

THESIS

Rise and fall of the American Empire



Jasper de Graaff, 458199

24-06-2024

Words:

Wordcount.com: 19444

Wordcounter.net : 19655

Wordcounter.io: 19469

Lecturer: dr. Yuri van Hoef

The role of traditional middle powers after the fall of the American empire: Addressing concerns using global interdependence theory.

Abstract

This thesis explores the evolving relationships between the traditional middle powers the Netherlands and Denmark and the United States from the early seventeenth century to the (post-) Trump era. Initially, these relations were characterized by mutual benefits and pragmatic cooperation, but the post-WWI period marked the US's rise as a, if not the, global superpower, which changed the way these traditional middle powers had to behave in the international arena. Controversial atlanticist choices where the Netherlands and Denmark followed their powerful ally in the War on Terror. In the Trump era, where the US practices more isolationist policies, middle powers seem to be left without protection in a world with an increasing amount of rising economic powers. Keohane's Interdependence theory however illustrates that traditional middle powers still merit power and autonomy, as an interdependent world puts asks for more than just military security. It asks for frontrunners in cooperative environmental, liberal and humanitarian issues, issues which traditional middle powers have always advocated for. Besides, the increased influence of supranational organizations in Keohane's interdependent world offers both security and a platform for smaller states. Denmark and the Netherlands have traditionally maintained strong ties with these organizations, which enhances their leverage and soft power on the international stage. Thus, one must not fear for the future of traditional middle powers, but instead realise that a globalized, interdependent world is particularly well-suited for traditional middle powers.

INTRODUCTION.....	3
SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIETAL RELEVANCE.....	3
MAIN THESIS STATEMENT, RESEARCH QUESTION AND SUB QUESTIONS.....	5
METHODOLOGY.....	7
MAIN THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK.....	8
CHAPTER 1: CONCEPTUALIZATION OF MIDDLE POWERS AND GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE.....	9
1.1 DEFINITION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF MIDDLE POWERS	9
1.1.1 <i>Areas of agreement</i>	9
1.1.2 <i>Turning points</i>	11
1.1.3 <i>Reasons for discussion</i>	13
1.2 CONCEPTUALIZATION OF COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE THEORY.....	15
CHAPTER 2: PRAGMATIC COOPERATION FROM THE 17TH CENTURY TO WORLD WAR I (PERIOD 1)	21
2.1 HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND RELATIONSHIP DYNAMICS BETWEEN THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED STATES.....	21
2.2 HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND RELATIONSHIP DYNAMICS BETWEEN DENMARK AND THE UNITED STATES.....	29
CHAPTER 3: UNILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS FROM WORLD WAR I TO THE TRUMP ERA (PERIOD 2)	32
3.1 HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND RELATIONSHIP DYNAMICS BETWEEN THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED STATES.....	32
3.2 HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND RELATIONSHIP DYNAMICS BETWEEN DENMARK AND THE UNITED STATES.....	43
CHAPTER 4: BILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE IN THE POST-TRUMP ERA (PERIOD 3)	49
4.1 INCREASINGLY INWARD-LOOKING STANCE OF THE US AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR TRADITIONAL MIDDLE POWERS.	49
4.2 HOW THE PLACE OF TRADITIONAL MIDDLE POWERS WILL CHANGE AS A RESULT OF THE FALL OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE.	52
CHAPTER 5 GENERAL CONCLUSION.....	59
5.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS PERIOD 1.....	59
5.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS PERIOD 2.....	60
5.3 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS PERIOD 3	61
5.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE	62
7. BIBLIOGRAPHY	64

Introduction

Middle powers are nations that do not have the same level of influence on the world stage as superpowers, but they often have some degree of regional power and are generally key allies to superpowers. This thesis aims to investigate the behaviour of Denmark and the Netherlands, often portrayed as traditional middle powers. Traditional middle powers are stable, social democracies, highly egalitarian, are positioned in the core of the world economy, and have a high quality of living¹. The role of the middle power came to prominence during the Cold War, as nations less powerful than the bipolar bloc of superpowers resulted in a foreign policy highly concerned with military and political issues, causing their internationalist², cooperative and mediating role. This thesis will explore how the global shift, meaning the US adopting a more inward-looking stance and the rise of China and other nations in the Global South, is affecting the way traditional middle powers act in this changing hegemonic climate.

This paper will use Nye and Keohane's 'complex interdependence theory' to argue that anxiety over the place in the international arena for traditional middle powers like the Netherlands and Denmark in a world with an increasing amount of complexity and major powers is unnecessary. An overview of historical ties with the Netherlands and the US and Denmark and the US will be covered to illustrate how deeply aligned the policies of the US and these middle powers historically were. In short, their tendency Atlanticism will make place for Internationalism; from favouring the USA and other NATO members to a more globalist, all-encompassing approach.

Scientific and Societal relevance.

This thesis addresses a significant lack in the current literature on international relations by focusing on the role of traditional middle powers, specifically the Netherlands and Denmark, in the context of current geopolitical shifts. The existing research that has been done largely puts emphasis on the dynamics of superpowers, not small- or middle powers. By exploring how these nations navigate a world with an increasing amount of global

¹ Jordaan, "The concept of a middle power", 172.

² Ibid, 171.

interdependence, this thesis provides valuable insights into their potential for maintaining influence and autonomy.

As for societal relevance, this research is relevant for policymakers and the general public in middle power countries, especially those who are anxious for the future. As traditional allies like the United States show signs of relative decline and shift towards a more isolationist stance, there is anxiety about the implications for national security and their role in the international arena. This thesis aims to reassure that such fears may be unfounded and unnecessary. It highlights that middle powers, through using their soft power and embracing cooperative relationships with other emerging global players like China, can reassure the position of these middle powers.

For scientific relevance, this thesis contributes to the field of international relations by applying interdependence theory to middle powers in global dynamics, offering a fresh perspective on the potential for non-superpowers for equal, balanced and multilateral engagements. It challenges the realist view that emphasizes military might, security issues and unilateral actions. Instead, this thesis proposes that the interdependent nature of today's world allows for a more nuanced, liberal and cooperative approach to foreign policy. This idea is crucial for understanding how smaller nations can navigate and shape the global order in the future.

To conclude, this study not only fills a critical gap in the literature but also provides a hopeful outlook for middle powers. It underscores that in an interdependent world, traditional middle powers like the Netherlands and Denmark have the opportunity to assert their influence and maintain stability without reliance on the dominance of old ally superpowers like the US.

Main thesis statement, research question and sub questions

The relationships between the United States, the Netherlands, and Denmark have evolved from pragmatic collaborations based on mutual convenience and shared history from the 17th century to World War I, to predominantly unilateral engagements with the U.S. as the dominant power from World War I to the Trump era, and finally to more bilateral interactions post-Trump. This evolution is best understood through the lens of interdependence theory, which highlights the interconnected nature of international relations. The theory is particularly applicable to the post-Trump era, where global interdependence has empowered middle powers like the Netherlands and Denmark, contrasting with the post-World War II period when U.S. hegemony allowed for more unilateral influence, exemplified by Dutch and Danish involvement in U.S.-led conflicts such as Iraq and Afghanistan. This shift underscores a potential liberation for middle powers, allowing them to leverage their soft power and engage more autonomously with a variety of global actors, fostering a more balanced and multilateral international system."

The main research question for this thesis is as follows:

"This thesis attempts to analyse how the relationships between the United States, the Netherlands, and Denmark evolved from the 17th century to the post-Trump era have evolved and how can these changes be understood through the lens of interdependence theory?"

Subquestions:

1. *“What are the defining characteristics and roles of middle powers in international relations?”*
2. *“How is global interdependence conceptualized, and what are its core principles?”*.
3. *“How did pragmatic cooperation between the Netherlands, Denmark, and the United States shape their relationships from the 17th century to World War I?”*
4. *“How did the relationships between the Netherlands, Denmark, and the United States evolve into predominantly unilateral engagements from World War I to the Trump era?”*.
5. *“How did U.S. foreign policy shifts under the Trump administration and the broader impact of globalization influence the bilateral agreements and global interdependence involving the Netherlands and Denmark in the post-Trump era?”*.

Methodology

The methodology employed in this research uses a combination of primary and secondary sources, including books, scholarly articles, and historical analyses, to construct a detailed historical analyses of Dutch-US and Danish-US relations over the past centuries. While primary sources such as interviews and pamphlets were utilized to provide contemporary perspectives and firsthand accounts, a big portion of the research relied on well-established historical literature which allow for a thorough review of existing theories and concepts.

Main theoretical and conceptual framework

Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye introduced the complex interdependence theory in the 1970's to describe the emerging process of a global interconnected political and economic system, in other words, it emphasizes the importance of understanding the complex web of economic, political, and social interactions between states and non-state actors and how these interactions shape the international system. Keohane and Nye attributed three main characteristics to this school: The absence of hierarchy of issues, the minor role of military force and the existence of multiple channels which connects societies³.

A major advantage of interdependency is that actors have something to gain through an interdependent relationship, and that it can lead to co-operation in multiple areas⁴. The latter would be in line with liberal values of traditional powers, as they favour politics in line with social democratic values, justice and humanitarianism. As liberalism in the IR context centres around cooperation between states and powerful international institutions, increasing the interdependence can cause the formation of a community⁵, which can positively influence trade, migration, tourism and cultural exchanges. These ambitions are in line with the way traditional middle powers position and advertise themselves in the international arena, as they have the tendency to promote their liberal values with the rest of the world.

³ Neugebauer, "China's cooperation", 5.

⁴ Rogerson, "Information Interdependence", 418.

⁵ Deutsch, "Nationalism and Social", 124.

Chapter 1: Conceptualization of Middle Powers and Global Interdependence

1.1 Definition and Characteristics of Middle Powers

1.1.1 Areas of agreement

In international relations, different theories rule the discourse in literature. Realists, liberalists and constructivist scholars are all alive and well, actively contributing to the ever-changing field of international relations. One thing they can agree on however is the vagueness of the term ‘middle power’. The middle power concept has grown in popularity in recent years as a term to categorize non-great powers⁶. This can be explained by the rise of the Global South, as growing nations cause for a larger group of nations that can be labelled as a middle power. The rising list of candidates soliciting for middlepoweriship increased academic interest in the concept. Increasing complexity in global governance gives states which ambition middlepoweriship to assume this role, but the competition for this role has increased due to the rising number of states for which traditional, oversimplistic definitions for middle powers apply. Estathopoulos⁷ hypothesizes that prospective middle powers will have to meet more demanding criteria when assuming middlepoweriship.

However important, the term ‘middle power’ is seldom defined, and explanations are rarely specific or satisfactory⁸. The term stems from the post-WWI era where nations were determined to prevent a repeat of the war by creating the League of Nations as an arena to discuss (international) policy problems, rather than wage war of it. Non-permanent council seats were to be assigned to nations which were not considered a ‘great power’. This started the problematic endeavour of assigning status to nation-states, exemplified by Brazil’s threat to leave the League were it been labelled as “middle”, an event which served as a prelude to the subsequent formalization of the term “middle power”⁹, the latter word noting that ‘middle’ does not mean ‘weak’.

Traditionally, Canada has laid claim on middlepoweriship by virtue of their efforts and contributions to World War II and post-war peace. It argued that middle powers were countries which contributed to significantly to the building of the global order and were

⁶ Estathopoulos, “Middle Powers and the Behavioural Model”, 47.

⁷ Ibid, 48.

⁸ Chapnick, “The Canadian middle power myth”, 188.

⁹ Wood, “the middle powers”, 8.

likely to protect the values of that order, at least at a greater extent than the greater powers¹⁰. Advocate of Canadian middlepowerism, McKay¹¹ (1969), characterizes middle powers as entities which can be trusted to use their power in a responsible way, a way which serves the interest of the international community. A satisfactory definition is given by Shin¹², as he notes that “A middle power can change the position of great powers and defend its own position on matters related to national or regional security that directly affect it”. This in return separates the middle power from small powers, as states who cannot defend its own position or change the position of great powers cannot be labelled as middle powers. It remains arbitrary however, when a state is capable of given requirements by Shin.

The main crux of the matter is thus as follows: Problematic for conceptualizing the term ‘middle power’ is the numerous number of states who can be considered middle powers¹³; long lists of nation-states who meet the criteria one poses on the term ‘middle power’, are dubbed a “conceptual incoherence”¹⁴. Such long lists of nations may be due to simplistic definitions which centre round the idea that middle powers are positioned between major and small powers¹⁵ in the international arena, which, given the small amount of great powers, would mean that some 180 countries have to be categorized under the label of “middle”- or “small” power. These characteristics were applicable for Australia and Canada in the final stages of WW2, when middle powers as a concept first received some serious attention¹⁶, since both countries tried to strengthen their position by aiding the Allies. These two countries, with a few other (Western European) countries were considered ‘traditional’ middle powers, but according to Jordaan², twenty-three countries have been added to that list. Having such an extensive list begs the question of how concise the definition in practise actually is, or whether revision is needed.

The largely accepted approach to identifying whether a country can join the list is formulated by Chapnick¹⁷, as he identifies three perspectives: Firstly, there is the ‘behavioural’ perspective, noting that a nation can be a middle power when it identifies itself as such or when it acts like it in international relations. Secondly, the hierarchical

¹⁰ Neack, “Searching for Middle Powers”, 1.

¹¹ McKay, “The Canadian doctrine”, 137.

¹² Shin, “A Critical Review of the Concept of Middle Power”, 3.

¹³ Jordaan, “The emerging middle power concept”, 395.

¹⁴ Ibid, 396.

¹⁵ Chapnick, “The middle power”, 76.

¹⁶ Shin, “A Critical Review of the Concept of Middle Power”, 1.

¹⁷ Chapnick, “The middle power”, 73-82.

approach is much more pragmatic and quantifiable, as it ranks nations by economic wealth, military power or population: Countries with values in the middle of the list are considered middle powers. Lastly, the functional perspective holds the view that a country which can actually exert influence in certain arenas can be considered a middle power. To prevent inflation of the term as a result of self-electing itself for middlepowership, Neack¹⁸ notes that countries which portray 'good citizenship', favoured policies of compromise and coalition building and supported multilateralism in general can be ranked as middle powers. This take is in line with Chapnick's 'behavioural' and 'functional', while disregarding his 'hierarchical' approach as quantifiable characteristics of a nation does not per se mean 'good' international citizenship.

All three approaches can summon lists of perceived middle powers. The consensus remains however, that there is no consensus regarding the definition of the term 'middle power'. Disagreements are plentiful, as constructivists, realists and liberalists all have a different view on the matter. The next chapters will discuss different viewpoints and turning points in this debate.

1.1.2 Turning points

For a long time, middle powers were seen as policy takers, not as policy makers. Before 1945, the concert of great powers was surviving, causing middle-and small powers to be seen as governed by the solidarity of the great powers, and safely linked to the security system of the United Nations¹⁹. It was only in 1947 that Glazebrook noted some characteristics of middle powers as "their opposition to undue great power control, their growing tendency to act together, and the influence they have individually come to exert"²⁰. This description fits the current Zeitgeist where the self-proclaimed status of the superpowers as guardians of civilization and morality has taken a blow as a consequence of the atrocities the world witnessed in both World Wars. The main contributions of middle powers in the early post war- period to the United Nations' current security organisation could take three forms: Support as they had considerable wealth and resources, participation

¹⁸ Neack, "Searching for Middle Powers", 1.

¹⁹ Holbraad, "Middle Powers in International Politics", 68.

²⁰ Glazebrook, "'The Middle Powers in the United Nations System', 308.

with a strong sense of responsibility and the contribution of political leadership of high standard and morale²¹. In the Cold War period, it was in the interest of middle powers to be bridge builders in a tense, bipolar world. With the end of the Cold War, the position of middle powers has gotten more complex. The abrupt developments of the late 1980s and 1990s as a result of the end of the Cold War have created a wide range of new challenges, placing middle powers in a more uncertain and vulnerable position²². With the end of the bipolar system however, comes new opportunities and increased flexibility, as middle powers are no longer faced with the “stark choices of loyalty or exit”²³, as, in the wake of the cold war, middle powers have, condescendingly, been called ‘supporters’ and ‘loyalists’ of the dominant power.

Since the end of the Cold-War, some scholars point to a loss of influence of the traditional middle powers, who are mainly Western, in the new globalized, more liberal international system, by a cluster of non-traditional intermediate states²⁴. With an increase of the amount of states that can be considered middle powers, more diversity in the types of middle powers arose. Now, you had middle powers who were not regional powers, like Canada and Poland, but also regional powers who were not middle powers, like Nigeria or Ethiopia²⁵. Of the nineteen members of G20, only eleven are middle powers²⁶. Logical, because, as discussed, Economic might is not the only determinant for a nation to be considered a ‘middle power’. International status, relationships and other less quantifiable variables get put in the equation as well.

For states, such variables change constantly. The role middle powers play should not be viewed as a fixated and permanent set, but rather as something that needs to be constantly re-evaluated in light of how the international system is evolving¹⁰. The set of middle powers will change throughout time because its wealth and relational nature constantly changes. Since the end of the Cold War, the traditional Western middle powers are no longer the only ones who define the category but are joined by states from the Global South.

To conclude, middle powers in the early years after WW2 were mainly Western countries with a decent amount of economic wealth and portrayed a mediating role in a

²¹ Holbraad, “Middle Powers in International Politics”, 69.

²² Cooper, “The Evolution of Multilateralism”, 3.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid, 4.

²⁵ Gilley, “Middle powers and the rise of China”, 5-6.

²⁶ Ibid, 7.

bipolar world. When the Cold War ended, other determinants were used to identify middle powers, opening up this title to less traditional countries, mainly from non-western parts of the world who were previously ostensibly marginalised from world order when the old superpowers were alive and well. These ‘new’ middle powers bring with them new norms, values and ambitions. Non-traditional middle powers want more drastic change in the international arena, change that strays from traditional liberal values and that opposes American leadership²⁷. Observers have remarked that the contestation of world order by middle powers has mainly come from non-traditional middle powers, and that this contestation is increasing.

1.1.3 Reasons for discussion

The main areas of disagreement are, firstly, disagreement about the definition of the term middle power and whether it is still applicable in the twentieth century as the international system is now globalised and multipolar, and secondly on the method that is used to measure middle powers; does one use quantifiable identifiers of power like population, military strength and GDP, or less quantifiable determinants like ‘prestige’, ‘influence’ or the presence of old relationships?

In literature, the role middle powers have, and the number of countries one can consider to be a middle power, changes alongside other major events in international relations, such as a world war or the collapse of a superpower. As Chapnick (1999) notes:

“Whereas the greatness of great powers persists, the influence of middle powers fluctuates constantly.”²⁸

Neack argues that a key characteristic of a middle power, to make the role of a middle power less situational, contains a moral obligation. Middle powers are not those who lay claim on middlepowermanship but are the ones who are willing to take responsibility and assert their influence they have on international relations. By noting that middle powers are only those

²⁷ Jordaan, “The emerging middle power concept”, 400.

²⁸ Chapnick, “the Middle Power”, 74.

who are actively and willingly using their political power to serve the interest of the world, the list actual middle powers is way greater than those who merely self-proclaim it. Being in the arithmetic middle is thus not enough to be granted middlepowermanship, one has to show that it has proved effort, like Canada did after WWII, noting their contributions in both World Wars. This way, nations like the Netherlands and Denmark, with their contributions to peacekeeping and preference for compromise and cooperation, justify their middlepowermanship over states like Nigeria, which are less active in the international arena but are more 'powerful' when considering quantifiable facts like population, land mass and regional influence.

Realists will argue that middle powers will pursue their own national interest, meaning that it would not matter to them whether that means that a superpower has to be followed, or if it means large-scale cooperation with other middle powers by creating international institutions.

Shen (2015) notices a tendency to liberal criteria in middle power studies, whereas, he argues, classical realism theories can help broaden perspective on the behaviour of middle powers as it brings security affairs into the centre of attention²⁹. Classical realism is in strong contrast to the humane policies (traditional) middle powers often portray, as they favour politics of cooperation, compromise and humanitarianism. As mentioned previously, Holbraad noticed that within the United Nations' security organisation, the traditional post-war middle powers had a responsibility of liberal political leadership and sharing their wealth and resources. This responsibility to promote economic and social growth and human rights is based on humanitarian values and ethics, and is motivated by compassion³⁰.

The lack of universally accepted definitions- and determinants of the concept of middle powers has thus to do with a clash of theories: realism versus liberal humanitarian and compassion driven motives. Most attempts of formulating definitions and criteria for a middle power use categories defined by sets of quantifiable attributes or by geopolitical or geo economic circumstances. Constructivists however, advocate to look at the term 'middle power' as a self-created identity or ideology³¹. Which would explain the emphasis of early (traditional) middle powers on responsibility, morality and multilateralism³². Nonetheless,

²⁹ Shin, "A Critical Review of the Concept of Middle Power", 3-4.

³⁰ Stokke, "Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty", 10.

³¹ Hurrell, "Some Reflections on the Role of Intermediate Powers", 1.

³² Ibid.

such self-proclaimed messiahship would rule out nations like Iran as a middle power, a country which should tick all the boxes of a middle powers as it is a regional power and has ‘middle-power like’ economic and military resources, as well as an excellent geographical location. To only give countries that are cooperative, mediating and strive for humanitarian or traditional liberal values the title of ‘middle power’ would undermine countries like Iran. Constructivism would thus seem insufficient in creating an universally accepted definition of the term middle power, as every country either sees themselves as a middle power or not, but also has an opinion on whether other countries are a middle power or not.

Studies on the behaviour of middle powers are thus complex, as (classical) realists, liberalists and constructivists, will, just like in other field of international relations, tend to disagree on motives.

1.2 Conceptualization of Complex Interdependence theory

This paper will use Keohane’s complex interdependence theory to explain the Netherlands’ and Denmark’s decreased tendency to side with the US. In *Power and Interdependence*, Keohane and Nye introduce the term ‘interdependence’ to international relations studies. The authors conceptualize ‘interdependence’ as *mutual dependence*³³: governments and peoples are affected by events and actions elsewhere, which means a higher level of interdependence as transnational relations between states increases³⁴. The post war period has seen a rise in number of industrialized states, for which economic development and open trade with other states are more efficient and effective approaches to achieve prosperity than by means of military force³⁵. This train of thought resulted in functionalist theories of integration in the Post-War period but was also present in the interbellum period. As soon as 1932, Mitrany opted that the global society should stop obsessing over national borders and integrate economic activities on an international scale, as he argued that a greater integration and interdependence would increase ties between states which could lead to peace³⁶. Caporaso³⁷ writes on two dominant usages of ‘dependence’: Dependency and

³³ Keohane & Nye, “Power and Interdependence”.

³⁴ Jackson & Sørensen, “Introduction to International Relations”, 103.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Alexandrescu, “David Mitrany: From Federalism”, 22.

³⁷ Caparoso, “Dependence, Dependency, and Power”, 18.

dependence. The former is conceptualized as the absence of autonomy, or the lack of independence from foreign influences and is particularly apparent with respect to developmental goals. The Dependency Approach as a theoretical framework is thus present in studies regarding post- and neocolonialism and studies of asymmetric North-South relations³⁸. 'Dependence' refers to an imbalance in a relationship between two actors, whereby interdependence is its antonym, not autonomy³⁹. Autonomy is thus the concept of having self-control and some matters of autarkic principles, whereas interdependence can be summarized as mutual control, a situation where exchanges and transfers of needs are roughly symmetric⁴⁰.

Keohane has been debating core principles of realism since the late 1960's, with the co-created concept of complex interdependence as a theoretical treatment to the popular realist school of the 1970's. The core argument of their work is that the paradigm of realism is limited in its ability to help us understand the dynamics of international institutions and economic collaborations between states⁴¹. The book begins with an extensive exegesis of two theoretical models to analyze international issues: Realism and their new, alternative model of 'complex interdependence'. Realism in the IR arena according to them can be summarized as a struggle or power, "dominated by organized violence"⁴², attributing three main assumptions about the theory: 1) they argue that states as "coherent unities" are the predominant actors in the international arena, 2) power display and force are an effective and applicable instrument for policy, and 3) (mostly because of the second assumption), that the most important issue in global affairs is military security⁴³. These assumptions describe an ideal type of world politics, a world in which politics can be described by a continuous threat or presence of conflict among states where each state thrives to defend their own interests from threats they perceive to be true, with the ever existing threat of the use of force⁴⁴. Cooperation and liberal theories of political integration exist only when it benefits the interest of the most powerful states, coming to an end when this alignment of

³⁸ Sekhri, "Dependency approach", 246.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid, 19.

⁴¹ Griffiths et al., "Fifty Key Thinkers", 107.

⁴² Keohane & Nye, "Power and Interdependence", 19.

⁴³ Ibid, 19-20.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

interest is absent. Non-state actors like transnational actors, non-governmental organizations, civil society groups and the individual are political unimportant.

With their Complex Interdependence theory, Keohane and Nye challenge these realist assumptions. Their new theory has three main characteristics: Firstly, they note that actors other than the state can directly participate in world politics. They use the concept of 'Multiple Channels' to argue that multiple channels connect society, channels which can be summarized by three types of relations: the *interstate*, the *transgovernmental* and the *transnational*. *Interstate* relations refers to the normal channels of communication assumed by realists, like informal ties between governmental elites, arrangements between foreign offices, and informal relationships between leaders of different states. *Transgovernmental* relations happen when we "relax"⁴⁵ the realist assumption that states act coherently as units. Other unites like local and regional governments or non-state actors can have an influence in international politics. States can have connections with non-state actors, and local- and regional governments can have with their counterparts from other countries. Transnational relations occur when we challenge the assumption that the state is the only actor in the international relations arena that matters, ignoring non-state actors like civil society groups, international organizations and the individual. Such actors have little ties to the state, but do have the ability to operate across borders and influence decisions.

They conclude their description of the characteristic of 'Multiple Channels' by arguing that the lines between domestic- and foreign policies are getting increasingly interwoven; foreign policies touch more upon domestic policy than in the past. This trend will not lessen in the upcoming years due to the rise of issues in environmental regulations and the international desire to have control over technology.

The second characteristic of Complex Interdependence contains the notion that there is not a hierarchy among issues, i.e. military security does not dominate the policy agendas of states. As the number of issues in foreign policy with which governments concern themselves increases in both diversity and complexity, merely focusing on military security is no longer an option. Policies of governments, even those who were considered to be purely domestic matters, now have consequences that effect other policy issues. The energy transition, environmental issues, increased populations, technological security issues all

⁴⁵ Ibid, 20.

rank themselves at the same level of military security, as the current state of global politics has become more interconnected.

Thirdly, they describe the minor role of military force. Military force is not used against other states in the region, particularly in industrialized, pluralist states. The intense relationships of mutual influence of these first world countries make that the fear of an attack by a neighboring state are nonexistent: Britain, France and Germany are not afraid of military actions against each other, neither do Australia and New Zealand, and Canada and the US. The realist assumption that military action is an effective measure still holds some merit, but, in most situations, the use of military force are costly and its effects uncertain⁴⁶.

As described above, complex interdependence implies a more cooperative and liberal relationship between states. This, according to Keohane and Nye, has the following consequences⁴⁷:

First, in complex interdependence, goals will vary by issue areas. With the devaluation of military force, militarily dominant states will find it difficult to assert dominance in areas in which they are weak. Besides, with more variation in the distribution of power resources in trade, like shipping lanes or oil, it is plausible to expect diverse patterns of outcomes and political processes across different issue areas. The influence of states may thus vary depending on specific issue areas. So, as the utility of the use of military force declines and other issues become equally or more important, new power dynamics arise within every issue area. Keohane and Nye expect states to rely on other instruments than force to achieve policy goals. Linking strategies of multiple issue areas will become more problematic within complex interdependence, as using force is not the remedy for all policy issues. States with less economic or military power will be able to have influence in specific areas, like for instance the influence Denmark and Norway will command in international shipping due to their large merchant fleets. This influence, however, does not translate to other issue areas⁴⁸. So, by using linkage strategies with more powerful states, middle powers can decrease their vulnerability⁴⁹.

⁴⁶ Griffin, "Globalization and the Shape of Things to Come", 80.

⁴⁷ Keohane & Nye, "Power and Interdependence", 25-31.

⁴⁸ Jackson & Sørensen, "Introduction to International Relations", 106-107.

⁴⁹ Manicom & Reeves, "Locating Middle Powers", 26.

The second expectation of complex interdependence examines how this abovementioned lack of hierarchy in issues affects the politics of agenda setting and issue formulation. In traditional models, they argue, statesmen tend to focus on military and security issues, and assume that the agenda will be automatically set by shifts in the power balance, and by threats they perceive to be there on national security. Other issues are merely important if they affect security or military power, and the formation is strongly influenced by perceived considerations of the overall balance of power dynamics in the current international arena. With complex interdependence however, agenda setting is expected to be influenced by the international and national problems which are created by economic growth and an increase in interdependence: domestic advocacy groups will put domestic issues on the interstate agenda; an effect of the characteristic of complex interdependence theory about the power of non-state actors. Additionally, the agendas will be affected by the shifts in the distribution of power resources within sets of particular issue areas, as discussed in the previous section about issue areas. Thus, the politics of agenda formation and control will become more important, due to the lack of a clear hierarchy among multiple issue areas.

Thirdly, the Keohane and Nye expect that the nearer a situation is to complex interdependence, the more the outcomes of political bargaining can be affected by transnational and transgovernmental relations, as the distinction between domestic- and international problems in complex interdependence are increasingly getting harder to distinguish. Attitudes towards policy issues and their solutions are likely affected by the relations and communications between non-governmental counterparts abroad. Such multiple channels of communication between organizations and institutions across borders make it harder for statesmen to calculate the influence of interdependence on domestic policy issues, or to be consistent in their strategies to link multiple issues. Furthermore, governmental organizations can have contact with their counterparts from other bureaucratized states, which leads to transgovernmental coalitions in certain policy arena's. To increase maximize chances of success, government agencies work together with agencies from other governments to create an alliance. Powerful states can use this strategy to penetrate the governments of weaker states, but also vice-versa, as the authors note that US-Canadian relations are often advantageous to Canadian interests.

As discussed previously, Keohane and Nye write on limitations of realist frameworks, noting that states act to their own self-interest. Within complex interdependence and the transnational and transgovernmental connections it brings, the 'self' and 'interest' are ambiguous. A governmental agency can pursue interests other than the national interest, and interactions with other governmental agencies from other states can change their definitions of their interests. A lack of clarity of national interests poses difficulties for state leaders, as communications and relations between government branches across states continuously alter perceptions of state interests and goals, centralized control and consistency in policy outputs becomes increasingly difficult. Keohane and Nye expect governments with a centralized nature to be better able to manipulate uneven interdependence than states which are less centralized, but have nonetheless more resources, power and influence in an issue area.

Lastly, the presence of multiple channels, the increased levels of transnational exchange and communication, will pose a significant role for international organizations in the international relations arena. Within realism, international organizations have a marginal role, as states are uniform safety seekers with military issues at the top of their agenda, with only a place for international organizations at the table at rare times of congruence of interests. The presence of multiple channels within complex interdependence however, make this alignment of interests between actors more prominent and recurrent, causing international institutions to play a more significant role in world politics. With complex interdependence, the bargaining role of international organizations increases; they play a crucial role by influencing the global agenda and provide a facilitating role in the formation of coalitions, create norms, rules and behavioral institutions⁵⁰. They can define which global policy issues can be grouped together, help to determine governmental priorities and bring governments in contact with each other, increasing the possibility to create alliances. Additionally, with the presence of international organizations weaker states now have a platform for political initiatives and a place to connect and engage with other (weak) states, increasing their political influence.

⁵⁰ Hurrell, "On Global Order", 68.

Chapter 2: Pragmatic Cooperation from the 17th Century to World War I (Period 1)

2.1 Historical Context and Relationship Dynamics between the Netherlands and the United States

History of US-Dutch relations is long and extensive, reaching back to the early-seventeenth century, when in 1609 the Dutch East India Ship the *Halve Maen*, commandeered by English captain Henry Hudson, spotted which had the potential for a “very good harbor protected from all winds”, located somewhere between modern-day Manhattan and Staten Island⁵¹. as the young Dutch West India Company lay official claim to a large area around Manhattan and its settlement in 1624, now named ‘New Amsterdam’. This marked the beginning of Dutch public administration practices, with the Chartered West India Company taking over the private fur trading posts.

Its directors were ambiguous: there were those who favored trade, and those who favoured colonization. The trade faction argued that Dutch influence should be limited and merely focused on acquiring as much wealth as possible, in order to save resources on defense and supply of provisions⁵². The colonizing group accentuated the positive long-term effects of continuous investments in agriculture and settlements, but also had some religious motives⁵³. By 1657 the WIC decided to pursue their long-term goals by installing the ‘burgher’ right, which referred to the legal rights and privileges granted to those who were considered burgers.

The region remained under Dutch control for forty years, until the English seized it in 1664 and renamed it New York, after its new owner and brother of King Charles II, the Duke of York. This third installment of Anglo-Dutch tensions lasted for only two years, ending in 1674, consequently ending the Dutch conquest of New Netherlands, when they accepted to hand over the region to its rightful owner, the English, in the Treaty of Westminster⁵⁴.

Dutch presence had evident impact on the region’s culture, manifested in the specific styles and furnishing of buildings, customs, stories and Dutch traditions⁵⁵. Ruby (2008)

⁵¹ Krabbendam, et al., “Four Centuries”, 17.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Frijhoff & Jacobs, “The Dutch, New Netherland”, 39.

⁵⁴ Frijhoff & Jacobs, “The Dutch, New Netherland”, 31.

⁵⁵ Ibid, 32.

argues, as the Dutch art was the first to reach and the first art to be produced in New York, that Dutch influence in art lasted well into the eighteenth century⁵⁶.

Efforts for the Christianisation of the region were grounded with a more long term approach of discourse and intercultural approaches, rather than the Spanish short-term and aggressive approach of spreading Christianity. The lack of mass killings caused by the Dutch could perhaps cause the absence of American hatred for the Dutch, marking a good beginning for US-Dutch relations.

Ties between New Netherlands and the Dutch Republic in the beginning of the eighteenth century were marginal, as the region was now under British rule. Dutch presence in the area were slim, occupying only some small islands in the Caribbean. In the wake of the Seven Year's war however, these seemingly insignificant islands became rather important for the American rebels. In order to finance the war on the continent, the British empire sought to increase taxes imposed on the colonies, increasing already present sentiments for independence from the colonies in America. Hostilities and protests among the colonies ensued, with the creation of George Washington's Continental Army and the formal start of the American revolution in 1775. Dutch merchants on the overseas Dutch Caribbean Island of St Eustatius saw opportunities, and started to trade goods with American rebels, especially focussing on the American desperation for gunpowder and ammunition. Whereas Te Brake (2009) notes this trade relation as "the first important, if informal, Dutch contribution to the American War of Independence"⁵⁷, whereas Enthoven (2012) goes further into noting that "the enduring relationship between them was instrumental to the growth of both sets of colonies and ultimately to the success of the American Revolution"⁵⁸.

Trading activities between Dutch colonies and American rebels was known by the British empire and put strain on the Dutch Republic's stance on neutrality. When in 1776, the commander of Fort Orange on St. Eustatius stopped the seizure of an American ship by the British admiral James Young, he complained that trading activities between American rebels and the inhabitants of St. Eustatius were so general and to no secret of anyone in the West Indies⁵⁹. The island of St. Eustatius and the thirteen North American colonies formed

⁵⁶ Ruby, "Dutch Art", 57.

⁵⁷ Ibid, 205.

⁵⁸ Enthoven, "That Abominable Nest of Pirates", 239.

⁵⁹ Te Brake, "The Dutch Republic and the Creation of the United States", 205.

a natural alliance in their fight against British mercantilist protectionist policies⁶⁰. Hence, it is fitting that after the American Declaration of Independence in July 1776, a significant event happened when the American brig of war *Andrew Doria* entered St. Eustatius' harbour on November 16, 1776. Johannes de Graaff, the Dutch commander of Fort Orange and the governor of the island, offered the first ceremonial salute to a ship proudly displaying the red and white striped flag of the newly established American Congress. This incident holds crucial historical significance and exemplifies the early diplomatic ties between not only St. Eustatius and the newly independent United States, but also with the Dutch republic. Additionally, when the British cited a one-hundred-year-old treaty asking for help from the Dutch in mobilizing troops for the war against the American rebellion, the States General, as an act of the policy of neutrality, refused⁶¹.

The American Revolution, marked by the drafting of the Articles of Confederation in 1777, perhaps found an unexpected source of inspiration in the Dutch struggle against the Spanish aggressor during the sixteenth century. Parallels with the situation of the American rebels could be made, and one can argue that the heroic narrative of the Dutch fight for independence served as a compelling example for those who were opposing British, as they viewed it, tyranny, in the eighteenth century. Looking at the Dutch experience showcased that the idea of a loosely confederated republic on the international stage while enjoying remarkable economic prosperity was viable⁶².

On September 1780, King George declared war against the Netherlands, capturing two hundred Dutch merchant vessels and the seizure of St. Eustatius.

John Adams energetically responded by travelling to The Hague to negotiate the treaty of amity and Commerce and also secure the first direct loan to the American Congress. This sum of five million guilders was direly needed aid for the exhausted treasury of the United States in Congress Assembled that was quite insolvent as it negotiated a Treaty with Great Britain to end the Revolutions. In response to John Adam's proposal, a group of merchants from Amsterdam, Leiden and Haarlem requested the States General in an address to decide swiftly and favourably on the proposal for extensive commercial relations with the United States.

⁶⁰ Enthoven, "That Abominable Nest of Pirates", 242.

⁶¹ Te Brake, "The Dutch Republic and the Creation of the United States", 206.

⁶² Ibid.

“Het gewigt der zaake daar inne vervat: de Considerable Handel, die uit deeze Landen op Noord-America zou kunnen geschieden, de Producten, die van daar kunnen komen, en de importantie van den Koophandel en Fabrieken, zo die betrekking hebben tot de commercie zelve”.⁶³

"The significance of the matter contained therein: the considerable trade that could occur from these lands to North America, the products that could come from there, and the importance of commerce and factories, insofar as they relate to trade itself."

This statement calls for pragmatic economic ties with the North American colonies as the merchants see considerable potential in the colonies to create factories “on the vast plains on either sides of the Mississippi”, in order to score economic gain for both parties as well as counter English mercantilist might. A year before the merchants’ statement, a similar statement was delivered to the States General about the commercial value of the United States of North America, but this time historical sentiments were used.

“De Oogen van Amerika zyn thans op ons gevestigd, misschien heeft men daar al kwalyk gevonden dat een Commercieerende Republicq en een vrygevoigten volk, (gelyk wy) niet eerder tot hun bystand is toegesprongen. So wy nu, na onse Rupertuure met Engeland, noch blyven draalen eene Connectie met haar aantegaan”.⁶⁴

"The eyes of America are now fixed upon us; perhaps they have already taken offense that a commercial republic and a freedom-fighting people like us have not yet come to their aid. If we now, after our rupture with England, still hesitate to establish a connection with them..."

Instead of merely citing opportunities for factories like the merchants, the noblemen and scholar who delivered this statement used sentiments of a shared identity and history, noting how the Dutch and the Americans are mercantilist republicans who had to fight for their

⁶³ Delpher, “A petition by merchants to the States General”, 3.

⁶⁴ Delpher, “Statement about the commercial value”, 6.

freedom. Poetry and Song in the Netherlands also shed their light on the choice for America and against the Brits: Some line from a 1782 poem:

“Haakt gij naar Vrede met den Brit, Dan stemt gij in zijn Duivelsch wit; Verdrukt Amerika! Wees blij; De Hemel keurt uw Staaten vrij! Houd uw Broeders bij de hand, En laat ons samen Zeevaart drijven; Wij in geboorte en aart gelijk, Wij zullen steeds elkaer met nut en voordeel stijven, En zorgen dat geen trouw bezwijk!”⁶⁵

"If you negotiate Peace with the Brit, Then you agree with his Devilish aim; Oppress America! Rejoice; Heaven approves your States' freedom! Hold your Brothers by the hand, And let us engage in Navigation together; We alike in birth and nature, We shall always support each other with benefit and advantage, And ensure that no loyalty falters!"

And this poem praising John Adams and his decisiveness as well as the merchants who supported the Treaty of Amity and Commerce:

“Wilt dan dees uwe trouwe Vrinden Beschermen als de Afgezant, Van het Americaansche Land. Die ‘er voor uit komt zonder vreezen, Hy eer een Americaan wou weezen, Dood arm, dan een Engelschman, Die zich in goud omwentelen kan. Geen Mensch als ik den Brit zo haaten, Uw Dienaar, Trouw aan Neerlands Staaten.”⁶⁶

"If you wish to protect these faithful friends, As the envoy of the American land, Who stands forth without fear, He would rather be an American, Dead poor, than an Englishman, Who can roll himself in gold. No man hates the Brit like I do, Your servant, loyal to the Dutch states."

The Treaty of Amity and commerce of 1782 was signed and official ties between the states were sealed. Article 1 of the treaty states that there “Shall be a firm, inviolable and universal Peace, and sincere Friendship”⁶⁷. Article 2 and 3 note that either nations between their “Ports, Havens, Roads, Countries, Islands, Cities or Places” shall not pay more duties or

⁶⁵ Delpher, “A view on the present Dutch situation, England’s impotence and America’s freedom”, 2-4.

⁶⁶ Delpher, “A humble speech of thanks to all gentlemen merchants”, 3-5.

⁶⁷ National Archive, “Final Text of the Dutch-American Treaty of Amity and Commerce”.

tariffs than the most favoured nations have to pay⁶⁸. Article 4 notes “an entire and perfect Liberty of Conscience”. In summary, good ties between the states have thus been established. This treaty marked the beginning of official ties between the Netherlands and the American colonies, and was born out of their shared hostility to the English.

Furthermore, between 1790 and 1794, the American Congress negotiated loans totalling more than twenty-three million guilders from the Netherlands.

These loans played a vital role in ensuring the financial stability of the fledgling American republic⁶⁹. Not only did the loans help the American Republic in maintaining its fiscal health, but it also facilitated substantial private Dutch investments in the American economy, encouraged by high levels of trust between Dutch bankers and the American government, as Dutch investors regarded the punctual payment of loan services and interest as the fundamental measure of credit reliability⁷⁰.

Throughout the century, relations remained largely uneventful, with no noteworthy complications or transactions. The Netherlands was looked upon as unremarkable and insignificant, while the United States directed its attention predominantly inward as a result of ever growing confidence⁷¹. To characterize the switch in power relations, the appointment a president of Dutch descent as well as the presence of many New York political elites of Dutch descent bared no sign of using elements of Dutch political culture. In the these years before the American Civil War, the US and the Netherlands went their own way, with bilateral relations taking shape again after the Civil War was over. In this so-called second industrial revolution, The US became one of the most powerful and technologically advanced nations, attracting Dutch immigrants⁷². During the 1850s, despite a period of relative economic growth in the United States, Dutch investments in the American economy remained limited. However, when the Civil War came to an end, a significant shift occurred. As the nineteenth century drew to a close, the United States captured over one-third of Amsterdam's foreign investment capital, signifying a substantial increase in Dutch financial involvement in the American market⁷³. The main portion of the Dutch investments were made in the construction of railways, leaving Dutch town names

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid, 214.

⁷⁰ Riley, “Foreign Credit and Fiscal Stability”, 661.

⁷¹ Van den Doel, “From distant Images to closer Relations”, 222.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid, 227.

along some of the railway lines as a remnant of these investments. Political reasons didn't play a big part in this, but some Dutch writers of that time argued that investing in the United States was preferably to investing in countries like Russia or Austria, as they believed investing in American railroads was a more peaceful one⁷⁴. The Dutch investors were happy to give the management of the funds to the Americans, as long as dividends and interests were paid, as they believed the Americans to be honest protestant workers.

Conclusively, during the 19th century, a distinctive bond blossomed between the United States and the Netherlands, characterized by multifaceted influences and mutual admiration. The arrival of rural Dutch emigrants, with their unique religious roots, contributed to an alternative image of the Netherlands in the American consciousness: as Americans and the Dutch interacted more economically and in tourism, Americans started seeing the Dutch in a more positive light. By the 1880s, this better view of the Dutch began to change how artists portrayed Dutch Americans. Instead of showing Dutch colonists rough drinking workers from rural Holland, artists began to paint Dutch American citizens more dignified, as if they were painted by Vermeer or Rembrandt himself⁷⁵. The Dutch now got an image of well-behaved Protestant middle class people with an admirable culture⁷⁶. This positive image got a final push due to the second Boer war of 1899, as the American sympathized with the Dutch- descent Boers as they saw parallels with their battle as immigrants against the British empire⁷⁷; weak against large, monarchy against republics⁷⁸. Edward Hodgson wrote in 1900 on the American view of the Boer war and noted that;

“Rarely, if ever, have the people of a neutral State been under such weight of obligation to give their sympathy and moral support to a belligerent nation as the people of the United States have been, during the South African War”.⁷⁹

The US remained neutral in the war however. In the beginning of the twentieth century the US had become a guiding light on the horizon the land of opportunity, even more so than the centuries before, and not only economically but also culturally and politically. A new

⁷⁴ Veenendaal, “Dutch investments”, 292.

⁷⁵ Stott, “Images of Dutchness in the US”, 242.

⁷⁶ Ibid, 243.

⁷⁷ Van den Doel, “From distant Images to closer Relations”, 235.

⁷⁸ Farwell, “Taking Sides In The Boer War”, 1.

⁷⁹ Hodgson, “An American view of the Boer War”, 272.

actor has appeared on the stage with a financial and military might, which has still needs to find its place in the world. Figure 2 shows a 1900 cartoon from the American magazine Puck provides a compelling illustration of the United States' foreign policy stance at the turn of the 20th century. In the image, America is portrayed as a policeman, while in the background a fist fight ensues between John Bull, representing Britain, and Paul Kruger, leader of the Boers. Concerned citizens are urging America to intervene, but he “won’t go off his beat”. This cartoon is particularly significant as it serves as an early representation of the United States as an emergent global power and policeman of the world, but it also highlights the isolationist sentiment of the era. With the US now being a major economic superpower, asymmetric foundations between the US and the Netherlands as a middle power had now been laid.




Figure 1

2.2 Historical Context and Relationship Dynamics between Denmark and the United States

The first documented Dane in North America were Jan Jansen and his wife Engeltje who arrived in New Amsterdam in 1636. This family bared Dutch names, because Dutch colonists were invited to Denmark by King Christian in the early 17th century for their skills in constructing dikes, drainage systems and shipbuilding expertise . Large scale Danish presence in the Americas accelerated when the Danish West Indies Company settled on Islands in the Caribbean in the 1660's. As the only of the Nordic countries, Denmark had

the ambition to become a maritime power which extended to the tropics . With settlements on the Gold Coast and in India, Denmark acquired the Islands of Sankt Thomas (in 1666), Sankt Jan (1717) and Sankt Croix (1733), which are the Islands of St. Thomas, St. Croix and St. John in the American Virgin Islands. They were able to do this as the already present and much more powerful states of France, England, Spain and the Netherlands were in too much competition to bother with expelling the Danes . The Spanish, still calling upon the Treaty of Tordesillas, looked as these Danish settlements as trespassers as they had claimed the entire region, but their 15th century treaty with Portugal had already been ‘broken’ when the English and Dutch settled in the region in the very early 1600’s. These overseas territories began to establish trade with New England but was also a steppingstone for immigrants to the North American continent, where the New Netherlands housed some early Danish settlers. In 1755, the islands came under direct rule of the Danish Crown, instead of through the offices of the Danish West India Company, and were thus treated as overseas colonies.

US-Danish relations do not date back as far as the Dutch-US relations do. First official contact came as ‘Late’ as 1741, when an American ship passed the Sound strait on its way to the Baltic . It's likely that this ship was among the earliest from North America to travel into the Baltic Sea. Danish ship records from the period show that before the American Revolution, a total of fifteen ships hailing from the British North American colonies would cross the Sound, indicating their presence in the region. In 1776, some one thousand Danish settlers participated in the American Revolutionary War, fighting with Faaborg-born Hans Febiger, trusted advisor to George Washington . In 1780, the Danes, together with Sweden, Austria and Prussia joined the League of Armed Neutrality of Catherine the Great to protect (neutral) European commercial shipping during the American Revolutionary War, which Great Britain had threatened in the years before: by 1778, 59 ships were captured, of which were 8 Danish and 35 Dutch.

The Danes were, just like the Dutch, quick to recognize the United States as a sovereign nation, when on June 9, 1792, sixteen years after the Dutch’ ‘first salute’ at St. Eustatius and ten years after the official acknowledgement, the Danish government granted approval to Hans Saabye, the U.S. consul in Copenhagen, thus establishing consular relations. But as early 1783, The Danes had a desire to sign a treaty of commerce just like

the French and the Dutch had recently done, as Danish minister of foreign affairs notes on February 22 1783 that:

“to form as soon as possible reciprocal connexions of friendship and commerce of foreign affairs (...) the shortest way of accelerating these new connexions would be to take the treaty between the Congress and the States General for the basis”.⁸⁰

Benjamin Franklin responded by sending a concept treaty of “formed on the basis of our treaty with Holland”.⁸¹

So just like the Netherlands, a pragmatic bilateral relationship was official, born out of mutual (economic) benefit. Further Diplomatic relations were established in 1801, when the Danish Minister officially presented his credentials to the United States government. On September 20, 1827, the U.S. Legation in Copenhagen was opened as Chargé d’Affaires Henry Wheaton officially presented his credentials to the Danish government, marking the beginning of formal diplomatic representation between the two nations .The earlier decades of the eighteenth century saw the first major spikes in immigration of Danes to the US. Every year from 1820 to 1850, about 60 Danes settled in the US. The greatest surge of Danish immigration however, was caused by missionaries from the US who told stories of a new faith from America . In the following years, thousands of Danes converted to Mormonism and settled primarily in Wisconsin, Illinois and Iowa .

⁸⁰ Burnett, “Notes on American Negotiations”, 582.

⁸¹ Ibid.

Chapter 3: Unilateral Relationships from World War I to the Trump Era (Period 2)

3.1 Historical context and relationship dynamics between the Netherlands and the United States

Prior to World War 1, relations between the US and the Netherlands were untroubled. Dutch settlers had earned respect and the public perception of the Dutch was positive and their contribution to American society acknowledged⁸². Between 1901 and 1910 forty-thousand Dutch people set sail to a better life in America. In Dutch eyes, the US manifested itself from an impressive, potential superpower that was nevertheless quite unimportant for the Netherlands to gaining full recognition as the major powerhouse of the twentieth century⁸³.

Diplomatic and strategic relations between the US and the Netherlands in the years prior to WWI was limited, but the nations did have a shared vision of peace and neutrality. After the outbreak of the Great War both countries remained neutral, but the situations for both states were not the same. The US maintained neutrality out of a position of strength: its economy could function even though international trade was restricted, an economic characteristic which the Netherlands could not share, as it was highly dependent on international trade. America also had the advantage of pursuing geographical isolationism, whereas the Netherlands was in the thick of the War, struggling to support the million Belgian refugees who sought refuge in the its northern neighbour. The countries would also cooperate in the Commission for Relief in Belgium (CRB), a humanitarian effort to aid civilians in German-occupied Belgium who were suffering from food shortages and dire conditions. US-Dutch relations took a blow however when Woodrow Wilson decided to enter the War. The assumption of the Dutch that Wilson would remain to have sympathy for the neutral countries were proved false as he and his administration believed that the best protection for neutrals would be a complete victory for the entente ⁸⁴. As Van Tuyl argues, was not an completely false assumption as in the event of a German victory it would have entirely surrounded and dominated its smaller neighbour⁸⁵.

Furthermore, the had carefully build and international trade regulation system that pleased both sides of the war. After America entered the war, this vital economic instrument fell apart. Additionally, the Netherlands had to take on more duties for the Commission for

⁸² Bosscher, "Toward a community", 401.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Van Tuyl, "Dutch-American Relations", 423.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

Relief in Belgium because the American convoy there couldn't stay in German occupied Belgium anymore. By August 1917, the Netherlands was practically under blockade, with communications to the Dutch East Indies cut and the entente demanding the use of Dutch merchant vessels, with the height of this askewed relationship coming in in march of 1918, when Britain and the US claimed a third of the Dutch merchant fleet which were in their ports at the time. The Dutch government felt they had no choice but to concede⁸⁶. As the entente nations claimed to be protectors of neutral nations and international law, they justified these actions by an obsolete legal concept of “the right of angary”, meaning that a nation can claim foreign vessels in their port to serve a public good like transporting supplies⁸⁷. These actions were to be considered hypocritical, as Wilson stages himself as an protector of international law, and a violation of the traditional friendship between the Dutch and the US, leaving the Dutch to feel “humiliated and maltreated”⁸⁸. At this time in the war, Germany demanded passage of sand and gravel through Dutch railways in Limburg. Formally accepting would further worsen their ties to Britain and the US, but declining could trigger an invasion of the Netherlands. The Entente, understood this situation, and accepted that the Netherlands had no choice but to turn a blind eye to the German demands, as they were aware that the Netherlands could not be defended with allied support, as they were needed on the western front. This moment of understanding by the US and Britain was met with great gratitude by the Dutch. After the armistice, US-Dutch relations were mentioned again, after the Dutch were opposed to negotiations regarding the extradition of the German Kaiser, who fled to the Netherlands after their defeat.

The war did create some frictions between the Dutch and the Us, but it ultimately did not impact their longstanding relationship. Wilson’s ambition of a strong League of Nations resonated with the trade-depended Dutch. The Us’ role in the creation of the League of Nations and the International Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy symbolized that American international policy now had some sense of responsibility in assuring world peace, an awakening that they too were a global superpower⁸⁹.

⁸⁶ Ibid, 425.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid, 426.

⁸⁹ Riemens, “The Netherlands, the United States”, 538.

In the interwar period, the Dutch put effort into making Holland a household name, but these efforts had little effect. In 1921 the Netherland – America Foundation (NAF), with Roosevelt being its vice president until he won the election in 1932. The NAF’s objective was to advance educational, literary, artistic, scientific, historical and cultural relationships between the countries⁹⁰. This endeavour was needed according to Dutch diplomat de Graeff as “The lack of knowledge about the Netherlands in the United states borders the unbelievable”⁹¹. The person most successful in promoting the Netherlands in the New World was Rotterdam-born Hendrik Willem van Loon, who became popular in the US as a historian, journalist and radio host. He wanted to promote (Dutch) history, culture and art to the common people and tie the US and the Netherlands closer together. After he passed in 1944, Roosevelt called him a “trusted friend”, and the *London times* wrote that he was one of the best products of the friendship between the US and the Netherlands⁹². Van Loon himself put it as: “I put Holland on the map, and that’s the simple truth”⁹³.

In the early years of World War II, the Dutch Royal family, a part of Queen Wilhelmina who fled to London, enjoyed close ties to the Roosevelt⁹⁴. In 1942, Wilhelmina became the first Dutch monarch to officially visit the White House, where she delivered a speech to congress which made a meaningful impression. She called upon the shared history between the two nations, noting that “it gives me pleasure to recall that the first salute given to the American flag on behalf of a foreign government was rendered by guns of my country”⁹⁵ and that Benjamin Franklin once wrote to John Adams, who was part of the first envoy at the Hague, that he believed that “neither Holland nor we could be prevailed on to abandon our friends”⁹⁶.

As the Americans played a substantial part in liberating the Netherlands, they still occupy a prominent place in the collective memory of the Dutch, and, vice, versa, the Americans had a good opinion on the Dutch as they were impressed by the English speaking skills of the Dutch and the enthusiastic and grateful reception they received⁹⁷.

⁹⁰ Van Minnen, “Promotion of Dutch Culture”, 436.

⁹¹ Ibid, 437.

⁹² Ibid, 438.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Kersten, “Dutch-American Relations”, 554.

⁹⁵ Queen Wilhelmina, “The Queen Looks at the Future”.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Klinkert, “Crossing Borders”, 574.

Yet when it became evident that the Allies were going to win the war, the Netherlands got acquainted with the New World order, as the Netherlands hardly carried any weight as colonial powers, as the US ultimately called the shots, which became even more clear when the US and Britain allocated the Dutch Indies to the South East Asia Command (SEAC) in July 1945. The Dutch experienced a harsh introduction into the new world of international politics, but it also presented the opportunity for the Dutch to become frontrunners of as guardians of democracy and humanitarian rights⁹⁸, a shared goal of both Roosevelt and Queen Wilhelmina, marking the start of a friendship based on not per se commercial or political goals, but also on being guiding countries on areas like human rights and a liberal, open world.

The end of the second world war marked the end of the long-standing neutrality (since 1839⁹⁹) of the Netherlands to the commitment to join the Western sphere of influence¹⁰⁰. For the US, the Dutch proved once again to be an ideal ally: The Dutch political culture was predominantly anti-communist¹⁰¹ (the Netherlands was one of the last countries to recognize the Soviet Union, finally doing so in 1942) and dominated by Christian- and Social democratic parties, and it was also positive toward an international system of free trade led by the US¹⁰². The Dutch had a long tradition of democratic principles, free trade and intellectual exchange, making them ideologically close to the US. The pragmatic and ideological stance of the Dutch to fight communism across society proved valuable for many American institutions which sought trustworthy allies in mainland Europe in fighting communism¹⁰³. However, the postwar period was above all characterized by asymmetric relations. The US was way more important to the Netherlands than the other way around. With the formation of the United Nations the Dutch felt that small states like the Netherlands would be a step towards a policy of universal co-operation. Without the United Nations, international anarchy would again be present, which for the security and peace for smaller nations has serious consequences¹⁰⁴. The new economic reality for the Dutch became once more evident with the Marshall plan, marking which state sustains which. This

⁹⁸ Kersten, "Dutch-American Relations", 563.

⁹⁹ Scott-Smith, "Testing the limits", 172.

¹⁰⁰ Scott-Smith, "The Ties that Bind", 290.

¹⁰¹ Scott-Smith, "Testing the limits", 173.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Koedijk, "The Netherlands, the United States, and anticommunism", 607.

¹⁰⁴ Van Campen, "The quest for security", 22.

Marshall plan combined various American financial economic European aid programmes and was meant to replace the UNRRA aid programme (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency) that had been set up just after the end of WWII by the UN. Until that moment the US accounted for more than 70% of UNRRA's budget¹⁰⁵. However, the US government was far from pleased with the course of events regarding the UN Aid and they wanted an aid programme that was far better geared to serve American national interests. The Undersecretary of State, W. Clayton stated in 1947 that¹⁰⁶:

“Canada, Argentina, Brazil, Australia, New Zealand, Union of South Africa could all help with their surplus food and raw materials, but we must avoid getting into another UNRRA. The United States must run this show.”

America now put a bid on for being a world superpower in a world where a power vacuum was the consequence of the War. The announcement of the Marshall plan and the communist response of the Kominform in 1947 marked, for Dutch opinion leaders, the definitive beginning of a divided Europe, one in which one needs to pick a side¹⁰⁷.

When the Netherlands ‘lost’ Indonesia in 1949, not in the least because the State Department put pressure on the Dutch government to allow Indonesia independence¹⁰⁸. The Netherlands had lost their ‘world role’, leaving them no choice that to side with the new superpower that is the US, and joining the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and NATO. Prior to Indonesian independence, all military interest of the Dutch was focussed on the West-Indies matter, but after 1949 the Dutch defence policy would be focused on Atlantic preference¹⁰⁹, as within the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 the Netherlands would again be seen as a faithful ally to the US, setting the stage for future collaboration in military affairs. The creation and presence of the Dutch as a founding member of NATO was backed by all major political parties, as a logical imperative to align the US’ and European security framework¹¹⁰. Additionally, the Dutch stance towards an European Defence Community

¹⁰⁵ The Memory, “Atlantic World”, 1.

¹⁰⁶ Clayton, “The European Crisis”, 1.

¹⁰⁷ Koedijk, “The Netherlands, The United States, and anticommunism”, 599.

¹⁰⁸ Jones, “After Hiroshima “, 46.

¹⁰⁹ Megens, “Bilateral Defense”, 621.

¹¹⁰ Scott-Smith, “Testing the limits”, 173.

(EDC) serves as another example of Dutch Atlanticist preferences¹¹¹, with Gaullist politicians even criticizing that the Dutch are “plus atlantique que les Américains”¹¹². At the Washington talks, negotiating the Atlantic Treaty, the Dutch and the Americans had a similarity of attitude, with the Dutch winning over American sentiments by expressing strong views about the hazards of communism, even though their biggest concern was neighbouring Germany¹¹³, but adhering to NATO and Atlantic loyalty was “logical and inevitable”¹¹⁴, bearing in mind the Dutch military weakness compared to that of the Soviet threat. The North Atlantic Treaty marked the beginning of a new reality for the Netherlands, as they saw that it would be in their best interests to participate in the international arena. In line with tradition, the Dutch looked more West than East, looking at Britain and the US for alliance, completely in line with their Atlantic traditions to serve as counterweight of French and German influence and the relatively newer Soviet Union threat¹¹⁵. The period between the end of WW2 and the start of the 1950’s is characterized by Dutch ambitious but dejected territorial claims in Indonesia and Germany, but ultimately by the recognition that it is in their best interest to appear cooperative in US-led sentiments of anti-colonialism and Atlantic practises. As the Foreign Ministry Yearbook for 1949-50 stated¹¹⁶:

“The past year, as far as Europe is concerned, was characterised by the growing conviction on every hand that close co-operation among the Western democracies is in the best means of maintaining the peace ... Netherlands interests in the maintenance of peace are best promoted by the establishment of an effective military and economic co-operation with the countries of Europe”.

The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 served to reaffirm prevailing relationship between the US and the Dutch became clear again. The Americans called to their European allies for substantial defence expenditures. In contemporary Dutch tradition, they were one of the only western European countries to recognize the People’s Republic of China, and thus preferred peace talks¹¹⁷. The Americans pressured the Dutch however and thus the latter agreed to a UN resolution that marked China as the aggressor of the war. Figure 5 from *De*

¹¹¹ Van der Harst, “Dutch and U.S. assessments”, 642.

¹¹² Ibid, 650.

¹¹³ Malinson, “Dutch foreign policy”, 105.

¹¹⁴ Hellema, “Backing Britain”, 38.

¹¹⁵ Malinson, “Dutch foreign policy”, 108.

¹¹⁶ Mallinson, “Dutch foreign Policy”, 28.

¹¹⁷ Megens, “Bilateral Defense”, 625.

Parool ("Vreemde" troepen in N.Korea - De aap komt uit de Mao) depicts a Mao dropping foreign soldiers in North Korea, showing his true intentions of spreading communism in eastern Asia.



Figure 5

The Dutch also sent one naval ship and a detachment of volunteers to aid the US, as they were fearful for the future of Indonesia. The Dutch Foreign minister was concerned that were the US to ‘permit’ Korea to fall to the communists, the consequences for the rest of Asia would be disastrous, and the western world “could be written off forever”¹¹⁸.

The Suez crisis of 1956 would turn out to be a rare example of the Dutch not following the stance of the US in international politics. However not actively involved, the Netherlands were not the ‘faithful ally’ of the US this time, but of Great Britain and France who sided with Israel to invade Egypt to secure the Suez Canal¹¹⁹, without consulting Eisenhower prior. The Dutch rationale was that the nationalization of the Suez was a matter of disobedience of the law by a third world country, and that the US were too complacent¹²⁰,

¹¹⁸ Mercer, “Emotions and Strategy”, 237.

¹¹⁹ Hellema, “Backing Britain”, 38.

¹²⁰ Megens, “Bilateral Defense”, 627.

and weakening the unity of the alliance¹²¹. Plus, the Dutch still had some frustration regarding post-colonialism. Relations between France, Britain and the Netherlands and the US showed some cracks because of the Suez Crisis, with the Dutch regaining US' trust when the Dutch let New Guinea, still under Dutch control, be transferred to Indonesia in 1963, again under US pressure¹²². The Dutch' recalcitrant behaviour regarding Suez turned out to be an exception however, exemplified by the fact that in the same month of the squabble about the Suez, the Dutch accepted the stationing of American nuclear weapons on Dutch ground to bolster NATO's defence arsenal¹²³. Furthermore, the 60's were to be named the prime time of Atlanticism for Dutch – US relations in foreign policy¹²⁴ or the “heyday of Atlanticism”¹²⁵. The 60's saw differences of opinion within NATO and the EEC, but the Dutch were always endorsing Atlanticism and American leadership¹²⁶.

The beginning of the 60's asked for the Dutch to formulate a nuclear strategy. The Major European states had some doubts if the US would use its extensive nuclear arsenal to be used to defend Europe, but these doubts were not present in the Dutch government, as Minister of Defence Visser in 1963 stated that “(they) had complete confidence that the American nuclear power was meant to defend territory of the treaty area”¹²⁷. Hereby the Dutch recognized American leadership and underline their Atlanticist tendencies, recognized by the US embassy who in 1968, lest we forget, reminded us that the relationship between the nations was “special”¹²⁸.

On the surface, the Vietnam war looks to be a period of indiscretions between the US and the Dutch government, as Amsterdam was the stage of huge anti-war protests, and opinion makers were critical, based on contemporary Dutch tradition of humanitarianism¹²⁹. This war however made apparent that in pressing times, the US expected full support from their ally, as became clear when in 1970 the Dutch government was the only NATO member who expressed understanding for Nixon's choice to bomb Cambodia to destroy North-Vietnamese bases¹³⁰. Dutch foreign minister Schmelzer acknowledged the gap between

¹²¹ Scott-Smith, “Testing the limits”, 173.

¹²² Hellema, “Backing Britain”, 40.

¹²³ Scott-Smith, “Testing the limits”, 174.

¹²⁴ Megens, “Bilateral Defense”, 628.

¹²⁵ Hellema, “The Politics of Asymmetry”, 588.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Megens, “Bilateral Defense”, 627.

¹²⁸ State of US, “Annual policy Assessment”.

¹²⁹ Righolt, “Dutch-American Relations during the Second Cold war”, 706.

¹³⁰ Van Der Maar, “Dutch-American Relations and the Vietnam War”, 688.

government policy and public opinion¹³¹ but also noted that the average citizen is not aware of the unequal relationship between the two governments, and that “Mainly intellectuals and young people are very committed. But they are not aware of what goes on in secret diplomacy”¹³². Additionally, the Dutch government aligned with American positions in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well¹³³. The 60’s thus marked a relatively ‘easy’ time for the Dutch, being rather protected by American military power. It was sheltered from major world conflicts, with the minimal likelihood that the Dutch military power would be tested. The policy of neutrality from the prewar period hence persisted in certain respects, albeit in a significantly altered context¹³⁴. In 1973, the Dutch appointed their most leftwing government yet with the Den Uyl cabinet, which was formed in times of protests and discontent among the Dutch public about the American aggression in Vietnam. But even though Kissinger looked at the new Dutch cabinet with distrust, the cabinet turned out to be more loyal to the US than expected¹³⁵. For example, the Dutch rejected British and French ideas of a more independent Middle Eastern and energy policy to instead follow a liberal Atlantic course, much to the appreciation of Kissinger¹³⁶. Kissinger is however responsible for the immortal term of ‘Dutch cabaret’¹³⁷, who disliked the Dutch hammering on about human rights¹³⁸ and the liberalization and democratization of the Soviet system¹³⁹, as he was opposed to including human rights in international diplomatic talks and the presence of smaller states with veto within the CSCE talks¹⁴⁰. He did not like *Kleinstaterei*. Interestingly, one moment of non-Atlantic negligence in the 70’s did cause annoyance in the US¹⁴¹, namely the financial aid given by Pronk, minister of development and cooperation, to Cuba and Vietnam, which according to the Americans were part of the communist bloc and thus deserved an embargo, not aid. This aid ended immediately after Pronk’s resignation in 1977, restoring this discrepancy between the two states.

¹³¹ Hellema, “The Politics of Asymmetry”, 589.

¹³² Het Vrije Volk, “Een gesprek met Schmelzer”.

¹³³ Hellema, “The Politics of Asymmetry”, 588.

¹³⁴ *Ibid*, 589.

¹³⁵ *Ibid*.

¹³⁶ *Ibid*, 590.

¹³⁷ Baudet, *The Netherlands, The United States and the Helsinki process*”, 695.

¹³⁸ Hellema, “The Politics of Asymmetry”, 591.

¹³⁹ Hellema, “The Politics of Asymmetry”, 590.

¹⁴⁰ Baudet, *The Netherlands, The United States and the Helsinki process*”, 690.

¹⁴¹ Hellema, “The Politics of Asymmetry”, 591.

The end of the cold war marked the continuity of Dutch Atlanticism, as Dutch foreign minister Van den Broek advocating Dutch military contribution to the US-led first Gulf War in 1991, and his preference to maintain American military presence in Western Europe, as he argued that American isolationism in the earlier decades of the twentieth century led to “a dangerous chain of events”¹⁴².

The biggest tests of Dutch Atlanticism occurred after 2000, with Iraq, Afghanistan and the Joint Strike Fighter illustrating the consequences of Dutch loyalty. To begin with, the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan caused friction because the Dutch had doubts on the justifiability of the wars¹⁴³. The Dutch considered itself as a pioneer and front bearer of human rights and international law, two frequent pillars in Dutch foreign policy. Before the Iraq War, Balkenende announced that the Dutch would only support political support, as there was significant public opposition for the war¹⁴⁴. After the Cold War, Dutch defence became almost entirely focussed on peacekeeping operations, as the Dutch considered the positive aspects which inherently came with peacekeeping missions, like human rights, democracy and international prestige¹⁴⁵. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, Dutch troops participated in stabilization forces, both only being deployed after the Americans had already achieved regime changes in Kabul and Baghdad¹⁴⁶. However public opinion still opposed interventions in the middle east. Worries about human rights and peacekeeping violations surfed in the media and newspapers. Major publications contain *NRC handelsblad*'s critical examination in June 2004 of the Dutch' incentives to joining the war, expressing scepticism over Iraqi possession of WMD's¹⁴⁷, and *de Volkskrant*'s piece in 2006 about alleged Dutch soldiers torturing Iraqi prisoners¹⁴⁸. The American view on the war was more absolute and aggressive than the Dutch. The Americans felt that they truly were 'at war' with terrorism, while the Dutch angle had been gentler, based on international duty and peacekeeping. The Dutch began to wonder what the big picture was. Was it even possible to revolutionize these middle eastern nations by building new democracies? The Taliban and Iraqi forces were defeated rather quickly, but the US and its allies found out

¹⁴² Ibid, 592.

¹⁴³ Klep, “Peacekeeping and the War”, 729.

¹⁴⁴ Scott-Smith, “Testing the limits”, 175.

¹⁴⁵ Klep, “Peacekeeping and the War”, 728.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid, 730.

¹⁴⁷ Scott-Smith, “Testing the limits”, 176.

¹⁴⁸ Klep, “Peacekeeping and the War”, 730.

that it was rather difficult to rebuild states that were essentially broken to the western ideal¹⁴⁹. With the commencement of the unilateral system after the Cold War, the US sought to avoid the perception of fighting wars unilaterally, so it consistently formed ‘coalitions of the willing’ due to the cumbersome process of obtaining clear mandates via the UN Security Council¹⁵⁰. Some irritations arose as the Americans kept asking for more military support in the Middle East, expecting to get what they wanted, but the Dutch were increasingly unsure of the big picture of Western involvement in the Middle East. The Dutch had an increasing desire to act independently and not to be seen as America’s lapdog¹⁵¹. The Dutch government kept insisting to the public that they were not part of an American-led occupation force, but that their role was to provide security and stability for the locals to rebuild their countries. The association with counterterrorism had been formulated and framed by the Dutch government to be subordinated to the broader, more humanitarian cause of reconstruction and development¹⁵². Patience, humanitarianism and supporting role was dubbed as ‘the Dutch way’, and was in stark contrast to the American way, which was characterized by violence, short term planning and the protection of their own soldiers rather than that of the locals¹⁵³.

In contrary, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) saga gives a strong indication of the Atlanticist tendencies that still occupy the Dutch political and military domain. In 2002, with an investment of \$800, million the Dutch government joined the development programme of the JSF, the supposed successor if the F-16 fighter jet. A mere year later however, there were already doubts of whether the final version would meet its requirements. The Dutch however were the only major investor to not show any uncertainty or hesitation. Other options like the Eurofighter or Rafale were not even considered as the Dutch military were completely committed to their Atlanticist perspective¹⁵⁴.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid*, 732.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid*, 733.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid*, 734.

¹⁵² Scott-Smith, “Testing the limits”, 180.

¹⁵³ Klep, “Peacekeeping and the War”, 734.

¹⁵⁴ Scott-Smith, “Testing the limits”, 181.

3.2 Historical context and relationship dynamics between Denmark and the United States

On a national level, the first substantial cooperative transaction was when the United States bought the Danish West Indies. After several failed rounds, a new round of negotiation rounds was requested in 1915 by the Hamburg-America line to new dock facilities on the port of Charlotte Amalie on ST. Thomas. More important however was the fear of the US that a possible German invasion of Denmark in WW1 would cause German control over the Islands, giving them a foothold in the Western Hemisphere: President Wilson regarded the German submarine campaigns in the Caribbean as a threat to the upholding of the Monroe Doctrine, and thus hastened to start a new round of negotiations for the purchase¹⁵⁵. Figure 3 from 1940 Depicts how a large ‘Uncle Sam’ protects the oversees ‘ducklings’ from France, Holland and Denmark, the old three faithful from the Commerce treaties of the 1780’s, from hunters Hitler and Mussolini, reaffirming the new geopolitical position of the US.



Figure 2

¹⁵⁵ Brady, "Purchase of the Danish", 12.

A Danish referendum showed that the Danes were heavily in favor of selling the islands, which was achieved by the incentive that the Americans would promise to back Danish claim to sovereignty over Greenland, which had been disputed by Norway¹⁵⁶. In March 1917, just days before the US declared war with Germany, officially took over the Caribbean islands, marking an end to 260 years of Danish colonial rule. Figure 4 shows a cartoon published in the Danish magazine *Klods-Hans*, depicting Woodrow Wilson adopting the three islands with Denmark in the background saddened. This is illustrative for the new dynamics between the two nations, as a suited-up rich America now has the ability to purchase islands from an ally in order to keep in line the philosophy of the Monroe Doctrine.




Figure 3

Denmark wanted to remain neutral in WWII as well, but Germany invaded and occupied their northern neighbors in 1940, cutting of Danish connection with Greenland.

¹⁵⁶ Berdichevsky, "An Introduction to Danish Culture", 40.

The US always had an eye on Greenland, informing the Danes in 1920 that it would recognize the right of a third country to acquire Greenland should Denmark wish to dispose it¹⁵⁷. After Greenlandic authorities requested American protection in May 1940, the US answered, opening a consulate in Godthab (Nuuk). With Germany extending the warzone to the east-coast of Greenland, Roosevelt allocated funds, with the permission of Danish representatives in Washington, for the realization of military bases in Greenland¹⁵⁸. By the end of the war, the US had established thirteen Army bases and four Navy bases. After the War, American activities on the Danish island did not stop: For the years after the War, the US needed to link North America to Europe¹⁵⁹. Greenland was geographically interesting and was an ideal point for naval-, air- and weather bases. In post war Denmark however communist sympathy was high and communist political parties were popular. In 1947 the Secretary of State send to the Embassy in Denmark the following telegram regarding the potential approval of communist resolutions:

“...public and official opinion in US would be profoundly shocked by passage Communist resolution and should Dan Govt acquiesce in passage we could not avoid conclusion such action carried implied charge US had in some way failed to live up to its international obligation or obligations to Den (...) such a step could only be regarded by US as matter of utmost gravity; it would inescapably carry with it conclusion on part US that Den had deliberately chosen associate itself with world forces presently striving in every way embarrass US in its efforts uphold UN and promote peace and security for all nations”.¹⁶⁰

For the US, it was vital that Denmark would not become sympathetic to communist ideals, not in the last place for the strategic importance of Greenland. Local Greenlandic political parties see the American presence as a threat to the right to control their own land, but the American diplomatic and political power proves to be too strong, and presence will remain, not in the last place because of good military relations between Copenhagen and Washington. As in 1947, the Secretary of State vowed in a telegram to the embassy in

¹⁵⁷ Archer, “The United States Defence Areas in Greenland”, 123.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid*, 124.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid*, 127.

¹⁶⁰ The Secretary of State, “Telegram to the Embassy in Denmark”, 660.

Denmark that “US will continue recognize unqualified Dan sovereignty throughout Green and respect all Dan interests there”¹⁶¹. In 1972, Greenlanders voted to manage their own internal affairs, but foreign affairs and defense remained under control of the Danish government¹⁶².

The end of the Cold War marked a new beginning for Denmark’s position in geopolitics. During the final decades of the Cold War, Danish foreign policy was commonly viewed as reactive and pragmatic. However, the end of the Cold War presented the opportunity for a new approach¹⁶³. This new approach would be in line with that of the traditional middle power: focusing on building and maintaining international institutional framework and securing peace in Europe, with the US, through NATO as the ultimate peacekeeper¹⁶⁴.

Exemplarity was the Danish reply of sending a hospital ship to Korea in 1952 instead of military assistance that the US asked for, when Denmark did provide military assistance in the Gulf War. Furthermore, Denmark's involvement in the Balkan exemplified the country's new willingness to actively engage in challenging peacekeeping missions. Instead, NATO emerged as a crucial international institution, with American leadership being perceived as pivotal for promoting peace and security in Europe. When the US called upon NATO’s article 5 in the days after 9/11, the Danish government was eager to join the US, expecting the military response to be organized by NATO, but the US wanted a more unilateral approach¹⁶⁵. In the beginning of the twenty first century, the Danes, when given the choice to choose between Europe, the UN and the US, would often lean towards the US, leading analysts to dub Danish foreign politics as ‘super Atlanticist’¹⁶⁶. By contributing troops to the American-led operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, Danish soldiers became more directly involved in active warfare than before. Previous military operations were characterized by addressing humanitarian violations, such as in the Balkan. The Danish policy post-WWII was already aligned with that of the US, but President Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s decision to join the US in the Middle East cemented their position as faithful

¹⁶¹ The Acting Secretary of State”, Telegram to the Embassy in Denmark, 596.

¹⁶² Berdichevsky, “An Introduction to Danish Culture”, 28.

¹⁶³ Larsen, “Denmark’s Fight Against Irrelevance”, 61.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid*, 62.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid*.

¹⁶⁶ Mouritzen, “Denmark’s Super Atlanticism”, 155.

Atlanticist ally of the US¹⁶⁷, especially when joining the US into Iraq, as the invasion of Afghanistan is considered to be less-controversial¹⁶⁸. In a 2005 interview between president Bush and the Danish Broadcasting Corporation, Bush's answers on Danish questions regarding America's "either you're with us or against us" attitude towards the Iraq- and Afghan war which has created a "more violent and dangerous world" as an "arrogant superpower"¹⁶⁹ show the sentiment of the US and the Bush administration as regarding themselves as the sole superpower in the world:

"I did go to the United Nations, not only for Afghanistan, but for Iraq. And we did work with allies and we did ask people's opinion. And we put a coalition together, of which your great country joined (...) I understand we have an obligation as an influential nation to reach out to others. And I believe I've done so as the President. And we also have an obligation as an influential nation to help others. "

Here, President George W. Bush highlighted the US's multilateral efforts in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, implicitly revealing efforts of legitimization by going to the United Nations for discourse, thus creating room for allied nations like Denmark to join, while also underscoring that the US, as the sole superpower at the time, was uniquely capable of forming such a coalition. This policeman-of-the-world like attitude, where the US sees itself as the bringer of freedom is transferred to its allies. Assistant Secretary Fried's interview on the U.S.- Danish Relationship with TV2 on June 7 2006 showed how the US sees its function and position in the world:

"What they have to talk about is not a troubled bilateral relationship, because we have a wonderful bilateral relationship. But what they have to talk about is the world outside. Really, U.S.-Danish relations – as frankly, U.S.-European relations – are not really about themselves. They're not about the relationship, they're about what we do with this relationship in the world where our efforts are needed. What we do to extend freedom or greater security or help people in need, as in Darfur; help extend the wealth and prosperity we have known since 1945, or have built since 1945, together in parts of the world where

¹⁶⁷ Wivel, "Constellation Theory", 16.

¹⁶⁸ Mouritzen, "Denmark's Super Atlanticism", 157.

¹⁶⁹ Danish Broadcasting Corporation, "Interview of the President".

this is needed. So the U.S.-Danish relationship, like the U.S.-European relationship, is an outward-looking relationship.”

Between 2004 and 2005, following the Atlantist discussions regarding the fiasco Iraq turned out to be, Denmark kept making efforts to revitalize Atlantic relations, particularly within NATO and the EU-US framework¹⁷⁰.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid*, 158.

Chapter 4: Bilateral Agreements and Global Interdependence in the Post-Trump Era (Period 3)

4.1 Increasingly inward-looking stance of the US and its consequences for traditional middle powers.

With the geographical safety of being surrounded by two oceans and weaker neighbours, the US could expand westward, avoiding affairs in Europe and calmly became one of the largest economies in the world in the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. Their intervention in WWI tipped the balance of power definitely¹⁷¹. In the 1930's the US became isolationist, but WWII showed that they cannot afford to turn inwards again, so they created a new liberal international order, also sometimes subbed as the 'American Order', focusing on alliances, multilateral institutions and open economies¹⁷². This system defined America's position in the world and their Superpower status for decades to come. Tony Smith describes this American world order during the Cold War as 'hegemonic liberalism'¹⁷³.

The end of the Cold War sparked a moment in which the US had the opportunity to alter their foreign policy orientations. The liberal and conservative internationalist orientations became less defined and there was political optimism that democratic liberalism would spread over the world¹⁷⁴. Fukuyama used the phrases "the end of history" and "peace was at hand"¹⁷⁵. The War on Terror quickly put an end to this optimism., as the US shifts from a hegemonic liberal ideology to an imperialist ideology, as Smiths notes that American liberal internationalism became a danger to the core values it committed to uphold¹⁷⁶. Neo-conservative theorist Kagan notes that the American Liberal order is not imposed by superior virtue, but generally imposed by superior power¹⁷⁷. As Toft highlighted, the US was involved in 46 military interventions from 1948 to 1991, which rose to 188 between 1992 and 2017¹⁷⁸. The US' invasion of Iraq was at the beginning grounded on a realist fear that Hussein developed weapons of mass destruction and a realist desire to increase American influence in the middle east, but as the war bogged down and

¹⁷¹ Nye, "The rise and fall", 63.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Smith, "Why Wilson Matters", 232.

¹⁷⁴ Scott, "The Politics of United States Foreign Policy", 454.

¹⁷⁵ Fukuyama, "The End of History", 4 – 18.

¹⁷⁶ Smith, "Why Wilson Matters", 232.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Toft, "Why is America addicted to foreign interventions", 1.

the public opinion on the War worsened, Bush turned to more liberal and democratic claims to justify the war¹⁷⁹, preaching in May 2006 that the US would not rest until liberty and democracy has reached every people in every nation¹⁸⁰.

With the US and its allies out of Afghanistan and Iraq, the rise of China and the increasing complexity and interdependence of the foreign policy arena, debate has been generated again over the nature of the world and the role the US should play in it. Both American politicians and commentators are now arguing for an increasingly realist foreign policy, according to some, even flirting with post-war Isolationism¹⁸¹. The Pew Research Center identified an indicator marking a shift in public opinion, moving away from internationalism and favouring disengagement. Their findings revealed that the percentage of Americans where in favour of the theorem that the country should "mind its own business" and allow other nations to fend for themselves rose from 20 percent in 1984 to 57 percent by 2016¹⁸².

President Trump's notorious "American First" framework indicates this shift: He denotes the idea that the world economies benefit from adhering to the rules. With "America First" he intends to withdraw from trade deals he deems to be not advantageous for the US, he undermines global institutions like the World Trade Organization in favor of protectionism, encouraged economic powerhouses like China and India to go to their smaller neighbors for economic loyalty, undercuts global agreements on climate change and tax evasion and even pushed US allies to make trade deals without the US¹⁸³. The retreat from economic- and liberal leadership is a major shift in US foreign policy compared to the Post WWII era, pushed by the question what kind of policy the US should pursue in these globalized times to ensure the US keeps its security and global power. Rosato and Schuessler defend a realist foreign policy to navigate the current environment¹⁸⁴. They argue that the US should make it clear to potential and current great powers that attempts at expansion will be opposed, but when confronted by a smaller power should have a relaxed view, provided that the smaller power is located in a strategically unimportant area¹⁸⁵. When

¹⁷⁹ Nye, "the rise and fall", 69.

¹⁸⁰ Dinmore, "US right questions", 8.

¹⁸¹ Scott, "The Politics of United States Foreign Policy", 456.

¹⁸² *Ibid*, 457.

¹⁸³ Posen, " The Post-American World Economy", 28.

¹⁸⁴ Rosato, "A Realist Foreign Policy", 803.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid*, 807.

a minor power threatens the Security of the US, containment and balances should be sufficient, as the writers argue that smaller states do not have the capability to inflict damage to a superpower. Full on war against such a smaller state, à la Iraq and Vietnam, should be avoided, as weaker states can still win against superpowers in the right conditions. Their assumptions are threefold: Firstly, they argue that no government above that of the state can enforce agreements or peace on them. Secondly, a state cannot (and should not have the illusion that they do) know the current or future intentions of other states. Thirdly, an interstate war is unpredictable and can possibly have devastating consequences¹⁸⁶. In a way this suggestion is rather in line with Trump's 2016 campaign and subsequent time in office, as on the one hand Trump advocated for a reduction in US military involvement, especially in the Middle East¹⁸⁷. Trump consistently scrutinized US military commitments, deployments, and operations within various alliances like NATO. On the other hand, he pursued substantial expansion of US military capabilities, advocating for significant budget increases during each of his initial three years in office. Additionally, Trump's administration adopted a more aggressive stance, employing confrontational response to various global issues, including North Korean nuclear proliferation and the Maduro regime in Venezuela. Notably, the Trump administration withdrew from the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement, which was initially negotiated by the Obama administration alongside Germany, France, Russia, China, and the United Kingdom, aimed at controlling Iran's nuclear program¹⁸⁸. To conclude, Joseph Nye summarizes Trump as an idiosyncratic realist who downplays democracy as a source of American power and downgrades traditional US' alliance policy¹⁸⁹. Nye points out that for Trump, "there is no international community, and allies are free-riders who have taken advantage of the United States"¹⁹⁰.

So the US has released itself as 'leader of the free world' with less tendencies for internationalism and policies centred round alliances. At first glance, for a traditional middle power, like the Netherlands and Denmark, this seems like a deeply unfavourable development, as the US for years have been their guiding liberal light and historical friend

¹⁸⁶ Ibid, 803.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid, 206.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid, 207.

¹⁸⁹ Nye, "the rise and fall", 68.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

and ally. Global interdependence theory however will point out that the fall of the American empire might even be liberating.

4.2 How the place of traditional middle powers will change as a result of the fall of the American empire.

The role of traditional middle powers will inevitably change with the US' retrieval as the forerunners of the liberal world. According to traditional realist theory, the role of these middle powers will diminish, but Keohane's and Nye's global interdependence theory provides a powerful and realistic outlook for these middle powers. This chapter will explain why an interdependent world allows traditional middle powers to not worry too much about the fall of their traditional American ally. Let's go back to the consequences of a more cooperative and liberal relationship which global interdependence brings has in the international arena according to Keohane and Nye.

Their first consequence is that initially within complex interdependence, objectives will differ across various issue domains, and there is no hierarchy among issues. Military security does not solely dominate the policy agendas of states, as matters like energy transition, environmental issues, increased populations, technological security issues all rank themselves at the same level of military security. As military power diminishes in value and importance, states possessing military superiority will encounter challenges in asserting dominance in areas where their capabilities are lacking. States must focus- and rely on other instruments rather than force and security alliances to achieve policy goals. The influence of states with less military power, like that of traditional middle powers will thus increase. Denmark and the Netherlands thus are not reliant anymore of the protection of the American military. The realist assumption that the use of force is an affective policy tool to achieve policy goals does not hold merit according to global interdependence theory as Keohane and Nye' note that military force is not used against other industrialized, pluralist and democratic states; the use of military force is costly and its effects uncertain. For traditional middle powers, like Canada, Denmark and the Netherlands, there is virtually no military threat from their immediate neighbours as a result of an intense relationship of mutual influence and interdependence. In the twentieth century, the Netherlands and Denmark presented themselves as 'old' and 'traditional' allies of America as they were anxious of

further tensions on the European mainland. Both countries were overrun by their German neighbour in WWII and sought protection from a superpower which aligned with their own liberal and democratic values. Now that the threat of military aggression from democratic and liberal neighbours is non-existent and the value of military power diminishes, American military protection is no longer essential.

Their second consequence of complex interdependence explores how the abovementioned lack of hierarchy in issues influences agenda setting and issue framing in politics. Traditional and particularly Realist models suggest that policymakers mainly prioritize military and security concerns, assuming that shifts in power dynamics and perceived threats to national security will naturally dictate the political agenda. Non-security issues are typically only deemed important if they impact security or military capabilities, and their framing is heavily influenced by perceptions of the balance of power in the international arena. The Dutch and Danish decision to follow the US into the War on Terror was hugely influenced by the way the US, as unipolar superpower of the time, framed the security issue. For the European middle powers, security threats from Iraq were minimal and an increased presence in the Middle East was never on their domestic agenda. The Dutch and Danish were rather fixated on following their traditional ally, without second guessing the intentions and effectiveness of their foreign policy. Furthermore, in the framework of complex interdependence, agenda setting is expected to be shaped by both international and domestic challenges arising from economic growth and increased interdependence. Domestic interest groups play a significant role in placing domestic issues on the international agenda, reflecting the influence of non-state actors—a key aspect of complex interdependence theory. Liberal democracies like the Netherlands and Denmark have the freedom of speech-and press to let the voices of non-state actors and even the individual be heard, with modern social media amplifying public opinion significantly more so than was the case twenty years ago. Again, this consequence of an increased interdependent world is rather beneficial for traditional middle powers, as the role they play in the international arena is that of a state which portray ‘good citizenship’ by favouring policies of compromise and coalition building¹⁹¹. Without the US long gone as forerunner of the liberal world, the Netherlands and Denmark could actively find their place in the international arena by promoting economic- and social growth and humanitarian values,

¹⁹¹ Neack, “Searching for Middle Powers”, 1.

motivated by compassion. This way the traditional middle powers can attain soft power, a policy which trump neglected as Nye notes that he downplays democracy liberal values as a source of American soft power¹⁹².

Thirdly, Keohane and Nye propose that the closer a situation aligns with complex interdependence, the more likely political bargaining outcomes will be influenced by transnational and transgovernmental relations. This stimulates the need for states to cooperate and pursue liberal political and economic attitudes. For traditional middle powers, a liberal world is advantageous, especially for mercantilist states as the Netherlands and Denmark, as they rely on open borders and cooperation. As the boundaries between domestic and international issues blur within complex interdependence, attitudes towards policy matters and their resolutions are increasingly shaped by interactions with non-governmental counterparts abroad. The realist notion that states act a single entity is thus impossible in a connected and interdependent world. Furthermore, government entities must engage with their counterparts from other bureaucratized nations, leading to the formation of transgovernmental coalitions in specific policy domains, making it harder for superpowers to impose their power in areas in which they are weak without choosing a cooperative and liberal approach. Collaborative efforts between government agencies from different nations aim to increase the likelihood of success. Once more, this characteristic of an interdependent world is beneficial for the middle powers who benefit from and advocate for cooperation and liberal values. While realists might argue that powerful states may utilize this approach of transgovernmental ties to influence weaker states' governments, Keohane and Nye would argue that is also the case the other way round, as cases where mutual benefits are prevalent increase due to the lack of hierarchy in policy issues and the devaluation of military importance.

Lastly, this increase of transnational- and transgovernmental exchange and communication will pose a significant role for international organization in the international relations arena. Within realist framework, international organizations typically play a minor role as states primarily prioritize their own security concerns and the overall balance of power, and view these organizations as relevant only during rare moments of alignment of interest. However, complex interdependence highlight a more pronounced and frequent alignment of interests among actors, leading to a bigger role for international institutions in

¹⁹² Nye, "The rise and fall", 68.

international affairs. In the context of complex interdependence, international organizations have a more prominent bargaining role. They have significant influence over formulation of the global agenda and facilitate the formation of coalitions. The overall mission of transnational and transgovernmental organizations align with the mission of traditional powers; promoting liberal- and humanitarian values, and keeping a balance of power. These organizations play a pivotal role in determining which global policy issues are grouped together, enhancing the potential for cooperation and alliance-building. Furthermore, the presence of these international organization assist smaller- and middle powers with a platform for audits, political initiatives, opportunities and an increase in engagement with other states, increasing their influence on the world stage. For the Netherlands and Denmark, these organizations are the ideal platform to increase their soft power by promoting liberal and humanitarian values.

For years, the world saw that the US was either the single worlds superpower or one of the superpowers in a bipolar world. Now, there is no clear all-embracing international hierarchy¹⁹³. Only the military sphere shows clear American dominance of other world powers but in other areas as an effect of interdependence, the distinction and hierarchy between powers is arbitrary. Middle powers need to establish fresh priorities and embrace new approaches to regional and global diplomacy. For the Netherlands and Denmark, their status as spreaders of peace, cooperation and humanitarian values are a vital good in maintaining influence in the international arena. For years, the effectiveness of traditional middle powers has relied on a "rules-based international order" shaped by shared "Western values"¹⁹⁴. This order, characterized by liberal principles promoting free markets, democracy and humanitarianism, was supported and preserved through international institutions like the Atlantic Alliance (Atlanticism), the United Nations, the World Bank, and IMF. Now, they must navigate and find their place among the rise of global powers like China and India, as well as regional actors such as Brazil, Nigeria, and Indonesia, with whom they don't share a high amount of values. Amid these shifts, traditional middle powers must continue to prioritize building alliances with like-minded nations to strengthen multilateralism and keep promoting open markets and support the influence of supranational organizations. Positivism regarding the place of Denmark and the

¹⁹³ Stephen, "The concept and Role", 50.

¹⁹⁴ Job, "The Strategic options", 49.

Netherlands is a must, but justified as well. Middle powers, as Job notes¹⁹⁵ have achieved notable feats in norm entrepreneurship and multilateral institutionalism. There certainly are opportunities for middle power leadership and collaboration, both regionally and globally.

Another important tool to be positive about the future of traditional middle powers without the ancient notion of American security guarantees is asking oneself whether new superpowers have ambitions which does not align with that of the traditional middle power.

According to Dutch news channel RTL Z, 46% of Dutch people believe China to be a threat to European security and according to The Hill, 40% of Americans see China as the country that poses the greatest threat, twice as much as old nemesis Russia. This fear is also reflected in the policies of European countries: Sweden, the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, Latvia and Estonia have all decided not to use Huawei's 5G network, fearing data- and privacy violations by the Chinese government-owned company. This Western fear of China is largely based the classical realist assumption that China is merely a power seeker out to destabilize their Western enemies. But analysing the rise of China with liberal frameworks, such as liberal institutionalism and global interdependence which share the notion that states, partly thanks to international institutions such as the EU, NATO and WTO, strive for maximum profit through cooperation from an economically liberal point of view, will show that the rise of China can only increase Sino-European prosperity and stability. For example, China is traditionally not a state that is purely driven by a search for as much power as possible, or has the ambition to take over as many countries, economies and institutions as possible. China's military ambitions so far have focused only on territories it believes it has historical claims on, such as Tibet, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Arunachal Pradesh, an area on the border between Tibet and eastern India. Fears for negative Chinese influence on the European mainland are not grounded, as such pragmatic policy solution is more in line with the American approach to dealing with international affairs, which tends to be direct and assertive, prioritizing short-term goals, while China, perhaps rather influenced by Confucian values, adopts a more patient, long-term vision with the focus on stability and sensible investments.

As a result, China's foreign approach cannot be called uncooperative; trade agreements are concluded with the EU, the US and African countries. Progressive displays of soft power can be found in the presence of Confucius Institutes, the fact that China is the

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

largest supplier of UN peacekeepers, and have surpassed the US in scientific research output in 2022¹⁹⁶. Furthermore, China has the image of being a major polluter, but is on track to meet the Paris Agreements, the one from which Trump withdrew, and, due to the many domestic investments in R&D, is the first country close to developing a cobalt- and nickel-free battery, a more sustainable way of storing energy, which at the same time can relieve the pressure on Congo's mines and thus liberate exploited miners. In addition, China is the only country close to building a revolutionary thorium reactor, a much safer and more sustainable way of generating energy than uranium-based nuclear reactors. The recent statement by the Chinese ambassador to the Netherlands, Tan Jian, – “Clear water and green mountains are worth as much as mountains of gold and silver” – dodges accusations of propaganda through these demonstrated sustainability efforts.

In Keohane's liberal views, states must cooperate and advocate open borders. According to this teaching, China benefits from a prosperous and stable West, as they need markets to supply their huge industry with demand. China's investments in Europe can be explained in this liberal way¹⁹⁷; after all, the main beneficiaries of China's investments are the core states of France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. The takeover of the port of Piraeus by the Chinese state-owned company COSCO in 2009 is seen as a cunning and treacherous Chinese display of power, while forgetting that this takeover mainly came about by the EU's demand to privatize the port, and that after the takeover the port became one of the largest growing ports of the world, ensuring prosperity and stability on the European mainland¹⁹⁸. With the American protectionist measures and the rise of new global powers, European countries, like the Netherlands and Denmark, now have the opportunity to not only look at the US or mainland Europe for cooperative ventures. In a bipolar world with the economic bloc's it often brings, having economic ties with multiple superpowers is unthinkable for a traditional middle power, but now that the US voluntarily opts for more isolationist policies, new opportunities arise. Furthermore, in December of 2020, the EU bargained an agreement on investments with Beijing, giving European companies more access to and protection on Chinese markets. Analysts were particularly impressed by its strategic significance¹⁹⁹, as this agreement exemplifies how the EU can afford to accomplish

¹⁹⁶ Guardian News and Media, “China overtakes the US”.

¹⁹⁷ Keohane, “After hegemony”, 46.

¹⁹⁸ Kavalski, “China is now a Power in Europe”, 2.

¹⁹⁹ Van Middelaar, “EU-China Agreement”, 1.

a geopolitical act with actors other than the US even without consulting Washington. This showed how the EU must look at the rise of new superpowers as opportunities, not as a threat. This European geopolitical awakening also resulted in talks between Xi and Rutte in Beijing in March 2024. In 2018 and 2019, the US, according to Reuters²⁰⁰, pressured the Dutch government and even Rutte personally into cancelling sales of chip manufacturer ASML to Chinese industrialist SMIC. This method seemed to have succeeded, as Reuters noted ASML to put the Chinese orders on hold. Five years later, Rutte and Xi meet to discuss the matter as well as other key topics which include equal access to markets and the future of their economic cooperation. Rutte noted in truly traditional middlepowermanship way that ASML's hesitance to go through with the delivery of their semiconductor machines "is never aimed at one country specifically... We always try to make sure that the impact is limited, it's not impacting the supply chain and therefore is not impacting, let's say, the overall economic relationship"²⁰¹. Xi also showed that they do indeed have liberal tendencies as he noted that "The Chinese people also have legitimate development rights" and that "China will continue to pursue a win-win approach (and) open wider to the outside world at a high level"²⁰². These liberal words are of course promising for mercantilist and traditional middle powers like the Netherlands and Denmark who benefit from economic cooperation, and lest not forget it is the US who pressured ASML, which "did not want to upset the Americans", into stopping the deals with the Chinese, which is both not a liberal thought and in line with their new realist and isolationist policies, as well as not in line with Dutch interests.

²⁰⁰ Alper, "Trump administration pressed Dutch", 1.

²⁰¹ The Sun, "Xi tells Dutch PM Rutte".

²⁰² Ibid.

Chapter 5 General Conclusion

5.1 Summary of Findings period 1

The analysis of the relationship between the two middle powers and the US up until WWI explores the complex interdependence between the United States, the Netherlands, and Denmark, emphasizing the pragmatic mutual dependencies that characterized these relationships in this time period. Economic- and diplomatic relations were present but often created out of shared pragmatic mutual benefits. Keohane's Complex interdependence for this time period is not applicable, as the world was not as interwoven in this period. Globalisation was not as strongly developed as it is now. Thus, the bilateral, symmetric relationship between the European nations and the US were born out of pragmatic economic- and diplomatic benefits.

Despite the Dutch losing control of New Amsterdam to the English in 1664, their impact persisted through architecture, customs, and art. This early period highlighted a pragmatic approach where economic interests were central to Dutch activities in the region.

Similarly, Denmark's involvement in North America began with settlers arriving in New Amsterdam and later establishing trade networks through the islands of the Danish West Indies. Danish settlers participated in the American Revolutionary War, and Denmark, like the Netherlands, was quick to recognize the sovereignty of the United States, establishing formal diplomatic and commercial relations in the late eighteenth century.

Interdependence theory is crucial in understanding these early relationships. The Dutch and Danish direct- and indirect contributions to the American Revolution illustrate the strategic economic interdependencies that influenced political alliances. Dutch merchants on St. Eustatius, by trading essential supplies with American rebels, and Denmark's early diplomatic recognition and participation in the League of Armed Neutrality, show how economic interests and opportunity drove political decisions and created mutual efforts against common adversaries, such as the British Empire.

The pragmatic mutual dependence between these nations continued into the nineteenth century. The Dutch investments in American railways post-Civil War and Danish immigration waves driven by economic opportunities and religious Mormon missions highlight the sustained economic interdependence. Dutch and Danish investors found the American market attractive due to potential for growth, while the US benefited from the financial influx and labour provided by these European nations.

5.2 Summary of findings period 2

Before World War I, relations between the United States and the Netherlands were largely untroubled. However, by the early 20th century, the US began to be recognized as a major global powerhouse. Diplomatic and strategic relations between the US and the Netherlands were limited, though both nations shared a vision of peace and neutrality.

After WWII, the Netherlands faced a new reality as the US emerged as a dominant superpower: The Dutch experienced a harsh introduction to post-war international order, particularly when the US and Britain allocated the Dutch Indies to the South East Asia Command in 1945. The Netherlands, having lost its colonial influence, had to commit to the Western sphere of influence, joining NATO and aligning its defence policy with Atlantic preferences. Throughout the Cold War, the Dutch political culture, with its anti-communist stance, support for free trade and liberal and humanitarian values, made the Netherlands an ideal ally for the US.

Despite occasional frictions, such as during WWI, the Suez Crisis or debates over the Joint Strike Fighter program, the Dutch consistently demonstrated their commitment to the Atlantic alliance. The Netherlands' position in the world order gave them little reason or choice not to align with US.

In the period discussed, Danish-U.S. relations became markedly skewed as the United States emerged as a global superpower, with Denmark often following the U.S. as a middle power. Denmark, along with other European allies, often found themselves in a supportive role. This era saw Denmark aligning closely with U.S. policies, particularly through NATO, and supporting controversial American-led military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. This shift underscored a significant departure from the more pragmatic and equal relationship that characterized the previous centuries.

In the earlier period, cooperation between Denmark and the U.S. was more balanced, exemplified by the strategic purchase of the Danish West Indies in 1917 and mutual interests during WWII concerning Greenland. These interactions were based on practical negotiations and shared strategic concerns, reflecting a more equal partnership.

In the later stages, Danish foreign policy continued to evolve within the framework of transatlantic cooperation, despite occasional later controversies over the Iraq War. This era underscores how Denmark adapted to the realities of a unipolar world dominated by

American power, navigating its own interests alongside its commitment to transatlantic solidarity.

5.3 summary of findings period 3

The evolving global landscape of the (Post-) Trump era with its globalised nature presents new opportunities for traditional middle powers like the Denmark and the Netherlands, driven by increased global interdependence, the rise of China and the Global South in general, and the inward-looking policies of the (post-) Trump era that signalled a broader decline in American dominance in the international relations arena. This shift allows these nations to negotiate more bilateral and equal agreements with the United States, reminiscent of the more balanced relationships that existed before World War I when the US was not (yet) a superpower in a unilateral system like it would become in the period after the world wars.

As interdependence theory dictates, the reduced importance of military power in international relations lessens the need for middle powers to rely on American military protection. Today, other arena's like the economic, environmental, and technological issues are important, and not just military security, which creates the needs for a more balanced and multilateral global agenda. This change empowers middle powers, enhancing their influence in global affairs through diplomacy, soft power and humanitarian and liberal role models. China's long-term, stable, and cooperative approach offers new opportunities for economic and diplomatic engagements. Traditional middle powers can leverage relationships with emerging global powers to promote mutual prosperity and stability. This diversification of alliances is essential in a world where American influence is waning and the unnuanced, absolute sentiment where states have to 'choose sides' like in the Cold War era is over. The retreat from liberal internationalism and the role as the worlds 'policeman' under Trump's "America First" framework and protectionist measures has diminished America's role as the global leader of liberalism. This creates space for middle powers to form alliances and pursue their interests more freely, without being overshadowed by U.S. policies. Middle powers now have the autonomy to engage in balanced and equitable bilateral agreements, reminiscent of the more pragmatic and equal partnerships of the past. They can promote liberal and humanitarian values through multilateral institutions and soft

power. Economic cooperation with multiple superpowers becomes a viable strategy, enhancing their global influence and stability. So while the decline of American dominance may seem to put them in a predicament, it can liberate traditional middle powers like the Netherlands and Denmark. These nations can now cooperate more effectively with other global powers, leveraging global interdependence to maintain and enhance their influence on the world stage. And just like Keohane's complex interdependence theory anticipates, what the world needs in an interdependent world, which is not just military security but also expertise and leadership on environmental, cooperative and humanitarian issues, is exactly where the expertise of traditional middle powers like the Netherlands and Denmark lie. Additionally, global interdependence will increase the power of supranational organisations, which fight for and ensure cooperation and peace and thus diminishes the need for alliance building merely for security reasons. The soft power of traditional powers within these organizations makes for leverage in the international stage.

5.4 Implications for the Future

The evolving nature and dynamics of global interdependence and the shifting balance of power have significant challenges for future research. Future researchers should explore how middle powers like the Netherlands and Denmark can use their unique positions to navigate a multipolar and dependent world. Research could focus on the strategies these nations can adopt to establish equal bilateral agreements with various global powers, including China and emerging economies in the Global South. Examining the role of soft power and international institutions in enhancing the influence of middle powers will be crucial. Additionally, Future studies should investigate the long-term effects of the US' inward-looking policies on global alliances and its effects on the stability of the international order. Understanding these complex interactions will provide insights into the potential for middle powers to contribute to a global system with liberal and humanitarian values as guidance.

The shifting geopolitical landscape presents both challenges and opportunities for traditional middle powers like Denmark and the Netherlands. As the United States retreats from its dominant role, these nations should not mourn the 'loss' of their old, strong ally,

but should create awareness that they can capitalize on global interdependence to forge more balanced and diversified alliances and actually be aware that the merging world order can actually benefit traditional middle powers. Furthermore, tendencies of the public to be anxious or negative about the future should be researched. Even though many aspects of life are now better than they were 100, 50 or 10 years ago, negativity prevails, without clear signs of deterioration in the future. This bleak outlook on life and the international arena should be addressed.

7. Bibliography

- Guardian News and Media. (2022, August 11). *China overtakes the US in scientific research output*. The Guardian. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/11/china-overtakes-the-us-in-scientific-research-output>
- Toft, Monica Duffy. "Why Is America Addicted to Foreign Interventions?" *The National Interest*, June 11, 2018. <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-america-addicted-foreign-interventions-23582>.
- "1968 – State of US–Netherlands Relations," 16 January 1968, and "Annual Policy Assessment," 27 September 1968. Box 2363, POL 1 NETHUS, Subject-Numeric Files, RG 59, National Archives, College Park, Md.
- "Het Vrije Volk: Democratisch-Socialistisch Dagblad." Rotterdam, 14-09-1967, p. 15. Geraadpleegd op Delpher op 28-02-2024. <https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=ddd:010956415:mpeg21:p015>.
- "The Economist." "One World?" October 18, 1997, 79-80.
- "Xi Tells Dutch PM Rutte 'No Force Can Stop' China Tech Progress." *The Sun*. Accessed May 13, 2024. <https://thesun.my/world/xi-tells-dutch-pm-rutte-no-force-can-stop-china-tech-progress-CG12271131>.
- Alexandrescu, Mihai. "David Mitrany: From Federalism to Functionalism." *Transylvanian Review* 16, no. 1 (2007).
- Alper, Alexandra, Toby Sterling, and Stephen Nellis. "Trump Administration Pressed Dutch Hard to Cancel China Chip-Equipment Sale - Sources." *Reuters*, 2020. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asml-holding-usa-china-insight/trump-administration-pressed-dutch-hard-to-cancel-china-chip-equipment-sale-sources-idUSKBN1Z50HN>.
- America's 'Special Relationships': Foreign and Domestic Aspects of the Politics of Alliance*. United Kingdom: Taylor & Francis, 2009.
- Archer, C. "The United States Defence Areas in Greenland." *Cooperation and Conflict* 23, no. 3 (1988): 123-144. <https://doi.org/10.1177/001083678802300302>.
- Baudet, Floribert. "The Netherlands, The United States, And the Helsinki Process, 1972 1989." In *Four Centuries of Dutch-American Relations 1609-2009*, edited by Hans Krabbendam, A.C. van Minnen, and Giles Scott-Smith. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Boom, 2009.
- Belukhin, E. Nikita, V. Vorotnikov, V. Vladislav, and Y. Svetlana Dianina. "Reputation and Status in Denmark's Strategic Culture." *Baltic Region* 15, no. 3 (2023): 4-28. <https://doi.org/10.5922/2079-8555-2023-3-1>.
- Berdichevsky, Norman. *An Introduction to Danish Culture*. McFarland & Company, 2011.

- Braddick, Michael J., ed. *The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800*. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.
- Brady, Donovan. "An Historical Account of the Purchase and Transfer of the Danish West Indies." Department of Education of the U.S. Virgin Islands. University of Florida, 1969.
- Burnett, Edmund C. "Note on American Negotiations for Commercial Treaties, 1776-1786." *The American Historical Review* 16, no. 3 (1911): 579–87. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1834838>.
- Caporaso, James A. "Dependence, Dependency, and Power in the Global System: A Structural and Behavioral Analysis." *International Organization*. University of Wisconsin Press 32, no. 1 (1978).
- Chapnick, Adam. "The Canadian Middle Power Myth." *International Journal* 55, no. 2 (2000): 188-206.
- Chapnick, Adam. "The Middle Power." *Canadian Journal of Foreign Policy* 7, no. 2 (1999): 76.
- Clayton, W. "The European Crisis." *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The British Commonwealth; Europe, Volume III*. 1947.
- Cooper, Andrew. "The Evolution of Multilateralism in an Intermediate State: The Reorientation of Canadian Strategy in the Economic and Security Arenas." Latin American Program Working Paper Series, 2000.
- De Carvalho, Benjamin, and Iver B. Neumann. "Introduction: Small States and Status." In *Small States and Status Seeking: Norway's Quest for International Standing*, edited by Benjamin De Carvalho and Iver B. Neumann, 1-21. London: Routledge, 2015. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315758817>.
- Delpher, the Memory. "A Humble Speech of Thanks to All Gentlemen Merchants." 1782. From: <https://geheugen.delpher.nl/en/geheugen/view?coll=ngvn&maxperpage=36&page=1&query=john+adams&identifier=KONB04%3A19966&pres%5Bimageindex%5D=4#top-bar>.
- Delpher, the Memory. "A View on the Present Dutch Situation, England's Impotence and America's Freedom." 1782. From: <https://geheugen.delpher.nl/en/geheugen/view?query=&facets%5BcollectionStringE%5D%5B%5D=Atlantic+World&page=2&maxperpage=36&coll=ngvn&identifier=ONB04%3A20103&pres%5Bimageindex%5D=6#top-bar>.
- Delpher, the Memory. "Statement about the Commercial Value for This Republic of Concluding a Treaty of Commerce with the United States of North America." 1781. From: <https://geheugen.delpher.nl/en/geheugen/view?query=&facets%5BcollectionStringE>

<https://geheugen.delpher.nl/en/geheugen/view?query=&facets%5BcollectionStringE%5D%5B%5D=Atlantic+World&page=1&maxperpage=36&coll=ngvn&identifier=ONB04%3A19511&pres%5Bimageindex%5D=17#top-bar>.

Delpher. "A Petition by Merchants to the States General to Negotiate a Treaty of Commerce with the United States of America." 1782. <https://geheugen.delpher.nl/en/geheugen/view?query=&facets%5BcollectionStringE%5D%5B%5D=Atlantic+World&page=1&maxperpage=36&coll=ngvn&identifier=ONB04%3A19961&pres%5Bimageindex%5D=6>.

Delpher. "The Memory." War and Marshall Aid - The Memory. Accessed June 20, 2024. <https://geheugen.delpher.nl/en/geheugen/pages/collectie/Atlantic+World/Oorlog+en+Marshallhulp>.

Denmark, U.S. Mission. "History of U.S. – Denmark Relations - U.S. Embassy & Consulate in the Kingdom of Denmark." U.S. Embassy & Consulate in The Kingdom of Denmark, February 9, 2023. <https://dk.usembassy.gov/history-of-u-s-denmark-relations/>.

Deutsch, Karl. *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1953.

Dinmore, Guy. "US Right Questions Wisdom of Bush's Democracy Policy." *Financial Times*, May 30, 2006.

Douma, Michael. "Dutch-American Identity During the Civil War and the Boer War." In *Four Centuries of Dutch-American Relations 1609-2009*, edited by Hans Krabbendam, A.C. van Minnen, and Giles Scott-Smith. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Boom, 2009.

Efstathopoulos, Charalampos. "Middle Powers and the Behavioural Model." *Global Society* 32, no. 1 (2018). <https://doi.org/10.1080/13600826.2017.1351422>.

Enthoven, Victor. "'That Abominable Nest of Pirates': St. Eustatius and the North Americans, 1680—1780." *Early American Studies* 10, no. 2 (2012): 239–301. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23547669>.

Finnemore, Martha. *National Interest in International Society*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996.

Founders Online. "VIII. Final Text of the Dutch-American Treaty of Amity and Commerce: A Translation, 6 September 1782." National Archives. <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-13-02-0162-0011-0002>.

Fredrickson, J. William. "American Shipping in the Trade with Northern Europe 1783–1860." *Scandinavian Economic History Review* 4, no. 2 (1956): 109-125. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03585522.1956.10411487>.

Frijhoff, Willem, and Jaap Jacobs. "The Dutch, New Netherland, and Thereafter (1609-1780s)." In *Four Centuries of Dutch-American Relations 1609-2009*, edited by Hans Krabbendam, A.C. van Minnen, and Giles Scott-Smith. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Boom, 2009.

- Fukuyama, Francis. "The End of History?" *The National Interest* 16 (1989): 3-18.
- Gilley, Bruce, and Andrew O'Neil. *Middle Powers and the Rise of China*. Georgetown University Press, 2014.
- Glazebrook, G. P. de T. "The Middle Powers in the United Nations System." *International Organization* 1, no. 2 (1947): 308-319.
- Griffin, Keith. "Globalization and the Shape of Things to Come." *Macalester International: Globalization and Economic Space* 7 (Spring 1999): 3.
- Griffiths, Martin, Steven C. Roach, and Scott M. Solomon. *Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations*. New York: Routledge, 2009.
- Hellema, Duco. "Backing Britain: The Netherlands and the Suez Crisis." *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 4, no. 1 (1993): 37-58.
- Henriksen, Anders, and Jens Ringsmose. "What Did Denmark Gain? Iraq, Afghanistan and the Relationship with Washington." *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook* (2012): 157-181. <https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/what-did-denmark-gain-iraq-afghanistan/docview/1025766767/se-2>.
- Hodgson, Edward J. "An American View of the Boer War." *The Nineteenth Century: A Monthly Review* 48-282 (1900).
- Holbraad, Carsten. *Middle Powers in International Politics*. London: Macmillan, 1984.
- Hollis, Martin. *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.
- Hurrell, Andrew, Andrew F. Cooper, Guadalupe González, Ricardo Ubiraci Sennes, and Srinivasan. "Paths to Power: Foreign Policy Strategies of Intermediate States." Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2000.
- Hurrell, Andrew. *On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Jackson, Robert, and Georg Sørensen. *Introduction to International Relations*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Jacobs, Jaap. *The Colony of New Netherland: A Dutch Settlement in Seventeenth-Century America*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2009.
- Jakobsen, Peter Viggo, Jens Ringsmose, and Håkon Lunde Saxi. "Prestige-Seeking Small States: Danish and Norwegian Military Contributions to US-Led Operations." *European Journal of International Security* 3, no. 2 (2018): 256-77. <https://doi.org/10.1017/eis.2017.20>.
- Job, Brian L. "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Dilemmas of Middle Powers." In *The Strategic Options of Middle Powers in the Asia-Pacific*. Routledge, 2022.

- Jones, Matthew. *After Hiroshima: The United States, Race and Nuclear Weapons in Asia, 1945–1965*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Jordaan, Eduard. "The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations: Distinguishing between Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers." *Politikon* 30, no. 2 (2003): 165–181.
- Jordaan, Eduard. "The Emerging Middle Power Concept: Time to Say Goodbye?" *South African Journal of International Affairs* 24, no. 3 (2017): 395–412. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2017.1394218>.
- Kavalski, Emilian, and Maximilian Mayer. "China is Now a Power in Europe, but Fears of Interference in the EU are Simplistic and Misguided." *The Conversation*, April 4, 2019. <https://theconversation.com/china-is-now-a-power-in-europe-but-fears-of-interference-in-the-eu-are-simplistic-and-misguided-116193>.
- Keller, Simon. "Against Friendship between Countries." *Journal of International Political Theory* 5, no. 1 (2009): 59–74. <https://doi.org/10.3366/E1755088209000329>.
- Keohane, Robert O. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye Jr. *Power and Interdependence: Longman Classics in Political Science*. 4th ed. Pearson, 2011.
- Khan, Md. Zahidul Islam. "Is Voting Patterns at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) a Useful Way to Understand a Country's Policy Inclinations: Bangladesh's Voting Records at the UNGA." *SAGE Open* 10, no. 4 (2020). <https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244020961117>.
- Klep, Christ. "Peacekeeping and the War on Terror." In *Four Centuries of Dutch-American Relations 1609-2009*, edited by Hans Krabbendam, A.C. van Minnen, and Giles Scott Smith. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Boom, 2009.
- Klinkert, Wim. "Crossing Borders: Americans and the Liberation of the Netherlands." In *Four Centuries of Dutch-American Relations 1609-2009*, edited by Hans Krabbendam, A.C. van Minnen, and Giles Scott-Smith. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Boom, 2009.
- Klooster, Wim. "The Place of New Netherland in the West India Company's Grand Scheme." In *Revisiting New Netherland*. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789047407997_webready.
- Koedijk, Paul. "The Netherlands, the United States, and Anticommunism during the Early Cold War." In *Four Centuries of Dutch-American Relations 1609-2009*, edited by Hans Krabbendam, A.C. van Minnen, and Giles Scott-Smith. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Boom, 2009.
- Krabbendam, Hans, A.C. van Minnen, and Giles Scott-Smith. *Four Centuries of Dutch American Relations 1609-2009*. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Boom, 2009.

- Kristensen, Kristian Søby, and Kristian Knus Larsen. "Denmark's Fight Against Irrelevance, or the Alliance Politics of 'Punching Above Your Weight.'" In *Global Allies: Comparing US Alliances in the 21st Century*, edited by Michael Wesley, 59-76. ANU Press, 2017. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1sq5twz.8>.
- Kupchan, Charles. *How Enemies Become Friends: The Source of Stable Peace*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010.
- Maika, Dennis J. "Securing the Burgher Right in New Amsterdam: the Struggle For Municipal Citizenship in the Seventeenth-Century Atlantic World." In *Revisiting New Netherland*. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2005. <https://doi.org/10.1163/9789047407997>.
- Mallinson, W. D. E. "Dutch Foreign Policy, 1948-1954: From Neutrality to Commitment." London School of Economics and Political Science, 1990.
- Manicom, James, and Jeffrey Reeves. "Locating Middle Powers in International Relations Theory and Power Transitions." In *Middle Powers and the Rise of China*, edited by Bruce Gilley and Andrew O'Neil. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014.
- Mariager, R. M., and Anders Wivel. "Denmark at War: Great Power Politics and Domestic Action Space in the Cases of Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq." In *Danish Foreign Policy Review 2019*, edited by Kristian Fischer and Hans Mouritzen, 48-73. Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS, 2019.
- Megens, Ine. "Bilateral Defense Cooperation in an Atlantic Perspective." In *Four Centuries of Dutch-American Relations 1609-2009*, edited by Hans Krabbendam, A.C. van Minnen, and Giles Scott-Smith. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Boom, 2009.
- Mello, Patrick A. *Democratic Participation in Armed Conflict: Military Involvement in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq*. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2014.
- Miall, Hugh. *Emergent Conflict and Peaceful Change*. Berlin: Springer, 2011.
- Michael, Riemens. "The Netherlands, The United States, and the International Political Culture." In *Four Centuries of Dutch-American Relations 1609-2009*, edited by Hans Krabbendam, A.C. van Minnen, and Giles Scott-Smith. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Boom, 2009.
- Mija, Vasile, and Valeriu Teosa. "Is Complex Interdependence the Last Evolution of Globalization?" In *Materialele Conferinței Internaționale Științifice „Political Science, International Relations and Security Studies”, Ediția VIII*, 165-175. Sibiu, 2014.
- Mouritzen, Hans, and Anders Wivel. "Constellation Theory." In *The Geopolitics of Euro Atlantic Integration*, edited by Hans Mouritzen and Anders Wivel, 15-43. London: Routledge, 2005.
- Mouritzen, Hans. "Denmark's Super Atlanticism." *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 5, no. 2 (2007): 155-167. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14794019908656861>.

- National Foundation for Danish America. "National Foundation for Danish America (NFDA)," n.d. <https://danishamerica.org/history>.
- Neack, Laura. "Searching for Middle Powers." *Department of Political Science, Miami University*, 2017. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.330>.
- Neugebauer, Monika. "China's Cooperation on the Mekong River in the Realm of Complex Interdependence." *E-International Relations*, 2016.
- Nordin, Astrid H. M., and Graham M. Smith. "Reintroducing Friendship to International Relations: Relational Ontologies from China to the West." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 18 (2018): 369–396. <https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcy011>.
- Nye, Joseph S. "The Rise and Fall of American Hegemony from Wilson to Trump." *International Affairs* 95, no. 1 (2019): 63–80. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iyy212>.
- Oelsner, Andrea, and Antoine Vion. "Special Issue: Friendship in International Relations." *International Politics* 48 (2011): 1–9. <https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2010.36>.
- Orfield, Lester B., and Benjamin F. Boyer. *The Growth of Scandinavian Law*. 2002.
- Posen, Adam S. "The Post-American World Economy: Globalization in the Trump Era." *Foreign Affairs* 97, no. 2 (2018): 28-38.
- Righolt, Hans. "Dutch-American Relations During the Second Cold War." In *Four Centuries of Dutch-American Relations 1609-2009*, edited by Hans Krabbendam, A.C. van Minnen, and Giles Scott-Smith. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Boom, 2009.
- Riley, James C. "Foreign Credit and Fiscal Stability: Dutch Investment in the United States, 1781-1794." *The Journal of American History* 65, no. 3 (1978): 654–78. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1901417>.
- Robertson, Jeffrey. "Middle-Power Definitions: Confusion Reigns Supreme." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 71, no. 4 (2017): 355-370. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2017.1293608>.
- Rosato, Sebastian, and Joshua Schuessler. "A Realist Foreign Policy for the United States." *Perspectives on Politics* 9, no. 4 (2011): 803-819. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592711003963>.
- Ruby, Louisa. "Dutch Art and the Hudson Valley Patroon Painters." 2008.
- Scott, Jonathan. *How The Old World Ended: The Anglo-Dutch-American Revolution 1500 1800*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020.
- Scott, M. James, and Jerel A. Rosati. *The Politics of United States Foreign Policy*. 8th ed. London: Sage Publications, 2023.

- Scott-Smith, Giles. "The Ties that Bind: Dutch-American Relations, US Public Diplomacy and the Promotion of American Studies since the Second World War." *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 2, no. 1 (2007): 1-24. <https://doi.org/10.1163/187119007X240532>.
- Sehkri, Sofiane. "Dependency Approach: Chances of Survival in the 21st Century." *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations* 3, no. 5 (2009): 242-252.
- Shen, Dong-Min. "A Critical Review of the Concept of Middle Power." *E-International Relations*, 2015.
- Smith, Tony. *Why Wilson Matters: The Origin of American Liberal Internationalism and Its Crisis Today*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017.
- Söderström, Johanna, Malin Åkebo, and Anna K. Jarstad. "Friends, Fellows, and Foes: A New Framework for Studying Relational Peace." *International Studies Review* 23 (2021): 484–508.
- Stokke, Olav. *The Determinants of the Aid Policies of Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden*. Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1989.
- Stott, Annette. "Inventing Memory: Picturing New Netherland in the Nineteenth Century." In *Revisiting New Netherland*. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789047407997_webready.
- Stott, Annette. "Images of Dutchness in the United States." In *Four Centuries of Dutch American Relations 1609-2009*, edited by Hans Krabbendam, A.C. van Minnen, and Giles Scott-Smith. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Boom, 2009.
- The Acting Secretary of State. "Telegram. The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Denmark." *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The British Commonwealth; Europe, Volume III*. 1947. From: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v03/d430>.
- The Library of Congress. "The Danes | Scandinavian | Immigration and Relocation in U.S. History | Classroom Materials at the Library of Congress | Library of Congress," n.d. <https://www.loc.gov/classroom-materials/immigration/scandinavian/the-danes/>.
- The Secretary of State. "Telegram. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Denmark." *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The British Commonwealth; Europe, Volume III*. 1947. From: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v03/d420>.
- U.S. Department of State. "Interview of the President by Danish Broadcasting Corporation." 2005. From: <https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/48952.htm>.
- U.S. Department of State. "The U.S.-Danish Relationship Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs." 2006. From: <https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/67731.htm>.
- U.S. Department of State. *Voting Practices in the United Nations 2007*. Bureau of International Organization Affairs, 2008. <https://2009/2017.state.gov/p/io/rls/rpt/index.htm>.

- Van Campen, S. I. P. *The Quest for Security: Some Aspects of Netherlands Foreign Policy*. 'S Gravenhage: Springer-Science+Business Media, 1957.
- Van den Doel, Wim. "From Distant Images to Closer Relations." In *Four Centuries of Dutch American Relations 1609-2009*, edited by Hans Krabbendam, A.C. van Minnen, and Giles Scott-Smith. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Boom, 2009.
- Van der Harst, Jan. "Dutch and U.S. Assessments of European Political Integration." In *Four Centuries of Dutch-American Relations 1609-2009*, edited by Hans Krabbendam, A.C. van Minnen, and Giles Scott-Smith. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Boom, 2009.
- Van Der Maar, Rimko. "Dutch-American Relations And the Vietnam War." In *Four Centuries of Dutch-American Relations 1609-2009*, edited by Hans Krabbendam, A.C. van Minnen, and Giles Scott-Smith. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Boom, 2009.
- Van Hoef, Yuri. "The Friendcraft of Middle Powers: How the Netherlands & Denmark Supported the War on Terror and How This Affected Their Friendship with the US." *Academia Letters* (2021): 1-10. <https://doi.org/10.20935/al1972>.
- Van Middelaar, Luuk. "EU-China Agreement: A Sign of European Geopolitical Awakening." *Clingendael*, 2022. <https://www.clingendael.org/publication/eu-china-agreement-sign-european-geopolitical-awakening>.
- Van Minnen, Cornelis. "American Diplomats in the Netherlands." In *Four Centuries of Dutch American Relations 1609-2009*, edited by Hans Krabbendam, A.C. van Minnen, and Giles Scott-Smith. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Boom, 2009.
- Veenendaal, Augustus J. "Dutch Investments in the United States." In *Four Centuries of Dutch American Relations 1609-2009*, edited by Hans Krabbendam, A.C. van Minnen, and Giles Scott-Smith. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Boom, 2009.
- Westermann, John C. *The Netherlands and the United States: Their Relations in the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century*. Illustrated edition. Springer Science & Business Media, 2012.
- Wilhelmina, Queen of the Netherlands. "The Queen Looks at the Future." In *Important Statements of H.M. Queen Wilhelmina on War and Peace Aims*, 1943. https://www.dbnl.org/tekst/wilh001quee01_01/wilh001quee01_01_0012.php.
- Wivel, Anders. "From Peacemaker to Warmonger? Explaining Denmark's Great Power Politics." *Swiss Political Science Review* 19, no. 3 (2013): 298-321. <https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12043>.
- Wood, Bernard. *The Middle Powers and the General Interest*. Ottawa: The North-South Institute, 1988.

