



The Impact of Mandated Maternity Leave on Developed Economies Female Labor Force Participation Rate

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1. Introduction

In a contemporary economic setting, it is important to examine current economic conditions to further the agenda of sustainable economics, such as the goals laid out within the UN Sustainable Development Goals. One of these goals is to have gender equality by 2030 with some named objectives of ensuring women's "full and effective participation and equal opportunities" as well as recognizing and valuing domestic work through social protection policies (United Nations, 2015). These goals are internationally recognized by all member states. In most member states of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the gender gap has been gradually converging, yet since the 2000s, there has been a stagnation in the growth of female labor force participation (Goldin, 2014). This paper will quantitatively investigate how the weeks of available maternity leave to mothers across OECD countries are related to each country's women's labor force participation rate on an aggregate level.

A large portion of the female population is unable to work due to responsibilities of child-rearing and child care. When jobs do not offer security for women to remain employed in light of pregnancy, this can result in women exiting the workforce after having children. In addition to job security, when employers and governments are not accommodating enough towards child-rearing, this can also dissuade women from rejoining the workforce after birth, or joining in the first place (Berger & Waldfogel, 2004). Across the 38 member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), there is an average of 18.6 weeks of paid mandated maternity leave, with the lowest being 0.0 (The United States), and the highest being fifty-six weeks (Greece) (OECD, 2024). It is noteworthy that out of the member states, only sixteen pay the mothers one hundred percent of their earnings, and out of these countries the average weeks of leave is sixteen weeks (OECD, 2024). The goal of this paper is to establish if increasing maternity leave has a positive effect on female labor force participation rates.

This paper will conduct this investigation through a preliminary literature review in order to evaluate previous research and contextualize the academic relevance of the topic. The literature review will include information on both maternity leave and female labor force participation,

then will delve into research concerning the relation between the two. An explanation of the panel regression used as well as its various control variables will follow the literature review in the methodology section. This section will justify why a panel regression is most suited, as well as outline the data used from the OECD. This paper will use data sourced from the OECD and the World Bank from 2000-2020, covering a span of twenty years. The results from the regression show that there is a strong relationship between maternity leave and labor force participation. A one week increase in maternity leave is shown to increase female labor force participation between 0.029 and 0.032 percent. The paper will conclude with a discussion about the policy implications of the findings drawn from the research.

2. Literature Review

The history of maternity leave is a brief story. The International Labor Organization (ILO) has been highly involved in creating maternity leave standards since 1919, and towards the twenty-first century, they had pushed for longer periods based on their sound research and findings. The antecedent proposal for maternity leave was named *Maternity Protection Convention*, written in 1919 with the goal of having it enacted by 1922 (International Labour Organization, 1919). The proposal stated that women should have access to six weeks of maternity leave where they are compensated either by insurance or by government authorities an amount that supports her and the child for this time, although the exact amount is not stipulated. The proposal also stated that women are entitled to breastfeed their children twice a day during the work day for half an hour each time (International Labour Organization, 1919). While six weeks of maternity leave is sparse, it was a step in the right direction, and was revised in 1952 to be twelve weeks with a recommendation of fourteen weeks and paid at a rate of minimum two-thirds of the mother's earnings in her job alongside full health benefits (International Labour Organization, 2024).

A 2024 report from the International Labour Organization stated that “women provide the main source of income in some 30 per cent of all households worldwide” (International Labour Organization, 2024) and “more than 120 countries around the world provide paid maternity leave and health benefits by law, including most industrialized nations except Australia, New Zealand

and the United States” (International Labour Organization, 2024). This shows progression towards maintaining job security for women, but it is noteworthy that three very developed economies still lack legally mandated *paid* maternity leave, so in practice, the women in these countries receive no legally mandated support from their employers when they take leave to have children.

The World Health Organization, or WHO, provided commentary on the International Labour Organization’s proposal, giving reasons for the articles within the proposal from the standpoint of health and health economics. WHO also provides recommendations that often are more lenient towards women based on robust research on the effects of pregnancy and childbirth on employed women. WHO provided these recommendations alongside the ILO’s Maternity Protection Convention (2000), and the two organizations worked in conjunction on the ILO’s Maternity Protection Recommendation. One of the reasons for wanting the mother to have extended leave with their newborn is to prevent the early cessation of breastfeeding, which WHO together with UNICEF have determined returning to work early as being the primary catalyst of (WHO & UNICEF, 2019). The recommendations say that eighteen weeks of maternity leave is essential as this time of rest is crucial to the health and well-being of both the mother and the child (World Health Organization, 2024). Rather than two-thirds, they recommend the mother be paid the full earnings, as well as warning against having employers pay the mothers, instead it should be social insurance or public funds as otherwise this could be cause for potential discrimination by employers against women (World Health Organization, 2024).

Expansions in Maternity Leave Coverage and Mothers’ Labor Market Outcomes after Childbirth by Schönberg and Ludsteck (2014) discusses the impact of five policy changes concerning maternity leave in Germany, where the leave coverage time was expanded. The authors evaluate the causal impact of these changes on post-childbirth employment rates using a difference-in-difference design. The reforms succeeded in extending the time that mothers stay at home with their children by almost three months. The reforms extended the paid leave from six weeks to twenty-four months, with unpaid job protection up to thirty-six months, over a period of thirteen years. The paper discusses opposing effects of extending maternity leave both for the mother’s employment and for the mother’s income. Concerning employment, one effect is that

the longer a mother spends with her child, the more they enjoy being at home with their child. The opposing effect of this is that the utility of staying at home with the child declines with the child's age. Concerning the income, the opposing effects are that the women's job specific human capital may depreciate over time away from work, versus retaining job specific human capital. The study found that adverse effects may overpower the positive impacts, meaning that in the long run, these reforms actually decreased labor market attachment and income. This highlights the importance of finding a suitable amount of time for leave coverage that does not encourage the adverse effects of leave.

The next paper that will be discussed is *The Effect of Childcare Costs on Women's Labor Force Participation* by Rachel Connelly (1992). The study conducted in this paper examines how childcare costs have an impact on the probability of married women with children participating in the labor force. The study found that if childcare costs are higher than wages, then women will not work. The study found that for preschool aged children, there was an even lower level of women's participation which can completely be accredited to higher childcare costs associated with this age. Next, the model found that a one percent increase in childcare costs is associated with a 0.2% decrease in the probability of mother's employment. Lastly, the model simulated that if the government subsidized childcare costs by fifty percent, then sixty-four percent of married women with children would be employed in comparison to the actual fifty-six percent. The author discusses in the conclusion how if government systems were in place to relieve the burden of childcare costs to mother's, then countries could expect a positive impact of participation rates for married women with children. These findings relate to this paper by showing how mother's decisions to participate in the labor force are dependent on the social structures in place to support child-rearing.

Maternity Leave and the Employment of New Mothers in the United States by Berger and Waldfogel (2004) conducted a study to evaluate women's post-birth employment decisions in relation to maternity leave policies within the United States. The researchers hypothesized that women with access to maternity leave benefits would be more likely to return to work post-birth. The study evaluates a period of policy change in the United States. In 1993, the United States put in place a policy, the Family and Medical Leave Act, for twelve weeks, or three months, of

legally mandated unpaid maternity leave. The study is over the period of 1998 to 1996 and follows women in the age group of twenty-three to thirty. Eighty percent of women with leave coverage returned to work versus sixty-three percent for those without. Over time, there was an increase of coverage over the period of policy change from seventy-two percent to eighty-nine percent.

How Does Job-Protected Maternity Leave Affect Mothers' Employment by Baker and Milligan (2008) studies maternity leave changes in Canada. The goal of the paper is to investigate if leave entitlements increase the proportion of mothers who return to their pre-birth employer. Baker and Milligan (2008) hypothesize that leave will increase the amount of employed mothers, and maternity leave of all lengths increases job continuity. The paper follows leave entitlement changes across Canada as the regulations are provincial, meaning different areas have different mandated leave lengths. Over the period studied, they observe what they state as modest leave entitlement policies of seventeen to eighteen weeks being introduced to some provinces, while others have introduced the possibility of extending leaves to twenty nine to even seventy weeks. It is important to note that the leave discussed in the paper is unpaid. The study found that an increase in leave length increased job continuity.

Changes in Labor Force Participation in the United States by Juhn and Potter (2006) discusses changes in employment patterns within the United States in the previous forty years. The paper uses demographic and population data to evaluate the effects of various demographic variables on employment. In the section concerning solely female employment, they note how increasing divorce rates and therefore an increase in unmarried women result in an increase in female employment. Moreover, never married women have an even higher participation than both divorced women and married women. In addition to the effects marriage has on female employment, the authors also discuss education level as a notable factor in employment. High school dropouts experienced a thirty percentage decrease in comparison to college graduates, fifty percent versus eighty percent employment rates in 2004.

Female Labor Supply: Why Is the United States Falling Behind? by Blau and Kahn (2013) discusses why the United States is being surpassed by other developed countries in their female

employment rates despite having one of the highest in the 1990s. From 1990 to 2010, the United States female labor participation rate ranking out of twenty-two countries fell from sixth to seventeenth. Additionally, the US went from being around seven percentage points higher than the Non-US average female employment rate, to being four points below it. This paper cites paid parental leave, or the lack of, being one of the main motivators of female employment. As stated previously, the United States has twelve weeks of mandated unpaid maternity leave, while other countries in the OECD had longer and typically paid parental leave plans. The authors note the drawback of parental leave being that the cost of hiring women increases with mandated leave, which can possibly deter employers from hiring them. Yet despite this, they note that parental leave policies being implemented in other countries besides the US may have a strong influence on the increase in Non-US female labor force participation.

Fertility, Female Labor Force Participation, and the Demographic Dividend by Bloom et. al. (2009) delves into the effect of fertility on labor force participation. The authors evaluate each female's individual labor supply in years, and use abortion legislation as an instrument of reducing fertility. The paper assesses the impact of removing legal restrictions on abortions on female labor supply. They also estimate that each birth a woman has reduces her labor supply by two years. The authors note certain variables that also affect labor force participation, stating that high income countries such as the OECD countries have high participation rates as their education rates are also high, raising the opportunity cost of not working to raise children. Across ninety-seven countries, the author found that the reduction in fertility rates was about four children, and this corresponded to an eleven percent increase in labor supply and seven percent increase in GDP per capita.

The Economic Consequences of Family Policies: Lessons from a Century of Legislation in High-Income Countries by Olivetti and Petrongolo (2017) looks at the impact of family policies on three gender related outcomes: female employment, fertility, and the gender gap in employment. This paper aims to address the ambiguity of the effects of family leave policies due to the opposing views of proponents and opponents of maternal leave which have also been discussed throughout this literature review. The results of this study find that maternity leave policies have a positive impact on labor force participation rates up to fifty weeks and declines

after. The authors found that the effect of maternity leave on fertility is quantitatively negligible, regardless of whether the leave is paid or unpaid.

Female Employment and Childcare by Nessani-Nezhad (2020) evaluates the effect of childcare subsidies on female employment, as “the need for policies balancing the family-work life of mothers are becoming ever more relevant and the provision of affordable childcare could contribute to such a balance”. The paper states how childcare subsidies can increase female employment through a decrease in the reservation wage of mothers. The author found that an increase of ten percent in public childcare expenditures expands the labor supply by up to 5.4%.

Based on this literature, the effects of parental leave can be ambiguous due to the variety of factors that maternity leave influences. Some notable factors include the possibility of the mother becoming attached to giving childcare and not wanting to return to work after an extended leave (Schönberg & Ludsteck, 2014). The literature also shows that maternity leave consistently increases the amount of time that a mother spends at home post birth, and that maternity leave increases job continuity (Baker & Milligan, 2008). Additionally, childcare costs, education level, fertility, GDP and marriage status have an impact on female labor force participation, meaning that these are potentially reliable control variables for a regression model, in order to isolate the effects of maternity leave on labor force participation. The article by Olivetti and Petrongolo (2017) has also illustrated the effect of maternity leave on fertility, clarifying the causal pathway of maternity leave on labor force participation, as the confounding effect of using fertility as a control variable is negligible.

3. Methodology

This study will utilize a panel regression in order to assess the relationship between women’s labor force participation and the weeks of legally mandated maternity leave, paid or unpaid. There are two kinds of regressions that could be used, fixed effects and random effects. Fixed effects focus on variation within a country, while random effects focus on between-country time invariant differences. A Hausman test, of which the results can be seen in Table 4.2, is necessary

to determine which version is more suited, but for robustness, this study will use both methods. The regression equation is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 1. \quad LFP_i &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 Leave + \epsilon_i \\
 2. \quad LFP_i &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 Leave + \beta_2 GDP + \beta_3 Fertility + \beta_4 Education + \beta_5 Marriage \\
 &\quad + \beta_6 Childcare Costs + \epsilon_i
 \end{aligned}$$

The first equation is the simple regression equation without control variables, where the dependent variable, Y, or *LFP* is the labor force participation rate by country of women aged fifteen and older, and the independent variable, X, or *Leave* is the number of weeks of available maternity leave by country.

The second equation includes the control variables selected for this study. There are many factors which influence both the labor force participation rate for women and also the number of available weeks of maternity leave. These control variables are extrapolated from the information provided in previous literature as to what affects female participation rate. GDP is used as high income countries typically have higher education quality, which can positively impact labor force participation rates (Bloom et. al., 2009). This paper also motivates the use of education level as a control variable. Fertility is used as although fertility rate may be affected by maternity leave, the literature has shown that this effect is negligible (Olivetti & Petrongolo, 2017). But, fertility does have an impact on labor force participation, as shown by Bloom et. al., (2009). The last article reviewed provides motivation for the use of childcare costs as a control variable, as it decreases the reservation wages of mothers (Nessani-Nezhad, 2020). Lastly, Juhn and Potter (2006) showed how single women are more likely to participate in the labor force than married women.

By controlling for these five variables, the effect of maternity leave on female labor force participation is more isolated, and these five variables are reiterated within previous literature, whether in a direct study of maternity leave on labor force participation, or on studies done on female labor force participation alone. Although not every factor influencing female participation

can be measured, these five variables are intended to capture a majority of the outside effects on female employment.

A linear regression is suitable for this panel data. The regression analysis allows for a study to be done over a span of multiple years, and allows for the control of multiple variables, which leads to higher robustness and accuracy when evaluating the relationship between variables. The regression analysis is also used for estimating causal relationships. It is also well-suited for large data sets.

The study will use data from the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank from the years 2000 to 2020, as there were many changes in maternity leave policies throughout this time period. Using panel data over time will allow for the control of time-invariant heterogeneous factors, capture various policy changes within countries, and strengthen the statistical power of the results. OECD data uses a quality framework for all its statistics to guarantee reliable data by using programmes that collect data from countries' national surveys, web queries, and international organizations such as Eurostat and the UN (OECD, 2024). The World Bank is also a trusted international government organization that also sources its data from population surveys and the UN (World Bank, nd). The OECD countries are relevant to the research question, as most members of the OECD are developed economies as being a member of the OECD is dependent on having shared ideological values towards economic policy and contains some of the world's largest economies (OECD, 2024). By using OECD data, the study benefits from the effects of using high quality data which is essential for a robust analysis of the effect of maternity leave on labor force participation.

For GDP, the data used will be real GDP in dollars. Fertility rate is measured as the average number of births per woman. Education is measured as the gross percentage of the population enrolled in tertiary education, because based on the research by Juhn and Potter (2006), having a degree from higher education makes a large difference in employment rates. Marriage is measured by the crude marriage rate per thousand people. Childcare costs are measured by the net reduction in family budgets by taking the difference between identical families where one uses childcare services and one uses unpaid informal care. The data concerning childcare costs

was quite limited, with only data from 2004, 2008, 2012, 2015, 2018, 2019, and 2020 being available. Due to these limitations, the plausible values were filled in for each country. The plausible values were separated by time period. 2000-2004 is represented by the value in 2004, 2004-2008 is represented by the average between the two, and this is also applied for the periods leading up until 2018, where data is fully available. For the nine countries where the data is not available, the average for that year is used as a plausible substitute. Due to the fact that this may compromise the validity of the results, results excluding childcare costs will also be included in the results section.

4. Results

The purpose of this thesis was to evaluate the impact of maternity leave on female labor force participation rate by using the statistical interface, Stata. Below, a table containing the descriptive statistics of each variable. The full datasets for each variable can be located in the appendix.

Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics of All Variables included in Model

Variable	Measurements				
	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Female labor force participation	798	44.5	4.22	24.9	50.8
Leave in weeks	798	17.99	9.11	0	52
GDP	798	1.14E+12	2.66E+12	5.69E+09	2.15E+13
Education	798	66.98	21.38	9.9	143.3
Fertility	798	1.69	0.37	0.8	3.1
Marriage	797	4.95	1.13	1.6	9.5
Childcare Costs	798	16.98	11.25	-1	59

Table 4.2 Hausman Test Results Excluding the Control Variable Childcare Costs

Test Statistic	Value
chi ²	0.49
Prob > chi ²	0.974

The purpose of the Hausman test is to investigate whether the differences in coefficients are due to a violation of model assumptions, and in the case of random effects, it would be that the effects are correlated with the regressors. The fixed effects model assumes that country-specific effects are correlated with the explanatory variables, meaning that there are unobserved factors specific to each country that influence all of the variables within the study. Fixed effects allows each country to have its own intercept on the regression. The random effects model treats these country-specific factors as part of the error term. It is more efficient if the assumption of uncorrelation holds as it allows for both within and between country comparisons, and allows for time invariant variables. Choosing between the two models and selecting the most appropriate one increases the interpretability and reliability of the results. The Chi-Squared P-Value output from Stata was 0.974. This high p-value implies that the null hypothesis of the Hausman test, a systematic difference, is not rejected. This means that there are no systematic differences between the two models. Therefore, the preferred model is random effects. The childcare cost variable is excluded in the test as it may affect the validity of the results, but for robustness, the test was also performed with that control variable, and the results can be shown below. Both ways, the random effects model is preferred.

Table 4.3 Hausman Test Results Including Childcare Costs

Test Statistic	Value
chi ²	1.03
Prob > chi ²	0.960

Table 4.4 Random Effects Regression Results with Childcare Costs

Effect	Estimate	SE	z	p	95% CI
Intercept	43.084	0.817	52.750	0.000*	41.483 to 44.684
Leave	0.032	0.009	3.660	0.000*	0.014 to 0.048
GDP	0.000	0.000	0.400	0.693	-7.51e-14 to 1.13e-13
Education	-0.246	0.245	-1.000	0.315	-0.727 to 0.234
Fertility	0.062	0.003	20.970	0.000*	0.055 to 0.067
Marriage	-0.677	0.054	-12.550	0.000*	-0.782 to -0.571
Childcare Costs	0.027	0.008	3.380	0.001*	0.011 to 0.042
R-Squared (within)	0.578				
R-Squared (between)	0.182				
R-Squared (overall)	0.211				

Table 4.5 Random Effects Regression Results without Childcare Costs

Effect	Estimate	SE	z	p	95% CI
Intercept	43.689	0.801	54.550	0.000*	42.119 to 45.258
Leave	0.029	0.009	3.310	0.001*	0.012 to 0.046
GDP	0.000	0.000	0.130	0.894	-8.79e-14 to 1.01e-13
Education	-0.279	0.247	-1.130	0.258	-0.763 to 0.205
Fertility	0.061	0.003	20.650	0.000*	0.055 to 0.067
Marriage	-0.673	0.054	-12.390	0.000*	-0.779 to -0.566
R-Squared (within)	0.572				
R-Squared (between)	0.165				
R-Squared (overall)	0.196				

Table 4.6 Fixed Effects Regression Results with Childcare Costs

Effect	Estimate	SE	t	p	95% CI
Intercept	43.052	0.516	83.440	0.000*	42.039 to 44.065
Leave	0.032	0.009	3.670	0.000*	0.015 to 0.049
GDP	0.000	0.000	0.380	0.706	-7.79e-14 to 1.15e-13
Education	-0.235	0.248	-0.950	0.343	-0.721 to 0.251
Fertility	0.062	0.003	20.800	0.000*	0.055 to 0.067
Marriage	-0.675	0.054	-12.410	0.000*	-0.781 to -0.568
Childcare Costs	0.027	0.008	3.290	0.001*	0.010 to 0.042
R-Squared (within)	0.5784				
R-Squared (between)	0.1811				
R-Squared (overall)	0.2102				

Table 4.7 Fixed Effects Regression Results without Childcare Costs

Effect	Estimate	SE	t	p	95% CI
Intercept	43.658	0.485	89.980	0.000*	42.705 to 44.610
Leave	0.029	0.009	3.320	0.001*	0.011 to 0.046
GDP	0.000	0.000	0.090	0.926	-9.22e-14 to 1.01e-13
Education	-0.269	0.249	-1.080	0.280	-0.758 to 0.220
Fertility	0.061	0.003	20.490	0.000*	0.055 to 0.066
Marriage	-0.671	0.055	-12.260	0.000*	-0.778 to -0.563
R-Squared (within)	0.572				
R-Squared (between)	0.164				
R-Squared (overall)	0.195				

Tables 4.4-4.7 illustrate the regression results from four different tests with different model specifications. The p-values with asterisks are those that have statistical significance. The first two tables, 4.4 and 4.5, are most suited for the data based on the Hausman test, and they show the results from the random effects regression model. The main results for this experiment are going to be located in table 4.5. As stated earlier, childcare costs are an important control variable for this experiment, so it is important to also include the results with this control variable present. But, in order to increase the validity of the results, the regression without childcare costs may depict the most accurate coefficients, as all of the data for the other control variables is present. Unfortunately, childcare costs data was missing for nine countries, and although it is the minority, the goal of this experiment is to provide the most accurate interpretation of the results.

The effect of maternity leave on female labor force participation is significant and positive for all four iterations of the regression, implying that increasing the weeks of maternity leave does in fact increase female labor force participation. Based on table 4.5, it can be interpreted that an increase in the weeks of maternity leave has a positive and significant effect on female labor force participation. With a one week increase in maternity leave, there is a 0.029% increase in female labor force participation. When controlling for childcare costs in the random effects model, the coefficient for leave becomes even higher, indicating a stronger effect on female labor force participation, as in the model controlling for childcare costs, a one unit increase in maternity leave results in a 0.032% increase in female labor force participation, also at a statistically significant level.

The fixed effects results for the leave coefficient are the same as random, indicating that the results are indeed robust and reliable. It can be concluded from this study that when controlling for childcare in addition to the other four control variables, a one week increase in leave results in a 0.032% increase in female labor force participation, and when excluding the control for childcare, it results in a 0.029% increase. The results with and without childcare as a control variable are also similar, further indicating that the findings from the study are reliable. All coefficients for leave are statistically significant at the 1% level ($p < 0.01$), indicating a strong relationship between maternity leave policies and labor force participation. To further increase

robustness of the study, the regression was also performed with a robust standard error including childcare costs to account for the missing data that was filled in with averages. The results can be found in Tables 4.8 and 4.9.

Table 4.8 Fixed Effects Regression Robust Results with Childcare Costs

Effect	Estimate	SE	t	p	95% CI
Intercept	43.052	1.307	32.930	0.000*	40.403 to 45.701
Leave	0.032	0.021	1.520	0.138	-0.010 to 0.075
GDP	0.000	0.000	0.160	0.876	-2.21e-13 to 2.58e-13
Education	0.062	0.010	6.040	0.000*	0.040 to 0.082
Fertility	-0.235	0.715	-0.330	0.744	-1.683 to 1.212
Marriage	-0.675	0.148	-4.560	0.000*	-0.975 to -0.375
R-Squared (within)	0.027	0.018	1.440	0.157	-0.010 to 0.063
R-Squared (between)	0.5784				
R-Squared (overall)	0.1811				

Table 4.9 Random Effects Regression Robust Results with Childcare Costs

Effect	Estimate	SE	z	p	95% CI
Intercept	43.084	1.273	33.850	0.000*	40.589 to 45.578
Leave	0.032	0.021	1.520	0.129	-0.009 to 0.072
GDP	0.000	0.000	0.170	0.864	-1.98e-13 to 2.35e-13
Education	0.062	0.010	6.050	0.000*	0.041 to 0.081
Fertility	-0.246	0.705	-0.350	0.727	-1.628 to 1.135
Marriage	-0.677	0.149	-4.540	0.000*	-0.969 to -0.384
Childcare Costs	0.027	0.018	1.480	0.138	-0.008 to 0.062
R-Squared (within)	0.578				
R-Squared (between)	0.182				

With a robust standard error, the result of the leave coefficient is still 0.032 for both models, but the result is no longer statistically significant. The stability of the coefficient suggests that the relationship between leave and female labor force participation is consistent. The statistical significance decreases when accounting for heteroskedasticity, which is accounted for in a robust standard error.

The other variables in the model have varying effects and statistical significance. GDP has no statistical significance in any of the models, suggesting that it does not have a strong impact on female labor force participation. Education has varying effects and varying significance, so no firm conclusions can be drawn from this control variable. Fertility rates surprisingly show a positive and significant effect on labor force participation, although all countries in the OECD have similar fertility rates with a standard deviation of 0.37, which can be seen in table 4.1. Marriage, unsurprisingly, shows a negative and significant effect on female labor force participation which is consistent with previous literature by Juhn and Potter (2006). Lastly, childcare costs have a positive and significant effect on female labor force participation when included. Alternative explanations for the results could be that countries that implement higher maternity leave policies may have a more positive cultural outlook on female participation in the workforce, hence having higher participation rates. But, the stability and strength of these results suggest a causal relationship between maternity leave and labor force participation.

5. Conclusion

The results from the regression analyses as well as the robustness checks indicate that extending maternity leave policies result in an increase of female labor force participation. Extending the weeks of mandated maternity leave will result in higher female employment. In future studies, to increase the robustness of the results, higher quality data should be used for further investigation, as the loss of significance with a robust standard error suggests that either some assumptions of the model were not met, or that the quality of the data could be higher. Therefore, the hypothesis that increasing mandated maternity leave helps to increase equality in the workforce is correct.

Policymakers should also delve into the relationship between marriage, fertility, and female labor force participation. Although the focus of this study was maternity leave, policies that promote a work-life balance for both the husband and the wife could reduce the negative effect that marriage has on female labor force participation. In future studies, it could be useful to examine mandated paternity leave's effect on female labor force participation, to see if encouraging the husband to participate in child-raising would increase gender equality within the workforce.

All countries of the OECD have committed to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. Increasing female labor force participation aligns with the previously mentioned goal 5, of gender equality. By increasing maternity leave, countries will move closer towards that goal. Further studies should be done to determine the exact amount of leave that is optimal for female labor participation rates, as previous literature had found that beyond 50 weeks the effect is negative. The previous literature by Schönberg and Ludsteck (2014) showed that in Germany, the maternity leave policy expansions did not encourage female labor force participation, while the aggregate model using data from all OECD countries in this study showed that maternity leave increases female labor force participation. This illustrates the need for each country to evaluate the social and cultural norms or biases, and create policies which are best suited for their cultural, political and social frameworks. Although this study shows that throughout the OECD it is better for female employment to increase maternity leave, for future studies, it is important to individually study each country to determine what the best policy is.

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Slovenia	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
Spain	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16
Sweden	4.3	11.3	15.6	15.6	15.6	8.6	15.6	15.6	15.6	15.6	8.6	8.6	8.6	8.6	8.6	8.6	12.9	12.9	12.9	12.9
Switzerland	8	8	8	8	8	8	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	16	16	16	16	16	16	16
Turkiye	12	12	12	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16
United Kingdom	40	40	40	52	52	52	52	52	52	52	52	52	52	52	52	52	52	52	52	52
United States	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Table 6.2 Female Labor Force Participation Percentage by Country and Year (World Bank, 2024)

Country	Year																				
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Australia	43.8	44.2	44.3	44.7	44.6	44.9	45.1	45.2	45.3	45.4	45.3	45.5	45.6	45.7	45.9	46.1	46.4	46.6	46.8	46.9	47
Austria	43.9	44.2	44.7	44.7	45.3	45.7	45.8	45.9	46.1	46.5	46.6	46.8	46.9	47	47.1	47	47	47	46.8	46.9	47
Belgium	43	42.4	42.9	43.1	43.8	44.2	44.4	44.7	45	45.2	45.4	45.4	45.4	45.8	46.1	46.1	46	46.3	46.7	46.8	46.7
Canada	46	46.1	46.3	46.6	46.7	46.7	46.9	47.1	47	47.3	47.4	47.3	47.4	47.4	47.3	47.1	47.2	47.3	47.4	47.3	47
Chile	34.3	34	34	34.9	36	36.6	36.9	37.4	38.3	38.9	39.4	40.2	40.6	40.7	41.1	41	41	41.2	41.7	42	40.9
Colombia	40.2	40.2	40.1	40.6	40.5	40	40	40	40.1	41.2	41.5	41.6	42.1	42	42	42.2	42.1	42.1	41.7	41.6	41.2
Costa Rica	32.6	34.3	34.2	34.3	33.7	35.5	35.5	35.9	36.3	36.9	37.1	38.2	39.9	40.2	39.9	39.8	38.5	38.3	39.1	41.1	40.2
Czechia	44.3	44.3	44.1	44.2	44.1	44	43.9	43.6	43.3	43.4	43.3	43.5	43.8	44	44	44.2	44.3	44.4	44.6	44.5	44.3
Denmark	46.9	46.7	46.8	46.5	46.6	46.8	47	46.9	46.8	47.1	47.1	47.2	47.3	47.6	47.2	46.9	47.3	47.3	47.1	47	47.1
Estonia	48.7	48.7	48.8	48.5	49.3	49.8	49.2	48.6	48.8	49	49.5	49.3	49	48.9	48.3	48.7	48.4	48.3	48.3	48.5	48.3
Finland	47.6	47.8	47.9	47.8	47.9	48.2	48.2	48.2	48	48.4	48	47.8	48.1	48.1	48.2	48.3	48	47.9	48	47.9	47.7
France	45.9	45.9	45.9	46.5	46.5	46.9	47.1	47.3	47.4	47.6	47.7	47.8	47.8	47.9	48.1	48.1	48.2	48.2	48.3	48.4	48.5
Germany	44.1	44.5	44.7	45	45.1	45.3	45.6	45.8	45.8	45.9	46	46.1	46.1	46.3	46.3	46.4	46.5	46.6	46.6	46.6	46.7
Greece	38.8	38.6	38.9	39.2	40	40.1	40.3	40.4	40.5	41.2	41.9	42.4	43	43.1	43.8	44.4	44.6	44.5	44.3	44.4	44.4
Hungary	44.7	44.6	44.9	45.2	45.3	45.6	45.4	45.2	45.3	45.4	45.9	45.8	46	45.7	45.7	45.6	45.5	45.3	45.1	44.8	44.7
Iceland	47.2	46.7	46.9	46.8	46.2	46.7	46	45.5	45.6	46.6	47	47.3	47.7	47.6	47.3	47.4	46.8	46.4	46	45.8	45.8
Ireland	40.7	40.8	41.6	41.8	41.7	42.3	42.3	43	43.5	44.3	44.8	45.1	45.2	45.4	45.3	45.2	45.5	45.7	45.9	45.9	45.9
Israel	44.8	45	45.2	45.7	45.7	45.8	45.8	45.8	45.8	46.5	46.5	46.3	46.4	46.3	46.7	46.7	46.8	46.8	47.2	47.3	47.5
Italy	38.6	39.1	39.3	39.5	40.3	40.3	40.5	40.5	41	41.1	41.3	41.6	42.2	42.3	42.6	42.2	42.4	42.6	42.6	42.8	42.4
Japan	40.5	40.7	40.7	40.8	41.1	41.2	41.3	41.4	41.5	41.8	41.9	42	42.1	42.5	42.8	43	43.3	43.7	44.1	44.4	44.4
Korea, Rep.	40.2	40.5	40.6	40.2	40.7	40.9	41.1	41.1	41.2	41	41.1	41.1	41.1	41.2	41.4	41.5	41.7	41.9	42.1	42.5	42.5
Latvia	48.3	49.1	49	49.3	48.9	48.9	48.9	48.8	49.4	50.1	50.6	50.1	50.2	50.2	49.7	49.6	50.1	49.8	49.8	49.8	49.7
Lithuania	49.9	49.6	49.2	50.1	49.5	49.6	50	49.7	49.8	50.6	50.8	50.4	50.5	49.9	49.8	50	50	49.9	49.6	49.8	49.4
Luxembourg	39.6	40.3	40.7	41.2	42.1	42.5	42.9	43.2	43.6	43.5	43.7	44.1	44.5	44.4	44.6	45.6	45.5	46.3	46.5	45.9	46.7
Mexico	33.9	33.7	34	34.4	35	35.5	36	36.3	36.3	36.8	36.8	37	37.5	37.6	37.1	37.4	37.5	37.3	37.5	38.3	38

Netherlands	43.4	43.7	43.9	44.4	44.7	44.6	44.9	45.3	45.5	45.7	46	46.3	46.4	46.3	46.1	46.3	46.4	46.6	46.7	46.9	
New Zealand	45.4	45.7	45.8	46.1	46.1	46.4	46.4	46.6	46.9	47.1	47.2	47.3	47.6	47.6	47.6	47.5	47.5	47.4	47.5	47.6	47.2
Norway	46.6	46.8	47.3	47.1	47.3	47.1	47.1	47.3	47.3	47.5	47.3	47.5	47.2	47.3	47.3	47.1	47.1	47.2	47.1	47.2	47.1
Poland	46	45.9	45.6	45.6	45.3	45.1	44.8	44.7	44.6	44.7	44.9	44.9	45	45	45.1	45.1	45	44.9	45	44.8	44.7
Portugal	45.4	45.6	45.7	46.3	46.3	47	47	47.3	47.4	47.8	48.2	47.7	48.1	48.4	48.6	48.8	48.7	48.9	49.2	49.4	49.4
Slovak Republic	45.8	45.8	45.6	45.7	45.5	44.8	44.5	44.6	44.6	44.3	44.6	44.2	44.3	44.5	45	45	45.2	45.4	45.2	45.4	45.4
Slovenia	46.4	46.1	46.1	45.7	45.8	45.9	46.1	45.8	46	46	45.8	45.9	46.1	45.8	46	45.9	46.4	45.9	46	46	46
Spain	39.6	39	40.1	40.6	41.1	41.5	42	42.4	43	43.9	44.4	45	45.5	45.9	46	46.2	46.4	46.4	46.4	46.6	46.6
Sweden	47.8	47.6	47.7	47.7	47.6	47.5	47.4	47.5	47.4	47.4	47.1	47.3	47.4	47.4	47.4	47.5	47.5	47.4	47.5	47.4	47.1
Switzerland	44.2	44.8	45.2	45.2	45.3	45.6	45.6	45.5	46.1	46.2	45.8	45.8	46	46.1	46.4	46.5	46.4	46.6	46.8	46.7	46.7
Turkiye	26.6	27.3	28.2	27.5	25	24.9	25.2	25.3	25.9	27	28.1	28.7	29.4	30.1	29.9	30.7	31.2	31.8	32.1	32.5	31.3
United Kingdom	45.4	45.5	45.8	45.6	45.9	45.9	46	45.9	45.9	46.1	46.2	46.3	46.3	46.5	46.6	46.6	46.7	46.9	47	47.2	47.6
United States	45.8	45.9	45.9	46.1	46	46	46	46.1	46.2	46.4	46.5	46.4	46.2	46.1	46.1	46	45.9	46.1	46.1	46.1	46.1

Table 6.3 Gross Domestic Product by Country and Year (World Bank, 2024)

Country	Year																				
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Australia	416,167.81	379,629.30	395,788.6	467,739.079	614,659.9	695,692.89	748,417.	855,007.45	1,056,112.42	928,762.1	1,148,890.20	1,398,701.32	1,547,649.8	1,577,301.84	1,468,597.6	1,351,768.	1,207,580.90	1,326,882.10	1,429,733.6	1,394,671.	1,330,381.544
Austria	197,289.62	197,508.77	214,394.8	262,273.631	301,457.5	316,092.27	336,280.	389,185.57	432,051.935	401,758.7	392,275.107	431,685.217	409,401.816	430,190.979	442,584.815	381,971.14	395,837.353	417,261.151	454,991.174	444,596.1	435,049,316.9
Belgium	236,792.46	236,746.14	258,383.5	318,082.528	369,214.7	385,714.76	408,259.	470,922.15	517,328.087	483,254.1	481,420.882	523,330.354	496,152.879	521,791.015	535,390.200	462,335.57	476,062.757	502,764.720	543,299.066	535,865.8	526,021,513.4
Canada	744,773.41	738,981.79	760,649.3	895,540.646	1,026,690.	1,173,108.5	4,809.59	1,468,820.	1,552,989.69	1,374,625	1,617,343.36	1,793,326.63	1,828,366.4	1,846,597.42	1,805,749.8	1,556,508.	1,527,994.74	1,649,265.64	1,725,329.1	1,743,725.	1,655,684,730
Chile	78,339.750	71,574.739	70,264.04	76,492.579	99,075.98	122,284.14	153,843.	172,491.07	179,894.594	171,777.9	217,051.209	251,382.573	267,024.782	277,395.018	259,560.978	242,450.35	249,344.863	276,154.259	295,857.562	278,285.0	254,042,159.3
Colombia	99,875.074	98,200.641	97,945.81	94,644.969	117,092.4	145,600.52	161,792.	206,229.54	242,504.150	232,468.6	286,498.534	334,966.134	370,691.143	382,093.697	381,240.864	293,492.37	282,720.100	311,866.875	334,198.218	323,031.7	270,348,342.5
Costa Rica	15,013.629	15,976.174	16,578.82	17,271.760	18,610.59	20,040.642	22,715.5	26,884.700	30,801,744.8	30,745.71	37,658.614.8	42,762,613.7	47,231,655.	50,949,668.8	52,016,408.	56,441,920	58,847,019.6	60,516,044.6	62,420,164.	64,417.67	62,395,610.76
Czechia	61,828.166	67,808.032	82,196.000	100,090.607	119,814.4	137,143.47	156,264.	190,183.800	236,816.485	207,434.2	209,069.940	229,562.733	208,857.719	211,685.616	209,358.834	188,033.05	196,272.068	218,628.940	249,005.540	252,548.1	245,974,558.6
Denmark	164,158.73	164,791.44	178,635.1	218,096.033	251,373.0	264,467.33	282,884.	319,423.42	353,361.038	321,241.3	321,995.279	344,003.137	327,148.943	343,584.391	352,993.631	302,673.07	313,115.929	332,121.063	356,841.216	346,498.7	354,762,748.3
Estonia	5,686.579	6,254.649	7,367.975	9,874.013.0	12,145.91	14,106.790	17,022.8	22,449.129	24,341,678.6	19,633.03	19,523,477.3	23,213,994.0	23,019,150.	25,115,753.3	26,634,083.	22,890,762	24,072,829.2	24,924,385.1	30,624,720.	31,290.45	31,330,419.85
Finland	126,019.54	129,533.10	140,404.4	171,652.458	197,479.4	204,885.49	217,089.	256,378.06	285,716.311.	253,497.5	249,424.310.	275,604.356	258,290.060	271,362.405	274,862,826	234,534.38	240,771,351.	255,647,979	275,708,001	268,514.9	271,886,077.3
France	1,365,639.	1,377,657.	1,501,409.	1,844,544.7	2,119,633.	2,196,945.2	6,221.30	2,660,591.	2,930,303.78	2,700,887	2,645,187.88	2,865,157.54	2,683,671.7	2,811,876.90	2,855,964.4	2,439,188.	2,472,964.34	2,595,151.04	2,790,956.8	2,728,870.	2,647,418,691
Germany	1,947,981.	1,945,700.	2,078,484.	2,501,640.3	2,814,353.	2,846,864.2	3,642.02	3,425,578.	3,745,260.09	3,411,261	3,399,667.82	3,749,314.99	3,527,143.1	3,733,804.64	3,889,093.0	3,357,585.	3,469,853.46	3,690,849.15	3,974,443.3	3,889,177.	3,887,727,161
Greece	130,457.75	136,309.29	154,564.2	202,370,140	240,963.5	247,875.42	273,546.	318,902.82	355,908.689	331,308.5	297,124,961.	282,995,942.	242,029,307	238,907,690.	235,458,133	195,683.52	193,148,146.	199,844,406.	212,049,447	205,252.7	188,480,337.2
Hungary	47,218.405	53,749.989	67,608.91	85,285.062	104,120.8	113,211.15	115,715.	140,186.71	158,325.614	131,069.2	132,175.929	141,942,264.	128,814,279	135,684,315.	141,033,843	125,174.16	128,609,822	143,112,196	160,565,642	164,020.4	157,288,955.8
Iceland	9,025,660.	8,234,846.	9,318,395.	11,429,333.	13,825.30	16,852,963.	17,465.3	21,652,505	18,074,622.9	13,154.41	13,751,161.9	15,221,622.9	14,751,508.	16,125,060.5	17,867,662.	17,517,210	20,793,168.0	24,728,285.1	26,260,850.	24,681.34	21,629,953.19
Ireland	100,207.61	109,346.66	128,596.0	164,670,771	194,372.1	211,876.98	232,180.	270,079.27	275,447,471.	236,443.1	221,913,560.	239,170,638.	225,118,718	238,112,475.	259,681,883	292,364.22	298,559,265.	337,241,811.	386,693,357	398,933.0	428,608,687.8
Israel	136,035.77	134,635.82	125,060.6	131,299,915	139,973.1	147,083.99	158,670.	184,052.12	220,531,065.	211,970.0	238,364,092	266,791,854.	262,282,244	297,732,778.	314,330,061	303,414,217	322,102,790.	358,245,427	376,691,526	402,470.5	413,267,669.2
Italy	1,146,676.	1,168,023.	1,276,769.	1,577,621.7	1,806,542.	1,858,217.1	1,719.39	2,211,102.	2,408,653.34	2,199,928	2,136,099.95	2,294,994.29	2,086,957.6	2,141,924.09	2,162,009.6	1,836,637.	1,877,071.68	1,961,796.19	2,091,932.4	2,011,302.	1,897,461,633

Greece	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.4	
Hungary	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.6
Iceland	2.1	2.0	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7
Ireland	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.6
Israel	3.0	2.9	2.9	3.0	2.9	2.8	2.9	2.9	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.1	3.0	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.0	2.9
Italy	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.2
Japan	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.3
Korea, Rep.	1.5	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.0	0.9	0.8
Latvia	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.6
Lithuania	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.5
Luxembourg	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.4
Mexico	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.9
Netherlands	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.5
New Zealand	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.0	1.9	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.6
Norway	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.5
Poland	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.4
Portugal	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4
Slovak Republic	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.6
Slovenia	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6
Spain	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.2
Sweden	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.7
Switzerland	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5
Turkiye	2.5	2.5	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.0	1.9
United Kingdom	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.6
United States	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.6

Table 6.5 Crude Marriage Rates by Country and Year (World Bank, 2024)

Country	Year																				
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Australia	5.9	5.3	5.4	5.3	5.5	5.4	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.4	5.4	5.4	5.1	5.2	4.8	4.9	4.6	4.8	4.5	3.1
Austria	4.9	4.3	4.5	4.6	4.7	4.8	4.5	4.3	4.2	4.3	4.5	4.3	4.6	4.3	4.4	5.1	5.1	5.1	5.3	5.2	4.4
Belgium	4.4	4.1	3.9	4	4.2	4.1	4.2	4.3	4.3	4	3.9	3.7	3.8	3.4	3.6	4	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.9	2.8
Canada	5.1	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.5	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4
Chile	4.4	4.1	3.9	3.6	3.3	3.3	3.5	3.5	3.3	3.3	3.5	3.8	3.7	3.5	3.6	3.4	3.4	3.3	3.4	3.4	3.4
Colombia	6.3	6	5.9	6	6.1	6.1	6.2	6	5.7	5.4	5.3	5.4	5.6	5.5	5.4	5.5	5.5	5.2	4.7	4.5	3.7
Costa Rica	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5.6	5.6	5.6	5.6	5.6	5.6	5.6	5.6	5.6	5.6	5.6	5.6
Czechia	5.4	5.1	5.2	4.8	5	5.1	5.2	5.5	5.1	4.6	4.5	4.3	4.3	4.1	4.3	4.6	4.8	5	5.1	5.1	4.2
Denmark	7.2	6.8	6.9	6.5	7	6.7	6.7	6.7	6.8	6	5.6	4.9	5.1	4.9	5	5.1	5.4	5.5	5.6	5.3	4.9

Estonia	3.9	4.1	4.2	4.2	4.4	4.5	5.2	5.2	4.6	4	3.8	4.1	4.5	4.3	4.7	5.2	4.8	4.9	5	5	4.6
Finland	5.1	4.8	5.2	5	5.6	5.6	5.4	5.6	5.8	5.6	5.6	5.3	5.3	4.6	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.8	4.3	4	4
France	5	4.8	4.6	4.6	4.5	4.5	4.3	4.3	4.1	3.9	3.9	3.6	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	2.2
Germany	5.1	4.7	4.6	4.6	4.8	4.7	4.5	4.5	4.6	4.6	4.7	4.6	4.8	4.6	4.8	4.9	5	4.9	5.4	5	4.5
Greece	4.5	5.3	5.3	5.5	4.6	5.5	5.2	5.5	4.8	5.3	5.1	5	4.5	4.7	4.9	5	4.6	4.7	4.4	4.4	2.9
Hungary	4.7	4.3	4.5	4.5	4.3	4.4	4.4	4.1	4	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.7	3.9	4.7	5.3	5.2	5.2	6.7	6.9
Iceland	6.3	5.2	5.6	5.1	5	5.4	5.5	5.5	5.2	4.6	4.9	4.6	4.6	4.4	4.1	4.6	4.9	5.8	6	5.8	5
Ireland	5	5	5.2	5.1	5.2	5.1	5.2	5.2	4.9	4.8	4.5	4.3	4.5	4.5	4.7	4.7	4.8	4.6	4.3	4.1	1.9
Israel	6.4	6.3	6.2	6.1	5.9	5.9	6.3	6.5	6.8	6.5	6.3	6.6	6.4	6.5	6.2	6.4	6.2	5.7	5.6	5.3	5.3
Italy	5	4.6	4.7	4.6	4.3	4.3	4.2	4.3	4.2	3.9	3.7	3.4	3.5	3.2	3.1	3.2	3.4	3.2	3.2	3.1	1.6
Japan	6.4	6.4	6	5.9	5.7	5.7	5.8	5.7	5.8	5.6	5.5	5.2	5.3	5.3	5.1	5.1	5	4.9	4.7	4.8	4.3
Korea, Rep.	7	6.7	6.3	6.3	6.4	6.5	6.8	7	6.6	6.2	6.5	6.6	6.5	6.4	6	5.9	5.5	5.2	5	4.7	4.2
Latvia	3.9	4	4.2	4.4	4.6	5.6	6.6	7	5.9	4.6	4.4	5.2	5.5	5.7	6.3	6.9	6.6	6.8	6.8	6.7	5.6
Lithuania	4.8	4.5	4.7	5	5.7	6	6.5	7.1	7.5	6.5	6	6.3	6.9	6.9	7.6	7.6	7.4	7.5	7	7	5.5
Luxembourg	4.9	4.5	4.5	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.1	4.1	3.9	3.5	3.5	3.3	3.4	3.2	3	3.6	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.5	2.9
Mexico	7	6.5	6	5.6	5.7	5.6	5.4	5.4	5.3	5	5	4.9	5	4.9	4.8	4.6	4.4	4.3	4	4	2.6
Netherlands	5.5	5	5.2	4.9	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.3	4.5	4.4	4.5	4.3	4.2	3.8	3.9	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.7	3.7	2.9
New Zealand	5.4	5.1	5.2	5.3	5.1	5	5.2	5.2	5.2	5.1	4.9	4.7	4.7	4.4	4.4	4.3	4.2	4.3	4.2	3.8	3.3
Norway	5	4.4	4.5	4.9	4.1	4.8	4.7	5	5.3	5	4.8	4.6	4.8	4.7	4.6	4.5	4.5	4.4	4.3	4	3.3
Poland	5.5	5.1	5	5.1	5	5.4	5.9	6.5	6.8	6.6	6	5.4	5.4	4.7	5	5	5.1	5.1	5.1	4.8	3.8
Portugal	6.2	5.6	5.4	5.1	4.7	4.6	4.5	4.4	4.1	3.8	3.8	3.4	3.3	3.1	3	3.1	3.1	3.3	3.4	3.2	1.8
Slovak Republic	4.8	4.4	4.7	4.8	5.2	4.9	4.8	5.1	5.3	4.9	4.7	4.7	4.8	4.7	4.9	5.3	5.5	5.8	5.7	5.4	4.4
Slovenia	3.6	3.5	3.5	3.4	3.3	2.9	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.4	3	3.2	3.1	3.2	3.1	3.5	3.2	2.5
Spain	5.4	5.1	5.1	5	5	4.7	4.5	4.4	4.2	3.7	3.6	3.4	3.5	3.3	3.4	3.6	3.7	3.7	3.5	3.5	1.9
Sweden	4.5	4	4.3	4.4	4.8	4.9	5		5.5	5.1	5.3	5	5.3	5.4	5.5	5.3	5.4	5.2	5	4.7	3.6
Switzerland	5.5	5	5.5	5.5	5.3	5.4	5.3	5.3	5.4	5.4	5.5	5.3	5.3	4.9	5.1	5	5	4.8	4.8	4.5	4.1
Turkiye	7.1	7.1	7.1	7.1	9.2	9.5	9.2	9.1	9	8.2	8	8	8	7.9	7.8	7.7	7.5	7.1	6.8	6.6	5.8
United Kingdom	5.2	4.8	4.9	5.2	5.2	5.2	5.2	4.5	4.4	4.3	4.4	4.4	4.7	4.2	4.4	4.2	4.3	4.1	4	3.7	3.7
United States	8.2	8.2	8	7.7	7.8	7.6	7.5	7.3	7.1	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.8	6.9	6.9	7	6.9	6.5	6.1	5.1

Table 6.6 Enrollment in Tertiary Education in Gross Percentage (World Bank, 2024)

Country	Year																				
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Australia			119.		119.		119.	119.		119.										109.	
Austria	63.8	63.8	63.8	63.8	63.8	63.8	63.8	63.8	66.2	68	75	77.3	79.5	81	81	82.3	82.8	83.8	85.9	86.3	88.7
Belgium	56.2	56.7	58.1	59.6	62	62.8	63.4	62.5	62.8	65	66.9	67.7	69.7	71.8	74	76.4	77.2	80.8	79.1	79.3	79.5
Canada	58.5	58.5	58.4	58.4	58.4	58.4	58.4	63.8	64.3	63.6	61.9	63.2	63.6	65.8	67.2	67.4	69.5	70.6	69.6	72.8	74.2

Chile	35.4	35.4	40.3	43.5	44.3	50.3	49.3	54.7	56.8	60	66.3	70.8	75.1	79.9	83.7	86.4	88.8	89.9	91.2	92.1	89.1
Colombia	25.5	26.4	26.5	29.5	29.5	32.3	34.4	35.5	37.9	39.5	41.5	45.3	47.5	50.7	53.2	54.8	57.1	58.4	57.3	56.7	55.7
Costa Rica	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	44.9	47.3	47.8	50.8	51.7	52.1	54.5	52.9	54.7	54.7
Czechia	29.8	32	36.9	39.2	45.4	49.1	49.9	54.2	57.9	61.4	64.9	66.8	66.9	66.3	67.4	67.2	67.5	67.7	66.8	66.9	67.2
Denmark	58.4	61.4	64.2	68.2	75	80.8	78.5	78.2	74.9	73.1	72.5	75.9	77.7	80.4	81.3	83.3	82.2	81.3	81.1	81.7	82.7
Estonia	54.4	58.7	61.7	64.2	65.8	68	68.8	68.8	67.8	67.8	68.7	71	72.9	75.5	76.2	76.3	73	72.1	72.1	72.7	72
Finland	82.6	86	86.8	88.3	90.1	91.9	93.4	95.1	95.9	92	93.2	93.3	91.6	91.2	90	89.7	89.3	90.7	92.4	94.6	96.5
France	50.6	50.4	50.3	52.3	53.5	53.9	53.9	52.9	52.5	52.8	54.9	55.6	57.9	59.8	61.5	62.8	64.7	65.8	67.5	67.7	68.4
Germany	60.9	60.9	60.9	60.9	60.9	60.9	60.9	60.9	60.9	60.9	60.9	60.9	60.9	60.9	65.2	68.2	67.9	68.5	69.2	72.7	72.4
Greece	51.8	58.9	66.1	72	79.8	89.8	94.2	89.7	89.7	89.7	104.4	109.8	113.7	115.3	118.7	118.7	127.1	132.3	138.4	4	143.3
Hungary	37.8	42.3	47.4	54.6	61.5	65	66.4	66.3	64	62	60.7	60	60.7	57.2	52.8	50.1	49.5	49.9	50.9	52.4	54.6
Iceland	45.9	46.9	52.6	60	66.6	69.8	73	73.1	73.6	72.5	78.5	79.9	79.6	78.4	80.4	75.6	74.7	71.3	69.3	70.6	74.6
Ireland	49.4	50.7	53.5	55.8	58.9	58.9	58.4	58.3	54	56.5	63.1	67.8	68.2	71.7	73.8	77.2	77.6	77.8	77.3	75.2	74.7
Israel	48.3	50.5	54.9	54.5	53.9	54.9	54.3	57.1	56.5	59.1	61.9	61.9	63.6	62.1	62.1	60.8	60.4	59.1	57.4	55.9	56.4
Italy	50.3	53.5	56.3	60	63.3	65.3	67.3	68.9	67.6	67	65.4	64.2	62.3	60.9	60.9	60.9	61.4	62.7	64.5	65.7	68.7
Japan	62.8	62.8	62.8	62.8	62.8	62.8	62.8	62.8	62.8	62.8	62.8	62.8	62.8	62.8	62.7	62.5	63.2	62.5	62.2	62.1	62.1
Korea, Rep.	74.7	77.3	80.7	84.5	89.8	95.4	99.9	9	103.1	7	101.7	100.8	98.3	96.3	94.4	94	93.7	93.7	93.3	94	96.9
Latvia	56.2	63.5	67.8	71	74.6	75.4	74.6	73	72.4	73.1	69.1	68	66.6	69.1	70.9	74.3	80.6	88.1	93	94.9	94.5
Lithuania	50.9	57.3	63.1	69.6	74.9	79.7	82.5	82.5	85.7	89.3	86.6	84.1	79.8	73.5	70.4	69.7	71.1	72.4	73.7	72	70.8
Luxembourg	10	9.9	11.6	12.1	12.1	12.1	9.9	9.9	10.7	10.7	18.2	18.2	19.1	19.1	19.1	20.3	19.9	19.6	19.4	19.4	20
Mexico	20.5	21.4	22.3	23	23.7	24.1	24.6	25.1	25.8	26.2	27.2	28	29.3	30.3	31.2	32	38.6	40.3	41.6	43	45.2
Netherlands	51.4	53	54.3	55	56.8	58.8	59.8	60.4	61	61.4	63.7	75.5	75.8	80.2	80.2	80.2	79.8	83.2	83.7	83.7	85.1
New Zealand	80.4	80.4	80.4	80.4	80.4	80.4	80.4	80.4	80.4	80.4	80.4	80.4	80.4	80.4	80.7	82.2	81.9	81.3	81.3	77.6	75.7
Norway	69.9	70	72.3	78	78.6	78.4	77.9	77	73.6	73.1	72.1	71.1	71.7	75.9	78.2	79.2	82	83.7	85.4	85.8	87.2
Poland	50.4	56.3	59.5	60.6	61.7	63.8	65.1	66.9	70.3	72.7	76.6	75.8	75	73.3	70.2	69.4	69.9	70.6	71	70.9	71
Portugal	61.9	61.9	61.9	61.9	61.9	61.9	61.9	61.9	61.9	61.9	61.9	61.9	61.9	61.9	61.9	61.9	63.3	64.2	65	65.9	67.8
Slovak Republic	28.7	30.8	32.7	34.6	36.7	40.8	45	50.6	54.2	56.8	58	57.2	57	55.3	53.9	52.7	50.3	49.1	47.8	48.2	48.4
Slovenia	55.4	60.8	66.7	69.6	73.3	81.3	85.3	87.3	88.6	88	90.3	87.2	89	87.9	84.4	82.2	79.5	79.3	77.3	76.5	75.8
Spain	58.4	61	63.7	65.5	67.5	68.1	69	69.2	69.4	71.4	76.4	80.7	82.9	85.2	88	88.6	89.8	91.9	92.2	91	91
Sweden	67.6	70	74.7	80.5	83	81.7	79.3	75.4	71.2	71	73.1	71.9	68.7	65.8	65	66.4	68.3	70.4	73.4	75.1	79.1
Switzerland	38.1	39.2	40	43.1	44.9	45.2	46.3	47.8	49.7	50.3	52.8	53.1	54.8	56.2	58.1	60.8	61.2	62.5	64.4	66.3	68.1
Turkiye	25	25	25.9	29.7	30.8	33.2	37.3	39.4	40.8	46.9	56.8	61.5	70.1	79.6	87	95.6	103.7	110.5	115.5	117	118.9
United Kingdom	57.4	57.5	61.1	61.5	59.5	59.3	59.2	58.9	57.4	59.1	59.9	59.3	59.2	57.1	57	56.9	58.6	60.2	61.7	66	70
United States	88.7	88.7	88.7	88.7	88.7	88.7	88.7	88.7	88.7	88.7	88.7	88.7	88.7	88.7	88.6	88.9	88.8	88.2	88.3	87.9	87.6

Table 6.7 Net Childcare Costs for Families Using Childcare Facilities (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, 2024)

Country	Year																				
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Australia	21	21	21	21	21	21.5	21.5	21.5	22	20.5	20.5	20.5	19	21	21	23	25	25	27	23	24
Austria	10	10	10	10	10	14	14	14	18	10.5	10.5	10.5	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Belgium	15	15	15	15	15	16.5	16.5	16.5	18	18	18	18	18	18.5	18.5	19	19	19	19	19	19
Canada	24	24	24	24	24	23	23	23	22	24.5	24.5	24.5	27	27.5	27.5	28	30.5	30.5	33	32	30
Chile	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Colombia	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17
Costa Rica	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17
Czechia	31	31	31	31	31	35.5	35.5	35.5	40	43.5	43.5	43.5	47	35.5	35.5	24	20.5	20.5	17	15	14
Denmark	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11.5	11.5	11.5	12	11.5	11.5	11	11	11	11	11	11
Estonia	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4.5	4.5	4.5	6	5.5	5.5	5	5	5	5	8	8
Finland	24	24	24	24	24	22.5	22.5	22.5	21	22	22	22	23	23	23	23	21.5	21.5	20	19	17
France	15	15	15	15	15	14	14	14	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	14
Germany	8	8	8	8	8	10	10	10	12	11.5	11.5	11.5	11	8	8	5	5	5	5	1	1
Greece	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5.5	5.5	5.5	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	11	10
Hungary	8	8	8	8	8	7	7	7	6	5.5	5.5	5.5	5	6	6	7	13	13	19	17	16
Iceland	16	16	16	16	16	11	11	11	6	6.5	6.5	6.5	7	6.5	6.5	6	5.5	5.5	5	5	5
Ireland	37	37	37	37	37	35	35	35	33	31.5	31.5	31.5	30	29.5	29.5	29	28	28	27	25	28
Israel	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16.5	16.5	16.5	17	15	15	13	15.5	15.5	16	16	16
Italy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5	10	8	8	6	4	0
Japan	22	22	22	22	22	21.5	21.5	21.5	21	21.5	21.5	21.5	22	21.5	21.5	21	23	23	25	25	14
Korea, Rep.	14	14	14	14	14	14.5	14.5	14.5	15	7	7	7	-1	2.5	2.5	6	5.5	5.5	5	5	5
Latvia	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	14	14	16	14.5	14.5	13	8	0
Lithuania	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	13.5	13.5	13.5	15	15.5	15.5	16	15	15	14	9	10
Luxembourg	8	8	8	8	8	8.5	8.5	8.5	9	16.5	16.5	16.5	26	30	30	34	22.5	22.5	11	11	10
Mexico	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17
Netherlands	22	22	22	22	22	18.5	18.5	18.5	13	21	21	21	29	29.5	29.5	30	27.5	27.5	25	22	23
New Zealand	41	41	41	41	41	40	40	40	39	39	39	39	39	39	39	39	38.5	38.5	38	38	37
Norway	24	24	24	24	24	20.5	20.5	20.5	17	16	16	16	15	11	11	7	7.5	7.5	8	8	8
Poland	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	20.5	20.5	20.5	20	20.5	20.5	21	18	18	15	11	9
Portugal	7	7	7	7	7	6.5	6.5	6.5	6	7.5	7.5	7.5	9	8.5	8.5	8	8	8	8	8	8
Slovak Republic	18	18	18	18	18	23	23	23	28	18	18	18	8	8.5	8.5	9	9	9	9	11	14
Slovenia	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	15.5	15.5	15.5	15	15	15	15	14	14	13	14	14
Spain	10	10	10	10	10	9	9	9	8	8	8	8	8	7	7	6	6	6	6	15	9
Sweden	9	9	9	9	9	8	8	8	7	6.5	6.5	6.5	6	5.5	5.5	5	5	5	5	5	5

Switzerland	59	59	59	59	59	56	56	56	53	47.5	47.5	47.5	42	43.5	43.5	44	45	45	46	47	47
Turkiye	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17
United Kingdom	32	32	32	32	32	31.5	31.5	31.5	31	32.5	32.5	32.5	34	38	38	42	33	33	24	25	27
United States	36	36	36	36	36	36	36	36	36	35.5	35.5	35.5	35	32.5	32.5	30	32	32	34	33	31
