

## **Synthesising the Mechanisms of Peacekeeping Success**

A Comparative Analysis of the Mechanisms Explaining the Differing Outcomes of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo

Felicia Broddén

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of  
Science in Public Administration

Erasmus School of Social and Behavioural Sciences, Erasmus University Rotterdam

Supervisor: Agnieszka Kanas

August 2, 2024

### **Abstract**

This study investigates the mechanisms linking institutional and local factors to the success of United Nations peacekeeping operations. Success is defined as reducing battle-related deaths and protecting civilians. While variations in factors across peacekeeping operations are assumed to explain differing success rates, the specific reasons why certain factors contribute, or limit success remain unclear. The study examines institutional factors, such as the United Nations Security Council's (UNSC) interest, reflected in the size and composition of deployments. Local factors, particularly support from local actors, are also examined. A comparative analysis of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) was conducted due to their similar contexts yet differing outcomes. A qualitative analysis of resolutions and Secretary-General reports revealed that UNAMSIL's larger deployment and higher local support facilitated better violence mitigation and protection of civilians. These factors allow peacekeepers to increase the cost of violence, overcome combatants' commitment problems, protect civilians and gain legitimacy. In contrast, MONUSCO's smaller deployment and lack of local support limited its success. These findings address a gap in literature, offering valuable insights into the mechanisms of peacekeeping success. Moreover, the findings contribute to our understanding of why UNAMSIL succeeded while MONUSCO failed, thus providing practical implications. In particular, the securing of host-state support is critical to peacekeeping success. The findings further indicate that institutional and local factors are jointly sufficient for a successful United Nations peacekeeping operation, which provides direction for future research.

*Keywords: Institutional Factors, Local Factors, MONUSCO, United Nations, Peacekeeping Operations, UNAMSIL*

### Acknowledgments

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to everyone who supported and guided me throughout my master's thesis. Special thanks to my supervisor, Dr. Agnieszka Kanas, for her invaluable guidance, encouragement, and constructive feedback. Her support was instrumental in accomplishing this thesis. I am also grateful to my fellow students, whose support made this process much easier.

This thesis is particularly meaningful to me, as I have always aspired to contribute to improving the situation in conflict-ridden places like the Democratic Republic of Congo. While this thesis is only a small step in that direction, I hope it enhances understanding of the country's challenges and what we, as outsiders, can do to help. At the same time, as Hans Rosling once said, "It is hard to overestimate how important it is to see the good and the bad together. If we only see the bad, then we miss the opportunity to learn from the good". Inspired by his philosophy, I chose to highlight Sierra Leone's success to show that hope exists even in the most complicated conflicts.

Researching this topic has been incredibly challenging, not only because of the complexity of the conflicts, but also due to the horrors described in the data. Nonetheless, I believe it is my responsibility to highlight the stories of those who live with the constant fear of violence. This paper does not aim to criticise the United Nations, but rather to show that peace is achievable with international engagement. I hope this thesis inspires action that brings us closer to a world where everyone enjoys peace.

*Felicia Broddén*

*Erasmus School of Social and Behavioural Sciences*

*Erasmus University, Rotterdam*

*August 2, 2024*

**Table of Contents**

|  |    |
|--|----|
| Abstract .....   | 2  |
| Acknowledgments.....   | 3  |
| List of Abbreviations .....                                      | 6  |
| List of Tables .....   | 7  |
| List of Figures .....  | 8  |
| List of Appendices .....   | 9  |
| Introduction.....  | 10 |
| Theoretical Framework.....                                       | 12 |
| Measuring Success of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations..... | 12 |
| Factors for Successful Peacekeeping Operations .....             | 14 |
| Institutional Factors .....                                      | 14 |
| Capacity .....   | 14 |
| Constitution.....  | 15 |
| Local Factors.....   | 16 |
| Support from Host-State .....                                    | 17 |
| Support from Warring Parties .....                               | 18 |
| Support from Civilians.....                                      | 19 |
| Methods.....   | 20 |
| Case Selection .....   | 20 |
| Study Design .....   | 22 |
| Data .....   | 23 |
| Data Collection .....  | 23 |
| Data Analysis .....  | 25 |
| Reliability and Validity.....                                    | 27 |
| Results.....   | 28 |
| Success of the Peacekeeping Operations .....                     | 28 |
| Violence Mitigation in the Peacekeeping Operations.....          | 28 |
| Protection of Civilians in the Peacekeeping Operations.....      | 30 |

|  |    |
|--|----|
| Institutional Factors .....                                  | 34 |
| Capacity of the Peacekeeping Operations.....                 | 34 |
| Constitution of the Peacekeeping Operations .....            | 38 |
| Local Factors.....   | 39 |
| Host-state Support in the Peacekeeping Operations .....      | 41 |
| Warring Parties' Support in the Peacekeeping Operations..... | 42 |
| Civilian Support in the Peacekeeping Operations .....        | 44 |
| Discussion and Conclusions .....                             | 45 |
| How Institutional Factors Contribute to Success.....         | 46 |
| How Local Factors Contribute to Success .....                | 46 |
| Contributions to Literature.....                             | 47 |
| Limitations and Directions for Future Research.....          | 48 |
| Recommendations.....   | 49 |
| References.....  | 50 |
| Appendices.....  | 57 |

**List of Abbreviations**

|                 |  |
|-----------------|--|
| DDR             | Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration                           |
| DRC             | Democratic Republic of the Congo   |
| FARDC           | Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo                     |
| FIB             | Force Intervention Brigade   |
| GDP             | Gross Domestic Product   |
| Km <sup>2</sup> | Square Kilometres  |
| MLC             | Movement for the Liberation of Congo                                     |
| MONUC           | United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo  |
| MONUSCO         | United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo |
| MSSD            | Most Similar Systems Design  |
| PKO             | Peacekeeping Operation   |
| POC             | Protection of Civilians  |
| PRISMA          | Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses       |
| RCD             | Rally for Congolese Democracy  |
| SG              | Secretary-General  |
| UN              | United Nations   |
| UNSC            | United Nations Security Council  |
| UNAMSIL         | United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone                                   |
| UNOMSIL         | United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone                          |
| QCA             | Qualitative Comparative Analysis   |

**List of Tables**

|   |    |
|---|----|
| Table 1: Deductive Codebook .....                               | 25 |
| Table 2: Protection of Civilians in UNAMSIL.....                | 29 |
| Table 3: Protection of Civilians in MONUSCO .....               | 30 |
| Table 4: Institutional Factors of UNAMSIL.....                  | 33 |
| Table 5: Institutional Factors of MONUSCO .....                 | 34 |
| Table 6: Local Factors in the Peacekeeping Operations .....     | 38 |
| Table 7: Overview of Supported Theories and Contributions ..... | 46 |

**List of Figures**

|  |    |
|--|----|
| Figure 1: Conceptual Model .....   | 20 |
| Figure 2: Similarities between Sierra Leone and the DRC .....  | 21 |
| Figure 3: PRISMA Flow Diagram of the Literature Search and Study Selection Process for UNAMSIL. .... | 23 |
| Figure 4: PRISMA Flow Diagram of the Literature Search and Study Selection Process for MONUSCO.....  | 24 |
| Figure 5: Violence Mitigation in Sierra Leone .....  | 27 |
| Figure 6: Violence Mitigation in the DRC .....   | 28 |

**List of Appendices**

Appendix I: Inductive Codebook.....56

Appendix II: References to United Nations Sources .....57

### **Synthesising the Mechanisms of Peacekeeping Success**

Civil wars devastate societies, leading to economic decline, loss of life, and widespread displacement. Unlike interstate wars, their consequences are more enduring and prone to recurrence (Collier, 2003). With the incidence of civil wars tripling since 2003 (Von Einsiedel, 2014), addressing this issue is imperative. The United Nations (UN) employs military and civilian personnel in peacekeeping operations (PKOs) to address civil wars, asserting that, “Peacekeeping has proven to be one of the most effective tools available to the United Nations to assist countries to navigate the difficult path from conflict to peace.” (UN, 2024d, para. 1). Notable successes include operations in Cambodia, Mozambique, Namibia, and Tajikistan, where peacekeepers facilitated conflict resolution, political transitions, and long-term stability (UN, 2017a). For instance, Namibia’s peaceful transition to independence is widely credited to the operation. Conversely, operations in Somalia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, are remembered for failing to prevent mass atrocities and genocide (McGreal, 2015). Thus, the success of PKOs is not guaranteed and varies across contexts.

Researchers have attempted to identify factors determining the success of peacekeeping operations, highlighting both institutional and local factors. Success is defined as a reduction of battle-related deaths (Beardsley et al., 2019; Hultman et al., 2019; Pushkina, 2006), and the protection of civilians (Fjelde et al., 2018; Hultman et al., 2019; Johnson, 2019; UN Peacekeeping, 2024). Institutionally, the interest of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is crucial. Howard (2008) found that operations given more interest by the Council, as indicated by the number of meetings concerning the conflict, are more successful. Similarly, Koko and Essis (2012) highlighted that greater UNSC interest leads to better strategies and consequent success. Locally, the context of the conflict influences success. Country factors such as poverty levels, urbanisation, dependency on natural resources, and colonial histories are influential (Basedau & Lay, 2009; Brainard & Chollet, 2007; Lange & Dawson, 2009). Moreover, factors intrinsic to the conflict can undermine success, such as when it revolves around ethnicity and rebels are supported by external actors (Kaufman, 2015; Lange & Dawson, 2009; Pushkina, 2006). Apart from these factors, Pushkina et al. (2021) and van der Lijn (2009) found that support from local actors, such as the host-state government, is pivotal to success. In sum, both institutional and local factors influence the success of PKOs.

While the factors contributing to success in PKOs are well-studied, the mechanisms explaining these relationships are poorly researched. For instance, Pushkina (2006) identified five factors necessary for success yet did not explain *how* these factors contribute to success. Similarly, van der Lijn (2009) concluded eight success factors without further explanation. Whenever mechanisms to PKO-success have been studied, the focus is on a single factor. For instance, Duursma (2021) found that host-state support contributes to success through effective collaboration between peacekeepers and government forces, enhancing their ability to protect civilians and mitigate violence. Fortna (2003) noted that strong follow-up on ceasefire agreements facilitates peace by enhancing compliance through monitoring. Additionally, several studies (Fjelde et al., 2018; Hultman et al., 2019; Johnson, 2019) indicate that larger deployment sizes increase the cost of violence for combatants, thereby reducing violence. Although these studies provide some insight, they do not offer a holistic view of the various mechanisms of success. Thus, existing literature is limited in two ways. First, by often ignoring mechanisms, and second, by failing to provide a comprehensive view of how these factors jointly contribute to success.

This paper addresses these gaps in literature by studying both institutional and local factors in two UN peacekeeping operations; the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), formerly United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). Despite shared challenges like poverty, rural populations, dependence on natural resources, and external rebel support, these PKOs had different outcomes (Prunier, 2009; Taurus, 2010). UNAMSIL protected civilians and reduced battle-related deaths to zero, while MONUSCO has struggled, particularly in protecting civilians. These similarities make them suitable for a most similar systems design (MSSD), allowing the isolation of factors affecting peacekeeping outcomes (Anckar, 2008). A qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) of UN resolutions and Secretary-General (SG) reports on each PKO was conducted to uncover the mechanisms of success. The present paper leverages existing, though limited, research on PKO-success mechanisms. For institutional factors, Hultman et al.'s (2019) framework is used, which considers deployment size (capacity) and constitution as indicators of UNSC-interest. For local factors, theories regarding the role of support from the host-state, warring parties, and civilians are used (Autesserre, 2017; Bara & Hultman, 2020; Duursma, 2021; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Gray, 1996; van der Lijn, 2009).

This paper contributes to literature in three ways. First, it builds on the limited research on PKO-success mechanisms by either supporting or refuting existing theories. Second, the design and qualitative methods enable the isolation of various factors influencing success, providing insights into the most impactful elements. Third, while no single study can uncover all mechanisms of PKO-success, this paper offers a more holistic view by including multiple factors and their mechanisms. This paper alone may not transform the field, however, it paves the path for future research on understanding not only the *what*, but also the *how* of peacekeeping mechanisms. Beyond its scientific contributions, the findings have practical implications with societal value. The conflict in the DRC has caused six million deaths and displaced an equal number, considered the world's most neglected crisis (NRC, 2021) and a “slaughter in silence” (Morabia & Roberts, 2020, para. 1). Moreover, its failures have led the DRC president to demand the operation’s withdrawal (UN News, 2023). Gaining insights into strategies that can improve MONUSCO is therefore of utmost urgency and humanitarian relevance. Such knowledge aids policymakers in PKOs beyond the DRC, ultimately leading to higher success rates. Moreover, these findings allow more efficient use of resources, which not only saves costs to an underfinanced organisation like the UN but improves the overall effectiveness of international intervention.

Based on the above, this paper asks, "How do differences in institutional and local factors explain the varying success rates of UN peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and the DRC?". Five sub questions have been formulated. First, “how do differences in capacity explain the varying success rates of UN peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and the DRC?”. Second, “how do differences in constitution explain the varying success rates of UN peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and the DRC?”. Third, “how do differences in host-state support explain the varying success rates of UN peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and the DRC?”. Fourth, “how do differences in warring parties’ support explain the varying success rates of UN peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and the DRC?”. Finally, “How do differences in civilian support explain the varying success rates of UN peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and the DRC?”. Next, the variables of the study are introduced and presented in a conceptual model, followed by a methods section. Subsequently, the results are presented, finalised with a discussion, conclusion and recommendations for future research.

## Theoretical Framework

### Measuring Success of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

Researchers measure the success of UN PKOs using various criteria, however, violence mitigation measured through a reduction in battle-related deaths is a common metric. Hultman et al. (2019) explain that violence mitigation is a relevant success metric not only from a humanitarian perspective, but also as it is a prerequisite for other peacekeeping goals such as reintegrating former combatants and supporting elections. In their large-N analysis of all civil wars between 1992 and 2014, data on battle-related deaths from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP, 2019) was used to determine success. A PKO was considered successful if deaths had been reduced compared to before its deployment. Similarly, Beardsley et al. (2019) measured peacekeeping success through a reduction in casualties. By using UCDP data on African civil wars from 1989-2008, they concluded that PKOs are generally successful in reducing deaths. Pushkina (2006) used the same metric in analysing all UN operations between 1945 and 1998, considering six successful based on this criterion. Consistent with previous research, this paper uses violence mitigation as a measure of PKO-success, indicated by a reduction in battle-related deaths compared to before its deployment.

Apart from violence mitigation, the protection of civilians (POC) is a key success metric, regarded as “the yardstick by which the international community, and those whom we endeavour to protect, judge our worth as peacekeepers” (UN Peacekeeping, 2024, para. 4). POC includes three key activities: engaging in dialogue with the host government to reduce threats of physical violence, physically deterring attacks on civilians, and creating a protective environment (UN, 2017). This environment is fostered through programs like the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) of former combatants and training local security forces. Most scholars measure POC quantitatively by a reduction in civilian casualties. With this measure, Fjelde et al. (2018) examined PKOs in Africa and found that peacekeepers can protect civilians from rebel forces but not from government forces. This is likely due to the operation’s reliance on government consent, which discourages action against government forces. Hultman et al. (2019) also measured POC through a reduction in civilian casualties when analysing civil wars between 1992-2014.

Johnson (2019) is one of the few scholars to measure POC qualitatively by analysing resolutions and reports from the SG on the PKO in South Sudan between 2011 and 2014. The

analysis revealed mixed success; while peacekeepers engaged in dialogue with the government, they struggled with institution-building, faced resource challenges in physical protection efforts, and struggled to train security forces due to high illiteracy rates. These findings highlight the value of measuring POC qualitatively, providing nuanced insights into the mechanisms behind success or failure. Moreover, qualitative measures better capture the full scope of POC, concerning not only preventing civilian deaths but also eliminating physical threats and initiating programs that sustain peace (UN, 2017). Knowing this, this paper assesses POC qualitatively through its three activities.

## **Factors for Successful Peacekeeping Operations**

### ***Institutional Factors***

Institutional factors, particularly the interest of the UNSC, play a crucial role in PKOs. Howard (2008) notes, “the actions and will of the Security Council are undoubtedly important for peacekeeping outcomes” (p. 12). The UNSC deploys, manages, and monitors PKOs. Decisions require the support of at least nine of the 15 members, including the five permanent members holding veto power; China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Consequently, these states substantially influence PKOs. Howard (2008) conducted a QCA of ten PKOs deployed in Africa, Central America, Southeast Asia and Eastern Europe from 1991 to 2005, finding six successful cases. Interest was measured through the level of consensus and the number of meetings concerning the conflict, hypothesising a positive relationship between interest and success. The findings indicated that moderate levels of consensus and engagement are necessary for success, by facilitating effective decision-making and adaptivity on ground. Similarly, Koko and Essis (2012) identified UNSC-interest as pivotal to success. In their study evaluating 46 PKOs across Africa, Asia, and Europe between 1956 and 2006, they found that greater interest leads to better resource allocation and strategies. These studies collectively demonstrate that UNSC-interest is crucial for PKO-success, by optimising the formation and execution of each operation.

## Capacity

Capacity, defined as the operation's deployment size, serves as a tangible indicator of UNSC-interest. As Hultman et al. (2019) argue, a large size signifies a strong commitment from the majority of members to invest its finite resources into the operation. By evaluating all civil wars between 1992 and 2014, the authors concluded that PKOs with larger capacity better mitigate violence. The operation in Côte d'Ivoire from 2004 to 2017 is mentioned, which succeeded shortly after its deployment size increased. Similarly, Johnson (2019) found that large deployments to small countries are more likely to succeed. The number of UN-personnel per 100 square kilometres (Km<sup>2</sup>) in South Sudan was evaluated, stressing that this provides a better overview of whether the operation was adequately resourced in terms of personnel. To understand the relationship between deployment size and PKO-success, it is crucial to understand the dynamics of civil war. Hultman et al. (2019) state that civil wars involve distrust and violence due to actors' incomplete knowledge of each other's intentions. Moreover, government weaknesses make violence an effective tool to gain power, thereby discouraging peace commitments. UN-personnel help resolve these issues by monitoring combatants and disrupting attacks, which increases the cost of violence and makes it a less attractive way to discern enemy capabilities. Additionally, peacekeepers help combatants commit to peace processes by overseeing disarmament and adherence to peace agreements, thus addressing commitment problems through mutual enforcement (Hultman et al., 2019; Fortna, 2003; Mattes & Savun, 2009). In sum, larger deployments have better opportunities to overcome information asymmetry and commitment issues among combatants, thereby contributing to success.

Based on the above, this study conceptualises UNSC-interest through the capacity of the PKOs, referring to the number of deployed UN-personnel (Hultman et al., 2019). Capacity is measured quantitatively through resolutions and SG-reports on each operation. Recognizing that the number of personnel alone does not indicate the relative strength of the operations, capacity will also be evaluated as the number of military personnel per 100 km<sup>2</sup> (Johnson, 2019). Based on the above, the following is expected:

*Differences in the capacity of the peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and the DRC can help explain their differing success rates.*

## Constitution

Apart from its capacity, the constitution of personnel within a PKO influences its opportunities to protect civilians and mitigate violence. As elaborated by Hultman et al. (2019), a deployment consists of three types of personnel. First, unarmed observers that monitor and mediate in a conflict but lack authority to use violence or intervene in a conflict. Second, UN police that can use violence if necessary to protect civilians, yet only carry light weaponry and do not partake in combat. Finally, the military is the most sophisticatedly trained personnel, carrying heavy weaponry and authorised to engage in combat if necessary. Operations with a Chapter VII mandate allows the military to use any means necessary to protect civilians, including the use of deadly force. Thus, only the military has the adequate resources and authorization to intervene in an active war and mitigate violence. In fact, their mere presence deters violence by the threat of military intervention against combatants (Hultman et al., 2019). Kathman (2013) adds that the military increases the cost of violence more than any other UN-personnel type, through punishments like restricting combatants access to a given area. Such punishments are more effective than diplomatic solutions imposed by for instance unarmed observers. Moreover, only the military can provide physical safety for combatants wishing to disarm as part of the UN's DDR programs. Disarmament is crucial for success by reducing immediate threats of violence and helping the state regain monopoly over violence (Munive & Stepputat, 2015; Özerdem, 2002). Lastly, a higher proportion of military troops allows for a broader range of peace activities, including DDR, institution building, and training local security forces (Kathman & Wood, 2014). In summary, the constitution of a deployment matters as it reflects the actual resources available to mitigate violence and protect civilians.

Hultman et al. (2019) explain that operations consisting mainly of the military reflects high political will from the Council to end the conflict, since such personnel requires the most resources in terms of training and arm supplies. Additionally, since military contributions are voluntary, a large military presence indicates strong commitment and support from UNSC-members. This paper uses the constitution of each operation as a second indicator of UNSC-interest, measured quantitatively by analysing resolutions and SG reports. The following is expected:

*Differences in the constitution of the peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and the DRC can help explain their differing success rates.*

### ***Local Factors***

Beyond institutional factors, the local context of a conflict, referred to as local factors, impacts PKO-success. Particularly, the support from local actors in achieving the objectives of the operation matters. Pushkina et al. (2021) found that consent from local actors is the most important factor for success in a qualitative study of all 32 UN PKOs deployed to civil wars until 2022. Consent involves not only agreeing to the deployment but also committing to support the operation. Similarly, van der Lijn's (2009) evaluation of four PKOs across Africa, Asia, and Central America identified local actor support as essential for success. Support was defined not only as a genuine intent to achieve peace, but also a belief in the UN's role in facilitating it. Not only academia highlights the role of local support, but the UN made "consent of the main parties to the conflict" (UN, 2022, para. 1) the first principle of peacekeeping, as it provides the operation with legitimacy to operate within a sovereign state. In this paper, support from the host-state government, warring parties, and civilians is examined, arguing that these are the main societal actors.

### **Support from Host-State**

Although a PKO requires the initial consent of the host-state government to be deployed, sustained support is not guaranteed. Gray (1996) defines support as the government's legal consent for deployment and subsequent cooperation, such as providing practical assistance and making political decisions aligned with the operation's objectives. In studying the PKO in Yugoslavia (1992-1995), support was measured qualitatively by assessing the discrepancy between agreements and actions from the government. The findings indicate that a lack of support causes logistical struggles and restricted freedom of movement for peacekeepers, hindering mandate fulfilment. Similarly, Duursma (2021) defines host-state support as active cooperation with peacekeepers, such as sharing information and providing resources, while a lack of support includes actions that directly oppose peacekeeping objectives. A qualitative analysis of UN reports, academic papers, and NGO reports related to the PKO in Sudan (2007-2020) demonstrated that host-state support matters for the POC. This is because some states misuse the operation to perpetuate violence of civilians, creating an illusion of international cooperation that deters external interference in the conflict. The principle of government consent hinders peacekeepers to take action against such abuse, allowing the state to use violence without repercussions. In sum, host-

state support is crucial for the operational functioning and effective POC, shown through the degree of cooperation with peacekeepers.

Aligned with previous research, this paper conceptualises host-state support as the government's cooperation and alignment with the PKO's objectives, including DDR programs and ceasing violence, as ongoing violence counteracts violence mitigation and the POC. This concept is measured qualitatively as consistent with similar research, by analysing resolutions and SG reports on each operation. The following is expected:

*Differences in the support from the host-state in the peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and the DRC can help explain their differing success rates.*

### **Support from Warring Parties**

Beyond the pivotal role of host-state support, the endorsement of PKOs by warring parties such as rebel groups and militias, is crucial. Fjelde et al. (2016) define support through rebels' adherence to peace agreements and absence of attacks on peacekeepers in their quantitative analysis of African PKOs from 1989 to 2009. They found that fewer attacks correlate with success, as peacekeepers can focus on their mandate rather than self-defence. Doyle and Sambanis (2006) highlight that in lacking warring parties' support, peacekeepers are forced to become combatants, a role for which they are unprepared and that undermines their impartiality (UN, 2022). Additionally, limited resources restrict their ability to engage in full-scale military operations and ultimately undermine success. In a quantitative analysis on UN and non-UN PKOs from 1993 to 2016, Bara and Hultman (2020) found that peacekeepers' ability to mitigate violence depends more on the support of warring parties than deployment size. While the threat of military intervention can deter violence, its deterring effect fails if rebels doubt peacekeepers' capabilities and commitment. These studies collectively demonstrate that the support of warring parties enhances PKO-success by allowing peacekeepers to focus on peacekeeping activities and reinforcing deterrence mechanisms against violence.

While there are multiple warring parties in each conflict, this paper focuses on the most prominent rebel groups of each case. Their support of the operations is measured based on their adherence to peace agreements, participation in DDR, and the absence of attacks on peacekeepers. These activities are measured qualitatively through resolutions and SG-reports,

since qualitative measures can better capture the complex and evolving nature of support. It is expected that,


*Differences in the support from the warring parties in the peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and the DRC can help explain their differing success rates.*

### **Support from Civilians**

Although less researched than the support of the host-state and warring parties, some scholars highlight that support from civilians matters for success. Van der Lijn (2009) investigated civilian support qualitatively in four PKOs. Support was defined as engagement with the operation, indicated by whether civilians partook in meetings and initiatives by peacekeepers. Moreover, the absence of attacks on peacekeepers was used as an indicator of support. The study revealed that in Mozambique, attacks on peacekeepers by civilians undermined the operation, as peacekeepers had to focus on self-defence rather than their primary objectives. Furthermore, the findings suggested that peacekeeping activities were more effective and sustainable when civilians partook in and supported them. Similarly, Autesserre (2017) defines civilian support as active engagement with the PKO and their level of trust in peacekeepers. Trust was assessed qualitatively through fieldwork and interviews, concluding that civilian support helps peacekeepers address the root causes of conflict. Civilians provide local knowledge and resources, enabling peacekeepers to employ more informed and effective conflict-reduction strategies. Thus, civilian support is vital not only for the legitimacy and sustainability of peacekeeping activities but also for the success of local conflict resolution.

This paper defines civilian support as engagement in peacekeeping activities, the absence of attacks on peacekeepers, and positive attitudes towards the operation. The first two indicators are assessed through resolutions and SG reports. Civilian perceptions, however, are evaluated using independently conducted public opinion polls, as UN documents are deemed inadequate to demonstrate this concept. The following is expected:

*Differences in the support from civilians in the peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and the DRC can help explain their differing success rates.*

**Figure 1***Conceptual Model*

## Methods

### Case Selection


This paper analysed the PKOs deployed to Sierra Leone (1998-2005) and to the DRC (1999-present). In Sierra Leone, the civil war began after the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) attempted to overthrow the government over grievances related to corruption and diamond control (Keen, 2005). Persistent violence led to the deployment of the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) in 1999, later renamed UNAMSIL. Its significant role in ending the civil war in 2002 has made the operation “a model for a successful [peacekeeping] mission” (Tarus, 2010, p. 104). Similarly, MONUC was deployed in 1999 after a rebel group overthrew the DRC government, sparking conflict among the government forces named the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC), and rebel groups Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) and the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) (Prunier, 2009). MONUSCO is still in operation but is considered a failure, commented on by the DRC president as “neither able to control rebellions and resolve armed conflict, nor protect civilian populations” (UN News, 2023, para. 2). Clearly, the success of these operations differs. For simplicity, these operations are referred to as UNAMSIL and MONUSCO, which includes UNOMSIL and MONUC.

Despite differing success, these cases share local and institutional factors. Figure 2 illustrates key local factors, showing that both countries are Sub-Saharan African, with a GDP per capita of \$200 in 1999 (World Bank, 2024ab). This indicates widespread poverty, which complicates peacekeeping by generating instability (Brainard & Chollet, 2007).

Furthermore, their predominantly rural populations hinder peacekeepers' access to crucial areas. Both countries were colonised by European powers, causing ethnic divisions that fuel conflicts (Lange & Dawson, 2009). Their wealth in natural resources provide rebels with sustained capabilities, undermining peacekeepers' ability to counter their violence (Basedau & Lay, 2009). Adding to this were neighbouring countries' support for rebel groups, as Liberia supported the RUF whereas Rwanda and Uganda supported the RCD and MLC in the DRC (Kaufman, 2015; Pushkina, 2006). Liberia supported the RUF in Sierra Leone and Rwanda and Uganda the RCD and MLC in the DRC. These similarities in socioeconomic conditions, natural resource dependency, and colonial histories, indicate that other factors explain their differing success.

## Figure 2

*Similarities in Local Factors between Sierra Leone and the DRC*



*Note.* The data is from 1999, since both PKOs started that year (World Bank, 2024ab).

Apart from local factors, the PKOs share institutional factors. First, both deployed in 1999, which reduces temporal variance. Second, both have a Chapter VII mandate, authorising peacekeepers to use force to protect civilians, considered crucial to protect civilians (Atieno, 2005; Tarus, 2010). Third, leadership issues described as problems of command and control existed in both, which weaken operations' efficacy (UN, 2000g, 2017e; van der Lijn, 2009). Fourth, neither deployed within twelve weeks after a peace agreement, undermining the credibility and momentum of the operation (van der Lijn, 2009). Lastly, both contained a high-intensity conflict with militarily capable rebel groups and ethnic tensions complicating the PKO (Gromes, 2019). Concludingly, the PKOs share similarities, indicating that other factors account for their contrasting outcomes.

## **Study Design**

This study employs a Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) to isolate the effects of specific variables by comparing cases similar in most aspects except the dependent variable (Anckar, 2008). This approach enhances internal validity by controlling for extraneous variables, attributing observed effects to the independent variable. However, the study uses a "loose application of MSSD" (p. 390), identifying broad rather than detailed similarities, which may reduce causal precision and increase the risk of confounding variables. To address this, process tracing was applied to track events over time, offering a nuanced understanding of causality and mitigating the impact of uncontrolled variables (Collier, 2011). Additionally, qualitative methods were employed to better identify variable interactions, enhancing causal precision. As Merriam (1998) notes, "a major strength of qualitative research is in getting at the processes that led to the outcomes, processes that experimental and survey research are poor at identifying" (as cited in Maxwell, 2012, p. 30). Thus, qualitative methods are particularly suited for explaining the mechanisms central to this research.

Specifically, a QCA was employed, which is well-suited for small-N research by discerning patterns while preserving each case's uniqueness, thereby enhancing the understanding of distinct developmental trajectories (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009). Ragin (1998) identifies three benefits of this approach: it differentiates between necessary conditions required for an outcome and sufficient conditions leading to the outcome; it manages complex causal relationships by analysing multiple interacting variables, reflecting real-world nuances; and it reveals configurations of conditions leading to outcomes, uncovering underlying causal structures. In sum, QCA effectively reveals complex causal relationships by systematically analysing necessary and sufficient conditions. However, QCA can oversimplify complex causal relationships by focusing on patterns. To counter this, both qualitative and quantitative indicators were used, enhancing validity and reliability by providing more depth to findings (Creswell & Creswell, 2017; Solewski, 2001).

## **Data**


### ***Data Collection***

This study used secondary data from two primary sources. Numerical data on violence mitigation were obtained from the UCDP (2019), recognized as "the world's main


provider of data on organised violence and the oldest ongoing data collection project for civil war" (Knowledge4Policy, 2022). For qualitative data on institutional and local factors, the UN's online archives on the PKOs were consulted, analysing resolutions and reports from the SG following Johnson's (2019) approach. This review adhered to the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines (Moher et al., 2009). Three databases on MONUC, MONUSCO, and UNAMSIL (including UNOMSIL documents) were searched, covering documents published between 1998-2005 for Sierra Leone and 1999-2023 for the DRC (United Nations, 2024b; 2024c; 2005b). Only resolutions and SG-reports were included due to their standardised frameworks which enhances their comparability. Documents on topics as sanctions or diamond trading were excluded as they are irrelevant to the factors assessed in this study. Next, all documents were screened for eligibility, excluding those that were too brief or related to topics unrelated to the operation, like child trafficking. Ultimately, 31 UNAMSIL documents and 68 MONUSCO documents were included, all referenced in Appendix II. This process shows in Figure 3 and 4.

**Figure 3**

*PRISMA Flow Diagram of the Literature Search and Study Selection Process for UNAMSIL*



\*Note. (United Nations, 2005b).

**Figure 4***PRISMA Flow Diagram of the Literature Search and Study Selection Process for MONUSCO*

\* *Note.* (United Nations, 2024bc).

Apart from the UCDP and UN-archives, two public opinion surveys assessing civilians' opinions about each operation were analysed. The Sierra Leone survey (Krasno, 2005) was conducted post-PKO, reflecting public opinion after a successful mission, while the DRC survey (Congo Research Group, 2016) was conducted in 2016 during an ongoing PKO, capturing opinions amidst unresolved challenges. This timing discrepancy limits direct comparisons due to differing contexts of stability and conflict. A survey conducted after a successful operation is susceptible to rosy retrospection bias, where individuals recall past events more positively as time passes (Mitchell et al., 1997). For example, although an individual experienced a PKO negatively at the time, they may report a more favourable attitude once a significant period has elapsed since the last negative event. Nonetheless, in lacking other data, these polls remain relevant as a second indicator of civilian support.

### *Data Analysis*

The data was analysed using a directed content analysis (DCA), suitable for the validation or extension of existing theories (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). This method involves creating a codebook based on theory and coding the data accordingly. Atlas.ti was used for coding in this study. DCA's structured approach enhances the reliability of qualitative research by clearly linking data to theory. However, it risks researcher bias and an excessive focus on theory rather than the data itself. To mitigate this, a blended approach was adopted by also coding data that does not fit into the deductive codes (Linneberg & Korsgaard, 2019). This inductive element counters researcher bias by "giving voice to the data" (p. 14). Table 1 presents the deductive codebook whereas Appendix I illustrated the inductive codes.

**Table 1**

#### *Deductive Codebook*

| Variable           | Indicator                             | Definition  | Example   |
|--------------------|---------------------------------------|---|---|
| <b>PKO-Success</b> | Violence Mitigation (quantitative)    | A reduction of battle-related deaths since deployment (Beardsley et al., 2019; Hultman et al., 2019; Pushkina, 2006).   | Numerical data from UCDP (2019).  |
|                    | Protection of Civilians (qualitative) | Statements on whether peacekeepers engage in dialogue with host-state, deter attacks, and create a protective environment by DDR-programs and training security forces (Johnson, 2019). | "The security environment in the Lungu area improved significantly, mostly as a result of extensive UNAMSIL patrols." (UN, 2000e, section 10) |
|                    | Capacity (quantitative)               | Number of deployed UN-personnel and personnel density per 100 Km <sup>2</sup> (Hultman et al., 2019; Johnson, 2019).  | "The current military deployment of MONUC comprises approximately 640 military observers and 3,600 troops." (UN, 2002h, section               |

|                              |  |   |  |
|------------------------------|--|---|--|
| <b>Institutional Factors</b> |  |   | 54)  |
|                              | Constitution (quantitative)            | The share of the deployment consisting of military (Hultman et al., 2019).  | “Authorised strength: Military 17,500 (and 260 military observers); police 60.” (UN, 2001e, p. 14)   |
| <b>Local Factors</b>         | Host-State Support (qualitative)       | Statements on whether the host-state government supported operational objectives and ceased violence (Duursma, 2021; Gray, 1996).   | “Welcoming the progress made by the Government of Sierra Leone in preparing for elections, with the assistance of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone” (UN, 2002a, para. 6) |
|                              | Warring Parties’ Support (qualitative) | Statements on whether warring parties’ adhere to peace agreements, support DDR and refrain from attacking peacekeepers (Bara & Hultman, 2020; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Fjelde et al., 2016). | “RUF have returned to UNAMSIL 56 personal weapons, 10 vehicles, and 20 armoured personnel carriers” (UN, 2001e, section 6)   |
|                              | Civilian Support (qualitative)         | Statements on whether civilians partook in peacekeeping activities, and survey data on their attitudes (Autesserre, 2017; van der Lijn, 2009).  | “However, on 8 May, an estimated crowd of 30,000 went to Mr. Sankoh’s house to protest against the RUF attacks on UNAMSIL.” (UN, 2004f, section 74)                                |

### Reliability and Validity

There are limitations of this study in terms of reliability and validity. As mentioned, the loose application of MSSD reduces validity and generalizability, a QCA risks researcher bias, and some data such as the public surveys were not perfectly comparable. To counter

this, process tracing was applied as well as a blended-approach, and insufficient data was complemented with additional data sources. Overall, theoretical triangulation was performed by combining theories on institutional and local factors, whereas methodological triangulation was performed by using both qualitative and quantitative indicators. This counteracts researcher bias and enhances validity (Noble & Heale, 2019). Apart from these measures, this paper has been peer-reviewed biweekly, which reduces researcher bias (Creswell & Creswell, 2017). Moreover, to enhance the reliability of the findings, a transparent and detailed account of the study was reported, for instance by providing examples by which coding was performed (Riege, 2003).


## Results

### Success of the Peacekeeping Operations

#### *Violence Mitigation in the Peacekeeping Operations*

**Figure 5**

#### *Violence Mitigation in UNAMSIL*




*Note.* Data is gathered from UCDP (2019) and UN-documents (UN, 1998a, 1999b, 2001b, 2002d, 2003a).

Figure 5 illustrates battle-related deaths in Sierra Leone between 1998 and 2005 and the number of UN-personnel deployed (UCDP, 2019). Six months before UNOMSIL's deployment in early 1998, battle-related deaths were at 5,155. By the end of 1999, deaths declined to 856 and eventually to 73 in 2000, with no recorded deaths since. This indicates that UNAMSIL successfully mitigated violence by significantly reducing battle-related deaths (Beardsley et al., 2019; Hultman et al., 2019; Pushkina, 2006).

**Figure 6**

*Violence Mitigation in MONUSCO*



*Note.* Data is gathered from UCDP (2019) and UN-documents (UN 2000a, 2005d, 2010a, 2015a, 2020a). Surges in deaths in 2007 and 2009 are not depicted due to the selected intervals.

Figure 6 shows battle-related deaths in the DRC, which were 34,307 in 1995 before MONUC's deployment in 1999 (UCDP, 2019). By 2000, deaths decreased to 3,054. Although not shown in the figure, deaths surged to 7,945 in 2001, then declined to 305 in 2005. Similarly, deaths increased to 5,307 but decreased to 1,088 in 2010, remaining low in 2015 at 737 but rising again to 4,005 in 2020. These findings indicate that while MONUSCO succeeded in reducing violence overall, there were fluctuations throughout.

The findings align with research showing that peacekeepers mitigate violence (Beardsley et al., 2019; Hultman et al., 2019; Pushkina, 2006). However, UNAMSIL was more effective, achieving zero battle-related deaths and avoiding sporadic surges as in the DRC. Since the elimination of fatal violence is a precursor to other peace developments, this likely initiated a positive cycle of peace initiatives in Sierra Leone, contributing to the operation's success (Hultman et al., 2019). The ongoing violence in the DRC undermines MONUSCO's success.

### *Protection of Civilians in the Peacekeeping Operations*

**Table 2**

#### *Protection of Civilians in UNAMSIL*

| Year | Success/Failure | Event  | Related POC-activity  |
|------|-----------------|--|---|
| 1998 | Failure         | Rebels kill hundreds of civilians and displacing thousands (UN 1998c).                   | Failing to deter attacks on civilians.  |
| 1999 | Failure         | RUF kills 5,000 civilians, displacing tens of thousands (UN, 1998b).                     | Failing to deter attacks on civilians.  |
| 2000 | Failure         | RUF abduct 500 UN troops (UN, 1999b, 2004f).   | Failing to create a protective environment.   |
| 2000 | Success         | Hostages released and Freetown stabilised (UN 1999b, 2000h).                             | Succeeding in creating a protective environment.                                    |
| 2001 | Failure         | Peacekeepers allegedly sexually assaulting civilians (UN, 2004d).                        | Failing to create a protective environment.   |
| 2001 | Success         | Disarming 24,000 combatants, providing protective zones for civilians (UN 2001b, 2001d). | Succeeding in deterring attacks on civilians and creating a protective environment. |
| 2002 | Success         | Disarming another 51,000 (UN, 2002d, 2002h).   | Succeeding in creating a protective environment.                                    |

*Note.* The table only captures the main events related to the protection of civilians.

Table 2 lists major POC-related events during UNAMSIL (1998-2005). Initial failures included the 1998 RUF attacks on civilians and their 1999 seizure of Freetown, causing thousands of deaths and displacements (UN, 1998a, 1999c). A significant failure occurred in 2000 when the RUF took 500 UN personnel hostage, leaving civilians unprotected. These failures show that UNAMSIL initially struggled to protect civilians from attacks and create a protective environment (Johnson, 2019). Moreover, peacekeepers allegedly sexually abused civilians in 2000; a significant POC-failure (UN, 2004d). However, POC-successes emerged after peacekeepers were released and regained Freetown (UN, 2002h). Consequently, an effective DDR-process disarmed 75,000 former combatants in 2001-2002 (UN, 2001e, 2002h). The SG stated, “The completion of the disarmament of RUF, CDF and AFRC/ex-SLA has resulted in a general improvement in the human rights situation in Sierra Leone.” (UN, 2002h, section 38). Thus, the PKO eventually succeeded in protecting civilians, mainly through a successful DDR-process (Johnson, 2019).

**Table 3***Protection of Civilians in MONUSCO*

| Year | Success/Failure | Event  | Related POC-activity                             |
|------|-----------------|--|--|
| 2002 | Failure         | Rebels killed 103 civilians. (UN, 2002c, 2002f)  | Failing to deter attacks on civilians.           |
| 2003 | Failure         | Rebels killed 500 civilians. (UN, 2003e).  | Failing to deter attacks on civilians.           |
| 2003 | Success         | Successful intervention between armed groups (UN, 2003b, 2003e)  | Succeeding in creating a protective environment. |
| 2004 | Failure         | Rebels killed 88 civilians (UN, 2004c, 2004e).   | Failing to deter attacks on civilians.           |
| 2006 | Success         | Enhanced cooperation with the government, facilitating the disarmament of 15,000 combatants (UN, 2006e). | Succeeding in creating a protective environment. |

|      |         |  |   |
|------|---------|--|---|
| 2006 | Failure | 176 allegations of sexual assaults conducted by peacekeepers (UN, 2007b)                       | Failure to create a protective environment.   |
| 2008 | Failure | Rebels killed 150 civilians (UN, 2008a, 2008e).  | Failing to deter attacks on civilians.  |
| 2010 | Success | MONUSCO trained 48,000 national police officers (UN, 2010b).                                   | Succeeding in creating a protective environment.                                    |
| 2012 | Failure | Rebels captured the city of Goma (UN, 2012b).  | Failing to create a protective environment.   |
| 2013 | Success | Successful operations against rebel group M23 (UN, 2013b).                                     | Succeeding in deterring attacks on civilians and creating a protective environment. |
| 2017 | Failure | FARDC killed 30 refugees (UN, 2017d).  | Failing to deter attacks on civilians.  |
| 2018 | Success | Establishing safe zones in North Kivu which reduced the number of displaced people (UN, 2018a) | Succeeding in deterring attacks on civilians and creating a protective environment. |

*Note.* The table only captures the main events related to the protection of civilians.

Table 3 lists major POC-related events during MONUSCO. Failures include multiple attacks on civilians, such as in 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2008, resulting in several hundred deaths (UN, 2002c, 2003e, 2004c, 2008a). The SG commented,

Persistent violence against civilians and localised conflicts have dire consequences for the population. Between December 2006 and January 2007 an estimated 115,000 people were forced to flee their homes in North Kivu following the confrontation between FARDC and elements loyal to Laurent Nkunda. ... Just over 1 million persons remain displaced, and there are 413,000 Congolese refugees in neighbouring countries. (UN, 2007b, section 65).

Frequent abuses by the government forces, FARDC, including looting, civilian abuse, and rape, further highlight MONUSCO's failure to protect civilians (Johnson, 2019; UN, 2004e). A 2019 report states that FARDC committed 26 % of all abuses against civilians. This aligns with Fjelde et al. (2018), showing that peacekeepers cannot protect civilians from government forces due to relying on the government for operating. Another persistent failure concerns widespread sexual assaults by peacekeepers, with 176 cases reported in one year, resulting in the repatriation of 17 peacekeepers (UN, 2007b). Some successes included in 2003, when 4,500 UN troops stopped fighting in Ituri (UN, 2003b, 2003e), and dialogue with the government led to the disarmament of 15,000 combatants in 2006 (UN, 2006e). Moreover, 48,000 local police were trained, thereby contributing to a protective environment (UN, 2010b) and safe zones established in North Kivu in 2018 effectively deterred attacks on civilians (UN, 2018a).

Concludingly, both operations had successes and failures concerning POC. However, initial failures in UNAMSIL shifted to successes in 2000, with the disarmament of 75,000 combatants largely contributing. While allegations of sexual assaults occurred, they were more frequent in MONUSCO. Kovatch (2016) found that peacekeeper misconduct is more common when the host-state has weak institutions and rule of law, creating an environment without repercussions. This suggests that the DRC had weaker state institutions than Sierra Leone, which undermines the success of the PKO by eroding trust in peacekeepers and hindering POC. Despite some POC-successes within MONUSCO, they were overshadowed by persistent failures, mainly through attacks on civilians by rebel groups and government forces. Thus, UNAMSIL succeeded both in violence mitigation and POC, whereas MONUSCO succeeded in violence mitigation but not in POC.

## **Institutional Factors**

### ***Capacity of the Peacekeeping Operations***

It was expected that differences in the capacity of the PKOs can explain their differing success. In Table 4 and 5 the capacity and personnel density of each operation is outlined.

**Table 4***Institutional Factors of UNAMSIL*

| Year | Capacity | Constitution (%) | UN Personnel/100 Km <sup>2</sup> |
|------|----------|------------------|----------------------------------|
| 1998 | 70       | 0                | 0.1                              |
| 1999 | 6000     | 95.8             | 8.4                              |
| 2000 | 11,100   | 97.7             | 15.5                             |
| 2001 | 17,500   | 97.6             | 24.4                             |
| 2002 | 17,500   | 97.6             | 24.4                             |
| 2003 | 13,000   | 97.9             | 18.1                             |
| 2004 | 5,000    | 97.9             | 7                                |
| 2005 | 250      | 66               | 0.4                              |

*Note.* Capacity refers to the deployment size, with constitution representing the percentage of the deployment that are military (UN, 1998a, 1999b, 2000d, 2001b, 2002d, 2003a, 2004g, 2005e). Land area data was obtained from the World Bank Group (2024b).

UNOMSIL initially only consisted of 70 personnel in 1998, but soon expanded to 6,000 personnel, representing 8.4 personnel per 100 Km<sup>2</sup> (UN, 1998a, 1999b). Escalating violence led to further expansion, with personnel increasing to 11,100 in 2000, and then to 17,500 in 2001 and 2002, equating to 15.5 and 24.4 personnel density, respectively (2000d, 2001b, 2002d). After the civil war ended in 2002, the deployment decreased to 13,000 in 2003, resulting in 18.1 personnel per 100 Km<sup>2</sup> (UN, 2003a). The deployment became smaller in 2004 and 2005, with only 5,000 and then 250 personnel remaining, translating to 7 and 0.4 personnel

density (2004g, 2005e). Thus, at its peak, the deployment consisted of 17,500 UN personnel, equating to 24.4 personnel per 100 Km<sup>2</sup>.

**Table 5**

*Institutional Factors of MONUSCO*

| Year | Capacity | Constitution (%) | UN Personnel/100 Km <sup>2</sup> |
|------|----------|------------------|----------------------------------|
| 1995 | 0        | 0                | 0                                |
| 2000 | 6,037    | 91.7             | 0.3                              |
| 2005 | 17,541   | 95.2             | 0.7                              |
| 2010 | 22,016   | 90               | 0.9                              |
| 2015 | 20,016   | 89               | 0.9                              |
| 2020 | 18,316   | 88.5             | 0.8                              |

*Note.* Capacity refers to the deployment size, with constitution representing the percentage of the deployment that are military (UN, 2000a, 2004c, 2010a, 2015a, 2020a). Land area data was obtained from the World Bank Group (2024a).

Table 5 outlines the capacity and constitution of MONUSCO over selected years. In 2000, its deployment consisted of 6,037 personnel, representing 0.3 personnel per 100 Km<sup>2</sup> (UN, 2000a). By 2005, this increased to 17,541, equating to 0.7 in personnel density (UN, 2004c). The largest deployment occurred in 2010, with 22,016 personnel translating to 0.9 personnel per 100 Km<sup>2</sup> (UN, 2010a). This decreased to 20,016 in 2015 and to 18,316 in 2020, reflecting 0.9 and 0.8 personnel in personnel density (UN, 2015a, 2020a).

In comparison, UNAMSIL's capacity was 27 times greater than that of MONUSCO at their peak deployment, representing 24.4 versus 0.9 personnel per 100 Km<sup>2</sup>. As suggested

by theory, this provided peacekeepers in Sierra Leone with better ability to increase combatants' costs of violence while addressing their commitment issues (Fortna, 2003; Hultman et al., 2019; Johnson, 2019; Mattes & Savun, 2009). Ultimately, this contributed to the effective violence mitigation and successful POC. Furthermore, this discrepancy highlights that the UNSC had greater interest in the conflict of Sierra Leone compared to the DRC (Hultman et al., 2019). Apart from their differing deployment size, the analysis revealed that the deployment was much quicker for UNAMSIL than MONUSCO. In 2000, the SG said,

Since my last report, new troops from Bangladesh, India and Jordan have arrived in the Mission area, bringing the troop strength of UNAMSIL to 12,428, as at 22 July 2000. With the expected arrival of a Russian military aviation unit, the military strength of UNAMSIL would approach the ceiling set under Security Council resolution 1299 (2000). (UN, 2000, section 29)

This illustrates swift deployment of personnel. In contrast, although 5,537 personnel were authorised for MONUSCO in 2000, only 223 personnel had arrived by the following year (UN, 2001d). It was not until the end of 2003 that the number of personnel approached the authorised strength. Resolution 1316 (2000b) cited "lack of adequate conditions of access, security and cooperation" (para. 5) as reasons for the delay. This indicates that a lack of host-state support hindered full deployment, suggesting that local factors interact with institutional factors. Moreover, it indicates that host-state support is more important than the authorised deployment size, as aligned with the findings of Pushkina et al. (2021). Without support, an operation might not reach its authorised deployment level and thereby lack resources to mitigate violence and protect civilians.

In conclusion, the findings substantiate that differences in the capacity of UNAMSIL and MONUSCO can help explain their differing success. The multifold greater personnel density in Sierra Leone underscores that peacekeepers could better mitigate violence and protect civilians by increasing combatants' cost of violence and making them commit to peace. This confirms theories on how capacity links to PKO-success (Fortna, 2003; Hultman et al., 2019; Johnson, 2019; Mattes & Savun, 2009) Additionally, host-state support enabled swift deployment of UNAMSIL, whereas a lack thereof slowed deployment of MONUSCO,

which further contributed to their differing success. This supports Pushkina et al. (2021), arguing that host-state support is more influential to success than deployment size.

### *Constitution of the Peacekeeping Operations*

Differences in the constitution of the operations were expected to have influenced their contrasting outcomes. As shown in Table 4, the military represented between 66 % and 97.9 % of UNAMSIL's deployment. During the civil war (1998-2002), this proportion never dropped below 95.8 %. Contrastingly, Table 5 displays the constitution of MONUSCO, ranging between 88.5 % and 95.2 %. Thus, even the lowest military deployment of UNAMSIL was greater than the highest military deployment of MONUSCO. This indicates that the mechanism of violence deterrence through peacekeeper presence was stronger in Sierra Leone than in the DRC, potentially contributing to why battle-related deaths were brought to zero by UNAMSIL and not MONUSCO (Hultman et al., 2019; Kathman, 2013). Moreover, knowing that UNAMSIL succeeded mainly through an effective disarmament theory, the findings substantiate that a higher share of military facilitates disarmament (Kathman & Wood, 2014; Munive & Stepputat, 2015). Together, these findings suggest that a large share of military personnel contributes to PKO-success. Additionally, the discrepancy in the constitution of the PKOs suggests that the UNSC was more interested in ending the conflict in Sierra Leone than the DRC conflict (Hultman et al., 2019).

Further supporting the notion of differing UNSC-interest between the operations was a discrepancy between the number of troops recommended for MONUC by the SG, and the number authorised by the UNSC. In 2004, the SG stated, "... the Security Council authorised an increase in the strength of MONUC by an additional 5,900 [military] personnel, which is some 7,200 fewer than I recommended." (UN, 2004h, section 38). At that time, the military count was 10,800, and the SG's recommendation would have increased this by 13,100, a 121 % increase. However, the UNSC only authorised an increase of 5,900, a 54% rise. According to Howard (2008), discrepancies between the SG's advice and the UNSC's authorisation reflect a lack of interest from the Council. Additionally, a 2010 report mentioned "resource constraints regarding the protection of civilians" (UN, 2010b, section 70), further indicating the need for more military personnel for MONUSCO to succeed. These findings illustrate how low UNSC-interest influences success, by determining the number of military deployed.

Another finding adding to the difference in military troops between UNAMSIL and MONUSCO was that external military troops supported UN-troops in Sierra Leone.

Particularly, troops from the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) played a significant role, as noted by the SG, “ECOMOG troops have continued to fulfil their vital tasks of providing security [for civilians] at Freetown and Lungi” (UN, 1999e, section 11). As this quote suggests, ECOMOG helped protect civilians (Johnson, 2019). Additionally, British troops were noted for its “significant contribution” (UN, 2000g, section 20) in freeing hundreds of UN-personnel from being held hostage by RUF in 2000 under Operation Palliser. Their contribution of 1,300 military personnel also helped UNAMSIL regain control over Freetown. The involvement of these external troops provided the operation with more resources in mitigating violence and protecting civilians. Moreover, Sandler (2017) found that PKOs involving both UN and non-UN troops are more successful due to burden sharing and the diversification of strategies.

Concludingly, differences in the constitution of the PKOs contributed to their differing success as UNAMSIL’s higher share of military provided more resources to deter violence and disarm combatants (Hultman et al., 2019; Kathman, 2013; Kathman & Wood, 2014; Munive & Stepputat, 2015). The UNSC’s deviance from SG-recommendations in terms of military number strengthens the notion that its interest in ending the Sierra Leonean conflict was higher than for the DRC conflict. More importantly, the involvement of non-UN troops in UNAMSIL helps explain why it succeeded better than MONUSCO.

### **Local Factors**

Regarding local factors, variations in local actors’ support were expected to contribute to the PKO-outcomes. Table 6 provides an overview of the actors’ support in the operations.

**Table 6***Local Factors in the Peacekeeping Operations*

| Actor                  | Sierra Leone   | The DRC   |
|------------------------|--|---|
| <b>Host-state</b>      | Mostly supportive, occasional lapses.  | Mostly resistant, few instances of support.   |
| <i>Examples</i>        | Quick deployment due to government cooperation.  | Hindered deployment due to lack of cooperation.   |
|                        | Collaborative initiatives (Special Court, Diamonds for Development).                   | Government forces attacked civilians.   |
|                        | SG noted excellent cooperation and support for UNAMSIL (UN, 1999e, 2000d).             | SG criticised lack of cooperation and human rights violations by FARDC (UN, 2004h, 2005f).                    |
| <b>Warring Parties</b> | Initially resistance, later supportive.  | Consistently resistant.   |
| <i>Examples</i>        | Harassing civilians and taking UN-personnel hostage (UN, 2004f).                       | Frequent attacks on peacekeepers (UN, 2003e, 2004e, 2017a).   |
|                        | Commitment to ceasefire, leading to disarmament in 10 out of 12 districts (UN, 2001e). | Frequent violations of agreements and the FIB escalated combatants' violence (Tull, 2017; UN, 2015a).         |
| <b>Civilians</b>       | Active engagement, high support.   | Active engagement, no support.  |
| <i>Examples</i>        | 30,000 civilians protest in favour of UNAMSIL (UN, 2004f).                             | Protests against MONUC, demanding better protection (UN, 2007a, 2010b).                                       |
|                        | Nearly 100 % felt PKO improved the security situation (Krasno, 2005).                  | 70 % felt peacekeepers failed to protect civilians, 50 % wanted the PKO to leave (Congo Research Group, 2016) |

### *Host-state Support in the Peacekeeping Operations*

The analysis of UNAMSIL indicated that the host-state was mostly supportive but occasionally unsupportive. For instance, in 2000, the SG urged the government to “step up its efforts” (UN, 2000e, section 46) in implementing all aspects of the DDR-process, indicating insufficient support. Government forces harassed civilians, and some officials hindered RUF’s movement, contravening UNAMSIL instructions (UN, 2001e). These instances undermined peacekeepers’ ability to mitigate violence and protect civilians (Duursma, 2021; Gray, 1996). However, the majority of findings indicate host-state support. In 1999, rapid deployment was credited to “excellent cooperation provided by the Government of Sierra Leone” (UN, 1999e, section 30). In 2000, the SG noted that the government “defended the mandate of UNAMSIL and confirmed President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah’s support for the speedy deployment of UNAMSIL” (UN, 2000d, section 5). Various collaborative initiatives between the government and UNAMSIL further indicate support, such as the establishment of a Special Court, the Diamonds for Development Initiative, and a joint commission for prosecuting war criminals (UN, 2003d, 2003g). Thus, the Sierra Leonean government supported the operation by providing resources to establish joint initiatives and ceasing violence.

Regarding MONUSCO, findings revealed active resistance from the host-state with only a few instances of support. A lack of cooperation from the DRC government hindered military deployment in 2000 (UN, 2000b), and in 2004, the SG noted “an absence of follow-up action on the preparation of an overall police reform plan [as agreed with MONUC]” (UN, 2004g, section 48). This suggests that the government failed to adhere to agreements, strengthened by the SG criticising the DRC government for failing to set up a transparent revenue collection system as agreed (UN, 2005f). Active resistance showed as the government forces, the FARDC, continuously attacked civilians, committing “gross human rights violations” (UN, 2005k, section 79). Their attacks killed hundreds and displaced thousands during MONUSCO’s time, and their abuse accounted for 26 % of all POC-violations in 2019 (UN, 2006b, 2017b, 2019). Despite this, MONUSCO collaborated with FARDC and noted a “deepening partnership between MONUSCO and the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo” (UN, 2016a, section 74). Although the collaboration indicates host-state support, several authors note that it undermined the legitimacy of peacekeepers as FARDC abused human rights (Johnstone, 2011; Tull, 2017). Moreover, host-

state support was more symbolic than real, knowing that FARDC continued its abuse. This contributed to MONUSCO's failure in protecting civilians (Duursma, 2021).

Together, the findings substantiate that differing host-state support within the operations partly explain their contrasting success. UNAMSIL was provided political support and more resources through collaboration from the Sierra Leonean government, whereas MONUSCO's success continues to be undermined by a lack of host-state support. Particularly, the abuse by FARDC hindered success not only by hindering effective POC, but also as its collaboration with MONUSCO undermined the legitimacy of the operation (Johnstone, 2011; Tull, 2017). Most likely, the DRC government exploits the operation to continue its violence, illustrating how the consent principle of UN peacekeeping hinder POC without the host-state's support (Duursma, 2011). As noted earlier, variations in host-state support across the operations impacted their deployment, suggesting that the capacity of the operation hinges upon its support.

### ***Warring Parties' Support in the Peacekeeping Operations***

Differing support levels of warring parties in the PKOs were expected to have influenced their diverging successes. The analysis showed that in both cases, warring parties posed resistance. The RUF, the main warring party in Sierra Leone, was initially unsupportive of UNAMSIL, taking personnel and civilians hostage in 1999 (UN, 1999b). The group violated ceasefire agreements in 2000 and restricted UN personnel's movement (UN, 2000f). A near collapse occurred as RUF took hundreds of peacekeepers hostage and although hostages were released, misalignment with the operation's objectives showed as "RUF allegedly harass civilians" (UN, 2001e, section 45). Notwithstanding, RUF demonstrated a renewed commitment to ceasefire agreements later in 2001, and "continued to take steps towards furthering of dialogue" (UN, 2000d, section 5). Their support allowed UNAMSIL to disarm combatants in 10 out of 12 districts (UN, 2001e). It is noteworthy that the increase of UN-personnel from 11,100 to 17,500 correlated with a shift to support from warring parties, suggesting a link between institutional and local factors. A plausible explanation is that the increased deployment size increased combatants' cost of violence, making disarmament more attractive (Fortna, 2003; Hultman et al., 2019). Ruggeri et al. (2012) propose that increased personnel generate support from rebels through normative mechanisms, as it signals UN's commitment to investing long-term resources in overcoming the conflict. In summary, the findings underscore the importance of support from warring

parties for the success of PKOs. The near collapse of UNAMSIL due to the initial lack of support, followed by the significant role their eventual cooperation played in the success of disarmament efforts, highlights this necessity (Bara & Hultman, 2020; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006).

In the DRC, warring parties also resisted the PKO. Attacks on peacekeepers included the targeting of its headquarters in 2003 (UN, 2003e), a patrol in 2004 (UN, 2004d) and an attack in 2017 that killed 14 peacekeepers, defined as the “worst attack on UN peacekeepers in recent history” (UN, 2017a, para. 1). Warring parties repeatedly violated agreements, showing by instances of rebel groups killing 29 civilians in 2008 and 250 in 2009 (UN, 2008c, 2010b). A prison attack by rebels freed 747 inmates in 2011 and the group M23's human rights violations in 2014 further highlighted ongoing resistance (UN, 2011, 2014c). The SG noted increased human rights violations in 2017, indicating sustained resistance from warring parties towards MONUSCO (UN, 2017c). The sustained resistance led to the creation of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), which allowed peacekeepers to use force offensively in collaboration with the FARDC (UN, 2015a). This substantiates theory stating that peacekeepers are forced to engage in combat when warring parties pose resistance (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006). This likely undermined success as peacekeepers focused on combat instead of peacekeeping. Moreover, Tull (2017) found that the FIB's aggressive stance and collaboration with human rights violators led to negative perceptions among locals and escalated violence. Armed groups either relocated to previously calm areas or intensified their attacks to demonstrate their strength. This contradicts theories suggesting that peacekeepers' presence mitigates violence through the threat of military intervention (Fortna, 2003; Hultman et al., 2019; Kathman, 2013). Instead, it aligns with Bara and Hultman (2020), emphasising that peacekeepers ability to deter violence depends more on the reactions of combatants than their capacity and constitution.

Concludingly, these findings indicate differences in the support from warring parties in these PKOs which contributed to diverging outcomes. UNAMSIL's success was aided by the RUF's participation in disarmament. Contrarily, MONUSCO's success is undermined as warring parties' resistance has forced them to become combatants. This is exacerbated by FIB, which had counterproductive effects by escalating violence and undermining the legitimacy of the operation. The analysis presented a link between local and institutional factors, with more troops correlating with greater support for UNAMSIL. This suggests that the capacity and constitution of a PKO influence support through deterrence and normative mechanisms.

### *Civilian Support in the Peacekeeping Operations*

Lastly, differing civilian support in the operations were expected to contribute to the PKOs' varying success. The findings highlight that UNAMSIL actively engaged with civilians. In early 2000, the SG stated, "it will be necessary to set up a countrywide public information campaign, which would also help to promote understanding about the role and mandate of the United Nations..." (UN, 2000e, section 56). A Department of Public Information was established to familiarise civilians with UNAMSIL's role via radio (UN, 2000g). An Ombudsman addressed public complaints, and meetings with civilians, such as teachers and lawyers, were initiated to enhance community participation (UN, 2000h, 2001e). The poll of 2005 showed 94 % satisfaction with the UN's radio, nearly 100 % experiencing improved security since the PKO deployment and 74 % felt peacekeepers resolved local conflicts (Krasno, 2005). Yet, 45 % said peacekeepers only "sometimes" treated locals with respect, possibly due to reports of sexual assaults in 2001 (UN, 2001e). While the validity of the survey findings is undermined by potential rosy retrospective bias, this is countered by a 2000 report showing civilian support (Mitchell et al., 1997). After UN-personnel were taken hostage by the RUF, 30,000 civilians gathered to protest for their release (UN, 2000f, section 74). This shows that civilian support was strong throughout the operation, even during periods of poor performance, indicating that support was even higher in times of better performance. This counters the survey findings potential for bias. In summary, these findings indicate that civilian support was successfully generated, potentially through engaging with locals by setting up meetings and complaint mechanisms. Moreover, it is plausible that UNAMSIL's success in POC contributed to civilian support (UN Peacekeeping, 2024). This support enabled local conflict resolution and more sustainable peacekeeping strategies, contributing to success (Autesserre, 2017; van der Lijn, 2009).

In the DRC, engagement with civilians also occurred including radio broadcasts and community meetings (UN, 2004d, 2005f). In 2020, "MONUSCO established proactive force deployments to create space for civilian-led dialogue" (UN, 2020b, section 36). Despite these efforts, civilian resistance was frequent. In 2004, civilians protested against MONUC, and in 2005 the SG noted that, "the reputation of MONUC has been severely damaged by acts of sexual exploitation and abuse committed by some peacekeepers against the local population." (UN, 2005f, section 85). This indicates that peacekeeper misconduct contributed to civilian resistance. In 2007, anti-UN protests erupted in response to an NGO's sanctioning for illegal arms trade involvement, whereas protests in 2010 arose from demands for better protection

from rebel attacks (UN, 2007a, 2010b). A 2016 public opinion poll revealed that half the population wanted MONUSCO to leave, and 70% felt peacekeepers had failed to protect civilians (Congo Research Group, 2016). These findings indicate active civilian resistance to the PKO, despite efforts to engage with locals. Potential explanations to their resistance include MONUSCO's failure to protect civilians, which undermines support (UN Peacekeeping, 2024). Moreover, the widespread sexual assault conducted by peacekeepers, as well as the establishment of FIB, undermined civilian support of the PKO (Tull, 2017). This hindered success as peacekeepers de facto had to protect themselves against civilian attacks and missed the opportunity to gain the local knowledge and resources required for effective peacekeeping strategies (Autesserre, 2017; van der Lijn, 2009).

To conclude, civilian support was higher for UNAMSIL than for MONUSCO, suggesting that this contributed to their differing success rates. Since both operations attempted to engage with civilians, this difference suggests that MONUSCO underwent a legitimacy crisis which prevented the engagement to transform into support. Its legitimacy was severely undermined by peacekeepers' collaboration with FARDC, inability to protect civilians, and sexual abuse. Thus, MONUSCO's success is hindered by mechanisms of legitimacy and local conflict dynamics.

### **Discussion and Conclusions**

As presented, the PKOs in Sierra Leone (1998-2005) and the DRC (1999-today) displayed major differences in their success rates as influenced by their institutional and local factors. Data on battle-related deaths (UCDP, 2019) and the analysis of resolutions and Secretary-General reports illustrated that both operations correlated with significant reductions in battle-related deaths, confirming that peacekeepers effectively mitigate violence (Beardsley et al., 2019; Hultman et al., 2019; Pushkina, 2006). However, only UNAMSIL effectively protected civilians, in contrast to MONUSCO that failed in deterring attacks, lacked collaboration with the DRC government, and had limited success in the DDR process (Johnson, 2019). This is partly due to ongoing abuse by government forces, FARDC, aligning with Fjelde et al. (2018), who found that peacekeepers cannot protect civilians from government forces due to the principle of government consent. Generally, the findings support the expectations that differences in institutional and local factors contributed to the differing success.

### **How Institutional Factors Contribute to Success**

Concerning institutional factors, personnel density was 27 times higher in Sierra Leone than in the DRC, suggesting that UNAMSIL peacekeepers were better positioned to address combatants' commitment issues (Fortna, 2003; Hultman et al., 2019; Mattes & Savun, 2009). The shift to support from the RUF as troops increased in 2000 supports this notion, and theories suggesting that military is the most effective in overcoming commitment issues and aiding disarmament (Hultman et al., 2019; Kathman & Wood, 2014; Munive & Stepputat, 2015; Özerdem, 2002). Despite similar constitutions, the involvement of non-UN troops saved UNAMSIL from collapse during the hostage crisis of 2000, indicating that combining UN and non-UN troops enhances success through diverse resources and strategies (Sandler, 2017). This also suggests a higher level of international interest in ending the conflict in Sierra Leone compared to the DRC. The significantly lower number of military authorised for MONUC than recommended by the SG further highlights a lack of UNSC-interest (Howard, 2008). Together, these findings answer the questions of *how* capacity and constitution contribute to success, mainly through better resources to address combatants' commitment issues and facilitate disarmament. More importantly, it substantiates that interest from the UNSC, and the international community is necessary for success (Howard, 2008; Hultman et al., 2019; Koko & Essis, 2012).

### **How Local Factors Contribute to Success**

Regarding local factors, the findings support the expectations that differing levels of support can help explain the varying success of UNAMSIL and MONUSCO. The Sierra Leonean government provided substantial support to the PKO, enabling operational functionality and additional resources to protect civilians, aligning with theory (Gray, 1996; Duursma, 2021). Conversely, the DRC government undermined MONUSCO's success by committing abuses against civilians. This is particularly problematic because the operation might inadvertently legitimise the government's actions, allowing them to continue these violations under the guise of international support (Duursma, 2021). This comprises the operation's objectives but also erodes trust in the UN's ability to protect civilians. Furthermore, the lack of host-state support delayed troop deployment by three years, illustrating Johnstone's (2011) concept of "death by a thousand cuts" (p. 177), where incremental host-state obstructions undermine the PKO. The crucial role of warring parties'

support showed, confirming that without it, peacekeepers are forced into active combatants' roles, as demonstrated by the establishment of FIB. This shift undermines success by diverting resources from peace-making efforts, as theory suggests (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Fjelde et al., 2016). More importantly, this combat role severely damages the operations' legitimacy, further undermined by widespread sexual abuse by peacekeepers. This clearly undermined success, as civilian attacks threatened peacekeepers and protests contributed to DRC politicians' demands for MONUSCO's withdrawal (Tull, 2017; UN News, 2023). The FIB also exacerbated violence from warring parties, challenging the conception that their violence subsides through the threat of military intervention. Instead, warring parties' attitudes toward the operation is influential (Bara & Hultman, 2002). These findings answer the questions of *how* support from these local actors influences success. Mainly, host-state support is pivotal as it enables POC and provides the operation with legitimacy. In sum, the findings align with the importance of local support emphasised by Pushkina (2006) and van der Lijn (2009).

### **Contributions to Literature**

This study addressed the research question: "How do differences in institutional and local factors explain the varying success rates of UN peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone and the DRC?" by testing theories on mechanisms linking factors to success. Table 7 presents an overview of theories supported by the findings, with new insights presented under contributions.

**Table 7***Overview of Supported Theories and Contributions*

| Factor                          | How Factors Link to Success   | Contributions   |
|---------------------------------|---|---|
| <b>Capacity</b>                 | Peacekeepers increase the cost of violence and address commitment issues (Hultman et al., 2019; Fortna, 2003).                      | Capacity is influenced by host-state support.   |
| <b>Constitution</b>             | Military troops deter violence and contribute to disarmament (Hultman et al., 2019; Kathman & Wood, 2014; Munive & Stepputat, 2015) | Non-UN troops contribute to success through burden sharing and diverse strategies.                        |
| <b>Host-state Support</b>       | Support enhances resources and the POC.   | An unsupportive and abusive host-state undermines capacity, POC and civilian support.                     |
| <b>Warring Parties' Support</b> | Support enhances DDR-efforts and prevents peacekeepers from becoming combatants.  | Support is influenced by capacity and contributes to success through deterrence and normative mechanisms. |
| <b>Civilian Support</b>         | Support enhances local conflict strategies.   | Engagement with civilians only generates support when the operation is deemed legitimate.                 |

It is concluded that the lack of host-state support and UNSC-interest are the main factors undermining the DRC operation's success. Host-state support contributes to success by providing resources for disarmament and ceasing violence, which in turn contributes to effective protection of civilians. Consequently, the legitimacy and civilian support for the operation grow. While host-state support alone is not sufficient for success, it is a prerequisite to adequate deployment sizes, together with UNSC interest, which is crucial for mitigating violence. This shows that the main mechanisms of success are legitimacy and adequate resources, and that a combination of institutional and local factors, particularly host-state support and UNSC interest, are jointly sufficient for success. These findings contribute to literature in three ways. First, it contributes to the understanding of not only the factors, but

also the mechanisms that link them to the success of peacekeeping operations. It has substantiated the existing yet limited research on the mechanisms of success, while also providing add-ons, such as highlighting that PKOs might benefit from involvement of non-UN troops which contributes to success by diversifying resources. Second, the evaluation of various factors and their influence on success highlight that host-state support is the most important to success due to its impact on the operation's resources and legitimacy. Lastly, this paper highlights how factors and mechanisms come together to produce success, providing a more comprehensive view of *what* works and *why*.

### **Limitations and Directions for Future Research**

Despite its scientific contributions, this research has five major limitations that have implications for future studies. First, the methodology is limited in two ways. It applied a loose MSSD, meaning that similarities across cases were not controlled for all possible variables, which undermines validity due to the risk of extraneous variables. Moreover, while qualitative methods were deemed appropriate for this paper's aim, their interpretative nature makes them prone to researcher bias. To counter these methodological limitations, future research should test for more control variables and include quantitative methods. Second, although the findings indicate how factors are linked to success, the strength of these relationships has not been tested statistically. Quantitative methods employing regression analysis could help identify which factors are more influential to success. Third, while comparing these two cases yielded important insights, the findings of this study should be tested on a larger number of peacekeeping operations to determine their reliability. By including PKOs across various regions and contexts, the reliability of the findings would increase. Fourth, similar studies are encouraged to conduct triangulation in terms of data sources, as the reliance mainly on UN documents for this paper undermines the validity of findings. Fifth, the data on the DRC was more complex than anticipated. The conflict in the DRC involves numerous warring parties, which could not all be included in the analysis due to time constraints. Future research should account for this by employing more comprehensive data collection and advanced analytical techniques, such as conducting a network analysis to understand the various involved warring parties.

## Recommendations

In addition to contributing to literature, this paper has implications for policymakers, the UN, international politicians, and the broader international community. The findings reveal that the lack of host-state support and UNSC-interest are primary obstacles to success. Thus, policymakers should develop strategies to manage host-state resistance proactively. As Duursma (2021) suggests, addressing resistance early is crucial to prevent it from escalating into severe violations. While negotiations or condemnation of such acts might be effective, it is sometimes necessary for the PKO to withdraw to demonstrate its intolerance of misconduct. Moreover, in complex conflicts like the DRC, adopting a minimalist approach, focusing on security and political processes rather than broader peacekeeping activities, can be beneficial (Johnstone, 2011). In practice, this means creating secure zones for civilians and facilitating dialogue among warring parties instead of for instance training police forces. This not only directs resources where they are most needed but also builds trust in the UN's ability to achieve its goals, which van der Lijn (2009) identifies as vital for success. Additionally, meetings with local stakeholders like local politicians, religious leaders, and teachers through and the establishment of local peace committees enhances strategy formation and the likelihood of sustained peace. Moreover, it contributes to the PKO's legitimacy by generating civilian support.

While the analysis provides several lessons for the UN, the demand for MONUSCO's withdrawal indicates that the opportunity to manage consent has passed, making withdrawal the only option. This situation has broader implications for international politicians and the international community, as there is a clear need of new leadership in peacekeeping efforts in the DRC. As illustrated in Sierra Leone, the engagement from actors such as the United Kingdom and ECOMOG facilitated success, showing that international engagement can help end conflicts. Moreover, a non-UN led peacekeeping operation in the DRC might offer better strategies and resources to mitigate violence and protect civilians, and it has the chance to gain legitimacy among the population (Duursma, 2021; Johnstone, 2011; Sandler, 2017). The UN could still play a vital role by supporting mediation efforts and providing vital information gained throughout its operations there. To conclude, it is undeniable that the conflict in DRC is complex, resting on decades of grievances and involving numerous actors. However, a more active international stance and a reimagined peacekeeping operation could help mitigate the devastating consequences of what is considered the most neglected crisis of our time.

### References

- Anckar, C. (2008). On the applicability of the most similar systems design and the most different systems design in comparative research. *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*, 11(5), 389–401. <https://www-tandfonline-com.eur.idm.oclc.org/doi/epdf/10.1080/13645570701401552?needAccess=true>
- Atieno, M. (2005). The role of United Nations peacekeeping in intra-state conflict management in Africa period 1989-2004. A comparative analysis of MONUC and UNAMSIL. *University of Nairobi Research Archive*.  
<http://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke/handle/11295/17588>
- Autesserre, S. (2017). International peacebuilding and local success: Assumptions and effectiveness. *International Studies Review*, 19(1), 114–132.  
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/26407939>
- Bara, C., & Hultman, L. (2020). Just different hats? Comparing UN and non-UN peacekeeping. *International Peacekeeping*, 27(3), 1–28.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2020.1737023>
- Basedau, M., & Lay, J. (2009). Resource curse or rentier peace? The ambiguous effects of oil wealth and oil dependence on violent conflict. *Journal of Peace Research*, 46(6), 757–776. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25654495?seq=18>
- Beardsley, K., Cunningham, D. E., & White, P. B. (2019). Mediation, peacekeeping, and the severity of civil war. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 63(7), 1682–1709.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002718817092>
- Brainard, L., & Chollet, D. (2007). *Too poor for peace?* Brookings Institution Press.
- Collier, D. (2011). Understanding process tracing. *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 44(04), 823–830. <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ps-political-science-and-politics/article/understanding-process->

tracing/183A057AD6A36783E678CB37440346D1

Collier, P. (2003). *Breaking the conflict trap: Civil war and development policy: Vols. 41181, No 4*. World Bank Publications.

Congo Research Group. (2016). *Impasse in the Congo: What do the people think? Results from a national public opinion poll*. Congo Research Group.

<https://oenz.de/sites/default/files/final-poll-crg-berci.pdf>

Creswell, J. W., & Creswell, J. D. (2017). *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches* (5th ed.). SAGE Publications.

Doyle, M. W., & Sambanis, N. (2006). *Making war and building peace: United Nations peace operations*. Princeton University Press.

Druckman, D., Stern, P. C., Diehl, P., Fetherston, A. B., Johansen, R., Durch, W., & Ratner, S. (1997). Evaluating peacekeeping missions. *Mershon International Studies Review*, 41(1), 151. <https://doi.org/10.2307/222819>

Duursma, A. (2021). Pinioning the peacekeepers: Sovereignty, host-state resistance against peacekeeping missions, and violence against civilians. *International Studies Review*, 23(3), 670–695. <https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viaa063>

Fjelde, H., Hultman, L., & Lindberg Bromley, S. (2016). Offsetting losses: Bargaining power and rebel attacks on peacekeepers. *International Studies Quarterly*, 60(4), 611–623. <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqw017>

Fjelde, H., Hultman, L., & Nilsson, D. (2018). Protection through presence: UN peacekeeping and the costs of targeting civilians. *International Organization*, 73(1), 103–131. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818318000346>

Fortna, V. P. (2003). Scraps of paper? Agreements and the durability of peace. *International Organization*, 57(2), 337–372. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818303572046>

Gray, C. (1996). Host-state consent and United Nations peacekeeping in Yugoslavia. *Duke*

*Journal of Comparative and International Law*, 241.

<https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315251967-6/host-state-consent-united-nations-peacekeeping-yugoslavia-christine-gray>

- Gromes, T. (2019). Does peacekeeping only work in easy environments? An analysis of conflict characteristics, mission profiles, and civil war recurrence. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 40(4), 459–480. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2019.1659575>
- Hegre, H., Hultman, L., & Nygård, H. M. (2019). Evaluating the conflict-reducing effect of UN peacekeeping operations. *The Journal of Politics*, 81(1), 215–232. <https://doi.org/10.1086/700203>
- Howard, L. M. (2008). *UN Peacekeeping in civil wars*. Cambridge University Press.
- Hsieh, H. F., & Shannon, S. E. (2005). Three approaches to qualitative content analysis. *Qualitative Health Research*, 15(9), 1277–1288. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1049732305276687>
- Hultman, L., Kathman, J. D., & Shannon, M. (2019). *Peacekeeping in the midst of war*. Oxford University Press. <https://doi-org.eur.idm.oclc.org/10.1093/oso/9780198845577.001.0001>
- Johnson, H. F. (2019). Protection of civilians in the United Nations: A peacekeeping illusion? In *United Nations peace operations in a changing global order*. Springer International Publishing.
- Johnstone, I. (2011). Managing consent in contemporary peacekeeping operations. *International Peacekeeping*, 18(2), 168–182. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2011.546091>
- Kathman, J. D. (2013). United Nations peacekeeping personnel commitments, 1990–2011. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 30(5), 532–549. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894213491180>

- Kathman, J. D., & Wood, R. M. (2014). Stopping the killing during the “peace”:  
Peacekeeping and the severity of postconflict civilian victimization. *Foreign Policy Analysis, 12*(2), 149–169. <https://doi.org/10.1111/fpa.12041>
- Kaufman, S. J. (2015). *Modern hatreds: The symbolic politics of ethnic war*. Cornell University Press.
- Keen, D. (2005). *Conflict and collusion in Sierra Leone*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Knowledge4Policy. (2022, October 28). *Uppsala Conflict Data Program | Knowledge for policy*. [https://knowledge4policy.ec.europa.eu/dataset/ds00121\\_en](https://knowledge4policy.ec.europa.eu/dataset/ds00121_en)
- Koko, J. L., & Essis, E. J. M. C. (2012). *Determinants of success in UN peacekeeping operations*. University Press Of America.
- Kovatch, B. (2016). Sexual exploitation and abuse in UN peacekeeping missions: A case study of MONUC and MONUSCO. *The Journal of the Middle East and Africa, 7*(2), 157–174. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21520844.2016.1192978>
- Krasno, J. (2005). Public opinion survey of UNAMSIL’s work in Sierra Leone. *New York: United Nations Peacekeeping Best Practices Section*.
- Lange, M., & Dawson, A. (2009). Dividing and ruling the world? A statistical test of the effects of colonialism on postcolonial civil violence. *Social Forces, 88*(2), 785–817. <https://doi.org/10.1353/sof.0.0255>
- Linneberg, M. S., & Korsgaard, S. (2019). Coding qualitative data: A synthesis guiding the novice. *Qualitative Research Journal, 19*(3).
- Mattes, M., & Savun, B. (2009). Fostering peace after civil war: Commitment problems and agreement design. *International Studies Quarterly, 53*(3), 737–759. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00554.x>
- Maxwell, J. A. (2012). *Qualitative research design: An interactive approach*. SAGE Publications.

- McGreal, C. (2015, September 17). What's the point of peacekeepers when they don't keep the peace? *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/17/united-nations-peacekeepers-rwanda-bosnia>
- Mitchell, T. R., Thompson, L., Peterson, E., & Cronk, R. (1997). Temporal adjustments in the evaluation of events: The "rosy view." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 33(4), 421–448. <https://doi.org/10.1006/jesp.1997.1333>
- Moher, D., Liberati, A., Tetzlaff, J., Altman, D. G., & PRISMA Group\*. (2009). Preferred reporting items for systematic reviews and meta-analyses: the PRISMA statement. *Annals of Internal Medicine*, 151(4), 264–269. <https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.b2535>
- Morabia, A., & Roberts, L. (2020). Slaughter in silence: Violence and public health in the DRC, the world's deadliest conflict since World War II. In *APHA's 2020 VIRTUAL Annual Meeting and Expo (Oct. 24-28)*. APHA.
- Noble, H., & Heale, R. (2019). Triangulation in research. *Evidence Based Nursing*, 22(3), 67–68. <https://doi.org/10.1136/ebnurs-2019-103145>
- NRC. (2021, May 27). *DR Congo tops list of world's most neglected crises*. NRC. <https://www.nrc.no/news/2021/may/dr-congo-tops-list-of-worlds-most-neglected-crises/>
- Prunier, G. (2009). *Africa's world war: Congo, the Rwandan genocide, and the making of a continental catastrophe*. Oxford University Press.
- Pushkina, D. (2006). A recipe for success? Ingredients of a successful peacekeeping mission. *International Peacekeeping*, 13(2), 133–149. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533310500436508>
- Pushkina, D., Siewert, M. B., & Wolff, S. (2021). Mission (im)possible? UN military peacekeeping operations in civil wars. *European Journal of International Relations*, 28(1), 158–186. <https://doi.org/10.1177/13540661211046602>

- Ragin, C. C. (1998). The logic of qualitative comparative analysis. *International Review of Social History*, 43(S6), 105–124. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020859000115111>
- Riege, A. M. (2003). Validity and reliability tests in case study research: A literature review with “hands-on” applications for each research phase. *Qualitative Market Research: An International Journal*, 6(2), 75–86. <https://doi.org/10.1108/13522750310470055>
- Rihoux, B., & Ragin, C. C. (2009). *Configurational comparative methods: Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and related techniques* (Vol. 51). SAGE.
- Ruggeri, A., Gizelis, T.-I., & Dorussen, H. (2012). Managing mistrust: An analysis of cooperation with UN peacekeeping in Africa. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 57(3), 387–409. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002712448906>
- Sandler, T. (2017). International peacekeeping operations: Burden sharing and effectiveness. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 61(9), 1875–1897. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002717708601>
- Tarus, D. K. (2010). *Effectiveness of United Nation’s missions in Africa: A comparative assessment of UNAMSIL, MONUC, and UNAMID*. (Doctoral dissertation, Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College). <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA524127.pdf>.
- The World Bank Group. (2024a). *Land area (sq. km) - Congo, Dem. Rep.* <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.TOTL.K2?locations=CD>
- The World Bank Group. (2024b). *Land area (sq. km) - Sierra Leone.* <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.TOTL.K2?locations=SL>
- Tull, D. M. (2017). The limits and unintended consequences of UN peace enforcement: The Force Intervention Brigade in the DR Congo. *International Peacekeeping*, 25(2), 167–190. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2017.1360139>
- UCDP. (2019). *Uppsala Conflict Data Program*. <https://ucdp.uu.se/>

van der Lijn, J. (2009). If only there were a blueprint! Factors for success and failure of UN peace-building operations. *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, 13(1-2), 45–71.

<https://doi.org/10.1163/187541109x402981>

Von Einsiedel, S. (2014). Major recent trends in violent conflict. *Occasional Paper*, 1(2014), 1–11. [http://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:3212/unu\\_cpr\\_conflict\\_trends.pdf](http://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:3212/unu_cpr_conflict_trends.pdf)

Walter, B. F., Howard, L. M., & Fortna, V. P. (2020). The extraordinary relationship between peacekeeping and peace. *British Journal of Political Science*, 51(4), 1–18.

<https://doi.org/10.1017/s000712342000023x>

## Appendices

### Appendix I

#### *Inductive Codebook*

| Variable                     | Indicator                                      | Definition   | Example  |
|------------------------------|--|--|--|
| <b>PKO-Success</b>           | Peacekeeper Misconduct (qualitative)           | Reports on peacekeepers conducting sexual abuse of civilians.  | “Thus far, 17 military personnel have been repatriated on disciplinary grounds, for offences including sex with prostitutes, engaging in a sexually exploitative relationship, assault, and failure to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse.”(UN, 2005i, section 73)                            |
| <b>Institutional Factors</b> | Discrepancy SG-recommendations and Resolutions | A misalignment between the SG’s troop level recommendations and resolutions indicate a lack of UNSC interest (Howard, 2008). | “In its resolution 1565 (2004), the Security Council authorised an increase in the strength of MONUC by an additional 5,900 personnel, including up to 341 civilian police personnel, which is some 7,200 fewer than I recommended in my third special report on MONUC.” (UN, 2004g, section 38) |
|                              | Non-UN Military Troops                         | Statements concerning the involvement of non-UN troops.  | “ECOMOG is expected to continue to play a critical role in providing national security functions as well as assisting the DDR process, as envisaged in the Lomé Agreement.” (UN, 1999e, section 36)  |
| <b>Local Factors</b>         | Engagement with Civilians                      | Statements concerning public information campaigns or meetings with local actors on behalf of the PKO.                       | “MONUC Public Information continues to support the Mission’s key operations.” (UN, 2004d, section 14)  |

**Appendix II***References to United Nations Sources*

United Nations. (1998a). *Resolution 1181*. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1181>

United Nations. (1998b). *Resolution 1231*. Unscr.com. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1231>

United Nations. (1998c). *S/1998/1170*.

<https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unamsil/docs.html>

United Nations. (1999a). *Resolution 1258*. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1258>

United Nations. (1999b). *Resolution 1270*. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1270>

United Nations. (1999c). *S/1999/237*.

<https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unamsil/docs.html>

United Nations. (1999d). *S/1999/790*. <https://monuc.unmissions.org/en/documents>

United Nations. (1999e). *S/1999/1223*.

<https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unamsil/docs.html>

United Nations. (2000a). *Resolution 1291*. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1291>

United Nations. (2000b). *Resolution 1316*. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1316>

United Nations. (2000c). *Resolution 1332*. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1332>

United Nations. (2000d). *S/2000/13*.

<https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unamsil/docs.html>

United Nations. (2000e). *S/2000/186*.

<https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unamsil/docs.html>

United Nations. (2000f). *S/2000/455*.

<https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unamsil/docs.html>

United Nations. (2000g). *S/2000/751*.

<https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unamsil/docs.html>

United Nations. (2000h). *S/2000/832*.

<https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unamsil/docs.html>

United Nations. (2001a). *Resolution 1341*. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1341>

United Nations. (2001b). *Resolution 1346*. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1346>

United Nations. (2001c). *Resolution 1355*. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1355>

United Nations. (2001d). *S/2001/128*. <https://monuc.unmissions.org/en/documents>

United Nations. (2001e). *S/2001/228*.

<https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unamsil/docs.html>

United Nations. (2001f). *S/2001/1195*.

<https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unamsil/docs.html>

United Nations. (2002a). *Resolution 1389*. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1389>

United Nations. (2002b). *Resolution 1399*. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1399>

United Nations. (2002c). *Resolution 1417*. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1417>

United Nations. (2002d). *Resolution 1436*. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1436>

United Nations. (2002e). *S/2002/267*.

<https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unamsil/docs.html>

United Nations. (2002f). *S/2002/621*. <https://monuc.unmissions.org/en/documents>

United Nations. (2002g). *S/2002/679*.

<https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unamsil/docs.html>

United Nations. (2002h). *S/2002/987*.

<https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unamsil/docs.html>

United Nations. (2002i). *S/2002/1005*. <https://monuc.unmissions.org/en/documents>

United Nations. (2003a). *Resolution 1492*. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1492>

United Nations. (2003b). *Resolution 1493*. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1493>

United Nations. (2003c). *Resolution 1508*. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1508>

United Nations. (2003d). *S/2003/321*.

<https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unamsil/docs.html>

United Nations. (2003e). *S/2003/566*. <https://monuc.unmissions.org/en/documents>

United Nations. (2003f). *S/2003/663*.

<https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unamsil/docs.html>

United Nations. (2003g). *S/2003/863*.

<https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unamsil/docs.html>

United Nations. (2004a). *Resolution 1537*. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1537>

United Nations. (2004b). *Resolution 1562*. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1562>

United Nations. (2004c). *Resolution 1565*. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1565>

United Nations. (2004d). *S/2004/650*. <https://monuc.unmissions.org/en/documents>

United Nations. (2004e). *S/2004/724*.

<https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unamsil/docs.html>

United Nations. (2004f). *S/2004/965*.

<https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unamsil/docs.html>

United Nations. (2004g). *S/2004/1034*. <https://monuc.unmissions.org/en/documents>

United Nations. (2005a). *Background*. UNAMSIL.

<https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unamsil/background.html>

United Nations. (2005b). *Documents*. UNAMSIL.

<https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unamsil/docs.html>

United Nations. (2005c). *Resolution 1592*. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1592>

United Nations. (2005d). *Resolution 1610*. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1610>

United Nations. (2005e). *S/2005/135*.

<https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unamsil/docs.html>

United Nations. (2005f). *S/2005/167*. <https://monuc.unmissions.org/en/documents>

United Nations. (2005g). *S/2005/273*.

<https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unamsil/docs.html>

United Nations. (2005h). *S/2005/320*. <https://monuc.unmissions.org/en/documents>

United Nations. (2005i). *S/2005/506*. <https://monuc.unmissions.org/en/documents>

United Nations. (2005j). *S/2005/596*.

<https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unamsil/docs.html>

United Nations. (2005k). *S/2005/603*. <https://monuc.unmissions.org/en/documents>

United Nations. (2005l). *S/2005/777*.

<https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unamsil/docs.html>

United Nations. (2005m). *S/2005/832*. <https://monuc.unmissions.org/en/documents>

United Nations. (2006a). *Resolution 1698*. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1698>

United Nations. (2006b). *S/2006/310*. <https://monuc.unmissions.org/en/documents>

United Nations. (2006c). *S/2006/389*. <https://monuc.unmissions.org/en/documents>

United Nations. (2006d). *S/2006/390*. <https://monuc.unmissions.org/en/documents>

United Nations. (2006e). *S/2006/759*. <https://monuc.unmissions.org/en/documents>

United Nations. (2007a). *S/2007/68*. <https://monuc.unmissions.org/en/documents>

United Nations. (2007b). *S/2007/156*. <https://monuc.unmissions.org/en/documents>

United Nations. (2007c). *S/2007/671*. <https://monuc.unmissions.org/en/documents>

United Nations. (2008a). *Resolution 1856*. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1856>

United Nations. (2008b). *S/2008/218*. <https://monuc.unmissions.org/en/documents>

United Nations. (2008c). *S/2008/433*. <https://monuc.unmissions.org/en/documents>

United Nations. (2008d). *S/2008/693*. <https://monuc.unmissions.org/en/documents>

United Nations. (2008e). *S/2008/728*. <https://monuc.unmissions.org/en/documents>

United Nations. (2009). *S/2009/335*. <https://monuc.unmissions.org/en/documents>

United Nations. (2010a). *Resolution 1925*. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1925>

United Nations. (2010b). *S/2010/164*. <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/documents>

United Nations. (2010c). *S/2010/288*. <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/documents>

United Nations. (2010d). *S/2010/512*. <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/documents>

United Nations. (2011). *S/2011/656*. <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/documents>

United Nations. (2012a). *Resolution 2053*.

[http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2053#google\\_vignette](http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2053#google_vignette)

United Nations. (2012b). *S/2012/838*. <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/documents>

United Nations. (2013a). *S/2013/581*. <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/documents>

United Nations. (2013b). *S/2013/757*. <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/documents>

United Nations. (2014a). *S/2014/42*. <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/documents>

United Nations. (2014b). *S/2014/698*. <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/documents>

United Nations. (2014c). *S/2014/956*. <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/documents>

United Nations. (2015a). *Resolution 2211*. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2211>

United Nations. (2015b). *S/2015/172*. <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/documents>

United Nations. (2015c). *S/2015/486*. <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/documents>

United Nations. (2016a). *S/2016/233*. <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/documents>

United Nations. (2016b). *S/2016/833*. <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/documents>

United Nations. (2016c). *S/2016/1130*. <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/documents>

United Nations. (2017a). DR Congo: Over a dozen UN peacekeepers killed in worst attack on

“blue helmets” in recent history. *United Nations*.

<https://operationalsupport.un.org/en/dr-congo-over-dozen-un-peacekeepers-killed-worst-attack-blue-helmets-recent-history>

United Nations. (2017b). *Our successes*. United Nations Peacekeeping.

<https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/our-successes>

United Nations. (2017c). *S/2017/565*. <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/documents>

United Nations. (2017d). *S/2017/712*. <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/documents>

- United Nations. (2017e). *S/2017/826*. <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/documents>
- United Nations. (2018a). *Resolution 2409*. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2409>
- United Nations. (2018b). *S/2018/250*. <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/documents>
- United Nations. (2019). *Protection of civilians: Human rights violations documented in provinces affected by conflict*. <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/documents>
- United Nations. (2020a). *Resolution 2556*. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2556>
- United Nations. (2020b). *S/2020/214*. <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/documents>
- United Nations. (2020c). *S/2020/919*. <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/documents>
- United Nations. (2021a). *S/2021/274*. <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/documents>
- United Nations. (2021b). *S/2021/587*. <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/documents>
- United Nations. (2021c). *S/2021/987*. <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/documents>
- United Nations. (2022a). *Principles of peacekeeping*. United Nations.  
<https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/principles-of-peacekeeping>
- United Nations. (2022b). *S/2022/252*. <https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/documents>
- United Nations. (2023). *Resolution 2717*. <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2717>
- United Nations. (2024a). *Background*. MONUSCO.  
<https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/background>
- United Nations. (2024b). *Documents*. MONUC. <https://monuc.unmissions.org/en/documents>
- United Nations. (2024c). *Documents*. MONUSCO.  
<https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/documents>
- United Nations. (2024d). *What is peacekeeping*. United Nations Peacekeeping.  
<https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/what-is-peacekeeping#:~:text=Peacekeeping%20has%20proven%20to%20be>
- United Nations News. (2023, September 20). DR Congo President sets early withdrawal of UN peacekeepers, country will take reins of its destiny. *United Nations News*.

<https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/09/1141182>

United Nations Peacekeeping. (2024). *Protecting civilians*. United Nations Peacekeeping.

<https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/protecting-civilians>