

Master thesis

‘Half a truth is often a great lie’: Uncovering Israel’s public
diplomacy strategies after October 7th

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Abstract

Israel's offensive on Palestine that began in October 2023, and the conflict with Iran in April 2024, has led to the highest point of the country's global public opinion crisis. Consequently, (digital) public diplomacy has become a priority through the nation-branding of Israel and nation-shaming of the Palestinians. In previous studies, Israel's use of social media, specifically Twitter (now X), has been characterised by the tailoring of content towards different groups of society, the constant calls for support, and a tendency to brand itself as the only victim. In my paper, I identify the continuation of these trends in the accounts @Israel and @IDF after October 7th. Firstly, calls for support continue to be a priority in Israel's social media accounts, whether by appealing to the public, celebrities or politicians. Secondly, the use of hashtags helps Israel stay relevant. However, this period differs from previous ones in that hashtags are now used less with the goal to inform, and instead they convey clear political messages, with nation-branding and nation-shaming strategies. Additionally, Israel's branding as a victim continued after October 7th, together with the shaming of Hamas and anyone who supported them. After the addition of Iran to the conflict, Israel stopped stressing its innocence, and instead highlighted the resilience of its population. Furthermore, the account of the Israel Defence Forces abandoned its activism to focus almost exclusively on operational updates and other military information. These changes evidence a slight turn in Israel's public diplomacy, even with a number of its traditional pillars still present.

Keywords: Public diplomacy, Digital Public Diplomacy, Hasbara, Israel, Nation-branding, Nation-shaming

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1. Introduction

On October 7th 2023, the Palestinian group Hamas committed an attack that took the lives of over a thousand Israelis, most of whom civilians. Consequently, Israel began a military operation centred on Gaza, but targeting also some of Hamas's allies like the Iranian consulate in Damascus, Syria. The goal was to make one message clear: Israel would not tolerate another attack.¹ However, hostilities in the region escalated and, on April 13th 2024, Iran carried out a series of unsuccessful drone attacks against Israel. This makes for a complicated landscape in which the international public may have trouble positioning themselves. However, Israel's offensive in Gaza has left almost fifty thousand confirmed civilian deaths, leading international public opinion to turn their sympathy towards the Palestinians. In fact, surveys from March 2024 evidence that Israel is now viewed in an increasingly negative light in virtually every country, with the exception of the United States.² Even there, president Joe Biden warns that Israelis are "facing major, possibly generational damage to their reputation".³ Moreover, this turn of public opinion has institutional consequences. Western countries such as Spain, Ireland and Norway made the move to officially recognise the Palestinian state in May 2024, with others following after them.⁴ More importantly, South Africa brought a case against Israel to the International Court of Justice on the grounds of genocide, leading to one of the most significant institutional responses against Israel, now convicted of committing plausible genocide.⁵ Throughout this crisis of international image, Israel has been consistently active on its social media, like Twitter, giving constant reminders of the suffering of October 7th and calling for international support.

1.1 Research question

It is clear that social media is an essential element of modern day wars. With the globalisation of democracy, international public opinion has become a crucial part of participating in and winning

¹ Vali Nasr, "Why Iran and Israel Stepped Back From the Brink", *Foreign Affairs*, May 14, 2024, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/why-iran-and-israel-stepped-back-brink#:~:text=Israel's%20strike%20on%20the%20Iranian.7%20can%20never%20be%20repeated>.

² Yasmeen Serhan, "How Israel and Its Allies Lost Global Credibility", *Time*, April 4, 2024, <https://time.com/6963032/israel-netanyahu-allies-global-standing/>

³ Serhan, "How Israel and Its Allies".

⁴ Joseph Wilson, Melanie Lidman and Joseph Krauss, "Norway, Ireland and Spain say they will recognize a Palestinian state, deepening Israel's isolation", *AP News*, May 23, 2024, <https://apnews.com/article/norway-palestinian-state-ddfd774a23d39f77f5977b9c89c43dbc>

⁵ Raffi Berg, "What is South Africa's genocide case against Israel at the ICJ?", *BBC News*, May 24, 2024, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67922346>

any war. This is no different when it comes to Israel's attacks on Gaza since the October 7th Hamas attacks and the April 13th Iran attacks. Subsequently, the use of social media by Israel has sparked up many discussions, including some about their use of framing and other techniques to support their actions. It can be argued that this is part of a public diplomacy strategy with the goal of turning public opinion in favour of Israel and its actions. For that reason, I have chosen a research question that reflects this idea: *To what extent did the recent attacks on Israel in 2023 (Hamas) and 2024 (Iran) influence the country's digital public diplomacy practices?* In order to reach a final answer, I first explore Israel's previous public diplomacy behaviour through the subquestions: *What is Israel's current political landscape?*, *How did Israel conduct public diplomacy before October 7th?* and *How did Israel conduct digital public diplomacy before October 7th?* An answer to this question is provided through secondary sources. Alternatively, my primary source analysis explores the subquestions: *What was Israel's Twitter behaviour in the three weeks before October 7th?*, *What was Israel's Twitter behaviour in the three weeks after October 7th?* and *What was Israel's Twitter behaviour in the week after April 13th?* The answers to these questions will be the building blocks to my main RQ.

My research question is relevant because of several reasons. In the first place, social media is a relatively new form of communication and is ever changing, meaning that new techniques and strategies are constantly developing. This is especially true for digital public diplomacy, since countries are undergoing a process of adaptation to the new digital platforms. Additionally, Hirschberger demonstrates how there is a significant difference in public diplomacy behaviour in times of crisis, as opposed to times of peace.⁶ Since Israel is currently in one of its largest crises of public opinion, it is critical to have a good understanding of how Israel uses its social media with the goal of obtaining public support. The literature on Israel's social media behaviour is extensive for previous conflicts. However, the most recent period has been studied by only one article so far, in which Fridman, Michlin-Shapir and siman-Tov attempt to give recommendations for a more effective public diplomacy policy.⁷ Alternatively, in my research, I expect to offer an explorative overview of Israel's use of social media after October

⁶ Bernd Hirschberger, *External Communication in Social Media During Asymmetric Conflicts: A Theoretical Model and Empirical Case Study of the Conflict in Israel and Palestine* (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2021).

⁷ Ofer Fridman, Vera Michlin-Shapir, David siman-Tov, "From Hasbara (Public Diplomacy) to Influence in the Gaza War", *INSS* (2023).

7th and April 13th. The addition of this new period in the literature allows for a clearer view of the evolution of Israel's social media activity.

The rest of this chapter will establish the basis to answer my research question through a historiography on public diplomacy and its Israeli version ('hasbara'), as well as an introduction of the theoretical concepts that drive my research (nation-branding and nation-shaming) and the method of hand-coding. The second chapter uses secondary sources to analyse the state of the art in Israeli public diplomacy and branding. Subsequently, chapter 3 includes the analysis of primary sources in three different time periods, as well as the results that answer my research question. Lastly, my conclusion chapter puts an end to this thesis.

1.2 Historiography

In order to properly understand Israel's use of social media, it is first important to have a good conception of its basis. In this section, I first introduce diplomacy and the subsequent soft power and public diplomacy. In this, I emphasise the relevance of diplomatic methods in international relations and the central role of foreign audiences in public diplomacy. After this, digital public diplomacy is presented as the most recent development in the field of diplomacy and the basis of this research. Lastly, I give an overview of Israeli public diplomacy ('hasbara') in history.

The evolution of Public Diplomacy

Diplomacy dates as far back as the first human societies, despite the fact that it is often associated with the Westphalian state.⁸ In fact, while Western diplomacy is the most common approach to it, diplomacy has existed in nearly every civilisation, with the goal of managing differences with other nations and facilitating external communications.⁹ In 1917, Sir Ernest Satow defined diplomacy as "the process and machinery by which negotiation is carried out".¹⁰ The context of this is significant, since the definition was developed at the height of the first World War, a violent conflict that left little space for peaceful methods and negotiation. However, this definition does not take into consideration the risks of unsuccessful negotiation or the reasons why diplomacy is carried out. Therefore, more recent definitions of diplomacy refer to "the conduct of human affairs by peaceful means, employing techniques of persuasion and

⁸ Donna Lee and B. Hocking, "Diplomacy", in *International Encyclopaedia of Political Science*, eds. Bertrand Badie, Leonardo Morlino and Dirk Berg-Schlosser (Sage, 2011), 1.

⁹ Lee and Hocking, "Diplomacy", 3.

¹⁰ Jeremy Black, *A History of Diplomacy* (London: Reaktion, 2010), 12.

negotiation”.¹¹ Indeed, peace is one of the chief aspects of diplomacy. Diplomacy is the resource that creates harmonious relations between countries and, without it, war is a common consequence. In other words, as Berridge evidenced in 2010, diplomacy allows states to pursue their foreign policy interests without resorting to force.¹² Traditionally, realist and orthodox research refers to diplomacy as an activity that only public officials can carry out, therefore leaving it exclusively to governments to partake in diplomatic activity.¹³ However, most modern work agrees that diplomacy has been democratised and extended to the wider world.¹⁴ Thus, it is no longer the exclusive task of ministries of foreign affairs to defend their country’s interests, but in an increasingly globalised world, diplomatic network-based approaches open up negotiations to all kinds of actors.¹⁵ Similarly, it is no longer foreign officials that are the target of diplomatic efforts. Now, the general worldwide audience also becomes the recipient of different forms of public diplomacy.

In order to understand public diplomacy, it is important to first understand its basis, soft power. Soft power is a concept coined in 1990 by Joseph Nye, and it has become essential in the field of international relations. In his paper, Nye talks of the traditional way of managing disagreements with other countries, often through war, militarisation and violent and physical attacks. In opposition to this, he introduces a new, more modern world that he recognised was starting to form. In this world, military operations and the overall use of force are too risky because they could lead to countries losing alliances and eventually escalate into larger conflicts¹⁶. Instead, we (by 1990) had reached a new era of soft power, or co-optive power. This marks a difference between the post-Cold War world and its predecessor. He defines the concept as “the ability of a country to structure a situation so that other countries develop preferences or define their interests in ways consistent with its own.”¹⁷ Additionally, he identifies the sources of soft power in elements such as ideology, cultural attraction and international institutions. These features, instead of threatening other states with violent attacks and eventual war, contribute to decision making and international agreements through the creation of an uneven interdependence

¹¹ Lee and Hocking, “Diplomacy”, 1.

¹² G.R. Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 1.

¹³ Lee and Hocking, “Diplomacy”, 4.

¹⁴ Black, *A History of Diplomacy*, 23.

¹⁵ Lee and Hocking, “Diplomacy”, 6.

¹⁶ Joseph Nye, “Soft Power”, *Foreign Policy*, 80 (1990), 156.
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/page/joseph_nye_soft_power_journal.pdf

¹⁷ Nye, “Soft Power”, 163.

between them¹⁸. This way, for example, a country that has more power in the United Nations can easily leverage in their favour negotiations with other countries, since it has the power to influence decisions that could benefit or undermine others. One essential feature of this soft power is public diplomacy, as it influences foreign citizens that, in turn, have a say in their government.¹⁹

As established, a global public that favours a country is desired since this has a direct effect on the governments they elect and international relations. Therefore, public diplomacy is essential in foreign policy. Nevertheless, the practice of public diplomacy has been present since long before the term. While ‘soft power’ was introduced by Joseph Nye in the 1990s, in a period where violent, military conflicts were no longer the norm, there had already been talks of “power over opinion” during WW1.²⁰ Later on, Tuch defined public diplomacy as “a government’s process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and policies”.²¹ This communication is the government’s way of structuring a situation, influencing other countries’ citizenries in their favour and, therefore, building soft power. While some authors, such as Berridge, level public diplomacy with state-led propaganda²², it is important to remember that this denomination has no effect on the strategies and goals of public diplomacy. Instead, the focus of the matter is on the characteristics of public diplomacy: a feature of soft power with a direction towards the foreign public, as well as a goal to influence opinions on the country. Moreover, its more significant changes came with new technologies, establishing the field of digital public diplomacy.

Digital Public Diplomacy

The academic investigation of digital public diplomacy did not kick off until 2012, when social media had settled into everyone’s lives and made its way into many fields.²³ Additionally, two versions of the term are distinguished: Digital Public Diplomacy (DPD) 1.0, with virtual

¹⁸ Nye, “Soft Power”, 158.

¹⁹ Jan Melissen, *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Power Relations* (Springer, 2005), 4.

²⁰ Melissen, *The New Public Diplomacy*, 4.

²¹ Melissen, *The New Public Diplomacy*, 11.

²² Berridge, *Diplomacy*, 179.

²³ Ilan Manor, "Chapter 17: Digital public diplomacy", in *A Research Agenda for Public Diplomacy*, ed. Eytan Gilboa (Edward Elgar, 2023), 268.

embassies and unilateral communication, and DPD 2.0, beginning around 2008 and referring to public diplomacy that takes place in platforms such as social media, allowing for a double-sided communication with citizens. In fact, Cull identifies the creation of relationships around online communities, the reliance on user generated content and the horizontal (as opposed to vertical in the 1.0 version) networks of information sharing as the three main characteristics of DPD 2.0.²⁴ These traits hint to the growing importance of non-government users in social media platforms. Additionally, the differences between DPD 1.0 and 2.0 signify the societal changes that technology and globalisation had brought. While earlier forms of (digital) public diplomacy prioritised state actors, the rise of social media has made citizens all over the world increasingly central. In these platforms, there is a massive flow of content from all sectors of society, and official channels no longer get preferential treatment. Instead, it is ‘someone like you’, ordinary citizens, powering these platforms by creating content that reflects the interests and values of each individual, and diplomats are now left to fight for the readers’ attention.²⁵

The struggle for public attention is a central element to social media and Digital Public Diplomacy 2.0. As social media advances, algorithms do too. This way, tailored content is presented to each individual user, reflecting their identity and interests, and creating new communities around them.²⁶ Since official accounts fall out of the scope of many such communities, it is now a priority for those posting on social media to steer their posts towards individual citizens. Algorithms are a key concept in this process, as they determine when and to whom a post is shown. This leads to two different reactions from public diplomacy: firstly, the identification of biased groups and the subsequent creation of posts that reinforce this bias, which is often in favour of the government.²⁷ However, another, more common way for digital diplomats to use algorithms is by adapting to them. More specifically, Cull suggests that social media (specifically tweets) should remain relevant within their scope, their poster should be cooperative with other similar accounts and realistic about the powers of digital public diplomacy (thus not having unrealistic expectations), and they should also know their audience

²⁴Nicholas J. Cull, “The Long Road to Public Diplomacy 2.0: The Internet in US Public Diplomacy”, *International Studies Review* 15, no.1 (2013): 125, <https://doi.org/10.1111/misr.12026>

²⁵ Nicholas J. Cull, “WikiLeaks, public diplomacy 2.0 and the state of digital public diplomacy” *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy* 7 (2011): 3, <https://doi.org/10.1057/pb.2011.2>

²⁶ Corneliu Bjola, Jennifer Cassidy and Ilan Manor, “Public Diplomacy in the Digital Age” *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 14, no. 1-2 (2019): 91, <https://doi.org/10.1163/1871191X-14011032>

²⁷ Bjola, Cassidy and Manor, “Public Diplomacy in the Digital Age”, 91.

and listen to them.²⁸ Additionally, he suggests that posts must be created not necessarily with the intention to go viral, but with elements that make them easy to share and pass on, reaching more people.²⁹ These recommendations lead to a positive and effective relationship between a diplomat and their social media followers. Nevertheless, feeds also have power on how a tweet is interpreted, and a member of the audience may only find a tweet relevant when it concerns a topic that has consistently been present in their timeline.³⁰ As a way to overcome posts getting lost in the massive flows of social media data, ‘visual enhancement highlights’ are used, catching the user’s attention, and often portraying a large amount of information in a smaller format.³¹ Additionally, engagement with posts has an effect on how algorithms deal with them. One solution for this is to create ‘emotional framing’, as a way to intensify the reader’s feelings and therefore stimulate interactions with the post.³²

As previously stated, one principal characteristic of Digital Public Diplomacy 2.0, and social media platforms in general, is the fact that discourse now becomes democratised, with every individual having increasing opportunities to speak their mind and be heard. While listening to the people is one of the most common recommendations to public diplomats, it is incredibly common that this dimension of social media will be ignored.³³ However, it is important to remember the relevance of citizen input and public participation through diplomacy, as this can legitimise policy choices and contribute to a better public image. When listening, Digital Emotional Intelligence is an important tool.³⁴ This is being able to read emotions and feelings through a screen, and determining which topics have a particular emotional reaction from the public. While this is helpful when it comes to being sensitive to negative reactions and maintaining a positive relationship with the readers, it also aids in determining the creation of emotionally framed content, as explained above, by evaluating topics and the emotions they trigger. However, feelings differ for every individual, and this is clear in the fragmentation of reality that is visible in social media and digital public diplomacy.³⁵ Here, one fact can be experienced differently by different sectors of the audience, and therefore presented in different

²⁸ Cull, “WikiLeaks”, 7.

²⁹ Cull, “The Long Road”, 137.

³⁰ Manor, “Digital Public Diplomacy”, 276.

³¹ Bjola, Cassidy and Manor, “Public Diplomacy in the Digital Age”, 86.

³² Bjola, Cassidy and Manor, “Public Diplomacy in the Digital Age”, 86.

³³ Cull, “WikiLeaks”, 5.

³⁴ Bjola, Cassidy and Manor, “Public Diplomacy in the Digital Age”, 88.

³⁵ Manor, “Digital Public Diplomacy”, 275.

ways. It is important for a digital diplomat to display events in a way that puts forward a country's values and to establish a positive online persona.

Nevertheless, the fragmentation of reality on social media is not exclusively tied to emotions and interpretations. In fact, its most important cause is instead the spread of misinformation. The universalisation of access to social media and information has led to some reframing facts or simply sharing false information in order to lean readers towards certain ideas. As Bjola, Cassidy and Manor explain, "while some actors may use digital tools to create bridges, others use them to destroy bridges".³⁶ With this, both global and national audiences become a problem for public diplomacy, as some of its members are now victims, or even producers of misinformation.³⁷ As a consequence, official accounts are now tasked with the issue of clarifying disinformation and protecting their audience. In relation to this, information dominance is a growing technique for many countries. This consists of the "degrading or destroying" of any "enemy information capability" with the goal of controlling the narrative and creating one that supports the strategic goals of the country.³⁸ This way, diplomacy meets its objective of defending its state's values, policies and strategies in a (generally) global context.

Israeli public diplomacy ('hasbara')

In the specific case of Israel, public diplomacy is embodied by the concept of 'hasbara' (Hebrew for 'to explain') and is extensively studied in the literature. A definition of the term is controversial, as different sides of the conflict view it in different ways. For example, within Israel, 'hasbara' is simply the management of relations with the international public.³⁹ However, its opponents see it as a form of propaganda, "the manufacturing of discontent with, or toward, Palestinian self-determination, while simultaneously constituting consent for Israel's dominance."⁴⁰ It is clear from the literature that definitions of 'hasbara' are contingent on each author's views on Israel. Another relevant debate in the literature is the one regarding the placement of 'hasbara' within Israel's priorities. For example, Aouragh argues in 2016 that

³⁶ Bjola, Cassidy and Manor, "Public Diplomacy in the Digital Age", 93.

³⁷ Manor, "Digital Public Diplomacy", 272.

³⁸ Kalathmika Natarajan, "Digital Public Diplomacy and a Strategic Narrative for India" *Strategic Analysis* 38, no.1 (2014): 98, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2014.863478>

³⁹ Dervla Murphy, "Hasbara in Action" *Irish Pages* 9, no.2 (2015); 212, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44508361>

⁴⁰ Miriyam Aouragh, "Hasbara 2.0: Israel's Public Diplomacy in the Digital Age" *Middle East Critique* 25, no.3 (2016): 273, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2016.1179432>

Israeli hasbara has existed since the creation of the state, and has always had a prime position. In fact, she demonstrates that even during military conflicts, the management of public opinion is at the front of Israel's priorities.⁴¹ On the other hand, Medzini's 2015 article evidences how, despite its long history, 'hasbara remains a sideshow' in Israeli politics, which are instead focused on military conflicts.⁴² He therefore points out that, despite public diplomacy efforts being extensively present, military efforts are put first. Alternatively, in a paper that was, like Aouragh's, published in 2016, Jon Dart attempts to explain the historical negligence of Israel's public opinion management and states that the country had instead relied on its military superiority until the most recent years.⁴³ In other words, he denies that Israel paid any attention to its public image due to it being preoccupied with domination in the battleground. It is possible that these differences are owed to a divergence in the researchers methods and theoretical basis. In Medzini's and Aouragh's research, 'hasbara' is exclusively designated as Israel's words and narratives targeted to the world, whether this is through press releases or social media posts. Instead, Dart uses Israel's actions, their decision to host a football event, as an instance of hasbara. Therefore, he extends the limits of what public diplomacy can be. Nevertheless, Dart's claim that 'hasbara' has only been relevant to Israel in the most recent years is difficult to support, considering the heaps of literature focusing particularly on Israeli 'hasbara' through the years.

In fact, the origins of 'hasbara' date as far as almost two millennia back. In the first century, Flavius Josephus wrote *Against Apion*, a book where he argued against the anti-Jew claims of Apion, one of his contemporaneous thinkers. In this book, Josephus wrote in a respectful manner, without attempting to offend his opponent in any way.⁴⁴ According to Schleifer, this is a flaw of 'hasbara' that continued on to the latest years. Schleifer also mentions the 'hasbara' of the Middle Ages, which "was not done out of a desire to convince the opponent of the truth of Judaism, but out of a desire to survive in this undesired arena".⁴⁵ Therefore, criticism of the other was rarely present. These instances showcase the 'hasbara' of Judaism,

⁴¹ Aouragh, "Hasbara 2.0", 278.

⁴² Meron Medzini, "Hasbara in the Second Lebanon War: A Rebuttal" *Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs* 3 (2015): 39, <https://doi.org/10.1080/23739770.2007.11446272>

⁴³ Jon Dart, "'Brand Israel': hasbara and Israeli sport" *Sport in Society* 19, no.10 (2016): 1402, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17430437.2015.1133595>

⁴⁴ Ron Schleifer, "Jewish and contemporary origins of Israeli 'hasbara'" *Jewish Political Studies Review* 15, no.1/2 (2003): 126, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25834565>

⁴⁵ Schleifer, "Jewish and contemporary origins", 128.

which should not be confused with Zionism and the state of Israel. However, it is true that Zionists were inspired by their religious tradition after the establishment of Israel. After 1948, the goal was not to defend the Jewish religion, but the state of Israel, which now had to represent itself and its interests in the international scene. Schleiffer says, those who had escaped the ghettos now had to fight for integration and, more importantly, the global recognition of their new country.⁴⁶ For this, moral arguments were used, alleging to the ‘historical right’ to the land of Israel and the genocide the Jewish people had just experienced. Schleiffer maintains that, following the centuries-long tradition of ‘hasbara’, no ‘wicked’ content was created to turn the audience against Israel’s enemies, and the only goal was to obtain the favour of the international community.⁴⁷ However, not every author may agree with this statement.

In the last decade, many researchers have studied the historical characteristics of ‘hasbara’. One instance of this is Goodman’s 2017 article on the 1967 war and occupations. Goodman gives an overview of the different strategies followed and the logics that informed these choices. As she puts it, “explaining the ‘genocidal threat’ and ‘Arab rebelliousness’” were essential tenets of Israeli ‘hasbara’ during this conflict.⁴⁸ In other words, Israel attempted to justify its occupation of the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt, the Golan Heights in Syria and all of the remaining Palestinian territories by playing it not as an expansion attempt, but as a response to threats to Israeli existence. By disseminating Arab statements with anti-Semitic tones, as well as circulating images of Israeli victims, they managed to portray themselves as a vulnerable state that was forced into geographical expansion as a security measure. On a similar note, Murphy explains in 2015 how anti-Semitism has historically been weaponised by Israel.⁴⁹ Instead of taking responsibility for their actions when attacking and occupying their neighbours, Israel instead deflects any criticism by accusing its source of anti-Semitism. This way, the spotlight remains on the Jewishness of the country, and not on its actions. With Israel presenting itself as the representative and advocate for Jewish people all over the world, Jon Dart identifies how any criticism the country receives is most often dismissed, and instead marked off as anti-Semitism.⁵⁰ Finkelstein puts this as the “exploitation of the Nazi holocaust to deflect criticism of Israel's and

⁴⁶ Schleifer, “Jewish and contemporary origins”, 130.

⁴⁷ Schleifer, “Jewish and contemporary origins”, 131.

⁴⁸ Giora Goodman, “Explaining the occupation: Israeli hasbara and the occupied territories in the aftermath of the June 1967 war” *Journal of Israeli History* 36, no.1 (2017): 72-77, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13531042.2017.1366716>

⁴⁹ Murphy, “Hasbara in Action”, 186.

⁵⁰ Dart, “Brand Israel”, 1407.

its own morally indefensible policies".⁵¹ In fact, this use of the Holocaust has been widely criticised since, while victimising themselves for it, Israel supplied arms in other genocides such as the one that took place in Rwanda or the Armenian genocide committed by Azerbaijan. In more recent years, a similar trend has been found by Aouragh in which Israel attempts to persuade the public of its right to occupy Palestine, however fails to mention its attacks and segregation against the Palestinians.⁵² In short, it is clear how, since its beginnings, 'hasbara' has been focused on accusing critics of anti-Semitism, a technique that lives on.

However, while 'hasbara' has remained the same in some forms since its creation, it has also undergone dramatic changes, especially in the recent decades. More specifically, Digital Public Diplomacy 2.0 brought with it 'hasbara 2.0'. Indeed, 'hasbara 2.0' finds its base in the new technologies and social media platforms.⁵³ This is the result not only of technological advancements, but also of a new strategy of Israeli public diplomacy after previous failures. Therefore, in 2013, an informal 'hasbara' subdivision of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs resulted in an intensification of 'hasbara' activities. While it has always been directed towards foreign audiences, Aouragh establishes that 'hasbara 2.0' is characterised by the use of multilingual Israelis and more far-reaching transnational strategies.⁵⁴ Dart adds on to this, by evidencing how 'hasbara' is no longer only about the information that is shared with the international public, but also about who does it and how.⁵⁵ For example, a new target of 'hasbara 2.0' are university campuses, where a pro-Israel bias can be easily created through the offering of scholarships or aid in exchange for the active promotion of Israel in both physical and virtual spaces. Additionally, these virtual spaces have changed the way in which information is conveyed. Aouragh mentions how "the rhythms of journalistic storytelling have changed", with audiences now expecting real-time reactions to world events.⁵⁶ The forms of storytelling have also changed, as Seo makes clear, with visual elements being used increased in public opinion campaigns.⁵⁷ These findings lay the ground for 'hasbara's' new shape in the most modern times.

⁵¹ Murphy, "Hasbara in Action", 188.

⁵² Aouragh, "Hasbara 2.0", 278.

⁵³ Aouragh, "Hasbara 2.0", 286.

⁵⁴ Aouragh, "Hasbara 2.0", 284.

⁵⁵ Dart, "Brand Israel", 1416.

⁵⁶ Aouragh, "Hasbara 2.0", 288.

⁵⁷ Hyunjin Seo, "Visual Propaganda in the Age of Social Media: An Empirical Analysis of Twitter Images During the 2012 Israeli–Hammas Conflict", *Visual Communication Quarterly* 21, no.3 (2014), <https://doi.org/10.1080/15551393.2014.955501>

Nonetheless, ‘hasbara’ and Israel find criticisms in the literature coming from authors within and without the country. In fact, ‘hasbara’ is regarded as an unsuccessful practice by most, alleging to the fact that international public opinion on Israel is on the decrease. According to Israel’s opponents, one thing is clear: the failures of Israel’s public image are not due to ineffective ‘hasbara’ or public diplomacy, and are instead directly tied to Israel’s actions.⁵⁸ While part of the goal of ‘hasbara’ is to put Israeli military action in a better light, this becomes increasingly difficult when there is a constant stream of crimes that need to be justified.⁵⁹ Even Eban, one of the officials responsible for ‘hasbara’ during the 1967 war expressed how no form of public diplomacy or framing could deny the misery of those who were affected by Israel’s occupations.⁶⁰ Meanwhile, Fridman, Michlin-Shapir and siman-Tov offer the first overview of ‘hasbara’ in the October 7th conflict. They refuse to put any blame for the loss of public support on Israel’s actions, and instead focus on the nature of ‘hasbara’. As they put it, ‘hasbara’ takes its meaning (‘to explain’) too literally, and focuses too much on educating its public, without putting any thought into what the audiences may be interested in.⁶¹ Their argument is that Israel is losing the cyberwar against Hamas because Hamas appeals to the public’s emotions through a particular narrative, while Israel simply tries to inform, and not collect support. This is, to a degree, supported by Seo’s findings, which evidence Hamas’s posts during the 2014 conflict were mainly of emotional nature, while Israel’s fit in a more analytical framework.⁶² Schleifer makes a similar point when deeming ‘hasbara’ a historically submissive and overly respectful practice.⁶³ As a result, he states, ‘hasbara’ has rarely been effective against ‘Arab propaganda’, which he identifies as an aggressive sort of convincing based on attacking the opponent and manipulating facts. In short, while one branch of the literature believes that no amount of ‘hasbara’ can save Israel’s public image, there is another segment of scholarship that maintains changes in the strategy will bring better results.

In conclusion, my research will be informed by the historiographical work in the field of diplomacy. For that reason, I first established diplomacy as a centuries-long concept that has only in the most recent decades turned its focus from the relationships between diplomats to public

⁵⁸ Dart, “Brand Israel”, 1406.

⁵⁹ Aouragh, “Hasbara 2.0”, 2894.

⁶⁰ Goodman, “Explaining the occupation”, 86.

⁶¹ Fridman, Michlin-Shapir and siman-Tov, “From Hasbara”, 2.

⁶² Seo, “Visual Propaganda”, 158.

⁶³ Schleifer, “Jewish and contemporary origins”, 129.

diplomacy and the general public. This was intensified by the rise of Digital Public Diplomacy, in which diplomatic activities became democratised through social media. In the specific case of Israel, ‘hasbara’ is the most common term referring to public diplomacy, and the literature demonstrates it dates as far back as the creation of Israel itself. In line with the rest of the world, in the most recent years, ‘hasbara 2.0’ has appeared, with a focus on digital means. Public diplomacy and ‘hasbara’ are relevant fields of study in a time when international public opinion on Israel is rapidly decaying. In making up for this significant decrease in popularity, it is logical that Israel would seek out ways to improve the situation: namely, the creation of a national brand that appeals to the global public, as well as the shaming of their opponents in a way that will cause them to lose global support. My research will add on to the literature on ‘hasbara’ by analysing Twitter behaviour during the most modern conflict. In addition, none of the existing research includes concepts of nation-branding and nation-shaming within ‘hasbara’ and public diplomacy methods. Therefore, I use nation-branding and shaming theory as a way to incorporate their perspective into the literature.

1.3 Theoretical framework: nation branding and nation shaming

This paper builds on theories and concepts of nation branding and nation shaming. Nation branding was first conceived at the end of the 20th century, but has yet to receive a definitive definition. This field takes after the study of company marketing, and essentially treats the nation as a brand that needs to be promoted. Therefore, Kotler and Gertner define a nation brand as “The sum of beliefs and impressions that people have of that place. The image represents a simplification of a large number of associations and pieces of information connected with a place. They are the product of mind trying to process and pick out essential information from huge amounts of data of a place”.⁶⁴ In other words, a nation brand is based on collective stereotypes towards the particular nation, and nation branding is the management of this through positive forms of communication.⁶⁵ Nation branding is often associated with economic and financial reasoning, however this is not always the case. One reason why a country may choose to take the path of nation branding is to distinguish and position themselves among other

⁶⁴ Andy W. Hao, et al., “Two decades of research on nation branding: a review and future research agenda”, *International Market Review* 38, no.1 (2021): 48, <https://doi.org/10.1108/IMR-01-2019-0028>

⁶⁵ Hirschberger, *External Communications*, section 2.2.2

nations.⁶⁶ Indeed, nation branding is done with three elements in mind: desired long-term future, values and purpose.⁶⁷ For that reason, international relations are often at the centre of nation branding, as countries increasingly use marketing techniques to restore international credibility, increase international political influence, or stimulate partnerships with other countries.⁶⁸ In short, nation branding is a form of marketing used by states with financial and, more importantly, political goals.

Secondly, nation shaming is a less widespread, but still relevant aspect of this paper. Nation shaming is a position often taken simultaneously to nation branding, with the goal of diminishing support to an adversary.⁶⁹ The way this is done is by first identifying a negative experience or trait. This is often done with the audience's values in mind in order to have the intended effect of causing outrage or concern. Secondly, this negativity is attributed to the target actor. The best possible result of this technique is that the adversary will realise their faults and stop their behaviour. However, this is unlikely, and the goal is instead to diminish, or even prevent, any support directed at the adversary.⁷⁰ Together with nation branding, nation shaming contributes to the creation of a country image in which the first country is celebrated, while others are put down.

1.4 Sources

In relation to the corpus of my research, I will be studying and analysing 722 tweets from @Israel and @IDF. I divide my dataset into three periods: firstly, the three weeks before the October 7th attacks (from 18th September until October 7th 2023); secondly, the three weeks that followed said attacks (from October 7th until October 28th 2023) and, lastly, the week that followed Iran's attacks on Israel (from April 13th until April 20th 2024). The choice of this timeframe is with the intention of capturing the direct effects that two attacks on their citizens had on the Israeli government and army's public diplomacy strategy. Not only this, but the fact that the weeks that preceded the October 7th attacks are included allows me to identify differences and similarities between Israel's social media activity before and after the events.

⁶⁶ Hlynur Gudjonsson, "Nation branding", *Place branding and public diplomacy* 1 (2005): 285, <https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.pb.5990029>

⁶⁷ Leslie de Chernatony, "Adapting brand theory to the context of nation branding", in *Nation Branding: Concepts, Issues, Practice*, ed. Keith Dinnie (Burlington: Elsevier, 2008), 16.

⁶⁸ De Chernatony, "Adapting brand theory", 316.

⁶⁹ Hirschberger, *External Communications*, section 2.2.1

⁷⁰ Hirschberger, *External Communications*, section 2.2.1

Additionally, the tweets will come from two of the official, English-speaking Israeli accounts: Israeli Defense Forces account (@IDF) and the official account of the state of Israel (@Israel) which, at the time of writing, states in its description that it is managed by the Digital Diplomacy Team of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The choice of these two accounts is due to the fact that they are run by both the diplomatic and the military branch of the Israeli government, and communicate with the English-speaking communities of Jews and non-Jews all over the world, therefore representing the state of Israel and its values and ideas to the world. Additionally, @Israel is run by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which, according to Berridge, is the main source of foreign policy and has expertise on how to deal with foreign publics.⁷¹ @IDF is run by the military, an essential part of Israeli society as I will demonstrate in the following chapters. Considering the volume of these data (with over a dozen tweets per account per day in some periods), retweets and responses or Twitter ‘quotes’ will not be studied, instead focusing on the original tweets posted by both accounts. This is with the exception of instances in which Israel replies or Twitter ‘quotes’ (this is another tool for responding to tweets, but in this case the response is treated by the platform as a regular post and not a conversation between two accounts) its own posts. With each tweet, I will attempt to identify the strategies of nation branding and shaming present and find meaning in them.

My choice of sources is the most adequate for answering my research question. My research goal is to uncover official Israeli public diplomacy strategies. Therefore, accounts such as @IDF and @Israel are ideal, as they are directly managed by the Defence Forces diplomacy team and the country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, respectively. In addition, the choice of social media over any other platform is justified by the fact that social media posts portray an account’s real time reaction to particular events, thus allowing me to analyse Israel’s real time response to the studied attacks. Twitter is specifically suitable for this, as it is a microblogging platform that allows text, image and video content and has a significant volume of posts uploaded daily. Nevertheless, there are some downsides to my choice. Principally, while tweets allow me to study Israel’s final public diplomacy strategies, the process that led up to them is not visible. Therefore, it is difficult to fully understand the reasoning behind a particular post or a technique found in a tweet. This limitation could be overcome with documents that report the public diplomacy process, however access to this is most often restricted. Moreover, another choice that

⁷¹ Berridge, *Diplomacy*, 1.

was made in regards to my sources was related to the periods that I studied (i.e. three weeks before and after the October 7th attacks and one week after the April 13th Iran attacks). These are the most adequate choice, as they offer an insight into three aspects: Twitter activity during peace times, the immediate aftermath of a crisis, and the state of public diplomacy six months into said crisis. Even so, these periods are limited most importantly by the large period of time between October 7th and April 13th. Here, six months of activity remain unstudied, therefore losing some nuance in my findings and missing milestones in the evolution of Twitter diplomacy. Additionally, while both October 7th and April 13th were direct attacks on the Israeli population, the fact that the former caused hundreds of deaths while the latter had no casualties is likely to have an effect on Israel's attitude. Nonetheless these limitations, my choices of primary sources and studied periods is the most suitable to answer my research question.

1.5 Methodology

The analysis of my sources is qualitative and based on content analysis and close reading of my sources. This is done completely by hand through a coding process. The reasoning for choosing a human-led instead of automated method lies within my intention to conduct an in-depth analysis with certain terms that would be difficult to identify by a computer program. In fact, studies show the failure of automated coding methods to “identify complex, socially constructed, and unsettled theoretical concepts, often with ill-defined boundaries”.⁷² Instead, hand-coding provides a more flexible framework of analysis. However, this comes with a time constraint, as hand-coding is a more labour intensive method than its alternatives. This is, nevertheless, not a significant consideration in my research, as the corpus is not overwhelmingly large: it contains 728 tweets, 344 from @IDF and 378 from @Israel. In any case, the advantages of the hand-coding method rule out its disadvantages, and provide me with the tools to conduct a comprehensive analysis.

The first step of my analysis consists of collecting the data. No particular method of extraction is used here, as I use close to every single tweet posted by the @Israel and @IDF accounts in the given periods of 18th September 2023 and 28th October 2023, and 13th to 20th April 2024. This is excluding the exceptions specified in the ‘Sources’ section, which are

⁷² Laura K. Nelson et al, “The Future of Coding: A Comparison of Hand-Coding and Three Types of Computer-Assisted Text Analysis Methods” *Sociological Methods & Research* 50, no.1 (2021): 202, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0049124118769114>

manually factored out. Therefore, tweets are filtered by date thanks to Twitter's 'advanced search' tool and then manually collected onto a spreadsheet that includes their text, link, account, date and presence of media such as pictures, videos or screenshots. Once this is done, the coding process begins. Categories for coding can be of two different sorts: predetermined and based on previous research, or inductively developed in the process.⁷³ I use both types. For example, categories such as "emotional" are based on Rodley's research and his finding of "high arousal emotion posts" on Twitter and Facebook⁷⁴, and "antisemitism" is informed by studies such as the one by Moreno-Mercado and Calatrava-García.⁷⁵ At the same time, codes such as "Hamis is ISIS" are based on the repetition of this particular phrase (or hashtag) throughout the database. This way, the first phase of coding (open coding) becomes a process "in which the researchers essentially enter into a dialogue with the data, a back-and-forth comparative process of reading and re-reading a subset of the corpus to look for patterns"⁷⁶. Once these initial patterns have been established, all of the very specific codes are regrouped into more general categories in axial coding, where the core themes are identified based on the initial ones. This process is once again repeated with selective coding, leading to a final series of categories. This way, all of the initial open codes are narrowed down into broader categories that are easier to analyse.

In short, my research uses a method of hand coding with three steps: open, axial and selective coding. This allows me to code complex concepts that automated methods could not properly analyse, as well as to include predetermined codes originating in previous research. One limitation of this method is the lack of co-coders to conduct this research with me and ensure the precision of my analysis.⁷⁷ This, in turn, has an effect on the replicability of my research, as it becomes subjective and personal to a certain degree.⁷⁸ More importantly, the fact that all coding was done by hand meant that the process was rather time consuming. Due to the time constraints of writing this thesis, this fact led to my research only encompassing a small period of time.

⁷³ Brianna A. Lienemann et al., "Methods for Coding Tobacco-Related Twitter Data: A Systematic Review" *Journal of Medical Internet Research* 19, no.3 (2017): 8, 10.2196/jmir.7022

⁷⁴ Chris Rodley, "When Memes Go to War: Viral Propaganda in the 2014 Gaza-Israel Conflict", *The Fibreculture Journal* 27 (2015): 5.

⁷⁵ José Manuel Moreno-Mercado and Adolfo Calatrava-García, "Multilingual public diplomacy: Strategic communication of Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) in Twitter during Operation Guardian of the Walls" *Media, War and Conflict* 16, no.2 (2023).

⁷⁶ Claire Lauer, Eva Brumberger and Aaron Beveridge, "Hand Collecting and Coding Versus Data-Driven Methods in Technical and Professional Communication Research" *IEEE Transactions on Professional Communication* 61, no.4 (2018): 402, 10.1109/TPC.2018.2870632

⁷⁷ Lienemann et al., "Methods for Coding", 8.

⁷⁸ Lauer, Brumberger and Beveridge, "Hand Collecting and Coding", 403.

Nevertheless, conscious attempts are made throughout the research to undermine these limitations to the highest degree.

2. Israeli public diplomacy in previous conflicts

Israeli public diplomacy has more to it than it might initially seem. It is more than anything concerned with the state of politics in Israel in itself, but also its relations with the general public in other countries. Public diplomacy is defined as “the process by which direct relations with people in a country are pursued to advance the interests and extend the values of those being represented”⁷⁹. Therefore, it is of extreme importance to observe what type of techniques Israel uses in its public diplomacy efforts. With this goal, I will commence this section by offering a brief overview of the political landscape in Israel, answering my first subquestion *What is Israel’s current political landscape?*. Since the main targets of Israeli public diplomacy are foreign nations and the people living in them, I will first expand on the aspects found in international mainstream media which appear to favour Israel. This is in regards to my subquestion *How did Israel conduct public diplomacy before October 7th?* After this, I will finally delve into Israel’s social media activity, giving special attention to Twitter and answering my third subquestion *What was Israel’s Twitter behaviour in the week after April 13th?* The knowledge obtained through this chapter establishes a point of departure for the analysis of changes in Israeli public diplomacy in the latest conflict.

2.1 Israeli political landscape

Before going in depth into Israel’s public diplomacy, it is important to first have a look at its internal world and the reasons why public diplomacy may be needed. With the continuous fight between Israel and Palestine, it is understandable that the conflict takes some part in shaping Israeli politics. At its basis, the Israeli political system is a liberal democracy with three bodies: the executive, legislative, and judicial branch. The most relevant when considering the political situation in the country is the legislative one, embodied by the Knesset (or Parliament), as it is the 120 members of this institution that get voted by the population every four years. These are placed, like in many other countries, in an axis from left to right. However, the case of Israel is unique in the sense that voters not only must consider the parties’ position on social and economic issues, but an additional dimension is found. This is the Israel-Palestine conflict, going

⁷⁹ Paul Sharp, “Revolutionary states, outlaw regimes and the techniques of public diplomacy.”, in *The New Public Policy: Soft Power in International Relations*, ed. Jan Melissen. (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 106.

from parties that do not blatantly deny the possibility of a Palestinian state and oppose settlements in the West Bank at the left of the political spectrum, to parties that defend the opposite positions at the right.⁸⁰ Therefore, in the elections, three branches of political parties are considered for office. In the first place, the political right, with which 62 percent of the Israeli population identifies.⁸¹ In this group, we find Likud, the party of Benjamin Netanyahu, the Prime Minister at the time of writing (2024). Together with Likud, other parties represent the Israeli right, such as Otzma Yehudit, a far-right party, and some ultra-Orthodox parties. These parties defend right-leaning policies in both economic and social issues, as well as a more strict policy towards Palestine and the Arab world in general. On the other hand, the centrist and left-leaning parties, such as Yesh Atid and the Labour party, constitute the main opposition to the government. Lastly, the Arab population of Israel is represented in parties like Hadash-Ta'al and Ra'am. This overview of the Israeli political system should provide a basis for the rest of this subsection.

In the years between 2019 and 2023, Israel experienced five general elections, with the last ones establishing Benjamin Netanyahu as the repeat Prime Minister who, for the first time ever in the history of Israel, brought the far-right parties into his coalition. It is therefore not daring to say that Israel was in a political crisis long before the October 7th attacks, but it seems that Netanyahu is a constant in the Israeli government. Benjamin Netanyahu ascended to power for the first time in 1996, as the leader of the right-wing Likud, but also by presenting himself as a fierce opponent to the Oslo agreements that had been in negotiation around that time.⁸² Additionally, during the 1996 elections, Netanyahu was able to effectively position himself against his Labour party opponents by carrying out a political campaign against them.⁸³ This is the first proof of his capabilities to obtain public support. Despite the fact that he had to leave the Knesset in 1999, Netanyahu was reelected in 2009. During this election campaign and all the ones that followed, Netanyahu has been able to “tailor his politics to match public opinion”, presenting himself as a centre-rightist or a hard-right-winger depending on the political context

⁸⁰ Roi Zur and Ryan Bakker, “The Israeli parties' positions in comparative perspective” *Party Politics* 0 (2023): 7, <https://doi.org/10.1177/13540688231218917>

⁸¹ Ezra Hess, “What Israel's Political Landscape Says About the Course of the War in Gaza”, Council on Foreign Relations, May 15, 2024, <https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-israels-political-landscape-says-about-course-war-gaza>

⁸² Efraim Inbar, “Netanyahu takes over” *Israel Affairs* 4, no.1 (1997): 34, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13537129708719450>

⁸³ Inbar, “Netanyahu takes over”, 42.

at the time.⁸⁴ Additionally, since the 2016 elections, he has taken charge of the communications portfolio, therefore having the last word in any media communication.⁸⁵ In fact, the media is an essential element of Netanyahu's success. Domestically, Israel Hayom is among the most read newspapers in the country and has been unconditionally showing support to Netanyahu since its creation in 2007.⁸⁶ Internationally, while the traditional media plays a role, social media is Netanyahu's specialty. For around a decade, he has been using his Facebook and Twitter accounts on a daily basis and communicating with the citizenry of countries all over the world. In fact, he has accounts in both English and Hebrew, which contributes to opening up his ideas to the entire world.⁸⁷ He is the third most popular leader on the basis of social media followers, and was voted the 10th most admired person in the United States, something that definitely aids in his politics in the domestic and international fields.⁸⁸ In short, part of Israel's social media diplomacy efforts must be credited to its Prime Minister, who has a consistent online presence.

Despite the (until recently) unmovable popularity of Netanyahu, political instability is at an all time high in Israel, judging by the constant calls to the polls. There are two reasons for this: the increasing de-democratisation of the country, and the growing polarisation. In the first place, it is relevant to remember that democracy is not only about the right to vote, but also about human rights, checks and balances, and the division of powers. Nevertheless, these aspects have long been challenged in Israeli politics. Netanyahu has been indicted for corruption on three occasions, something that may have him end up in prison.⁸⁹ Not coincidentally (at least according to many who oppose him), he was quick to impose reforms to the Israeli democratic system as soon as he returned to power in 2022. These reforms "aimed to weaken the courts and concentrate power in the hands of the executive by granting the government control over the selection of judges and allowing parliament to override Supreme Court rulings."⁹⁰ In other words, Netanyahu's new system would grant him even more power and allow him to control the judiciary, under the excuse that the executive is the only power that is elected and is therefore the

⁸⁴ Aluf Benn, "The End of the Old Israel: How Netanyahu Has Transformed the Nation" , *Foreign Affairs* 95, no. 4 (2016): 24

⁸⁵ Benn, "The End of the Old Israel", 22.

⁸⁶ Yaron Katz, "How Netanyahu's New Media Policy is Influencing Israeli, American and Global Politics", *International Relations and Diplomacy* 5, no.8 (2017): 507, doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2017.08.004

⁸⁷ Katz, "How Netanyahu's New Media Policy", 505.

⁸⁸ Katz, "How Netanyahu's New Media Policy", 501.

⁸⁹ Noam Gidron, "Why Israeli Democracy Is in Crisis", *Journal of Democracy* 34, no.3 (2023): 36, <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2023.a900431>.

⁹⁰ Gidron, "Why Israeli Democracy", 33.

most democratic. This undermines the principles of democracy, and led to extensive protests all over the country. Related to the de-democratisation of Israel, polarisation is an ever-growing challenge in the country. Between 2009 and 2023, dual polarisation rose by 180 percent. This is “a clear division between two opposing and antagonistic political camps”.⁹¹ While polarisation may not always be inherently negative, such levels of it lead to the undermining of the neutral rules and institutions of democracy, allowing them to become increasingly biased and politicised, and therefore compromising the positive aspects of the system. In short, the rules of the game in Israel are currently in a process of change for the worse from the perspective of democracy.

Not only is the loss of democracy an issue in Israeli politics, but also the ever-present militarisation of the political system. This begins with the fact that political leaders are often former members of the army, like Netanyahu being a veteran of the special forces.⁹² But it does not end there. Since the creation of Israel in 1948, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have been a key pillar in its society. This applies to almost any point in the history of the country, with the exception of the 1980s and 90s. In this period, the unnecessary deaths of Israeli soldiers triggered an anti-war/anti-military movement in most sectors of society that prioritised diplomatic efforts over military interventions.⁹³ However, the not-so-peaceful Second Intifada of the 2000s and other conflicts around the time took away all the progress made in previous decades and brought back a sense of necessity towards the army as a means of protection for the whole of society. In fact, Císcar says, the Israeli military is profoundly intertwined with its society, and therefore politics, for three reasons: firstly, the reality of war and the constant threat of war against. Secondly, the fact that an immense majority of the Israeli population is mandated to serve the army, therefore bringing together different sectors of the population and creating a certain social cohesion among them. Lastly, the reality that the survival of the country depends on its military capabilities has led to the army not being taken for granted, and instead being considered an essential part of Israeli life.⁹⁴ In short, militarisation is one of the chief characteristics of the

⁹¹ Iddo Porat, “Political Polarisation and the Constitutional Crisis in Israel”, *Israel Law Review* 56, no.3 (2023): 370, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223723000213>

⁹² Jairo Císcar, “Israel and the role of war and the Army in its society: A 3,000-year relationship”, Universidad de Navarra, accessed June 19, 2023, <https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/detalle1/-/blogs/israel-and-the-role-of-war-and-the-army-in-its-society-a-3-000-year-relationship-3>

⁹³ Yagil Levy, “Israel: A Politically Monitored Military in a Militarized Society”, in *Oxford Research Encyclopedias, Politics*, 2020, <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1895>

⁹⁴ Císcar, “Israel and the role of war”

Israeli political landscape due to the country's reliance on its army and its links throughout all sectors of society.

All of these domestic politics issues are aggravated by a crisis of international public opinion. In fact, international public opinion on Israel has historically been at its best during periods of peace, such as the Oslo accords in the 1990s.⁹⁵ For this reason, Dart states that the two Palestinian Intifadas (1987–1993 and 2000–2005) have damaged Israeli public image, as these brought attention to Israel's non-peaceful acts against the Palestinians.⁹⁶ While this is true for the general global public, it is important to point out that public opinion on Israel varies between countries, with the Middle East and North Africa being consistently against it, Europe being divided, and the United States being firmly pro-Israel.⁹⁷ However, the last decade has seen changes even in the US, where some Democrat candidates are slowly becoming more and more critical of Israel and their policies towards Palestine.⁹⁸ This trend has been dramatically more obvious since the beginning of the 2023-2024 offensive on Gaza. In fact, most countries in the world now have a negative opinion on Israel, with even the US being neutral instead of positive.⁹⁹ This crisis of public opinion on Israel evidences the country's need for public diplomacy in the past two decades and, especially, now.

In conclusion, Israeli politics are a complicated field. In regards to the parties, there is a very clear axis that separates them on the basis of their attitudes towards the Palestinian question. However, the party and democratic system is in crisis due to the increasing de-democratisation of the country and polarisation of the population. Benjamin Netanyahu, the long-standing leader of Israel is at least partly responsible for this. He has governed for a total of over a decade and a half, giving primacy to his media image both nationally and internationally, but has not been able to resolve the instability issues of Israeli politics. Additionally, militarisation is prominent in Israel and has direct effects on the political system. All of this, together with decreasing sympathy for Israel in the global arena, justifies growing efforts in public diplomacy. In short,

⁹⁵ Eytan Gilboa, "Public Diplomacy: The Missing Component in Israel's Foreign Policy", *Israel Affairs* 12, no.4 (2006): 715, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310600890067>

⁹⁶ Dart, "Brand Israel", 1402

⁹⁷ Raphael BenLevi, Amnon Cavari and Lesley Terris, "Global public opinion toward Israel: mapping and assessing the determinants of public attitudes in 45 countries", *Israel Affairs* 25, no.6 (2019): 1010, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2019.1670442>

⁹⁸ Jonathan Rynhold, "Democrats' Attitudes toward the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict", *Middle East Policy* 27, no.4 (2020): 51, <https://doi.org/10.1111/mepo.12526>

⁹⁹ Serhan, "How Israel and Its Allies"

the political landscape of Israel is currently dealing with various issues, which may in turn affect their public diplomacy strategies and their need for public diplomacy in itself.

2.2 Israel in the international media

The media in which public diplomacy takes place. Therefore, it is relevant to look at the ways Israel dealt with the press and other forms of media before (and during) the popularisation of social media, as many elements of traditional public diplomacy may seep into a country's online behaviour. This section therefore sheds light on Israel's non-digital public diplomacy.

Despite issues in Israeli politics, international media have a tendency to misreport in favour of Israel and its government. In fact, the media in many countries has often been called out on their propensity to participate in the normalisation of Israeli occupation and the omission of Israel's actions against the Palestinians. Additionally, Israel is clear about its need for international support and makes sure to use the international media to achieve its goals.¹⁰⁰ One first topic that arises when it comes to the international media's treatment of Palestinians is the fact that they are likely to be discredited, with their words and their side of the story being ignored. This way, for example, there is historically a form of international denial of the Nakba, until Israeli historians started investigating this event and confirmed that many Palestinians did in fact get expelled and attacked¹⁰¹. This is often because of the fact that Israeli sources tend to be taken more seriously by an international public, which is not without consequence. In a match to determine who is the loudest party in the conflict, and who is able to create the most prominent nation brand, Israelis continue to attempt to justify their presence in the territory by appealing to a Zionist version of the history of the territory, making the international public believe that the Jewish people do in fact deserve an ethno-state and that this should be located in the homeland of Palestinians.

Additionally, one of Israel's many strategies to deal with an international public is shedding doubt on the claims of Palestinians. This is a form of shaming, as it presents Palestinians as liars with the goal that the global audience will be outraged, reject their experiences, and instead accept those of the Israelis. This way, Israel refuses blame for their actions and switches the tone of the conversation. As Aouragh says, the media no longer

¹⁰⁰ Chomsky and Pappé, *On Palestine*, 95.

¹⁰¹ Chomsky and Pappé, *On Palestine*, 91.

condemns Israeli actions and instead “they answer the question, ‘Did Israel kill the Ghalias?’ when the question should be, ‘What do we do about the fact that Israel killed the Ghalias?’”¹⁰². With this strategy, not only do they avoid bearing the consequences of their actions, but they also delay aid and support for Palestinians as blame is often put on them. With the hegemony of the United States and its media being dominant in every form, it is of special relevance to analyse treatment of the conflict in American media. This is especially appalling, as it is seen that this branch of the press tends to follow the Israeli version of events and gives little space to Palestinian voices¹⁰³. There is not a critical view of Israeli attacks, instead focusing almost exclusively on Palestinian actions against the Israeli occupation, giving Israel a monopoly on suffering, which has become part of the Israeli brand.

One additional way in which Israel’s image is improved through Western media is the fact that it is often branded, nationally and internationally, as part of the West¹⁰⁴. This makes the country appealing to global and Western publics, therefore improving public opinion. In fact, the claim that Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East is repeatedly mentioned, even with this being a controversial statement that many scholars have tried to refute, due to the many flaws in the Israeli system.¹⁰⁵ In any case, this idea of a modern and democratic Middle Eastern state has earned Israel many privileges, as the brand it has created is undoubtedly appealing to the Western audiences. One example of this is Israel’s right to participate in Eurovision and represent itself in front of the whole of Europe. In this contest, Israel has often taken the opportunity to ‘win over’ European audiences, as well as give an image of a ‘tolerant, cosmopolitan, and progressive society’, and therefore consolidating this nation-brand of a liberal state¹⁰⁶. Despite this being a supposedly apolitical contest, nationalistic songs have been submitted by the Israeli officials since its early days, highlighting Israel’s suffering and its resilience. One relevant addition to this is their efforts to acknowledge women’s and LGBTQ rights in their songs, which are some of the many liberal values that Israelis associate with

¹⁰² Aouragh, “Hasbara 2.0”, 282

¹⁰³ Luke Peterson, *Palestine-Israel in the Print News Media: Contending Discourses* (New York: Routledge, 2015), 203.

¹⁰⁴ Raja Shehadeh. “No villa in the jungle”, in *Midnight on the Mavi Marmara*, ed. Moustafa Bayoumi (New York: OR books, 2010), 192.

¹⁰⁵ Ilan Pappé, *Ten myths about Israel* (London: Verso, 2017), 87.

¹⁰⁶ Daniel Mahla, “Distinguished Member of the Euro(trash) Family? Israeli Self-Representation in the Eurovision Song Contest” *Israel Studies* 27, no.2 (2022): 175, <https://doi.org/10.2979/israelstudies.27.2.12>.

Europe¹⁰⁷. In short, discrediting and shaming Palestinians and questioning their word, as well as using their voice in Europe as a weapon to convey their values and establish their nation-brand are some of the strategies through which Israel has ensured a favourable image in the international mainstream media. It is relevant to study traditional media behaviour, as this may be reflected on social media activity.

2.3 Israel and social media

In order to properly analyse the changes in Israel's social media after October 7th, it is necessary to first establish how exactly Israel behaved on their social media in previous years. In this section, I use secondary sources to explore the techniques Israel used on social media since its popularisation (around 2012).

Whereas the mainstream media in Western countries are likely to take Israel's side, this is a much less popular position among citizens, who resist falling for Israeli marketing. For this reason, Israel has considerably increased its efforts to reach the general public in a more personal manner during the last decade, specifically by using social media. And there is no understanding of Israel's social media communication without first an explanation of how it came to be. From the beginning of the millennium and the taking off of the Second Intifada, Israel felt a notable decrease in its popularity among the international public¹⁰⁸. This was made stridently evident with the 2012 conflict, where social media became a part of the battleground for the first time, with some calling it a "hashtag war".¹⁰⁹ In fact, some researchers identify this moment as key in the decay of Israel's international image. It is effectively relevant to mention how social media triggered many changes when it comes to many people's view on war, as it allowed for continuous reporting of events, as well as sharing graphic and unfiltered proof of the events of a conflict.¹¹⁰ This not only led to a change in public opinion, but even some of Israel's allies began to condemn their actions. It was made evident that Israel's public diplomacy needed a change to make up for the support lost.

It was at this point when the operation Pillar of Defense was put into action, restructuring the traditional forms of hasbara and instead establishing a new public diplomacy¹¹¹, or what some

¹⁰⁷ Mahla, "Distinguished Member?", 179.

¹⁰⁸ Aouragh, "Hasbara 2.0", 277.

¹⁰⁹ Chris Rodley, "When Memes Go to War", 2.

¹¹⁰ Moreno-Mercado and Calatrava-García, "Multilingual public diplomacy", 283.

¹¹¹ Moreno-Mercado and Calatrava-García, "Multilingual public diplomacy", 284.

others call hasbara 2.0¹¹². With this, Israel's social media activity became crucial in its public diplomacy attempts, especially through the official Israel and IDF accounts, but also with the use of civilian volunteers, like the account IsraelUnderFire, managed by a group of students in Herzliya University who were funded by the state of Israel and the IDF. It is like this that Israel restructured and modernised its interaction with foreign audiences and set up a new policy based on "(1) to focus on solving, in light of the international public opinion, establishing a multilevel dialogue with the audiences of the target country; (2) to praise the achievements of Israel in the political, military, cultural, academic and economic fields; (3) to integrate and mobilise civil organisations; (4) to consider the public opinion as an actor in the process of developing public policies; and (5) to integrate a formal monologue with informal dialogue"¹¹³. These steps influence all of Israel's social media activity, as they contribute to Israel's new nation-brand, approachable but effective.

However, social media diplomacy is not as simple as it might have initially seemed and Israel has run into several obstacles throughout the course of this hasbara 2.0. The first of this is domestic characteristics that have an effect on the shape of external communication. In the first place, the militarisation of Israeli politics has played a key role¹¹⁴. This, added to the fact that public diplomacy efforts are framed as a sort of war, has led to a militarisation of foreign policy where the Israeli Defence Forces have the most leverage in 'hasbara' decisions, a process that does not agree with the opinions of other sectors of the government. Additionally, Israeli coalition governments are often described as unstable and conflict between the parties is not unusual. This has on several occasions led to contradicting messages being sent out by the foreign ministry, creating social media posts that may be incoherent with Israeli policies or values.

Moreover, other issues of the modern Israeli public diplomacy efforts are tied into the structure of social media platforms themselves. In the first place, internet success is measured by how viral a post becomes and how many times it is shared¹¹⁵. With this, social media popularity is often fleeting, with posts going in and out of the spotlight every day, or even every hour.

¹¹² Aouragh, "Hasbara 2.0"

¹¹³ Moreno-Mercado and Calatrava-García, "Multilingual public diplomacy", 286.

¹¹⁴ Gal Hadari and Asaf Turgeman, "Public diplomacy in army boots: the chronic failure of Israel's Hasbara", *Israel Affairs* 24, no.3 (2018), 487, https://doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2018.1455374open_in_new

¹¹⁵ Rodley, "When Memes Go to War"

Therefore, a challenge is presented where messages have to be conveyed in the short-term, without any historical context, highlighting only the latest developments and completely neglecting previous events as these are deemed unimportant at the face of social media audiences¹¹⁶. This often leads to the creation of dramatic posts that appeal to the readers' feelings, instead of actually informative content¹¹⁷. Additionally, since the ultimate objective of social media is to become viral, content must appeal to a majority of the audiences. However, since "Political or military hasbara is, after all, not Coca-Cola."¹¹⁸ posts are often adapted to different audiences and niches. This way, while likely not becoming a global trend, every tweet is tailored to become popular among a different circle of society with different interests and ideas.¹¹⁹ This includes languages used, but also phrasing, images, and even the tone of a post.

Other than adaptation to the audiences and platforms, Israel's social media diplomacy officials use many more strategies to ensure 'brand Israel' is effectively communicated to the world. This has been studied in practically every platform, but in this section I will principally focus on Twitter as that is the object of my research. Rodley identified in his research some of the strategies and concepts employed by Israel during the 2012 conflict, right around the time when social media began to integrate itself into the Israel-Palestine conflict. These are neophilia, pop polyvocality, high arousal, recombinatory circulation, hashtags and transparent immediacy¹²⁰. In the first place, neophilia is described as the "seeking out of novelty of form"¹²¹, meaning that Israeli Twitter accounts look to innovate and use original formats and messages in their posts. As a result, one relevant part of the job of an Israeli digital diplomacy official is to make sure that there is a constant flow of new posts with different images, structures and wording, often taking after current social media trends. This adds on to the nation-brand of a modern and actualised Israel. Additionally, it is fit for a majority of social media platforms that posts would keep up with relevant trends, as these maintain people engaged while conveying a message¹²². In connection to neophilia, pop polyvocality, defined as "a phenomenon whereby a diverse range of voices make use of pop culture signifiers to join in civic debate through contributing derivations of widely recognised discursive forms", contributes to the engagement

¹¹⁶ Chomsky and Pappé, *On Palestine*, 87.

¹¹⁷ Moreno-Mercado and Calatrava-García, "Multilingual public diplomacy", 287.

¹¹⁸ Moreno-Mercado and Calatrava-García, "Multilingual public diplomacy", 285.

¹¹⁹ Rodley, "When Memes Go to War", 10.

¹²⁰ Rodley, "When Memes Go to War", 4-11.

¹²¹ Rodley, "When Memes Go to War", 4.

¹²² Rodley, "When Memes Go to War", 5.

with topics of popular interest, while still integrating Israeli values and ideas. One example of this is the use of meme templates extracted from well known movies or series, but adding text that relates to the conflict. Neophilia and pop polyvocality are some of the strategies used in the creation of ‘shareables’ - images and videos created with the goal of being shared. This type of posts is another prominent element that Rodley identifies in his research, and it is especially relevant when establishing the theory that Israel’s principal goal in its social media diplomacy is to spread its word to as wide a public as possible.

Furthermore, not only format matters to Israel when promoting its brand, but also content. Therefore, many posts on their Twitter accounts are of so-called high arousal emotion. Tweets of this type do not mean to make people laugh like in the former cases, but to bring out emotions such as fear or anger with the goal that this would justify Israel’s actions and get a higher percentage of the audience on their side¹²³. As with shaming, creating outrage in the audience may have an effect on who they support. When these types of posts come in, the dichotomy in Israel’s brand becomes clear: on the one hand, pop culture references and new formats downplay the effects of war on a strong and proud Israel, while emotional posts emphasise the (historical) suffering of their population.¹²⁴ However, some of these posts do not always achieve their initial intention and instead end up being the objects of recombinatory circulation, “whereby digital content produced by a counterpublic (or public) is resignified by an oppositional public (or counterpublic) in an antagonistic way.”¹²⁵ This way, it was common during the 2012 conflict that Israeli accounts would repost publications from pro-Palestinian media, but emphasised one aspect (such as certain words, pictures or tone) to convey a particular, critical message about the original poster. Once again, the Palestinian nation is shamed, in this case, for daring to post about their own suffering. Moreover, hashtags are used in order to boost engagement, either by reinforcing interactions between those who already support Israel, or by bringing into the conversation actors that were not involved in the first place. One example of the latter is the use of trending but unrelated hashtags (such as World Cup related ones) to send a pro-Israel message¹²⁶, but there are also multiple hashtags that are exclusively dedicated to

¹²³ Rodley, “When Memes Go to War”, 5.

¹²⁴ Medzini, “Hasbara in the Second Lebanon War”, 39.

¹²⁵ Rodley, “When Memes Go to War”, 8.

¹²⁶ Robert Mackey, “Young Israelis Fight Hashtag Battle to Defend #IsraelUnderFire”, *The New York Times* (New York), July 15, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/16/world/middleeast/young-israelis-fight-hashtag-battle-to-defend-israel-underfire.html?_r=1

discussing or informing about the conflict. Lastly, transparent immediacy is what makes social media, and specifically Twitter, more striking than any traditional form of media. This is defined by its objective to “immerse the viewer in the image and minimise or de-emphasise the mediation”¹²⁷, and it is what pulls many members of the audience towards following official accounts like Israel’s. Therefore, the posting of videos, images and testimonies on the ground tends to attract a larger audience, in addition to potentially affecting their views through graphic, unfiltered evidence of the battleground¹²⁸.

Outside of these strategies, Israel is known for using multiple other techniques in its social media diplomacy. The first of these is the use of demonising words and expressions that undermine and shame the Palestinian struggle. In this sense, Israel makes sure to emphasise facts, like Hamas (in charge of the Gaza strip) being a terrorist organisation, and use them as a justification for their actions¹²⁹. In fact, while they assure their audience that they have no intention of harming civilians, they always find a way to excuse their attacks on civilians by somehow blaming it on Hamas’ terrorism. This shames Hamas for being a terrorist group, but also the Palestinians for being under their rule, in an attempt to cause outrage in the audience and invalidate their claims. Additionally, this aspect of their social media strategy also includes downplaying Israeli actions. As Aouragh explains, “This may take the form of conflating the number of rockets fired from Israeli jets and warships with the number of Palestinian handmade grenades or stones. Another common form is the comparison between calling for revenge in Palestinian propaganda videos and actually committing military massacres. As a result impact is replaced by intent and this itself is pathologized and divorced from reason.”¹³⁰ This is how the brand of a law-abiding state in need of self-defence may be created towards the international public.

Another form of shaming Palestine supporters (whether civilians or world leaders) is through Israel’s constant flow of anti-Semitism accusations¹³¹. Under the Israeli narrative, anyone who does not support the state of Israel automatically hates Jewish people. Therefore, someone who criticises any aspect of Israel, even when it is guilty of violent attacks against the

¹²⁷ Rodley, “When Memes Go to War”, 3.

¹²⁸ Moreno-Mercado and Calatrava-García, “Multilingual public diplomacy”, 284.

¹²⁹ Nurit Peled-Elhanan. *Palestine in Israeli School Books: Ideology and Propaganda Education* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015), 78.

¹³⁰ Aouragh, “Hasbara 2.0”, 282.

¹³¹ Moreno-Mercado and Calatrava-García, “Multilingual public diplomacy”, 285.

Palestinian population, is also anti-Semitic. The effects of this strategy are two-fold: it brands the Israelis as a suffering people who carry a centuries-long struggle and, more importantly, shames the Palestinians and marks them as anti-Semites with the goal that some of their supporters will switch sides. Lastly, it is relevant to remember that all of the phenomena described in this section takes place in the specific context of Twitter, where content is rewarded based on shares. As a consequence, viral agitprop, “creative content intended to influence thoughts or behaviours that may or may not be produced by a government or formal institution”¹³² is a common trait of Israel’s social media activity. This results in the strategies and techniques described above being employed with the ultimate goal of obtaining sympathy globally. For this, American liberals are often targeted, since the United States is Israel’s principal contributor¹³³. Not only this, but celebrities and influencers are also a significant part of Israel’s intended audience, as their support can easily become a way to promote Israeli values and ideas¹³⁴. In short, before the 2023-2024 conflict, Israel used a violent social media strategy where they strive for maximal engagement on posts that convey their side of every conflict and brand them as an innocent nation trying to defend itself.

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter has explored Israel’s efforts to obtain and maintain support for their establishment and their actions. Domestically, politics have been poisoned with illiberal democracy, polarisation and militarisation. Despite this, the Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, is communications savvy and able to effectively communicate the Israeli brand to the world. This seeps into international media, which then goes on to glorify Israel and give it a platform in events such as Eurovision while neglecting Palestinian voices. Most importantly, Israel has been known in the last decade for its social media efforts. Here, there are constant attempts at creating viral, spreadable posts that spread Israel’s brand to the largest possible population. This is done through memes, but also emotional posts. In this chapter Israel’s public diplomacy techniques have been exposed in this chapter, which will provide a solid basis for my empirical research of Israeli tweets in the following sections.

¹³² Rodley, “When Memes Go to War”, 3.

¹³³ Aouragh, “Hasbara 2.0”, 285.

¹³⁴ Moreno-Mercado and Calatrava-García, “Multilingual public diplomacy”, 284.

3. Israeli public diplomacy in the 2023-2024 conflict

In this chapter, I explore the different strategies and techniques used by both the Israeli state (@Israel) and the Israeli military (@IDF) in the studied periods, chosen because they are the state of Israel's most prominent English-speaking official accounts. This begins with a brief analysis of the three weeks that led up to the October 7th attacks (September 18th to October 6th 2024), corresponding to my subquestion *What was Israel's Twitter behaviour in the three weeks before October 7th?* I identify a new stage in Israel's social media diplomacy beginning on October 7th, in line with the kick-off of the conflict against Hamas. This answers the question *What was Israel's Twitter behaviour in the three weeks after October 7th?* Later on, there are new changes uncovered in Israel's social media use in the period between April 13th and April 20th 2024, the week after the Iranian attacks on Israel. With this, I expose the answer to my last subquestion *What was Israel's Twitter behaviour in the week after April 13th?* The relevance of these subquestions is to clearly outline the changes in each period, allowing for a more detailed description of Israel's public diplomacy. The three periods are presented chronologically in this chapter.

3.1 Three weeks before October 7th

Before diving deep into Israel and the IDF's Twitter activities during the conflict, it is relevant to first understand what preceded. In other words, we must take a look at Israel's nation-branding efforts before the October 7 attacks in order to fully grasp the changes in strategy the state underwent after the beginning of its public opinion crisis. When it comes to the @Israel account, it is clear how relations with other countries are a priority. This way, the national days of most nations are commemorated, reinforcing Israel's favourable relations with them. Israel is quite inclusive with these messages of congratulations, and in the three-week period that I studied commemorated the national days of small countries such as Belize or Tuvalu, but also more powerful, (potential) allies such as Germany or China. In these tweets, the same simple image and message are personalised with each state's name and flag, with little change. With this, Israel brands itself as a friendly state with peaceful relations in the global arena. While this simple message may not have a significant effect on traditional diplomacy, it is possible that the acknowledgement of a country's national day may positively affect the citizen's attitudes towards Israel. In addition to a reinforcement of its international relations, Israel uses its official Twitter

account to communicate with the Jewish diaspora on occasions such as Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the year in the Jewish religion. Additionally, more general, international days are celebrated. For example, Israel made sure to upload a tweet on World Teachers' Day and World Smile Day with their respective hashtags, among others. This is interesting, as the use of these hashtags is a technique more commonly found in the accounts of private actors and companies who are looking to self promote and not so much in official accounts managed by a government. One could relate this to nation branding, with Israel behaving like a private actor in need of promotion and using marketing techniques that are normally attributed to the for-profit sector. Additionally, the use of these hashtags aligns with the idea exposed in the last chapter that the accounts use certain elements, words and topics in order to adapt different tweets to different audiences¹³⁵. Overall, it seems like Israel had been attempting to reach the attention of a wider public in a non-political, non-controversial way.

In fact, as the English-speaking account of the Jewish state, the team behind @Israel made clear efforts to speak out to its global audience as a politically neutral actor. Self-promotion and positive branding constituted a significant part of the account's activity in the weeks leading up to Hamas' attacks on Israel. Pictures of Tel Aviv, the Israeli capital, or Israeli beaches are posted as a way to stimulate tourism, presenting Israel as just another holiday destination. Additionally, historical facts about the country dating back as far as the Roman Empire are presented, enhancing Israel's history in the territory. These are typical moves in a nation-branding strategy: creating a touristic and cultural appeal to global audiences, as therefore a positive image in the world. Moreover, the attitude that Israel presents towards its Twitter audience is that of a friendly state. There are attempts to directly interact with other users, such as a tweet on September 25th, asking about the readers' plans for breaking their fast on Yom Kippur.¹³⁶ More interestingly, the account's efforts to expand its audience are clear in a tweet posted on the 21st of September, simply asking "Who's going to help us get to 1,000,000 followers 🤔?".¹³⁷ This type of activity is, once again, inherent to nation branding. Here, countries are not explicitly concerned about international relations and agreements, and instead

¹³⁵ Rodley, "When Memes Go to War", 12.

¹³⁶ Israel (@Israel), "So what's everyone breaking their Yom Kippur fast on?", Twitter, September 25, 2023, <https://x.com/Israel/status/1706348976105050454>

¹³⁷ Israel (@Israel), "377 days until 5785 (the next Jewish Year). Who's going to help us get to 1,000,000 followers 🤔?", Twitter, September 21, 2023, <https://x.com/Israel/status/1704770605520699461>

focus their efforts on followers, establishing themselves as a popular brand known and loved by many. Moreover, while the account clearly attempts to stay politically neutral, this is with the exception during the studied period of two consecutive tweets that openly criticise the Iranian president. Here, Iran's president is shamed for human rights violation with the words "Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi's visit to NY for the General Assembly, ironically falls out almost a year to the day that his regime murdered #MahsaAmini. Raisi may try to normalize his crimes by attending UN meetings, but the sanctions against him, which keep him confined to a small NYC radius, are a reminder that he is and will continue to be persona non grata."¹³⁸. This makes evident the tensions with Iran even in the period preceding the Israeli bombing of the Iranian consulate in Damascus on April 1st 2024.¹³⁹ In short, before the current conflict, Israel's official English-speaking account was primarily focused on presenting a politically neutral and positive image of the country to the global general public.

On the other hand, the account of the Israeli Defence Forces (@IDF), used the platform under a different strategy between September 18th and October 6th. Whereas @Israel mostly clearly addresses the international public and attempts to self-promote, the army's account presents itself as more objective, technical and informative. This way, most of its tweets are simply directed to Israeli citizens who are English speakers, or generally anyone interested in the smaller scale events that would break out in Israel on a day to day basis. Arrests, riots, and small attacks were reported in the IDF's account during this period. It is interesting to note how every suspect or arrested individual is immediately deemed a terrorist by this account, despite giving little context or evidence for it. This is consistent with a shaming strategy, where a negative characteristic is given to an enemy in order to undermine support for them, despite the fact that not every Palestinian is affiliated with Hamas. In short, it is clear that while @Israel uses Twitter to brand itself as a country and obtain more support internationally, @IDF is more focused on reporting events in a way that shames and frames Palestinians as terrorists and Israelis as their victims.

¹³⁸ Israel (@Israel), "Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi's visit to NY for the General Assembly, ironically falls out almost a year to the day that his regime murdered #MahsaAmini.", Twitter, September 18th, 2023, <https://x.com/Israel/status/1703796735850491954>

¹³⁹ Reuters, "Iran says Israel bombs its embassy in Syria, kills commanders", *Reuters*, April 2, 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-bombs-iran-embassy-syria-iranian-commanders-among-dead-2024-04-01/>

3.2 Three weeks after October 7th

After October 7th 2023, the types of posts published by both accounts changed. One of the most evident changes had to do with the frequency of activity, which became exponentially higher. Thus, while @Israel posted a total of 35 tweets in the 21 days preceding the October 7th attacks, the 21 days that followed saw 291 in total. In other words, Israel went from an average of 1,66 tweets in a day to 13,85. This is close to ten times the original frequency. At the same time, @IDF posted 19 tweets in the three weeks before the attacks, making it less than one post in a day. However, after the events of October 7th, 333 tweets were posted. This is close to sixteen tweets in a day. Additionally, the content of the tweets became very different too. While objectivity, positive nation-branding and self-promotion was the goal in most of the tweets posted before the fact, the attacks and the crisis of public diplomacy that came with them caused a complete change of attitude in the strategies of both accounts.

The fight for support

Visibly, the main goal of Israel's social media diplomacy efforts is to obtain support from the global public through the creation of an appealing national brand. My empirical, primary source research focuses on the exact ways in which Israel brands themselves and shames its opponents towards the global public. In the field of creating and boosting a national brand, a common form to obtain international attention and support is to simply ask for it. From my research, I have gathered that calls for support from the general public are among the most recurrent themes in Israel's Twitter posts after October 7th. In this section of the chapter, I will dive into this aspect of my research results.

As mentioned, Israel has no issue with addressing its posts directly to the members of its audience. This is used as a way to keep people thinking, nudge them into taking part in pro-Israel action and spread ideas that will benefit the Israeli establishment. In the first tweets after the Hamas attacks, calls for support started by a plea for the public to share Israel's tweets. Here, Rodley's concept of 'shareables' can be applied to our context.¹⁴⁰ 'Nice' looking images, normally quite simple or with small slogans, but conveying a clear message that other users can repost in order to state their support for Israel. A drawing of a bloody teddy bear with the words

¹⁴⁰ Rodley, "When Memes Go To War", 5.

“Slaughtering children is not fighting for freedom” is an example of this.¹⁴¹ Posted on October 17th, its message is clearly directed at those who defend Palestine’s struggle for freedom, tied to the identification of Hamas and its actions as part of a liberation movement. Here, those who ‘fight for freedom’ are linked to Hamas and shamed for ‘slaughtering children’. Even if this is not true, the goal of such a claim is to showcase an image of Palestinian freedom fighters as murderers, creating outrage and affecting support for them. Other shareables are not so clear and simple and are instead politically charged. For example, three days after the attacks, Israel produced a shareable video in which it attempted to prove Hamas’s inhumanity by showing that an artificial intelligence software would refuse to create videos based on prompts that described the events of October 7th.¹⁴² The point of this shareable was to demonstrate that Hamas’s crimes were so unimaginably horrific that not even artificial intelligence could recreate images from it. Here, Israel intended to create a viral post reflecting the horrors of October 7th so that as many people as possible would have a glimpse of Hamas's inhumanity. These viral posts through simple messages were posted by Israel on several occasions in the weeks after October 7th.

Nevertheless, Israel has more straightforward ways of stimulating interactions with its posts. One of these consists of simply asking the audience to share a post or spread a message. On October 21st, when the initial shock of the October 7th attacks was starting to wear off, @Israel began a post with the sentence “Please don’t look away”, and then began pleading for the audience to pay attention to Israeli hostages.¹⁴³ This was not only present in this post, but also in many other of the studied tweets, the imperative “Share.”, or less commanding variants such as “Please share.” or “Spread the word.” are seen a minimum of once a day in each account, sometimes even more. It accompanies all kinds of tweets, some explicitly reporting the horrors committed by Hamas on October 7th, as more people positioning themselves against Hamas would bring more support for Israel. Other posts asking to be shared have less to do with the events of October 7th and more with their consequences: pictures of the hostages, pleas by their families and less graphic information that does not necessarily even mention Hamas, but more so

¹⁴¹ Israel (@Israel), “Share.”, Twitter, October 17, 2023, <https://x.com/Israel/status/1714210046425350181>

¹⁴² Israel (@Israel), “Even artificial intelligence is more humane than Hamas terrorists. Hamas terrorists are not human beings. They are evil, barbaric, murderers. Share.”, Twitter, October 10, 2023, <https://x.com/Israel/status/1711613038053175688>

¹⁴³ Israel (@Israel), “Please don’t look away. It’s easy to keep scrolling in the age of social media, but we ask that you keep reading and sharing the names and photos of Israelis taken hostage by Hamas. We need to keep their stories alive so that we can bring them home. Every minute counts.”, Twitter, October 21, 2023, <https://x.com/Israel/status/1715744269560893905>

intends to gather sympathy for the Israeli cause. Briefly, Israel relies on shares to obtain more views, which it expects will translate into public support.

While asking their audience to retweet and share may help, not every reader of Israel's Twitter account is necessarily a supporter. This means different techniques are required in order to convince different Twitter users to support 'brand Israel' and appeal to different sectors of society¹⁴⁴. One common strategy is to use verbs and pronouns in the second person, therefore directly speaking to the audience. This is again demonstrated with the post uploaded to Israel's Twitter on October 21st.¹⁴⁵ It demonstrates knowledge about the platform by referring to its shortcomings of posts getting lost in the abundance of new information. At the same time, it attempts to overcome it by asking for attention towards the hostages, since this would contribute to saving them. By framing this in a way that guilties readers for potentially forgetting about the hostages, the writer of the tweet ensures that some of the readers will keep Israel and their victims in their thoughts. This is a form of directly shaming not the opponent nation, but instead the middle ground, with the goal of creating a narrative through which they will feel embarrassed for not openly supporting Israel. Nevertheless, those in charge of the account are aware that some readers are actively against Israel, and they also have messages to deliver to this segment of the audience. On October 21st Israel tweeted: "We'll say it again for those of you who need a reminder. Hamas=ISIS."¹⁴⁶ The tweet in question not only speaks to the audience, referring to "those [of the non supporters] who need a reminder", but it also seems to have an aggressive tone against the reader. While the tweet conveys the message that Hamas is ISIS (a common theme throughout the period between October 7th and October 28th), it is not posted to spread Israel's calls for support. Instead, it is meant to put pressure and shame on Palestine supporters who still oppose Israel and its military operations in Gaza. This can be appreciated in a plethora of other tweets from the account. Many posts ask readers to put themselves in the victims' shoes. This is done by sharing testimonies and horror stories from the October 7th events and adding the final note "It could be you.". A tweet from @IDF posted on October 25th is an example of this in a more indirect manner, conveying the distance between the location of the October 7th attacks and major cities in Israel, asking people how they would feel if this took place at such a short

¹⁴⁴ Rodley, "When Memes Go to War", 12.

¹⁴⁵ Israel, "Please don't look away"

¹⁴⁶ Israel (@Israel), "We'll say it again for those of you who need a reminder. Hamas=ISIS.", Twitter, October 21, 2023, <https://x.com/Israel/status/1715774603472080971>

distance from their homes.¹⁴⁷ Overall, whether Israel supporters or not, the Israel official account will make sure to tailor its tweets to everyone, and nation-brand or nation-shame accordingly..

One last way in which Israel attempts to obtain public support is by reminding its audience of the support it already has. By taking the philosophy of “leading by example” literally, Israel shares instances of eminences, states and celebrities supporting them, in hopes that others will follow. This is firstly clear in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, where images of London, New York and Berlin, among others, were shared, covered in blue and white as a symbol of solidarity with the Jewish state.¹⁴⁸¹⁴⁹ This is not only posted as a thank you to those who have shown their support for Israel, but also to demonstrate that Israel has some of the most powerful actors in the world on its side, supporting its brand of a cosmopolitan and friendly state. On October 18th, Israel posted speeches by Joe Biden, the US president, in which he made clear the friendship between both countries.¹⁵⁰ Interestingly, this is done in a similar way when showcasing celebrities’ support for Israel. In the days following the attacks, many celebrities such as Jamie Lee Curtis and Kim Kardashian reposted some of Israel’s shareables in their support. This was acknowledged with a thank you in the country’s official Twitter account. Not only this, but by showcasing the celebrity support it received, Israel knew that many fans would follow their idols. This is in line with the expectation set by Moreno-Mercado and Calatrava-García, since they establish that celebrity support can easily promote Israeli ideas¹⁵¹. Additionally, despite the support they had received, Israel’s Twitter account did not miss a beat asking for more. In fact, they called out several celebrities under all types of pretences in hopes they would offer their support. This way, Taylor Swift was mentioned because her bodyguard was allegedly a member of the IDF,¹⁵² a tweet was sent out to J.K. Rowling because one of the

¹⁴⁷ IDF (@IDF), “ Hamas is closer to our homes than you think.”, Twitter, October 25, 2023, <https://x.com/IDF/status/1717014181440892946>

¹⁴⁸ Israel (@Israel), “Empty strollers displayed outside of Parliament in London as a stark reminder of the Israeli babies and children being held hostage by Hamas❤️”, Twitter, October 22, 2023, <https://x.com/Israel/status/1716066623176458513>

¹⁴⁹ Israel (@Israel), “Thank you to all of you around the world for your constant messages of support and solidarity. This is a dark day for all of us here in Israel, but we can feel your love and warmth from miles away.”, Twitter, October 7, 2023, <https://x.com/Israel/status/1710742106300424519>

¹⁵⁰ Israel (@Israel), ““They’ve (Hamas) committed evils and atrocities that make ISIS look somewhat rational. I want to say to the people of Israel. Their courage, their commitment, their bravery is stunning. It’s really stunning. I’m proud to be here.””, Twitter, October 18, 2023, <https://x.com/Israel/status/1714600951481323747>

¹⁵¹ Moreno-Mercado and Calatrava-García, “Multilingual public diplomacy”, 284.

¹⁵² Israel (@Israel), “Taylor Swift’s #ErasTour body guard returned home to fight for his country. Hey @taylorswift13, we promise you’ll never find another like him. We love you Eran 🇮🇱❤️.”, Twitter, October 19, 2023, <https://x.com/Israel/status/1714922694414598419>

victims of the attacks was a Harry Potter fan,¹⁵³ and Greta Thunberg was criticised for standing against Israel because “ Hamas’s missiles are not sustainable”.¹⁵⁴ This way, celebrities were shamed into showing support for Israel by emphasising Israel’s positive qualities opposed to Hamas/Palestine’s negative traits. Overall, Israel tried to use its existing and potential support in order to get more people on their side.

In summary, it is clear how Israel has used all types of techniques to maximise the support its brand received during the aftermath of the attacks. This seems like a logical development from the tweets preceding the attacks, where there already seemed to be efforts to gain as many followers/supporters as possible. This can explain the points brought up throughout this section: the creation of shareables, pleas for the audience to spread Israel’s side of the story, direct appeals to the readers, and the instrumentalisation of existing support. In short, it is clear that obtaining support was a priority for Israel in the weeks following the October 7th attacks, and branding and shaming was a key element in this.

Israel’s hashtag war

In the last section of my second chapter, I illustrated the relevance of hashtags in digital public diplomacy. Hashtags are some of the most outstanding tools in social media. They consist of one or a few words preceded by the symbol “#”, and result in posts being grouped on the basis of the hashtags used. This way, if someone wants to learn about the events happening in Israel, they could simply click on a related hashtag and obtain access to tweets from every account that include that hashtag. This is especially important if an account wants to boost their engagement. Therefore, Israel’s use of hashtags is frequent and strategic. In this section, I will expand on the different hashtags used during the studied period.

The days that immediately followed the October 7th attacks were hectic for all parties involved. This includes Israel’s public diplomacy team. With this new conflict, a new strategy began to form regarding how to address them in their social media accounts, and what attitude to take towards the world in regards to them. In addition to this, the temporality of the social media

¹⁵³ Israel (@Israel), “This beautiful 12 year old girl with autism was kidnapped from her home by Hamas terrorists and was taken to Gaza. Noya, is sensitive, kind, funny and a massive Harry Potter fan. @jk_rowling can you help us get her story out? Share this and help us bring Noya home ♥ #HamasisISIS”, Twitter, October 15, 2023, <https://x.com/Israel/status/1713517847412941162>

¹⁵⁴ Israel (@Israel), “.@GretaThunberg, Hamas doesn’t use sustainable materials for their rockets which have BUTCHERED innocent Israelis .The victims of the Hamas massacre could have been your friends. Speak up.”, Twitter, October 20, 2023, <https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1715370190714589677>

cycle becomes an added source of pressure for those in charge of writing and posting, as I have explained in my previous chapter. All of these factors contribute to the use of hashtags in the studied period becoming a trial and error process, with some being repeated daily, while others were quickly discarded after being used in one or two occasions. For example, the hashtag “#Israel_Under_Attack” appears in one of the first tweets posted on October 7¹⁵⁵. This mirrors the hashtag (and subsequent account created and managed by civilians) #IsraelUnderFire, prominent mainly during the 2014 conflict between Israel and the Palestinians¹⁵⁶. In that case, the hashtag was used to share information about the events of the conflict, but also to spread pro-Israel content of all kinds. However, this time, #Israel_Under_Attack did not prevail in the Israeli accounts, and it was only used twice in the studied period of three weeks. This demonstrates the fleeting nature of all elements of social media. Additionally, it marks the beginning of a new era of Israel’s tweets, breaking from the pattern of past activity.

Indeed, other hashtags were quickly introduced. “#IStandWithIsrael” is one example.¹⁵⁷ While #IsraelUnderFire had as a goal informing of events related to the conflict in Israel, this one seems purely ideological. In this case, the tools of social media are not used to inform, or even to persuade the public. Instead, #IStandWithIsrael is used to reinforce a position of support to the Jewish state. As with the shareables studied in the previous section, the account used this hashtag with the hope that those who defend Israel would see it, use it and, with that, spread the word to as wide of a public as possible. Indeed, it seems like this was successful. While Israel’s official account did not use the hashtag more than five times, mostly grouped in the first week after the attacks, #IStandWithIsrael became a trending topic on Twitter worldwide. This way, Israel managed to spread the word of its suffering by creating a hashtag that could easily be shared by millions all over the world, as well as establish that their brand was widely supported worldwide.

Four days after the attacks, on October 11, a new hashtag emerged that would mark Israel’s social media strategy for the rest of the studied period. This was “#HamasIsISIS”. It is relevant to mention that the phrase “Hamas is ISIS” is directly taken from a speech by

¹⁵⁵ Israel (@Israel), “Share this. #Israel_under_attack”, Twitter, October 8, 2023, <https://x.com/Israel/status/1710908447623962728>

¹⁵⁶ Mackey, “Young Israelis Fight Hashtag Battle to Defend #IsraelUnderFire”

¹⁵⁷ Israel (@Israel), “Thank you for all of your support and love. #IStandWithIsrael”, Twitter, October 9, 2023, <https://x.com/Israel/status/1711402005803987352>

Netanyahu on October 12th, 2023.¹⁵⁸ This signifies the importance of the Prime Minister in digital diplomacy efforts, as his words can be taken as inspiration to build a strategy that reflects the values of Israel at a particular moment. With the hashtag, Israel's public diplomacy officials highlighted the horrors of October 7. However, this was not by directly sharing testimonies of victims, or proof of the events. Instead, the hashtag was used to shallowly compare the terror attacks of 2023 with a well-known organisation such as ISIS, responsible for many other terror attacks all over the world. With this, Hamas is shamed not only for its actions, but also for its alleged connections to a well-known terrorist organisation, hindering any potential support. An especially interesting part about this trend is that no real explanation is ever given for the comparison. While it is made clear that both Hamas and ISIS are terrorist organisations that have left many victims behind them, no real link is made between the two of them. In fact, in most tweets, ISIS is not even mentioned outside of the hashtag. One example is a tweet from October 19th stating "They murdered a 12 year old girl with Autism. They murdered a young girl with CP and her father. They murdered babies. They murdered grandmothers. Don't be silent. #HamasisISIS".¹⁵⁹ Here, objective facts about the events are given, with an emphasis on the innocence and vulnerability of the victims, and finally the tweet ends with a hashtag that condemns Hamas not only for its own actions, but also for its similarities with other terrorist groups.

The intentions of this hashtag are diverse. Firstly, since the accounts are aimed towards an international public, comparing a regional, relatively small terrorist group with an internationally known one helps more easily convey the idea that Hamas needs to be destroyed. In fact, the emphasis on Hamas being a terrorist group is interesting, considering the fact that the UN does not classify it as so.¹⁶⁰ Secondly, terrorist or not, Hamas describes itself as a liberation movement of the Palestinian people against Israeli occupation. At the same time, the Islamic State's stated goal is based on the expansion of a particular form of Islam. This way, by directly

¹⁵⁸ "Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu After Their Meeting", US Department of State, 2023, <https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-israeli-prime-minister-benjamin-netanyahu-after-their-meeting-2/>

¹⁵⁹ Israel (@Israel), "They murdered a 12 year old girl with Autism. They murdered a young girl with CP and her father. They murdered babies. They murdered grandmothers. Don't be silent. #HamasisISIS", Twitter, October 19, 2023, <https://x.com/Israel/status/1714995058951204946>

¹⁶⁰ "Top UN Aid Official Says Hamas Is Not a Terrorist Group", Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 2024, <https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/02/16/top-un-aid-official-says-hamas-is-not-a-terrorist-group/#:~:text=And%20you%20don't%20have.Israel%20but%20not%20the%20UN.>

presenting both groups as if they are one, Israel undermines any form of Palestinian liberation and shames it for its (alleged) links to Islamic terrorism. Indeed, this is done with the goal of shaming and causing international rejection against Palestinian liberation.

Lastly, Israel centres their efforts not only on their framing of Hamas or “the enemy”, but also in the way they brand themselves and present their suffering to the world. Another hashtag was created dedicated to the victims and hostages of October 7. This is “#BringThemHome”. As opposed to the last one, this hashtag simply highlights the Israeli struggle. Pictures of the victims, messages from their loved ones, and testimonies by the survivors are the most common posts under this hashtag. However, this is not all. One of the most relevant aspects of a hashtag is that it is intended to be shared by as many users as possible, and this is most evident in the case of #BringThemHome. Conveying a particular image is a crucial element of this. Israel aims, once again, to brand itself as a harmless country in need of support. One example of this is a tweet posted on October 22nd, featuring a video that compiles pictures of all child hostages.¹⁶¹ However, this is not the only focus of the tweet. While watching the video, the audience can read a body of text pleading for sympathy and, most importantly, shares. Here, Israel uses high arousal emotion posts and situations in order to secure a favourable opinion.¹⁶² This highlights Israel’s digital diplomacy intentions: reaching a wider public and obtaining their support through emotional branding.

In summary, hashtags are usually a reasonably effective way of getting a brand across to the general public. This is especially useful in the case of said hashtags going viral. In this case, Israel has three principal hashtags go viral, each with a different focus: firstly, #IStandWithIsrael was targeted to those who already supported Israel and wanted to share it. Secondly, #HamasIsISIS attempts to convince those who are not on Israel’s side to stand against Hamas and possibly the Palestinians. Lastly, #BringThemHome is a hashtag of remembrance and awareness about the events of October 7 and their consequences, but still has a tendency to make calls for support. This way, Israel is once again able to diversify its content towards different audiences, make effective calls to action (e.g. sharing of their posts) and increase the potential of popularising its posts in different sectors of the population.

¹⁶¹ Israel (@Israel), “Hug your children tight. There are many Israelis who wish they could right now 🧡. Share this and help us bring our children home. #BringThemHome”, Twitter, October 22, 2023, <https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716061782391840883>

¹⁶² Rodley, “When Memes Go To War”, 3.

Branding Israel and shaming Palestine

In addition to calls for support and the use of hashtags, branding and shaming is central to Israel's social media content. As explained in the previous chapter, there is a perpetual distinction between how Israelis portray themselves in opposition to the Palestinians. In the Israeli narrative, Jewish Israeli citizens are branded as innocent actors who simply want to be able to live peacefully in the holy land, but circumstances impede them from doing so. On the other hand, Palestinians are portrayed as barbaric, and shamed for being less advanced and full of unwarranted hate. In this section, I will first go in depth about Israel's nation-branding on Twitter during the conflict. This will be followed by an analysis of the techniques used to shame (pro-)Palestinians.

Israel was founded by brave Holocaust survivors who escaped Europe after World War II. After the creation of the state, they chose to maintain a narrative that established them not as victims of a horrible genocide, but as the victors who were able to survive it. However, this discourse did not work in the international scene.¹⁶³ Therefore, Israel's diplomacy was taken over by a victim narrative and constant reminders of the Holocaust.¹⁶⁴ Up to this day in the 2020s, this is the image Israel has chosen to show to the world. This attitude is stridently evident in the primary sources studied. Once Hamas infiltrated the Israeli border, there were shouts of this being an 'unprovoked' attack on an 'innocent' nation. It is clear to anyone familiar with the history of the territory that neither was this attack unprovoked nor is Israel innocent. Nevertheless, this is the abiding brand that Israel has created. There is, in fact, an emphasis on innocence. One of the most common topics in Israel's tweets are the names and pictures of the victims of October 7th, either those who died or the ones who were taken hostage. While these are undoubtedly innocent people who do not deserve to be subject to such an attack, Israel uses this to their advantage. In these tweets, there is an element of branding the Israeli nation as an innocent one: because the victims were innocent citizens, Israel should not be held accountable for their earlier or posterior crimes on the Palestinians. For example, on October 9th, Israel posted a picture of a young woman and her grandmother with the text "This young woman's grandmother was murdered by Hamas terrorists. She found out from Facebook after Hamas

¹⁶³ Murphy, "Hasbara in Action", 186.

¹⁶⁴ Murphy, "Hasbara in Action", 186.

posted a video of the execution. This is what we are fighting against. Pure evil.”¹⁶⁵ The last two sentences of this tweet are especially telling of the fact that Israel justifies attacks on Gaza by blaming (or shaming) the Palestinians for such sad events. Another example is the tweet posted by the IDF on October 8th and stating that Hamas’s attacks warrant a response from Israel “with determination and force”.¹⁶⁶ These words turned out to be euphemisms for the attacks and carpet bombing all over Gaza, while at the same time Israel continued filling their Twitter profile with memorial tweets to their own innocent victims and branding its nation as a law-abiding one.

In fact, much can be said about Israel’s nation-branding from what they do not say on their Twitter. October 7th kickstarted a series of attacks on Gaza that would not stop for months. However, the almost six hundred tweets in my sample from the October 7th-28th period rarely mention any of these attacks. The one tragedy in Gaza that is repeatedly mentioned is that of Al-Ahli Arab Hospital in Gaza City. Here, on October 17th, a missile fell on a hospital, killing an unknown number of innocent Palestinians. While Israel was immediately accused of this massacre by the international community, some evidence points to a Hamas missile having misfired. So much so that Israel held on to this evidence, repeatedly posting in the days that followed about Hamas’s unwieldiness, and openly shaming anyone who initially blamed Israel.¹⁶⁷ In other words Israel’s attempts to brand itself as innocent were in danger with the Al-Ahli hospital events, subsequently leading to the shaming of Hamas as a way to ensure that their lost support would not go to the Palestinian cause. However, this is an exception from the norm, as Israel has been accused of countless attacks on the Palestinians, which have rarely been acknowledged on their Twitter. Since the news of the hospital attack were quickly and widely spread, it is possible that Israel wanted to deny the accusations before they reached any pro-Israel circles. Alternatively, it is clear how the Israeli ‘innocent’ brand on Twitter relies on the neglect of most of the accusations against them in the real world.

While a victim narrative remains to this day, it is true that the brand of a strong, united and powerful country has been reinforced. In fact, it is relevant to mention the contrast between

¹⁶⁵ Israel (@Israel), “This young woman’s grandmother was murdered by Hamas terrorists. She found out from Facebook after Hamas posted a video of the execution. This is what we are fighting against. Pure evil.”, Twitter, October 9, 2023, <https://x.com/Israel/status/1711294658343587870>

¹⁶⁶ IDF (@IDF), “Hamas started a war against Israel with the worst massacre of innocent civilians in Israel’s history. We paid a heavy price; but we will restore security to the people of Israel. Full statement from @IDFspokesperson:”, Twitter, October 8, 2023, <https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711138315628372110>

¹⁶⁷ Israel (@Israel), “An Al Jazeera broadcast documented the moment that the Islamic Jihad launched a rocket which misfired and hit a hospital in Gaza, killing hundreds.”, Twitter, October 17, 2023, <https://x.com/Israel/status/1714378880713203844>

both studied accounts when it comes to branding. Whereas a victim narrative was mostly prevalent in the @Israel account, the IDF's official account seems to maintain a stronger front of resilience and power. Nevertheless, both accounts had elements from both narratives. In the three weeks that followed the October 7th attacks, Israel's Twitter accounts were not only filled with evidence of the horror and calls for international help. "Am Yisrael Chai", Hebrew for "The people of Israel live", became the brand slogan for Israel's resilience during the first two weeks after the attacks. In addition to this, there were constant statements of Israeli strength. Whether it was simple reminders for the population and the international public that Israel would stay strong, like in an October 15th post with the phrase "They won't break us",¹⁶⁸ or actual proof of unity, the posts demonstrated the hardiness of the community. Two or three times a week, tweets would be posted where the Israeli population was used as an example of the state's resilience. Long lines to donate blood after the attacks, entire neighbourhoods singing Hebrew songs, or big crowds gathering to say goodbye to the troops heading to Gaza are some of the images that Israel chose to demonstrate the unity of the Israeli people in these dark times.¹⁶⁹ This is contrasted to the actual events of Israel, experiencing political instability and a degree of civil unrest due to the government's actions in Gaza.¹⁷⁰ Interestingly, this is also omitted in Israel's tweets, as it would hinder their brand image. In summary, Israel uses a victim narrative, as well as an image of unity and resilience, to represent a brand of a victimised but strong nation.

In contrast to the consistent representation of Israel as a victimised but brave nation, the Palestinians are rarely mentioned. When they are, this is done in a negative way. Throughout the studied period, there are several mentions, and even entire informational images and clips, dedicated entirely to individual Palestinians. However, these Palestinians are not regular civilians. Instead, Israel used its social media to spread information about some of the heads of Hamas and their actions. Among others, on October 13th, the IDF posted an informational video about Yahya Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza.¹⁷¹ The fact that these were the only individual Palestinians to be mentioned by the accounts may have led to a form of shaming: a particular

¹⁶⁸ Israel (@Israel), "They won't break us ♥ 🇮🇱", Twitter, October 15, 2023, <https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1713495945420124163>

¹⁶⁹ Israel (@Israel), "Three hour line to donate blood in Jerusalem. Thank you to each and every one of you.", Twitter, October 9, 2023, <https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1711353180733214841>

¹⁷⁰ Aya Batrawy, "Israeli protesters demand Gaza cease-fire in rare anti-war march through Tel Aviv", NPR, January 19, 2024, <https://www.npr.org/2024/01/19/1225651180/israel-tel-aviv-protest-gaza-war>

¹⁷¹ IDF (@IDF), "Have you ever Googled "Who is Yahya Sinwar"?", Twitter, October 13, 2023, <https://x.com/IDF/status/1712810990495035482>

negative trait of some Palestinians is emphasised. Since the audience exclusively obtains information on the most prominently evil members of a community, an inevitable generalisation could take place where an assumption that every Palestinian is an evil terrorist is formed. This leads to shaming the Palestinians and their supporters for the actions of a few.

In addition, the trend ‘ Hamas is ISIS ’ is also relevant to the shaming of Palestinians. Because, after all, Hamas is made up of a sector of the Palestinian population and they are in charge of the Gaza strip. Therefore, identifying them as one of the worst and most well known terrorist organisations is a way to discourage any type of support to Hamas, which can in turn have a negative effect on innocent Palestinian civilians with no fault in this conflict. In fact, there is a clear attempt by Israel to converge the identities of Hamas and the regular Palestinians, as a way to put them all down internationally for the actions of a few. In their quest for international public support, Israel refuses any type of sympathy for the Palestinian people. In fact, some posts are clear attacks on those who do not support Israel, accusing them of instead favouring a terrorist organisation, like Hamas. This is done with the goal of shaming pro-Palestinian individuals into withdrawing their support. One example of this is a tweet posted on October 19th, condemning non-Israel supporters with the words “ Good morning to everyone except for those of you who are having trouble condemning a terrorist organization. #HamasisISIS ”.¹⁷² This is to say, in Israel’s social media accounts, there is rarely any room for a Palestinian that is not a member of Hamas, and anyone who does not position themselves on Israel’s side is shamed as an endorser of terrorism. This builds on a trend that was already visible before October 7th, where the mere existence of Palestinians was neglected, except for those ‘ terrorists ’ who dared to fight against the Israeli occupation. In the after-October-7th period, this is so much so that Israel accuses innocent Palestinians who are victims of the conflict of lying in favour of Hamas. Only two weeks after the start of the conflict, Israel’s official account uploaded a tweet calling out Palestinian journalist Saleh Al-Jafarawe for posting a video of himself after he had allegedly been injured by an Israeli airstrike¹⁷³. This way, they denied that any potential crimes against civilians were committed that could have an effect on their positive nation-brand. Instead, they

¹⁷² Israel (@Israel), “ Good morning to everyone except for those of you who are having trouble condemning a terrorist organization. #HamasisISIS ”, Twitter, October 19, 2023, <https://x.com/Israel/status/1714903300087124369?lang=en>

¹⁷³ Israel (@Israel), “ And just two days later, he's back on Instagram after a MIRACULOUS recovery. And there are many more videos like these circulating online. Bottom line: Don't let these cheap (and badly directed) films fool you. #Pallywood ”, Twitter, October 26, 2023, <https://x.com/Israel/status/1717532884242727318>

invalidated Palestinian experiences and shamed victims as simple liars who have it out against innocent Israel. This is a continuation of what was discussed in Chapter 2: Israel tends to discredit Palestinians and their experiences for its own gain. To sum up, in the Israeli branding strategy, there is little difference between Hamas members and regular Palestinians, because even the latter are biased against Israel.

Seeing that the focus on Hamas is so evident, it is important to consider what elements are left unsaid in the posts analysed. October 7th left over one thousand Israeli deaths at the hands of Hamas, which evidences the horror of that day. However, the Israeli death count was quickly surpassed by those who died in Palestine, victims of Israeli missile attacks. While these attacks and the offensive on Gaza are often ignored, some rare mentions of Palestinian civilians are found, even picturing them as victims. However, they are not Israel's victims. Instead, Hamas is to blame for any misfortune that occurs to the Palestinians. For example, Israel seems to show concern for the Palestinians in the North of Gaza. In the immediate aftermath of October 7th, this area was indiscriminately bombed, including civilian areas where Hamas had no presence. After days of this offensive, Israel finally put out a warning for civilians to evacuate the area towards the safer South of Gaza. However, the inability of some to flee and the fear (backed by historical evidence) that they would never be allowed to return led to a reluctance from many Palestinians to flee their homes. Nevertheless, Israel did not back down and instead used their Twitter to blame Hamas for impeding the evacuation of the area, repeatedly backing this claim with one single testimony from a citizen in Gaza. This audio testimony was the only proof Israel was able to present, but for days they still emphasised Hamas's authoritativeness. This way, 'brand Israel' of a law-abiding and innocent country in a struggle for peace is protected through the shaming of Hamas, in an interplay of nation branding and shaming strategies with the goal of maintaining support for Israel.

What Israel did not post on Twitter, however, is that despite such clear evidence that Palestinians were being prevented from fleeing North Gaza by Hamas, the area was still bombed, killing hundreds.¹⁷⁴ In fact, this seems to be a pattern in Israel's public diplomacy strategy: on several occasions, they have identified Hamas presence in a civilian area and used Twitter to

¹⁷⁴ "Israel destroys a quarter of northern Gaza Strip, Palestinian death toll exceeds 4,000", ReliefWeb, March 19, 2023, <https://reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/israel-destroys-quarter-northern-gaza-strip-palestinian-death-toll-exceeds-4000-enar>

condemn it and show sympathy and a will to protect the civilians that are victimised by Hamas, therefore maintaining their positive brand. For example, the IDF posted a four-tweet thread on October 22nd that intended to demonstrate the presence of Hamas rocket launchers in UN buildings, schools and mosques.¹⁷⁵ However, the actions of Israel show that instead of turning their words into practice and making efforts to avoid civilian casualties, the areas are often attacked regardless with little care for the civilians that they pretend to value on Twitter. Similarly, while Israeli officials were openly telling the world that they would not allow any type of aid to go into Gaza, their Twitter accounts were telling a different story. In fact, on several occasions, Israel used Twitter to accuse Hamas of blocking and stealing aid from the civilians in need, like with the alleged ‘six days worth of fuel’ they stole from the United Nations.¹⁷⁶ All of these examples emphasise the need for full information when dealing with Israeli public diplomacy. It is clear that whatever is posted by Israel is only one part of the story, framed and told in a way that presents Hamas as an evil entity that needs to be eliminated, and Palestinians as victims only of them.

In conclusion, this section shows the different forms that nation-branding and shaming takes in the Israeli Twitter accounts. When it comes to representing the people of Israel, these are shown as the victims of innumerable crimes. However, they have proven to be brave, strong and resilient in their brand narrative and will continue to fight. On the other hand, Palestinians are seldom mentioned in these accounts outside of Hamas, therefore being shamed out of support. Even when civilians are mentioned, this is either as pro-Hamas propagandists, or poor innocent people who are victimised exclusively because of Hamas, therefore avoiding Israeli responsibility for the suffering of Palestinians, or preventing any negative effects on the Israeli brand.

3.3 One week after April 13th

The past sections have dealt with Israel’s Twitter diplomacy in the three weeks that followed the October 7th attacks and (briefly) the three weeks that led up to said date. At this point, it has

¹⁷⁵ IDF (@IDF), “This @UN building sits directly across from a Hamas rocket launch site used to terrorize Israeli civilians. Hamas directly endangers Gazans, Israelis and the international community. Click the thread to see where Hamas put their other rocket launchers 📍”, Twitter, October 22, 2023, <https://x.com/IDF/status/1716156227585974585>

¹⁷⁶ IDF (@IDF), “IDF Spokesperson, RAdm. Daniel Hagari speaks about how Hamas stole 6 days worth of fuel from the @UnitedNations and from Gazan civilians. Hamas' crimes continue to pile up.”, Twitter, October 17, 2023, <https://x.com/IDF/status/1714045853793403039>

been established that some aspects of the public diplomacy strategy have been perpetuated through the years, even up to the studied period, while other elements analysed constitute a break from Israel's usual behaviour. In my thesis, I not only intend to compare the current conflict to prior attacks, but I also analyse the evolution of Israeli digital diplomacy throughout the long months between the beginning of the conflict and the time of writing. More importantly, on April 13, 2024, Israel was the victim of a series of missile attacks coming from Iran. As a consequence, tensions arose between Israel and Iran. This not only has an effect on Israel's foreign affairs, but it also reflects on their Twitter activity and nation-branding. In this section, I exhibit my findings from my analysis done on tweets from @Israel and @IDF in the seven days following April 13th.

As opposed to the previous period, it is clear from my analysis of the tweets posted regarding the conflict with Iran that the frequency of posts had significantly decreased. As previously established, @Israel posted an average of almost 14 tweets per day in the three weeks after October 7th. Similarly, the IDF's account had an average of around 16 posts a day. However, at some point between October and April, it seems that posts became less recurrent. In fact, @Israel only posted a total of 47 tweets in the week after the Iranian attacks, or 6.71 tweets per day. Moreover, the IDF was even less active on their social media, with 30 posts in the entire week, or 4.3 per day. This is quite a change from the previous period. Some may expect that the beginning of a new war and Israel being back in the spotlight after having been victim of a foreign attack would encourage the accounts to be more active. For example, Hirschberger shows how Israel's social media presence is multiplied when in crisis.¹⁷⁷ Nevertheless, that does not seem to be the case. This could be for various reasons, such as the fact that the Iranian attacks caused little actual damage to Israel and its population, or that the widespread international condemnation of Israel's actions in Gaza led to a new social media strategy. At the same time as the frequency of tweets has changed, the patterns in the content of both @Israel and @IDF are different between October and April. In the case of the state's official account, the victim brand seems to have become secondary, while the focus now is on showcasing Israel's strength and Iran and Hamas's weakness. On the other hand, the account of the Defence Forces is more focused on operational updates and facts about their victories. Additionally, both accounts include repeated propagandistic messages against Iran and, still, sometimes, Hamas.

¹⁷⁷ Hirschberger, External Communications, section 4.2.2

When it comes to @Israel, there are several points to be brought up. First is the framing of the conflict with Iran. Israel was attacked by Iran after the Iranian embassy in Damascus was bombed by Israel, killing an Iranian leader.¹⁷⁸ However, this is never mentioned in the account. Instead, Israel focuses on the fact that it has been ‘unprovokedly’ attacked by a terrorist state. In fact, Israel seems so focused on presenting Iran as a threat that they try to exaggerate its power and potential. This is made clear, for example, with the hashtag ‘#StopIran’, paired with the slogan “Coming soon to a city near you”¹⁷⁹. With this, Israel shares an alarmist message about Iran, warning Western countries that they could soon also be targets of an Iranian attack, therefore shaming their opponent. Edited pictures and videos of New York, London and Paris are shown as a way to get people thinking, again trying to get the audience in Israeli shoes as was done after October 7th. This is clearly done with the goal of shaming Iran through manufacturing public fear, which ideally results in a loss of support and Israel obtaining more from the Western public. Similarly to what was done with Hamas in the three weeks that followed October 7th, Israel stresses the fact that Iran and its leaders are closely tied to terrorism, and anyone who supports Iran (or does not explicitly support Israel) is complicit with it. This not only achieves sympathy for Israel within the international public, but is also used as a way to justify retaliation and eventual attacks on Iran and its allies.

Nevertheless, despite the way Israel frames Iran as a whole in its tweets, there is still an attempt to depict an image of Israel as a compassionate entity with the only goal of destroying terrorists, and not innocent civilians. This is an essential element in creating ‘brand Israel’. On several occasions, tweets are found stressing the fact that the fight is with Iranian leaders and not their citizens¹⁸⁰. It is interesting to remember that messages like this one were also shared back in October regarding the Palestinian people and Hamas, in a conflict that has cost the lives of close to 50 thousand Palestinians, most of which had no ties to Hamas. In fact, Hamas and the Palestinians continue to be mentioned by Israel’s account to this day. Continuing to shame civilians, Israel posts pictures and videos of beaches and markets in Gaza, attempting to demonstrate that the suffering in the strip is exaggerated and Israel is not as evil as international

¹⁷⁸ Nasr, “Why Iran and Israel”

¹⁷⁹ Israel (@Israel), “Coming to a city near you. **Stop Iran now, before it’s too late!** The Iranian Regime’s missile attack on Israel this week showed the world exactly what Iran is capable of and what they are willing to do.”, Twitter, April 17, 2024, <https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1780608497933025432>

¹⁸⁰ Israel (@Israel), “Our message to the People of Iran: Our fight is with the Islamic Republic, not with the People of Iran.”, Twitter, April 14, 2024, <https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1779433588582227972>

media paints it to be.¹⁸¹¹⁸² However, it is relevant to remember that these pictures only show one side of the reality, and ignore the deaths, starvation and attacks happening simultaneously. In short, despite Israel's emphasis on targeting terrorists and not civilians in Iran, there is a clear parallel with the case of Palestinians, who continue to be shamed with the goal of strengthening the Israel brand.

When it comes to branding themselves, there is a perpetuation of the self-image that was discussed in the previous sections. This is Israel as a victim but also an invincible nation. But, the victim narrative is not so clear here. While in the October period Israel does present themselves as the ever-suffering victim of Hamas, this is no longer the norm. Despite constant mentions of the hostages and reminders of October 7th and the adversities that came with it, other elements are more prominent. Tweets often include statements of Israel's will to fight and an intention to never give up, as in a tweet posted on April 15th with the words "Day 192. We don't rest until each and every one of them are home. #BringThemHome 🇮🇱🇺🇦"¹⁸³. This matches Israel's attitude since October 7th, consolidating the resilience in their brand. With a new conflict against Iran, there is a brief moment of weakness in the immediate aftermath of the initial attack, referring to the hard times Israel has been put through¹⁸⁴. However, Israel quickly recovers and begins a campaign against Iran that attempts to demonstrate Israeli strength. One example of this is the uploading of video proof of Israel's tactical superiority, as they did on April 14th¹⁸⁵, not only placing itself above its enemies, but also proving its strength. Moreover, it is not only in the military field that Israel wants to parade its greatness. In other tweets, they flaunt their democratic values as opposed to Iran. This is used to appeal to the liberal West. In another post from April 14th¹⁸⁶, a video of Irani missiles in the vicinity of Al-Aqsa mosque are contrasted to Israel's 'freedom of worship'. This is another example of things being left unsaid: Israel has

¹⁸¹ Israel (@Israel), "Recent footage from the Deir-al Balah beach in central Gaza.", Twitter, April 18, 2024, <https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1780962656733569300>

¹⁸² Israel (@Israel), "Market scenes from northern Gaza (April 16): 🇮🇱 @cogatonline", Twitter, April 17, 2024, <https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1780509503944843685>

¹⁸³ Israel (@Israel), "Day 192. We don't rest until each and every one of them are home. #BringThemHome 🇮🇱🇺🇦", Twitter, April 15, 2024, <https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1779774231103840491>

¹⁸⁴ Israel (@Israel), "It's been a long night/morning but one thing is clear. We are strong, resilient and we will never give in to terror. Those who harm the people of Israel will pay the price.", Twitter, April 14, 2024, <https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1779397368183431261>

¹⁸⁵ Israel (@Israel), "Israeli defense systems shooting down Iranian missiles over Jerusalem 🇮🇱", Twitter, April 14, 2024, <https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1779289998434374031>

¹⁸⁶ Israel (@Israel), "Israel protects freedom of worship. The Iranian Regime intentionally harms places of worship", Twitter, April 14, 2014, <https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1779461441776386070>

destroyed countless mosques and churches in Gaza since October 7th, with complete disregard for religious ideals. However, by framing Iran's attacks in this way and shaming them for it, Israel builds an image of being a 'good' state fighting 'evil' enemies. In short, a relevant part of Israel's social media diplomacy is based on nation-branding. While the victim narrative was a central element of the previous period, the Iran attacks seem to have triggered a new strategy, more focused on showcasing the resilience and Western values of Israel.

At the same time, the IDF's official account seems to have neglected its activist side at this time. In fact, a significant percentage of its tweets are now informational, simply depicting so-called 'operational updates' or other information on the war with Iran and Hamas. It is only natural that these include language referring to terrorism or Israel's right to defend itself, as these concepts are often used to justify Israel's actions at war, branding even their military activity. In addition to this, some (very few) anti-Iran messages are posted, mirroring those previously posted by @Israel. This is overall a significant change from the very active Defence Forces Twitter account that was seen in the October period. The reasons for this are unknown, but this fact is definitely telling of a change in Israel's public diplomacy strategy.

In conclusion, changes in @Israel and @IDF's Twitter activity are clear when comparing the studied periods from October 2023 and April 2024. When it comes to the official Israeli account, while less active than before, there has been a clear switch from the former innocent and harmless brand. The current policy is instead based on creating an image of a resilient and invincible nation who is clear in its mission against its enemies, yet allegedly still respecting the rights of innocent citizens who may see themselves affected. This includes not only a concern with representing Hamas and later Iran as inherently 'bad', but also emphasising Israel's positive role in the conflict. Naturally, when presenting themselves as the good guy, Israel avoids at all costs any mention of its attacks on Palestine or Iran. Simultaneously, the IDF's account has now become almost inactive

3.4. Conclusion

To summarise this chapter, my analysis has proven a slight progression of Israel's social media diplomacy and nation-branding and shaming, through the periods immediately before and after October 7th and, finally, the week that followed the unfolding of the hostility with Iran. The three weeks that preceded October 7th are an outlier period in my analysis, as they did not take

place at the height of a conflict. However, the period between the 7th and the 28th of October proves to align with existing research in fundamental aspects: content tailored to different sectors of society, constant calls for support, and representation of Israel as the ‘good guy’ who follows the law and only attacks to defend itself. In opposition, its enemies are shamed as the ‘bad guys’, unprovokedly attempting against a good innocent nation. Nevertheless, some minor changes constitute a new branch of the Israeli brand: the use of hashtags to advance their ideals and not share information, the constant calls for support, and the direct attacks and shaming against Hamas, Palestinians, and those who oppose Israel’s actions, among others. Furthermore, more dramatic changes can be observed in the April period concerning the conflict with Iran. Most significantly, the IDF takes a clear step back from activism and instead dedicates itself almost exclusively to transmitting relatively objective information about the military operations. When it comes to the @Israel account, some new developments in this period are the decrease in victimisation, prioritising a brand of a strong and invincible country. At the same time, while criticism of Hamas prevails, the addition of Iran as a new actor in the conflict leads to Israel introducing the Persian state as a new enemy in its social media. In short, this is how Israel brands itself to the foreign public.

4. Conclusion

Throughout this paper, I have presented the findings of my research on Israel's Twitter activity in order to answer the research question: *To what extent did the recent attacks in 2023 (Hamas) and 2024 (Iran) on Israel influence the country's digital public diplomacy practices?* For this, I have conducted a hand-coding analysis on a corpus of 723 tweets by @Israel and @IDF, two of Israel's official, English-speaking accounts. Additionally, I studied the periods from September 18th until October 6th 2023, from October 7th until October 28th 2023 and April 13th until April 20th 2024. These primary sources aided me in finding out the public diplomacy behaviour of Israel on Twitter in times of crisis. Additionally, I position my research within historiography as adding on to the literature on 'hasbara' through the lens of nation-branding and nation-shaming, which had not been used before.

My first empirical chapter studied Israel's history with public diplomacy. I have established that Israeli politics are in crisis due to the fact that democracy is at risk in the country, and polarisation is consistently on the rise. Additionally, the militarisation of society leads to the Defence Forces having a significant role in politics and, by extension, public diplomacy. This is relevant because global public opinion on Israel is increasingly negative, therefore leading to a more urgent need for public diplomacy. One way in which this is carried out is through the international press. This is especially true in the United States, one of Israel's chief allies, but it is not only there. The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 proves that the press all over the world has a tendency to normalise and understate the crimes Israel commits against Palestinians. Additionally, the international media gives Israel a platform to brand itself as a modern, quasi-Western nation. Most importantly, social media posts produced by Israel are the object of my study. In regards to this, existing studies demonstrate the domination of viral agitprop in their posts, as well as the tendency to create different tweets with different target audiences and therefore using different strategies. What ties all of Israel's tweets together is their goals of being spread to a larger public and obtaining support. In short, propaganda and indoctrination are common inside of Israel, and social media is used by the state in an attempt to expand pro-Israeli messages all over the world.

When it comes to the primary source analysis, my research used a sample of 723 tweets written by both @Israel and @IDF. The majority of these were in the immediate post-October 7th period, but it is relevant to mention that 54 of the studied tweets were posted in the three weeks before the attacks, and 77 others concern the period of the first week after the April 13th Irani attacks. The first studied period, from September 18th to October 6th 2023, demonstrates

an overall objective and politically neutral trend. Posts are often concerned with nation-branding as a neutral, Western country, and while there is still a clear intention of maximising their following, this has little to do with political goals. There are some exceptions to this in both @Israel and @IDF, which can be appreciated in informative posts, as well as in overtly political, name-calling, nation-shaming ones. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that the period before October 7th was relatively calm in comparison to the ones to come.

Moving on to the three weeks after the October 7th attacks, there is a quick change in activity. The frequency of tweets shot up to almost ten times what it was in the pre-October 7th period, and the content of the posts also became completely different. In the first place, Israel's attempts to grow their followers and interactions multiplied, demonstrating a constant desire for their words to be shared and reposted. There is a clear switch in attitude: Israel is no longer looking for Twitter followers; now that they are at war, their brand needs loyal supporters. Several strategies are used to achieve this, from the creation of shareables to shaming anyone who dares speak out against any of Israel's actions. Additionally, following earlier periods of conflict, hashtags become relevant in the tweets studied. Israel uses #HamasIsISIS to paint a picture of their enemies as evil enough that it seems like supporting Israel is the only option against them. This is a strategy of nation-shaming that attempts to cause a loss of support for the shamed nation. Additionally, #BringThemHome creates high arousal, emotional content about the victims of October 7th, not only as a form of remembrance, but also to condemn and shame Hamas's actions, and brand Israel as an innocent and harmless nation. This is new to a degree, since hashtags had, until this conflict, been used chiefly for informative, not ideological reasons. In short, calls for support and hashtags that share ideas and not information are some of Israel's most common posts.

Moreover, some explicit branding and shaming is present. When it comes to branding themselves, an image of an oppressed, innocent people is created. However, this idea is only sustained on the Twitter pages by the complete omission of Israel's constant attacks on Gaza, that started almost instantly after the October 7th attacks. In fact, at the same time Israel is presented as completely innocent, it continues to reiterate its intention to defend itself and its strong determination. On the other hand, Palestinians are rarely talked about outside of Hamas. This turns into a form of genericisation that converges all Palestinians and Hamas. This is clearly with nation-shaming intentions, as the Palestinians are only presented as having negative traits deserving of punishment. In fact, in the few occasions Palestinian civilians and their situation are mentioned, Israel refuses all responsibility, as the law-abiding state it brands itself to be, and instead blames any harm the Palestinians may be put under on Hamas. To sum up, according

to the analysed tweets, Israel is branded as an innocent but strong country, while Palestinians are either Hamas terrorists or victims only of them.

Lastly, the rise of the conflict with Iran changed things in Israel's Twitter once again. In the first place, while my analysis had to this point combined tweets from both @Israel and @IDF this was no longer possible in this period, since the IDF's account in this period almost exclusively posted objective posts about their military operation, and barely any of their tweets could be related to a nation-branding strategy. When it comes to @Israel's tweets, there is a clear difference in branding, going from presenting themselves as a mainly inoffensive but sometimes resilient country, to an invincible actor that happens to be innocent in the conflict. At the same time, shaming similar to the last period, changing the fact that Iran has now been added to the list of Israel's direct enemies.

The above findings come together to answer my research question. In the first place, the presence of shareables and other attempts to create potentially viral posts have been present since at least 2014, evidencing that Israel's calls for support are nothing new.¹⁸⁷ Additionally, the tendency to call out Palestinians and their supporters and accusing them of anti-Semitism, as visible in many of the studied tweets, is in line with much of the existing literature, such as Murphy's comments on the instrumentalisation of anti-Semitism.¹⁸⁸ When it comes to nation-branding strategies, it is clear that little has changed. Israel continues to present itself as both strong and victimised, in what Medzeni calls a historical dichotomy, where public diplomacy attempts to demonstrate that Israel is too strong to be damaged by attacks, while also playing up the suffering of its people.¹⁸⁹ This is effective because it helps Israel gain the favour of different sectors of society: those who feel pity for the victims, and those who feel sympathy for the strongest party. Alternatively, nation-shaming of the Palestinians has progressed from historical 'hasbara'. In fact, those who have criticised the historical failures of 'hasbara' have done so by blaming it on its submissiveness and lack of attacks against the enemies.¹⁹⁰ However, the periods studied are explicitly critical of their enemies. After October 7th, this was mainly Hamas. After April 13th, however, not only was Iran added on to the list of Israel's opponents, but it also seems that the Palestinians in general were too. The use of hashtags also differs from the short history of Israeli social media: while other periods saw informational hashtags such as #IsraelUnderFire, the ones in this period were primarily ideological, by either shaming Hamas (#HamasIsISIS) or branding Israel as a victim (#BringThemHome). Lastly, the

¹⁸⁷ Rodley, "When Memes Go To War", 3.

¹⁸⁸ Murphy, "Hasbara in Action", 186.

¹⁸⁹ Medzini, "Hasbara in the Second Lebanon War", 43.

¹⁹⁰ Schleifer, "Jewish and contemporary origins", 131.

April period was also characterised by the inactivity of the @IDF account. This is a new development, not only from every previous period (in 2023 and before), but also from Israel's constant trend of militarisation.¹⁹¹ In conclusion, while the Hamas and Iran attacks did not trigger dramatic changes, some new techniques are beginning to form in Israeli digital public diplomacy.

Some limitations of my study should be made known. Firstly, due to time constraints and the chosen hand-coding method, my research only concerns a total span of around one month in a conflict that has lasted more than six months at the time of writing. This can undermine generalisation since, despite the fact that I have analysed tweets from the very beginning and the very end of the conflict, the entire in-between period remains unstudied. I suggest that, for future studies, a more comprehensive sample is used. Additionally, one concept that is closely linked to public diplomacy is public opinion. My research focuses exclusively on the former, giving little room to the latter. This limits my results in that the effects of the studied public diplomacy techniques are not known. I suggest that future research analyses public opinion on Israel in relation to their public diplomacy efforts. Lastly, Israel is not the only country to engage in public diplomacy. Most countries in the world, including Israel's enemies in this conflict, also invest in such strategies. It would therefore be compelling to study the other parties' public diplomacy behaviour on their own or in a comparative way to Israel.

In conclusion, this paper has uncovered Israel's social media and nation-branding strategies in the period of the 2023-24 conflict against both Hamas and Iran. This is an especially relevant event to study since the death toll of Israel's enemies is the highest ever recorded, leading to Israel being accused of committing plausible genocide. However, as I have demonstrated, there is little remorse in Israel's words. Whether calling for the exclusive support of the public or shaming their victims, Israel has doubled down on its actions and made sure to use social media to establish itself as an innocent actor with no fault of its own. The lack of acknowledgement of the harm Israel's own actions have caused, as well as the refusal of responsibility for the death and suffering of Palestinians, shed a bright light for the public to understand the Jewish state's attitude towards innocent Palestinian civilians. This opens up a door for international law to condemn Israel's attacks, not as part of a plausible genocide, but as a clear, blatant attempt against Palestinians and their existence.

¹⁹¹ Císcar, "Israel and the role of war"

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List of primary sources

See appendices.

Appendix 1: @Israel, September 18th - October 6th

Date	Link	Codes
06/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1710263641201672536	Celebration
05/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1709825753817158115	Celebration
04/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1709478461906231518	National appreciation
04/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1709467891031281752	National day
03/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1709176482155913504	Celebration
03/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1709155214924632400	Communication with citizens
03/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1709100714079728033	National day
01/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1708466804337881168	Celebration
01/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1708376202036322713	National appreciation
01/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1708361149740204272	National day
01/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1708361101593702477	Celebration
01/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1708346744071712785	National day
01/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1708325213534843023	National day
01/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1708300700524986439	National day
30/09/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1708212376439332951	National day
29/09/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1707707364156035113	Celebration
28/09/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1707388419708432687	National appreciation
27/09/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1707050151561281631	Communication with citizens
27/09/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1707043200190280174	National appreciation
25/09/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1706348976105050454	Celebration
24/09/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1705925081963102448	Celebration
24/09/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/170589072234641	Celebration

	4536	
24/09/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1705878099122848155	Celebration
24/09/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1705870766485495814	Celebration
22/09/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1705092193667494384	National day
21/09/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1704900992624427364	National day
21/09/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1704846394547147009	Celebration
21/09/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1704770605520699461	Celebration
21/09/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1704746112152711677	National day
21/09/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1704726976836088120	National day
20/09/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1704490553235141056	National appreciation
19/09/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1704110635414372424	Political statement
18/09/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1703796735850491954	Political statement

Appendix 2: @IDF, September 18th - October 6th

Date	Link	Codes
06/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1710250238412239337	Celebration
05/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1710016543570989259	Informative
05/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1709997783346712934	Informative
05/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1709812674370982236	Informative
03/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1709223515520397469	Fun facts
28/09/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1707444493295783937	Informative
26/09/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1706701555083235722	Informative
24/09/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1705972343699312666	Informative
24/09/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1705933084938367093	Fun facts
24/09/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1705883267650470251	Informative
24/09/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1705883306300985464	Informative
23/09/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1705636569091027417	Celebration
23/09/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1705627862487728427	Informative
22/09/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1705245955736416683	Informative
22/09/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1705262828108611919	Informative
22/09/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1705143942423994759	Fun facts
21/09/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1704897119432196409	Informative
21/09/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1704868518376665300	Informative
19/09/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1704193648097734965	Informative
19/09/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1704224352143638964	Informative

Appendix 3: @Israel, October 7th-28th

Date	Link	Codes
07/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1710592288500384182	- Victim narrative, call for support
07/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1710763600988532995	- Own strength, citizen support, thankful, resilience, united
07/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1710745458539123031	- International support, thankful
07/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1710615207435743633	- Terrorism, horror, right of self-defense, intention to fight, war
07/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1710690179558555708	- Horror, Hamas is Isis, terrorism
07/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1710583575123263962	- Terrorism, horror, alarmism, war
07/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1710742106300424519	- International support, thankful, victim narrative, dark days
07/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1710724558062223447	- War, terrorism, horror, innocence, intention to fight
07/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1710657378268426751	- Resilience, Israeli identity, united
07/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1710771314942677142	- International support, thankful, victim narrative, call for support, dark days
07/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1710751492892934364	- Resilience, Israeli identity.
07/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1710597999133409310	- War, terrorism, intention to fight, right of self-defense, innocence
07/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1710670477381808390	- Terrorism, horror
07/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1710584327828836694	- Intention to fight, protect citizens, aimed at citizens, united, horror
07/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1710702517519073389	- Aimed at citizens, informative
07/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1710574738471317616	- Horror, terrorism, intention to fight, innocence, protect citizens
08/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1710911112563097950	- Resilience
08/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1710908447623962728	#Israel_Under_Attack, call for support
08/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1711052188389171474	Horror, informative, terrorism, intention to fight
08/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1710973753943843169	Thankful, international support

08/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1711126093934072012	Victims, innocence, terrorism, horror, emotions
08/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1710888079416844651	Victims, terrorism, call for support. emotions, sensitive
08/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1710891829174976631	Dark days, resilience, victim narrative
08/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1710995032851849672	Informative, resilience, victim narrative
08/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1710898622487789910	Celebrity support, thankful, Hamas is evil
09/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1711353180733214841	Own strength, citizen support, thankful, resilience, united
09/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1711402005803987352	#IStandWithIsrael, thankful
09/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1711302075257176121	Resilience, united, own strength, Israeli identity
09/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1711291721235992659	Celebrity support, terrorism
09/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1711218958685073748	Horror, terrorism, innocence, Hamas is Isis, emotions
09/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1711294658343587870	Terrorism, horror, justification for crimes, Hamas is evil, victims
09/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1711268868247707921	Victims, horror
09/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1711279923069952316	
09/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1711391591108141074	Hamas is evil, terrorism, horror, Hamas attacks themselves
09/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1711228030247391335	International support, thankful
09/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1711346567624487353	Aimed at citizens, dark days, victim narrative, resilience, own strenght
10/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1711730914471092404	Horror
10/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1711747809500709374	Hamas is evil, horror, Hamas is ISIS
10/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1711759443698811073	
10/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1711748790443458988	
10/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1711617079260872819	International support, victim narrative, thankful
10/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1711817100430348481	United, resilience, emotions

10/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1711801008878215275	Thankful, #IStandWithIsrael
10/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1711787085319778420	Informative, horror, Hamas is ISIS, innocence
10/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1711738867173200363	Intention to fight, reactionary
10/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1711663108689625259	Resilience, united, emotions
10/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1711618140839334010	Never again
10/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1711678889108332862	Thankful
10/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1711613038053175688	Hamas is evil, terrorism, horror, call for support
10/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1711680382813245813	Terrorism, national hero
10/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1711575436713460104	Emotions, horror, international support, US
10/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1711805320840782320	International support, victim narrative, thankful, Israeli identity
10/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1711823589547094039	International support, Hamas is evil, horror, US, emotions, antisemitism, human shields
10/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1711683167986327901	Thankful, international support, dark days
11/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1712065956351000853	Horror, Hamas is Isis, proof
11/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1712177410047619331	Horror, proof, child victims
11/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1712039923333603428	Hamas is ISIS, terrorism, horror, victims, emotions
11/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1712084643653079312	Aimed for children, terrorism, horror, Hamas is ISIS, intention to fight, protect citizens
11/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1711985883681845725	Informative, horror, emotions, testimony, victim's relative
11/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1712000487988379879	Terrorism, horror, emotions, proof, victims
11/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1712010244916646312	Victim, national hero, terrorism, horror
11/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1712120628227047842	Emotions, victims, victim's relative, national hero, news snippet.
11/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1712045635011019102	Thankful, international support, #IStandWithIsrael, proof of support, citizen's support, call for support.
11/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1712121777478902261	Hamas is ISIS, terrorism

11/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1712113847924896093	Alarmism, victim narrative, proof
11/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1711993919716647010	#IStandWithIsrael
11/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1712065106052300845	Horror, alarmism, intention to fight, proof.
11/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1712029133826412810	Emotions, movie-like, Hamas is ISIS, proof, horror, terrorism
11/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1712128312007381105	National hero, testimony, horror
11/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1712019019291656378	Horror, Hamas is ISIS, second person, emotions
11/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1711977907273257163	Informative, dark days
11/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1712118485881418172	Informative, dark days
12/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1712464329575158222	Celebrity support, thankful, screenshots, movie-like
12/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1712421299807469610	Victims, victim's relative, emotions, testimony, horror, news snippet, Hamas is evil
12/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1712369147466670416	Horror, terrorism, news snippet, proof, intention to fight, Hamas is ISIS, justification for crimes, antisemitism
12/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1712361785712374162	Hamas is ISIS, proof
12/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1712453725363581373	Emotions, victims, call for support,
12/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1712411518212423842	Victims, emotions
12/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1712366457693094149	Victims
12/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1712361265530655092	Victims, emotions, call for support
12/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1712410619779940809	Testimony, terrorism, horror, Hamas is ISIS, dark days
12/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1712364980350193995	Terrorism, Hamas is ISIS, horror, movie-like
12/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1712453071983218977	Victims, national hero
12/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1712432530211668218	Victims
12/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1712339668786704805	Victims, horror, testimony, Hamas is ISIS, terrorism
12/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1712380975735243171	US, international support, thankful

12/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1712536571566764423	Dark days, resilience, own strength, Israeli identity
12/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1712430612777181325	Israeli identity, thankful, victim narrative
12/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1712537272653066699	Call for support
13/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1712663382287876484	Emotional, informative, aimed for children
13/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1712740019297767817	Victims, terrorism, innocence, horror, Hamas is ISIS, emotional
13/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1712781519373160879	Celebrity support, dark days, horror, right of self-defense, call for support
13/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1712813109113491470	Terrorism, justification for crimes, horror, right to self-defense, human shields, help Palestinian civilians
13/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1712893310501626171	Human shields, call for support, victims, horror
13/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1712786819815760029	Help Palestinian civilians
13/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1712788884977750464	Thankful, international support, horror
13/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1712875040092430569	Dark days, informative
14/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1713092258617070067	Justification for crimes, victims, intention to fight, emotions, horror, graphic, Hamas is ISIS, movie-like, proof
14/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1713159474888798693	Celebrity support, international support, thankful, Hamas is evil
14/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1713160318686237035	Graphic, horror, emotions
14/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1713201571444507018	Horror, proof, help Palestinian civilians, Hamas is evil, justification for crimes, intention to fight
14/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1713262029635506238	Misinformation, proof, emotional, horror, celebrity support, terrorism, antisemitism, Hamas is ISIS
14/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1713074806722015495	Child victims, horror, graphic, emotional, could be you
14/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1713125608098562517	Dark days, proof, protect citizens, horror, justification for crimes, emotional, Hamas is ISIS
14/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1713211827667062882	Dark days, US, international support, thankful, antisemitism, right to self-defense, emotional, movie-like
14/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1713205200821854410	US, international support, thankful, citizen support

14/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1713244796372804042	Hamas is evil, human shields, proof, Hamas is ISIS
14/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1713072754709365180	Hamas is ISIS, terrorism, justification for crimes
14/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1713144318125363367	Germany, international support, thankful
14/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1713106642315718765	Dark days, US, international support, thankful, antisemitism, right to self-defense, emotional, movie-like
14/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1713196336470790156	Second person, Hamas is ISIS, call for support
14/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1713076418395959780	Intention to fight, right to self-defense
14/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1713199363642495146	Testimony, horror, call for support
14/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1713063760447840419	International support, thankful, Germany, horror, emotional, innocence
14/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1713283302625345710	Dark days
14/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1713071060558467175	Dark days, intention to fight, right of self-defense, horror, Hamas is ISIS
15/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1713495945420124163	Resilience, own strength
15/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1713605415802487171	Horror, Hamas is ISIS, emotional
15/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1713507099110777136	Screenshot, misinformation, second person, horror, antisemitism
15/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1713577235200749614	Israeli identity, own strength, resilience, aimed for children, protect citizens
15/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1713517847412941162	Child victims, call for support, celebrity support, Hamas is ISIS
15/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1713514739878289414	Misinformation, call for support, informative
15/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1713454981053853993	Misinformation, second person, horror
16/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1713931519620788538	International support, proof, movie-like, bring them home, emotional, Hamas is ISIS, graphic, horror
16/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1713867059187028044	Never again, emotional, antisemitism, horror, justification for crimes, help Palestinian civilians, Hamas is ISIS
16/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1713963445706482003	Horror, victim's relatives, testimony, call for support, emotional
16/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714008727081107623	Horror, victims
16/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1713872752040362407	Horror, Hamas is ISIS, emotional, could be you, resilience, own strength

16/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/171390717692845926	Emotional, testimony, horror, bring them home, victim's relative, news snippet
16/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1713920937471496294	Bring them home, emotional, call for support
16/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1713918249669112145	Screenshot, second person, terrorism
16/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1713799802809380994	Own strength
17/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714210046425350181	Shareable, Hamas is evil
17/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714201336709894167	Screenshot, Hamas is evil, meme
17/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714212307352400284	Thankful, emotional
17/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714378880713203844	Hamas attacks themselves, news snippet
17/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714376703697355193	Emotional, Hamas is evil, proof
17/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714157562344456558	Victims, bring them home, call for support, second person
17/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714326698932498559	Call for support, horror, emotional, bring them home
17/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714306582375268372	Misinformation, help Palestinian civilians, human shields, Hamas is ISIS
17/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714312805497639232	Victims
17/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714208323002601573	Victims, horror
17/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714247071484580186	Hamas is ISIS, horror, testimony, emotional
17/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714307694637482299	Victims, bring them home
17/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714220090529329176	Horror, Hamas is ISIS, emotional
17/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714187742035300748	Victims
17/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714353161937301677	Victim's relative, testimony, emotional, bring them home
17/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714248131779473720	United, dark days
17/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714311073124282569	Victims, bring them home
17/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714371894521057737	Misinformation, Hamas attacks themselves
17/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714216356067836028	Victims, call for support, bring them home

18/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714545680562184434	Audio, misinformation, Hamas attacks themselves, proof
18/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714593881801601043	Misinformation, Hamas attacks themselves, news snippet, proof
18/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714632975445291410	Misinformation, #Israel_Under_Attack, second person
18/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714631119893668033	Victims
18/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714719198633406491	Victims
18/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714696695060066743	Victims, emotional
18/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714685167162274049	Testimony, victims, horror, bring them home
18/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714569025689207225	Proof, graphic, movie-like, emotional, victim's relative, testimony, bring them home
18/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714589950371381381	Victims, bring them home
18/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714557497636180478	Screenshot, Hamas is evil, human shields, Hamas attacks themselves
18/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714528957498810738	Bring them home, victims
18/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714600951481323747	Hamas is ISIS, thankful, international support, US, horror, justification for crimes, right to self-defense, resilience
18/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714644849301897701	International support, US, thankful
18/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714563012726546498	Bring them home, victims, movie-like
18/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714702214822846592	Thankful, call for support, bring them home
18/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714529492297781664	United
19/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714957390020231587	News snippet, victims
19/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1715002664067424679	Thankful, celebrity support
19/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714917084361056528	Misinformation, Hamas attacks themselves, news snippet, proof
19/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714922694414598419	Celebrity support, call for support
19/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714943111485444368	Victims, second person
19/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714949084291752054	Emotional, call for support, victim's relative
19/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1715005640110747746	Misinformation, screenshot, horror, Hamas is evil, antisemitism

19/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1715052107072496005	International support, call for support, horror, alarmism,
19/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714997443245293594	Call for support
19/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714995058951204946	Emotional, disabilities, Hamas is ISIS, call for support
19/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714991989370798427	Emotional, victims
19/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714982040972533895	Horror, testimony
19/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714966766097457280	Israeli identity, resilience
19/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714952493547860302	Misinformation, horror, Hamas is evil
19/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714941863294038208	Second person
19/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714932046777237749	Testimony, victim's relative, horror, bring them home, proof, emotional
19/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714913106340557236	Second person, news snippet, misinformation
19/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714905717591699771	Bring them home, celebrity support, thankful
19/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1714903300087124369?lang=en	Hamas is ISIS, second person, terrorism
20/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1715439615962702145	Informative, bring them home
20/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1715381520293085302	Bring them home, Israeli identity
20/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1715371142104412410	Bring them home
20/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1715370190714589677	Celebrity support, call for support, could be you
20/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1715357597996339459	Victims, emotional
20/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1715310715291234656	International support, call for support, UK, US
20/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1715306232561418458	Celebrity support
20/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1715269533529702864	Emotional, call for support, Hamas is ISIS
21/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1715795532931539265	Human shields, help Palestinian civilians
21/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1715782480760869151	International support, Lithuania, thankful
21/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1715774603472080971	Hamas is ISIS, second person

21/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1715744269560893905	Victims, bring them home, call for support, second person
21/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1715743467903525370	Victims, bring them home
21/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1715695096518074738	Victims, bring them home, call for support, Hamas is ISIS
21/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1715687224224727273	Hamas is ISIS, news snippet, antisemitism
21/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1715675145241612338	Sport speaks up, victims, celebrity support
21/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1715657698383970689	Aimed for children, bring them home, victims, emotional
21/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1715629832132812934	Dark days, horror, Hamas is ISIS, second person
22/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716198455146598643	Hamas is evil, terrorism, Hamas is ISIS, justification for crimes, Hamas attacks themselves, news snippet, right of self-defense
22/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716171678537990297	Bring them home
22/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716170037445173504	Bring them home, UK, thankful, international support
22/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716133304687063396	Screenshot, right of self-defense, justification for crimes
22/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716131399487328606	Proof, horror, graphic, Hamas is evil
22/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716068142818927064	Victims
22/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716066623176458513	UK, international support, victims
22/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716061782391840883	Bring them home, victims, emotional
22/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716041965391814670	Thankful, celebrity support, informative, antisemitism, movie-like
22/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716037390244925516	Graphic, horror, news snippet, proof, Hamas is evil, Hamas is ISIS, terrorism
22/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716031613719494684	National hero, thankful
22/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1715992816889761830	Right of self-defense
23/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716480631847194961	Victims, emotional, bring them home
23/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716473402637091272	Hamas is evil, proof, graphic
23/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716462429532479726	Hamas is ISIS, Hamas is evil

23/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716462730167644183	Antisemitism
23/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716463529346118116	Hamas is evil
23/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716464777440948376	Hamas is evil, human shields
23/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716464790036414838	Human shields
23/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716464800962609381	Hamas is evil, terrorism
23/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716464871271706844	Antisemitism
23/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716464885125488759	Hamas is ISIS, Hamas is evil
23/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716451049857237456	Victims, bring them home
23/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716421315597398191	Victims, emotional
23/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716414757245198767	Emotional
23/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716394625609388124	Emotional, call for support, victims, movie-like
23/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716388985147142454	Testimony, emotional, victims
23/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716382738838671763	Hamas is ISIS, human shields, justification for crimes, screenshot
23/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716360493604966762	Aimed for children, emotional, call for support, victims, bring them home
23/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716349753980555489	Victims
24/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716940249685958854	Resilience, own strenght
24/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716881059508596962	Proof, testimony, call for support
24/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716873289182949799	Hamas is ISIS
24/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716866876418949602	Audio, Hamas is evil
24/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716843452887929287	United, citizen support
24/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716818269334864160	Human shields, Hamas is evil
24/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716811570674823671	Graphic, emotional
24/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716809684060090600	Emotional, bring them home, victim's relative, movie-like, call for support

24/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716803913284800718	Hamas is ISIS, testimony, horror, Hamas is evil
24/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716802759033324021	Victim's relative, victims, emotional, movie-like
24/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716794520535232699	Victims, emotional
24/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716772988681441292	Bring them home, proof, victim's relative, emotional
24/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716770431573590270	Call for support, informative, proof
24/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716749682116841835	Informative
24/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716744656178839844	Second person, news snippet, Hamas is evil
24/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716741604759707696	Proof, horror
24/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1716717170011316318	Emotional, call for support, bring them home, victims
25/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1717266084082921924	United, Israeli identity
25/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1717241394761269452	Hamas is ISIS, Hamas is evil, meme, informative
25/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1717205988657246381	Child victims, bring them home, call for support
25/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1717201572894044498	Graphic, second person, horror, Hamas is ISIS
25/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1717195510165950898	Victims, victim's relative, bring them home,
25/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1717169080958939449	Informative, bring them home, victims, emotional
25/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1717165226372510019	Bring them home, call for support
25/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1717160795484655957	Emotional, victims, bring them home
25/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1717147747462033815	Testimony, victims, Hamas is evil, bring them home
25/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1717123212918522249	Bring them home, second person, child victims
25/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1717108136291553448	Bring them home, victims
25/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1717104638950826246	National hero, victims
25/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1717093630698041544	Bring them home, child victims
25/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1717090155901653157	Bring them home, victim's relative, emotional, horror, proof, testimony, call for support

25/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1717086556010233897	International support, thankful, India
25/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1717081009722626431	Bring them home, victims, child victims
25/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1717012438330008028	Bring them home, victims, emotional, Hamas is ISIS, HAMASisis, movie-like
26/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1717618066798846192	Bring them home, child victims
26/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1717604230586941724	Victims, citizen support
26/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1717577354313077084	Second person
26/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1717570100792889447	Bring them home, celebrity support, movie-like, emotional
26/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1717556335565246797	Bring them home, victims
26/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1717553687025815817	Horror, testimony, graphic
26/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1717532884242727318	Screenshot, Pallywood, misinformation
26/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1717474428072644782	Bring them home
26/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1717448484448539050	Child victims, disabilities
26/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1717445430504509565	Child victims, bring them home
27/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1717994285893595177	Bring them home, could be you, victims, emotional
27/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1717992005433704521	Horror, child victims, justification for crimes
27/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1717916354013995073	Bring them home
27/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1717913931904147582	Audio, Hamas is evil, help Palestinian civilians, justification for crimes
27/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1717913994038554868	Justification for crimes, Hamas is evil, help Palestinian civilians
27/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1717914072761389165	Audio, Hamas is evil, help Palestinian civilians
27/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1717914077345853796	Hamas is evil, help Palestinian civilians
27/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1717894348346409197	Victims, emotional
27/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1717890846496817280	Aimed for children, bring them home, emotional, movie-like, child victims
27/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1717866216704889230	International support, Australia, thankful, bring them home

27/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1717843238319505678	Victim's relative, testimony, could be you, testimony
27/10/2023	https://twitter.com/Israel/status/1717808761275109615	Second person, meme, screenshot

Appendix 4: @IDF, October 7th-28th

Date	Link	Codes
07/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1710784783381393515	Informative
07/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1710781540932739295	Informative
07/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1710757663565385875	Military victims
07/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1710747199993217080	Informative, #IsraelAtWar, horror
07/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1710705060278055077	Informative, horror, victim narrative
07/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1710651624329236841	Informative, #IsraelAtWar, horror, terrorism, intention to fight
07/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1710580568302223374	Informative, war, right of self-defense
07/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1710562933770469547	Right of self-defense, informative, victim-narrative
07/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1710525114880516370	Informative
07/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1710522378860511633	Informative, right of self-defense, intention to fight, victim narrative
07/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1710516833269301714	Informative, terrorism
07/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1710504343097499802	Informative
07/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1710497933513081178	Informative
08/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711158369552138326	Informative, horror, dark days, innocence, Hamas is evil, intention to fight, right of self-defense, help Palestinian civilians, call for support, resilience, victim narrative, 9/11, unprovoked
08/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711138315628372110	War, victim narrative, Hamas is ISIS, innocence, justification for crimes, right of self-defense, human shields, protect citizens, international law, unprovoked
08/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711133993364521334	Informative, infographic
08/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711120161552412691	Informative
08/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/171111473294868741	Child victims, horror, innocence, emotional, proof

08/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711027540536471994	Informative, innocence, horror, dark days, 9/11, international law, call for support
08/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711023916246774252	Informative
08/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711001747236278351	Informative, protect citizens
08/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1710993555487879669	War, proof, horror, intention to fight
08/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1710968308869091616	International law, intention to fight
08/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1710949291739533755	Informative
08/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1710949402469183516	Informative, proof
08/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1710949407586238615	Informative, human shields
08/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1710949527652298769	Informative, terrorism, proof
08/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1710925725669249512	Informative
08/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1710912326562410514	Informative, intention to fight
08/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1710900896442331275	Informative, intention to fight
08/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1710811251549360333	Informative, protect citizens, intention to fight, innocence
09/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711530379222339816	Military victims
09/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711517350132887934	Celebrity support, U2
09/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711508178486100399	Informative, horror, infographic
09/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711491075016159304	Horror, intention to fight, war, Hamas is evil, antisemitism, proof, movie-like
09/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711468487434997782	Victim narrative, proof, innocence
09/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711456592053338496	Military victims
09/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711438415588213236	Informative, innocence, horror, Hamas is evil, dark days, call for support, human shields, help Palestinian civilians, justification for crimes, call for support, unprovoked, victim narrative
09/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711424254682550345	News snippet, horror, victim narrative

09/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711408190506573913	Informative
09/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711399158488150217	Testimony, horror
09/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711391620929577136	Informative
09/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711389908605001880	Informative, victim narrative, intention to fight
09/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711389912996384989	Proof, informative
09/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711389916670660654	Human shields, proof, justification for crimes
09/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711389919900246493	Intention to fight, Hamas is evil
09/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711382263336742981	Informative
09/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711368462906368169	
09/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711365628433399825	Informative, right of self-defense
09/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711363875591823594	Informative
09/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711336335468802537	Informative
09/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711350797043138974	Hamas is evil, informative
09/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711332940238467209	Emotional, resilience, united
09/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711305966430433299	Informative
09/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711210451403501672	Proof, Hamas is evil, human shields
10/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711890347985432912	Proof, Hamas is evil
10/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711890537031041107	Proof, Hamas is evil
10/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/171189094512421394	Proof, Hamas is evil
10/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711871499731095603	Informative, infographic
10/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711832531891269841	Informative
10/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711830323464474797	Informative
10/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711789795771351402	Testimony, proof, horror, Hamas is evil

10/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711777375459971238	Informative, intention to fight
10/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711782405223182744	Informative
10/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711771052571824167	International support, call for support
10/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711764480307151344	Hamas is evil, antisemitism, terrorism
10/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711753651046236651	Hamas is evil, news snippet, victim narrative, human shields
10/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711744526283424135	Hamas is evil, second person
10/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711751701550497937	Informative
10/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711719560997421347	Informative
10/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711712658104193406	Victims, informative
10/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711698008708964472	Informative, help Palestinian civilians
10/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711676229688938904	Proof
10/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711664293345685586	Informative, infographic
10/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711643989366198311	Informative
10/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711573856811438521	Military victims
11/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712249510330552550	International support, US, thankful
11/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712247628652503261	United, right of self-defense, intention to fight
11/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712228876158394775	#StandWithIsrael, second person
11/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712148116160368949	United, resilience, Israeli identity
11/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712127423075045575	Informative
11/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712104297104556304	Informative, justification for crimes, Hamas is evil, victim narrative
11/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712082429047898514	Informative
11/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712064432929480919	Horror, graphic, Hamas is evil
11/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712050251391963140	National hero

11/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712038582414655872	Emotional, child victims
11/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712028977567605168	Proof, Hamas is evil, human shields
11/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712013064982151597	Informative
11/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712011289659150399	Informative
11/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711998755510112386	Intention to fight, Hamas is evil, proof
11/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711935604705882137	Hamas is evil, informative, horror, innocence, informative, second person, human shields, justification for crimes, international law, international support, right of self-defense, call for support
11/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711935572527165813	Testimony, horror, victim narrative, terrorism, antisemitism
11/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711927566670434371	Informative
11/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711923004182278594	Military victims
11/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1711894809936367860	Informative, international support
12/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712579906423431208	Informative, proof
12/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712517979479355635	Informative
12/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712515021513584972	Informative, victim narrative, Hamas is evil
12/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712504294279168307	Horror, intention to fight
12/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712489646536482827	Informative, Hamas is evil, terrorism, human shields, antisemitism, justification for crimes
12/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712467438342934852	Emotional, Hamas is evil, intention to fight
12/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712460971187564566	Informative
12/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712409889367072876	Informative, infographic
12/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712382998073454888	Hamas is ISIS
12/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712343443324776755	Informative
12/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712282365924343910	Informative, horror, human shields, justification for crimes

12/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712278167564570778	Informative
12/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712263220000334282	Emotional, horror, proof
13/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712957205014601757	Informative
13/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712907913281343975	Informative
13/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712892932636725291	Informative, proof, justification for crimes
13/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712872276633239984	Informative
13/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712859895110811737	Hamas is evil, human shields, intention to fight, right of self-defense, protect citizens, help Palestinian civilians
13/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712851052561645796	Proof, horror, Hamas is evil
13/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712831073032220796	Informative
13/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712825819691716748	Human shields, help Palestinian civilians
13/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712810990495035482	Informative, Hamas is evil
13/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712793662407442565	Proof, horror, victim narrative
13/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712779017718300886	Emotional, national hero
13/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712773593828831607	Hamas is evil, proof
13/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712755037259071505	Informative, infographic
13/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712747840055713841	Informative
13/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712726504423989389	Screenshot, Hamas is evil, help Palestinian civilians, human shields
13/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712707301369434398	Informative, help Palestinian civilians, human shields
13/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712691423600894382	Emotional, victim narrative, horror
13/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712684887105249284	Help Palestinian civilians, international law, Hamas is evil, informative
13/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712678627798642726	Victims, victim's relative, emotions, testimony, horror, news snippet, Hamas is evil
13/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712675917133475905	Informative

13/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712651990222651780	Military victims
13/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712621419152941393	Hamas is evil, antisemitism
14/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713295966327988570	Help Palestinian civilians, right of self-defense, victim narrative, Hamas is evil, human shields
14/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713269170140278821	Hamas is evil, proof
14/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713261289114333477	Proof, informative
14/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713224721381118418	Horror, victim narrative, horror, intention to fight
14/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713208073706254674	Second person, call for support
14/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713163707683926131	Intention to fight, united, resilience
14/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713148968530518226	Informative, victim narrative
14/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713146042823147716	United, national hero, resilience, Israeli identity
14/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713129176104923383	Intention to fight, informative
14/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713110296946950388	Informative
14/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713040749678231832	Informative, Hamas is evil
14/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713037101896204637	Help Palestinian civilians, informative, human shields, Hamas is evil, united, misinformation, international support
14/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713027031582007577	Informative
14/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713026330692899324	Proof, emotional, child victims, intention to fight
14/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712999566717403528	International support
14/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1712995516173127913	Informative
15/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713685914575044809	Hamas is evil, proof, informative
15/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713679109816012981	Hamas is evil, justification for crimes
15/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713652371320963455	Proof, protect citizens
15/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713589815176757251	News snippet, Hamas is evil, human shields

15/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713585557392035855	Informative, victim narrative
15/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713566287102689292	United, emotional
15/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713553661807215011	Informative
15/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713535693274612184	Informative
15/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713509256920535179	Informative
15/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713500050511253928	Audio, Hamas is evil, human shields
15/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713485420321747022	Informative, antisemitism
15/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713466285953077556	Proof, national hero
15/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713453410534543518	Help Palestinian civilians
15/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713404793790550313	Help Palestinian civilians, Hamas is evil, human shields
15/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713395802159133059	Informative
15/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713374444612378647	Help Palestinian civilians, justification for crimes, Hamas is evil, right of self-defense
15/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713362078604382696	Hamas is evil, intention to fight, proof, victim narrative
16/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714047233786601625	Informative
16/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714045853793403039	Hamas is evil, human shields, intention to fight
16/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714028835916652675	Hamas is evil, misinformation
16/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714015527201370503	Informative
16/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714002147505766808	Informative
16/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713927599028576530	Screenshot, Hamas is evil
16/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713914396198445110	Informative
16/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713896361714766026	Intention to fight, Hamas is evil
16/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713874674222776355	Emotional, horror, proof
16/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713852880560468052	Victims, testimony, horror

16/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713799168169304089	Informative
16/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713780092139147351	Horror, second person
16/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713763024803160275	Movie-like, antisemitism, Hamas is evil
16/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713744533563801676	Hamas is evil, dark days
16/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1713709448173101270	Proof, horror, Hamas is evil
17/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714409021992521983	Misinformation
17/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714403025136017784	Informative, Hamas attacks themselves
17/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714397390432612795	Informative, Hamas attacks themselves
17/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714370853465387395	Informative, Hamas attacks themselves
17/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714320476825112808	Hamas is evil, help Palestinian civilians
17/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714319498856087725	Informative
17/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714309264997568680	Informative
17/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714289932842488024	Informative, intention to fight
17/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714275857790091479	Hamas is evil
17/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714270011706179718	Informative
17/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714235229378933210	Victims, testimony, emotional, horror
17/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714213357396296183	Informative, Hamas is evil
17/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714179576979493156	Informative
17/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714155445605015631	Informative, international support, US
17/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714137372860789226	Proof, informative
17/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714120624153440283	Resilience, united
18/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714786045105958986	Informative
18/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714756629227507739	Hamas is evil, misinformation, second person

18/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714730664413610456	Hamas is evil, horror, misinformation
18/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714684722398277864	Misinformation, Hamas attacks themselves, audio, proof
18/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714680890582806884	Informative
18/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714667301713125381	Second person, call for support, Hamas is evil, huma shields
18/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714638842244858336	Misinformation, screenshot
18/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714607699168526523	Misinformation, Hamas attacks themselves
18/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714568304776384682	Hamas is evil, movie-like, human shields, proof
18/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714548529538953637	Audio, proof, Hamas attacks themselves, misinformation
18/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714513625598021868	Proof, Hamas attacks themselves
18/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714496675237040464	Second person, Hamas attacks themselves
18/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714483112023846926	Human shields, justification for crimes
18/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714464412671557774	Proof, Hamas attacks themselves
19/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1715146633325744260	Victims, resilience
19/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1715123815406039528	Second person, Hamas is ISIS, Hamas is evil
19/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1715112507688288755	United, horror, victim narrative, antisemitism, resilience, intention to fight
19/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1715096399988081130	Informative
19/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1715065473300140254	Resilience, united
19/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1715001156047396909	Victims, disabilities
19/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714968576514277789	Informative
19/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714948408857796793	Informative, proof, graphic, emotional
19/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714918710882762809	Misinformation, Hamas is evil, Hamas is ISIS
19/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714852119944085782	Informative
19/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714842755677986890	Shareable, informative, horror

19/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714818422154891328	Informative, Hamas is evil, intention to fight
19/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1714811719053115496	Misinformation, Hamas attacks themselves, proof
20/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1715501756753367333	Informative
20/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1715497106494873705	Emotional, testimony, movie-like
20/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1715475468533596432	War, intention to fight
20/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1715472680453840984	Misinformation, Hamas is evil
20/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1715449841432531386	Proof, informative
20/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1715398771964617013	Misinformation, proof, Hamas is evil, second person, antisemitism
20/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1715365554511380659	Shareable, Hamas is evil, help Palestinian civilians
20/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1715344844779098566	Emotional, united, intention to fight
20/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1715304917915574467	Informative
20/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1715269883879932166	Victims
20/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1715213798532087982	Informative, Hamas is evil
20/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1715194933663998210	Proof, graphic
20/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1715179115215458758	Victim narrative, emotional, movie-like
21/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1715870954331496746	Misinformation, Hamas is evil, Hamas is ISIS, horror, Hamas attacks themselves, human shields
21/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1715835960049512796	Informative
21/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1715829279781433621	Military victims
21/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1715819239221641617	Informative, help Palestinian civilians
21/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1715796045278380461	Informative, Hamas attacks themselves, shareable
21/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1715715126127468730	Hamas attacks themselves
21/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1715669812964135186	Israeli identity, emotional, resilience
21/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1715648985224900805	Proof, Hamas is evil

22/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1716156227585974585	Human shields
22/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1716156410566709606	Human shields
22/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1716156558269112633	Human shields
22/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1716156708609818783	Human shields
22/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1716143946936488161	Child victims, proof, Hamas is evil
22/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1716115527255355505	Informative
22/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1716113659284410798	Informative, movie-like, horror, protect citizens
22/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1716055855857041460	Movie-like, emotional, proof
22/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1715936575714963933	Informative, victim narrative, intention to fight
22/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1715927937269027044	Israeli identity, united, movie-like
22/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1715918676728119487	Informative
22/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1715886726160204049	Informative, human shields
23/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1716577498270499020	Justification for crimes
23/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1716534327821869365	Informative
23/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1716462311370633484	Shareable, emotional
23/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1716453082291184081	Informative
23/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1716441061730512943	Human shields, Hamas attacks themselves, Hamas is evil
23/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1716396717984166187	Hamas is evil, help Palestinian civilians, movie-like
23/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1716313300915425535	Informative
24/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1716960957950210332	Informative
24/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1716931441010131219	Informative, justification for crimes
24/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1716896564231495830	Misinformation, Hamas is evil, horror
24/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1716874448694096095	Audio, proof, Hamas is evil, antisemitism

24/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1716849199684178136	Proof, Hamas is evil
24/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1716817652881182755	Informative
24/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1716791423591133558	Informative
24/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1716774094329483711	Help Palestinian civilians
24/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1716774038909915263	Help Palestinian civilians, informative
24/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1716772112612860049	Informative
24/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1716689253927718929	Informative, protect citizens
24/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1716627394415481196	Hamas is evil, horror
25/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1717277447438082421	Informative
25/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1717257834415476846	Proof, informative
25/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1717250406890320137	Informative
25/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1717165555860320541	Proof, intention to fight
25/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1717142549620576689	Informative, Hamas is evil, proof
25/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1717114079720992848	Proof, Hamas is evil
25/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1717104632588095652	Israeli identity
25/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1717029249205358763	Resilience, emotional, united
25/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1717014181440892946	Alarmism, could be you
26/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1717691501063401703	Testimony, horror
26/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1717623428935483740	Informative
26/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1717583240481960133	Emotional, shareable
26/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1717571449626468578	Informative, intention to fight
26/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1717513327063015743	Informative, proof
26/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1717490139323105664	Informative

26/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1717473359003291900	Audio, proof, human shields
26/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1717401249199329634	Informative
26/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1717387263670169974	Informative, graphic, justification for crimes, misinformation, Hamas is evil, human shields
26/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1717382143452627420	Informative
27/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1718050294116839853	Hamas is evil, victim narrative, intention to fight, movie-like
27/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1718010359397634252	Justification for crimes, proof, human shields
27/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1717956609479974931	Shareable, Hamas is evil
27/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1717926904768909338	Human shields, screenshot, proof
27/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1717924811903562126	Justification for crimes, human shields, proof
27/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1717911686026268831	Justification for crimes, human shields, proof
27/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1717901184986382364	Justification for crimes, human shields, proof
27/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1717895235307499969	Informative
27/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1717867479177847179	Informative
27/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1717859954831307254	Informative
27/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1717840051491541077	Informative, proof
27/10/2023	https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1717775899238584737	Informative, proof

Appendix 5: @Israel, April 14th-20th

Date	Link	Codes
14/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1779298808146378976	Resilience, thankful, united
14/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1779397368183431261	Dark days, resilience, intention to fight
14/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1779400609600344242	Resilience, thankful, international support, united
14/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1779419282448711913	Resilience, own strength
14/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1779433588582227972	Help Iranians
14/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1779449141350809632	Misinformation, own strength
14/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1779461441776386070	Iran is evil, Israeli identity
14/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1779476840748302415	Own strength
14/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1779493746981142940	Informative
14/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1779508578123915364	Own strength
14/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1779516650288460131	Own strength, intention to fight
14/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1779566854966579687	Resilience
14/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1779567165357600941	Thankful, international support
15/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1779774231103840491	Resilience, intention to fight, #BringThemHome
15/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1779790011111547298	Second person
15/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1779852867450384485	Iran is evil, help Iranians
15/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1779918507896934440	Iran is evil
15/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1779971607152230876	Informative, help Palestinian civilians
15/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1779973576717713582	Victims
16/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1780153365265072353	Screenshot
17/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1780509503944843685	Misinformation
17/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/178060849793302	Alarmism, Iran is evil

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17/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1780613415846740033	#BringThemHome, victim's relative
17/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1780623161723097575	#BringThemHome
17/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1780640929872835021	Hamas is evil, horror, terrorism
17/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1780661774850605356	Help Palestinians civilians, informative
18/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1780846932484661663	#BringThemHome, intention to fight
18/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1780871314875490525	Alarmism, Iran is evil
18/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1780884525989445844	#BringThemHome, proof of support
18/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1780938095442919484	Alarmism, Iran is evil
18/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1780946278588858407	Iran is evil, justification for crimes
18/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1780962656733569300	Misinformation
18/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1781021372212252927	Intention to fight
18/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1781031132483527059	Informative, intention to fight
19/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1781231955767411004	Informative, help Palestinian civilians
19/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1781248043725017372	#BringThemHome, victim narrative
19/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1781265263582691754	Alarmism, Iran is evil
19/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1781293694429151659	Victims, own strength
19/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1781308385301795187	Iran is evil, intention to fight
19/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1781342354261111056	#BringThemHome
19/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1781346236366246060	Iran is evil, terrorism
20/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1781608758449246345	Alarmism, Iran is evil
20/04/2024	https://x.com/Israel/status/1781768391482647019	#BringThemHome

Appendix 6: @IDF, April 14th-20th

Date	Link	Codes
14/04/2024	https://x.com/IDF/status/1779311780675682477	Informative, intention to fight
14/04/2024	https://x.com/IDF/status/1779330369201791402	Iran is evil
14/04/2024	https://x.com/IDF/status/1779372720863514936	Own strength
14/04/2024	https://x.com/IDF/status/1779428020316520677	Iran is evil, international support, united, own strength
14/04/2024	https://x.com/IDF/status/1779503384434819454	Infographic, own strength
14/04/2024	https://x.com/IDF/status/1779513900741927185	Own strength
14/04/2024	https://x.com/IDF/status/1779534265836839065	Informative, US
14/04/2024	https://x.com/IDF/status/1779539139819368623	Informative
14/04/2024	https://x.com/IDF/status/1779558920802996457	Informative, Iran is evil, terrorism
14/04/2024	https://x.com/IDF/status/1779610072609382598	Informative
14/04/2024	https://x.com/IDF/status/1779620223277993989	Right of self-defense
15/04/2024	https://x.com/IDF/status/1779792381291712663	Informative
15/04/2024	https://x.com/IDF/status/1779916340976910530	Informative
15/04/2024	https://x.com/IDF/status/1779964389438697866	Informative, support, UK, France
16/04/2024	https://x.com/IDF/status/1780192654602461558	Informative, support, UK
16/04/2024	https://x.com/IDF/status/1780289681524998627	Informative, terrorism
16/04/2024	https://x.com/IDF/status/1780319368439631991	Informative, own strength, Iran is evil
17/04/2024	https://x.com/IDF/status/1780575300646027436	Informative, terrorism
17/04/2024	https://x.com/IDF/status/1780642864906510820	Informative, helping Palestinians
19/04/2024	https://x.com/IDF/status/1781291002059211263	Informative, helping Palestinians