ERASMUS UNIVERSITY OF ROTTERDAM

Erasmus School of Economics

Bachelor's Thesis [International Bachelor of Economics and Business]

The Secret Majority:
The Impact of Increasing Popularity of Right-wing Parties on Discrimination and Expression in the Netherlands

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Date Final Version: 15/07/2024

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Abstract

This study investigates the relationship between voting patterns for right-wing parties and perceived discrimination and the willingness of Dutch citizens to express their views and opinions. A rising wave of far right-wing political parties across Europe, fuelled on the success of their anti-immigration policies and rhetoric, raises the question whether this leads to increased perceived and actual discrimination. This study will focus on discrimination in the Netherlands and the impact of right-wing parties on perceived discrimination. Equality for all persons was not protected until 1994, when the Equal Treatment Act was introduced protecting minorities and vulnerable groups ("The Dutch Equal Treatment Act", n.d.). The recent success of these far right-wing parties may have removed the stigma surrounding these views and lead to citizens expressing these views to feel vindicated. Data from the LISS panel (Longitudinal Internet studies for the Social Sciences) will be used for each year that a major election occurred. Linear regressions will be used to see if there if a relationship between voting for a right-wing party today on anti-immigration views, and the relationship of where respondents place themselves on the left-right political scale on anti-immigration views. The results of the linear regression signify that respondents are not more vindicated in their views or beliefs over time even with the rising popularity and increasing vote share for right-wing parties in general elections. The results of the logistics regression, exhibits that anti-immigration views are a predictor for voting for right-wing parties with inclusion of satisfaction dimensions to determine whether other dimensions lead to support for (far) right-wing parties. Economy and education were the only significant dimensions that had a negative relationship with vote. These results lead to the conclusion that voting for right-wing parties and being more political right-wing in views leads to higher anti-immigration views. However, the increase in actual vote share for right-wing parties does not lead to an increased relation between the variables of vote and anti-immigration views. This study concludes that although real vote share for (far) right-wing parties has increased, citizens do not feel vindicated and validated in their anti-immigration views and that the popularity does not lead to a decrease in social undesirability of these views.

Introduction

The immigrant share of the population has risen substantially in the Netherlands. In 2010 154,000 persons immigrated compared to 400,000 in 2022 ("How many people immigrated to the Netherlands", 2022). The rapid increase in the immigrant population has coincided with a rise in support for far-right political parties. This association suggests that issues surrounding immigration, such as integration, education, and employment, have become focal points in political discourse,

contributing to the electoral success of parties aiming to combat these issues (Davis & Deole, 2017). The success of anti-immigration parties has influenced the policies of mainstream parties and shifted the entire political spectrum to the right (Van Spanje, 2010). This phenomenon is characterised by a 'contagion effect' where mainstream parties adopt stricter positions on immigration and integration following the electoral success of anti-immigration parties, although these positions are found to be mostly temporary. When the anti-immigration parties decline in popularity, the mainstream parties return to their original positions (Pettigrew, 1998).

Several characteristics contribute to the association between immigration and the electoral success of far-right parties. Brunner and Kuhn (2018) argue that immigration into Switzerland impacts far-right electoral success through cultural differences between immigrants and native populations. Harmon (2018) supports this argument by showing that increases in local ethnic diversity, resulting from immigration, lead to shifts in electoral outcomes towards the right in Denmark. Increased ethnic diversity in Denmark led to a decrease in votes for left-wing parties and an increase for nationalists, although the size of the increase for nationalists was smaller than the decrease for left-wing parties. Sniderman, Hagendoor and Prior (2004) attribute the main influence of discrimination of (ethnic) immigrants as retention of national identity and culture. They also conclude two ways situational triggers or predisposing factors may shape attitudes to ethnic minorities and immigrants, mainly that a situational trigger (Pim Fortuyns' assassination in 2002, refugee crisis of 2011) may motivate those already wary and holding negative attitudes or mobilize those not yet in line with these views to agree. Voters that already have negative attitudes would increase their intensity of support while the voters that are unsure on their stance towards certain issues are convinced by the situational trigger and increase the size of the support for right-wing parties as seen in 2002 with the Lijst for Pim Fortuyn Partij acquiring more seats (26) than any new party mainly due to the assassination of Pim Fortuyn (Van Holsteyn, Irwin & Den Ridder, 2003).

Anti-immigrant and general discriminatory attitudes and views are often considered socially undesirable as well as politically incorrect. Equality is an important value in society as it is the promise of impartiality and meritocracy but also includes the threat of commonality replacing individuality (Peters, 1996), perhaps leading to a loss of national identity. People that are more accepting of immigrants associate with high-transcendence values (equality) and low self-enhancement (power) (Wagner, Kotzur & Friehs, 2021). People who are socially stigmatized hold an identity or views that are devalued by others in society. The people who hold such negative attitudes or views towards another group of people may themselves consider their views unethical and social

pressure and lack of agreement within society demand that they hide their views (Newheiser & Barreto, 2014). In this study's case, the focus is on concealable views. An individual may hide their true views and opinions to protect themselves from devaluation or discrimination, even when they themselves are hiding views that are discriminatory.

With support for the (far) right-wing parties increasing in the Netherlands, citizens may feel vindicated in their views. A previously unpopular opinion and viewpoint to hold is now growing in relevance, bringing supporters of anti-immigration policies to the forefront of political debate. When public opinion shifts towards the right-wing (as seen in figure 1), citizens may not feel as though they would be devalued if anti-immigration opinions are expressed. Discriminatory views and actions may face far lower social repercussions due to the increasing support of (far) right-wing countries that push an anti-immigration narrative.
From this the main research question is derived:

Does an increase in (real) votes for (far) right-wing parties lead to an increase in the perceived discrimination where voters for (far) right-wing parties are vindicated and more open to expressing and acting on their socially undesirable views?

This research will use the representative sample datasets provided by LISS panel core studies. The politics and values survey focuses on critical social issues in politics and society. In figure 2 in Appendix C displays the right-wing voter share of the sample against the average anti-immigration views per year. In figure 2, there is a loose relation between voter share and anti-immigration views. Anti-immigration views decrease until 2021, whereafter the trend is sharply reversed and rises alongside the right-wing voter share. The right-wing voter share is relatively constant but rises to its highest in 2023.

Right-wing parties, although known for extreme views on anti-immigration, have stances in their manifestos covering a wide range of issues. The average voter/citizen may not be attracted to their immigration policies or not focus on them as a determinant for voting. Dissatisfaction with the current establishment and government in power can push voters to finding alternatives. Increasing vote share for far right-wing parties may be due to other concerns. Satisfaction with key issues such as the military, economy, healthcare and education are covered in manifestos with clear policies against the current established government. Right-wing parties must aim to convert and appeal to

voters that are dissatisfied with any dimension of society or politics. This yields the second part of this research and the secondary question:

Do anti-immigration attitudes explain voting for far right-wing parties after controlling for satisfaction with other dimensions of society and politics?

A significant amount of research has been conducted on right-wing party ideology and their negative impact on society. The link between hidden views and impact of political parties on vindicating voters with discriminatory views is missing in current analysis of politics. This study will aim to fill the gap of the effect right-wing parties have on society and how parties promoting this ideology impact discrimination and perceived discrimination in the Netherlands.

Dutch Political Context

To aid the reader, this section will discuss the definitions of far right-wing parties and what other themes and trends are present in the Dutch political environment.

For concrete definitions of which parties are considered right-wing and to what extent, this study will rely on the PopuList database for the Netherlands. The PopuList database is described as an Expert-Informed Qualitative Comparative Classification (EiQCC). Definitions and classifications of parties are made and agreed upon by several researchers and experts in the field. Using the definitions determined by the Populist database that are relevant to this study, classifying parties according to the following:

- ***Far-Right parties:*** Parties that are nativist (states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group and non-native elements are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state) and authoritarian (belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely).
- ***Populist parties:*** Parties that endorse the set of ideas that society is ultimately separated into two groups: 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite'. Politics should be the expression of the general will of the people.
- ***Eurosceptic parties:*** Parties that express the idea of opposition to the process of European integration. Further classification:
  - ***Hard Euroscepticism:*** Outright rejection of the entire project of European political and economic integration, opposition to one's country joining or remaining a member of the EU.
  - ***Soft Euroscepticism:*** Contingent or qualified opposition to European integration.

The following list includes parties in the PopuList database as well as LISS panel politics and values survey. This is not an exhaustive list and there are more fringe far right parties, however, these fringe parties do not receive a significant percentage of votes or have never held seats in Dutch parliament. The parties defined as far right in this study and their classifications are the following (refer to Appendix B for more detail on classifications):

- **Party for Freedom (PVV)/Geert Wilders Partij**
  Classification: Populist, Far-Right, Hard Eurosceptic

- **Forum For Democracy (FVD)**
  Classification: Populist, Far-Right, Hard Eurosceptic

- **Farmer-Citizen Movement (BBB)**
  Classification: (Agrarian) Populist, (Borderline) Far-Right. Soft Eurosceptic

- **Right Answer 21 (JA21)**
  Classification: Populist, Far-Right, Soft Eurosceptic

- ***For Netherlands (VNL)**
  Classification: Populist, Far-Right, Soft Eurosceptic

- ***Rita Verdonk Dutch Pride Party (TROTS)**
  Classification: Populist, (Borderline) Right-wing

*Although the VNL and TROTS are not listed in the PopuList database, the classification was decided by the same restrictions as the other parties

Literature Review

In this section, the relevant literature and theories concerning discrimination and stigmatized views are discussed. First, a comprehensive review of the contact hypothesis, understanding the origin conflict and attitudes. Next, a discussion on the stigma towards expressing anti-immigration attitudes and social desirability. Lastly, a discussion regarding anti-immigration attitudes and the link to right-wing voting.

Contact Hypothesis

A critical part to understanding why people discriminate against others is how their interaction with people different to themselves spawns negative and positive reactions. The contact hypothesis proposes that interaction of members of different groups decreases the intergroup prejudice towards one another, if certain conditions of the theory are met (Dixon, Durrheim &

Tredoux, 2005). The contact hypothesis was first proposed by Allport (1954) and is comprised of 4 conditions. Studies since then focus on these 4 conditions of intergorup contact that reduce prejudice (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2005). The four conditions are equal group status, common goals, intergroup cooperation and the support of authorities/customs. Equal status may reduce prejudice when in the pursuit of common goals especially with the support of institutions (Allport 1954). Equal status is therefore crucial in workplaces and society to reduce prejudices of outgroups. Discrimination and xenophobia are fostered in situations of inequality (Paluck, Green & Green, 2019). Authorities and institutions must support minorities and punish discriminatory behaviour to create consequences for socially undesirable behaviour, the Netherlands introduced anti-discrimination laws in 1994 to this end ("The Dutch Equal Treatment Act", n.d.). The conditions of Allport's (1954) contact hypothesis are contingent on one another and often depend on the act and premise of intergroup contact. Generally, studies have found that contact has a positive effect, that is, that contact with immigrants leads to lower prejudice. The term contact is ambiguous and an inadequate term according to Amir (1969). Intergroup Contact, can be classified into 4 main forms; direct, extended (through friends of friends although weaker than direct contact), vicarious (through media and TV) and imagined (imagining interacting with outgroups members) (Brown & Paterson, 2016). Negative contact, although less frequent, could strengthen negative emotions and adverse views towards outgroups (immigrants in this study) (McKeown & Dixon, 2017). In this study, the focus is on the consequences due to adverse contact, and how citizens that become entrenched in their viewpoints are more likely to vote for right-wing parties aligned with prejudice against the outgroup (immigrants). The contact hypothesis theorizes that more immigrants would lead to more contact, which in turn reduces prejudices and fears.

In Pettigrew and Tropp (2006), the researchers state that previous studies have fundamental biases that call into question the results of Allport and others. Participant bias could severely limit the results of studies on the contact hypothesis. Participant bias occurs in surveys when certain participants disproportionately have the same traits leading to skewed results, in this study's case this refers to people attempting to hide their true preferences and, therefore, the surveys may underestimate the true discrimination of a sample. The relationship between contact and prejudice has reverse causality, explaining one another. Contact with outgroup members (immigrants) may reduce prejudice or prejudice leads to reduced contact with members of the outgroup (Binder et al., 2009). Prejudiced people may try to avoid, and tolerant people may seek, contact with different groups (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). One of the main findings of this study is also the fact that Allport's conditions are not necessary for intergroup contacts positive outcomes (Paluck, Green & Green,

2019). Rodrik (2021) describes the relationship between the presences of immigrants and support for populism as negative and that highly diverse cities are not where populists receive votes. Knigge (1998) found that, between 1984 and 1993, extreme right-wing parties have been least successful in the Netherlands, and latent public support for extreme right-wing parties does not equal electoral support.

Social Norms, Desirability and Stigma of Discrimination

A social norm is a general understanding of what is appropriate behavior in certain situations (Álvarez-Benjumea, 2023). People often follow social norms even when not in their best interest, conformity to the norm is conditional on having certain social expectations (Bicchieri & Xao, 2009). Conditional norm compliance theory suggests that if people break a norm or witness a norm being broken, it is more acceptable that another person can also break said norm. Descriptive norms (what most people do) impact injunctive norms (what most people approve of) (Diekmann, Przepiorka, & Rauhut, 2015).

Social influence can take two important forms that lead to private acceptance and internalization. Normative social influence occurs when people conform to group norms and do what is expected of them, these are less likely to be internalized. Informational social influence occurs when people use others as a source of accurate information and conform to the views of others (Zitek & Hebl, 2007). When voters with anti-immigration views conform it is likely to be due to normative social influence. Opposing anti-immigration views may not be the case in private for right-wing voters. The increase of politicians and parties opposing immigration could impact informational social influence as voters take politicians as a source of information on which to base their views.

A more factual approach to discrimination is needed to understand the core root of many attitudes and views against immigration. The factor-proportions model provides a rational yet often misconceived approach. The factor-proportions model describes a closed economy (does not trade with other nations), where (low-skilled) immigrants enter employment and lower the wages of native low-skilled workers. As more low-skilled labor is applied to fixed amounts of other factors, therefore, real wages of the less skilled will decline. Individual attitudes of opposing immigration are linked to lower education and lower economic/skill status (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007). Coenders et al. (2008) determine that the support for discrimination depends on competition for resources, mainly houses, or jobs. Unemployment also exacerbates these attitudes, with an equal number fighting over diminished resources. Political affiliation is also linked to anti-immigration sentiments, people who

are politically alienated may look for others to blame and could view immigrants more negatively (Rustenbach, 2010).

Social desirability is a common source of bias in survey research findings, defined as the tendency of people to over/underestimate the chance that they would perform a socially undesirable action (Chung & Monroe, 2003). Social desirability bias results from two factors: self-deception and other deception (Nederhof, 1985). In this study, the socially undesirable action is discrimination. The survey questions would be heavily bias in terms of self-deception, due to the survey being anonymous and online, respondents may underestimate the severity of their anti-immigration views. Sensitive topics, such as discrimination or support for far-right wing parties, may introduce two additional factors: intrusiveness (questions deemed private) and threat of disclosure (taboo and possibly risky or costly to answer) (Krumpal, 2013). Self-deception can also be a positive, and according to Fisher and Katz (2000) "reflects an honest but overly favorable self-presentation" (p. 107). The second factor identified as other deception or impression management in Fisher and Katz (2000), is the idea of presenting yourself as more socially acceptable. Impression management is usually linked to lean towards low-profile behaviors, even if this rewards them. Stigma of expression of anti-immigrant and discriminatory views can also be linked to the theory of political correctness. Political correctness refers to situations where certain statements lead listeners to make adverse conclusions about the type of the speaker, leading to speakers altering what they say to avoid an adverse inference (Morris, 2001). This phenomenon is key to understanding why people may hide their true views and opinions in daily life. Individuals may feel misunderstood or that conclusions are made from even mild anti-immigration views, causing them to hide and avoid discriminatory behavior or expression.

In figure 4 in Appendix C, it is observed that the actual vote share of (far) right-wing parties' doubles in the time of this study (2010-2023). Alongside actual vote share, it is theorized that the relation between anti-immigration views and vote becomes stronger over time. Newheiser & Barreto (2014) claim that Individuals who are motivated in avoiding rejection become more likely to hide their stigmatized identities. Thus, it can be argued that as the popularity of parties holding anti-immigration views increases (as shown by the actual vote share in figure 4), the possibility of rejection and therefore the motivation to keep stigmatized identities hidden decreases and respondents become vindicated in their previously socially undesirable views.

Understanding the LISS panel is important to understand why the respondents may be tempted to not be entirely honest in their responses. The set up and the consequences of how the

survey is administered is important to understand the effect of social desirability bias. The LISS panel core study is a survey that is administered online; therefore, it is important to discuss whether social desirability may be a larger factor in internet surveys or paper ones. In Dodou and Winter (2014), the researchers meta-analysis concludes that there is no significant difference between online and offline surveys, suggesting that the survey is administered in an ideal way to avoid bias. Furthermore, the LISS panel data takes measures against social desirability, namely encrypting the participant number and anonymous results. In 1999, Joinson conducted a similar study comparing computer and paper surveys and the additional factor of anonymity. Joinson (1999) concluded that the lowest social desirability and social anxiety was in a computer and anonymous survey as we see in the LISS panel administered surveys.

Data

This study makes use of the LISS panel database. The LISS panel Core Study is a longitudinal survey about a broad range of core social information. Conducted for each year since 2007, it covers multiple themes and topics. The sample is derived from a true probability sample of the Netherlands provided by Statistics Netherlands, meaning that everyone in the greater population has an equal chance of being chosen for the survey ("The Archive", n.d.). The survey consists of nearly 4,500 households (approximately 7,000 individuals above the age of 16). The surveys are strictly invitation only meaning that the representativeness of the sample is maintained. The survey of focus in this study will be the politics and values core study. The survey covers a range of social and political themes. There are 15 waves in total, starting from 2007 and ending with the most recent wave in 2023. Each wave consists of around 6,000 – 7,000 respondents. Later waves conduct the survey with repeats and in 3 parts. Using the waves that were conducted during general election years (2010, 2012, 2017, 2021, 2023), forming the main variables from the politics and values core study, and control variables from different core studies

Due to the survey being conducted online, there are several instances of questions that are unanswered, or where respondents answer: 'I don't know'. Non-responses are excluded from the analysis, therefore, the same individuals over the 5 waves as attrition have a severe impact on the sample size. Panel regression analysis would be useful to show a trend analysis and allow the same individuals to be analysed, however due to the small sample size of the same individuals over time this would not lead to convincing or credible results. The waves themselves also vary significantly in size of valid responses due participation rates and answers such as 'I don't know' or 'prefer not to

answer', particularly in the 'vote' variable. Participation or completion of the entire survey seems to be more of an issue in the later waves, perhaps due to lower interest in the survey itself.

Several questions will make up the 'Anti-immigration Views' dependent/independent variable. The variables are scaled from 1- 5 representing whether you fully disagree to whether you fully agree. The variables that will be measured are:
- V1: There are too many people of foreign origin or descent in the Netherlands.
- V2: People of foreign origin or descent are not accepted in the Netherlands
- V3: It does not help a neighbourhood if many people of foreign origin or descent move in.

Taking the average of these variables will assess the views the respondent has on immigration. This will be the dependent 'anti-immigration views' variable, 1 being pro-immigration/foreigners and 5 being anti-immigration/foreigners.

The variable tested for the relationship against anti-immigration view will be 'vote'. The variable will be created from the question: 'if the parliamentary elections were held today, who would you vote for?'
The variable vote is a categorical variable with each party corresponding to a certain number. The variable will be coded to portray voting for right-wing parties against non-right-wing parties, therefore, the variable will be binary. In Table 1 in Appendix A, the parties that are considered right-wing per wave are displayed, certain parties do not appear in every wave. Parties are considered (far) right-wing based on the PopuList database definitions explained in the Dutch Political Context section and expanded on in Appendix B.

The second independent variable will be 'left-right'. This variable measures where the respondents place themselves on a 0 – 10 scale of the political spectrum, where 0 is very left-wing and 10 is very right-wing. The variable is measured by the self-reported question: Where would you place yourself on the scale below, where 0 mean left and 10 means right?
This variable will allow the analysis of where right-wing voters and place themselves on a political ideology scale.

Extending the initial model, 'satisfaction' variables will control for the opinion and satisfaction of respondents for different institutions. The scale is a 0-10, with 0 being very dissatisfied and 10 being very satisfied. The institutions that may drive someone to vote for a right-wing government party are healthcare, education, military and the economy.

The PVVs' election programme states that they are not satisfied with the current state of the military, that the current military power of the Netherlands is unable to protect their own territory (NEDERLANDERS WEER OP 11, 2022). Right-wing parties in the Netherlands follow this similar ideology, the parties that are generally against the current path of the military. In terms of current events, the military and politics are heavily intertwined in the current Ukraine and Russia conflict. Right-wing parties in the Netherlands believe in keeping the military independent and not contributing supplies. European right-wing political parties are more supportive of military missions, with exception of the radical right (Raunio & Wagner, 2020).

Healthcare is another sector where right-wing parties become anti-establishment and current government and right-wing populist parties often claim to protect healthcare and benefits from immigrants (Falkenbach & Greer, 2018). JA21's beliefs for healthcare are that health insurers have become too powerful and that over the past years the salaries of healthcare staff have been destroyed ("JA21 - Public Health and Care," n.d.).

Education is another field where dissatisfaction with the current system may lead a voter to a right-wing party establishing change. Deinstitutionalization is a common theme among the right-wing in education. Education institutions and organizations that are subsidised by the state are being threatened by right-wing parties aiming to withdraw these supports (Taylor, 2022). JA21 and the PVV seek to end the indoctrination of students and the PVV aims to stop all Islamic schools and teachings.

The economy is the last major dimension controlled in this study, once again, the right-wing parties aim to change the established system. The FvD wants to reduce taxes, exit the EU and focus on trade rather than aid ("Standpunten," n.d.). Radical right-wing parties will prosper even in a healthy economic state, diverting attention away from prosperity and bolstering their ideology as the fight between the ordinary person being exploited and the elite/immigrants taking resources away for natives (Mols & Jetten, 2016).

It is necessary to control for these variables as they would have an impact both on the views on immigration and the party for which one votes. Although the survey question is vague and open to interpretation, namely respondents are asked: "How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with: (name of sector)". The sectors play significant roles in policy making and societal opinion on government.

Age will also be a control variable; age is part of the politics and values survey. Controlling for age is necessary as there is likely to be a link between the anti-immigration views and vote variables. Controlling for age will also ensure that there are no characteristic biases between respondents. Controlling for gender will be crucial as men tend to have more extremist views, particularly right-wing. It is important to control for this characteristic bias to maintain a representative effect. In

America, women are 30 percentage points more liberal than me. Germany follows a similar trend and over the past 6 years the gap has been widening (Burn-Murdoch, 2024).

The last control used is education level. In a study conducted by Kuppens & Spears (2014), the researchers found that higher educated people are less likely to hold non-prejudiced beliefs, although the behaviour and attitudes of higher educated people may play a significant role in this. Therefore, controlling for education as a possible factor that effects views and voting behaviour. Education level is a categorical variable with 27 different levels, as displayed in Table 2 in Appendix A. The variable shows a higher value as more educated, with 1 being the lowest (I have not completed any education) and 27 being the highest level of education obtainable (a doctors/PhD degree). Education level will be taken from the LISS panel core study: Work and Schooling. Respondents conduct both these studies and by merging the dataset to the Politics and Values survey. Respondents' answers are matched based on household number. The question respondents are asked in this survey is: What is the highest level of education that you have completed with diploma or certificate?

Methodology

Regression 1 analyses the effects of vote of anti-immigration views. The effect of this will be show in Column 2 of tables testing for anti-immigration views. The first step of the analysis will be a regression of only the controls to test separate effects of the control variables. Step 2 will be the inclusion the independent variable vote (for which party would you vote today). This simple linear regression will be conducted in STATA, first for each wave sample separately. Regression 2 will show the effect of left-right on anti-immigration views, shown in the 3rd step. The respondent may feel less stigma surrounding placing themselves higher on the left-right political scale than openly expressing if they would vote for a (far) right party. Once again regression 2 will control for age, gender and education level.

Regression 1:

$$Anti\ immigration\ Views_{i_t} = \alpha + \beta_1 Vote_{i_t} + \beta_2 Age_{i_t} + \beta_3 Gender_{i_t} + \beta_4 EducationLevel_{i_t} + \epsilon_{i_t}$$

Regression 2:

$$Anti\ immigration\ Views_{i_t}$$
$$= \alpha + \beta_1 LeftRight_{i_t} + \beta_2 Age_{i_t} + \beta_3 Gender_{i_t} + \beta_4 EducationLevel_{i_t} + \epsilon_{i_t}$$

After the initial analysis, an extension is conducted to the second question: after controlling for the respondent's satisfaction in several aspects of society, is anti-immigration views still a predictor for voting for a (far) right party and how does this change over time?

Satisfaction with certain aspects of society may draw a potential voter in to certain parties, not necessarily every aspect of the party line must be agreed with. Therefore, key political debate and general satisfaction dimensions will be added as robustness checks. Regression 3 will test the effect of anti-immigration views on whether the respondent would vote for a (far) right party today. Consistent with the first regression analysis, step 1 will show the effect of the control variables on the dependent. Step 2 will show the single effect of the independent variable, anti-immigration views. Step 3 will include the satisfaction dimensions in these sectors: military, education, healthcare and economy. For this regression, due to the dependent variable vote being binary, conducting a logit regression will be more appropriate to avoid results that are negative and therefore represent a negative probability. Log-odds represent a probability ratio of the event happening to the event not happening. For easier interpretation for the reader as steps 1, 2 and 3 are displayed in log-odds, column 4 displays the final step in marginal effects (the constant and R^2 are excluded in this representation). Due to the translation of the coefficients into percentage points, an extension of 1 decimal point is added to all term in the marginal effects column to increase validity.

Regression 3:

$Vote_{i_t} = \alpha + \beta_1 Anti\_immigration\ views_{i_t} + \beta_2 Age_{i_t} + \beta_3 Gender_{i_t} + \beta_3 EducationLevel + \beta_4 Military_{i_t} + \beta_5 Education_{i_t} + \beta_6 Healthcare_{i_t} + \beta_7 Economy_{i_t} + \epsilon_{i_t}$

Results

The hypotheses are divided into two questions regarding the two research questions. Hypothesis 1 and 2 will be tested by the linear regressions displayed in tables 1 to 5. Hypothesis 3 and 4 will be tested by logistic regression displayed in tables 6 to 10. Figure 1 will show the coefficients over time of vote and left-right against the actual vote share in general elections for right-wing parties in the Netherlands. This figure will allow hypothesis 2 to be answered.

Hypothesis 1 refers to regression 1, predicting that in each wave respondents that vote for right-wing parties and place themselves higher on the left-right political scale have a higher score on the anti-immigration scale.

Question 1: Does an increase in (real) votes for (far) right-wing parties lead to an increase in the perceived discrimination where voters for (far) right-wing parties are vindicated and more open to expressing and acting on their socially undesirable views?

Hypothesis 1:

Null Hypothesis (H_0): In each wave, there is no relation of voting for (far) right-wing parties and left-right on anti-immigration views. The coefficient of vote and left-right is not significant at 5%.

Alternative Hypothesis (H_1): In each wave, there is a significant relation of voting for (far) right-wing parties and left-right on anti-immigration views. The coefficients of vote and left-right is significant at 5%.

Hypothesis 2:

Null Hypothesis (H_0): Over time, there is no relationship of vote and left-right on anti-immigration views, there is no trend in the coefficients.

Alternative Hypothesis (H_1): Over time, the relationship of vote and left-right on anti-immigration views becomes stronger (the coefficients become larger).

Hypotheses 3 and 4 refer to the second question of this study. After including several satisfaction dimensions, is anti-immigration views a predictor for voting behaviour. This question relates to the voters possibly identifying with one issue more than another and that anti-immigration views may not necessarily be the reason that the voter is drawn to a right-wing party.

Question 2: Do anti-immigration attitudes explain voting for far right-wing parties after controlling for satisfaction with other dimensions of society and politics?

Hypothesis 3:

Null Hypothesis (H_0): After controlling for satisfaction dimensions in areas of society, anti-immigration views is not a predictor for a preference of voting for (far) right-wing parties. The coefficient of anti-immigration views is not significant. Coefficient is significant at 5%

Alternative Hypothesis (H_1): After controlling for satisfaction dimensions in areas of society, anti-immigration views is a predictor for a preference of voting for (far) right-wing parties.

Hypothesis 4:

Null Hypothesis (H_0): After controlling for satisfaction dimensions in areas of society, anti-immigration views as a predictor does not become stronger/larger over time.

Alternative Hypothesis (H₁): After controlling for satisfaction dimensions in areas of society, anti-immigration views as a predictor does become stronger/larger over time.

Relation of Vote and Left-Right on Anti-immigration Views

The following results tables display the linear regressions 1 and 2 in steps 2 and 3 respectively. The first step of every table is controls check to see the individual influence on the controls on the main dependent variable of anti-immigration views. Anti-immigration views is a scale variable that takes values 1 to 5, where 1 indicates low anti-immigration views and 5 high.

Table 1 depicts the results for 2023 of the effect of vote and left-right on anti-immigration views. InTable1 shows significant results for both vote and left-right at 1%. A respondent that votes for a (far) right party in 2023 (PVV, BBB, FvD or JA21), has is on average 0.57 higher on the anti-immigration views scale than one that does not. For left-right there is a similar result. For each 1 value increase on the left-right political scale, respondents are on average 0.11 higher on the anti-immigration views scale. Age does not play a role and is not significant, both gender and education do, suggesting that a male that is less educated would have on average higher anti-immigration views than a higher educated female. From the inclusion of the independent variables in step 2 and 3, the R^2 value increases from step 1, suggesting that the independent variables increase the explanatory power compared to just the control variables.

Table 1: Linear regression of vote and left-right on anti-immigration views 2023

	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3
Anti-immigration Views			
Control Variables			
Age	-.00	-.00	-.00
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Gender	.14***	.12***	.09**
	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)
Education Level	-.03***	-.02***	-.02***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Main Effects			
Vote		.57***	
		(.04)	
Left-Right			.11***
			(.01)
Constant	3.58***	3.17***	2.93***
	(.10)	(.10)	(.11)
Observations	1,175	1,175	1,175
R^2	.08	.21	0.20

Notes: Significance levels: 1% = ***, 5% = **, 10% = *. This table depicts the regression results for step 1, 2 and 3. Standard errors are presented under the unstandardized B coefficients.

InTable2, the results for the linear regression of vote and left-right are shown for 2021. 2021 shows a similar significant effect at 1% yet slightly smaller in effect at 0.46. Therefore, when respondents vote for a right-wing party (PVV or FvD) they are, on average, 0.46 higher of the anti-immigration views scale. For left-right, there is also a smaller effect yet equally significant at 0.09. Respondents that are 1 step higher on the left-right political scale, increase their anti-immigration views by 0.09 holding all else constant.

Table 2: Linear regression of vote and left-right on anti-immigration views 2021

	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3
Anti-immigration Views			
Control Variables			
Age	-.00	.00	.00
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Gender	.06*	.03	.03
	(.00)	(.03)	(.03)
Education Level	-.02**	-.02***	-.02***
	(.00)	(.00)	
Main Effects			
Vote		.46***	
		(.06)	
Left-Right			.09***
			(.01)
Constant	3.43***	3.22***	2.83***
	(.10)	(.10)	(.11)
Observations	1,262	1,262	1,262
R^2	.06	.11	.17

Notes: Significance levels: 1% = ***, 5% = **, 10% = *. This table depicts the regression results for step 1, 2 and 3. Standard errors are presented under the unstandardized B coefficients.

Displayed inTable3 are the results for regressions 1 and 2. Table 3 shows significant results at 1% for vote and left-right in step 2 and 3 respectively. In 2017, voting for a right-wing party (PVV or VNL) on average increases the respondent's placement on the anti-immigration views scale by 0.55. This result is closer to the year 2023. For left-right a similar result of 0.10 is presented. Although the R^2 for left-right is lower than in 2023. Both 2021 and 2017 have a R^2 value higher in left-right than in vote, suggesting that regression 2 in step 3 may have a higher explanatory value than regression 1 in step 2.

Table 3: Linear regression of vote and left-right on anti-immigration views 2017

	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3
Anti-immigration Views			
Control Variables			
Age	-.00	.00	-.00
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Gender	.07*	.02	.03
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Education Level	-.02***	-.01***	-.02***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Main Effects			
Vote		.55***	
		(.05)	
Left-Right			.10***
			(.01)
Constant	3.51***	3.25***	2.88***
	(.11)	(.10)	(.11)
Observations	1,114	1,114	1,114
R^2	.04	.13	.16

Notes: Significance levels: 1% = ***, 5% = **, 10% = *. This table depicts the regression results for step 1, 2 and 3. Standard errors are presented under the unstandardized B coefficients.

In 2012, the results in Table 4 are very similar to 2021. Both the coefficients of vote and left-right are the same as in 2021, 0.46 and 0.09 respectively. The difference in the results for 2012 lie in the constant. A respondent on average is higher on the anti-immigration and higher on the left-right scale than in 2021. However, a lower R^2 than in 2021, suggest that the regression in 2012 explains less of the total variance.

Table 4: Linear regression of vote and left-right on anti-immigration views 2012

	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3
Anti-immigration Views			
Control Variables			
Age	-.002**	-.00	-.00
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Gender	.05*	.03	.01
	(.03)	(.03)	(.02)
Education Level	-.02***	-.02***	-.02***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Main Effects			
Vote		.46***	
		(.04)	
Left-Right			.09***
			(.01)
Constant	3.58***	3.39***	2.99***
	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)
Observations	2,128	2,128	2,128
R^2	.04	.09	.15

Notes: Significance levels: 1% = ***, 5% = **, 10% = *. This table depicts the regression results for regressions 1 and 2 (anti-immigration views and left-right respectively).

Lastly, in Table 5 the results are presented for 2010. Regression 1 and 2 are presented in Table 5 and are similar results to 2017, vote and left-right are significant at 1% at 0.55 and 0.09 respectively. Voting for a right-wing party in 2010, leads to on average an increase in 0.55 on the anti-immigration scale. An increase on the left-right scale by 1, leads to an on average increase in the anti-immigration views scale by 0.09. From step 1 to step 2 and 3 there is a large difference in the R^2 value, this suggests that inclusion of the independent variables leads to higher explanatory power of the model, and a higher power for step 3's model.

Table 5: Linear regression of vote and left-right on anti-immigration views 2010

	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3
Anti-immigration Views			
Control Variables			
Age	-.00	-.00	.00
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Gender	.12***	.08***	.09***
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
Education Level	-.02***	-.01***	-.02***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Main Effects			
Vote		.55***	
		(.03)	
Left-Right			.09***
			(.01)
Constant	3.48***	3.27***	2.93***
	(.06)	(.06)	(.07)
Observations	2,613	2,613	2,613
R^2	.04	.14	.15

Notes: Significance levels: 1% = ***, 5% = **, 10% = *. This table depicts the regression results for regressions 1 and 2 (anti-immigration views and left-right respectively).


Figure 1: Coefficients of Vote and Left-Right compared to the change in the actual vote share for right-wing parties

Figure 1 represents the coefficients of vote and left-right of the past 5 linear regressions. The coefficients of left-right do not have a significant trend or change - every coefficient is in the range of 0.09-0.11. There is no significant change displayed over time where respondents place themselves on a left-right wing political scale. There also does not seem to be a relation of these coefficients with the actual vote share of right-wing parties in Dutch general elections.

The coefficient for vote shows more variation. Ranging from 0.46-0.57, the variable shows a slight relation to the actual vote share. The trend of vote and the actual vote share follow a similar trend until 2017, when the actual vote share continues rising even when the vote variable declines slightly. Another turning point in the trend occurs in 2021, when the actual vote share increases sharply after 2021. The share of respondents that vote for right-wing parties in the LISS panel survey increases from around 10% to over 25% from 2021 to 2023 as displayed in Figure 4 in Appendix C. These results correspond with the survey as the coefficient of vote increases from 0.46 to 0.57 from 2021 to 2023 respectively.

In this Figure there is not enough evidence to reject the null of Hypothesis 2, that there is a significant relationship over time. Although vote does become stronger between certain elections, the overall trend analysed does not show a significant increase in this period of analysis.

Anti-immigration Views as a Predictor for Voting

The aim of this section is to decipher whether the anti-immigration views is the most appealing part of right-wing party policies. Voters that are not satisfied with the current government or certain policies that are in place may be drawn to right-wing parties for a change. Below Hypotheses 3 and 4 are tested, of whether anti-immigration views are a predictor for voting for right wing parties, and additionally what dimensions of society and government policy are important to voters.

Table 6 shows the results of the logistic (logit) regression. The results are, therefore, not directly interpretable, the coefficients represent changes in log-odds of the dependent vote for a 1-unit change in the predictor (independent variable). Significant results for anti-immigration views at 1% in step 1 and 2, represent that a 1-unit increase in anti-immigration views increases the log-odds of voting for a (far) right-wing party today by 1.64 and 1.53 in step 2 and 3 respectively. The marginal effect of a 1-unit increase in anti-immigration views is 21.4 percentage points holding all other terms constant. The satisfaction dimensions for education and economy are the only significant ones at 5% and 1% respectively. The effect of a 1-unit increase in satisfaction for education decreases the probability of voting for a right-wing party by 2.4 percentage points and for economy the probability decreases by 3.5 percentage points.

Table 6: Logit Regression Anti-immigration as predictor for voting 2023

	Step 1 Log-odds	Step 2 Log-odds	Step 3 Log-odds	Marginal Effects
Vote				
Control Variables				
Age	-.01***	-.01***	-.01***	-.002***
	(.00)	(.01)	(.01)	(.001)
Gender	.23	.05	.17	.025
	(.14)	(.015)	(.16)	(.023)
Education Level	-.10***	-.08***	-.07***	-.010***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.002)
Main Effects				
Anti-immigration views		1.64***	1.53***	.214***
		(.14)	(.14)	(.016)
Satisfaction Effects				
Military			.05	.007
			(.06)	(.008)
Education			-.17**	-.024**
			(.08)	(.011)
Healthcare			.05	.008
			(.07)	(.010)
Economy			-.25***	-.035***
			(.05)	(.006)
Constant	1.36***	-4.23***	-2.40***	
	(.39)	(.65)	(0.74)	
Observations	1,175	1,175	1,175	1,175
Pseudo R^2	.06	.20	.24	

Notes: Significance levels: 1% = ***, 5% = **, 10% = *. Standard errors are presented under the log-odd values in parentheses. Logit regression shows the probability of voting for (far) right wing party given the independent variable predictors.

Table 7 represents the results of the logit regression of anti-immigration views on vote. For 2021, results are significant for the effect of anti-immigration on vote. In step 3 the log-odds are significant at 1%, showing that a 1-unit increase in the scale increases the probability of voting for a right-wing party today by 1.19 log-odds. The marginal effect of an increase in anti-immigration views is 8.8 percentage points, much lower than the results from 2023 (21.4 percentage points). Compared to 2023, the only satisfaction dimension that is significant at 1% is economy, meaning that a 1-unit increase of the satisfaction scale of economy, decreases the probability of voting for a right-wing party by 2.8 percentage points.

Table 7: Logit Regression Anti-immigration as predictor for voting 2021

	Step 1 Log-odds	Step 2 Log-odds	Step 3 Log-odds	Marginal Effects
Vote				
Control Variables				
Age	-.03***	-.04***	-.04***	-.003***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.001)
Gender	.64***	.61***	.67***	.050***
	(.20)	(.20)	(.22)	(.16)
Education Level	-.13***	-.11***	-.10***	-.007***
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.001)
Main Effects				
Anti-immigration views		1.30***	1.19***	.088***
		(.17)	(.17)	(.013)
Satisfaction				
Military			-.01	-.001
			(.07)	(.005)
Education			-.19*	-.014*
			(.10)	(.008)
Healthcare			.08	.006
			(.09)	(.007)
Economy			-.38***	-.028***
			(.07)	(.005)
Constant	1.41***	-2.81***	.27	
	(.53)	(.76)	(.90)	
Observations	1,262	1,262	1,262	1,262
Pseudo R^2	.09	.17	.26	

Notes: Significance levels: 1% = ***, 5% = **, 10% = *. Standard errors are presented under the log-odd values in parentheses. Logit regression shows the probability of voting for (far) right wing party given the independent variable predictors.

Table 8 displays the results of the logistics regression for 2017, showing significant results for anti-immigration views on vote at 1%. In step 3, the log-odds show that a 1-unit increase in the anti-immigration views scale leads to on average an increase of 1.45 log-odds. In terms of marginal effects, a 1-unit increase in anti-immigration views causes the probability of voting for a right-wing party to increase by 14.8 percentage points keeping all other variables constant. This result is higher than 2021 but lower than 2023. Once again economy is the only satisfaction dimension that shows significant results at 1%.

Table 8: Logit Regression Anti-immigration as predictor for voting 2017

	Step 1 Log-odds	Step 2 Log-odds	Step 3 Log-odds	Marginal Effects
Vote				
Control Variables				
Age	-.03***	-.03***	-.03***	-0.003***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(0.001)
Gender	.79***	.80***	.91***	.093***
	(.18)	(.20)	(.20)	(.02)
Education Level	-.10***	-.09***	.08***	-.008***
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.002)
Main Effects				
Anti-immigration views		1.50***	1.45***	.148***
		(.17)	(.17)	(.016)
Satisfaction				
Military			-.03	-.003
			(.07)	(.007)
Education			-.01	.001
			(.10)	(.011)
Healthcare			-.00	-.000
			(.07)	(.008)
Economy			-.27***	-.027***
			(.07)	(.007)
Constant	.83	-4.46	.16	
	(.52)	(.79)	(.86)	
Observations	1,114	1,114	1,114	1,114
Pseudo R^2	.07	.18	.21	

Notes: Significance levels: 1% = ***, 5% = **, 10% = *. Standard errors are presented under the log-odd values in parentheses. Logit regression shows the probability of voting for (far) right wing party given the independent variable predictors.

Table 9 displays the results for the logit regression in 2012. In step 3 shows the log-odds of anti-immigration views is 1.23 and significant at 1%. An increase in 1-unit of anti-immigration views leads to on average an increase of 1.23 log-odds of the possibility of voting for a right-wing party (PVV). Using the marginal effects column, an increase in 1-unit of anti-immigration views leads to a 9.6 percentage points. The second lowest result for anti-immigration views in the logit regressions.

Table 9: Logit Regression Anti-immigration as predictor for voting 2012

Vote	Step 1 Log-odds	Step 2 Log-odds	Step 3 Log-odds	Marginal Effects
Control Variables				
Age	-.03***	-.03***	-.03***	-.003***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.000)
Gender	.55***	.54***	.61***	.048***
	(.15)	(.16)	(.16)	(.013)
Education Level	-.13***	-.11***	-.10***	-.008***
	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)	(.001)
Main Effects				
Anti-immigration views		1.31***	1.23***	.096***
		(.14)	(.14)	(.011)
Satisfaction				
Military			-.03	-.002
			(.05)	(.004)
Education			-.07	-.005
			(.07)	(.005)
Healthcare			-.00	-.000
			(.006)	(.005)
Economy			-.22***	-.017***
			(.05)	(.004)
Constant	1.11***	-3.61***	-1.84***	
	(.41)	(.66)	(.74)	
Observations	2,128	2,128	2,128	2,128
$Pseudo\ R^2$	.08	.16	.20	

Notes: Significance levels: 1% = ***, 5% = **, 10% = *. Standard errors are presented under the log-odd values in parentheses. Logit regression shows the probability of voting for (far) right wing party given the independent variable predictors.

Table 10 shows the results for the logistics regression for 2010. Anti-immigration views are highly significant at 1%, with a marginal effect of 17.1 percentage points and 1.67 log-odds with the inclusion of the satisfaction dimensions. This follows that, holding all other variables constant, that increasing anti-immigration views by 1-unit leads to an increase in the probability of voting for a (far) right-wing party by 17.1 percentage points or 1.67 log-odds. The only satisfaction dimension that is highly significant in all logistic regressions is economy, suggesting that satisfaction with the economy has a significant impact on whether you vote right-wing or not.

Table 10: Logit Regression Anti-immigration as predictor for voting 2010

	Step 1 Log-odds	Step 2 Log-odds	Step 3 Log-odds	Marginal Effects
Vote				
Control Variables				
Age	-.02***	-.02***	.02***	-.002***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.000)
Gender	.56***	.46***	.51***	.051***
	(.11)	(.13)	(.13)	(.013)
Education Level	-.09***	-.08***	-.07***	-.007
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.001)
Main Effects				
Anti-immigration views		1.75***	1.67***	.171***
		(.12)	(.13)	(.012)
Satisfaction				
Military			-.04	-.004
			(.04)	(.004)
Education			-.11*	-.011*
			(.06)	(.006)
Healthcare			.08	.008
			(.06)	(.006)
Economy			-.20***	-.020***
			(.05)	(.005)
Constant	.09	-5.93***	-4.27	
	(.32)	(.55)	(.63)	
Observations	2,613	2,613	2,613	2,613
Pseudo R^2	.05	.18	.20	

Notes: Significance levels: 1% = ***, 5% = **, 10% = *. Standard errors are presented under the log-odd values in parentheses. Logit regression shows the probability of voting for (far) right wing party given the independent variable predictors.

Discussion

The main research question analysed in this study is:

The willingness of people to express their anti-immigration views and how this relates to a preference towards voting for (far) right-wing political parties in the Netherlands.

The results discussed and presented in the results section, show that there is a clear relation of voting for a (far) right-wing political party in the Netherlands leads to an average increase of anti-immigration views of respondents. Additionally, respondent that places themselves higher on the left-right political scale will also, on average, place higher on the anti-immigration views scale. Looking at the waves in isolation, each one displays a clear significant effect of the independent variable vote and left-right on anti-immigration views. This shows that a preference for (far) right-wing parties and a preference for general right-wing political ideology, translates to higher anti-immigration views. The stigma of choosing a higher spot on the left-right scale is likely to be lower than voting for (far) right-wing parties. The relationship of left-right and anti-immigration views is lower than that of vote and has a lower volatility in the coefficients. Respondents that place themselves further to the right than the average respondent do not necessarily hold anti-immigration views and may be attracted to other aspects of the party.

For Hypothesis 1 (tested by regression 1 and 2), the null hypothesis is rejected in favour of the alternative, there is a significant association of vote and left-right on anti-immigration views in every wave. There does not seem to be a conclusive trend between 2010-2023 for vote or left-right and certainly no trend in relation to actual vote share. There is not enough significant evidence to reject the null hypothesis and therefore, there is no trend over time. A trend can be seen between vote and actual vote share when analysing 2010-2017 and 2021-2023 separately. In Figure 1, an increase in the actual vote share of right-wing parties and Figure 3 (in Appendix C) a decrease in other political parties. In Figure 2 (in Appendix C), an increase in the anti-immigration views with the percentage of respondents that vote for right-wing parties over time. This could be due to two key reasons; respondents may not identify with the anti-immigration views of right-wing parties or respondents are not comfortable/honest in the survey about said views and preferences. Voters for right-wing parties are likely not comfortable or honest about their views as in an article written by France 24 (2023), the PVV election program states that they aim for less Islam in the Netherlands and propose to opt-out of the EU asylum and immigration rules. This very specific issue and core mission to the largest right-wing party in the Netherlands would be hard to ignore.

With such clear anti-immigration ideology, it is hard to conclude that respondents and PVV voters are not in line with the anti-immigration views the party stands for. Assuming respondents are honest about their preference for right-wing parties, and there is an increasing support for right-wing parties overall in the Netherlands. The support of the figure and the regressions support the conclusion that respondents are not being honest about their views and preferences likely due to social desirability.

In the second part of the study the second research question was analysed. After the inclusion of satisfaction dimensions, are anti-immigration views still a predictor for a preference for voting for a (far) right-wing party. In the analysis of the waves separately, anti-immigration views are significant as a predictor for voting behaviour. Therefore, the null hypothesis of Hypothesis 3 is rejected as there is significant evidence to accept the alternative. Every wave shows a significant increase in the log-odds probability of voting or a right-wing party if there is an increase in the anti-immigration views. This is likely due to the mission statement of the parties and the respondents being able to identify more with their views. Over time, there is not significant evidence to accept the null hypothesis of Hypothesis 4. Anti-immigration views do not become a more significant predictor for voting for (far) right-wing parties. Anti-immigration view policies and attitudes of right-wing parties does not change significantly over the period of analysis and therefore this dimension as an appeal to right-wing parties remains relatively unchanged over time.

The satisfaction dimensions education and economy show significant results as predictors for voting for right-wing parties. Higher satisfaction with these dimensions shows lower probability for voting for (far) right-wing parties. Respondents and voters that are less satisfied with the current governments policies regarding the economy and education are more likely to vote for right-wing parties.

In terms of future research, it would be useful to extend the model to other European nations. Additionally, other satisfaction dimensions and specific questions of satisfaction with the government may aid with insight of whether respondents are seeking change in the government or are identifying with the policies and views of right-wing parties. A drawback of the LISS panel data is that there are no specific questions regarding income brackets. This variable could impact voting behaviour significantly especially regarding the economy dimension that was tested. Extending analysis to 2000 would also be useful in seeing the introduction of anti-immigration views and the effect of Pim Fortuyns assassination and political party on the popularity of anti-immigration views and voting for right-wing parties.

A limitation of this study is that the link between perceived discrimination and anti-immigration attitudes. An extension to this study would be to look at discrimination from both sides, from respondents holding anti-immigration views and respondents that have experienced discrimination or perceive an increase in discrimination over the time of the study. Although citizens feeling more validated in their views and, therefore, being able to express them would increase actual discrimination, but in terms of perceived discrimination an analysis of immigrants would be necessary for a concrete effect to be established.

Conclusion

In conclusion, there is a significant positive relationship of voting for (far) right-wing parties and anti-immigration views and a significant positive relationship of left-right political scale on anti-immigration views. However, there is no evidence that these effects change over time or become stronger for either variable. For the second part of this study, the results show that anti-immigration views are a significant predictor variable for voting for (far) right-wing political parties, and education and economy are significant satisfaction dimensions that impact this.

Voters do not feel as though they are vindicated in their views even when the popularity and social norm is broken. Therefore, the result of this paper does not show conclusive evidence for the main research question. Actual votes for (far) right-wing parties does not lead to increased perceived discrimination due to respondents not feeling vindicated in their views and being able to express them.

The results of this study show opposing evidence for social norm and desirability behaviour. Rising anti-immigration views may be the consequence of informational social influence, with politicians becoming accurate sources of information that voters use as indicators of current problems and issues (Zitek & Hebl, 2007). Researchers have recommended keeping stigmatized (anti-immigration views) identities hidden unless concealing these causes severe distress (Newheiser & Barreto, 2014). However, conditional norm compliance theory suggests that as the norm for discrimination is broken by politicians and increase in actual votes for (far) right-wing parties, that voters and citizens are more comfortable breaking the norm and expressing their views openly (Diekmann, Przepiorka, & Rauhut, 2015). This study's theoretical implications are against the theory of conditional norm compliance, as there is no evidence that citizens feel more vindicated by the actual increase in votes for (far) right-wing parties. The contact hypothesis also does not seem to hold with respect to this study, as the Netherlands immigrant population increased drastically between 2010-2022 ("How many people immigrated to the Netherlands", 2022), the increase in actual vote share (figure 1) for (far) right-wing parties increased in response to this.

In terms of practical implications, public education campaigns against the consequences of discrimination and the misconceptions of immigration would be useful to inform voters on the decisions that they make. Parties that promote immigration/do not oppose it, should promote the benefits of inclusion and diversity. Promoting diversity and having a diverse workforce and diverse student body contributes to the achievement the of democratic ideals of equity and access as well as a more educated society (Milem, 2003).

With right-wing politics and anti-immigration views increasing in the Netherlands, the effect of such views on expressing and perceived discrimination are unclear over time. Keeping in mind that the PVV is the first far right-wing party to achieve majority seats in Dutch parliament, the consequences on discrimination and diversity could be detrimental to the ideals of democracy and society.

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Appendices

Appendix A

Table 1: Parties included in each wave for variable 'vote'

Variable: Vote	*Right-wing Parties Listed*
Wave 15	PVV – Party for Freedom FvD – Forum for Democracy BBB – Farmers and Citizens Movement JA21 – Right Answer 2021
Wave 13	PVV – Party for Freedom FvD – Forum for Democracy
Wave 9	PVV – Party for Freedom VNL – Pro Netherlands
Wave 5	PVV - Party for Freedom
Wave 3	Rita Verdonk – Dutch Pride Party Groep Wilders – Wilders' Freedom Party

Table 2: Education Level Categories (LISS panel database definition)

Education Level	Certificate Acquired
1	did not complete any education
2	did not complete primary school
3	primary school
4	lower and continued special education
5	vglo (continued lower education)
6	lbo (lower professional education)
7	lower technical school, household school
8	mulo, ulo, mavo (lower/intermediate secondary education; US: junior high school)
9	vmbo vocational training program (preparatory intermediate vocational school)
10	vmbo theoretical or combined program (preparatory intermediate vocational school)
11	mms (intermediate girls' school)
12	hbs (former pre-university education, US: senior high school)
13	havo (higher general secondary education; US: junior high school)
14	vwo (pre-university education, US: senior high school)
15	gymnasium, atheneum, lyceum (types of pre-university education programs)
16	kmbo (short intermediate professional education), vhbo (preparatory higher professional education)
17	mbo professional training program (intermediate professional education) (BOL)
18	mbo professional training program (intermediate professional education) (BBL)
19	mbo-plus to access hbo, short hbo education (less than two years) (higher professional education)
20	hbo (higher professional education), institutes of higher education, new style
21	teacher training school

22	conservatory and art academy
23	academic education (including technical and economic colleges, former style) bachelor's degree (kandidaats)
24	academic education (including technical and economic colleges, former style) master's degree (doctoraal)
25	academic education, bachelor
26	academic education, master
27	doctor's degree (Ph. D, including doctoral research program to obtain Ph. D)

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics per year

2023 / 2021 / 2017

Variables	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Anti-Immigration	1175	3.08	0.65	1	5	1262	3.02	0.64	1	5	1114	3.15	0.65	1	5
Vote		0.26	0.44	0	1		0.11	0.31	0	1		0.15	0.36	0	1
Left-Right		5.29	2.23	0	10		5.30	2.27	0	10		5.33	2.30	0	10
Satisfaction															
Military		6.44	1.79	0	10		6.77	1.81	0	10		6.35	1.80	0	10
Education		6.68	1.62				7.23	1.53				6.77	1.48		
Healthcare		7.04	1.68				7.70	1.58				6.60	1.74		
Economy		5.74	1.92				6.46	1.68				6.17	1.65		
Controls															
Age		59.27	16.50	18	96		58.03	16.29	19	103		56.57	16.09	21	98
Gender		0.56	0.50	0	1		0.56	0.50	0	1		0.56	0.50	0	1
Education level		16.76	6.38	1	27		16.70	6.38	1	27		16.02	6.57	1	27

2012 / 2010

Variables	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Anti-Immigration	2128	3.19	0.61	1	5	2613	3.20	0.62	1	5
Vote		0.10	0.30	0	1		0.14	0.35	0	1
Left-Right		5.34	2.31	0	10		5.20	2.25	0	10
Satisfaction										
Military		5.86	1.86	0	10		6.22	1.74	0	10
Education		6.35	1.57				6.41	1.47		
Healthcare		6.53	1.66				6.56	1.53		
Economy		5.23	1.75				5.87	1.47		
Controls										
Age		54.09	15.72	18	89		52.65	15.15	18	93
Gender		0.56	0.50	0	1		0.53	0.50	0	1
Education Level		14.9	6.02	1	27		15.00	6.05	1	27

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics Combined

Variables	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Anti-Immigration	8,292	3.14	0.63	1	5
Vote		0.15	0.35	0	1
Left-Right		5.28	2.28	0	10
Satisfaction					
Military		6.26	1.82	0	10
Education		6.66	1.56		
Healthcare		6.80	1.70		
Economy		5.82	1.72		
Controls					
Age		55.54	15.84	18	103
Gender		0.55	0.50	0	1
Education Level		14.9	6.02	1	27

Table 5: Correlation of Satisfaction

Variables	Military	Education	Healthcare	Economy
Military	1.00			
Education	0.51	1.00		
Healthcare	0.44	0.78	1.00	
Economy	0.46	0.55	0.58	1.00

Table 6: Correlation of Satisfaction (Combined) and Vote

Variables	Vote	Voted	Satisfaction
Vote	1.00		
Satisfaction	-0.19	-0.20	1.00

Appendix B

Comprehensive Description of Right-wing Parties:

The following is a more comprehensive description of parties' stances and views, in the Populist database and LISS panel survey. The list is limited to these parties by PopuList and options given by LISS panel.

- **Party for Freedom (PVV):** The PVV founded by Geert Wilders in 2006, campaigns against the 'left-wing Church' that has enforced multiculturalism on the Dutch. The PVV particularly emphasizes: Islamophobia, stop on asylum and restrictive immigration policy, independent military and defence spending and an end to indoctrination of children in schools ("Nederlands Weer Op 1, 2022).
  Classification: Populist, Far-Right, Hard Eurosceptic

- **Forum For Democracy (FVD):** The FVD was founded by Thiery Baudet in 2015. The party rejects the 'cultural-Marxist' elite and its institutions. The party has radicalized pushing conspiracy theories, antisemitism, anti-immigration and anti-EU
  Classification: Populist, Far-Right, Hard Eurosceptic

- **Farmer-Citizen Movement (BBB):** Founded in 2019 as a response to widespread farmers protests. It promotes the populist view of 'Ordinary Dutchmen' against the establishment from cities. It has very restrictive policies on immigrations and consistently votes alongside other far-right parties in the Netherlands. Aims for less power of the EU over decision making specifically in farming and agriculture (BBB, 2023).
  Classification: (Agrarian) Populist, (Borderline) Far-Right. Soft Eurosceptic

- **Right Answer 21 (JA21):** Founded in 2021, the party was founded to present itself as a more respectable alternative to the FVD and PVV. The party holds similar immigration, EU and climate stances as both of those parties although in some areas less extreme. The party votes alongside other far-right parties ("JA21 – Standpunten", n.d.).
  Classification: Populist, Far-Right, Soft Eurosceptic

- ***For Netherlands (VNL):** Founded in 2014 and dissolved in 2017 by members of the PVV. The party ran on small government, limited immigration, defense of Western core values and EU returning to a pure economic cooperation ("VNL", n.d.).
  Classification: Populist, Far-Right, Soft Eurosceptic

- *Rita Verdonk Dutch Pride Party (TROTS):** Formally founded in 2008 by former VVD minister Rita Verdonk. TROTS ran on restrictive immigration policies and nationalist views although less extreme than others. Taking a stand against the Dutch administration elite at a national level. The party did not win a seat in the 2010 election and Rita Verdonk left politics ("Trots Op Nederland", n.d.).

  Classification: Populist, (Borderline) Right-wing

*Although the VNL and TROTS are not listed in the Populist database, the classification was decided by the same restrictions as the other parties

Appendix C

Figure 1: Distribution of Anti-immigration Views

Figure 2: Right-wing voters and anti-immigration views over time

Figure 3: Election Results per Party from 2010 to 2023 (Excluding right-wing)

Figure 4: Election Results for Right-wing Political Parties Compared to Survey Right-wing Voters


Figure 5: Barchart anti-immigration Views for Right-wing Voters against Other