					100.0%
Total		94.6%	1.1%	1.1%	2.4%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.4%	100.0%

"Shot type"

Which account is the post issued from? * Shot type Crosstabulation

% within Which account is the post issued from?

		Shot type			
		Close up = Portrayal of the politician from shoulders to head or anything closer than that (e.g. portrayal of body parts such as eyes, hands, ...)	Medium shot = Portrayal of the politician from knees to head or in full length, excluding the surrounding area	Long shot = Portrayal of the politician in full length, including the surrounding area	Total
Which account is the post issued from?	Emmanuel Macron (@emmanuelmacron)	16.7%	54.1%	29.2%	100.0%
	Soazig de la Moissonnière (@soazigdelamoissonniere)	28.2%	24.8%	47.0%	100.0%
Total		24.1%	35.2%	40.7%	100.0%

"Content & context"

Accountowner*$Contentandcontext Crosstabulation

			Content & context[a]								Total
			Dummy Con: Official	Dummy Con: Official visit/event	Dummy Con: Campaign	Dummy Con: Policy representation	Dummy Con: Leisure time	Dummy Con: Past life	Dummy Con: Domestic/personal life	Dummy Con: Unclear	
Which account is the post issued from?	Emmanuel Macron (@emmanuelmacron)	Count	38	154	46	2	10	0	4	27	257
		% within Accountowner	14.8%	59.9%	17.9%	0.8%	3.9%	0.0%	1.6%	10.5%	
	Soazig de la Moissonnière (@soazigdelamoissonniere)	Count	108	139	114	0	28	1	19	87	468
		% within Accountowner	23.1%	29.7%	24.4%	0.0%	6.0%	0.2%	4.1%	18.6%	
Total		Count	146	293	160	2	38	1	23	114	725

Percentages and totals are based on respondents.

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Which account is the post issued from? * Dummy Content & context: Policy representation combined Crosstabulation

% within Which account is the post issued from?

		Dummy Content & context: Policy representation combined		Total
		NOT Policy representation/informative post	Policy representation/informative post	
Which account is the post issued from?	Emmanuel Macron (@emmanuelmacron)	93.9%	6.1%	100.0%
	Soazig de la Moissonnière (@soazigdelamoissonniere)	99.8%	0.2%	100.0%
Total		97.4%	2.6%	100.0%

"Other people pictured"

Accountowner*$Otherpeople Crosstabulation

			Other people pictured[a]													Total
			Dummy People: Other politicians	Dummy People: Family	Dummy People: Citizens	Dummy People: Celebrities	Dummy People: Pets/animals	Dummy People: Children	Dummy People: Members of Macron's team	Dummy People: Military	Dummy People: Security	Dummy Other people pictured: Nemo (Macron's dog)	Dummy People: Other	Dummy People: Unclear	Dummy People: None of the above	
Which account is the post issued from?	Emmanuel Macron (@emmanuelmacron)	Count	49	15	148	6	14	23	15	28	18	0	21	37	86	363
		% within Accountowner	13.5%	4.1%	40.8%	1.7%	3.9%	6.3%	4.1%	7.7%	5.0%	0.0%	5.8%	10.2%	23.7%	
	Soazig de la Moissonnière (@soazigdelamoissonniere)	Count	93	19	157	2	15	20	95	38	80	6	35	32	134	527
		% within Accountowner	17.6%	3.6%	29.8%	0.4%	2.8%	3.8%	18.0%	7.2%	15.2%	1.1%	6.6%	6.1%	25.4%	
Total		Count	142	34	305	8	29	43	110	66	98	6	56	69	220	890

Percentages and totals are based on respondents.

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

"Appearance of Macron"

Which account is the post issued from? * Appearance of Macron - Selected Choice Crosstabulation

% within Which account is the post issued from?

		Appearance of Macron - Selected Choice					
		Official clothing = Suit, shirt, tie	Casual clothing = Jeans, t-shirt, hoodie	Unclear	Other	Outdoor clothing = Macron is wearing a coat (i.e. not clear what he wears under that)	Total
Which account is the post issued from?	Emmanuel Macron (@emmanuelmacron)	75.5%		9.3%	0.4%	14.8%	100.0%
	Soazig de la Moissonnière (@soazigdelamoissonniere)	79.1%	1.7%	11.1%	0.2%	7.9%	100.0%
Total		77.8%	1.1%	10.5%	0.3%	10.3%	100.0%

"Cultural/political references"

Accountowner*$Culturalpoliticalref Crosstabulation

			Cultural/Political references[a]							
			Dummy Cultural/pol symbols: Pop culture	Dummy Cultural/pol symbols: Party symbol/name	Dummy Cultural/pol symbols: Party colours	Dummy Cultural/pol symbols: French flag	Dummy Cultural/pol symbols: European Union flag	Dummy Cultural/pol symbols: Other	Dummy Cultural/pol symbols: None of teh above	Total
Which account is the post issued from?	Emmanuel Macron (@emmanuelmacron)	Count	4	10	2	61	33	84	229	363
		% within Accountowner	1.1%	2.8%	0.6%	16.8%	9.1%	23.1%	63.1%	
	Soazig de la Moissonnière (@soazigdelamoissoniere)	Count	2	17	12	81	61	58	394	527
		% within Accountowner	0.4%	3.2%	2.3%	15.4%	11.6%	11.0%	74.8%	
Total		Count	6	27	14	142	94	142	623	890

Percentages and totals are based on respondents.

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

"Feature"

Which account is the post issued from? * Feature Crosstabulation

% within Which account is the post issued from?

		Feature			
		Spontaneous = Picture does not seem pre-planned	Settled = Picture seems pre-planned (i.e. Macron is posing for the picture)	Unclear	Total
Which account is the post issued from?	Emmanuel Macron (@emmanuelmacron)	96.1%	3.1%	0.8%	100.0%
	Soazig de la Moissonnière (@soazigdelamoissoniere)	98.3%	0.6%	1.1%	100.0%
Total		97.5%	1.5%	1.0%	100.0%

"Gaze"

Which account is the post issued from? * Gaze Crosstabulation

% within Which account is the post issued from?

		Gaze			
		Eye-contact = Macron's gaze directed at the viewer (direct address)	No eye-contact = Macron's gaze not directed at the viewer (indirect address)	Unclear	Total
Which account is the post issued from?	Emmanuel Macron (@emmanuelmacron)	3.9%	96.1%		100.0%
	Soazig de la Moissonnière (@soazigdelamoissoniere)	1.3%	98.3%	0.4%	100.0%
Total		2.2%	97.5%	0.3%	100.0%

% electoral periods versus % routine periods

"Ownership"

Period * Has the picture been taken by Macron himself or his staff? (nb. Soazig is considered part of Macron's staff) Crosstabulation

% within Period

		Has the picture been taken by Macron himself or his staff? (nb. Soazig is considered part of Macron's staff)			Total
		Yes	No	Unclear	
Period	Elections (16 November 2016 to 10 May 2017 or 7 March 2022 to 27 April 2022)	98.8%	0.3%	0.9%	100.0%
	"Routine" (Any post not part of 'elections')	98.6%	0.4%	1.1%	100.0%
Total		98.7%	0.3%	1.0%	100.0%

"Politician's presence"

Period * Is Macron present on the picture? (Select "Yes" even if Macron is not fully visible (e.g. only his hands are visible)) Crosstabulation

% within Period

		Is Macron present on the picture? (Select "Yes" even if Macron is not fully visible (e.g. only his hands are visible))		Total
		Yes	No	
Period	Elections (16 November 2016 to 10 May 2017 or 7 March 2022 to 27 April 2022)	86.2%	13.8%	100.0%
	"Routine" (Any post not part of 'elections')	78.6%	21.4%	100.0%
Total		81.5%	18.5%	100.0%

"Type of picture"

Period * Type of picture Crosstabulation

% within Period

		Type of picture								Total
		Photo = Still image taken by a camera	Image macro = Image with text, but without party symbol/reference	Campaign flyer = Image with text and presence of party symbol/reference	Only text = Although uploaded as an image, only text is visible	Montage = An image consisting of several photos	Cartoon = Drawing/comic	Selfie = A picture that Macron has taken of himself	Social media post = Screenshot of another social media posts (e.g. a Tweet)	
Period	Elections (16 November 2016 to 10 May 2017 or 7 March 2022 to 27 April 2022)	91.3%	1.5%	3.0%	3.3%				0.9%	100.0%
	"Routine" (Any post not part of 'elections')	96.6%	0.9%		1.8%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	100.0%
Total		94.6%	1.1%	1.1%	2.4%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.4%	100.0%

"Shot type"

Period * Shot type Crosstabulation

% within Period

		Shot type			Total
		Close up = Portrayal of the politician from shoulders to head or anything closer than that (e.g. portrayal of body parts such as eyes, hands, ...)	Medium shot = Portrayal of the politician from knees to head or in full length, excluding the surrounding area	Long shot = Portrayal of the politician in full length, including the surrounding area	
Period	Elections (16 November 2016 to 10 May 2017 or 7 March 2022 to 27 April 2022)	22.9%	43.4%	33.7%	100.0%
	"Routine" (Any post not part of 'elections')	24.9%	29.7%	45.3%	100.0%
Total		24.1%	35.2%	40.7%	100.0%

"Content & context"

Period*$Contentandcontext Crosstabulation

			Content & context[a]								Total
			Dummy Con: Official	Dummy Con: Official visit/event	Dummy Con: Campaign	Dummy Con: Policy representation	Dummy Con: Leisure time	Dummy Con: Past life	Dummy Con: Domestic/personal life	Dummy Con: Unclear	
Period	Elections (16 November 2016 to 10 May 2017 or 7 March 2022 to 27 April 2022)	Count	28	55	158	1	13	1	9	44	288
		% within Period	9.7%	19.1%	54.9%	0.3%	4.5%	0.3%	3.1%	15.3%	
	"Routine" (Any post not part of 'elections')	Count	118	238	2	1	25	0	14	70	437
		% within Period	27.0%	54.5%	0.5%	0.2%	5.7%	0.0%	3.2%	16.0%	
Total		Count	146	293	160	2	38	1	23	114	725

Percentages and totals are based on respondents.

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

Period * Dummy Content & context: Policy representation combined Crosstabulation

% within Period

		Dummy Content & context: Policy representation combined		Total
		NOT Policy representation/informative post	Policy representation/informative post	
Period	Elections (16 November 2016 to 10 May 2017 or 7 March 2022 to 27 April 2022)	96.7%	3.3%	100.0%
	"Routine" (Any post not part of 'elections')	97.8%	2.2%	100.0%
Total		97.4%	2.6%	100.0%

"Other people pictured"

Period*$Otherpeople Crosstabulation

			Other people pictured[a]													Total
			Dummy People: Other politicians	Dummy People: Family	Dummy People: Citizens	Dummy People: Celebrities	Dummy People: Pets/animals	Dummy People: Children	Dummy People: Members of Macron's team	Dummy People: Military	Dummy People: Security	Dummy Other people pictured: Nemo (Macron's dog)	Dummy People: Other	Dummy People: Unclear	Dummy People: None of the above	
Period	Elections (16 November 2016 to 10 May 2017 or 7 March 2022 to 27 April 2022)	Count	30	17	158	1	3	19	45	3	50	0	22	24	78	334
		% within Period	9.0%	5.1%	47.3%	0.3%	0.9%	5.7%	13.5%	0.9%	15.0%	0.0%	6.6%	7.2%	23.4%	
	"Routine" (Any post not part of 'elections')	Count	112	17	147	7	26	24	65	63	48	6	34	45	142	556
		% within Period	20.1%	3.1%	26.4%	1.3%	4.7%	4.3%	11.7%	11.3%	8.6%	1.1%	6.1%	8.1%	25.5%	
Total		Count	142	34	305	8	29	43	110	66	98	6	56	69	220	890

Percentages and totals are based on respondents.

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

"Appearance of Macron"

Period * Appearance of Macron - Selected Choice Crosstabulation

% within Period

		Appearance of Macron - Selected Choice					Total
		Official clothing = Suit, shirt, tie	Casual clothing = Jeans, t-shirt, hoodie	Unclear	Other	Outdoor clothing = Macron is wearing a coat (i.e. not clear what he wears under that)	
Period	Elections (16 November 2016 to 10 May 2017 or 7 March 2022 to 27 April 2022)	85.4%	1.0%	5.9%	0.7%	6.9%	100.0%
	"Routine" (Any post not part of 'elections')	72.8%	1.1%	13.5%		12.6%	100.0%
Total		77.8%	1.1%	10.5%	0.3%	10.3%	100.0%

"Cultural/political references"

Period*$Culturalpoliticalref Crosstabulation

			Cultural/Political references[a]							Total
			Dummy Cultural/pol symbols: Pop culture	Dummy Cultural/pol symbols: Party symbol/name	Dummy Cultural/pol symbols: Party colours	Dummy Cultural/pol symbols: French flag	Dummy Cultural/pol symbols: European Union flag	Dummy Cultural/pol symbols: Other	Dummy Cultural/pol symbols: None of teh above	
Period	Elections (16 November 2016 to 10 May 2017 or 7 March 2022 to 27 April 2022)	Count	3	26	14	58	33	51	219	334
		% within Period	0.9%	7.8%	4.2%	17.4%	9.9%	15.3%	65.6%	
	"Routine" (Any post not part of 'elections')	Count	3	1	0	84	61	91	404	556
		% within Period	0.5%	0.2%	0.0%	15.1%	11.0%	16.4%	72.7%	
Total		Count	6	27	14	142	94	142	623	890

Percentages and totals are based on respondents.

a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1.

"Feature"

Period * Feature Crosstabulation

% within Period

		Feature			
		Spontaneous = Picture does not seem pre-planned	Settled = Picture seems pre-planned (i.e. Macron is posing for the picture)	Unclear	Total
Period	Elections (16 November 2016 to 10 May 2017 or 7 March 2022 to 27 April 2022)	97.6%	2.4%		100.0%
	"Routine" (Any post not part of 'elections')	97.5%	0.9%	1.6%	100.0%
Total		97.5%	1.5%	1.0%	100.0%

"Gaze"

Period * Gaze Crosstabulation

% within Period

		Gaze			
		Eye-contact = Macron's gaze directed at the viewer (direct address)	No eye-contact = Macron's gaze not directed at the viewer (indirect address)	Unclear	Total
Period	Elections (16 November 2016 to 10 May 2017 or 7 March 2022 to 27 April 2022)	3.8%	96.2%		100.0%
	"Routine" (Any post not part of 'elections')	1.1%	98.4%	0.5%	100.0%
Total		2.2%	97.5%	0.3%	100.0%

H1 – H1a

Measures of central tendency – Degree of individualisation + Degree of privatisation

Statistics

		Degreeofindiv idualisation	Degreeofpriva tisation
N	Valid	725	725
	Missing	165	165
Mean		1.22	.16
Median		1.00	.00
Mode		1	0
Std. Deviation		.820	.439
Variance		.673	.193
Range		5	2
Minimum		0	0
Maximum		5	2

Paired Samples t-Test

Paired Samples Statistics

		Mean	N	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Pair 1	0 feature of individualization	.14	890	.345	.012
	0 feature of privatization	.71	890	.453	.015
Pair 2	1 feature of individualization	.42	890	.493	.017
	1 feature of privatization	.08	890	.268	.009
Pair 3	2 features of individualization	.21	890	.406	.014
	2 feature of privatization	.02	890	.155	.005
Pair 4	3 features of individualization	.05	890	.215	.007
	3 feature of privatization	.00	890	.000	.000
Pair 5	4 features of individualization	.00	890	.058	.002
	4 feature of privatization	.00	890	.000	.000
Pair 6	5 features of individualization	.00	890	.034	.001
	5 feature of privatization	.00	890	.000	.000
Pair 7	Degreeofindividualisation	1.22	725	.820	.030
	Degreeofprivatisation	.16	725	.439	.016

Paired Samples Correlations

		N	Correlation	Sig.
Pair 1	0 feature of individualization & 0 feature of privatization	890	.075	.026
Pair 2	1 feature of individualization & 1 feature of privatization	890	.037	.273
Pair 3	2 features of individualization & 2 feature of privatization	890	-.028	.403
Pair 4	3 features of individualization & 3 feature of privatization	890	.	.
Pair 5	4 features of individualization & 4 feature of privatization	890	.	.
Pair 6	5 features of individualization & 5 feature of privatization	890	.	.
Pair 7	Degreeofindividualisation & Degreeofprivatisation	725	-.112	.003

Paired Samples Test

		Paired Differences					t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)
		Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference Lower	Upper			
Pair 1	0 feature of individualization - 0 feature of privatization	-.574	.549	.018	-.610	-.538	-31.220	889	.000
Pair 2	1 feature of individualization - 1 feature of privatization	.338	.552	.019	.302	.375	18.267	889	.000
Pair 3	2 features of individualization - 2 feature of privatization	.183	.439	.015	.154	.212	12.453	889	.000
Pair 4	3 features of individualization - 3 feature of privatization	.048	.215	.007	.034	.062	6.718	889	.000
Pair 5	4 features of individualization - 4 feature of privatization	.003	.058	.002	.000	.007	1.734	889	.083
Pair 6	5 features of individualization - 5 feature of privatization	.001	.034	.001	-.001	.003	1.000	889	.318
Pair 7	Degreeofindividualisation - Degreeofprivatisation	1.066	.973	.036	.995	1.137	29.518	724	.000

<u>Number of 'personalised', 'individualised' and 'privatised' features – Frequencies (Table 7)</u>

% total

"Degree of personalisation"

**Degreeofpersonalisatio
n**

	N	%
0	11	1.2%
1	155	17.4%
2	724	81.3%

"Degree of individualisation"

Crosstab

% within Is Macron present on the picture?
(Select "Yes" even if Macron is not fully visible (e.g. only his hands are visible))

		Degreeofindividualisation						Total
		0	1	2	3	4	5	
Is Macron present on the picture? (Select "Yes" even if Macron is not fully visible (e.g. only his hands are visible))	Yes	17.0%	51.0%	25.5%	5.9%	0.4%	0.1%	100.0%
Total		17.0%	51.0%	25.5%	5.9%	0.4%	0.1%	100.0%

"Degree of privatisation"

Crosstab

% within Is Macron present on the picture?
(Select "Yes" even if Macron is not fully visible (e.g. only his hands are visible))

		Degreeofprivatisation			Total
		0	1	2	
Is Macron present on the picture? (Select "Yes" even if Macron is not fully visible (e.g. only his hands are visible))	Yes	87.4%	9.5%	3.0%	100.0%
Total		87.4%	9.5%	3.0%	100.0%

% @emmanuelmacron versus % @soazigdelamoissonnière

100

"Degree of personalisation"

Which account is the post issued from? * Degreeofpersonalisation Crosstabulation

% within Which account is the post issued from?

		Degreeofpersonalisation			
		0	1	2	Total
Which account is the post issued from?	Emmanuel Macron (@emmanuelmacron)	2.8%	26.7%	70.5%	100.0%
	Soazig de la Moissonnière (@soazigdelamoissonni ere)	0.2%	11.0%	88.8%	100.0%
Total		1.2%	17.4%	81.3%	100.0%

"Degree of individualisation"

Which account is the post issued from? * Degreeofindividualisation Crosstabulation

% within Which account is the post issued from?

		Degreeofindividualisation						
		0	1	2	3	4	5	Total
Which account is the post issued from?	Emmanuel Macron (@emmanuelmacron)	8.9%	64.2%	20.6%	5.8%	0.4%		100.0%
	Soazig de la Moissonnière (@soazigdelamoissonni ere)	21.4%	43.8%	28.2%	6.0%	0.4%	0.2%	100.0%
Total		17.0%	51.0%	25.5%	5.9%	0.4%	0.1%	100.0%

"Degree of privatisation"

Which account is the post issued from? * Degreeofprivatisation Crosstabulation

% within Which account is the post issued from?

		Degreeofprivatisation			
		0	1	2	Total
Which account is the post issued from?	Emmanuel Macron (@emmanuelmacron)	89.1%	9.3%	1.6%	100.0%
	Soazig de la Moissonnière (@soazigdelamoissonni ere)	86.5%	9.6%	3.8%	100.0%
Total		87.4%	9.5%	3.0%	100.0%

% electoral periods versus % routine periods

"Degree of personalisation"

Period * Degreeofpersonalisation Crosstabulation

% within Period

		Degreeofpersonalisation			
		0	1	2	Total
Period	Elections (16 November 2016 to 10 May 2017 or 7 March 2022 to 27 April 2022)	0.9%	13.2%	85.9%	100.0%
	"Routine" (Any post not part of 'elections')	1.4%	20.0%	78.6%	100.0%
Total		1.2%	17.4%	81.3%	100.0%

"Degree of individualisation"

Period * Degreeofindividualisation Crosstabulation

% within Period

		Degreeofindividualisation						Total
		0	1	2	3	4	5	
Period	Elections (16 November 2016 to 10 May 2017 or 7 March 2022 to 27 April 2022)	14.6%	55.6%	23.3%	5.6%	0.7%	0.3%	100.0%
	"Routine" (Any post not part of 'elections')	18.5%	48.1%	27.0%	6.2%	0.2%		100.0%
Total		17.0%	51.0%	25.5%	5.9%	0.4%	0.1%	100.0%

"Degree of privatisation"

Period * Degreeofprivatisation Crosstabulation

% within Period

		Degreeofprivatisation			
		0	1	2	Total
Period	Elections (16 November 2016 to 10 May 2017 or 7 March 2022 to 27 April 2022)	87.5%	9.7%	2.8%	100.0%
	"Routine" (Any post not part of 'elections')	87.4%	9.4%	3.2%	100.0%
Total		87.4%	9.5%	3.0%	100.0%

H2

Independent Samples t-Test "Degree of personalisation" x "Account owner"

Group Statistics

	Which account is the post issued from?	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Degreeofpersonalisation	Emmanuel Macron (@emmanuelmacron)	363	1.68	.524	.027
	Soazig de la Moissonnière (@soazigdelamoissonniere)	527	1.89	.324	.014

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
									95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
Degreeofpersonalisation	Equal variances assumed	210.062	.000	-7.328	888	.000	-.208	.028	-.264	-.153
	Equal variances not assumed			-6.747	551.483	.000	-.208	.031	-.269	-.148

Independent Samples Effect Sizes

		Standardizer[a]	Point Estimate	95% Confidence Interval	
				Lower	Upper
Degreeofpersonalisation	Cohen's d	.417	-.500	-.635	-.364
	Hedges' correction	.417	-.499	-.635	-.364
	Glass's delta	.324	-.644	-.783	-.504

a. The denominator used in estimating the effect sizes.
  Cohen's d uses the pooled standard deviation.
  Hedges' correction uses the pooled standard deviation, plus a correction factor.
  Glass's delta uses the sample standard deviation of the control group.

Chi-Squares Tests of Independence + Phi Coefficient: "Ownership" + "Politician's presence"

"Ownership"

Crosstab

% within Which account is the post issued from?

		Has the picture been taken by Macron himself or his staff? (nb. Soazig is considered part of Macron's staff)			Total
		Yes	No	Unclear	
Which account is the post issued from?	Emmanuel Macron (@emmanuelmacron)	97.0%	0.6%	2.5%	100.0%
	Soazig de la Moissonnière (@soazigdelamoissonniere)	99.8%	0.2%		100.0%
Total		98.7%	0.3%	1.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	14.074[a]	2	.001
Likelihood Ratio	17.135	2	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	14.045	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	890		

a. 3 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.22.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.126	.001
	Cramer's V	.126	.001
N of Valid Cases		890	

"Politician's presence"

Crosstab

% within Which account is the post issued from?

		Is Macron present on the picture? (Select "Yes" even if Macron is not fully visible (e.g. only his hands are visible))		Total
		Yes	No	
Which account is the post issued from?	Emmanuel Macron (@emmanuelmacron)	70.8%	29.2%	100.0%
	Soazig de la Moissonnière (@soazigdelamoissonniere)	88.8%	11.2%	100.0%
Total		81.5%	18.5%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	46.143[a]	1	.000		
Continuity Correction[b]	44.958	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	45.487	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	46.091	1	.000		
N of Valid Cases	890				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 67.30.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.228	.000
	Cramer's V	.228	.000
N of Valid Cases		890	

Independent Samples t-Test "Degree of individualisation" x "Account owner"

Group Statistics

	Which account is the post issued from?	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Degreeofindividualisation	Emmanuel Macron (@emmanuelmacron)	257	1.25	.711	.044
	Soazig de la Moissonnière (@soazigdelamoissonniere)	468	1.21	.875	.040

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means					95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
Degreeofindividualisation	Equal variances assumed	17.318	.000	.561	723	.575	.036	.064	-.089	.161
	Equal variances not assumed			.595	622.475	.552	.036	.060	-.082	.154

Independent Samples Effect Sizes

		Standardizer[a]	Point Estimate	95% Confidence Interval	
				Lower	Upper
Degreeofindividualisation	Cohen's d	.821	.044	-.109	.196
	Hedges' correction	.822	.043	-.109	.196
	Glass's delta	.875	.041	-.111	.193

a. The denominator used in estimating the effect sizes.
   Cohen's d uses the pooled standard deviation.
   Hedges' correction uses the pooled standard deviation, plus a correction factor.
   Glass's delta uses the sample standard deviation of the control group.

Chi-Squares Tests of Independence + Phi Coefficient: "Campaign flyer", "Political/professional: Official", "Political/professional: Official visit/event", "Political/professional: Campaign", "Political/professional: Policy representation", "Other politician(s)", "Member(s) of Macron's team", "Party symbol/name", "Party colours"

"Campaign flyer"

Crosstab

% within Which account is the post issued from?

		Dummy Type of picture: Campaign flyer		
		NOT Campaign flyer	Campaign flyer	Total
Which account is the post issued from?	Emmanuel Macron (@emmanuelmacron)	97.2%	2.8%	100.0%
	Soazig de la Moissonnière (@soazigdelamoissonniere)	100.0%		100.0%
Total		98.9%	1.1%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	14.683[a]	1	.000		
Continuity Correction[b]	12.308	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	18.102	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	14.666	1	.000		
N of Valid Cases	890				

a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.08.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.128	.000
	Cramer's V	.128	.000
N of Valid Cases		890	

"Political/professional: Official"

Crosstab

% within Which account is the post issued from?

		Dummy Con: Official		
		NOT Official	Official	Total
Which account is the post issued from?	Emmanuel Macron (@emmanuelmacron)	85.2%	14.8%	100.0%
	Soazig de la Moissonnière (@soazigdelamoissonniere)	76.9%	23.1%	100.0%
Total		79.9%	20.1%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	7.091[a]	1	.008		
Continuity Correction[b]	6.585	1	.010		
Likelihood Ratio	7.361	1	.007		
Fisher's Exact Test				.009	.005
Linear-by-Linear Association	7.081	1	.008		
N of Valid Cases	725				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 51.75.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.099	.008
	Cramer's V	.099	.008
N of Valid Cases		725	

"Political/professional: Official visit/event"

Crosstab

% within Which account is the post issued from?

		Dummy Con: Official visit/event		Total
		NOT Official visit/event	Official visit/event	
Which account is the post issued from?	Emmanuel Macron (@emmanuelmacron)	40.1%	59.9%	100.0%
	Soazig de la Moissonnière (@soazigdelamoissonniere)	70.3%	29.7%	100.0%
Total		59.6%	40.4%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	62.921[a]	1	.000		
Continuity Correction[b]	61.672	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	62.782	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	62.834	1	.000		
N of Valid Cases	725				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 103.86.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.295	.000
	Cramer's V	.295	.000
N of Valid Cases		725	

"Political/professional: Campaign"

Crosstab

% within Which account is the post issued from?

		Dummy Con: Campaign		Total
		NOT Campaign	Campaign	
Which account is the post issued from?	Emmanuel Macron (@emmanuelmacron)	82.1%	17.9%	100.0%
	Soazig de la Moissonnière (@soazigdelamoissonniere)	75.6%	24.4%	100.0%
Total		77.9%	22.1%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	4.026[a]	1	.045		
Continuity Correction[b]	3.659	1	.056		
Likelihood Ratio	4.123	1	.042		
Fisher's Exact Test				.049	.027
Linear-by-Linear Association	4.020	1	.045		
N of Valid Cases	725				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 56.72.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.075	.045
	Cramer's V	.075	.045
N of Valid Cases		725	

"Political/professional: Policy representation"

Which account is the post issued from? * Dummy Content & context: Policy representation combined Crosstabulation

% within Which account is the post issued from?

		Dummy Content & context: Policy representation combined		Total
		NOT Policy representation/informative post	Policy representation/informative post	
Which account is the post issued from?	Emmanuel Macron (@emmanuelmacron)	93.9%	6.1%	100.0%
	Soazig de la Moissonnière (@soazigdelamoissonniere)	99.8%	0.2%	100.0%
Total		97.4%	2.6%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	29.428[a]	1	.000		
Continuity Correction[b]	27.142	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	33.045	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	29.395	1	.000		
N of Valid Cases	890				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.38.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.182	.000
	Cramer's V	.182	.000
N of Valid Cases		890	

"Other politician(s)"

Crosstab

% within Which account is the post issued from?

		Dummy People: Other politicians		Total
		PPL: Not Other politician(s)	PPL: Other politician(s)	
Which account is the post issued from?	Emmanuel Macron (@emmanuelmacron)	86.5%	13.5%	100.0%
	Soazig de la Moissonnière (@soazigdelamoissonniere)	82.4%	17.6%	100.0%
Total		84.0%	16.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2.759[a]	1	.097		
Continuity Correction[b]	2.458	1	.117		
Likelihood Ratio	2.802	1	.094		
Fisher's Exact Test				.113	.058
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.755	1	.097		
N of Valid Cases	890				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 57.92.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.056	.097
	Cramer's V	.056	.097
N of Valid Cases		890	

"Member(s) of Macron's team"

Crosstab

% within Which account is the post issued from?

		Dummy People: Members of Macron's team		
		PPL: Not Member(s) of Macron's team	PPL: Member(s) of Macron's team	Total
Which account is the post issued from?	Emmanuel Macron (@emmanuelmacron)	95.9%	4.1%	100.0%
	Soazig de la Moissonnière (@soazigdelamoissonniere)	82.0%	18.0%	100.0%
Total		87.6%	12.4%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	38.309[a]	1	.000		
Continuity Correction[b]	37.037	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	43.535	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	38.265	1	.000		
N of Valid Cases	890				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 44.87.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.207	.000
	Cramer's V	.207	.000
N of Valid Cases		890	

"Party symbol/name"

Crosstab

% within Which account is the post issued from?

| | | Dummy Cultural/pol symbols: Party symbol/name | | |
		CPS: Not Party symbol/name	CPS: Party symbol/name	Total
Which account is the post issued from?	Emmanuel Macron (@emmanuelmacron)	97.2%	2.8%	100.0%
	Soazig de la Moissonnière (@soazigdelamoissonniere)	96.8%	3.2%	100.0%
Total		97.0%	3.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.162[a]	1	.687		
Continuity Correction[b]	.042	1	.839		
Likelihood Ratio	.164	1	.686		
Fisher's Exact Test				.843	.424
Linear-by-Linear Association	.162	1	.687		
N of Valid Cases	890				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.01.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.013	.687
	Cramer's V	.013	.687
N of Valid Cases		890	

"Party colours"

Crosstab

% within Which account is the post issued from?

| | | Dummy Cultural/pol symbols: Party colours | | |
		CPS: Not Party colours	CPS: Party colours	Total
Which account is the post issued from?	Emmanuel Macron (@emmanuelmacron)	99.4%	0.6%	100.0%
	Soazig de la Moissonnière (@soazigdelamoissonniere)	97.7%	2.3%	100.0%
Total		98.4%	1.6%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	4.136[a]	1	.042		
Continuity Correction[b]	3.096	1	.078		
Likelihood Ratio	4.746	1	.029		
Fisher's Exact Test				.054	.034
Linear-by-Linear Association	4.131	1	.042		
N of Valid Cases	890				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.71.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

111

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.068	.042
	Cramer's V	.068	.042
N of Valid Cases		890	

H2b

Independent Samples t-Test "Degree of privatisation" x "Account owner"

Group Statistics

	Which account is the post issued from?	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Degreeofprivatisation	Emmanuel Macron (@emmanuelmacron)	257	.12	.375	.023
	Soazig de la Moissonnière (@soazigdelamoissonniere)	468	.17	.470	.022

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
									95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
Degreeofprivatisation	Equal variances assumed	8.576	.004	-1.427	723	.154	-.049	.034	-.115	.018
	Equal variances not assumed			-1.522	630.357	.129	-.049	.032	-.111	.014

Independent Samples Effect Sizes

		Standardizer[a]	Point Estimate	95% Confidence Interval	
				Lower	Upper
Degreeofprivatisation	Cohen's d	.438	-.111	-.263	.042
	Hedges' correction	.439	-.111	-.263	.042
	Glass's delta	.470	-.103	-.256	.049

a. The denominator used in estimating the effect sizes.
Cohen's d uses the pooled standard deviation.
Hedges' correction uses the pooled standard deviation, plus a correction factor.
Glass's delta uses the sample standard deviation of the control group.

Chi-Squares Tests of Independence + Phi Coefficient: "Selfie", "Non-political/non-professional: Leisure time", "Non-political/non-professional: Past life", "Non-political/non-professional: Domestic/private life", "Family members", "Macron's own pet", "Casual clothing", "Popular culture"

"Selfie"

Crosstab

% within Which account is the post issued from?

		Dummy Type of picture: Selfie		Total
		NOT Selfie	Selfie	
Which account is the post issued from?	Emmanuel Macron (@emmanuelmacron)	99.7%	0.3%	100.0%
	Soazig de la Moissonnière (@soazigdelamoissonniere)	100.0%		100.0%
Total		99.9%	0.1%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.453[a]	1	.228		
Continuity Correction[b]	.035	1	.851		
Likelihood Ratio	1.795	1	.180		
Fisher's Exact Test				.408	.408
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.452	1	.228		
N of Valid Cases	890				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .41.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.040	.228
	Cramer's V	.040	.228
N of Valid Cases		890	

"Non-political/non-professional: Leisure time"

Crosstab

% within Which account is the post issued from?

		Dummy Con: Leisure time		Total
		NOT Leisure	Leisure	
Which account is the post issued from?	Emmanuel Macron (@emmanuelmacron)	96.1%	3.9%	100.0%
	Soazig de la Moissonnière (@soazigdelamoissonniere)	94.0%	6.0%	100.0%
Total		94.8%	5.2%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.462[a]	1	.227		
Continuity Correction[b]	1.071	1	.301		
Likelihood Ratio	1.528	1	.216		
Fisher's Exact Test				.296	.150
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.460	1	.227		
N of Valid Cases	725				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 13.47.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.045	.227
	Cramer's V	.045	.227
N of Valid Cases		725	

"Non-political/non-professional: Past life"

Crosstab

% within Which account is the post issued from?

		Dummy Con: Past life		Total
		NOT Past life	Past life	
Which account is the post issued from?	Emmanuel Macron (@emmanuelmacron)	100.0%		100.0%
	Soazig de la Moissonnière (@soazigdelamoissonniere)	99.8%	0.2%	100.0%
Total		99.9%	0.1%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.550[a]	1	.458		
Continuity Correction[b]	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.876	1	.349		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.646
Linear-by-Linear Association	.549	1	.459		
N of Valid Cases	725				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .35.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.028	.458
	Cramer's V	.028	.458
N of Valid Cases		725	

"Non-political/non-professional: Domestic/private life"

Crosstab

% within Which account is the post issued from?

		Dummy Con: Domestic/personal life		Total
		NOT Domestic	Domestic	
Which account is the post issued from?	Emmanuel Macron (@emmanuelmacron)	98.4%	1.6%	100.0%
	Soazig de la Moissonnière (@soazigdelamoissonniere)	95.9%	4.1%	100.0%
Total		96.8%	3.2%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	3.385[a]	1	.066		
Continuity Correction[b]	2.619	1	.106		
Likelihood Ratio	3.783	1	.052		
Fisher's Exact Test				.077	.048
Linear-by-Linear Association	3.380	1	.066		
N of Valid Cases	725				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.15.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.068	.066
	Cramer's V	.068	.066
N of Valid Cases		725	

"Family members"

Crosstab

% within Which account is the post issued from?

		Dummy People: Family		Total
		PPL: Not Family	PPL: Family	
Which account is the post issued from?	Emmanuel Macron (@emmanuelmacron)	95.9%	4.1%	100.0%
	Soazig de la Moissonnière (@soazigdelamoissonniere)	96.4%	3.6%	100.0%
Total		96.2%	3.8%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.162[a]	1	.687		
Continuity Correction[b]	.051	1	.822		
Likelihood Ratio	.161	1	.688		
Fisher's Exact Test				.724	.407
Linear-by-Linear Association	.162	1	.687		
N of Valid Cases	890				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 13.87.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.014	.687
	Cramer's V	.014	.687
N of Valid Cases		890	

"Macron's own pet"

Crosstab

% within Which account is the post issued from?

		Dummy Other people pictured: Nemo (Macron's dog)		Total
		NOT Nemo	Nemo	
Which account is the post issued from?	Emmanuel Macron (@emmanuelmacron)	100.0%		100.0%
	Soazig de la Moissonnière (@soazigdelamoissonniere)	98.9%	1.1%	100.0%
Total		99.3%	0.7%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	4.161[a]	1	.041		
Continuity Correction[b]	2.634	1	.105		
Likelihood Ratio	6.316	1	.012		
Fisher's Exact Test				.087	.043
Linear-by-Linear Association	4.156	1	.041		
N of Valid Cases	890				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.45.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.068	.041
	Cramer's V	.068	.041
N of Valid Cases		890	

"Casual clothing"

Crosstab

% within Which account is the post issued from?

		Dummy Apperance: Casual clothing		Total
		NOT Casual clothing	Casual clothing	
Which account is the post issued from?	Emmanuel Macron (@emmanuelmacron)	100.0%		100.0%
	Soazig de la Moissonnière (@soazigdelamoissonniere)	98.3%	1.7%	100.0%
Total		98.9%	1.1%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	4.442[a]	1	.035		
Continuity Correction[b]	3.014	1	.083		
Likelihood Ratio	7.052	1	.008		
Fisher's Exact Test				.056	.030
Linear-by-Linear Association	4.436	1	.035		
N of Valid Cases	725				

a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.84.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.078	.035
	Cramer's V	.078	.035
N of Valid Cases		725	

"Popular culture"

Crosstab

% within Which account is the post issued from?

		Dummy Cultural/pol symbols: Pop culture		
		CPS: Not Popular Culture	CPS: Popular Culture	Total
Which account is the post issued from?	Emmanuel Macron (@emmanuelmacron)	98.9%	1.1%	100.0%
	Soazig de la Moissonnière (@soazigdelamoissonniere)	99.6%	0.4%	100.0%
Total		99.3%	0.7%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.675[a]	1	.196		
Continuity Correction[b]	.770	1	.380		
Likelihood Ratio	1.644	1	.200		
Fisher's Exact Test				.232	.189
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.673	1	.196		
N of Valid Cases	890				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.45.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.043	.196
	Cramer's V	.043	.196
N of Valid Cases		890	

H3

Independent Samples t-Test "Degree of personalisation" x "Period"

Group Statistics

	Period	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Degreeofpersonalisation	Elections (16 November 2016 to 10 May 2017 or 7 March 2022 to 27 April 2022)	334	1.85	.382	.021
	"Routine" (Any post not part of 'elections')	556	1.77	.453	.019

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means					95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
Degreeofpersonalisation	Equal variances assumed	27.937	.000	2.658	888	.008	.079	.030	.021	.137
	Equal variances not assumed			2.773	794.120	.006	.079	.028	.023	.134

Independent Samples Effect Sizes

		Standardizer[a]	Point Estimate	95% Confidence Interval	
				Lower	Upper
Degreeofpersonalisation	Cohen's d	.428	.184	.048	.320
	Hedges' correction	.428	.184	.048	.320
	Glass's delta	.453	.174	.038	.310

a. The denominator used in estimating the effect sizes.
   Cohen's d uses the pooled standard deviation.
   Hedges' correction uses the pooled standard deviation, plus a correction factor.
   Glass's delta uses the sample standard deviation of the control group.

Chi-Squares Tests of Independence + Phi Coefficient: "Ownership" + "Politician's presence"

"Ownership"

Crosstab

% within Period

		Has the picture been taken by Macron himself or his staff? (nb. Soazig is considered part of Macron's staff)			
		Yes	No	Unclear	Total
Period	Elections (16 November 2016 to 10 May 2017 or 7 March 2022 to 27 April 2022)	98.8%	0.3%	0.9%	100.0%
	"Routine" (Any post not part of 'elections')	98.6%	0.4%	1.1%	100.0%
Total		98.7%	0.3%	1.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.091[a]	2	.955
Likelihood Ratio	.093	2	.955
Linear-by-Linear Association	.086	1	.770
N of Valid Cases	890		

a. 3 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.13.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.010	.955
	Cramer's V	.010	.955
N of Valid Cases		890	

"Politician's presence"

Crosstab

% within Period

		Is Macron present on the picture? (Select "Yes" even if Macron is not fully visible (e.g. only his hands are visible))		
		Yes	No	Total
Period	Elections (16 November 2016 to 10 May 2017 or 7 March 2022 to 27 April 2022)	86.2%	13.8%	100.0%
	"Routine" (Any post not part of 'elections')	78.6%	21.4%	100.0%
Total		81.5%	18.5%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	8.044[a]	1	.005		
Continuity Correction[b]	7.547	1	.006		
Likelihood Ratio	8.320	1	.004		
Fisher's Exact Test				.004	.003
Linear-by-Linear Association	8.035	1	.005		
N of Valid Cases	890				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 61.92.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.095	.005
	Cramer's V	.095	.005
N of Valid Cases		890	

Independent Samples t-Test "Degree of individualisation" x "Period"

Group Statistics

	Period	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Degreeofindividualisation	Elections (16 November 2016 to 10 May 2017 or 7 March 2022 to 27 April 2022)	288	1.23	.817	.048
	"Routine" (Any post not part of 'elections')	437	1.22	.824	.039

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference Lower	Upper
Degreeofindividualisation	Equal variances assumed	1.022	.312	.281	723	.778	.018	.062	-.105	.140
	Equal variances not assumed			.282	617.959	.778	.018	.062	-.105	.140

Independent Samples Effect Sizes

		Standardizer[a]	Point Estimate	95% Confidence Interval Lower	Upper
Degreeofindividualisation	Cohen's d	.821	.021	-.127	.170
	Hedges' correction	.822	.021	-.127	.170
	Glass's delta	.824	.021	-.127	.170

a. The denominator used in estimating the effect sizes.
Cohen's d uses the pooled standard deviation.
Hedges' correction uses the pooled standard deviation, plus a correction factor.
Glass's delta uses the sample standard deviation of the control group.

Chi-Squares Tests of Independence + Phi Coefficient: "Campaign flyer", "Political/professional: Official", "Political/professional: Official visit/event", "Political/professional: Campaign", "Political/professional: Policy representation", "Other politician(s)", "Member(s) of Macron's team", "Party symbol/name", "Party colours"

"Campaign flyer"

Crosstab

% within Period

		Dummy Type of picture: Campaign flyer		Total
		NOT Campaign flyer	Campaign flyer	
Period	Elections (16 November 2016 to 10 May 2017 or 7 March 2022 to 27 April 2022)	97.0%	3.0%	100.0%
	"Routine" (Any post not part of 'elections')	100.0%		100.0%
Total		98.9%	1.1%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	16.836[a]	1	.000		
Continuity Correction[b]	14.249	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	19.791	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	16.817	1	.000		
N of Valid Cases	890				

a. 1 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.75.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.138	.000
	Cramer's V	.138	.000
N of Valid Cases		890	

"Political/professional: Official"

Crosstab

% within Period

		Dummy Con: Official		Total
		NOT Official	Official	
Period	Elections (16 November 2016 to 10 May 2017 or 7 March 2022 to 27 April 2022)	90.3%	9.7%	100.0%
	"Routine" (Any post not part of 'elections')	73.0%	27.0%	100.0%
Total		79.9%	20.1%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	32.231[a]	1	.000		
Continuity Correction[b]	31.165	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	34.852	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	32.186	1	.000		
N of Valid Cases	725				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 58.00.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.211	.000
	Cramer's V	.211	.000
N of Valid Cases		725	

"Political/professional: Official visit/event"

Crosstab

% within Period

		Dummy Con: Official visit/event		Total
		NOT Official visit/event	Official visit/event	
Period	Elections (16 November 2016 to 10 May 2017 or 7 March 2022 to 27 April 2022)	80.9%	19.1%	100.0%
	"Routine" (Any post not part of 'elections')	45.5%	54.5%	100.0%
Total		59.6%	40.4%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	90.159[a]	1	.000		
Continuity Correction[b]	88.696	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	95.048	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	90.034	1	.000		
N of Valid Cases	725				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 116.39.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.353	.000
	Cramer's V	.353	.000
N of Valid Cases		725	

"Political/professional: Campaign"

Crosstab

% within Period

		Dummy Con: Campaign		Total
		NOT Campaign	Campaign	
Period	Elections (16 November 2016 to 10 May 2017 or 7 March 2022 to 27 April 2022)	45.1%	54.9%	100.0%
	"Routine" (Any post not part of 'elections')	99.5%	0.5%	100.0%
Total		77.9%	22.1%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	298.742[a]	1	.000		
Continuity Correction[b]	295.587	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	343.216	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	298.330	1	.000		
N of Valid Cases	725				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 63.56.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.642	.000
	Cramer's V	.642	.000
N of Valid Cases		725	

"Political/professional: Policy representation"

Period * Dummy Content & context: Policy representation combined Crosstabulation

% within Period

		Dummy Content & context: Policy representation combined		Total
		NOT Policy representation/informative post	Policy representation/informative post	
Period	Elections (16 November 2016 to 10 May 2017 or 7 March 2022 to 27 April 2022)	96.7%	3.3%	100.0%
	"Routine" (Any post not part of 'elections')	97.8%	2.2%	100.0%
Total		97.4%	2.6%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.068[a]	1	.301		
Continuity Correction[b]	.665	1	.415		
Likelihood Ratio	1.039	1	.308		
Fisher's Exact Test				.383	.206
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.067	1	.302		
N of Valid Cases	890				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.63.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.035	.301
	Cramer's V	.035	.301
N of Valid Cases		890	

"Other politician(s)"

Crosstab

% within Period

| | | Dummy People: Other politicians | | |
		PPL: Not Other politician(s)	PPL: Other politician(s)	Total
Period	Elections (16 November 2016 to 10 May 2017 or 7 March 2022 to 27 April 2022)	91.0%	9.0%	100.0%
	"Routine" (Any post not part of 'elections')	79.9%	20.1%	100.0%
Total		84.0%	16.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	19.386[a]	1	.000		
Continuity Correction[b]	18.563	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	20.809	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	19.364	1	.000		
N of Valid Cases	890				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 53.29.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.148	.000
	Cramer's V	.148	.000
N of Valid Cases		890	

"Member(s) of Macron's team"

Crosstab

% within Period

| | | Dummy People: Members of Macron's team | | |
		PPL: Not Member(s) of Macron's team	PPL: Member(s) of Macron's team	Total
Period	Elections (16 November 2016 to 10 May 2017 or 7 March 2022 to 27 April 2022)	86.5%	13.5%	100.0%
	"Routine" (Any post not part of 'elections')	88.3%	11.7%	100.0%
Total		87.6%	12.4%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.612[a]	1	.434		
Continuity Correction[b]	.458	1	.498		
Likelihood Ratio	.606	1	.436		
Fisher's Exact Test				.462	.248
Linear-by-Linear Association	.611	1	.434		
N of Valid Cases	890				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 41.28.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.026	.434
	Cramer's V	.026	.434
N of Valid Cases		890	

"Party symbol/name"

Crosstab

% within Period

		Dummy Cultural/pol symbols: Party symbol/name		Total
		CPS: Not Party symbol/name	CPS: Party symbol/name	
Period	Elections (16 November 2016 to 10 May 2017 or 7 March 2022 to 27 April 2022)	92.2%	7.8%	100.0%
	"Routine" (Any post not part of 'elections')	99.8%	0.2%	100.0%
Total		97.0%	3.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	41.019ᵃ	1	.000		
Continuity Correctionᵇ	38.475	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	44.604	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	40.973	1	.000		
N of Valid Cases	890				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.13.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.215	.000
	Cramer's V	.215	.000
N of Valid Cases		890	

"Party colours"

Crosstab

% within Period

		Dummy Cultural/pol symbols: Party colours		Total
		CPS: Not Party colours	CPS: Party colours	
Period	Elections (16 November 2016 to 10 May 2017 or 7 March 2022 to 27 April 2022)	95.8%	4.2%	100.0%
	"Routine" (Any post not part of 'elections')	100.0%		100.0%
Total		98.4%	1.6%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	23.678[a]	1	.000		
Continuity Correction[b]	21.048	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	27.816	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	23.651	1	.000		
N of Valid Cases	890				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.25.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.163	.000
	Cramer's V	.163	.000
N of Valid Cases		890	

Independent Samples t-Test "Degree of privatisation" x "Period"

Group Statistics

	Period	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Degreeofprivatisation	Elections (16 November 2016 to 10 May 2017 or 7 March 2022 to 27 April 2022)	288	.15	.431	.025
	"Routine" (Any post not part of 'elections')	437	.16	.444	.021

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
									95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
Degreeofprivatisation	Equal variances assumed	.111	.739	-.154	723	.878	-.005	.033	-.071	.060
	Equal variances not assumed			-.155	627.482	.877	-.005	.033	-.070	.060

Independent Samples Effect Sizes

		Standardizer[a]	Point Estimate	95% Confidence Interval	
				Lower	Upper
Degreeofprivatisation	Cohen's d	.439	-.012	-.160	.137
	Hedges' correction	.440	-.012	-.160	.137
	Glass's delta	.444	-.012	-.160	.137

a. The denominator used in estimating the effect sizes.
   Cohen's d uses the pooled standard deviation.
   Hedges' correction uses the pooled standard deviation, plus a correction factor.
   Glass's delta uses the sample standard deviation of the control group.

Chi-Squares Tests of Independence + Phi Coefficient: "Selfie", "Non-political/non-professional: Leisure time", "Non-political/non-professional: Past life", "Non-political/non-professional: Domestic/private life", "Family members", "Macron's own pet", "Casual clothing", "Popular culture"

"Selfie"

Crosstab

% within Period

| | | Dummy Type of picture: Selfie | | Total |
		NOT Selfie	Selfie	
Period	Elections (16 November 2016 to 10 May 2017 or 7 March 2022 to 27 April 2022)	100.0%		100.0%
	"Routine" (Any post not part of 'elections')	99.8%	0.2%	100.0%
Total		99.9%	0.1%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.601ª	1	.438		
Continuity Correctionᵇ	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.942	1	.332		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.625
Linear-by-Linear Association	.601	1	.438		
N of Valid Cases	890				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .38.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.026	.438
	Cramer's V	.026	.438
N of Valid Cases		890	

"Non-political/non-professional: Leisure time"

Crosstab

% within Period

| | | Dummy Con: Leisure time | | Total |
		NOT Leisure	Leisure	
Period	Elections (16 November 2016 to 10 May 2017 or 7 March 2022 to 27 April 2022)	95.5%	4.5%	100.0%
	"Routine" (Any post not part of 'elections')	94.3%	5.7%	100.0%
Total		94.8%	5.2%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.509ª	1	.476		
Continuity Correctionᵇ	.295	1	.587		
Likelihood Ratio	.518	1	.472		
Fisher's Exact Test				.502	.296
Linear-by-Linear Association	.508	1	.476		
N of Valid Cases	725				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 15.10.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.027	.476
	Cramer's V	.027	.476
N of Valid Cases		725	

"Non-political/non-professional: Past life"

Crosstab

% within Period

		Dummy Con: Past life		Total
		NOT Past life	Past life	
Period	Elections (16 November 2016 to 10 May 2017 or 7 March 2022 to 27 April 2022)	99.7%	0.3%	100.0%
	"Routine" (Any post not part of 'elections')	100.0%		100.0%
Total		99.9%	0.1%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.519[a]	1	.218		
Continuity Correction[b]	.044	1	.834		
Likelihood Ratio	1.849	1	.174		
Fisher's Exact Test				.397	.397
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.517	1	.218		
N of Valid Cases	725				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .40.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.046	.218
	Cramer's V	.046	.218
N of Valid Cases		725	

"Non-political/non-professional: Domestic/private life"

Crosstab

% within Period

		Dummy Con: Domestic/personal life		Total
		NOT Domestic	Domestic	
Period	Elections (16 November 2016 to 10 May 2017 or 7 March 2022 to 27 April 2022)	96.9%	3.1%	100.0%
	"Routine" (Any post not part of 'elections')	96.8%	3.2%	100.0%
Total		96.8%	3.2%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.003[a]	1	.953		
Continuity Correction[b]	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.004	1	.953		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.568
Linear-by-Linear Association	.003	1	.953		
N of Valid Cases	725				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.14.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.002	.953
	Cramer's V	.002	.953
N of Valid Cases		725	

"Family members"

Crosstab

% within Period

		Dummy People: Family		
		PPL: Not Family	PPL: Family	Total
Period	Elections (16 November 2016 to 10 May 2017 or 7 March 2022 to 27 April 2022)	94.9%	5.1%	100.0%
	"Routine" (Any post not part of 'elections')	96.9%	3.1%	100.0%
Total		96.2%	3.8%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2.345[a]	1	.126		
Continuity Correction[b]	1.825	1	.177		
Likelihood Ratio	2.274	1	.132		
Fisher's Exact Test				.149	.090
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.343	1	.126		
N of Valid Cases	890				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 12.76.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.051	.126
	Cramer's V	.051	.126
N of Valid Cases		890	

"Macron's own pet"

Crosstab

% within Period

		Dummy Other people pictured: Nemo (Macron's dog)		
		NOT Nemo	Nemo	Total
Period	Elections (16 November 2016 to 10 May 2017 or 7 March 2022 to 27 April 2022)	100.0%		100.0%
	"Routine" (Any post not part of 'elections')	98.9%	1.1%	100.0%
Total		99.3%	0.7%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	3.629[a]	1	.057		
Continuity Correction[b]	2.196	1	.138		
Likelihood Ratio	5.670	1	.017		
Fisher's Exact Test				.089	.059
Linear-by-Linear Association	3.625	1	.057		
N of Valid Cases	890				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.25.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.064	.057
	Cramer's V	.064	.057
N of Valid Cases		890	

"Casual clothing"

Crosstab

% within Period

		Dummy Apperance: Casual clothing		
		NOT Casual clothing	Casual clothing	Total
Period	Elections (16 November 2016 to 10 May 2017 or 7 March 2022 to 27 April 2022)	99.0%	1.0%	100.0%
	"Routine" (Any post not part of 'elections')	98.9%	1.1%	100.0%
Total		98.9%	1.1%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.017[a]	1	.897		
Continuity Correction[b]	.000	1	1.000		
Likelihood Ratio	.017	1	.897		
Fisher's Exact Test				1.000	.601
Linear-by-Linear Association	.017	1	.897		
N of Valid Cases	725				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.18.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.005	.897
	Cramer's V	.005	.897
N of Valid Cases		725	

"Popular culture"

Crosstab

% within Period

		Dummy Cultural/pol symbols: Pop culture		
		CPS: Not Popular Culture	CPS: Popular Culture	Total
Period	Elections (16 November 2016 to 10 May 2017 or 7 March 2022 to 27 April 2022)	99.1%	0.9%	100.0%
	"Routine" (Any post not part of 'elections')	99.5%	0.5%	100.0%
Total		99.3%	0.7%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	.401[a]	1	.527		
Continuity Correction[b]	.044	1	.834		
Likelihood Ratio	.388	1	.533		
Fisher's Exact Test				.677	.404
Linear-by-Linear Association	.400	1	.527		
N of Valid Cases	890				

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.25.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approximate Significance
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.021	.527
	Cramer's V	.021	.527
N of Valid Cases		890	